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The prospect of arms control in Northeast Asia: A contextual, procedural, and perceptual approach

Choi, Kang, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1991
To My Parents
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Students of world affairs often say that Northeast Asia constitutes one of truly significant geostrategic pressure points of world politics. Considered in its full extension, embracing China, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia, and the vast Asian portion of the Soviet Union, Northeast Asia today contains the greatest concentration of military forces of any comparable region in the world. Within its geographic environs, the interests of the two superpowers and one additional nuclear power intersect, as well as those of an economic giant which remains militarily insignificant, and of two smaller powers with a bitter legacy of antagonism.

The nations of Northeast Asia find themselves at a critical turning point in history, on the threshold of what promises to be a very different era in the 1990s and beyond. Since 1945, Northeast Asia has been a center of the world struggle between the dominant adversarial socioeconomic systems of capitalism and socialism. While this region continues to be a potential conflict zone, "forces for peace" have become in general stronger than "forces for war" over the years. The Soviet Union and China finally normalized their relations in 1989. They want to establish a peaceful external international environment in which they can concentrate most of their efforts on resolving domestic problems. The Soviet Union and South
Korea established full diplomatic relation in September 1990. As a reaction to this, while there has been no significant progress so far, North Korea has suggested its wish to join the process of detente in the region by approaching Japan and the United States. In September 17, 1991, South and North Korea simultaneously joined the United Nations. The simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the U. N. is expected to provide a new ground in their mutual relations and to make the situation in and around the Korean peninsula more stable. The last important step in regional detente, Soviet-Japanese relations, has lagged behind the pace of the improved political climate elsewhere in Northeast Asia. While Japan is reluctant to fully normalize its relations with the Soviet Union by concluding a peace treaty with the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union returns the Northern Territories once and for all, the Soviet Union is working hard to normalize its relations with Japan by making more flexible and conciliatory gestures toward Japan.

It seems that throughout the postwar era we have never had a better situation than what we are observing now in Northeast Asia. It seems that detente in Northeast Asia is contagious. Political and economic accommodation between the Northeast Asian states has increased since the second half of the 1980s and it seems that those states will continue to pursue detente. But, paradoxically, the military situation has not changed much, except the situation along the Sino-Soviet frontier. If political accommodation is a precondition for military accommodation, it is time to think about military detente in the region.¹

While on several occasions the Soviet Union proposed arms control in the region, such proposals have never been met with enthusiasm from other countries in the region. And arms control has never been seriously considered and recommended as a way to keep stability and peace in Northeast Asia. While there have been many scholars and works on security in Northeast Asia, few have seen the possibility and utility of arms control in the region. It seems that many of them have thought that Northeast Asia is not the place for arms control because Northeast Asia is obviously a very different place with very different problems, or that Northeast Asia is not ripe for arms control.

However, it would be wrong to see arms control as the preserve of Europeans or the superpowers. At its most fundamental level, arms control is "restraint internationally exercised upon armaments, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, deployment or use." Thus arms control is concerned with everything from controlling the numbers of troops and weapons, to establishing demilitarized zones, or arranging for various confidence-building measures. There is nothing


inherently ethnocentric about this idea. It is simply sensible in most cases to help control the risks and scale of war by limiting the implements of destruction. Thus it would be a regrettable act of "ethnic-chic" to assume a priori that arms control has no place in Northeast Asia.

If the idea of arms control is universally applicable wherever and whenever the danger of war and conflict exists, why has there been so little interest in arms control in Northeast Asia? What are the factors which have discouraged the Northeast Asian states from adopting arms control as a way to keep peace and stability in Northeast Asia? Or to pose the problem another way, what factors, which promoted the idea of arms control in European and superpower relations, are absent in Northeast Asia? Why have the Northeast Asian states begun to probe arms control since the late 1980s? What has changed over the years? Generally speaking, what are the factors which would discourage or encourage arms control universally, and what are the specific, contextual factors of arms control from one case to another? It is a screening process in which we can differentiate the universal factors from the particular factors. Furthermore, it is a test of modern arms control theory which has been developed and applied in the West.

Second, since arms control in Northeast Asia is at the initial stage, we tend to look at the European or superpower arms control experience as a point of reference. It might be necessary to look at the western arms control experience to help keep peace in Northeast Asia. However, we cannot be sure that the arms control framework developed in a European context is valid in Northeast Asia. It would also be ethnocentric to suggest that an arms control framework and principles, developed in the European and
superpower context, are applicable to Northeast Asia. On the other hand, it would also be ethnocentric to reject all the arms control features of European and superpower relations by simply saying that Northeast Asia is different from Europe and that arms control needs to be developed within a specific regional context. We cannot reject all the features of European or superpower arms control. We don't know exactly what features are relevant and what features aren't. We should be careful in selecting, or devising, specific arms control measures. There will be similarities as well as differences across the regions and the levels in terms of arms control. There are various dimensions of arms control: contextual, procedural, and perceptual. Contextually and perceptually, there may be differences across the regions and the cases. Most scholars on Northeast Asian affairs tend to emphasize the contextual characteristics of security issues in Northeast Asia and, thus, to neglect the procedural aspect of arms control. Some scholars such as Gerald Segal pay attention to the perceptual aspect to distinguish Northeast Asia from Europe by using the concept of defense culture.

But, there may be similarities in terms of procedure of arms control across the regions. Sometimes, these procedural lessons of European and superpower arms control can provide very valuable lessons for the Northeast Asian states in pursuing arms control. Such an approach which will incorporate the contextual, procedural, and perceptual dimension of arms control will enrich the enterprise of arms control in general and will be more appropriate and balanced. Thus, we are going to apply the western arms control experience to identify general features of arms control as well as particular features. We are going to ask under what condition what type
of arms control is more or less applicable and to identify the sources of such variation.

There are two main objectives of this research: one is to assess the prospect for arms control in Northeast Asia and to provide some relevant thoughts on the ways which arms control can be successfully introduced and implemented. The other is to test modern arms control theory developed in the West in a different security environment and in a different strategic/defense culture. Keeping these two main purposes in mind, we are going to ask the following questions:

(1) What are the problems of stability and peace in Northeast Asia? And, how much are they different from those of European and U.S.-Soviet relations?

(2) What is the relation between those problems and arms control? How much can arms control contribute to stability and peace in Northeast Asia?

(3) What has been achieved in Northeast Asian arms control? What is now being proposed for Northeast Asian arms control? What more can arms control in Northeast Asia achieve?

(5) How much can the European or superpower arms control experience help the Northeast Asian states to formulate and implement arms control regime(s)?

(6) How does arms control, or the arms control experience in Northeast Asia, contribute to theory construction in arms control?

Before discussing the prospect for arms control in Northeast Asia, it is important to understand the current trend of Northeast Asian politics in
which arms control and security issues will be handled. And then we will review the pending arms control proposals and security issues.

**The Strategic Trends in Northeast Asia**

The general trend of relations among the Northeast Asian states since the second half of the 1980s can be summarized by economic dynamism, political realignment, and tension reductions. And the internal economic and social crises of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea have an important impact on their foreign policies and regional stability.

Northeast Asia in the postwar era has been and is one of the most economically dynamic regions in the world, a region which provides both a competitive edge and an economic challenge to the West. Northeast Asia is becoming the world's most productive region whose goods, technology, and services are outcompeting the West in many instances. What is more important than the economic dynamism in the region is the development of regional economic interdependence since the late 1970s with great implications for global economic and security issues. A spreading and deepening network of economic ties has been built within Northeast Asia, with Japan as the primary catalyst. This network of economic ties now transcends ideological-political lines, and represents the single most significant development in the post-1945 decades. Increased economic interdependence among the Northeast Asian states may change the nature of the game they play, and have important military-strategic ramifications. The development of such economic ties has been facilitated by the failure of command economies of socialist states in general. The socialist, or former socialist, states cannot maintain their own economies and transform their
economies into market-oriented ones without external help. By presenting themselves as a threat to possible investors, they cannot get what they want from them. The Soviet Union in particular had experienced the counterproductiveness of a military buildup to achieving its goals. Thus, it is necessary for them to change their images and foreign policies toward more accommodating, peace-loving line. On the other hand, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are likely to use their economic leverage to create a stable security environment by urging the socialist states to change military/security policies. In a word, increased economic interdependence among the states is likely to lead them to seek mutually accommodating relations not only in the economic sphere but also in the political-military sphere by expanding the common ground of their interests.

There are some special characteristics in these economic relations among the Northeast Asian states. It is a "soft" regionalism, meaning it does not have a formal structure or organization such as can be found in Europe. And this soft economic regionalism is based on several separate bilateral relations rather than comprehensive multilateral relations. However, these facts do not make it less important since these bilateral economic relations among the countries in the region are intricately intertwined and interdependent with strong political implications.

The Soviet Union, which was regarded as the outsider of this economic orbit, recently expressed its interests and desire to expand its economic relations with the countries in the region. The Soviet government has good reason to seek new policies in the Far East, policies that will supplement military power with more dynamic economic and political programs designed to induce Asian cooperation which is crucial to
development of the Soviet Far East. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Far East contains large energy, mineral, and marine resources, and that the exploitation of these resources has long been on the Soviet agenda. Vast in area, thin in population, and with a forbidding climate, Siberia has proven difficult and costly to develop. It is very difficult to develop this region under the faltering Soviet economy without external help. The opening of this region will require many decades and substantial funds, in competition with monies badly needed for the modernization of the USSR's industrial heartland. External assistance will be very important. While the Soviet Union has been able to expand its economic ties with China and South Korea, it has been unable to expand its economic and trade relations with Japan which can be considered the linchpin of the economic regionalism. Despite an apparent high degree of complementarity between the Japanese and the Soviet economies, the level of trade and investment between the two countries have been quite small, representing less than half a percent of Japan's gross national product and less than 2 percent of Japan's total exports. It seems that there are two reasons for this: the one is purely economic, and the other is political-strategic. While most Japanese businessmen justify their reluctance to invest in the Soviet Union on economic grounds, the real obstacle for expanding economic ties between the Soviet Union and Japan is political-strategic.

The political-strategic impediments are obvious. While the Soviet Union is trying hard to establish firm economic ties with Japan to get

Japanese capital and technology, Japan is reluctant to provide such help to the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union accedes to Japanese territorial claims over the Northern Islands, and until the Soviet Union substantially reduces its forces in the Far Eastern Military District and the Pacific Fleet. In his visit to Tokyo in April 1991, President Gorbachev emphasized that economic ties between Japan and the Soviet Union should expand and precede other aspects of their relations without further delay by arguing that "economic relations and economic cooperation are the firm ground on the basis of which one can calculate and forecast long-term forms of cooperation in all areas." Gorbachev's argument was not so welcomed by the Japanese audience. For Japan, the resolution of the territorial dispute over the Northern Islands and the reduction of Soviet forces in the Far East are the preconditions for the enhancement of Soviet-Japanese economic ties. This Japanese posture is very firm and unlikely to change. And Japan is expected to try to get the "maximum mileage" out of the economic aid for the resolution of the territorial issue.

There is a fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and Japan: that is, while Japan sees the resolution of political and strategic

5. Japan still sees the Soviet Union as the prime source of threat to Japan's security. Japan sees the presence of large size of Soviet armed force in the Far Eastern MD and modernization of Soviet Pacific Fleet as the source of threat.


7. Prime Minister Kaifu made clear during Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 that the Soviet Union couldn't expect any money until it gave back the Kurile Islands.

issues as preconditions for the enhancement of Soviet-Japanese economic ties, the Soviet Union sees it the other way. It is very unlikely to see the breakthrough in their trade relation in near future unless the Soviet Union fully accedes to the Japanese demands, or Japan changes its posture on the territorial disputes, which is unlikely to happen.

Furthermore, the collapse of the central authority of the Soviet Union will probably make the resolution of the territorial issues complicated, if not difficult. That is, with whom should Japan negotiate on the resolution of territorial issue? It is uncertain whether the central authority represented by President Gorbachev or the Russian Republic headed by Mr. Yeltin is responsible for this matter since the territories under contention are parts of the Russian Republic, and whether they have the same posture on the resolution of the territorial dispute with Japan.\footnote{It is reported that Mr. Yeltin told the visiting American that he was poised to begin serious discussions with Japan about the return of the four Kurile islands to get the economic aid from Japan. And also this is backed by the central government "in principle." Mr. Yeltin offered 5 steps for the resolution of territorial dispute between the two countries: (1) the recognition of the existence of the territorial dispute between the two countries; (2) transformation of the disputed islands into special free trade zone to induce the investment of Japanese enterprises; (3) demilitarization; (4) the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan; and (5) the resolution of territorial dispute. See \textit{The Korea Times}, 9 Sept., 1991, and 25 Sept., 1991; and \textit{The New York Times}, 12 Sept. 12, 1991, p. A7.} It might be necessary to have a kind of consensus between the central authority of the transitional government and the Russian Republic on the Northern Territories before it begins the negotiation with Japan to resolve the territorial dispute in order to get the economic aid from Japan. Otherwise, it is going to be more complicated and, thus, to prolong the territorial dispute. In a word, there is a clear linkage between economic cooperation and the resolution of
territorial disputes between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Soviets' desire to be integrated into the regional economic orbit and the failure of Soviet economic system will force the Soviet Union to give in to Japan's claims.

Among the several economic ties in Northeast Asia, the most important development must be the enhanced economic ties between the Soviet Union and China. The importance of mutual economic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and China does not lie in economic benefits, but in political aspects. The growth in trade between the Soviet Union and China during the last decade helps to create a context wherein the leaders of both countries can visualize and plan for cooperative, as opposed to purely conflictual, interactions. The resumption of the Soviet foreign aid program to China and the enhanced economic ties with China have important implications for the security relationship.\textsuperscript{10} China now views the Soviet Union as willing to contribute to Chinese well-being. And a changed Soviet image of China is suggested by Moscow's willingness to have their resumed aid program cover projects such as metallurgy and power generation, which are central elements of any country's strength.\textsuperscript{11}

Economic developments along the 7,520-kilometer border, long viewed by China, the Soviet Union, and outside observers solely as a zone of potential conflict, have similar implications. Of particular importance are the resumption of barter trade in the eastern sector and in the western


sector, in 1983 and 1986, respectively; the 1986 agreement to resume trade along the Amur river, involving the Soviet ports of Nizheleninskoye, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk and the Chinese port of Tongjiang; and the agreement in 1986 on Soviet assistance in constructing a railroad in China connecting the Xingjiang Uighur Autonomous Region with Kazakhstan.\(^\text{12}\)

From the early 1980s, China rapidly accepted South Korea as a trade partner, so that by the late 1980s the annual turnover was reported to be nearly $3 billion. This only constituted roughly 3 percent of Chinese and South Korean trade, but it was at least five times the level of Sino-North Korean trade and appeared to have a far more substantial base. Chinese exports, such as agricultural products and coal, were more than matched by South Korean exports of steel and consumer goods. China sought technology at a lower price than from more developed Western states. South Korea was pleased to have a new market. The progress in Sino-South Korean economic relations ended up having political impact: North Korea received the message of Beijing's pragmatism loud and clear. With its new and valuable trade relationship with South Korea, China was not interested in supporting North Korean adventurism. Rather it urged North Korea to follow the global trend of detente and tension reduction.\(^\text{13}\)

As the Soviet Union and China have become less capable of providing economic aid to North Korea due to their own economic problems and as

\(^{12}\) On these developments, see Bavrin, "USSR-PRC," loc. cit. pp. B/3, B/5.

\(^{13}\) In Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing in October 1991, it is reported that the Chinese leaders urged North Korea to moderate its aggressive foreign policy vis-a-vis South Korea, and to adopt more conciliatory policy. \textit{Hankook Ilbo}, 7 October, 1991.
they have developed their interest in a more peaceful Korean peninsula, North Korea has begun to seek other external help, especially from Japan. And North Korea has begun to recognize the necessity of reform to sustain the regime.\textsuperscript{14} Most recently, North Korea has announced that it would establish two special economic zones by the end of 1991 to induce foreign investment.\textsuperscript{15} While the prospect of such a plan is uncertain, it represents a departure from the past position: the resolution of military/security issues first, economic cooperation and trade later. Such a departure would provide more opportunities to improve inter-Korean relations by changing South Korea's image of North Korea since such a functional approach is exactly what South Korea has been arguing for.

In sum, the success of market economies and the failure of command economies have created a situation which fosters "economic regionalism." Interdependent economic regionalism is likely to provide more opportunities for the countries in the region to work together and to enhance mutual understanding of each other, especially Japan and South Korea, by adopting so-called "constructive engagement." Such an economic interdependence is likely to change the nature of the relations among the countries in the region from conflictual competition to cooperative competition. Consequently, it would contribute to stability and peace in Northeast Asia.

While Northeast Asian regionalism is most strongly manifested in the economic realm, it is not devoid of political and even strategic

\textsuperscript{14} Kim Il-sung, in his meeting with Japanese MPs, announced that North Korea will revise its domestic and foreign policies according to the trend of world politics. \textit{The Korea Times}, 26 July, 1991.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, 30 July, 1991.
components. The Soviet Union and China finally normalized their relations in May 1989. The Soviet Union and South Korea established full diplomatic relations in September 1990. North Korea and Japan are working toward the establishment of full diplomatic relations. One major trend in political relations among the Northeast Asian states is the decline of ideology, as the leaders of these countries increasingly grapple with problems on a pragmatic, experimental basis. Ideological sources of the Sino-Soviet split have declined, or possibly disappeared, as both have adopted reformist measures. They no longer criticize each other on the basis of ideology: who is the revisionist and who is the orthodox.

South Korea has ceased to criticize the Soviet Union and China for being aggressive communists. The words such as "military dictatorship" and "imperialist puppet government," which were used to describe the South Korean government, have disappeared from the Chinese and Soviet media. All of them are reluctant to talk about the past experience such as the Korean War and KAL 007, and to raise the question of responsibilities.

Alliances, many of which bind their members together through the common ground of ideology, have begun to be supplemented by alignments based on pragmatism and practical interests. This means that there will be more flexibility and fluidity on one hand, and there will be more complexity and uncertainty on the other. Complexity and uncertainty do not necessarily mean unstable relations among the powers. Rather, they can mean that there will be more opportunities for negotiation and compromise. The general trend away from alliances of ideology and

towards alignments of practical interests means that regional politics in Northeast Asia will require more creative and flexible foreign policies from all countries of the region.

Domestic political, economic, and social problems have become the most important issue of stability and security of most Northeast Asian states, especially the communist states. Domestic problems and instability will affect a state's foreign policy behavior in various ways. To all socialist states, the most serious threat to a regime's security comes not from outside, but from inside. We have seen the collapse of the communist rule in the Eastern European states since 1989. Most importantly, we have seen the collapse of the Soviet empire just after the failed coup of August 1991. The monolithic and repressive communist rule in Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union is over. These cases have shown the simple fact that when a state is not responsive to the demands of the society and its people, it collapses.

Political and economic reforms are required to create a strong bond between society and state, and to maintain regime stability. However, such reformist measures might lead to the collapse of regime as in the case of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet empire has raised concerns in China and North Korea in which the communist still rules the country. They are fully aware of the necessity of political as well as economic reform in order to maintain a strong bond between the society and the states, but, on the other hand, they are deeply concerned about the survival of the current regime which would be threatened by the introduction of reformist measures. It is a dilemma: that is, some kind of reform is required, but reform itself carries the danger of the collapse of the current communist
rule. The primary issue for them is how to effectively and successfully launch a reform to develop the country without jeopardizing domestic stability.

Furthermore, the issue of regime stability and survival is complicated by the issue of leadership succession. After the failed coup of August 1991, the new form of interim government was established in the Soviet Union in September 1991. The new government was declared a transitional authority until those republics that wanted to could agree on a new relationship, still undefined. However, it is uncertain what kind of leadership and what form of government will emerge after all. During this transitional period, we will have a difficulty in identifying the counterpart with whom we have to deal with various issues.

The Chinese Communist Party leadership is deeply concerned about the selection of the next party leadership which might take place in the 14th Party Congress in 1992. After Zhao Ziyang and his ally, Hu Qili, were dismissed from leading organs following the 1989 crisis, and the emerging policy preferences and balance of political power in the leadership favor the most conservative forces among the party elders: Chen Yun, Peng Zhen,

17. The new Soviet government is consisted of three main bodies: the State Council, the Interrepublican Economic Committee, and the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet is made up of two bodies: Council of the Republics and Council of the Union. State Council is the highest government body which is headed by Gorbachev and made up of leaders of the participating republics. It is responsible for foreign affairs, military, law enforcement and security. Interrepublican Economic Committee which is led by Mr. Ivan S. Silayev is responsible for management of the economy, economic reform, and social policy. Supreme Soviet is the highest legislative body which is consisted of two chambers, the Council of the Union and the Council of the Republics. The Council of the Republics will decide on the organization and activities of union organs, and will ratify and annual international treaties of the union.
Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, Yao Yilin, Wang Renzhi, Deng Liqun, Hu Qiaomu, and Song Ping. Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Yang Shangkun can be considered "softer" conservative elders, while in the "moderate" camp one can finds Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Jiang Zemin. A fourth category has reformers such as Li Ruihuan, Wan Li, Tian Jiyun, and several provincial leaders, notably Yang Rudai, Ye Xuanping, Zhu Rongji, and Wang Zhaoguo. This quadripartite leadership constitutes the constellation of political power at the top.\textsuperscript{18} Since the collapse of the central authority and the communist rule in the Soviet Union, the CCP leadership has become more concerned about the leadership succession. By arguing that the Soviet Union chose the wrong successor, China's octogenerian leaders are suggesting that they will be particularly careful to avoid selecting someone who would turn out to be like President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. This could suggest an especially hard line in promotion of party officials in the 14th Party Congress.\textsuperscript{19} This will make the future of reform in China complicated. It is questionable whether China is able to continue its policy of separation of economics from politics for a long time.

Compared to other socialist states, North Korea remains relatively stable. There is no identifiable political opposition in North Korea.\textsuperscript{20} In defiance of the political reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{The New York Times}, 8 September, 1991.
\item \textsuperscript{20} It is reported that there was an anti-government demonstration in Shinojoo in which approximately 4,000 people took part in just after the failed coup in the Soviet Union. \textit{Hankook Ilbo}, 28 Sept., 1991.
\end{itemize}
the North Korean media has stepped up ideological exhortations. Since the failure of the hard-line coup against President Gorbachev in August 1991, North Korea has acknowledged that a "vortex of fast-changing history" is under way. But the DPRK government also declared that no sign of even the "slightest political instability or vacillation" was visible in the country. Two weeks after the failed coup in the Soviet Union, Park Sung Chul, the Vice President, called on everyone to unite once more around the 79-year-old self-proclaimed Great Leader, Kim Il Sung. As long as Kim Il Sung lives, North Korea would experience a relative political stability. However, the death of Kim Il Sung will probably set off a struggle for power and there will be instability. It is uncertain whether the designated successor, Kim Jong Il, can maintain power and manage the coalition after his father's demise since he seems to lack the unrivaled prestige with which to enforce cohesion and unity among the top leaders and the popular support from the mass. The leit motif of continuing Kim Il Sung's "revolutionary traditions" will be the most valuable and reliable source of Kim Jong Il's power at the outset. However, it is questionable how long it can persist in the midst of deteriorating economic conditions and increasing demands by the North Koreans for a better life. If Kim Jong Il introduced some reformist measures to meet the domestic demands, he would probably undermine his own power base by deviating from his

23. Ibid.
father's line which is the most important source of legitimacy and power for Kim Jong II. The present dilemma of the Kim Il Sung regime seems to be that it should initiate some new and significant changes during Kim Il Sung's lifetime in order to hand over a relatively stable economy to Kim Jong Il before its economy reaches an irremediable level, but the process of its economic adjustment will require changes in the basic character of the current system and will also jeopardize Kim Jong Il's power base.

In sum, reform in the socialist states and the maintenance of the socialist regime do not go hand in hand. On the one hand, economic and political reform is required to reestablish a unity and cohesiveness between the society and the state. On the other hand, regime survival might be threatened by reform itself. One possible consequence of such a dilemma is the moderation of assertive foreign policy and the pursuit of conciliatory foreign policy to create a peaceful external environment under which they can concentrate on domestic problems. But, we cannot rule out the possibility of the scapegoat theory of war: that is, war or conflict can be used as a way to divert domestic concerns to external problems. In a word, we need to incorporate domestic issues to predict the future of arms control in the region.

Although there has been much progress in the political and economic spheres in Northeast Asia and there are various domestic sources of changes and instability, military-strategic relations have not changed much, except on the Sino-Soviet border.\textsuperscript{25} Since the early 1980s,

\textsuperscript{25} In addition, we can think of the decline of U.S. dominance in military power. That is, the number of U.S. troops stationed in the region is to be reduced over the years, and its local allies are urged to take more defense responsibilities. For detail, see chapter 5.
tension reductions and arms reductions have occurred along the Sino-Soviet border. Such tension reduction and arms reductions are not the outcome of extensive arms control negotiation between the Soviet Union and China. Most of them are unilateral and informal. While they have contributed to stabilization of the border, it is uncertain whether such unilateralism and informalism will continue to be effective in reducing tensions in the coming years.

If we turn to other areas of the region, we can see that little has changed. While there have been various arms control proposals, as of 1991 nothing had been accomplished. In the Korean peninsula, military detente appears to be far away. Both sides still maintain huge armed forces along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). And there is also a possibility of nuclear proliferation. For the last two years, the Soviet Union has reduced its armed forces in the Far East. Such a quantitative reduction has been compensated by deploying more modern and advanced systems. On the other hand, the United States has begun to reduce the size of its forces in Northeast Asia and to urge its allies to assume more defense responsibilities. Japan and South Korea are deeply concerned about such a process.

Everybody wants to have military detente as well as political and economic detente. However, unlike in the political and economic sphere of their relations, the military/strategic dimension has changed little. The Soviet proposals for CBMs have been rejected by the United States and Japan due to the unbalanced nature of the proposals. North and South Korea's approach to arms control has shown tremendous differences

26. For detail, see chapter 4 on Sino-Soviet arms control.
27. For detail, see chapter 5 and 6.
between themselves. One positive element in the military/strategic dimension is that everybody wants to establish some kind of arms control regime in order to stabilize military relations. But they don't agree upon where to begin and how to ground. Unlike economic and political relations, military relations among the Northeast Asian states will be very slow to change. But, they will change as the general trend of detente will continue to maintain its momentum.

**Arms Control in the Past and in the Future**

While there have been intense arms races between competing powers and adversaries in Northeast Asia and there are many sources of conflict, there have been remarkably few "formal" arms control agreements and serious arms control efforts in Northeast Asia since 1945. Since the early 1970s, the Soviet Union has been proposing "Asian Collective Security System." This theme has been succeeded by the following Soviet leaders. The Soviet Union is the leader in proposing region-wide CBMs. But, as Arnold Horelick said, this Soviet proposal has become "a club in search of members." No one has responded positively to this Soviet proposal. They may perceive that the security of their own country cannot be guaranteed by the negotiated agreement with the adversaries. Not balance of power, but

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hegemony of one nation over the others has been the way in which peace and stability have been maintained in Northeast Asia. Arms control appears to be quite the new concept and approach for the nations of the region.

Perhaps the most formal and enduring arms control measures in the region are those agreed to as part of the end of the Korean War in 1953. The armistice of July 27, 1953, created a demilitarized zone that nominally remains in force today. While we can say that the arms control of 1953 helped control a conflict to the limited extent that both parties desired, it has not advanced the cause of peace in the region from a long-term perspective. It has not generated any successive follow-up arms control measures at all. Rather it has contributed toward a bitter arms race between North and South Korea. We can say that it ended one war but left a significant possibility of another.

As the only victim of nuclear explosion in human history, Japan has adopted unique arms control and disarmament measures for a power of comparable size since 1947. These measures can be divided into three groups: the first include the various constitutional constraints such as the renunciation of war as a sovereign right of the states (Article 9), a ban on sending military personnel for combat abroad (Article 9), a ban on conscription (Article 18), and a very tight civilian control over the SDF (Article 66 and 76); the second includes the three non-nuclear principles which state that Japan will neither possess, nor manufacture, nor permit entry of nuclear weapons into the country; and the third is a ban on arms export.
The uniqueness of these measures is that most of them are unilateral and passive. Neither do they require a cooperation of the enemies nor do they need an active negotiation with the adversaries. These measures are directed toward the domestic audience rather than other states. Although these measures have a very high profile in Japanese domestic politics and have contributed to regional stability of Northeast Asia to a certain degree by presenting Japan as a non-threatening neighbor, they have not translated into a more active regional or global arms control policy.

The superpowers have agreed to two minor measures that can be classified as confidence-building measures. In 1972 they agreed to help reduce incidents at sea and in 1985 they agreed with Japan to help assist air safety after Soviet aircraft shot down a civilian Korean airliner, KAL 007. Both agreements remain in force and have been useful in their own, minor way. Both sides see clear limits and a useful role for measures in these essentially technical spheres. Neither superpower has an interest in conflict arising from uncontrolled disputes and tensions. This basic level confidence-building exercise is often a first step to ensuring the stability necessary for future arms control.

Another important development in Northeast Asia during the last decade is arms reduction along the Sino-Soviet border. China has reduced its armed forces by one million, and the Soviet Union is expected to reduce its Far Eastern Forces by 200,000. As I said before, these are unilateral measures, not negotiated arms reductions. But they have contributed to the stabilities of the military dimension between the Soviet Union and China.

How such arms control measures will be modified and replaced by new forms of arms control depends on the development in various bilateral
or multilateral relations among the Northeast Asian states. It might be easier to organize a study of arms control around individual states' perception of the issues. While that might yield some insights, it might miss the essential interactive political nature of the arms control process. Since arms control is inseparable from the source of conflict, it would be better to devise the study of arms control according to the specific security issues and conflicts in the region, to assess the linkage between these issues, and then to assess the prospect of a comprehensive regional arms control regime.

We might think of nuclear arms control as one important issue on arms control agenda in Northeast Asia. Nuclear arms control can be divided into two groups: nuclear arms reduction talks among the nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and the nuclear non-proliferation issue.

Since the conclusion of INF Treaty in 1987, nuclear arms control issues, whether strategic or not, have become less important for China and Japan. The INF Treaty eliminated most Northeast Asian states' concerns over the Soviet nuclear threat heightened by the deployment of SS-20s. The Soviet Union is believed to deploy one quarter to one third of its strategic weapons in the Far East. But, it is believed that those weapons are targeted against the United States, not the Northeast Asian states. Thus, they don't pose a direct threat to the Northeast Asian states. Those states tend to define the stability of the region in terms of the conventional military balance, rather than the strategic nuclear balance.

During the SALT process, the Soviet Union promoted the idea of "equal security" as the only acceptable basis for arms control agreements. According to Soviet analysts, the United States and the Soviet Union can be equally secure under an arms control agreement only if their different strategic, geographic, and political situation are taken into account. This meant that the Soviet Union reserves the right to certain arithmetical advantages in nuclear weaponry as compensation for a disadvantageous geography and the presence of additional hostile power-China-on its periphery.\(^{31}\) On various occasions, the Soviet Union tried to draw the United States into a cooperative arrangement directed against China. But such a posture has disappeared as Sino-Soviet relations have improved over the years. The presence of the third largest nuclear power-China-does not affect strategic arms control negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is purely a prerogative of the two superpowers.

Furthermore, the strategic nuclear balance has been and will be maintained by negotiations such as SALT and START between the United States and the Soviet Union. China and Japan believe that there is no room for them to be involved in strategic arms control negotiations. China, the third largest nuclear power in the world today, has a very small amount of nuclear forces, compared to the two superpowers. It does not want any strategic arms control negotiation to affect its small nuclear forces.\(^ {32}\) There is a tremendous gap between the second and the third nuclear power. Even


\(^{32}\) It is believed that China has 1,300 nuclear warheads on 200 various launchers, including ICBM, SLBM, and bombers. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1990-1991* (London: IISS), p. 149.
after the START Treaty which will reduce 30 percent of strategic offensive arms of the Soviet Union and the United States in three phases over seven years,\(^3\) the Soviet Union and the United States will maintain far larger nuclear arsenals than China-1,600 launchers with 6,000 warheads vs. 200 launchers with 1,300 warheads.\(^4\) It is very unlikely that China will equal to the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals in seven years. Thus, unless China increases its strategic nuclear arsenal tremendously, or the superpowers decrease their strategic arsenal far more, strategic arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States, and China are very unlikely to happen.\(^5\) And also, for minor military powers such as Japan and South Korea, the basic strategic landscape has not been affected since under the START Treaty the Soviet Union and the United States will maintain strategic parity between themselves. Thus, for most Northeast Asian states, the signing of START is more symbolic than substantive, and more political than military-strategic: that is, the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have entered a new era of detente, and there will be more cooperation than conflict.

In a word, it is premature and futile to discuss START and its impact on Northeast Asian security since the strategic balance between the two superpowers does not change and the military balance between the second

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34. After the complete implementation of the START Treaty over seven years, the Soviet Union and the United States are allowed to have 6,000 "accountable" strategic warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which are approximately five times larger than the current Chinese nuclear arsenal. *Ibid.*
and the third nuclear powers does not change. The possible impact of the START Treaty may be related to the change in the number of SSBNs and SLBMs. But it is at this stage only speculative, not deterministic, on naval arms control between the two superpowers.

The second nuclear issue—nuclear proliferation—is more important and relevant to regional security of Northeast Asia. We have three nonnuclear states in the region—North and South Korea, and Japan. Until recently, we have not paid much attention to nuclear proliferation in the region since all of them are the signatories of the NPT. But, recently, North Korea's nuclear program has raised international concern about nuclear proliferation in the region. North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons would jeopardize regional stability and peace by possibly igniting a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation. President Bush's plan to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, which was announced on September 27, 1991, will have a significant impact on the course of events in the region by affecting U.S. allies' as well as the Soviet and Chinese security policies and their arms control policies. It may ignite the process of de-nuclearization and creation of nuclear-weapons free zone in Northeast Asia, or it may send the wrong signal, one of slow U.S. disengagement from Northeast Asia. If the latter is the case, the situation will become more precarious.

36. On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced U.S. plan to unilaterally eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. Under President Bush's plan, the United States would destroy 1,300 nuclear-tipped artillery shells and 850 Lance missiles, rockets with ranges of about 70 miles. The artillery shells include 155-millimeter shells and two types of eight-inch shells. The howitzer launchers will also be destroyed. About 500 nuclear weapons will be removed from ships and submarines at sea. See The New York Times, Sept. 29, 1991.
The creation of NWFZ is a desirable goal. The issue is how to pursue that goal by discouraging the incentives to go nuclear without jeopardizing the traditional U.S. security guarantees to its local allies.

The issue of nuclear proliferation is going to be a Pandora's box for the security of Northeast Asia and the most important security issue which involves not only the two Koreas' security interests but also those of the major powers. Thus, it is necessary to assess the prospect of nuclear proliferation in the region by assessing incentives and disincentives of non-nuclear states in the region, and the ways to depress incentives and strengthen disincentives to acquire nuclear weapons.

There are other important potential conflict areas: the Sino-Soviet border, the Korean peninsula, and the naval arms race in and around the region. As the Sino-Soviet relationship has steadily improved since the early 1980s, arms control has become a viable option to address the national security problems of both countries vis-a-vis each other. Since 1985, we have observed tension and arms reductions between the Soviet Union and China along the Sino-Soviet border. Arms control between the Soviet Union and China has shown a quite distinctive pattern. We are going to analyze this peculiar pattern of Sino-Soviet arms control and to assess the prospect for future arms control.

The Korean peninsula is a security flashpoint in Northeast Asia. As a heavily armed peninsula, divided Korea continues to act not only as the focal point of armed confrontation between the two hostile states but also as a strategic fulcrum among the four major world powers maintaining active interests in and surrounding the Korean peninsula. Since the end of the Korean War, there has been an intense arms race between South and North
Korea in which neither side dares to fall behind. As the political relations among the major powers have improved since the late 1980s, the issue of arms control and tension reduction has gained substantial support and attention. While there have been various arms control proposals from each side, nothing has been achieved. The road to arms control in the Korean peninsula is going to be rocky because of intense hostility, deep distrust, the presence of U.S. troops in the South, and the issue of reunification. But the rationale for arms control exists there. And most scholars agree that the Korean peninsula is a place to which European arms control experience is most applicable. We are going to analyze possible ways and conditions to start arms control and to identify the most suitable form of the arms control. And also, since it is the place in which the European arms control experience is expected to play an instructive role, we are going to assess how much the European arms control experience can help the Koreans to stabilize their military relations vis-a-vis each other.

Since the early 1980s, Northeast Asia has been observing a naval arms race. Given the maritime-oriented geographical attributes of Northeast Asia and their vested interests in the region, all major powers have an interest in increasing, or at least maintaining effective, naval capabilities. While arms control has achieved substantial progress on the ground and in the air between the Soviet Union and the United States, the same result has not taken place at sea. It is time to think about "the unthinkable" to stabilize the situation at sea: that is, naval arms control.

In conclusion, we are going to reassess the arms control enterprise in theory and practice by comparing Northeast Asian arms control with the European and superpower arms control experience. The six questions
raised in the opening of this introduction will be answered. Hopefully, we can expand our knowledge and understanding of arms control by looking at different cases.

Before we start with specific security issues and arms control agendas of Northeast Asia, we will survey the regional security environment and characteristics of Northeast Asia in which an arms control regime will have to arise. It is a process of assessing how much Northeast Asia is different from Europe. By looking at regional characteristics of Northeast Asia, we can identify the possible agendas, paths, and forms of arms control in Northeast Asia.
CHAPTER II

Comparison of Security Environment between Europe and Northeast Asia

The discussion of arms control should start with an understanding of the situation and environment in which arms control can be seriously considered and pursued since arms control should be perceived as one of many foreign policy instruments for achieving national security objectives rather than an overriding objective. Since the security environment and situations from one region to another and from time to time differ we cannot apply the lessons obtained in one region to another without reservation. So we should understand the characteristics of one region as an intervening variable in applying those lessons to another region. In comparing the security environment between the two regions, in order to predict the possible course of arms control, it seems better to look at the characteristics of postwar Europe in which the idea of arms control has grown up and been applied, and compare them to those of Northeast Asia since some of the European arms control experiences during that period will provide some relevant knowledge.

There are a number of differences between Northeast Asia and

1. By this, I mean the period of before the post-Cold War era.
Europe in the security environment in which the states formulate and implement security policies. These differences have dictated Northeast Asian states to pursue quite a different approach toward security problems. The word which captures the fundamental characteristic of Northeast Asian security environment is "complexity." This complexity arises from various factors such as a complex regional structure of the balance of power system, maritime geographical attributes and vastness of the area, conventionalization of arms races and strategy, and lingering problems of divided states and territorial issues.

**Complex Regional Structure of Balance of Power**

Even though there are a larger number of states in the region, until recently Europe has been characterized by being divided into two competing blocs. Each of them has been headed by one of the two superpowers. Consequently, there has been a clear consensus among the bloc members on a definition of a potential aggressor. And both sides knew where the cold war lines were drawn; for example, in the cold war era, the United States did not prevent the Soviet Union from imposing order in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. Of course, there is some debate about the intentions of the aggressor, but no doubt about where the threat will come from should it take place. More specifically, the NATO countries have had a most important common security interest of effectively countering the Soviet threat. The need to meet the Soviet threat effectively and collectively has nurtured the development of integrated command and control, an

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2. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved on March 31, 1991.
attempt at a coordinated diplomacy vis-a-vis their common enemies, and an attempt to achieve common East-West negotiating positions. As a consequence, arms control in Europe, whether in the form of limits on arms sales or deployments, has grown up in a two bloc structure as a way to manage military rivalry and to stabilize military competition.

Compared to this European character, since the early 1960s, Northeast Asia has been developing a complex balance of power system. Northeast Asia is the only region in the world where four of the five centers—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan—meet and intersect. Three of the four—the Soviet Union, China, and Japan—are present by virtue of their physical geography. The U.S. involvement in the region has been primarily determined by its economic, political, and strategic calculation. In addition, there are two smaller powers—South and North Korea—which face each other across the 155-mile long DMZ with heavily armed force and severe hostility.

Since the Sino-Soviet split, the Northeast Asian strategic landscape has become very fluid and complex. None of the communist states in Northeast Asia belong to the Soviet empire. Proud and independent China refuses to permanently side with either of the two superpowers. China’s population guarantees that it will be among the handful of states which will shape the destiny of the next century. Furthermore, China is currently engaged in a very ambitious modernization effort which, if successful, will lift it from the ranks of the Third World nations to that of an industrial power. As China grows strong, it will pursue a more independent line of foreign policy. For example, in his visit to Moscow in May 1991, Jiang Zemin emphasized that "China pursues an independent foreign policy of
peace. No matter how the world situation changes, China will, at all times and under all circumstances, uphold independence, refrain from entering into alliance or establishing strategic relations with any big powers, and decide on its own position and policy on any international issue according to the rights and wrongs of the issue itself. "United front against Soviet hegemony" has become a less dominant theme in Chinese security and foreign policy as it has improved its relations with the Soviet Union. Washington's ability to play the "China card" has also decreased over the years. The so-called strategic triangle which could be considered as competition between one and a half versus one has become a true strategic triangle.

The internal and external difficulties of the Soviet Union and China, and a contraction of American power, are promoting Japan to play an

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enhanced role not merely in economic but also in political and security areas. Until recently, Japan shied away from assuming such roles because of domestic constraints and its neighbors' fears of resurgent militarism. Japanese foreign policy has been reactive rather than active. But Japan is now being forced to play a more active role by virtue of its growing economic clout and the changing configuration of power in its surroundings. While Japan limits its defense budget to 1 percent of GNP, due to the size of its economy, it is the world's third largest, just next to the Soviet Union. It has only 240,000 troops, but they are equipped with advanced weapons. It also has a sufficient scientific and technological base to make its armed forces into formidable. Politically and diplomatically, Japan has become more active. From a regional perspective, Japan has been the leading actor in an effort to open North Korea. On September 28, 1990, a group of Liberal Democratic and Socialist Dietmen led by the former deputy prime minister, Shin Kanemaru, signed an agreement in Pyongyang for negotiating Japan's diplomatic relations with North Korea. Japan is the first among the western states to announce its willingness to recognize the DPRK as a legitimate government which represents the northern half of Korea. Thus, it appears that Japan is willing to play a more active role, commensurate to its economic power in Northeast Asia, as well as in the larger international community.

5. One of good examples is the issue of JSDF's participation in U.N. peace-keeping operation. Prime minister Kaifu proposed a law-Self-Defense Force Law-which would possibly allow JSDF to take part in PKO not only in non-combat missions such as medical, communication, and transportation but also in combat mission. Hankook Ilbo, Sept. 27, 1991.

This kind of strategic complexity of regional structure is well reflected in the following statement:

Northeast Asia is an area of danger to world peace because it provides the nexus between four great powers with competing ambitions: the Soviet Union, determined to develop the resources of Siberia and to have unimpeded access to the Pacific for mercantile shipping and the protection of naval power; China, determined to be influenced over continental sphere; Japan, maritime power, lying across the Soviet exists and dependent upon the United States for protection against the Soviet hegemony; and the United States, dependent upon Japan for Western Pacific presence. The Korean peninsula lies at the nexus, manifesting by its division the competing ambitions, pulled and pressed within and without, a self-propelled pawn in a complex power game.7

The regional structure of Northeast Asia can be called the "four-plus-two" system. This four-plus-two power system reflects the increasing political, economic, and military multipolarity that has been developing alongside the bipolar military system in which the United States and the Soviet Union have remained preeminent. But they have been unable to create a collective, multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia.

As Dr. Kissinger mentioned,8 the situation in Northeast Asia resembles that of the 19th century European balance of power system, especially among the big four.9 This has become much more obvious since

the Sino-Soviet split and along with the erosion of ideologies as one of the determinants of foreign policy. First of all, the balance of power system is based on a rivalry and competition between the status quo and the revisionist powers. The United States and Japan can be described as status quo powers which want to preserve the current balance of power system which has been serving their national interests very well. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and China can be considered as revisionist powers which strive to redefine the rules of game and to replace the current balance of power system with one which will serve their interests better. The instrument for change may differ from time to time, but the fundamental desire of the Soviet Union and China seems constant: that is, equal presentation of their interests in Northeast Asian regional politics. Recently, this tendency has been reinforced with the erosion of the ideological dimension of foreign policy. While they would welcome relaxation of tension among the Northeast Asian states, the United States and Japan would not allow the emergence of a regional structure which would better represent Soviet or Chinese interests at the cost of their own interests. Thus, the spirit of rivalry that has been pervading the four-plus-two power system of Northeast Asia would continue to create tension,

12. For example, the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea and the enhancement of economic ties between China and South Korea can be good example of this tendency.
possibly at a lower level, and imposes on the actors both pressures to act and constraints on action.

Figure 2.1 Collective Security and Other Arrangements in Northeast Asia and the Pacific
Secondly, the main interest of each of the big four lies in preventing any of the others from gaining hegemony over the region.\footnote{This is well reflected in Chinese objective of preventing Soviet hegemony in Asia by forming united front against hegemony.} None of them has shown any intent to do so by military force, but should one attempt it, the others would act to prevent it, either singly or jointly. The Soviet Union came close to its domination of the region in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. But this action was met by the United States which mobilized multilateral forces in order to stop the communist expansion and restore an equilibrium in the region. In the Shanghai communique of February 27, 1972, the United States and China expressly disavowed any intent to gain hegemony over the region and declared their opposition to efforts by any other state to do so. Japan and China made a similar declaration in the Zhou-Tanaka communique of September 29, 1972. These three actors have formed and worked together within the framework of the so-called anti-hegemonic coalition against the Soviet Union during the 1970s and early 1980s. The Soviet Union has showed a similar approach toward this region by criticizing U.S.-Chinese rapprochement and a U.S.-China-Japan coalition against the Soviet Union. To a lesser degree, China and the Soviet Union, which had experienced Japanese imperialism, have consistently showed a strong worry about the possibility that Japan may translate its economic power into military power under the condition of U.S. disengagement and then seriously upset the regional military balance.

Thirdly, each of the big four powers greatly exceeds any of the smaller nations in the region-North and South Korea-in its combined population, economic power, and actual or potential military power. The
security and survival of the smaller states are guaranteed by the equilibrium of power among the big four. And, even though they could enhance their own capabilities and play one against the other, their ability to change substantially the distribution of power in the region is quite limited. For example, the tilt of North Korea toward either the Soviet Union or China, or South Korea's normalization with the Soviet Union does not fundamentally change the distribution of power. The equilibrium or distribution of power is primarily determined by a change in alignment among the big four. For example, the rapprochement between the United States and China has changed the distribution of power in the region.

Fourth, since the Sino-Soviet split, the alignment of military power within Northeast Asia has taken the form of a triangle, with Japan's military power serving only as an addition to U.S. military power in the defense of Japan. Japan has acted on its own in its political and economic relations with the Soviet Union and China but only within limits which would not disturb its security alliance with the United States. The military power at the three points of the triangle is not equal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possess the power to devastate China with strategic nuclear weapons, but China appears to have a so-called minimal deterrence capability. China has modernized its forces in the past decade. As part of a new emphasis in strategic doctrine, Beijing seems to have accepted that it required a more effective deterrent of limited Soviet nuclear

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14. Currently, North Korea tilts toward China after South Korea and the Soviet Union have established their full diplomatic relations in November 1990.

15. According to the Military Balance 1990-1991, China has approximately 200 launchers including ICBMs, IRBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, and 1,300 nuclear warheads.
threats and longer-range American threats. Furthermore, the confrontation is not so unbalanced with respect to the ability of any of the three to compel another to do its will. The nuclear superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union vis-a-vis China can deter Chinese attack but does not assure that one of the superpowers could either defeat China with conventional weapons or achieve a foreign policy objective by threatening China with nuclear weapons. And China’s size and population, combined with the inhibitions that exist on the use of nuclear weapons against China by either the United States or the Soviet Union, confer on China greater defensive strength than its military capabilities alone. Furthermore, China tries to match the superpowers in military dimension. Military modernization, even if it receives the lowest priority in Chinese "Four Modernization Program," will enhance its military power qualitatively.

There are in fact several balances of power and multiple sources of conflict in Northeast Asia. This feature complicates our strategic calculation. The complexity of regional structure is likely to be accompanied by fluidity and flux. Thus we can expect that arms control in

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Northeast Asia will take very different forms and paths from those of European and superpower relations.

**Geographical Attributes of Northeast Asia**

The proponents of the geographical approach to international politics maintain that geography is the most fundamental factor in foreign policy because it is the most permanent feature of international relations.\(^{18}\) In general, we can say that geography, technology, and power politics in the modern system of nations define the limits and the opportunities for the foreign policy options of nation-states. Geographic attributes affect a nation's security, and its foreign and military policy, by creating certain temptations to expand and potential threats to its independence, by offering certain points and lines of trade and contact, by compelling attention to the politics and policies of certain neighbors.\(^{19}\) In geopolitics, strategy is directly connected to the geographical attributes configuring the global space in which conflicting national interests must operate. More specifically, they define the types of weapons, modes of deployment, and military strategies of nation-states in order to overcome and take advantage

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of them. Since arms control is a part of armament policy of the state which is also a part of grand national security strategy, it is necessary to define geographical attributes of Northeast Asia and compare them to those of Europe in order to clearly assess the prospect of arms control in Northeast Asia.

One common element which connects Europe and Northeast Asia together is the fact that they are located in the Eurasian rimland which gives access to the heartland area, and conversely to the circumferential maritime routes. And it is the place where land-power competes against maritime power. The Soviet Union, located in the heartland (or pivot area), holds the interior lines of communication on the Eurasian continent and consequently aggression could be directed against a number of points on the Eurasian rimland which on their own would be politically and geographically incapable of cohesive resistance. Thus, since the end of World War II, the United States has been trying to deter Soviet aggression toward this rimland by organizing alliance relations with the local powers in the mode of forward defense. Except this, Europe and Northeast Asia have very significant geographical differences.

Until the end of World War II, Great Britain did function as a barrier against continental threats to the Western Hemisphere because British sea power lies between the Continent of Europe and the Atlantic and, therefore, between Europe and the United States. This is a quite similar situation in Northeast Asia. The United States could be effective in military action on

the continent only in alliance with British sea power, not against it. This had begun to change with the conclusion of World War II. By the end of World War II, the Soviet Union successfully expanded its control over the East European states by establishing communist regimes there. On the other hand, there was no power to check this Soviet expansionism, except the United States. Under this circumstance, the United States could not withdraw its forces from Europe as it did after World War I. It adopted the concept of forward defense. Since then, conflict in Europe has become a conflict between sea-power vs. land-power on the land of Central Europe, not the conflict between sea power and continent power at the exits toward the Atlantic oceans as it was once. It is not really the conflict between land-power vs. maritime power. Since the conflict is over the control of Central Europe, both sides- NATO and the Warsaw Pact-have developed similar force structures and types of weapons. Although, there have been various asymmetrical aspects of weapons and strategies, the general force structure between NATO and WTO is similar: that is, emphasis on ground and air forces.

Unlike this land-oriented strategic landscape, Northeast Asia is maritime-oriented. The huge size of land in Northeast Asia is neutralized by the presence of vast seas. It is not surrounded by the seas. Rather it is divided by the seas into two parts: land occupied by the Soviet Union and China and ocean mainly controlled by the United States and Japan. Except the Korean peninsula, the United States has not had any direct access to the Eurasian rimland in this part of world since the loss of China in 1949. So the United States needs reliable naval and air forces in order to reach this region and to protect its interests and allies. Japan has become the most
important ally in the region which would allow the United States to check the expansion of the continental power—the Soviet Union—toward the Pacific. In other word, Japan is the Northeast Asian version of Great Britain before World War II for the United States. In order to maintain U.S. political and economic access to the people, resources, markets, and transportation highways of the region, to deny political and military control of the region and the Pacific, and to help U.S. allies to maintain their security, the United States has and will rely on its naval and air forces. The size of U.S. ground troops deployed in this region has been reduced from 370,000 at the end of the Korean war to less than 60,000 in 1990.\(^{21}\) So, for the United States and its regional allies, any attempt to deny the dominant sea power the ability to use its assets for deterrence, crisis stability, or war could jeopardize the regional balance of power. On the other hand, the Soviet Union increased its ground troops from 20 to 50 divisions.\(^{22}\) The Far Eastern MD alone which is easternmost military district of the Soviet Union has 24 divisions. In addition to the expansion of the number of ground troops, since the late 1970s the Soviet Union has been trying to build up and modernize its naval forces in the region. As a consequence, the Pacific fleet has become the largest Soviet fleet. The Soviet Union has reduced the size of its armed forces in the Far East over the last three years. But, it does not necessarily mean the actual decrease of Soviet military capabilities. It has begun to replace the old outmoded weapons with modern, advanced

\(^{21}\) This figure does not include air force and navy. See *the Military Balance 1990-1991*, p. 26.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 42. In the Far Eastern TVD, there are four groups: Transbaykal MD, Siberian MD, Far Eastern MD, and Forces in Mongolia. In total, there are 45 divisions (6 TD, 39 MRD), 2 heavy machine gun/arty divisions, and 3 arty divisions.
weapons. So, the conflict has become a conflict between maritime power with few ground assets and continental power with enormous ground forces plus naval forces. Consequently, unlike in Europe, there is going to be a tremendous asymmetry in force structure. And also, because of the mobility of naval forces, it is very difficult to define geographical limits in arms control and to verify weapons. For example, unlike its Soviet counterpart which is locked by Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan, the U.S. Seventh fleet, which has its headquarter at Yokosuka, Japan, covers wide geographical areas: Western Pacific, Japan, the Philippines, ANZUS responsibilities, and Indian Ocean. Should we allow the United States to have more naval forces in order to compensate for the inferiority of its ground forces and to let it cover a wider region? Because of the maritime character of Northeast Asia, there is going to be totally different arms control agenda and arms control itself is going to be a very challenging one.

Secondly, while the Soviet Union bases its forces almost entirely on its own territory, US forces are forward-deployed in allied countries. In Europe, NATO could inflict severe damage upon the Warsaw Pact by attacking the East European nations, without striking the Soviet Union itself. However, in Northeast Asia, any counter-attack or retaliation in response to a Soviet invasion must be directed against the Soviet Union. In such a circumstance there would be a dangerously high probability of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. In times of mounting tension, it might restrain Soviet action or it might erode and weaken the credibility of the U.S. commitment. Which of these alternatives would become the reality would depend on the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons in the region.
The third aspect of geographical difference between Europe and Northeast Asia is the issue of whether the vulnerability of principal targets is relatively equal or not. In Western Europe and the Soviet Union west of the Urals there is general symmetry of attack targets. Approximately 80 per cent of Soviet population and 70 per cent of industrial sector are located west of the Urals. The Soviet Union cannot assume a relative advantage in the loss of assets if war occurs. In a word, in Europe, mutual vulnerability and balanced cost and benefit of war between the adversaries exist. So, even if it is possible to contain war at the theater level, the Soviet Union cannot assume that it will be immune from devastation of its population and industrial sectors.

On the other hand, in Northeast Asia, the exchange ratio of the value of targets favors the Soviet Union and China. U.S. allies in the region—Japan and South Korea—have tremendous disadvantage since the economic, social, and military infrastructures of U.S. allies are concentrated within small geographical areas with high population densities. Most areas of the wide expanse of Eastern Siberia remain undeveloped and sparsely populated. Even China, which has the largest population in the world, has lower population density than U.S. allies in the region. If war occurs, there are going to be tremendous asymmetries in terms of value and vulnerability of targets.
Table 2.1 Population Density (per sq. kilometer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>POPULATION DENSITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>114.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>181.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>423.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>325.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fourth, the territories of European states are clearly defined. There is no unclear territory. Everybody knows where the lines which separate one from another are drawn. In Northeast Asia, with the exception of the Korean peninsula which comes close to the Central European situation, a clear geographic demarcation for delineating regional security requirements is absent. Even the term "Northeast Asia" is obscure. No one really knows where Northeast Asia begins and ends. There is no clear geographical definition of Northeast Asia. The absence of a clear geographical definition of Northeast Asia is due to the presence of vast area of waters(or seas) in the region. No one can claim its jurisdiction over these international waters. On the other hand, anybody can utilize these international waters for its own advantage. These areas can become, already have become, a place of naval arms races. Geographical obscurity would possibly allow anybody to take advantage in arms control agreements.
by providing loopholes in interpreting the terms of agreements. The unclear geographical definition of Northeast Asia is going to set a different agenda for arms control in the region.

Fifth, in a close relation to the fourth point, compared to Europe, Northeast Asia is vast. Northeast Asia is much larger than Europe. The geographical vastness of Northeast Asia would affect one's ability to deploy and employ troops and equipment, provide reinforcements, and conduct resupply operations. The Soviet Union cannot assume a fast moving offensive attack against either Japan or China. It could cause a problem of monitoring even after reaching arms control agreement. China and the Soviet Union can conceal their weapons in their vast areas. Furthermore, it could cause a problem of mobilizing forces in the event of crisis.

These geographical characteristics of Northeast Asia are going to be very influential in producing any specific arms control regime which is going to be very different from what we have in Europe. Symmetrical geographical attributes of Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union have been a benign factor for them to consider arms control measures as a way to stabilize their military competition and to cope with security problems of both. Geographical characteristics of Northeast Asia could prove that arms control strategies that are appropriate for Europe are not necessarily relevant to the situation in Northeast Asia.

Conventionalization of Arms Race and Strategy

Europe and Northeast Asia have been experiencing arms races throughout the Cold War era. But, the nature of arms races across these regions is quite different. That is, on the one hand, the arms race in Europe
has been directed toward mostly nuclear elements of both sides; on the other hand, Northeast Asia has been witnessing a conventional arms race with a nuclear arms race at a lower level. The conventionalization of the arms race in Northeast Asia will provide a totally different strategic landscape in which the Northeast Asian states must tackle their respective security issues.

Since the mid-1950s, Europe has observed the proliferation of nuclear weapons both quantitatively and qualitatively. It was due to the conventional inferiority of the West European states, their inability to raise conventional force level sufficient to defend themselves and deter Soviet aggression, and Soviet reaction to the nuclearization of NATO forces. In 1954, the NATO Council decided to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into Europe. Their purpose was to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority and to signal the intent to use nuclear weapons early on in any conflict.²³ From the beginning of the Cold War era, the United States and Western European states have been inferior to the Soviet bloc in conventional forces. However, it was not possible for the United States and its west European allies to raise conventional force levels to meet the Soviet challenge due to serious domestic economic problems. In order to compensate this deficiency, the United States and its European allies

²³. It is an extension of massive retaliation. The doctrine of massive retaliation was formally adopted by NATO in its endorsement of Military Committee Document 14/2 (known as MC 14/2). Under this scenario, the role of conventional forces was to contain the attack until the nuclear sword wielded by the United States struck down the aggressor. On the use of nuclear weapons, a Presidential Directive to the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff (NSC 162/2) indicated that the United States should plan to use nuclear armaments of all types whenever this would work to the advantage of the United States.
deployed theater nuclear weapons. As a consequence, the arms race in Europe has been focused on theater nuclear weapons.

While it maintained conventional superiority over the NATO countries, the Soviet Union, in reaction to NATO's decision to deploy theater nuclear weapons, enhanced its theater nuclear forces. About 750 medium-range ballistic missiles were deployed in the period of 1958-1966. In addition to this number, around 1967, the Soviet Union decided to enhance its theater nuclear forces by reallocating 360 SS-11s from the intercontinental target set to the regional one. These were deployed in 1969-1973, largely compensating for the short-fall in the original SS-5 deployments. The purposes of these forces were: (1) to avoid, if possible, the use of nuclear weapons in the European theater; and (2) if resort to them became inevitable, to use them in such a way as to minimize the chances of escalation to an intercontinental exchange.

In contrast, in Northeast Asia, while we cannot overlook the nuclear arms race, the most observable arms race among the powers has been directed toward conventional forces. The conventional arms race has been, to a certain degree, one-sided: that is, while the United States and its

24. These missiles are known as VRBMsv(variable-range ballistic missiles).
26. It is uncertain how many nuclear forces the United States deploys in Northeast Asia. It is reported that the Soviet Union has maintained one quarter of its strategic forces in the Far East. And also it is assumed that most of them are targeted against the United States.
regional allies have been moderate in their military buildup, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been very active in their military buildup. In 1963, the Soviet Union had only 17 divisions in the region and North Korea had 280,000 troops. By 1990, the Soviet Union has 50 divisions and North Korea had over one million troops. The physical increase of Soviet armed forces of the 1960s and 1970s has been followed by modernization of those forces deployed in the region in the 1980s.

Table 2.2 Military Buildup of the Socialist States in Northeast Asia
(Total Armed Forces in Thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The USSR</th>
<th>The PRC</th>
<th>The DPRK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,324</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,988</td>
<td>3,030</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


27. Actually, the United States has been reducing its troops deployed in the region. By the end of the Korean war, the United States had approximately 400,000 troops in Northeast Asia. Nowadays it is reported that the United States has about 65,000 troops in the region. It is expected that this figure will become smaller in the future.
The Soviet Union has increased not only ground forces but also naval and air forces which actually are more threatening to the United States and its regional allies. The Soviet air force in the Far Eastern territories of the Soviet Union has grown even more quickly than the ground forces. Fighter aircraft alone increased ten times (from 210 to about 2,240) between 1965-1990. As in the case of Soviet ground forces, these forces have received advanced combat aircrafts. For example, reinforcement with fourth-generation fighters, such as MiG 31 Foxhound, Su-25 Frogfoot, Su-27 Flanker and the newly deployed MiG-29, has been conducted promptly and their aggregate number represents about 20 percent of the total. As a result, a total of the fourth- and third-generation fighters, Su-24 Fencer and other types, came to account for approximately 90 percent of all the fighters in the Far East.

Figure 2.2 Changes in Soviet Air Forces in the Far East: Composition of Fighters and Bombers: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th generation. Source: Defense of Japan, 1990.
The most striking and widely noted change in the Far Eastern military situation insofar as the Soviet posture is concerned involves the modernization and growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The modernization and growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet surpass other Soviet fleets. Based in Vladivostok, the Pacific Fleet, the largest of the Soviets' four fleets, is deployed in the waters around the Far East. The physical size of the Soviet naval forces increased until 1989. Soviet sea power total has about 260 major surface combatants and about 340 submarines with total displacement tonnage of some 2,800,000 tons. Among them, the Pacific Fleet is deployed in the Far East region, with about 90 major surface combatants and about 130 submarines (of which 75 are nuclear powered), with total displacement reaching about 1,000,000 tons. Even though there has been some reductions in the number of ships, this reduction does not necessarily mean the real reduction of operational capability of the Pacific Fleet. About 10 new-type naval vessels have been commissioned to the Pacific Fleet. In recent years, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, and anti-air warfare capabilities have been enhanced due to the reinforcement of Sovremenny- and Udaloy-class destroyers carrying helicopters. Anti-land and anti-surface ship attack capabilities have also been enhanced by the introduction of the Akura-class nuclear-powered attack submarine carrying sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of 3,000 km. Furthermore, the Pacific Fleet has amphibious assault and landing ships including the Rogov-class. A naval infantry division, the only unit of its kind in the Soviet navy, is also assigned to the fleet.

28. It is reported that about since 1988 50-70 ships are eliminated from the scene.
Figure 2.3 Soviet Military Deployment in Areas Close to Japan
Furthermore, what is threatening Japan is the Soviet militarization of the Northern Territories, which have been occupied by the Soviet Union since 1945. The Soviet Union, since 1978, redeployed ground troops in parts of the Northern Territories. The combined strength of the troops stationed on these islands is estimated to be the equivalent of one division. The Soviet Union has brought to these islands not only weapons that are normally possessed by its divisions, such as tanks, APCs, various artillery pieces, anti-aircraft missiles, and Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, but also 130 mm cannons which usually do not belong to the equipment of a Soviet division. Moreover, the cannons were recently replaced by 155 mm cannons. Furthermore, MiG-23 Flogger fighters, deployment of which started in 1983, now number about 40 at the Tennei Air Base on Etorofu Island.

In order to cope with the military buildup and increasing activities of the Soviet forces in Northeast Asia, the United States has striven to maintain the balance of power through improvement and modernization of its forces and flexible operation of its forces, thereby maintaining and strengthening the credibility of deterrence. First of all, the United States cancelled its planned force withdrawal from South Korea. While the number of U.S. troops in the region remains constant, or slightly reduced, the United States has modernized the firepower and mobile capabilities of the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea. The navy deployed a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier with F/A-18s and a Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser. In addition, the aircraft of the aircraft carrier, Midway, was replaced by F/A-18s. The air force deployed two F-16 fighter squadrons and is replacing F-4 fighters with F-16s in South Korea. Meanwhile, the marine corps deployed
two F/A-18 fighter squadrons and an AV-8B fighter squadron to Iwakuni, Japan. Moreover, modified Hawk missile and light armored infantry armored vehicles were added to the III Marine Expeditionary in Okinawa. The firepower and mobility of U.S. forces are being strengthened.

As we can see, the conventional arms race in the regions shows several interesting trends. First of all, the nature of the arms race has changed over time: that is, from a quantitative arms race—the physical increase of the size of armed forces—to qualitative arms race—replacement of old equipments with new and modern equipment. Since the mid-1980s, unilateral arms reduction with a strong emphasis on modernization has emerged.

Figure 2.4 Trend of Conventional Arms Race in Northeast Asia

While the United States has reduced the number of troops in the region and its allies have remained constant in their total armed forces, the Soviet Union and North Korea have drastically increased their armed forces (see Table 2.2).

29. Japan has maintained approximately 250,000 and South Korea has maintained 700,000 troops.
From the mid-1970s, all Northeast Asian states began to emphasize the modernization of their armed forces over the quantitative increase of the size of their armed forces. China, in post-Mao period, has joined this modernization of armed forces. Japan, by adopting National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976, launched a modernization program of SDF. From the mid-1980s, the general trend of the conventional arms race in the region began to be replaced by arms reductions coupled with modernization, which does not necessarily mean the actual reduction of operational capabilities, with the exception of North Korea. The Soviet Union has announced that it would withdraw 200,000 troops from the Far East within the framework of the reduction of Soviet troops by 500,000 as President Gorbachev addressed in his U.S. speech in December 1988. China has reduced its armed forces by one million.

Secondly, until the mid-1970s, the arms race among the great powers in the region was mainly directed toward ground forces. However, from the late 1970s, the arms race has been directed toward naval components. The increase of the number of Soviet divisions in the Far East did not impose a direct threat to the United States and its regional allies since they are deployed along the Sino-Soviet border and are dispersed in a vast geographical area. The major threat to the United States and its regional allies is Soviet naval and air power which allow the Soviet Union to project its power and influence well beyond its own territories and challenge the U.S. dominance in the region. This Soviet naval buildup in Northeast Asia has been met by the United States and its regional allies in the same fashion.
We can "speculate" the reason(s) why the arms race in Northeast Asia has been directed toward conventional weapons. First of all, from the U.S. perspective, from the beginning of the cold war, unlike in Europe, the United States and its regional allies have maintained an overall superiority of conventional forces vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia. By the end of the Korean War, the United States had more than 400,000 troops in the region. While the United States has reduced the number of its troops in the region, it still maintains operational superiority over the Soviet Union. The superior conventional forces of the United States has made its regional allies-Japan and South Korea-less sensitive to the shift in theater nuclear force balance. Japan and South Korea were less shaken by the Soviet deployment of its INF forces and the superpower strategic equivalence than NATO countries, focused more on the U.S. commitment to regional conventional power in Northeast Asia as an indication of the credibility of American extended deterrence. The credibility of U.S. extended deterrence has been maintained not by the virtue of theater nuclear forces but by the virtue of the superior conventional commitment Washington maintains in the Pacific. It is not necessary to rely on theater nuclear weapons in order to deter conventional war. Although the initiation of nuclear war may be threatened by the United States to defeat a mass Soviet land invasion of Japan, Japanese and American conventional forces alone may deter a conventional invasion by the Soviet Union. In other words, the relatively balanced conventional forces between the United States and the Soviet

Union in the region reduces the necessity to rely on theater nuclear weapons in order to deter conventional war. So, an explicit strategy which threatens nuclear escalation is not necessary as long as conventional strength alone is sufficient enough to deter conventional conflict. Furthermore, the United States has few places to put nuclear weapons on land in Northeast Asia. Even if it deploys nuclear weapons in South Korea and on its ships, there is a limit on this mode of deployment of nuclear weapons. As we know, constitutionally Japan does not allow deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil. Consequently, the United States has been constrained in terms of mode of deployment of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. If there were no "three non-nuclear principles" of Japan, the situation would be quite different.

From the Soviet perspective, conventional forces in Northeast Asia are more attractive and important than nuclear elements for the following reasons. First of all, U.S. conventional forces, especially naval and air forces, have been dominant throughout the postwar era. These forces have denied the Soviet Union the ability to project its power and influence well beyond its own territories. As Gerald Segal said, the Soviet Union was considered a power in Asia, but not an Asian power. The continuation of U.S. dominance in East Asia was going to perpetuate this predicament. Consequently, the growth of Soviet naval power and the steady modernization and re-equipment of both the ground combat forces and of

the tactical air capacity of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia were designed to enhance its influence over the regional affairs of Northeast Asia, to reduce U.S. military power, and to become a major arbiter of change in the region.\(^3\)\(^3\) Since the credibility of U.S. commitment to defend its allies in Northeast Asia was dependent upon the superior conventional forces, it would be better for the Soviets to enhance their conventional capabilities—especially naval and air forces—in order to undermine the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. And these forces are also much more visible than nuclear weapons which would be stationed on submarines, placed on Soviet territories. Thus, conventional forces—especially naval forces—have a much more effective psychological effect on other Asian states than nuclear weapons.\(^3\)\(^4\) Furthermore, U.S. allies in the region—South Korea and Japan—are extensively dependent upon the import of energy and raw materials from abroad and the export of industrial goods to world markets. The expansion of the Pacific Fleet and its capability and activities can deny their access to markets, energy, and raw materials. It is obvious that the Japanese and South Korean economy would be rapidly paralyzed by the interception of such shipments and the disturbance of the main sea lanes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Soviet Union is capable of

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34. This argument can be applied to Sino-Soviet relations. Navies are flexible instruments of power-designed for one purpose, used for another. The Soviets have used their naval forces to pressure the Chinese by increasing their sense of isolation and encirclement. See Kenneth G. Weiss, "The Sea Is Red: The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Its Naval Dimension," *Professional Paper*, No. 421 (May 1984).
neutralizing U.S. allies in the region during a war, using this threat as a lever. In order to achieve this objective, the Soviet Union needs large naval and air forces, not nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the most important reason for the Soviet conventional force buildup in the Far East is China. The Soviet Union did not need to increase its conventional forces in the Far East as long as China remained a strong Soviet ally. However, the Sino-Soviet split urged the Soviets to increase their conventional forces. Khrushchev's removal did not alter Mao's profound hostility toward the Soviet Union and the Soviets faced a permanent Chinese challenge to the legitimacy of Soviet borders with China. Since then, in the Far East, the main threat has come not from the United States but from China, which has the largest army in the world. From a global perspective, the hostile relations between the Soviet Union and China changed the strategic landscape: that is, the Soviet Union had begun to face the so-called "two-front war": one in the east and one in the west. Thus, the Soviets became pessimistic that in time of war they would be able to use much of their Far Eastern ground forces to reinforce their position in the west, as they did in World War II. They seemed to believe that they should shape their permanent force posture to allow for the possibility, however unlikely, that they might have to fight China at some stage in a war with the United States, wherever such a war began. Soviet analysts appeared to assume that the Soviet Far East would be far more vulnerable to China than

35. This assumption has been strengthened as superpower relations and their competition in Europe have stabilized throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

36. Actually, the Soviet Union had abandoned its swing strategy by establishing Soviet Far Eastern TVD in 1978 which assumes independent military operation.
heretofore in the aftermath of a devastating and exhausting Soviet clash with the United States. The Soviets apparently believed that even if this worst case did not materialize, and China remained aloof from such a struggle, very large force deployments would still be required to deter China and ensure its continued neutrality.\textsuperscript{37} The problem was how to meet the Chinese threat and defend the Soviet Far East against possible Chinese attack. Whereas China was weak in the nuclear sphere, the Soviets were reminded of their weakness in the conventional sphere. By the early 1960s, Soviet conventional forces in the Far East were very small and could not match the large size of Chinese forces. In order to defend its territories and deter Chinese aggression under any circumstance through achieving war-fighting deterrence capabilities vis-a-vis China, the Soviet Union needed a huge conventional military buildup against China since the Soviets assumed that they had a sufficient nuclear capability to discourage China from using nuclear weapons at the early stage of conflict.\textsuperscript{38}

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\textsuperscript{37} In view of Soviet concern since the late 1970s over the possibility of Sino-American strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union, some Soviets appear to find an element of reassurance in the Soviet experience with China-reassurance that the forces of Chinese nationalism are too strong to make it likely that the United States will succeed where the Soviet Union failed. Both the Soviet experiences of the 1950s and 1960s and the more recent U.S. difficulties with Beijing over Taiwan have confirmed the force of Chinese nationalism, its resentment of what it regards as affronts to its sovereignty, and its wariness about trading political concessions for security. See Gerald Segal, "As China Grows Strong," \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 1988): pp. 217-232.

\textsuperscript{38} William Hyland sees the elimination of "most China's retaliatory force" as "still within the realm of Soviet capabilities." In William Hyland, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Search for New Security Strategies," \textit{Strategic Review} 7 (Fall 1979), p. 61. For more discussion, see Harry Gelman, \textit{The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China} (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-2943-AP, August 1982); Gerald Segal, ed., \textit{The Soviet Union in East Asia: Predicaments of Power} (Boulder, Colo.:
deterrence capabilities cannot be achieved only through nuclear weapons. They need a more well-balanced force structure from the conventional level to the strategic level. So, it is natural that the Soviets have tried to achieve a sufficient level of conventional forces in the Far East.

Thirdly, since there was no buffer zone between the Soviet Union and China, conventional forces were required to penetrate, to occupy Chinese territories and to establish a buffer zone which would separate the Soviet Union and China and would provide a more secure defensive position against a possible conventional Chinese attack. Nuclear weapons are not suitable for this mission. Nuclear weapons appear to deter China from launching a preemptive strike. To occupy enemies' territories and to create a buffer state between the Soviet Union and China, huge conventional forces were required. The estimate of the required size of Soviet conventional forces seemed to be based on the Soviet analysis of the Manchurian campaign of August 1945 in which the Soviet Union massed approximately 1.5 million troops before making a surprise attack along the entire 5,000 kilometer front. It is interesting that the Soviet military press first began to stress the importance of the Manchurian campaign as a


40. For the discussion of the scenario of Soviet invasion of China, see William C. Green and David S. Yost, "Soviet Military Options Regarding China." In China, the Soviet Union and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s, edited by Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 135-144.
model for decisive offensive operations in 1960, when the tenor of Sino-Soviet relations became openly hostile. Soviet military analyses of this campaign had become even more comprehensive and prominent since Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964. Thus, we can expect that the Soviets might assume an actual occupation of some parts of China—especially Xinjiang and Outer Mongolia—and establishment of friendly allies there.

And, finally, to control the escalation of war from the conventional to the strategic level, the Soviet Union needed to increase conventional forces. Under the condition of Chinese aggression or any crisis, the inferior size of conventional forces might mean that the Soviet Union would be pushed to use nuclear weapons in the early stage of conflict, or to accept defeat. If the Soviets were pushed to use nuclear weapons, there would be a problem of consultation with the United States in order to avoid undesirable consequences. It might be necessary for the Soviets to increase conventional forces in order to achieve objectives in war without resorting to nuclear weapons.

In a word, the main arms control agenda in Northeast Asia is the control of conventional forces. Conventional arms control has proven to be very difficult in the European experience. It has taken almost two decades to reach a conventional arms control agreement in Europe. It is uncertain how much the Northeast Asian states can learn from conventional arms control in Europe or whether they can find more effective alternatives to achieve conventional stability in the region.
Divided States and Lingering Territorial Disputes

There are some unresolved issues in Northeast Asia, of the kind which in Europe have long been settled. They are the problems of achieving mutual recognition between divided states and the resolution of territorial disputes. They are the division of Korea, Sino-Soviet border issues, and the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute over the Northern territories. While there has been some progress on the Sino-Soviet border issue, it is unlikely there will be any concrete resolution of these territorial disputes.

In the Korean peninsula, any attempt at unification by direct military means would certainly run a significant risk of igniting a major war. It is also very difficult for South and North Korea to bring about the conditions for peaceful unification, or for mutual recognition as independent states, accepting the divided status. Of course, it is possible that the two Koreas can achieve a stable relationship similar to that between East and West Germany. However, the Korean War has left a very deep scar in the Korean people's mind. It is not only the competition between socially, politically, and economically different systems, but also emotional hatred. Both sides have assigned a tremendous importance and value to reunification. And also they are in competition with each other in deciding who will lead the unification. Simultaneous admission to U. N. will bring a temporary relief, but will not resolve the issue of unification completely.

41. In addition to these disputes, there are number of disputes around the area: Taiwan, the islands in the South China Sea, and the continental shelf rights.
The territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan is another problem which has impeded the normalization process between the two countries by concluding peace treaty. Until 1990, the Soviet Union had denied the existence of a territorial dispute between the two countries. Since the mid-1980s the Soviet Union has been inching toward a more conciliatory position on the islands. In April 1991, President Gorbachev visited Japan and promised to negotiate the status of all the islands. Such a conciliatory gesture by President Gorbachev was not met by corresponding Japanese enthusiasm. Japan was quite firm in its posture on the Northern Territories. It seemed very unlikely to reach a dramatic resolution of this territorial dispute. However, the collapse of the Soviet empire after the August coup has opened another round for the resolution of territorial dispute between the two countries which seems to be much more promising and optimistic than ever before. Japanese optimism soared after the coup against Mr. Gorbachev failed. Given the declarations of independence by various Soviet republics, the Japanese reasoned that one of the long-time arguments against Moscow's giving up the islands—that it would encourage secessionism—seemed to have been eliminated. In addition, the Russian republic has announced its intention to solve the territorial dispute with Japan as soon as possible to get economic aid from Japan. To a certain degree, the central government in Moscow is reported to agree on the Russian republic's posture "in principle."42 However, once again, Japan has taken a very cautious position. A senior Japanese official said that the Russian leaders' statements about the need for concessions to resolve a

territorial dispute with Tokyo had created a "better environment" but that the improvement did "not mean we are closer to a solution." The prospect for the resolution of territorial dispute between the two countries has improved over the years. But it is difficult to find a mutually acceptable resolution on the territorial issue.

Border consultation between the Soviet Union and China has achieved the most progress among other territorial issues in the region. There has been a biannual meeting between the Soviet Union and China to resolve territorial disputes. Since the early 1980s there has been substantial progress in their border issues such as unilateral arms reduction along the border and increased economic contact along the border line. But there has been no concrete resolution of jurisdiction over these areas. As in the case of Soviet-Japanese relations, the collapse of the Soviet empire will further complicate the final resolution of territorial issue between the Soviet Union and China.

Whether these problems are going to be an opportunity or a stumbling bloc is uncertain. However, in Europe, several confidence-building measures have been proposed and in some cases implemented, as a step toward relaxing East-West tensions. These CBMs are predicated upon the mutual recognition of nations as independent states and their acceptance of clearly-defined territorial borders. On the other hand, these

44. This was included in Baskte I, "Security in Europe." It consisted of ten principles on interstate relations: respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality, nonresort to the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
issues may encourage politically oriented confidence-building measures. That is, unresolved territorial issues among the Northeast Asian states may provide more opportunities for them to increase contact and chances to enhance mutual understanding as we have been in Sino-Soviet case.

Conclusion

From a contextual perspective, Northeast Asia is quite different from Europe. In Northeast Asia, there are more poles of power with fewer states than in Europe. It is a complex and complicated situation in which we have to work on arms control and security policies. The "iron triangle" involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and China emerged when the Nixon administration practiced triangular diplomacy in 1971-72 by seeking to play a balancing role in the worsening Sino-Soviet relationship and to take advantage of it. This was possible because both Beijing and Moscow were eager to cultivate better relations with Washington to counter the other's leverage. This "iron triangle" gradually yielded to a "flexible triangle" as Beijing began to distance itself from the United States and to improve its relations with Moscow from the early 1980s. The rise of Japan as an important player prompted the triangle to turn into a "rectarchy" especially when other powers began to appreciate the primacy of economics and technology. In a word, a relatively simple bipolar structure was replaced by quadrilateral structure. It is uncertain how this systemic change affects cooperation among states, and fulfillment of international obligations. See U.S. ACDA, The Document of Disarmament 1975 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976),

45 See ft. 4.
46 William T. Tow, p. 113.
peace and stability in the region as well as on the global scale. Joseph Kruzel argued that "The postwar international system was a fertile ground for arms control because, among other reasons, it was essentially bipolar in character." If this is true, the multipolar structure in Northeast Asia is not likely to provide a fertile ground for arms control. On the other hand, as the relationship among the great powers has improved dramatically since the second half of the 1980s, these great powers, especially the Soviet Union and China, have shown an increased interest in arms control. Thus, we have to think about how the increased interest in arms control among the great powers as well as the minor powers can be translated into observable outcomes in establishing an arms control regime under an infertile, complex, multipolar situation.

It is a more maritime-oriented region with asymmetrical geographical attributes. It is truly a place in which maritime power meets landpower. It can challenge the concept of "equal security." How can we define the concept of equal security when the states have different geographical attributes? How should we incorporate these geographical and strategic differences into arms control?

Arms races among the countries in the region have been directed toward conventional elements rather than nuclear weapons. While the two superpowers deploy a substantial amount of their strategic nuclear weapons in the region, the stability and peace of the region have been maintained by the virtue of a conventional military balance. The issue of conventional arms control will be elevated by President Bush's decision to

eliminate tactical nuclear weapons. Will this decision ignite a conventional arms race, or not? How should we visualize the stability and peace in de-nuclearized circumstances?

While the general mood for the resolution of territorial disputes among the Northeast Asian state has improved over the years, all the territorial issues have not been clearly resolved and require more intensive negotiation.

In addition to the security environments, we have to take into consideration the domestic problems of most communist states in the region. The Soviet Union, China, and, to a certain degree, North Korea, are faced with serious domestic political, economic, and social problems. For them, the most serious security problems do not come from the outside. Rather it comes from the inside. This would possibly undermine their capacity to cope with external problems. Generally speaking, such serious domestic problems would make them adopt a more conciliatory foreign policy in order to concentrate their efforts on domestic problems by creating a non-threatening peaceful external environment.

Under these contextual constraints, arms control and tension reductions among the countries in the region have become very important. As the politics of conflict has begun to be replaced by the politics of accommodation and peaceful coexistence among the Northeast Asian states, the prospect for arms control has become more optimistic. Arms control itself is a very general concept. But the ways in which arms control is applied and implemented, the ways agendas of arms control are set, and the types of arms control regime, will differ from one case to another since the context in which arms control is applied will be different from one
region to another. The sources of variation of arms control in practice may lie in the distinctive regional strategic configurations discussed above. It is uncertain how and in what direction the regional characteristics of Northeast Asia will influence the process of arms control. But one thing is certain: the mechanical application of the European experience to Northeast Asia will not guarantee the same result we have achieved in European or superpower arms control.

In the following chapters, we will deal with several arms control issues of Northeast Asia. In doing so, we will focus our attention on the relationship between the sources and types of conflict and arms control itself. And also we will examine the applicability of the European or superpower arms control experience to arms control in Northeast Asia. It may be called a contextual comparative approach to arms control. But the fundamental goal of this research is to test and revise modern arms control theory by comparing two regions from the objectives of arms control. While, in some cases, we already have some distinctive patterns of arms control, in some cases, we don't. So, in the latter case, it is going to be very speculative, not conclusive.
CHAPTER III

Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia: Pandora's Box

In Northeast Asia, we have three nonnuclear states which are at "near nuclear" status. By the end of the 1980s, all of them achieved scientific and technological capabilities to manufacture nuclear weapons with some variation. All of them already possess means of delivery. Nuclear proliferation coupled with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology could make the world unsafe and complicate the strategic landscape complicated, seen in the Gulf War.¹

We have not discussed much of the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the developing countries. In Northeast Asia especially we have not discussed the possibility of nuclear proliferation since the U.S. nuclear umbrella has made it unnecessary for South Korea and Japan to go nuclear and North Korea has maintained conventional military superiority over South Korea. All of them, in addition, are signatories of the NPT. However, two events have raised the concern of nuclear proliferation: North Korea's nuclear program and the U.S. plan to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.

The evidence related to the construction of nuclear reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, some 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang, and

¹ It is reported that North Korea is working on modification of SCUD missile to enhance the range to 1,000 kilometer. It is named "Rodong-Il ho."
Pyongyang's refusal to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, ignited international concern over a possible nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. Given the facts of the inter-Korean rivalry and the geographic proximity to Japan, if North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, the repercussion in South Korea and Japan will be severe and it could possibly ignite a chain-reaction of nuclear proliferation in the region.

In addition, the U.S. decision to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea has raised South Korea's concerns over its own security and its security ties with the United States. Since the end of the Korean War, the American strategy for keeping peace in and around the Korean peninsula ultimately hinged on the looming presence of a huge arsenal of American tactical nuclear weapons, stored at its bases in South Korea and aboard the ships of its Pacific fleet (see next page Table 3.1).

No one has seriously questioned the reliability and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantee to its local allies in the region. When President Bush announced his plan to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons not covered by the INF and START treaties, President Roh hailed the nuclear initiative. But one senior South Korean official hinted that his government had privately expressed to the Bush Administration some misgivings about removing the tactical nuclear weapons without getting

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2. The South Korean government's posture toward North Korea's nuclear program is very firm. Just hours before President Bush's speech, South Korea's Defense Minister Lee Jong-koo was taking an unusually hard line, publicly warning that if North Korea refused to budge on the inspection question, "military action may be taken" to force compliance. *The Hankook Ilbo*, 28 Sept., 1991.
Table 3.1 U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery System</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Type of Nuclear Warhead</th>
<th>Number of Warhead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter-Bombers</td>
<td>930 km</td>
<td>B61</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16</td>
<td>840 km</td>
<td>B28/57/61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>18/24/30 km</td>
<td>M - 454 Shell</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-109 (155 mm)</td>
<td></td>
<td>W - 48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-198 (155 mm)</td>
<td>14 km</td>
<td>M - 785 Shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-110 (203 mm)</td>
<td>21.3/29 km</td>
<td>M - 422 Shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>W - 33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M - 753</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>W - 79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>110 km</td>
<td>W - 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGM 52C (Lance)</td>
<td></td>
<td>TLAM-N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGM 109A</td>
<td>2,500 km</td>
<td>W - 80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Mine</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Center for Defense Information, cited from The Hankook Ilbo, September 30, 1991

any North Korean concessions in return since this bold move invalidates South Korea's claim over nuclear issue. South Korea has been dismissing

4. The South Korean government has been arguing that the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons should come only after North Korea's acceptance of IAEA's safeguards inspection.
calls for the creation of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula as premature, saying it was something to discuss only after the hard-line Communist regime in the North allowed international inspection of nuclear plants that might be close to producing weapons. South Korea faced a dilemma.

On the other hand, Mr. Bush's move amounts to almost exactly what Pyongyang has long demanded as a condition for international inspection of its nuclear program and further discussions about its own nuclear ambitions. In its first response to President Bush's speech, North Korea struck an uncharacteristically positive tone. The official North Korean press agency said that "If the United States really withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea, the way of our signing the nuclear safeguards accord will be opened." But North Korea has made similar statements before, only to back away from them later. The question is whether America's sudden, unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons will strengthen its negotiating hand with Pyongyang without jeopardizing its security relations with Seoul, or whether it sends the wrong signal to both Koreas and, consequently, ignites a chain-reaction of nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula.

Furthermore, the issue of nuclear proliferation ignited by the North Korea's nuclear program would challenge the two important issues of international security. First, it will challenge how much the superpowers can cooperate with each other in a new era of detente on common agendas of international security. Since the mid-1980s, superpower relations have improved dramatically. They have achieved breakthroughs in their security

relations by signing INF, CFE, and START treaties. These arms control negotiations and treaties are directly related to the immediate security concerns of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, it might be natural for them to cooperate with each other on these matters. But what about the other security issues in the periphery which do not directly impose an immediate threat to their own security, but are likely to cause problems in the long term? Nuclear proliferation is going to be the next step they should deal with since there is a very real danger that further states will take the fateful step of acquiring nuclear weapons. Thus, we have to ask the following: Do they have a shared concern over those matters? If they do, is it possible for them to expand their collaborative efforts to solve the problems? How much can they effectively cooperate to solve those problems? Is their cooperation effective enough and sufficient to solve those problems? If not, what are the alternatives we can think of? The United States and the Soviet Union have been the leading nations for arming the world with nuclear weapons. Is it possible for them to lead in denuclearizing the world? In a word, the nuclear proliferation issue in Northeast Asia will be the first one which addresses those questions and tests the scope and robustness of these new relations between the great powers (or superpowers) in denuclearizing the world in order to maintain international peace and security.

Second, it is a testing ground for the effectiveness of the traditional anti-proliferation measures such as the safeguard system of the IAEA. The security environment and technology have changed tremendously since IAEA's safeguard systems were introduced. Are those measures still reliable and effective in the new security environment and in an era of
technological revolution? Is it possible to enforce such measures on some states which are reluctant to accept such legal obligations and have little interest in fulfilling such commitments and obligations? North Korea is one of the prime examples of such states, although it may be an extreme case. It is quite an isolated state and it is very reluctant to change its traditional domestic and foreign policies even in an era of global detente. If we can come up with some measures of anti-proliferation in the North Korean case, it is going to be a raw model for controlling future proliferation in other cases.

First of all, it is necessary to look at the factors which would possibly promote the incentives of nth states to go nuclear and the disincentives to discourage them from going nuclear. And we have to ask whether these factors will be useful and effective in the future or not. If not, we have to think of other measures.

North Korea's Nuclear Program and the Possibility of Proliferation

Some time in late 1988 or early 1989, U.S. satellite photographs are reported to have revealed that North Korea had begun construction of a plutonium extraction plant near the Yongbyon nuclear complex. It is well-known that in order to make nuclear weapons, plutonium must be extracted from spent reactor fuel in a reprocessing plant. Since there is no

legitimate use for plutonium in the North's peaceful nuclear program, it is believed that the facility is intended to produce material for nuclear weapons.\(^7\) By July 1989 another component necessary for a nuclear weapons program, a high-explosive testing site, was allegedly detected. These two pieces of evidence raised international concern over North Korea's nuclear program. In addition to these two pieces of evidence, North Korea has refused to sign a safeguards agreement covering all of its nuclear activities with the IAEA, as required under the Non-proliferation Treaty.\(^8\) Within 18 months of signing the NPT, states must complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Such an agreement would grant the agency access to the Yongbyon reactor to verify that spent fuel from it was not being diverted to a nuclear weapons program. The safeguards agreement also would grant the IAEA authority to place the nearby plutonium plant under verification procedures once nuclear materials were introduced there and would entitle the agency to obtain design information about the plant during its construction to facilitate the subsequent application of such safeguards. Inspections would also be required for North Korea's uranium conversion and reactor fuel fabrication plants.

Initially, IAEA had sent an incorrect version of the proposed agreement, which was based on the IAEA's non-NPT safeguards agreement, which would have imposed uniquely stringent controls on


\(^{8}\) In June 1991, the North Korean delegate to the IAEA meeting announced that the DPRK would accept the safeguards agreement. Then, suddenly, in September 14, it rejected to sign the agreement.
North Korea in comparison to other NPT parties. The IAEA acknowledged the mistake and sent the correct document to Pyongyang in June 1987, along with a second eighteen-month grace period. The new deadline passed without an agreement. Pyongyang's persistent failure to fulfil its treaty obligations has increased Western suspicions about the nature of the nuclear program at Yongbyon.

These extraordinary displays of Pyongyang's disregard for the norms of international behavior coincided with the buildup of its nuclear potential spawned continuing international suspicions about the objectives of the country's nuclear program. Since then the debate centered on when North Korea will acquire nuclear weapons rather than on whether it seeks to do so. For example, a senior Defense Department official said, "There is no question that the North Koreans have in mind a nuclear weapons program. They can say anything they want. But as far as I'm concerned, if it looks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, there's pretty good case for it being a duck .... There's still some question as to what the timing of all this is. My own sense is that it will be several years before this turns from intention into [nuclear] capability. But that's not a lot of time."9 However, recently, North Korea has announced its intention to sign the safeguards agreement.10 This sudden change of North Korea's posture on the


10. Chin Chon Gok, North Korean special envoy to IAEA Committee meeting, announced that North Korea will accept the safeguards agreement unconditionally. And also according to the DPRK official news agency, if such inspection does take place, it should not be carried out only in North Korea. The U.S. nuclear bases on the territory of South Korea should be subjected to similar inspection. And also the inspection is likely to be followed by the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces from South Korea and
safeguards agreement makes us wonder why Pyongyang has changed its position and what is a North Korea's real motive in announcing such a statement. Has Pyongyang already completed its plutonium plant and begun to operate it? If so, Pyongyang could have accumulated several years' worth of spent fuel. This could give North Korea the wherewithal for several nuclear weapons soon thereafter and could then permit the country to add to its stockpile at a rate of one or two weapons per year. North Korea would thus possess a ready nuclear option. If not, what is the reason that Pyongyang suddenly changed its position on the safeguards agreement? It is necessary to look at some objective incentives and disincentives for North Korea to go nuclear.

First, it is necessary to assess the nuclear capability of North Korea. North Korea may not have the technical expertise to go nuclear independently. President Kim Il-Sung himself claimed that his country has "neither the economic capability nor the will and ability to produce nuclear weapons." Given the secrecy of North Korea, it is very difficult to assess the exact status of technology, but South Korean specialists have been skeptical about Pyongyang's ability to reprocess spent fuel and make nuclear warheads. If Pyongyang does not have such a technological base, it could rely on external help, either from the Soviet Union or from China. The Soviet Union helped North Korea to build the controversial nuclear power plant in Yongbyon and it agreed to supply four nuclear power reactors in 1985. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China was apparently


prepared to make nuclear transfers to North Korea without IAEA safeguards. It would have been possible for North Korea to acquire necessary technological know-how and external help from its socialist allies, if Sino-Soviet relations continued to remain bad and if their relations with the United States and South Korea remained conflictual as in the past. But, as we have seen, all these relations have improved dramatically. No one wants to see a nuclear-armed North Korea which would upset the delicate balance of power in the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia and damage the newly-emerged relations. Pyongyang cannot count on either Soviet or Chinese help. Moscow has joined with Washington in pressuring North Korea to sign a safeguards agreement and has suspended its civil nuclear cooperation programs with Pyongyang. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has already taken some unilateral measures to curb North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The Soviet Union has suspended the sale of four nuclear power reactors to North Korea, withdrawn its technicians and technology transfer programs from the Yongbyon complex, and halted the supply of spare parts for advanced aircraft such as the MiG-29 and SU-25 which the Soviets sold to North Korea. China, which has expanded its trade and economic relations with South Korea, has little incentive to provide support to a North Korean nuclear weapons program which could only destabilize the peninsula and the Northeast Asian region-at-large. Beijing reportedly has also advised Pyongyang to sign the agreement. Under this circumstance, it would be very difficult or impossible for North Korea to get the external help for its

nuclear program. It must depend solely upon itself for its nuclear weapons program.

Second, North Korea should recognize the counter-productive effect of its nuclear weapons program on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea: that is, North Korea's nuclear weapons program will slow down and may halt the process of U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea, including nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. According to the "East Asia Strategic Initiative" released in April 1990, the United States is expected to reduce its forward-deployed forces by adopting "a phased approach." Between 1992 and 1995, the overall force total of 135,000 U.S. personnel in Asia would be reduced to approximately 120,000; between 1995 and 1997, unspecified but "proportionately (emphasis added) greater reductions" in theater-deployed combat forces (emphasis added) would occur; and between 1997 and 2002 yet further reductions but "stabilizing (emphasis added) at lower levels of withdrawal as circumstances permit."13 North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to take place during the second or the third phase of the U.S. reduction plan. If North Korea acquires nuclear weapons during this period, it is very unlikely that the United States would follow the proposed plan of a phased reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea. Rather the United States is likely to reaffirm its security commitment to South Korea either by enhancing its own military establishment there, or if that is not possible because of domestic political and economic problems, the United States could make the

military situation in the Korean peninsula stable by providing more advanced weapons and transferring military technology to South Korea in order to make South Korea more self-reliant and self-sufficient for its own defense. In either case, North Korea would find itself in a worsened situation.

Third, North Korea has little to gain by acquiring nuclear weapons since North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons will probably press South Korea to launch its own nuclear program in order to meet North Korea's challenge. South Korea tried twice to launch its own nuclear weapons programs and cancelled them under U.S. pressure. One South Korean analyst suggested that, given suspicions that North Korea may acquire a nuclear bomb by 1995, the ROK would have to launch its own bomb program by 1993 at least.\footnote{Andrew Mack, p. 96.} The U.S. decision to withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea will strengthen South Korea's incentive to go nuclear if North Korea does not cancel its nuclear program and the United States fails to provide supplementary measures for the security of South Korea.

While it is uncertain whether South Korea will go nuclear or not, if South Korea does, it is going to be unfavorable to North Korea. Given the disparities in economy and technological capabilities between the North and the South, we can easily expect that North Korea could not win. By 1990, as we can see in the following table, South Korea's military expenditure was approximately three to four times larger than that of North Korea. Such a trend is expected to continue unless the North Korean
economy gains its momentum of development and strength which is very unlikely in near future.

Table 3.2 Comparison of the Two Koreas' Economies and Military Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>38.0 square miles</td>
<td>46.5 square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>42 million</td>
<td>21 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita</td>
<td>$5,500</td>
<td>$400 to 1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Imports</td>
<td>$51.8 billion</td>
<td>$3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>$60.7 billion</td>
<td>$1.85 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Imports</td>
<td>$61.5 billion</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>$62.4 billion</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Imports</td>
<td>$69.9 billion</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>$65.0 billion</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth Rate</td>
<td>12.4 %</td>
<td>3.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>$4.40 billion</td>
<td>$4.16 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>$5.22 billion</td>
<td>$4.10 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>$6.39 billion</td>
<td>$3.94 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$9.89 billion</td>
<td>$3.89 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$10.89 billion</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


North Korea has already begun to lose its conventional military superiority over South Korea. Is it possible for North Korea to win a nuclear arms race with South Korea? If one expects a no-win situation in its competition with its adversary, is it reasonable for anyone to start such a competition?
Fourth, if such a nuclear arms race occurs on the Korean peninsula, the first years of nuclear standoff would be extremely dangerous and unstable. When rival states have small, unsophisticated, and vulnerable nuclear arsenals, the incentive to preempt in a crisis situation is very high because disarming first strikes have a real chance of success and failing to strike first renders the hesitant state vulnerable to nuclear preemption by the other side. It is going to be a race of who is going to press the button first. "Use it or lose it" will dominate their strategic thinking. What makes this preemption scenario more frightening is that it is going to be a countervalue strike rather than a counterforce strike due to the lack of sophistication of early versions of nuclear weapons. It raises a fundamental question of the utility of nuclear weapons in relation to reunification. Is it worth the use nuclear weapons to achieve reunification? Is it acceptable and justifiable to kill the people who share the same history and culture of 2,000 years to achieve reunification? What would be left in a reunified country after the use of nuclear weapons? The separate families in both Koreas want to see their relatives and family members alive, not dead. North Korea has claimed the "liberation" of South Korea from U.S. imperialist's rule as the highest priority, not the annihilation of the South Korean people nor the total destruction of South Korea. How can a North Korean leader justify such an annihilation and destruction to its people? No one can justify the use of nuclear weapons on its own people.

These facts will not only make the military situation in Korea unfavorable to North Korea but also make a mockery of North Korea's two most important policy goals: a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Korean peninsula and reunification of the motherland. Who shall be responsible
for the continuing presence of U.S. troops in South Korea which has been identified as one of the most fundamental obstacles for reunification by North Korea? Who should be blamed for halting U.S. troop reductions, or possible withdrawal, which has already been set in motion? Who could be responsible for a nuclear arms race in the Korean peninsula and thus for destroying any prospect for reunification? It might be North Korea, but neither the United States nor South Korea. Thus, if North Korea is reasonable enough to see these points, it would not try to acquire nuclear weapons.

Fifth, no single country has gone nuclear after signing the NPT. France, China, and India, possibly Pakistan and Israel, have neither signed nor ratified the NPT. Thus, we have to ask why North Korea would have signed the NPT, which forced it to accept the IAEA safeguards system, if it were intending to build a bomb. Whatever the reason is, North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which is contradictory to its commitments to respect and fulfill international obligations, would undermine its reputation in the international community and further isolate it from outside world.

These are the possible reasons and evidence why North Korea is not likely to go nuclear. However, these disincentives to going nuclear should be carefully weighed against the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Then we might discern which is more convincing.

First, we must think of the military and security rationale of acquiring nuclear weapons. Will the acquisition of nuclear weapons make North Korea more secure? The primary rationale for North Korea to go nuclear may be to offset the U.S. nuclear forces deployed in South Korea in two ways: one is that North Korea's nuclear weapons targeted against the South could deter a U.S. nuclear strike on the North in any North-South conflict,\(^\text{16}\) and the other is that North Korea could use its own nuclear program as a way to denuclearize the peninsula.

The rationale behind the first is simple: a nuclear power can attack non-nuclear power, while it cannot do the same thing against another nuclear power. As we have seen in the Gulf War, the possibility of Iraqi nuclear weapons forced the United States and other allied powers to adopt a very cautious approach to the situation. The military situation between the North and the South is a kind of confrontation between a nuclear state and a non-nuclear state. The United States has deployed its nuclear forces in South Korea to maintain the so-called "trip wire" deterrence.\(^\text{17}\) President Bush's plan to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons does not change the basic rationale of U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea. The United States confirmed that South Korea would remain under the protection of U.S. nuclear umbrella even after the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons.\(^\text{18}\) Thus, there still is the possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack against North Korea in the event of war in the Korean peninsula. On the

\(^{16}\) North Korea has demanded the U.S. guarantee on the non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea.


other hand, there are no Soviet nuclear weapons deployed in North Korea. North Korea has been relying on the Soviet's verbal commitment to use nuclear weapons for the defense of North Korea—a Soviet deterrent against a U.S. nuclear strike on the North. It is very unlikely, however, that the Soviets would materialize such a commitment as it has improved its relations with the United States and established full diplomatic relations with South Korea. Neither Beijing nor Moscow would support aggression by the North. Moscow has already initiated unilateral steps to curb North Korea's nuclear weapons program. North Korea may feel insecure and abandoned by its major nuclear ally. Thus it may perceive a need for such a deterrent of its own even after the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.\(^\text{19}\)

Being the sole nuclear aspirant in the developing world today that faces an overt nuclear threat from a superpower, the ability of North Korea to threaten southern cities with nuclear devastation could impose unacceptable costs on the use of nuclear weapons by the United States or South Korea, raising the prospect that the North could prevail in a future conflict by gaining a preponderance of conventional forces.\(^\text{20}\)

The second way to eliminate the U.S. nuclear threat to North Korea is denuclearization: that is, North Korea can use its nuclear weapons

\(^{19}\) North Korea demands the announcement of no-first use of nuclear weapons of the United States against North Korea. However, the United States refuses to announce such a particular guarantee to a specific country, while it is possible to adopt a general principle of no-first use of nuclear weapons. *Hankook Ilbo*, 1 Oct., 1991.

program as a means for the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea. By showing an intention to go nuclear, while in reality having no such ambitions, North Korea could take a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States in its negotiations for the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. From Pyongyang's perspective, there would be no more effective bargaining chip than a North Korean nuclear option. All of its previous attempts to force the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea have failed. This argument is supported by Pyongyang's behavior in the construction of nuclear facilities. If Pyongyang is really determined to acquire nuclear weapons, it would build key nuclear facilities in underground shelters hidden from U.S. satellites and less vulnerable to military attack. It is well-known that since the mid-1960s North Korea has been trying to protect its major military establishments from an attack by putting them underground. Thus, the real intention of North Korea is rather to denuclearize the Korean peninsula than to go nuclear. While this incentive has been weakened by the U.S. unilateral decision to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, North Korea still demands more for complete denuclearization by using its own nuclear program as a bargaining chip. There is a gap between North Korea and South Korea, including the United States, on the terms of denuclearization. Whereas the United States and South Korea visualize the Japanese style of three non-nuclear principles which would allow more

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flexible management of nuclear weapons, North Korea demands nontransfer of nuclear weapons through air and no port-call of nuclear-armed ships since it believes that the United States still can reintroduce nuclear weapons in the event of crisis.

The shift in the conventional military balance, or the expectation of such a shift, is another incentive for North Korea to go nuclear. Since the early 1970s, North Korea has enjoyed a superior position vis-a-vis South Korea in conventional military forces. It now has more than 1.1 million troops, whereas South Korea has 700,000 troops. However, the military balance is moving inexorably in Seoul's favor. South Korea spends approximately 5 per cent of its GNP on defense, whereas North Korea allocates between 20 and 25 percent of GNP to its defense. In terms of the raw dollar figure, however, Seoul's current defense budget is already approximately double that of the North. It is expected that by the end of the 1990s South Korea may well have achieved conventional military superiority over North Korea. In order to maintain its own competitive edge against South Korea, the North may require nuclear weapons.

The third military-security incentive for North Korea to go nuclear lies in the reliability of its military equipment. North Korea relies heavily on Soviet weapons and must be deeply concerned by the poor performance of those weapons in the Gulf War. On the other hand, the Gulf War has increased the confidence of the South Korea, both in its U.S. ally and in its U.S. equipment. Moreover, most of the military equipment and weapons North Korea possesses are old and outmoded. While North Korea has a

22. The three principles would be (1) nonintroduction, (2) nonpossession; and (3) nondeployment of nuclear weapons.
numerical advantage over South Korea in troops and weapons, it cannot be sure of their operational capabilities. In order to maintain its competitive edge against South Korea not only in numerical terms but also in operational terms, North Korea must spend more money to modernize its army.

North Korea faces a no-win situation in this game. Attempts to match Seoul militarily will be ruinously expensive for an economy already burdened with huge external debt and deep economic crisis. And South Korea has technological and scientific advantages over North Korea which can be translated into the production of more sophisticated weapons to further outpace North Korea in their arms race.

Fourth, economically, going-nuclear makes sense to North Korea by saving its resources and maintaining a military balance vis-a-vis South Korea. For North Korea nuclear weapons can be perceived as a relatively cheap strategic equalizer. Is it possible for Pyongyang to maintain or increase its defense expenditures to match Seoul? North Korea's dilemma in matching South Korea in arms acquisition is further complicated by the faltering North Korean economy and booming South Korean economy. The reduction in Soviet and Chinese aid to North Korea is inevitable due to their own economic problems. Can Pyongyang get the external aid and credit from the West? Not necessarily. The creditworthiness of Pyongyang is very low, North Korea is a very unattractive place to invest, and most of its creditors have refused to provide an extra credit to North Korea. The nation's external dept is currently estimated at $5 billion. The Western aid may be counterproductive by helping North Korea to maintain its own system without a fundamental reforms in domestic and foreign policies.
Thus, North Korea's economic system cannot sustain its own military establishment and is likely to fail to keep up with South Korea militarily.

Nuclear weapons can be quite an attractive solution to Pyongyang's dilemma. The cost of North Korea's nuclear program is estimated $203 million--around 5 per cent of the annual defense budget.\(^{23}\) We should not find it surprising that such an option might appear attractive to North Korea. We have seen that NATO deployed nuclear weapons as a low-cost strategic equalizer to the conventional superiority of its enemy. If North Korea had nuclear weapons, a conventional military balance favoring South Korea would be of far less consequence. In a word, militarily and economically, the nuclear option makes sense to North Korea.

We have covered military-security and economic incentives for North Korea to go nuclear. There would also be other incentives to go nuclear. Those are more political and diplomatic reasons.

First, North Korea may believe that an independent DPRK nuclear arsenal would reduce its political and military dependence on Moscow and Beijing and provide greater freedom of action to pursue its designs on the peninsula. Pyongyang's freedom of action has derived from its geostrategic location between the Soviet Union and China and Sino-Soviet rivalry. The Soviet Union and China have competed with each other to establish a better relation with Pyongyang. So, Pyongyang has been able to manipulate this rivalry to get external support for its political objectives. As Sino-Soviet relations have improved dramatically, however, Pyongyang cannot expect such freedom of action. It has failed to block the normalization between the

\(^{23}\) Andrew Mack, p. 94.
Soviet Union and South Korea, even with the threat of development of its own nuclear weapons. If North Korea acquires nuclear weapons, however, its position vis-a-vis its socialist allies—the Soviet Union and China—is likely to be enhanced. Of course, North Korea with nuclear weapons cannot determine the course of events in Northeast Asia. But no one could ignore its claims and it can also influence regional politics in its own favor. In order to maintain regional stability in Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula, the great powers may become more receptive to North Korea's claim.

Second, Kim Il-Sung may perceive that the domestic and foreign impacts of developing nuclear weapons would boost the legitimacy of his regime and help ensure its future survival under the leadership of his son, Kim Jong-II. With the succession in mind, Kim Il-Sung may perceive that nuclear arms would provide tangible proof of the technological and military accomplishments of the Kim dynasty for his domestic audience. He may also believe that the North's possession of nuclear weapons would deter the South from attempting to emulate his own tactics and interfere in the country's succession process after his death or retirement. Or, in the event that reunification on Pyongyang's terms were impossible, Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons could ensure the continued existence of the DPRK on a divided Peninsula. Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear weapons program may be intended not only for the survival or existence of

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24. Actually, there was a threat of North Korea to the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union and South Korea tried to normalize their relations. Foreign Minister Kim Yong-Nam warned that the North would push ahead with nuclear weapons development if the Soviet Union recognized the South. **FBIS-SOV, 29 Sept., 1990, p. 10.**
the DPRK but also for the enhancement of its status in international politics.\textsuperscript{25} North Korea is one of very few pariah states in the world today, and it may recognize the disadvantages of such an isolation in international politics and the necessity of opening up to the outside world. But, the problem lies in how to open up without jeopardizing the current North Korean regime. Submissive admission to the international community would possibly undermine the legitimacy of the DPRK and would be unacceptable. Japan and the United States have refused to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. On the other hand, nuclear weapons could boost North Korea's status in international politics and, thus, would provide a face-saving opportunity, or a better bargaining position in a negotiation to normalize its relations with Japan and the United States. Prestige and a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the West can be another incentive for North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons.

In sum, North Korea has more incentives to go nuclear than disincentives. However, numerical comparison of the number of incentives and disincentives does not guarantee the correct prediction of the future. Some incentives may be much stronger than other incentives. And also

\textsuperscript{25} For the discussion of pariah states and nuclear proliferation, see Robert E. Harkavy, "Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation," in George H. Quester, ed., \textit{Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain} (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), pp. 135-163. He defines the pariah state as "a small power with only marginal and tenuous control over its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily be solved by neutrality, nonalignment, and lacking dependable big-power support. Under contemporary conditions, pariahtude crucially involves estrangement from the numerically dominant Soviet and Third World blocs- in conjunction with poor leverage which translates into weak, clandestine, or nonexistent support from reluctant Western powers-and perhaps some spillover from the over-all anti-Western bias of numerous Third World nations." p. 136.
some disincentives might be felt more strongly than some incentives. The relative strength between incentives and disincentives may change according to how the situation in and around the Korean peninsula changes. Among the various factors which will influence North Korea's nuclear calculus, South Korea and its relations with the United States occupy the central position. Thus, it is necessary to look at South Korea's nuclear posture.

South Korea and Nuclear Proliferation

Under Park Chung Hee's rule, the South Korean government attempted to acquire nuclear weapons. In this case, the major incentive for South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons was the diminishment of the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and the perceived threat of North Korea. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine and the worsening situation in Indochina might have compelled South Korea to consider its nuclear option. It still occupies the central concern of South Korea when it considers a nuclear option. Of course, there may be other incentives for South Korea to go nuclear, but compared to the centrality of the security concern, other incentives seem residual and have become invalid for various reasons.

First, one of main reasons for South Korea to go nuclear is its pariah status in the international community and its intention to overcome such a status.\textsuperscript{26} It might have been true during the 1970s and early 1980s when South Korea was heavily dependent upon the United States economically,

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 136.
politically, and militarily, had no diplomatic relations with the socialist countries, and had fewer diplomatic relations with Third World countries than North Korea. However, South Korea has successfully overcome its pariah status without acquiring nuclear weapons. The relations between Washington and Seoul have evolved from dependence to interdependence. It is no longer a patron-client relation. Even in the security dimension, South Korea has become less dependent upon the United States. With a thriving economy, South Korea is expected to assume more defense responsibility and the United States is supposed to reduce and withdraw its forces. Diplomatically, Seoul has overcome its isolation very successfully. The "Nordpolitik" of South Korea has been very successful. Since 1988, Seoul has established diplomatic relations with most East European states and the Soviet Union, and also has equivalent relations with China. South Korea is no longer a pariah state. It is neither desirable nor necessary to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather the acquisition of nuclear weapons can make South Korea an "outlaw state" in the international community. For South Korea, it is very counterproductive.

Second, South Korea may consider a nuclear option to redress its conventional military imbalance vis-a-vis North Korea. However, as I said before, South Korea is expected to achieve a favorable military balance by the mid-1990s without going nuclear. If South Korea can achieve a favorable conventional military balance by that time and possibly widen the gap, why it should go nuclear? It seems that the South Korean economy can afford such a conventional military buildup. If nuclear war took place, South Korea would suffer more than North Korea. Furthermore, South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons would jeopardize its security ties
with the United States, the security ties with the United States may be more important than the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons could provide an excuse for the strategic decoupling of the United States which might be unacceptable for South Korea.

Third, in domestic politics, the acquisition of nuclear weapons can enhance the political leaders' legitimacy and credit. It might have been true during the 1970s when most South Korean people felt insecure. The political leader's legitimacy was correlated to how much he could provide security for his people. Nuclear weapons could appeal as the ultimate guarantee of security under the circumstance in which the United States decided to reduce and withdraw its forces from South Korea.

That is no longer the case. South Korean people have become more self-confident than ever before. They may be more confident about their national security than their government. They urge the South Korean government to adopt a realistic approach to North Korea and to avoid conflictual competition between the two Koreas. And they also question the utility of U.S. nuclear forces in South Korea. For example, South Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung has endorsed an American legislator's proposals for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces and the pullout of land-based nuclear weapons believing that such a move could induce North Korea into a genuine detente with South Korea. Furthermore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons might enhance the influence of the ROK military over the political matters which might reverse the current trend of democratization in South Korea. The military's influence over Korean

politics has declined substantially as the democratization process has proceeded. However, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or a nuclear weapons program, could reverse this trend. It does not mean that the military will take over the civilian government. Rather it means increased assertiveness of the military due to its control over the most important military asset. No one wants to see that happen. The political leaders cannot obtain any credit by going nuclear. Rather they will be accused of being anti-democratic. Thus, domestically, the nuclear option is not so attractive as it was before.

A nuclear weapons program may be unattractive to South Korea for the reasons we have discussed. However, it is possible for South Korea to consider its nuclear option in an extreme case: that is, North Korea acquires nuclear weapons and the United States pulls out its ground and nuclear forces without any complementary measures. This is a plausible scenario if we remember the ROK's failed attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in 1975. The worsening situation in Indochina and the possibility of a further reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea made the ROK consider the nuclear option to contribute to its security. Thus, we cannot be sure that history would not repeat itself in Korea since the security rationales of the ROK remain same: the reliance on U.S. extended deterrent for its security

and defense, the credibility of the U.S. commitment to materialize its extended deterrence to South Korea, and the ways in which this security commitment is implemented.

South Korea has been relying on the United States for its defense and security. American forces stationed in South Korea have been the most effective deterrent against any second North Korean invasion. It is an Asian version of "trip wire" deterrence which is an integral part of U.S. extended deterrence strategy, designed to demonstrate and ensure its willingness and determination to retaliate against a would-be aggressor when U.S. troops were drawn into a conflict in defense of an invaded ally. It assures America's ally of its intention to honor its security commitments.29

At the end of the Korean war, the United States had approximately 330,000 troops in South Korea. In the subsequent years, we observed the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea to 50,000 troops between 1953 and 1954.30 In order to implement its extended deterrence commitment to South Korea while reducing conventional forces there, during the Eisenhower administration the United States began to incorporate a nuclear component in its extended deterrence strategy on the Korean peninsula.31 The introduction of more discriminate and diverse nuclear warheads and


30. This troop size had been maintained until March 1971 when the US 7th Infantry Division was pulled out from Korea under the Nixon Doctrine. From 1971, the United States has maintained approximately 40,000 troops in South Korea.

31. It is applicable not only to the Korean peninsula, but also to European theater.
delivery system into the US nuclear inventory during this period made it possible for the United States to substitute nuclear forces for conventional forces. In January 1954, the US National Security Council approved Action No. 1004, authorizing U.S. military commanders to plan for "limited nuclear offensives"—exclusively on Korean territory—in the event hostilities resumed between North and South. From the mid-1950s, the United States began to introduce tactical missiles such as Nike, Honest John, Regulus, and Sergeant into the Korean peninsula. During the Johnson administration, the United States planned to modernize its tactical nuclear forces in Korea with the emplacement of nuclear-tipped Nike-Herculus and Hawk-I surface-to-air missiles. Recently, in 1987, Washington announced plans to modernize its nuclear forces in Korea by deploying "dual-capable" Lance surface-to-surface missiles.

The deployment and modernization of nuclear weapons in Korea since the end of the Korean war, along with conventional forces, have been designed to maintain the U.S. escalation control capabilities in a conflict in Korea and to deter North Korean aggression against South Korea. It is relatively easy to assert that U.S. conventional forces—2nd Infantry Division in March 1971.


33. Song-joo Han, "South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict: An Analysis of the U.S.-Korean Alliance," Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 4(Winter 1978), p. 903. This modernization program was delayed for three years as Washington became preoccupied with the Vietnam war. The actual modernization was paralleled with the withdrawal of U.S. 7th Infantry Division in March 1971.
Division-deployed along the DMZ assure the automatic engagement of U.S. forces in any conflict. On the other hand, it is not an easy task to assess how much nuclear weapons have contributed to stability in Korea and US escalation control capabilities.\textsuperscript{34} The effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence against North Korean attack is dependent on how North Korea perceives this nuclear threat.

It seems that North Korea takes U.S. nuclear threat very seriously. If not, why has it persistently demanded a legal guarantee from the United States that it will withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea and refrain from making nuclear threats? North Korea might have perceived that in a denuclearized situation in Korea it might be easier to use forces to achieve its objective--liberation of South Korea under its own terms--with a given conventional military superiority over South Korea. It might be possible for North Korea to achieve a decisive victory in the early stages of a renewed Korean war with its massive tank units, amphibious vehicles, fire support systems, and quick strike tactical support aircraft in a blitzkrieg mode.\textsuperscript{35} What makes it difficult for North Korea to materialize this strategic thought and its superior conventional forces is the possibility of the United States using its tactical nuclear weapons, along with its conventional forces, for the defense of South Korea. Thus, the presence of U.S. forces in

\textsuperscript{34} Andrew Mack assumes a marginal strategic value of nuclear weapons in Korea. Anti-government groups in South Korea argue the same assumption. See "Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula and Ending the Cold War [Editorial]," \textit{Han-Kyoreh Shinmun}, June 26, 1990, p. 2, as translated and reported in \textit{FBIS-East Asia}, June 27, 1990, pp. 24-25.

South Korea, including nuclear weapons, has served as a vital component of deterrent strategy by complicating North Korea's military calculation and injecting an element of uncertainty for North Korea with respect to the use of nuclear weapons.36

Thus, the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea and the ways in which this credibility is implemented are the most important factors in determining South Korea's nuclear option. If the United States withdraws its nuclear as well as conventional forces without appropriate compensatory measures, and if North Korea is determined to possess nuclear weapons, South Korea may feel it necessary to go nuclear in order to guarantee its own security and survival even though it may recognize the danger of a nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula.

A nuclear arms race in Korea will be a concern for the great powers. Among these great powers, Japan is the one which is most seriously concerned about nuclear proliferation in Korea. While there have been some efforts to normalize relations with North Korea since 1989, Japan has refused to normalize its relation with North Korea by arguing that North Korea's acceptance of IAEA safeguards is a precondition for normalization. Japan expects that North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons would destabilize the delicate balance of power in Northeast Asia.

as well as in Korea and would be followed by a South Korean nuclear weapons program. With geographical proximity to the Korean peninsula, collateral damage or nuclear radiation resulting from a nuclear war on the peninsula would likely affect Japan directly. Furthermore, what is important is how nuclear proliferation, if it occurs, will influence the Japanese posture on nuclear issues and its security policy. In a word, the prospect of a nuclearized Korean peninsula could have a profoundly destabilizing impact on Japan, strengthening the hand of the so-called "Japanese Gaullists" who believe that Japan should have a nuclear weapons capability. If Japan should go nuclear, the global nonproliferation regime would be seriously damaged. So, it is necessary to assess the relations between the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula and Japanese incentives to go nuclear.

**Japan and Nuclear Weapons**

As the only victim of a nuclear explosion, Japan has, since 1947, taken very unique arms control and disarmament measures for a power of comparable size. Among these measures, three nonnuclear principles have been an example for many other nonnuclear states. The Japanese government under Prime Minister Sato adopted these principles in 1967. The principles state that Japan will neither possess, nor manufacture, nor permit entry of nuclear weapons into the country. A strong and natural

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37. These include the various constitutional constraints such as the renouncement of war as a sovereign right of the state (Article 9), a ban on sending military personnel for combat abroad (Article 9), a ban on conscription (Article 18), a very tight civilian control over the SDF (Article 66 and 76), the three nonnuclear principles, and a ban on arms export.
public abhorrence of nuclear weapons—deriving from Japan's experiences of the nuclear holocaust at Hiroshima and Nagasaki—was behind their adoption. However, the adoption of the Three Nonnuclear Principles does not necessarily mean that Japan permanently renounces its right to possess nuclear weapons.

Many Japanese officials and scholars have stated since 1955 on several occasions that the Constitution does not rule out the possession of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. Having, in its statements, linked the scope of the terms of "defense" to the international situations and the progress of technology, the Japanese government has kept its options open. For instance, although he had stated previously Japan had no intention of possessing nuclear weapons, in 1958, in the House of Councilors, Prime Minister Kishi declared, "Depending on future developments in nuclear weaponry, I do not think that the Constitution bans nuclear weapons if they are of defensive character ...." In 1959, Kishi declared as legal the possession of "minimum amount of nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defense." In the same line, Yasuhiro Nakasone, in 1970, reaffirmed Kishi's statement: " ... if small-size nuclear weapons are within the scale of real power needed for the minimum necessary limit for self-defense, and if they are such as will not be a threat of aggression toward other nations, it is possible to say that possession thereof is possible, in legal theory." In 1970, Masami Takatsuji, director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, extended the

scope of defensive capabilities to include "defensive nuclear weapons."
While adhering to the three nonnuclear principles and calling for nuclear
disarmament, Japan has not renounced the utility of nuclear deterrence
nor characterized nuclear weapons as clearly "offensive weapons" which
would, in effect, have declared them unconstitutional. Neither has Japan
renounced the right to build Japanese nuclear weapons.

In addition, while Japan announced the three nonnuclear principles
a year before the NPT, when the NPT was up for signature in July 1968,
Japan did not sign immediately as most other states did. It took almost two
years for Japan to sign the NPT. Even after signing the NPT in February
1970, Japan did not move quickly to ratify it. The Japanese government
declared that ratification of the NPT hinged on progress in nuclear arms
reduction, guarantees concerning the security of nonnuclear states, and
equal rights for all nations with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.

Japan's reservations over the renunciation of the legal possession of
nuclear weapons, its hesitance to ratify the NPT, resistance to define
nuclear weapons as offensive weapons, and implicit acceptance of nuclear
deterrence suggest a latent Japanese interest in maintaining its nuclear
option. Why hasn't this nuclear option materialized? Domestically, the
"nuclearphobia" of the Japanese people has made it difficult for the
Japanese government to materialize its nuclear option. While,
ocasionally, right-wing conservatives have argued for nuclear weapons,
the mainstream of Japanese public opinion still is against the adoption of
nuclear weapons.
Externally, Japan's security ties with the United States, U.S. extended deterrence to Japan, and a favorable conventional military balance in Northeast Asia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union have made it unnecessary and undesirable for Japan to build independent nuclear forces. As in the case of South Korea, the United States is formally committed under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which replaced the 1951 Security Treaty to the defense of Japan against external aggression. Since then the United States has repeatedly assured Japan that it will continue to abide by the commitment it assumed under the Treaty.

American forward military strategy in East Asia since the 1950s has included the presence of theater nuclear weapons first deployed in Korea and on American naval ships. The explicit threat of nuclear retaliation for a conventional attack on Japan is a relatively new policy. President Nixon, in his 1970 Report to Congress, asserted that "the nuclear capability of our strategic theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO European or Chinese attack on our Asian allies." Nixon's secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, in 1972, extended the president's implicit guarantee for the defense of Japan, "coupling" Japan's conventional defense with the threat of escalation by the United States to the strategic nuclear level:

Our theater nuclear forces add to the deterrence of theater conventional wars in Europe and Asia; potential opponents cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the use of nuclear weapons. The threat of

escalation to strategic nuclear war remains a part of successful deterrence at this level.42

Potential aggressors had to consider the possibility that regional conventional or nuclear war against Japan would be met with U.S. retaliation including the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Japan's security, like Europe's, was explicitly coupled with the threat of U.S. strategic war as a national policy. In 1976 the Japanese National Defense Program Outline, which detailed Japan's long term defense needs, stated, "Against the nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States."43 Deterrence was formally "extended" to Japan and Western Europe by the United States and Japan welcomed such an explicit extended nuclear deterrence by the United States.44

What has made this U.S. extended deterrence credible is the favorable conventional military balance of the United States over the Soviet Union in East Asia. Whereas the United States and its European allies have been inferior to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries in conventional military forces, the United States and its Asian allies have enjoyed a favorable conventional military balance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its communist allies. Unlike in Europe, throughout the postwar era, the United States has maintained a favorable conventional military balance in Northeast Asia. The conventional forces of the Soviet Union are mainly deployed along the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviet ground forces are not concentrated. Rather they are dispersed over a vast area. So, the Soviet conventional forces do not impose a menacing threat on Japan and the United States, as they did in Central Europe. This favorable conventional military balance in East Asia has produced a totally different Japanese approach to nuclear issues.

In contrast to Central Europe, where theater nuclear forces are required to offset superior Soviet conventional capabilities, the defense of Japan has relied, so far, on a sufficient U.S.-Japan conventional defense.\(^{45}\) The superior conventional forces of the United States have made the Japanese less sensitive to the shift in the theater nuclear force balance. Japan was less shaken by the Soviet deployment of its INF forces and the superpower strategic equivalence than NATO countries, and focused more on the U.S. commitment to regional conventional power in East Asia as an

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indicator of the credibility of American extended deterrence. The credibility of U.S. extended deterrence has been maintained not by virtue of theater nuclear forces but by virtue of the superior conventional commitment Washington maintained in East Asia. The relatively balanced conventional military forces between the Soviet Union and the United States reduced the necessity to rely on theater nuclear weapons in order to deter conventional war.

How does North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons, or a nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula, change the Japanese perception of security and nuclear weapons? To a certain degree, North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons would not directly undermine Japan's security because it does not have sufficient delivery systems. However, as I said before, the prospect of a nuclearized Korean peninsula could have a profoundly destabilizing impact on Japan by strengthening the hand of the so-called "Japanese Gaullists" who believe that Japan should have a nuclear weapons capability. North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons could alter the present domestic balance of political forces in Japan. Currently, the Liberal Democratic Party is internally divided over nuclear issues and lacks the political strength to push a program against the opposition; the opposition finds an antinuclear position very useful to its political stance against the government. North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons could break this delicate equilibrium and provide an opportunity for Japan's right to make a strong case for nuclear weapons to deal with a possible North Korean threat to Japan's security. From a long-

term perspective, a unified and nuclear-armed Korea is not a favorable neighbor to Japan. If Korea is unified and armed with nuclear weapons, it could become more assertive in its relations with its neighbors. Under current conditions, Japan has the best of all world in Korea. The peninsula is divided. Each half of Korea is too busy with the other half to impose a direct threat on Japan. The United States looks after Japan's security interests. However, a reunified Korea could create a totally different strategic landscape. The expectation of such a change could possibly enhance the chance of Japan's right wing making a stronger case for a larger military establishment and nuclear weapons.

Second, Japan cannot be sure about the confinement of the conflict within the Korean peninsula. There is a high possibility for Japan to become involved in the Korean conflict. While Japan does not have a security treaty with South Korea, it is linked to the defense of South Korea through indirect trilateral linkage among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with the United States at the center. For example, the U.S. Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have command structures that treat South Korea and Japan as a single region. The Fifth Air Force has one air division at Japan's Kadena Air Base and another at South Korea's Osan Air Base. In 1984, Japan's ASDF conducted a joint training exercise with the U.S. F-16s stationed in South Korea. And South Korea and Japan have participated in naval exercise with the United States. Thus, as in the Korean War, the U.S. defense of South Korea in the event of a North Korean attack on South Korea would inevitably involve U.S. bases in Japan and could conceivably bring the war to Japan as well through the bombing of U.S. facilities and naval warfare to cut off supply lines around the Sea of
Japan. Thus, it is very likely that Japan, voluntarily or involuntarily, would become involved in another Korean conflict. Or, at least, North Korea may use its nuclear weapons, or the threat of nuclear weapons, against such joint military efforts to isolate South Korea from its allies. In order to deal with such a North Korean nuclear threat, to moderate North Korea's behavior during the crisis, and to restore order and stability in the Korean peninsula by backing South Korea and the United States, nuclear weapons might be required. In a word, nuclear weapons can be perceived as the most effective means of coping with a nuclear threat from another nuclear power.

Third is that North Korea may attempt to use North Korean nuclear weapons as bargaining chips in a "divide and rule" negotiating strategy, compelling the United States to withdraw its forces from South Korea. If the United States caves in to such a demand without appropriate supplementary measures, Japan might perceive this as a sign of the erosion of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. The U.S. withdrawal of its forces from South Korea can be perceived as a prelude of U.S. disengagement from East Asia. Under this scenario, Japan might feel abandoned by its traditional ally. This kind of feeling was dominant when the United States abandoned Vietnam. Many Japanese argued that "The U.S. is no longer willing to make sacrifices to protect friendly countries. And this presents Japan with an important problem that she must think about. Until now, Japan's security has depended on the Security Treaty's

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nuclear deterrent power. But we are now shifting from a situation in which there was no doubt about the adequacy of the deterrent to one in which we can no longer be confident about it." On another occasion when the United States announced its plan to withdraw its troops from South Korea, Japan, as well as South Korea, was shaken again. In April 1977, seven Japanese cabinet members and 235 legislators jointly stated that the withdrawal would represent "an invitation to instability in the Korean peninsula... and Northeast Asia as a whole." Japanese opinion leaders took out advertisements in major American papers declaring that the maintenance of the status quo in US-ROK relations was "absolutely vital to the security of Japan and East Asia as a whole." Thus, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea which is intended to stop North Korea's nuclear ambition would change the status quo in Northeast Asia and cause a doubt on U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. Japan should rely on itself for its own security by enhancing its military establishment.

In addition, according to the East Asia Strategic Initiative, the United States is pursuing "a phased reduction" of its deployed forces in East Asia. The reduction or withdrawal of U.S. forces in this region means that


U.S. allies should assume more defense responsibilities. The decrease in the American role in Northeast Asia means an increase in Japanese defense capability and burden sharing. It may be impossible to reduce the American regional defense role without a corresponding increase in the Japanese role in maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. The U.S. leadership will be replaced with U.S.-Japan coleadership in the region. Under this coleadership framework, Japan should play the role of regional balancer. To be a regional balancer, Japan would need more military capability in order to fill in the vacuum incurred by the reduction of U.S. forces in the region. The current Japanese military capability is insufficient to fulfil such a mission. It is inevitable for Japan to increase its military capability for the regional balancer role. The nuclear option can appeal to Japan for the following two reasons. First, the economic imperative: that is, how Japan can contribute to the maintenance of regional balance of power without breaking the 1 percent of GNP defense budget barrier. In the post-Cold War era, with a diminishing threat to its security and the global trend of detente, the Japanese government could hardly justify a defense budget increase to its domestic audience. On the other hand, with its enormous economic success and power, Japan is faced with a mounting external pressure for burden sharing and a defense buildup. Is it possible to satisfy those conflicting goals?

In order to achieve a sufficient level of conventional forces for its own defense and to maintain regional balance of power, Japan should inevitably expand its defense expenditures. On the other hand, nuclear weapons can be a quick fix for Japan. Given the development of the civilian nuclear program, the additional resources required for manufacturing nuclear weapons are quite small. It can be achieved without breaking the 1 percent barrier. The problem is how to justify such a move.

North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons, the diminishment of U.S. dominance in the region, and the erosion of the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan all can provide an excuse for the Japanese government to go nuclear. Second, if everybody, except Japan itself, in the region has acquired nuclear weapons, is it possible for Japan to play the role of regional balancer? Can we think of a balancer and its effectiveness in maintaining regional balance and stability without nuclear weapons under the condition that everybody, except the balancer itself, has nuclear weapons? Not necessarily. Unless Japan is backed by its own military establishment or by its security ties with the United States, its economic power does not guarantee that it can play such a mediator or balancer role in Northeast Asia. The effectiveness of Japan's economic power in international politics has been conditioned by its security ties with the United States. With the erosion of the US commitment to the defense of Japan and the shift in the regional balance of power, Japan cannot enjoy the same degree of influence in regional as well as international politics unless it translates its economic power into military power. If Japan translates its economic power into military power, it would become a more influential actor in international politics. It would tremendously enhance
its bargaining position. This feeling has become stronger since the Gulf War. Japan has contributed $13 billion to the Gulf War, but it did not gain any comparable benefit from its contribution. Japan has shown its resentment for the treatment it received during the Gulf crisis. It felt the limits of economic power. To become a real regional balancer and to enhance its position in international politics, Japan must increase its military capability. At the initial stages, Japan may focus on a conventional military buildup. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to become more influential and to maintain the regional balance of power, if other regional powers such as South Korea and North Korea acquire nuclear weapons and if the United States reduces its defense parameter.\(^{52}\)

In sum, North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons will increase the probability of a Japanese nuclear weapons program for the reasons discussed in above. A nuclear arms competition in Northeast Asia will undermine the stability of the region as well as global stability and peace. How should we avoid such a disastrous case?

**Conclusion**

There would be no greater common security interest than preventing Pyongyang from going nuclear in Northeast Asia. Right now, North Korea possesses the detonator of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. It is quite uncertain how the concerned states will react to North Korea's

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acquisition of nuclear weapons. But, at least, we can expect that the probability of nuclear proliferation in the region will increase. How can we prevent North Korea from going nuclear and how can we break the chain of nuclear proliferation? Furthermore, if we cannot, what should we do in order to preserve peace and stability in a nuclearized Korea?

As we have discussed before, North Korea seems to have various incentives to go nuclear such as the achievement of an independent nuclear deterrent capability, maintenance of the military balance, an economic rationale, political and diplomatic independence, domestic stability, survival of the DPRK, and etc. It seems that these objectives can be achieved in other ways without going nuclear. And also, while the nuclear option may appear to be quite attractive immediately, from long term perspective the consequences of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the possible reactions of other states would outweigh the short term benefits. We cannot force North Korea to quit its nuclear weapons program without providing ways out of it. So we should try to show North Korea the alternatives for the achievement of its objectives and to encourage North Korea to choose the alternatives over nuclear option.

From the military strategic point of view, the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the South in exchange for North Korea's renunciation of its nuclear weapons program and acceptance of the safeguards system may be one possible way to stop nuclear proliferation. As I said before, the presence of U.S. troops in the South and the U.S. nuclear deterrent threat has been one of the most important security concerns of North Korea and one of North Korea's incentives to achieve its own independent nuclear deterrent
capability. Thus, if we eliminate this security concern, the probability of North Korea going nuclear will decrease.

It may be true that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has played a very significant role in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula by providing additional security to South Korea and imposing nuclear deterrent threat on North Korea. However, the strategic utility of nuclear weapons in Korea has diminished as South Korea has become stronger economically and more self-reliant for its own defense. South Korea is expected to achieve a self-sufficient defense establishment by the mid-1990s.

If the South Korean military could manage the defense of its country without any U.S. forces, it could surely do without nuclear weapons. What is the necessity and rationale of deploying U.S. nuclear weapons under condition of the military parity, or South Korean superiority? What is the role of nuclear weapons, if conventional deterrence and a conventional military balance are sufficient enough to guarantee stability in Korea? Furthermore, the United States has shown its ability to project and use its conventional forces effectively in the Gulf War. There seems to be no good reason for the United States to continue the deployment of its nuclear weapons there. The tactical nuclear weapons of the United States would be a useful supplement to U.S. and South Korean conventional forces in halting a North Korean assault, but they are not indispensable either in a conflict or as a deterrent. The deployment of U.S. nuclear forces has and will become a political symbol of U.S. commitment to its allies rather than a military-strategic function in Korea.\footnote{Ralph N. Clough, \textit{Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 368-371.} Such a political assurance can be
obtained in other ways. The process of removing U.S. nuclear forces from South Korea should be incremental and cautious since a sudden shift in U.S. policy might strain US-ROK relations. For example, ambassador Hong-Choo Hyun said that his government would oppose any removal of U.S. nuclear weapons if it amounts to a quid pro quo for a halt to North Korea's nuclear weapons development. However, on the other hand, there are quite few alternatives to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program, other than the conditional, phased removal of U.S. nuclear weapons. The South Koreans might well recognize this fact. What they worry about is the erosion of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Seoul. Thus, it is necessary for the United States to assure the South Korean government that the removal of U.S. nuclear forces from South Korea does not necessarily mean the abandonment of South Korea. If nuclear reassurances to Seoul are required, the United State can provide them by using less controversial nuclear-capable sea-based systems as it does in case of Japan. And also, the United States can help South Korea establish a self-sufficient defense through the selective transfer of military technologies. Thus, we can say that President Bush's plan is on the right track. This plan will eliminate North Korea's excuse for not signing IAEA's safeguards agreement and will create a more favorable condition for negotiating arms control.

The removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea may be a necessary condition for stopping North Korea's nuclear weapons program and can solve our immediate concern over North Korea's nuclear ambition, but it may not be a sufficient condition to resolve permanently the nuclear

proliferation issue on the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. The removal of U.S. nuclear weapons still leave nuclear option open for both Koreas and will not resolve the source of instability in Korea. Both Koreas still think of nuclear weapons and may possibly opt for them. For South Korea, the current conventional military inferiority vis-a-vis North Korea would make the South Korean government think of nuclear weapons as a strategic equalizer. For North Korea, the expectation of a shift in the military balance in favor of South Korea would be an incentive to go nuclear to retain its military edge against South Korea and to guarantee its survival. Thus, an arms control regime is required that will remove such a strategic incentive for both Koreas, provide each side with a sufficient defense to repel aggression without the offensive preponderance that, regardless of intent, is perceived as threatening by the other side. The removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea urges the South Korean government to think of "structural" arms control more seriously.

The South Korean government has been taking a very reluctant posture toward structural arms control measures. It can no longer delay the discussion of structural arms control, given the U.S. decisions to withdraw its nuclear weapons and to reduce its conventional forces in South Korea. It should take more responsibility for its own defense. To make the military situation stable, it has two options: increase of its own military establishment, or decrease the military establishments on both sides through arms control talks. The first contains the danger of an intense arms race between the two Koreas and makes nuclear options more attractive to North Korea since North Korea appears to be unable to match South Korea in a conventional arms race. On the other hand, the arms
control option will be mutually acceptable and make the inter-Korean relations more stable. It is time for the South Korean government to think of structural arms control more seriously and propose its own version of a specified arms control plan. Through such arms control talks, we could reach a strategic balance in which neither side could hope to prevail against the other. Such a conventional arms control regime, or progress in arms control negotiations, would facilitate the process of the phased removal of U.S. forces, including nuclear weapons, from South Korea.\footnote{The detail on Korean arms control will be covered later in this dissertation.}

It may be ironic that North Korea's nuclear weapons program could possibly generate momentum for arms control negotiations in the Korean peninsula. In recent years, arms control has become popular in inter-Korean dialogue. But, there has been no dialogue on arms control. Rather there have been two monologues on arms control. Each party has its own arms control agenda and is very reluctant to review the other's arms control proposals seriously. For example, South Korea argues for CBMs first, whereas North Korea argues for mutual force reductions first. It has been very difficult for both Koreas to find a common agenda of arms control. However, nuclear weapons could provide them an opportunity to talk about a common agenda in their security relations. And it could probably lead them to reach an agreement on the fact that conventional arms control negotiations are needed to avoid a nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula. Since either side will retain an incentive to go nuclear depending upon the result in conventional arms control, this fear will probably force both Koreas to work closely in conventional arms control to
avoid the disastrous consequences of a nuclear arms race in the Korean peninsula. In a word, the probability of nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms race which is heightened by North Korea's nuclear weapons program could provide an opportunity for an opening of arms control and keep the momentum of arms control in inter-Korean relations. It is necessary for both Koreas to have a conventional arms control regime to weaken each other's incentive to go nuclear and to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

Another strong incentive of North Korea to go nuclear is related to its growing international isolation and survival of regime. North Korea did not start nuclear-weapons relevant activities such as until the mid-1980s when North Korea began to be isolated from the international community. Given the decades-old North Korean nuclear research program, if it really wanted to go nuclear, it would have started weapons relevant activities earlier than it actually did. Why didn't North Korea incorporate a nuclear weapons program in its "Four-point Military Guidelines"? Why didn't North Korea start its own nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s when South Korea intended to launch a nuclear weapons program? Why didn't North Korea choose the nuclear option over a conventional military build-up in the late 1970s?57

It may not be a coincidence to see the speed-up of the construction of nuclear-weapons relevant facilities and the further isolation of North Korea

57. By the late 1970s, North Korea had 720,000 troops. It has increased its troops to more than 1.1 million.
in the international community at the same time. The success of Seoul's Nordpolitik and the changes in the communist world have put North Korea in a very unfavorable situation. It has become one of few pariah states in the world today. While the legitimacy of South Korea has been enhanced, that of North Korea faces a dilemma. The succession from father to son has been criticized even by its socialist allies. As I said before, North Korea may have perceived a nuclear weapons program as a means to boost the legitimacy of his regime and to ensure its future survival under Kim Jong Il's leadership.

Nuclear weapons program may be the last card that North Korea can play to ensure the survival of the DPRK under the shifting international security and political environment.

Being isolated from the international community and having few diplomatic relations with the outside world, nuclear weapons can enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the outside world. Is it possible for North Korea to gain the substantial international attention without nuclear weapons? Is it possible for North Korea to have a better bargaining position vis-a-vis the West? Since 1989 there have been 19 contacts between North Korea and the United States in Beijing. The main factor which has contributed to the opening of such talks between the United States and North Korea is the possibility North Korean acquiring nuclear weapons and the U.S. concern to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If North Korea had no such a program, is it possible to imagine such a direct contact between the United States and North Korea? Not necessarily. Thus, it seems that North Korea's nuclear weapons program has tremendous diplomatic and political implications.
If North Korea's nuclear weapons program is intended to enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the outside world and to ensure the survival of the DPRK in the future, we should devise some ways through which North Korea can be incorporated into world community without going nuclear and that would ensure the survival of the DPRK for the time being. These seems no good reason to oppose diplomatic contacts with North Korea. And there is also no good reason not to recognize the legitimacy of the DPRK which seems to be a *de facto* truth. By recognizing the DPRK, we can free ourselves from the past and work for the future. The recognition of the DPRK does not necessarily mean the permanent fixation of the division of Korea. Rather it may contribute to the creation of a period of peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea. During this period, both Koreas can work together to devise a way to reunify their motherland and the other great powers can help them. It could provide more chances for national reconciliation. North and South Korea have become a member of the United Nations. The admission to the U.N. provided North Korea an opportunity to become incorporated into the international community and a chance to enhance its direct contact with the United States as well as other democratic countries. On the other hand, the United States can put more pressure on North Korea to accept IAEA's safeguard inspection by using its diplomatic leverage over North Korea. North Korea cannot simply ignore the pressure in order to establish a new type of relations with other members of international community.

In sum, the conditional phased removal of U.S. forces accompanied by progress in arms control, and the enhancement of the contact between the two Koreas and between North Korea and outside world can eliminate
the sources of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. While showing our resolve to meet North Korea's challenge and the counterproductiveness of its nuclear weapons program, we should take into account North Korea's genuine security concerns and address those concerns in order to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In response to that, North Korea should show a genuine intention to reduce tension in the Korean peninsula. For example, North Korea should accept the South's call for defensive restructuring, political CBMs, and verifiable guarantees that Pyongyang has given up its nuclear ambitions. What is important here is that we should try to create a situation in which neither side has an incentive to go nuclear. This final point leads us to look at the role of the superpowers in post-Cold War era. The way in which North Korea's nuclear ambition is dealt with and resolved will probably set a pattern for the great powers handling of the nuclear proliferation issue in the future.

There is a clear linkage between nonproliferation and a superpower's extended deterrence to its allies. Alliances with the superpowers are an extremely important factor in non-proliferation.

Superpower's guarantee of its extended nuclear deterrence to its allies in exchange for their renunciation of nuclear ambitions has contributed to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. The situation in which the NPT has been maintained is one in which the world is divided into two alliances centered around the two superpowers, each protecting its allies from each other with their nuclear guarantee. This would be a non-proliferating world. It might even be a more peaceful world, as local conflicts would be subjected to greater control by the superpowers; in fact, if
they were inside one of the two blocs, the hegemonic superpower would intervene as peacemaker; if they occurred between countries in the two blocs, the superpowers would try to prevent or at least contain them to avoid escalation into a general nuclear conflict.\textsuperscript{58}

However, this situation has changed over the past few years. As superpower relations have improved and as they have begun to change their perception of each other from enemy to partner, the necessity to maintain such an alliance has diminished. Thus, the credibility of a superpower's nuclear extended deterrence has also diminished. Secondly, the superpowers seem to be finding it hard to ensure continuing protection to the same extent as before, mostly for reasons related to relative economic decline. In a word, the background which allowed the establishment of the NPT regime has weakened. As the foundations of the NPT weaken, we can expect that the formerly protected countries would have a stronger interest in achieving an independent nuclear deterrent posture. The North Korean case may be the first of this sort of possible proliferation. How can we reinforce the foundation of the nonproliferation regime?

Nuclear protection of the superpowers for their allies is needed when a threat to their security is present. If there is no threat, the protection is not necessarily required. This means that the superpowers should try to expand their newly-emerged relations to the periphery where the threshold states are situated. Superpower cooperation in resolving the local and regional disputes should be enhanced before these disputes override

superpower relations. And also, in dealing with the threshold states, the superpowers should take into account the legitimate security interests of the threshold states.

In sum, the success of nonproliferation in the future depends on how quickly the United States and the Soviet Union restructure their political relationship from the point of view of preventing nuclear proliferation, how much they can expand their cooperative relations to nonproliferation policies, and whether they will be able to realistically examine their own security interests with due regard for the threshold states, not on IAEA's safeguards system or the legal obligation to the NPT. The North Korean nuclear weapons program will give them such a chance. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as other great powers, should utilize this chance to create and reinforce the foundation of nonproliferation for the future.

CHAPTER IV

Sino-Soviet Arms Control

When the Soviet Union and China were intense rivals, arms control couldn't be considered as a way to solve the security problems of both socialist giants. However, as the Sino-Soviet relationship has steadily improved since the early 1980s, arms control has become a viable option for the national security problems of both countries. It is also clear that substantive Sino-Soviet arms control has already begun with considerable success. What makes Sino-Soviet arms control different and distinctive from other arms control measures we are familiar with is that Sino-Soviet arms control has a very informal character and is based on several unilateral measures as a starting point of arms reduction. The Soviet cuts of its forces in the Far East by 200,000\(^1\) have been in tacit response to unilateral moves by China to withdraw many of its troops from areas close to the Sino-Soviet frontier, and then to cut the size of the PLA by one million men between 1985 and 1987. Throughout this arms reduction process, there

\(^1\) It is part of the Soviet force reduction program by 500,000 which was delivered by President Gorbachev on December 7, 1988, in his speech at the U. N. Of the 500,000 troops included in the coming reductions, 260,000 are supposed to come from Asia, and 240,000 from Europe. Of the 260,000 from Asia, only 60,000 will come from the Southern Theater, and a massive 200,000 will come from the Far Eastern TVD.
has been no formal agreement between the Soviet Union and China. They are neither negotiated nor formal. The formal agreement on mutual reductions of military forces in border areas and the guidance of enhancing trust in the military field has come after the substantial reduction of forces in border areas has taken place. The arms reductions along the Sino-Soviet border have preceded the full normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union and China have utilized arms control to strengthen the groundwork of the Sino-Soviet detente. Arms reductions on the Sino-Soviet frontier are not the outcome of political detente. Rather, to a certain degree, they are the one of various inputs of Sino-Soviet detente.

All these characteristics of Sino-Soviet arms reductions challenge the conventional wisdom of arms control in the West. Why have they taken an informal rather than a formal approach? What makes such an informal approach successful in Sino-Soviet tension reduction? What makes it possible for both countries to take unilateral measures instead of reductions of forces based on extensive mutual arms reduction talks? How does arms reduction precede the political normalization? Is it possible to maintain such a momentum of arms reduction in future Sino-Soviet relations? What

2. The Soviet Union and China signed the agreement on mutual reduction of forces on border areas on April 24, 1990 as part of six agreements when Premier Li Peng visited Moscow in April 1990. The six agreements include: first, agreement on jointly building nuclear power stations and the Soviet Union granting credit to China; second, a consultation accord between the two foreign ministries; third, program for long-term cooperation and development between China and the Soviet Union in the fields of economy, science, and technology; fourth, mutual reduction of military forces on border areas and the guidance of enhancing trust in the military field; fifth, cooperation in peaceful use and studies of space; and sixth, a credit agreement of daily-use commodities provided by China to the Soviet Union. See FBIS-CHI-90-080, April 25, 1990, pp. 16-17.
can we learn from Sino-Soviet arms reductions? How much applicable is this informal and unilateral arms reduction to other regions in the world?

**Sino-Soviet Split and Arms Race**

The fact that the ups and downs in the Sino-Soviet relationship have had a major bearing on the security and foreign policies of countries in many parts of the world, including Europe, hardly needs re-emphasizing here. The two socialist giants share a 7,500 kilometer-long vulnerable frontier, with a history of invasion and counterinvasion. In the early 1950s, when the relationship between Moscow and Beijing seemed so intimate that some believed a virtual power-political "monolith" had been created, the potential of the combined ideological influence and military power of these two giant communist states was regarded as a key factor in the East-West balance of power by imposing a menacing threat to the West. However, this communist alliance did not last long for various reasons.

Khrushchev's successors began the buildup when they decided that Khrushchev's removal had not altered Mao's profound hostility toward the Soviet Union and that they faced a permanent Chinese challenge to the legitimacy of the Soviet borders with China. They resolved to undertake a

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long-term strengthening of their position in the Far East, both to ensure their hold on the frontiers they claimed and, more broadly, to create the means to exert pressure on China. Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev was willing to devote resources to the major expansion of the Soviet ground forces associated with this long-term buildup in the Far East.\(^5\)

These initial Soviet motives were reinforced in 1969 by the outbreak of a long series of border clashes with China. This crisis resulted from increasingly active border patrolling by both sides intended to assert jurisdiction at the many disputed points controlled by the Soviet Union but claimed by China. Although the military challenge to the Soviet version of the Sino-Soviet border was averted, the Chinese have never renounced their jurisdiction over the disputed areas and continually challenged the Soviet Union. This adamant Chinese stand has helped perpetuate the Soviet determination to continue its military buildup to ensure stability in the disputed areas and to meet the Chinese challenge.

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5. In his comparison of Soviet policy toward China of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, William G. Hyland remarked: "Where Khrushchev had relished polemicizing with the Chinese and set some store by his ability to persuade other Communists of the righteousness of his own cause, the Brezhnev regime downgraded the purely polemical aspects of the contest with Beijing. Whereas Khrushchev brought primarily political and psychological pressures on China, without any real threat of military action, the Brezhnev regime began building its military forces, with the implicit threat of intervention. Where Khrushchev wanted to win over the majority of the Communist movement and reestablish Soviet preeminence, the Brezhnev regime came to see the contest more in conventional power terms. In short, in the years that followed Khrushchev’s removal, the Soviet leadership began to pursue policies designed to contain and counter Chinese influence. The conflict was transformed from an ideological contest to a power struggle between two potential enemy states." William G. Hyland, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Search for New Security Strategies," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4(Fall 1979), p. 52.
The Soviet military buildup in the Far East slowed between 1972 and 1977. The Soviets hoped for improvements in their relationship with China after the death of Mao. But such Soviet expectations turned out wrong. Mao's successors rejected Soviet overtures and insisted that Moscow "prove its sincerity with deeds" by withdrawing from the disputed areas and by totally undoing the Soviet force buildup in the Far East since Khrushchev's time. This the Soviets regarded as out of the question.

In addition, Soviet disappointment with new Chinese leadership coincided with a steady deterioration in Soviet-American relations after the mid-1970s, in large part because of a growth in Soviet efforts to expand influence and presence in the Third World at the expense of the United States. The expansionist Soviet activities in Africa and Asia simultaneously exacerbated Chinese anxieties about Soviet expansionist tendencies. To deal with the threat posed by the Soviet military buildup, the Chinese adopted a policy of using political means to try to defuse the Soviet military buildup. China called for a "united front" of the countries threatened by Moscow's force buildup to resist Soviet hegemony. This Chinese call was welcomed by the West. The general assessment of Western observers in the

6. It is uncertain why the Soviets slowed down the military buildup during this period. They might conclude that the level of deterrence they had achieved was sufficient for the time being.


8. In addition, China demanded the resolution of two issues: withdrawal from Afghanistan and Cambodian resolution. In all, these constitute the so-called "three obstacles" in Sino-Soviet normalization.

9. For example, the Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia and its support for Vietnam had contributed to the formation of the so-called "united front against Soviet hegemonism."
1970s and 1980s was that as long as the situation along the Soviet-Chinese border would not get out of hand, the mutual military buildup along the frontier would effectively reduce the ability of the Soviet Union to exert military pressure elsewhere. In a word, the Chinese "second front" was deemed of strategic importance in tying down an appreciable portion of the military forces available to the Soviet leadership.\textsuperscript{10} Thus the Soviets ironically paved the way for the United States and China to begin to normalize their relations and to develop closer security cooperation against Moscow. To cope with the problems caused by such security cooperation between the United States, China, and Japan in the Far East, the Soviets began to increase their military capabilities in the Far East in 1978.\textsuperscript{11}

In sum, the Sino-Soviet arms race grew as the result of mutual animosity and a sense of insecurity. Furthermore, the indirect involvement of the United States in the Sino-Soviet rivalry by aligning itself with China has made it more complex and difficult for them to break out of the vicious circle of their arms race and rivalry.

\textsuperscript{10} Actually, the Soviet military buildup along the Chinese border has been accomplished without corresponding reductions on other fronts.

\textsuperscript{11} While the Soviet military buildup in the 1960s and early 1970s was directed to cope with Chinese threat, there are some additional Soviet motives in military buildup in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They are: (1) to ensure that Soviet military capabilities in the Far East remained adequate against any combination of Soviet adversaries, and particularly in the event of the development Sino-U.S.-Japanese military collaboration; (2) to ensure, through the threat constantly posed on China's northern borders, that China was dissuaded from undertaking effective military action to counter initiatives by Soviet clients on China's southern border; and (3) to create in the Soviet Far East a platform to assist in the future exploitation of opportunities for further geopolitical advance in South and Southwest Asia. See Harry Gelman, \textit{The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China}, R-2943-AF (Santa Monica, Calif: RAND Corporation, 1982), pp. xiii-xiv.
Sino-Soviet Detente and Tension Reduction

Until recently, many observers seem to have convinced themselves that the chances for full Sino-Soviet rapprochement were practically nil. The interests of the two communist giants seemed fundamentally at odds in most areas. Thus, Sino-Soviet relations appeared to be fundamentally antagonistic and irreconcilable. However, against this "irreconcilability thesis," since the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and China have begun to improve their relations. Compared to the neo-detente between the United States and the Soviet Union during the second half of the 1980s, the hallmark of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1980s has been slow, unspectacular, but steady detente. By 1981-82, Beijing was more receptive to the idea of Sino-Soviet tension reduction. It was China that first recognized the Soviet Union as a socialist state and began reducing its troop strength along the frontier. Then, in Tashkent on March 24, 1982, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev claimed: "We have not denied and do not now deny the existence of a socialist system in China—although Beijing's fusion with the imperialists' policy in the world arena is, of course, at variance with the interests of socialism." This Brezhnev's assertion in Tashkent that a socialist system existed in China reversed the antagonistic approach of the Soviet Union.


13. This has generated the so-called "irreconcilability thesis" in Sino-Soviet relations.

toward China and indicated that the Soviet Union was trying to lay the groundwork for increased efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

Over the course of the last decade, several meetings have taken place between leading officials on each side. The Gorbachev visit to Beijing in May 1989 was the culmination of a long and complex process that provided obvious gains for both China and the Soviet Union.\(^1\) This upsurge of contacts and summit meeting between Deng and Gorbachev fundamentally altered each country's stereotypes of the other that had emerged, among other reasons, as a result of the Cultural Revolution's frenzied anti-Soviet polemics, the 1969 border clashes, and the Soviet military buildup. Neither China nor the Soviet Union regards the other as an immediate security threat. How has this unexpected thing taken place? What are the factors which have contributed to such a normalization between the Soviet Union and China?

First, the deterioration of both socialist giants' relations with the United States during the early 1980s provided a momentum to normalize their bilateral relations. Chinese-American relations were beginning to deteriorate because of Chinese concerns that the Reagan administration was moving back toward a "two Chinas" policy. Although Chinese dissatisfaction with Reagan's policy toward Taiwan was not the sole factor which brought about a shift in Chinese foreign policy, it was probably one of a number of factors.\(^2\) And, as China became strong and gained self-
confidence, it refused to be played by the superpowers and to be a "junior partner" of the United States. The proud, highly nationalistic Chinese were not suited to be the junior partner of the United States any more than they were suited to be Moscow's junior partner in the 1950s.  

On January 24, 1983, *Beijing Review* wrote: "China adopts an independent diplomacy. China will never tag after any big power or bloc of powers nor will it succumb to pressure from any big nation. China has no intention of balancing the scales between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are against whoever seeks hegemony, be it the United States or the Soviet Union." Their stress on "independence" reflected a desire both to gain greater maneuverability in the future and to carve out a fully independent place in world politics.

The Soviet Union worried about the reversal of the tendency of Soviet-U.S. relations to develop faster than Sino-American ties during the Carter administration. The Soviet Union tried to block Sino-American rapprochement by offering three reasons. First, the Soviet Union was a more important actor in world affairs than China, and hence had more to offer as a partner. Second, China was too weak to be as vital for the United

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Chinese dissatisfaction with trade, technology transfer, and human right contributed to the deterioration of its relations with the United States.

17. China's fear of dependence and ideological contamination, and differences with the United States on regional conflicts led to the decision at the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982 to pursue an independent foreign policy devoid of alliance.


States in the long run. That is, the United States could ensure its own security only through arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Third, China was too unstable to be considered a reliable ally.\(^{20}\)

This Soviet effort to isolate China failed to prevent Sino-American rapprochement. However, the discord between China and the United States over Taiwan, technology export, trade, and human rights provided the Soviets an opportunity to manipulate the strategic triangle for their own interests. The Soviets had equally powerful incentives for wanting detente with China. At a time when Soviet relations with the United States were at a low ebb, the Soviets had a strong incentive to try to play their "China card" against the United States. By improving Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow could hope to put some pressure on the Reagan administration to be more flexible in strategic arms control negotiations.\(^{21}\) Improving relations with China would also help ease the Soviet Union's two-front problem by undercutting any strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing. China's even handed approach toward the two superpowers was quite acceptable for the Soviets. The Soviets found that as long as China would maintain an open door to the north as well as to the West, their interests would be better served than under U.S.-Chinese detente.

In a word, in an atmosphere of cool superpower and Sino-American relations, both socialist giants saw more opportunities to serve their national interests in improving their bilateral relations to counter the


renewed activism of American policy. For them, it would be better to have at least one positive relation than to have two negative relations in the strategic triangular situation.

Second, as both countries have adopted reformist measures, they have grown closer together, recognizing the similarities of their ideologies and domestic political systems. The diverging domestic politics and ideologies of both communist powers is one of the most critical areas of the original Sino-Soviet split. In the 1950s, China's rejection of the unsuitable Soviet model of development was a prime element of Sino-Soviet split. In the 1960s the rift was widened by Mao's rejection of Soviet revisionism which was supposedly corrupting China's own revolution. During the 1970s the Soviet Union's hostile attitude towards China was related to the Kremlin's perception that Chinese politics were not changing as Beijing continued to pursue "Maoism without Mao." However, Sino-Soviet rapprochement began in 1980 when China decided to abandon radical its political experiments and to pursue pragmatism, and the Soviet Union began to accept that China's policy changes were real and important. China's new variant of socialism was one that the Soviet Union found more or less compatible, meaning that both states have virtually ceased mutual recrimination on internal politics.

The compatibility of two socialist systems further increased as the Soviet Union has adopted reformist measures since 1985. The Soviet Union


23. Deng's pragmatism is well represented by his word, "White Cat, Black Cat." This means that it doesn't matter whether it is a black cat or white cat as long as it catches mouse.
used to dismiss such Chinese innovations as joint ventures with foreigners, special economic zones, and so-called stock market mechanisms to guide the economy. The Soviet Union now has taken up all of these new ideas in one form or another as part of the search for effective economic perestroika.

In sum, the need to reform the political, economic, and social system of the Soviet Union and China has widened the commonality between the Soviet Union and China. They have found more common elements in their reformist measures and they recognize that they can learn from each other. It was led to the lessening of the ideological competition between the Soviet Union and China.

Third, in order to carry out socialist reform successfully, the Soviet Union and China are in need of a long-standing and stable international environment. The management of the external environment is crucial for the success of reform for two main reasons. First, economic reform of a socialist command economy requires a lot of resources. It is almost impossible to pursue economic reform on one hand and to maintain high military expenditures on the other.

A hostile, threatening external security environment would worsen a country's economic situation by wasting badly needed resources in the defense sector. On the other hand, the creation of a non-hostile, friendly external environment will enable a country to save its valuable resources for economic reform by lowering its military expenditures.

Second, the hostile external environment would allow the

24. This fact has been very strongly emphasized by the Chinese leaders. Premier Li Peng and General Secretary of CPC Jiang Zemin, when they visited Moscow, emphasized the importance of maintenance of stable international order for the success of socialist reform.
conservatives of both socialist countries to resurge and to redirect reformist measures. It is necessary to create a friendly, non-threatening external environment which would support the power base of the reformers in both socialist giants.

*Arms Reductions and Military Detente*

As their political relations have improved, Sino-Soviet security relations have also improved. Since the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and China have thinned out their forces in the frontier. China unilaterally began to withdraw many of its troops from areas close to the Sino-Soviet frontier and then to cut the size of their armed forces by one million men between 1985 and 1987. In response, the Soviet Union has begun to respond positively to the so-called "three obstacles" to normalization of Sino-Soviet relations--Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, force reductions in the Far East, and the Vietnamese-Cambodian issue.\(^{25}\) The Soviet Union completed the pullout of its forces from Afghanistan in February 1989. Within Gorbachev's plan to cut 500,000 men from the Soviet armed forces which was announced at the U. N. on December 7, 1988, the Soviet Union is expected to reduce its Far Eastern Forces by 200,000. And the Soviet Union has begun to show some flexibility on the Cambodian issue. By pulling out its troops from Mongolia, the Soviet Union has lessened its threat to the Chinese capital. Again some Chinese sources suggest that they will now reduce their armed forces by a further 500,000 in response to the Gorbachev

cuts. And in April 1990, the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement on the principles guiding such reductions in their military relations.

As I said before, these tension reductions measures can be explained by the three factors we have discussed: political incentive, expansion of commonality, and economic incentive. However, these tension reduction measures are quite distinctive. These arms reductions along the Sino-Soviet border are not the result of an extensive negotiation between the Soviet Union and China. These reductions have been initiated unilaterally and reciprocated by the other. There is also much more scope for informal arrangements and possibly confidence-building measures. In a word, Sino-Soviet arms reductions have shown a very distinctive pattern which cannot be found in European and superpower arms control. European and superpower arms control have been directed toward the establishment of a concrete military balance between the adversaries. They tend to be bogged down by various technical problems such as classification and counting of weapons, verification, compliance, etc. And they tend to take a long time to reach an agreement. But not in Sino-Soviet arms reductions. Why are there such differences? What are the reasons for this pattern of arms reductions?

First, we can think of the achievement of a rough military balance along the border and the enhancement of the sense of security on both sides of the border. As we have seen in many cases of arms control, military parity has been a preconditional factor. Since the early 1980s, the military balance along the Sino-Soviet border has been quite stable. By the early 1980s, the Soviet Union had 53 divisions, with approximately 500,000 troops, and China had 75 divisions with 1.5 million troops. China maintained the numerical advantage over the Soviet Union over the years. However, while
not increasing its force size in the Far East, the Soviet Union has effectively coped with the Chinese numerical advantage through its modernization plan since 1978.\textsuperscript{26}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Soviet Union</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. Troops</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
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**Comparison Between the Chinese and Soviet Ground Force Levels in the Sino-Soviet Border Region**

Figure 4.1 Troop Deployment Along Sino-Soviet Border as of 1990. Source: *Defense of Japan 1990*

Most analysts agree that although the Soviet Union has fewer troops and equipment than China along their shared border, the overall quality of

Soviet forces gives Moscow a minor edge. The Soviets were also convinced that while they did not have sufficient offensive capabilities, they believed they had sufficient defensive/deterrent capabilities against China. On the other hand, while military modernization has received the lowest priority in the Chinese "Four Modernizations," China has effectively modernized its nuclear forces. In May 1980 China tested its first full range ICBM, in September 1981 its first MIRV warhead, in October 1982 its first SLBM, and in October 1985 its first SLCM. Over the years, China has achieved a more effective deterrent capability against limited Soviet nuclear threats.


30. China was seriously concerned about Soviet SS-20 in the Far East which would undermine Chinese minimum deterrence capabilities. In
military parity along the border has allowed both countries to free themselves from the sense of insecurity and made them more confident about their posture vis-a-vis the other. We can think that once such a military balance arrived, both-the Soviet Union and China-would have tried to maintain such a balance through either extensive arms control negotiations or a corresponding military buildup. However, it is not the case in Sino-Soviet arms reduction. Since the early 1980s China has begun to break away from this delicate military balance by undertaking a unilateral cut of its armed forces and a withdrawal of its forces from the border. These unilateral Chinese moves have been reciprocated by the Soviet Union.

The western theory of arms control seems inadequate and inappropriate to explain such a pattern. The closest explanation we can find may be the Robert Jervis' article, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in which he argues that unilateral arms reduction can take place when an offensive posture is distinguishable from a defensive one and when defense has the advantage over the offense. His argument is partially applicable, but not sufficient to explain the Sino-Soviet arms reductions. British scholar Gerald Segal, in his several articles, has tried

mid-1983, the Soviet Union responded to and lessened this Chinese concern of SS-20s by saying that any Soviet weapons removed from the European theater would be destroyed, not transferred.


to explain such a pattern by using the concept of "defense culture." Defense culture refers to "the elite's perception of the fundamental and enduring components of defense policy through which problems of current defense policy are filtered and refracted." The most distinctive element of the defense culture of China and the Soviet Unions is "peace through strength" and the way in which strength, or "correlation of forces," is defined. I have no objection to the second concept—multifaceted dimension of forces or strength in Chinese or Russian defense culture. However, it is quite doubtful that the defense culture concept of "peace through strength" is peculiar only to China, the Soviet Union, or both, and necessary as well as sufficient to explain such a pattern. No one in the world is willing to reduce tension until it feels more confident about security and no one wants to become inferior. Peace through strength is universal, not particular only in Sino-Soviet relations. And also it is contradictory to see unilateral arms reductions of China and the Soviet Union when they don't occupy a dominant military position vis-a-vis the other if their defense culture is based on the concept of peace through strength. China did not and does not possess military superiority over the Soviet Union. But it has launched unilateral arms reductions. If it really wanted peace through strength, China would have launched a tremendous military buildup rather than unilateral arms reductions.


It seems that while Segal does capture some elements of Chinese and Soviet defense culture, he does not go far enough to capture the other essences of the defense culture of China which have contributed to such a unilateral arms reductions and an informal approach to arms control. We can say that Chinese defense culture has four underlying strategic themes: extramilitary and extracombative emphasis, the primacy of defense, flux and fluidity, and negativism and minimalism. To a certain degree, the Soviet Union, or the Russians, share some of these strategic traditions. We can see more similarities of the strategic themes in Sino-Soviet relations and than in U.S-Soviet or U.S.-Chinese relations. These similarities in their strategic tradition, or defense culture, have contributed to successful arms reduction in their military relations. The differences in the approach to security issues and defense culture between the United States and the Soviet Union have made it very difficult to understand each other and, consequently, to achieve progress in their arms control negotiations. On the other hand, the similarities in their strategic/defense culture have made it much easier for the Soviets and Chinese to achieve a successful arms reduction in a short period of time once it got on track. Thus, in order to understand and explain the distinctive character of arms reductions in Sino-Soviet relations, it is necessary to look into the strategic/defense culture and to link it to arms control.

The term extramilitary refers to factors beyond those that are purely military, such as the plan and action of troops maneuver, military

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An underlying Chinese strategic theme is the aversion to the sole emphasis on, and the immediate application of, purely military means. Prior to the start of a military operation, all extramilitary factors should be considered and all extramilitary instruments exhausted. The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." A corollary of the strategic theme of extramilitary emphasis is integration. Multiple factors—extramilitary and military—are to be considered and employed in an integrated manner. This Chinese strategic tradition of extramilitarism corresponds to Soviet military theorists and officials who have always seen the prevention of war as a political task, essentially unrelated to the day-to-day activities of the military establishment. In the Soviet perspective, it is the duty of the statesman and the diplomat to manage the political environment for potential armed conflict. In the Soviet view, war has deep political causes—it cannot be triggered by "mechanistic instabilities" in the balance of forces. However, if extramilitary factors fail to prevent war, the Soviet military establishment would do its duty and endeavor to conduct it in efficient pursuit of a clear, favorable military outcome. In a word, there is a clear

35. In Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, certain key extramilitary factors are: (1) *Dao*—includes the domestic-political, the socio-economic, the moral/psychological, and the moralistic/ethical factors; (2) *Heaven*—includes the temporal factors (seasonality and meteorology); and (3) *Earth*—includes the spatial factors (alliance, diplomacy, geopolitics, and geomorphology or terrain). *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, translated by Lionel Giles (Taipei: Confucius Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 1.1, Section 2.


similarity between the Soviet Union and China in their emphasis on the role of extramilitary factors as a way to prevent war.

What is the implication of this extramilitarism in Sino-Soviet relations and how does it affect Sino-Soviet arms control? The most important implication we can draw from this extramilitarist tradition is that they don't define the situation and national security from a purely military perspective. National security depends on not only what kinds of weapons you have and how much you have, but also how much you can effectively manipulate non-military factors which would determine the possibility of using those weapons. On the other hand, in the western tradition, it is very important to assess the military capabilities to maintain peace and stability. Modern arms control theory and practice in the West tends to emphasize only the military aspects of national security, rather than the balance between military factors and non-military factors. A nation's capacity to deter an enemy is determined by the means for defense at its disposal; number of soldiers, types of weapons, quality and quantity of weapons, industrial capacity, and so forth. A state's military capabilities are frequently used by statesmen as a barometer of national security. And arms control itself is perceived as a way to create a stable military balance, or military environment in which neither side is significantly disadvantaged and in which neither is tempted to attack by the weakness of the other. It requires a high degree of a military transparency. Credibility and stability are defined in terms of military balance between the

4(Fall 1980); Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to America," Foreign Affairs, No. 58, No. 4(Spring 1980), pp. 797-834.

38. These are the internal sources of power. Externally, a nation can secure its national interests by finding allies, or forming alliance.
adversaries. Thus, arms control has become a technical exercise which is designed to fine-tune the military balance so as to preserve deterrence and peace by eliminating incentives for one side to attack the other by controlling military establishments of both sides. It rarely takes into account the non-military factors. The alienation of military factors from nonmilitary factors is a fundamental flaw in modern arms control theory of the West. We also tend to forget the fact that "Arms control is much more than two teams of negotiators glaring at each other across a bargaining table."40

Since we tend to focus on the technical issues in arms control, arms control negotiations have been bogged down by the technical problems. The insistence on the resolution of the controversial technical issues tends to work against the establishment of arms control regimes. On the other


hand, the emphasis on extramilitary factors for the defense of the nation has allowed the Soviet Union and China to overcome such technical problems which tend to arise when we focus on technical issues in arms control. Of course, they don't deny the importance of the creation of a military balance and transparency. But, what is more important than the creation of military balance through arms control is the creation and management of a political atmosphere which would depress the incentives to use military means. Such a political approach to arms control has been quite successful in Sino-Soviet arms reductions since the early 1980s. The emphasis on extramilitary factors for the defense of the nation has allowed them to avoid most of the technical problems of arms control, and to adopt a more flexible, balanced, and creative arms control approach. For them, it is not necessary to discuss the details of arms control as long as their political relations and other nonmilitary aspects of their relations are nonthreatening and they can find more common elements in their domestic and foreign policies. It may be counterproductive and ruin their political relations if they touch the details of arms control. For them, the control of the military establishment on both sides to prevent war is a residual, minor task, compared to the control of the political aspect of their relations.

A second set of underlying Chinese strategic themes is the primacy of defense over offense. The primacy of defense has been deeply ingrained in the Chinese mentality. Wars in which the inferior defenders, rather than the superior aggressors, won have been emphasized by historians and romanticized by writers. The best offense is defense. Being undefeatable or unconquerable denies the enemy victory and insures oneself against defeat.
More important than, and a prerequisite to, winning is "occupying an undefeatable position."  

The primacy of defense over offense is closely related to the minimalist of Chinese strategic theme. Minimalism is the management of minimum resources for maximum yield. More specifically, minimalism is confidence in the inferior being victorious over the superior, as well as aversion to escalation of strategic means and ends out of grand-strategic interests. The principle has two aspects that approximately correspond to economy of force and economy of time. The corresponding Chinese idea to economy of force is expressed as "few victorious over many" and "the weak victorious over the strong." Both are made possible by an emphasis on the intellect of the commander over the force of the army, an emphasis on quality over quantity in the troops, and emphasis on tactical superiority through concentration.

41. Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Griffith trans., p. 87.
42. The idea of few victorious over many can be seen as the victory of numerical inferiority, while the idea of the weak victorious over the strong can be seen as the victory of physical inferiority.
China's new sense of strength and confidence in security have revived these two traditional Chinese strategic themes—the primacy of defense and minimalism. As the Soviet Union has shifted its doctrine from "defensive offense" to "defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency," the momentum of arms reductions has been strengthened since both sides have adopted similar strategic themes.

It is believed that a rough military parity between the Soviet Union and China has arrived, with marginal Soviet advantages. By the early 1980s, China seemed to achieve a minimum deterrent capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union through modernization of its national defense.\(^44\) China's military modernization has been quite successful and it has contributed to the enhancement of self-confidence in security matters.\(^45\) By 1981, and more clearly by 1982, China seemed to see the Soviet threat as less serious. For example, China's Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan said in Japan in January 1982, "I wonder if the Soviet Union can launch a large scale assault at the moment. The situation along the border area has remained calm and stable over the past one year or two."\(^46\) China's power has also

\(^44\) China's military modernization has four dimensions: military doctrine, weapons and equipment, internal reform of the PLA, and civil-military relations. See Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The PLA under modern condition," Survival (August 1985); Ellis Joffe, The Chinese army after Mao (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987); Gerald Segal, "As China grows strong," International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2(Spring 1988), pp. 217-220. What is interesting in Chinese military modernization in the 1980s and on is that it is a revival of, or return to, the traditional Chinese strategic culture, not the departure from it.

\(^45\) From the Soviet perspective, China's military modernization is a welcoming trend which is likely to discourage the kind of adventurism and irrationality on China's part that Moscow feared in the past. A more professional PLA makes for a more rational China in time of crisis.

\(^46\) Wu is cited in Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East 6928 A 38.
increased in relation to others because its main rivals, the superpowers, have seen their power decline in important ways. For example, economic and social problems in the Soviet Union have sapped Moscow’s ability to continue its military buildup. The growth of American military power may have given the Soviet Union more to worry about, but the United States itself has come to recognize the limits of its power, if only by virtue of the Vietnam and Iran experiences, not to mention domestic economic woes.47

The successful modernization of the national defense of China and the relative decline of the superpowers’ strength have provided China a new sense of strength and affected its security policies by reviving traditional Chinese strategic themes—the primacy of defense and the principle of minimalism. It is less likely that war can be imposed on China by an aggressive enemy. On one hand China may not be able to achieve victory over the enemy, on the other hand the enemy cannot be sure of its victory over China. It corresponds to the third outcome of war—neither winning nor losing. Thus it seems that China has achieved an undefeatable defensive position vis-a-vis its enemies. The primacy of defense has finally materialized. Under this defensive position, Beijing can look forward to a period of peace that allows it to further develop its own power. But why a reduction of its armed forces? Why not an increase of military capabilities which would yield a superior position vis-a-vis the enemies? By 1987 China had completed the reduction of the PLA by one quarter, slashing one million men from the rolls. Further reduction is expected. It is one of paradoxes of China’s new strength and strategic

47. Shejie Shishi, No. 21, 1 Nov. 1986, translated in FBIS-China-86-221.
culture that it can lead to a reduction rather than an increase in the threat of war—the principle of minimalism. A more confident China can scale down its forces along the frontier while actually deploying a stronger, more modern, but numerically smaller force which exactly corresponds to the principle of minimalism in Chinese strategic thinking. It is the revival of Chinese minimalism—"few victorious over many" and "the weak victorious over the strong."

To a certain degree, the primacy of defense over offense and the principle of minimalism are responsible for China's unilateral arms control toward the Soviet Union. But, they are not sufficient. It was very unlikely that China would pursue such unilateral arms control if it did not feel that its initial gestures of detente with the Soviet Union were being reciprocated. China expected that the Soviet Union would positively respond to Chinese unilateral arms control due to the changes in the strategic triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. 48 As Soviet-American relations declined, Moscow saw a possible answer to counter the renewed activism of American policy in improved relations with China. 49 The implication of these changes in the strategic triangular relations was that it could assume the pivotal position in the great-power triangle and that it could increase its ability to play off one potential partner against the other. In other words, the changes in triangular relations had increased China's ability to manipulate

extramilitary factors for national defense. It was not necessary for China to rely on its own 'military power' for security as long as it could manipulate extramilitary factors effectively. If China would have relied on military power only, this could have decreased its ability to manipulate extramilitary factors by worsening Sino-Soviet relations, and possibly Sino-American relations also. Since the Soviet Union had always worried about the huge numbers of Chinese troops stationed along the border, it was felt necessary for China to respond to such a Soviet fear by pulling out its troops from the border and reducing its armed forces. Such unilateral arms control by China has enhanced China's ability to manipulate extramilitary factors in the great-power triangle by encouraging the broader process of Sino-Soviet detente and by decreasing Washington's ability to play "China card" against the Soviet Union at the expense of China's own interests. In a word, China's unilateral arms control was the result of China's emphasis on extramilitary factors for the defense of country and a tactical move to increase its ability to manipulate such extramilitary factors vis-a-vis its primary rivals in international politics.

Unilateralism in Sino-Soviet arms control is the product of traditional Chinese strategic thinking—the primacy of defense over offense, the principle of minimalism, and the emphasis on extramilitary factors—and changes in the external security environment. The defense culture concept of "peace through strength" and the way in which the Chinese and the Soviets assess their strength partially explain unilateralism in Sino-Soviet arms control, but they are insufficient. It seems that Segal bypassed other defense culture concepts of China—the primacy of defense over offense and the principle of minimalism—to emphasize the common defense
culture between the Soviet Union and China as a driving force in Sino-Soviet military detente. But we should remember that it was China who initially adopted a unilateral approach toward Sino-Soviet arms control and that it was the Soviet Union who reciprocated such Chinese unilateral actions. Such unilateralism in arms control is the product of the combination of the primacy of defense over offense, the principle of minimalism, and the emphasis of extramilitary factors, not the product of defense culture concept of "peace through strength" and how they assess strength only. The latter represents only the last strategic theme of China: that is, the emphasis on extramilitary factors for the defense of the nation.

We have reviewed the sources of unilateralism in Sino-Soviet arms control. What about informalism in Sino-Soviet arms control? What are the sources of such an informalism? It seems that there are two: unilateralism and complexity of security relations between the two socialist giants and their local allies.

First, the unilateral nature of Sino-Soviet arms control is one of the sources of informalism. Both--the Soviet Union and China--seem to prefer unilateral moves, often in response to actions and moves of the opponent that are interpreted as peaceful and stabilizing. Hence the series of de-escalatory steps of arms control were launched by China's decision to pull back its troops from the border and then reciprocated by the Soviet Union. In 1985, China then responded by announcing plans to reduce the PLA by one million troops by 1987. In the spring and summer of 1987, the Soviet Union withdrew one motorized rifle division and some additional forces
from Mongolia. Soviet press reports explicitly tied the move to "the new thinking" and depicted it as a step toward addressing the three obstacles to rapprochement with China. In 1989, at the Beijing summit, President Gorbachev announced the additional reduction of 120,000 Soviet Far Eastern forces. Arms reductions along the Sino-Soviet border achieved cuts more sweeping than anything proposed at the MBFR talks. In the European theater, such a reduction would have been an obvious 'bargaining chip' to be traded against Soviet reductions. The Chinese and Soviets had the sense to carry out de facto arms control without playing negotiating games or waiting for a piece of paper to be signed. The essential objectives of sensible arms control are to reduce tension, enhance confidence, and build stability. The Soviet Union and China are doing just that through mutually reinforcing unilateral arms control measures. Such unilateral arms control measures seem to have a much more fundamental effect on tension reduction and stability. Unilateralism does not require extensive formal negotiations. Rather it requires the expectation that unilateral moves will be reciprocated by the other party and the actual corresponding moves of that party. Such an expectation was enhanced by the factors which we have discussed. Arms control by deed is clearly preferable to arms control in words.

Second, the complexity of security issues between the Soviet Union and China in their relations with their local allies or adversaries is another

50. Before this withdrawal, the Soviet Union had stationed the two tank and two motorized rifle divisions with the highest category of readiness.
source of informalism. Arms reductions between the Soviet Union and China would not only affect the relations between the Soviet Union and China but also the relations between the two socialist giants and their local allies or adversaries. In the Mongolian case, the Soviet military presence is meant to secure Mongolia's status as the Soviet Union's sole buffer along a vast and thinly populated frontier with China. Mongolia has also viewed the Soviet Union as the guarantor of its territorial integrity against China. As Sino-Soviet relations improved over the years, Mongolia became more concerned that the Soviet Union might 'sell them out' for the sake of a broader Sino-Soviet deal. After Gorbachev first broached the possibility of a withdrawal in his Vladivostok address, Mongolia's foreign minister indicated his opposition by saying at a press conference in Zimbabwe that "there would be no complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia." On the other hand, the Chinese saw Soviet troops as menacing the approaches to Beijing and feared that they would serve as the spearhead of any assault on their capital, which is only about 500 kilometers from the Mongolian border.

It was a dilemma for the Soviets. If the Soviet Union pulled out its troops from Mongolia based on a formal arms control agreement, this Soviet move would jeopardize its relations with Mongolia, and possibly with Vietnam. On the other hand, if it would not respond to the Chinese unilateral arms control of pulling back its troops from the border by doing something about the most serious Chinese security concern--the Soviet troops in Mongolia: the opportunity to improve its relations with China

might be lost. It was necessary for the Soviets to respond to the Chinese unilateral arms control measures in order to sustain the momentum of Sino-Soviet rapprochement by materializing their argument that Soviet troops in Mongolia could be pulled out if China no longer posed a threat. China did its part. It was Soviet turn.\textsuperscript{53}

How could the Soviet Union achieve two objectives—the maintenance of close alliance relations with Mongolia and tension reduction with China at the same time? The problem for Moscow is in part one of 'face.' The answer is informal arms control. While in practice the Soviet Union has thinned out its divisions in the Far East as a response to Chinese unilateral arms control, it has maintained the fiction that it has not done so. Thus, while in practice arms control has taken place, the Soviet Union has been able to deny that there has been any change in order to palliate local allies, such as Vietnam and Mongolia, that the Soviet Union is about to abandon them since there is no formal arms control agreement between the Soviet Union and China which would be criticized by the local powers. Such informal arms control was necessary and suitable since it would allow the Soviet Union and China to reduce tensions in their bilateral relations in practical terms, while not jeopardizing their relations with local allies and also inducing their local allies to adjust their posture toward their adversaries as well as their allies in a positive way. Formal arms control agreements would have given them more symbolic meaning. But it would have cost them too much. In a word, in Sino-Soviet arms control, complexity of security alliance and the desire to improve their relations

\textsuperscript{53} The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia took place after the substantial progress in relations between Mongolia and China in 1989.
have driven them to adopt an informal approach rather than formal agreements. It has proved to be quite effective.

**Conclusion**

The Soviet Union and China have successfully managed arms reductions along the border. It is clear that the process of arms control in Sino-Soviet relations is distinctive. The process of Sino-Soviet arms control has been based on unilateral moves of one side and reciprocation by the other. There has been far less concern with formal agreement. The formal talks between the two governments on arms control and confidence-building measures began only after the official normalization of relations in May 1990 and the substantial arms reductions on both sides. And arms reductions on both sides paved the road to the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit.

The reasons for this pattern in Sino-Soviet relations have a great deal to do with distinctive defense culture, a more complex balance of power, and the uncertainty over many states' sovereignty. Especially, defense culture should be taken seriously in future arms control. Every country has its own defense culture which would define security and the appropriate means of guaranteeing security. Of course, we can find some similarities as well as differences. If there are more similarities than differences, it is much easier to reach an arms control agreement, whether it is formal or informal, or whether it is unilateral or not. There is no single form of arms control which is universally applicable. The mechanical application of one successful form of arms control from one region would not guarantee the same success in another region, or another relation. There will be much variation in the form of arms control from one region to another due to such
idiosyncratic features. In the study of arms control and security, we should take into account such idiosyncratic features.

Sino-Soviet arms control has shown us another way of pursuing the objectives of arms control. It shows that the likelihood of war or conflict does not lie in a mechanical balance of military power. Rather, it lies in the nature of political relations between the adversaries. We have been focusing too much attention on the military dimension in the study of security and arms control. The emphasis on the military dimension may be due to the fact that it is the easiest, most reliable and observable way to measure stability. We can relatively easily count the number of various weapons, and assess their capabilities. But not political relations. The real problem is political, however, not military. Thus, in order to reduce tension, it is more important to manage such a political relation between the adversaries than to control the military establishment between them. Sino-Soviet arms control has shown just this. It has also shown that arms control can facilitate political detente, not necessarily the outcome of political detente. In other words, the military dimension can contribute to the general detente by achieving limited arms control and reductions in tension. Until recently, most of the arms control measures taken by the Soviet Union and China in their bilateral relations have been tacit, gradual and, often officially denied. Nevertheless, they have made a contribution to the process of de-escalating the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

Of course, this is not to deny the utility of some formal Sino-Soviet arms control. As I said before, Sino-Soviet arms control has been going on without formal agreement. It is uncertain that such informal arms control will continue for a long time. Maybe they have reached the limit of
informalism. They may feel it necessary to formalize their arms control process. The Soviet Union and China signed an outline agreement on troop reductions along the Sino-Soviet border and confidence-building measures when Premier Li Peng visited Moscow in April 1990. This was the first formal arms control agreement between the Soviet Union and China.\textsuperscript{54} It seems likely that a formal treaty, when complete, will not do much more than codify the cuts already made and the confidence-building-measures previously agreed upon. Some delimitation of zones of deployments can be expected, and limits may be placed on certain types of weapons and their deployment. Both sides are likely to encourage the mutual adoption of more defensive military doctrines, and demonstrate these in defensive military exercises open to foreign observers. The measures to increase military transparency will be adopted. They are not likely to see verification and compliance as vital in arms control.\textsuperscript{55} They are less concerned with the details of arms control agreements and the ways to enforce them. Mutual understanding is much more important than a mutual military balance. The military dimension constitutes only one aspect of their relations, not all. Clearly, they will pursue a politically oriented approach toward arms control since it is much more suitable to their defense culture and their approach has proven to be very effective.

In sum, Sino-Soviet detente continues to develop even after the collapse of the communist power in the Soviet Union. While the uncertainty

\textsuperscript{54} The contents of this agreement has not been reported. However, it seems that both-the Soviet Union and China-just agreed on the principles for arms reductions and CBMs, not the details.

\textsuperscript{55} Gerald Segal, "A New Order in Northeast Asia," \textit{Arms Control Today}, Vol. 21, No. 7 (September 1991), p. 15.
over the future of the Soviet Union makes arms control difficult, it also makes it more essential. The momentum of arms reductions and tension reduction along the Sino-Soviet border which was introduced into their bilateral relations circa 1985-87 will remain effective and strong. Each side will adopt arms control by deed more than arms control in word. The next phase in Sino-Soviet arms control will be the institutionalization of the arms reduction and tension reduction process in their bilateral relations. The Sino-Soviet arms control experience has shown a practical way to start arms control by adopting unilateral, informal methods, and to transform such a momentum into a formal, institutional approach.
CHAPTER V

The Arms Control in the Korean Peninsula

Since the division of Korea in 1945, the Korean peninsula has been characterized as a place of hostility and an arms race between the two governments: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in north and the Republic of Korea in south. It has become one of the most heavily militarized zones in the world in which 1.8 million troops are deployed along the 155-mile long Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The north and south division of Korea with two large military establishments confronting each other in a concentrated area makes the 38th parallel the most dangerous border in the world. Although the armistice agreement was signed on July 28, 1953, it did not end the conflict completely and permanently. Rather it changed the form of competition from open armed conflict to an active arms race and rivalry in every dimension between North and South Korea in

which neither side dares to fall behind. Their quest for security and survival has degenerated into a vicious circle of arms race: the more one side upgrades its military potential, the more the other side needs to take countermeasures. It is a perfect example of the so-called security dilemma.²

Stability in the Korean peninsula is not only a concern for the Koreas. The Korean peninsula is the sole place in Northeast Asia where the vital interests of three nuclear powers and one economic superpower intersect. Both North and South Korea are perceived to be strategic assets to outside forces. In the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, Japan and China fought over control of Korea, as Japan and Russia fought over it a few years later in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. The first major postwar conflict in Asia was the Korean War in which the Soviet Union and China sided with North Korea, while the United States and other "free" world nations fought, directly or indirectly, on behalf of South Korea in that war. The Korean War ended with the Armistice Agreement in July, 1953.

We might have expected sufficient time to pass, as it has in Europe, for the conflict to be controlled and arms control to take its place as a major part of regional stability. However, the Korean conflict still remains vitriolic and emotional, defying the half-hearted attempts of the Koreans and the great powers to find solutions. The danger of renewed hostilities persists as long as Pyongyang will not give up the goal of 'national liberation' nor hesitate to use military means to achieve it. The conflict in the Korean

peninsula is complicated by the fact that, nowhere else in the world, do the interest of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union more clearly intersect. Both the Soviet Union and China have maintained defense and mutual security treaties with North Korea and the United States has maintained a similar relationship with South Korea. In addition, the United States-Japan security treaty implicitly links the security of South Korea with U.S. access to basing facilities on the home islands of Japan. While the big powers do not want another war on the Korean peninsula, the rivalry between the big powers supporting each side has hardened the division. Hence, Korea has been considered as a possible flashpoint for a conflict that could draw in the big powers in Northeast Asia.

While it is true that the great powers are increasingly interested in controlling the conflict in Korea, they have taken few initiatives, especially in the form of arms control, in the past. However, as the superpower relations have improved drastically since the mid-1980s and tensions in


4. We often call the Korean peninsula as "the dagger pointed at the heart," from Japanese perspective due to its geographical location: that is, South Korea controls one side of the important Straits of Korea (Tsushima): one of the four main choke points for the entrance into the Sea of Japan from the Pacific, and the exit to the Pacific. See Joseph A. Yager, "The Security Environment of the Korean Peninsula in the 1980s," Asian Perspective, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 1984), p. 85.


6. It does not necessary mean the total absence of arms control proposals. There have been various arms control proposals from North and South Korea, as well as other external powers. However, these proposals can be perceived as a propaganda rather than a genuine arms control initiative.
Europe have declined, the issue of arms control in the Korean peninsula has come to surface. The great powers have an interest in turning the Korean peninsula from a zone of controlled conflict into a zone of peace. The necessity of arms control lies in the fact that the situation in Korea today, despite all the positive diplomatic and economic movement, remains a military exception. While in European and superpower relations military detente has followed political detente, in Korea, military detente is far behind political and economic detente. As political relations and economic ties have improved, it is necessary to think of military detente in order to consolidate this newly emerged relation, to facilitate this process of detente, and to avoid unwanted conflict in Korea.

The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the prospects for arms control in helping to reduce tensions between the two Koreas in this newly-emerged security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. We need first to understand how we have arrived at the current situation, so we must identify the factors that have shaped the Korean conflict and its evolution and how much these factors are different from the factors we find in the European context or in superpower relations. Second, we need to explore the agendas of Korean arms control. And, finally, we should think of how we can successfully establish an arms control regime in the Korean peninsula.

7. Furthermore, from regional perspective, normalized relations between Seoul and Moscow, expanded economic and trade relations between Seoul and Beijing, and talks between Washington, Pyongyang, and Tokyo are expected to have a positive effect on North and South Korea.

The Arms Race Between North and South Korea

The Korean war experience and the failure of the Geneva political conference of 1954 to establish a framework for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas left the leaders on both sides of the DMZ reliant primarily on the military capability of their own forces and the backing of their allies to assure the survival of their political systems. The armistice of 1953 halted the fighting, established a narrow demilitarized zone across the peninsula to separate the combatants, and set in place two international bodies, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) to supervise the carrying out of the armistice terms. One of the armistice provisions, aimed at preventing the strengthening of forces on either side by limiting the importation of weapons to replacements only, soon broke down when the UN Command noted the arrival of military aircraft on airfields in the North and the North Korean government denied the NNSC the freedom of movement necessary to check on weapons imports. Since then, the two sides have competed in increasing the quantity and improving the quality of their weapons and other military equipment (See Table 5.1).

By 1960 Kim Il-Sung completely consolidated his political power, which was shaken by the defeat in the Korean War, by eliminating all his political opponents from South Korea and China. During the next two years the trend of events outside North Korea convinced him that heavier emphasis on military development was necessary. The widening rift between Beijing and Moscow, the Cuban missile crisis, increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, U.S. support of India in the Sino-Indian border conflict, and Park Chung-hee's military coup in South Korea seemed to
create an atmosphere of growing threat. In December 1962, at the fifth plenum of the Fourth Central Committee, North Korea adopted "Four-Point Military Policy Guidelines."

Table 5.1 Comparison of North and South Korea's Military Buildup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Armed Forces (thousands)</th>
<th>Military Expenditure/GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>S. Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Under the banner of "Four-Point Military Policy Guidelines," North Korea began to divert large and increasing amount of resources to building a powerful military machine which could be considered being beyond defensive purposes. Members of the regular forces, serving a minimum of five years in the army and navy or three to four years in the air force, have


been trained in the responsibilities of the next higher rank, to permit rapid expansion of the military in an emergency. North Korea has secured five million reserve forces which are supposed to back up the regular forces in an emergency situation.\textsuperscript{11} Officers received training in an elaborate system of military academies, universities, and specialized schools. Training and discipline are rigorous, and ordinary soldiers are granted no leave during their five years or longer period of service. Turning the whole nation into a fortress involved placing vital air bases, arms and munitions factories, and other important installations underground. Extensive networks of tunnels have been dug and hardened artillery emplacements have been built along front lines of defense. Furthermore, North Korea has enhanced its military preparations by adding underground fortifications along the DMZ. It has converted several infantry divisions into mechanized or motorized divisions in order to enhance their mobility and capability to penetrate the front line defense of South Korea and to achieve a decisive victory at an early stage of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{12} Between 1983 and 1984 it brought forward 10 divisions from rear areas, including highly mobile, mechanized strike

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} There are three types of reserve forces: Young Red Guard, The Pacification Corps, and the Worker and Peasant Red Guard. People aged 14-16 are to serve in the Young Red Guard. Those who have finished their active military service are attached to the Pacification Corps until they reach the age of 40. Those who aged 41-60 become members of the Worker and Peasant Red Guard and undergo intensive training as regular forces at their work sites or in their respective regions. It is reported that North Korea can mobilize approximately 5 million people in 12 hours. See \textit{Defense White Paper, 1989}, p. 143, and \textit{The Military Balance 1990-1991}, p. 166.
\item \textsuperscript{12} There is a tremendous resemblance between North Korea's strategy and that of the Soviet Union. Actually, North Korea has adopted the blitz-krieg strategy of the Soviet Union. See Jong-Chun Baek, "North Korea's Military Policy and the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," \textit{The Journal of East Asian Affairs}, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1990), pp. 311-341.
\end{itemize}
forces, relocating them within 40 to 60 kilometers of the DMZ.\textsuperscript{13} North Korea has also deployed its main ground forces in the forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.\textsuperscript{14} The forward deployment of these forces enables initiation of an attack on the South without any re-deployment or massive mobilization. North Korea's army corps stationed along the front line are maintained in a high state of readiness so as to launch an offensive at a moment's notice. North Korea has continued intensive training for special forces numbering approximately 100,000 men, some of whom would rapidly infiltrate behind South Korean lines by numerous fast patrol craft or by 250 slow, low flying AN-2 aircraft, capable of ducking beneath radar detection, although they are noisy and vulnerable to ground fire. The result of these efforts is the emergence of the unprecedented militarized society in North Korea and the quantitative advantage over South Korea in troops, tanks, artillery, personnel carriers, combat vessels, and planes. To a certain degree, we can say that North Korea has become a military-industrial complex itself. Furthermore, this military machine has an ultimate goal of supporting the unification of Korea under North Korean terms, not solely for defense of North Korea.

For its part, South Korea had begun to expand its military establishment around the early 1970s. By 1954 the army numbered nearly 600,000 in 16 divisions deployed along three-fourths of the front. Later, the army was cut back to 520,000, but improved greatly with rigorous training and a steady influx of U.S. equipment. Since South Korea had maintained a

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Korea Herald}, 26 February, 1985.
numerical advantage over North Korea and the United States still maintained the presence of substantial number of its troops in South Korea, it was not necessary to launch an extensive military buildup until 1975 on regular forces and 1969 on backup forces. And also, during this period of time, the primary goal of the South Korean government was economic development which required enormous resources and energy on private sectors. The extensive military buildup began around the late 1960s and early 1970s. The factors which spurred this defense effort of South Korea were the aggressive behavior of North Korea and the relative decline of the U.S. defense commitment. The aggressive behavior of North Korea during the 1960s such as the commando raid against the Blue House and the infiltration elsewhere of armed units from North Korea in 1968 and 1969 urged the South Korean government to establish three backup forces: the Homeland Reserve Force, the Civil Defense Corps, and the Student National Defense Corps. The size of these backup forces has increased along with the increase of population of South Korea. By 1990 the size of these forces reached 4.5 million.\footnote{The Military Balance 1990-1991, p. 168. However, it is reported that these three backup forces are being restructured toward a smaller size.} (See table 5.2)

The presence of U.S. troops in South Korea reduced the incentive to increase its armed forces. U.S. forces in Korea, which had reached 360,000 during the Korean War, dropped to 60,000 by 1957 and consisted primarily of two infantry divisions--the 2nd and 7th divisions. Although Chinese forces withdrew from North Korea in 1958, the U.S. and South Korean governments felt that they continued to pose a threat from the beyond the Yalu. Hostilities had been halted only by an armistice, not by a peace treaty,
and intense antagonism persisted between Washington and Beijing. Consequently, the U.S. government regarded the deterrence of China as an important reason for the continued presence of U.S. forces in South Korea.\textsuperscript{16} In a word, as long as hostile relations between the United States and the communist bloc remained and the Cold War maintained, it was not necessary to increase its military capabilities since the United States would provide a sufficient and reliable protection against a North Korean attack. However, this benign assumption was shaken by detente. By 1969 U.S. attitudes toward China had changed substantially, and President Nixon was signaling to Beijing a desire for a change in relations. Under strong public pressure to reduce the U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam, Nixon announced the Guam doctrine, which proposed shifting to allies of the United States more of the burden of their defense. South Korea's vibrant economy and its strengthened military forces made it a prime target for application of the doctrine. Reluctantly, Park Chung-hee agreed to the withdrawal of one of the two U.S. divisions, about 20,000 men, in exchange for a U.S. pledge to provide $1.5 billion in military aid to South Korea's force modernization plan.

Even if the United States promised to provide a large amount of military aid in exchange for the withdrawal of the 7th division from South Korea, this incident urged South Korea to reconsider its security policy and the status of its own forces. The presence of U.S forces and the massive influx of military aid had provided a sense of security that allowed them to concentrate much of their energy and resources on stimulating economic

\textsuperscript{16} Ralph Clough, p. 96.
growth. The decision to withdraw the 7th division undermined this benign assumption of U.S. security guarantee. The size of force reduction was not so great—one third of total U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. But the implications of the sudden change in the direction of U.S. policy toward the socialist camp were tremendous. The shift to detente with China, the enunciation of the Nixon doctrine, and the intimidations that more U.S. units might be removed from South Korea left South Korea troubled. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Carter's decision to remove U.S. ground forces from Korea intensified the already troubled sense of security in South Korea.

In addition, the deterioration of political relations between the United States and South Korea added to the uneasiness felt by Koreans over the effect of the Vietnam debacle on U.S. determination to stand by security commitments in the Western Pacific. The deterioration of political relations convinced South Korea that it must move quickly to become less dependent for its defense on the United States. The growth of the South Korean economy had eliminated the need for defense budget support. The South Korean government sought to become more independent for its own defense by launching the two successive force improvement plans, between 1971-1975 and between 1976-1980. As the United States phased out grant aid almost entirely in the first plan period, the South Korean government adopted a special defense tax to help fund the required purchases and raised the defense budget from 4 percent to over 6 percent of the GNP. Defense spending, in real terms, rose at an average rate of 12.5 per cent annually from 1971-1981.
For South Korea, military self-dependence meant not only buying weapons from its own resources, but also developing a capacity to manufacture modern weapons. In this respect, Seoul was more than ten years behind Pyongyang, which had begun in the late 1950s to channel the bulk of its investment into heavy industry, thus creating a base for defense production. In South Korea large investments in the heavy and chemical industries began in the late 1960s and reached full-scale production only in the late 1970s. Spurred by the desire to build as quickly as possible a base for a defense industry, as well as to begin the export of heavy industrial products such as steel and ships, in which the state-of-art Korean plants would have a competitive advantage, the government provided a variety of incentives to encourage the construction of chemical and heavy industrial plants. A huge industrial machinery complex, especially designed to house and support a defense industry, was begun in 1974 in the south at Changwon. Following President Carter's decision in 1977 to withdraw U.S. ground forces, President Park acted to speed expansion of the capacity and variety of South Korea's heavy industry. As a result, at the end of the 1970s, South Korea was producing about half of the weapons and equipment required by its armed forces. This included M-16 rifles, machine guns, 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers, mortars, recoilless rifles, Vulcan antiaircraft guns, various types of ammunition, personnel carriers, and patrol boats. The defense industry had been boosted throughout the 1980s. As a result, by the end of the 1980s, South Korea was able to produce 88 tanks, Jegongho, etc.
Table 5.2 Military Balance Between South and North Korea as of 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Armed Forces</td>
<td>1,111,000</td>
<td>750,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Tanks</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECCCE</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIFV</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWED ARTY</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP ARTY</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRL</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORTARS</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Navy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol &amp; Coastal</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Naval Air        | NA          | 24 cbt ac   |
|                 |             | 35 armed hel.|

**Air Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>716 cbt ac,</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 armed hel.</td>
<td></td>
<td>469 cbt ac,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no armed hel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 cbt, 2 tpt wings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Marine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One interesting point on South Korea's military buildup is that unlike North Korea, which is independent from external powers in deciding the direction of military establishment, South Korea has been constrained by the order of the United Nations Command (UNC). It cannot increase the size of its armed forces without permission of the UNC. So the military buildup of South Korea has been directed toward qualitative rather than quantitative ends by acquiring modern weapons from the West.

*The Momenta of the Korean Arms Race*

We have reviewed the historical record of the arms race between North and South Korea. If an arms race is a condition in which two or more parties, perceiving themselves to be in an adversarial relationship, increase or improve their armaments and structure their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, present, and anticipated military and political behavior of other parties, the arms race between North and South Korea is the prime example. Superficially, it looks like any other arms race in the world. However, the arms race between North and South Korea has some distinctive features which make arms control much more difficult to achieve on the Korean peninsula and may dictate both Koreas to take a different approach to arms control from the past arms control experience in superpower relations and Central Europe. These characteristics grow out of the division of Korea, the traumatic experience each government had of being nearly destroyed in war and saved only by the military intervention of a powerful ally.
First, unlike other arms races in the postwar era, the arms race on the Korean peninsula is closely related to the division and reunification of Korea. In other word, the genesis of Korean arms race lies in the artificial, arbitrary, and abnormal division of the country in 1945. The ultimate goal of both Koreas is the reunification of the motherland. The armed forces of both Koreas should respond to this goal. It is different from the German case. East and West Germany were incorporated into separate blocs and the arms race between East and West Germany should be understood in terms of the superpower competition in Central Europe, or as a NATO vs. WTO arms race. In other words, the German arms race is an integral part of East-West arms race. On the other hand, arms race between North and South Korea is the function more of the role of armed force in the process of reunification and less of inter-bloc competition as in Europe. Of course, there is a difference between North and South Korea with respect to the role of armed forces in achieving unification. In this dimension, North Korea has been emphasizing its armed forces as the final means of achieving reunification. It does not exclude the use of armed forces in order to achieve its reunification goal. On the other hand, South Korea has adopted some kind of minimalist position. That is, the armed forces of South Korea are supposed to serve to deter the North Korean aggression, not to liberate North Korea. The final outcome of reunification will be determined by a more comprehensive combination of various means such as economic superiority, social and political unity, and international support.

Secondly, the arms race between North and South Korea is based on a deep-rooted mutual suspicion, fear complex, and hatred as a result of the Korean War. The rivalry between North and South Korea is not only a
reflection of ideological and political incompatibility between two different political system, but also of very emotional hatred between North and South. This emotional hatred as a product of the traumatic experience of the Korean people during the Korean War\textsuperscript{17} has hardened the artificially and externally imposed ideological and political competition between North and South Korea. The emotionally backed mutual hostility and hatred of the two Korean states have developed lives of their own separate from the Cold War tensions and they are resistant, even under the erosion of ideologies.

This emotional hatred has created a very strong enemy image which cannot be easily overcome. Neither Korea has recognized the legitimacy of the other. This has not changed even after their simultaneous admission to the U. N. on September 17, 1991. They have seen each other as a hard-core enemy. For South Korea, North Korea is an "evil-empire" which once invaded South Korea, does not restrain itself from using violence, and relentlessly seeks opportunities to use its armed forces against South Korea. Consequently, most South Koreans have been possessed by a "fear complex." Under this circumstance, the security and survival of South Korea can only be guaranteed through superior, or at least equal, military strength, not dialogue, denying those opportunities. On the other hand, North Korea has postulated South Korea as a puppet government or military dictatorship backed by the U.S. imperialist power which does not represent the Korean people's interests. It is North Korea's duty to liberate South Korea from U.S. imperialism by overthrowing the military

\textsuperscript{17} In addition to the Korean War, frequent border incidents, infiltrations, and terrorist attacks such as Rangoon and KAL incident have deepened distrust and hatred between North and South Korea.
dictatorship or fascist regime of South Korea with its armed forces. And the liberation of South Korea is a precondition for the ultimate survival of the entire Korean nation.

What makes this emotional and psychological dimension difficult to overcome is the presence of a trait particular to Korean political culture and tradition. Throughout its history the Korean political culture has never been able to negotiate with political opponents. Koreans have never learned to accept compromise as a legitimate or even tolerable approach to politics and government. Compromise means the lack of ability to win the game and the acceptance of defeat. The dominance of one party over the other is the condition of stability and peace. This political culture has exacerbated the inter-Korean rivalry in every dimension.

While there have been many cases of inter-Korean dialogue, the emotional aspect of the inter-Korean rivalry, embedded fear complex, and traditional political culture have prevented both Koreas from learning about each other in those dialogues and from achieving mutual trust since their involvement in the dialogue was driven by the changes in the external political and security environment, and were not internally derived. So the inter-Korean dialogue during the 1970s and 1980s bred distrust and suspicion between North and South Korea rather than mutual trust and understanding. Mutual learning is very essential to improve the relations between the states and to sustain the momentum of improvement. As we know in superpower relations, while it is not necessarily true that detente was motivated by the change in their perception of each other, we have observed a kind of mutual learning and enhancement of mutual understanding through their dialogue in various fields, including arms
control. Along this mutual learning process, the United States and the Soviet Union have changed their image each other.\(^{18}\) Or, at least, there has emerged a diversified image of the other. These images are based on an ideological understanding of each other, not emotional hatred and/or direct war experience with each other. Consequently, as the impact of ideologies has eroded, it has been relatively easier to overcome a stereotyped image of an enemy in superpower relations and to reassess the intention of the other in a more productive way. But not in the Korean case. So it has been natural to see a bitter arms race between the two Koreas since each Korea sees the other as a hard-core enemy and because their enemy image is emotionally motivated.\(^{19}\)

Thirdly, there is a domestic source of the arms race between North and South Korea: that is, the military-industrial complex.\(^{20}\) Of course, in any arms race we can find an element of military-industrial complex as one of the momenta to sustain action-reaction chain, but the intensity and the degree of influence of the military-industrial complex in the inter-Korean arms race can be assumed to be very high. The source of this


military-industrial complex lies in the division of Korea and the imperative of national security under this circumstance.

North Korea is a nation-state version of those paranoid "survivalists" in U.S. society who, armed to the teeth, wait for the final assault on their way of life by alien forces. At the fundamental level, Pyongyang neither trusts nor relies on any external power to protect or rescue it, despite its frequent and flowery rhetoric about socialist brotherhood. Thus, North Korea has become a garrison state that places the utmost priority on national security and elevates the providers of that security to a unique status, and the concept of the military-industrial complex is inherent in the state. The defense of the state, and providing means to accomplish that vital task, makes the military and its needs essential to North Korean society. Those roles are so thoroughly integrated that they essentially define the state and its purpose. To attain this level of self-reliance, North Korea is prepared to accept the heavy costs its preparedness inflicts on other, non-defense sectors of its society. In short, North Korea is willing to sacrifice a great deal to maintain its version of security. This security rationale has provided Pyongyang's economic rationale: that is, it needs as strong, viable, and autonomous an arms industry as it can maintain. Though unclassified details about North Korea's arms industry are virtually impossible to obtain, it is clear that it occupies a central role in Pyongyang's planning, allocation of resources, and bureaucratic structure. The state can devote all required means to achieving and maintaining the strongest possible state and army. In the largest sense, one can fairly say that all of North Korea is a military industrial complex, serving rather well-defined
aggressive objectives vis-a-vis South Korea. This has created a very distinctive economic infrastructure in North Korea. The military-(or defense-)oriented economic infrastructure of North Korea, and the party and bureaucrat's vested interests in maintaining the system, are likely to oppose a radical reform in North Korea. The system itself shows a very strong tendency toward endurance and cohesiveness. This will make arms control even more difficult since arms control itself will require a change in the concept of national security held by North Koreans and will challenge the economic structure of North Korea.

Furthermore, the issue of leadership succession will make the situation more difficult and unpredictable. It would be safe to assume that we cannot expect a fundamental structural change of North Korea during the succession period. As we have seen in many cases of succession in communist states, reform comes after the complete consolidation of power by new leaders. The expected successor of Kim Il-sung is his son, Kim Jong-il. He cannot discredit the party and military on behalf of reform. Since, unlike his father, Kim Jong-il has no popularity, unchallenged prestige, and authority, he has to align himself with the most powerful

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23. There have been few studies on the relations between arms control and economic reform. However, we can expect the resistance of the military in the process of reform if reform itself is likely to undermine its predominant position in North Korean politics.
organ in North Korea: i.e., the military. It also seems that there is no organized reformist group in North Korea which would challenge the military-industrial complex and provide an alternative source of power to the new leader. The expected succession pattern from father to son and the absence of other organized interest groups in North Korean politics will sustain the military-industrial complex which has maintained momentum of the arms race vis-a-vis South Korea.

There is no doubt that a military-industrial complex exists in South Korea which was invaded by Soviet-backed North Korea and suffered from poverty and war-inflicted devastation. However, unlike North Korea's extreme form of military-industrial complex and self-reliance in defense, South Korea has cast its lot with the interdependent, free-trading, Western world as it pursues a broadly based guarantee of its security. Despite South Korea's incentives to be as paranoid as North Korea about self-defense, South Korea enthusiastically relies on the support it receives from the United States and, indirectly, the strategic network headed by the United States. This support is implemented most directly by Washington's long-standing commitment to the defense of South Korea. Regardless of whether that commitment's viability is predicated on South Korea's inherent importance to U.S. national interests, as many South Korean's choose to

25. We have seen the emergence of bureaucratic politics in socialist states as they become mature. Unlike other socialist countries, we cannot find any other strong interest group in North Korea. It is very difficult to apply interest-group politics to North Korea. For the discussion on bureaucratic politics of the communist states, see Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist System (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970); and H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).
interpret it, or on South Korea's importance to vital regional interests of the United States—for the defense of Japan—the U.S. commitment remains solid. As a result, and as a perverse way of assuring that the U.S. commitment will be kept, South Korea has not developed an extreme form of military-industrial complex which would relentlessly seek military autarky. In a word, security interdependence has allowed South Korea to follow the pattern of the Western World. South Korea's involvement in the race is equally a matter of national economic incentives. South Korea is no different from many other export-oriented countries in its desire to build an arms industry that can bolster its foreign trade position. If it could do so without jeopardizing its reliance upon foreign strategic commitments, South Korea might immediately create a much stronger arms industry, of the sort it is capable of building. Members of both branches of the South Korean military-industrial complex have ample reasons to root for development of an expanded arms industry. They know what kind of technological spin-offs the civilian sectors might obtain from such a development. They also know that they lose an increment of competitive edge by not taking advantage of such spin-offs. Moreover, defense industries of that magnitude would enable South Korea to provide much of its own equipment more cheaply because of the economies of scale, would provide the funds to buy whatever it could not produce, and would create increased opportunities for arms/no-arms trade packages. However, since Seoul knows it cannot go that far without damaging traditional U.S.-ROK defense and economic relationships, which provide South Korea's true security, it stops far short of such steps. It is very unlikely that South Korea will expand its arms industry.
To a certain degree, the security interdependence of South Korea and its internationalist posture have prevented the emergence of an extreme form of military-industrial complex in an economic sense which is likely to take place under military authoritarian regime. However, in the political field, the role and influence of the military has been crucial. The military's politicization began in South Korea with its entry into the political arena in 1961. If North Korea typifies the party control of the military, South Korea exemplifies the military control of politics. Generally, two contrasting arguments exist for military intervention in politics. At one extreme, it is argued that the defense or enhancement of the military's own corporate interests is the most important interventionist motive. At the other extreme, it is said that when a regime is too weak, corrupt, or arbitrary to govern, and there is no legitimate political agency capable of taking over, effective military intervention to arrest chaos or disintegration or to prevent external intervention can facilitate constructive political development. The South Korean experience indicates that the truth may lie somewhere


between these two poles. The prevailing pattern of civil-military relations in South Korea, beginning in 1961, has been one of civil-military political fusion. While there has been progress toward democratization and the enhancement of civilian control over the military since 1987, the military remains one of the most important forces in South Korean politics. It seems that the military has lost its power and influence as the ultimate power broker in South Korean politics. While the military's involvement in politics has decreased, that decline has been confined mostly to domestic political issues. In security matters, it retains its dominance due to the division of Korea and the presence of an aggressive North Korea. While the civilian leaders are pressing conciliatory measures toward North Korea, the ROK's military is reluctant to change its point of view on security: that is, national security is only guaranteed by maintaining strong armed forces, not by political reconciliation. The ROK's military opposes politicization of security issues. Peace through strength is strongly believed by the ROK's military. Under this condition, it is very unlikely that the South Korean government could adopt unilateral, or drastic, arms control measures which would substantially damage the military's interests and challenge


29. It is well reflected in the recent proposal of defense budget for 1992. The increase of defense budget was justified as the presence of undimining North Korea's threat. Furthermore, it argues that as long as North Korea maintains a huge armed forces it is necessary for South Korea to match it up to a certain degree. See The Korea Times, 5 June, 1991.
its concept of security. For influential members of the military and security establishments, the objectives of Nordpolitik are the isolation of North Korea by severing it from the support of its patrons and particularly by depriving Pyongyang of modern armaments from the Soviet Union.

In sum, both governments have created a very distinctive economic infrastructure and civil-military relations which would promote the interests of military or military-industrialists by sustaining the arms race between North and South Korea at a high rate. While both Koreas recognize the importance of arms control negotiations in their bilateral relations, they will not push it hard because of this inherent military-industrial complex. Arms control in the Korean peninsula is likely to be accompanied by regime change. This will make any form of arms control negotiation between the two Koreas distinctive and difficult.

Fourthly, while most arms races can be perceived as a relation between a pair of states, the involvement of the external powers—the Soviet Union, China, and the United States—in Korean affairs is very important in explaining the Korean arms race for two main reasons: first, the relations among the big powers have provided a condition in which inter-Korean relations have evolved; and second, while both have been trying to establish

a self-reliant defense industry, both Koreas are dependent upon the big powers for the supply of sophisticated modern weapons and military equipment.

The shifting major power relations in the region have had a great impact on the Korean peninsula, especially on the diplomatic alignment of the respective Korean states. As children of the Cold War era, the political character of the two Koreas was determined, from the outset, by the ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar era. The subsequent diplomatic activities of the Koreas have also been largely affected by the ebb and flow of U.S.-Soviet competition and cooperation in world politics.31

There were some efforts to relax tension in inter-Korean relations as superpower relations and Sino-American relations improved in the 1970s. U.S. moves to improve relations with China and the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of a U.S. division from South Korea radically changed the atmosphere.32 South Korea's foreign policy could no longer be conducted as


32. On the other hand, in addition to Park Chung-hee's military coup in South Korea, a series of international events such the widening rift between Beijing and Moscow, the Cuban missile crisis, U.S. support of India in Sino-Indian border clash, and increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam had contributed to North Korea's military buildup in the 1960s.
it had been at the height of the Cold War. President Nixon's policy of shifting emphasis from confronting major adversaries to negotiating with them had created a more complex international environment requiring great flexibility in South Korean foreign policy.

The shift in U.S. foreign policy toward its major adversaries had the same effect on North Korea. The implications of the sudden reversal of U.S. policy toward China from North Korea's viewpoint were ominous. China, concerned with improving relations with the United States and with Japan, the principal ally of the United States and a firm supporter of South Korea, could no longer be relied upon as in the past to endorse a harsh, unyielding posture toward those two powers and South Korea. At the same time, North Korea undoubtedly was encouraged by the U.S. decision in 1971 to withdraw one of its infantry divisions from South Korea and by indications that further withdrawals were likely. The Nixon Doctrine, together with trends in Vietnam and in U.S. opinion, encouraged North Korea to believe that all U.S. military forces would soon be pulled out of the Asian mainland. At this juncture a mild policy toward South Korea could be believed to accelerate this process of withdrawal.

Hence, both Koreas began to make subtle changes in their posture vis-a-vis each other. Face-to-face talks between representatives of the two

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33. This trend was reserved since the late 1980s when the Soviet Union began to adopt more reformist measures and to loose its control over the East European states. Since 1989, North Korea and China came much closer. The failed coup of August 1991 in the Soviet Union had provided another momentum for North Korea and China to strengthen their bilateral ties. Since then North Korea has begun to actively seek the support from China. Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing in October 1991 can be interpreted as a move to seek Chinese support.
Koreas began for the first time in 1971, after more than the two decades of frozen hostility. However, these changes did not last long. As superpower relations deteriorated after the mid-1970s, the inter-Korean dialogue was stopped and their relations returned to the previous hostile rivalry. However, as superpower relations and Sino-Soviet relations improved since 1985, the inter-Korean dialogue resumed and there emerged another chance to improve relations. In a word, the ups and downs in superpower relations have been followed by ups and downs in inter-Korean relations. They have been and will be the precondition for influencing direction of inter-Korean relations.

The second aspect of big powers' influence over Korean issue is a more military one. While both Koreas have been trying to be self-reliant in defense, they are still dependent upon their external allies for the supply of modern weapons and military equipment. In this dimension, the importance of China is quite small. While China could provide North Korea with military aid, it lacks the capability to design and produce more advanced weapons. It has been the Soviet Union that supplied North Korea with advanced weapons and the technology needed to build a defense industry and to modernize its armed forces. Consequently, after Khrushchev's fall, Pyongyang and Moscow seized the opportunity to patch up the rift between them, and the transfer of Soviet arms resumed. Since then, North Korea has continued to depend on the Soviet Union for new weapons and the Soviet Union has been using this leverage over North Korea in its competition with China.
Table 5.3 Cumulative Comparison of Arms Transfer from the Soviet Union and China To North Korea between 1984-1988.

(In Millions of Current Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>The Soviet Union</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>2,370 (100%)</td>
<td>2,200 (92.3%)</td>
<td>50 (2.1%)</td>
<td>150 (5.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If Soviet arms transfers to North Korea in the early period was intended to play North Korea against China by pulling North Korea toward the Soviet side by using its most reliable leverage over North Korea—the supply of modern weapons and transfer of modern military technologies, since the early 1970s Soviet arms transfers to North Korea have been a kind of reaction to the U.S. supply of advanced modern weapons to South Korea. In other words, there has been an action-reaction cycle in their arms transfers to their respective allies. In the early 1970s Su-7 fighter bombers appeared in North Korea, apparently provided in response to the acquisition of F-4s by the South Korean air force in 1969. During the 1970s, the Soviets provided the technology that enabled the North Koreans to begin the production of T-62 tanks. The Soviet Union has not made available to Pyongyang the T-72 tank. Until the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union did not supply North Korea the advanced aircraft such as MiG-23 and surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-6 and SA-7, which it had sent to friendly states in the Middle East, such as Syria and Libya. Since the mid-1980s the Soviet Union and North Korea began to pick up the pace of military cooperation. It
was only after Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow in April 1984 that the Soviet Union began to provide advanced weapons to North Korea. The first public report appeared that North Korea had acquired the SCUD, a surface-to-surface missiles of the 1950s vintage with a range of 96 to 162 miles, considerably greater than the range of the FROG missile that North Korea had possessed for years. In 1985, the first MiG-23 fighters began to appear in the North Korean air force, with MiG-29s appearing later. At the same time, North Korea began receiving SA-3 and SA-5 missiles to upgrade the air defense network of SA-2 missiles deployed many years earlier. The Soviet decision to provide advanced weapons to North Korea can be perceived as a reaction to the U.S. decision, announced in 1981, to sell 36 F-16s to South Korea, just as the provision of the Su-7s appears to have been in response to the arrival of F-4s in the South Korean air force. Such an action-reaction of supply of modern weapons to their local ally is not likely to continue due to the collapse of Soviet political and economic system. It seems that the Soviet Union cannot compete against the United States in supporting its local allies by providing military and economic aid. Economically, the Soviet Union itself is faced with serious economic problems which undermine its ability to provide economic and military aid to North Korea. North Korea is also unable to pay the Soviet Union for the weapons either in hard currency or in consumer goods. Politically, it is counterproductive to provide modern weapons to North Korea: that is, such Soviet action would possibly undermine its newly established relations with South Korea. While the Soviet Union will not be able to provide military and

34. It is reported that North Korea has 46 MIG-23s and 30 MIG-29s. *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, p. 167.
economic aid to North Korea, which has been the primary means to maintain balance of power in the Korean peninsula for the Soviets, it is likely to use a "peace offensive" in the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia by pressing arms control which would affect not only North Korea's military establishment but also that of South Korea and the United States. The Soviet Union is not likely to put up its hands over the Korean affairs.

In sum, the unique condition of the Korean peninsula has made it necessary for external countries to be involved. It is not because the divided Koreans cannot manage their relations by themselves, but because certain foreign countries are deeply involved in the Korean situation because of the importance of Korea to their own national interests. The ups and downs in great powers' relations have had a tremendous impact on the relations between the two Koreas. And they will continue to do so in the future. Of course, while the final outcome of inter-Korean relations will primarily be dependent upon the two Koreas, the nature and type of relations among the great powers will exert their influence over the course of change in inter-Korean relations by providing the environment in which the two Koreas work. In other words, while they are not sufficient condition for determining the fate of Korea, the relations among the great powers are necessary since both Koreas are dependent upon their respective external allies for the achievement of their foreign policy objectives. A sort of double-track approach will be required to improve the situation: efforts made by the two Koreas to improve their bilateral relations, and those to be made by foreign countries in order to facilitate a process of reconciliation between North and South Korea.
In sum, the division of Korea and both Koreas' efforts to reunify the motherland on its own terms, the traumatic war experience and the consequent hostility and distrust, the unique role of the military in each Korea, and the great powers' competition over the Korean peninsula have sustained and exacerbated the Korean arms race.

The Pending Issues of Korean Arms Control

We have reviewed some distinctive characters of the Korean arms race. While there has been an intense arms race in the Korean peninsula, there have also been some arms control proposals. Since 1945 North and South Korea have proposed several arms control measures. While North Korea has been pressing arms control measures which require structural changes of the military establishment of both sides, South Korea has been proposing various CSBMs.

North Korea has been pressing three sets of arms control measures: (1) withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea; (2) denuclearization of the peninsula; and (3) reductions in the size of the regular armies of both sides to 100,000 each. In response to those proposals, South Korea has proposed

35. It is reported that some 284 proposals were tabled between 1948 and 1988, 235 by Pyongyang and 59 by Seoul. See Young Koo Cha, "Arms Control Talks on the Korean Peninsula: A Korean Perspective," paper prepared for delivery at the 18th International Conference of the KIIS, 5-7 July 1989, Seoul, Korea, p. 5. The data were complied by the National Unification Board of the Republic of Korea.

arms control initiatives which are directed to confidence and trust building between the two Koreas. They are (1) the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the North and the South; (2) renunciation of the use of military force, and (3) exchanges in cultural, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

There are fundamental differences between North and South Korea in their approach to arms control and in the subjects of arms control. While North Korea argues that structural measures should precede operational measures, South Korea argues the opposite. On the issue of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, North Korea argues that the U.S. presence itself is a root cause of tensions and creates danger of war in Korea, and perpetuates the division of Korea. Thus, the removal of U.S. forces is required to reduce tensions and to have constructive dialogue and unification through "Koreanization" of the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, most South Koreans, as well as many Americans, believe that the U.S. forces, including nuclear weapons, in South Korea has been and will be the most reliable deterrent against another North Korean attempt at a military conquest of South Korea. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee in April 1989, General Louis Menetrey, Commander of USFK, argued that

The presence of this combat force and the knowledge that any attack against the ROK may involve, either intentionally or unintentionally, ground combat with a U.S. Ground Force, has

37. See Young C. Kim, pp. 114-115
38. By this, General Menetrey meant the 2nd Division deployed along DMZ. The 2nd Division serves as the so-called trip-wire deterrent. For the discussion of trip-wire deterrent strategy, see William T. Tow, "Reassessing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 1(Summer 1991), pp. 179-218.
served as a vital component of our deterrent strategy. [It] complicates military equation on the peninsula and injects an element of uncertainty for North Korea. This uncertainty constitutes an unacceptable level of risk and mandates that the North Korean leadership consider the total U.S. commitment in the correlation of forces. Any reduction in this combat capable force may be perceived as a lessening of U.S. resolve and may cause the North to conclude that an attack against the South, designed to rapidly achieve their objectives while avoiding direct combat with U.S. Forces, may avoid direct U.S. retaliation and, therefore, constitutes an acceptable risk.39

Thus, for the ROK and the United States, the presence of U.S. force in South Korea is one of main sources of stability on the Korean peninsula, not a destabilizing factor. The current plan of phased reductions of U.S. forces in South Korea is driven by the economic constraints of the United States and the booming South Korean economy, not by the diminishing North Korean threat.40 The initial reduction of U.S. troops will be followed by further reductions, depending upon progress in the inter-Korean dialogue and circumstances.41 So, if North Korea wants to see a further reduction of


40. For detail, see US Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: US DoD, April 1990). In this plan, the US Department of Defense unveiled a "strategic plan" envisioning a "a phased approach" to additional American force withdrawals. Between 1992-1995, the overall force total of 135,000 forward-deployed US personnel in Asia will be reduced to approximately 120,000, mostly, non-combatant; between 1995-1997, unspecified but "proportionately greater reductions" in theater-deployed combat forces would occur; and between 1997-2002 yet further reductions but "stabilizing at lower levels of withdrawal as circumstances permit."

41. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
U.S. troops in South Korea, it should change its aggressive foreign policy objectives.

The second difference is related to their understanding of the cause of arms races and war. North Korea's basic argument for troop reductions on both sides is that the arms race and arms are the sources of misunderstanding, distrust, and potential armed clash. Thus, a mutual reduction of troop strength would contribute to the relaxation of tensions between the North and the South, enhance mutual trust and confidence, and precipitate the reunification process. South Korea, on the other hand, argues for CSBMs prior to mutual troop reduction. The arms race is not the cause of misunderstanding and distrust. Rather distrust and hostility are the cause of the arms race. Unless such distrust and misunderstanding are resolved through contacts in non-military spheres, reductions of troop strength are absurd and unacceptable. 42

These arms control proposals have exacerbated the inter-Korean rivalry. Arms control, or arms control initiatives, itself has been the extension of their rivalry: that is, who is winning the propaganda game. In the past, arms control initiatives have been used for propaganda purpose rather than tension reduction and politico-military stability. They have been very reluctant to accept the status quo on the Korean peninsula which could be considered as one of preconditions for the initiation of arms control negotiations. In inter-Korean relations, everything has been perceived as a zero-sum game. Neither Pyongyang nor Seoul has had a serious commitment to arms control. There has been no dialogue on the common

42. Young C. Kim, pp. 117-118.
subject of arms control and no effort to narrow the gap in their proposals. Rather, there have been two monologues on arms control. There has been no effort to establish an organic linkage between the two different types of arms control proposals which we have seen in the European arms control experience such as the linkage between MBFR and CSCE. If they had a serious commitment to arms control, they should have tried to set up a common agenda.

We know exactly what is going to be on the agenda if arms control talks begin. The problem of Korean arms control is not that we don't know the issues. The problem lies in where we should begin, how to provide an organic linkage between different arms control measures, and how we should proceed. In this assessment, the European arms control experience can help us to assess the prospect of Korean arms control. In other words, what have been the factors which have supported arms control in Europe and how applicable are they to the Korean peninsula? And what can the European arms control experience tell us about Korean arms control?

The Prospect of Korean Arms Control

Over the past few years, the situation in and around the Korean peninsula has become very favorable to arms control and tension reduction. However, at the current stage in the Korean situation, it seems premature to talk about the details of specific arms control measures. We have to focus instead on the issue of how we can begin arms control talks in general: that is, under what condition have arms control talks happened, what are the factors determining that condition, and how much of the current Korean situation fits into that pattern.
There are various factors which influence nations considering arms control. Schelling and Halperin's definition of arms control gives us some hints on the conditions under which nations are more or less likely to adopt arms control. If we follow their definition of arms control, we can think of three preconditional factors of arms control: a political status quo, the expectation of unacceptable damage in war, and the enormous economic burden of defense.

The primary condition for any arms control talks is the acceptance of the political status quo. We don't need to go in depth to discuss this matter. Before the opening of arms control talks between East and West, the status quo was established in Europe and in superpower relations. East and West finally recognized the spheres of influence at least in Europe by the late 1960s and early 1970s. The territorial and political status quo drawn up at the end of World War II was finally accepted before the CSCE and formally recognized by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It allowed the European states to free themselves from the past and work toward a new direction.

How about the Korean peninsula? Is there a political status quo? While there has been improvement of the situation in and around the Korean peninsula, there is no status quo upon which the great powers and the two Koreas agree. It is true that the great powers have improved their relations and begun to act as a concert of like-minded great powers in order to avoid armed conflict. It might be said that the Soviet Union, the United States, and China have a shared strategic interest in preventing war in

43. Here, I mean SALT, MBFR, and CSCE.
Korea. Since the death of Mao, China gradually accepted the US presence in South Korea as a significant contribution to regional security. China began to share the strategic interests with the Soviet Union during the process of Sino-Soviet rapprochement that culminated in the Gorbachev-Deng summit in May 1989.\textsuperscript{44} The Soviet Union and China have assumed a more activist posture on Korean issues, arranging "unofficial contacts" between South and North Korea, urging the United States and Japan to begin their contacts with North Korea to help draw it into the international community, enhancing their direct contacts with South Korea, and encouraging Pyongyang to pursue dialogue with Seoul as well as to undertake domestic and foreign policy reforms that would help end its international isolation.\textsuperscript{45} The United States has been consulting with the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and South Korea on the dangers of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{46} These are quite positive signs of improvement in great-power relations over the Korean peninsula. These are the signs of transition, not those of conclusion. And they have not reached any agreement specific to the Korean peninsula such as restraints on arms transfers. They feel obliged to protect their respective allies' basic


interests. In moving towards rapprochement with Seoul, Moscow has taken care to support North Korea's arms control initiatives which have been rejected by Seoul and Washington. Since June 1989, China has taken North Korea's side and is very reluctant to normalize its relations with South Korea, while expanding economic and trade relations with South Korea. The United States has shown a very cautious approach toward North Korea.

While the great powers have a common interest in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula, they have no common idea on what is the stable condition of the Korean peninsula and no common framework in which they can work together to foster stability on the Korean peninsula. These are due to the division of Korea and the uncertain future of inter-Korean relations. It seems that there are some limits in the great powers' influence in determining the situation in Korea. It might be said that the great powers have done what they can do under the current situation. To a certain degree, the future development of inter-Korean relations and stability in the Korean peninsula depends more upon the two Koreas themselves than on the great powers.

The division of Korea and each Korea's desire to reunify the motherland under its own terms have created a non-status quo policy line in each Korea and an intense arms race between the North and the South.

47. For example, the Soviet Union has been strongly backed North Korea's proposal for the creation of nuclear-weapons free zone in Korea.
48. This tendency was strengthened since the failed coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991. China still refuses to establish a diplomatic relation with South Korea. It is confirmed in Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing in October 1991. See Hankook Ilbo, 10 October 1991, pp. 5-6; ibid, 14 October 1991, pp. 4-5.
Thus, the development of a common framework for reunification, or at least an effort at this, is required to have arms control talks and achieve progress in those negotiations. It has been argued that reunification and arms control are incompatible since arms control can be established on the basis of recognizing the status quo, whereas national unification is inconceivable without breaking it. It is not necessarily true, and it is quite a static interpretation of arms control. Arms control does not necessarily mean the permanent fixation of the division of the country, or the perpetuation of the status quo. Rather it is a step toward reunification by encouraging the two Koreas to recognize and/or accept the current situation as a starting point for the future development of their relations and by providing stability during the transitional period of the reunification process. The problem is not arms control itself. Rather arms control initiatives proposed either by the South or by the North are biased to favor one side over the other, to support each one's own version of reunification policy, and to upset the situation. Arms control and reunification can be mutually supportive and reinforcing. The relation between arms control and reunification can be manipulated by the political leadership.

If so, we have to ask whether there has been progress in the inter-Korean dialogue to narrow the gap between Pyongyang and Seoul in their reunification policies. We don't need to cover the evolution of reunification policies of both Koreas. And that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

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Ideas and blueprints of reunification that the two Koreas have unveiled over the years need to be taken with a grain of salt. Their foremost function has been symbolic: to underscore the commitment of each state or its leadership to the goal of reunification and to score propaganda points in the unending war of words and nerves. The most recent version of each Korea's reunification framework is the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo of the North and the Korean National Community Unification Formula(or Korean Commonwealth) of the South. The DCRK plan was first unveiled by Kim Il-Sung in his report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on October 10, 1980.\footnote{For details, see Kim Il-Sung, \textit{Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on the Work of the Central Committee, October 10, 1980} (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980).} The most notable aspect of the plan was that, for the first time, "confederation" was presented as a form of reunification. Previously, North Korea had characterized confederation as a transitional step toward reunification. Under this framework, the North and the South recognize and tolerate each other's ideas and social systems. In the new government the two sides would have equal representation and exercise "regional autonomy." There will also be a unified national government with equal, not proportional, representation of both regional governments.\footnote{There will be the Supreme National Confederal Assembly and the Confederal Standing Committee at the center.} In a word, it is a formula of "One Nation, Two States."

The KNCUF made its official debut on September 11, 1989, when President Roh Tae Woo made a speech to the ROK National Assembly. It is predicated on the proposition that the two Korean states must first restore and strengthen a sense of national community before they can hope to forge political unity. The KNC formula thus envisages an interim state in which the North and the South will form a loose union to be known as the "Korean Commonwealth." It was a counterproposal to DCRK. And it aims to achieve "One Nation, One State" in the end.

In this brief review of the most recent version of each Korea's unification formula, we can see some fundamental differences. First of

53. The origin of this framework can be found in Mr. Hongkoo Lee who argued that the initiative for unification should not be led by the government or the political leadership but rather by the people at large, and that first priority should be placed on the welfare of the people as the initial step towards reconciliation. See Hongkoo Lee, "The Korean Commonwealth and the Asian Community," a paper presented at the 30th International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Mexico City, Mexico, August 3-8, 1976.


55. There are also similarities such as (1) both plans recognize not only the pressing necessity of reunification but also its ultimate inevitability; (2) both plans recognize that the long duration of division has widened the gap in ideology, ideas, and systems between the North and the South; (3) both plans accept that strengthening the bonds of the Korean nation and people is more important and urgent than achieving a political union; (4) both plans affirm the importance of honoring the principle of regional representation or equality of the North and the South in moving toward reunification; and (5) both plans subscribe to the three principles of reunification, namely (a) independence, (b) peace, and (c) great national unity. For further discussion, see B. C. Koh, "A Comparative Study of Unification Plans: The Korean National Community versus the Koryo Confederation," Korea Observer, Vol. XXI, No. 4(Winter 1990), pp. 437-456.
all, whereas the KNC plan adopts an incremental functional approach, the DCRK plan adopts an approach that would tackle and solve all problems at once. Under the KNC plan, an interim stage of the Korean Commonwealth will pave the way for reunification by fostering a sense of national unity through dialogue and multi-faceted cooperation and exchanges in non-political, non-military spheres between the North and the South.

The DCRK plan, by contrast, calls for the attainment of national reunification without any intermediate or preparatory steps. Contacts and cooperation between people of the North and the South, between their economic and social organizations, are considered not to be preliminary steps but rather the consequences of political decisions. Second, as I said before, whereas the ultimate goal of the KNC plan is to establish a single nation-state in Korea, that of the DCRK is substitute "national reunification" for "systemic reunification" on the ground that the latter is unattainable under the existing conditions. Third, maybe the most important difference with respect to arms control, whereas the KNC plan has no preconditions, the DCRK plan does. Pyongyang's preconditions are the replacement of the military fascist government in Seoul by a "progressive" one and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

What makes the two Koreas' reunification policies difficult to reconcile is the deeply rooted distrust and emotional hatred due to the traumatic experience of the Korean War, and the lingering effect of a distinctive Korean political culture. We don't need to reemphasize the effects of the Korean War on the Korean people since we have already discussed them before. The Korean political culture is distinctively the culture of zero-sum thinking in which any gain for one side either
translates into or is perceived as a loss for the other. Equal representation of interests is inconceivable. However, compromise can happen under one condition: that is, if there is a tremendous imbalance of power, compromise and variant-sum games are likely to appear. What is interesting in the traditional Korean political culture is that if one feels quite confident about oneself and feels superior over the others, one tends to become very generous, to become willing to negotiate, and to give out more than one is supposed to give. Superiority does not necessarily mean more gain in Korean political culture. Rather, sometimes, it means more loss. But the loss itself tends to be perceived as a sign of superiority. That is, "I am superior and strong enough to suffer such loss, I can endure such a loss, and I am morally superior."

If we apply this logic to inter-Korean relations, the prospect of arms control and reunification is quite positive. South Korea has a better position to offer such a reconciliation to North Korea. South Korea has become less paranoid about the North as it has begun to outperform North Korea in economics and diplomacy. South Korea has now normalized its relations with the Soviet Union, has the equivalent of an embassy in Beijing, and has diplomatic relations with all East European countries. Seoul also retains its close security ties with the United States. Consequently, the self-confidence of South Korea has increased tremendously. This self-confidence has allowed South Korea to pursue a more flexible posture toward North Korea and to overcome the "fear complex" which has been one of the momenta of the inter-Korean arms race. Thus, we can expect that Seoul is likely to pursue a more constructive and more forgiving policy toward Pyongyang.
Economic incentive is another important factor which drives nations to consider an arms control option. Before MBFR, the United States and most West European states were faced with domestic economic problems. The possible unilateral cut of U.S. forces in Europe due to its domestic pressure had forced the United States and its European allies to put the agenda of mutual reduction of forces forward in response to the Soviet proposal for a European Security Conference. In another occasion, the major breakthroughs in INF and CFE were preceded by the collapse of Soviet economy. If we apply this pattern to Korea, the prospect for arms control in the Korean peninsula is quite positive.

Internally, while it has shown a tremendous endurance to sustain the world's fifth largest army of around one million by spending more than 20 percent of its GNP on defense expenditures, and ability to maintain extensive internal control and social unity through ideological education and various control mechanisms, North Korea cannot escape from the fate of other socialist countries. Economically, North Korea confronts a "serious" situation. Agricultural conditions are catastrophic with population growth outstripping food supply and potential remedies being either exhausted or no longer available. Raw material and energy resources are being exhausted, while economic management continues to be politicized and over-centralized. The shortage of consumer goods and the dissatisfaction of consumers are inevitable. The impotency of the North

Korean government to raise the people's living standard jeopardizes Kim Il Sung's advocacy of the superiority of juche's socialism over other system.\textsuperscript{58} These economic difficulties coincide with indications of rising tensions and public discontent. Recent accounts of the appearance of wall posters criticizing the government's economic policies mesh with early reports of opposition slogans being painted on a Pyongyang railway station, of scattered industrial strikes, and of incidents of sabotage.\textsuperscript{59} It is reported that North Korea has been spending 20-25 percent of GNP on the military. There is no doubt that this extravagant spending on defense has been constraining its economic growth. If North Korea transfers 15-20 percentage points out of defense expenditures, it can add another 3-4 percentage points to the current growth rate and help North Korea to solve its economic problems. Furthermore, reduced defense spending will release much needed labor to the non-military sector.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, for North Korea, arms control makes sense for economic reasons. In addition, arms control is likely to give North Korea access to foreign countries in order to get the needed materials and capital by creating a peace-loving image of North Korea.

From South Korea's perspective, the economic incentive for arms control is not like that of North Korea. Not because of the failure of its economy, but because of the success of its economy, South Korea is forced to

\begin{enumerate}
\item[60.] Kwan-Chi Oh, p. 53.
\end{enumerate}
assume more defense responsibility. Since the end of the last decade, the United States has been pressing the South Korean government to assume more defense responsibility. It has ignited a domestic debate over "guns" vs. "butter." The emergence of this kind of debate is quite a positive sign since in the past it was perceived as taboo to question defense policies. The South Korean government cannot maintain a defense-first policy. As its economy develops, South Korea is faced with the problems of distribution and welfare. To meet this kind of domestic demand for a welfare society, arms control makes sense to the South Korean government.

The probability of war in the Korean peninsula has substantially decreased over the years. North Korea identifies three revolutionary capabilities as the necessary conditions for communizing the entire Korean peninsula. Those are: North Korean revolutionary capabilities, South Korean revolutionary capabilities, and international revolutionary capabilities. It seems that two out of three revolutionary capabilities—South Korean and international revolutionary capabilities—have diminished drastically. North Korea has been trying to further South Korean revolutionary capabilities in order to force a US troop withdrawal from South Korea and to promote the South Korean revolution and domestic unrest. Young men, students and intellectuals, among others, have been the main targets of North Korean propaganda. However, mass support for these anti-government groups and their claims has decreased as the democratization process has begun to unfold in South Korea. Everybody wants democracy, but nobody wants either communism or juche.

North Korea's strategy of promoting international revolutionary capabilities has been focusing on strengthening ties between North Korea
and potential international supporters, which include all socialist and Third World countries. In promoting such capabilities, North Korea has been trying to isolate South Korea in the field of world politics and then to pressure US troops to withdraw from South Korea. Such a strategy is no longer valid nor available. North Korea's ties with all socialist states are almost gone, as the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union have abandoned communism and launched democratic reform. Its ties with Third World countries have weakened as many Third World countries find more benefit from their ties with South Korea. North Korea, not South Korea, has become more isolated than ever before. International revolutionary capabilities are gone.

Under these circumstances, it is very unlikely that North Korea will continue its aggressive foreign policy vis-a-vis South Korea, or to launch an attack against South Korea. But there may be a chance of unexpected accidental war caused by miscalculation and misperception. Thus, arms control is required to reduce the chance of accidental war and to provide grounds for peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity during the transitional period until Korea is peacefully unified.

The prospects for arms control in the Korean peninsula are quite positive. The current situation in and around the Korean peninsula is better than ever before. The problem lies in materialization of this situation in a constructive way. A concerted effort among the great powers is required to encourage the two Koreas launch a new era in their relations.

61. China and Cuba can be considered as an exception.
On the other hand, both Koreas should try hard to overcome the legacy of the past and to build a new relation between them.

**Conclusion: Steps to Arms Control**

Arms control initiatives on the Korean peninsula should be aimed at eliminating the risks of war and paving the way to unification through the establishment of a system that guarantees peaceful co-existence between the two Koreas. The approach to securing peace on the Korean peninsula should be incremental and realistic. We can think of two approaches to arms control: structural and operational. A structural approach is aimed at establishing long-term stability by providing greater predictability about the types and levels of forces that will be maintained over a given span of time. Operational arms control measures are aimed at establishing a framework for clarifying the nature and purpose of military operations and for enhancing or restoring stability during fast-moving crisis situations.62

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On the Korean peninsula, we can think of several structural measures. Immediate arms reduction is not likely to take place. The reduction of troops to 100,000 on both sides, which North Korea has been pressing, is not feasible. The first step in arms reduction in the Korean peninsula should be directed toward a freeze of the current level of forces on both sides. It seems that the growth in the size of armed forces has reached its limit, especially in North Korea. 1.1 million troops out of 22.7 million population is too big to sustain. Parallel with the freeze of force size, it is possible to demobilize, or at least reduce, the large size of the reserves such as the Pacification Corps, the Worker and Peasant Red Guard, or the Youth Red Guard in the North, and the Homeland Reserve Forces in the South. It is reported that North Korea has 5 million reserves which can be fully mobilized within 12 hours. And South Korea has 4.5 million reserves. It does not make any sense to maintain so many the reserves since both Koreas have a sufficient number of regular forces. Sustaining a large reserve force is counterproductive since it wastes human resources and it continues to militarize the society itself. The effectiveness of these forces in combat is also questionable. The South Korean government has begun to reduce and reorganize its reserve forces since 1989. But it has not tried to link the reorganization of its own reserve forces to those of North Korea, even though it fears the North Korean reserves. It is possible and desirable to link the reduction of South Korean reserves to those of North Korea. This


would not affect the basic military establishments of both Koreas, nor jeopardize national security interests of both, but it would induce changes in the society, especially in North Korea, by demilitarizing the society.

Third, South Korea fears a North Korean blitzkrieg attack. North Korea deploys its main ground forces—approximately 65 percent—in the forward area south of Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The forward deployment of these forces enables initiation of an attack on the South without any redeployment or massive mobilization. North Korea's army corps stationed along the front line are maintained in a high state of readiness so as to launch an offensive at a moment's notice. Seoul is only 40 km away from the DMZ, warning time is insufficient. These facts make South Korea quite vulnerable and paranoid about North Korea's military threat, and make the situation very unstable. If a crisis occurs, it might easily result in armed conflict. In order to avoid such a disastrous consequence and to enhance crisis stability, it is necessary to change the deployment of forces, the state of alert, and the configuration of weapons deployed along the DMZ. These kinds of measures will make South Korea less vulnerable to North Korea's attack by providing more warning time and, thus, crisis stability. From North Korea's perspective, these measures would be acceptable since they don't affect the military establishment of North Korea; they do not reduce the actual size of North Korea's armed forces, and they can provide North Korea an opportunity to project a non-aggressive image to the outside world. In addition, the modification of the military strategy of North Korea

64. Given the strength of military-industrial complex in North Korea, any dramatic arms reduction measure will possibly jeopardize domestic stability of North Korea.
will make the situation more stable. North Korea's military strategy is extremely offensive, whereas South Korea emphasizes the counter-attack.\textsuperscript{65} Defensive military strategy on both sides is required to make deterrence more stable, to make the process of redeployment of forces smoother, and to provide grounds for arms reductions.\textsuperscript{66}

Based upon progress in these fields, arms reductions can begin. In this process, we can employ some features of the CFE treaty. Those are: (1) the concept of reducing forces to a lower equal level below that of the numerically weaker side, (2) focus on reduction of armaments, especially mobile, far ranging high firepower weapons essential for offense and attack, and (3) stringent verification measures.

On the other hand, we can pursue various CBMs simultaneously, or in advance. It is desirable to introduce a CSCE-type regime, or an agreement like the Basic Principles of Relations between the USA and the USSR of 1972, between North and South Korea in order to routinize and coordinate the contacts. The contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang have been unorganized and uncoordinated across different fields. And there have been no guiding principles of relations between Seoul and


\textsuperscript{66} In August 1990, Kim Byong Hong of the DPRK Foreign Ministry's Institute for Disarmament and Peace stated that "the North wished to turn the military forces of both sides of the Korean peninsula into that of a defensive character." Kim Byong Hong, "The Development of the Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Prospect of Settlement of the Korean Question," paper presented to the Asia-Pacific Dialogue, University of Hawaii, August, 1990, p. 4.
Pyongyang. There was an effort to establish such principles. On June 23, 1973, Park Chung Hee, in his "Declaration on Diplomacy of Peaceful Unification," proposed some essential guidelines for the ROK's relations with communist countries, including North Korea. The most important points were: (1) that North and South Korea should neither interfere with each other's internal affairs nor commit acts of aggression against each other; (2) a continued North-South dialogue based on the 4th July 1972 communique; (3) that South Korea does not oppose North Korea's participation with the South in international organizations and, in helping ease tensions and further international cooperation; (4) that South Korea is willing to open its doors to all nations of the world, on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality; and (5) South Korea urges those countries whose ideology and social institutions are different from that of South Korea to open their doors as well. This proposal was not accepted by North Korea, and it was directed not only to North Korea, but also to other socialist countries.

The simultaneous admission of both Koreas to the U.N. on September 17, 1991 has opened a door to a new era in inter-Korean relations. Some sort of agreement on guiding principles of their bilateral relation and their

67. On July 4, 1972, under the Pyongyang-Seoul consensus for a relief of tension at the peninsula, North and South Korea announced a joint communique. Among the many points agreed to by both Koreas included: (1) peaceful means to achieve unification, (2) a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang, and (3) the establishment of a South-North Coordinating Committee. See Ming Lee, "Seoul's Searching for Nordpolitik: Evolution and Perspective," Asian Perspective, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1989), pp. 145-146; and A White Paper on the South-North Korean Dialogue, pp. 93-95.

68. Ming Lee, pp. 146.
conduct in international politics in a new era is required to avoid conflictual competition between the two Koreas, to depart from the past, to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions, and to lead them to be reunified through peaceful means. The basic framework of the Helsinki Final Accord of 1975 and Basic Principles of Relations between the USA and USSR of 1972 can be transferred to the Korean case. We can call it a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Korea (CSCK). As in the case of the Helsinki Final Act, this can be divided into three baskets. Basket I should be directed to the management of political relations between the two Koreas. Basket I which can be called as "Agreement on Guiding Principles of Relations Between the ROK and the DPRK" will include: (1) renunciation of the use or threat of force in their relations, (2) respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality, (3) nonintervention in internal affairs of the other party, (4) peaceful settlement of disputes, and (5) fulfillment of international obligations. Basket II can cover nonpolitical, more technical and functional concerns of both Koreas such as trade, economic cooperation, joint ventures, and science and technology. Basket II will possibly lead the two Koreas to functional integration and policy coordination. Basket III should cover social and humanitarian issues such as family unification, information exchange, communication, sport, and cultural and educational exchanges. These measures will provide an opportunity to rediscover national unity and identity among the Korean people who share the same history and culture.

In addition, we can introduce military CBMs as a part, or a separate, field. They are: (1) prior notification of military maneuvers and movements exceeding a certain numerical limit of participating troops; (2) a hot line
between senior military commands; (3) an exchange of data on military strengths and dispositions; (4) observation and inspection; (5) a ban on imports of advanced offensive weapons systems; (6) transforming the DMZ into peace zone; and (7) ban on psychological and propaganda warfare along the DMZ.

We have surveyed a wide array of arms control and tension reduction measures applicable to the Korean peninsula. Each of them has intrinsic value in stabilizing the situation. If they seem to contribute to the stability and peace in the Korean peninsula, why is it so difficult to open a forum for arms control and tension reductions and to introduce such measures? What is required at the current stage may not be the discussion of arms control itself. Rather the discussion should be directed to the factors which will make arms control and tension reductions more feasible. In this discussion, we have to pay attention to the Korean defense culture. In the preceding chapter, we defined defense culture as "the elite’s perception of the fundamental and enduring components of defense policy through which problems of current defense policy are filtered and refracted."\(^{69}\) It affects the way in which the conditions for peace, order, and stability are defined, and which means are selected. Among the various features of the Korean defense culture and political culture, the most important component is the concept of the condition of peace: that is, a hierarchical/paternalistic order.\(^{70}\) For the Koreans, the conditions for

\(^{69}\) Defense culture can be perceived as a part of general political culture which is a part of social culture.

\(^{70}\) For further discussion on this, see Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985); and Gregory Henderson,
peace and stability do not lie in an equal distribution of power. Rather the concentration of power on one side is a preferable condition for peace and stability. Peace through negotiation between equally powerful entities is inconceivable and fragile. Negotiation, or the consideration of negotiation, comes only after the emergence of some kind of hierarchical order or an asymmetrical power structure between the competing parties. The superior becomes eager to take care of the inferior's concerns, and more flexible. Being flexible means being powerful, whereas rigidity means weakness.71 In other words, the Korean defense culture is a hegemonic culture in which the hegemon provides collective goods and order, and defines the rules of game. Until the mid-1980s the situation between North and South was a kind of balance of power in which neither side had a superior position and neither side had the ability to enforce its own terms of stability or define the rules of game. That is why the Korean conflict has been quite intense and neither side has been willing to negotiate. As the delicate equilibrium in the distribution of power in and around the Korean peninsula has begun to be replaced by a concentration of power, the conditions for negotiations have become better. Since the late 1980s South Korea has begun to occupy a superior position vis-a-vis North Korea in almost every dimension. North Korea knows this. Under this situation, it is not North Korea but South Korea who can turn the Korean peninsula into a


zone of peace, and change the nature of game the two Koreas have been playing.

In the initial stage, we should emphasize the political approach to security matters: that is, political confidence-building measures. As I said before, the simultaneous admission of both Korea to the U.N. has opened a new era in inter-Korean relations. To avoid a conflictual competition between the two Koreas in international politics, it is desirable to have some kind of agreement on the basic principles which guide, or restrain, their conducts vis-a-vis each other, or in international community. I call it "The Agreement on the Guiding Principles of Relations between the ROK and the DPRK." Based upon the agreement on the guiding principles, we can introduce military CBMs, various functional and policy integration measures(Basket II), and humanitarian measures(Basket III).

The South Korean government has been arguing that negotiations for arms reductions will be possible only after a certain level of political and military confidence has been fostered. The South Korean government has been reluctant to discuss any structural arms control measures. However, the U.S. decision to withdraw its troops from South Korea and to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons will force the South Korean government to consider structural arms control measures seriously.\footnote{Just after President Bush's announcement of U.S. plan to eliminate nuclear weapons, President Roh ordered his advisers and cabinet members to come up with some kind of arms reduction proposals. \textit{Hankook Ilbo}, 30 Sept., 1991, p. 1.} It seems that the U.S. decision will facilitate the arms and tension reduction process in the Korean peninsula. It is necessary for the South Korean government to change its posture on arms reductions. As we know in the European
experience, by linking the MBFR to the CSCE, it was possible to convene two separate arms control processes in Europe. It is possible to pursue two separate arms control processes simultaneously on the Korean peninsula. They can be mutually reinforcing. The debate on chicken vs. egg would not result in progress in arms control and would prolong a propagandistic war on arms control between North and South Korea. Thus, it is necessary for the South Korean government to link its proposals for CBMs to North Korea's proposals for arms reductions. Why should South Korea wait until North Korea gives in to South Korea's proposal for CBMs? Why should South Korea as well as North Korea try to separate one type of arms control from the other when they can be mutually reinforcing? Why one? Why not two? To bring North Korea to the negotiating table, South Korea should try to link its proposals for CBMs to North Korea's proposals for arms reduction. South Korea should also devise and clarify its own version of an arms reduction plan. In other words, it should make it clear what it wants to hear from the North on arms reduction. It would possibly allow North Korea to refine its proposals for arms reduction.

The primary factor which will facilitate or impede the introduction of arms control into the Korean peninsula is the self-confidence of its status,

73. The Soviet Union pressed the idea of the CSCE, whereas the United States urged the Soviet Union to participate in the talks on arms reduction (the MBFR). NATO intended to improve its security through MBFR by pursuing a military/technical arms agreement, as opposed to a purely political agreement enhancing detente. Neither side was willing to consider the other's proposal. But, in May 1972, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to participate in both. The Soviets agreed to start preliminary talks on MBFR in exchange for U.S. approval for the starting of CSCE preliminary talks. See John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe (New York: Pergamon Press): 16-48.
and the political will of the national leaders to translate this self-confidence into the generosity to accept equal partnership in the stabilization process. Both Koreas, especially South Korea, should avoid propagandistic arms control proposals which would discredit the other and favor one side over the other. This will be counterproductive as in the past. The problem of arms control in the Korean peninsula may be much more fundamental and hard to solve, due to its division, desire to reunify, and distinctive political and strategic culture. It directly challenges the concept of balance of power and balance of interests which have been the foundation of the European arms control approach. On the other hand, from a procedural and technical aspect, there are some valuable features in European arms control we can exploit. As I said before, the key to open the door for arms control is possessed by South Korea. It is time for South Korea to lead North Korea in the arms and tension reduction process.
CHAPTER VI

Naval Arms Control in Northeast Asia

The importance of the navy was rediscovered as the United States adopted the so-called "maritime strategy" and the Soviet Union began to deploy more nuclear warheads on submarines. Navies are not the only important facet of world leadership and of ups and downs that seem to be bound up with it but they form a crucial politico-strategic factor that in conjunction with other input factors, economic, social, and cultural, helps to lay the foundations for operations of global reach. Only those possessing superior navies have, in the modern world, staked out a good claim to world leadership.¹ Use and control of the sea, or the denial of it to an opponent, requires naval forces and naval forces are essential to world leadership. This is much more evident when we look at Northeast Asia's geographical attributes. It is surrounded by seas: the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan, and the Yellow Sea, which are described as "choke points" for the Soviet Union at the exit to the Pacific. Traditionally, the United States has maintained dominance at sea in the region as well as on a global scale. Such a dominance assures the credibility and reliability of U.S. security

guarantees to its local allies. The Soviet Union has, however, increased its naval forces in the Far East tremendously during the last decade. The Soviet Union seems to have achieved a rough naval parity with the United States, at least in the region. Among the Soviet four fleets, the Pacific Fleet, based in Vladivostok, is the largest one, with about 90 major surface combatants and about 135 submarines (of which 75 are nuclear powered), with total displacement reaching about 1,000,000 tons. Over the last three years, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been scaled down in terms of the numbers of vessels, however, the vessels that were eliminated were all old. Newly commissioned vessels are all of the new type.\(^2\) The modernization of the Pacific Fleet is alarming.

From the western perspective, the increase of Soviet ground forces which are mostly concerned with China does not impose a direct threat to the United States and its regional allies, but the increase of Soviet naval power does.\(^3\) The increase of Soviet naval power is a direct challenge to U.S. dominance in naval operations in the Pacific, undermines U.S. security guarantees to its regional allies by imposing a tremendous threat on SLOCs (sea lines of communications), and denies sea-power the ability to use the sea. Thus, the United States has been trying to match the increase of Soviet naval power in the Pacific by modernizing its own naval forces. China is also sensitive to the increase in Soviet naval power since this will enable the Soviet Union to encircle and isolate China from the outside world.

\(^2\) It is reported that the Soviet Union commissioned two additional Oscar II-class SSGNs to the Pacific Fleet in 1991. *Hankook Ilbo*, 15, October 1991.

and to localize conflicts in the peripheries during crisis. Japan, which is reliant on external markets for its goods and products and the supply of raw materials and oil, is very sensitive to the shift of balance of naval forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. Japan defines its regional defense role in terms of naval operations by assuming the defense of 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo to supplement U.S. naval capabilities in the Pacific. It is necessary for Japan to increase the size of the MSDF and to modernize its equipments to effectively carry out such a mission. However, Japan's increased defense capability might raise the Soviet and Chinese security concerns. 4

Unlike such a potential danger of a naval arms race, we have not paid much attention to managing stability at sea. 5 The discussion of naval


ars control is far behind other arms control issues, except several bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (IncSeA) of 1972 and the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities of 1989. The reasons for such delay and the reluctance to discuss naval arms control, especially from the United States, may be the following:

• Differences in the United States and Soviet naval security situations;
• Divergent views of the two superpowers on naval arms control;
• Insufficient mutual trust in the genuine objectives of naval doctrines of the two sides;
• Practical difficulties in designing mutually acceptable measures of naval arms control due to (a) existing asymmetries in objectives, requirements, strategies, force structures, capabilities, patterns of deployment, and operation of the navies, and (b) the mobility and global scope of operation of naval forces;
• Verification problems;
• Insufficiency of information on likely common interest in naval arms control measures of the two superpowers in the new international settings of the 1990s and beyond.6

6. For example, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Carlisle Trost, Chief of Naval Operation until June
But we cannot afford to further delay naval arms control in Northeast Asia due to the dominance of maritime geographical attributes of the region. For the United States and its regional allies, the Soviet threat does not come from its ground forces, but from naval and air forces. Given the maritime-oriented geographical attributes of Northeast Asia, it is important to carefully manage their naval operations and capabilities in order to further strengthen the momentum of peace in the region. So we have to ask how much arms control can contribute to stability at sea, how much arms control framework developed in different strategic landscape can be applicable to maritime oriented situation, what is the relevance of the previous naval arms controls, and what alternatives can we think of.


7. In addition, Barry M. Blechman argues the four rationales of naval arms control: "(i) ensuring in peacetime the safety and security of naval forces, fishing fleets, and merchant shipping; (ii) avoiding inadvertent or accidental conflicts, and particularly in avoiding the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons; (iii) reducing the cost of naval acquisitions and operations; and (iv) minimizing the complications in political relations that sometimes result from incidents on the seas." Barry M. Blechman, p. 4.
**The Naval Arms Race and Its Dilemma**

In 1980, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was the second largest of the four Soviet fleets, second to the Northern Fleet. By 1990, it had become the largest. Soviet sea power today consists of about 227 major surface combatants and about 323 submarines. The Pacific Fleet is deployed in the Far East region, with about 69 major surface combatants and 110 submarines.\(^8\)

What has changed in the Soviet Pacific Fleet over the last decade is the expansion of the so-called SSBN bastion strategy to the Sea of Okhotsk which is under the control of the Pacific Fleet.\(^9\) In fact, the number of submarines in the Pacific Fleet grew "significantly," while those of the Northern Fleet based at Kola numbered slightly less, analyzes a Finnish naval expert. During the 1975-1980 period, he points out, the "the number of SSBNs of the Pacific Fleet rose from eleven to twenty-five, i.e., over two fold."\(^{10}\) The number of SSBNs in the Pacific Fleet has remained constant. But it has gained more capability by replacing old Yankee- and Hotel-class SSBNs with Delta-class SSBNs.

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9. Bastion strategy is consisted of two elements: submarines and the protective ASW measures to protect SSBNs.

Table 6.1 Soviet Pacific Fleet SSBN Order of Battle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yankee</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel II</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta I</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta III</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the increase in SSBNs, anti-land and anti-surface ship attack capabilities have also been enhanced by the introduction of the Akura-class nuclear powered attack submarine carrying cruise missiles with a range of 3,000 km.\textsuperscript{11} Anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, and anti-air warfare capabilities have been enhanced by the reinforcements of Sovremenny- and Udaloy-class destroyers carrying helicopters, and the assignment of various cruisers to the Pacific Fleet.\textsuperscript{12}

These demonstrate the steadfast modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. While reducing the physical size of the fleet, the Pacific Fleet is acquiring more modern and sophisticated surface warships, submarines, and aircraft at a pace comparable to the Northern Fleet. Consequently, the Pacific Fleet's overall combat effectiveness has not diminished significantly with the retirement of older and less capable ships. Indeed, the Fleet's combat potential has actually increased with the addition of fewer, but more

\textsuperscript{11} It is reported that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has 5 Akura-class and 12 Victor-class attack submarines.
\textsuperscript{12} Over the last ten years, the Soviet Union has added 6 more cruisers.
capable, ships into service. The increase of Soviet naval power and the changes in the Soviet force structure are intended to better serve Soviet strategic military objectives in the Far East. These objectives are: (1) controlling the ocean areas contiguous to the Soviet Union, including the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk; (2) preventing strikes by U.S. naval forces against the Soviet Union by seeking out and destroying those forces at sea; (3) maintaining the ability to conduct nuclear strikes against the United States, its forces, or regional targets; (4) controlling key straits in the region, i.e., Soya, Tsugaru, Korea-Tsushima, and presumably somewhere between the Kurile islands; and (5) attacking allied sea lines of communication (SLOCs) throughout the region or using the threat of attacking SLOCs in order to isolate the United States.13 The primary strategic military objective of the Soviet Union in the region is to defend the Soviet Union against an attack in the East. To accomplish such a mission, the control of the key straits and adjacent bodies of water in the region is essential for the Soviets. Aside from defensive concerns, such control would provide the Soviets access to the open waters of the Pacific, where their forces can position themselves for attacks against US and allied naval forces far from Soviet territory.14


14. It is called "break-out" capability. It might also be defensive one which is designed to protect SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk and Soviet homeland by establishing multilayer forward defense perimeters.
Table 6.2 The Current Force Structure of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

| Submarines: | 110: strategic; 24 SSBN; tactical; 81: 19 SSGN, 26 SSN, 3 SSG, 33 SS; other roles: 5 SS. |
| Principal Surface Combatants: | 69: 2 carriers, 15 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 45 frigates. |
| Other Surface Ships: | 100 patrol and coastal combatants 102 mine warfare, 21 amph, some 230 spt and misc. |
| Naval Air: | 233 cbt ac., 89 cbt hel. |
| Bombers: | 71 |
| FGA: | 93 |
| ASW: | Aircraft: 69 Helicopter: 89 |
| Naval Infantry: | 1 div HG, 3 inf, 1 tk and 1 arty regt. |


To meet such potential Soviet threats to the United States and its allies and to deny the Soviet Union freedom of action, it is also essential for the United States to seek forward offensive naval operations. The U.S. maritime strategy is essentially offensive due to the maritime nature of the United States. The offensive character of the U.S. maritime strategy has

raised Soviet concerns. The Soviets have been seriously concerned about the inherent threat of American maritime power to their homeland. In a recent speech, Marshall Akhromeyev complained about the level and offensive character of US maritime activity in the Pacific:

The scale of the naval activities and the presence of the forward-based forces close to the Soviet Union's Far East borders are expanding. The number of ships fitted with Tomahawk cruise missiles is growing with the 7th Fleet which operates there. Large scale exercises involving aircraft carriers, battleships and landing ships take place in waters close to the Soviet Union's borders from the Sea of Japan to the Bering Sea, and their intensity and scope have increased recently. The offensive nature of these exercises can be seen in the fact that they are held as part of a single plan, with similar NATO exercises in the Atlantic and in Europe, to rehearse in the course of these exercises seaborne strikes against Soviet territory.16

Thus, although defense is foremost in Soviet military planning in the region, offensive elements are present in each of the strategic military objectives supporting this primary objective to offset U.S. forward offensive operations.17 It is the same for the United States, perhaps even stronger.


It is a terrible situation. It is all mixed up with indistinguishable offensive and defensive elements of the two superpowers at sea. There is a potential momentum of an intense naval arms race. To protect its homeland and its valuable SSBNs, the Soviet Pacific Fleet should be able to go out deep into the Pacific Ocean. From the Soviet perspective, the range of US carrier-based strike aircraft and SLCMs determines the forward defense perimeter the navy must defend. In order to defend deep, moreover, the Soviet Pacific Fleet must mount an extensive reconnaissance effort much further forward even of this "line of concern." This line—sea denial line—is placed at 2,000 km from Vladivostok and Petropavlosk. Putting these defensive lines beyond the Japanese island chain means that Japan and South Korea are in a sense behind the Soviet Union's defensive perimeter.

Whether the Soviet Union means to be threatening or not, this must be a source of some serious concerns for the United States and its two regional allies—Japan and South Korea—since this Soviet defensive perimeter interferes with the SLOCs. Should the Northeast Pacific become a Soviet lake, then the political perceptions of the Soviet Union by its neighbors are very likely to change. They might feel the need to become more accommodating to Soviet demands since a potential Soviet threat to SLOCs may emerge as realistic scenario at any time. That might be what the Soviets want to achieve: to become the ultimate arbiter of regional affairs by weakening U.S. alliance, and by developing a Soviet-sponsored security system by expanding its naval and air forces to replace that of the

United States. The presence of powerful Soviet naval and air forces would possibly enhance the political and diplomatic status of the Soviet Union in the region.¹⁹

What might be necessary for the U.S. allies--Japan and South Korea--to prevent that from happening is the increase of their naval forces, more cooperation between them, more attempts to assert control over the straits in their areas and more encouragement for the US fleet to stay.²⁰ To some extent, this is happening already. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is increasing its fleet of P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, completing their Asagiri-class of ASW frigates, and constructing five towed-array ships. This should help Japan meet its commitment to defend the SLOCs out to 1,000 miles from Tokyo Bay. The ROK Navy's ASW capacities, however, are much more local, and the need to enhance them widely recognized.

From the U.S. perspective, the continued presence of the U.S. Navy with a modernization effort is essential for various reasons. The declared termination of the Cold War means the gradual withdrawal of US ground and/or air forces from overseas locations. In order to supplement the withdrawal of U.S. forces and to ensure its security guarantees to its regional allies, effective, capable naval forces are required.

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¹⁹. This is hypothetical understanding. In reality, the increase of Soviet naval power has ironically cemented Japan's naval alliance with the United States. Such reality can change if U.S.-Japanese relations deteriorate and Soviet-Japanese relations improve drastically.

Figure 6.1 Outline of Soviet Naval and Air Activities in Northeast Asia
A withdrawal from a forward commitment of U.S. naval forces would inevitably be interpreted as a step toward isolationism and disengagement. Thus, the groundwork of the traditional U.S.-led alliance system in Northeast Asia, as well as in the Pacific, would be undermined. That would basically serve one of the Soviet interests: weakening the U.S. alliance and replacement of the U.S.-sponsored security system with that of the Soviet Union. If the United States wishes to remain a leader of democracies, the naval presence overseas is almost a sole "symbol of U.S. involvement," or a continued commitment to the alliance. If the Soviets were unable to seize the opportunities, the strategic opportunities might fall into either Japan's hand or China's hand. There is a high possibility that Japan would choose to rearm or enhance its defense capability beyond the current level in the absence of the U.S. security umbrella. A rearmed Japan would alarm its neighbors in the region who experienced Japanese imperialism at the turn of the century. It would possibly intensify the regional arms race in Northeast Asia. Thus, U.S. naval forces should be of sufficient size and deployment so as to remove the necessity for the Japanese rearmament much beyond its current level.

Even for an exclusively continental defense, however, the U.S. Navy needs a forward positioning as far away as possible from the homeland.

shores, given the contemporary progress in long-range, precision guided, high-throwweight strike capabilities, i.e., SLBMs, SLCMs, and carrier-based airborne platforms of ALCMs.\textsuperscript{24}

However, such a responses of U.S. allies and the United States itself would make the Soviets feel more threatened. For example, the Soviets felt threatened when the United States formulated so-called "maritime strategy" in the first half of the 1980s and began to form the basis of the development and practical activity of U.S. naval forces.\textsuperscript{25} It is one of the classical examples of the security dilemma, and an action-reaction arms race at sea. Both sides define their naval strategy and force structure as a defensive one. But, in order to defend their national security interests at sea, they need to develop offensive elements.

If we want to have peace and stability in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to think about arms control to break out of such a vicious circle. The action-reaction of the naval arms race, and the maritime strategy and counter-strategy are products of the Cold War in which the United States and the Soviet Union saw each other as the primary enemy and the primary source of threat to each other's national security. Nowadays we publicly announce that the Cold War is over and the Soviet threat has

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Owens and Moseman, pp. 25-32.
\item \textsuperscript{25} This Soviet perspective on U.S. maritime strategy is well reflected in General Lobov's article in Krasnaya Zvezda. General V. Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, "Peace and Stability for the World's Oceans," Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 28 June 1987, tans. in FBIS-SOV, 10 July 1987, pp. AA 1-AA 4. In his article, he argues that "the 'new naval strategy' of the United States will inevitably lead to an intensification of U.S. Navy aggressiveness, a growth in the level of the 'new naval strategy' of the United States will inevitably lead to an intensification of U.S. Navy aggressiveness, a growth in the level of the sides' military confrontation, and a heightened likelihood of military conflict." Ibid. p. AA 1.
\end{itemize}
diminished, if not disappeared. With the diminishing threat of the Soviet Union against the West, we have made breakthroughs in arms control in Europe and superpower relations by signing the INF, CFE, and START treaties. Why has there been no naval arms control? Navies now remain the only military forces still excluded from the arms control process. From a regional perspective, among other security issues, the stability and peace of Northeast Asia is dependent upon careful management of the naval forces of the superpowers as well as the regional powers in a non-provocative, non-threatening, and cooperative way. If the CFE Treaty will contribute to fostering stability and peace in Europe, naval arms control will do the same things in Northeast Asia. It is time to expand the momentum of detente on the ground and in the sky to the sea. If the naval arms race continues unchecked, it may jeopardize the security-building effort in Northeast Asia as well as in the Pacific.

If the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union is no longer the primary enemy of the United States, it is necessary to rethink and revise the maritime strategy in a way that reflects the changes we have observed since the introduction of maritime strategy. It is also necessary to seize the momentum of tension reduction in Northeast Asia by initiating naval arms control discussions.

**Arms Control at Sea**

The United States has been very reluctant to discuss naval arms control. There have been three substantive reasons for such opposition: first, opposition to the establishment of precedents that challenge the underlying principles of maritime law; second, the questionable benefits of
the proposals for the national security of the United States; and third, the difficulty of verifying an agreement within the limitations of current technology.\textsuperscript{26}

On the other hand, since President Gorbachev's famous Vladivostok speech, the Soviet Union has portrayed itself as a "peace-loving" Pacific power by curtailing exercises outside the main Soviet fleet areas, shutting down the facilities at Cam Rahn Bay, and calling for a series of arms control and CBM initiatives, including a proposed cut of 73 ships.\textsuperscript{27} In his interview with the Indonesian newspaper, Merdeka, Gorbachev articulated four arms control measures for the Asian and Pacific region. Among them, three are naval arms control measures. They are:

- (1) freeze of the number of nuclear-capable aircraft in the region;
- (2) lessening of the activities of the USSR and U.S. Navies in the Pacific Ocean which include (a) the limitation of the areas of navigation by ships carrying nuclear weapons, (b) the limitation of antisubmarine rivalry and ban on the antisubmarine activities; and (c) various maritime

\textsuperscript{26} On U.S. position on naval arms control, see Douglas M. Johnston, "Naval Arms Control: Not in the Nation's Best Interest," Proceedings (Naval Institute), August 1990, pp. 36-38. And James McCoy, "Naval Arms Control: Ante Up," Proceedings, September 1990, pp. 34-39. Another argument focuses on the fact that the United States is a maritime power and the Soviet Union is a continental power and that, therefore, the United States cannot afford to have a navy only equal to that of our principal adversary. Entering into a discussion of arms control, however, does not necessitate an agreement based on equality—it would be foolish for the United States to agree to an arrangement that would abandon the U.S. Navy's capability to control the seas in the event of war.

\textsuperscript{27} The Soviet positions on naval arms control have been articulated at many levels and repeated over time. Gorbachev's proposals on naval arms control in the Pacific are best outlined in his interview with Indonesian newspaper, Merdeka in July 1987. Marshal Akhromeyev has elaborated on them in numerous Pravda articles and interviews (see particularly his article of September 1988). See ft. 13.
confidence-building measures such as limitation of the scale and number of naval exercise, information exchange and notification, and safety measures on SLOCs;

(3) the creation of peace zone.  

Actually, these Soviet proposals have not been met with enthusiasm by the United States and other regional powers since they appeared to favor the Soviet interests. If such proposals are not going to be welcomed, we have to think about other forms of naval arms control which are mutually acceptable and will contribute to stability and peace in Northeast Asia. The feasibility of such measures will depend upon how much they are acceptable to the interested parties--the United States and its regional allies. And the acceptability of any naval arms control measure will be determined by how much it can contribute to national security of the countries involved.

**The Creation of Peace Zones or Sanctuary**

There have been a variety of Soviet and other national proposals to limit naval operations in specified zones. These zones would be either "nuclear free," or off-limits to ASW operations, or be established on the basis of minimum standoff distances from the homelands of the


signatories, or in some cases not be available for naval exercises. In Northeast Asia, the creation of SSBN sanctuaries in the Sea of Okhotsk and the safety of the key straits are the central theme in Soviet proposals which are designed to protect its valuable strategic nuclear forces from US ASW.

A Canadian scholar, for instance, foresees a possible US-USSR agreement in which the "Soviets would receive an American recognition of their *de facto* SSBN sanctuaries, in return for forbearance in regard to the forward deployment of both their SSBNs and nuclear-powered attack submarines," close to North American coasts. This might be mutually acceptable, he argued, because of the "Western preference for open-ocean dispersal versus the apparent Soviet preference for well-defined 'bastions'..."

Few observers see the feasibility of SSBN sanctuaries in the Sea of Okhotsk. The Okhotsk bastion, if it is to remain a sanctuary for Soviet SSBNs, needs not only a local protective cover as densely multilayered as its Arctic counterpart, but also a freedom of coercive naval-air actions against the US allies in the region, inevitably including countervailing choke-point operations. They are most likely designed to offset US ASW efforts in and around the break-out passageways and to secure beachheads along the choke-point shores by amphibious operations.

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If these proposals were to be accepted, the United States would probably be denied operations by most of its forces in the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Bering Sea. They would entail a *de facto* default on US commitments to guarantee its regional allies' security by limiting the US ability to defend the SLOCs. Currently, the United States and its allies hold an edge in the military balance in the Pacific in antisubmarine warfare, antiair warfare, naval long-range strike systems, amphibious warfare, and overall maritime capabilities. The acceptance of such proposals would eliminate the allies' edge over the Soviet Union in naval and air operations. Consequently, the United States would lose its deterrent and war-fighting capabilities by accepting SSBN sanctuary and peace zone in the region since such measures would make the Soviet Union less vulnerable to US strikes, whereas they would make the US naval and air forces more vulnerable and unable to wage deep strikes against Soviet targets.

In addition, the United States would be explicitly divorced from its current "neither confirm nor deny" policy regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in U.S. military units. That means that the United States would have to eliminate the nuclear elements from its 7th Fleet to meet the third non-nuclear principle of Japan, i.e., nonintroduction of nuclear weapons into its territory. That move would undermine the credibility of the existential deterrence of the United States to Japan. If it confirms the presence of nuclear elements in the 7th Fleet, it would raise public resentment in Japan as well as in Korea. The one is politically

35. James A Winnefeld, p. 16.
unacceptable and the other is militarily unacceptable. Thus, the establishment of SSBN sanctuary and the creation of NWFZ in and around the region are unacceptable to the United States and its regional allies.

**Naval Arms Reductions**

The Soviets have proposed in general terms that the United States and the Soviet Union agree to arms "freeze," reductions, and limitations on certain types of weapons such as cruise missiles. In the Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989, President Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would eliminate 73 ships from the Pacific Fleet. He did not mention the total tonnage or the type of ships. Such obscure proposals would not yield a success in naval arms reductions. Rather it may foster mutual suspicion on the underlying intention of such proposals. We have to think of some feasible naval arms reduction measures which would be mutually acceptable and mutually beneficial.\(^{37}\) We can think of two types of naval arms reductions: attack submarines and CVBGs.

\(^{37}\) W. Philip Ellis provides three reasons for structural limits on naval forces: "First, by creating more stable force balances or configurations, agreements can help, (a) to prevent misunderstandings from developing that might precipitate a crisis or a war, and (b) to make the choice of premeditated war more onerous and/or more obvious, thus enhancing the deterrence of war; second, negotiated force structure limits, if properly crafted, can allow each side to rely on the provisions of the agreement, rather than on its own defense programs, to limit certain threats posed by the other side's forces; third, force structure limits can be used to cement and perhaps to foster an improving political relationship between adversaries." W. Philip Ellis, "Back to the Future? Assessing Structural Limits on U.S. and Soviet Naval Forces," in Barry M. Blechman, et. al., *Naval Arms Control: A Strategic Assessment* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 168.
It is the feeling that the Soviet Union wishes to get a handle on this formidable US military power that lies behind a great deal of American reluctance to enter into any naval arms control with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union proposed the reduction of modern submarines and naval aviation forces in exchange for the reduction of U.S. CVBGs in the Pacific. To the Soviet Union, the CVBG is a very threatening element of U.S. military power since it allows the United States to launch a deep strike against the Soviet homeland. However, the CVBG can project power in defense as well as in offense. It is also not directed solely against the Soviet Union but also to Third World operation.38 Since the United States is far away from the region and there are quite a fewer number of ground troops stationed in the region, it may be the only way of projecting effective defensive as well as offensive power.

There are valid arguments for keeping aircraft carriers. Even with a diminishing Soviet threat, it is necessary for the United States to maintain effective CVBGs to carry out its defense commitment to its regional allies since all naval capabilities are not designed to deal only with the Soviet threat. The U.S. CVBGs are the most effective instrument for the Third World mission, militarily and politically.39 Furthermore, as I said before,


39. It is the so-called Third World Operation. Navy is predominant in this dimension. In Forces without War, Blechman and Kaplan argued that "Throughout the postwar period the United States has turned most often to its navy when it desired to employ components of the armed forces in support of political objectives. Naval units participated in 177 of the 215 incidents, or more than four out of every five.... In short, the Navy clearly has been the foremost instrument for the United States's political uses of
the reduction of US troops stationed in Japan and South Korea under the EASI will make it more necessary to maintain, or to a certain degree strengthen, the surface forces which are represented by the CVBGs.

Thus, the Soviet proposal for the reduction of submarines and naval aviation forces in exchange for the reduction of the US CVBGs is unacceptable to the United States and its regional allies since these proposals are asymmetrical in terms of balance of interests and missions which should be carried out by specific components of the naval forces of the superpowers. And also, the recent development within the Soviet Navy--a major program of building its own carriers, i.e., Tbilisi-class aircraft carrier--will make such a naval arms reduction proposal very impossible and make us wonder about real Soviet intentions.  

The second issue is the reduction of the size of attack submarine fleet. The most effective approach would be a "build-down" agreement, whereby the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) in service on both sides would be substantially and progressively reduced over a period of some years.

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40. That is the development of the Soviet Union's new 65,000-metric-ton Tbilisi-class aircraft carriers. For the discussion on this subject and U.S. view on this, see Admiral Charles R. Larson, "National Interests and Naval Forces in the 1990s," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 1(Winter 1990), pp. 9-18.

With the increase in the number and operational value of the Pacific Fleet SSBNs, there arose a simultaneous need to protect them within their patrol stations, the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Since 1982, US hunter-killer submarines of the Los Angeles and Sturgeon classes have been conducting routine peacetime patrols within the SSBN sanctuary of the Sea of Okhotsk. This expression of an enhanced potential threat posed to the Soviet SSBNs may have spurred the buildup of the Pacific Fleet's general purpose forces devoted to SSBN defense, especially modern advanced SSNs. As we can see in the table below, some of the new attack submarines—Akula and Victor III—that joined the Pacific Fleet after the late 1970s are now subordinated to the security requirements of the enlarged SSBN force.

To counter the US strategy or to minimize the "break-in" into the bastions by US ASW elements, the Soviet Navy will try to enhance protective measures, i.e., the development of sophisticated SSNs that can "travel at up to 100 knots submerged, dive to 6,600 feet, and fire 300-knot torpedoes" as speculated by a US chief of naval operations.

42. The number of Soviet SSNs has increased from 13 in 1977 to 30 in 1989. Cunha depicted the characteristics of the development of Soviet SSNs over the last decade as follow: (1) establishment of a group of seventeen first-line nuclear-powered boats(SSNs) for open-ocean ASW; (2) a program to arm the seventeen first-line SSNs with the new three-thousand-kilometer-range SS-N-21 nuclear land-attack cruise missile; and (3) a new operational role for older, conventionally powered boats. Cunha, p. 20.


Table 6.3 The Growth of Soviet SSNs in the Pacific Fleet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSNs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akula</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor III</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November (unoperational)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echo I (unoperational)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, from the US perspective, the growth of Soviet SSNs--Akula-class and Victor III-class--in the Pacific is not only defensive but also offensive: that is, it has created an enormous threat to US SSBNs. A large U.S. SSN fleet is required primarily to counter Soviet forces, whether by attacking Soviet SSBNs in the bastions, sinking Soviet SSNs attempting to destroy U.S. and allied shipping, or decimating Soviet amphibious groups.  

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Table 6.4 Comparison of Submarine Forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Pacific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>The Soviet Union</th>
<th>The United states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSGN</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is a clear momentum of a naval arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers want to protect their own SSBNs by deploying SSNs as well as other protective elements. The increase in the number of SSNs on one side for defensive purpose for the protection of SSBNs is likely to be perceived as an offensive move against the other side's SSBNs and other naval elements since modern SSNs have not only a defensive character but also an offensive character. The development and expansion of modern SSN forces are likely to undermine the current posture of deterrence by increasing the threat to SSBNs of both sides. Of course, we cannot deny the necessity to protect SSBNs by deploying SSNs, but the excessive number of SSNs is destabilizing by inflating the threat on the other side. Thus, the reduction of the number of SSNs on both sides would greatly reduce the magnitude of the threat imposed on SSBNs and, therefore, would take away the rationale for maintaining or expanding
attack submarines. It is possible to reduce the number of SSNs over the years by adopting the so-called "build-down" strategy which will require each party to decommission or retire a certain number of old SSN for each new SSN in service. Tied to this would be a graduated schedule of force level ceiling, with the goal of having numerical parity on both sides within certain years in the future.  

The ratio can differ for each party, depending on how many SSNs they currently possess and how many SSBNs they have. Since the primary purpose of this strategy is to make SSNs purely defensive, if the two superpowers come up with a specific number of SSBNs they intend to have, it would facilitate the reduction of attack submarines. From this perspective, the START Treaty can contribute to such a process of reduction. Both superpowers agreed to reduce the number of launchers to 1,600 over a 7-year period with 6,000 warheads limit. They have not reached an agreement on how they mix the triad within the limit. However, if they come up with an agreement on the composition ratio of each component of strategic triad within the limit, it would make the build-down of attack submarine much easier and faster. Currently, the United States is working on SNAPS(Strategic Nuclear Arsenal, Post-START) which is designed to transform the large, aged U.S. triad of the 1980s into a modern,

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47. The force level of SSN should be sufficient enough to protect SSBNs, but not sufficient enough to wage defensive offense against other.

48. It seems that the two superpowers agree on the freedom of mix of the triad within the limits under the START treaty.

49. The proportion of each component of triad should not be necessarily same to each party, given geographical and strategic differences. Unequal and/or asymmetrical composition is also acceptable as long as they come up with a specific portion of strategic nuclear forces assigned to each component of triad within the limit.
highly effective strategic force by 1995 and beyond.\textsuperscript{50} SNAPS is a unilaterally designed plan, based on the constraints of available nuclear assets and procurement schedules. It clarifies the future posture of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. As we can see in the following table, the number of old SLBMs and SSBNs will be reduced. All SSBNs will be Ohio-class equipped with the Trident II D-5.

Table 6.5. The Possible Change of U.S. SLBMs in the Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poseidon C-3 (x14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident I C-4 (x8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident II D-5 (x8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total SLBM</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Soviet Union may also be expected to work on its own version of SNAPS. If they have such a plan, it is possible to talk about the reduction of SSNs since they can speculate how many SSNs are required to protect the

\textsuperscript{50} For detail, see Ensign Douglas J. Hanson, U.S. Navy, "Strategic Nuclear Planning After START," \textit{Naval War College Review}, Vol. XLII, No. 3(Summer 1989), pp. 78-96.
specified number of SSBNs under SNAPS. It is possible to reach an agreement on such a measure since we already have such an agreement, the ABM Treaty. It is going to be a naval version of the ABM Treaty.

It would not only make deterrence at sea, as well as in general, stable but also save a lot of money. Not only are nuclear-powered submarines themselves very expensive to build, to operate, and to dispose of at the end of their useful operational lives, but the cost of the anti-submarine warfare forces, fixed-wing long range maritime patrol aircraft, ASW helicopters, surfaceships, and special sonar devices, is extremely high. There are few fields in which the potential "peace dividend" is higher. Furthermore, such a build-down strategy can contribute to confidence-building by putting the most difficult to verify and detect under control, submarines.

We have discussed two possible structural naval arms reduction measures: reduction of attack submarines and reduction of CVBGs. It seems that the reduction of submarines has better chance to succeed than that of CVBGs in Northeast Asia because, while the issue of submarines can be confined within the negotiation between the two superpowers and has limited effect on U.S. security guarantees to its allies, the issue of CVBGs is not. The reduction of CVBGs may be the last thing to happen in naval arms control due to its multifaceted functions and the symbolic meaning.\footnote{See ft. 35.}
Maritime Confidence-Building Measures: Small But Important

Recently, we have begun to emphasize the importance of CBMs in any arms control regime or arms control issue. In naval arms control, it is not an exception. Given the U.S. navy's reluctance to discuss structural measures of naval arms control, it would be better to start with modest proposals which might give credit for seriousness in the whole approach to naval arms control and which would enhance mutual understanding and expand common ground in naval arms control issues. Small steps in which the countries could find some common ground can help modify doctrinal thinking in a manner that might later make far-reaching measures feasible. There is also a need to eliminate some of the reasons for mutual distrust that prevent even discussion of the naval arms control issue on its own merits. At the initial stage of naval arms control, therefore, it might be appropriate to deal mainly with confidence-building measures. Maritime confidence-building measures could play an ice-breaking role as precursors of progress in arms control covering the maritime environment of Northeast Asia.52

The Soviet Union has proposed several MCBMs: (1) the limitation of the size of naval exercises; (2) prior notification of naval exercise; (3) notification of ship transfers of a specified size between zones of naval groups; (4) the limitation of the number and duration of naval exercise; and (5) exchange of observers in exercises. In addition, the activities of Soviet naval ships in the open sea have generally tended to decrease since 1986.

The United States has rejected such proposals since they appear to benefit the Soviet Union and to deprive the United States of its effective naval operation capabilities for various missions in and around Northeast Asia.53

These measures are not the only type of MCBMs. They are the measures to increase the openness and predictability of naval activities in order to prevent surprise attack and misunderstanding. They also represent the most difficult type of MCBM because the effectiveness of such MCBMs should be determined by the parallel progress in naval arms reduction which is much more difficult to achieve. Secondly, to a certain degree, the currently proposed MCBMs are the extension of CBMs developed in Europe where the strategic landscape is quite different: that is, land-oriented. On land, it is possible to mobilize forces immediately and launch a surprise attack. Thus, it is very important to have openness and predictability by institutionalizing various CSBMs. At sea such measures are not necessary, because the concept of freedom of the seas already permits either side to observe and monitor the other's activities so that no surprise or misinterpretation could occur. Unlike in the past, in today's world, with the exception of submarines, naval forces on the surface of the sea do not readily lend themselves to the initiation of surprise attacks because they are much slower than any other weapons on the ground and in the sky. The Pearl harbor-style surprise attack is no longer possible.

53. See James Winnefeld, pp. 13-15. In his argument, James Winnefeld appeared to insufficiently distinguish crisis from non-crisis situation. His appraisal of Soviet proposals seems based on the worst case scenario. These MCBMs are intended to constrain the naval operation of surfaceships, mostly U.S. CVBGs. If these measures are adopted, the United States, not the Soviet Union, should reduce its naval operations in and around Northeast Asia.
Besides being relatively slow, surface ships are so big that they can be tracked easily, either visually or through modern technical means. In sum, the currently proposed MCBMs seem to have more symbolic than substantive value. Of course, we cannot underestimate the symbolic value of an agreement on such MCBMs. However, if we really want to stabilize the situation at sea, we have to think about some substantive measures.

The difficulties of such MCBMs lead us to ask: what kind of measure we can think of for confidence-building at sea. The safety of the SLOCs could be considered as a candidate for the initial stage of MCBM negotiation. It reflects strongly expressed security concerns that vital maritime shipping lanes may be interrupted in times of high tension or military conflicts of a larger scale. Such fears may have given rise to the introduction of maritime military doctrines containing elements of an overtly offensive (if not aggressive) nature, which aim at destroying the other side's strategic ballistic missile submarines (having a recognized stabilizing role in strategic relations) or general purpose attack submarines, early in a conventional war between the major naval powers or their military alliances. The possible intention to cut the safety of SLOCs and such doctrinal elements seem equally destabilizing for the naval security environment of Northeast Asia. In a crisis situation, each side will try to cut off the other's SLOCs preemptively. Such a move contains a very high possibility of escalation. We might lose control over events.

In terms of confidence-building, the Soviet Union and the United States could consider the possibility of concluding an agreement to offer appropriate guarantees for the safety of the shipping lanes or SLOCs. The necessity of cutting off each other's SLOCs lies in the nature of the relations between the countries. As we have observed, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have improved dramatically over the last few years. The Soviet Union and South Korea established full diplomatic relations in September 1989. The Soviet Union is also trying to normalize its relations with Japan. Such a change in political relations will make it easier to discuss safety measures for SLOCs.

The second candidate for MCBMs is the issue of ensuring safe access to the seas and oceans for ships and aircraft of the countries which are not involved in on-going crises or armed conflict. The harmful effects of naval activities that curtail free and open use of sea lanes can hardly be overemphasized. Such actions contain great risks of expanding regional hostilities to more states. The idea behind MCBMs of this type is to distinguish vessels of the countries involved in a conflict from those of non-belligerent states, with a view to offering the latter a general priority for shipping, fishing, off-shore industry or other peaceful activities at sea. The ultimate purpose is to provide crisis security to all types of non-military activities in the maritime domain. Such MCBMs would seek to make it difficult to violate the freedom-of-navigation right on the high seas with respect to the states which do not partake in a conflict covering a sea area. Naval activities such as mining, covert submarine operations in coastal waters, blockades, restrictions on the use of certain areas in disputes, and establishment of maritime exclusion zones as a result of conflict may
constitute interference with the peaceful uses of the sea. Some MCBMs could play an important deterrence role with respect to possible maritime activities denying the right of freedom of navigation. One possible measure is collective guarantees of the safety of international shipping lanes with the participation of the countries in the region. The emergence of *de facto* economic regionalism in Northeast Asia and the necessity for economic cooperation among the Northeast Asian states can provide a rationale for the creation of such a MCBM regime.

The third type of MCBM is a kind of measure to lower the risks of naval incidents. Lowering the risks of naval incidents and confrontations in peacetime is a primary security objective of several bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (IncSeA) of 1972 and the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities of 1989. Although provisions of such agreements usually regulate the behavior of naval vessels, in practice they also enhance security for non-military activities at sea. This kind of MCBMs should not only clarify rules of behavior for preventing dangerous naval collisions but should also contain provisions on (a) crisis management procedures; (b) separation of naval forces during a crisis; and (c) establishment of a consultative body to consider the modalities of such a separation when tense situations develop.

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The MCBM objective of avoiding incidents is probably the one most widely shared. Encouraged by the success of the bilateral Soviet-American IncSeA of 1972, many European states have proposed the idea of negotiating a multilateral convention on the prevention of incidents at sea. But there have not been such efforts in Northeast Asia. The Northeast Asian states, given their maritime nature, high traffic, and relatively high potential of tension at sea, cannot remain merely as interested bystanders over arms control measures in the region in general and naval issues in particular and will find it in their national interest to conclude, or at least to begin to speculate on, regional agreements on the prevention of naval incidents with a view to reducing the risk of a military conflict.

**Conclusion**

We have reviewed the naval arms race in Northeast Asia and possible arms control measures. Some measures seem to have a better chance to succeed than others. The United States and its regional allies have been reluctant to discuss naval arms control. With the diminishing Soviet threat, it has become more viable to discuss the stabilization of the situation at sea. It is time to examine naval arms control from a fresh perspective. Naval arms control is not a Pandora's box of virulently dangerous possibilities. It can contribute to peace and stability in the region as well as in world politics. It is time to forget "Just Say No!"

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Any type of arms control regime is unthinkable if it is unequal in its presentation of the balance of interests of the parties. A NWFZ and the reduction of CVBGs are unacceptable for the United States and its regional allies since they favor the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the build-down of attack submarine and some MCBMs are within our reach.

We can start with small steps such as maritime confidence-building measures to enhance mutual understanding and trust, and to eliminate uncertainty and the sources of unwanted crisis. Through the various MCBMs that I suggested before, we can hopefully begin the process of solving the problems at sea. We cannot apply CBMs developed within a land-oriented strategic landscape. Rather we have to take into account the maritime nature of the region when we consider regional stability and peace. In parallel, the United States and the Soviet Union, in their bilateral negotiations, can stabilize their strategic relations at sea by controlling the submarine forces of both. It would make their SSBNs less vulnerable and thus make deterrence more stable by eliminating the incentive of preemptive(or preventive) strikes against SSBNs, and by making their submarine posture more defensive, not offensive.

The implementation of such a speculative strategy of stabilization at sea is dependent upon the political will of our national leaders. As the general trend of political relationship among the powers in the region as well as in world politics has improved drastically, it may be possible and desirable to think of such measures. By making MCBMs as the first item of negotiation and using the IncSea as the reference, we can constructively engage in naval arms control.
CHAPTER VII

Conclusion

Intellectual interest in arms control and disarmament in Northeast Asia, while growing, is of recent origin when compared with the effort focused on the global level and Europe. It has been stimulated by the following concerns and developments:

(1) The continuing risk of war in the Korean peninsula and the attendant potential for escalation involving the great powers;

(2) The increasing naval competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the buildup of Japanese and Chinese naval capabilities, and the growing nuclear development at sea and the consequent concern over inadvertent war;

(3) Japan's desire for a more active international role and the possibility that it will assume increasing responsibility for its own defense as well as regional stability, and its neighbors' worries over Japan's neoimperialism;

(4) China's desire to become a more powerful, independent actor in international politics and efforts to establish a peaceful external environment in which it can devote its all energy and resources to its modernization;

(5) Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the institution of unilateral arms
control measures along the Sino-Soviet border;

(6) Region-wide political detente and the expansion of *de facto* economic regionalism;

(7) Substantial progress in arms control at the global strategic level and in Europe such as the INF, CFE, and START treaties;

(8) Fiscal and economic constraints on the armed forces of the two superpowers and China;

(9) A general perception that a new security framework is emerging in the Asia-Pacific region and that arms control and disarmament may have a role to play in molding this new framework.

Clearly, there is a strong momentum for arms control and tension reduction in Northeast Asia. We can assume that the political situation in the region has become more favorable for the initiation of arms control. The limited, but expanding, improvement that has taken place in a number of the political relations over the several years\(^1\) suggests that it is a situation which may be more conducive for consideration of several arms control measures, with a special emphasis on CBMs, among the Northeast Asian states. The situation in Northeast Asia has become similar to that of Europe circa the late 1960s and early 1970s when East and West began to talk seriously about arms control. As their political relations have improved

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1. Gerald Segal called this improvement of the political relations among the Northeast Asian states as contagious detente in which no one wants to fall behind. See Gerald Segal, "Detente in Northeast Asia: Everybody on Board?" *Arms Control Today*, Vol. No. In September 1990, the Soviet Union and South Korea established a full diplomatic relation. China and South Korea have expanded their economic relations over the years. And, finally, South Korea and North Korea have become a member of U. N. in September 1991.
over the years, they have begun to raise the issue of arms control. Arms control which was considered a remote possibility and just propaganda has become a reality. This confirms what Joseph Kruzel and Hedley Bull argued for in relations between arms control and political relations among the concerned powers: that is, a certain measure of political detente is a preconditional factor for arms control.  

In addition, domestic priorities and pressures have or are moving foreign and military policies toward accommodation. Economic reform, which became a central determinant of Chinese foreign policy beginning in the late 1970s, and the desire to avoid strategic confrontations have made for a more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy, which has emphasized cordial relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. While the Tiananmen incident of June 1989 and the attendant domestic political and economic changes raise some important concerns, thus far these developments have not had a significant impact on China's foreign policy, although Sino-American relations were at least temporarily strained. Similarly, the dire state of the Soviet economy, the bankruptcy of central planning and totalitarian control, and the need to bring international commitments in line with national interests and capabilities have resulted

2. Hedley Bull argued that "..., the political conditions may allow of a system of arms control, or they may not. Unless the powers concerned want a system of arms control; unless there is a measure of political detente among them sufficient to allow of such a system; unless they are prepared to accept the military situation among them which arms control system legitimizes and preserves, and can agree and remain agreed about what this situation will be, there can be little place for arms control." See Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 10; and Joseph J. Kruzel, "From Rush-Bagot to the START: The Lessons of Arms Control," Orbis, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 1986), p. 201.
in dramatic changes in Soviet relations with China and the United States. North Korea is not an exception. As its major suppliers of economic and military aid have become more strained in their ability to support their local allies, North Korea has begun to moderate its aggressive foreign policy objectives and to probe the possibility of integration into the international community in order to get the alternative sources for economic aid. There is also growing domestic pressure in the United States to re-examine the role of American military forces in the Asia-Pacific region (and elsewhere) in the light of the relative decline in the economic position, massive imbalances in its trade with the eastern Asian countries, especially with Japan, the budget deficit, and dramatic changes taking place in East-West relations.

We don't need to re-emphasize the impact of domestic economic problems of socialist states on arms control and the successful conclusion of CFE. Suffice it to say that with their economies teetering on the brink of collapse, reform for the sake of national survival—and not for the sake of improved external relationships—has become essential. This reform has meant the relaxation of Soviet controls in Eastern Europe and the imposition of major cost-cutting efforts in the Soviet and Eastern European military establishments. Taken together, this erosion of capabilities in the traditional Warsaw Pact structure has done far more to promote meaningful, negotiated reductions than any amount of good faith or desire to reduce inter-bloc tensions. This will be the same in Northeast Asia. Unilateral economic and domestic political self-interests will further efforts in arms control in Northeast Asia as they did in Europe. While the Northeast Asian states will consider arms control as an attractive means
for achieving national security objectives more seriously than ever before, this does not mean that they are ready to accept a certain kind of arms control measure and does not guarantee a successful institutionalization of an arms control regime. Rather this means that there is better chance to introduce a certain form of arms control to Northeast Asia and the improved political relations among the Northeast Asian states will play a catalytic function in institutionalizing arms control. In institutionalization of the process, they can learn from the European and superpower arms control experience: that is, how one can connect its own security concerns with other's, how one can incorporate arms control into general national security policy, and how can we begin arms control talks for what subject. While the political climate of Northeast Asia is ripe for arms control and there are unilateral economic and domestic self-interests in arms control, given the contextual and substantive differences between Northeast Asia and Europe, the agenda of arms control and the type of arms control regime and arms control measures will be different from those in Europe and in superpower relations. In a word, there will be more procedural than substantive similarities between Northeast Asia and Europe in the types and content of arms control.

From the contextual point of view, we can say the following about arms control in Northeast Asia. First, unlike in Europe, a comprehensive region-wide arms control approach is infeasible. Joe Clark, the Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, has proposed a Europe-style Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia to bring an end the Cold
War in Asia. \(^3\) Eduard Shevardnadze called for "a multilateral negotiating mechanism" in a similar vein. And South Korean President Roh Tae-Woo proposed in 1988 a consultative meeting on peace in Northeast Asia. It might be desirable to have such a region-wide comprehensive arms control regime in Northeast Asia. But, the several poles of power, the virtual absence of the idea of common threat, and multiple sources of conflict in Northeast Asia make a comprehensive approach difficult, if not impossible. Country-specific security concerns are uppermost in nearly all the conflictual and cooperative relationships in the region. For the United States and Japan, Soviet ground troops in the Far East do not impose a direct threat to their national security interest, whereas Soviet naval and air forces do. Japan is deeply concerned about the modernization and increased operational capabilities of Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East MD. Thus, the reduction of Soviet troops in the Far Eastern TVD which has taken place in the Siberian MD, the Transbaykal MD, and Mongolia has not changed the Japanese perception of the Soviet threat. On the other hand, China is more concerned about the presence of Soviet troops along the border than naval and air forces in the Far East MD. For South Korea, North Korea is the immediate concern, not China or the Soviet Union. In a word, there are very few substantive things to discuss among the Northeast Asian states with respect to their security concerns on a multilateral basis. Thus, at the initial stage of arms control in Northeast Asia, we should focus on specific bilateral issues.

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Second, conventionalization of the arms race and force structure has depressed the idea of common security. The scale of deployment of nuclear forces in the region is relatively small, and their focus is not strictly on Northeast Asia. And they are not fully integrated into the regional strategies of the major powers. This implies that, compared to the European and superpower situation, the expected costs of mutual non-cooperation in Northeast Asia are not so great. From a game theoretic framework, the greater these costs, the greater the incentives to try cooperation.\(^4\) This is not the case in Northeast Asia. This fact will possibly weaken the foundation of arms control in Northeast Asia.

One of many consequences of the difference in the type of arms race between Europe and Northeast Asia is threat perception and the conception of war. The nuclear arms race in Europe has created uncertainty and a danger of escalation to general nuclear war from the initiation of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the consequences of nuclear war in Europe had become apparent to the Europeans.\(^5\) They began to doubt the validity and utility of the traditional way of preserving security and survival through a balance of terror. It seems that most Europeans recognized that the state of no-war through balance of terror could only provide imperfect security. The consequences of human and technological failure in an age of

\(^4\) It is so-called "Chicken Game."

\(^5\) In the "Carte Blanche" exercise in June 1955, it was reported that some 355 weapons were "used" against military targets, mostly on German territory, with the result that civilian casualties were estimated at about 1.5 million dead and 3.5 million wounded. See Bogislav von Bonin, *Atomkrieg-Unser Ende* (Dusseldorf, 1956), p. 22. Cited by Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson & Co., 1957), p. 144.
mass-destruction would also be disastrous. A political sense of responsibility called for all-out efforts at dialogue and negotiation with political rivals and potential foes. Common security could be achieved by negotiation with political rivals and potential enemies and by understanding the reasons for the armed, antagonistic security of potential enemies. The establishment of mutual confidence and cooperation and the demystification of alleged threats was required to enhance stability in Europe. Nuclear proliferation in Europe has ironically led the Europeans to seek a mutual survival, especially CSBM.

On the other hand, conventionalization of the arms race in Northeast Asia has not changed the conception of war and the utility of armed forces. Individual security interests still override a common interest in mutual survival. No one seriously considers the disastrous consequences of war since most of the Northeast Asian states expect that war will be a conventional one, not nuclear. If so, there is a low probability of self-deterrence and moderation of their behavior in crises and crises may easily result in armed conflict. In general, while the situation may be precarious, the threat of nuclear war in the region is low. Consequently the fear of mutual annihilation, one of the key foundations of common security in Europe, is absent in Northeast Asia. What this may imply is that while most Northeast Asian states argue for arms control, the sincerity and commitment to arms control may be weak. It seems that the main rationale for arms control in Northeast Asia is not the fear of annihilation, but domestic economic and political interests. That is, arms control can contribute to the creation of a stable and peaceful environment in which a state can concentrate on its domestic problems and which allows it to divert
resources and energy to more constructive sectors of its economy. Once it solves its domestic problems, regains domestic stability, and strengthens its economic base, a state's interest in arms control may diminish.

A related factor on which key strategic circumstances in Northeast Asia differ from those in Europe concerns the roles played by nuclear-armed superpowers, not only as members of defense and deterrence-oriented coalitions, but as the political leaders of those organizations. In the NATO/Warsaw Pact standoff, the deeply integrated and central participation of the United States and the Soviet Union has meant certain risks (e.g. of serious escalation should conflict occur), but on the positive side, the involvement has tended overall to have a stabilizing and dampening effect on the behavior of the counterpoised coalitions. The stakes in Europe are so high and the commitments so deeply ingrained that it is impossible to imagine any major crisis or conflict in Europe not having worldwide repercussions. In Northeast Asia, this is far less the case for both superpowers. Strategically speaking, extended nuclear deterrence to Northeast Asia is less reliable than that toward Europe. It is much easier to decouple.  

Without the notion of common security, it is very difficult to set a common agenda of stability and to visualize a comprehensive region-wide arms control regime which we can see in Central Europe, i.e., CFE or CSCE. That means that we have to focus our attention on particular

conflicts and security issues. The idea of establishing Asian Collective Security System has been raised several times. But the probability of success of a region-wide comprehensive arms control regime is very low because of the absence of the idea of common threat and the different perspectives on the sources of threat.

Third, arms control in Northeast Asia will be very difficult because of the geographical asymmetries between the opposing states. In the context of Soviet-American relations, the Soviet Union is an in situ power but with very weak local bases and an extended and vulnerable communications line to its European heartland. The United States, on the other hand, is an out-of-region power forward-deployed in pursuit of its containment policy and in support of its regional allies. Despite its naval buildup, the Soviet Union is primarily a land power while the United States is essentially a maritime power. These differences combine to create a substantial asymmetry in force structure, posture, strategy and operational conduct which are not easily reconciled. It is going to be truly a competition between maritime power and continental power at the exit to the ocean, not at the rimland. Arms control negotiation may be easy when both parties have similar force structure and posture. But when the parties have different force structures,

7. The idea of establishing a form of collective security system has been prominent feature in Soviet foreign policy since the late 1970s. See ft. 2 in chapter 1.

8. One possible candidate for region-wide arms control regime is the idea of nuclear-weapon free zone. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has raised international concern. No one disagrees on the fact that North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons will jeopardize regional stability of Northeast Asia. All the great powers oppose the North Korea's nuclear program and urge North Korea to sign the safeguard agreements and accept the IAEA's inspection.
it is going to be a very tough one. It will require more creative thinking and flexibility.

In addition, U.S. allies in the region are more vulnerable than their counterparts. For example, Japan, unlike China and the Soviet Union, lacks geographic depth and its high industrialization and urbanization make for relatively greater vulnerability. It raises a question of the relation between the idea of equal security and the role of arms control in providing a mutually acceptable security environment. How can we incorporate such unequal vulnerability in arms control negotiations? What would be an appropriate measure to compensate such asymmetries?

This shows the contextual limit of the applicability of the European and superpower arms control experience to Northeast Asian arms control. While there has been a problem of military imbalance, there have been no problems of asymmetrical force structures and asymmetrical vulnerabilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. What is required in Northeast Asian arms control is a way to provide a linkage between different types of weapons on a mutually acceptable basis and the effort to take into account the other's side security concerns. For example, how can we connect the Soviet ground forces in the Far Eastern MD with the air and naval forces of the United States and Japan in arms control negotiations?

Fourth, the lingering territorial disputes among the Northeast Asian states can be an obstacle or catalyst for arms control. In Europe, several confidence-building measures have been proposed and in some cases implemented, as steps toward relaxing East-West tensions. These CBMs

9. By this, I mean the composition of air, ground, and naval forces of each side.
are predicated upon the mutual recognition of nations as independent states and their acceptance of clearly-defined territorial borders. Thus, the European arms control experience tells us that the territorial status quo is required for the success of arms control.

It is not necessarily the case. In Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union and China have launched unilateral arms reductions along the frontier without a clear resolution of territorial dispute. Actually, reductions of forces along the Sino-Soviet border preceded the resolution of territorial disputes between the Soviet Union and China. While China identified the resolution of the territorial dispute as one of the conditions for full normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China, in reality, it has taken quite a flexible stance.\textsuperscript{10} Formal border talks--held in 1964 and from 1969 to 1978--resumed in February 1987 with the focus being on the eastern sector spanning from the area from the trijunction with Mongolia eastward to the Pacific. Joint aerial photography to aid delimitation began in May 1988, and according to Soviet sources, an agreement in principle has been reached on the course of the boundary for most of the eastern sector.\textsuperscript{11}

Yet, China and the Soviet Union continue to dispute the status of Heixiazi (Tarabarov/Bol'shoy Ussuriysk)--a 300-square kilometer island at

\textsuperscript{10} One of the five principles guiding Sino-Soviet relations is the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Others are: mutual nonaggression, nonintereference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

\textsuperscript{11} Izvestiya, Nov. 1, 1988, trans. in FBIS-SOV, Nov. 2, 1988, p. 19. This article, which appeared at the end of the third round of the boundary talks (October 20-31), noted that the two sides had a "common understanding on the majority of sections" of the eastern border. See also The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1988.
the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. This dispute has an important bearing on Soviet security. The island is claimed by the Chinese but controlled by the Soviet Union. Because Heixiazi overlooks Khabarovsk as well as the point where the Trans-Siberian railways crosses the Amur river, the Soviets are reluctant to see it pass from their control. The issue has yet to be settled, and it remains to be seen whether the change in Sino-Soviet relations and Moscow's altered perception of China's security policy allay Soviet concerns about the danger of any future use of the island for hostile purposes. Such apprehensions could well be addressed by measures such as partition, joint administration, or Chinese control with verifiable demilitarization provisions. It is reported that they are working on several CBMs to stabilize their relations on these areas. Thus, we can conclude that the territorial dispute can work in either direction, depending upon the strength of the parties' interests in stabilizing their relations. In Sino-Soviet relations, they don't want to be bogged down by the territorial dispute and they appear to minimize the impact of territorial issues in overall Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Arms control measures have been used as a means to create a stable situation in which they can resolve their territorial dispute without using force.

Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute represents the opposite. The territorial dispute has been a volatile and emotional one for Japan and the Soviet Union ever since World War II, when the Soviet army occupied the Kuriles, a string of islands north of Hokkaido, in the waning days of the war. This is the single most important factor which has impeded the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations and conclusion of a peace
treaty. Japan identifies the resolution of the territorial dispute with the
Soviet Union as the last thaw of the Cold War. There are fundamental
differences between the Soviet Union and Japan in their approach to this
territorial dispute. Until one year before the Gorbachev visit to Tokyo in
April 1991, the Soviet Union denied the existence of a territorial dispute
with Japan. Now it recognizes the existence of a territorial dispute and has
begun to show more flexible and conciliatory gestures. The recognition of
the existence of the territorial dispute does not end their dispute and
reconcile their different postures on the territorial issue. Since 1956 the
Soviet Union has shown its willingness to transfer the Habomai Island and
the islands of Shikotan to Japan. The Soviet Union had also maintained the
separate decoupling strategy between the resolution of the territorial
dispute and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Since 1990, in order to resolve
the territorial dispute with Japan, to facilitate economic and trade
relations, and to conclude a peace treaty, the Soviets have suggested various
possibilities, including joint administration, demilitarization of and the
creation of a special economic zone on the disputed islands, and the
establishment of U. N. trusteeship over them. On the other hand, Japan

12. The area of the disputed Northern Territories encompasses a
group of islands off northeastern Hokkaido: Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan,
and the Habomais which are not a single island but a cluster of small
islands. Etorofu and Kunashiri are part of the Kuril chain, which runs
northeast from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula. Shikotan and the
Habomai group are located off the tip of the Nemuro Peninsula, which juts
into the Pacific to the south of and parallel to Kunashiri.

13. These proposals are made by the Soviets, not by the Japanese.
Japan has shown a negative response to those proposals. For example, at a
closed-door symposium in Japan, G. Kunadze of IMEMO mentioned these
points. See Aleksandr Bovin's interview with Mainichi Shimbun, Jan. 3,
1989, trans. in FBIS-SOV, Jan. 15, 1989, p. 2; Yomiuri Shimbun, July 27,
has demanded the transfer of all four islands at once, not two out of four islands. And while the Soviet Union has tried to separate the resolution of the territorial dispute from the development of other dimensions of its relations with Japan, Japan has persistently tried to establish an organic linkage between the territorial dispute and other issues, notably conclusion of a peace treaty and economic and trade relations. The resolution of the territorial dispute has been and will be the preconditional factor for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the development of a closer tie with the Soviet Union in various dimensions. None of these proposals and initiatives have been accepted by the other party or implemented either unilaterally or bilaterally. It seemed very unlikely that either the Soviet Union or Japan would change its posture on the territorial dispute. The collapse of the Soviet empire after the failed coup in August 1991 raised an optimism in Japan with respect to the resolution of the territorial dispute. That is, given the declarations of independence by various Soviet republics, the Japanese reasoned that one of the long-time arguments against Moscow's giving up the islands—that it would encourage secessionism—seemed to have been eliminated. And the leaders of the Russian republic sent a signal of its willingness to resolve the territorial dispute with Japan as soon as possible to get desperately needed economic aid from Japan. Of course, such a series of events created a better environment for the resolution of the territorial dispute. But it is not going to be that easy. The disputed areas are very important for Soviet naval operations and they are highly militarized. The forces deployed on the islands are under the control of the central government, not the Russian republic. Even though the Russian leaders expressed their willingness to return these islands, they need to get the
consent of the central government to remove the forces deployed on the islands. That means that the Russian republic and the central government should come up with a kind of coordinated plan and consensus among themselves before they negotiate with Japan. This will make the resolution of the territorial dispute more complicated. It might be better to have one rather than two counterparts to make the channels of negotiation and communication simple and straightforward. In a word, the chaos in the Soviet Union makes it difficult for Japan to find its counterpart for negotiation.

The impact of this impasse on the resolution of territorial dispute has been fundamental. Japan's Foreign Ministry made the extension of credits or financial assistance to the Soviet Union and the conclusion of large-scale economic cooperation projects conditional upon the prior resolution of the territorial dispute. Even after receiving positive signs from Moscow on the territorial issue after the failed August coup, Japan dismissed all suggestions that it would be ready to provide billions of dollars to the Soviet Union. Japan, while it has agreed to shelve the territorial dispute with China over the Shenkaku island, is quite firm and inflexible in resolving the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. From an arms control perspective, Japan refuses to consider any Soviet-proposed arms control measures until the Soviet Union returns all four islands. From the Japanese perspective, territorial integrity and sovereignty are not fully recovered unless the Northern Territories are returned since the acceptance of Soviet-proposed arms control measures might decrease the chance to recover the Northern Territories by fixing the current boundaries. Arms control that assumes the current geographical,
jurisdictional boundaries as the starting point is unacceptable for Japan. Thus, unless the territorial dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union is clearly resolved, there will be no arms control and no closer economic ties between the two countries.

The situation in Korea is a mixed one and may be in-between the above two extreme cases. National unification is the ultimate goal for both Koreas. Over the last few years, there has been an assimilation in their unification policies.\textsuperscript{14} With the expansion of common ground in their unification policies, arms control has gained substantial attention and importance as a way to provide a militarily stable situation in a transitional period in which both Koreas can work towards unification.\textsuperscript{15} While there are still fundamental differences in their arms control proposals, they recognize the fact that some kind of arms control is worth pursuing and mutually beneficial. Not because of the territorial status quo, but because of the division of the Korean peninsula and the desire for peaceful unification, arms control has a place on the Korean peninsula.

In sum, the territorial status quo is not a prerequisite for arms control. An argument that the territorial status quo is a prerequisite for arms control is culturally biased based on the European arms control experience. In two out of three cases of territorial disputes in Northeast Asia, arms control is used or is likely to be used as a means to stabilize the military situation so the disputants can resolve the territorial issues

\textsuperscript{14} See chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{15} One of the best pieces on the relations between unification and arms control in the Korean peninsula is Kevin Lewis, \textit{Toward a Korean National Community: Selected Strategic, Military, and Arms Control Issues}, P-7685(Santa Monica, Calif: The RAND Corporation), August 1990.
peacefully through negotiations. The relation between arms control and the territorial status is not necessarily unidirectional. The relation can vary depending upon how the disputants define and conceptualize it. In some cases, arms control can be a policy of status quo. In other cases, it may not. The function of arms control can be either the preservation of the status quo or a catalytic one for the creation of a new status quo. In the latter case, arms control is much more challenging since it should be able to provide a stable military situation during the transitional period and it requires a futuristic vision.

While basic objectives and techniques of arms control might be transplanted wholesale from the European theater into Northeast Asia, as suggested above, Northeast Asian arms control has a different agenda and a different security environment. At the initial stage of arms control, a comprehensive region-wide regime is not an achievable objective, given the various, separate conflicts. It is very difficult to coordinate the arms control and security policies of the countries because of the absence of a common threat, except the nuclear proliferation issue. It requires a special attention to maritime (or naval) arms control, and its linkage with other arms control measures such as arms control on the Korean peninsula. Northeast Asian arms control requires more attention to the change of the status quo than the preservation of the status quo. Arms control in Northeast Asia may be difficult, but not impossible.

A region-wide multilateral comprehensive arms control regime is not likely to emerge in the near future. It requires the resolution, partial if not complete, of specific security issues in several specific bilateral relations between the states and the improvement of relations between the
disputants. It will be the same process which had occurred before the opening of the CSCE and MBFR process in Europe. The expansion of contacts between some European states, notably France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union made it possible to convene such a region-wide forum for arms control and security in Europe. CSCE and MBFR did not emerge suddenly in 1973. Before the actual opening of CSCE and MBFR, there were the increase of the contacts between East and West and the resolution of some important security concerns in several bilateral relations, especially between West Germany and the Soviet Union. Thus, we can expect that there will be a kind of region-wide forum for security and arms control in Northeast Asia as the several separate bilateral relations improve over the years and their immediate security concerns are satisfied. The easing of the Cold War is making Northeast Asia more interdependent and integrated, both strategically and economically. It will be almost impossible for the Northeast Asian states to avoid discussing security and arms control issues region-wide in the future. In a word, contextually, the possibility of establishing a region-wide arms control regime is very low at this stage. In comparing Europe and Northeast Asia, we tend to focus only on the contextual differences between the two regions and to conclude that it is not possible to establish a common security regime in Northeast Asia. It seems that such an argument is static. If we think the situation in procedural terms, it is possible to expect some sort of region-wide security regime in Northeast Asia in the future as several bilateral relations between the states improve over the years. It seems that the situation in Northeast Asia is quite similar to that of Europe circa the late 1960s. We can
learn some procedural lessons for opening region-wide fora for security and peace from the European experience.

**The Arms Control Agenda in Northeast Asia**

There would be no greater common security interest than preventing Pyongyang from going nuclear. As we have discussed before, North Korea seems to have various incentives to go nuclear. It seems that most of the underlying objectives of North Korea's nuclear weapons program can be achieved in other ways without going nuclear. And also, while the nuclear option may appear to be quite attractive immediately, from a long term perspective, the consequences of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the possible reactions of other states would outweigh the short term benefits. If North Korea is determined to acquire nuclear weapons, it can do so. However, the recent change in North Korea's posture on IAEA safeguards gives some hint for the way to stop nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. With its increasing international isolation, North Korea seems to utilize its nuclear weapons program as a way to break out of its extreme international isolation and garrison state status in international politics and to establish new relations with Japan and the United States. It is more a politically motivated program than a military/security oriented program, especially toward the United States. Nuclear weapons can enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the outside world. Is it possible for North Korea to gain a substantial international attention without nuclear weapons? Is it possible for North Korea to have a better bargaining position

16. See chapter 3.
without nuclear weapons? Since 1989 there have been 19 contacts between North Korea and the United States in Beijing. The main factor which has contributed to the opening of direct talks between the United States and North Korea is the possibility North Korea could acquire nuclear weapons and the U.S. concern to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. If North Korea had no program, is it possible to imagine such a direct contact between the United States and North Korea? Not necessarily, given the rigidity of the United States to recognize North Korea. And the change in North Korea's posture on the acceptance of IAEA safeguards took place after the contact with the United States. This means that North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a politically motivated one. If so, we should devise some ways through which North Korea can be incorporated into world community without going nuclear and that would ensure the survival of the DPRK. There seems no good reason to oppose diplomatic contacts with North Korea. There is also no good reason not to recognize the legitimacy of the DPRK. By recognizing the DPRK, we can free ourselves from the past and work for the future. It would also eliminate North Korea's strongest incentive to go nuclear: that is, the political and diplomatic incentive.

Sino-Soviet arms reductions are the most successful case of arms control in Northeast Asia. China has completed the reduction of its armed forces by one million and is working on further reductions. In response to the Chinese unilateral reduction, the Soviet Union announced that it would reduce its armed force by 200,000. The Soviet Union has begun to withdraw its forces from Mongolia which did impose an immediate threat to Beijing. It is expected that by the end of 1992 the Soviet Union would complete the
withdrawal of its forces from Mongolia. They are talking about various CBMs along the border such as demilitarization, mutual notification of military exercises, the exchange of the observers, a ban on exercises in particular border regions, and no military movement along the border without prior notification.

We can see some distinctive characteristics in Sino-Soviet arms reductions. First, arms reductions along the border actually preceded the full normalization of their relations. They have been used as a means to facilitate the normalization process by changing the mutual threat perception. They have made an important contribution to the process of de-escalating the Sino-Soviet confrontation and to strengthening the momentum of the general detente. In a word, the road to the historical 1989 Sino-Soviet summit was paved with mutual but informal arms reductions. What it implies is that, unlike the conventional wisdom, arms control can be used to change political relations, or at least to facilitate that change in a positive way. Arms control may not be the final product of detente.

Second, unlike other arms control, arms reductions along the Sino-Soviet border have been conducted unilaterally and informally. Unilateralism and informalism in Sino-Soviet arms control have proven to be quite effective in creating military detente between the Soviet Union and China. China and the Soviet Union carried out de facto arms control without playing negotiating games or waiting for a piece of paper to be signed. Bold unilateral moves and reciprocal countermoves of the other have been quite effective in reducing tensions, building confidence, and

enhancing stability. Informal methods made arms control between the Soviet Union and China much easier and more acceptable by isolating purely bilateral issues from other correlated issues such as their relations with respective local allies, and by making their posture on arms control more flexible. In a word, arms control by deeds may be more effective than arms control in words.

A broad political approach, unilateralism, and informalism have been quite effective in the past. The question is whether such approaches and methods will be effective and will be maintained as they were in the past. But if the past is any guide, neither the Soviet Union nor China is very much interested in formal arms control. Even if they reach a certain formal arms control agreement, that will be quite abstract and general and would allow them to maintain flexibility. It will not do much more than codify the cuts already made and the CBMs previously agreed upon.¹⁸ Some delimitation of zones of limited deployments of offensive weapons such as tanks can be expected. Some limited, loose mechanisms of verification and observation to enhance military transparency are likely to be adopted. Information and personnel exchanges are ongoing. But deep cut of troops and certain types of weapons through negotiation is not likely to take place.

In sum, Sino-Soviet detente continues to develop despite the collapse of communist power in the Soviet Union. Both have a strong interest in stabilizing their bilateral relations because of the domestic concerns on each side. Without a stable and pragmatic relationship with each other,

¹⁸. Upon Premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow in April 1990, the Soviet Union and China signed on an outline agreement on troops reductions along the Sino-Soviet border and CBMs. But the details of the agreement have not been reported.
Chinese and Soviet security might be weakened. While the uncertainty over the future of the Soviet Union makes arms control difficult, it does not make arms control unimportant. Rather they will try to keep up the momentum of arms control.

The greatest risk to Northeast Asian security comes from the still unresolved division of the Korean peninsula. While there have been some signs of an improved climate in and around the Korean peninsula, there has been little sign of any real progress on security issues or on the fundamental issue of reunification. And the Korean peninsula appears to be the place we can best apply the European arms control experience and framework. At a very abstract level, the situation on the Korean peninsula is quite similar to that of Europe before the conclusion of the CFE Treaty. There is a military imbalance between the North and the South which favors the North. North Korea has a offensive blitzkrieg type of military strategy, whereas the South has a defensive military strategy. And the South is much more vulnerable than the North: that is, should war occur, Seoul is going to be under an immediate attack from Pyongyang, not vice-versa.\(^{19}\) Under these circumstances, there are some valuable features of the CFE Treaty which can be transferred to the Korean peninsula in order to stabilize the military situation in the Korean peninsula. Those are: (1) the concept of reducing forces to a lower equal level below that of the numerically weaker side, (2) focus on reduction of armaments, especially five types of mobile, far ranging, high firepower weapons essential for

\(^{19}\) This last point is quite similar to the case of West Germany’s security concern.
offense and attack, (3) agreement on restrictions on force deployments and activities, especially restrictions on force concentrations, and (4) stringent verification measures. These are some of features of structural arms control which could be transferred and utilized to enhance military stability on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, it is possible and desirable to institutionalize a CSCE-type regime-i.e., the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, between the North and the South which will enhance mutual understanding, normalize inter-Korean relations, and expand a common ground for national reconciliation. Up to now, the contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang have been unorganized and uncoordinated. For example, the talks on cultural and sport exchanges are far more advanced than other types of contact. And also, occasionally, these contacts have been on and off the track. And they have not been mutually supportive of each other. There is no coordinating body which can orchestrate inter-Korean talks on various dimensions and fields. It seems that the occasional contacts have not contributed to the enhancement of mutual understanding and the stabilization of inter-Korean relations. It would be better for the Koreans to have a kind of comprehensive, well-organized blueprint for the development of relations between themselves rather than occasional contacts. Like the Helsinki Final Act, this plan--

20. Five types of weapons are tanks, artillery, ACVs, aircraft, and helicopters.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Korea (CSCK)\textsuperscript{22}--can be divided into three baskets:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basket I</th>
<th>Basket II</th>
<th>Basket III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guiding principles (e.g. non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs)</td>
<td>Trade and joint economic venture, science and technology exchange</td>
<td>Family reunification, freedom of movement, humanitarian and cultural exchange</td>
</tr>
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Figure 7.1 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Korea

The simultaneous admission to the U. N. has heightened the possibility to introduce such a comprehensive plan for national reconciliation. Recently, the South Korean government has announced the 3-Tong plan to expand contacts with Pyongyang: Tongshin (communication), Tongyok (trade), and Tongrae (mutual visit).\textsuperscript{23} It is time to think about a comprehensive plan such as CSCK to provide a general guideline and blueprint for future contacts between South and North Korea.

The most fundamental problem in Korean arms control is not the lack of ideas on arms control, but the lack of political will and trust. Pyongyang's long established stance is that the removal of U.S. forces from the South must be the first step preceding real reconciliation whereas Seoul


considers a strong U.S. presence as clearly essential to keeping peace on the Korean peninsula. As long as this vicious circle of intense mutual mistrust and divergent aims is not broken, the implementation of any arms control remains unlikely. But with the possibility for change in domestic Korean politics, encouragement from the great powers, increase of contacts between the North and the South, and signs of general political detente, there is some reason to believe the Koreans have finally stepped on the road to real detente. It is not the time for "Just Say No!" to the other's proposals. It is the time to think about constructive engagement in arms control. The constructive engagement of the two Koreas in arms control requires: (1) expansion of mutual understanding by taking into account the other's security concerns in arms control proposals; (2) incremental adjustment in arms control and unification policies on both sides and a cumulative concept of arms control; (3) self-restraints on the exploitation of arms control and unification issues for domestic political purposes; and (4) the introduction of moderate CBMs as an initial step. Very slowly the rising mood of detente between the North and the South will expand the ground for arms control. In the initial stage, an agreement on guiding principles of relations between the ROK and the DPRK is required. This agreement will include: (1) renunciation of the use or threat of force in their relations; (2) respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality; (3) nonintervention in internal affairs of the other party; (4) peaceful settlement of disputes; and (5) fulfillment of international obligations. Based upon the agreement on the guiding principles of relations, functional policy integration between the North and the South and social integration should be introduced. Military CBMs such as notification of military maneuvers and movement
beyond a certain limit, observations, a hot line between senior military commands, delimitation of the deployments of certain types of weapons within a certain zone, and information exchange can be introduced as the political relations between North and South Korea improve over the years. Arms reductions will be feasible only after a certain level of trust is built.

Naval arms control in Northeast Asia requires multilateral cooperation and involvement. At the superpower level, it is time to stabilize the competition at sea. Under current circumstances, each side has strong incentives to strike first with its submarines—that is, to use submarines to threaten the other's most valued naval assets in order to protect its own. This source of "crisis instability" will only grow as each side deploys more capable submarines.24

Militarily, therefore, well designed reciprocal submarine limits would benefit both superpowers by curbing offensive threats posed by the other's submarines, but without interfering with their own capabilities to carry out essential defensive missions in the event of war. Moscow's confidence in the survivability of its SSBNs would increase, while the risk of U.S. strategic ASW operations actually precipitating a nuclear war would decrease. And the build-down approach for attack submarines will make deterrence stable by decreasing the offensive elements in the naval force structure and by eliminating the threat to SSBNs. Furthermore, it would reduce the threat Soviet submarines pose to the SLOCs. At the multilateral

24. For the Soviets, these will be the Victor IV-, Oscar III-, Sierra II-, and Akula II-class submarines. For the United States, these will be the Los Angeles-class, improved Los Angeles-class, and Seawolf-class submarines.
regional level, we can think of various maritime confidence-building measures. The IncSeA can be the starting point for MCBMs.

**Arms Control Theory Revisited**

There are several things we can say about modern arms control theory based on the analyses of the four cases: nuclear proliferation, Sino-Soviet arms control, Korean arms control, and naval arms control. One thing we have to keep in mind is that there are some limits in this study because, except for Sino-Soviet arms control, the other three arms control issues have not reached any conclusive result. Thus, it is going to be more speculative than conclusive.

Schelling and Halperin proposed that arms control included "all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interests of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared."\(^25\) This classical definition of arms control has many implications for the study of arms control.

The most fundamental question is the relationship between the likelihood of war and the contribution of arms control to reduce the chance of war: that is, under what conditions is war more or less likely to occur and how and in what way can arms control contribute to the prevention of war.

There are numerous theories of war. Among them, balance of power theory provides the basis of modern arms control theory. Modern arms control theory assumes that security is not based on the concentration of

military power in an authority superior to sovereign states. Rather it rests upon balance of power or equilibrium.26 Or it rests on a stable deterrent situation in which nobody will gain from war what it expects to gain. Modern arms control theory can be seen as an extension of classical balance of power theory since it argues that a balance of power between opposed nations or blocs, the possession on both sides of such forces and weapons that neither is able to impose its will on the other, is an important source of international security.27 However, the balance of power is precarious since there is no guarantee that nations will act in accordance with an appreciation of this balance. Moreover, the military balance does not remain stable for a long period of time. There are numerous factors such as technological breakthroughs, shifts in political relationship, or economic decline or progress which make the balance of power unsustainable and instable. The main problem is how to devise a mechanism to maintain a stable balance of power and to create a consensus upon it.

The military balance itself remains unstable, entailing substantial risks and burdens unless all the major powers are satisfied with the current balance of power system. There is no guarantee that this strategic military balance will maintain itself automatically. Arms control is perceived as a way to maintain or perfect a stable and satisfactory balance of power system which would not jeopardize the security interests of the major powers and in which no one has a strong incentive to upset the

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27. Ibid., p. 38.
current military stalemate. Thus, the proper concern of arms control is to construct a military environment in which a stable balance of power exists with neither side significantly disadvantaged by it and in which neither is tempted to upset the system. In modern terms, such an environment is the so-called stable deterrent situation. It is an environment where the existence of a military balance is seen as a stabilizing factor, a good thing, but where it is recognized that some weapons or deployments might threaten this stability and where therefore there exists a common interest in creating a negotiated environment which minimizes or even eliminates the destabilizing influence of certain weapons or strategies.

Consequently, modern arms control theory in practice has paid much attention only to the military dimension of international security and arms control itself has become more technical. In practice, such a military-technical approach to arms control has created more problems than solutions. It has actually impeded the progress in arms control negotiations or agreements due to the differences among the participants in defining certain types of weapons, classifications, counting-rules, verification, and agreeing on acceptable force levels. Of course, we cannot deny the benefit of the accumulation and sophistication of knowledge on such matters over the years of negotiation. The recent results in superpower arms control and European arms control such as the INF, CFE, and START treaties are the product more of the change in political relations than of military-technical maturation.

Arms control itself is part of an overall political process. The political approach to arms control and tension reduction is much more effective and efficient. Sino-Soviet arms control proves this fact. In their arms reduction
process, they have rarely raised the question of military balance. Rather
they define the stability of their relations from a very broad political
perspective. The creation of a military balance appears to be of minor
importance compared to the creation of stable political relations between
them. For them, war occurs not because of the existence of a military
imbalance, but because of improper management of extramilitary factors
and overall relations between the countries.

In the Chinese strategic tradition, the emphasis on extramilitary
factors over military factors is distinguishable. The discussion of military
factors separate from other dimensions of the relationship between states is
an improper way to avoid war. This Chinese strategic tradition of
extramilitarism corresponds with Soviet military theorists and officials
who have always seen the prevention of war as a political task, essentially
unrelated to the day-to-day activities of the military establishment. In the
Soviet perspective, it is the duty of the statesman and the diplomat to
manage the political environment for potential armed conflict. In the Soviet
view, war has deep political causes—it cannot be triggered by "mechanistic
instabilities" in the military balance. Thus, for them, a careful
management of the military balance is residual and minor compared to the
management of overall political relations. Such an attitude has contributed
to the reduction of the likelihood of war between the Soviet Union and
China. It actually corresponds to the definition of arms control suggested by
Schelling and Halperin.

28. In Sun Tzu's tradition, it means "To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill." Sun Tzu: The Art of War, p. 77.
The most important implication we can draw from this political approach to war and arms control is that national security depends not only on what kinds of weapons you have and how much you have, but also how effectively you can manage extra-military factors which would determine the possibility of using those weapons. In the Western tradition, it is very important to assess military capabilities to maintain peace and stability. In a word, a nation's capacity to deter an enemy is determined by the means for defense at its disposal: numbers of troops, quantity and quality of weapons, industrial capacity, and so forth. A state's military capabilities are frequently used by statesmen as a barometer of national security. And arms control is conceived as a way to create a stable "military" balance, or "military" environment in which neither side is significantly disadvantaged and in which neither is strongly motivated to attack by the weakness of the other. Credibility and stability of deterrence are defined purely in terms of the military balance between the adversaries. Thus arms control has become a technical exercise designed to fine-tune the military balance so as to preserve deterrence and peace by eliminating incentives for one side to attack the other by controlling the military establishments of both sides.

Modern arms control theory and practice in the West tends to emphasize only the military dimension of national security, rather than the balance between military and extra-military factors. It rarely takes into account the extra-military factors in stabilizing relations and in reducing the chance of war. The alienation of military factors from non-military

factors in accounting for the occurrence of war has been a fundamental flaw of modern arms control theory in the West.

More recently, we emphasize the role of CBMs in arms control. The idea of CBMs, to a certain degree, corresponds to the idea of a non-military approach to security problems. The theory of CBMs has not yet been well developed. Further elaboration CBMs in theory and practice are required to take into account the non-military factors' influence over military relations. In balance of power theory, which is the starting point of modern arms control theory, we can see such a line of argument. The military balance is precarious and unstable unless it is backed by a some kind of consensus among the powers. Diplomacy is an effective means to create and sustain such a consensus. Such an insight has been lost over the years. It is time to re-discover the mechanisms which have made the balance of power work in the past.

In practice, the political approach to arms control has been quite effective in reducing tension. The emphasis on extra-military factors for the defense of the nation has allowed the Soviet Union and China to avoid most of the technical problems embedded in arms control negotiations and resulted in a sweeping effect on tension reductions. If they have raised and touched the questions on technical issues, the situation would be quite different from the one we have right now. They shrewdly avoided such issues. The management of political relations may be more important than the resolution of the technicalities of arms control.

30. For an extensive survey on the literature on CBMs, see James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* (Ottawa, Ontario: Department of External Affairs).
influence a state's conception of arms control, its attitude and behavior in arms control, and the forms of arms control adopted.

In Sino-Soviet arms reductions, Chinese defense culture has influenced their attitude and behavior in arms control. Extra-militarism, the primacy of defense over offense, minimalism, and negativism are the products of Chinese defense culture, and they have influenced Sino-Soviet arms control in a distinctive way. These factors lead China to adopt a unilateral and informal approach toward arms control issues. And some elements of Chinese defense culture find counterparts in Soviet defense culture. In a word, if there are more common elements in defense culture, it is much easier for the parties to execute arms control.

In the case of the Korean arms control, the Korean defense culture is much closer to hegemonic stability than balance of power. For the Koreans, the balance of power system is precarious and unstable. The source of stability lies in the concentration of power on one side, not the balanced equal distribution of power. There is also a strong tendency of zero-sum thinking in which any gain for one side either translates into or is perceived as entailing a loss for the other. Peace through negotiation is quite alien way for the Koreans. Negotiation comes only after there emerges some kind of hierarchical order, or asymmetrical power structure between the competing parties as a gesture of good will of the superior. The superior party becomes eager to take care of the inferior party's concerns, more flexible in its posture to the inferior's demand to avoid the worst case, and more generous.\textsuperscript{32} Flexibility is a sign of strength, whereas rigidity is

\textsuperscript{32} This is deeply rooted in the Korean conception of paternalistic order in almost every dimension in social and political relation.
strategic force posture, endorsed strategic doctrinal concepts, and pursued arms control agreements vis-a-vis a "fictional" Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{34} Incomprehension of its own and other's strategic and defense culture and tradition will generate more misunderstandings and obstacles in managing military relations between the states and in achieving the objectives of arms control. Strategic and defense culture is a mechanism through which the definition of stability and peace is constructed and means are selected. Each state has some distinctive elements in its strategic/defense culture with a long historical experience. The perspectives of history and cultural anthropology are neglected in modern arms control theory due to its strong emphasis on the rationality assumption of deterrence theory and the arrival of the nuclear era. Strategic and defense culture is resistant to fade and is one of the useful keys for improving our understanding of why particular security communities behave as they do. In order to explain the variation in arms control behavior and to build an arms control regime, we have to incorporate strategic/defense culture in our approach to arms control.

Third, in practice, we tend to assume the painstaking negotiation process as a standard form of arms control. Schelling and Halperin argued that "Arms control is essentially a means of supplementing \textit{unilateral} (emphasis added) military strategy by some kind of collaboration (emphasis added) with the countries that are potential enemies."\textsuperscript{35} In Sino-Soviet


\textsuperscript{35} Schelling and Halperin, p. 142.
arms control, there has been no negotiation. Arms reductions along the Sino-Soviet border have taken place without negotiation or agreement. Rather it has been based on bold unilateral moves and reciprocal moves by the other. These unilateral reciprocal moves have been reinforcing each other and strengthening the ground for further reductions and tension reduction. How can we explain such unilateral arms reduction with modern arms control theory? Under what condition can unilateral arms reduction take place?

The closest argument which we can find for conditions for unilateral arms reduction is Robert Jervis' article in World Politics, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." He suggested two variables: whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and whether the defense or the offense has the advantage. He argues that when defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones and when the defense has the advantage over the offense, we can escape from the vicious circle of the arms race. Is it possible to apply such an argument in Sino-Soviet arms reductions? Can it explain the unilateralism in Sino-Soviet arms reductions?

It may not. Jervis' explanation of the possible path of unilateralism in arms reduction is insufficient and inadequate to explain the unilateral nature of Sino-Soviet arms reductions. The sources of unilateralism in Sino-Soviet arms reductions do not lie in such a mechanical distinction.

36. This process of unilateral arms reduction has been initiated by China and followed by the Soviet Union. See chapter 4.
37. Jervis assessed the advantage in terms of the cost of building weapons. That is, when the cost of building defensive weapons is much lower than the cost of building offensive weapons, we can say that the defense has the advantage over the offense.
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along the frontier while actually deploying a stronger, more modern, but numerically smaller force.

In addition, the worsening relations between the Soviet Union and the United States directed Chinese attention to political measures for their own security. The extra-military approach appeared to be quite an attractive solution for its own security problems. It is not necessary to rely solely on its forces when it can manipulate external political, military factors effectively. It makes sense to use such a political assurance measure to supplement insufficient military capabilities.

The sources of unilateralism in arms control are not necessarily related to what Jervis argued for. Rather unilateralism in arms control can be the product of a perceptual factor such as strategic/defense culture.

Fourth, we have mentioned informalism in Sino-Soviet arms control. The Chinese and the Soviets had the sense to carry out de facto arms control without playing negotiating games or waiting for a piece of paper to be signed. The main factor which has contributed to informalism is the nature of unilateralism in their arms control and the Chinese tradition of flexibility. The series of de-escalatory steps of arms control were launched by China's decision to pull back its troops from the border and reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Unilateralism does not require extensive formal negotiations and agreement. Rather it requires the expectation that its unilateral moves would be reciprocated by the other.

While there is a danger of betrayal, informalism is quite an effective way to solve complex security problems by allowing the parties to have some kind of flexibility. Whenever security problems are complicated, it is possible to make a breakthrough by adopting an informal method. It could
generate a momentum for future arms control by providing more chances for communication in which we can strengthen mutual trust and mutual understanding. Informal methods have another advantage over a formalistic approach: that is, it can provide a chance to test the other's willingness to cooperate and trustworthiness in arms control before signing an agreement. By the time a treaty were signed, we might have achieved a substantial level of mutual trust in compliance in implementing an agreement. For many years, the issues of compliance, verification, and trustworthiness of the signatories have been discussed. If we start with a formal agreement and begin to test the trustworthiness of the other side in its compliance to the terms of the agreement in the implementation process, the agreement itself would become jeopardized and the ground for future arms control would be undermined. On the other hand, if we start with an informal method and then convert informal arms control into a formal arms control regime, it would strengthen the ground of arms control itself and expand the scope of cooperation in other fields since before signing a formal document we would have sufficient time to build mutual trust. This is what happened exactly in Sino-Soviet arms control. Informal methods in Sino-Soviet arms control contributed not only to the reduction of armed forces along the Sino-Soviet border and but also to the changes in mutual threat perceptions and to the enhancement of mutual understanding of each other's security concerns. Formal arms control may have a great symbolic meaning, whereas informal arms control has substantive and practical benefits. Policymakers and national leaders tend
to assign a great symbolic meaning to signing treaties. The passion for "an agreement" is irresistible. To a certain degree, western society is result-oriented. No agreement and no signing usually mean no achievement, or no progress, in arms control. To reach an agreement and to take the credit out of it, arms controllers tend to devise the terms of agreement which would not affect the strategic doctrines, strategic planning and force structures. Such a standard of arms control is counterproductive in achieving the real objectives of arms control. From this perspective, the West should learn from the Sino-Soviet arms control experience. Why no informal arms control? As long as informal methods contribute to the achievement of the objectives of arms control, it is acceptable. Arms control by deed is more effective than arms control in words. It would not generate as much political-symbolic meaning as a formal agreement, but it would generate substantive and practical results.

In sum, modern arms control theory is quite insensitive to perceptual aspects. Arms control is a recurring phenomenon across regions and time. The form, type, and method of arms control differ from one case to another. We usually focus on the contextual differences as the main source of variation. Scholars on Northeast Asian security focus on such contextual differences, but very few of them pay attention to the perceptual source of variation such as defense/strategic culture. Each nation has a different perceptual understanding of national security. It has its own "black box" of security. This black box influences each state's

definition of security, conditions of peace and stability, strategies, and its selection of the instruments for the achievement of security objectives.\textsuperscript{40} Arms control itself is one of many ways to achieve those objectives. A state's posture toward arms control, its behavior in arms control, and its selection of arms control measures will be highly influenced by its own strategic/defense culture. It actually interferes with rational thinking. It can be a source of misperception and distortion. Not everyone thinks and behaves in the same way. It is necessary to incorporate strategic/defense cultures as an intervening variable in arms control. We cannot impose our own thinking upon the others. Our understanding and comprehension of our own defense culture and other's will enhance the productivity of arms control. As I said before, the reason that we have been emphasizing only the capabilities as the indicator of threat and stability is that, compared to intangible sources of threat such as ideological and cultural differences, these are relatively easy to measure. The difficulty in operationalization and measurement of certain concepts does not necessary mean that these concepts and elements are not important in strategic studies. What makes muscle move is nerves and the brain. We have to pay attention how these nerves and the brain operate in order to achieve success and to explain the variation in arms control.

\textsuperscript{40} For further discussion, see Ken Booth, \textit{Strategy and Ethnocentrism} (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
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**Data and Documents:**


