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Toward assimilations of political economy and postmodernism with cultural studies

Min, Eung-Jun, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1991

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Toward Assimilations of Political Economy and Postmodernism with Cultural Studies

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University

1991

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Approved by
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1991
To My Wife, Parents, and Mother-In-Law
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The process of creating intellectuals is long, difficult, full of contradictions, advances, retreats, dispersals and regrouping, in which the loyalty of the masses is often sorely tried - Antonio Gramsci, 1971, p. 334.

A varied set of discourses on the mass media has emerged in the twentieth century, creating an imposing body of theoretical, methodological and practical literature. It is now a commonplace in mass communication study to say that we must examine the adequacy of these theories and methods before proceeding to carry out concrete studies of the media. What direction is the field taking? What are the relationships between empirical and critical work? What are the implications of the "ferment" taking place in the field? Which theories hold promise for the future, and which should be dropped? These are the questions being asked by scholars in every branch of the field.

This study explores one particular direction in this variety of discourses. My concern is with those studies that have inherited the theoretical and methodological interests of Marxist thought, and which have thus attempted to carry out a critical examination of the media as material practice. Although these approaches do exhibit a unity in that they all examine cultural practices within the context of a critical, materialist theory of history, they are themselves diffuse and varied. This study will identify differences between those approaches and suggest ways to bridge the gaps.

In the field of communication, drawing upon fields of scholarship and research as diverse as sociology, economics, semiotics, political philosophy, literary criticism, psychology and history, the critical tradition rethinks and rearticulates the behaviorist
orientation of mainstream communication research. Since this school of thought encompasses a wide variety of theoretical and empirical concerns and approaches, there are several major research approaches within it. Many scholars have attempted to draw these approaches into a divisional map (Steeter 1984; Johnson 1982; Curran & Gurevitch, 1982; Grossberg 1984; Becker 1984). They divide various approaches to the question of the relation of culture and society. Their divisions can be summarized into four major areas: 1) Cultural Marxism; 2) Structural Marxism; 3) Classical Marxism; 4) Critical Theory. While this division may be helpful as a guideline, it tends to separate theories of determination from theories of ideology. Thus, the differences between the various views are seen in terms of particular stances toward supposedly isolable problem areas. The problems with this kind of categorization are obvious; there is a danger of taking a reductive approach to some theories and excluding the work of some theorists who influenced the tradition.

Although cultural studies, which is the main concern of this study, was pioneered at the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at University of Birmingham, it is not the exclusive province of CCCS. In fact, no single theorist or institution is responsible for the emergence of cultural studies. It is an intellectual movement and a network of the various theories that now often go under the label "theory" into a problematic and perhaps impossible synthesis. In my view, however, cultural studies is not new, but a site where old disciplines could be applied in various new combinations and criticized and transformed at the same time.

There have been pressures to define cultural studies in various conferences in North America. The 1990 conference "Cultural Studies - Now and in the Future" at the University of Illinois was organized to summon up a single apparition, Cultural Studies
capitalized, as a new discipline fully legitimized in the eyes of the North American University. The conference was designed as a ceremony of setting agendas and enforcing definitions, as an act of selective gathering and monumental display. One thing is clear to me: Cultural Studies lives, born in Birmingham and reborn, twenty years later, in Urbana-Champaign. This pressure to define cultural studies leads us to create ways of viewing a vigorous but fragmented field of study, if not as a unity at least as a whole. In other words, as Richard Johnson argues, it is not definition that we need, but critical reviews of existing approaches: their objects, good sense, and limitations. We do not need to aggregate existing approaches, but rather to reform the elements of different approaches in their relations to each other (Johnson, 1987, p. 41).

Thus, this study will not attempt to unify the various theories in cultural studies. Instead it will propose pointers or directions to further transformations of cultural studies. This study will identify and analyze three theorists, who have been largely ignored in cultural studies, to suggest a resolution of the theoretical conflicts surrounding cultural studies by tracing inner connections: political economy for production-based study, structuralism and postmodernism for textual and audience analysis. This is not to say that this study will provide a perfect solution to all the theoretical conflicts and incompatibilities among approaches. Instead it will suggest some theoretical possibilities of those three theorists to help to bridge the gap between cultural studies and other disciplines and intellectual formations. For the weakest aspect of cultural studies, the political economic aspect, the study will suggest Bourdieu's sociology of culture (the notion of habitus, cultural capital, symbolic violence) to bridge the gap between cultural studies and political economy. For Bourdieu, the social patterning of taste and the distribution of cultural capital is intimately related to the reproduction of social power.
Pierre Bourdieu has attempted to theorize the role of structural determinations with detailed empirical work on cultural consumption. He argues that to analyze media adequately, for example, one must analyze the linkages between the political-economic power structure, the ideological functions of the mass media, and the media related forms of popular culture. Therefore, there cannot be one single appropriate starting point or key to understand such complex phenomenon. I would argue that the work of Pierre Bourdieu is most interesting in developing concepts which overcome the gap between analyses of culture and of socio-economic processes.

As a substitution for structuralism, the study will suggest the work of German philosopher Habermas, who has been virtually dismissed by both British and American cultural studies. His theory of communication is valuable to cultural studies because it emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy of various cultural forms. Habermas's perspective on the relations between culture and social structure is a reformulation of the Marxist theory of historical materialism, but with greater emphasis on communication and culture.

Habermas's reformulation of Marx suggests that the social relations of production are regarded as a distinct type of behavior, as communicative action. Habermas accords to communication theory the tasks of defining, critiquing, and determining the bases for legitimacy in advanced social systems. He establishes the importance of a theory of communicative competence by asserting that communication must be accounted for in human communication. Here, the notion of the ideal speech situation provides the framework of rational discourse which ideally allows two or more people to exchange valid, trustworthy messages and thus to achieve understanding. In fact, the concept of communicative rationality, as Habermas admits, contains a utopian perspective.
However, this perspective comprises only formal determinations of the communicative infrastructure of possible forms of life and life-histories: it does not extend to the concrete shape of an exemplary life-form or a paradigmatic life-history.

For Habermas, aesthetic experience is also the central category, not as a way towards utopian possibilities, but as a way of achieving human emancipation. Habermas said: "Aesthetic experience renews .... not only the interpretations of the needs in the light of which we perceive the world; it intervenes simultaneously in the cognitive interpretations and the normative expectations and alters the manner in which all these elements refer to each other" (1983, p. 10). Unlike postmodernism's localization of reason, which tends to separate those elements by an abyss, Habermas is maintaining here that aesthetic experiences, cognitive interpretations and normative expectations are not independent of each other, and this means of course that aesthetic, moral-practical and factual discourses are not separated by an abyss but are bound together in multiple ways - even if aesthetic, moral or cognitive validity claims represent different categories of validity, which cannot be reduced to a single category of validity.

Habermas also complicates the Marxist argument by suggesting that the social base need not be the economy in all stages of societal development. This view is strikingly similar to Williams's cultural materialism. Like Williams, Habermas's underlying hope for the theory is to show that the means for actualizing reason or the emancipatory interest in a society are already embedded in language. Habermas's theory aims to further the self-understanding of social groups capable of transforming society. Since cultural studies's project is to abstract, describe and reconstitute in concrete studies the social forms through which human beings live, become conscious, and sustain themselves
subjectively, Habermas's critical theory not only fits well in cultural studies, but could sharpen the project of transforming society.

Finally, Bakhtinian method celebrates difference; rather than expand the center to include the margins, it interrogates and shifts the center from the margins. It calls attention to all oppressive hierarchies of power, not only those derived from class but also those of gender, race and age. A Bakhtinian textual politics favors a more open, reciprocal, decentered negotiation of specificity and difference. His concept of dialogism and of language oppose the individualist assumptions and romantic interpretations of cultural forms, providing us rather with specific ways in which those producers orchestrate diverse social voices. His emphasis on a boundless context that constantly interacts with and modifies the text helps us avoid formalist insistence on the autonomous art object. His emphasis on the situated utterance and the interpersonal generation of meaning avoids the static ahistoricism of an apolitical value-free postmodernism. Finally, Bakhtin's notion of carnival also helps to maintain a balance between the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity. Thus, Bakhtin's theory would restore the notion of collective pleasure to its rightful place within cultural studies.

The first chapter of this project attempts neither a full history of significant intellectual developments in England and the U.S., nor a consideration of the distinctive relations between cultural studies and the analysis of literary texts. It is concerned instead with the detailed theory and criticism of the genesis of cultural studies as counter-intellectual critique. My focus will be on main issues, questions, themes, and approaches. It begins by focusing on the originating formulation of cultural studies. Chapters 2 and 3, examine some aspects (productive and also problematic) of marginality in a set of new
intellectual endeavors: the relation of cultural studies (both British and American) to the established disciplines inside and outside of the field of communication in both Britain and the U.S.; to some received working practices of higher education; and to the purposes and possibilities of intellectual work from such a location. The main questions raised by this study concern the breaking of frames and boundaries. This leads to a description and clarification of some concepts which are regarded as the central notions of cultural studies - namely, culture, class (race, gender), ideology, power, and hegemony. The brief history of cultural studies is of necessity caught in the specific and shifting conditions of the politics of intellectual work in Britain and the U.S.. This study also argues that American cultural studies often ignores the importance of ideology. Thus, the concept of ideology is extensively discussed and reconsidered in the relation of media practices in chapter 4.

An analysis of the ideological aspect of media practices is not the only concern for cultural studies. In fact, much research has been done on the relationship between text and audience by analyzing conditions of reception and production. Chapter 5 examines media studies in cultural studies to identify theoretical incompatibilities among approaches and writers. Chapter 6 and 7 identify three continental scholars who have been less counted and valued as one of cultural studies's interdisciplinary formation: Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of culture, Mikhail Bakhtin's notions of dialogism and heteroglossia, and Habermas's communication theory. These chapters explore how they could provide pointers to resolve the theoretical problematics within cultural studies. Bakhtin's notion of dialogism, for example, helps to maintain a balance between the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power (cultural studies) and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity (postmodernism). Despite Johnson's theoretical suggestion for further transformation,
cultural studies has not seriously considered political economic aspects of cultural processes. The debate between political economy and cultural studies has continued for a decade. I think it is the time to find interconnections between the two approaches. Political economists have a legitimate point in their criticism of cultural studies. Chapter 6 begins with an exploration of the political economic aspect of production-based studies and show how Bourdieu's sociology of culture may improve the incompatibility between cultural studies and political economy in the field of communication. Bourdieu's theory would provide a way to bridge the serious gap between political economy and cultural studies. The final part of chapter 7 examines how the postmodern tradition has influenced cultural studies in general and discusses how it can or cannot provide cultural studies with further theoretical depth. Finally, based on this description, critique, and new possible interconnections with the broader discourse of those three writers, this study points to the development of an alternative direction for its primary problematic in chapter 8.
Chapter I

Cultural studies as a integral way of analyzing the society

Crisis in the Humanities and Social Sciences

Since the early 1960s, American and European universities have been experiencing a crisis in the humanities and social sciences. Radical scholars argue that the crisis in humanities and social sciences are occurring because both areas are giving little effort to challenge the established dominant disciplines (Andersdon, 1968). This lack of effort has enabled to maintain a legitimating ideology that oppresses critical thought. Is there a cure for this crisis? The answer to this question usually leads to critical theory or critical sociology as well as interdisciplinary research. "Critical theory" may help the social system resolve its crisis, but it may also precipitate crisis in order to bring about progressive social change. I'm not saying that critical theory will be the ultimate cure for crises of both academic disciplines and the social system. The cure cannot come completely from universities. Critical theories can only be effective in bringing about social change when they are active political practices as well as theories. As Marx suggests, we may have only interpreted the world, the point, however, is to change it (Tucker, 1972, p. 10).

Walter J. Bate, for example, declares that the humanities are in their worst state of crisis since the 1880s. William Bennett, agreeing with Bate, claims that "a collective loss of nerve and faith on the part of both faculty and academic administrators was undeniably destructive of the curriculum" (1984, 16-21).
When students demanded a greater role in setting their own educational agendas, we eagerly responded by abandoning course requirements of any kind and with them the intellectual authority to say to student what the outcome of a college education ought to be. With intellectual authority relinquished, we found that we did not need to worry about what was worth knowing, worth defending, worth believing. The curriculum was no longer a statement about what knowledge mattered; instead, it became the product of a political compromise among competing schools and departments overlaid by marketing considerations (1984, 19-20).

Thorstein Veblen, one of the prominent leftist scholars in North America, also points out that the modern university is a business house dealing in merchantable knowledge. Since its primary customers are students who mostly wish to acquire "merchantable knowledge," the university with outside customers from corporations and government has to provide "merchantable knowledge" which students in turn can sell to the university's outside customers (cited in Brantlinger, 1990, p. 4). This system produced university curriculums that are now careerist smorgasbords instead of intellectually coherent programs. This outcome, however, may not satisfy radical scholars and students. Some university faculties and administrators are more concerned about public relations than progressive curriculum change that can create intellectually coherent programs. As a result of neo-conservative hype, feminist, leftist, and Afro-American scholars, for example, have been considered as "intellectual lightweights" (Ibid, p. 5).

The issues of systemic racism, classism, sexism, and environmental spoliation at home and abroad have also been downplayed or ignored by neo-conservatives within the university.

Curriculums change more slowly than world events; their skills and silence are purchased by investors; passion is called unscholastic. There is a die-hard myth that theory such as structuralism, deconstructionism, Marxism, feminism, and psychoanalysis has caused the crisis in the humanities. Theory is a response to the
crisis, not its cause. Theories in the humanities offer the profoundest expression of our society's ideals. Of course, social crisis must necessarily be reflected in academic work. As Terry Eagleton (1987) remarks, the humanities are a "body of discourses" about the "most imperishable values"; they are "pitched into continual crisis" by the negation of those values in actuality. To Eagleton, crisis is the permanent and structural condition of the humanities. The cure, therefore, cannot come completely from within the schools and universities (1987, Forward).

Social sciences are also in a state of crisis. Sociology, for example, in Continental Europe and its assimilation in the U.S., represents a synthetic social science of "crucial innovating importance" (Anderson, 1968, p 8) - an attempt to transcend the fragmentation of disciplines and to generate a theory of society as a totality. In his article "Components of the National Culture," Anderson sees this fragmentation as the achievement of the West bourgeoisie in response to the challenge of the totalizing theory of Marx. He attributes this to the lack of any total internal challenge within the western societies, to the lack of an indigenous Marxist grouping, especially in the US, and to the "lionization of a disparate series of White emigrés across different disciplines" (Ibid). These thinkers consider their consistent disqualification of system-wide questions and the alternative installation of gradualist, pragmatic, empiricist questions as the only proper field for most of the major disciplines. The old imperial ideas from metropolitan centers like London, Paris, and New York that constituted reality and morality have been challenged by what Foucault has called subjugated knowledges like feminism, deconstruction, and cultural studies (Ibid, p. 9).

Anderson also articulates the key issues around which cultural studies organized itself. He argues that British culture (and here he either discounts or ignores the different
Scottish experience) has an "absent center" in that, viewed in Western European terms, British culture is structurally irregular: it has never produced a classical sociology (Ibid, p. 7). During the 1950s and 60s, British mainstream sociology depended upon American theories and models. But American sociology, in either its Parsonian theorization or its structural-functionalist methodology, is theoretically incapable of dealing with some complex social issues (Ibid). In other words, it is systematically functionalist and integrative in perspective.

American sociology also abolishes the category of contradiction and claimed the mantle of a science. It celebrates the triumph of pluralist society, constantly counterposed to totalitarian society, a highly ideological couplet which is advanced as a concluded scientific fact. It did not deal with culture, except within the terms of a highly pessimistic variant of the mass society/mass culture hypothesis. Instead, it referred to the value system in the singular, as Ed Shils (1968) puts it, on the basis of pluralism, the "brutal culture" of the masses was destined to be gradually and successfully incorporated. Shils argues that many of the developments outlined within the mass society position - the dissolution of non-rational forms of social attachment, the weakening of traditional ties and obligations, the attenuation to the power of established hierarchies - tend to increase the democratic process rather than to undermine it (1968, p. 74). He militantly refuses the concept of ideology. American sociology, however, provides a sort of reply to the central question: What sort of society is this now? It transposes then into its own, highly distinctive theoretical framework.

At the same time, American behavioral sociology prefers a methodology - the method of the social science - modelled on a highly outdated version of the natural sciences, militantly behavioralist and quantitative. Anderson argues that such a sociology could
produce no concept of "totality" and, without that, no concept of culture either (1968, p 8). On the contrary, literary criticism is a crucial site for the construction of theories about the relations between history, national identity and the production of meaning, and thus provides the space, methodology and motivation for many descriptions and analyses of culture.

The Emergence of Cultural Studies

- Origins of the culture problematic

While the search for origins is very tempting, an absolute beginning of intellectual matters may not exist. There have been, instead, continuities and breaks. Cultural studies is the result of one of those breaks. Under the influence of literary criticism, cultural studies, in its institutional manifestation, was the result of such a break in the 1960s. It came also about as a result of dissatisfaction with conceptions of the formation and the early period of the development of cultural studies to be found in the literature in the field. It took up the total questions in the Leavisite tradition of culture and society. Leavis and colleagues attempted to unite close, though untheorized, attention to texts with wide-ranging social criticism: the projected idea for an English School (Education and the University) is still worth reading for its scope (1961). Left-Leavisites, like Williams, Hoggart, and Thompson sustained, extended and rethought the Leavisite tradition of culture and society. Williams' Culture and Society (1958) tries to locate and understand Leavis's descent, while The Long Revolution (1961) puts together many of his concerns (art, education, politics, and communication) in an optimistic view of the future. Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy (1957) seeks to describe the containment and resistance of a class through a reading of its texts: 'listening to the voices' at all levels from idioms and common sense through magazines and newspapers.
Edward Thompson's *The Making of The English Working Class* (1968) accounts for the active process of the birth of the English working class. The working class, Thompson argues, "did not rise like the sun at an appointed time." It was present at its own making.

Each of these seminal works tries to understand the momentous changes in British social structure from the margins of existing disciplines. They are not textbooks for the inauguration of a new discipline, Hall insists (1980). They are not scholarly books, but rather cultural interventions in their own right. They produce not only a substantive analysis of British culture but a text which is methodological in its subtext (1980, p. 16). Hoggart applies the methods of literary criticism "attempting to rework their procedures and methods so as to apply them to the study of living class cultures" (1957, p. 18). His method is to counterpose two orders within working-class culture - the "older order" of traditional working-class culture and the aggressive "new order". The older order is evoked by the oral tradition, the centrality of home, a sense of hostility, the solidarity of the neighborhood, etc. These themes constitute "characteristic working class relationships and attitudes" - "in many respects a good and comely life" (1957, p. 37).

Against the older order, the new order creates the "probable effects of certain developments in publications and entertainments" (1957, p.141). The result is a critique of "the paralysis of moral will," the "new callowness," or the "spiritual dry rot amid the odor of boiled milk" which "make it harder for people without an intellectual bent to become wise in their own way" (1957, p. 148;160;204;276). Hoggart's book refused some of Leavis's embedded cultural judgements. But it does attempt to deploy literary criticism to read the emblems, idioms, social arrangements, and the lived cultures and
languages of working class life as a privileged sort of cultural evidence. It seems to me, however, that *The Uses of Literacy* makes only a partial break with Leavisite literary criticism, although the break was seminal in the CCCS. Like Hoggart, F. R. Leavis believes that new cultural forms such as radio, film, and the mass-circulation newspapers undermine the old forms, leaving all intellectuals vulnerable to the increasing pressure of the mass market and the new expectations being placed on the artist and the intellectual.

**Impact of the Leavisite Tradition**

Leavis (1961) finds films and advertising to be equally insidious aspects of this process of levelling-down. Leavis continues to be suspicious and antagonistic towards film throughout his life. He refuses to consider them as an art form even though such a high level of creative activity has been channelled into film making over the years. He believes that films only contain cheap emotional thrills under conditions of hypnotic receptivity. Similarly, advertising relies on the deliberate exploitation of the cheap response, indicating an unprecedented use of applied psychology in institutions in British society, an entirely new factor in history (1961, p. 147-148).

When Leavis describes many things wrong with mass society, he often blames America. According to him, America exhibits the taste for bathos, the loss of the "organic community", and the fragmentation of modern life more dramatically than other Western countries. Leavis complains that instead of the community, rural or urban we have now, almost universally, suburbanism. People live in agglomerations united only by contiguity and systems of transport, gas, water and electricity (1961, p. 22). Leavis’s attack on Americanization and his concept of the organic community are certainly laments for an old social order. This form of society, he claims, was destroyed by the
preoccupation with progress characteristic of modern industrial society. The easy optimism, cultivated particularly by advertising, promotes this belief in progress and destroys the integrated, personalized way of life characteristic of the organic community. The quality of life and traditional culture of the old social order is irretrievably lost. Any attempt, Leavis and Denys Thompson (1960) declare, to save that culture is essentially a substitute.

What we have lost is the organic community with the living culture it embodied. Folk-songs, folk-dances, Cotswold cottages and handicraft products are signs and expressions of something more: an art of life, a way of living, ordered and patterned, involving social arts, codes of intercourse and a responsive adjustment, growing out of immemorial experience, to the natural environment and the rhythm of the year (1960, p.1-2).

Clearly he is nostalgic for the past and is writing in a romantic vein. But he romanticizes the past, not acknowledging the social degradation which the majority of the population suffered in earlier times. His interest, Leavis insists, is to emphasize what was gone and to draw attention to the nature of human problems associated with the loss (1972, p. 88). Leavis, however, refuses to examine the question of the economic basis of such a society. As Williams (1958) points out, Leavis masks the extent to which the previous order in English society was as much characterized by "the penury, the petty tyranny, the disease and mortality, the ignorance and frustrated intelligence which were also among its ingredients", as any adaptation to the natural environment or social integration (1958, p. 253). If the organic community is anything more than a literary myth, Williams continues, then an analysis of its form needs to examine how quality of life for all members of its population stems from its economic and material base.

Nevertheless the concept of the organic community enables Leavis to provide a concrete image of the quality of life he envisages as essential to our society. He juxtaposes this
image with a discussion of modern industrial society to point out the way in which this
idea is used to cultivate optimism and overconsumption. Leavis argues that such
optimism postpones any attempt to see things as they really are, or to set them right.
His attack on the idea of progress, and the associated concept of the standard of living,
demonstrates the particular strengths of his critique of modern industrial society. To
me, his analysis is far less cogent than Williams's, in his attacks on the dehumanization,
materialism and consumer orientation of British society, I could see Leavis's profound
effect on Williams. Williams does not accept the political implications of Leavis's social
writings, but Leavis did provide for him the basis for a cultural critique of society when
he could turn to very little else in the tradition of English thought.

The idea of the organic community in Leavis's work seems to be related to his argument
for a system of elites. Leavis is explicitly elitist in his ideas of how society should be
structured, without the defiance towards the idea of democracy illustrated by, for
example, T. S. Eliot. He defines two types of elites as essential to the functioning of
democracy. The first type of elite is directly connected to political power. They hold
specific responsibility for the actual leadership and ruling of society. The second type of
elite is comprised of a specially educated class, responsible for checking and controlling
the first elite. The second one guarantees that the democratic formation of society is not
accompanied by a lowering of standards (Leavis 1972, p. 209).

Eagleton (1976) diagnoses Leavis and his followers' central preoccupations as being of
an élitist nature, committed to a framework of overarching authority. Revealing their
petty bourgeois character, its members reject the "democratic anarchy, it discerns below
it and the ineffectualness of the actual authority posed above it" (1976, p. 14). Eagleton
is not so much concerned with the petty bourgeois origins of this movement, as with the
framework of their central preoccupations. He avoids Leavis's reductionist approach to ideas, which discusses their formation in terms of the social origins of the writer or thinker.

- **Left-Leavists and the Breaking of Boundaries**

Like Leavis, Hoggart tends to romanticize the past and the old working class. Though he criticizes precisely such romanticization, he himself presented an overall romantic account of them. Hoggart's affirmative approach to working class patterns of leisure activities and the consumption of reading material in *The Uses of Literacy* presents popular culture as being meaningful. Unfortunately, this legitimation is tainted by the fact that his essentially literary-critical approach to working-class cultural life is not linked to what the necessary recrudescence of Marxism has subsequently insisted upon: power.

In the eyes of more ideologically minded literary critics, Hoggart would be a politically naive cultural critic. His analysis of working-class culture is too good to be true at the times. He focuses on questions of the quality of British cultural life and the effects of mass society on high culture. He asserts the necessity of art for its moral and critical training of the intellect and our sensitivity in general. These concerns indicate the ideological and political limitations of Hoggart's problematic, for they are essentially a preoccupation with the role of the literary intellectual in modern society. In Hoggart's defense, at least two arguments are possible. First, his lack of political consciousness is partly due to the pacifying effects of the mass media. Secondly, Hoggart researched and wrote *The Uses of Literacy* in the early 1950s before the emergence of an effective New Left in Britain. He subsequently became the first spokesman for the New Left. While his social theory is barely useful today, his significance in the development of English
social theory is that, in his role as spokesman, he dissolved the distinction between
theory and practice. Hoggart engendered the development of a new movement of active
politics with the alternative practices of intellectual commitment, a movement that
provides the conjunctional conditions for the radicalization of cultural studies as a new
interdisciplinary study of culture situated in the English department of British
universities. Cultural studies today continues to explore Hoggart's themes of social
class, community, and mass communication.

As Hoggart was attempting one break with literary criticism, so Raymond Williams was
taking another. But unlike Hoggart, it is no surprise to discover a politics in Williams's
reinterpretations of the tradition of literary criticism. He rejects the abstraction of great
writers from their social context and shows their formulations on culture to be deeply
embedded pieces of cultural criticism. Williams argues that the concept represents two
different though related responses in the changing society:

In summary, I wish to show the emergence of culture as an abstraction
and an absolute: an emergence which, in a very complex way, merges
two general responses - first, the recognition of the practical separation
of certain moral and intellectual activities from the driven impetus
of a new kind of society; second, the emphasis of these activities, as a court
of human appeal, to be set over the processes of practical social judgement
and yet to offer itself as a mitigating and rallying alternative (1958, p 17).

Williams believes that to develop a satisfactory concept of culture, an attempt should be
made to envelop all the ways in which the term has been used. He argues that the
variation of meanings for the term "culture" should not be seen as a disadvantage, but as
a genuine complexity corresponding to real elements in experience. He claims that there
are three levels of culture: the lived culture of a particular time and place, the recorded
culture from art to most everyday facts, and the culture of selective tradition (1961, p. 66).

One needs to grasp the meanings of culture at the three levels and the fundamental relation between the meanings, Williams explains, before one can reach a satisfactory understanding of the term. One will then be in a position to reconcile culture as creative activity and culture as a whole way of life. In an attempt to explain the relationship between the different levels of culture, Williams turns to a discussion of creative activity and the nature of reality. Here, it is hard to see any theoretical depth. On man's perception of reality, for example, the central thrust of his argument concerning reality as a social phenomenon is to show that art forms part of our attempt to categorize and communicate experience. As an individual creative act, he says, art is part of the general process which creates conventions and institutions, through which the ways of seeing "the meanings that are valued by the community are shared and made active" (1961, p.55). In assuming that one definition of culture can be produced through the collapsing of the three levels of meaning in the term, Williams obscures the very basis for the existence of these three concepts.

In my view, Williams's mistake is in his belief that a concept will always be coherent and consistent once fully analyzed. This assumption seems to share with anthropologists and sociologists. Furthermore, in his attempt to find the foundations for a single definition of the term culture, Williams refuses to accept the concept of class division and questions some distinct forms of working class cultures. Some (Hall, 1980; Johnson, 1987; Shiach, 1989), however, argue that the history of developing uses and meanings of culture and the relation of these to social and cultural transformations, is most clearly described in Williams's Culture and Society. In this
book, Williams mostly talks about culture in 19th century England, but not culture in the British Empire. He never discusses the relationship between the two. I don't see how the analysis of culture in any society could be appropriate when the apparent historical connection is ignored. And his Welsh cultural experience seems to be applied universally. In this sense, culture in *Culture and Society* is not used as essentially a cooperative and communal term, but as a term of exclusion. Later, Williams admits that bourgeois culture is orientated towards the basic individualist idea and working class culture towards the basic collective idea. But he also argues that there is constant interaction between the two cultures and calls for the development of a common culture, a subtle interaction between the old forms and a vision of socialist man (1977, p. 12-20).

Williams continued to refine his theoretical propositions in terms of concepts such as "structures of feeling" and culture. The transition in his work coincides with his political disenchantment with the Labour party and parliamentary reformism. By the late 1960s he was addressing himself more and more to the development of a Marxist cultural theory. He shifts his attention away from questions of cultural change to issues concerned with the relationship between base and superstructure. Williams is especially concerned with Marxism's failure to recognize the material nature of the productive forces responsible for producing what are often misleading versions of society. The maintenance as well as the creation of a social order, according to Williams, is necessarily material production:

> From castles and palaces and churches to prisons and workhouses and schools; from weapons of war to a controlled press: any ruling class, in variable ways though always materially, produces a social and political order. These are never superstructural activities (1977, p.93).
To Williams, superstructure is not simply a range of legal, political and ideological institutions. An institution or practice is superstructural only when it acts in some way to support the exploitative or oppressive nature of social relations (1977, p. 78). Superstructure, in short, is a relational term: it identifies those particular aspects of a social practice or institution which act in particular conditions as supports of exploitation and oppression. Thus, Williams criticizes Marx's notion of base/superstructure for using it as a fixed formula in viewing the process of art and thought as superstructural.

In my view, he is both right and wrong. I agree that cultural activity is not superstructural; it can be examined, as part of material production in general, by treating it in an infrastructural way. But, as soon as we come, for example, to read a cultural text for symptoms of its collusion with class power, then I believe we are going to treat it superstructurally. I don't think the superstructure is an isolable and static realm.

To me, Hall's argument about the notion of base/superstructure is more convincing than Williams's. On the issue of determinacy, Hall (1977) sees human practice as mediated by the determinate conditions in which men live and work. Their subjective experiences of their situations, their consciousness of their identities, and the terms through which they understand their worlds are not freely created by individuals and thus are not direct reflections of their conditions. Thus, Hall argues that the superstructure is determinate in a fundamental sense (1977, p. 320). This leads Hall to the conclusion that we must concentrate on the "radical and systematic disjunctures" between different levels of social formations,

...between the material relations of production, the social practices in which class and other social relations are constituted (here Marx locates "the superstructures" -- civil society, the family, the juridico-political forms, the state), and the level of "ideological forms" -- ideas, meanings, conceptions, theories, beliefs, etc. and the forms of consciousness which are appropriate to them (1977, p. 320).
It is significant that Hall includes relations of production in his rendition of society, but makes no mention of forces of production or of an economic base. In order to move away from the notion of a determining base and a reflective superstructure, Hall characterizes society as a "structure-superstructure complex" (Ibid, p. 327). According to this conceptualization, society is always constituted by a set of complex practices. Each practice has its own specificity and modes of articulation. These practices will have their registrations and effects "at all the other levels of the totality -- economic, social, political, ideological; none can be reduced to or collapsed into the other" (Ibid).

Hall is concerned to stress that these practices are not independent and autonomous. Instead, they are interconnected within the totality through mechanisms and articulations which are linked through their differences and dislocations. Therefore, determinacy must not be conceived "as the simple determination of one level over all the others, but as the structured sum of the different determinations, the structure of their overall effects" (Ibid). Here, Althusser should be credited for coining this concept as "over-determination."

Indicative of his objection to base/superstructure was Williams's attention to the concept of hegemony as derived from Gramsci. This concept describes the process by which the dominance of the ruling class is maintained through a complex interlocking of political, social and cultural forces. In times of crisis this dominance will be maintained chiefly by direct coercion, often of a specifically physical nature. But at other times the ruling class's rule is expressed predominantly through its hegemonic influence. According to Williams the advantage of the concept of hegemony is that it emphasizes the lived experience of people, rather than the imposition of a structure on their consciousness (Ibid, p. 110). The dominance of the ruling class is not experienced
passively nor is it static; it has to be renewed constantly if it is to be maintained.

Williams describes the concept of hegemony as including and going beyond both the concepts of culture and ideology. By using the concept of hegemony, he defines culture as a "whole social process" related to "specific distributions of power and influence."

Similarly, the concept of hegemony adds to the concept of ideology through its recognition of "not only the conscious system of ideas and beliefs, but the whole lived social process as practically organized by specific and dominant meanings and values" (Ibid, p. 108-109).

In these discussions of the concepts of culture, ideology and hegemony Williams highlights one of the most significant developments in his thought. Through the concept of hegemony Williams seeks to examine the social and political context of culture. He stresses the extent to which the contradictions and conflicts inherent in the capitalist social formation require the constant establishment and maintenance of hegemonic influence (Ibid). Williams extends his exploration of a Marxist cultural theory through the use of a number of specific concepts. He suggests the notion of "structure of feeling," for example, to escape the rigidity which Marx also criticized when people talk of ideologies or world views. This structure of feeling emphasizes the way in which meanings and values are actively lived and felt. It is the particular living result of all the elements in the general organization. And it is in this respect that the arts of a period are of major importance. Williams (1981b) writes:

One generation may train its successor, with reasonable success, in the social character or the general social pattern, but the new generation will have its own structure of feeling, which will not appear to have come from anywhere. For here, most distinctly, the changing organization is enacted in the organism: the new generation responds in its own ways to the unique world it is inheriting, taking up many continuities, that can be traced, and reproducing many aspects of the organization, which can be separately described, yet feeling its whole life in certain ways differently, and shaping its creative responses into a new structure of feeling (p. 49).
What is missing from this albeit sophisticated theoretical account of generational transmission, according to O'Connor (1989a), one of a few faithful students of Williams, is a sociological conceptualization of the horizontal divisions of an apparent singular generation into more or less distinct generation units (1989a, p. 83-84). A definite structure of feeling is then more properly applicable to a well-formed generation unit rather than to an undifferentiated generation. However, O'Connor argues that Williams never used that term in the general sense of the structure of experience of a whole generation after *Marxism and Literature* (Ibid, p. 84).

The term is given the specialized meaning of effective dominant culture and residual and emergent cultural elements (Williams, 1973). Williams argues that artists and intellectuals are sensitive to trends in the culture and anticipate changes in the cultural patterns of our society. They express these insights in their work. But their work provides a central articulation of the effective dominative culture. By "effective dominative culture" Williams means "the central, effective and dominant system of meanings and values, which are not merely abstract but which are organized and lived" in society. "Residual cultural elements" are similarly "lived" even though they are remnants from the past; they are active elements in the cultural process rather than experienced as archaic and not part of our lived culture. "Emergent cultural elements", on the other hand, are quite separate from the dominant culture; they are the new meanings and values, new practices which may develop, for example, with emergence and growing strength of a new class (1973, p. 9).

As part of the effective dominative culture, according to Williams, there is the selective culture which is represented as "the tradition." It consists of the traditional wisdom, knowledge and art of the society. The selective culture serves to perpetuate the effective
dominative culture, in a process of continual making and remaking. Our relationship with history, society, and knowledge is defined by this selective tradition. Williams argues that this process accompanies the processes of education, the processes of wider social training within institutions like the family, and the practical definitions and organizations of work, as forces in the maintenance of hegemony in the society (Ibid).

Williams is clearly committed to a method of cultural analysis in which culture is related to social existence, but the book demonstrates no clear sense of theoretical order or methodological procedure. Of course, these criticism apply chiefly to Williams's early works. After Marxism and Literature (1977), he turns to a more effective way of looking at the different levels of culture - lived culture and selective culture. He moves away from his attempts to reconcile the different levels of meaning in the term culture, which was his prime concern in the concept of a common culture, to a consideration of culture in its relationship to the structure of society (O'Connor's lecture note, Winter 1988). Williams's work in the field of cultural studies has always been stimulating and provides the impetus for much of the activity going on in that realm in England.

One important consequence of The Long Revolution was its elicitation of a seminal review by E. P. Thompson. Thompson shared much of the perspective of Williams - a commitment to dense empirical analysis, a sense of the importance of the different historical experience of different classes, and the use of some form of "being determines consciousness" formula without resort to a mechanical, base/superstructure model. Thompson, however, criticized Williams for treating the complex processes of social history in general as "a process of learning and communication" (Thompson, 1961, p. 35). Thompson uses the broader definition of culture. He argues that working-class culture is not only produced by and for the people, but that it is the product of their
struggles against the dominant order. He criticizes Williams for insufficient historical analysis and for lacking in a conception of the determinant role of class conflict in shaping knowledge and ideas (Ibid). Thompson was anxious to demolish two notions - the collective "we" of an established culture and a pluralism of determination in which elements of a way of life were held to interact in no disciplined manner. In *Politics and Letters* Williams indicated that he reacted positively to Thompson's criticism, but at the same time believed that the rhetoric about the whole way of struggle distorted the nature of the historical process under capitalism. Clarifying his position, Williams asserts a crucial distinction between class struggle and class conflict the former being the moment at which "structural conflict becomes a conscious and mutual contention, an overt engagement of forces" (1979, p. 139).

Thompson himself offers new insights for the study of culture. He suggests that culture should be defined in terms of both function, what culture does (or fails to do) and of experience handled in specifically human ways. He suggests also that the theory of culture must include the concept of the dialectical interaction between culture and something that is not culture. He insists on the active process of culture (1961, P. 36).

In 1968, *The Making of the English Working Class* was published. Here Thompson accounts for the active process of the birth of the English working class:

> This book has a clumsy title but it is one which meets its purposes. "Making" because it is a study in an active process which owes as much to agency as conditioning. The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time (1968, p. 9).

Like Hoggart and Williams, Thompson's work is seminal in the development of cultural studies. It represents the recovery of the experience of class fractions long consigned to historical oblivion; it places these long disqualified groups at the center of events not as
the passive pinballs of a grand historical game. Culture is not treated as the reflex of something else but as the arena in which conflicts are engendered and fought - ways of life become ways of struggle between competing classes. In other words, Thompson stresses the dimensions of historical agency through which distinctive class formation made itself - the active tense in the title is fully intentional. His definition of culture is rooted in the collective experiences which formed the class in its larger historical sense. The book situates culture in the dialectic between "social being" and "social consciousness." In doing so, it broke with a kind of economic determinism, and with an institutional perspective, which had marked and limited certain older versions of labour history, which it effectively misplaced. It also challenges the Leavisite tradition's elitist conception of culture and Williams's concept of culture. Thompson insists on the historical specificity of culture, conflict between cultures and their links to class cultures, class formations and class struggles. If the Making does not live up fully to Thompson's theoretical strictures on Williams, then it poses the problems of theoretically informed empirical work sharply, particularly the relationship between agency and determination.

It is now time to draw a line beneath the original curriculum and take stock. The immediate achievement of the three writers is a change in the working definition of culture, although each has different views on the concept. This redefinition was not, however, simply a coup over the concept of culture but, as culture is the refuge of total questions, effectively, a bid for the absent center. The contours of this bid are clear if the details are not. Culture is taken from its nostalgic, ideal, realm and placed as a key element in the constant reconstitution of social relations.
• Why Culture?

Many scholars have problems with the concept of culture, and some of them may be bored by the continuing appearance of "culture." Why is the concept of culture so difficult to grasp? Why does almost every scholar from almost every discipline call "culture" a notoriously complicated term? Simply, there is no solution to this polysemy. Richard Johnson (1987) argues, it would be a rationalist illusion to think there is a universal meaning of this term which dictates a whole history of connotations. It is a notorious term because we cannot explain culture as the result of a single, determining social process. We should reject both the theoretical essentialism that would derive culture from a single determining social process within the social formation and the essentialism that would derive the concept of culture from a single discursively privileged concept. I think that objects of knowledge do not exist independently of thought and thus cannot be appropriated in thought.

It is very important to retain culture as a category of analysis, though it is, as Johnson (1987) argues, too broad to analyze a precise category. The importance of culture is closely related to the concept of ideology because culture has to be understood in terms of the common sense or way of life of a particular class, group or social category, and the complex of ideologies. The argument on this usage insists on the complex recreation of ideological effects as a moment of the analysis of consciousness. The effects of a particular ideological work or aspect of hegemony can only be understood in relation to attitudes and beliefs that are already lived. I believe, we are constructed as culturally classed and sexed agents, already having a complexly formed subjectivity. Ideologies always work on the ground of culture. This insistence on recognizing the ground is also to criticize the Marxist tradition for its neglect of the ground.
Cultural studies is particularly interested in the analysis of a powerful and pervasive element in cultural analyses: popular culture. As various studies in cultural studies will demonstrate, popular culture is about the cultural forms of the people, cultural texts and practices outside the sphere of the dominant culture. Talking about popular culture is nothing new. This has been a constant feature of literary, political and cultural debates since the eighteenth century. But the term "popular" is not straightforward either because it is related to a broader series of discourses about culture and society. Hall (1981) said that he has almost as many problems with "the popular" as he has with "culture." "When you put the two terms together, the difficulties can be pretty horrendous" (1981, p. 227).

What Hall and other writers from the Left want to do with "popular" is to re-evaluate of the political implications of the term. Instead of seeing it either as a guarantee of social stability and unity, or as a dangerous threat to society, their analyses look to "the popular" as a site of opposition, of resistance; they see "the popular" as a demonstration of the possibility of developing new social and cultural relations. In other words, the analyses of popular culture and culture try to understand them as parts of a set of social relations: relations between different nations, different social classes, different races, and between men and women.

The finding of elements of a cultural analysis is also important for checking tendencies to functionalism. Although it is difficult to disengage the notion of ideology from a mode of production analysis, ideological conditions do not exhaust the whole sphere of the cultural - ideological in any concrete society. There are many cultural elements which capitalism ignores and unables to change. Cultural analysis, especially Thompson's, may put too much weight on cultural struggles among classes, but it
secures that the analysis of struggles within culture will not be ignored. Another danger of functionalism can be checked by culturalists' (Thompson, Williams) insistence on the production of self. Thompson (1968) criticizes theoretical humanism that ignores the conditions under which choices are made, moral preferences formed. If one ignores those conditions, Thompson argues, we return to "pure mechanicity." (1968, p. 9). To prevent pure mechanicity, culturalists emphasize more the force of ideological social relations than relations of political coercion or economic necessity. Simplistically put, outcomes of consciousness or ideology are not determined in the same kind of way as in economic or political relations. But if cultural studies is committed to the analysis of culture as a set of material forms and practices, I think it has to try to identify the institutions in which cultural forms are produced, and by which they are rendered significant. Thus, cultural studies must also analyze the economic relations in which cultural production participates: patronage, commodity production or state subsidy.

This is not to say that we should ignore the ideological dimension of popular culture. Indeed, Judith Williamson (1986) demonstrated very convincingly the need to see popular culture in its dimension as ideology, as a space that is always contested and never won, as the cultural sphere of people who are constantly undermined and marginalized by the social relations in which they participate (1986, p. 14-15). This sort of judgement can only usefully be produced, however, on the basis of a careful analysis of the forms and practices of popular culture. It is important, for example, to understand the power of narratives of romance and adventure, for ourselves and as well as for others, and to realize the complexity of the ways in which they are consumed. In other words, questions of the power of particular cultural forms, the economic interests of those who produce them, or the ways in which cultural commodification has altered
the cultural relations are important. To assign cultural relations simply to a discourse of manipulation and addiction is to trivialize theory.

By reading theories of cultural studies, one can recognize that it is shadowy to the extent that it opposes, counters, and shadows 'official' rationalities. But, unlike most postmodern theories, cultural studies embraces rationality rather than rejects it. Aiming to be a critical-reconstructive social science, its rationality is complex for it contains both popular and theoretical elements. On the popular side, cultural studies has to be interested in those subcultural milieus which have been constructed underneath authorized social discourse. The commitment by cultural studies to the paradoxical enterprise of producing a theory of the popular must be able to lead to another commitment; to all sorts of human values and meanings. The next chapter reviews the brief history of the CCCS and charts cultural studies's positive/negative relation to the academic disciplines as a strategy of clarifying cultural studies.
Chapter II

The historical and scientific specificity of cultural studies

Before the World War II, the term culture referred to the high culture of classical literature and art or to anthropological phenomena. In 1950s, as mentioned above, Hoggart, Williams and Thompson extended the category of culture by examining ordinary people's lived daily experiences (Hall 1980). In other words, they focused on everyday life rather than literature. In the postwar era, the depression and new kinds of relations among economic, political, and cultural forces led these writers to rethink the anthropological or primitive society conception of culture. Hoggart, Williams and Thompson, who analyze English working class historically, question what shaped Britain's earlier phases of industrial capitalist development. Hoggart, Williams, and Thompson raise some important questions. Was it the determining historical forces or merely their recomposition into new continuity? What would be the results for traditional class relationships, for class formation and their culture? How should these historical processes be understood and assessed? These issues were debated by people who were involved in the formation of the early new left in Britain. They also termed the debate as the postwar cultural debate. Cultural studies, with its own defined objectives and agenda, found its space in the cultural debate. It has tried to address issues about contemporary society and culture. Tension between political and intellectual concerns which has shaped cultural studies ever since.
A Brief History of The Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS)

The CCCS provides a focus for examining many issues in British society. They have been prolific as a group in the production of papers, articles, and so on, but they have also been responsible for creating a great deal of the interest in that field. The CCCS was formed in 1964 under the directorship of Hoggart (Dunn, 1986). He has left a legacy of interest in sub-cultures and sub-cultural analysis which continues to add strength to the CCCS’s theoretical analyses. Though the question of the relationship between sub-cultures and the dominant culture remains unresolved, its presence resists an over-formalization of the notions of culture or cultural hegemony.

It would be difficult to summarize the whole intellectual history of the CCCS for a number of reasons. As an academic institution has stressed cooperative work by staff and students and has been prolific in its production of papers over the years. Such prolixity makes it an overwhelming task for anyone to attempt to describe specific developments. The production of working papers means that evidence of the intellectual lineage within the CCCS is scattered. Moreover, the production of working papers is not available to public. I failed to obtain the CCCS’s journals Working Papers in Cultural Studies and Stencilled Occasional Papers. But to search for such original works and their lineage would misrepresent both the changes over the years as being straightforward stages and the CCCS as a monolithic institution in which everyone held the same opinions.

Tony Dunn’s essay (1986) "The Evolution of Cultural Studies," in my view, is an example of failing documentation of the evolution of the intellectual lineage and intellectual formation of cultural studies. His narrative tends to be composed of images
and metaphors rather than verifiable documented facts. He documents the formation of the institution, but not the CCCS's internal intellectual development. Dunn writes: "The evolution of cultural studies courses has... been marked by the assimilation of a wide range of social and cultural theory" (1986, p. 76). But he provides no specific examples of how radical thought produced on the European continent affected the CCCS's intellectual development. The essay is not so much a historical reconstruction of cultural studies, but a highly selective practice of critical reconstruction at the service of Dunn's own diagnostic act of cultural criticism.

Instead of risking such errors, the humanist literary tradition will suffice to indicate the direction of the CCCS's work, particularly in the 1970s under the directorship of Stuart Hall. First, the CCCS emphasized the analysis of class as being fundamental to the study of culture. As mentioned above, a striking feature of the literary tradition was the extent to which these writers depoliticized class. Up until Williams's work this attempt emerged in the depiction of classes according to particular natural functions in the British society. This mystification was not unusual amongst intellectuals, the most obvious example being in the popular representation of education as establishing a new structure of élites in the society.

Though Williams rejects this connection between class and function, he does not succeed in escaping it import. By discussing class in terms of communication, he contributed to the depoliticization of the concept of class. In Culture and Society and The Long Revolution, Williams argues in terms of the possibility of breaking down the divisions between classes through the establishment of a common culture, not as fundamental economic divisions. The problem of class, he believes, could be solved through communication. During the mid-1970s, the CCCS sought to examine class at
the economic level as well as the cultural level, though they have had some difficulties in reconciling this theoretical task with their interest in class as lived experience (Coward, 1977).

Second, the CCCS avoids the literary tradition's concern with the role of art in society. In its very conception the question of the role of art in society seeks to affirm its specialness as a human activity. In Leavis's work the concept of culture articulates a belief in the superior reality of art and the special function of the artistic imagination in society. Similarly, Williams seeks a special function for the artistic imagination as the basis of his concept of a common culture. After Marxism and Literature, he attempts to move away from the question of the role of art in society. This question appears to play no role in the work of the CCCS in the 1970s; art is examined rather in terms of material production. The CCCS also rejects a moral critique of society. Its criticisms of society look beyond the way in which people live their lives, to an investigation into the structures that support that way of life.

Finally, the CCCS's work differs from the literary tradition in its emphasis on theoretical concerns. English social thought has been generally characterized by its aversion to abstract theoretical ideas; the literary intellectuals were no exception. The CCCS emphasizes the need for theoretical rigor in its work. This theoretical focus led in the mid-1970s to a concern amongst certain members of the CCCS that they may have swung too far in this direction. Stuart Hall, for example, expressed this concern in the various conferences. But theoretical interests have not precluded their undertaking concrete studies of historical and contemporary issues. Cultural studies's commitment to theory involves a certain self-scrutiny, a certain translation of intellectual being which becomes a constant self-reflexive exposing of the underside of its own practices of
theorizing. Without a theoretical basis, there can be no intellectual function in social organizations.

These points of departure from the concerns of traditional literary studies only indicate certain aspects of the CCCS's work. They represent significant shifts in the field of cultural studies and provide some indication of the continuing significance of this area of English social thought. These moves by the CCCS have not been unique to that group. There are a number of other English writers who share similar interests. For example, Terry Eagleton, a student of Williams, works in the field of Marxist cultural theory from an anti-humanist framework. Stephen Heath and other Screen (British cinema journal) theorists represent a significant trend toward the study of semiotics, although the CCCS and Screen theorists debate over the theoretical understanding of the cinema.

Interest in cultural studies is burgeoning in a number of different contexts. This phenomenon is vital for preventing useless debates around rigidly defined theoretical positions. Although Hall is concerned about "too much theories", I think theoretical analysis has made a significant contribution to the development of cultural studies as a vital area of social thought in Britain in the 1970s. The concerns may lie in that the elaboration of theoretical positions could potentially obscure the importance of concrete investigations. But, more significantly, the tradition associated with the concept of culture has promoted and transformed vigorous critiques of society.

The main institutional site of the production of this leading project in Britain, of course, has been in the CCCS. However, given the expansion of this field since the mid-1970s, cultural studies is composed of such a number of complex and diverse projects that it cannot be entirely equated with the work of the CCCS. Even Richard Johnson (1987),
as a former Director of the CCCS, questioned the CCCS as the main site for cultural studies:

There are a plurality of answers from the different centers, not the single Center. In Britain, cultural studies is now a movement or a network. It has its own first degrees in several polytechnics and its own journals and meetings. It exercises a larger influence on academic disciplines, especially on English studies, sociology, media and communication studies, linguistics, and history (1987, p. 38).

I would agree with Johnson's assessment of the expansion of the field of cultural studies, but it has to be acknowledged that the production of spearhead concrete research studies, as well as critical synoptic accounts of the name and nature of cultural studies, are still very much the result of the research endeavors at the CCCS. In addition, both before the expansion of the field of cultural studies, and in its continuing development, the leading point of view of the CCCS - the research towards a materialist non-reductionist theory of culture, linked to various forms of engaged politics - has remained of paramount importance and influence in Britain and abroad. More clarification of the status of the CCCS and cultural studies in general, I believe, would come from the examination of their negative and positive relations to academic disciplines and other theories.

**Cultural studies's relation to other disciplines**

- Break up with behavioral sociology

Materialist non-reductionist theory of culture is the point where it breaks with behavioral sociology. British sociology is dominated by versions of Parsonian and Mertonian functionalism along with the adaptation of American models to the British empiricist tradition and the rejection of Marxism (Hall, 1980, p. 20). This discourse is conducted
at a level akin to social philosophy - overall conceptions of society and social action assessed in purely conceptual terms (Ibid, p. 21-22). The potential of these different conceptions for research was rare.

Functionalism is the basis for the study of institutions in British sociology. Naturally, this orientation leads to a reductionist analysis of each institution rather than to the analysis of the social whole. Institutions are defined by common sense - the sociology of work, the sociology of the family, the sociology of education, etc.. This fragmented nature of British sociology, Hall argues, fails to generate new, synthetic insights on British society (Ibid).

Methods are separated from theory and institutions. Sociology is equated with statistical analysis in search of the perfect correlation. As Hall argues, this is "modelled on a highly outdated version of the natural sciences, militantly empiricist and quantitative" (Ibid, p. 21). The practical effects of this empiricism generate a series of statistics dependent on ad hoc, common sense explanations. But it relies too much on an assumed consensus and the attribution of pathology to dissenters.

The sociology of education, for example, aimed at an understanding of the interrelation between different institutions (school, family, etc.) through empirical details (see Halsey et al., 1960; 1980 - London School of Economics's statistical survey on school children). The major problem with this survey, as seen in most cases of behavioral studies, is the dismissal of the complex status of institutions. Schools are assumed to be about the teaching and learning of a formal curriculum, students are distributed normally across a curve of fixed ability, and outcomes can be measured in terms of examination results. The family was taken as a self-evident entity functioning as the site of primary socialization and in the statistical moments. The simplistic and practical perspectives of
educational professionals could lead to the dangerous social assumption that an "A+" student will be "A+" worker in society.

As behavioralist sociology cannot contend with the questions emerging from cultural studies, it tries to find intellectual sources from wider fields: the classical sociologies of Europe, the American tradition of symbolic interactionism, and the renewal of Marxism. In Weber, there is an insistence on the understanding of the perspective of individuals as a necessary ground for social explanation. This methodological individualism is tied into a sharp historical and structural sense of the social whole. As Hall notes, these perspectives are connected with the concerns of Williams, Hoggart, and Thompson (1980, p.23).

- Phenomenology - A social constructive view

The phenomenological tradition presents a more radical challenge to behavioralist sociology. Where Weber and the Heidelberg school work on "meaning" as the explanatory principle, the phenomenologists hold meaning itself to be in need of explanation through deconstruction (Berger, 1973). The promise of such an approach is its disentangling of the internal structure of a culture treating its appearance as the final product to be explained rather than as the starting point from which explanation could be built. In other words, phenomenology focuses on meanings that people share intersubjectively, but that also objectivated in a variety of cultural artifacts (Pilotta and Mickunas, 1990, p. 46-47). It also attempts to describe social reality as a situation in which individuals are constantly in the process of creating and recreating their worlds:
The relationship between the founding individual and the social, higher order individual can be depicted through an analogy with musical notes and melody. The sounds are the foundation of melody; but in forming the melody, the sounds create a higher order that is not identical with the sum of sounds. This is not to suggest the sounds lose their individuality; the contribution of each is recognizable (1990, p. 48).

Culture would be presented as fluid; society is in motion. This notion of fluidity is articulated in the concept of dialogical domain (Ibid) or dialectic (Berger, 1973). In Hurrel (1962) this project is tied into an epochal sense of historical change, while in Schutz (1973) there is a constant emphasis on the social nature and consequences of experience. There are questions of how and by what mediations do subjective meanings become objective social facts and vice versa. Significantly, the means to link these two poles is suggested by Williams (cited in Hall, 1980). His interactionalist conception of the relations between the creative mind and patterned cultural processes suggests that even though the meanings of social phenomena are primarily determined by the shared cultural meanings, the specific actualized meanings of these phenomena are in large measure determined by the intentional actions of the individuals involved (1980, p. 24-25).

Cultural studies's emphasis on the problematic nature of the complex relations between the subjective and objective factors involved does in fact fit into a phenomenological-social constructive perspective and its own problematics. How do the structures of consciousness become the articulated structures of society and social relations? How are meanings transposed from the subjective-meaning complex of action into the symbolic systems and language of a culture? These kinds of questions stress that conditions of possibility for understanding the meanings and values embodied, for instance, in a work of art, are shared cultural frameworks of meaning.
Although he never uses the term "reflexive thinking" (Pilotta and Mickunas, 1990, p. 1). Hall's metatheoretical consciousness is well exemplified when he related the social constructionist distinction between subjective meaning and objective facticity to the metatheoretical understanding that society constitutes a dialectical process involving both subjective productivity and objective product, men producing society and in turn being produced by it (Hall, 1980). For cultural studies the crucial feature of phenomenology is the social construction of reality and dialectical view of society. I think that this paradigm still holds validity for cultural studies because of its attention to meaning, its roots in social interaction, and its awareness of the expressive and intentional character of cultural life.

The other connection is with Weber's view that the characteristic uniqueness of an object affords the reason why an object is attended to intellectually. The object can be a subject. Thus the value analysis of the meaningful behavior of a given human subject can only be productive of meaning via a practice of value-interpretation, a necessary process (Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977, p.4-6). There is no doubt that, at least in the case of British cultural studies, phenomenology contributed to the CCCS's contextualizing approach reformulated in a new sociological way.

Cultural studies, however, does not take account of phenomenology uncritically. Though meanings are shared and intentionality is embodied in cultural artifacts, the researcher's interpretations of these meanings can vary considerably (Blum and McHugh, 1974, p. 11-18). In other words, there is danger that cultural forms are objectivated in very different ways than their producers originally intended. Cultural studies argues that cultural forms as concrete observable objects must not be reduced to subjective meanings and analysis. This is not to say that the objectivity of social reality
should only be emphasized. Instead they must be seen together to avoid any possible distortions. Cicourel (1973) argues that the phenomenological tradition is idealistically drawn either to solipsism or to the reduction of culture as the expression of innate cognitive universals. Berger and Luckmann (1966) also recognize that an exclusive emphasis upon subjective meanings leads to idealism. Nonetheless, the social constructive view of phenomenology (dialectics) and its anti-positivism were crucial to cultural studies.

As I discuss later, the incorporating subjectivity in cultural analysis is not insignificant. Cultural reality is necessarily rooted, at some level, in human subjectivity. And while culture is clearly analytically distinct from human subjectivity, it profoundly and continually affects human consciousness. To incorporate subjectivity into cultural analysis provides one deterrent against the ossification of social reality into categories totally detached from the actors that individually and collectively produce them. If subjectivity is ignored in cultural analysis, we deny human freedom, the social psychological bases of culture. On the other hand, if subjectivity is overemphasized, the analysis would be reduced, thereby, losing its critical edge.

- Symbolic Interactionism - A Social psychological perspective

Social psychological perspectives are important for the analysis of the internalization of social reality. This analysis is called symbolic interactionism in American sociology, influenced by George Herbert Mead (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 17). This American symbolic interactionism has had some impacts on cultural studies. Symbolic interactionism refers to the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings (Giddens, 1987, p. 54). The peculiarity consists in the
fact that human beings interpret or define each other's actions instead of merely reacting to each other's actions.

In Mead's view, the actor evaluates himself not from the single standpoint of what he believes others think of him/her. He/she identifies with others and is motivated by their approval. Others, relationships, settings, the self - all can become objects having meaning to the actor. The social context is always present because meaning is necessarily shared. Meaning is imputed to objects after some negotiation on the part of the actors and often after each has inferred the meaning from the type of response observed in the other (Shibutani, 1961, p. 239-240).

In its assimilation to the sociology of deviance it presented positive features for cultural studies. There is an emphasis on the importance of close empirical contact with the lived experience of actors but also on the societal consequences of these experiences. This clearly brought social structural issues into play. But its optimistic view of society doesn't seem to take account of the power structures that are capable of affecting individuals to the dominant view of reality. Blumer (1975) argues that it implies a "give-and-take" process among persons, each regarding the other's point of view as equal to his own, and neglects to see power as a fact of life (1975, p. 334-340).

Symbolic interactionism also lacks the theoretical tools with which to conceptualize the relation between its ethnography of power at work and the social structure through which power is generated (Ibid, p. 349). It stresses the researcher's need for an open mind so that theory can emerge in the field situation in conjunction with the feedback from the subjects being studied. According to Huber (1973), what is seen is a product of the agreements reached by the participants and the influence of those who are most powerful. The problem is the reluctance of the symbolic interactionist to interpose
between man and his pursuit of knowledge some word-pictures and procedures in terms of which attempts can be more readily judged as valid or invalid (1973, p. 279-284). Although symbolic interactionism along with ethnomethodology challenge the versions of social action and offer an alternative, they are unable to shift the ground from that of defining the situation to that of social relations relying on the personification of acting units to account for supra-individual events. The other major route offered by sociology is the structuralist side of the work of Durkheim and French structuralists.

- Structuralism and Post-Structuralism

In British sociology, Durkheim has been read as a proto-positivist who makes an effortless and rapid move from social facts to statistical analysis. Durkheim, like Lévi-Strauss, views culture as a structured system, independent of individual volition, to be understood as a symbolic expression of social structure defined by its internal relations (Hall, 1980, p. 30). Their reductionistic view of culture, according to Hall, is not able to provide a paradigm for cultural studies. The European Marxist structuralist movement represented by Althusser has been an important influence on cultural studies debates. The structural approach is primarily interested in the production of texts and the manner in which texts, as structures of codes, produce subjects (Hall, 1980; Johnson, 1987). One of cultural studies's project is to abstract, describe and reconstitute the social forms in concrete studies through which human beings become conscious and sustain themselves subjectively (Hall, 1980, p. 30-31). This emphasis on social forms is obviously influenced and enriched by some general structuralist views. This is not to say that cultural studies concerns only the description of form, but rather that cultural studies sees the historical nature of subjective forms too (social tendencies and social determinations of forms).
Structuralists argue that reality can only be made sense of through language or other cultural meaning systems. To Lévi-Strauss, language is both an ordered and structured system for explaining primitive society. Thus, he establishes the rule as central in the construction of all ordered human systems. Since structuralism's main emphasis is in the specificity, the non-reduction, Lévi-Strauss's scientific study of culture is revised within cultural studies. Drawing from Marxist, Lacanian psychoanalytics, and Gramscian theories Althusser revises the base/superstructure model. He argues that there is a multiplicity of determinations located at different levels in the social formation, not just the economic base. Each practice is active in its own specific effectivity yet each is a necessary condition of existence for the others (relative autonomy). But the level of ideological practice is termed material in that it produces particular products. The economy is finally determinant only in that it determines which element in the social formation will be dominant at a particular time (Althusser, 1977a, p. 113). Yet the work of Althusser imported at least three lines of thought into Britain, which can be regarded as post-structuralist: the account of the historical formation as decentered; the assertion that knowledge as proceeding from theoretical practice is discursively constructed; the account of the subject as effect rather than cause.

For Althusser, it is as wrong to understand the social formation as a spatial essence as it would be to imagine it as a temporal essence. The notion of absolute, chronological time is bourgeois time. "The conception of historical time as continuous and homogeneous and contemporaneous with itself must give way to recognition that there are different times in history" (Althusser and Balibar, 1975, p. 96). And so it is no longer possible to think of the development of the different levels of the whole in "the same historical time." Each of these different levels does not have the same type of
historical existence, according to Althusser (Ibid, p. 100). A conception of social formation as a decentered structure in dominance points to a decentered structure.

Subject and object come into existence simultaneously, in a reciprocally situated relation. The subject must be understood as a dispersed, heterogeneous effect rather than original cause. In his essay "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses", (For Marx) Althusser (1977) goes beyond Marxist criticism of the bourgeois conception of the subject to a critique which would explain not only the structure of relations determining the subject's position but also the internal process by which the subject "freely" enters that position. Ideology works on subjects so that they "work by themselves" (1977, p.169). At this point the Marxist account of how social being determines consciousness is mapped together with Lacan's psychoanalytic account of how the unconscious determines consciousness, how the subject appears as a split between the process of the other (the symbolic) and a position of fixity (the imaginary) in which it misrecognizes an identity for itself within that process (Ibid, p. 168). This account of the subject is the foundational matrix for British post-structuralism.

I think that Althusser's conception of the subject denies the subject its humanism and in this respect opens a path to post-structuralism. Because Althusser opposes Marxist notions of social contradiction and class struggle by conceiving the subject only as constituted by an assigned position (Ibid, P. 38-42). This conception contributes to postmodern theories which are discussed later.

Post-structuralism's account of how the subject is constituted to appear constitutive appeals to the Lacanian conception of subjectivity and thus rests on a psychoanalytic understanding of the subject as unconscious, and therefore as the subject of desire. While in the Althusserian conception the social formation terminates in the constituted
subject, desire is endless. Once the subject has become a subject by entering discourse, its "needs have passed over into the register of desire" (Lacan, 1977, p. 309). In the process of desire the subject is always constitutive though only within the terms of social formation. The object of desire is socially and historically discovered. Under the system of commodity production, for example, "needs are reduced to exchange values" (Ibid, p. 252) and objects of desire are provided for the subject in the form of capitalist consumption.

Althusser's work is best regarded as structuralism passing over into post-structuralism. His account of the subject as ideologically constituted draws upon a psychoanalytic conceptualization which subverts Althusser's account. As Hirst and Woolley (1982) have demonstrated by matching and assessing Malinowski's anthropological analysis of incest taboos among the Trobriand Islanders against Freud's Totem and Taboo, the order of the social formation and the order of desire are not commensurate simply; while by nature they are theoretically incommensurate, they are always brought together in social practices and textual practices (see 1982, p. 149-60).

Jonathan Culler (1983, p. 30) says in On Deconstruction, "the distinction between structuralism and post-structuralism is highly unreliable" (1983, p. 30). The prefix "post", however, is serious not because it is after structuralism, but because it discovers the limitations of structuralism's project. Structuralism, the movement which reached its plateau in the mid-1960s and is associated with the work of the structural anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, broke radically with the conventional critical approach. Founding itself on the Saussurean distinction between signifier and signified it set out to analyze the text as a self-sufficient ordering of the signifier of which meaning was an effect. It thus pronounced, in the title of an essay included in Image,
Music, Text, by Roland Barthes (1977), "The death of the author" on the grounds that in a text "it is language which speaks, not the author" (1977, p. 143).

Structuralism borrows two main concepts from linguistics for its model of the text. One is the distinction between *langue* and *parole*, used to argue that any given text is an utterance generated according to the rules of a system of signification of which the text is but an instance. In analyzing this underlying and invisible system structuralism has recourse to Saussure's account of the way phonemes, the smallest units systematized in a language, are characterized not "by their own positive quality but simply by the fact that they are distinct and negatively opposed" (Saussure, 1959, p. 119). Generalizing Saussure's account as a model, structuralism concentrates on disclosing the system of oppositions or opposed features structuring a text.

In other words, what structuralism wants is a pure form beneath the obvious content, something which, like Saussure's phonemic oppositions, has no positive content but which produces an effect simply from the repetition of merely relational oppositions. Umberto Eco's (1982) essay on the James Bond novels would be a perfect example of classical structuralism. He argued that "the texts have an objective and conventional structural strategy" which functions to produce their effects and that this structure or "narrating machine" is susceptible to rational, indeed scientific, analysis (1982, p. 244). Eco generates the following system of fourteen oppositions or dichotomies from ten different Bond novels (The Spy Who Loved Me is excluded as "quite untypical"): Bond/M; Bond/Villain; Free World/Soviet Union; Duty/Sacrifice; Love/Death; Loyalty/Disloyalty.

Eco argues that the rules or game of the Bond novels led to an invariable scheme underlying every text:
To sum up, the plot of each Fleming is, by and large, like this: Bond is sent to a given place to avert a science fiction plan by a monstrous individual of uncertain origin and definitely not English who, making use of his organizational or productive activity, not only earns money but helps the cause of the enemies of the West. In facing this monstrous being Bond meets a woman who is dominated by him and frees her from her past, establishing with her an erotic relationship interrupted by capture, on the part of the Villain, and by torture. But Bond defeats the Villain, who dies horribly, and rests from his great efforts in the arms of the woman, though he is destined to lose her (1982, p. 258).

Eco's analysis is pretty convincing for me and probably anyone who is familiar with Bond novels. Then, I ask, would it work for more complex formulaic literary texts and other cultural forms? What justification is there for analysis founded in a synchronic model of dichotomies or oppositions? Needless to say, Eco's analysis rests on an Althusserian notion of ideology, Saussureian linguistics, the distinction between langue and parole, and the account of phonemic opposition. Although such structuralism breaks with the commonsensical impressionism of conventional literary theory, it remains stuck with this notion of a structure which is seemingly in and of itself and which thus "must foreclose the text against history (Bennett and Woollacott, 1987, p. 77). By this limitation structuralism enables and provokes a move beyond structuralism.

Structuralism is transformed into post-structuralism when the structures of the text are seen to be always structures in and for a subject (reader and critic). This shift, in opening the issue of the subject and his or her unconscious pleasures, inevitably poses the question of gender. The text of structuralism is intransitive, while that of post-structuralism is transitive. Because British post-structuralism is heavily influenced by the Althusserian framework, it becomes inseparable from questions of ideology and politics. Within this discursive space post-structuralism develops simultaneously in two directions. Its concepts were first adopted in relation to problems of textuality, in an
Althusserian analysis of the way readers are positioned by the text. That move takes place earliest and with most influence in the area of film theory represented by a film journal called *Screen*. Cultural studies's adoption of post-structuralism, while crucial, has been selective.

**Screen Theory**

While the Marxist tradition generally supports realism and critical realism against modernism, the film theory of *Screen* criticizes the realist tradition. Realism is here not a matter of any fidelity to an empirical reality, but of the discursive conventions by which and for which a sense of reality is constructed. Colin MacCabe (1985), a *Screen* theoretist, argues that since as an object the real is represented as apparently self-sufficient and timeless, the subject will be interpellated into a secure position of dominant specularity. He claims as an essential formal characteristic of realism that it is always structured by a "hierarchy of discourses." By this he means that a realistic narrative will contain a range of different and often contradictory discourses, which are usually explicitly recognized as such, but that these occupy a low position in the discursive hierarchy.

In *MacGyver*, for example, there is a discourse of heroes and a discourse of villains, but the televisual discourse (setting, lighting, costumes, dialogues, music, etc) gives us the means to understand and evaluate both discourses and set them in a sense-making relationship to each other. This unspoken discourse is called metadiscourse and, according to MacCabe, gives us a more privileged position than either the heroes or the villains. But can the effect of object language and metalanguage be simply distributed between direct and indirect speech? I think that even though MacGyver's sighs and pursed lips signify his disbelief on something, his direct speech relatively offers itself as
metalanguage too. MacCabe dismisses the signifier/signified opposition as merely methodological. Fiske (1988) attacks MacCabe's classical realism as empiricism, as it seeks to guarantee "its truthfulness because it disguises its arbitrariness and therefore its political effectivity" (1988, p. 35).

MacCabe identifies two essential features of the classic realist text as exemplified in Hollywood classical movies: The classic realist text cannot deal with the real as contradictory; in a reciprocal movement, the classic realist text ensures the position of the subject in a relation of dominant specularity (1985, p. 39). By introducing the idea of contradiction here, the analysis finds a link back to traditional Marxism. Realism compels us to treat as natural and always already pre-given that which is humanly constructed, in a contradictory process, and therefore changeable. In realism "the real is not articulated - it is" (Ibid, p. 39). MacCabe's theory so densely packed as to require a diagram.
While MacCabe claims that realism is transparent in the sense that its metalanguage is not regarded as material, Heath (1981) argues that narrative space acts through "the holding of signifier on signified" (1981, p. 37), that transparency is "impossible - no one has yet seen a signified without a signifier" (Ibid, p. 44), and that classical cinema does not efface the signs of production but rather contains them through narrativization. It seems to me that MacCabe analyzes classic realism with an essential emphasis on formal structure and textual effect therefore remains largely a structuralism; Heath's account of classical cinema is more fully post-structuralist since it is founded in a conception of process which narrative space seeks to fix and contain. This process is the process of the subject.

British post-structuralism is strongly associated with the notion of the subject, Marxism, and political radicalism. The psychoanalysis of Lacan provides ways to explore the
issue of the subject and his/her unconscious pleasures. On this basis psychoanalysis in post-structuralism also becomes a means to analyze the ideologies at work in maintaining women's oppression. It claims that ideologies are promoted by men and submitted to by women. Laura Mulvey's work in *Screen* on the representation of women in the cinema forms part of this project. Mulvey's work willingly appropriates psychoanalytic theory as a political weapon because "it faces us with the ultimate challenge: how to fight the unconscious" (Mulvey, 1975, p. 7). It also analyzes how mainstream cinema offers its viewer a position of dominant specularity, a masculine position.

*Screen*’s theory is, however, challenged by writers from the Left, especially Eagleton, Hall, and Williams. Their challenges can be summarized in three questions: (1) Does it have a sense of history? (2) Does it still maintain the principles of relative autonomy and economic determination of the superstructure? (3) Is this how real as distinct from notional readers are affected by the text? Eagleton's main criticism, for example, is that *Screen*’s formalism evaporates history, that "the historical specificity of the ideological codes upon which texts labour is dwindled to the merest gesture" (1978, p. 23). Responding to this criticism, Heath (1981) argues that Eagleton's position on history needs to be clarified in terms of: period and conjuncture. The narrower dimension is usually understood in terms of years and decades, but there is also a wider scale of history understood particularly in the Marxist conception of the epoch, as the era of a mode of production. *Screen* is not attempting to investigate the historical as determined by conjuncture, according to Heath, but it is certainly concerned with the dependence of narrative space on what might be termed the epochal space of the Renaissance (1981, p. 29; 64).
The topic of history brings the discussion right up against the issue of economic determinism and base/superstructure relations in Marxist theory. The *Screen* problematic is governed by the distinction between signifier and signified. Conceived in terms of Althusserian relative autonomy, the cinema is seen as both a signifying practice, actively producing meaning in its own specific autonomy, and a practice relatively determined by the others of the social formation (Hollywood as an economic institution, for example). The debate over relative autonomy broke out in *Screen* in 1977 when Rosalind Coward, a former student of the CCCS, attacked some work on subcultures from the CCCS. Taking off from the issue that language cannot confidently be ascribed to either base or superstructure, Coward's paper criticizes the work on subcultures for its commitment to a conception of the social formation "in terms of an essential division between capital and labour which is directly reflected in economic classes, which themselves are reflected at the level of culture and ideology" (1977b, p. 90). Instead of responding to Coward's criticism, Hall (1977/8) demanded a clear response to the question of relative autonomy: is signifying practice relatively autonomous, determined in the last instance by the economic (what Hall refers to as a "limit-position" within Marxism)? Or must we recognize "the absolute autonomy of signifying practice" (a position outside Marxism) (1977/8, p. 115)?

Coward's reply reveals both the political stakes of the debate and why it took on such importance when it did. Simply, feminism cannot be theorized within the classic Marxist account of base and superstructure. The conception of class is very problematic for Coward's feminism because it is difficult for her to accept the idea of women as a class since economic class divisions cut across gender. Socialist-feminists should, Coward argues, relegate questions of the class positions of women to secondary positions, since
traditional Marxism never bothered with feminist issues (1977/8, p. 122). To return to Hall's critique of Coward, it would be hard to guess what the absolute autonomy of a signifying practice would look like in contrast to its relative autonomy. In fact, the two questions are both within the same essential spatial problematic, that is, one assuming the primary existence of a central point (the economic) from which secondary and descendant forms would or would not emanate (ideological practice, signifying practice).

In sum, Coward's argument emphasizes not on representation as effect of a cause but as cause of an effect, "how systems of representation inscribe ideological positions" (Ibid, p. 95). In other words, the spectacle creates the spectator, and not vice-versa. Mass culture interpellates the masses, the ultimate commodity, as audiences comprised of passive cultural dupes. In my view, this view of representation is a sort of radicalized version of the Frankfurt School's concern with the massifying properties of mass culture: the very way we see the world is ideological. Most of the work in Screen is devoted to analyzing textual strategies in detail and to bringing the project into closer connection with the politics of feminism. Although Althusser attempts to replace Marxism's traditional concern with control and ownership a concern on the politics of signification, critics argue that he still retains an essentialist understanding of mode of production in the form of economic practice as ultimately corresponding to the real behind the superstructural appearances of ideological and political practice.

The full orthodoxy of the structuralist tradition never existed in cultural studies, even though it poses certain critical questions for cultural studies. But the impact is not a matter of mere subscription. What interests cultural studies about Althusser's work is well summarized in Hall's work: his notion of the relative autonomy of the
superstructure which emphasizes the effectivity of signifying practices; his attempt to reformulate the problem of determination in a non-reductionist way; and his stress on practices in addition to ideas (1980, p. 33-34). Althusser argues that ideology performs the reproduction of the conditions and relations necessary to the mode of production of class society. He defines ideology as a representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. But the structuralist tradition tends to conceptualize these relations as functional supports for a given system of dominant social arrangements. Thus it consistently down-plays the notion of cultural contradiction and struggle.

Despite its clear interrogation or deconstruction of the common sense positioning of text's subjects, the structuralist's tradition has been accused of constructing a unity in the viewing subject. This subjective view of the real then appears as common sense. Despite its very clear attempts to situate both ideology and common sense within the workings of a specific society at a particular historical moment, it tends to make everything appear realistic; ideology is made to appear as the product of reality or nature, and not of a specific society and its culture. Thus, if a Hispanic or a black villain in *MacGyver* had won over MacGyver, who is the white hero, it would have appeared unrealistic. The structuralist's tradition has itself become a part of dominant ideology or myth by presenting dominant ideology as natural rather than cultural. Althusserians including *Screen* theorists, and some radical filmmakers are not agents of change at all, but dupes of myth and the visual epistemology of empiricism.

*Spike Lee's Do the Right Thing*, for example, sold out to neo-liberalism. Lee seemed to think that the film would make white audiences very uncomfortable to watch for two hours (*Time*, June 17, 1991, p. 64-68). By presenting an "us and them" dichotomy,
Lee rules out the possibility that black viewers might find this film difficult to watch, as well. A responding letter to *Time* on the article quoted above argues that

*Spike* Lee has proved that racism is a million-dollar enterprise. Take away racism, and Lee is out of business. I can only guess what he is trying to accomplish, but I don't think it has anything to do with ending racism. You don't put out a fire by pouring gasoline on it (*Time*, July 15, p. 12).

All stereotypes of blacks, Italians, Hispanics, Koreans, and whites are familiar spectacles. What is it, then, that makes white viewers uncomfortable? In my view, he is not "an angry young radical black filmmaker." We could be watching any cop show on television or even a glimpse of the evening news and experience this drama.

Although Lee's films (including his recent *Jungle Fever* which portrays interracial love relationship in political perspective) do contribute to open another cultural space for dialogue, and highlight the urgent need for more intense public discussion about racism, they are not intrinsically counterhegemonic.

Unlike Althusser, Williams emphasizes the active human agents who implement the experiential basis of ideology, while Althusser disagrees with Williams' approach on the position of experience and agency. For Althusser, texts are not made by subjects (agents), but rather subjects are made by texts. The Althusserian conception of society and ideology has been subjected to criticism and revision. As mentioned above, Hall rejects the notion of a homogeneous totality. For him, ideology does not completely dominate subjects, rather ideology is inserted in a hegemonic process of struggle between dominant and oppositional ideologies. If ideology is purely a reflection of the mode of production, the world be much simpler than we have experienced. Ideology is a site of struggle over meanings. Thus, Hall argues that we must seek concrete effects
of ideology, not origins of it. And gender and race are also fundamental elements as economic practice.

Hall and Williams would agree with Anthony Giddens that "an extra-subjective reality exists and that it is describable via social theory" (McLennan on Giddens social theory, 1984, p. 134). Giddens (1987) argues,

> If we regard language as situated in social practices, and if we reject the distinction between consciousness and the unconscious followed by the structuralist and post-structuralist authors, we reach a different conception of the subject - as agent... Meaning is not constructed by the play of signifiers, but by the intersection of the production of signifiers with objects and events in the world, focused and organized via the acting individual (p. 91).

Giddens's particular contribution to cultural studies is be in emphasizing the agency of even routine social behavior, and so of all human actors (audiences and authors). A great deal of *Screen* theory has concerned itself with textual strategies for fixing subject positions. As O'Sullivan et al. (1983) argues, "there's a tendency in this area for texts to be privileged as the constructors or producers of our subjectivity, and for individuals to be seen as more or less passive subject in ideology" (1983, p. 233). For Williams and Giddens, subjects are first and foremost agents, reflexively monitoring their own contextually based actions. In sum, Althusser's structuralist approach poses some critical questions for the cultural studies debate, although it does not provided answers. It offers the keystone of further works on the problem of a materialist, non-reductionist theory of culture. Cultural studies, especially in the CCCS, does not subscribe to the structuralist tradition uncritically. It indicates that another influential figure - Antonio Gramsci - provided an insight into the limitation of Marxist structuralism. Gramsci's work has been widely influential in a different way for the CCCS.
Gramsci, like the structuralists, rejects the orthodox Marxist tendency to reduce the complexity of culture to the status of a totality. He analyzes the nature of state and civil society, the role and formation of intellectuals, popular cultures, class, etc. In doing so, Gramsci brings these ideas together under the concept of hegemony, which has played a seminal role in cultural studies. The literal meaning of hegemony is leadership, domination, or preponderance. But for Gramsci, the concept of hegemony signifies something much more complex. Hegemony describes the general predominance of particular class and their political and ideological interests. Although a society is made up of conflicting class interests, the ruling class exercises hegemony in that their interests are accepted as the prevailing ones. Social and cultural conflict is expressed as a struggle for hegemony, a struggle in which ideas will be recognized as the prevailing, common-sense view (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12-13). If orthodox Marxism stresses the repressive role of the state in class societies, then Gramsci introduces the dimension of civil society to locate the complex ways. He suggests the ways in which culture is a strategic field for the establishment of forms of consent. For example, cultural and ideological forms are historically negotiated between dominant and subordinate groups. In this way, one could explore the transactions between class and culture.

Of course Gramsci was not the first to put forward this kind of analysis (Lenin). But he is certainly the first to see it as a positive process of cultural construction. Gramsci sees the bourgeois enlightenment as a real liberation from the tyranny of superstition and feudal social relations. That it precipitated another kind of tyranny does not minimize this positive movement. But the question remains: how is hegemony won? Gramsci develops two related concepts to confront this question: the concept of ideology and the
concept of intellectual (Ibid, p. 5). He distinguishes between organic ideology (an
ideology necessitated by a given structure), and arbitrary ideology (a set of
speculations). There are four different organic ideologies: philosophy, religion,
commonsense, and folklore. Philosophy is the most systematic and coherent form of
ideology, and the best expression of the world view of a group or class. Religion
bridges the gap between a philosophical system and people, since ideology is
experienced as a belief and not as intellectual argument. Commonsense represents the
precipitated elements of philosophy that form the consciousness and the basis for
experience of ordinary people. Folklore is the most unsystematic ideological level,
according to Gramsci (1971), because it is a collection of elements and beliefs from a
variety of world views, that forming part of the consciousness of the people (1971, p.
375-377).

The important point here is that organic ideology organizes the actions and the
consciousness of the people. The group of people responsible for providing leadership
here are the organic intellectuals; every organic group in society has its organic
intellectuals. To Gramsci, all men are intellectuals, or philosophers, in the sense that
we all think or use our intellect. He points out that if we want to talk of a social category
of intellectuals then we need to refer to the social relations in which their work takes
place, just as we do with manual laborers or workers. Gramsci refers to the intellectuals
as a professional category with a specific function in society. Gramsci distinguishes
between two types of intellectuals: the organic and the traditional. Organic intellectuals
are those created by the development of a particular social class, providing
"homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in
the social and political fields" (1971, p.5). Traditional intellectuals are constituted by
those categories of intellectuals who are historically bound to a previous economic
structure. They are scholars, scientists, artists, and literary men. According to Gramsci, the traditional intellectuals "experience through an 'esprit de corps' their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification" on the basis of which "they put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group" (Ibid, p. 7). Though Gramsci's distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals is a useful one, his analysis of the traditional intellectuals is rather out of fashion. Because traditional intellectuals as a category are those who are bound by their origins to an earlier social formation, how they experience these roots is a question of ideology.

Since Gramsci stresses the complexity of the process of struggle, and the necessity for compromise and transformation to reshape society to new goals and purposes, his thinking is orthodoxy to cultural studies. Gramsci's work plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between the culturalist and structuralist paradigms. There is, however, some criticism over the application of this particular version of Marxism. McRobbie, for example, contends that Gramscian class dimensions of popular culture are identified with only male sections of the working class, thereby ignoring women (Hall, 1980, p. 38-39). Murdock and Golding (1979) attack the Gramscian approach, in its analysis of the relationships between cultural practices and the state, for ignoring the economic and market relations involved in the making of popular culture. Although Gramscian Marxist do not considered the sexual division of labour, cultural studies has dealt masculine topics extensively. Feminist studies have forced cultural studies to rethink its tendency to a class reductionism by raising the question of how to think of both the causes and the effects of the contradictions of gender. As a result, those studies have somewhat reshaped cultural studies' existing agenda.
I would like to summarize briefly Gramsci's main contribution to cultural studies. First, he emphasizes the positive formative function of ideology. Secondly, he makes apparent the way that ideology moves on different levels, from an academic level of logical discrimination to a largely emotional level of belief and superstition. Thirdly, he emphasizes the political role of intellectual institutions (e.g. media) in the winning of consent and the maintenance of hegemony. The most important contribution, however, is his providing of a bridge between the pessimism of structuralism and the optimism of culturalism. Ideological struggle is indeed for Gramsci an important facet of resistance, but it must be part of the larger political struggle for hegemony. Its theoretical openness has not been difficult to sustain until the emergence of profound challenge of feminism.

- Feminism and Ethnic Studies

The selective subscription of structuralism is crucial and influential to cultural studies. The most profound challenge to cultural studies, however, comes from the emergence of feminism (Ibid, p. 38). It challenges "the male-oriented models and assumptions and the heavily masculine subject-matter and topics which for long constituted the assumed terrain of cultural studies" (Ibid). Despite the complicated and contradictory histories of both feminism and cultural studies, they share some common grounds. First, they have a strong link with radical politics outside the academy (the feminist movement and left politics, for example). Secondly, on the basis of interdisciplinary tradition, they both challenge conventional academic boundaries and power structures. Both also focus on the analysis of forms of power and oppression, and on the politics of the production of knowledge within the academy, as well as elsewhere in society. Finally, they have challenged the conventions of academic practice. For example, they encourage students
to participate in various administrative decisions, such as curriculum changes and even syllabus construction.

Feminism's fundamental challenge is, however, that the issue of gender is almost excluded in cultural studies. Issues like male violence, sexuality and reproduction were introduced into academic agendas by feminists. These topics became subjects of study in their own right in sociology, anthropology, history and literature, as well as within cultural studies. Women in the CCCS wrote "Women Take Issue" (1978), and it highlights the need for cultural studies to engage with the personal dimensions of culture in the political context of a feminist analysis. Since then, the effect of feminism on cultural studies has had an increasing significance. For example, with the influence of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, feminism forces cultural studies to consider the issues of identity and subjectivity. Feminists theoriest address sexuality as well as gender: Mulvey (1975) and Heath (1978) on the construction of sexual identities; Coward (1984) on the issue of representation and ideology; Modleski (1983) and Radway (1984) on the analysis of narratives of romance; and Weeks (1985) on state regulation of sexual deviancy. Similarly, lesbian and gay issues are also beginning to be taken seriously within cultural studies.

Issues of race and ethnicity have also contributed to the development of cultural studies. As racial conflicts intensify in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and South Africa, the racial problematic is becoming more urgent on cultural studies's agenda. Cornel West (1988) argues that the ruling classes in late capitalist societies promote white supremacist logics embedded in their cultures. Afro-American Marxists, West criticizes, have been reductionistic in dealing with the oppression. They assume Afro-American oppression under the general rubric of working-class exploitation. This view
point is logocentric, West explains, in that it elides and eludes the specificity of Afro-American oppression outside the workplace. This viewpoint holds that Afro-American people are only subjected to general working-class exploitation owing to racial discrimination at the workplace (1988, p. 17-19). The complexity of racism cannot be interpreted with such a reductionistic view, according to West. By using Gramsci's hegemonic theory, he suggests three areas cultural studies should investigate the issue of race.

1. a genealogical inquiry into the discursive conditions for the possibility of the hegemonic European supremacist logics operative in various epochs in the West and the counterhegemonic possibilities available;

2. a microinstitutional analysis of the mechanisms that inscribe and sustain these logics in the everyday lives of Africans, including the hegemonic ideological production of African subjects, the constitution of alien and degrading normative cultural stylism, aesthetic ideals, linguistic gestures, psychosexual identities, and the counterhegemonic possibilities available;


Hall and his colleagues', in their book *Policing the Crisis* (1978), they analyzed the "moral panic" aroused by the "mugging crisis" following the Handsworth "mugging" in November 1972, and the ways the criminal and legal categories used to understand and control that crisis expressed the underlying ideology of white racism.

In *The Empire Strikes Back* (CCCS, 1982) Paul Giloy and his colleagues criticize the "pathologization" of race within race relations and sociology and the racism of some white feminist analyses. It also explores the importance of racist ideologies in both shaping aspects of state regulation in Britain, such as immigration law. Another area in cultural studies influenced by the study of ethnicity is the analysis of subcultural practices (Hebdige, 1979). Changes within left politics influence on the kinds of
political questions taken seriously within cultural studies. What has been seen as a crisis in left politics has led to a rethinking of political strategies, allegiances and agendas by some on the Left. In certain circles, this has contributed to a broadening of agendas, and a desire for stronger political alliances with other radical forces such as the women's movement, black politics, the green movement, and lesbian and gay liberation. The principal influences in the development of cultural studies and feminism make clear that both share a number of theoretical concerns.

The end of "Two Paradigms"?

Hall once argued that cultural studies "is no longer a dependent intellectual colony. It has a direction, an object of study, a set of themes and issues" (1980, p. 26). The original curriculum (Hoggart, Williams, and Thompson) provided the object of study, while the encounter with sociology (and break with the behavioralist tradition), including the structuralist tradition and the Gramscian version of Marxism, provided the dimensions of problematics and a complex materialist reading of culture. Symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and phenomenology helped cultural studies to move beyond the positivism of the behavioral tradition. The reworking of the Marxist tradition, especially by Gramsci and Althusser, helped to move beyond the base/superstructure metaphor of determinism to a more open conceptualization. This enabled an examination of culture without resorting either to transcendental values, essences or ideas or to individual creativity as the center of the system. These advantages promise to give us a purchase on contemporary issues, particularly the growing crisis of hegemony, and open up a whole new set of studies and practices. Hall recalls the effects:
If the ensuing disarray caused consternation in the sociological camp, it also released intellectual energies, set people free to undertake new kinds of work. Certainly, so far as cultural studies was concerned, it gave us a much-needed theoretical breathing-space. Its effect has been, in the long run, profoundly liberating, intellectually (1980, p. 26).

The emergence of feminism brought new areas of inquiry, such as the structuring principle of gender and issues of sexual difference and patriarchal relations. A theory of culture without the consideration of patriarchal structures of dominance and oppression would have been reductionistic. Feminism provides, Hall argues, a radical view of society. Hall is rather uncritical of feminism's view on culture. Despite the fact that both share some common grounds on culture and that feminism has broadened cultural studies's perspectives and areas of inquiry, both differ greatly on Marxism; feminism rejects most tenets of Marxism. Feminism takes the same position on Marxism as deconstructionism and postmodernism. The emergence of feminism actually signaled the second round of debate between culturalism and structuralism - modernism versus postmodernism. The final chapter discusses this debate.

The emergence of cultural studies has, of course, shaken British sociology since 1970s. In its methods, the assumed monopoly of quantitative methods has been broken, but technical advances in statistics and in their practical availability have ensured wider abuse. This tendency of abuse has its parallel in the U.S.. Ethnography has become a possible practice, although methodological discipline appears elusive. Watching people and talking with them without predefined categories for analysis seems to be legitimate but the fact that the researcher is not a neutral recording machine seems to be a problem.

In terms of its research practice, however, cultural studies has a different emphasis from mainstream sociology. The latter tends to ignore theory as a source for the generation of
research problems. On the contrary, cultural studies shares a theoretically self-conscious approach to research using theories of social structure to set the basic conceptual framework for empirical study of particular sites. This has generated more mature than those made possible within the mainstream sociology. In their book, *Policing the Crisis*, Hall, et al. (1978) placed one crime within the gradually expanding structural context of a crisis of hegemony from which it makes more sense than that which the "New Criminology" of labelling theory could generate.

Cultural studies so far can be summarily characterized, on its own terms, as a complex intellectual field constituted by the two main traditions of "culturalism" and "structuralism," cultural studies has developed within a critique of contemporary Marxisms, whose raison d'être has been the construction of a materialist, non-reductionist theory of culture motivated by the leading knowledge-constitutive interest of producing critical knowledges useful in helping to constitute popular emancipations. Before I examine the two paradigms, it is appropriate at this point to talk about the debate between culturalism and humanism.

The term humanism connotes elitism. It sometimes obscures analytical and political assessment. Since it overemphasizes the sensibility, the moral consciousness, and the validity of human experience, it tends to overestimate the transparency of sources and the purposive integration of human subjectivity and agency. Experiences, for example, are not unities and thus not always coherent. Nor do they have a privileged access to the nature of social reality. Thompson (1981) distinguishes between two senses of experience in order to comply formally with a more materialist criterion. One sense refers to the self-perception of individuals. The second is the wider sense that experience is also whatever socially impinges on self-perception (1981, p. 406). The
second sense requires, in a way the first does not, a materialist and causal analysis of society. The different senses are related but incommensurable. It seems to me that cultural studies prioritizes the second sense.

Richard Johnson (1981) argues that Thompson's work is fully culturalist in its presuppositions (1981, p.389). Similarly, Anderson (1980) diagnoses the Thompson's work as an involuntary "creeping culturalism" (1980, p. 82). Some critics (Johnson, 1981; Eagleton, 1987) criticize Williams's earlier version of culturalism as a classic form of idealistic reduction. Williams's early approach was class cultures. He offers a simple typology of cultures: bourgeois culture is individualistic but is modified by the idea of service; working-class culture, by contrast, revolves around collectivity and solidarity. In other words, this binary analysis produces results that are close to other idealist accounts of class elements in English culture.

Eagleton (1976) argues that Williams fails to perceive that the massing together of people is not just a condition of their oppression, but also, because of the contradictions of capitalism, a condition of their emancipation. Eagleton highlights Williams's confusion by substituting the word classes for masses to show that Williams's claim that masses is only a way of seeing people would serve to perpetuate the divisions in society by refusing to see them. Eagleton accuses Williams of shortchanging the people he set out to defend by trading "a theoretical instrument of revolutionary struggle" for "liberal humanitarianism" (1976, p. 13). In a later work, Keywords (1976), Williams appears to have been aware of this type of criticism. In his discussion of the concept of the masses in this context he acknowledged that there is an alternative use of the term in the revolutionary tradition where the masses are the subject of political action, rather than the object. Since the book is a kind of dictionary of various concepts, it was difficult to
me to figure out whether this recognition of a more revolutionary use of the term masses coincides with a change in his theoretical position.

What is "culturalism" anyway? It refers to a concern with cultural forms, ideas, and institutions which are not wholly under the influence of economic causality. For Marx, perhaps any form of culturalism is a fallacy, since experiences are given by class location, and institutional forms are derivative from an economic base. If we take such orthodox Marxism seriously, both Anderson's and Johnson's charges on Thompson's culturalist position are not completely correct. As mentioned above, Thompson analyzes cultural forms materialistically in his works, although he remains relatively at the level of cultural determinism, at which culture determines social being. Williams's culturalism adopts a strategic vision of socialist politics and treats cultural change as "the dominant front on which all energies should be concentrated" (Barnett, 1976, p. 95). Others have extended the term to characterize the preoccupation of Williams and other writers such as Thompson with class as culture, with the way in which structures are experienced or lived (Ibid). Johnson uses the term to classify all the elements in these writers' work.

Williams attempts to shift the Marxist theory of determination from a base/superstructure model to an organic process model. He sees society as a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures in political, economic and cultural formations. For example, in explaining the emergence of the mass media, Williams refutes any notion of determinacy by abstract structures of technology or economy. Instead, the technological emergence of television is explainable only in terms of certain purposes and practices that were intentionally acted upon. Television emerges from a socially shared awareness of mobility and change, conditions of a "structure of feeling" that sets the terms for its development. This complex interaction between structure (economic, social
determinants) and agency (cultural autonomy) points to the need for an adequate definition of culture. The term culture for Williams is a way of living within an industrial society. Culture is the lived experience of a people in institutions, practices, habits of everyday existence. Culture is not just ideological production, but embedded in material practices and lived experiences, as well. Since culture is an environment, a process and an hegemony in which individuals and their works are embedded, it has a concrete effectivity. The culturalist strand in cultural studies is interrupted by the arrival of structuralism on the intellectual scene.

There are many structuralist criticisms on culturalism (Screen, Spring 1977; New Left Review, No. 95, 1976; Hindess, 1975). The common mode of critique is derived from the work of Althusser. In general, structuralist theories push into the background the association between culture (or particular ideologies) and class and focus instead on the relation between ideology, as a general feature of historical societies, and mode of production as their determining base. Thus it mainly accuses culturalism of taking a class-reductionist view of culture-ideology.

Althusser's essay Ideological .... has been exhaustively criticized and none of the points made here are new. I can therefore be brief in recapitulating relevant criticisms. For Althusser, reproduction is a necessary contradictory and antagonistic process, as the functional necessity of a system. Reproduction is a function performed by ideology for capital through the state. The whole sphere of the ideological is subsumed within this function. Dominant ideology, organized especially through apparatuses like schools, works with all the certainty usually ascribed to natural or biological processes. Certainly, all sense of struggle or contradiction is lost in Althusser's bourgeois vision of ideology. Thompson (1976) provides the best critique of Althusser.
Althusser's writing, which I see as a mutation, or as a fully exposed development of idealism which uses certain Marxist concepts but which is attempting to wall up, totally, the empirical dialogue and the empirical criticism of those concepts. It ranks as a theology, and as between a theology and what I regard as the major tradition of Marx there can be very little common ground. Then what is at issue is reason itself: whether Marxism is a rational theory available to dialogue with evidence and open rational criticism. If it ceases to be such, then it is disreputable. It is not only disreputable, it is actively injurious. It will mislead all the time. Hence it is a question of principle to oppose this.... (1976, p. 18).

Thompson is resolutely anti-Althusserian. In that interview, Thompson explains that his dislike of structuralist Marxism is not a rejection of structural Marxism. Thompson obviously tries to avoid the charge that culturalism is a blunt instrument of criticism.

The most sustained criticism of Althusser is contained in William's *Marxism and Literature*. But the accusation of culturalism or structuralism is not so much an assertion of the validity of either structuralism or culturalism. Neither culturalism nor structuralism will constitute cultural studies completely. It is impossible to develop an adequate theory of culture-ideology from Althusserian positions. Culturalist accounts are also extremely vulnerable to aspects of the structural critique. Culturalism tends to ignore determinations that are not culture or experience. It tends to treat the authentic experimental text as the exclusive source of accounts. Certainly there are shared absences and problems in both traditions. In an essay on the absolutism inherent in both traditions, Johnson (1981) argues that culturalism neglects, for example, Marx's analysis of capitalism as a mode of the production of material life, while structuralism's representation of *Capital* is too simplistic and formal (1981, p. 395).

While the opposition has been destructively critical to each other, the long debate between the two, however, has raised many useful questions. Is culture too broad term to constitute a useful term of analysis? How can we distinguish between culture and non-culture? Can we speak of relatively homogeneous cultures that belong to particular
classes? Is it too simplistic to understand societies in terms of class relations alone? What about gender and race? These questions have to be answered with the best means available. One may continue to work within paradigms by considering more carefully the strengths and weaknesses of the two traditions. Within those major works of influence, Hall (1986) locates two primary views within cultural studies. Culturalism sees culture as threaded through all social practices, and as the sum of their interrelationships. The media, for example, are viewed in terms of how they are lived and experienced in structure. So it holds the concept of the active individual subject and attempts to locate the interests behind media practice. On the other hand, structuralism (Althusser) stresses signifying practices. It disagrees with culturalism over the place of experience. Structuralism tends to look at the individual subject as embedded in structured practices which they reproduce in their signifying practices. Although this division produced some healthy debates over theoretical and methodological issues, the division became an impediment to the development of cultural studies (1986, p. 45). Hall suggests a third position called "the mediation approach." This approach would combine culturalism's emphasis on the active agent with structuralism's emphasis on the unconscious areas that determine the individual agent. Hall suggests Gramsci's notion of hegemony as a possible synthesis of these two paradigms. In this view, the individual can be active in shaping history through struggle and at the same time be incorporated into a dominant structure (Ibid, p. 47-48).

Comparing the similarities and differences is perhaps not the most productive way of furthering the transformation of cultural studies. More fruitful would be further analysis and comparison of theoretical problematics such as the relevant but largely ignored theories of Bourdieu, Habermas, Bakhtin, and postmodernism. Some of them are of course closely related. Unfortunately, no academic disciplines cannot grasp the full
complexity of cultural processes. But if we are to be able to imagine cultural plurality, to understand the possible relations between cultural production and social power, and to see the historical dimensions of particular cultural developments, we have to sharpen and broaden our theoretical tools. Therefore, cultural studies must not only be interdisciplinary but producing counter-intellectual critique.

While those vigorous cultural theories are well theorized in Britain and Europe, those theories exist in the gaps and cracks in the American academic disciplines. In the field of communication, while British mass media studies, equipped with behavioral methodologies of American sociology, is seriously questioned by cultural studies, the behaviorist tradition's assumptions about the media industry in the U. S. is challenged by another critical tradition, the political economy. Schiller, Mosco, Smythe, and others have developed a radical institutional analysis of media industries. This political economy approach was then criticized by cultural studies for being economic determinism. In the field of communication, Larry Grossberg, a former student of the CCCS, has introduced and tried to transform British cultural studies in an American context. But in the attempt to transform, a critical edge is often lost. The following chapter examines the genesis of American cultural studies in relation to both British cultural studies and its own American studies in the 1960s.
Chapter III

The Genesis of American Cultural Studies

Agenda Setting

Again, the search for origins is tempting but illusory. Lawrence Grossberg (1983) suggests John Dewey's work is the founding discourse of American cultural studies. Determined by his philosophical commitment to pragmatism, Dewey argues, according to Grossberg, that meaning is worked out in transaction with the other. For Dewey, society exists not only by communication, but it exists in communication. In other words, the process of communication inevitably leads toward consensus, shared meaning, and community (1983, p. 41-42). He seems to understand better than most of us that communication has two contrasting definitions in the history of Western thought, a transmission view of communication and a ritual view of communication. He uses the conflict between these definitions as a source of creative tension in his work. This conflict led him into some of his characteristic errors. One serious flaw of Dewey's view, according to Grossberg, is his teleological view of culture, communication, and community. If the process of communication was not working, this could not be due to something inherent in the process itself but due to the external forces or structure blocking the flow of communication (Ibid).

To solve this problem, Dewey suggests putting the original processes back in circulation. Dewey believes that the cultural and political realms are describable as homologous or corresponding processes. Dewey's most significant contribution is,
however, the elucidation of the relations between forms of communication and forms of social life. He opens up the question of how texts relate to and distort reality (Carey, 1989, p. 13-14). But unlike Williams, he is politically optimistic and unable to conceptualize the relation between internal forces and external forces in the process of communication. Compared to Williams's influence on both British cultural studies and American cultural studies, Dewey's naturalistic idealism provided little direction for the concrete theoretical and interpretive practice of American cultural studies. But he has to be considered as a theorist in the course of the development of American cultural studies.

"American Studies as a Cautionary Example of Cultural Studies"

In his essay "The Problem of American Cultural Studies", O'Connor (1989b) seems to have a narrower view of the origin of American cultural studies than Grossberg's. He argues that "the idea of cultural studies in the U.S. is fairly new" and American cultural studies is discussed with particular references to Grossberg's postmodern theory of cultural studies. In the study of communication, it may be true that cultural studies has existed for only about 10 years against the claims of the more scientific effects tradition. Cultural studies in the study of communication, O'Connor argues (1989b, p. 407), has become synonymous with various types of postmodern theorizing. But, I believe that there are many other precedents for American cultural studies. Grossberg correctly points out that the American tradition of culturalism, developed out of the work of the Chicago School, has taken a very different path. This is the result of the particular marginalization of this tradition not only in social theory but in the study of communication as well. But I believe that there are various forms of interdisciplinary
work beyond the Chicago School. They can be identified with cultural studies and deserve scrutiny.

- **The American Studies Movement**

  Giroux et al (1985) identify various interdisciplinary programs: American Studies, Canadian Studies, Women's Studies, Afro-American Studies, and other ethnic studies. Giroux et al claim that they all failed, like the Chicago School, to produce the genuinely counter-disciplinary praxis (1985, p. 473). But I think that both Women's Studies and Afro-American Studies have been oppositional and established counter-disciplinary praxis, more successfully than Giroux and his colleagues recognized. I agree, however, that American Studies "should be regarded as a cautionary example to those who should try to establish cultural studies as an interdisciplinary enterprise within the academy" (1985, p. 476).

  As briefly mentioned above, the American Studies movement was in part a response to the disciplinary dogmatism and fragmentation of higher education in this century. American Studies emerged out of a desire to engage with and explain American culture as a unique phenomenon, and to explicate the diverse patterns and aesthetic forms of the American historical experience (Ibid). This project is reflected in the diverse theories of culture and methods of cultural study which characterize the American Studies movement. In his book, *The Search for a Method in American Studies* (1973), Cecil Tate writes that the original goal of American Studies was to study American culture more closely. He defines the new field in terms of "holism and myth." According to his theory of holism, a culture or a personality could be grasped by an effort of comprehension which insisted on a view of the whole as a whole. Tate's desire can be
found in Tremain McDowell's work, one of the founding fathers of the American Studies movement. McDowell (1948) writes:

The discipline of American Studies is the intellectual process whereby a student assimilates the complicated and often contradictory details of American civilization...whereby he fashions out of them a picture of these United States. In doing so, he reduced diversity to some degree of unity (1948, p. 33).

McDowell wants to establish coherence and order in what only appears to be diversity and conflict. He argues that only American Studies could promise to reconcile both the different disciplines and tenses - past, present, and future. His procedure is one of forging a synthesis on the level of intellectual inquiry. For McDowell, the ultimate goal of American Studies is social harmony.

Another example would be Richard Huber's 1954 essay, "A Theory of American Studies." Huber argues that the purpose of American Studies is to grasp reality as a whole and to analyze "the functional interrelationships between parts within the whole" (1954, p.264). According to him, there is a fundamental connectedness in American life and an organic unity to American culture. Thus, there is a subtle shift during these early years from attempts to synthesize the surface diversity of American culture to search for the internal functional links of an organically unified cultural whole. The goal of this exercise, as Roy Harvey Pearce writes, is to form an "integrated, genuinely holistic view" of American civilization (1957, p. 187).

The desire to represent the dynamics of the American experience in terms of continuity and consensus is not unique to American Studies. It is the dominant intellectual paradigm of the 1950s and one which could be linked to the general political and social conditions of the period. For example, American Studies had been very much in flux
with the same historical forces which constituted the period of American involvement of Vietnam. Women's liberation, civil rights and other movements also influenced the early American Studies movement.

- **American Studies's Relation to Other Disciplines**

In 1950s, a radical revision of previous social and cultural theory was changing the basic premises of intellectual inquiry. It was time that a theory of pluralism was conceptualized to interpret American society as a complex of interest groups which compete in the political arena. Topics of social/cultural theory that had been common before the WW II, such as political power or the nature of economic relations based on the classical political economy were becoming of less importance. Some economists, for example, found a new way of interpreting the substantial growth in the Western capitalist society. Conservatives, including Heilbroner, Machlup, Arrow, and McClosky (Curtis, 1989, p. 100-101) found new ways of conceptualizing which reject long-established classical political economy, but which at the same time are no longer bound by the Marxian tenets. They are interested in the labor process, the state, the world economic system, government, the private sphere, policy process, and leisure. They argue that economic institutions cannot be explained by the role of the rational individual. Thus, individual self-interest is replaced by several social groups with complex socio-economic determinants. Those conservatives seem to share some similarities with theorists of "pluralism" and "rational theory."

The fundamental reason for the continuity of pluralism is that there exists a broadly based normative consensus on core values. It is further claimed that ideology no longer functions in American society (Bell, 1960). In other words, ideology has come to represent American society's pluralistic nature. In criticizing the theory of pluralism,
Hall (1982) argues that although the approach is advanced as empirically grounded and scientific, it is nevertheless "predicted on a very specific set of political and ideological presuppositions." Hall continues:

These presuppositions, however, were not put to the test, within the theory, but framed and underpinned it as a set of unexamined postulates. It should have asked, "does pluralism work?" and "how does pluralism work?" Instead, it asserted "pluralism works" -- and then went on to measure, precisely and empirically, just how well it was doing (1982, p. 59).

For Hall, it is wrong to assume that no structural or class barriers exist in the U. S. to obstruct the "process of cultural absorption," resting on "a mixture of prophecy and hope" and dressed up as "pure science." The result of these dubious assumptions is that pluralists missed altogether the multitude of unabsorbed elements "still simmering in the American melting pot" (1982, p. 59-60).

The 1960s version of American Studies with its roots in literary criticism and underpinnings of pluralism, was altered and shattered by the upheavals of the Vietnam War era. Obviously liberalism, patriotism, and humanism suffered hard blows during the sixties. In the times of the ghetto rebellions, campus revolts, counter-culture upheavals, and anti-war movements, the internal American Studies debates over theory and method grew increasingly intense, and established procedures came under attack (See Leo Marx, 1979; Hall 1982). In addition to all political and social forces, there was bureaucratic marginalization due to the main academic response to marketing consideration within the university. Graff (1987) locates the chief reason for the failure of American Studies in a "dynamics of patterned isolation." American Studies as an interdisciplinary discipline was innovative and welcomed, according to Graff, but so isolated that its effects on the institution was minimal. It was merely added to the existing departments and fields, which did not have to adapt to it, quarrel with it, or
recognize its existence to any sustained degree. Perhaps a similar fate is waiting for cultural studies in the U.S.. Just as class, racial, and sexual minorities experience subordination and isolation, minor discourses may be subordinated and isolated by dominant discourses. As Foucault (1979) argues in his book *Discipline and Punish*, disciplines are often used as techniques of marginalization and exclusion.

Some innovators of American Studies, such as Leo Marx, admit that the concept of an interdisciplinary study of American culture should have been more boldly pursued, regardless of where the political implications would lead (Marx, 1979; Sklar, 1975). I would add to all the above reasons for failure that if those innovators had been convinced that ideology was a better term than myth, if they would have recognized the political categories of race, gender, and class not only in terms of themes, characters, and events, but of their very languages. American Studies surely would not be in quite the state of confusion that it is today, and a truly imaginative and demanding cultural studies would have been in place prior to the explosive events of the Vietnam War era. Today, American Studies is shifting its ground from utopian literary criticism to counter-interdisciplinary praxis. Jehlen (1986) argues that the ideological dimension of literary works has emerged as integral to their entire composition. The question of ideological criticism is taking over the older "myth and symbol" school of American Studies.

Another important development has been the education of American critics in European theories of culture, which includes a complex tradition of ideological theory. As a result, it is possible for American Studies to locate itself at the site of the intersection between semiotics and the theory of ideology.

The root of American cultural studies can be found in various discourses: Dewey's pragmatism, Weber's cultural scientism into natural science, the tradition of symbolic
interactionism, American Studies. Unfortunately, they have lost the sharper edges of Weber's emphasis on domination, authority, and conflict. Although both British and American cultural studies have been forming in quite different conditions, they are influenced by the debate over popular culture and the work of Williams, Hoggart, Thompson, and Weber. Both have drawn on symbolic interactionism, though in somewhat different ways; a radically simplified explanation suggests British cultural studies stresses the analysis of subcultures and the problem of deviance, while the American version is interested in a generalized model of social action.

The influence of structuralism in American cultural studies has been limited by the conflict with powerful formalisms provided by information theory and transformational linguistics. British cultural studies has been imported in the field of communication, for example, by Grossberg and Fiske. Grossberg, a former student of the CCCS, argues that cultural studies must be practiced within a specific context - British cultural studies cannot provide an adequate theoretical basis for an American context. Meanwhile, Hall argues that American cultural studies has been successful in finding the origins and insights into culture, but fails to consider power, dominance, subordination, and ideology as central issues (1986b). American cultural studies needs to face the fact that societies are structured not only by communication, but by relations of power and dominance.

- Ideology in American Cultural Studies: Escape from Ideology?

As mentioned above, while the idea of culture was present in the American Studies Movement from the beginning, the question of ideology - all culture is inescapably ideological - has become an issue only recently (e.g. Bercovitch and Jehlen's 1986 article on ideology in American literature). Before I focus on ideology, I would like to
expand Hall's claim about ideology in American cultural studies. Ideology is certainly not a popular term in the U. S.. This anti-ideology attitude, in my view, is closely related to the broad American hostility to socialism and the lack of left organizations. There are two different conclusions from two books and one book entitled "The end of ideology." They are Raymond Aron (1962), Seymour Martin Lipset (1963), and Daniel Bell (1960).

Among them, Bell is the most elaborate and consistence with the premises of "the end of ideology." He declares that "ideology, which was once a road to action, has become a dead end" (1960, p. 370). Bell compares ideology to religion; ideology is religion's successor, appealing to the same sort of faith, passion and irrationality. But, unlike Gramsci who draws strong parallels between religion and ideology, Bell draws the definitional boundaries of both very tightly, and the validity of his approach depends heavily on an distinction between the decline of ideology and the decline of "old ideologies" - principally Nazism and Soviet Communism.

Although his argument about "the end of ideology" is primarily semantic, I would argue that the thesis does contain some substantive assumptions. But his attempt to restrict the concept of ideology and even to eliminate it from Western society is based on questionable premises. Ideology is reduced to an mere challenge to totalitarian political thinking. According to Hannah Arendt (1973), since totalitarian politics became associated, in the post-war decades, with the Soviet Union, "the end of ideology" thesis often amounts to a thesis about the end of Marxism. As a result, ideology is not relevant to advanced industrial societies (1973, p. 471). The other assumption is that it is possible to contrast ideology with science. Science here appeals to empirical observation and a rigid separation of fact from values. Typical of this assumption are
two articles on ideology in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Ed Shils (1968) allows that advances in scientific knowledge have been influenced by ideological thinking. But the progress of science involves an exclusion of ideology. For, he continued,

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science is not and never has been part of an ideological culture.
Indeed, the spirit in which science works is alien to ideology....
In so far as the social sciences have been genuinely intellectual
pursuits, which have their own rules of judgement and observation
and are open to criticism and revision, they are antipathetic to
ideology (1968, p. 74).
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In the second article, Harry Johnson (1968) argues that "ideology consists of only of those parts or aspects of system of social ideas which are distorted or unduly selective from a scientific point of view" (1968, p. 77). This definite and positive view is naturally under heavy attack. To Gramsci, the science/ideology dichotomy is a form of vulgar Marxism in which virtually any aspect of contemporary society is symptom of bourgeois ideology (1971, p. 375-377). Thus, the dichotomy reduces all social and political arguments to the status of mere propaganda. Although theorists from the Frankfurt School have their own theoretical problems concerns ideology (too much emphasis on ideology), they rightly argued that it is difficult to construct any empirical analyses without imparting some kind of ideological bias. Although American social sciences have not been all value-free, the role of ideology is often marginalized, as Hall argued, by pluralism. This does not mean that pluralism is necessarily false or mistaken, but rather that it does not have the obvious authority that would attend a descriptive or factual statement about what is pluralism making a statement.

It is difficult for me to step out of the ideological circle. I am not saying that ideology is the only condition in the production of a product, that we are dupes of ideology. Other conditions, such as class or gender position of producers, conditions in consumption,
and textual forms of representation should be examined in the production process. What I am suggesting is that the theory of "the end of ideology" is wrong and the theory of ideological bias may be right for the logics of that moment. But again, there is danger that the latter would neglect the wide range of possibilities in cultural forms (production - text - consumption). It is reductionistic to claim that we need only trace an idea to its source to declare it "ideological." Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand ideology before criticizing it and also adopts a self-reflexive attitude towards its own premises. It is also important to preserve the critical potential of a theory of ideology by linking it with analyses of control and domination. It is thus worthwhile to reconsider the concept. The next chapter discusses the importance of ideology and its role and problems in mass communication.
Chapter IV

Ideology Reconsidered

The end of ideology or ideology without end?

There is no social practice outside of ideology (Hall, 1985, p. 103).

Theories of Ideology in the Marxist Tradition

Why are so many writers devoted to the concept of ideology? Why do they put so much time on redefining and modifying this concept of ideology? Is there any way to escape from ideology? These questions may not be answered at a propositional level. Instead we must discover the strategies, motivations and interests that constitute Marxist discourse. For Marxist thought the element of ideology is inserted in a discourse whose purpose is the interpretation of texts. Texts, broadly defined, are messages that have a physical existence of their own, whether in written or transmitted form. Thus, ideology arises in communication—conceived as the space where the exchange of meanings or information takes place. Ideology then is present both in the production and reception sides of the communication situation. As Grossberg (1984) notes, "consequently, the investigation of the text is divided into questions of encoding—the relation between production and text—and decoding—the relation between text and consumption or reception" (1984, p. 393).

Theories of ideology function in a Marxist interpretation of texts in terms of encoding and decoding. The analysis of ideology in the mass media involves what Grossberg calls a "politics of textuality," i.e., the purpose of Marxist interpretation is to describe the way texts are "produced by, inserted into, and function within the everyday lives of
concrete human beings so as to reproduce or transform structures of power and
domination" (Grossberg, 1984, p. 393). As mentioned above, interpretive analysis
conducted by critical studies treats texts as embodiments and reflections of social reality
at the level of material practice. The purpose of interpreting media messages, for
example, is not simply to find the meanings that they produce, but to show how this
production of meaning is connected with underlying social processes. Before turning to
the concrete application of the concept of ideology to the practices of the media, it is
necessary first to examine the general theory of ideology in Marxist thought. I look at
this theory by examining how the different approaches (political economic, culturalist,
structuralist) have defined the concept of ideology by using Grossberg's (1984) three
categories of Marxist interpretation: the classical approach, the hermeneutics approach,
and the discursive approach.

It is at this point necessary to narrow the field and to look at the problem of Marxist
ideology in its particular form. Many scholars who had become used to working on
culture/ideology within the earlier British tradition, have had to face the challenge of the
work of the Althusserians. The problems are posed in the relations, apparently
overwhelmingly antagonistic, between two broad tendencies in the analysis of
culture/ideology. Both traditions are Marxist or Marx-influenced. On the one hand
there is the older British tendency, formed the break from Leavisite literary criticism and
economistic Marxism (the classical approach), concerned primarily with the analysis of
the history of cultural traditions, class experiences, or literary texts (the hermeneutics
approach). The other tendency is still more diverse than the prior one. The confluence
of critical theories include the linguistics of Saussure, the structural anthropology of
Lévi-Strauss, and the epistemological concerns of traditional French philosophy,
specifically Althusser. This position is known as structuralist (the discursive approach).
Within Marxist theories of culture and society, the concept of ideology has been intensively explored. Traditional political economy of Marxist thought interprets society in terms of a base/superstructure model. According to this model, ideology is the production and dissemination of erroneous beliefs whose inadequacies are socially motivated. This approach assumes that texts are collections of representations that can be isolated from the text and looked at as ideological interpretations of reality, i.e., "they are motivated by and function to protect the class interests already structured into the economic relations of capital" (Grossberg, 1984, p. 394).

According to Mattelart, ideology produces signs that serve to mask "real conditions" (Mattelart, 1979, p. 117). In other words, the dominant class has the ability to invert signs and distribute images in such a way that the other classes are duped into accepting them as reality. Here, the question of textuality is side-stepped altogether. As Golding and Murdock (1979) suggest, the media is ideological to the extent that it is comprised of large corporate structures tied to the dominant economic mode of production (1979, p. 211). The question of ideology therefore cannot be explained except in reference to the media's function as "big business." The media's ideological role is simply the legitimization of wealth and power. Garnham (1983) is cautious of any textual approach that grants autonomy to the realm of signification or to the decoders of that realm. Instead, he insists that the producers and consumers of the media are positioned by their material conditions of existence (1983, p. 321). In other words, their relation to the media is structured by their economic position.
For Smythe (1960, 1984) and Schiller (1976, 1981) media is deliberately deployed in support of the dominant political-economic system. Ideologies are consciously produced falsehoods that serve the purposes of a particular group. Their approach is known as "conspiracy theory" and, this approach seeps into their evaluation of the media, according to Alan O'Connor (1988). These approaches to ideology arise from a previous commitment to the base/structure model. Ideology is based on false consciousness, which is based on the production of error by class interests, which is based on the dominant economic system.

Like political economy, Critical Theory of Frankfurt School, with the exception of Habermas, seeks to find direct relations between cultural texts and social/economic realities. Within this theory, ideology is analyzed within the context of dialogical communication in the public sphere. Thus, ideology tends to be interpreted in grand terms, as a function of a political and philosophical world-view. Adorno (1975) conceives of ideology as concealment. In other words, he regards ideology as an inescapable and totalizing system of domination. According to Habermas, however, the primary ideological functioning of the media occurs not at the level of propaganda, but in the use of distorted language. Mass communication is distorted in that it represses the intentional and normative aspects of discourse in favor of content. Groups in society, unable to articulate their interests due to linguistic constraints are prone to adopt media content as a given. This distortion of language is not intentional in the sense that ruling classes impose coercive propaganda on the audience. Rather, the distortion is due to the structuring of communication based on the commitment of society to a techno-instrumental cognitive interest. Habermas tends to conceive of ideology as opposed to
truth, evident in his attempt to find an "ideal speech situation" free of domination (Habermas, 1981).

- "The Hermeneutics Approach"

In this approach, the function of texts the production of representations is given a more positive and important position in Marxist theory. As Grossberg (1984) states:

Texts reveal their social significance, not on the surface of images and representations, but rather, in the complex ways that they produce, transform and shape meaning-structures. Texts orchestrate social reality, producing a symphonic experience which is not reducible to the cumulative contributions of each social determination. A text is not a simple reflection of a social reality, even a distorted one, nor is it a reflex response to the material conditions of its production (1984, p. 399).

On ideological statements, Raymond Williams characterizes the main positions on ideology. He criticizes the position because such a view is based in a dualist materialism which separates ideas and material reality. Williams defines ideology as a "general term to describe not only the products but the processes of all signification." He believes that some sense of this general use of the term must be maintained, for "the practical links between ideas and theories and production of real life are all in [the] material social process of signification itself." It is therefore,

an open question whether 'ideology' and 'ideological,' and ideological with their senses of abstraction and illusion, or their senses of ideas and theories, or even their senses of systems of beliefs or of meanings and values, are sufficiently precise and practicable terms for so far-reaching and radical a definition (1977, p. 71).

Williams seems to avoid the traps of reflection theory and of the science/ideology dichotomy by putting the theory of ideology into the terms-'structure of feeling' and 'hegemony.' The dominant "structure of feeling" defines the experiential context in
which encoders and decoders of messages are grounded. This general structure is a lived system of meanings and values which is a referent point for the production and reception of media texts. Williams simply rejects reductionism by emphasizing a process model. This process is a complex of practices, practices which are at once formative of a general social condition and which take their effectivity from the general structure of meanings and values. In other words, if the term ideology is to be retained it must be seen as the result of human practice. In the simplest terms, Williams wishes to link cultural texts with social reality by conceiving of both as mediated through "structures of feeling."

- "The Discursive Approach"

This approach reverses the experiential basis of ideology and challenges with the hermeneutics approach precisely on the place of "experience" and "agency." In the discursive approach, textuality is a practice that produces experience. Thus, experience does not mediate between culture and society, but rather is the product of cultural practices. For structural Marxists such as Althusser, texts are not made by subjects (agents); instead subjects are made by texts:

> It is this power of the text to locate the subject by producing its intertextual domain of experience that becomes the object of critical interpretation... The issue is not so much the particular knowledge of reality (true or false, mystified or utopian) which is made available, but the way in which the individual is given access to that knowledge and consequently empowered or de-powered. (Grossberg, 1984, p. 409)

Althusser recognizes the importance of the mode of production in determining the nature of society. But rather than arguing that the mode of production is a base that unilaterally determines the rest of the superstructure, he argues that society is comprised of a variety
of interrelated social and intellectual activities or practices, including the economic, the political, and the ideological (Althusser, 1971). These different practices comprise the social formation.

Economic practice involves the mode of production for the nature of productive forces and the relations of production. Political practice describes social relations and forms of social organization. Economic and political analyses are therefore concerned with the nature and relations of power expressed in particular economic and social systems. Ideological practice refers to systems of representation (images, myths, ideas), in which individuals experience their relation to their material (economic and political) world (Hall, 1985, p.103). Althusser's view is often criticized for being unable to substantiate science over ideology, and for reducing ideology to a vague transhistorical formation which forever dooms the subject to the status of "social dupe." Critics of Althusser claim that his notion of ideology is too general (Hall, 1985; Clark et al, 1980). Nonetheless, the basic terms of his understanding of ideology have important implication. Because Althusser defines ideology in terms of both systems of representation and individuals' relations to their material world, his theories have been used in film, media, and cultural studies. The relative autonomy of ideological practice in this context points to the importance of studying modes of representation and recognizing that they are socially determined, but are not simple or direct reflections of dominant class interests understood strictly in economic terms.

Hall, who has been influenced by both Williams and Althusser, conceives of ideology as a site of struggle over meanings. Thus, he does not seek to find the origins of ideology, but rather attempts to describe its concrete effects. Hall insists that the point of ideological criticism is not to find unadulterated truth or unbridled manipulation
"beneath" or "behind" a given text or system of representation, but to understand how a particular system of representation offers us a way of knowing or experiencing the world (O'Connor, 1988, a lecture note). Although there are differences between the hermeneutics approach and the discursive approach, they share some common assumption: (1) they insist that ideology has a determinancy or autonomy of its own, (2) they insist on the relation between cultural-ideological and other processes, (3) both are opposed to an idealism, and (4) both identify their object of study as history or as historical. These points of agreement constitute the claims of both these traditions to be Marxist (Bennette, et. al., 1986).

**Ideological Criticism of Media**

As indicated above, ideology involves a complex set of practices and relations. Ideological analysis therefore includes a variety of procedures and methods that may emphasize different aspects of the individuals/systems of representation/social formation network. A cultural form such as television provides a crucial arena for ideological analysis because it represents the intersection of economic-industrial interests, a system of texts, and a leisure-entertainment activity. Marxist scholarship on mass communication, especially before 1980, tends to provide an economic and institutional analysis of media systems within the orthodox Marxist tradition (classical Marxist approach).

However, there has been growing interest in a text-oriented ideological criticism within cultural studies, especially at the CCCS that examines television as an ideological practice. With this emphasis, critics attempt to examine the effects of the text as defined by its existence within a network of other practices which it both enables and is enabled by (Grossberg, 1984, p. 418). They share the position of Benjamin that the focus of all
critical work should be to place "the text in its context" (1969, p. 252). The text produces the context of its interpretation, but is at the same time produced by its context. Text and context are not related externally, but rather the context appears in fragmented form in the text; they occupy the same space. For example, television texts are analyzed in terms of their context of production. They take final form through a long constraining process of negotiating between artist, producer and executive.

Marxist thought locates a number of practices in television that they classify broadly as ideological. First, television creates a visual culture in which literalness, the visible, becomes the exclusive domain of rational discourse. This is accomplished through the segmentation of experience, the reliance on banality and sentimentality, stereotypical portrayals of sight and sound, and a linear conception of time (Aronowitz, 1981, p. 249). Here, ideology functions in what Althusser labels the production of 'subjectivity'. It is not the content of this television output that requires a change, it is the semantic logic that it employs. Althusser's critique of the cultural approach's (the hermeneutics approach) reliance on experience as primary is supported by this ideological function of the media, for in adaptation, experience itself is produced (Hall, 1985, 103). Second, as Benjamin sees it, the mass media provides a displaced, mediated experience (1969, p. 103). It is not so much experience that is communicated, but rather information, which is context free, and coded experiences devoid of an affect structure. The discourse of television lessens the intensity of experience. It serves to create a discourse of spectacle; a society of spectacle is least disturbed by the interference of autonomy (Ellul, 1980, p. 10). Here, ideology does not produce consciousness and action based on that consciousness. Its effect is just the opposite; discourse is produced as simply discourse. Its effect is that it has no effect. This ideological function does not produce thoughts in the heads of viewers but subjectivity itself (Hall, 1983).
The weaknesses of the theories of ideology show up in their concrete application. Starting from a foundational theory of ideology allows one to use this theory as an explanation for any phenomenon. However, one starts in the middle of things and examines practices in their historical specificity, then a local theory of ideology is articulated - the theory is articulated from the empirical evidence. A comparison between the work of McCluhan and Grossberg may help to clarify the distinction between local theory and total theory. McCluhan (1962) develops a global theory of the media as structuring consciousness. He presents his theory as a grand scheme of the history of communicative modes, in which forms of existence are effects of forms of media. Ultimately, McCluhan develops a "system of deduction" that purports to explain social behavior and to direct this behavior toward a utopian social network of consciousness.

On the contrary, Grossberg (1984) begins, not with a total theory of media or human consciousness, but instead focuses on specific practices that involve particular groups of individuals. For example, he studies the practices of popular music forms and their relation to the practices of youth. Grossberg's analysis is a picture of how a localized marginal group has been defined and controlled through the instrumentality of domains of knowledge and power. Grossberg's work, however, should not be taken to be a "celebration" of concrete facts over abstract theory, or as indicative of "a denial of knowledge," according to Smart (1985, p.61). In other words, a local theory should not be taken to mean that its qualities are those of a naive or primitive empiricism.

Foucault also believes that what the local theory indicates in reality is an autonomous non-centralized kind of theoretical production. It is to say that one's validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of thought (1980, p. 81).
The local approach of ideology attempts to operate as a critique of forms of power that produce controlled domains of knowledge, truth and consciousness; to retrieve forms of subjugated knowledge, and not to be a programmatic attempt to define what must be done. These three aims may be unified in that they are carried out from a common discursive position. Ideology is a condition of all discourse, which is formed in confrontation with other practices (both discursive and non-discursive) and exists as the embodiment of power. Ideological theories within Marxist thoughts do not look for the origins of ideology, but rather at its concrete effects (Johnson, 1982). In examining ideology we are led to ask a series of questions: Who is speaking? From what site, institutional or otherwise, are they speaking? How is their authority won? How have they won access to this expression? Ideological analysis does not try to find ideological contents underlying media messages, but to understand how a particular system of representation offers us a way of knowing or experiencing the world:

What was at issue was no longer specific message-injunctions, by A to B, to do this or that, but a shaping of the whole ideological environment: a way of representing the order of things which endowed its limiting perspectives with that natural or divine inevitability which makes them appear universal, natural or coterminous with reality itself (Hall, 1982, p. 65).

In sum, ideological analysis describes particular media constructions (programs, formats, genres, etc.) in order to analyze their position within a domain of knowledge interconnected with power relations, interests, and desires. This analysis might lead to the examination of a particular text or to the description of a common discursive pattern across text. It might lead to an examination of the production situation in media, organizational codes, the techniques and strategies of media practice that become embodied in its modes of communication and information. As an interpretive analytic,
this approach is not so much concerned with the real meanings of these media constructions, but rather with the manner in which they become places in which meanings can be inserted. These texts are described in their effectivity. The starting point of such an analytic might be a particular perceived effect. Media constructions are not simply products. Their effectivity, the manner in which they are problematized by various groups, are part of their discursive relations and thus define their textuality. This chapter proceeds to examine how ideological analysis has been applied to different contexts.

As mentioned above, ideological analysis is not a simple or self-evident practice, even when various levels or moments of ideological meaning work more or less together in the course of a given TV program. At the same time, the production of multiple ideological positions can be seen in terms of programming practices, as individual episodes and programs are situated within program flow. Since the texts are juxtaposed and segmented, those ideological positions flow unceasingly from program to program. The texts are regulated through various kinds of repetition - the same shows in the same position within the weekly schedule, genres, and so forth. In this context, a given program may develop variable perspectives and issues over time. Within a single episode, evening, or season of television, the ideology of particular programs may emerge as variable, or even contradictory. There is a growing body of books and articles in journals and anthologies that offer ideological analyses of television programs. The following paragraphs review three studies which offer ideological perspectives.
On the Popular Novel

In his analysis of "Narrative Structure in Fleming," Eco (1981) argues that the Bond novels exhibit an invariant plot structure consisting of a series of moves through which the relationships between the principal characters are developed. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, Eco analyzes the plot structure of the novels and its effects on the 'average reader'. His purpose is to look below variations in story and narrative to detect a set of underlying rules governing the organization of plot elements. Eco argues, at the level of plot, that the Bond novels are structurally uniform. The main characters in the Bond novels are motivated by the functions assigned to them, functions which he likens to a series of moves required by the rules of a game. He identifies nine such moves, present in all the novels but not necessarily in the same sequence:

A. "M" gives a task to Bond.

B. The villain appears to Bond.

C. Bond gives a first check to the villain, or the villain gives a first check to Bond.

D. The girl shows herself to Bond.

E. Bond possesses the girl or begins her seduction.

F. The villain captures Bond in either simultaneously or at different moments.

G. The villain tortures Bond and, sometimes the girl.

H. Bond beats the villain, killing him or his representatives, or helping at their killing.

I. Bond, convalescing, possesses the girl, whom he then loses; she either leaves him or is killed by the villain.
Eco combines this plot analysis with a Lévi-Straussean analysis of a series of binary oppositions which governs the relations between the principal characters and provides the structural co-ordinates for the system of ideological meanings at work in the novels. These binary oppositions take the form of a series of opposing values which are superimposed on the relations between the various characters: Free World/Soviet Union; Great Britain/non-Anglo-Saxon nations; duty/sacrifice; cupidity/ideals; love/death; chance/planning; luxury/discomfort; loyalty/disloyalty. Eco's primary interest centers on the way these opposing values are organized around the relations between Bond and the villain. Bond represents all those values which are positively ranked. He stands for Great Britain and the Free World, places the service of ideals above self-interest (cupidity), is sexually normal, embodies the virtues of loyalty and duty and relies upon chance and improvisation in his contest with the villain. The villain typically represents all those values which are negatively ranked. He is sexually perverse (i.e., impotent, neuter or homosexual), places self-interest above all ideals, does not recognize any claims of duty or loyalty, carries a taste for luxury, and so on.

These contrasting qualities are also subject to a distinctive ideological organization in that all the positive values, through their association with Bond, are thereby also associated with England and the West. The consequence is that, as the contest between Bond and the villain is worked through and resolved, a series of collateral ideological contests is also worked through and resolved as all the positive values, articulated to the Free world/Anglo-Saxon axis of signification, triumph over the negative values articulated to the Soviet Union/non-Anglo-Saxon axis of signification. It is by working a set of contemporary ideological references into the system of elementary oppositions
governing the structure of the fairytale, Eco argues, that the Bond novels achieve their considerable ideological potency.

Eco interprets the Bond-M pair as a dominated-dominant relationship. M assigns Bond his task and thereby sets events moving. M also represents knowledge in relation to Bond's ignorance. Finally, M represents those values which most forcefully articulate an ideology of Englishness: the values of duty, country, method and measure. Such are the plot elements of the Bond novels. It is, according to Eco, the foregone nature of their conclusions that explains the pleasure the Bond novels afford the average reader. He likens the position of such a reader to that of a football spectator who knows not only the rules of the game but also the outcome of the particular match. There are, however, some aspects of the novels which pass unnoticed by the average reader. The sophisticated reader is distinguished and interpellated as a subject of culture and knowledge. The Bond novels thus become, for such a reader, a medium for the exchange of cultural values between author and reader.

The ideological perspective assumes that a cultural text offers a particular construction of the world. In other words, ideological criticism examines texts and viewer-text relations to clarify how the meaning and pleasures generated by the cultural text express specific social, material, and class interests. Eco's study focuses on the systematic meanings and contradictions embodied in textual practices; with the Bond novel, familiar narrative and generic structures orient our understanding of what we read and naturalize the events and stories.
• On Scientific Serial Drama

Fiske (1984) examines the cultural meanings of Doctor Who, the most ongoing fictional program ever aired by the British Broadcasting Corporation. Fiske interprets the meanings that Doctor Who might hold for its audience by examining its various discourses - politic, moral, economic, and individualistic - and by comparing its version of reality to the realities of its audience. The essay argues that there are certain relations between how humans make sense of symbolic texts and their own realities. Fiske suggests that one of the functions of texts and of discourses is to enable readers to use them as metaphors of their own similar, but more complex, real-life experiences. Fiske seems to agree with Althusser's position that society is comprised of a variety of interrelated social and intellectual activities or practices, including the economic, the political, and the ideological.

Fiske's analysis of Doctor Who, Eco's analysis of the Bond novels, suggests that the program portrays the strength of many of society's strongly held traditional values. Through analysis of the metaphorical presentations of the discourses of good and bad, democratic and autocratic, Fiske proposes a unique system for understanding the process between the text, the reader, and the culture which produces theory. Text and social experience are made understandable - for both the reader and the scholar - only through such analyses of discourse.

• The News Magazine Program

In his analysis of Good Morning, America, a live news magazine program, Feuer (1983) shows how the intimacy of this mode of address works to construct a complicity between presenter and viewer that provides a televisual way of experiencing the
ideology of the family; the intimacy of the address recognizes and constructs the
domesticity of the viewing subject as the appropriate site where meanings are made and
thus as a selector of the discourses which constitute those meanings. According to
Feuer, this construct of unity in the program also works to construct an equivalent unity
in the viewing subject. He finds that David Hartman's mode of address in *Good
Morning, America* works similarly to identify viewers with him in a way that produces
a comprehensive unity in diversity:

- For - at least in the case of *Good Morning, America* - the mode
  of address is to a great extent its ideological problematic.
- It would not be accurate to say that the show carries certain
  ideologies which the viewer may then accept or reject.
- *Good Morning, America's* mode of address both produces and
  reproduces its ideological problematic of family unity and national

Hartman acts as the father of the *Good Morning, America* family, sitting in his fictional
living room and linking, through his person, in an electronic circuit, people in various
parts of America whom he interviews on television monitors. The close-up device
obscures the actual space separating Hartman and interviewee, much as we, in our living
rooms, are made to feel part of Hartman's space by the mode of address and the reality-
effects of liveness of the line broadcast. But Hartman mediates all discourse.

According to Feuer, we are positioned by the way the apparatus functions, so as to be
sutured into Hartman's space, participating in this way in the ideology of national and
family unity. "Television," Feuer concludes, "in its liveness, its immediacy, its reality,
can create families where none exist."

As these studies have shown, underneath schematic tales, there lies an actual text which
consists of a complex set of social and political contradictions of specific historical
moments (i.e, *Bond* novels in the Cold War period). The dominant ideology manages
to affirm itself as the truth, embodied by the good guys in the popular narrative, but the fact that this fantasy is designed to be sold to those outside the ruling classes, far removed from positions of social and economic power, can never be forgotten or ignored by the mechanism of the text. Ambivalences and contradictions are structured into the popular texts. A close analysis brings out ideological complexities and exposes the way in which a hegemonic ideology can draw in those outside of the status-quo.

This chapter discusses how the principles of this approach can be applied to a research question.

The goal of ideological analysis is not to have the last words about cultural forms, to close them off from further analysis by exhausting their meaning or significance (as if that could be done). Ideological analysis rather seeks to open cultural focuses up, to map out some of their historical, economical, aesthetic, and cultural features within ideological perspectives. The point of ideological analysis is not to find unadulterated truth or unbridled manipulation beneath or behind a given text or system of representation, but to understand how a particular system of representation offers us a way of knowing or experiencing the world. This approach is concerned with texts as social processes and as social products. Given television's prominent position in contemporary social life, its dense network of texts, and its pervasive effects on a large consumer culture, it constitutes a prominent sphere of contemporary ideological practice. It is therefore a clearly important albeit complex, task to subject the medium to ideological investigation.

Again, the most visible problem of ideological analysis would be a lack of concrete tools for concrete analysis. Most of the criticisms of ideological analysis are familiar. It is possible, therefore, to be quite brief (see Hirst, 1977; Coward & Ellis, 1977). Three
main problems of ideological analysis can be drawn: the problem of the preferred level of abstraction; the tendency, associated with this, to radically simplify the social formation; the slide into a functionalist account of ideological social relations. There is a possibility that the "sheer matter-of-factness" of everything on television, its tendency to reduce all events to trivia, can promote generalized indifference and cynicism in the viewer (Corcoran, 1984). The desensitization and detachment of the spectator, resulting from the passive nature of television viewing, suggests that television, in continually announcing that it cannot be taken very seriously, weakens the ideological effect at the very point of reception in the spectator. This possibility warrants closer inspection.

The locus of attention in ideological criticism on television research is not the relationship between the dual poles of television programs and television audiences. Rather, it attempts to understand the significance of a news broadcast, a sitcom, or an episode of soaps. One must interpret the text as inextricably enmeshed in the social, cultural, and historical conditions of the lives of its audience. I think ideological criticism is a significant intervention in American media theory because it asks questions of the media that previous paradigms have ignored. However, like all manipulatory theories of culture, its weakest link is its impoverished conceptualization of the construction of individual consciousness within the total ideological process. One strategy for strengthening the link would be to insist that concrete social individuals are always already constructed as class-ed, sex-ed and age-ranked subjects, have already entered into complex cultural forms, and have already formed a complex subjectivity.

Cultural studies is certainly concerned with the ideological role of the media, rather than a stimulus-response model. It defines the media as a major cultural and ideological force within the dominant position. It treats texts as bearers of meaning and analyzes them in
terms of complex linguistic and ideological structuration. The early work of the CCCS created the framework for media studies. Since cultural studies stresses on subjectivity and individual experience, the concept of the passive and undifferentiated audience has no place in the CCCS (Hall, 1980, p. 118). Instead they were interested in the relation between media messages and audience to see how messages are encoded and how audiences decode messages differently (encoding/decoding). They are also concerned about broader questions regarding mass media. Cultural studies argues that the media plays the role of securing dominant ideological definitions and representations. This concern leads cultural studies to analyze news and current affairs programs to see how messages are structured and how they circulate dominant social definitions. Some members, such as Morley (1980, 1986), Brundson (1978), Hobson (1982), explore the new methods to analyze news oriented programs. They organize ways of conceptualizing the complex relations between the media, politics, class, and society. Since then, there have been countless new theoretical positions on media studies that are not unified. In addition to the ideological perspective, cultural studies has to look at other conditions of cultural processes, such as specific conditions of consumption or reading. The next chapter will examine how those other conditions are considered along with ideology in media practices.
Chapter V

Media Studies in Cultural Studies

Critical versus Administrative: A Critical View

Mass communication study is in "ferment." It has tried to reconcile a longstanding conflict between the administrative school and the critical school or vice versa (a dichotomy between criticism and empiricism seems to be more pervasive). They have argued over a choice of areas, problems and objects of study, and the strategic aims and valuations of study (Allen, 1987, p. 8). On the one side, the empirical tradition, especially in American empirical mass communication research, carries out its analytic within the space created by the methodological individualism of the 19th century social sciences (Comte, Darwin). In turn, this social scientific matrix of disciplines is situated in the "epistemological fracturation of knowledges" in the natural sciences, social science, humanities (Hall, 1980, p. 117). The empirical mass communication research imports methods and theories from the social science disciplines that draw upon a biological, natural science model. It tends to proceed toward scientific specificity. The administrative theorist, from the Lazarsfeld point of view, is not concerned with the corporate structure of ownership and control at all. Instead she/he begins with the existing order and considers the effects of a certain use of it.

On the other side, the critical tradition is concerned with the conditions of knowledge forming the analytic of content. It attempts externally to monitor empiricity by questioning the preconditions of the object of study. But, in doing so, it resists being
incorporated into the empirical tradition as a condition for its development. Instead, cultural studies attempts to reconceptualize the empirical by bracketing all contents inherited in the importation of the methodological individualist social psychological domain (Ibid). Critical studies is interested in empirical data produced by observation, interviewing, and personal testimony. It has ignored all forms of statistical analysis. Murdock (1989) argues that this is a narrow and unproductive stance that reduces the range of problems. He does not reject well-designed sample surveys. To him, the important thing is to treat survey findings as posing questions that still need to be answered rather than answers.

At one level, the critical tradition is aware of theoretical movements and of the geographical boundaries of its practice. These boundaries are important for its direction. The American region is grounded in British empiricism and Anglo-American pragmatism. The Continental region is grounded in the epistemologically oriented tradition of Kant and Hegel. By incorporating British empiricism and the Continent's epistemological concerns, it is no accident that the field of critical studies is dominated by British scholars. The British critical field was acceptable to the pragmatic tradition. There are, however, several divisions within the Continental theories (Jansen, 1983, p. 344-348).

The empirical school of mass communication research has generally focused on the study of the effects of communication, while ignoring the broader context in which such communication is embedded (Smythe and Van Dinh, 1983; Noeller-Neuman, 1983). This has been possible by popular concern and funds from private and public sectors. Effects-oriented research has almost become synonymous with mass communication research in this country. Drawing upon functionalism, positivism, quantitative
empiricism, and behaviorism in psychology, sociology, and political science, this mainstream research has produced some scientific data about the role of the media in human affairs (Steeter, 1984; Fiske, 1987, 1989; Grossberg 1983, 1984). The study of the audience has been the center of mainstream mass communication study. Before 1960s, early researchers regarded an audience as a collection of isolated individuals who responded in essentially the same way to a message presented via the media. It was subsequently discovered that audience members do not exist in a social vacuum. Klapper (1960) argues that mass media do not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects. This reassessment shows that an audience member's social relationships will have an impact on media use and effect.

Many scholars in either side of the empirical/critical debate act as if the choice between a positivist empirical method and a dialectical method is a primary concern of the human sciences. The "ferment in the field" debate (1983) reflects this position, and it calls for a synthesis of positions. As Foucault says, the human sciences cannot help but be both empirical and critical. Man is both subject and object. The human sciences function in a space in which man is both an object and a subject of knowledge. The first side is empirical - the attempt to find contents, fix meanings, etc. The second side is critical - the questioning of the conditions of possibility of those contents. Thus, the dispute between empiricists and critical theorists is not resolvable in terms of one side or the other. Rather, this dispute indicates that a tension between the empirical and critical exists at the very heart of the human sciences problematic. As Slack and Allor (1983) point out, it cannot be overcome through the self-reflection of the disciplines or through their attempts at synthesis.
According to Allor and Slack (1983), the two positions can be better understood from an ideological vantage point. The site of struggle within the study of mass communication may not be between empirical and critical schools of thought. Rather the struggle between empiricism and criticism exists within each of these schools. For example, the history of the interpretation of Marxism is a struggle between positivist and dialectical versions of Marx's theory. Orthodox Marxism identifies the base as strictly the economic which determines the superstructural elements. This proceeds as an empirical analysis of social formations and tends toward a positivist reduction of experience to its phenomenal forms (1983, p. 212-217). This position is modified by Lukacs, Gramsci, Althusser, etc., and their modifications tend toward a critical approach. The history of Western Marxism is the attempt to overcome the reductionist position.

**Cultural Studies as a Counter-Discipline**

Cultural studies is often considered by the field of communication as a form of criticism, or network, or a movement both drawing from and criticizing previous research on communication and media studies, as well as previous work in other disciplines. Much of contemporary American research has been devoted to finding a fixed epistemology that would provide an objective understanding of the empirical world. Klapper (1960), for example, summarizes empirical research of the 1940s and 50s: "mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effect" (1960, p. 8). Although it has been reinforced with highly sophisticated social survey techniques and uses and gratification studies, this tradition continues to maintain the view of society as being composed of isolated and atomic individuals.
On the other hand, cultural studies doesn't seem to be interested in a particular set of assumptions or hypotheses. Rather it focuses on the nature of everyday experience, the sense the individual makes of the world. For example, where mainstream research has seen mass society, cultural studies has seen cultures, subcultures, classes, and institutions. Thus, it avoids the mechanistic determinism of much sociology, including some forms of Marxism, by looking at the complexity of social processes and the importance of subjective experience.

Cultural studies, however, doesn't simply deny scientific approaches, nor is it an attempt to synthesize administrative and critical research, according to Hall (1980). This resistance to reductionism can also be found in the work of Weber. He argues the need for a cultural science that was interpretive rather than reductionist in the form of causal or functional explanations (Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977, p. 19-20). Hall seems to prefer cultural studies to cultural science to avoid a possible slide toward more behaviorist scientism. Cultural studies refuses the notion that there is any fundamental or essential difference between humanistic and scientific modes of thoughts. Stuart Hall (1980) describes cultural studies as a concerned approach to questions of modern society in opposition to the false antithesis between literary criticism and scientific sociology (1980, p. 17). With its openness and theoretical flexibility, cultural studies has been able to locate the problem in the cultural process, specifically among cultural, political and economic phenomena, and to provide the analysis of communication and media practice with a descriptive power and theoretical complexity.

The theoretical issues have been complicated by the increasing prominence in the United States and the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of Birmingham. The CCCS's activities have been identified largely with Stuart Hall, who
draws his theoretical approach from continental theory and politics, particularly Marxism and structuralism, surprisingly little on Critical Theory. Cultural studies can be defined as an intellectual and political tradition in terms of theoretical paradigms. It seeks to understand struggle with dominant styles within the labor movement, especially the neglect of cultural conditions of politics, and positivistic understanding of politics itself. As mentioned above, the connection between intellectual and political concerns has been important for cultural studies. Thus, it has been interdisciplinary and sometimes anti-disciplinary in its tendency. Cultural studies questions the relation between cultural practices and other practices in definite social formations.

Some scholars (Grossberg, Murdock, Lembo and Tucker, Johnson) argue that cultural studies's methodologies have not been clarified and tested. The elaboration of concrete studies of cultures and social formations, however, have existed in both inside and outside of the CCCS. Media studies, for example, has been a major focus of cultural studies. This area has developed through a series of stages, each taking a somewhat different analytical focus on the basis of related but developing theoretical approaches.

In the 1990 conference "Cultural Studies - Now and in the Future," Iain Chambers insisted that cultural studies was to be read not as a discipline in the traditional sense but as a developing problematic. This is not to say that cultural studies does not have its aims and tasks. The goal is to develop a critical study of the sources, direction and meaning of cultural change in a society, and the forces shaping that change. In other words, cultural studies must be committed to the production of counter-intellectual critique. On this view cultural studies is certainly shadowy to the extent that it opposes, counters, stalks, shadows and even overtakes official rationalities.
Aiming to be a critical-reconstructive social science, not to be mere a set of knowledges, its rationale is complex for it contains both popular and theoretical elements. On the popular side cultural studies cannot but be interested in those shadowy subcultural milieu which have been constructed underneath authorized social (public) discourse. As Hebdige (1988) explains:

Subculture forms up in the space between surveillance and the evasion of surveillance, it translates the fact of being under scrutiny into the pleasure of being watched. It is a hiding in the light (1988, p. 35).

Similarly, cultural studies's commitment to theory - to the paradoxical enterprise of producing a theory of the popular - involves a certain self-scrutiny, a certain translation of intellectual being which, in its unchecked reflexive form, becomes a perpetual self-reflexive exposure of the underside of its own practices of theorizing.

The intention cultural studies is not to establish one more compartment in the already fragmented map of knowledge; rather it attempts to view the whole complex process of change from the vantage point of culture and to make intelligible the real movement of culture as it is then registered in social life, in group and class relationships, in politics and institutions, and in values and ideas. Such a project needs to trespass across boundaries traditionally well-defined and well-patrolled in normal academic life. The development of a critical practice in the study of culture, then, entails a critique of orthodox viewpoints, methodologies and forms of teaching, study and research in the arts, humanities and social sciences.

From English, cultural studies is interested in popular cultural forms, along with an interest in texts and textuality outside the language and literature couplet, and/or a challenge to the very construction of the literary and its various exclusions of class and
gender. From History, it includes in the broadest sense history from below, but also oral histories and popular memory (the daily, informally exchanged, construction of a past). From Sociology, it involves ethnomethodologies, interests in meaning-construction, the examination of the structural reproduction of subordination. Cultural studies attempts to think those readings together: that of lived experience, requiring attention to the maps of meanings in the daily life of particular cultures and subcultures; that of texts, requiring a close attention to symbolic forms; that of larger determining social structures, requiring a specific historical account of the formation as a whole. The three can be thought in very different ways, but the strands and the connections between them are extremely important. Although each of these three dimensions of cultural study involve non-reductive materialist theoretical practices, a general materialist theory of culture has not been developed. Moreover, the fact that any practice of cultural inquiry has more or less definite political conditions of existence does not mean that to be involved in cultural studies work automatically entails the taking on of a particular politics. According to Hall (1980), the understanding of the relations between cultural studies and politics requires the recognition that a radical cultural studies is effectively the continuation of politics by intellectual means. Ironically, at the present time of the institutionalization of cultural studies into academia. The project of counter-intellectual critique has to be the on-going delegitimation of this process of recuperation from within the very process of institutionalization itself.

Because of the double academic/political insertion and in the mixed encounter of issues, cultural studies to me is resolutely impure. In consequence it has neither claimed nor been accorded (any more than has women's studies or postmodernism or Marxism) disciplinary status. For that reason it remains a thorn in the side, grit in the harmony. At all events, it has found only an uneasy lodgement in the academy.
Yet in any case, none of the surrounding subjects could be readily shown to have been either coherent or stable bodies of work. English displayed not only the rift between language and literature, but also that between scholarship and moral/aesthetic evaluation. The field of communication has not found a way to become a coherent discipline. Robert Craig (1989) argues that, depending on the philosophical backgrounds of any given scholar, the field of communication can be placed in social science, or humanities or the arts or the professional or policy disciplines (1989, p. 97). None of those categories could grasp the field as a whole. Each category only tells us about a tiny aspect.

One might think of academic disciplines as the reflection of more or less natural subjects. English is different from sociology because literature and sociology are two distinct sorts of thing. The identification of a discipline with natural objects, however, does not explain very much, because a particular group of objects is the subject of any number of disciplines. If one studies *Tom Sawyer's Adventure*, for example, it can be analyzed by literary scholars, historians, and sociologists. The division of intellectual labor of disciplines is symptomatic.

Two points might be made here. First, discipline, according to Foucault, is a general formula of domination. It produces subjected and practiced bodies, "docile" bodies. Discipline also increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience) (1979, p. 135-139). Although Foucault is not directly concerned with academic disciplines, much of his analysis does help us to see how theses limitations are enforced by institutions through various forms of exclusions. All disciplines, to the degree they are institutionalized, draw authoritative lines and limited access; knowledge, as a form of social activity,
necessarily reflects, to some degree, the preconceptions and interests of its participants. Within the universities, conservative resistance to new knowledge and the nasty nature of internal power relations are also too well-known.

As Foucault (1970) explains, the human sciences, differing from natural sciences, "seek not so much to generalize themselves or make themselves more precise as to be constantly demystifying themselves... We shall say, therefore, that a 'human science' exists, not wherever man is in question, but wherever there is analysis - within the dimension proper to the unconscious - of norms, rules, and signifying totalities which unveil to consciousness the conditions of its forms and contents" (1970, p. 364). This definition of the human sciences has two controversial implications. First, the human sciences are not, according to Foucault, sciences of man; they are explorations of the unconscious. Second, the human sciences are not sciences at all. There can be no science of man, not because man is too complex for systematic analysis but because it is impossible for man to be simultaneously a knowing subject and an object of knowledge (Ibid, p. 366-367). In other words, the human sciences are not sciences and cannot be securely placed among either the formalized discourses or the empirical sciences. As mentioned in the chapter 1, from the middle of the 1960s, this crisis in human sciences has been continually discussed and protested. Critical theories began to uncover the deep structures that make it possible for the human sciences to represent norms, rules, and systems to consciousness.

Second, a material explanation of institutions and continual re-organization of academic disciplines would need to take account of the changing class/race-composition of education, and to the social changes of which disciplines are complexly articulated mediations. In both respects the issue is the constant re-composition of the legitimated
(academic) forms of knowledge - in which (whether or not we still speak of bourgeois
disciplines) the disciplinary form of knowledge production is itself a sophisticated
ideology.

Cultural studies has thus not become a new form of 'discipline'. Attempts to unify the
field as the analysis of signifying practices, or as the study of forms of symbolic
production, distribution and consumption (cultural materialism), first, are premature or
unsatisfactory beneath a very high level of abstraction - though preferable to the view
that cultural studies is one way of studying communications. Cultural studies has been a
major site of developments within theories of cultural production and consumption. It is
, as Johnson (1987) argues, not a unified body of work, set of practices or even an
easily defined academic subject (1987, p. 38). Rather, it has offered a place within
higher education, and elsewhere in adult and further education, for traditional disciplines
to be challenged, for the kinds of knowledges produced to be questioned and for power
relations in educational practices to be transformed.

Equally, the notion of interdisciplinarity should not be considered as a major force of
cultural studies anymore - not so much because Marxism itself has superseded its
ambitions, but because specialist skills do not just lie ready to collaborate together: the
presence of other questions requires that a discipline address its object in quite
unfamiliar ways. To become a set of knowledge or an agenda for knowledge is not
cultural studies's goal. It involves close study of the relations of classes (including
political relations) where intermediary groups are ever more prominent (but where
classes are no longer thought solely through masculine relations to production); and the
development of cultural forms in a political mode (which is not necessarily the same as
cultural politics). As O'Connor argues, cultural studies appears as film or video as well
as writing. A cultural form crosses through social formations (writers, artists, institutions, industries, language, etc.) (1990, p.2). In this sense, cultural studies must develop an oppositional discourse and a counter-disciplinary praxis to deal with struggles over different orders of representation, conflicting forms of cultural experience, and diverse visions of the future. It is both a sphere of critique and a medium of social transformation. It should not commodify an appropriate theoretical style for analyzing everyday life and a proper position for the theorist of popular culture. It must constantly develop a language of critique and a language of possibility to reveal how the form and content of the disciplines reproduce and legitimate the dominant culture.

What then do these considerations mean for the task of distinguishing valid from invalid inquiry? To me, the answer is obvious; a good study is one that makes transparent the historically formed contradictions and thereby promotes emancipation and empowerment. At another level, however, the issue could be much more complicated. One might ask: Is cultural studies another partial theory that conceals as much as it reveals and is thereby likely to function as another self-serving ideology? Megan Morris (1988), a cultural critic from Australia, and Hall have a similar concern for cultural studies being institutionalized and fixed. Morris resents the fact that cultural studies is beginning to commodify an appropriate theoretical "style" for analyzing everyday life. For Morris, this is banality in cultural studies. But neither Hall nor Morris of has provided a feasible solution to this criticism. I believe Habermas's notion of "self-reflection" can be useful, if not perfect, to respond this criticism. According to Habermas (1971), self-reflection, with its emancipatory potential, can prevent the critique of ideology from becoming itself ideological: "In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy and
responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a movement of emancipation" (1971, p. 228). What can prevent cultural studies from being used to legitimize a new set of authorities in as unquestionable a fashion as in other ideologies is the insistence on self-reflectivity, the insistence that cultural studies must develop a discourse that contains a language of critique and a language of possibility.

As mentioned above, critical mass communication study is not a single entity, but a range of developing approaches to the study of communication. This critical school of thought encompasses a wide variety of theoretical and empirical concerns. There are several major research approaches within it. As mentioned in Chapter 1, many scholars have attempted to draw these approaches into divisional map. Generally, they describe critical studies as operating primarily within a Marxist perspective, which is characterized as a British phenomenon. They divide various approaches to the question of the relation of culture and society. There are two kinds of media research in cultural studies, (although two have been combined in most cases) textual analysis and audience research.

- **Audience Analysis: Uses and Gratifications versus Reception Theory**

At the individual level, the functional approach is given the general name of the uses and gratifications model. In its simplest form, this model posits that audience members have certain needs or drives that are satisfied by using both nonmedia and media sources. The actual needs satisfied by the media are called media gratifications (Gitlin, 1978). Researchers of this model ask people a large number of questions about how they use the media. They have identified various uses and gratifications, such as diversion and
personal relationship. Much of the uses and gratifications approach, reinforced by
functionalism, is neo-positivist in character. This is not strictly bounded by fact or data.
Parson's functionalism, for example, is a result of a study which attempts to transcend
the moment and which views society broadly. He considers the actions and interactions
of the various social organizations in society (Blumler, 1977; Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
Although his study shed light on the working of social organization within a society, it
is nevertheless administrative since it ultimately provides knowledge and understanding
for those who are interested in maintaining social order and harmony, and therefore the
study ultimately supports the status quo (Morley, 1980, p. 12-15). In the uses and
gratification tradition, researchers have portrayed the individuals that constitute any mass
media audience as active selectors and interpreters of media messages. Individuals not
only selectively expose themselves to media messages, but selectively avoid media
messages.

Within uses and gratifications, Parsonian functionalism has been criticized for being
Another major problem with functionalism is the its incapability of explaining the
relation between gratification on an individual level and the mass communication
function at a societal level. In addition, Marxist and neo-Marxist critical traditions attack
this tradition as being uniformly uninteresting. They seek to shift the context of the
discussion and research to the relation among the media, society and the individual.
Critical schools also argue that the mass media plays a central role in maintaining class
domination.

Marx's insistence on production relation and the ownership of the cultural industry
treats culture consumption by the audience as secondary and predetermined. As
discussed earlier, cultural studies has tried to get away from oversimplified models of
determination. It also criticizes traditional mass communication research on the
relationship between television texts and its viewers. It has attempts to measure the
direct effects of viewing particular programs on particular audience groups. The
hypodermic model of media research has largely given way to models of media-audience
interactions that emphasize the functions served by media use. Television industry,
which fund much of the early research on the media, required that the findings that
emerged from these studies be objective and scientific, rather than the expression of the
researcher's opinion. Again, this research tradition reduces the phenomenon being
studied to a limited set of variables and result, which can be expressed in quantitative
terms. Despite its increasing sophistication, this tradition has retained a commitment to a
conception of communication as a contextless process. Sender, message, receiver, and
effect are all isolatable phenomena, related to one another in specific and direct
relationships.

Cultural studies attempts to relate the question of audience interpretation to several levels
of determination. The question of audience is addressed in cultural studies by Hall
(1980). Briefly, he argues that viewers whose social situation, particularly their class,
aligns them comfortably with the dominant ideology would produce dominant readings
of a text. In other words, they would accept its preferred meanings due to their
inculcation by the dominant ideology. Other views would oppose its meanings in the
text and would produce oppositional readings. Morley (1980) tests Hall's model in his
book *Nationwide*. With empirical research of TV audiences, their socio-cultural
contexts, and their various decoding practices, Morley explores the extent and the nature
of effects on real audiences. Thus, he focuses on a more situated analysis of the
concrete determinations circulating in and between TV practices and family processes.
Even though uses and gratifications research argues against the passive audience and recognizes the polysemic nature of messages, it still places too much emphasis on individual differences in interpretation and does not explore the social character of these different interpretations. In other words, it overemphasizes the rational dimension of response. Obviously, there will always be individual readings, but, as Morley (1980) argues, we need to see the way in which these readings are patterned into cultural structures and clusters. Moreover, potential relations between differences in interpretation and socio-economic structures of society should not be ignored.

There is another difference between them. Morley's approach seeks not only to understand the social patterns behind differences in interpretations but also sees interpretations themselves as more than the products of unrelated, self-explanatory uses. The goal is an understanding of the role of social factors in determining differences in interpretations and the relations of these differences to the construction of a different social world as well as a determination of the varied access to meaning systems. Uses and gratifications research seems to deny the media's creative role in contributing to social change. Thus, it attempts to lock media and audience into a stable equilibrium.

Based on Morley's argument, Hobson (1980) from the Center, analyzes the role of TV and radio in the lives of working class housewives. She finds that their passive TV viewing behavior and their own structures of understanding reflect and reinforce their passive domestic roles in the homes. Housewives tend to believe that TV news is both boring and important, while the kinds of programs that they enjoyed watching were of lesser significance. Because they believe what they like to be of lesser significance, it seemed natural for them that their own needs and wishes were subordinated to their husbands' program choices (1980, p. 105-114).
Morley may be the first to put semiotics and cultural theory through an empirical investigation. He argues, however, that the ideology in the structure of the text does not always work to position and construct the subjectivity of the reader as a subject in ideology. Reading the TV text is a process of negotiation between this existing subject position and the one proposed by the text itself; in this negotiation, the balance of power lies with the reader. The meanings found in the text shift towards the subject position of the reader more than the reader's subjectivity is subjected to the ideological power of the text (Steeter, 1984, p. 80).

Similarly, Bradby, et al. (1980) call for joint emphasis on the conditions of production and the conditions of reception of both the individual and the group/class. Sharratt, one of the co-authors, writes:

> Part of my concern is to understand the experiences and aspirations not of the "class" as a whole but rather of the individuals and families who comprise the "audience"..... As we.... switch on the television we enter into relationships with others and with ourselves that cannot easily be mapped onto the relations of production and consumption that constitute the specifically economic and political identity of a class. In the disharmony between the collective strengths of a class and the individual position of the members of a class, one of the functions of "popular" art may perhaps be located (1980, p. 276).

Morley and Sharratt's emphasis on conditions of reception is important to audience analysis in cultural studies. They both agree on the notion of a dominant cultural order which reduces the number of possible interpretations, and argue for breaks and discontinuities in this order of things. With its complexity of production practices, television cannot be but polysemic despite its quest for a preferred meaning. This is not to say that it has to fall back on the individualistic pluralism of the uses and gratifications theory. Neither is this to say that the automatic reproduction of dominant ideology is in
the relation between text and audience. Putting the production of the subject inside the text is to ignore the social construction of the subject outside the text (see chapter 7 of Morley, 1980).

- Textual Analysis

As mentioned earlier, mainstream research on the analysis of texts has been called quantitative content analysis. This methodology reduces the text to quantifiable data by noting the incidences of certain features and comparing that frequency with something else (Allen, 1987, p. 9). The content analysis is useful to document the ways in which television programs represent constructions of the world rather than reflections of reality. But its preference of the principles of laboratory science limits its ability to account for the complexities of our engagements with those constructed worlds we see on television. We cannot categorize, according to Allen, meanings of sit-coms or soaps as a set of quantifiable and objective categories of data. Simply put, the scientific law tells us little about the various relationship we have with fictional television programs (Ibid).

Meanwhile, cultural studies attempts to fracture the simplistic approach. For example, Connell, (1980) from the Center, investigates news coverage of the dispute between the Labour party and British trade unions over the wage problem. He finds that routine journalistic practices help to construct a set of premises about the dispute that favor the government's position (1980, p.139-156). Television reading is a discursive negotiation between the social experience inscribed in the program and the meanings its wide variety of viewers makes of social experience.
Textual analysis is common in cultural studies. This, unfortunately, has led to a tendency for texts to be privileged as the producers of our subjectivity, and for individuals to be seen as more or less passive subjects in ideology (for examples, see Hawkes, 1977; Nichols, 1981; Heck, 1980). Drawing upon linguistics, anthropology, semiotics, psychoanalysis, and the work of Althusser, the structuralist approach to media analysis is concerned with the system and processes of signification and representation in the media. Earlier studies focus on how a wide range of cultural texts serve to construct certain ways of seeing the world (Barthes, 1973; Hall, 1973). The basis of this position is the belief that particular textual forms guarantee that the reader will be fixed in position by the text. This approach was first applied to cinema. When it focuses on television, it finds a different object of study. It stresses how TV's scheduling and mode of address to the audience constructs viewers. Hall (1977) argues that the "ideological work" of texts is understood by identifying how texts represent social problems and contradictions in such a way as to "mask", "fragment" or impose on these an "imaginary unity or coherence", and thereby showing the basic class antagonisms of society (1977, p. 336-337).

Some postmodernists argue that since actual studies' position is so concerned with the processes of representation, it has lost sight of producing any useful knowledge about the real world. Also this formalist position accepts unproblematically that texts would fix audiences. These works paid little attention to the issue of pleasure. Equally dangerous is the current trend is to shift away from the question of ideology to the pleasurable experiences and the contradictory and complex nature of ideology in any text (e.g. Grossberg, Frith, Fiske, Hebdige). Both the ideological workings of texts and their pleasures are important elements of the conditions of production and audience.
Borrowing from Mikhail Bakhtin, Barthes (1975) posits the inevitability of intertextuality arguing that intertextual relations are so pervasive that our culture consists of a complex web of intertextuality. In an essay about photographic image (1977), he argues that the photographic image has a special status because it is a message without a code. Though there are no transformations involved in its production, its message involves a transformation of reality through the style of presentation. Hall (1986) seems to be supportive of Barthes's view. In his commentary on TV commercials, Hall argues that they are not about products, but are images of desire and pleasure that overwhelm the product to which they are attached. Before I analyze the "inevitability of inter (inter-)textuality," it is worthwhile to compare the theories of three of the most influential writers on media studies in both British and American cultural studies.

• Williams, Hall, and Grossberg on Text and Audience

For Williams, TV is a generalized textual experience. He uses the term "flow" to explain the effect of immediacy and presence the experience of TV gives. TV becomes a continuous, never-ending sequence in which it is impossible to separate out individual texts. This doesn't mean that the flow is unstructured. It is structured and organized according to associative sequences of images rather than logical relations (cause and effect). The connections are not explicitly made in the text, but their associative nature will allow them to be made subconsciously (Williams, 1974, p. 9-12). In other words, these connections would not work to unify the segments of the texts but leave the descriptions between segments active and unresolved.

Anthony Giddens would agree with Williams's argument. Giddens (1987) argues that structures are both the product of and conditions for human agency. The agent has a
practical consciousness of conduct, not necessarily discursively known, which allows
the agent an awareness of the functioning of institutions in society. The agent is a
refuses any attempt to define TV's individual text apart from or as different from
particular texts. Although Williams does not use the word segment, he argues, that TV
the text is composed of discrete segments which comprise a sequential unity of images
and sounds. These images and sounds, however, follow each other with no necessary
connections and logical orders. Grossberg also argues that television is constructed
from intersecting discourses. In other words, segments of TV have no obvious relation
to their immediate context, although segments can momentarily take on relationships to
one another. MTV would be a perfect example of segmentation. I also think that the
flow promotes and is exploited by the commercial and political interests of television.
For example, Korean television programming is perhaps one of the most discrete.
Under quasi-government control, the scheduling strategy is supported by both political
and commercial interests. These economic and political purposes of televisual flow,
however, are meaningless unless its textuality appeals to popular tastes and modes of
viewing.

In analyzing dramas of the 18th and 19th century, Williams (1968) finds that those
dramas contained human actions described exclusively in human terms with
contemporary settings. Drama is socially extended. By this he means that it deals with
the lives and experiences of ordinary people, not kings. This led him to deal with the
working class' particular experiences in industrial society. Williams (1974) seems to
relate this view of social realism to his analysis of the TV audience. For him, TV is well
suited for representing human action in its repetition, familiar interior settings, excessive
use of close-up shots, and intimacy. In short, the senses and experience of the
individual are the prime way of making sense of this universe of phenomena and they must always be expressed within the forms of individual experience (1974, p. 44).

In his essay *Encoding/Decoding*, Hall (1980) considers the ideological influences of encoding or message formulation and the material, socioeconomic conditions that explain the variety within the audience's decoding of messages. He identifies three positions for decodings of mass media content. In the "dominant position," audiences decode messages in terms of the preferred code used to encode them. The "negotiated position" means that audiences distance themselves somewhat from the position offered by the text. The audience is not a passive recipient of preferred meanings. In the "oppositional position," messages are decoded in ways unrelated to preferred meanings or dominant meanings.

Hall's "preferred reading" theory suggests that while TV programs often use dominant meaning to maintain dominant ideology, these meanings cannot be imposed, only preferred (1980, p. 128-132). Obviously, we are not all engaged with TV in the same way. Producers of TV programs are driven by a complex set of institutional, political, and economic factors that are different from creative codes. In short, any set of social meanings has to be produced by a formation of groups situated within a social system of power relations. The dominant class would attempt to dominate the production of meanings. For Hall, TV is probably not neutral. It is a site of struggle between the dominating and the dominated. Similarly, Eco's theory of aberrant decoding argues that if social differences are found between encoders and decoders then decoding will be aberrant. In other words, the text will be decoded by a different set of codes and the resulting meanings will be more determined by the social situation of the decoder than by that of the encoder. Hall's links with sociology, has enabled television studies to
enter areas that film theory cannot handle and to provide a critique of film theory and to establish TV at least provisionally as an object of study.

By using Hall's theory of encoding/decoding, Morley (1980) was the first to put semiotics and cultural theory through an empirical investigation. He opposes mainstream British study of culture (Screen Theory), which draws upon structuralism, psychoanalysis, semiotics, and Marxism, and argues that the text informed by its dominant ideology has power over the viewing subject. He recognizes the polysemic nature of the TV text and the heterogeneity of audiences. Each of us has a history and lives in a particular social formation and is constituted by a complex cultural history, both social and textual. Morley is more concerned about the relations between different genres of texts than the relations between individual texts, so as to establish discursive connections are able to explain particular textual forms on particular categories of readers under socio-historical conditions. Here, the audience becomes a subject as well as an object, and is then analyzed as a site of conflict. He seems to imply that the discursive structure of the reader's consciousness is at least as influential as the discursive structure of the program in producing the reading. The reading subject is a product of history, not of genetics and nature.

Morley interviews groups of people, who had seen the British news magazine program, Nationwide, to find out their reactions to it and its meanings for them. They vary in social, ethnic, economic, and cultural backgrounds (1980, p. 36). He prefers to deal with groups rather than individuals because he is interested in the social dimensions of reading. Under Hall's definition, occupation is a prime definer of social class. But, Morley finds that different readings by different groups showed cross-class similarities. Bank managers and apprentices produced similar readings despite the class differences.
This suggests that decoding is not always correlated with class. The correlation between class and decoding was often dependent upon the program contents of *Nationwide.* Morley seems to share Bourdieu's idea of cultural capital. Morley argues that how a text is decoded depends upon the codes available to the interpreter.

Obviously, Morley tries to go beyond Hall's preferred reading theory. He shows that Hall's theory is too simple and overemphasizes the role of class in producing different readings. His work is often regarded as an ethnographic study of television. Ethnographic study attempts to discover the way people live their culture. It tends to shift its interests away from the textual and ideological concerns of the subject to socially and historical concerns. Morley (1981) elaborates some problems of his work in his self-critical essay "*The Nationwide Audience-A Critical Postscript."* He points out that the study was heavily centered on groups' reactions to specific issues in the program rather than on the ideological implications of the program (1981, p. 4, 6). Thus, the study lost potential profundity of analysis. Morley's way of defending against this criticism is his observation that there is little correlation between consciousness of the constructed news stories and readers' interpretations. He admits that the ideological effect of the program is important, but it is very difficult to verify if it is the primary effect. Morley also points out a need to investigate whether different audience groups focus on different characteristics of the program.

As mentioned above, Morley indicates that there are number of problems with Hall's encoding/decoding model. He argues that the interpretation of dominant decoding implies an understanding of language as a mechanism for sending messages rather than as the medium through which consciousness takes shape. When Morley uses the preferred reading theory for the study, he finds that the theory only made sense for news
facts. In reality, there are few either purely dominant or purely oppositional readings, and consequently viewing TV is a process of negotiation between the text and its variously socially situated readers. Hall argues that while TV programs allow a variety of negotiated or oppositional meanings, their structure always prefers a meaning that generally promotes the dominant ideology. I think Hall means that it is less productive to think in terms of a singular preferred meaning, than of structures of preference that seek to prefer some meanings and devalue others. Thus, he sees the text as a structured polysemy, with some meanings preferred over others. Critics also attack the theory's tendency to exclude notions of pleasure, and therefore to be more applicable to analyses of responses to news-oriented programs than fictional programs. Although critics charge Hall's theory with being simplistic and reductionistic, one should not ignore the valuable aspects of his theory its free of the text from complete ideological closure, and its emphasis on the reader as the site of meaning.

Meanings are constructed out of the conjuncture of the text with the socially situated reader. I don't think this means for both Morley and Hall that a reader's position mechanically produces meanings for him. It would be silly to suggest that there are identical constructed meanings among individual members of the working class. It would be equally silly to suggest that there is no such thing as a working class reading. For Morley, reading the TV text is a process of negotiation between this existing subject position and the one proposed by the text itself. This means that reading is not a search for meaning from the text but rather is a dialogue between text and the socially situated reader. This discursive negotiation suggests that the boundaries of the text are unstable. Similarly, Williams (1974) suggests that TV is not a discrete series of programs or texts but a flow in which all different genres merge into a continuous cultural experience (1974, p. 78-80). Grossberg (1987) argues that TV is indifferent to meaning, and
because it erases the line between realism and fantasy, it doesn't matter what meanings TV uses. On the other hand, Hall refuses to see the subjectivity as a unified site of ideological reconciliation. Instead he sees it as fragmented, as a site of struggle. Both the text and the subjectivity are discursive constructs and both bring to the battle competing or contradictory discourses.

Grossberg (1983, 1986) seems to take on all three of the above. He argues that Williams grants a autonomy to the cultural in his concept of "structure of feeling." The "structure of feeling" is the organized relationship of social practices, meanings and feelings, the shared sense of experience within a given social formation. Grossberg (1983) criticizes this position for collapsing society into culture, both involve the production of symbolized meanings which unifies practice by centering it in the cultural. Production becomes primary. In other words, Williams's failure to stress the specificity of particular historical practices leads him to fall into materialism. But Williams (1977) seems to reject such a collapsing of Marxist theory into a social whole or totality. The notion of a totality can be maintained only if it contains the notion of intention. Thus, totality must be combined with hegemony. To Williams, hegemony is "a whole body of practices and expectations, a set of meanings and values, and it constitutes a sense of reality for people" (1977, p. 108). O'Connor (1989b) criticizes Grossberg's reading of Williams as superficial. He argues that while Williams's structure of feeling is a contradictory formulation, the concept has not guided his works since the mid 70s.

I think that Grossberg's criticism of Hall's encoding/decoding model is similar to Morley's criticism. Basically, both criticize Hall's overemphasis of class. He argues that it is ridiculous to assume that the intentions behind the production of news are simply those of the ruling class. Grossberg also criticizes Morley's work: while he is
able to find the relations between the social and cultural within both the production and consumption of the text, he is not able to bring the two sets of relations into relations with one another. Morley admits the problem in his postscript. Grossberg, borrowing Foucault’s notion of discursive practices, clearly rejects the idea that ideology is crucial as a vehicle of power relations. Power does not come from outside. It is not a one way force, from the top down. It is a two-way force. Ideology is connected with two concepts - class and interest. Williams essentially would agree with Grossberg’s analysis. He sees the use of the concept of ideology as a shortcut for unifying Marxist theory. He argues that the complex social relations cannot be expressed by ideology alone. If both are critical of the concept of ideology, they do not mean to imply that this notion is not effective, but rather than the concept should be questioned.

Grossberg (1986) argues that while ideological relations may enable us to chart a particular set of effects and to locate particular sites of power and struggle, it's not sufficient to explain the power and popularity of TV. The effectivity of TV is the complex effects on the line of in-different. In-difference describes a particular structure of self-relationship enacted in the relation between identity and difference. TV reshapes the powers and pleasures of identity and difference and the relationship between ideology and affect (1986, p. 4-5) (unpublished manuscript is used, published in Screen 1987). These define an affective economy around television. Grossberg treats TV as certain affective structures that emerge from and impact upon every level of contemporary social life. He sees the socially motivated reading as the result of a psychological need (Ibid).

Grossberg extends Williams's position by presenting three related sets of "gestures": irony, repetition, and excess. TV erases the line between image and reality. He argues
that TV's indifference to reality can be found in every genre including advertisements (Ibid, p. 4). The way in which TV deals with the difference between the same and the different is the repetition of episodes, character types, narratives, etc. TV's repetitive nature creates a predictable set of images. Though there are differences in contents of each episode, they share similar a narrative structure. Here, the pleasure of the viewing depends on one's ability to renegotiate the difference that difference makes. The popularity of a particular TV program is not immediately dependent on ideological issues. Rather it is reliant upon TV's various forms of excess. The emotional excess is the most important one. It is caused by TV's in-difference to meaning and reality. It is structured by a series of movements between extreme highs and extreme lows, creating presents an image of an affective economy (Ibid, p. 30-32).

Grossberg's basic position is contained in the notion of "the nomadic subjectivity" (Ibid). He argues that the role of the concept is to produce meanings that span the whole range from the dominant to the oppositional. Negotiating meanings with the TV text is a discursive, and therefore social, process, not an individualistic one; however it still allows for the social situation of the viewer. He argues that if we treat some specific TV contents as texts to be interpreted, their power and impact cannot be found. They are not to be interpreted but to be assembled. Thus, to Grossberg, TV's specific message is not very useful. Hall also writes that subjectivities are formed in these practices, and must be examined in terms of the overall state of the discursive field in its relation to other practices and institutional sites. Meaning, while necessary and relevant to Hall, is irrelevant to Grossberg. To Morley, the audience is a subject crossed by a number of discourses. Discourses provide him with the cultural repertoire of resources with which he works. Members of the audience produce meanings that derive from the intersection of his/her social history with the social forces structured into the text. If a TV program
fails to allow space for these non-TV meanings to be generated from it, it's not going to be popular. Morley finds that black women, for example, simply rejected *Nationwide* because it held nothing for them (1980, p.140). Some of their views can be found in the postmodernist position. In the earlier days of capitalism, there was a such thing as individualism. But today, in the age of corporate capitalism, the individual subject no longer exists.

Postmodernism stresses the fragmentary nature of images and the way that images are more important than the real. Again, it refuses the notion of subjectivity as a site of making sense. It also refuses categories and the judgements inherent in theory. Thus, postmodernism makes no distinctions among fine arts, the mass media, and subcultures. It refuses neat generic differences, so that music video, ads and programs are inseparable (Jameson, 1983). For example, Coca-cola uses Max Headroom as a commercial pitch, and he is then involved in the record and music video business. He even had his own TV series. The postmodern style crosses genre boundaries as easily as those of gender and class. Another important feature of postmodernism is pastiche. Postmodern style asserts its ownership of all images. Nothing is inappropriate, all is incorporated. There is no longer a stylistic innovation, leaving only an imitation of dead styles (Ibid, p.114-115). For example, the movie "Batman" reinvents Americans' heroic adventures of the *Batman* cartoon and TV series. Youngsters can experience the adventures a fresh, while adults are able to gratify a deeper and nostalgic desire to return to that older period. Thus, the movie *Batman* does not reinvent a picture of the past, but bring back the feel and shape of characteristic art objects of the old days.

Applying this feature of pastiche, Grossberg (1987, 1989) argues that television deals with the difference between the same and the different. The text produces the context of
its interpretation, but is at the same time produced by its context. Text and context are not related externally, but rather the context appears in fragmented form in the text; they occupy the same place. Grossberg argues, like Foucault, that the determinants of practice may not be in the large and global decisions of history, but in the insignificant and marginal practices of history. By examining the marginal, one can discover the discursive and non-discursive elements of social life. Grossberg suggests that for one to understand the United States, one must begin with local detail that involves particular groups of individuals to characterize the multiplicity of processes and relations within the national structures.

According to Jameson (1983), this feature of postmodernism is connected to Lacan's structural psychoanalysis. Lacan argues that the unconscious is structured like a language and that the infant's acquisition of consciousness is the acquisition of language. The infant doesn't distinguish between self and non-self. After a certain period of time, the child develops the ability to make meaning and enters into the meaning system (Ibid, p.119). The two processes are really one, since the child cannot construct the basic meaning of self without entering into the existing meaning system. Lacan's view is also based on difference. When the child sees herself/himself reflected in a mirror, she/he realizes that self and reflection are different but related. The child then enters the world of symbol. Lacan argues that the reflection is more than the real and the symbolic is composed of both the imaginary and the real. That's why a photograph is often more pleasurable than the scene itself. Lacan develops a theory in which questions of the human subject, its place in society and its relationship to language are all interconnected (Flitterman-Lewis, 1987, p. 173-178).
Grossberg acknowledges the importance of a psychoanalytic foundation. He argues that psychoanalysis is a powerful critical tool in explaining the construction of meanings, and the formation of subjectivity which is the construction site of the meaning. Psychoanalysis has been influential in the development of Screen theory, since it stresses themes of desire, pleasure, and subconsciousness. But it has not been as effective in analyzing television, as TV is experienced by a variety of social subjects, not just psychoanalytic one.

Hall also seems to incorporate some aspects of postmodernist theory, especially deconstructivism. Unlike Grossberg’s criticism, in his recent works Hall (1986) argues that the massive development of the means of reproduction and circulation of images has pushed representation into the center of the cultural arena. Images are fragmented, clearer than the reality, and contradictory. Images are made and read in relation to other images and the real is read as an image. TV commercials are not about products, but are images of desire and pleasure. Images exist in an infinite chain of intertextuality (1986, p.45-51). Like deconstructionists (as well as a self-proclaimed non-deconstructionist, Grossberg), Hall also denies a final meaning for images. What is important in these views is the emphasis of the instability of symbolic systems and the absence of a final authoritative meaning against which the truth of specific readings can be judged. On the other hand, as Hall sees it, because meaning is necessarily infinitely elusive, the searching for a meaning is misdirected. What he basically suggests as a solution for this failure is the shift of our focus from the text to its moments of reading - readings by socially and historically situated viewers (Ibid).

Obviously, history is absent from Grossberg’s works (1987,1989). There is only a slight interest in the changing nature of media production, distribution, and forms of
consumption of the social relations of broadcasting. For example, in order to make
judgements about the cultural significance of Miami Vice, it is not sufficient to specify
the discourses. Grossberg seems to make big deal out of the subversive pleasure in
popular television. But how socioculturally differentiated audiences watched Miami
Vice may be more significant. If one wishes to locate this understanding in relation to
broader cultural struggles, then he/she must examine both the text and the reading in the
historical conjuncture of its occurrence. The value of his works may be the emphasis on
discursive practices of texts and audiences. But, at the same time, these discursive
practices are floating around without any theoretical support. This is largely because of
his strange utilization of somewhat unrelated various concepts. It is also very difficult to
find originality and consistency in his position.

British and American TV criticism, especially feminist criticism influenced by film
theory, has generally been concerned with how meanings are made and circulated and
how these meanings and their formations play in the structure of industrial societies and
in the structure of the unconscious and consciousness of the subjects of those societies.
Among them, Hall and Morley have not dealt with unconscious level explicitly. It
seems to me that if they dealt with unconscious processes, it would provide them with
more interpretive power. In fact, discourses are derived from social institutions such as
nation, race, class, family, gender, and so on. These are mediated through the verbal
and other signifying systems to exercise their influence upon the subjectivity of the
individual. Subjectivity is a discursive construct, the text is a discursive construct, and
both are determined linguistically and socially. This means that meanings are not only
polysemic, but must be contradictory. Morley's obvious weakness is his inability to
handle the linguistic dimension and to theorize the semiotics of meaning at the same level
of sophistication. But he shows us with empirical evidences that the polysemry of TV is
not just a theoretical construct, but a defining characteristic of the medium. Finally, the excessive emphasis on unconscious levels would obscure the understanding of TV's complexity. The notion of unconsciousness will be discussed later.

Despite the obvious differences that exist among Williams, Hall, and Grossberg, there is one thing they agree upon: The text is the intertext of a context whose reading is itself the intertext of the theoretical and critical text of reception. In other words, reality returns both as the text and as the response of the audience, as the impossibility of the truth of the text and as the real context that supplements the text. We cannot perceive this real context directly. Instead the real context is reconstituted as the reading of reading which is not available directly but must be analyzed in the form of evidence, reconstructed from documents, artifacts, records, case histories, surveys, etc. Bennett and Wollacott (1987) call it "reading formation."

"Inevitability of Inter(Inter-)textuality"

- Inter-textuality and Reading Formation

Both inter-textuality and reading formation are very important concepts in cultural studies that were not theorized in the CCCS. Many studies have concentrated on the issue of the audience, and tried to analyze the social and discursive factors which mediate the relations between texts and audiences (Curthoys and Docker, 1989; Fiske, 1987; Allen, 1987). But it was Bennett and Wollacott's book Bond and Beyond (1987) that theorized inter-textual phenomena in a cultural form. To study these concepts, Bennett and Wollacott argued (1987, p. 6-7) it is necessary to abandon the following assumption: that texts can be construed as the sources of meanings or effects which can be deduced from an analysis of their formal properties.
They define reading formation as "the inter-textual relations which prevail in a particular context, thereby activating a given body of texts by ordering the relations between them in a specific way such that their reading is always-already cued in specific directions from such relations" (Ibid, p. 64). Reading formations, Bennett and Wollacott pointed out, are "the product of definite social and ideological relations of reading composed, in the main, of those apparatuses - schools, the press, critical reviews - within and between which the socially dominant forms for the superintendency of reading are both constructed and contested" (Ibid, p. 64-65). Recent work in the cognitive aspect of television reception, for example, indicates that individuals bring with them to each new situation pre-established expectancies and plans which are based on previous experience (See Morley 1986; Murdock, 1989). What the concept of reading formation adds to this cognitive approach is the claim that these schema have material social supports (like schools, universities, etc.) with much greater regulatory power than the original text itself. This is not to say that the original text is negligible. In fact, it has its own cultural operators (like fanzines) which establish their own schema.

These propositions suggest that the TV text is a potential set of meanings capable of being viewed with a variety of modes of attention by a variety of viewers. In this way, Gramsci would have interpreted the TV text as a site of struggle between forces that attempt to close down its meaning and forces that open its variety of viewers to negotiate variety of meanings. As mentioned above, Bakhtin (1984) and Barthes (1977) express similar positions on the text. Barthes suggests that all narratives are composed of an interweaving of voices that cannot be structured in any order. Bakhtin also argues that all social differences and inequalities are represented textually. Thus, their popular texts
will show a similar structured multiplicity of voices and meanings in conflict
(Newcomb, 1984, p. 40).

Building on Barthes and Bakhtin, Bennett and Wollacott analyze the relationship
between popular fiction (Bond films and novels) and ideology and provide ways of
analyzing popular heroes and heroines. They focus on the formal attributes of the text
and the relationship of the various elements in it. The authors examine Bond in number
of ways - looking at the details of the production of a Bond film, comparing of film
versions and novels, studying the different readings of Bond (hero of modernization,
cold war warrior, Christian hero, killer, and sex symbol), relating Bond to his creator,
Ian Fleming, discussing different genres - to analyze this enigmatic figure (Ibid, Chapter
3). Borrowing from Gramsci, they also argue that popular culture constitutes an
important terrain through the process of negotiation between dominating and dominated.
Bond is a free individual with no stable set of meanings. Thus, he is able to defeat the
villain by thinking quickly and responding flexibly. The villain, on the other hand,
loses despite his wealth and his technological strength because he is so bureaucratic and
programmed. He is a prisoner of his social organization, whereas Bond is free.

Bond is free precisely because he has been constructed in a set of texts over the times as
a popular hero. These texts include films and serial novels, John Barry’s theme music,
interviews with Sean Connery and Roger Moore, pictures of Bond’s girls. In addition,
lipstick, lingerie, Bond’s plastic dolls function like textual meteorites. Thus, the
conditions of Bond’s existence have been inter-textual. Bond has been produced in the
constantly changing relations between a wide range of texts brought into association
with one another via the functioning of Bond as the signifier which they have jointly
constructed (Ibid).
Similarly, women fans of James Bond, as Bennett and Wollacott argue, do not have an existence that is clearly separable from the orders of inter-textuality (romance novels, soap operas, female magazines) which mark their formation as readers. Thus interpretations of James Bond films by men were "to a certain extent formed by the generic expectations of the imperialist spy thriller, while the parameters of romantic fiction and the image of the Byronic hero provided one inter-textual focus for women readers" (1987, p. 167). While their theorization of the inter-textual phenomenon is convincing, the logic of the male/female dichotomy in romance, in my view, is a limited understanding of romance fictions. Women are not necessarily trying to find romantic qualities in Bond novels or films. In fact, Bond's ladies are hardly for long term relationships; they are portrayed rather as rewards for successful missions.

The pleasures of culture and knowledge are produced not by the reader's direct encounter with the Bond novels themselves, but in the context of a culturally mediated relationship to those novels produced by the systems of cultural reference which animate the reader's practice. In short, all texts come to the reader always already incrusted with the effects of previous readings and hence it is pointless to speak of a text existing separate from these historically specific incrustations. Our reading of any work, Bennett and Wollacott argue, is inevitably conditioned by other discourses that circulate around it: ads, reviews, other works of the same genre or author, etc (Ibid, p. 6-7). Thus, studying the relationship between literary phenomena and society requires that everything that has been said or written about a text, every context in which it has been inscribed by the uses to which it has been put, should, in principle, be regarded as relevant to and assigned methodological parity within such a study. Our viewing of a given James Bond film is conditioned by the previous films in the series; by the novels
upon which the films are based; by the characterizations of Bond by Connery and
Moore; by ads for the novels and films; by the covers of novels; by songs associated
with the films; by reviews of the films, novels, the stars, Ian Fleming, Bond himself,
the British Intelligence force, and so forth. The film itself is merely one part of a mobile
system of circulating signifiers, a text that is activated by the reader only in relation to
the reading of other texts.

- Inter-textuality and Intertextuality

To clarify the concept of the intertext further, Bennett and Wollacott differentiate
Kristeva's "intertextuality" with "inter-textuality." Kristeva's intertextuality refers to the
system of references to other texts which can be discerned within the internal
composition of a specific individual text. Bennett and Wollacott intend the concept of
inter-textuality to refer to the social organization of the relations between texts within
specific conditions of reading (Ibid, p. 44). In a partial critique, this distinction could
instead be posited within the theory of the text itself, between Julia Kristeva on one
hand, and Roland Barthes on the other. In From Work to Text in his book Image-
Music-Text, for instance, Barthes (1977), like Bennett and Wollacott (see 1987, p. 65-
69), argues against any final limit in the determination of a text's reading by opposing
the concept of the text to that of the work (1977, 155-164). Bennett and Wollacott
argue that "texts constitute sites around which the pre-eminently social affair of the
struggle for the production of meaning is conducted, principally in the form of a series
of bids and counter-bids to determine which system of inter-textual co-ordinates should
be granted an effective social role in organizing reading practices" (Ibid, p. 263) - and, I
would add, production practices. The play between generic expectation and excess,
specific institutional practices, the semiotic density of performance, and audience positioning, all engage with texts via this contest of reading formations.

"A Story So Far"

American empirical mass communication research has tended to treat the individual as a primary object. The individual, as a self-subsistent entity, is assumed as an object which is affected. Since, the individual is representative figure, the data gathered in each case can be extrapolated to describe the aggregate. This methodological individualism then leads to a general description of effects on the aggregate. In the case of content analysis of soap operas, the problems of empiricist research in general are compounded because what is being observed for its regularities is not some aspect of a real-life society but a fictional construction. Restricted to explanation by quantification, this empirical content analysis tells us little about the relationship between drama texts and their viewers.

As Allen (1987) argues, it would be shortsighted to dismiss out of hand the entire body of research generated by empiricists. The issues addressed (What is the effect of soap operas upon their viewers? How is the soap opera world like or unlike that of the viewer?) are important ones, even if the questions are framed in ways that reveal preconceived notions regarding "who" those viewers are and what those effects are likely to be. It would be equally shortsighted, however, to accept unquestioningly the results of these studies as knowledge of the phenomena they claim to explain. Regardless of how much can be salvaged from empiricist research on soap operas, or drama serials, they represent one of those complex phenomena that for the most part will remain inaccessible to, and hence unexplained by, research under that model.
Cultural studies focuses on the broad social patterns of economic, political and cultural structures that form the individual as representative. In this manner, it looks at individuals, not as representative units, but as subjects who are located in the first place by the effects of their insertion in social structures. Thus, instead of focusing on the particular effects of media practices on individuals and then describing the general scope of these effects, it begins with the question of how this system of representation, effect, response, etc., has arisen in the first place.

Cultural studies attempts to fracture the linear causal model in such a way that the impact of the media message is conceptualized as inseparable from, a consideration of the way of life of the particular social group under study. Inspired by the Gramscians' interests on the analysis of subculture, members of cultural studies have shown how subordinate groups appropriate consumer goods in a way that resist or negotiate dominant values in society. Morley, by criticizing uses and gratification research, argues that potential relations between differences in interpretation and socio-economic structures of society should not be ignored (1980, p. 14-15). Interpretations occur within socially constructed meaning systems which rest in larger ideological frameworks. Similarly, Radway, not from the Center, drawing on ethnography as well as on feminist, psychoanalytic, and literary analysis, studies the meaning of romance reading for a specific group of women. She finds that some women readers of romance novels reported that they chose to read novels in front of disapproving husbands and finds meanings in them that supported feminist values. This value system gave them the self-confidence to assert themselves more strongly. This may have resulted from the act of reading itself - it was something they did for themselves, not for others in the family. These readings saw the progress of the narrative as one of the feminization of the hero.
At the start he was cruel and unfeeling, but by the end he had become sensitized enough
to the heroine's finer feminine sensibility for him to be fit for her to marry. Radway
concludes that romances acclimate women to the limits and opportunities of their lives.

I think that the matrix of several academic disciplines with a particular version of
Marxism for cultural studies produces a convenient context for the questioning of
cultural activities and social communication. Such contextualization and the location of
the problematic in the cultural process specifically among cultural, political, and
economic phenomena-can provide descriptive power to the analysis of communication
and media practices. Cultural studies analyzes the linkages between political-economic
power structure, the ideological functions of the mass media, and the media-related
forms of popular culture.

While people working in cultural studies are debating whether academic and political
work can mesh, in the field of communication few have raised questions on cultural
studies's approach to the analysis of popular culture and mass media. There have been
very few articles devoted to criticism of cultural studies in general. Because it is not a
unified field, because it seeks to make explicit connections between various culture and
politics, because it has been a site for intellectual contestation, and because it is the
ongoing effort to define its own local specificity, any impressionistic and piecemeal
accounts of cultural studies would be one-dimensional. The outcome of its process of
redefinition and reconstructive transformation is not the achievement once and for all of
definitional clarity, but this is not to say that the whole efforts of those working in
cultural studies did not contribute to cultural studies's subject matters and approaches.
Lembo and Tucker's (1990) analysis and critique of cultural studies would be one good example of off-targeted analysis of cultural studies. They discuss cultural studies with particular reference to the work of John Fiske. They argue that cultural studies:

- tends to analyze all cultural interpretation in terms of struggles between dominant and subordinate groups. This reductionist perspective does not adequately conceptualize the formation of shared meanings nor the possibility of innovative cultural creativity. Its discussion of oppositional cultural politics lacks a strong normative dimension.
- Second, we argue that the text-centered approach of cultural studies misses much of television viewing's complexity (1990, p. 97).

These two well elaborated criticisms belong to Fiske, the structuralist tradition, and Hall's early model of encoding/decoding (preferred reading theory). Hall's overemphasis on the class dichotomy (dominant/dominated) has already been refuted by Morley's ethnographic studies on audience and is no longer considered as a valid approach in cultural studies. As mentioned earlier, the structuralist tradition's full orthodoxy never existed in cultural studies. In fact, the product of British post-structuralism, *Screen* theory and cultural studies are constantly debating over Lembo and Tucker's second argument.

Lembo and Tucker do not seem to recognize the existence of audience reception theory in cultural studies. Reception theory is a critical response to the *Screen* paradigm. As discussed in the concept of inter-textuality, cultural studies never insists on the only text-centered approach. The dynamic interplay between experience and social structure is at the heart of cultural studies. The interplay between the communication system and the audience is the core concern for reception analysis. It claims that reception should be understood with constant reference to the social and cultural networks that situate the individual viewer, and that these networks do not necessarily coincide with the income brackets or segments of market research. The audience experience of a particular
medium and its content cannot be separated from how it is used. The media are carriers of cultural forms, but the recipients already carry an essential part of the message within them. Reception analysis thus advocates the combined analysis of textual structures and audience responses as a comprehensive approach to reception as in Morley's research. The role of the recipients in mass communication should be explained with reference to their specific social and cultural background: they have been formed within communities of interpretation as seen in Radway's work and Hobson's work.

Like the reception theorists, Morley argues that the ideological discourses which, in a particular context, mediate the relations between text and reader will influence the way a text is perceived and read. He gives such varying reading practices a social base in arguing that an individual's location within class, gender, ethnic and national relations will condition the mode of his/her access or exposure to the discourses which thus mediate his/her encounter with a text. The advantage of this approach is that it enables us to pattern readings into identifiable clusters whose distinguishing characteristics are explained by the operation of both cultural (discursive) and structural (social positionality) factors. In short, we need to see how the different sub-cultural structures and formations within the audience, and the sharing of different cultural codes and competencies amongst different groups and classes, determine the decoding of the message for different sections of the audience. The audience must be conceived of as composed of clusters of socially situated individual readers, whose individual readings will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices pre-existent to the individual.

Lembo and Tucker suggest an alternative way to study audience which is similar to what I have describe. They argue that
as we have tried to show, is a variety of viewing relations that are cultural but that do not rely for their meaning on a correspondence between text and the act of interpretation. Viewers can rearrange the textual encodings of ideology without necessarily articulating an oppositional ideological stance. Indeed, it seems they can altogether ignore the text's discursive power. Furthermore, viewers can see through the ideology of the text to recognize the formulaic qualities of programming as a commodity that hides meaning. And perhaps most important, viewers focus on images and thus, break with the ordered discourse provided for them (1990, p. 111).

I would agree with their criticisms of cultural studies's tendency to overemphasize ideology and class in earlier studies, but equally they overestimate the freedom of audiences in reception by ignoring ideological aspects of the whole process of cultural production. Even though they criticized cultural studies in reference to Fiske, they share some similarities on the issue of audience with Fiske. I think that Fiske's analysis of television is insightful and able to summarize a broad range of research (from UK, US, Australia), but his work is aggregated and inconsistent. His view on television, on the other hand, seems to be rather positive. Fiske (1987) claims that television is institutional art with a strong economic motive, this preferred reading will normally bear the dominant ideology (1987, p. 309-326). But cultural studies argues that despite the power of ideology to reproduce itself in its subjects, despite the hegemonic force of the dominant classes, the people still manage to make their own meanings and to construct their own culture within, and often against, that which the industry provides for them.

Like uses and gratification research, Fiske, Lembo and Tucker overestimate the openness of the television message. In other words, they argue that TV programs encourage diverse readings. In order to win a large enough audience to be commercially viable they have to appeal to a broad, heterogeneous audience. TV programs thus tend to be more open than other texts; for example, quiz shows produce active participatory viewers. For Fiske, Madonna provide gaps and spaces in her image which escape
ideological control and allow her audiences to make meanings that connect with their social experience (Ibid, p. 90; 125-126). Such readings of subculture as an area of escape from ideological control are common in uses and gratification research. But there can be no law to ensure that the receiver will take the preferred or dominant reading of a text in precisely the way in which it has been encoded by the producer.

Fiske also misinterprets Gramsci's influence on cultural studies. He argues that the dominant (capitalist & bourgeois) class always wins the willing consent of the subordinate classes to the system that ensures their subordination (1987, p. 325-326). But Gramsci's idea was to reject the single dominant class with a single ideology. His idea of a hegemony bloc involves an alliance of quite diverse social strata (including sections of working classes); it constitutes an unstable balance by temporary wining forces, and demands compromise at economic, political, and cultural levels of the social formation. Thus, for Gramsci, a society is not seen as held in the grip of a dominant ideology reflecting dominant interests. Fiske's precise reading of Madonna has no value unless he can find her real cultural significance. How socioculturally differentiated audiences watch her may be more significant as cultural analysis. But if we wish to locate this understanding in relation to broader cultural struggles, then we must examine both the text and the reading in the historical conjuncture of its occurrence.

Television should be seen as a set of institutional practices, not an aggregation of texts, operating through programming policies and scheduling-through what it excludes as well as what it includes, though its overall mode of address-and offering various subjectivities to the viewers by these exclusions and inclusions: familial identities, national identities, definitions of what a child/a woman/a man might be expected to be interested in or to understand. Our understanding also must include technologies of
distribution and consumption; how does their insertion into the domestic sphere affect viewing cultures and the construction of everyday life alongside other domestic practices? Morley's studies have aimed at such an understanding.

It is not always easy to consider all aspects of television viewing, for example. Both Hall (1980) and Johnson (1987) recognize three dimensions which do not easily correspond with each other. They are (1) work on signs, signifying practices, signification and discourse (text-based studies); (2) work on history and histories, time and narrativity, on the forces which make and interrupt specific historical conjunctures (studies of lived culture); and (3) work on institutions, power and state policies (production-based studies). Hall is more pessimistic than Johnson about the commensurability of these three separate dimensions of the intellectual work. For Hall, this non-commensurability means that a general theory of culture is difficult to conceive. Although each of these three areas of cultural study involve non-reductive materialist theoretical practices, Hall argued (in the Illinois Conference), a general materialist theory of culture is not on the radical agenda of cultural studies. Johnson also admits that each dimension is inadequate as an account of the whole and has a different view of the politics of culture. But, unlike Hall, Johnson suggests the search for "the inner connections" and "real identities" between them (1987, p. 73).

Hall's desire to find a universal paradigm may not be feasible without transformations of each approach and our thinking about reality. I would argue that the divergence within cultural studies in a different way is very important. Those different approaches are a cross-checking mechanism on the hubris of intellectuals and power relations that underlie the formation of knowledge itself. An analysis of a TV show, for instance, one should embrace with production and readership perspectives for more complete analysis. In
other words, cultural studies need to consider cultural and economical conditions of production as well as formal semiological questions about the codes and conventions and ideological themes and problematics that belong to a wider social and political conjuncture.

This is not to say that cultural studies should adopt a philosophical position of extreme relativism. Rather it is to relativize issues of methodology by making them historical issues that tie the practices of science to those of power and control in society. If we read those approaches not only as giving us information but as expressing relations in the world, we can understand some of the fundamental issues that underlie the world in which we live. As Habermas (1971) argues, there are different human interests in social science, and these contain different dispositions toward the world and how we challenge it. The argumentation, debate, and cross-fertilization concerning these interests have a dual quality: a more serious debate about social issues and knowledge of science, a certain degree of humility. Of course, those approaches need to be reconstructed by reference to history: History should be a part of the analysis just as the researched, research, and researcher are interrelated.

Human knowledge must be situated historically: Knowledge must be historized. Concepts have no fixed or timeless meaning. What is known and how knowledge is obtained are mutually influencing and intertwined within a historical context. Also, what is judged now as adequate knowledge will not necessarily be adequate knowledge in the future. Another important point involves the modified realism. To cultural studies, the objective is not referenced directly to an external existing reality but is a way to consider the dynamic and changing, historically and socially formed through human struggles. The subjective, on the other hand, directs attention to what is inside people -
the interests and purposes in their everyday lives. Human possibility, it is believed, occurs through understanding how the boundaries and structures are formed through struggle rather than as given as an inevitable and unalterable present.

These definitions lead cultural studies, and perhaps all critical theories, to reject the objectivist pretensions of both quantitative analysis and grounded theory. It rejects the former, because its analytical procedures are firmly attached to a researcher's historically situated inclination toward the world, it is difficult to conceive any epistemological privilege. And the latter makes the wrong assumption that there are essences or fundamental underlying realities that are necessarily expressed at this day-to-day level. In other words, people are very often unaware that they are manipulated by patterns of distorted communication. For cultural studies there is no such thing as objective or disinterested inquiries. On the contrary, the major thrust of cultural studies is to reunite knowledge and practical concerns. It is true that cultural studies often expresses its moral and political interests, but not for a particular party or tendency. I also think the connection between intellectuals and politics is vital for any academic doctrines. For example, the analysis of popular culture for merely academic purposes would be one dimensional. One must also consider power and social possibilities.

Cultural studies thus rejects the separation of research and political activity at two levels. It is not just for accumulating knowledge or understanding the world but for acting in it. As mentioned in Hall's argument above, cultural studies is not only an intellectual involvement in the production of ideas but entails a direct and explicit involvement in the production of ideas and in efforts to transform current social relations. Researches of cultural studies can be used in several different ways. First, the researcher organizes a collective action against the dominant power in order to help improve the
underprivileged. The powerful are often assumed to be ignorant or moderately uncaring. In this case, the researcher can provide better knowledge in order to develop better policy. The second task is to educate the underprivileged. Liberation is in the hands of the people, not the powerful, but that first false consciousness must be overcome through education. Liberation may be achieved through either individual or collective action. Finally, the existing social structure must be changed through collective action by those outside the system. The researcher's job is to clarify where changes are needed and how to accomplish them. I think mixing research and politics intentionally is much more straightforward than the latent politicization of research. Value-neutrality is impossible because social research is historically situated in particular cultures and responds to specific political issues, however indirectly.

In the study of the media audience, for example, cultural studies's goal is to identify of the role of social factors in determining differences in interpretations and the relations of these differences to the construction of different social world, and to determine varied access to meaning systems. It involves a continual skepticism toward the socially accepted conventions of the relation between media contents and its viewer, realizing that social, cultural, and economic conditions contain contradictions in which there are continually issues of power domination. Cultural studies must inquire into the relations of conditions and organization of media institutions, as continually bound to processes of production and reproduction in society.

The relationship, however, are not linear in fashion but shaped through debate and struggle as social practices are constructed. Important to the debates in cultural studies are different conceptions of power. For some, priority is given to certain structural relations in the constructions of meaning, such as class, ethnicity, or gender. A
different position remains sensitive to these concepts but focuses on how power is circulated through the relation of knowledge to the construction of identity. Production-based studies, which, I believe, is the weakest area in cultural studies, is concerned with the power struggle to control or transform the means of cultural production. Text-based studies focus on the forms of cultural products and the possibilities of a transformative cultural practice. Finally, studies on lived culture concern about the ways of life of subordinated groups. It is not the incorporation of the three we need, Johnson argues. We need to think "each moment in the light of the others, importing objects and methods of study usually developed in relation to one moment into the next" (Ibid). A diagram may clarify the complexity of the relationship among three dimensions. Johnson's (1987) diagram is modified according to other references.
This diagram should not be considered as a perfect account of cultural processes, and does not sketch the ideal approach either. It may, however, serve as a guide to the directions of future approaches, or to the way in which they might be modified. Each aspect is depends upon the others and is indispensable to the whole. Each is distinct and involves characteristic changes of form. If we emphasize just one point of the circuit, we will not see what is happening at others. What we really need is to transform or
enhance our tools for each dimension. What we need is something that helps to trace the inner connection and real identities between dimensions. We need to develop and identify theories that enable to relate the different theoretical problematics. Thus, in the next chapter, I will identify and explore the relevancy of some theories that are largely ignored in cultural studies and, I believe, would contribute to the further transformation of cultural studies.
Chapter VI

Transformations of Cultural Studies (I)
Reconciliation of Political Economy and Cultural Studies

An Overview

In addition to Lembo and Tucker's criticism on cultural studies, there have been five more articles that exclusively analyzed and criticized cultural studies. O'Connor (1989b) and Budd, et al. (1990) criticized American cultural studies, mostly Larry Grossberg's and Fiske's. As discussed earlier, Grossberg (1989) defended his position and explained the utility of his effort to link cultural studies with postmodernism. He also complained of the lack of specificity in cultural studies and of the tendency to take the British body of work as the standard model or universal paradigm. I would agree with Grossberg's claim that cultural studies in the U.S. should be practiced within an American context, although it should be understood as practice, institution, and cultural form regardless of national origins. Megan Morris (1988), a cultural critic from Australia, warned of cultural studies being institutionalized and fixed. She resented the fact that cultural studies is beginning to commodify an appropriate theoretical "style" for analyzing everyday life. For Morris, this is banality in cultural studies. Even more importantly Graham Murdock (1989), a British political economist, in his essay "Cultural Studies: Missing Links," offered a rather sympathetic critique of cultural studies from the viewpoint of the political economy. Along with Murdock, Nicholas Garnham (1986) and Peter Golding (1977) have been also critical of cultural studies for not seriously considering economic aspect of cultural processes. The debate between political economy and cultural studies has lasted for over a decade now. I think it is time
to find innerconnections between two approaches. The political economists have a legitimate point over the criticism of cultural studies. As the first pointer, this chapter begins with exploring the political economic aspect of production-based studies and showing how Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of culture may address the apparent incompatibility between cultural studies and political economy in the field of communication.

The influence of Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, has been largely ignored in the field of communication. Bourdieu's work is considered as the most comprehensive and elegant system since Talcott Parsons (Dimmagio, p. 1460). Garnham (1986) tried to revalue the significance of Bourdieu's sociology of culture to critical theories:

Neglect of this aspect of Bourdieu's work (comprehensiveness) is not only damaging in its own right in the study of culture, but the fragmentary and partial absorption of what is a rich and unified body of theory and related empirical work across a range of fields from the ethnography of Algeria to art, science, religion, language, political science and education to the epistemology and methodology of the social sciences in general can lead to a danger of seriously misreading the theory (1986, p. 116).

The purpose of this part is not to attempt to review and criticize the whole body of his theory. Instead it will explore the applicability of Bourdieu's theory of culture to one of the critical theories of mass communication, namely cultural studies. Secondly, it will compare the two schools within four concepts which are regarded as the central notions of cultural studies: culture, class, ideology, and intertextuality. Pierre Bourdieu attempts to theorize the role of structural determinations with detailed empirical work on cultural consumption. I would argue that to analyze the media adequately, for example, one must analyze the linkages between political-economic power structure, the ideological functions of the mass media, and the media related forms of popular culture. Therefore, there cannot be one single appropriate starting point or key to understand such complex
phenomenon. Bourdieu's may be the work that has provoked the most interest in developing concepts which overcome the gap between analyses of culture and of socio-economic processes. For example, Bourdieu constructs a general model whereby symbolic goods have "economies" in which transactions take place in order to accumulate symbolic capital or prestige, while insisting that these operations also contain forms of economic rationality (Murdock, 1989, p. 240).

The political economy approach, as a branch of classical Marxism, has also been treated as mere conspiracy theory and economic reductionism, rather than as a starting point for empirical and theoretical inquiry. As far as the media are concerned, political economy focuses on the economic structure, the role of the state, and processes of media production (Wasko, 1989, p. 475). To understand contemporary cultural formations accurately, it argues, one must first analyze monopoly capitalist structures of ownership and control. It certainly wants to preserve the base/superstructure metaphor. It is true that it has an element of economic determinism. However, this approach is not simply a temporal extension of orthodox Marxism or even a revival of it. Rather, the political economy arises as a reaction against other Marxist and neo-Marxist positions (Wolff, 1984, p. 30). In particular, it criticizes Structuralist Marxism for overemphasizing the ideological elements of media and ignoring the question of the determination of the media. Thus, Gamham, Murdock, Golding, and Mattelart call for a return to "a political economy of culture" (Ibid). They argue that the key to understanding contemporary cultural formations lies in analyzing monopoly capitalist structures of ownership and control. But not everyone agrees.

Critics from the other side ask how economic determination can explain properly how meanings are created and how cultural forms develop. Although economic logic can
explain the origin of the ubiquity of cultural domination in mass culture, it cannot account for their autonomy. According to Williams' definition of "materialistic culture," beyond capital's conditions of reproduction, mass culture reproduces itself on the basis of its own logic and other social activities. Certainly, economic factors may partially penetrate cultural life by mechanization, transforming art into entertainment, and expanding mass communications on a global scale. At the same time, however, economic logic is unable to explain the counterlogic of reception. In other words, the proletarian public sphere and the popular culture that is rooted in resistance cannot be explained by the capital logic. I think that any theory loses its interpretive power if it tries to seek to specify the conditions of transcendence. The conflict between two positions over how to understand economic determination is far from resolved. However, there is recognition that a more complex model is needed which takes account of institutional, legal and political pressures, and which analyses the gender and racial, as well as the class nature of the divisions of labor and exercise of power within the industry.

Political Economy and Bourdieu's Economic Rationality

Adam Smith in *The Wealth of nations* defined political economy as the science of wealth. This definition was also inherent in Ricardo. Basically, they were concerned with the distribution and the creation of surplus value, problems of determination of three forms of monetary return (rent, wages, profit), and political factors to promote accumulation in agriculture and manufacture (Smith, 1970, p. 43-81; Bottomore, 1984, p. 375). Smith believed in a natural economic order that was responsible for progress and continuously increasing productivity. The natural laws governing the market were those of individual, enlightened self-interest, and competition would be harmonized by
an "invisible hand" for the ultimate good of society. He opposed any artificial controls or restrictions on the free working of the market (Ibid, 1970).

It is commonly recognized that in *Capital*, Marx went beyond the achievements of the classical political economy. He recognized that it had provided the analysis which was the necessary basis for critical understanding to begin. He called it "the necessary prerequisite of genetical presentation," that is, of a dialectical presentation of the finished critical science (Tucker, 1972, p. 191-198). What it lacked was an understanding of the categories it had abstracted from its study of the system of market economy, according to Marx. Classical political economy proceeded to analyze the forms of human life along "a course directly opposite to their real development." It does this because it begins with the results of historical development already in hand, and proceeds uncritically taking "the forms which stamp products as commodities for granted as natural and seeks to give an account, not of their historical character ...... but of their content and meaning" (Ibid). Where classical political economy attempts an explanation of its categories, the result is inadequate. For example, Smith considers exchange as a natural propensity to truck and barter, which is inferior to Marx's account.

There has been a view that Marx's advance over classical political economy is seen as consisting in his being historical where classical political economy had been ahistorical (Schiller, 1989; Sweezy, 1968; Wasko, 1989). This view is certainly correct since Marx says that a historical approach to social science leads to a critical approach (Sweezy, 1968, p.21). Marx's criticisms, however, go further. Marx (1971) believes that shortcomings of classical political economy come from what he calls the "analytical method" of it.
Classical political economy seeks to reduce the fixed and mutually alien forms of wealth to their inner unity by means of analysis and to strip away the form in which they exist independently alongside one another.... it is not interested in elaborating how the various forms came into being, but seeks to reduce them to their unity by means of analysis, because it starts with them as given premises (p. 500).

Marx's point here is that classical political economy with its "analytical method" could not recognize the contradictions as real, and so was not seeking to explain that the incompatibilities were made compatible in reality by their interweaving, by changes of form, and sometimes by forcible and violent readjustments, within the continuing movement. So the target of Marx's criticism of classical political economy is not simply its lack of historicity. He is saying that ahistoricity is a bad thing because it leads to errors that prevent thought from succeeding in its objective of understanding. The historical process itself, for Marx, is thus comprehended not merely as a process of undifferentiated change, but as a process of development of an essence through its essential transformations. The historical method is incomplete unless it is coupled with a search for the relevant real essence and its forms, which is what gives the historical enquiry its point (Ibid, p. 501).

To examine Marx's political economy would not be possible in this paper. I would, instead, summarize what are believed to have been the Marxian tenets of political economy.

- We live in a society dominated by the capitalist mode of production. It is a society based on exchange, a commodity society. Products are manufactured primarily for their realization as value and profit, and not for their capacity to satisfy human wants and desires.
• The commodity character of products is not simply determined by exchange, but by abstract exchange. Exchange, based on abstract labour time, affects the objective form as well as the subjective side of the productive process. It affects the former through its determination of the form of products and labour and the latter through its debasement of human relationships.

• The particular constellation of social relations which ensures the unity of the capitalist social process also ensures its "fetishization and reification." The products of human labour are viewed as independent, "having a life of their own" a "natural value." The social and material relations which result from exchange, distribution and consumption are not immediately comprehensible. They are veiled by necessary illusion - the fetishism of commodities.

• Capitalism is not a harmonious social whole. Both in the realm of the production of commodities and in the sphere of illusion it is based on contradictions. The dominant relations of production "fetter" the developed forces of production and produce a series of antagonisms. Further, the mass of workers' separation from the means of production produces direct conflict with those that possess capital. Antagonisms arise in the cultural sphere as well as in the economic. Contradictions between socially generated illusions (ideology) and actuality (performances, effects) lead to crisis. For the principles which govern production are often not those which govern wants and needs, and their multifarious expression.

• A general tendency exists towards capital-intensive industries and increased concentration of capital. The free market is progressively replaced by the oligopolistic and monopolistic mass production of standardized goods.

• The progressive rise in the organic composition of capital - the amount of fixed capital per worker - exacerbates the inherently unstable accumulation process. In order to sustain this process, its protagonists utilize all means available - including imperialist expansion and war (Smirnov, et al. 1984; Tucker, 1972; Bottomore, 1983; Miller, 1984; Smith and Evans, 1983).
In the field of communication, the political economy emphasizes the direct relations between cultural texts and socio/economic realities. Of all positions within the critical tradition, it most closely preserves the base/superstructure metaphor. Within this orientation, the economy is seen as the primary reality that explains second order processes within media practice - audience perception, the production of texts, etc. The issue of who controls media and owns media institutions has been central to Marxist concerns since Marx wrote *The German Ideology*. This has been a point of reference for all subsequent debates about economic determination.

> The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. In so far, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age; thus, their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx, 1970, p.64)

As a result, for many early political economists, the fact that capitalist relations of production limit and define the production and distribution of images, values, visions, etc., leads easily to the claim that such images naturally disseminate the dominant ideology and are naturally accepted by consumers of these cultural commodities as true. Obviously this view fails to demonstrate the assumed direct effects of corporate structure on consciousness, and does not account for innovation either in production or reception. This reflection hypothesis had become difficult to maintain in the light of historical events during the 60s and 70s. The paradigm was getting shaky.

It was Golding and Murdock who rejected the charge of the reflection hypothesis and the conspiracy theory, and relaunched discussion of the political economy of mass communication. They criticized the prevailing tendency among Marxists working on the
media to ignore economic determination. Thus, Golding and Murdock (1979) argue that "the media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce commodities" (1979, p. 210). They seem to accept the "autonomy of certain cultural practices," but at a macro level, the economy was predominant. Thus, according to Golding and Murdock, the theoretical debates in structuralism, psychoanalysis, etc. missed the point and in a sense were useless since the most important determinations took place in the institutional structures of the media. Smythe (1981) reiterates this position in claiming that the first question that historical materialism should ask about mass communication systems is "what economic function for capital do they serve?"

Smythe goes on from this to propose his famous "audience as commodity" proposition, which again calls for a shift of attention from the ideology of texts to the "effectivity" of the mode of production (1981, p. 117). However, these proponents of political economy seem to be careful to note that analyses need to take account of the specific nature of production activities in order to go beyond generalities and crude instrumentalism. But they argue that while production studies provide evidence for the specificity and relative autonomy of professional practices and ideologies, conceptions of news values, for example, are not fundamentally at odds with the dominant forces in society. This is why Golding and Murdock maintain that it is imperative to understand the workings of economic determinations, which are said to "penetrate and frame the forms of particular productions" (Golding & Murdock, 1979, p. 198-204). In his recent article, Murdock (1989) takes up some of Marx's tenets - productionism and the separation of practices. He still stresses the economic dynamics:
Economic dynamics are crucial to critical inquiry because they establish some of the key contexts within which consumption takes place, but they do not negate the need for a full and separate analysis of symbolic determinations. My position is that economic dynamics play a crucial role in structuring the social spaces within which communicative activity takes place, but that within these spaces the symbolic sphere operates according to its own rules, which establish their own independent determinations (p. 229-230).

To Golding, Murdock, and other political economists, Bourdieu's masterpiece *Distinction* has been the shield from criticisms of being called mere economic determinists. In fact the book shows how cultural forms are expressions of the structure of domination in society. It is a systematic study of the cultural forms in which this domination is revealed in the way of life of different classes and class fractions. Here, Bourdieu tries to demonstrate that patterns of cultural production and consumption are not just determined by the socio-economic structure. Bourdieu tends to concentrate more on the analysis of symbolic violence and symbolic capital than the analysis of the economy. Where Bourdieu attracts political economists most, however, is in his argument on symbolic capital which serves essentially economic interests. The following paragraphs will discuss how his notion of economic rationality may agree with the school of political economy and cultural studies.

**Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture: An Overview**

In his book, *Distinction*, Bourdieu shows how cultural forms are expressions of the structure of domination in society. It is a systematic study of the cultural forms in which this domination is revealed in the way of life of different classes and class fractions. Here, Bourdieu tries to demonstrate that patterns of cultural production and consumption are not just determined by the socio-economic structure.
In my view, Bourdieu is certainly not a crude economic determinist, although some scholars point out that he uses economic language, such as capital and market, which evokes the economic mode of reasoning (e.g. Frow 1987; Shirley 1986). He believes that the general theory of the economy of fields which emerges from generalization to generalization enables us to describe the specific form taken by the most general mechanisms and concepts such as capital, investment, and thus to avoid all kinds of reductionisms including economism which, he argues, recognizes nothing but material interest and the search for the maximization of monetary profit. There may be many reasons why Bourdieu has had both appraisals and criticisms, and has not been received fully into the discourse of Anglo-American social science. Most of all, I believe, there is difficulty of his style and prose. The words he has created break with the common-sense understandings embedded in common language. In other words, the nested configuration of his sentences—designed to convey the relational and recursive character of social processes and the density of his argumentation—have prevented American social scientists from fully grasping the originality and essence of Bourdieu's sociology.

For example, Bourdieu uses a model of society which can be seen as a simple formal analogy of the Marxian concept of capital (1979, p. 109-144). Everyday life is a combination of "fields" such as leisure, family patterns, consumption, work, artistic practices, etc. There are two forms of assets in each of those fields: money and cultural competence. Bourdieu conceptualizes these as economic and cultural capital which are accumulated through competition. For the orthodox Marxists, this analogy may be too liberal use of the concept. As mentioned above, some actually called it a crude economism applying a concept of capital by analogy to any area of social interaction. His theory is far more complex than that. Bourdieu's writing is particularly dense and
wide-ranging in subject matter cannot be summarized within the space available, if at all. Consequently, I will only concentrate on the central notions of (symbolic, economic, cultural, social) capital and habitus in social science.

The basic notion in Bourdieu's methodological position is his conception of the **habitus**. He defines it as "a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices" (1979, p. vii). The basic unit of **habitus** is the individual actor as a member of a social group or class. What is the exact meaning of habitus? The habitus is a generative principle that mediates and harmonizes the objective spaces of economic and social conditions with the more subjective space of group and class-specific lifestyles on the level of the individual actor in his/her quality as member of a class. Here, he strongly rejects Marx's unilateral transposition of an economic "base" into a cultural "superstructure" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101-102). As mentioned above, he contends that the combinations of any concrete social formation are held to be refracted through relatively autonomous mediating institutions and forces.

Habitus is not a simple, direct function of living conditions. Cultural forms have an inertia that survives, often through several generations, the material basis that may change very rapidly (Bourdieu, 1979, P. 195). This point can be seen in his work on Algeria (1964). He shows how the precapitalist way of life determined by the agricultural cycle survives along with the linear conception of time imposed by the colonial transformation of the economy. Thus, the habitus of a group or a class defines a symbolic order within which it conducts its practices. It provides a common framework, like universal formula, to understand actions of the members of the group. But it is not a deterministic formula or a set of norms to which individuals are expected
to conform. Lower middle class people do not prefer Rafaello to Picasso because there is a norm saying they should. What this preference means and how it has been generated is a matter of the habitus. But this preference is an active choice. There is a cultural code that defines a symbolic value to cultural practices and the habitus of each group or class is formed in the practical choice of utilizing these values.

So Bourdieu (1977) summarizes the contribution of the concept of the habitus to the links between individual and collective practices and to our understanding of transformations of society and culture.

In short, the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. The system of dispositions ...... is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world without being able to give them a rational basis. And it is at the same time the principle of the transformations and regulated revolutions which neither the extrinsic and instantaneous determinisms of a mechanistic sociologism nor the purely internal but equally punctual determination of voluntarist or spontaneist subjectivism are capable of according for (P. 82).

Bourdieu moves beyond the agent defined by class habitus to the relations between habitus in the processes of domination. Bourdieu approaches his analysis of modes of domination through his analysis of symbolic capital. Symbolic capital involves consideration of the mechanisms which disguise the true nature of the economy, "a system governed by the laws of interested calculation, competition, and exploitation, but which are integral to its reproduction" (1977, p. 172). Knowledge of symbolic capital provides the link between the objective economy and the accumulated behavior of agents. It is merely a subjective reflection, acknowledgement and legitimation of a given distribution of economic, cultural and social capital (Ibid, p. 171-173). Mander (1987) says that symbolic capital only exists in the eyes of others and always fulfills ideological
functions, while the other forms of capital have an independent objectifications, such as money, titles, etc.

For Bourdieu, the understanding of symbolic capital and symbolic violence is given further point by the study of non-capitalist society, in his case Kabylia. The Kabylia have no consciousness of economic capital and political institutions. Power is exercised not so much through physical violence, but through symbolic violence. Symbolic capital, symbolic power, and symbolic violence are intertwined as vital elements in the establishment of modes of domination (Bourdieu, 1965b). The significance of symbolic practices in the accumulation and distribution of symbolic capital then provides for him the clue to the non-violent reproduction of classes (Garnham, 1986, p. 428).

In sum, as was mentioned above, the focus of Bourdieu's theory is to disclose the causal relations between the objective structure of social classes and the cultural field of conflicting but social-reproduction guaranteeing lifestyles. How is the power structure of the objective social space transformed into distinctive lifestyles? An answer to this crucial question presupposes, besides the above mentioned concept of habitus, an adequate theory of the social field. The dynamics of social fields are determined by the interaction of their autonomous internal logic with the external state of the social distribution of capital resources. Social fields, ranging from the educational system, the spheres of high and popular culture, the consumptive complexes of fashion, sport, leisure, etc., supply "objectified possibilities" (goods, services and patterns of action) (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 223). Social fields are characterized by the interplay of their relative autonomy with the efforts of the social agents and classes to occupy and determine their legitimate definition. In this sense the autonomy of social fields is always relative. Social classes try to seize these spheres and use them for displaying of
power and social reproduction. This general struggle is ultimately determined by economic struggle in the field of class relations. Even though the founding fathers like E. P. Thompson, Williams, and Hall emphasized the significance of Bourdieu's work, though never elaborating his theory, newcomers are reluctant to agree with the assessment (e.g. Mander 1987; Frow 1987). Since it is composed of several institutions and disciplines, it would be inappropriate to attempt to compare one model of individual scholarship from cultural studies with Bourdieu's work. Therefore, the paper will emphasize the central notions of cultural studies, namely, culture, ideology, class, and intertextuality, and see how Bourdieu's theory of culture may agree with cultural studies.

Bourdieu and Cultural Studies

- On the Methodological Point of View

Few seem to accept cultural studies as an academic discipline, although it is growing and has influenced academic disciplines of humanities and social sciences, especially on communication and media studies in North America. Cultural studies is often considered in the field of communication as a form of criticism, or network, or a movement both drawn from and criticizing previous research on communication and media studies, as well as previous work in other disciplines. Much of contemporary American research has been devoted to find a fixed system of understanding that would provide a objective understanding of the empirical world. On the other hand, cultural studies doesn't seem to be interested in a particular set of assumptions or hypothesis. Rather it has focused on the nature of everyday experience, the sense the individual makes the world. For example, where mainstream research has seen mass society, cultural studies has seen cultures, subcultures, classes, and institutions. Thus, it avoids
a function of them (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu's complex theoretical dimension around *habitus* can be expressed in a diagram:

**STRUCTURE**

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Meaning<--------->Habitus<-------->Function
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*Figure 3. Dimensions of Habitus*

To Bourdieu, it is necessary to see human practices as structured by meaning systems and as their expressions, but they also serve various functions determined by objective conditions of existence; and while on the other hand they are parts of a structure, on the other they are carried out, produced, reproduced and used by living individuals (1984, p. 485-500). Like cultural studies, Bourdieu's sociology never developed grand theoretical systems and does not lend itself to systematic generation of precise hypotheses which could be rigorously tested by statistical method. Bourdieu's flexible methodological position can best be appreciated in his interpretations of the cultural forms, including media.

- **On Culture**

Williams, one of the most influential figure in cultural studies, attempts to shift the Marxist theory of determination from a base/superstructure model to an organic process model. He sees society as a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures in political, economic and cultural formations. For example, in explaining the emergence of the mass media, Williams refutes any notion of determinacy by abstract structures of technology or economy. Instead, the technological emergence of television is
the mechanistic determinism of much sociology, including some forms of Marxism, by looking at the complexity and importance of subjective experience. Cultural studies, however, doesn't simply deny scientific approaches, nor an attempt to synthesize what Lazarfeld called administrative and critical research. This resistance to reductionism can also be found in the work of Weber, who argued the need for a cultural science that was interpretive rather than reductionist in the form of causal or functional explanations. Hall seems to prefer cultural studies to cultural science to avoid a possible slide toward more behaviorist scientism. On the philosophy of the subject—Richard Johnson and others having defined cultural studies as the investigation of how our individual subjectivities are socially constructed (1987, P. 45, 62)—then in my view, cultural studies is anti-subjectivist because it locates the sources of meaning not in individual reason or subjectivity, but in social relations, communication, cultural politics. The stress on culture implies the social construction of meanings, but it also implies the existence of forms of political reason transcending individual subjectivity.

Similarly, Bourdieu's methodological point of view is at one and the same time anti-functionalist and anti-subjectivist. To him, the cultural forms of the practices of everyday life cannot be reduced to needs of the individual any more than to the functional imperatives of the collectivity. They take the form of irreducible symbolic expressions, the meanings of which are not directly apparent to the subjects (1977, p 3-9). Yet the subjects are not determined by the collective institutions in their practices. People do not simply reproduce their meaning systems, they also produce and use them. Classes and their members are not just actors in a prefabricated play, but also creative subjects. According to Bourdieu, such actions should not be interpreted in terms of a 'logic' but rather in terms of a 'sense.' This sense is generated by the objective living conditions, but since it is itself able to generate new sense it is by no means reducible to
explainable only in terms of certain purposes and practices that were intentionally acted upon. Thus, television emerges from a socially shared awareness of mobility and change, conditions of a "structure of feeling" that sets the terms for its development. This complex interaction between structure (economic, social determinants) and agency (cultural autonomy) points to the need for an adequate definition of culture. The term culture for Williams is a way of living within an industrial society. Culture is not just ideological production, it is the lived experience of a people in institutions, practices, habits of everyday existence. Since culture is an environment, a process and an hegemony in which individuals and their works are embedded, it has a concrete effectivity.

Bourdieu also takes seriously the notion of culture, though he defines it narrowly: "the summits of achieved civilization" (Hall 1980, p.59). It is true that he places more emphasis on the whole range of social activities—an emphasis which is most evident in specifically cultural activities than on a whole social order. Leaving culture to such cultural activities only, of course, may prevent him from taking a broader view of culture. Nevertheless, his narrow interpretation of culture has its own value. For example, it helps to illustrate and clarify national histories of styles of art and kinds of intellectual work which manifest, in relation with other institutions and activities, the central interests and values of a people. It is inevitable to combine both the anthropological and sociological senses of culture for a more complete analysis of culture. Thus, I would argue, Bourdieu's definition of culture is relevant for cultural studies of consumption patterns, life-style, social consciousness, and even of the various forms of political practices. He also believes that culture is defined by the dominant classes. In fact, his interest revolves around the question of what determines
those practices and how they are expressed and lived among the different sections of the dominating classes and among the dominated popular classes.

• **On Class and Ideology**

In *Distinction*, by exploring the socio-economic origins of cultural taste, Bourdieu questions the "relative autonomy" of culture and articulates a way of mediating the relation between culture and economic or class status that attempts to resolve dialectically the structuralist-voluntarist tension. He argues that the tension was caused by Marx's ambiguous conception of class either an objective condition (the relation to the means of production) or a subjective sense of class identity and shared political goals (class consciousness). Instead of abandoning the category of class as reductive and economistic, referring to Weber's distinction between class and estate, Bourdieu refines the categorical determinants to account for the effects of cultural capital (i.e., the status derived from education and modes of consumption) as well as economic capital (i.e., the status derived from material goods and income), and intra-class struggles among class fractions. To Bourdieu, like money or investments, culture has value. The possession (or lack) of cultural capital increases (or decreases) the social worth of the individual. Class fractions are differentiated by whether the origin of their social capital is primarily economic or cultural: thus, junior executives and primary school teachers represent different class fractions of the middle class. Bourdieu attempts to complicate the category of class according to many factors (age, sex, geographical location, trajectory, etc.). Here, Bourdieu tries to describe class in both structural and dynamic terms.

To describe Bourdieu's definition of class, it is helpful to recapitulate briefly the one main sociological traditions, Weberian theory, which has shaped the discussion of class up to the present. However, I will focus on the Weberian tradition which has affected
Bourdieu to define the notions of class, class relations and struggle (Parkin, 1979). Weber conceptualizes classes as totalities of individuals who share the same marketable capacities in the sphere of distribution. Classes are occupational groups who share the same amount of socially valued resources and engage in a distributive struggle for their maximization (Weber, 1982, 63-64). Class struggle in this context is an entirely competitive effort by social groups to appropriate and to enclose themselves within the boundaries of respective social classes. They are based on a similar setting within the division of labor and are socially integrated by common lifestyles, intermarriage patterns, etc. Classes as competitive social groups basically acknowledge the institutional rules which set the legal framework for the distributive struggle, the latter being essentially a struggle for power, according to Weber (Ibid).

Similarly, Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of class relations for the constitution of classes. The identity of a particular structure can only be secured by its negation of all other structures, not by its internal qualities. Class relations take the meaning of mostly unconscious group activities to maintain or to break down the objective distances between them, for example by means of the symbolic struggle for distinction. Class relations therefore refer to practices which secure and affirm implicit group identities (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 244-249).

Bourdieu is also concerned with class struggle. But the struggles that concern him are not Marx's antagonistic nature of capital/labor relationship, but conflicts within the dominant class with economic and cultural capital. Indeed, the notion of capital is the center of his class theory. Cultural capital refers to cultural knowledge as a resource of power used by individuals and social groups to improve their positions within the social class structure (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 89). Economic capital refers to monetary assets
which can be accumulated and invested as part of class strategy. Cultural capital is harder to measure than economic capital because there is not clear equivalent to the medium of money in the sphere of culture. For Bourdieu, cultural capital is the incorporation of symbolic, cognitive and aesthetic competences via implicit learning processes mainly within the family socialization. The acquisition of cultural capital in the sense of incorporation is the prerequisite for the possibility of symbolically appropriating that cultural capital as objectified in cultural goods, artifacts, books, pictures, etc (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 53).

The distinction between economic and cultural capital enables Bourdieu to distinguish between 1) the ruling-class fraction with much cultural and little economic capital (free artists, intellectuals, etc.), 2) the fraction with little cultural and much economic capital (free entrepreneurs, managers, etc.), and 3) the free professions which own a high amount both of economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 260-317). Due to their relatively high amount of economic and cultural capital, all three fractions of the ruling class can engage not only in the struggle for the appropriation of economic and cultural goods, but also in the symbolic struggle for the marks of distinction inhering in the socially highest valued cultural goods and practices (Ibid, p. 124).

This double aspect of cultural capital, as partly incorporated and partly institutionalized resources of individual actors and social groups used to support their strategic positions in the struggle for wealth, status, and power, is crucial to Bourdieu's overall theory (Mander, 1987, p. 429-430). Despite this emphasis on meaning systems, however, Bourdieu is by no means a subjectivist. Much of his writing is against phenomenological approaches and strict structuralism, such as that of Lévi-Strauss. Since Bourdieu believes that systems of domination persist and reproduce themselves
without conscious recognition by a society's members, to him, any social science based on the subjective perceptions of participants, or on commonsense classifications of social groups or social problems, can only reinforce and confirm the very domination he regards as problematic.

The notion of cultural capital is further explored in the empirical analysis of the French school system (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). The educational system succeeds in its function as a mechanism of class reproduction allocating individuals to stratified occupational positions insofar as, with the transition from liberal to corporate capitalism, the economic relations between firms and sectors, and the administrative hierarchies within enterprises are rationalized and bureaucratized (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 186-188). With separation between ownership and control, the acquisition of academic degrees replaces the "inheritance of property titles" as the mechanism of position. In other words, the acquisition of titles itself presupposes that cultural competences be incorporated, which favors individuals from family backgrounds with a large amount of cultural capital (1979, p. 91-92).

Beyond the notions of economic and cultural capital Bourdieu introduces social capital as another autonomous means to maximize power and rewards. Social capital refers to the membership in social groups and the profits that can be appropriated by the strategic use of social relations in order to improve one's position (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 171). For example, membership in exclusive clubs can explain why the same amount of economic and cultural capital often yield unequal returns. Mutual knowledge and acknowledgement among the group members is the condition for the efficiency of social capital, according to Bourdieu (Ibid, p. 179). Therefore Bourdieu states that social capital always functions as "symbolic capital." Symbolic capital cannot be objectified,
institutionalized or incorporated, since it is dependent on its activation and affirmation by actual communicative practices. It will be discussed along with symbolic violence.

These three sorts of capital are used for the appropriation of the objective products of social labor. Bourdieu believes that they make it possible to construct a social space which, besides the economic sphere, integrates the spheres of culture and social relations into the structuration of class relations. For Bourdieu, the analysis of class should be under the restriction of the "tendential dominance of the economic field" (1985, p. 11). In other words, class struggle is ultimately determined by economic struggle in the field of class relations. While there is convertibility between economic and cultural capital in both directions, it is the convertibility of cultural into economic capital that defines it as capital and determines not only the overall structure of the social field but also that of subfields (Bourdieu, 1977, P. 183). It does so because economic capital is a more efficient reproductive mechanism. He seems to avoid Marxist essentialism by introducing the structure of capital distribution beyond the volume of capital. In this way, intra-class differences between the cultural and the economic bourgeoisie can be analyzed. How does then a given volume and structure of capital-accumulation among individuals and social groups translate into empirically observable class practices? This question will be discussed later.

The point of this seems to be that culture and class are closely interrelated but the discourse of culture disguises its connection with class. By using words like "taste," and "discrimination," the discourse of culture grounds cultural differences in universal human nature or in universal value systems. It pretends that culture is equally available to all, as democratic capitalism pretends that wealth is equally available to all. The fact that few acquire either culture or wealth is explained by reference to natural differences
between individuals, which are expressed as differences in their natural taste. The argument here is that naturally people who have better conditions of existence appreciate "high" art and therefore the value system that validates high art and denigrates low art is based in nature, and not in the unequal distribution of power in a class-divided society. Bourdieu's account of cultural capital reveals the attempt of the dominant classes to control culture for their own interests as effectively as they control the circulation of wealth. Thus, in Bourdieu's view, culture is neither neutral nor morally edifying but constitutive of the semiotics of class struggle.

Bourdieu (1984) takes the charismatic mode as characterizing all high cultural practices. He seems to restrict it to the practices of the dominant fraction of the ruling class - the fraction that possesses economic capital (p.68). The children of the upper classes, for example, are forced to rely on the school for the "credentialled cultural capital" which, supplemented by their social capital of networks and connections, can be reconverted into a high class position. Their parents convert a portion of their economic capital into cultural capital by sending their children to the proper universities and business schools. These children, in turn, reconver their cultural and social capital into economic dominance. Because, according to Bourdieu, remuneration is increasingly provided through salaries rather than profits, this transformation has not only reproduced the previous structure of class relations but fortified it as well, by transforming its basis from inheritance of wealth to possession of cultural and social capital (Bourdieu & Saint Martin, 1973).

Individuals with common material conditions of existence share not only, conditions of existence but a system of dispositions associated with those conditions of existence. There is a "harmonization of agents' experiences" associated with "the production of a
commonsense world endowed with ..... objectivity" (1977, p. 80). Thus the context of material and ideology is relatively homogeneous, and is secured through "the orchestrations of the habitus " in its dialectical interaction with lived experience. The concept of habitus thus enables Bourdieu to explain the natural processes of culture and economical social relations.

In Bourdieu's class theory, class boundaries are conceptualized objectively in the class-members relations. Similarly, Hoggart's particular concern is the interrelationship among several existing cultures that made up the culture of the working class. He argues that forms of entertainment were rapidly eroding and commercializing this distinctive culture. Williams, on the other hand, began by refusing to accept the concept of class division and questions some distinct forms of working class cultures. Later, Williams admitted that bourgeois culture was orientated towards the basic individualist idea and working class culture towards the basic collective idea. But he also argues that there is constant interaction between two cultures and calls for the development of a common culture, a subtle interaction between the old forms and a vision of socialist man. Thompson used the broader definition of culture. He argues that working-class culture was not only produced by and for the people, but that it was the product of their struggles against the dominant order.

Gramsci also rejects the orthodox Marxist tendency to reduce the complexity of culture to the status of a totality. He analyzes critically the nature of state and civil society, the role and formation of intellectuals, popular cultures, class, etc. In doing so, Gramsci brings these ideas together within the concept of hegemony which has played a seminal role in cultural studies. The literal meaning of hegemony is leadership, or domination, or preponderance. But for Gramsci, the concept of hegemony signifies something much
more complex. Hegemony describes the general predominance of particular class, political, and ideological interests. Although a society is made up of conflicting class interests, the ruling class exercises hegemony in that its interests are accepted as the prevailing ones. Social and cultural conflict is expressed as a struggle for hegemony, a struggle over which ideas will be recognized as the prevailing, common-sense view. If the orthodox Marxism had stressed the repressive role of the state in class societies, then Gramsci introduces the dimension of civil society to locate the complex ways. He suggests ways in which culture is a strategic field for the establishment of forms of consent. Gramsci would support Bourdieu's argument that there are many features of the working-class lifestyle "which, through the sense of incompetence, failure or cultural unworthiness, imply a form of recognition of the dominant values" (1984, p. 395). Although his analysis is supported by Gramsci, theorists from cultural studies disagree with this pessimistic view on working-class culture, because this dominance of the dominant values thus seems to become something absolute, and the working class to be inevitably entrapped within the cultural limits (Frow 1987, p. 70-71). Also it would reject Bourdieu's notion of dominant class which leads him to neglect the potential for contradiction in the role of intellectuals, for example.

Both certainly reject the notion of homogeneity, although Bourdieu is more deterministic on class division. It is difficult to say which one is more accurate to the analysis of class than the other. Again, cultural studies has always stressed the heterogeneity or complexity of working class culture. Johnson, however, underscores the idea of the heterogeneity of what happens in culture; as both Thompson and Williams often stressed, experience does not conform neatly to theory. Johnson (1980) argues that "it is an error, certainly in modern capitalist conditions, to view working-class culture as all of piece. The degree of homogeneity is undoubtedly historically variable" (1980, p.
Culture is plural and messy, and cannot be representable by a single point of view; a too reductively deterministic approach must fail to take account of the multiplicity and contaradiction of experience. At the same time, extreme emphasis on heterogeneity, I think, may weaken the possibilities of class solidarity. It also becomes very difficult to think in terms of class experience or culture at all. Thus, Johnson continues to argue that we should start to analyze the relation between economic classes and cultural forms, as Bourdieu did, by looking for contradictions, taboos, displacements in a culture, as well as unities (Ibid). In a way, Bourdieu's theory can help to break the bad romantic or theoretical side of cultural studies.

- **On Intertextuality**

Textual analysis of cultural products is common in cultural studies. It uses the Althusserian concept of relative autonomy and the ideological level to explore the internal dynamics of signifying practices. On the other hand, the mainstream research on analysis of texts has used an approach called quantitative content analysis. This methodology reduces the text to quantifiable data by noting the incidences of certain features and comparing that frequency with something else. Content analysis is useful to document the ways in which television programs represent constructions of the world rather than reflections of reality. But its preference for the principles of laboratory science limits its ability to account for the complexities of our engagements with those constructed worlds we see on television. We cannot the categorize meanings of sitcoms or soaps as a set of quantifiable and objective categories of data. Simply put, the scientific law tells us little about the various relationships we have with fictional television programs.
Meanwhile, cultural studies attempts to fracture the simplistic approach. For example, Connell from the Center investigated news coverage of the dispute between the Labour party and British trade unions over the wage problem. He found that the routine journalistic practices helped to construct a set of premises about the dispute that favored the government's position. Television reading is a negotiation between the social sense inscribed in the program and the meanings of social experience made by its wide variety of viewers, and thus, the negotiation is discursive one. This inevitability of intertextuality is proposed by Barthes who argues that intertextual relations are so pervasive that our culture consists of a complex web of intertextuality. Bourdieu takes similar position in analyzing the French educational system. For him, texts-as the means of both transmitting privilege from generation to generation and legitimating the resulting perpetuation of class differences by representing it as the consequence of unequally distributed natural aptitudes-are classified and valorised so as to function as tokens of exchange within a game of culture (1984, p. 328-330). In the case of Parisian university students, knowledgeability of all forms of culture, including those classified as popular, serves as a means of distinguishing students of bourgeois origin from those of working-class or even petit-bourgeois origin. In every area of culture, students have richer and more extensive knowledge the higher their social origin. Thus, Bourdieu argues that the forms of cultural stratification that may be produced in relation to textual phenomena are more complex and varied than is usually supposed.

There is no doubt that Bourdieu is an important figure in cultural studies of communication. But while Bourdieu's work has been explicated in the sociology of culture, the political economic aspects of his work have been overlooked. Hall (1978) locates Bourdieu's significance in his synthesis of the Marxist position with
structuralism, a dialectical resolution which offers the possibility of the development of "an adequate Marxist theory of ideology" (1978, p. 29). Garnham and Williams (1986) seem to agree with Hall's judgement. At the same time, they stress Bourdieu's commitment to the materialist side of the theoretical dialectic.

While Bourdieu has concentrated his attention upon the mode of domination, upon what he calls the exercise of symbolic power, his theory is cast in resolutely materialist terms and it is not just the terms borrowed from economics such as capital, profit, market and investment, which he uses to describe and analyze cultural practice, that links his theory to a properly economic analysis in the narrow sense of that term, that is to say to the analysis of the mode of production of material life, which for Bourdieu is always ultimately and not so ultimately determinate (p. 118).

Bourdieu seems to be accepted favorably in critical studies of communication without depth. Hall, for example, in the paper cited above, devoted only the last page to critical discussion of Bourdieu's thought. Garnham (1986), Garnham and Williams (1986), despite their detailed exposition of the central strands in Bourdieu's work, devote only the last two pages to an actual critique. Murdock (1977, 1989) seems to be more enthusiastic about Bourdieu than any other scholars in our field.

Bourdieu's discussions of the production and reproduction of capital seem to suggest the influence of Marxism, although he avoids that. It may be helpful to consider his relationship to Marxism. When he writes about capital, Bourdieu sounds very Marxist, according to DiMaggio (1978).

... increase in the quantity of cultural capital that is objectified in machines, implements, or instruments ... and hence the quantity of embodied cultural capital necessary to reproduce this objectified capital and to make it productive (p. 27).

Despite his preoccupation with culture, distinctions of infrastructure and superstructure can be discerned. In his discussions of French society, Bourdieu refers to the owners
of capital as the dominant fraction of the dominant class: pursuit of cultural capital is seen as a means to economic ends (DiMaggio, 1979). In responding the charge of economism, Bourdieu (1989) argues:

The only thing I share with neo marginalist economists are the words. Take the notion of investment. By investment I mean the propensity to act which is born out of the relation between a field and a system of dispositions adjusted to the game it proposes, a sense of the game and of its stakes which implies both an inclination and an ability to play game. The general theory of the economy of fields which emerges progressively from generalization to generalization enable us to describe and to specify the specific form taken by the most general mechanisms and concepts such as capital, investment, interest, within each field, and thus to avoid all kinds of reductionisms .................. Thus my theory owes nothing to the transfer of the economic approach (p.42).

Although he does not belong to crude economic determinism, Bourdieu, in my view, takes a deterministic view of social reality and the practice of social agents. If objective reality determines social practice, as he argues, then conformity to the dictates and probabilities of that reality is the only possible outcome. Although he may draw heavily upon Weber as the source of his ideas on symbolic domination, the introduction of a false knowledge seems the ensure the reproduction of determinism in his work. Thus, he ignores that class's internal differentiation and stratification and underestimates the importance of the possibility of mobility in the legitimation of patterned domination. I think that the reproduction in social practice of class society is complex and less determined.

Bourdieu (1984) defines class in terms of three variables: the volume of capital possessed; the composition of this capital (that is, the relation between economic and cultural capitals); and the change in volume and composition over time. Within the dominant class "the structure of the distribution of economic capital is symmetrical and opposite to that of cultural capital" (1984, p. 120), and this means that the two forms of
capital are mutually exclusive. Thus, for example, in an analysis of cultural and social reproduction between fractions rich in cultural capital and those rich in economic capital, he suggests that both kinds of capital are differentially distributed in the dominant class. But I think that they are in some way mutually convertible. Their structural difference is subordinated to their potential equivalence. But of course this argument is incomplete: in the first place because the conversion of capitals can take place only under certain conditions and at certain restricted levels of the market, and in the second place because conversion is not reciprocal (it is possible to convert cultural capital into economic capital, but not vice versa).

His theory of cultural capital explains the social function of culture as the provision of a system of meanings and pleasures that underwrites the social system structured around economic, class, and other forms of social power. Cultural capital underwrites economic capital. But the metaphor of the cultural economy must not be confined to its similarities with the material economy. The circulation of meanings and pleasures in a society is not the same as the circulation of wealth. Meanings and pleasures are much harder to possess exclusively and much harder to control: power is less effectively exerted in the cultural economy than it is in the material. I would extend the metaphor of cultural capital to include that of a popular cultural capital that has no equivalent in the material economy. Popular cultural capital is an accumulation of meanings and pleasures that serves the interests of the subordinated and powerless. Like any form of capital, either economic capital or the cultural capital of the bourgeoisie, it works through ideology; as Hall (1986) points out, we must not limit our understanding of ideology to an analysis of how it works in the service of the dominant. We need to recognize that there are alternative ideologies that both derive from and maintain those social groups who are not accommodated within the existing power relations.
Finally, the novelty of Bourdieu's analysis of a society is its comprehensiveness, enough to accommodate both cultural studies and political economy. This comes out most clearly in *Distinction*. He sees the same pattern of contestation for distinction operating everywhere. The value of his work is to uncover the dialectical interrelation between the various practices and social classes as mediated by the habitus. Another value of Bourdieu's work lies in his portrayal of the relations of domination and subordination which structure the internal dynamics of French society. Most importantly, Bourdieu examines his work as relatively autonomous systems which are transformed not only through their internal dynamics with other fields but through their relations as well. It seems to me that Bourdieu tends to concentrate more on the analysis of symbolic violence and symbolic capital than the analysis of the economy, although he argues that symbolic capital serves essentially economic interests. To me, his work is more of a culturalism with the backbone of determinism in response to vulgar materialism. I would argue that Bourdieu's sociology, especially the analysis of the relations between economic capital and cultural capital, would be a way of resolving the resolving the lack of political economic aspect of cultural studies. However, one must also recognize that Bourdieu's analysis is based on the structure of modern French society. He thinks that it is dominated by bourgeois values vested in a vast variety of symbolisms and encoded in a long tradition of legitimized elite culture. In French society, in his view, it is the pursuit for expressions of cultural competence that motivates the style and aesthetic practices of all classes. Finally, I think that those differences in those central notions, especially in the definition of culture, between Bourdieu and cultural studies may not be differences of theoretical orientation but differences in the societies themselves.
Chapter VII

Transformations of Cultural Studies (II)
Habermas's and Bakhtin's Contributions to the Modernity vs. Postmodernity Debate in Cultural Studies

Just as Bourdieu's sociology of culture has been overlooked in cultural studies, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has been dismissively treated by both British and American writers in cultural studies. Perry Anderson's 1976 book Considerations on Western Marxism, which was one of the seminal books in cultural studies, for example, did not even mention Habermas's name. Despite the dismissal of Habermas, I think his approach provides an attractive solution to many of the concerns that have troubled the analysis of culture in cultural studies. I would even argue that his theory of communication is a better model for cultural studies than Althusserian structuralism.

Habermas's Communicative Theory: Toward a Defense of Modernism

Habermas attempts to revise his Frankfurt School predecessors' pessimistic view and recast a more viable method for analyzing contemporary society and culture. Habermas argues that although the first generation has exposed some of the major flaws of certain traditional and conventional approaches to philosophy and social investigation, they have not demonstrated its own adequate theoretical status. In other words, they have not resolved a whole series of epistemological and methodological issues they intended to settle. In addition to the central focuses of the first generation, they emphasize more on the private sphere. They, especially Habermas, attempt to develop a theory of society by focusing on the self-emancipation of people from domination with a practical
sense. Habermas' version of critical theory aims to further the self-understanding of social groups capable of transforming society.

His insistence on communication is not much different from the emphasis on language use in structuralism and deconstruction, except that communication brings the question of politics to the fore: language for what? In other words, communication is also a quite different starting point from the abstractions of language that appear in linguistically oriented theories from structuralism to deconstruction. For the Saussurean tradition, language is the final cause, at least in relation to culture. But for Habermas and Williams, "language is the articulation of this active and changing experience: a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world" (Williams, 1977, p. 37-38).

The advantage of viewing culture in close connection with social structure, I believe, is that culture ceases to be reified as a purely abstract set of norms and values. For Habermas, the problem of legitimation is never solved through values and norms alone; it involves the dynamic interaction of social classes, class factions, prophetic and messianic movements, and state agencies. The values and norms espoused by these various actors must be seen in conjunction with the institutions that articulate them and translate them into collective behavior. He avoids the danger of explaining culture or of perceiving it as a mere reflection of social activity. Instead he treats culture as a phenomenon of importance in its own right.

This framework is articulated clearly in his essay on "Universal Pragmatics" (1979, p. 1-68). In this essay, he poses the question of what conditions influence the likelihood that any attempted act of communication will actually communicate effectively. This question is similar to the more specific issue concerning ideology that has been addressed in the Marxist tradition. The question of what produces ideology, in Marx's
formulation, is answered primarily with reference to the class struggle. Ideology is produced by the ruling class in its struggle for domination, masking the interests of the ruling class and promoting false consciousness among both rulers and ruled. The understanding of ideology must concentrate on the structure of class conflict.

Habermas's treatment of effective communication, however, is more complex in that he distinguishes four types of conditions influencing the effectiveness of communication, each of which represents a distinct domain of reality.

The first of these, the world of external nature, is a world of objects that can be manipulated. Any act of communication will be affected by its symbolic relation to this domain. Speakers and actors accordingly make claims about the truth of their assertions in relation to this domain. Other things being equal, the closer the level of correspondence between these claims and facts observable in the external world, the more likely it is that a specific act of communication involving these claims will be regarded as meaningful (1984, p. 69; 75-76).

The world of society, as the second domain, includes the usual array of interpersonal relations, institutions, traditions, and values that social scientists commonly associate with the idea of society. These can be recognized by the actor as external objects or simply taken for granted as features of life incorporated into the actor's perspective (Ibid, p. 235). In either case, they consist of pre-existing norms or symbolic patterns - objects created through processes of social identification and interaction (e.g., the concept of a nation, the value of freedom, the feeling of love). The fact that any act of communication takes place in relation to this domain, in addition to the domain of external nature, means that its effectiveness or meaningfulness is influenced by its relation to social norms. Communication can be judged as legitimate or illegitimate in
relation to these pre-existing norms, and for this reason, speakers build clues into the content of their speech acts that make claims about the "rightness" or legitimacy" of their assertions (Ibid, p. 237-238).

The third domain is the internal world of the person communicating - the realm of subjectivity. It includes feelings, wishes, and intentions. Only this person only has access to this realm, but it influences the effectiveness of communication. Assumptions tend to be made in judging communication about the relation between what has been uttered and what the speaker really thought or felt internally. Communication will be more effective if it is judged to have accurately expressed the speaker's intentions. The speaker, therefore, is likely to shape communication in such a way that it can be judged to have contained "truthful" statements (Ibid, p. 90-94).

Finally, communication takes place within the domain of language. Consequently, its effectiveness depends in part on the linguistic medium in which it is framed. To the extent that an act of communication conforms to the grammatical, semantic, and syntactical rules of the language in which it is expressed, it may be said to be "comprehensible" and, therefore, more likely to achieve its intended results (Ibid, p. 98). Chomsky inspired Habermas for this concept of the universal rules and Habermas expands this concept further. He believes linguistic competence of the kind Chomsky studies is fundamental but that a second level of competence exists as well. This is knowledge of the rules for how to use speech acts - how we adapt sentences for use in various contexts. A speaker, in Habermas's scheme, must do more than master linguistic rules to be considered a competent communicator: "By communicative competence I understand the ability of a speaker oriented to mutual understanding to embed a well-formed sentence in relations to reality" (1979, p.29). More specifically,
this level of competence involves the ability to communicate in such a way that: (1) the truth claim of an utterance is shared by both speaker and hearer; (2) the hearer is led to understand and accept the speaker's intention; and (3) the speaker adapts to the hearer's world view.

This ideal speech situation is conceptualized both as a means of analyzing the nature of a society and as an imaginative model or end in itself of autonomous human activity. Habermas warns that the ideal speech situation should not be taken as anything but an ideal (Smith, 1981, p.74). He acknowledges that discourse rarely achieves this level of purity, but for him, this is not the issue. Its value lies in its function as an assumption that is made whenever we enter into conversation, thus supplying communication with a rational base. When both participants in an interaction operate as if free to speak their minds and to listen to reason without fear of constraints, the possibility for a rationally motivated consensus exists (Habermas, 1984, p. 307). As such, it is a consensus based not on the arbitrary norms of one interest group or another, but on norms inherent in language itself.

According to Habermas, he has uncovered, in the ideal speech situation, a universal principle of rationality that is true because it taps a necessary structure of our world (Ibid, p. 136-138). By suggesting that the attainment of a rationally motivated consensus requires the acknowledgment, understanding, and acceptance of norms that embody the universal ideals of truth, freedom, and justice, Habermas presupposes rationality as a basic structure of human life. The ideal speech situation, then, is not simply a set of principles by which actual social arrangements are to be evaluated (Ibid). Rather, as Thomas McCarthy argues, it expresses the ideals of truth, freedom, and
justice, thus providing non-arbitrary norms for a contemporary theory of society (1978, p. 305).

Habermas concludes that "... the appropriate model is rather the communication community [Kommunikationsgemeinschaft] of those affected, who as participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given circumstances the proposed norms are 'right'" (Habermas, 1973, p. 105). Finally, Habermas observes cynical suspicions of truth. System theorists see political dialogue as useless bickering which hinders rational preference selection by technocrats and administrators. Habermas seems to believe in his "partiality for reason" and a determination to fight the stabilization of a nature-like social system over its citizens (Habermas, 1975, p. 2-8). All of these domains must be taken into account to fully assess the conditions influencing communication.
This work is valuable to cultural studies because it emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy of various cultural forms. Habermas's perspective on the relations between culture and social structure is a reformulation of the Marxist theory of historical materialism (1979, p. 130-177), a reformulation which gives more weight to communication and culture. The basis of Marx's theory is the observation that humankind engages in productive labor to earn its subsistence. Habermas characterizes production as an action concerned with the manipulation of the material (physical, objective) world (1984, p.368).

Habermas's reformulation of Marx suggests that the social relations of production are regarded as a distinct type of behavior, as communicative action. Habermas accords
communication theory the tasks of defining, critiquing, and determining the bases for legitimacy in advanced social systems. He establishes the importance of a theory of communicative competence by asserting that communication must be accounted for in human communication. He also complicates the Marxist argument by suggesting that the social base need not be the economy in all stages of societal development. The economy did in fact serve as the basic determinant of society during the transition to capitalism.

This view is strikingly similar to Williams's cultural materialism. Like Williams, Habermas's underlying hope for the theory is to show that the means for actualizing reason or the emancipatory interest in a society are already embedded in language. Habermas's theory aims to further the self-understanding of social groups capable of transforming society. Considering Johnson's assertion that "our project is to abstract, describe and reconstitute in concrete studies the social forms through which human beings "live", become conscious, sustain themselves subjectively" (1987, p. 45), Habermas's critical theory not only fits well into cultural studies, but also could sharpen the project of transforming society.

The Relevancy of Bakhtin's Theories in Cultural Studies

Habermas, like Williams, is closer to the position of a Russian linguist, Mikhail Bakhtin, for whom language is "a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world" (Williams, 1977, p. 38). Bakhtin's theory has been studied in literary criticism for a long time. Within cultural studies, however, Bakhtin's theory has been largely ignored. In fact, since Horace Newcomb's (1984) essay "On the Dialogic Aspects of Mass Communication," no one has explored the relevancy of Bakhtin's theory for left cultural analysis in the field of communication. What Newcomb suggested was
Bakhtin's dialogical approach for cultural studies in the study of relations between mediated texts and social practice as an alternative to structuralism. As in the case of Habermas, my reading of Bakhtin here will be quite partial and will propose a partial appropriation of certain features of his thought for cultural studies.

Bakhtin offers cultural analysis, as Todorov (1984) points out, a unitary, transdisciplinary view of the human sciences and of cultural life based on the common textual nature of their materials (1984, p. ix). His broad view of the text as referring to all cultural production rooted in language has the salutary effect of breaking down the walls not only between popular and elite culture, but also between text and context. The barrier between text and context, between inside and outside, for Bakhtin, is an artificial one, for in fact there is an easy flow of permeability between the two. His critique of all structuralisms and formalisms which at the same time avoids the trap of vulgar Marxism, I believe, is the advantage Bakhtin offers to cultural studies.

Unlike the Saussurean tradition that regards speech as individual and the language system as social, Bakhtin sees the two as constantly imbricated. Speech produces utterances, which are social by definition, since they are inter-individual, requiring a socially constituted speaker and addressee. For Bakhtin, the individual is permeated by the social; indeed, one develops individuality not against but through the social. The process of constructing the self, for Bakhtin, involves the hearing and assimilating of the words and discourses of others (mother, father, relatives, friends, representative of religious, educational and political institutions, the mass media and so forth), all processed dialogically so that the words in a sense become half one's own words (Bakhtin, 1981, p. xvii). With maturity, these words transform themselves into what Bakhtin called "internally persuasive discourse":

...
Such discourse is of decisive significance in the evolution of an individual consciousness: consciousness awakens to independent ideological life precisely in the world of alien discourses surrounding it, and from which it cannot initially separate itself. The process of distinguishing between one's own and another's discourse, between one's own and another's thought, is activated rather late in development. When thought begins to work in an independent, experimenting and discriminating way, what first occurs is a separation between internally persuasive discourse and authoritarian enforced discourse, along with a rejection of those congeries of discourses that do not matter to us, that do not touch us (1981, p. 345).

A self is constituted by acquiring the ambient languages and discourses of its world. The self, in this sense, is a kind of hybrid sum of institutional and discursive practices bearing on family, class, gender, race, generation and locale. Ideological development is generated by an intense and open struggle within us for hegemony among the various available verbal and ideological points of view, directions and values.

Thus, the location of meanings, for Bakhtin, is not in linguistic form but rather is the use of language in action and communication (the utterance). These meanings are generated and heard as social voices anticipating and answering one another (dialogism). And he recognizes that these voices represent distinct socio-ideological positionings whose conflictual relation exists at the very heart of language change (heteroglossia).

These three concepts can provide very important tools for the analysis of the praxis of mass media in cultural studies. While structuralists are successful in calling attention to the specifically literary and the specifically cinematic, they are less successful in linking the specific and the non-specific, the social and the cinematic, the textual and the contextual. But for Bakhtin, all utterances, including artistic utterances, are determined not by system of codes but by the continuous changing circumstances of the communication (1981, p. xix).
Utterance is the topic of analysis when language is conceived as dialogue, the fundamental unit of investigation for anyone studying communication as opposed to language alone. Since Bakhtin's idea of the utterance is active, there is always a danger that it will be confused with the Saussurian concept of speech (parole) in which apparently willed action is a key aspect (Ibid, p. xvii). For Bakhtin, utterance is not the completely free act of choice Saussure posited. It is dialogic precisely in the degree to which every aspect of it is a give-and-take between the local need of a particular speaker to communicate a specific meaning, and the global requirements of language as a generalizing system (Ibid, p. 433; 263).

We are not wired into the brain. But the norms controlling the utterance are similar to other social norms, such as those found in judicial or ethical systems. They may vary in their details, but the nature of their existence remains the same: they exist only in the individual minds of particular people in particular groups. In dialogism, of course, the "I" of such individual minds is always assumed to be a function of the "we" that is their particular group. According to Bakhtin, it takes place between speakers, and is therefore entrenched in social factors (Ibid, p. 433-434). This means that the utterance is also on the border between what is said and what is not said, since, as a social phenomenon par excellence, the utterance is shaped by speakers who assume that the values of their particular community are shared, and thus do not need to be spelled out in what they say.

First, Bakhtin's concept of utterance is, in my view, at the very heart of cultural studies's audience analysis. Unlike the uses and gratifications model, which is an essentially psychologistic problematic, relying on individual's mental states, needs and processes, and thus less sociological, Bakhtin would argue that utterances are to be
examined not as totally individual, idiosyncratic expressions of a psychological kind, but as sociologically regulated both by the immediate social situation and by the surrounding socio-historical context. Audience must be conceived of as composed of clusters of socially situated individual readers, whose individual readings will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices already existed to the individual.

The second concept, dialogism, is the source of the contemporary discussion of both intertextuality (Julia Kristeva) (Todorov, 1984, p. 60) and inter-textuality (Tony Bennett). Todorov mentions only Kristeva as the contemporary theorist who introduced Bakhtin's dialogism for her own concept of intertextuality. But I think that Kristeva's reading of Bakhtin's dialogism is narrower than Bennett's inter-textuality. As discussed earlier, Kristeva's intertextuality refers to the system of references to other texts which can be discerned within the internal composition of a specific individual text. Bennett intends the concept of inter-textuality to refer to the social organization of the relations between texts within specific conditions of reading.

Dialogism - a term which Holquist (1990) said Bakhtin never used - refers to the open-ended possibilities generated by all the discursive practices of a culture, the entire matrix of communicative utterances within which the artistic text is situated, and which reach the text not only through recognizable influences but also through a subtle process of dissemination (1990, p. 15; 40-41). Dialogism is central not only to the canonical texts of the literary and philosophical tradition of the West, but equally to non-canonical texts. It is just as relevant to those cultural utterances not conventionally thought of as texts, such as extra-commercial products of Bond films, the publicity surrounding film stars in Bennett and Wollacott's analysis of the Bond phenomenon. Since dialogism is concerned with all the series that enter into a text (verbal or non-verbal, erudite or
popular), it can be a perfect approach to the analysis of popular culture, which is the central concern of cultural studies.

The third concept, heteroglossia, is very close to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Both concepts provide a theoretical frame for analysis of the discursive relationships that can be found in cultural forms. According to Bakhtin (1981), language is a zone of conflict, stratified and fractioned among different dialects, classes, ethnic minorities, etc., each creating a discourse that embodies its own particular set of reasons, rules and contradictions.

At any given moment...a language is stratified not only into dialects in the strict sense of the word (i.e., dialects that are set off according to formal linguistic markers, but is...stratified as well into languages that are socio-ideological: languages belonging to professions, to genres, languages peculiar to particular generations, etc. (1981, p. 271-272).

Heteroglossia is central to Bakhtin's concept of language as a totality. Verbal-ideological belief systems, points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing social experience, which are marked by their own tonalities, meanings and values, are represented by languages composing heteroglossia (Ibid, p. 428). The role of a television show, for example, is not to represent real life existence, but rather to stage the conflicts inherent in heteroglossia, the coincidences and competitions of languages and discourses.

The notion of heteroglossia also brings a discursive dimension to the premise in cultural studies that everything is political. Patriarchal oppression, for example, passes through language, as does feminist resistance to oppression. Bakhtin spoke little of the specific oppression of women, yet his work can be seen as intrinsically open to feminist inflection. A female professor at Stanford medical school recently resigned because of
her male colleagues' "gender insensitivity" (Time, July 8, 1991, p. 52-53). She simply was tired of being called "honey" by male surgeons. She claimed that the word "honey" made her lose control as a surgeon in operating room. Another example she provided was that if she had a disagreement with her male counterparts, she was simply treated as a sufferer of PMS syndrome. This incident sounds trivial, but it is, I believe, a real problem (sexism as patriarchal oppression) which exists in all societies. Issues of race also intersect questions of language, power and social stratification. I often hear that Black English in the U. S. is bad English. But is it? I hadn't disagreed with that claim until recently. I begin to think that this is not a matter of good/bad language, but a matter of differences. We probably fail to take into account the specific African historical roots and the immanent logical structure of black speech.

A good deal of oppressive politics are also taking place in everyday language exchange - the welfare officer's rude treatment of the welfare recipient, the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) officer's patronizing of immigrants, the male doctor's condescending tone and language toward his hysterical female patient. Resistance, similarly, takes the discursive forms of whispered words of solidarity or loud collective proclamations of protest. Language, for Bakhtin, is an arena for struggle. Political issues also take place on the terrain of language. The issue of abortion, for example, is permeated by ideological conflicts fought in churches, Congress, Supreme Court, the media, and the streets. If either side (pro-choice and anti-abortion) is trapped in the language of its opposition, either pro-choice or anti-abortion has already lost half of the battle.

Bakhtin notion of heteroglossia is also useful in understanding the different levels of discourse articulated by non-mainstream cultural producers (films in Sundance Film
Festival, Third Cinema, alternative press, etc.) through textual production. Using this model it is possible to conceptualize the characteristic modes of productive practice as signifying codes that establish those cultural products as discourses of resistance. In the case of Third Cinema, Teshome H. Gabriel (1982), who pioneered theoretical framework for Third Cinema, analyzed Third Cinema from some of Third World nations such as Chile and Peru exclusively based on Althusserian ideological criticism. But I think both the concept of hegemony and of heteroglossia can provide a more comprehensive theoretical frame for analysis of discursive relationships that can be found in Third Cinema.

Their relevance can be shown in several different contexts: (1) the context of the dominant cinema of Hollywood, which constitutes a cultural hegemony throughout much of the world, and of the local mainstream film industry which is not much different from Hollywood in terms of modes of production; (2) the context of local folk culture and nationalism to which Third Cinema is closely related; and (3) the international context, within which Third Cinema can be seen in relation to European counter-cinema, American regional film (Sundance Institute), and other national non-mainstream cinema. Again, Bakhtin's heteroglossia can provide a better model for cultural studies's textual analysis than the structuralist tradition.

Bakhtinian method celebrates difference; rather than expand the center to include the margins, it interrogates and shifts the center from the perspective of the margins. It calls attention to all oppressive hierarchies of power, not only those derived from class but also those of gender, race and age. A Bakhtinian textual politics favors a more open, reciprocal, decentered negotiation of specificity and difference. His concept of dialogism, and of language oppose the individualist assumptions with romantic
interpretations of cultural forms. They rather provide us the specific ways in which those producers orchestrate diverse social voices. His emphasis on a boundless context that constantly interacts with and modifies the text, helps us avoid formalist insistence on the autonomous art object. His emphasis on the situated utterance and the interpersonal generation of meaning avoids the static ahistoricism of an apolitical value-free semiotics.

The notion of heteroglossia, finally, proposes a fundamentally non-unitary, continuously changing cultural field in which most varied discourses exist in a state of flux. Heteroglossia can be seen as another name for the social and psychic contradictions that constitute the subject as the site of conflicting discourses and competing voices. Like Gramsci, Bakhtin rejects the idea of a unitary political subject: the bourgeois, the proletarian. One can hear the voice of the proletarian in the bourgeois and the voice of the bourgeois in the proletarian, without denying that social class is a meaningful category. A Bakhtinian view deconstructs the rigidities of the base/superstructure and the paranoia of the dominant ideology school of Althusserian Marxism.

My readings of Bourdieu, Habermas, and Bakhtin have been quite partial, and have tried to propose a partial appropriation of certain features of their thoughts for the strategic purposes of cultural studies. There are some real theoretical incompatibilities between them, like the three approaches (production, text, audience). What I have traced are the inner connections and real identities between them which in turn could improve the interdisciplinary tradition of cultural studies. The following paragraphs of this chapter will be devoted to the presence of postmodernism in cultural studies and how it accommodates postmodernism and how these two writers, Habermas and
Bakhtin, can show the way to bridge or to extend the gap between the two intellectual formations.

**Toward a Reconciliation of Postmodernism and Modernism in Cultural Studies**

The gap is essentially the debate between modernism and postmodernism within cultural studies. Some (Hall, Johnson) hold on to a modernistic view of culture, while some (Grossberg, Chambers, Hebdidge, Chen) propose the postmodern cultural studies. This is not to say that Hall and Johnson are ignoring the obvious presence of the postmodern culture and postmodernism's strength on a certain level in the exploration of linkages between social and cultural realms. On the contrary, those postmodernists tend to believe in a total break with modernism. In fact, postmodernism is deeply rooted in modernism and it is probably the continuation of modernism - a radical modernism.

Although attempts to link it to an epochal analysis of "post" thinking and concepts (e.g. post-structuralism, post-industrial society, post-empiricism, post-rationalism) are useful and convincing, it seems to me that those working in cultural studies on the basis of postmodernism tend to refuse to speak to issues of transformation and issues of enlightenment. As Habermas argued, those issues of modernity have not been exhausted is surely not identical with the ideology of postmodernism. It is, however, artistic and intellectual formation which is worthy of serious study.

Cultural studies is indeed on a new round of the theoretical debate between modernism and postmodernism: a "war of worlds" between two apparently separate semantic planets (Hebdige, 1985, p. 19). The concept of postmodernism has become one of the most elusive concepts in aesthetic, literary and sociological discussion of the last decade. Before getting into the discussion of postmodernism in relation to modernism, it is necessary to describe a series of practices which condition the postmodern.
Postmodernism is, then, the term which signals the cultural character of new times. The modernist movement, it argues, which dominated the art and architecture, the cultural imagination, of the early decades of the 20th century, and came to represent the look and experience of modernity itself, is at an end (Ibid, p. 79-80). Postmodernism celebrates the penetration of aesthetics into everyday life and the ascendancy of popular culture over the high arts. Jameson (1983, 1984) and Lyotard (1984) agree on many of characteristics of the postmodern condition. They remark on the dominance of image, appearance, surface-effect over depth; the blurring of image and reality; the preference for parody, nostalgia, kitsch and pastiche over more positive modes of artistic representation (like realism or naturalism); a preference for the popular and the decorative over the functional in architecture and design. They also comment on the erasure of a strong sense of history, as seen in Grossberg's case: the end of the narrative of progress, enlightenment, and rationality.

A major change in the political and cultural problematic, postmodernism is in turn related to other changes that have taken place since World War II. The main shifts from the pre-modern to the post-modern world can be seen in a diagram. I think that it is a mistaken to conceive of postmodernism as a periodizing concept, as Jameson (1983) tried to do. This diagram provides nothing more than a convenient comparative chart based on predominant features of each. The postmodernism is not synonymous with the contemporary. As Lyotard (1984) indicates, postmodernism is, in fact, the founding condition of the possibility of modernism, although he insists on the end of modernity (1984, p. 79).
Let me take an example from differences in production pattern between modern and postmodern. If the modern world is based on the notion of an endless repetition of a few products, then its successor is based on the idea of short-runs and the targeting of many different products. The computerized and totally cybernetic production in some
many different products. The computerized and totally cybernetic production in some industries has partly allowed this situation to develop. This development also leads to individualization of everything. Surveying postmodernity from the precipice of the "end", Baudrillard describes a culture which is not just prone to, but actually predicated on, instability and uncertainty. Everything has become short-circuited within the whirligig of reflexivity and paradox. Sober analysis has been displaced by "virulent description" (more descriptive than description: hype) (Morris, 1984).

In the U. S. in 1950, there were seven hundred radio stations; now with only a moderate population increase there are more than ten thousand, and many of them are oriented to specific city cultures (DeFleur and Dennis, 1991, p. 191;197). ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX still control the large portion of the mass market, but they are being supplemented by five thousand cable systems, more than one hundred television channels with satellite transmission. In Los Angeles, for example, one can watch Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean networks. This segmentation of tastes leads to another obvious shift: from centralized authority to decentralized pluralism.

"The loss of authority" is the theme of this shift. Lyotard (1984) traced this to the decline in belief systems and the rise of skepticism. The role of marriage and the family has been decreased in a time when many women work and almost as high a percentage are divorced, the place of nations in a world economy dominated by transnational corporations on one side, and city and regional life on the other. Both cultural and political regionalism are growing. There is a growing polarization: between the north and south in Britain; or in America between the East Coast and the West Coast, New England and the Pacific Rim. In the art the New York hegemony is being challenged by other cities, such as London, Toronto, L. A. etc.. One could go on and on.
According to Baudrillard, something has changed. It is a change which is perverse and paradoxical, signalling the end of the very possibility of change. In the place of a world ordered according to monolithic truths, linear grids and representational stability, we are faced with a set of unstable and volatile equations that correspond to a collapsed or imploded representational space. Reality can only repeat itself - the feature film serialized and forced into the quotidian space of the soap opera. Our space of interaction has been replaced with the narcissism of contact, contiguity and feedback:

We are no longer part of the drama of alienation; we live in the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. The obscene is what so ed away with every mirror, every look, every image. The obscene puts an end to every representation. But it is not only the sexual that becomes obscene in pornography; today it is the whole pornography of information and communication, that is to say of circuits and networks, a pornography of all functions and objects in their readability, their fluidity, their availability, their regulation, their forced signification, in their performativity, in their branching, in their polyvalence, in their free expression.... (1988, p. 220).

This is Baudrillard's analysis of the postmodern condition. It seems to be an analysis that does not make direct claims to argument and substantiation. It does not seem to seek to challenge and repudiate reality. If theory can no longer offer itself as the mirror of the subject, what remains? What can it do? Baudrillard also described a postmodernity predicated on death - the end of history, the social, meaning, politics, etc. - while offering no strategies of resistance, and refusing to posit alternatives.

Despite the presence of the past as an important guiding concern for postmodernism, it seems to me that there is a simultaneous rejection of modernism and the modernist project. The postmodernists' reality, especially Baudrillard's, is a nice place to visit, but I wouldn't live there. All that we are left with is a nostalgia for an era that existed prior to simulation, for a stability that we cannot find in the text. In the simulated mediascape,
Baudrillard (1987) describes how the complexity of the intertextual flotation within media networks always confuses the story with the real events to the point at which images, codes, subjects (the masses) and events flow and intersect independently of the referent. What is described is a hyperspace of neutralization and indifferenciation, where dialectics has been given over to seduction, rhetoric of demolition, inversion and provocation (1987, p.16-18). Grossberg (1986) seems to conform with Baudrillard's postmodernism.

To Grossberg, television erases the line between image and reality. He argues that TV's indifference to reality can be found in every genre including advertisements (1986, p.4). The way in which TV deals with the difference between the same and the different is repetition - episodes, character types, narratives, etc. TV's repetitive nature makes it the most predictable set of images. Of course, there are differences between the contents of each episode, although they share a similar narrative structure. Here, the pleasure of the viewing depends on one's ability to renegotiate the difference that difference makes.

The popularity of TV programs is not immediately dependent on ideological issues. Rather it relies on TV's various forms of excess of which, the emotional excess is the most important. It is made by TV's "in-difference" to meaning and reality. It is structured by a series of movements between extreme highs and extreme lows. It presents an image of an "affective economy" (1986, p. 30-32). For Baudrillard and Grossberg, there is no reality beyond appearance (image is everything) and therefore no dialectics of inside and outside from which to position a critique.

Postmodernism is becoming the dominant cultural and political form of our epoch with systematic excesses and provocations. But not everyone rejects the modernist project. Most famously, Habermas has called for the completion of the project of modernity, a
project whose roots lie in the Enlightenment notion of rationality. In the speech he delivered at New York University titled "Modernity versus Postmodernity" (1981b), one can feel his extreme dislike of postmodernism. The original German version was delivered in 1980 when he received the Adorno-Prize from the city of Frankfurt. In it, Habermas openly attacks the notion that we have reached the age of postmodernism because this assumption would necessarily result in a flawed assessment of our future. Instead, he insists on the continuation of the Enlightenment project, even if this project should not be pursued through the use of instrumental reason or in the mode of traditional subject philosophy (Habermas, 1990, p. 59-60). He also charges that postmodernism is neoconservative and a completed pluralism. All historical styles, along with all imagery, are reduced to the level of exchange-value.

Habermas claims that the privilege attributed to the aesthetic sphere by the neo-Nietzscheans (postmodernists, deconstructionists) tends to undermine theoretical and practical rationality. He contends that such a primacy of the aesthetic entails an absence of social mediation and especially a lack of articulation between cultural modernity/postmodernity and every-day social practices. He notes a certain convergence between postmodernists and neoconservatives (e.g. Daniel Bell), implying that the renunciation of any notion of substantive rationality by the former paves the way for the "decisionism" advocated by some of the latter (1990, p. 65; 1983, p. 89).

The influence of post-structuralism has been a decisive factor in the formation of postmodernism, according to Habermas. Post-structuralism’s critique of metanarratives, its productionism, and its general emphasis upon the rhetorical rather than the referential function of language, have met the crisis of the reformist Western left with a celebration of fragmentation and the de-territorialization of disciplines and
identities (Hohendahl, 1986, p. 50-51). Lyotard argues that questions of relevance, adequacy and fit, in discussions of politics, science and art, can only lead to "correct narratives" and "correct content" (1984, p. 75). In fact, a correlation is held to exist between the breakdown of modernist historicism and the great emancipatory narratives; we live on the threshold, Lyotard argued, of an age of micro-narratives, of aesthetic and political pluralism. Here, both post-structuralism's and postmodemism's pure systematicity fails, Habermas argues, to acknowledge the most basic of historical materialist premises: that analysis of a given conjuncture must begin from the contradictions internal to it (1990, p. 58-59).

Habermas's dislike of the neo-Nietzscheans continues. He also criticized Derrida's emphasis on the end of European history and the decline of traditional European philosophy. Habermas (1987) described Derrida's project as an anarchistic and subversive struggle that aims at undermining the foundations of Western metaphysics.

Habermas argued that:

The critique of the Western emphasis on logos inspired by Nietzsche proceeds in a destructive manner. It demonstrates that the embodied, speaking and acting subject is not master in its own house; it draws from this the conclusion that the subject positing itself in knowledge is in fact dependent upon something prior, anonymous, and transsubjective - be it the dispensation of Being, the accident of structure-formation, or the generative power of some discourse formation. But the hope awakened by such post-Nietzschean analyses has constantly the same quality of expectant indeterminacy. Once the defenses of subject-centered reason are razed, the logos, which for so long had held together an interiority protected by power, hollow within and regressive without, will collapse into itself. It has to be delivered over to its other, whatever that may be (1987, p. 311).

Derrida's approach, Habermas argued, has to be seen against the background of Jewish mysticism and its heretical hermeneutic theory (Handelman, 1983, 98). Hence, Derrida's deconstruction belongs to a tradition that opposes the hegemony of Christian logos and its hermeneutics in Paul's teaching. Deconstruction sounds more radical than
Habermas' communicative reason, but it cannot clear away the rubble of metaphysics its analyses pile up in order to open a space for an understanding of the social/political construction of meaning.

Williams (1962) seems to share common ground with Habermas on neo-Nieztcheans, although Williams raises some issues about modernism that seem to be ignored by the epochal analysis of postmodernism. As the Frankfurt School problematic of the dialectic of enlightenment suggests, the fate of modernity is identical to the success or failure of the social embodiments of reason through industrialization and democratization. Most postmodernists, especially Baudrillard, claim the failure of the Enlightenment project of social rationalization, and do so at times even more pessimistically than Habermas's predecessors. This polemic, Williams argues, reduces the ambiguity of modernity by stressing the negative elements without considering the positive side of the account. Habermas also argues that the project of modernity must not be abandoned even if its failure has caused catastrophes. Attacking the potential of the project of modernity, Habermas (1987) responded:

This critique of the essential elements of modernity not only repudiates the dangerous consequences of reified self-reference, but also cancels those connotations which explain subjectivity, connotations in other words that subjectivity once contained as unredeemed promises: the expectation that there will be a self-conscious practice in which self-determined solidarity of all individuals would encourage and support the authentic self-realization of these individuals. This criticism rejects precisely those elements that the age of modernity, when it fully grasped its own project, articulated through the concepts of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization (1987, p.391).

While postmodernism argues that people and societies are confined to relationships of power, property, and production, both Williams and Habermas argue that communicative relationships (describing, learning, persuading, exchanging experiences,
etc.) are equally fundamental. This is not to say that both assert that communication is an automatically rational activity that will eventually cure history of all ailments. The point is that if we abandon the tools of reason to indict the irrationality of society for the promise of a future, there is no point in critiquing society. Habermas and Williams seem to be sympathetic to the questions and problems which motivated poststructuralists and postmodernists to problematize the Western philosophical tradition, but they are less sympathetic to their pointless solutions (the end of history, the death of author, and the end of reason).

As mentioned above, in cultural studies, there has been talk of modernity versus postmodernity. It is, however, difficult to say who is sympathetic with postmodernism or with modernism in cultural studies, as in the case of Habermas versus the entire neo-Nietzscheans. In fact, cultural studies overall has been open to postmodernism and to examining it as a tool for rethinking the direction of cultural politics. The importation of postmodernism is closely related with the theoretical force of the feminist critique of narrative.

Feminism's basic argument is that women have been mainly excluded from the selective tradition of modernist art history and criticism (O'Connor, 1988). The issues of gender and sexuality have become central to recent radical American accounts of postmodernism under the influence of writings of British postmodernism theorists (e.g. Mary Kelly, Victor Burgin). What postmodern feminist discourses focus on are postmodernism's concept of the end of class struggle as the principal motor of emancipatory transformation and the end of the masculine high arts of painting and sculpture (1988, p. 4). Owens (1987) condemns Marxist cultural studies for "its totalizing ambitions, its claims to account for every form of social experience" (1987, p. 71). Rosalind Coward
Mao's and Lenin's writings would have been dismissed as being outside their contemporary limit-positions. The contemporary implications of this notion are also clear: members of the women's movement are to crawl back into their corners suitably reproved for attempting to theorize those things which Marx never bothered with. The centrality of the conception of class is very clearly problematic for feminism since it is difficult to accept either the idea of women as a class since economic class divisions cut across women much as men; neither is it helpful to conclude that just because Marxist theorization is inadequate, we should relegate questions of the positions of women to secondary positions of class. Questions such as the organization of sexuality do arise. And Marxism has as yet nothing to say about them (1977/8, p. 122).

Postmodernism stands principally as a theory of photographic intervention within dominant visual ideology. Feminism's critique of the Western fine-art tradition has rested principally upon the historical collusion of the institutionalization of painting with the interests of men, with the male gaze. For feminism, therefore, postmodernism has come to signify the end of painting (Kelly, Burgin, Owens, Foster, and Crimp). In fact an equation is made, particularly in Burgin and Owens, between the end of painting as male-dominated tradition and feminism's critique of a masculinized class politics (Owens, 1987, p. 74). The defense of this theory is focused through patriarchy theory.

Because meaning under patriarchy circulates around the primary signifier of the Phallus then the responsibility of the postmodern artist is to initiate some critical rupture in those forms, traditions and categories that perpetuate such a system of division. And this is why photography takes on a particularly important political significance of these theorists. I believe the problem with such a scenario is not that feminism is not at the center of a new politics of representation, but that such claims are used in highly idealist ways to displace a caricatured historical materialism. Coward and Owens raises a relevant issue in the conflict between Marxism and feminism, but neither of them has
provided a solution to the crisis. Instead they reduce Marxism to the monolithic and productivist. Marxist historical materialism is not a stagist roll-call of modes of production but an interlinking set of research programs which place the relations of production as the starting point for the analysis of a given social formation.

Thus it is the institutionalized presence which designates the socialist character of a mode of production and not the nationalized or state-owned form of the mode of production itself. It is therefore one thing to keep in view the autonomy of feminism's critique of representation and class-based politics, of countering that view that woman's oppression can only be explained if it is put forward as mediating another oppression. Then, Marxist historical materialism must provide a way: a new theorization must be found. As Alex Callinicos (1987) from the CCCS has succinctly argued:

> Feminists and black nationalists often complain that the concepts of Marxist class theory are gender-blind and race-blind. This is indeed true. Agents' class position derives from their place in production relations, not their gender or supposed race. But of itself this does not prove grounds for rejecting Marxism, since its chief theoretical claim is precisely to explain power-relations and forms of conflict such as those denoted by the terms "nation", "gender", "race" in terms of the forces and relations of production. The mere existence of national, sexual and racial oppression does not refute historical materialism, but rather constitutes its *explanandum* (1987, p.177).

Can all paintings be reducible to a master narrative of Western male authorship? Is painting merely, as Owens contends, the "simulacra of [male] mystery" (Owens, 1987, p. 75)? In his critique of Marxism, Owens simply reduces painting to its inherited and imputed contents. This is not to say that painting is not implicated in the privileges of men, or that painting is more "aesthetic" or "pleasurable" than photography, video or performance. Rather questions of value in art are reduced to essentialist foreclosure.
The methodology for postmodernists is known as "schizoanalysis" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977; Jameson, 1983). Guattari (1984) argues that schizoanalysis is superior to other approaches because its principle of "semiotic polycentrism" is not limited by what it believes is rational, and thus it can improve the data collection (1984, p. 77). In semiotic polycentrism, postmodernists claim that phenomena may possess a variety of meanings simultaneously. Although this theory is widely practiced within cultural studies, especially textual analysis, I would argue that this is close to Krestiva's interpretation of intertextuality - narrower than Bennett's inter-textuality. The idea of a final reading of a text must be rejected as uniformed. Postmodernism also undermines the belief that a society's "dominant significations" are synonymous with reality and lead to truth (Ibid, p. 168). Reality is thus recognized to be multivalent. A schizo-analyst, therefore, does not seek "to make subjectification fit in with the dominant significations and social laws" (Ibid, p. 77). The duty of a researcher, according to Derrida, is to subdue the "aggression of reason" indigenous to technological rationality, so that the fragile linguistic basis of facts is not destroyed (Derrida, 1979, p. 31-69). In other words, even if an interpretation of reality appears to be irrational, the reason that is present must be given serious attention.

While cultural studies have displayed a greater degree of openness in establishing new grounds for theoretical debate, Stuart Hall has rejected postmodernism's epochal sense of itself in claiming to embody a "final rupture or break with the modern era" (1986, p. 47). Again, like Williams, Hall also seems to agree with some postmodern phenomena and the problems postmodernism raises in the Western philosophical tradition, but he disagrees with its solutions. Hall argues that the grouping together of a series of
problems arising out of the collapse of modernist certainties under the singular sign of postmodernism is, in itself, a form of ideological closure:

What it says is: this is the end of the world. History stops with us and there is no place to go after this. But whenever it is said that this is the last thing that twill ever happen in history, that is the sign of the functioning, in the narrow sense, of the ideological - what Marx called the "eternalising" effect (1986, p. 47).

Perhaps using esoteric terminology, such as schizoanalysis, makes it difficult for postmodernism to clarify its position. The postmodernist tendency to weave together often disconnected problems produces a generalized discourse of crisis under the name of intertextuality. Also it tends to turn its discourses of crisis back on itself in arguing that what such discourses register as crises are more appropriately viewed as positively enabling of new forms of thought and political action. Hebdige's (1986) characterization of postmodernism in terms of three oppositions is also familiar: an opposition to totalizing forms of social and historical theory; an opposition to teleological modes of reasoning; and an opposition to utopian representations of the future. I do not see how a postmodern science is possible with its abandonment of any transcendental theoretical guarantees or fixed finality of political purpose. The following diagram shows some similarities and differences between cultural studies and postmodernism.
Figure 6. Theoretical comparison between postmodernism and cultural studies
To me, nothing is striking or enlightening about postmodernism, except from a theoretical, philosophical, intellectual or moral perspective. And I still believe that modernism has offered a much more favorable arena in which to wage cultural studies's cultural struggle. Yet, I must admit that the cultural terrain on which we now all live, work, love, and struggle is pervaded by postmodernism. Thus, it is unwise to ignore it. The following paragraphs will argue that Bakhtin's dialogism, especially the notion of carnival can provide some theoretical connections to bridge the gap between cultural studies and postmodernism.

The ability to connect two intellectual formations in Bakhtin's work lies in his theory of dialogism, especially the notion of carnival, which absorbs both intertextuality and intertextuality. Novels, for example, are overwhelmingly intertextual, constantly referring within themselves to other works outside them. In other words, novels quote other specific works in one form or another. In doing so, they manifest the most complex possibilities of quasi-direct speech. In addition, they simultaneously manifest intertextuality in their display of the enormous variety of discourses used in different historical periods and by disparate social classes, and in the peculiarly charged effect such a display has on reading in specific social and historical situations. Among the more powerful intertextual effects novels have is the extra-literary influence they exercise on claims to singularity and authority made by other texts and discourses. Thus both Fiske's (1987) analysis of Madonna and Grossberg's analysis of Miami Vice, for example, have little theoretical value unless they consider the variety of discourses used in different historical periods by disparate social classes and specific social and historical situations in reading.
For Bakhtin, carnival is a means for displaying otherness: carnival makes familiar relations strange. Like the novel, carnival is both the name of a specific kind of historically instanced thing and an immaterial force which such particular instances characteristically embody. Embodiment is precisely what carnival gives to relations, as it draws attention to their variety, as well as highlighting the fact that social roles determined by class relations are made and not given, culturally produced rather than naturally mandated. Among many forms of popular culture, Bakhtin has a special appreciation for carnival, because it concentrates and reveals all the features of comic popular culture. "Carnival, with its whole complex system of images, was the purest and fullest expression of comic popular culture" (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 90).

Bakhtin describes the carnival as actually being "consecrated by tradition," both social and ecclesiastical (Ibid, p. 5). Therefore, although this popular festival and its manifest forms exist apart from "serious official, ecclesiastical, feudal, and political cult forms and ceremonials" (Ibid), in so existing, they in fact also posit those very norms. The recognition of the inverted world still requires a knowledge of the order of the world which it inverts and, in a sense, incorporates. The motivation and the form of the carnival are both derived from authority: the people's second life of the carnival has meaning only in relation to the official first life (Clark and Holquist, 1984, p. 299-302). Carnival shatters, on a symbolic plane, all oppressive hierarchies, redistributing social roles according to the logic of the world upside down. Brazilian carnival may be a good example of Bakhtin's notion of carnival. It is a collective celebration, at once sacred and profane, in which the socially marginalized - the poor, black, homosexuals, etc. - take over the symbolic center of social life. It offers a trans-individual taste of freedom.
I would argue that Bakhtin's notion of carnival could appeal to both cultural studies and postmodernism and reconcile the differences with a number of inter-related ideas.

**Ideas of Reconciliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Studies</th>
<th>Postmodernism</th>
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<tr>
<td>Social inversion and counter-hegemonic subversion of established power</td>
<td>Idea of ambiguity, gay-relativity and Janus-faced ambivalence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valorization of desire, Eros and pleasure</td>
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<tr>
<td>The notion of carnival as trans-individual</td>
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<td>The notion of carnival as the space of the sacred</td>
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**Figure 7. Bakhtin's notion of Carnival**

Carnival for Bakhtin is more than a party or a festival. It is rather the oppositional culture of the oppressed, the official world seen from below. It is not a mere disruption of etiquette but the symbolic, anticipatory overthrow of oppressive social structures. It is also ecstatic collectivity, the joyful affirmation of change, a dress rehearsal for utopia. The current students' anti-government protest in Korea, for example, shows a kind of carnivalesque politics. Demonstrations are, except for the violent confrontation with riot police, often incorporated with colorful elements of music, folk dance (often expressing the painful hope for democracy), costume, and guerilla theater. The line between performer and spectator is often blurred. Those elements not only celebrate the
performer and spectator is often blurred. Those elements not only celebrate the traditional culture, but suggest metaphorically a progressive change towards social and political justice. Bakhtin maintains a balance between the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power, including the collective power of social formations (class hierarchy, sexual repression, patriarchy, dogmatism, etc.) and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity. Thus, Bakhtin's theory would restore the notion of collective pleasure to its rightful place within Marxist thought, especially cultural studies.
Chapter VIII

Toward Assimilations of Political Economy and Postmodernism with Cultural Studies

Setting an Agenda

As discussed in chapter 2, the development of any strategies for transforming cultural studies has always been grounded on an interdisciplinary approach which integrates and synthesizes a whole range of perspectives of social reality and its meaning. The theoretical work described above, though useful for cultural studies, is not to be taken as a substitution for existing theories. They do not provide a systematic or unitary method for cultural studies. Instead, they are methodological points that can provide new theoretical directions for cultural studies. The presentation of the following strategy for cultural studies is not intended as a comprehensive model, nor is it intended as evidence for a new paradigm. It is rather a way of enhancing cultural studies's multi-disciplinary tradition. These self-constraints are to avoid the danger of fashioning cultural studies into a system or a model that would establish an authority for its discourse and a set of doctrinal requirements for its practice. The internal logic that gives any academic theory - including cultural studies - its mechanical coherence should not be confused with general theory. This does not mean that the search for laws of uniformity is not a useful and interesting pursuit or that a treatise of immediate observations on the art of advertising, for example, does not have its purpose. But it is important to present treasies of this kind for what they really are.
Cultural studies should be maintained as an open construction, one of whose primary projects is to provide for further possibilities. It should open its door to these kinds of questions: Has it missed the opening up of the individual to the transforming rhythms and forces of modern material life? How can cultural studies in the 21st century revive without considering the contradictory terrain of popular pleasures? Is it thinking dialectically enough? In what follows, on the basis of existing theories, critiques, and new possible interconnections with the broader discourse of these three writers, this study will point to the development of an alternative direction to its primary problematic.

The last two chapters have argued the possibility and necessity of assimilating of political economy and postmodernism with cultural studies for further theoretical transformations. Cultural studies has been very open to postmodernism as shown in the previous chapter. Grossberg once argued that the distance between cultural studies and postmodernism is "not as great it appears" (1986b, p. 71). Although he correctly points out that there are many similarities as described above between two theoretical formations, cultural studies should not agree with postmodernism's pointless solutions. I am not saying that cultural studies should preserve Adorno's rebellious modernity, but rather the project of the Enlightenment has to be preserved. Meanwhile cultural studies has tended to ignore the political economic aspects of cultural practices. It is absurd to believe that there is no relation between ideological and political forms and economic classes. This is not to say that culture has a simple functional relation to capital's needs, but that capital certainly has a stake in the forms of culture. In the case of postmodernism, we should pay attention to its interrelated questions of meaning, pleasure, and taste, but not its solutions (the end of the author, reason, and history).
As discussed earlier, there are three main models of cultural studies which Hall and Johnson have identified. As mentioned above, it is not always easy to consider all aspects of television viewing, for example. Both Hall and Johnson recognize three dimensions which do not easily correspond with each other. They are (1) work on signs, signifying practices, signification and discourse (text-based studies); (2) work on history and histories, time and narrativity, on the forces which make and interrupt specific historical conjunctures (studies of lived culture); and (3) work on institutions, power and state policies (production-based studies). For Hall, the non-commensurability means that a general theory of culture is difficult to conceive.

Johnson also admits that each dimension is inadequate as an account of the whole and that each has a different view of the politics of culture. It is thus unwise to combine all three approaches to generate a general theory of culture. However, it is important to improve these three areas of cultural study and trace the inner connections between them to avoid reductive materialist theoretical practices. These new directions and inner connections will be described in relation to their applicability to media, especially television, practices and strategies. These are offered, not as a finished theory of culture or popular culture in cultural studies, but as indications of how to work towards more adequate accounts. Any fully developed theory cannot rest on theoretical clarification alone, but must also engage in research and fresh abstractions.

**Political Economy of Culture**

- **Theoretical Backgrounds**

There has been a debate between the political economy of the media and the textual analyses for more than a decade. Production-based studies did not examine television
programs themselves, for example, while elsewhere programs were dissected without reference to how and under what conditions they were produced. The prejudice of this division of intellectual labor has tended to underpin differences between orthodox Marxism (political economy and the early Frankfurt School) and the structuralist tradition which has used the concepts of relative autonomy and the ideological level to explore the internal dynamics of signifying practices without attempting to relate them to economic structures. It is true that cultural studies at the CCCS in the early 1970s tended to align itself with the structuralist tradition. Although it has distanced itself from the structuralist tradition by developing and improving audience reception theory and the concept of inter-textuality (production - text - audience), and has admitted that the analyses of political economic aspects is important in the process of cultural production, it has nonetheless ignored or been unable to analyze these aspects of cultural production explicitly.

The gap between approaches which focus on the political economy and those which concentrate on cultural forms cannot be bridged from one side only. In other words, we need a more complex approach that is able not only to take account of both political economic aspects (institutional, legal, economical and political pressures) and the textual organization of cultural forms, but also to analyze the gender and racial, as well as the class nature of the divisions of labor and exercise of power within the industry. I have argued that the work of Pierre Bourdieu has provided the direction in developing concepts which may overcome the gap between analyses of culture and socio-economic processes. He seeks to relate cultural manifestations to class relations, while recognizing their specificities. For example, he constructs a general model whereby symbolic goods have economies in which transactions take place in order to accumulate
symbolic capital or prestige, while insisting that these operations also contain forms of economic rationality.

There are three elements of the economy of culture: (1) the supply-side or the producers of cultural goods, (2) the symbolic goods or products themselves, and (3) the demand-side, the consumers of cultural goods. The symbolic goods produced here will only have much of a chance of realizing their value if they stand in a relation of elective affinity to the consumers; that is, to their ideal and material interests. The importance of Boudieu's work in relating the differences between analyses of culture and of socio-economic processes can be encapsulated in the following statements. The specific and differentiated fields are sites of collective symbolic struggles and individual strategies. And the aim of such strategies and struggles is to produce (or be associated with the production of institutions) valuable cultural products. The value of symbolic goods depends upon the value which is assigned to them by the relevant consumer community. In turn, these value judgements are in most fields often determined by the amount of symbolic capital that the producer has accumulated. Victory in a symbolic struggle means that one's symbolic goods have been judged to possess more value than those of one's competitors. The fruits of such a victory is the right to impose one's symbolic goods on the social field; that is, to exercise symbolic violence on the consumers' in the social field.

Postmodern Cultural Studies versus Marxist Cultural Studies

- Theoretical Backgrounds

While the debate between political economy and textual analysis is disappearing without a major effort to develop a more complex model that takes account of problematics of
both sides in cultural studies, another major debate, as mentioned above, has been between modernism and postmodernism. This study has argued that within cultural studies, postmodernism has established a genuinely new ground for theoretical debate as well as requiring that the ends toward which socialist cultural politics are directed, and the means through which such politics should pursued, be rethought. Cultural studies has related itself to postmodernism with a greater degree of openness, especially in the U. S.. As a result, the force of postmodernist criticisms or rejections of Marxist thought is often granted, and these have served as the basis for elaborating new ways of theorizing the field of political practices - following their implications through to produce a new political logic rather than stemming their import so as to suture an old one back into place.

Despite its useful epochal analysis of culture, modernism, in my view, has offered a much more favorable arena in which to wage cultural studies's cultural struggle. Some of the tenets of postmodernism are welcome developments in terms of the more open, adaptive and flexible forms of debate that it has produced. But the difficulty cannot be ignored that this openness is sometimes produced at the price of a corresponding emptiness. The major problem exists in the process of subject production. The subject is not a singular one imaginarily inserted within a narrative history, as postmodernism asserts. Rather, its concern is with the organization of groups of subjects, imaginary communities, whose interests and identities are to be grafted on to or/and articulated with one another to bond them into fragile unities, momentarily fused in the pursuit of common objectives, only then to fly apart awaiting their inscription into new, and possibly quite unrelated, discursively constructed political positionalities.
This study has suggested Habermas's communicative rationality as a shield against postmodernism's notion of "the death of subject," and Bakhtin's notion of dialogism as a tool for assimilating some useful and necessary tenets of postmodernism. Habermas's insistence on communication is not much different from emphasizing language use as in structuralism and postmodernism, except that communication brings the question of politics to the fore: language for what? In other words, communication is also a quite different starting point from the abstractions of language that appear in linguistically oriented theories from both traditions. For Habermas, language is a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world.

Similarly, for Habermas, the problem of legitimation is never solved through values and norms alone; it involves the dynamic interaction of social classes, class factions, prophetic and messianic movements, and state agencies. The values and norms espoused by these various actors must be seen in conjunction with the institutions that articulate them and translate them into collective behavior. He avoids the danger of explaining culture or of perceiving it as a mere reflection of social activity. Instead he treats culture as a phenomenon of importance in its own right.

Most importantly, he insists on the continuation of the Enlightenment project, even if this project should not be pursued through the use of instrumental reason or in the mode of traditional subject philosophy. All historical styles, along with all imagery, are reduced to the level of exchange-value. Habermas claims that the privilege attributed to the aesthetic sphere by the neo-Nietzscheans tends to undermine theoretical and practical rationality. He contends that such a primacy of the aesthetic entails an absence of social mediation and especially a lack of articulation between cultural modernity/postmodernity and every-day social practices. As discussed earlier, he notes a certain convergence
between postmodernists and neoconservatives (e.g. Daniel Bell), implying that the renunciation of any notion of substantive rationality by the former paves the way for the "decisionism" advocated by some of the latter. In the following paragraphs, I will demonstrate how some of useful tenets of postmodernism and political economy can be assimilated to Marxist cultural studies.

**Toward a political Economy of Culture in Postmodern Era**

- "The Wonderful New World"

How can culture be explained with the economy? I think it is less useful in this context to speak in terms of the base/superstructure notion of articulation than to consider culture as part and parcel of the economy. The distinction between culture and economy is becoming blurred. Culture is not the icing on the cake of the material world. It is now as material as the world. This means that the new regime of accumulation is becoming itself progressively more and more a regime of signification. That is, a greater and greater proportion of all goods produced comprises cultural goods. It also means that both the means and relations of production are becoming increasingly cultural. In other words, relations of production are mediated by questions of discourse, of communication between management and employees, and material means of production.

No one seems to argue about the major change that has taken place in the political, cultural, social, and economical spheres since World War II. But there are varied assessments of so called "new times." Post-Fordism and postmodernism should be given the credit for identifying trends of new times. But there are problems and questions with this discourse of new times. Are they new? Is this the beginning of a
new history? How do we characterize what is new about them? What political meanings do they have? How do we assess their contradictory tendencies?

Postmodernism theorists have theorized and characterized these transitional times. The biggest flaw of postmodernism's theorizing of new times is probably its lack of interest in the future. In other words, it expresses a clearer sense of what we are leaving behind (post) than where we are heading. Its characterization of new times, however, provides a useful explanation for why the distinction between culture and economy is rather useless now.

• Changes in Economic and Cultural Spheres

On a macro level, the global economy is changing. This is true for the production of traditional commodities such as steel, cars, and clothing, as well as for the telecommunication and information industries, which have partly replaced the old use values as crucial sources of investment, profit, and hegemony. As Aronowitz (1981) argues, the Western hegemony of the world economy has been challenged by nations like Japan, Korea, and others. Of course, this does not mean the end of American production. In fact, certain industries have revived, but on different foundations. Mini mills have replaced centralized steel production. Many Japanese auto corporations have built plants in the U.S., at times on a nonunion, paternalistic basis; low-wage apparel manufacturing survives on immigrant labor, both inside and outside the official economy. But the once commanding American lead in electronics has passed to the Pacific region, and the dominance over the crucial automobile industry has been lost.

It sounds so fresh, radical and even dramatic. But this postmodernism's characterization of new times is not so new. Marx already predicted these phenomena:
capital's global expansion, transforming everything in its wake. Although his prediction about class as the motor of revolution has been wrong, Marx was the one who grasped the revolutionary connection between capitalism and modernity, as well as the dialectical relationship between the outside and the inside of the process. He often spoke of the constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, and everlasting uncertainty and agitation.

On a micro level, the following characteristics have also been true: more flexible, decentralized forms of labor process and work organization; decline of the old manufacturing base and the growth of the computer based industries; a greater emphasis on choice and product differentiation, on marketing, packaging and design, on the targeting of consumers by lifestyle, taste, and culture; a decline in the proportion of the skilled, male, manual working class, the rise of the service and white-collar classes and the feminization of the workforce. Although these characterizations are acceptable, the question is how complete or total this transition of postmodernism is. We know that earlier transitions (capitalism, household production, modern industry) all turned out to be more protracted and incomplete than the theory suggested. We need to make assessments, not from the completed base, but from the visible change. The question, thus, should always be where is the visible change and in what direction is it pointing. The following is what political economy of cultural studies in this changing time should be able to take account of.

• Consumption of Cultural Products

One phenomenal change is the shift from mass consumption to specialized consumption. The connection between economy and culture here can be understood notionally in various goods. As Hebdige (1988) argues, in clothing, the diversity of clothing styles
is closely associated with subcultures among youth, for example. In this case, the shift has not just been from mass-ness to specialization but also from a focus on function to a concern with style. Hall (1988) argues that consumption is no less symbolic for being material. People express in their practical lives not only what they need for material existence but some sense of their symbolic place in the world, of who they are, their identities. The preoccupation with consumption and style may appear trivial. But the fact is that many people tend to play the game of using things to signify who they are. In other words, specialized consumption is not only a matter of the psychic investment of consumers with style, or the symbolic. It is also a question of the development of demand for more specialized use-values (1988, p. 26-28).

As Bourdieu argues, this specialized consumption creates taste and thus leads to the spread of flexible production methods, which itself leads to qualitative changes in labor relations, and so on. What is then the cause of this specialized consumption? The answer could be found in Weber's analysis of capitalism: the cause has to do with the individual and collective identities of emergent and receding social groupings. The current capitalist conditions of accumulation bring with them a largely modified class structure with a largely modified set of collective and individual identities. And this will produce new demand patterns for both material and cultural goods.

Similarly, if we are to make sense of the ways in which television is and might be used, then we need to understand the nature and consequences of the choices that are daily made in the public and private acts of consumption. There are two points to be made here. All consumption involves both the consumption of meanings and the production of meanings by the consumer. Consumption has as one of its bases utility, and as one of its foundations human need, but neither utility nor need exhaust it. Consumption is a
general process of the construction of meaning. It is concerned with the internalization
of culture in everyday life, the result of a positive recontextualization of the alienating
possibilities of everyday life. Although Pierre Bourdieu has provoked the most interest
in developing concepts which overcome the gap between analyses of culture and socio-
economic processes, he is too insistent, I believe, on the divisive nature of
consumption, on reducing consumption practices to social class division.

- Commodification of Cultural Products: Exchange, Use, Symbolic-Values

To what extent can culture be considered as an economic sector? Both cultural and
material goods possess both use-values and sign-values. In material goods, the use-
value lies in the material properties of the good, and the sign-value in its signifying
properties. In cultural goods both use-value and sign-value are inherent in the object's
signifying properties, although it is difficult to define their use-values. The use-value of
a work of art is different from that of a pound of sugar, for example. The key to
understanding consumption is the interactive possibilities in play. The social
differentiation of objects through consumption need not simply be an expression of
social divisions, or the power of the producer to define how a product will be used, nor
indeed will it be necessarily defined or determined by the intrinsic properties of the
object itself.

Here, commodification must be addressed. As Boudieu argues, it would be wrong to
think that the financial economy can account adequately for all cultural factors, but it still
needs to be taken into account in any investigation of popular art in a consumer's
society. It is useful to be able to describe texts as cultural commodities, but we must
always recognize crucial differences between them and some goods in the marketplace.
With the shift of capitalist economies from production to marketing, the cultural value of
material commodities like cars, TV sets, and clothing has increased in proportionate importance. Nevertheless, such commodities still circulate largely within a financial economy that retains their bases in use-value (Fiske, 1987, p. 311-313).

A commodity possesses a number of characteristics. It primarily possesses exchange-value. In other words, it is sold on the market. Labor power, means of production, and objects produced are now commodities. They all possess value and exchange value. The value of a product of labor stands in relation to its exchange-value much as the use-value of the labor incorporated into the product stands to the use-value of the product to its user. All products of labor have thus a complex nature - the use-value of the labor they contain plus the use-value they have to its consumer, and the value of the labor they contain plus the exchange-value they have from the point of view of the consumer. Cultural commodities have a more clearly identifiable exchange-value which the technology of reproduction has put under severe pressure. Since various types of software copier are available, producers and distributors have had to argue for elaborations and extensions of copyright laws to maintain some control over exchange-value and its base in scarcity, although such legislation has largely failed.

Commodification comes from a concern of the consumer as well as the concrete and specific use-value of a product, including the price that a product will fetch on the market. Commodification also entails the consumer's qualification to consume a given product because of his/her ability to pay. The sign-value of product is yet again something else and not necessarily related to commodification. It also means, as Marx emphasized in the section on commodity fetishism, the power of things over people and the importance attributed to commodities in capitalism as opposed to human beings. This power is mostly due to the qualities that products possess as exchange-value.
Exchange-value, unlike Marx's use-value, is also a social construction. For example, a painting may be purchased for a combination of these three factors (exchange, use, sign-values). Though a commodity in the sense of the consumer's ability to pay, it is not a commodity in the sense that the painting is above all consumed even by the rich - primarily as use-value.

The process of commodification is probably more complex in the sphere of reproduction than it is in that of either production or exchange. Labor-power is reproduced through the consumption of material and cultural products. In terms of reproduction through consumption of material products, a general process of commodification takes place, affecting the working class only on a large scale with the advent of mass production (Budd and Steinman, 1989, p. 10). Let's consider the reproduction of labor power through the consumption of cultural goods. Leisure activities, for example, are devoted to non-market forms of production. They are housework, childrearing, repairing automobiles, painting, putting together a local band, football, softball team. Some of these activities can be hired out via the market. That we include them somehow in the sphere of leisure rather than the sphere of production is an indicator of how commodified our very notion of leisure is, and our notion of work as well. Where has commodification been making advances in the sphere of leisure? The best clue here might be to return to our discussion above of culture as an economic sector, and in particular the media industry.

The narratives and information we consume, the melodies and songs we hear, and the images we see come in increasingly commodified forms, we buy package tours from companies that specialize in these, and book our flights with specialized agencies, and so on. The commodification of mass culture is in effect three simultaneously occurring
processes: (1) the creation of a specifically working-class (as distinct from artisan or
peasant) culture; (2) the shift from folk culture to popular culture; (3) the
commodification of the culture of non-elite groups. The culture that the masses
consume becomes progressively more commodified. The place of television is central
here. To buy a TV set is to enter into commodity exchange, but the impact of TV is
rather another matter. That is, there are few commodities which cost so little and which
users get so much (at least quantitative) use from. There is no exchange of money at the
point of sale/consumption, and no direct relationship between the price paid and the
amount consumed; people can consume as much as they wish and what they wish,
without the restriction of what they are able to afford. If our leisure is spent more than
anywhere else in front of TV then is this commodified consumption? Not necessarily.
It can be argued that what we are exposed to on TV is increasingly commodified. All
TV shows are commodified, in the sense that they are mass distributed. The material
economy, thus, offers two modes of circulation for cultural commodities: the producers
of a program sell it to distributors; the program is a straightforward material commodity.
In the other, the program-as-commodity changes role and it becomes a producer. And
the new commodity that it produces is an audience which, in its turn, is sold to
advertisers or sponsors.

The producers and distributors of a program can exert some, if limited, influence over
who watches and over the meanings and pleasures that the audiences (and we must shift
to the plural in the cultural economy) may produce from it. For example, few years ago,
Paramount produced a mini-series "Alexander the Great." It sold it for distribution to
ABC. ABC sold its audience to AT&T who sponsored the series. The series rated
respectably, but not spectacularly. Paramount could change the content of the show to
reach more general audiences. But the lower socioeconomic group was not a
commodity that AT&T wished to buy. It targeted a higher socioeconomic group. Of course, this is not to say the consumption of images of TV can totally be reducible to the consumption of commodities. The image and spectacle must be seen not so much as a continuation of commodification, but as a different order of commodification. The meanings and pleasure of TV viewing do not circulate in the cultural economy in the same way that money does in the material economy.

• Organization of Cultural Production

It is also obvious to me that the commercial mass media are riddled with conflicts and contradictions at a number of levels - not only in program content but also in the organization of corporate production, in the nature of the viewing experience, and in the media's social and political functions. Each television show must somehow integrate itself into television's continuous commercial flow. The desire to maximize profits through minimizing production costs manifests itself in industrial methods of production; this encourages repeating protagonists in which "good" continually triumphs over "bad." The settings of most programs reproduce a middle-class, consumerist lifestyle which echoes those promises of social and personal utopia offered by the commercials' images of commodity gratification. Even in high-rating series with a decidedly working-class orientation like *Rossanne*, the habituated naturalism which blunts creativity and political penetration still exists. While it has a traditional narrative within its generic mix of humorous and cynical sketches, the show never portrayed the working classes defined in relation to capitalism as economic personification of labor. Personal relations are present, but the current relations of production are absent.

While most television shows are swamped by naturalism, some plays have tried to avoid pure naturalism. A Broadway hit, *Miss Saigon*, for example, has also a traditional
narrative reliance on dramatic climaxes and crescendi within its generic mix of humorous and sad sketches, songs, historical reconstruction and drama. But at the same time, it both emphasizes key concepts such as mode of production, uneven development, colonialism, and imperialism, and challenged the transparency effect of naturalistic drama. The importance of relating text and its production process is that the exposure of capitalism is needed in a much bolder and more aggressive fashion to avoid the appropriation of realism. Television's realist narrative determinedly addresses economic and social relations and is far from resolving all problems and contradictions, and denies the dialectic nature of social conflict.

In addition to the profit orientation which obviously affects texts, the institutional spaces for political and critical engagement, which shift from place to place over time, also have important effects on the contents of the texts. Personal and organizational factors change constantly over time, and with these the spaces for strategic penetration are also changed. Joe Roth, chairman of 20th Century Fox, said, "I've been in the business for 18 years, and I've never felt safe" (Time, July 29, 1991). The so-called new innovative writers, directors, and producers are constantly challenging the old innovative people. Scheduling of programs is also crucial, because it may have the effect of dulling the audience's response to challenging material by placing it within a predictable and familiar framework of regular program slots.

- Scheduling: A Strategic Penetration

Scheduling has largely been ignored by media researchers within cultural studies. Scheduling a television show involves making choices according to two sets of relationships. First, there is the choice of which TV genre (soaps, sit-coms, drama, etc) to place in any one time slot. Secondly, there is the choice of the sequencing of
programs. There is the notion of delivering audiences from one show or genre to another on the same channel by careful sequencing. On the other hand, there is the importance of out-rating competing shows in the same slot on other channels in order to deliver those audiences to advertisers. In this regard, programs are either strong ones that can go on against tougher opposition or perhaps need a softer time slot.

The set of choices and vertical sequencing is culturally determined; in the latter case in quite precise industrial terms, usually according to demographics and ratings. In addition, there is another syntagmatic set of relationships. As well as the flow-on relationship between TV genres, there is the flow-on effect within programs between the drama itself and the advertisements placed in it. Advertising helps to regulate the exchange between general processes of production and consumption. It is a discourse that works to articulate one with the other. The network licenses programming from independent suppliers and sells time within and between those programs to advertisers. Within this system, the program must provide a suitable environment for the commercial message. Basically, the advertiser's demand for viewers is the fundamental condition of a program occupying a particular slot in the schedule.

The concept of the schedule also helps to analyze the history of the text of television. The schedule organizes the terms of television's disparate programming in the overall economy of the television - achieving a profitable balance of news and entertainment, comedy and drama, talk shows, etc. The discursive effects of the single program, the genre, the series, are at the same time significantly dispersed and constrained by the strategies and determinations of the weekly schedule. An analysis of the schedule helps to identify the main lines of television programming - the rise and fall of genre, formats, personalities, the migrations and initiations of form - and to begin the process of
charting the terms and contours of an institutional, as well as social, history of television. The position of programs in the television schedule reflects and is determined by the work-structured order of the real social world. The patterns of position and flow imply the question of who is at home, and through complicated social relays and temporal mediations, link television to the modes, processes, and scheduling of production characteristic of the general population. Thus, to analyze the television text, its relation to the schedule and the relation of the schedule to the structure and economics of the work week of the general population must be considered. For a more complete analysis of the television text, it is necessary to add the analysis of the formal and semiotic relation of the program proper to the series of ads interpolated into the structure of the program.

These considerations seem to be trivial but do indicate two important theoretical points about strategic penetration in the TV industry. First, any dramatic performance is a dense web of semiotic practices and a multiplication of communicational factors. Thus at any point in the communication process potentially conflicting signs compete for audience attention: the dramatist as pre-text, the director who chooses the transmitters and the forms their signals take; the actors, set and costume designers, stage manager, sound and music composers. Secondly, this semiotic density in the process of cultural production is embedded in a routinized process of professional practice.

A dramatic text, for example, is performed or spoken by multiple voices: cameras, theatrical spaces, planning meetings, plotting meetings, and script editing meetings, rehearsals, studio, audio, video editing, etc. Each of these practices in some way transforms earlier ones, and they do so according to a hierarchical range of professional values and practices - each of them a source of information, and a system insofar as
directing, acting, set design, musical scoring, etc. Each has its own selection and combination rules constructed across a complex of technical, dramatic, and cultural discourses. It is a power situation in which each performer is spoken by a range of industrial, generic, formal, and cultural discourses, each perhaps with its own space for contradiction and drama. The value of the notion of semiotic density in this organizational context is that it allows us to think systematically about a TV text as the site of contestation and struggle within and between professional practices in the relation of other economical, political and cultural factors, rather than as a simple mechanism for the flow of dominant ideology.

The industrial discourse here is not limited to a mere corporation decision on cultural production. It interacts with other related (press, film, magazine, radio, etc) and unrelated industries within horizontal and vertical media ownerships (e.g. Time-Warner also owns non-media firms). National and international telecommunication policies and the status of the international media market are not separate issues either. Of course, the text-as-produced is a different object from the text-as-read. But a more complete analysis of the flow of American media products and its effects on local audiences, for example, must not only concern economical, political and cultural conditions of production, distribution and exhibition in both national and international media markets, but also the formal semiological questions about codes and conventions of those texts. All of these have to be related to the lived culture of local audiences.

• Conditions of Reception

The fact that a rather extensive amount of American entertainment programming is used abroad does not necessarily mean that effects on local cultures are identifiable and overwhelming. Nonetheless, there is a certain degree of influence, though they may be
different from those suggested by some previous studies. Whether it is clearly addressed or not, cultural identity has been the central concern of international communication. There are some cultural aspects on which imported media products may have some impact. It is difficult to distinguish traditional culture from foreign culture. It is also difficult to measure how much of local culture is based on indigenous themes and how much is influenced by Western models. One clear fact is that classical arts are dying in the Third World, and one issue we should investigate is how much the media flow has contributed to this decline of traditional culture and to the changes of cultural activities. With a small audience and a limited repertoire, traditional opera, for example, has to compete with Beethoven, "Dallas," and Bruce Springstein. In addition, even less complex common types of traditional music are in fact an integral part of the major individual and collective events. Further, traditional music is difficult to adapt to media usage as it is often popular only in the immediate area in which it originates.

The change in the structure of taste in food, clothing, aesthetic appreciation, native customs, and preference for human relations have been recognized by many scholars. In some cases, rock music enjoys increasing popularity over native popular songs, and some youth in the Third World imitate rock stars' appearances as a desirable way to seek personal identity. They have accused imported media products of changing indigenous cultures and of providing a false consciousness. These occasional observable effects, however, do not constitute scientific data. One must realize that those media products may have influences and produce changes only insofar as other elements of the social environment reinforce social change. Thus, to analyze the social and cultural implications of the flow of media products in more satisfactory manner, a broader discussion of the relationship between leisure and culture, work and family, ethnicity and national sovereignty should be the starting point.
If cultural dependency is the general effect of media imperialism, research in this area should move away from a model of direct, single-centered and world wide influence to one that functions as interactive, multicentered, and regional. Data should be collected country by country to find out how programs reach audiences and how those audiences react to the programs they use. The model for investigation must include cultural as well as economic and political analyses. Culture is an elusive concept. It is difficult to trace a precise causal link between mass media exposure and cultural change. In the case of the Third World, the cultural changes might have been occurred before the coming of mass media, in the days of colonialism. The role of imported television programs has been overstated in the study of media imperialism. The role of TV in any society is far more complex than is often allowed for.

**The Role of the Agent in Political Economy of Culture**

In a sense, the network is a relay in a process of textualizing the interaction of audience and advertiser. The audience is directly active in the textual negotiation by what it wants as well as through the figure of what is wanted of it. In a way, television offers a justification for the audience by inscribing the audience as consumer. The networks are one of the central mechanisms of modern consumption and of social discipline, working through the historical strategy of aligning and intermixing sexuality with the representation and consumption of objects. Television's serial and single episodes both repeat, though in different dramatic registers, the forms of everyday experience, and have proved to be well suited to linking the consuming subject with the system of production under multinational capitalism.
The political economy can be a valuable theoretical asset because it also analyzes the history and form of the schedule by linking the world of television entertainment and the world of work with the general mechanisms of circulation of capital and commodity in Western industrialized societies. It is in this context that the analysis of serial forms, and their alternatives, in the form of the schedule takes on particular significance. The schedule is an important institutional mediation between the worlds of work and of entertainment. The political economy of the text consists of elaborating a framework that links the statements of social and psychic value specific to programs in diverse time slots, and of particular audiences, to the processes of the general economy. This framework would enable us to articulate and explain the specific link between form, audience, schedule, and mode of consumption.

I have argued that we need to put more weight on the political economic side of the text which has been ignored in cultural studies: the interaction between material economy and cultural economy. However, it is also important to reemphasize that the workings of the material economy cannot account for all cultural factors. A television show is certainly a material commodity as described above, the show-as-commodity changes into the product of an audience to be sold to advertisers. Up to this point, the role of audience seems to exist as the end point of a linear economic transaction. As mentioned above, the material economy does affect the way we consume cultural products. But the process of the consumption does not work in the same way as the material economy. The text-as-commodity is not only a container of meaning and pleasure, but also a provoker of meaning and pleasure. We are responsible for producing meaning and pleasure and the production is undertaken only in our interests. But our interests are constantly affected and formed voluntarily and involuntarily by the lived culture: the
material producers and distributors attempt to make and sell meanings and pleasures. Meaning and pleasure are hard to possess and to control because the production of meaning and pleasure is not the same as the production of the cultural commodity, or of other goods. The power of audiences as producers in the cultural economy is considerable.

The Return of the Agent as a Producer of Meaning and Pleasure

- The Death of The Author versus The Creation of a New Author

Postmodernism's theme of the decentering of the subject (producer and audience) often leads to the disappearance of the self as agent. The author, for example, is irrelevant and not a presence to be uncovered behind the text. Postmodernism simply rejects the notion of subjectivity as a site where sense is made as seen in the work of Fiske and Grossberg. But I still believe in emphasis on the politics of both audience and production, set within daily domestic and professional routines. The consequences of this belief involve rescuing the knowledgeable (from the de-emphasis of the knowledgability of human behavior) as the conceptual center for social analysis, and situating what knowledgability there is in the context of the ongoing practices of social life. The death-of-the-author formulation has been exacerbated by a particular concern within cultural studies to conflate with its notion of realism (Colin MacCabe's classic realist text). This immediately draws attention to inter-textually as a constructed view - that is, in its relations of similarity and difference with other texts, for example, television contents. But despite this, radical realism still seeks a transparency effect and a guarantee of its truthfulness for disguising its arbitrariness and therefore its political effectivity (no means for struggle).
Similarly, both Fiske and Grossberg acknowledge their debt to Baudrillard's notion of the hyperreal: the endless world of simulation which isolates and privatizes individuals in a closed circuit of images where it is impossible to distinguish between the spectacle and the real - indeed, in which there is no real. But, as mentioned above, Baudrillard's theory ludicrously reduces the power of agency. His hyperreal is a condition of mass hyperconformity. Messages are given to teenagers, they only want some sign (Fiske's analysis of Madonna and Grossberg's Miami Vice and rock and roll phenomena), they idolize the play of signs and stereotypes, they idolize any content so long as it resolves itself into a spectacular sequence.

With the acceptance of the power of visual epistemology, Fiske and Grossberg do not seriously consider forms of resistance within the media industry itself where precisely those dominant myths of empiricism and naturalism have been challenged. They make no sustained distinction between naturalism and realism; indeed both are cautious about accepting the notion of the real at all, even though their view that the unequal distribution of power in society is the central principle that structures the relationship of any group to others, or to the social system as a whole is clearly a realist one. So although their own texts are bids to establish reading positions in terms of this central structuring principle, realist television texts which do the same (by way of engaging with reading formations established within popular genres) still deny subordinate groups the means of articulating and understanding their subordination by denying them a discourse with which to speak and think their opposition. So I think they do not give the same positive weight to agency within production as they do within the audience (e.g. viewing pleasure).
This study is part of a renewed theoretical reflection on Marx's insistence that people make history, but not of their own choosing. As such it is part of a broad current critique of the neo-Nietzscheans for their linguistic turn. They have rightly abandoned the over-emphasis on production in the base/superstructure model, but only to reductively treat the structure of society in terms of language and signification. The emphasis on all human actors (audiences as well as authors) can be a part of a political project to decenter elitist theories of the subject which reduce people living in day-to-day routines to inconsequential and non-comprehending dwellers.

• **The Role of the Agent**

Subjects are first and foremost agents, reflexively monitoring (and thus understanding) their own contextually based actions. Our reflexive capacity as agents engaged in the flow of daily social conduct operates only partly on a discursive level. What agents know about what they do and why they do it is largely carried in practical consciousness. In other words, we reflexively monitor our conduct, and are partially aware of the conditions of our behavior. Habermas gives an example here of our routine competence in language. Language is a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world. To speak a language, we need to know an enormously complicated range of rules, strategies, and tactics involved in language use. However, if we were asked to give a discursive account of what it is that we know in knowing these rules, we would find it very difficult. The chances are that only a very trivial account could be given discursively of what is known in order to speak a language. The same is often true of soap opera and romance novel fans' ability to explain discursively the very considerable sophistication which they routinely apply to the reading of their favorite books and shows.
As Giddens (1986) argues, the relationship between agency and the social structure is always a dynamic one. In other words, subjects are never simply positioned as effects of structure. Human beings as agents are knowledgeable by way of routine daily activity; they may also be knowledgeable discursively; and they may be knowledgeable in the theoretical manner that can understand this behavior in the context of social reproduction and transformation (1986, p. 531; 541). This language of possibilities, I believe, can provide the opportunity to rethink questions of authorship, adding an emphasis on the socially oppositional possibilities of media practice to Grossberg's and Fiske's emphasis on audience pleasure. It is very important to recognize and understand the mutable relationship between different strata of consciousness, and so between active agency and the boundedness of structures - not only in the human beings that they observe, but in their own practice. This has to do with their sense of themselves as surveillant social observers in relation to knowledgeable social subjects. It has also to do with the necessary relationship between the innocence of asserting human agency and the guilt of being determined by institutional structures.

Agency, as Gramsci has reminded us, has also to do with power; and power inheres in much more than the top-down structures of social control. Power and freedom in human society are not opposites; on the contrary, power is rooted in the very nature of human agency, and thus in the freedom to act otherwise. Like readers, authors are constrained by both mutual knowledge and generic expectation promotes the deconstruction of dominant myth. Authors or producers of cultural products are not fixed and unconstituted creative sources. They must be understood as constituted in language, ideology, and social relations in their relation to the meaning of the text. The point is that there is a dual sense of power (as constraining and emancipating) in the
retention of notions of authorship and agency. We are, all of us (cultural producers, media academics, adult members of the audience) necessarily engaged in both the pleasures of knowledgeable observers (questioning, monitoring, watching, bringing to light) and the pleasures of knowledgeable actors (evading, fleeing from and fooling this power). We need to be aware of both pleasures in all the institutional and agentive situations to which we customarily relate.

**Pleasure in Cultural Economy**

- **The Value of Pleasure**

Finally, I have argued that cultural studies tends to ignore the pleasure of viewing experiences. It is wrong to ignore the obvious the fact that people enjoy watching television, for example. The values Grossberg and Fiske desire from their postmodernisms, which overemphasize media manipulation, are the insistence on the agentive mobilization of pleasure in relation to counter-myth. Despite their comments about pleasure "not resisting ideology," it is crucial to both that even *jouissance* operates within the social context of audiences. Thus the hegemonic distinction between the public-political world of the man and the private-domestic world of the woman is itself mobilized for the resistant pleasures of *jouissance*: "The privatization of pleasure allows for its articulation in the body and the senses, and its feminization allows it to be articulated with the culture of the repressed" (Fiske, 1988, p. 230). But the focus is still too much on audiences, with a relationship suggested between form (male narrative closure versus female narrative openness) and gendered distinctions of sexuality within the audience. Thus, Grossberg and Fiske are unable to provide an adequate tool to develop a theory of pleasure that goes beyond audience.
Placing too much emphasis on the pleasure that people experience from television is not a harmless theoretical and political choice. As mentioned above, Adorno argued that the experience of pleasure in mass culture is a false kind of pleasure, even part of the trick of manipulating the masses more effectively in order to lock them in the eternal status quo of exploitation and oppression. Hall also strongly rejects consideration of pleasure. He argues that the project of the left is directed at the future and considering the experience of pleasure causes all sorts of mental blocks when theorizing about the problem.

But this is a one-sided view of the case. How can cultural studies be transformed without considering the landscapes of popular pleasures? A television show may not have clearly defined use-value as material goods. If the show does not provide entertainment, it ceases to have an exchange value. In other words, one cannot succeed in selling a commodity if it does not have a certain usefulness. And it is here that the contradictory character of the capitalist mode of production lies. From the standpoint of production the product only features as a commodity, but from the standpoint of consumption the same product features as use-value. Of course, the way in which a cultural product is consumed cannot be directly deduced from the way in which it is produced; it is also dependent on all sorts of socio-cultural and psychological conditions.

- Pleasure as Use-Value

But what is entertainment value? Entertainment is usually associated with simple, uncomplicated pleasure. But this association evades the obligation to investigate which mechanisms lie at the basis of that pleasure, how that pleasure is produced and how it
works - as though that pleasure were something natural and automatic. Nothing is less true, however. Any form of pleasure is constructed and functions in a specific social and historical context. L. A. Law, for example, is offered to the public as an object for pleasurable consumption. The consumption of L.A. Law is, however, not an isolated phenomenon, but is embedded in a network of other activities and associations which are connected with those activities. The pleasure of the show, thus, is not unique.

The promise of pleasure is the use-value by which the industry tries to seduce viewers to watch the show on their television set. But to achieve this aim the producers have to have a definite idea of what the audience will find pleasurable; they must have a certain self-confidence that their own definition of pleasure will coincide with that of the public. Therefore the strategy of the producers will be directed at the elaboration of what they already know about popular pleasures. Their previous experience in the business will be of assistance to them in this. Hence it is unlikely that the pleasure offered in L. A. Law will be structurally new and provocative. It will keep within the guidelines of existing and accepted definitions and routines of popular pleasure. In order to attract a large audience the format of L. A. Law will therefore tend to accord with easily accessible and current patterns of what is pleasurable and entertaining. This is not to say that the producer will be fully aware of the effectiveness of his product. He has to try to discover by rating and program testing. From his pragmatic viewpoint, he may not be interested in cultural theory.

• Pleasure as Cultural Resistance

But we need to know how and why the mechanisms of pleasure functions, because the commercial culture industry employs the populist ideology for its own ends by reinforcing the cultural eclecticism underlying it and propagating the idea that indeed
there is no accounting for taste, that in other words no objective aesthetic judgements are possible. It sells its products by propagating the idea that everyone has the right to his/her own taste and has the freedom to enjoy pleasure in his/her own way. It is also links up with what Bourdieu has called the popular aesthetics (1986, p. 176-178): an aesthetic which is the exact opposite of the bourgeois aesthetic disposition in which an art object is judged according to extremely formal, universalized criteria which are totally devoid of subjective passions and pleasures. The popular aesthetic, on the other hand, is of an essentially pluralist and conditional nature because it is based on the premise that the significance of a cultural object can differ from person to person and from situation to situation. It is based on an affirmation of the continuity of cultural forms and daily life, and on a deep-rooted desire for participation, and on emotional involvement. In other words, what matters for the popular aesthetic is the recognition of pleasure, and the recognition that pleasure is a personal thing. According to Bourdieu, the popular aesthetic is deeply anchored in common sense, in the way in which cultural forms in everyday life are approached by ordinary people.

Similarly, Bakhtin has argued that popular culture can parody both generic form and social hierarchy, so thereby challenging conventions and systems which control us through our fear of infinity. This popular culture is collective and interactive. He argues that parody and carnival serve to subvert hierarchy in two ways: formally and socially. Literary parody undermines the hierarchy of styles maintained by orthodox practices; carnival inverts the social hierarchy maintained by official culture. Carnival for Bakhtin is more than a party or a festival. It is rather the oppositional culture of the oppressed, the official world seen from below. It is not a mere disruption of etiquette but the symbolic, anticipatory overthrow of oppressive social structures. It is also an ecstatic collectivity, the joyful affirmation of change, a dress rehearsal for utopia. Those
elements not only celebrate the traditional culture, but suggest metaphorically the
progressive change for social and political justice. Bakhtin maintains a balance between
the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power, including
collective power of social formations (class-hierarchy, sexual repression, patriarchy,
dogmatism, etc.), and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity.

• Difficulty of Constructing a Theory of Pleasure

As mentioned above, pleasure is the category that is ignored in the ideology of mass
culture. In its discourses pleasure seems to be non-existent. Instead it makes things like
responsibility, critical distance or aesthetic purity central - moral categories that make
pleasure an irrelevant and illegitimate criterion, as Hall has argued. In this way the
ideology of mass culture places itself totally outside the framework of the popular
aesthetic, outside the way in which popular cultural practices take shape in the routines
of daily life.

Since experiencing pleasure is not a conscious, directed activity, it may not be easy to
solve the riddle of the pleasure of cultural products, but we should keep trying to
unravel it to some degree. Watching a television show is a cultural practice which has
much of the nature of a habit: it is directly available, causal and free. And a habit is
always difficult to explain in intellectual terms, because it feels so natural and self-
evident. A theoretical construction has the character of a rationalization. And is it not a
fact that we can talk of the experience of pleasure only by means of rationalization?
Pleasure eludes our rational consciousness. We can express in words why we like a
certain show. We do our utmost to give explanations for that pleasure, but somehow
we know that the explanations we can put into words are not the whole story, or even
the right story. Pleasure is obviously something uncertain and precarious. The pleasure
of the text a is fragile pleasure, conditioned by mood, habit, circumstance, etc. A theoretical construction can never fully comprehend pleasure, because theory makes it something substantial and presumes it to be permanent and static. Any theoretical look at the subtlety of pleasure by definition falls short - a conclusion which, however paradoxical it might sound, gives rise to optimism.

In spite of the difficulty of constructing a theory of pleasure, considering pleasure in the analysis of a text is still important. The individual subject has become more important. We can no longer conceive of the individual in terms of a whole and completed ego or autonomous self. The self is experienced as more fragmented and incomplete, composed of multiple identities in relation to the different social worlds we inhabit, something with a history produced in process. This returning and decentering of the subjective aspect is postmodernism's central theme - the death of the author.

Postmodern art draws on uncoded and semi-coded libido in the unconscious to produce a literature and fine arts that break with the aesthetics of representation. Postmodern art penetrates to underneath the signifier, to the real, the material, to sensation. It draws on desire, and operates from a position of sensation; it also embodies desire. The intensity of libido is embodied in a work of art - hence transmitted to the consumer. The effect on the consumer is equally by means of the unconscious, the flow of libido embodied in cultural products. And they produce forces that give rise to sensation when they strike the bodies of consumers. Such effects on the unconscious are maximized - and hierarchy is diminished - to the extent that not just the separation of stage and audience is cancelled, but the walls of the theatre are destroyed to erase the distinction between inside and outside.
Postmodernism's theme of the decentering of the subject (producer and audience) often leads to the disappearance of the self as agent. The author, for example, is irrelevant and not a presence to be uncovered behind the text. Postmodernism simply rejects the notion of subjectivity as a site where sense is made. Could there be new times without a new subject? How is change possible if we remain untransformed? Have the forces remaking the modern world left the subjects of that process untouched? I still believe in an emphasis on the politics of both audience and production, set within daily domestic and professional routines. We have to take into account the socio-cultural context in which a text is consumed. The consequences of this belief involve rescuing the knowable from the de-emphasis of the knowledgeability of human behavior and reinstating it as the conceptual center for social analysis, situating the nature of what knowledgeability in the context of the ongoing practices of social life. As Hall argues, the wounds of modernity can be healed through a fuller and deeper modernity. Postmodernity would only cover them with its own solutions - the death of the author (consumers and producers), the end of history and of the need for new history (the end of reasons and meanings). In other words, only modernity can complete the revolution of modernity which capitalism has initiated.
"Cultural Studies - Now and in the Future"

Lots of people are doing or talking about cultural studies. Within the field of communication, Grossberg argued, "cultural studies is no longer merely tolerated as a marginal presence; it is courted and even empowered - within limited parameters - by the discipline's ruling bloc" (1989, p. 413). At the 1990 conference, "Cultural Studies - now and in the future", presenters (Allor, Morris, Giloy, Hall, etc) raised a number of questions on the commodification and institutionalization of cultural studies.

Cultural studies is supposed to be avowedly political and anti-elitist, and to maintain connections outside academe. By the second day of the conference, voices of dissatisfaction began to spread among participants (non-presenters) due to the conference's unrealistic schedule without any small-group discussion sessions or non-academic cultural producers (poets, musicians, artists, etc.). A critical manifesto, called "Hypocrisy in cultural studies" was put in the bathroom near the conference auditorium by unknown protesters). "Is there any point in establishing a radical voice which only duplicates those structures it seeks to displace" (The Chronicle of Higher Education, 1990, p. 10)?

This voice of dissatisfaction finally became public when a graduate student from Stanford University interrupted and read a list of complaints in the question and answer session for Stuart Hall. I suspect the timing was quite intentional because Hall's presentation drew the biggest crowd. She criticized the conference for its elitism, its
exclusivity, and its unwillingness to reflect on the power relations involved in its organization. Her interruption may not reflect the whole picture of dilemmas cultural studies is facing, but I believe that her remarks were necessary in cultural studies, which aims not merely to study or describe, but to promote change. The interruption led to call several unofficial small-group meetings. Participants in a meeting I attended generally agreed that cultural studies, especially American-style, may be losing its political impetus, its transformative agenda.

The conference had not articulated all the accomplishments and failures of cultural studies. The desire of the organizers, Larry Grossberg and Cary Nelson, to define cultural studies, however, was actually shattered by the conference itself. Despite the conference's organizational failure, it certainly gave momentum to a growing academic movement. Some important questions were raised regarding the future of cultural studies. First, cultural studies is now a widely taught subject and thus, unless we are very careful, students will encounter it as an orthodoxy. Secondly, there is a tendency, as several (Grossberg, Allor, Morris, Hall) pointed out, that cultural studies is being institutionalized, although I think it would not be captured and institutionalized so easily: too many people have too much at stake to let a conference or an institution impose its parameters and protocols.

In an lecture which Hall gave in Spring 1989 at Ohio State University, he forcefully stated that the incorporation of cultural studies into academia has resulted in the tendency towards the normalization and homogenization of the productive intellectual space of cultural studies. Hall characterized the cultural studies of the 1970s as a period of searching for a theoretical orthodoxy, and the 1980s as marked by the marginalizing of radical theoretical self-reflection. What Hall and other writers fear is that the exposing
of the relations between the theoretical discourses of cultural studies and the forms of institutionalized cultural power will consciously or unconsciously suppress the critical self-reflection of cultural studies at the boundaries between its theoretical discourses.

The other question is how we can overcome the constraints of academic life, including the lures of money, promotion, and prestige which may greatly limit our political effectiveness. Jan Zita Grover, a former professor and now an AIDS activist, for example, criticized scholars who comfortably study the disease from afar, using it as a metaphor for post-modern malaise. Radway, too, urged scholars to be more reflective about their teaching and their universities. "The whole structure of the university needs to be questioned and openly discussed," she said. Hall reminded his audience to keep in mind the "nagging tension" between academic work and possible political change. "It is all the difference in the world between understanding the politics of intellectual work and mistaking intellectual work for politics," he said. Others argued that teaching is by nature political, and criticized the absence of discussion about pedagogy. Constance Penley from the University of Rochester, for example, argued that professors should work hard to raise awareness about racism, sexism, and homophobia in the classroom. It is wrong, she said, to believe that their own workplace is not a political terrain.

These issues surrounding cultural studies have also been in the main argument for this study: cultural studies must improve a language of possibility as a counter-disciplinary praxis to deal with struggles over different orders of representation, conflicting forms of cultural experience, and diverse visions of the future within and outside of university. For this we need a continuous effort to transform the theories, methods, objects, political limits, and potentials of particular forms of cultural study (production-based, text-based, and audience study). This is not to say that we should aggregate those
approaches, but rather identify and reform the elements of different approaches in their relation to each other.

Based on Richard Johnson's strategies for defining cultural studies, this study has tried to identify the characteristic object of cultural studies for further transformations and reinforcement of cultural studies's inter-disciplinary tradition to produce counter-intellectual critiques. Those strategies are: (1) tracing the intellectual history of cultural studies in Britain and in the U.S.; (2) justification of necessary connections with politics, institutions, and various cultural forms; (3) criticism of orthodox Marxism; (4) charting its negative/positive relation to the academic disciplines; (5) analysis and comparison of theoretical problematics (e.g. structuralism vs. culturalism, feminism vs cultural studies, modernism vs. postmodernism). These strategies were not to produce a nicely crafted definition in one or two sentences. They were rather meant to provide pointers for further theoretical transformations as tools of social transformation.

Some important theoretical problems that require further elaboration in cultural studies has been identified in this study: (1) the psycho-social elaboration of desire and pleasure (Bakhtin); (2) consumption as the locus of the reproduction of the labor force and the expansion of capital (Bourdieu); (3) the locus of symbolic differentiation and distinction (Bourdieu); (4) the system of integration and communication between groups (Bakhtin and Habermas); (5) the issue of interiorizing social structures in subjects, converting them into unconscious disposition, thought and action, habitus (Bourdieu and Bakhtin).

One important issue in the era of globalization has not been discussed here: does British cultural studies have universally applicable interpretive power over other countries with different cultures? It may not be an approximate model for other countries, simply because it was the result of a postwar British intellectual movement that attempted to
reconstitute existing knowledge under the sign of new questions. The depression, the 
revival of capitalist production and the Cold War brought economic, political and 
cultural forces into new kinds of relation in Britain. Writers like Hoggart, Williams, and 
Thompson questioned and addressed the long-term shifts taking place in British society 
and culture within the framework of a long, retrospective, historical glance. They 
asked, for example, whether there had been a decisive rupture with the determining 
historical forces which had shaped Britain's peculiar route through the earlier phases of 
industrial capitalist development, or merely their recomposition into new continuities. 
This kind of question could be legitimate for some countries that followed the similar 
path. But each distinctive type of social formation has to be interpreted in specific 
cultural and historical contexts with different theoretical orientations and academic 
traditions.

Grossberg (1989), for example, criticizes British cultural studies in the service of an 
effort to define an American practice of cultural studies. He argues that cultural studies 
in the US has to locate itself within the trajectories of the American Left, including the 
various urban-immigrant, labor and agrarian-populist formations, the culturalism of the 
New Left, the various feminist struggles, and the different intellectually inspired projects 
of leftist journals, such as Social Text. I would agree with Grossberg's claim that 
cultural studies in the US should be practiced within the American context, although it 
should be understood as practice, institution, and cultural form regardless of national 
origins.

It is not possible to say what cultural studies is in a decisive way, partly because its 
theoretical terms make it difficult to grasp. Furthermore, those terms that have been 
described in a theoretically somewhat irresponsible manner lead to further confusion and
incomprehension. Hopefully, this study has provided a way out of the dilemmas. No single academic discipline grasps the full complexity of cultural processes. No single academic discipline can make cultural studies grasp the full complexity of cultural processes. Postmodernism with a schizophrenic attitude toward culture ("Universal Abandon?") cannot be a solution for the perfect future either. Can cultural studies be the one that would grasp the complexity? I think that cultural studies would be, if not perfect, the most rational response available to the analysis of cultural processes if it preserves and enhances its counter-disciplinary tradition. Then, cultural studies would be able to pose problems across apparently different social sites - for example, the concept of reproduction enables the family, work, the media, schooling, the adolescent peer group, etc. As Gramsci noted, the process of creating intellectuals is a long journey. It involves full of "contradictions, advances, and retreats" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 334).
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