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A study of the dynamics of an authoritarian regime: The case of the *Yushin* system under Park Chung Hee, 1972–1979

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The Ohio State University, 1991
A STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: THE CASE
OF THE YUSHIN SYSTEM UNDER PARK CHUNG HeE, 1972-1979

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *

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To My Parents
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On October 17, 1972, South Korean president Park Chung Hee suddenly declared martial law throughout the country and announced "the extraordinary measures" that according to him, were necessary to "move forward with the south-north [Korean] dialogue more positively and courageously while overcoming the harsh challenges of rapidly changing international situations".¹ Under these measures, the National Assembly was dissolved; the activities of all political parties and other political activities were suspended; tight press censorship was imposed; universities were closed; and a new constitution was proposed.

The so-called Yushin ("Revitalizing Reform") system² was thus practically imposed and soon the Yushin constitution, which fundamentally changed the rules of the political game and severely restricted political rights and freedoms, was formally adopted after it was passed in the national referendum in November under martial law. During this period, no critical opinions were allowed and only the regime's "instruction and enlightenment" on the need for the new regime were heard and written in

¹Major Speeches by President Park Chung Hee, p. 29. The presentation of the names of all Koreans in this study (except when citing the authors) will follow Korean practice, in which the family name comes before the given name.

²Yushin literally means revitalization. Because the Yushin regime was imposed in October, it is also called Shiwoł (October) Yushin.
the media. It was announced that 91.9 percent of those eligible voted and that 91.5 percent of those who voted approved the new constitution.

Although Korea had never had a sustained democratic rule, political institutional arrangements in the pre-1972 period included significant democratic elements. The Yushin regime was unprecedented in its elimination of the democratic institutions without even verbal promise to restore the formal democratic institutions. Indeed, it was the first attempt in post-independence Korean politics to stabilize the extreme form of authoritarianism with a high level of repression and the overt denial of even limited democratic competition for the state power.³

Despite the ostensibly overwhelming public support for the new constitution, the maintenance of the "Fourth Republic"⁴, as it was called, was not based upon genuine popular support but largely dependent upon its high level of pervasive repression, which along with the good economic performance of the regime, received international attention. Any activities that seemed to challenge the regime were now defined as anti-state (or anti-Yushin) activities, and were not allowed. When it seemed necessary, opposition activities were harshly repressed by the extensive and effective employment of the coercive instrument of the regime -- the police, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and Army Security Command. Under these circumstances, political opposition -- students, students,

³Even after the military coup in May 1961, the junta promised to restore democracy after they accomplish their "revolutionary tasks." The military rule lasted for two years (1961-1963).

⁴The period of rule by Rhee Syngman (1948-1960), the first regime of the Republic of Korea, is called the First Republic. The Second Republic (1960-1961) was the democratic government of Chang Myon, which was overthrown by the military coup. The Third Republic refers to the formally civilianized pre-Yushin Park regime (1963-1972).
intellectuals, church leaders, opposition politicians, and labor activists — did not have a chance to organize effectively and, given the strong coercive capacities of the state, seemed to be too weak to bring about the "restoration of democracy."

However, anti-regime activities continued to challenge the regime, reflecting only a part of the strong democratic expectation of the public, particularly among the attentive public. The denial of any significant democratic participation and the suppression of rising political discontents led to an increasingly stifling condition. The Yushin regime broke down in 1979, when Kim Jae Kyu, the director of the KCIA, assassinated Park in the aftermath of the spontaneous popular revolt in Pusan and Masan.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the emergence, maintenance, and breakdown of the Yushin system. Why and how did such a highly authoritarian regime emerge? Why did the authoritarian regime, despite its extensive and effective coercive instruments and "economic miracle", fail to be institutionalized? And why and how did it breakdown? Although there are some controversies on the causes of the emergence of the Yushin regime, these controversies are yet to be resolved. Also, few, if any, works have attempted to study systematically the failure of the institutionalization of the Yushin system and its breakdown despite the proliferation of descriptive work on the regime. Part of the reason for this is that the breakdown of the Yushin regime was directly caused not by the mass movement but by the assassination of President Park by the KCIA chief. Another reason is because the breakdown of authoritarianism did not lead to the inauguration of a democratic system, but the imposition of
another authoritarian rule (1980-1987) by Chun Doo Hwan after a brief uncertain interlude, the phenomenon is a less interesting subject. There is no doubt that had the democratic regime been inaugurated after the fall of the Park regime -- which was a possibility -- much more work would have been produced.

The lack of appropriate perspective that could be applied to the case is unfortunate because a systematic understanding of the breakdown of the Yushin system as well as the difficulties of maintaining the regime are needed not only to explain the phenomena themselves but also to improve our knowledge of the dynamics of Korean politics including democratization that began in the late 1980s and the subsequent realignment of political forces including political parties. By analyzing important underlying mechanisms of political evolution as well as the specific processes during the period, it can also help us to assess the prospects for democratic or authoritarian rule in Korea. It is my argument that well before democratization which began in 1987, politically relevant strata in Korea had a strong expectation for more democratic system. Why did the "social elites" demand democracy? And to what kind of democracy did they aspire? These questions, which are relevant not only for the Yushin period but for Korean politics in general, have not been answered satisfactorily.

On a broad theoretical and methodological level, this study argues that general theories of political development do not provide satisfactory explanations for the emergence and dynamics of the Yushin regime. Also, the attempt to apply theories developed in countries with different
contexts (e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian model\textsuperscript{5}) has often led to the hindrance rather than the increase in our understanding of the Yushin system particularly and Korean political development generally. This study also tries to overcome a problem of the many studies done by the area specialists of Korean politics. Almost all major works on Korean politics at the macro level were done by the area specialists. Although very detailed and rich analyses of Korean political development they provide are extremely valuable and indispensable, they tend to lack explanatory power in the absence of comparative perspective.

For a study to have stronger explanatory and predictive power of Korean politics and prescriptive relevance, a comparatively oriented and contextually sensitive approach that looks at not only socioeconomic variables but also political variables and international and external factors seems to be more appropriate than general theory or rigid application of a theory that is developed in a substantially different context. Also, although a broad classification of regime types may have its own merits in explaining certain outcomes, a disaggregated approach is needed in analyzing political development in Korea. As I will show later, for example, democratic components within the authoritarian regime, an unusual rigidity of anti-communism in the political system, and highly concentrated power structure within the state have played crucial roles in political outcomes in Korea.

In attempting to answer the above questions about the Yushin regime, I will approach those issues from the perspective that emphasizes

\textsuperscript{5}Guillermo A. O'Donnell, \textit{Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics}.
political and institutional variables as independent variables in explaining political dynamics. These political variables include relative strength of the state vis-a-vis society⁶; the internal structure of the state; political leadership; political institutional arrangements; and political ideology. These variables have been partly affected by political influence of the U. S. and the existence of a hostile North Korea. This, of course, does not mean that socioeconomic variables are not important -- particularly in Korea where rapid socioeconomic changes have taken place. But often too much emphasis has been put on socioeconomic variables (such as economic development, social mobilization, dependent capitalist industrialization, and class structure) ignoring or underemphasizing the importance of political variables. This tendency has dominated the literatures of political development and dependency. Although individual scholars looked at the significance of the political variables in their analyses of the specific cases, they were not included or sufficiently incorporated in their theories.⁷ Only recently, a perspective that emphasizes the role of the state and other political variables has become more popular.⁸

⁶Throughout this study, the state is defined as government institutions. In Korean context, this include the government bureaucracies and the military-security apparatus. The state has been strong in Korea in terms of its capacity to control the social groups and of its coercive capacities.

⁷This seems to be in part related to the conception that social scientists adopted of adequate theories and explanations that were too general and/or abstract to be useful to analyze political dynamics.

⁸Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America"; Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China; and Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In. However, it seems that this perspective can be still
That there is a need to look at political variables (including the state) in explaining Korean politics does not mean that I advocate the inherent analytical supremacy of the state over society or that of political variables over socioeconomic variables over time and across space. Obviously socioeconomic and political variables are interacting. But the nature of interaction between these variables and the relative importance of political and socioeconomic variables not only within a country but among countries is not predetermined but is dependent on the specific context. And much of this is the subject of empirical analysis.

It seems that the Korean case is an extreme case in which political variables have been important in determining political dynamics. But by studying this extreme case, we may discover variables that are not so obvious but still operate in important ways in other countries.9

**Literature Review**

A. Theories of Regime Stability and Change

Regime change and stability have been among central concerns for political scientists.10 If we look at the development in the field of

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9 For an argument how the case of East Asia with its significantly different context illuminates the study of "dependent development" in Latin America, See Peter Evans, "Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists."

10 Although only macro-political theories are treated here, the rationale for the studies at the micro level -- e.g., political socialization and political culture -- is that they have important impact on the regime dynamics.
comparative politics in the post-World War II period, much of political development/modernization literature, which dominated the field in the 1950s and 1960s, took the theoretical position that socioeconomic development and democracy tend to go together.\textsuperscript{11} This optimism was at least in part the result of the application of the static, cross-national analysis that looks at the correlation between the aggregate socioeconomic indicators and the crudely classified regime types.\textsuperscript{12} Second, this literature placed too much emphasis on the socioeconomic variables as the independent variables.\textsuperscript{13} Although the individual scholars often pointed to the importance of the political variables to explain the specific country cases, the role of the political variables was largely ignored in their theoretical models. Third, political development/modernization theory also did not incorporate the international and external factors. Here again the problem was not that the international and external factors are totally absent in the specific analyses, but they had no place in their theories.\textsuperscript{14} Finally as we can see in the case of Almond and Coleman's The Politics of the Developing Areas, the attempt to build a universal science of political system was too ambitious. Differentiation and functional


\textsuperscript{12} For a good critique of political development/modernization theory, see O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, pp. 1-15.

\textsuperscript{13} In addition to the literature cited above see Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development."

\textsuperscript{14} For a review of a "minor tradition" that looks at the international impact on internal political structure and process, see Gabriel A. Almond, "Review Article: The International-National Connection."
specificity of the political structure was the standard of classifying political systems, but structural-functional analysis does not go beyond description.\textsuperscript{15}

Huntington, by arguing the importance of political institutionalization in creating and maintaining political order in developing countries, explicitly introduced the political variables in his social mobilization-political institutionalization theory.\textsuperscript{16} A central problem with Huntington's theory seems to be that the concept of political institutionalization, defined as "the process by which (political) organizations and procedures acquire value and stability," is empirically hard to be distinguished from political stability and order.\textsuperscript{17} In his prescriptive argument, Huntington reduces the problem of political institutionalization to that of creating effective formal political institutions. In most developing countries, "where traditional political institutions are weak or nonexistent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalized political party."\textsuperscript{18} By advocating strong

\textsuperscript{15}Sidney Verba, "Comparative Politics: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going," pp. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{16}Samuel P. Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies}.

\textsuperscript{17}As Lee Sigelman finds out, "Ruhl . . . measured institutionalization with four indicators, two of which have often been employed by other researchers as indicators of political stability. Lehtinen . . . did essentially the same thing." Lee Sigelman, "Understanding Political Stability: An Evaluation of the Mobilization-Institutionalization Approach," p. 219. For other useful critiques of Huntington's work, see Mark Kesselman, "Order or Movement? The Literature of Political Development As Ideology"; Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?"; and Alexander G. Groth, "The Institutional Myth: Huntington's Order Revisited."

\textsuperscript{18}Huntington, \textit{Political Order}, p. 91.
strong party organization, Huntington tends to ignore the informal bases of political institutionalization and stability.  

From a radical perspective, the nature of the "dependent capitalist industrialization" and "class structure" were given the primary attention to explain dynamics in political and economic arena. Although this perspective may be useful in illuminating developments in certain regions such as Latin America, it is not very adequate as a general model of Third World development -- particularly that in the political arena.

It is O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) model that received widespread attention among social scientists. O'Donnell came out to reverse the proposition of the modernization theory as he argued that there existed an "elective affinity" between capitalist development in industrially advanced countries in South America and the emergence of B-A regime, a new type of authoritarian regime that is distinguished from other authoritarian regimes in its "defining characteristics." But what the defining characteristics of the B-A regime are remains unclear. O'Donnell argues that by broadening the concept of the B-A regime, the

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19 R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions"; and Susan Kaufman Purcell and John F. H. Purcell. "State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized?"

20 For a critique of dependency approach, see Tony Smith, "Requiem or New Agenda for Third World Studies?"; and Tony Smith, "The Logic of Dependency Theory Revisited." For a sympathetic treatment of dependency theory, see James A. Caporaso, "Dependency Theory: Continuities and Discontinuities in Development Studies."

21 O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. See particularly pp. 51-111.

model may be applicable to other countries and regimes.\(^\text{23}\) But this makes the concept too broad and ambiguous to be useful.\(^\text{24}\) The essential ambiguity involving the concept means that for an analysis to be useful to explain regime dynamics, one has to use a disaggregated approach to find out the similarities and differences among countries.\(^\text{25}\) This will prevent one from rigidly applying the assumptions of the theoretical model developed in a specific region to the countries in other regions with substantially different context.\(^\text{26}\) At a more fundamental level, advocates of O'Donnell's B-A model due to their epistemological position are not careful about the level of analysis. One should recognize, even if one adopts the neoMarxist perspective, that there is a difference between regime and the state in developing countries as well as advanced industrial nations.

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\(^{23}\) On this point, see also Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State."


\(^{25}\) David Collier, "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model."

\(^{26}\) "Dependent development" theorists quite correctly emphasize a very different historical context in Korea and Taiwan. Although their main focus is on the socioeconomic aspects of development, the theoretical implication should also apply to political dynamics in the countries. Thus, Evans says that "Evidence from East Asia . . . provides useful reminders of how parochialism can limit the scope of theoretical imagination. The point is perhaps more obvious in relation to geopolitics. . . . [It] has salience for the internal politics of East Asian politics that goes far beyond what is normal in Latin America." Peter Evans, "Class, State, and Dependence in East Asia," p. 222. See also Hyun-Chi Lim, "Dependent Development in the World System: The Case of South Korea, 1963-1979"; and Thomas Gold, "Dependent Development in Taiwan."
In reaction to the structural analysis of the regime change in terms of socioeconomic and cultural variables, some studies of the breakdown process of democratic regimes emphasize the choices of political actors. Democracy and redemocratization in several developing countries in the last decade have shifted scholars' attention to the investigation of politics of (re)democratization. This literature avoids sweeping generalizations by including political and international factors in analysis, and their explanations tend to look at dynamic process of complex political realities.

The works that specifically focus on the dynamics of the authoritarian regimes from the comparative perspective include those of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. These works, along with Robert Dahl's study provide important insights on the issues studied here.

B. Literature on the Emergence and the Dynamics of the Yushin System

We can distinguish about 4 perspectives that attempt to explain the emergence of the Yushin system. First, O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) model has been applied with some modification to

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27 See for example Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium.


29 Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situations or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime"; and Stepan, "State Power."

30 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.
explain the emergence of the Yushin regime. According to this perspective, the Yushin system is a new kind of authoritarianism, which emerged due to the nature of the capitalist industrialization in Korea. According to Hyung Baeg Im, the labor intensive, export-led industrialization in Korea became problematic by the end of the 1960s as the unlimited supply of labor had ended. The state intervened to contain rising wages, and this aroused "a distributional conflict . . . between the power bloc (the state apparatus, the local bourgeoisie, and international capital) and the popular masses (the working class, marginals, farmers, and progressive intellectuals). The ensuing political crisis, thus, was "deeply rooted in the organization of the system of production." Im argues that the establishment of the South Korean B-A regime is due to the failure of the ruling power bloc and the popular masses to reach a compromise solution with respect to development strategy and the organization of the economy. And, "the power bloc launched bureaucratic authoritarianism preemptively to exclude the popular masses from participating in the distributional struggle." Despite differences on the specific points, the basic arguments of the Korean students of the B-A model are the same: It is the nature of the Korean capitalist industrialization that led to the emergence of the Yushin regime.

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31 Hyung Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism in South Korea"; Jeong Woo Kil, "The Development of Authoritarian Capitalism -- A Case Study of South Korea"; and Sang-jin Han, "Bureaucratic Authoritarianism and Economic Development in Korea during the Yushin Period."


33 Ibid., p. 255.

34 Ibid., p. 241.
A major problem with this perspective seems to be that it does not consider a particular political and historical context in which Korean politics operated (and still operates in many aspects). The complete elimination of radical groups before and during the Korean war, the existence of hostile North Korea, consolidation of a strong, anti-Communist state in the South, and high economic growth without extreme economic inequality produced a situation in which there was little political mobilization of popular classes. It was in fact a political desert for the popular forces, and in this sense the Korean political system was similar to Taiwanese one.\footnote{As Bruce Cumings correctly points out, labor in Taiwan and Korea was politically "excluded in the 1950s and remained excluded in the 1960s." See his "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," p. 70. See also, Hagen Koo, "The Political Economy of Industrialization in South Korea and Taiwan," p. 172.} Prior to the imposition of the Yushin regime, the opposition to Park largely came from the intellectuals, students, and the press. The majority of these groups were conservatives and their demands were largely political, and related little to "organization of the system of production," although the minority of opposition activists were very critical about economic system in Korea. As we will see later, popular classes (particularly labor) were generally very conservative despite rapid expansion of its composition. In addition to the absence of popular mobilization, political structure within the strong Korean state was highly centralized, and political power was firmly concentrated in the president.

The B-A theorists of Korean politics assume a much higher degree of political, social, and ideological pluralism in pre-Yushin Korea than
actually existed and thus missspecify the model of Korean politics by classifying political groups to fit the theory without an empirical basis. This perspective also gives little help in explaining the nature of the political opposition during the **Yushin** regime as well as political realignment since recent democratization in Korea.\(^3^6\)

Thus the application of the B-A model in Korean context leads to an inadequate understanding of political dynamics in the country. Less rigid, more empirically oriented examination of the certain component of the B-A model can improve significantly our understanding of Korean political development by looking at the similarities and differences of those elements. Was there a high degree of internal threat by the populist mobilization? Was there economic and political crises? Which groups in state and society demanded the regime change? Was there pluralism within the ruling group (as is the case of Latin American countries?) And, what were the sources of the major political conflict?

Another perspective emphasizes the lack of democratic tradition in Korea.\(^3^7\) Authoritarian rule has dominated throughout Korean history, and thus the emergence of the **Yushin** system is not something surprising.\(^3^8\) It

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\(^3^6\)For example, why after more liberalization, has the public become more or less unconcerned about the arrests of opposition activists?

\(^3^7\)Thus one scholar remarks that "Given the history of Korean government, it is in keeping with tradition that authoritarian regime should prevail in both the North and the South. The Koreans have never had a democratic or constitutional system. . . . Viewed in this context, the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in the South was very natural." Franklin B. Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya, eds., *The Security of Korea: U.S. and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s*, p. 2.

\(^3^8\)This view is often expressed by the conservatives. Those from the radical perspective also often overemphasize the authoritarian nature of Park's rule prior to the **Yushin** system. According to Frank, "the Park regime was already a police state (by 1970) with but a few trappings --
is true that there were few democratic experiences in five centuries of the centralized rule of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) and the 36-year Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 after 3 years of American Military Government, there has been no peaceful transition of power to the opposition. And the transition of power within the ruling group occurred for the first time in 1988. The rules of Rhee Syngman (1948-1960), Park Chung Hee (1961-1979), and Chun Doo Whan (1980-1987) can be broadly categorized as authoritarian with their various repressive and restrictive measures toward political opposition and social groups to maintain their rules and to control society. To understand why Korean politics has not been as stable and democratic as Western democracies, clearly we have to understand Korean political culture. The conflict between Rhee Syngman and the Korean Democratic Party in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the furious political struggle within the democratic regime before the 1961 military coup, and the uncompromising rivalry between two opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, in 1987 are only some of the examples in which Korean political culture was detrimental to the political stability and democracy.

However, focusing on the authoritarian characteristics of political regimes in Korea, by ignoring important democratic elements that coexisted with authoritarianism, does not lead to a satisfactory explanation of Korean political dynamics. It also fails to ask the important question of

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why such a highly repressive regime emerged within the same political culture and tradition. Although Korea did not have an enduring democratic system, the Yushin regime, as we will examine later, was unprecedented in its destruction of democratic institutions and the level of repression against conservative elements of political opposition. For most Koreans, the difference between the pre- and the post-1972 Park regime is so great that there is intersubjective agreement that it cannot be treated as the same type of regime.

The tendency to broadly classify the regime (which from the Western democratic perspective is irresistible) also can have important implications for the U.S. policy toward Korea. For example, Richard Holbrooke, writing not long before the beginning of democratization in 1987, implicitly made a prescription for the orderly transfer of power within the dictatorial constitution -- which did not allow popular election -- by arguing that Korea, unlike the Philippines, has no democratic tradition and thus cannot expect "the miracle of Manila". The fact that direct elections of president and Assembly members, in which parties seriously competed for the state power, were held in regular intervals and in a reasonably democratic way is ignored in his analysis, thereby resulting in the wrong prescription and prediction in post-Chun Doo Whan politics.

The third view blames Park for his unwillingness to step down. There was no political crisis that could justify the regime change. It is

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40This is the dominant view of the attentive Korean public. See also, Edwin O. Reischauer and Gregory Henderson, "There's Danger in Korea Still."
Park who destroyed the "fragile" democratic institutions. Like the second view, this perspective, although it correctly points to the element of personal rule and the lack of popular support for the regime change, does not really explain the emergence of the Yushin system. The leadership's commitment to authoritarian rule is certainly a crucial variable, but we have to explain why Park's will was realized. Indeed, unlike the first perspective, both the second and third perspectives have been presented as simple arguments rather than the result of a serious study.

Fourth, there is a view that although the Yushin system emerged from Park's desire for permanent rule, there are a variety of internal and external factors that also contributed to its emergence. According to Eugene Kim, for example, the Yushin system is at least in part a result of the process of "forced, unbalanced, socioeconomic development strategies" and in "uncertain international milieu surrounding the Korean peninsula."41 The question becomes whether and how seriously the perception of the crisis existed among the political elite and the public and whether the existing political system was not expected to have the capacity to solve the problems resulting from those internal and external events.

In comparative perspective, all of the perspectives discussed above are seriously deficient in their neglect of political structures from which the more authoritarian regime emerged.42


42 A couple of Korean scholars emphasize political variables in their examination of the emergence of the Yushin regime. Jang Jip Choi identifies the "overdeveloped state", and Park's motivation for his indefinite rule. "Gwadae sungjang gukga ui hyungsung kwa chongch'i gyunyul
No systematic analysis has been made of the failure of Park's authoritarian rule and its breakdown, although many descriptive works have been produced on the opposition movement under the Yushin system. Many of these were written by journalists and opposition figures, and while these provide rich descriptive information, they do not provide a more systematic analysis. There are several perspectives that could be used to explain the failure of the maintenance of the Yushin system. First, political instability has been attributed to political traditions and culture such as Confucianism, tradition of civilian rule, democratic values, and tradition of the opposition movement. Second, some people applied a social mobilization approach. According to this view, Park's rule was unstable because of its inability to meet the increasing demands which result from the high level of social mobilization. Other variables

"ui kujo" [The Formation of the Overdeveloped State and the Structure of the Political Cleavages]. Jong-bok Lee adds two more variables to Choi's analysis: the power structure concentrated to Park and the diminishing U.S. influence. "Sanuo-wha wa chongch'i che'je ui byunwha" [Industrialization and Regime Change]. Lee's analysis is basically similar to mine except the assessment on the U.S. influence.

The most extensive study of the opposition movement during the period is 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong [Democratization Movement in 1970s], the five-volume books written under the name of the Human Rights Committee of the National Council of Churches in Korea [Han'guk kidoggyo kyohoe hyupui-hoe inkwon wiwon-hoe]. Other studies include Seung Hun Han, ed. Yushin ch'eje wa minju-wha undong [Yushin Regime and Democratization Movement]; Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae [The Park Chung Hee Era]; and Hak-Kyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea.

For a discussion of the psycho-cultural problem of political legitimacy in Korea, and the characterization of Korean political culture as "aggressive Confucianism," see Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. For a sociocultural approach to the problem of political stability, see Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex.

See for example Nack Young An, "Political Consequences of Rapid Social Mobilization and Prospects for Democracy in Korea."
such as the expansion of middle class and the economic problems have also been pointed out. These variables may be important but, once again, political variables have not been systematically examined.

The Characteristics of the Yushin System

If the Yushin system can be called a new regime, it was essentially at the level of political institution. In terms of the basic social characteristics, the Yushin regime did not have any significant difference with the pre-1972 Park regime. In this sense, it differed from new authoritarian regimes in many other countries. Society continued to be weak with little independent organizational power of the major socio-economic groups. The state continued to favor upper and upper-middle classes (and the big business conglomerates that are called chaebol) in terms of economic benefits, although unlike many other developing countries, economic development resulted in the overall increase in the living standards across all major social groups. The military and the intelligence community continued to provide the essential power base for the regime without participation of the active military officers in the government policy-making process.

The main characteristic of the Yushin regime that is distinguished from that of the previous regime in Korea is its elimination and significant weakening of important democratic institutions that existed previously. Before the emergence of the new regime, the rules of the political game included free and fair presidential and National Assembly elections that are held at regular intervals; the legitimate and effective existence of opposition parties that are seriously contesting for state
power; fixed terms for the presidency; and freedom of the public and press
to criticize government policies and actions. In practice, of course, the
formal rules were violated, often significantly. The rigid anti-leftist
state significantly constrained the operation of democratic institutions
by excluding any leftist forces from the political scene. The state became
strong with power concentrated in the presidency while social groups
failed to develop strong autonomous organizations to pursue their
interests. The regimes used the issue of national security to repress
political opposition. Electoral irregularities were committed by the
ruling party and the government. The regimes also resorted to
constitutional amendment to continue their rules.

As a result, there has been always a tension between the regime
which denied their violation of democratic rules and political opposition
that protested the regime's authoritarian actions. Until the Yushin
regime, however, various regimes temporarily violated democratic rules
without delegitimizing or changing the basic democratic institutional
arrangements. Within the limited political space of the anti-leftist
state, there were opposition parties that attracted significant public
support and that were engaged in a serious struggle for state power.

The Yushin regime possessed several characteristics that are
distinguished from the pre-Yushin system. First, the presidential election
lost its practical meaning as a contest for the state power and the
presidency was no longer accountable to the public. Under the new
constitution, the president was indirectly "elected" by the so-called
National Conference for Unification (NCU), for an unlimited 6-year term.
The constitution defined that the NCU was "a national organization based
on the collective will of the people as a whole to pursue peaceful unification of the fatherland", and was "the depository of the national sovereignty, entrusted with the sacred mission of the unification of the fatherland." Despite the extensive constitutional power of the NCU, it played virtually no meaningful independent role in the national policies including unification policy and functioned primarily as a rubber-stamp electoral college to choose the president.

The regime quite successfully used a variety of measures to make the NCU a pro-regime organization without independent institutional power. First, the NCU candidates and members were constitutionally barred from affiliating themselves with a political party, or holding memberships in the National Assembly or other public positions. Political parties also were not allowed to support or oppose the candidates. While making the NCU an apolitical organization, this had an effect of excluding the participation of the professional opposition politicians in the NCU election. Second, although the NCU members were elected by the direct popular votes, the regime's pressure successfully prevented those who were critical of the regime from running for the NCU election. Finally, during the presidential election, no debates were allowed, and the atmosphere and procedure for the voting were such that one could not dare to cast an opposing vote.  

\[\text{Korea Annual, 1973, pp. 347-348. For a full text of the Yushin constitution, see any issues of Korea Annual from 1973 to 1980.}\]

\[\text{For example, NCU members did not bother to fold the thick voting slip before putting it into the voting box. The presidential election during the Yushin regime was called gymnasium election because all the NCU members gathered at an indoor gymnasium to "elect" the president. For the NCU and the presidential elections under the Yushin system, see Sung-jae Kang, Kutaeta kwollyuk ui saengmi [The Nature of the Power of the Coup} \]
Realizing that there was no chance to win, the opposition did not put its candidate for the presidential election, and Park was the only candidate in the two elections held during the Yushin system. The success of the regime's systematic manipulation of the election is clearly demonstrated in the election results. In the December 1972 election, Park received 2,357 out of 2,359 votes cast. Two votes were declared invalid. In the election held in December 1978, Park won 2,577 votes out of 2,578 votes cast (1 vote invalidated).

The new regime also increased the already strong presidential power vis-à-vis other institutions of government and society. The president now appointed one-third of the National Assembly members. These appointed Assembly members were called Yushinjongwuhoe (Yujonghoe -- Revitalizing Fraternity Group) and were more submissive to the authority of Park than the DRP were. With the domination of the Assembly by the pro-regime forces, the president exercised full control over the legislature. In a further attempt to reduce the autonomous role of the legislative branch, the Assembly was deprived of its authority to conduct inspection of and audit the administrative branch. Furthermore, the president was given power to dissolve the Assembly.

With regard to the judiciary, the president appointed the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court (with consent of the National Assembly dominated by pro-regime members). The authority to review the constitutionality of laws was transferred from the Supreme Court to the newly established Constitutional Committee.

The president, in his own discretion, has the power to take
emergency measures in "the whole range of the state affairs" and "temporarily" suspend the freedom and rights of the people. These measures were not subject to judicial deliberations, and although the Assembly can recommend to the president to lift the emergency measures (with the approval of one half of the Assemblymen and thus practically impossible), the president did not have to comply. These emergency measures, which became the major coercive legal instruments against political opposition, were in effect for a prolonged period without the disadvantage of having the atmosphere of the extreme abnormality of the political situation that the garrison decree or martial law would accompany (and which in Korean context, applied to the short-term political crisis).

Political rights and freedoms were unprecedentedly restricted under the new regime. In principle, any form of opposition to the regime was now regarded as an "anti-state activity", and not allowed. Not only simple complaints about the regime, but a discussion about the opposition movement, can lead one -- whether he or she is a preacher in the church or professor in class -- to jail. The media was allowed neither the criticism of the regime nor the reporting of the opposition movement. It tended to become de facto government media, as the media was pressured to report only what the regime wanted the public to hear. The censorship was extended to the foreign news material available in Korea. Under the successive EM, the violators were arrested or detained without warrant and severely punished with long-term jail sentences. Various forms of severe torture and the harsh treatment of political prisoners were entirely new phenomena in their extent.
The new regime also replaced formal democratic ideology with the ideology of "Korean Democracy", which was disseminated throughout society, including the mass media and educational institutions. The ideology was neither elaborate nor intensively indoctrinated to the public and students, but its overt attack on the liberal democracy was unprecedented. School textbooks were revised after the Yushin regime to emphasize negative aspects of the democratic system prior to 1972 and to describe positively the objectives of the Yushin system.43

Finally, the Yushin regime provided no democratic means to change it by making it practically impossible to change the constitution unless the president supports it. While the amendments to the constitution prepared by the president are put on a national referendum, the amendments of the constitution presented by members of the Assembly must be approved by the two-thirds of the NCU members, after being adopted by the Assembly.

The Yushin system, in this sense, for the first time in the post-independence period fundamentally reorganized "political society" by changing the basic rules of the political games.44 Park himself made no secret about this. One can say that it changed from semi-competitive, soft authoritarianism to non-competitive, hard authoritarianism. The significance of this change must also be seen from the perspective of those who experienced it. According to Dal-jung Chang, "Korean polity,

43Yeong-su Tscheong, et al., Han’guk kyovuk chongcheck ui vinyun [An Examination of Educational Ideals in Major Educational Policies in Korea], vol. 2, p. 87.

44Following Alfred Stepan, "political society" is defined here as the "arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus." Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, p. 4.
which guaranteed relatively free political activities before 1971, turned
into the dark age with the adoption of the Yushin constitution."\(^{50}\) Moon-
young Lee goes as far as saying, "Before the Yushin [regime], the people
were the master of the country and the government was only the creature by
the people. However, during the Yushin period, government was the master
of the nation, and the people became the creature by the government."\(^{51}\)
It is no wonder that the opposition always used the term "restoration of
democracy".

With all its extreme form of authoritarian elements, the new regime
did not totally destroy democratic institutions. It did not eliminate or
restructure the major opposition party, although it significantly weakened
it. Popular elections were held for the two-thirds of the National
Assembly members. In these elections, politically discontented people had
a chance to vote for the opposition parties, although they knew that
elections -- because they would not change the regime -- did not have as
much meaning as before. The Assembly, with its domination by the pro-
regime members and the decreased power, was allowed to operate. The
operation of the significantly weakened democratic institutions is still
significant because, as we will see in Chapter 5, it contributed to the
dynamics of the Yushin regime leading to its breakdown.

Theoretical Approach of the Study

\(^{50}\) Dal-jung Chang, Han'guk chongch'i byunhwa wa minju chongch'i ui kujo
[Korean Political Change and the Structure of Democratic Politics], p.
325.

\(^{51}\) Shindong-a, April 1987, pp. 230-231.
In studying the emergence, maintenance, and breakdown of the Yushin regime (or regime stability and changes in any country), neither abstract, general theories nor static, cross-sectional analyses are very useful. Nor are the theories that ignore the possibility of an independent role for political and institutional variables. The rigid application of the theories developed in a country or an area with significantly different context should be also avoided. Finally, for our empirical focus, we need to go beyond the broad classification of regime types (such as democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes) or even the subtypes of a regime (such as military-bureaucratic or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes).

A more fruitful way seems to be a disaggregated approach with comparative references that looks at the political as well as the socioeconomic variables that could point to the differences among the regimes that could be treated as the same types or subtypes, because it is these differences that explain diverse regime dynamics. The task in this approach is to find out those factors, whose dynamic historical interaction contributes to the changes not only in the state-society relationship, but in the experiences with political institutions, which in turn contribute to the dynamics of the political changes in a regime. We also have to incorporate international and external factors in the analysis.

Thus the theoretical approach taken here in studying the Yushin regime is eclectic. While I recognize the need to look at the state control of the social groups, and its coercive capacities, the emphasis is also placed on the societal and institutional constraint on the state. Not only the strong state but the internal structure of the state and the
political leadership are emphasized. I also do not start from the assumption that the main characteristics of interaction between the state and society is economic. The nature of complex dynamics at the level of the regime necessitates eclectic analysis.

Within the context of the broad theoretical position taken above, my central theoretical argument concerning the Yushin system is that political variables are critical in the emergence and the dynamics of the Yushin regime. Although socioeconomic variables are important as the independent variables in influencing macropolitical dynamics such as regime stability and change, political variables are important in three respects in any study of political development. First, they could directly influence political outcomes. Second, socioeconomic variables themselves are shaped by the operation of political variables. Finally, political variables could influence the political significance of socioeconomic variables.

Now let's look at the specific phases of the Yushin system to examine the variables that affected each of them. These variables, while they do not provide complete explanation of the Yushin regime, are crucial variables that need attention for better understanding of Korean politics. In explaining the emergence of the Yushin regime, I identify three variables as crucial. These are the strong state vis-a-vis society, highly concentrated power structure within the state, and Park's motivation to remain in power for the rest of his life-time. The Yushin regime was imposed when Park, who was determined to remain in power, lost any constitutional means to do so. The political structural conditions that made possible the regime change was the strong state and the highly
concentrated power structure within the state. If any of these three variables had not existed, the imposition of the Yushin system would have been highly unlikely.

While there was certain cultural tendency in Korea for an authoritarian political leadership, strong state, and concentrated political power, I argue that a major reason why they developed to such an extreme level should be found first in the post-independence political circumstances. The security conscious actions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the bipolar international political system led to the divided occupation by those states of Korea after the end of Japanese colonialism in 1945. This led to the emergence of the separate regimes in North and South Korea, that were hostile to each other. The experience of the Korean War and the subsequent confrontation with hostile North Korea resulted in the consolidation of the rigidly anti-leftist state with very strong coercive instruments and broad national security ideology. After Park took state power, the state, now firmed backed by the military and the newly created intelligence apparatus, strengthened its control over society.

The "strong state", which had its root in post-liberation political circumstances, is only one of the three variables that contributed to the openly authoritarian regime in Korea. Another variable is the highly concentrated nature of the state power. The rigid anti-Communist atmosphere contributed to and was used in Park's firm control of the coercive state instruments. Based upon coercive power resources, Park gradually concentrated his power, and as a result, pluralistic elements within the state largely disappeared by the end of 1971.
Finally, the determination of the political leadership to remain in power for his life-time is a crucial variable. In fact, the direct cause of the imposition of the Yushin regime should be found in this motivational variable. The other two variables were the structural conditions which provided Park with the capability to achieve his motivation. After the 1971 elections, Park exhausted any constitutional means to continue his rule after 1975. However, he did not want to step down, and decided to impose the openly authoritarian regime, which would enable him to rule indefinitely. The Yushin system was prepared autonomously and secretly without the demand not only from society but from most state officials.

For a discussion of the maintenance of the Yushin regime, three political and institutional variables are emphasized. These variables are the public experience with democratic institutions (and their demand for more democratic rule), the availability of what Alfred Stepan calls the project, and the state coercion.

There is a general consensus among students of Korean politics on the high level of democratic aspiration during the Yushin regime, although the democratic movement was weak vis-a-vis the coercive capacities of the state. I argue that the strong democratic aspiration which provided a significant constraint on the maintenance of the Yushin regime cannot be satisfactorily explained by focusing on the socioeconomic variables (such as social mobilization, the expansion of middle class, or economic discontent). Although socioeconomic variables seems to be important, political variables are also important.
I argue, through disaggregated approach, that despite all the authoritarian characteristics, there had existed important democratic elements in the political arrangements of the pre-Yushin period. Furthermore, there had been widespread demand by the attentive public for increased democraticness of the regime. The experience with the democratic institutions had interacted with the increasing demand for more democracy, and these two factors cannot be fully understood without examining the complex and dialectical interaction of the variables. These are: the formal democratic institutional arrangements, the U.S. influence, the low level of internal social disorder and the dominant political ideology of the social elites. The pre-1972 experience with democratic institutions and a high level of democratic demands provided a major constraint for the maintenance of the Yushin regime, and contributed to the ultimate failure in the institutionalization of the Yushin system.

Along with the democratic experience, the lack of projects was crucial in the failure of the long-term maintenance of the Yushin regime. As Stepan puts it:

In any regime, but especially in a RA regime the capacity to lead the regime's political allies depends on the degree to which the regime has both "defensive" and "offensive" projects that potential allies consider to be feasible, crucial for the preservation and advancement of their own interests, and dependent on authoritarian power for their execution. Since coercion is particularly important part of the regime's power, the degree of internal institutional cohesion of the repressive apparatus is also a key variable.52

The lack of such project meant the regime had to rely heavily on repressive measures to maintain power. Coercion, in the absence of a new and clear project, led to the increase in the public discontents.

Democratic experience and the lack of projects also had an impact on state officials. The state officials, while generally supporting Park, considered the Yushin regime essentially a tool for the maintenance of Park's rule rather than an appropriate ideological and institutional framework for Korean polity on the long-term basis. This made it unlikely that the regime would be maintained after Park. By the end of Park's rule, with the increasing public discontent on the authoritarian rule, there emerged much skepticism among state officials on the necessity of the Yushin regime. However, Park's firm control over the coercive instruments did not allow any opposing opinions within the state.

In examining the process of the regime breakdown, which was directly caused by the unexpected assassination of Park by the director of the KCIA, we will divide the process essentially in two stages. First, the increasing challenge by the political opposition that increased the pressure on the regime, and second, the actual assassination and the breakdown of the regime. Contributing to the increasing pressure on the regime were the dynamics within the weakened democratic institutions, which the regime could not fully control. These are the increasing electoral strength of the opposition parties, that gave legitimacy to the opposition movement, and the emergence of new hard-line opposition party leadership. Kim Young Sam, after his election to the NDP president, decided to take the confrontational strategy to the regime. His hard-line strategy, which appeared dangerous to many, was supported by the public
and possibly encouraged by the critical attitude of the U.S. to the Park regime.

A sequence of events escalated political tension, culminating in the major riots in Pusan and Masan, which resulted in the split among the core members of the state on the proper strategies of dealing with the opposition. Assassination and the subsequent breakdown of the regime were caused by the choice of the KCIA director, which was based upon his analysis of the various situations. These included the widespread anti-regime sentiments among the public, the increasing skepticism about the Yushin regime among the state officials, the critical attitude of the U.S. toward the Park regime. He thought that the regime would breakdown after the assassination given the highly concentrated state power structure and the personalistic nature of the regime.

Methods

Evidence to support my arguments has been collected from various sources such as first-hand observation, news material, historical material, and the existing attitudinal and aggregate data. The public statements and writings by relevant figures or groups, as well as interviews conducted by the reporters and by me, provide important sources of information.

An effort will be made to interpret the available attitudinal data, which provide important clues on the political attitudes of different social and political groups in Korea. There exist important material on this subject in various articles and books (certainly more than is expected in an authoritarian regime) and a cautious analysis of these data
reveals the sources of public support and discontents under the Park regime. I have also gathered two sets of data. One is the 1971 survey data of the attitudes of the "workers", which was collected by Nack Jung Kim. The other is the 1989 opinion poll conducted by Joong-Ang Ilbo, a major Korean newspaper, on the Yushin regime.

Political attitudes of the attentive public can be also analyzed by examining the monthly intellectual journals such as Shindong-a and Wolgan Chosen. Articles written by professors and reporters generally reflect the majority view of the educated public. Although during the Yushin system, the anti-regime remarks were prohibited, there have been discussions about the Yushin after its breakdown.

In analyzing public statements made by the opposition, one has to be careful not to accept them at face value. First, hyperbolism is often used in Korea because Korean culture accepts overt expression of one's emotion more than many other countries. To give only one example, the opposition NDP in May 1968 said that "our party is one that preserves the establishment of daejung [mass] economic system. Our party makes it clear that the current economic system is antidemocratic and anti-daejung that serves the monopolistic profit of bureaucratic and privileged chaebol [a big business conglomerate], which is based on the ruthless exploitation of the farmers and workers and the sacrifice of small and medium industries."3 This kind of statement is designed to attract the support of the discontented groups in society, but reflects little the very conservative nature of the opposition party. Second, statements issued by

3Seung-jo Han, "Han'guk chongch'i ui jido yinyum" [The Guiding Ideology of Korean Politics], p. 502.
the various opposition groups sometimes reflect only a minority opinion within the opposition. This is particularly true in the case of the leaflets distributed by the opposition activists. Finally, pro-regime statements by social organizations or groups were not made voluntarily. They were often asked or even pressured to do so by the regime. This was particularly true during the Yushin regime. Thus, one has to be careful in analyzing various statements and check them with other evidence such as survey data and the observation of their actual behavior.

Writings by journalists, which were based upon their first-hand observation and interviews, provide valuable information on the political processes that happened behind the public scene and thus are difficult to identify by other methods. They should also help us to understand better the perception of the political situation by the political elite. This writer also had conversations and formal interviews with some people, including former government officials and high-ranking military officers as well as reporters and opposition politicians and figures. Only those findings that are considered new and important are presented here. A careful analysis of public statements and writings by Park, in combination with other sources of information could also provide us with a useful information on Park's political orientation.

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54The interviews carried out by the reporters are printed primarily in the monthly intellectual journals such as Shindong-a or Wolgan Chosen. Much of this information was not available until the mid-1980s.

55Many of Park's public speeches in 1963-1969 are collected in Bum Shik Shin, Major Speeches By Korea's Park Chung Hee. His speeches in 1970-1973 appear in Major Speeches by President Park Chung Hee. Park's speeches in 1970-1976 are in Chung Hee Park, Toward Peaceful Unification: Selected Speeches by President Park Chung Hee. The books that were published under Park's name include The Country, the Revolution, and I; and Our Nations Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction.
Although this study uses quantitative data freely when it seems necessary, it is essentially a qualitative analysis. The nature and the number of the variables that are dealt with here and their complex interaction are not amenable to more rigorous analyses.

Finally, an attempt will be made to bridge the gap between the area study and the comparative analysis as the study of the Korean case of authoritarianism will be occasionally guided and supported by comparative references by looking at the theoretically relevant variables in the regimes of other countries as well as other regimes within Korea, but without a direct analysis of those regimes.

**Organization of Chapters**

This work consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, I will examine a crucial context for Korean politics by looking at the nature of the anti-Communist state and its impact on the state-society relationship in the country. Specifically, I will look at the historical processes of the establishment, consolidation and institutionalization of what I call the anti-leftist state with strong coercive capacities and extended national security ideology, and will examine how it has constrained Korean political processes significantly. Domination of society itself by the conservative forces is also emphasized in the chapter.

Chapter 3 examines the emergence of the Yushin system. We will first look at various situations and events that happened prior to the imposition of the Yushin system to see whether they created socioeconomic disorder and political crisis. Then we will look at how such political factors as the leadership's commitment to remain in power, the strength of
the state vis-a-vis society, and the highly concentrated power structure within the state contributed to the imposition of the new regime.

In Chapter 4, we will look at those factors that provided basic constraints on the long-term stability of the Yushin system by analyzing pre-1972 Korean politics. I will emphasize the existence of the significant democratic components and show how democratic experience and demand increased dialectically by dynamic interaction of the variables, including formal democratic institutional arrangements, U.S. influence, the lack of internal threat by radical and populist forces, and the prevalent political ideology among politically articulate members of society.

Chapter 5 will then examine the dynamic process of the maintenance and breakdown of the Yushin regime. I will look at the efforts of the regime to create new project, and will argue that due to the lack of a new and clear project, the regime had to rely primarily on coercion to maintain itself. The increasing discontent by major social groups and the predominantly political nature of these discontents by the opposition are substantively and theoretically analyzed to see how the strong state was limited in institutionalizing the high level of authoritarianism vis-a-vis weak society.

In examining the breakdown of the regime, which immediately followed the assassination of Park by the KCIA director, I will look at how the dynamics within the weakened democratic institutions, along with increasing public discontent and the increasingly critical attitudes of the U.S. against the Park regime, led to increasing pressure on the regime, which contributed to the disintegration of core elements of the
state on the proper strategies in dealing with the opposition. Assassination itself is also analyzed by looking at the choice of Kim Jae Kyu, which was based upon his analysis of the various situations, the political structural conditions and the nature of the regime.

Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusion with the summary and discussion about the theoretical implications as well as possible contribution of my study to the Yushin regime and Korean politics.
CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHMENT AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ANTI-LEFTIST STATE

Categorizing the Korean political system under Park Chung Hee or Rhee Syngman as authoritarian (or more specifically military-authoritarian or bureaucratic-authoritarian) does not tell us much about a most important characteristic of all political regimes in Korea -- the kind of "anti-communism" that has existed in the country. Although anti-communism exists in many pro-Western developing countries, the special experiences and circumstances in Korea led to a situation in which anti-communism became particularly strong and stable both in the state and society of the country. The intensiveness, extensiveness and stability of anti-communism in the Korean political system from the end of the Korean War until recent democratization had few parallels in the world. Indeed it is more proper to call Korean anti-communism as anti-leftism because little distinction had been made between communism and other leftist ideology, and no significant leftist movement existed. Understanding this is crucial in analyzing Korean political dynamics because of the far-reaching impact of anti-communism in all spheres of political life throughout the post-Korean War period.

It is remarkable to see the conservative nature of political conflict in the post-Korean War era when we consider the extreme ideological and political polarization before the War. In the immediate
aftermath of the liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, it was in fact the leftists who took the political initiative. The organized leftist forces, whose strength increased until 1946, were then largely eliminated before the Korean War. A basic initial force for this political change toward anti-communism was caused not by the indigenous dynamics nor by the dependent capitalist process but by the security-conscious actions of the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that divided Korea and structured the power relationship among political groups in each of their occupied zones for the purpose of creating a friendly country to each of them. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. took geostrategic interests in having Korea (or at least a part of it) under their influence, as a bulwark against the other.¹

The psychological impact of the Korean War and the existence of a hostile North Korea, which seemed to pursue the ultimate goal of militarily reunifying Korea under communism, resulted in the consolidation and institutionalization of the rigid anti-leftist state with very strong coercive instruments and a broad conception of national security.² This has had a dominant impact on the dynamics of Korean politics by constraining domestic political processes as it restricted political rights and freedoms and opposition activities and narrowed the scope of political conflict by virtually eliminating the possibilities of the

¹E. Grant Mead, American Military Government in Korea, p. 5.
²The broad conception of the national security seems to differentiate Korea and Taiwan until recently from many other developing countries. For example, according to observers of Latin American politics, it is only in the sixties that the military in the region developed a "new professionalism" with a broader conception of national security. For an analysis of the Brazilian case, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil.
reemergence of any significant leftist forces and political mobilization of popular classes.

While the state played the prominent role in repressing any reemergence of leftist forces, society itself was dominated by the conservative forces after the end of the Korean War. Anti-communism (defined narrowly) was basically accepted by all major social institutions and groups, although there were always controversies surrounding the political use of the security issue by the successive regimes. Many Koreans also considered that even moderate leftism was not acceptable in Korea given its security dilemma.

Of course, the rigid anti-leftism of the Korean state was not entirely the result of the perceived security threat from the North. It would be reductionism to explain all anti-leftist characteristics of the Korean political system by the security dilemma of the country. Cultural factors and socioeconomic conditions also contributed to that effect. The successive regimes -- besides the democratic Chang government -- in various ways used the North Korean threat to repress opposition and to maintain or increase public support of the regime. The North Korean threats were often exaggerated. The Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law were applied in varying degrees to repress political opponents and the press. Many members of the attentive public also suspected that the timing for announcing "incidents" such as capturing North Korean spies was often politically calculated.3 Granting the political use of the security issue, there is no doubt that without the

3 Sung Chul Yang, Korea and Two Regimes: Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee, p. 241.
kind of salience of the security issue, Korea would not have evolved to such a rigid anti-leftist authoritarian regime with strong coercive capacities.

Under Korean anti-communism, the main political conflicts, which were fought exclusively among conservative forces, were less about fundamental socioeconomic issues than about the procedural rules of the political games and about the extent of the limits in political rights and freedoms for national security. The major opposition groups were elite groups such as the students, opposition politicians, intellectuals, priests and journalists. Almost complete political passivity characterized the popular classes as they were not engaged in politically-oriented activities. Even economic demands were limited to some workers.

This chapter examines the anti-leftist political system in Korea. We will first look at the political initiative taken by the leftist forces in the immediate aftermath of the Liberation in August 1945 and the increase in the strength of both rightists and leftists in the early period of the American occupation. We will then examine the weakening and elimination of the leftist forces between mid-1946 and early 1950. Finally, we will look at the consolidation of the anti-leftist state as well as the domination of conservatism in society after the Korean War.

Democratization since 1987 has produced the most significant changes in Korean politics since the Korean War. A minority of vocal activists with radical/nationalist ideology and more autonomous social groups emerged and engaged in various political activities including violent protests. Examination of this and other political changes in Korea would be the subject of another study, but one fundamental factor that allowed this change is the sharp reduction of tension between South and North Korea.
The anti-leftist aspects of the Korean regimes showed some variation. Subsequent developments in North-South relations and the regime characteristics influenced the specific characteristic of "anti-communism". Because our purpose here is to present a broad context of anti-communism in Korea which distinguishes it from many other countries and which is crucial in understanding Korean political development including the Yushin regime, our discussion will be more or less general. The changes in the characteristics of Korean anti-communism will be examined only to the extent that they had major significance.

Post-Liberation Ideological Conflicts and the Korean War

The defeat of Japan in World War II and the end of the 36-year Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) in Korea resulted in the Soviet occupation of the northern part of Korea and the American occupation of its southern part. However, the initial conditions in the South did not seem to favor the establishment of the anti-Communist state. Before the arrival of the U.S. forces in early September, it was the leftists who took the initiative in establishing political organizations.

Immediately after the liberation in August 15, 1945, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) was established by Lyuh Woon-hyung, a moderate leftist and nationalist.5 At the same time, a

5It was the Japanese governor-general in Korea who in an effort to prevent violent reprisals against Japanese life and property, approached Lyuh and asked him to take temporary charge of the government administration before the arrival of the American forces. For more details on this background, see Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, pp. 114-115. For a slightly different version of the story, see Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, pp. 233-237.
significant popular mobilization occurred throughout the country. Local self-governing bodies, which were called People's Committees, sprang up, and many of them began to play de facto governmental roles. Local peace-keeping forces were created often spontaneously replacing colonial police forces and maintaining order. Labor unions and farmers unions also developed in these weeks.

It is important to understand that the emergence and rapid expansion of the People's Committees and other mass organizations was a result of the sudden collapse of the repressive colonial state apparatus that had deeply penetrated Korean society. In other words, there existed little cost in establishing the self-governing bodies and in popular mobilization. Political space was almost completely open, and there were no restrictions on radical activities. Most Koreans did not have a firm ideological view at the time, and both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were welcomed by Koreans because they were the Allied power that liberated Korea from Japanese rule.

Although conservatives without a clear stigma as Japanese collaborators participated in and even led these organizations, the existing conditions provided a fertile ground for those who were looking for a radical restructuring of society. As the repressive colonial state

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6For a study of people's committees in the South, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 267-350.

7Ibid., p. 77.

8As Sacalapino and Lee point out, "Even among the so-called intellectual class, there was little understanding of the meaning of Communism, or of the distinction between Communism, Democratic Socialism, and Liberal Democracy. One must not impose on the Korean politics of this era the views and vantage points of another culture or intelligentsia." Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 240.
apparatus disintegrated, it was a time for those who fought for the national liberation. And most of these anti-colonial activists were leftists at the time. The release of the 10,000 political prisoners thus led to the increase in political strength of the leftists. In this situation, the workers and farmers who had repressed socioeconomic discontents (but without any deeply rooted ideological view) could be easily mobilized by the radical leftists.

The CPKI, which became increasingly dominated by the leftists, was engaged in the hasty process of constructing a government before the arrival of the U.S. forces. It regarded all the People's Committees as organs of its government and summoned a "congress of the people's representatives" to elect representatives for a People's Legislative Committee, which appointed a "cabinet". The Korean People's Republic (KPR) was proclaimed just two days before the arrival of the U.S. forces in early September. Despite the ostensible democratic methods, the whole process of organizing the KPR was dominated by the CPKI activists, most of whom were radical leftists. Although some rightists with a high reputation

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9 According to Japanese colonial records, more than 90 percent of the independent movement participants (and those prosecuted for this charge) were leftists. Young-Tae Jun, "The Rise of the Cold War and Labor Movement in South Korea, 1945-1948," p. 157. Although this figure may be exaggerated, the leftists were more willing to take the high risk of directly challenging the colonial state than the conservatives were. For the independence movements during Japanese rule, see Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Lee discusses the reasons why many became the leftists in the process of their anti-colonial struggle.

10 Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 119.
in the independence movement were appointed cabinet positions, almost all vice-ministers were leftists.\footnote{Thus there was little reason that the conservative leaders of the independence movement, who still did not return to Korea from the exile, would have accepted the positions. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 119.}

The rightist forces were not politically very active in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. Most of the prominent rightists present in Korea at the time refused to cooperate with the leftists. On the other hand, because they were not active in the anti-colonial movement by the end of the repressive 36-year Japanese rule, they were incapable of dominating the political situation in liberated Korea.\footnote{In fact, their accumulation of wealth during the colonial rule tarnished the images of many rightists.} Clear collaborators with the Japanese -- including many colonial bureaucrats and police officers -- went into hiding for fear of possible reprisals for their repressive actions during the colonial period. However, when the news that the U.S. would occupy the southern half of Korea came at the end of August, rightists began to organize to counter to oppose the KPR. Their effort led to the establishment of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) soon after the entrance of the U.S. forces in Korea. Most of the leading KDP members were well educated and came from landlord and business backgrounds. They were supported by the former colonial bureaucrats and police, who now saw an increasing danger of the leftists coming to power with ominous consequences for their status and lives.

To overcome their lack of respectable records during the independence movement, the rightists wanted to ally themselves with the
conservative elements of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in China.\textsuperscript{11} The KPG was established in China in 1919 to be engaged in the Korean independence movement. The KPG members, however, did not return to Korea until late November due to the opposition of the U.S. State Department. Political situations before the entrance of the U.S. forces, then, presented a great obstacle for the rightist forces to dominate the political system.\textsuperscript{14}

Subsequent political development in Korea did not follow these internal dynamics. The United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), which was established after the arrival of the U.S. occupation forces, took various measures to structure the power relations among groups in the southern portion of Korea so that it would not fall under the influence of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{15} To American officials in Korea, the KPR looked too radical to serve the U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, the USAMGIK believed that the Soviet Union was building its satellite in the North and training and sending an underground group to control Communist activity in the South.\textsuperscript{17} Thus to create political order in the occupied territory which seemed to head toward Communist revolution if unchecked,
the USAMGIK did not recognize the KPR and strengthened the rightist forces. Most of the Koreans who had served in the Japanese bureaucracy and police were retained or rehired. For example, 85 percent of the Koreans who had served in the police under Japanese rule were rehired as the USAMGIK police force. The former colonial police were the most effective forces against the leftists because of their fear of the repression in case of the power seized by the latter. The USAMGIK also recruited many KDP members for its administrative positions.

Because of the USAMGIK's need to have a rightist leader with a respectful record during the Korean independence movement, Rhee Syngman, who was a most prominent independence movement leader and a staunch anti-Communist, was brought from the U.S. to Korea in mid-October, 1945. Initially he was greeted positively by most Koreans because of his lifetime devotion to the independence movement. After his return Rhee appealed

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18 Henderson is correct in saying that "American responsibility and decision-making for Korea were, until August 1947, almost unbelievably divided and confused." Politics of the Vortex, p. 122. Organizations (e.g., the Departments of State and War) and different individuals were divided on the Korean issue, and some questioned whether the U.S. had vital interests in the Korean peninsula. But Henderson goes too far when he says that "[The USAMGIK] had no selfish aims; indeed, they did not have aims at all, lacking policy." Ibid, p. 121. The basic U.S. policy was that Korea or a part of it should be kept out of Soviet domination. See for example Bruce Cumings, "Introduction: The Course of Korean-American Relations, 1943-1953," p. 22. The confusion was primarily on how to achieve this basic policy.

19 Joungwon A. Kim Divided Korea, p. 54. See also Cumings, Origins, p. 166.

20 It appears that Hodge, MacArthur and Goodfellow (an OSS official) helped Rhee's return to Korea despite State Department policy against Rhee's return. See Cumings, Origins, pp. 188-189. The State Department opposed Rhee's return because it wished to make a multilateral trusteeship agreement for Korea with the Soviets. For this purpose, it found Rhee's adamant anti-communism less timely. Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 128.
for "unconditional" national unity. But soon conflict developed between him and the leftists because it became clear that while Rhee wanted to build a political system largely excluding the leftists, the latter would not want the rightist-dominated regime. To fight against the Communists, Rhee had to ally with the KDP and the former officials under Japanese rule.

The USAMGIK also supported rightist youth groups. The largest one was the National Youth Corps (NYC) headed by Lee Pom-sok. By July 1947, some 70,000 NYC members had received training with U.S. financial and material support. Although its purpose was to train men who could act as an anti-Communist Korean army in case that agreement with the Soviet Union failed, the NYC played an important role in fighting against the leftists. 21

While these actions taken by the U.S. increased the strength of the conservatives, the latter were not cooperative with all the U.S. policies. Particularly, they opposed the trusteeship. In December 1945, an agreement had been reached between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to create a trusteeship for Korea up to five years, under the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. In the U.S. view, the multilateral trusteeship would permit the other powers to prevent the Russian domination of Korea. 22 However, this decision produced a hostile reaction from the rightist groups, who opposed any international control in which the Soviet


22Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 104 and 109.
Union was to participate. The leftist parties, led by the Communist party, initially opposed the decision, but in early January 1946, they suddenly announced their acceptance of the decision. The leftist position on this emotionally sensitive issue weakened their popularity because people in the South opposed the trusteeship as they interpreted it as a postponement of independence and another subjugation to foreign rule. The first Joint Commission meeting between Soviet and American representatives, designed to initiate procedures for establishing a trusteeship government, was held in March 1946. But since no agreement could be reached on the issue of which groups of Koreans should be consulted, the Joint Commission was adjourned in two months.

Because the rightists with their opposition to trusteeship and to the Soviets became an obstacle to U.S. policy objectives, the efforts were made by the U.S. to build up a coalition group of moderate rightists and leftists, that supported the U.S. policy. However, the second Joint Commission, which was convened in May 1947, broke down due to the irreconcilable differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. With the end of the prospect to obtain a trusteeship agreement with the Soviet Union, the need for a moderate coalition also disappeared. Korea was politically polarized, and the moderates did not have much following in society. To keep the South from Communist expansion, it was now thought to be essential to return to the support of the rightist forces.

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23 Ibid., p. 106.
24 Cumings, Origins, p. 247.
25 Lyuh Woon-hyung, the most prominent moderate leftist, was assassinated in July 1947.
In the beginning of its occupation, while supporting the rightist forces, the USAMGIK took the measures to weaken the leftists. The USAMGIK declared that it was the only government in the South, and subsequently outlawed the Republic in December 1945. The KPR members performing the government functions were fired, and the Peace Preservation Corps and other armed groups were dissolved.²⁶ The leftists, however, were basically allowed to operate as political forces, partly because the U.S. did not want to antagonize the Soviet Union before the beginning of the trusteeship negotiation. Also, in many local areas, where the manpower of the USAMGIK was too small to enforce the policy, the People's Committees were tolerated to continue to play the government roles.

As a result of the relative tolerance for their activities, leftists had been expanding their organizations. By late 1945, the National Council of Korean Labor Unions (Chonpyong) claimed 500,000 members and the All-Nation Farmers Federation (Nongmin Chohap), 3 million members. Probably these claims are exaggerated, but there was indeed a widespread perception about the increased strength of the leftists.²⁷ The Korean Communist Party (KCP) itself, which had about 4,000 members at liberation, claimed 29,000 Communist members on March 1946, including regular members and candidates for membership in South Korea.²⁸ However, the overwhelming majority of

²⁶Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 128; and Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 54.

²⁷See for example Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 268. See also the American intelligence report cited in Cumings, Origins, p. 234.

²⁸Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 320. Scalapino and Lee present different figures. By spring 1946, Korean Communist leaders were claiming a membership of 200,000. American and South Korean authorities estimated between 40,000 and 60,000. See their Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 257.
those who participated in the leftist mass organizations were not truly committed themselves to the leftist movement. Their involvement occurred under the condition of little or no cost. Thus when they were faced with increased coercion by the American and Korean authorities, the leftists became rapidly weakened.\(^{29}\)

The U.S. occupation authorities shifted their policy to the direct suppression of the Communists in mid-1946. The USAMGIK closed three left-wing newspapers and arrested many Communist leaders. The arrest of Pak Hon-yong, the top leader of the KCP, and two other Communist leaders was ordered. By the end of September, most KCP leaders were arrested or in hiding.\(^{30}\) While this suppression weakened the Communist leadership, it also produced resistance from the leftists.

In September 1946 the railroad workers of the leftist union, Chonpyong, resorted to a general strike, which paralyzed rail transportation throughout south Korea. The strike spread to many other labor groups including printers, electrical workers and poster workers. The total number of workers involved in this event throughout South Korea was estimated to have been 251,000.\(^{31}\)

The labor protests were soon followed by successive farmers' riots on a major scale that lasted for three months. On October 1 in Taegu, a street demonstration demanding rice developed into riots of intense

\(^{29}\) See Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea*, vol. 1, p. 268. Scalapino and Lee also note that "the rosters of membership were in considerable measure paper rosters, with a handful of activists swimming in a sea of the inactive and the inarticulate." *Ibid*.

\(^{30}\) *Cumings, Origins*, p. 252.

violence, which resulted in the death of fifty-three policemen and dozens of rioters. Although the local American command restored order by declaring martial law, farmers' riots of a similar nature spread over to the other local areas, mainly to the southern part of the South. More than a thousand persons were killed in this revolt that ended in January 1947. The peasant riots were led by the farmers associated with the People's Committee and other leftist mass organizations. The peasants were particularly angry about the rice collection and the methods police employed for it. In fact, one of the important characteristics of the riots was that the violence was highly selective and directed primarily against the police, although in a few cases the landlords and their houses were objects of attack. Many of them were also politicized and joined more radical/nationalist activists in calling for the transfer of power to the people's committees. After the rebellions, which led to the arrests and elimination of radical activists, the People's Committees and the mass organizations associated with them no longer remained as strong political forces in the local areas. However, leftist resistance of a small scale continued after the peasant uprising.


33 For detailed description of this events, see Cumings, *Origins*, pp. 351-381.


36 For these incidents in 1947, see McCune, *Korea Today*, pp. 86-87; and Henderson, *Politics of the Vortex*, p. 155. A Communist-led rebellion of a major scale broke out in Cheju Island in April 1948. Due to the isolation of the island, the political impact of the rebellion in Cheju was not so
Meanwhile, after the failure of the efforts to establish a trusteeship, the U.S. took the issue to the U.N. in September 1947. As a result, general elections were held in the South in May 1948 under U.N. observation. The attempt by the Communists to disrupt the election failed except in Cheju island. More nationalist groups including the rightist Kim Koo and his Korean Independence Party as well as some moderate leftists boycotted the elections for the reason that separate elections in the South would lead to a divided nation. The resulting National Assembly was dominated by the conservatives, which elected Rhee Syngman as the first president of the Republic of Korea. In the North, a constitution was adopted early in 1948, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed in September 1948.

A major leftist challenge came in October 1948 when an Army regiment at Yosu that was going to Cheju Island to fight the Communist guerrillas instead rebelled against the government. The rebellion was brought under control in a week by loyal army forces, but some rebels escaped to the mountains to become guerrillas. In this so-called Yosu-Sunchon (Yu-Sun) Rebellion, two thousand soldiers and civilians were killed and about eight thousand people were arrested.37

The Yu-Sun Rebellion, by demonstrating the remaining strength of the underground Communists, led the Rhee regime to intensify its effort to eliminate them. The National Security Law with broad and ambiguous

serious as the severity of the fighting and the casualties indicate. For a detailed study of the rebellion, see Merrill, Peninsular Origins, pp. 63-87 and pp. 122-135. For the casualties, see also Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, vol. 1, p. 309.

37Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 108.
provisions was soon passed in the Assembly and promulgated in December 1949.\textsuperscript{38} Within the military, some 4,750 commissioned and uncommissioned officers were purged, affecting more than 10 percent of the entire military personnel.\textsuperscript{39} The Ministry of Education in December 1948 also began its search for the leftists by ordering the directors of all educational institutions to file detailed personal histories of all teachers. Student committees were set up in schools to report on "politically unreliable elements."\textsuperscript{40} The press was also affected. For example, between September 1948 and May 1949, the government closed down several newspapers, and journalists were arrested on charges of the violation of the security laws.\textsuperscript{41} The number of people arrested and prosecuted indicate the scope of the government attack on the leftists. 118,621 people had been arrested in 1949, and for the first 4 months of 1950, 32,018 people were arrested.\textsuperscript{42} With the massive campaign against underground Communists, the radical forces were greatly weakened by this time. Thus the Yu-Sun rebellion had an impact of contributing to the consolidation of the anti-leftist state. The Communists still engaged in

\textsuperscript{38}The National Security Law was ambiguous in its provision and could be applied broadly to punish political opposition. See Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 425.

\textsuperscript{39}Se-jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{40}Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{41}Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 163. Assemblymen, judges and prosecutors were not exceptions in this anti-Communist campaign. See Ibid., pp. 165-166.

\textsuperscript{42}Chon-joo Yun, Han'guk chongch'i ch'egye [The Korean Political System], p. 126. See also, Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 163.
the guerrilla activities after this, but they failed to attract popular support and were successfully contained by spring 1950.43

After establishing and recognizing the governments that supported their governments, the Soviet and the U.S. forces withdrew in December 1948 and June 1949 respectively. But the situations in Korea were not stable due to the establishment of the two ideologically polarized, separate regimes hostile to each other. Rhee Syngman was determined to overthrow the "Communist puppet" government in the North and unify the country.44 For the North Korean Communists, the "liberation" of the South should be achieved. There were numerous skirmishes and armed clashes -- some of them of a major scale involving battalions -- along the 38th parallel, although there was a decline in the fighting for some time before the War.

The all-out invasion of North Korea to "liberate" South Korea was probably encouraged by the perceived weakness of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea and the "revolutionary potential" in South Korea.45 Both of these calculations proved to be wrong. With superior arms and a disciplined army, North Korean forces advanced rapidly.46 Seoul was

43North Korea occasionally sent armed agents during this period, but they were largely eliminated.

44For this reason, the U.S. did not provide offensive weapons to the Korean military.

45The causes of the Korean War are beyond the scope of this study. For a discussion of the various explanations of the Korean War, see for example Merrill, *Peninsular Origins*, pp. 19-54.

46When the Korean War broke out, the South Korean troops were poorly equipped, and had no tank and combat airplane. The North had 500 tanks and 211 aircraft including fighter planes. John Kie-Chiang Oh, *Korea: Democracy on Trial*, p. 39. Byung Chul Koh, citing a U.S. government study, says that 10,000 North Koreans received military training in the Soviet
occupied in just 3 days and by August most of South Korean territory had fallen under the North Korean forces. The Communist victory in Korea was avoided by the engagement of the U.N. forces. The Allied troops led by the U.S. pushed back the North Koreans and further marched across the 38th parallel toward the Yalu river, which separates North Korea and China. This brought the engagement of the "Chinese People's Volunteers" in October. By spring 1951, a stalemate developed in the area along the 38th parallel. The truce negotiations that began in July 1951 lasted for two years until the Armistice agreement was finally signed in July 1953.

The human and physical costs of the Korean War were enormous, probably far exceeding the initial calculation by Kim Il Sung. In terms of military casualties, almost 300,000 North Korean troops, 200,000 Chinese, 227,000 South Korean troops, and 57,440 UN troops, of whom 33,000 were Americans, were killed. Including civilians, the death toll for all Koreans is estimated about 3 million, 10 percent of the whole population. And it is unknown how many people were injured. The Korean War also produced separated families on a massive scale. A popular account in South Korea puts them at ten million people. Total physical damages to

Union between 1946 and 1949, and had become "cadres in the mechanized units of the North Korean Army." See his "Unification Policy and North-South Relations," p. 266. For more discussion about the pre-war military imbalance between the North and South, see Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, pp. 100-101.

47Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea. The estimates vary. See for example, David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, pp. 460-461.

48Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, p. 11.
the South Korean economy are estimated at $1.8 billion, roughly equivalent to its gross national product for 1949.45

The Stable Anti-Leftist Political System After the Korean War

The end of the Korean war in July 1953 did not bring peace in Korea, but saw intensification and solidification of the antagonistic ideological and military confrontation between North and South Korea. The two de facto governments now completely closed their doors to each other without allowing any form of cooperative interaction. In the South an intensive, extensive and stable anti-Communist regime was finally established with almost complete elimination of leftist forces.

The impact of the Korean War and of the existence of a hostile North Korea on the South Korean political system was dramatic. First, it produced a significant expansion of the military institutions as a consequence of a rapid build-up of the military forces in both Koreas. The manpower of the South Korean forces stood at 720,000 at the end of the war. Although it was reduced to 600,000 soon, the increase in military force was dramatic compared to the pre-war level of around 100,000.50 With the compulsory conscription of all physically fit males for military service (for two and half to three years), Korea now became one of the most militarized countries in the world in terms of the proportion of military personnel to the whole population. With the quantitative increase

45 For more about the physical damages of the Korean War in the South and North, see for example Kenneth G. Clare et al., Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea, pp. 300-301.

50 Those under arms in the South as of June 1950 totaled about 151,000 -- 95,000 in the Army, 1,800 in the Air Force, 6,100 in the Coast Guard, and 48,000 in the police. Sawyer, Military Advisers, p. 106.
and qualitative improvement of the armaments and the creation of the massive paramilitary forces in the late 1960s and 1970s, the country would become increasingly militarized.

After the Korean War, the United States made clear its commitment to the defense of South Korea. The U.S. signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea in 1954. The U.S. operational control of the Korean military, which was acquired during the Korean War, was maintained after the war. More than anything else the presence of U.S. troops in the country demonstrated the U.S. commitment to deter any possible North Korean attempt to start another Korean War. After one division was withdrawn in 1954, the number of U.S. troops stayed around sixty thousand until 1971 when the Nixon Administration withdrew another division leaving about 40,000 troops. Also, the U.S. forces in Korea were said to have been equipped with nuclear weapons since around 1957. In addition to the measures, the U.S. poured massive military and economic aid into Korea to build a bulwark against communism. From 1950 through 1968 U.S. military aid, mostly in the form of grants, amounted to $2.5 billion. In this period U.S. military aid, including defense budget support, defrayed 75 to 80 percent of South Korea's total military expenditures. American economic and military aid

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51 The deterrence of China was initially an important rationale for the continued presence of the U.S. forces in Korea after the war. See Ralph N. Clough, Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support, p. 96. However, as it turned out, the U.S. forces have remained after the threat of China disappeared.

52 Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest, p. 48.

53 Clough, Embattled Korea, p. 98.
combined accounted for nearly 10 percent of South Korea's GNP during the period between 1954 and 1970.\textsuperscript{54}

The end of the Korean War saw the consolidation of a strongly anti-Communist political system in the South, which was completely dominated by the conservatives. The Korean War experience made the state institutions including the military staunchly anti-Communist and highly intolerant of radical forces. The state officials, obviously for good reason, perceived that Kim Il Sung in North Korea was constantly looking for an opportunity to unify Korea by another invasion. They considered any conciliatory gesture by North Korea as propaganda to conceal its ultimate goal of communizing the South. The North's peace overture on the eve of the Korean War was a factor contributing to this mistrust. The state officials also shared the view that the North Korean leadership was rather irrational and unpredictable. They also shared certain fears about the strength of the disciplined North Korean army. On these views of North Korea, there was no ideological division within the state and the military institution.

This view of the North Korean threat led to an enlarged conception of national security which affected the Korean political system in a fundamental way. No "leftist-oriented" groups have been allowed to operate legitimately and effectively in the political system. A "leftist-oriented" group is defined broadly to include not only such groups which advocate radical restructuring of socioeconomic order but also groups that attempt to politically mobilize workers or farmers or that advocate foreign and unification policy that would "benefit North Korea." The state control of

\textsuperscript{54}Sung-joo Han, "South Korea and the United States," p. 1076.
the radical and popular forces in Korea was predominantly based upon the ideology of national security.

Leftist influence was also minimized by the tight control over the means through which the leftist ideology could be spread. No leftist media were allowed to operate, and educational institutions were successfully controlled to prevent any radical ideological influence. Virtually no Marxist-Leninist literature was available to the public. The mere possession of radical literature could lead to one's arrest and prosecution by the security laws. Although the scholarly possession of the radical material by the academic specialists was allowed as an exception, any view sympathetic to leftist ideologies or political system was not practically allowed. Academic teaching on these subjects was thus extremely closed. The tense atmosphere of national security was also indicated by the curfew that had been enforced throughout the country between midnight and 4 AM.55

Although it was the state that repressed any signs of the emergence of the broadly-defined leftist forces, this kind of anti-leftism was made possible by the post-war domination of conservatism in society itself. First, the war experience, which was accompanied by enormous destruction and suffering, increased anti-communism among the South Korean public because the war was started by the North Korean invasion. Particularly those who suffered at the hands of the North Korean Communists or their supporters before and during the war supported the repression of any

55The curfew was finally lifted in 1980 as a part of the new regime's effort for "liberalization" after Chun Doo Whan took power. It is an interesting case of the strong authoritarian regime advocating "social liberalization."
radical activities. The existence of antagonistic North Korea produced a widespread public perception that North Korea was looking for another opportunity to invade Korea. For many Koreans, then, the fear of another Korean War (and its obvious consequences) was a major factor in refusing radicalism and accepting certain authoritarian characteristics of the government.

A second reason for political conservatism in Korean society is the massive elimination of those who were considered Communists and their sympathizers during the war. Probably over 100,000 were killed, often without any trial, when the Korean military recaptured or tried to control the areas of Communist presence. As Henderson says, elimination of communism from the South was "as complete as it is possible to be."

Third, the population movement between North and South Korea during the Korean War increased the conservative forces and decreased the number of radicals. Some 1.5 million North Korean refugees remained in the South after the War, while possibly 100,000 went to the North. These figures are combined with the 1.5 million refugees from the North during the period between the liberation and the Korean War. Most North Korean

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56 It should be pointed out that during the process of the elimination of the Communists, many innocent people were the victims. Well-known incident is the massacre of residents in Kuchang. 500 to 700 people including many children and the elderly were killed by the government forces that were frustrated by the continuing presence of the Communist guerrillas in the area. There were other incidents of a similar nature. See for example Un-sun Back, "Gukmin bangwi-kun sagun kwa kuchang yangmim haksal sagun" [The National Defense Corps Incidents and the Kuchang Innocent People Massacre Incidents]; and Gap-jae Cho, "Han'guk kunbu" [Korean Military].


refugees came to the South to avoid Communist rule and they were strong anti-Communists. This population movement increased the rigidity of the political line considerably. The refugees from the North played an important role in consolidating and intensifying anti-leftism in both state and society. During most of Rhee's rule, for example, the military officers of North Korean origin occupied a predominant position within the military as the two most powerful factions -- the Northwestern and the Northeastern factions -- were led by officers of North Korean origin.

In addition to the war produced conditions, there is another important factor that contributed to the stable anti-leftist regime in Korea by reducing much discontent in the rural area. This is the land reform conducted in two phases before the Korean War. First, in 1947 the USAMGIK decided to distribute the former Japanese-owned land to the tenants. By September 1948, some 700,000 plots representing over 96 percent of agricultural land which had previously been owned by Japanese were sold to 507,072 tenants. Second, the Farm Land Reform Law, which was enacted in June 1948, was finally implemented in 1950. The Law authorized the government to redistribute the remaining Japanese holdings as well as absentee-owned cultivated lands. Nearly one-quarter of all farm land in South Korea was redistributed as a result of these two land reform measures to benefit more than 1,550,000 rural families, 62.7 percent of the entire farm household (see Table 1). Almost one million landless

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59 Ibid., p. 62.

60 According to Se-jin Kim, the military officers of North Korean origin "constituted the most militantly anti-Communist elements in the Army, they were also most willing to serve the right-wing cause." See his The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea, p. 56.
tenants now became small owner-cultivators, while another half million now possessed additional farmland to cultivate. The land reform, by outlawing private land holdings in excess of 3 hectares (7.4 acres), resulted in the disappearance of the big landlord class. The land reform then abolished the tenant farmer system, reduced rural inequalities and established a small farmer owner-cultivator system in its place. (See Table 2)

### TABLE 1. Distribution of Farm Land under the Agrarian Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary Farm Household (in thousand)</th>
<th>Acreage (in thousand chongbo(^1))</th>
<th>Rice paddies</th>
<th>Dry fields</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redistributed land</td>
<td></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vested land</td>
<td></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (A)</td>
<td></td>
<td>352</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Farm Households</th>
<th>Total Arable Land</th>
<th>Rice paddies</th>
<th>Dry fields</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of the country (1949) (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>2,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A) as percentage of (B)</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) chongbo equals 2.45 acres.


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\(^1\)Hahn-Been Lee, *Korea: Time, Change and Administration,*" p. 52.
TABLE 2. Owner-Tenant Distribution of Farm Households (in Percentages)

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full owner</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner-tenant</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborer and</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burnt field farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on the number of Farm laborers were not given for these years.


The land reform then was a crucial factor that contributed to the maintenance of political stability in the rural area without the kind of state coercion that was prevalent in the pre-War period. Conservatism and political passivity characterized the rural population since the end of the War. During the Rhee regime, certain signs of discontent were detected when some rural areas voted for Cho Bong Am, a moderate social democrat, in the presidential elections. But in the 1960s, the rural voters generally supported the ruling government despite the slow development of the rural area. There have been virtually no rural protests of any significance until the mid-1970s.\(^\text{62}\) Peasant riots or rural guerrilla movements became a story of the past.

\(^{62}\)The Hampyong Sweet Potato Incident in 1976 was the first significant rural protests, but as will be examined in Chapter 5, it involved a small number of people with very moderate demands.
Finally, another major factor that contributed to the maintenance of the anti-leftist political system in Korea was good economic performance, particularly since the 1960s. As will be discussed later, rapid economic growth coupled with relatively equal economic distribution helped to prevent the emergence of the forces for a radical transformation of the socioeconomic system. Even for those intellectuals and students who were critical about the economic dependence on Japan (partly reflecting the anti-Japanese feeling), the Western developed countries including the U.S. was never a target of ideological or political attack, and the U.S. was perceived as an ally that helped Korea militarily and economically.

Social institutions such as mass media, schools, and church were influenced by anti-communism and contributed to the maintenance of the anti-leftist political system. The conservatism of the social institutions was of course partly due to the state control, but as noted above, there was also genuine opposition to radicalism. The mass media were completely dominated by the conservative views. While the media took generally critical attitudes toward authoritarianism (when it had such a freedom), its view of North Korea, the leftist groups and the U.S. were basically the same with the government. Except for a brief period during the Chang regime, there were simply no media that expressed even a moderately leftist view. The conservatism of the media influenced greatly the basic social stability.

Educational institutions in Korea were highly centralized, and government control over them was extensive. While anti-communism was an important subject of teaching, leftist teachers and radical materials were virtually not existing. In addition to the virtual absence of the
influence of radical ideologies, the government also watched closely for emergence of any leftist student organizations. Anti-communism prevalent in society was also reflected in universities, and adopted by many students. Consequently, left-wing student groups became almost insignificant, and the dominant view in universities did not go beyond liberal democratic one despite the existence of a small minority of more progressive (or radical) students.

Religious institutions, particularly Christian ones, were also dominated by strong anti-communism. This results from the experience of the churches and the Christians with the Communists. After the Soviets occupied the North, the Christians gradually became a major opposition against the emerging Communist rule. Due to the Communist suppression, many Christians escaped to the South and those who remained in the North were successfully repressed both as a political and religious force. In the South, the Christians were often the target of violent attack during the pre-War leftist uprisings. Many Christians are also believed to have been killed or kidnapped to the North by the Communists during the War.

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63 It should be noted that the political importance of the Christian churches was not apparent until the mid-1970s when there emerged a significant Christian opposition coupled with the increased number of Christians. The small number of the Christian population was a major reason for the relatively insignificant political influence of the church in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1950 there was 839,711 Christians in South Korea. The number increased to 1,190,000 by 1960. Young Bok Kim, "Haebang yihu ui kyohoe wa gukga" [Church and State Since Liberation], p. 192.

64 See for example Ibid., pp. 194-201. Although Christians numbered about 300,000, 3 percent of the whole population in the North, their influence was greater than the number.

65 Donald N. Clark. Christianity in Modern Korea, p. 16.
This experience with communism resulted in the churches' antagonism against the regime in the North.

Examination of several cases illustrates well the anti-leftist nature of the Korean political system. First, the execution in 1959 of the moderate socialist Cho Bong Am shows not only the importance of state coercion but his ideological isolation in a conservative political system. Cho had once been a Communist but he changed his political view and became a strong anti-Communist. He subsequently served as minister of agriculture in the first Korean government and as vice chairman of the National Assembly. He received 30 percent of the popular vote (2.16 million votes) in the 1956 Presidential election. Without a significant organizational network, he was doing very well. Cho was later arrested on the largely improper charge of espionage and the violation of the national security law and subsequently executed. His progressive party was dissolved by the government cancellation of the party's registration. When Cho was executed, neither the politicians nor the U.S. came out to defend him. In fact, before the presidential election, anti-Rhee conservative politicians refused to accept him into their groups despite his efforts to ally with them. There was also no popular protest. The execution of Cho revealed

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66 It should be emphasized, however, the electoral success of Cho was partly caused by the sudden death of Shin Ik-hee, the presidential candidate for the main opposition Democratic Party.

67 However, there was controversies within the opposition Democratic party leadership whether to accept Cho or not. For a discussion of Cho Pong Am and his Progressive Party in English, See Sung-joo Han, Failure of Democracy, pp. 79-87.
the danger any leftist figure (however moderate he might be) with substantial significant support would face. 68

That anti-communism in Korea is not solely due to state coercion but has been significantly accepted by the general public was demonstrated during the democratic elections in 1960 after the fall of the Rhee regime. The leftist politicians and parties experienced a near complete defeat in these elections. From the 123 districts in which they had candidates, the reformist parties managed to elect only 5 candidates -- 4 from the Socialist Mass Party (SMP) and 1 from the Korean Socialist Party (KSP). In terms of the popular votes, the SMP and the KSP received only 6.0 percent and 0.6 percent respectively. 69 In the House of Councillors election in which the reformists captured 2 seats out of 58, the SMP received 2.4 percent of the votes cast, and the KSP, 0.9 percent. 70 The defeat of the leftists was partly due to their financial and organizational weakness, but it was also due to "The ideologically conservative nature of the urban votes and culturally traditional nature of the rural votes." 71 During the democratic Chang regime, there was more political space for the moderate leftists. A definite answer cannot be provided to the question of how much the rigidity of anti-communism could have been lowered by the more democratic, but conservative, leaders of the regime.

68 Observers of Korean politics generally attribute the death of Cho less to his ideological view than to the political he posed to the Rhee's rule. There is much truth in this assessment. Rhee eliminated the emerging political rival by using the latter's apparent political view.

69 Ibid., p. 96.

70 Ibid., pp. 96-97.

71 Sung-joo Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," p. 271.
The tiny radical/nationalist forces that emerged during the Chang regime were crushed after the overthrow of the democratic regime by the military coup in 1961. The military junta demonstrated its anti-leftism by arresting 2,100 "suspected Communist sympathizers" soon after the coup.\textsuperscript{72}

That Korean society itself became anti-Communist seemed to be obvious in the case of the dispatch of Korean combat troops to South Vietnam. In 1965, the U.S. asked Korea to send troops to Vietnam to relieve the U.S. combat burden and to achieve the political effect of solidarity among its allies.\textsuperscript{73} From the perspective of the Korean government, this request was difficult to refuse because of the U.S. protection of the Korean security with the presence of American troops. Furthermore the U.S. offered financial and military assistance to encourage the troop dispatch. The first dispatch of the combat troops was approved in the Assembly in August 1965.\textsuperscript{74} With more economic and military incentives, the Korean government sent 20,000 additional troops to Vietnam in March 1966. Although some opposition assemblymen came out to oppose it, their opposition was more concerned about some aspects of the government policy (such as proper payment for the soldiers) rather than the principle of sending the troops.\textsuperscript{75} Despite a heavy involvement of Korean troops and the casualties, there was no significant protest by social groups including students. As one observer puts it:

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{72}Joungwon. A. Kim, \textit{Divided Korea}, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 53.
\end{flushright}
The public reaction to President Park and his Vietnam policy has been very favorable. For example, the Park regime has gained, not lost, increasing acceptance and support from the public since the inception of the Vietnam policy. . . . The general absence of anti-government demonstrations so characteristic of the Korean politics in the recent past, testify to this observation.76

North-South Relations and Expansion of Anti-Leftism in the South

In the aftermath of the Korean War, North Korea concentrated on rebuilding the war-torn economy with economic assistance from the Soviet Union and China. While concentrating on economic reconstruction, the North Korean emphasis on defense was "moderate" compared to the level of later years. The size of the North's military forces immediately after the War is estimated differently ranging from 257,000 to 410,000. But North Korea did not initially increase the size of its military force. Its military spending, according to official sources, was an average of 5 percent from 1953 to 1961, a quite moderate level compared to the later period.77 The North probably judged that there was no threat of a major invasion by the South and the U.S.78 200,000 Communist Chinese forces stationed after the war provided a certain measure of security for a while. The phased withdrawal of Chinese forces which was completed in October 1958 led to the increase in the North's own military force level by creating the Worker and Peasant Red Guard (Nodong Chokwidae) in 1959. North Korea added

76Ibid., p. 526. See also, David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics, pp. 228-229.


78On this point, See Ibid., pp. 147-148.
to its security measures by concluding defense treaties with both the Soviet Union and China in July 1961.\(^7\)

Rapid buildup of the South Korean armed forces during the war and the strong commitment of the U.S. for South Korean defense including the presence of U.S. combat troops meant that another all-out invasion was not a conceivable option for North Korea unless the South experienced severe internal political stability accompanied by the decisive weakening of the U.S. commitment. Furthermore there was little possibility that the Soviet Union and China, who provided the North with military assistance and vital arms equipment, would support another invasion. Despite the lack of any realistic hope for communizing South Korea, North Korea never seemed to have given up the unification efforts in its own terms. As Koh points out:

For more than three decades North Korea has doggedly pursued the elusive goal of national reunification. . . . All of North Korea's endeavors, both at home and abroad, are linked, ultimately, to that overriding goal -- "liberating" the South Korean people from the twin shackles of "U.S. imperialism" and "fascist repression," reunifying the peninsula and opening a bright new chapter in Korean history.\(^8\)

Occasional proposals by the North for peaceful unification were almost always accompanied by contradictory calls for revolutionary action on the part of the South Korean people.\(^8\) Consequently the North Korean regime

\(^7\)The reason for the signing of these treaties is subject to controversy. According to Koh, It was the North Korean concern of the possible attack by the new South Korea military regime. Another explanation is that due to the Sino-Soviet split, both Soviet Union and China were persuaded to form an alliance with North Korea. See Koh, "Unification Policy," p. 272; and Han, "North Korea's security Policy," p. 147.


\(^8\)Ibid., p. 272.
was always perceived as pursuing communization of the South as an ultimate goal.

Noticeable changes occurred in the North's policy in the early 1960s. The North's emphasis on security increased in December 1962 when the fifth plenum of the Fourth Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) was held. It announced a program of "equal emphasis" on military preparations and economic development, which "might affect to a certain degree the development of the national economy." The North Korean strategy of strengthening its military capability was further expressed in a four point program of military build-up adopted in the plenum: (1) turning the whole army into an army of cadres (2) modernizing its arms and equipment, (3) arming all the people, and (4) turning the entire country into a fortress. The reason why North Korea began to put more emphasis on military development is difficult to identify precisely, but probably it was the concern about the credibility of the Soviet Union and Chinese commitment to the defense of North Korea (due to a variety of factors) that led North Korea to embark on the military buildup and the self-reliant military strategy.

In February 1964 Kim Il Sung announced what appeared to be a revolutionary strategy for unification. Kim stated the nature of the "revolutionary forces" that must be developed on three fronts: first,

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83 For an elaboration of this, see Han, "North Korea's Security Policy," pp. 150-152.

84 For a discussion of this issue, see Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p.101; and Han, "North Korea's Security Strategy," pp. 150-157.

a revolutionary base should be built in the North with strong political, economic, and military capabilities; second, revolutionary forces in the South should be strengthened; and finally, antiimperialist (that is, anti-U.S.) forces throughout the world should be consolidated. Its ultimate aim is to "complete the Korean revolution in all parts of Korea."66

Despite increasing emphasis on the military buildup, it was not until the latter part of the 1960s that North Korea became dangerously aggressive. In his report to the "representatives' conference" of the Korean Workers Party in October 1966, Kim Il-Sung claimed that North Korea faced a sharply increased military threat from the United States and South Korea; announced the decision to extend North Korea's seven-year economic plan (1961-67) for three more years, citing the need to divert resources from economic to defense programs; and urged redoubled efforts to build revolutionary forces both at home and in South Korea.67 Defense spending increased sharply after that. The defense expenditures of the total state budget had been an annual average of 19.8 percent during the period from 1961 to 1966. But it increased to 30.4 percent in 1967 and stayed around that level until 1972.68

North Korean emphasis on defense was accompanied by its aggressive actions against the South and the U.S. This was indicated by the sharp

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66 Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 18


increase in the number of incidents and casualties that occurred in the South due to North Korean provocation (see Table 3).

**TABLE 3. Provocative Actions by North Korea, 1965-1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total of Incidents</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total casualties and captured</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The increase in the number of incidents was accompanied by major provocations by North Korea. In January 1968, there was an attempt to assassinate President Park by a special 31-man North Korean commando group. They were stopped by the South Korean forces just 1 kilometer from the Blue House, the South Korean presidential residence. Three days after this incident, the U.S. Pueblo and its crewmen were seized by North Korea, which claimed that the ship had "intruded into the territorial waters and carrying on hostile activities." In November of that year, about 120 North Korean armed guerrillas infiltrated the Northeast coast. The mop-up operation by the Korean army lasted for months. The shooting down of a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane in April 1969 was another major incident.

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There are many plausible explanations why North Korea was more provocative in the late 1960s. One major reason seems to be Korea's widening military participation in the Vietnam conflict. North Korea might have been fearful about Korea's increasing economic and military strength as a result of the South's military participation in the Vietnam War. It is also possible that North Korea was disturbed by the considerable U.S. military assistance grants for the modernization of the Korean armed forces. However, North Korean behavior became much more moderate after mid-1967.

The militant North Korean action alarmed the South Korean public and government. The South Korean government, infuriated by the repeated provocation by the North, reportedly suggested to the U.S. that "positive strikes against one or several of North Korea's staging bases would be better than coping with future aggression." But this option was rejected by the U.S., because it did not want to risk a second war in Asia. The South Korean government was very dissatisfied with the U.S. reactions to these incidents provoked by North Korea. Particularly Korean government

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91 Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," p. 60. According to one source, "there were indications that the South had inflicted casualties in the North during the short-range retaliatory commando raids in the fall of 1967", although it is unclear to what extent they instigated the North Koreans to consider a more serious raid into South Korea. U.S. House of Representatives, Korean-American Relations, p. 55.

92 In December 1968 and January 1969 a dozen or so high-ranking military officials (among them the Minister of Defense, and head of South Korean Operations) were dismissed. Shinn, "Foreign and Reunification Policies," p. 62.

93 Cho, "North and South Korea," p. 30.
officials were disturbed because the U.S. reaction to the Pueblo incident seemed to be more serious and swift than to the attempted attack on the Korean presidential residence.\textsuperscript{94} Korean government and military leaders felt that Korean national interests were not served well and emphasized the necessity of building a more self-reliant defense posture.

This situation resulted in the perceived need to improve national security by increasing defense capabilities. This led to the creation of a Homeland Reserve Force in April 1968 composed of ex-servicemen and reserve officers.\textsuperscript{95} The national militia totaled some 2 million as of October 1, 1969. Also military training and education was introduced for high school and university male students in 1969. (In 1970, high school female students began to receive education on first aid and nursing).\textsuperscript{96} By the end of the 1960s, then, Korean anti-communism intensified and its militarization extended to society. North Korean provocation drove the South toward more rigid anti-communism rather than helping "revolutionary forces" in the South (if there were any).

I have presented the kind of anti-communism which provided a crucial context for Korean political development, particularly until the recent democratization. The establishment of the anti-leftist state was an


\textsuperscript{95}The Homeland Reserve Force was to be mobilized against the armed Communist guerrillas, in fighting natural calamities and in guarding major industrial facilities. They were organized in communities, government agencies and business enterprises. \textit{Korea Annual}, 1970, p. 94.

\textsuperscript{96}Yeong-su Tscheong, et al., \textit{Han'guk kyovuk chongcheck ui vinyum} [An Examination of Educational Ideals in Major Educational Policies in Korea], vol. 2, p. 66.
outcome of the operation of political and external variables -- a result of the incorporation of Korea in a bipolar international political system after World War II. The experience of the Korean War and the continuing security threat from the North deepened anti-leftism by expanding the military institution and other coercive instruments of the state with an enlarged conception of national security. The "strong state" in Korea went hand in hand with society which was not only weak but conservative as a result of effective elimination of the leftist forces and political demobilization of popular classes. The political structure, which profoundly weakened the political impact of the rapid socioeconomic transformation, and which allowed the emergence of the Yushin system, then is based upon this anti-communism.

As we will see later, despite these constraints, political conflict in Korea has been often volatile. Ironically the very success of the establishment and institutionalization of the anti-leftist political system created a problem for excessive authoritarianism because the absence of the radical threat of internal sources increased democratic demands within the framework of anti-leftism.
CHAPTER III

THE EMERGENCE OF THE YUSHIN SYSTEM

As examined in Chapter 1, various explanations have been offered for the emergence of the Yushin regime. From the comparative perspective, crucial questions are: first, whether there were economic and political crises that were serious enough to generate demands for regime change; second, which groups in the state and society demanded or supported the regime change; and third, what the political structure of the pre-1972 Park regime was. I argue that the imposition of the Yushin regime was not, as many observers of Korean politics believe, a response to the crisis (economic or political) that a significant number of people in society and the state confronted and wanted to resolve by the regime change, but a result of an autonomous decision by Park and a handful of his loyalists to ensure Park's life-time rule. No significant groups in the state and society demanded the regime change.

What made possible and realized the decision for the regime change was the pre-Yushin political structure that was characterized by increasing authoritarian tendencies: The state had already become too strong vis-a-vis society, and political power was highly concentrated in Park. Ignoring these political structural variables, which distinguish the pre-Yushin regime from those regimes prior to "new authoritarianism" in other countries, leads to inadequate analysis. The emergence of the Yushin
system was not a change from democratic to authoritarian regime but either a change within the authoritarian regime (i.e., from semi-authoritarian to a highly authoritarian regime) or a change from semi-democracy to authoritarianism.\(^1\) It was, then, the existing authoritarian political structure that contributed to the emergence of a more pervasive, highly authoritarian regime in Korea.

The Degree of Socioeconomic Disorder

It has been pointed out by many that the emergence of the "new authoritarianism" in the developing countries, particularly in Latin America, was associated with economic crises. Whether one accepts O'Donnell's B-A model or not, there seems to be a general consensus among observers of Latin American politics on the existence of varying degrees of significant socioeconomic disorder and political crises before the emergence of the new authoritarianism.\(^2\) Faced with these crises, at least

\(^1\)Neither could some other countries (e.g., Brazil) before the emergence of the B-A regime be considered institutionalized democracy. For example, the pre-1964 Brazilian regime was at best "quasi-democratic system." See Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil." p. 110. The term semi-authoritarianism and semi-democracy is not distinguished here in theoretically meaningful ways and will be used interchangeably. Recently Larry Diamond and others classify semidemocratic "those countries where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised that electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; and/or where civil and political liberties are unable to organize and express themselves." Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, p. xvii.

\(^2\)Before the emergence of the harsh authoritarian regimes in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay in the 1970s, "in one form or another, the bourgeoisie seemed (and believed to itself) to be facing a situation in which it soon would no longer exist as a class. O'Donnell, "Reply to Renmer and Merkx," p. 43. Pre-1964 Brazil, although it faced a much lower "threat level" than the above three countries, is still qualitatively
initially there seemed to be significant support among those both in the state and society for regime change. In the case of Korea, whatever socioeconomic and political problems existed in the pre-1972 period, there was neither the economic crisis nor political polarization.

One note is needed here. Observers agree that there was not a serious socioeconomic disorder for the several months before the imposition of the Yushin regime. The controversies are on the extent to which various events in 1971 contributed to the emergence of the new regime. Many people argue that the declaration of national emergency in December 1971 was a reaction to the various serious events that challenged political stability or capitalist industrialization, and that it was these events that led to the regime change. Thus the discussion here will first look at the degree of socioeconomic disorder and political polarization in 1971. After that I will challenge the assumption that the decision for the regime change was made after the various events occurred in 1971.

The labor-intensive, export-led industrialization pursued by the Park regime since the early 1960s produced one of the most rapid economic growth rates in the world and a steady rise in the living standard of virtually all social groups. The average annual growth rate in real GNP for the First Five Year Plan period (1962-1966) was 7.8 percent; and the rate for the Second Five-Year Plan period (1967-1971) was 10.5 percent. Per capita real income rose from 87 dollars in 1962 to 293 dollars in different from Korean situation. For a discussion of the Brazilian case, see Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership."

3See for example Alfred Stepan, "State Power."

4Economic Planning Board (EPB), Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977, p. 3.
1972. The rapid economic growth in Korea accompanied a decline in the number of people in absolute poverty and the maintenance of a relatively equal income distribution. It was estimated that the "absolute poverty class" was reduced from 40.9 percent of the whole population in 1965 to 23.4 percent in 1970. The unemployment rate dropped from 8.3 percent in 1963 to 4.5 percent in 1971. During this period, Korea was transformed from one of the world's poorest countries that seemed to offer little hope for economic progress to one of the most successful developing countries that achieved a rapid economic growth with a relatively low level of economic inequality. Consequently, Korea was now beginning to be regarded by many as an economic model for other developing countries. This general characteristic of Korean economic performance sharply distinguished it from those of other countries that turned into more authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s.

Within the context of good economic performance, however, the Korean economy had a dark side with certain sectors in society -- farmers, urban poor, and workers -- receiving less benefits from economic growth. The absolute gap in incomes between urban and rural areas was widening until

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5Ibid., p. 3.

6Doshio Nishimura, Taeman daehanguk kyeongje biyo [Taiwan and Korea: Comparison of Economy], p. 136.

7The poverty of Korea in the early period was indicated by the annual "spring hunger," when considerable numbers of rural Koreans ate grass and tree bark for want of grain. This did not end until the mid-1960s. Donald S. Macdonald, The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society, p. 121.

8See for example David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics.
1970, despite a massive migration to the cities.\(^9\) This was largely a result of the government policy of purchasing domestic grain from the farmers at lower prices to provide inexpensive staples to the urban population including industrial workers, who were in turn paid low to increase the international competitiveness of Korean products. Recognizing the disparity between agricultural and urban incomes as an economic and a potentially serious political problem, beginning in the late 1960s the government made efforts to increase rural incomes by raising price supports for rice and barley. As a result, the rural economy began to see some improvement although it still lagged behind the urban economy.

Despite the rural-urban gap, the rural area remained politically most passive with virtually no significant protest. Land reform (discussed in Chapter 2) and the absence of autonomous organizations that could mobilize the farmers were central to the farmers' political obedience and their absence of economic demands. Also, in absolute terms the living standard of all rural groups has improved, particularly since 1967.\(^{10}\)

The migration of the rural population into cities, which the widening rural-urban gap accelerated, created problems in the cities, particularly in Seoul. The national capital city received an annual influx of 350,000 people in the late 1960s.\(^{11}\) Many of these migrants were from the rural area looking for jobs. Without adequate skills for high-income jobs, they generally occupied urban low class living in illegal housing.

\(^9\)Parvez Hasan, Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy, p. 22.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 54.

In 1970, for example, about one-third of the households in Seoul, 350,000, lived in unlicensed houses in and around the city limits. Despite their poor economic situation, there was little effort on the part of the urban poor to organize themselves to make economic demands. Lacking any independent organization that could have mobilized them, the urban poor were politically passive and conservative. Except when the government initiated "aggression" by attempting to forcefully remove the illegal housings, there was virtually no protest by the urban poor. The survey research of 420 urban poor done by Hong-koo Lee at the end of 1970 supports the general observation that the urban poor were neither anti-social nor politically discontented. Only 18 percent of the respondents said society is to blame for poverty, while "a surprisingly high percentage of the respondents" attributed the poverty to the lack of hard work by each individual. On the prospect of their living standards in five years, 65 percent said, "will be better," 27 percent said, "will be as good as now," and only 5 percent said, "will be worse off."

The major riots by the urban poor in Kwangju, a newly developed satellite city near Seoul, in August 1971 were caused more by gross policy mistakes of the government than by economic structural problems. It did not indicate basic changes in the political attitudes of the urban poor. To reduce the number of illegal houses in Seoul, the government relocated about 100,000 urban poor to the area. Lured by the temporary construction

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12 Ibid., pp. 16-17. The physical conditions of these illegal housings varied, however, some of them looking like a normal house.

13 Ibid., p. 23. Lee does not provide the exact percentage.

14 Ibid., p. 18.
boom and the prospects for development, about 50,000 additional people were moved into the area. The government raised the residents' expectations during the presidential and Assembly election campaigns by the various commitments for development projects and tax exemption. Few industrial facilities moved to the area, however. And after the initial construction boom, there were few jobs available, thus exposing the migrants to worse economic hardship through massive unemployment and hunger.  

Without realizing the serious situation, the local government aggravated the situation further by imposing taxes (within the strictly limited period) and asked those who bought the houses from the original migrants to pay the price of the house at one time. The residents' demands to mitigate their problems were not met by the Seoul city administration. Only after a six-hour riot, which resulted in the injuries of 100 policemen and demonstrators and the prosecution of 23 rioters, the government acted swiftly to alleviate their problems. This was the first major riot by the urban poor since the end of the Korean War. In no sense did it show changes in political attitude and behavior of the urban poor. Rather, the riots by the residents were a sudden explosion in an extreme hardship that was created by the inadequate policy planning and execution. Once their demands were met they returned to political passivity.

\footnote{For many, if not, most residents, their economic situation worsened because many of them had had at least some jobs in Seoul. One observer noted that poverty in the area was "beyond imagination." For example, "not a few people barely could have one meal a day." See Kyung-jae Lee, *Yushin kudaeta* [Yushin Coup d'Etat], p. 96.}

\footnote{Jae-hyun Choi, "Kwangju danji sagun" [Kwangju Development Complex Incident], p. 195.}
While industrialization accompanied the increase in the number of workers, the interests of the workers were not satisfactorily accommodated. Particularly in labor intensive, small and medium industries, there existed a serious problem of bad working conditions and low wages. Nothing exposed the serious labor problems more dramatically than the so-called Chun Tae-il Incidents. In November 1970, Chun Tae-il, a worker at one of the small clothing factories in Seoul, burned himself to death as a protest. The protest suicide of Chun was a result of the extremely harsh conditions of the workers at the Pyongwha [Peace] Market. In this area where 26,000 workers were employed for 400 clothes manufacturing factories, the workers not only received low wages but worked for 13-16 hours a day, 28 days a month (336-372 hours a month), in a terribly crowded and unhealthy area.\textsuperscript{17} As a result most workers there suffered from various health problems. Chun made petitions to many concerned authorities to alleviate the problems, but his demands were ignored.\textsuperscript{18}

Chun was probably ahead of most other workers in his consciousness of labor problems. But he showed the limits of this consciousness in a very conservative society and political system. He reportedly shouted before his death such slogans as "Preserve the Labor Standard Law", "We are not machines", and "Allow us to take a rest on Sunday". These were

\textsuperscript{17} Probably the working conditions and wage level in this area were among the worst of the industries in Korea.

\textsuperscript{18} Han'guk kidoggyo gyohoe hyupui-hoe [National Council of Churches in Korea] (hereafter cited as NCCK), Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun [Workplace and Testimony], pp. 73-76.
hardly radical demands. For most workers, they were lacking in their knowledge of the workers' rights.

The conservative attitudes of the workers are well shown in a survey conducted by Nack-jung Kim.\(^2\) Although an overwhelming majority of the workers were dissatisfied with their low wages,\(^3\) their view of the political system and society was essentially positive. To the question "Do you think anybody can achieve success in Korea if he or she works hard, spends less and saves money?" 61.1 percent provided positive answers while 37.8 percent answered negatively (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>really possible</th>
<th>possible</th>
<th>a little difficult</th>
<th>impossible</th>
<th>No answer/ Don't know</th>
<th>Total (N)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
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More significant than this positive view of society was workers' attitude toward the government. When they were asked "For whom do you think our current government is working?," 71.4 percent provided a positive evaluation and only 25.7 percent answered with cynicism (see Table 5). The workers were also highly conscious about the security threat from the North. To the question "Do you think that War will break out by the

\(^2\) For an analysis of a part of this survey data, see also Se-jin Kim, "Attitudinal Orientation of Korean Workers."

\(^3\) The dissatisfaction with their wages or salary was the same with other occupational groups including reporters.
Communist aggression in ten years?", 70.1 percent of the respondents saw some possibility of war with the North in 10 years (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5. Workers' Attitudes toward Government (in percentages)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For the people as a whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the masses of workers and farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only for capitalist and business owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only for Jipkwoncheung³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³The term Jipkwoncheung [ruling sector] is very popularly used in Korea, and has purely political meaning. It includes, at its core, high-ranking government officials and ruling party assemblymen.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6. Workers' View on the Possibility of War with North Korea (in percentages)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7,045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Political conservatism and weakness of the workers, despite the increase in the number of the workers, was in part due to government control of labor activities. The regime made a legal provision that allowed only one labor union on national and local levels. Union
leadership on the national level was controlled by the regime lest any independent or radical leadership emerge. Also political activities of the labor unions were legally and practically prohibited. The success of this governmental control of labor should be viewed within the context of the anti-communism in the state and society discussed in the previous chapter. Because of the existence of the national security problem which was shared by labor, workers (including labor union leadership) were restrained from engaging in any activities that could be regarded as radical. Also the workers were socialized in the anti-leftist system without any chance to receive radical ideological influence. Consequently, although there were labor disputes including strikes for higher wages and better working conditions, the labor protests were purely economic-oriented and conservative in nature, isolated from other social and political groups, small in scale, and generally non-violent.

Since it was thought by the government essential to maintain labor control for rapid economic development, the government always took precautionary measures to prevent labor mobilization without demand to do so far the upper and the upper-middle class. Thus in January 1970, a special labor law was enacted which prohibited labor union organizing, collective bargaining, and strikes by workers in companies in which there was foreign investment. This was less a reaction to the labor mobilization than a measure to attract more foreign investment by providing stable labor force.

Labor disputes increased in 1971, but most of them were resolved before developing into open protests. When they developed into protests,
they did not create any atmosphere of crisis. In fact, when the national emergency was declared in December 1971, not a single word was expressed by Park about the labor protests as a reason for the measure. Labor protest was not a major concern in society and thus could not be used as a rationale for the measure.

Two labor incidents that drew national attention in 1971 were not typical cases of workers' protest. One was the riots by the former workers of a Korean company in Vietnam. This incident was caused by the workers' judgement that they were paid much lower than they expected as a result of the deceptive contract made by the company. They stormed the company in downtown Seoul, and violently protested setting fire and damaging properties inside the company building. Second was a series of strikes by the Interns and Residents at the National Medical Center and major university hospitals. These strikes caused a great inconvenience for patients. Other labor disputes did not attract public attention because they did not create political disturbances nor hurt the economy in any significant sense. The GNP made a real increase of 10.2 per cent over the previous year.

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21 The report on the major events in Korea Annual include virtually no disturbances by the industrial workers. This correctly reflects relative unimportance of the labor disputes as a public issue during this period. See Korea Annual, 1972, pp. 21-43. During the one-year period ending August 31, 1971, there were 236 labor disputes reported, 71 more than same period a year before. Of the 236 disputes reported, 23 developed into strikes with 2,450 persons participating in and 77 to sit-ins and demonstrations joined by 2,286 unionists. By the number of disputes those involving the National Textile Workers Union topped with 121. Ibid., 1972, p. 211. The total labor disputes reported during the one year period ending August 1972 numbered 236. Ibid., 1973, p. 211. These reports do not include labor disputes by nonunionized workers.

22 Ibid., 1972, p. 120.
It should be pointed out, however, the Special Measures Law on National Security of 1971, which was proclaimed shortly after the declaration of the national emergency, included, among others, the provisions on the restriction of the workers' rights of collective bargaining and collective action by requiring any labor dispute to be referred to the government's Office of Labor for mediation. The imposition of more restrictive labor legislative measures indicated that the government felt they needed to maintain the control of labor, but the fact remains that the labor issue was not a central issue in Korean political development during this period. There was little protest against the government measures other than the petition by the pro-government Federation of Korean Labor Union (FKLU) for the revocation of the law.

Thus far I have argued that while there existed economic problems involving the popular sector, these popular classes did not create any significant political challenge to the regime. These and other economic problems, however, provided important issues which active elements of the political opposition used to attack the regime. The government was criticized on the ground that too many favors were given big business through various preferential allocations of financial resources. Many

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23Ibid., 1972, p. 362.

24A formal chief of the Army Security Command stated flatly that "labor issue was not a major concern" during this period. Interview with Kang Chang Sung in May 1990.

25Big business in Korea, despite their role in rapid economic development, never received support from the attentive public. They generally felt that the growth of big business was not by their own efforts but largely due to the disproportionate government support for them. As early as December 1965, Sung-Chick Hong found in his survey of
people also felt that the government put overemphasis on economic growth at the expense of equality. Other issues such as slow rural development, regional imbalance, foreign debts, and Japanese economic influence were pointed out by the opposition. These criticisms were expressed in strongly-worded terms by a minority of outspoken opposition, but a significant proportion of the public also shared the sentiments on some of these issues.

The identification of problems in economic development did not produce extreme political polarization, however, because the difference was based on the degree of emphasis between growth, equality, and stability rather than on fundamentals. At the fundamental level, there was a broad consensus in society as well as state on capitalist industrialization based upon export. There was no significant group that called for radical socioeconomic change or that threatened the existing socioeconomic order. This is one of the most important characteristics that distinguished Korea from many other developing countries.

Ironically, it is in part the lack of this threat and the weakness of the popular sector that contributed to the criticism of the conservative opposition to the regime's economic policy. For an overwhelming majority of the attentive public, their opposition sentiments were not strong. Some opposition to government economic policy was a

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1,515 journalists and university professors that 51 percent mentioned chaebol (essentially meaning a big business conglomerate owned by a family) and big business as receiving the greatest benefit from "modernization process" in Korea. This was followed by the urban people (14.1 percent), "ruling sector" (12.8 percent), upper class (12.1 percent). Militarymen received only 2.4 percent. Sung-Chick Hong, Jishik-in ui gachi-kwan von'gu [A Study of the Value Orientation of the Intellectuals], p. 168.
spillover from political issues. This is probably the case for the majority of the opposition politicians and intellectuals. The regime was not popular among politicians and intellectuals because of its authoritarian methods of rule. The opposition politicians also wanted to increase their popularity through the criticism of the negative aspects of the economy. Thus they took a more critical stance on the economic issues than they really believed.

The important points are that there was no crisis atmosphere in society and that society was dominated by the anti-leftist conservative forces. Ironically, it is much more likely that a good economic performance by the Park regime rather than the economic problems contributed to the emergence of the Yushin system to the extent that it was Park and a handful of his loyalists who decided the regime change and they were very proud of the regime's economic achievement. Park's positive evaluation of his economic achievement and confidence for future economic prospect is well indicated in a speech in March 1971:

How many nations on the face of this globe have joined the race so late and yet achieved growth so fast, establishing themselves as models in the face of severe competitive struggle for survival? . . . Growth of our national power points to the promise that these tasks can be completed. It also indicates that we are now at that stage of development in which "equalization of prosperity" is a distinct possibility.18

His positive assessment of economic development did not change after the regime change. In the presidential inaugural address in December 1972, Park pointed to the economic development that Korea had achieved and said

18 Chung Hee Park, Toward Peaceful Unification, p. 30.
"the experience has given us courage and self-confidence." He went on to say that "We have revealed our nation's great potential, our undaunted spirit, and our unlimited capability to create new history."27

Among various social groups, it was students who constituted the biggest challenge to the government in 1971. The campus disturbance started in spring 1971 after the government decided to intensify "military education" by requiring all male college students to receive a total of 711 hours of military training (representing 20 percent of all required coursework) before graduation. The government also assigned active military officers to the university campuses as instructors.28 Students resorted to rallies and demonstrations to oppose the measures. The protesting students argued that the intensification of the military education, by militarizing the university, was an attempt to achieve the "security of the regime" rather than the national security.29 Student protests also included such issues as government's surveillance of student activities and the visit of the Japanese prime minister to Korea.

Faced with strong resistance from the students, the government retreated and reduced the required hours of military training from 711 to

27Korea Annual, 1973, p. 374. For more about Park's positive evaluation of the Korean economy during this period, see Major Speeches by President Park. Jang Jip Choi points out, "the new political system . . . was not the result of an economic crisis, but the 'prize' for the regime's economic performance." See his "Interest Conflict and Political Control in South Korea," p. 313. The problem was he took the prize for himself.


29Gon Ho Song, "Bundan, minjok sahoe, haksaeng undong" [Division, National Society, and Student Movement], p. 164.
180, essentially returning to the previous level of military education.\(^\text{30}\)

However, this did not stop the student protests. The student protest movement, as the issue of election fraud was added after the presidential and Assembly elections, was intensified toward the end of June. When the fall semester started in September, the students renewed their rallies and demonstrations, some demanding total abolition of the forced training and criticizing corruption in the government.\(^\text{31}\) From March to November of 1971, there were 300 student demonstrations involving 65,000 students. Except for the summer vacation, protests occurred almost every day at 5-6 campuses.\(^\text{32}\)

Although student protests did not create a massive turmoil, their persistent occurrence, despite several warnings by the government and disciplinary actions taken by the university administration, became a serious problem for the regime. In October, the government imposed a garrison decree in Seoul and troops occupied 10 major universities in the city.\(^\text{33}\) 1,900 students were arrested, of which all but 92 were released soon. 185 student activists were expelled from 23 schools across the country, and some were forcefully inducted into the army. More than 6,000 students who had refused to take military training were given varying degrees of punishment. In a further attempt to eliminate the sources of

\(^\text{30}\)Han, "Student Activism," p. 153.

\(^\text{31}\)Korea Annual, 1972, pp. 37-38.


\(^\text{33}\)Under a garrison decree, the military is mobilized to restore order, but unlike martial law, the military does not establish a military administration or courts for more extensive control over the civilian sector.
future student disturbances, the government weakened severely the autonomous student organizations at the universities. Seventy-four student "clubs" were dissolved and 13 campus newspapers suspended. After this measure, student protests ended. The government lifted the garrison decree in early November. By the time the Yushin regime was imposed Korea did not see student protests for almost a year.

The main issue for student protests was political although various socioeconomic issues were also touched on by the students. Park's third-term presidency was opposed by the students as a violation of democratic rules for the maintenance of one man's political power. General unpopularity of and mistrust in the authoritarian political leadership led students to believe that the intensification of the military training on campus was an attempt for political control of students. Because the student protests were basically political, and because they reflected the critical view of many members of attentive public, they were supported by many conservative intellectuals, journalists and opposition politicians. For a minority of student activists, socioeconomic problems occupied central issues for them. However, the radical sounding slogans by these student activists were generally regarded as an indication of idealism of young intellectuals, which do not have any deep ideological roots. Although Sung-joo Han notes the relatively "radical" nature of the 1971 student protests, he rightly points out that with the possible exception of "a minute minority of the activists . . . the significant majority

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34 Korea Annual, 1973, p. 311.
which constitutes the mainstay of student activism could not support a major revolution."35

The biggest social challenge to the regime then came essentially from students, and the major issue was on political authoritarianism rather than economic problems. The incipient emergence of the criticism of socioeconomic structure, particularly by a small number of active oppositionists was not strong enough to create any atmosphere of serious socioeconomic disorder and political crisis in both the state and society. Furthermore, and most importantly, when the Yushin regime was imposed, the events that disturbed Park's regime disappeared for at least several months. And even the proclaimed rationale for the regime change did not include socioeconomic issues or existing political disorder as a reason for the imposition of the Yushin regime. There were two publically claimed reasons for the regime change: national security and unification. Let's turn to these issues.

National Security

According to the government announcement, one of the reasons for the regime change was the "harsh challenges of rapidly changing international relations." This basically refers to the U.S.-China rapprochement since April 1971 and the normalization of the relationship between the U.S. and China after the visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China in February 1972.36 The regime claimed that the improvement in the U.S.-

35Han, "Student Activism," p. 157.

36President Park's new year press conference, January 12, 1973. Quoted in C. I. Eugene Kim, "Emergency," p. 369. The government also included the normalization of relations between Japan and China; the rupture of
China relationship created new security problems: "We must guard ourselves against the possibility that the interests of third or smaller countries might be sacrificed for the relaxation of tension between big powers."  

The dramatic changes in the relationship of the two superpowers, that have a great influence on the two Koreas, was certainly a major environmental change for Korea. But did this create a national security problem so serious as to warrant regime change?

We have noted that the issue of national security became more critical in the late 1960s when North Korea pursued highly aggressive actions against Korea. While North Korea became less belligerent after 1969, there emerged new issues. In July 1969, President Nixon announced his Guam doctrine, which stated that in future conflicts, Asian countries would be expected to rely more on their own military capabilities to resist Communist aggression, although the United States would honor treaty commitments and provide assistance in the form of military material. The withdrawal of the 20,000 American troops, completed by June 1971, was viewed as an application of the Nixon Doctrine. Although the U.S. pledged to provide $1.5 billion in military aid to South Korea's Force Modernization Plan (1971-1975), there was concern among government officials about the prospect for eventual withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Korea. This would increase security threat as it could be interpreted by North Korea as a weakening of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea. The normalization of the relationship between the U.S. and China diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan; and the approaching peace in Vietnam. But these issues were less emphasized.

also led to a temporary suspicion among Korean leaders whether any "deal" would be made by the superpowers on Korean issues. These concerns among state officials did not create any crisis atmosphere among the public.

On December 6, 1971, Park suddenly declared a state of national emergency. He claimed that Korea was "faced with a critical situation in terms of its national security," because of the "drastic changes taking place in international scene including the recent admission to the United Nations of Communist China and the implications of the fanatic war preparations being carried out by the Communist regime in North Korea." Park said that North Korea "has nearly completed the preparation for invasion." While claiming an increased security threat from the North, he launched an attack on the political opposition:

Despite the various serious threat from outside . . . there are controversies even in such matters as Homeland Reserve Force and military training in university. Furthermore, . . . [the opposition Party] deludes people . . . with irresponsible conception of national security for the sake of party interests and strategy and electoral strategy. Also, . . . some intellectuals disturb the people's minds with irresponsible conception of national security. . . . I cannot but recall the eve of the Korean War.40

The regime provided a six-point guideline to "strengthen national security."41 On December 21, the government introduced the Special

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38 Korea Annual, 1972, p. 21

39 New York Times, December 7, 1971, p. 4


41 They were: 1. The government will give top priority to national security in its policies in order to consolidate its security posture within the shortest time possible. 2. No form of social disturbance detrimental to the national security shall be tolerated and factors
Measures Law on National Security. The bill was designed to vest the president with extensive emergency powers. It included the power to curb press freedom, restrict outdoor meetings, demonstrations or labor disputes, freeze wages and prices, and to forcibly mobilize the human and material resources.\(^ {42} \)

The government's claimed view of the national security crisis was not shared by many observers. The public was surprised by the sudden declaration of national emergency.\(^ {43} \) The New Democratic Party and other political opposition came out to oppose it by arguing that it is simply a measure to repress political opposition. The U.S. State Department said that it did not agree with Park's evaluation of the danger posed by the North Korean threat.\(^ {44} \)

Opposition assemblymen resorted to physical resistance on the house floor to block the passage of the Special Measures Law, but the ruling party legislators passed the bill in a predawn house session on December 27 in the total absence of the opposition members. After this, the National Assembly did not open despite the repeated demands by the opposition party to open it to debate the controversial national security

__condusive to social unrest shall be rectified. 3. The press shall refrain from any irresponsible comments on national security. 4. Every citizen shall render sincere, voluntary cooperation in carrying out his responsibility and obligation for national security. 5. Every citizen shall be required to establish a new concept of value placing highest priority on national security. 6. The people should be prepared to waive some of the freedoms they enjoy in the interests of national security under the worst circumstances. See Korean Annual, 1972, p. 21.__

\(^ {42} \text{Ibid., p. 22.} \)

\(^ {43} \text{Ibid., p. 22.} \)

\(^ {44} \text{New York Times, December 7, 1971, p. 4} \)
bil. Opposition politicians even took to the streets in June to demand the abolition of the state of national emergency and demanded to open the Assembly. The Assembly finally opened in June 3, 1972, one day before the announcement of the South-North Korean joint statements, which will be discussed later.

In fact, there was no sign of increased hostilities on the part of the North. On the contrary, the incidents between South and North Korea, that had soared in 1967 and 1968, declined sharply after 1969. In addition to the decreased hostilities against the South, North Korea announced its reduction of the military expenditures for the 1971-76 period in September 1971. Furthermore since 1971, the South and the North had been engaging in the first cooperative meetings between their Red Cross organizations.

Thus the declaration of the national emergency and the promulgation of the Special Measures Law does not seem to be a reaction to any objective sign of increased possibility of North Korean attack. The reasons why Park took these measures are more difficult to identify, because these measures, like the imposition of the Yushin regime, were decided essentially by Park and a few individuals surrounding him.

It is clear, however, that the measures were designed to increase domestic political control. It is possible that a combination of various factors such as the increased social challenges to the regime, the North-South contact, and the changes in the U.S.-China relationship were

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45 See Table 3 (p. 75) in Chapter 2.

46 Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kim, "North Korea and the Major Powers," p. 36.
perceived by Park as presenting a potentially serious political disorder. Another possibility was that Park felt that the strengthening of domestic control was needed to maintain political order that would facilitate the regime change. Whatever the causes of the declaration of the national emergency, the national security issue became less serious by October 1972. North Korean military expenditures declined sharply in 1972 in absolute amounts and as a proportion of both the national budget and the GNP. From a high of over 30 percent of budget expenditures during the 1961-71 period, military spending reportedly fell to 17 percent in 1972. By this time it was also fairly clear that the U.S. and China would not "make a deal" on the Korean issue. A direct North Korean threat disappeared even in the publically stated rationale for regime change. Rather the argument was that since the North Korean regime has a complete hold over its people, South Korea also should be united to pursue the North-South dialogue for national unification.

North-South Dialogue for National Unification

If there were any new development of significance, it was the North-South dialogue that seemed to open a new horizon for national unification.

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47 In an interview with this writer, a former high-ranking military officer who dealt with sensitive information, said that there was no increased military threat from the North and the measures taken by Park essentially resulted from the legitimacy problem. He, however, did not want to elaborate on this point. Interview in May 1990. Another high-ranking government official in charge of intelligence matters also suggested that the international situation and North Korea at the time did not pose increased threat to warrant the measures Park took. See Kyung-jae Lee, Yushin kudaeta, p. 172.

The initiation of contact between North and South Korea after 1971 was a direct result of the environmental change involving the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship.

Preliminary meetings between the South and North Korean Red Crosses had been held since September 1971 to discuss the issue of the separated families. In early May 1972, Lee Hu Rak, director of the KCIA, secretly visited North Korea and met with Kim Il Sung. Later that month, North Korean Vice-Premier Park Sung Chol made a secretive visit to Seoul, and met President Park. On July 4, 1972, the South-North Joint Communiqué was suddenly announced by the KCIA Director Lee producing a sensational response from the public. The communiqué implied a radical departure from the previous North-South relationship. According to it, efforts would be made to seek a peaceful, independent unification of Korea "without being subject to external imposition and interference" and to fulfill national unity by transcending "differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems." Both sides agreed not to undertake armed provocations. They also agreed to cease propaganda broadcasts and slanderous reports against each other. Moreover, they installed a direct "hot line" connecting Seoul and Pyongyang. Various cooperative exchange programs would be also promoted. The North-South Coordinating Committee co-chaired by Lee Hu Rak and Kim Young-ju would take charge of implementation of these matters.

For South Koreans who had lived under the rigid anti-communism and the constant threat of a North Korean invasion, this was a truly shocking

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49 For the full text of the Joint Communiqué, See Korea Annual, 1973, pp. 377-378.

event. The majority of the public welcomed it, although a small number of leading opposition figures suspected the political motivation behind the July 4th statement. As one reporter observes, "It was an enormous surprise that gave the feeling that 'even this kind of thing could happen in our lifetime.' The people felt as if the separated nations had become one because of the fact that the [KCIA] chief visited Pyongyang and the North Korean vice-premier visited Seoul. Everybody was in the illusion that the unification would come soon."\(^5\) For many who had family members in the North, the chance of meeting them seemed to have increased.

North-South talks continued after the joint announcement. The first South-North Red Cross general meeting was held in Pyongyang in August 1972, and the second meeting was held in Seoul in September 1972. Then on October 12, 1972, the first Cochairmen's meeting of the South-North Coordinating committee was held in Panmunjom. As the news media captured these events, the public expectation for unification increased. It was in this context that the Yushin system was declared.\(^5\)

Park said that the present Constitution and political structure of the nation were "fixed in the Cold-War era" and therefore were not suitable for improvement of relations with North Korea. A purpose of the regime change was "to emphasize unity in order to have a dialogue with the North" because South Korea "cannot afford to risk political unity when North Koreans have complete control over everything their people say and

\(^5\)Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae [The Park Chung Hee Era], vol. 1, pp. 299-300.

\(^5\)North Korea by revising their Constitution in December 1972 also strengthened the power of Kim Il Sung. This produced later a speculation among the attentive public that both North and South Korean leaders used the dialogue to strengthen their own power.
do."\(^5\) While the North-South contact and the announcement of the July 4th joint statement were the most significant political development before the imposition of the Yushin regime, the change in the North-South relationship did not create a demand for the regime change, but was used by Park to impose the new authoritarian regime.

There was no serious socioeconomic disorder to justify the declaration of martial law. Indeed the political situation for several months before the imposition of the Yushin regime was very quiet due to the declaration of the national emergency at the end of 1971. The martial law was then essentially designed to prevent any challenge from the political opposition and even within the ruling group against the regime change. In fact the regime was rather frank to some extent when it justified the martial law not by the existing political disorder but by the need "to prevent in advance any disturbances or confusion which may arise in the course of carrying out the structural reform necessary for overcoming the historical trials the Republic of Korea now faces and for achieving the peaceful unification of the fatherland."\(^5\) The emphasis on the unification issue was clear when Park said that if the constitutional amendments were not approved in the national referendum, "I will take it as an expression of the will of our people against the South-North dialogue."\(^5\)


In his declaration of the extraordinary measures on October 17, the only target for his attack was on political parties and representative institutions. Internal socioeconomic problems were not even touched in his statements precisely because there was no internal socioeconomic disorder that could justify the regime change. Park says:

Disorder and inefficiency are still rampant around us. The political circles in our country are obsessed with factional strife and discord. Moreover, even the supreme national tasks as [South-North dialogue for unification] are apt to be utilized as targets of political attacks. . . . What could we really expect from these political parties and from the representative institution? Could they be entrusted with the national task of peaceful unification? Would they back up the south-north dialogue sincerely and positively?

It is made quite clear that the extraordinary measures as above are fundamentally designed to reform the political structure. Accordingly, there will be neither hindrances nor changes in the daily lives and activities of the people.

And as we will see in Chapter 5, the first severe coercion was solely directed to some opposition party assemblymen who were considered excessively critical about the regime. No other major arrests were made.

Leadership's Commitment to the Authoritarian Rule

The unification and security issues were essentially used by Park and his loyalists to justify the imposition of the Yushin regime. The real motivation for the regime change was to prolong Park's rule for his lifetime. Without his desire to remain in power indefinitely it is highly unlikely that he would have changed the regime the way he did. A crucial

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57 Ibid., p. 372.
aspect of the Yushin system is that it provided for Park's indefinite rule with extreme concentration of power in him. Unless Park decided to step down voluntarily, it prohibited power transfer not only to the opposition but within the ruling group.

Park initially came to power by the military coup in 1961, which overthrew the democratic regime. Because of the significant domestic opposition and heavy U.S. pressure, a formal democratic system was restored in 1963. The new constitution, which adopted a presidential system based upon direct popular election of the president, contained a limitation of two four-year terms for the tenure of the presidency. Park was elected in the 1963 and 1967 elections that were conducted competitively and with a certain degree of freedom and fairness.

In 1967, however, Park already appeared to have decided to continue his rule at least one more term after his second term. Thus significant election irregularities were committed by the ruling group in the 1967 National Assembly elections, and as a result, the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) attained the two-thirds majority in the Assembly, which was necessary for the constitutional revision. The constitutional amendments, which extended the tenure of the president to three terms, were passed in the Assembly in 1969.

Park was once again elected president in 1971, but since the constitution allowed only three terms, he would have to step down in 1975 unless he could find other measures to continue his rule. However, no formal constitutional means were available. In the 1971 National Assembly

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58. Korean political development in the pre-1972 period will be further examined in Chapter 4.
elections, the ruling DRP, by capturing 113 seats as opposed to 89 seats for the opposition NDP, received less than the two-thirds of the Assembly seats. Furthermore there were two main competing groups within the DRP hoping to seize government power after Park's third term. Immediately after the election, then, it became rather clear that Park's opportunity to change the constitution again for the maintenance of his rule had become remote. It was the exhaustion of options to maintain his power through a formal democratic process that led Park to decide on the imposition of the Yushin regime.

One can only speculate why Park changed the regime in 1972, not in 1973 or 1974. He possibly thought that if the new authoritarian regime was imposed by the end of his rule, the motivation would be clearer to the public and would confront stronger opposition. He also might have wanted not to give time for those within the ruling party who wanted to be Park's successor to consolidate their position. Furthermore, the North-South dialogue and the changing international situation were available as the issues that provided Park with the justification for the regime change.

Underlying Park's decision on regime change was not only his "will to power" but also his belief in the undesirability of democratic institutions in Korea. He was the man who led the 1961 military "revolution" against the democratically elected government and imposed the two-year military government. Besides the most fundamental motivation to seize state power, he wanted to achieve "national resurrection" (Minjok Joongheung), by building a rich and strong nation with autonomy. Rapid economic development was thought absolutely necessary for this goal. The need for rapid economic development was also obvious to him to overcome
the North Korean threat and achieve national unification. Like almost all the state officials, Park had a total mistrust of North Korea. According to him, the efforts for peaceful negotiation with the North would be futile, and the unification could be achieved only after the strength of the South far outweighed that of the North. In the New Year press conference in January 1970, Park stated:

In all fields of endeavor, political, economic, diplomatic, social and cultural, our achievements must be overwhelmingly superior to those of the North Korean Communists. We will then be in a position of superiority in strength vis-a-vis North Korea. . . . we will have in our firm grasp the necessary initiative in vital matters related to the task of national unification. 55

In Park's view, political conflict and other waste should be avoided to achieve rapid economic development. It is the futile political conflict and other undesirable behavioral patterns that made Korea underdeveloped. For this reason, he had little respect for the political history of contemporary Korea. As he puts it: "Our history of the past five millennia was interspersed with moments of glory and shame; but our record of recent centuries was a steady continuation of tragic sufferings and misfortunes." 60 The 1961 coup was made not just to overthrow the unstable democratic regime and restore order but to change the course of Korean history in a revolutionary way. He stated in 1963:

55 Chung Hee Park, Toward Peaceful Unification, pp. 15-16. This view is repeated in many of Park's statements. For example, in a interview with Mainichi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, in November 1975, Park answered to the question "What are your plans for reducing tensions in the Korean peninsula?", "Only our superiority in strength will convince the North Korean Communists that they should join us in a dialogue. Without it, no policy for reduction of tension can become effective. Ibid., p. 171.

The May Revolution was not a simple change of political system; not the reorganization of the external order, nor the emergence of a new class. The ultimate objective of our revolution is to eliminate the unfortunate legacies from our ancestors of mutual hatred and factionalism, waste, confusion, indolence, and dishonesty and to put an end to this contaminated national history, in order to construct the independent, prosperous Fatherland of tomorrow.

He wanted each person in society to dedicate himself or herself to economic development. In a world of each country competing against each other in a capitalist order, only those people who are united and work harder can make progress. Political order and unity should be the highest priority, not political conflict and divisiveness. Probably a mobilized one-party state presented Park with a better institutional alternative for the achievement of his "revolutionary goals." The democratic institutions, which he was forced to adopt, must have presented him with much frustration, as there existed a great discrepancy between the "revolutionary goals" and Korean political behavior. While important groups in society were complaining and protesting the authoritarianism of Park's rule, he found that their oppositionist attitudes were a great obstacle to national development. The authoritarian methods he imposed upon society were justified in terms of political order and efficiency. In some sense, he was less interested in building his legitimacy by political maneuverings than in pushing the country the way he wanted with the efficiency and with the support of the military and other coercive instruments.

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Along with coercive methods, Park tried to inculcate the society with the values necessary for "national resurrection." The National Education Charter (NEC), which was declared in 1968, is a prime example of Park's statism and his effort to discipline the society with statist ethics. The purpose of the enactment of the NEC was "to reform in all aspects all the unproductive and premodern modes of thinking that prohibit the improvement of national power." Park himself stated in December 1972, on the occasion of the ceremony of the Declaration of the NEC:

As we all know, the [NEC] identifies our mission as a national resurrection and emphasizes to create a new history by putting public interest and order above and honoring efficiency and practicality.

According to one participant in preparation for the NEC, it was Park who "took the initiative in making the historic NEC." He did not simply instruct the making of the NEC, but chose the main members and chaired the meetings three times. The NEC was distributed to government offices and educational institutions. In formal government, public, and school

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62 It starts by saying "We are born in this country with the historical mission of national resurrection," and ends by saying "let's create a new history by endless efforts." There are many other values that are mentioned in the NEC including democracy and freedom, but the main theme is nationalism and patriotism.

63 Seung-jo Han, "Han'guk chongch'i ui jido yinyum" [The Guiding Ideology of the Yushin System], pp. 511-512.

64 Tscheong, Han'guk kyoyuk, p. 86.

65 Hyung-jin Yu, "Gukmin kyoyuk hunjang jaejung ui piwha" [The Hidden Story of the National Education Charter], pp. 22-23.
ceremonies, the NEC was read before the attendents. Furthermore, students were asked to memorize the content of the NEC.\(^6\)

To the extent that a less authoritarian regime was maintained, it is because they permitted Park to continue his rule. Now after his third-term presidency, there seemed to be no more constitutional possibility to continue his rule. But he found nobody beside himself who could continue to lead the "modernization of the fatherland and national resurrection." He was proud of his achievement in economic development and probably confident in further pursuing it. A higher level of authoritarianism would be opposed by many of the public, as he later claimed, positive evaluation would be provided in the end. The underlying commitment of Park to authoritarian rule finally surfaced in full force. He stated soon after the imposition of the Yushin regime:

> Until now, [we] used to disturb stability, practiced inefficiency and excessive consumption, and could not overcome the conflictual factional struggle and political tactics. This is because we unwisely tried to imitate closely the other's democracy. We can no longer waste our precious national power in imitating other's democracy . . . We should achieve stability and maximize efficiency in all aspects to achieve prosperity and the glory of unification.\(^7\)

The secret preparation for the Yushin system involved a handful of people surrounding Park. Because of its secrecy, it is not clear when the regime change was decided by Park and his close associates loyal to him. But recent information released by the two most powerful military men during the time suggest that there is a strong possibility that Park

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\(^6\)Park himself was said to have memorized the content of the NEC.

\(^7\)Seung-jo Han, "Han'guk chongch'i ui jido yinyum," p. 501.
decided the regime change soon after the 1971 election. According to Yun Pil Yong, the former commander of the Capital Defense Force, he "guessed" (surmised) that Park was preparing for a "new plan" when he heard Park saying after the 1971 election that "National security should not be left at the level of political tactics. It is a national waste to do such an expensive election. Wouldn't democracy be possible after the time we can eat and live well?" In an interview with this writer, Kang Chang Sung, the chief of the Army Security Command at the time, stated that he was sure that the decision of Park to change the regime was made immediately after the 1971 elections. 

Almost all the state and political elites, let alone the public, did not know that preparation for a new political regime was going on. Thus the declaration of martial law and subsequent regime change was totally unexpected. Opposition Assembly members who were touring the country for the inspection of government offices, did not believe it when the rumors of the impending declaration of martial law began to circulate a few hours before. It was revealed later that some members of the State Council, which has the formal governmental deliberation authority, had to approve

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68Gap-jae Cho, "Jinsang Yun Pil Yong sagun" [The True Story of the Yun Pil Yong Incident], p. 233.

69Interview in May 1990. When this writer asked for the evidence, he simply said that the personnel change involving several high-ranking government officials following the elections was done differently than was expected before the election. According to him, the purpose of this personnel change was to prepare for the regime change. Kang said that he had not been involved in the preparation. In a matter like this, it is generally impossible to get hard evidence. But the former general repeatedly affirmed that the decision was made soon after the elections.
the imposition of martial law before they knew what was going on.\textsuperscript{70}

Despite the absence of demands for regime change either in the state or society, it was the political structure with strong coercive capacities of the state and the centralized power concentrated in Park that made possible the regime change without any strong challenge from the opposition or within the ruling group.

**Strong State and Weak Society**

We have noted in Chapter One that the strong anti-leftist state provided a significant constraint for political activities of social groups. Weak society went together with the expansion of the coercive instruments of the state, particularly the military, that had an enlarged conception of national security with a low tolerance for any leftist or "leftist-oriented" groups and ideologies.

Since Park took power in 1961, the coercive capacities of the state to control social groups increased further in an absolute sense.\textsuperscript{71} Unlike

\textsuperscript{70}Kyung-jae Lee, *Yushin kudaeta*, pp. 15-17. Lee, a *Dong-A Ilbo* reporter at the time, says based upon his observation that "only seven hours before the Assembly was dissolved, . . . one could not find in any place any indication of the impending regime change." *Ibid.*, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{71}Robert Dahl distinguishes 2 types of resources that government use to suppress oppositions: violent means of coercion, persuasion, and inducement, typically wielded by military and police forces; and socioeconomic sanctions (or nonviolent means of coercion, persuasion, and inducement). Dahl provides an illuminating discussion of the relationship between the distribution of these resources and the different regime types. See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 48-61. In Korea, it was primarily the violent means of coercion that increased during the Park regime. Among socioeconomic sanctions, government control over economic resources significantly increased since Park took power. As will be discussed later, the relative weakness of government control of other socioeconomic sanctions was a major reason for the failure of long-term maintenance of a more extreme form of authoritarianism.
the Rhee regime, which used the police and various groups -- Korean Youth Corps, Labor Union, Farmers' Union, National Society, and the thugs -- to threaten and repress the opposition, the Park regime relied on the KCIA, which was created immediately after the coup and replaced the police as the most important instrument for domestic political control in normal times. The various pro-government social groups were not as extensively utilized as the Rhee regime. The KCIA was established "to supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, including that of the military." The KCIA actually became involved in any issue that was considered important not only for national security but for regime stability and Park's power.

Given the broadness and the ambiguities of the provisions of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law, the agency had wide latitude to apply them to the political opposition. Besides the investigative power, the agency used its policing power -- arrest, detainment, and interrogation -- as well as threats, terrorist activities (on a minor scale and intensity), and even bribes to repress the opposition and to control society. While many became fearful of the agency, the KCIA was far from attaining total control of Korean society. On the contrary, the use of the security agency for the suppression of

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72 Joungwon A. Kim says that the KCIA was estimated to have 370,000 employees by 1964. Divided Korea, p. 234. Probably this figure is overestimated. According to Hyung-wook Kim, there were only 2,000 regular KCIA agents when he became the head of the agency, but "because of the public fear, it was known as if the KCIA agents were everywhere." Kim and Park, Kim Hyung-wook hoego-rok, vol. 2, p. 13.

73 Se-jin Kim, Military Revolution, p. 111.
political opponents produced strong criticism of the KCIA, and became an important issue in opposition activities. From the regime's perspective, the coercive measures should not be used to an extent to alienate a majority of the attentive public. But there is no doubt that the KCIA greatly increased the resources available to the state for repression.

Another reason for the increased state power was the support the Park regime received from the military. Park received legitimacy from the military because of economic achievement and by the way he ruled the country -- with discipline and decisiveness. Park must have been an ideal leader for most military officers who put political order as the highest value due to the continuation and even the occasional increase in the perceived threat from the North.74 As we will see, the effective control Park exercised through the intelligence network over the military also increased state power by eliminating the possibility of dissension within the military. The military (particularly those forces surrounding the Seoul area) and the Army Security Command were occasionally used to control anti-government activities.75 When there was a strong protest

74 It is also possible that Korean military participation in the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1971 increased their perception of the importance of national security. About 47,000 Korean troops were engaged in the Vietnam War.

75 The role of the military intelligence agency in control of the society was more limited and less frequent than that of the KCIA during this time. The main military intelligence agency was called the Army Counter-Intelligence Agency (CIC) until October 1969, when it was renamed as the Army Security Command. In 1976, the name of the agency was changed to the Armed Forces Security Command. Although there were some organizational changes, the military agency was still almost completely dominated by the Army officers. For the matter of convenience, the main military intelligence agency (from October 1969 to the end of the Yushin regime) will be called the Army Security Command (ASC), as it was generally called during the period.
movement by the political opposition, martial law and the garrison decree were effectively utilized to suppress it.

While the strength of the state increased, the social challenge to the regime by no means disappeared. If Park faced any significant challenge to his rule in the pre-1972 period, it came from the students, intellectuals, the press, and opposition politicians. Particularly, the students, despite their lack of organizational strength, now occupied the most visible and active force against authoritarian rule. After the historical experience of the April student movement in 1960, students became politically more conscious and assertive. The primary discontent of these groups was political -- authoritarian methods of rule. Thus one of Park's main concerns for political stability throughout the pre-Yushin period was the control of these groups.

The Park regime faced particularly serious opposition during the period of 1964 and 1965 when it was engaged in the negotiation of the Korea-Japan normalization treaty. In addition to the widespread anti-Japanese feeling, other factors such as the existing anti-regime sentiments, the possibility of the government use of Japanese funds for political purpose, too low compensation and no apology for colonial rule, and the fear of economic dependence on Japan produced a particularly intense opposition to the signing of the treaty. Due to the massive protests led by students and supported by the press, intellectuals and religious leaders, the government resorted to extreme measures by declaring martial law in June 1964 and a garrison decree in August 1965.

\[n^\text{7}n\text{According to one writer, 3.5 million persons participated in the debate, discussions, demonstrations, and protest over the treaty issue. Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 256.}\]
Although the normalization treaty was finally signed by the two countries in 1965, it became clear that the students and the press by their actions and their words respectively were the most serious threat to the stability of the regime. During the period of martial law in August 1964, the ruling party-dominated National Assembly passed the Media Ethics Committee Law to control the critical attitudes of the media. After much protest by the press, the president decided to "hold in abeyance" the enforcement of the law.\textsuperscript{77} This decision came not as a government capitulation to press protests but as a lenient measure to give a chance for "voluntary self-regulation." There continued to exist a significant gap in opinion between the press and the government on the rights and responsibilities of the press. When the content of the reporting went beyond the permissible limit, the KCIA used such methods as arrests, interrogation and even a minor level of terror to suppress the press. A major event happened in April 1965, when the owner of Kyunghyang Shinmun, a major opposition daily, was arrested on the charges of violation of the Anti-Communist Law. Subsequently the newspaper company was sold at public auction for the reason of insolvency of its bank debt in January 1966.\textsuperscript{78} By the end of the 1960s, there were indications that Park's effort to control the press brought some success with the apparent decline in the ability of the press to criticize the regime. During the constitutional revision in 1969, for example, the media did not express its opposition.

\textsuperscript{77}Jae-chun Yu, Han'guk ullah kwa ullah munwha [The Korean Press and the Press Culture], pp. 52-53.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., pp. 248-249.
Compared to the period of the Rhee regime, student protests increased in terms of their frequencies. Besides the massive protests in 1964 and 1965, a major demonstration occurred in 1969 when the regime introduced constitutional revision. And then in 1971 students protested on a variety of issues including the intensified military training on campus. We have seen, however, that the student protests were effectively ended with the declaration of the garrison decree in 1971.

It was essentially the weakness of the opposition in society in their capacity to challenge the coercive state power that made possible the emergence of the regime. While there is no evidence that the military demanded the regime change, it was ready to support Park when he decided to impose the new regime. The sources of the loyalty of the military to Park and the apparent unity of the state are better understood when we look at the power structure within the state.

Centralization and Concentration of the Power Structure within the State (and the ruling group)

Countries differ in their degree of centralization and consolidation of the power structure within the state. Even if the coercive power of the state is great, the power structure among the state elites may be pluralistic. In this case, the unity within the state would be on a more voluntary basis, and the shift in the overall power balance among them and their alliance with different social groups would be an important process in regime change (and maintenance). The case of pre-Yushin Park regime shows the evolution toward a highly centralized regime with power concentrated in Park. In this case, because of the weight at the top of
the power structure, the political outcome is not based upon a more pluralistic struggle among political forces.

There were furious factional struggles with the ruling group during the military government. Park gradually eliminated his rivals in the military and firmly controlled the military and the intelligence agencies by the mid-1960s. Since his successful consolidation of centralized power, Park's main concern was the prevention of the emergence of any independent power base that might have a capability to challenge his power. The KCIA played a crucial role in consolidating and maintaining Park's centralized power within the state. It gathered information on the activities of the ruling DRP assemblymen and the high ranking government officials, especially those who were considered politically ambitious. For example, Kim Jong Pil, who was considered by many a potential successor to Park, was particularly watched closely. Anybody or group who looked disloyal to Park's rule could be investigated, and if necessary, interrogated and sometimes physically abused. Since the loyalty to Park of most ruling group members was not questioned, direct coercion was generally not used, but the expansion of the independent power of the politically ambitious politicians was clearly limited.

The KCIA director was appointed by Park on the basis of loyalty and the capability to figure out Park's intention and carry out Park's order. It was the chief of the KCIA who strictly controlled these activities of the agency. For this reason, the KCIA director was feared

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For example, Kim Ke Won, who was appointed the KCIA chief in 1969, was replaced in a little more than a year because he was found too "weak" for the position, while Kim Hyung-wook, extreme rightist and faithful performer of Park's will, stayed as the director of the agency for six and a half years.
and disliked not only by the opposition but by many DRP assemblymen and possibly by the government officials. The discontent of the DRP politicians about the KCIA is found in the fact that one of the "precedent conditions" some DRP members demanded for the support of the constitutional revision in 1969 was "to exclude the possibility of political investigation by limiting the role of the intelligence agency to the task of anti-Communist investigation."  

Park's firm control over the military was exercised primarily by the Army Security Command (ASC -- the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps until October 1969), which "maintains a strict surveillance over all high-ranking officers and their relationship to each other." For this purpose, the ASC's branches existed in all the major military installations. The meetings and parties by the military officers were generally attended by the ASC officers. Any potential signs of coup attempts -- even critical remarks about Park -- were investigated and punished accordingly. As a result, the freedom of the military officers to criticize the regime openly was very restricted. Like the KCIA director, the commander of the ASC was chosen on the basis of loyalty. The chief of the ASC made a written report everyday to the president, and in cases of what he considered "important matters", he reported directly to

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80 Chun-ho Ye, Udoom ui cheungin yi doeu-o [Having Become a Witness of the Darkness], p. 103.
81 Se-jin Kim, Military Revolution, p. 156.
82 Air Force and Navy do not have a significance influence within the military in Korea, and the possibility of the coup led by these military branches was considered particularly unlikely.
the president without reporting to the Minister of Defense or the Army Chief of Staff.\(^3\)

The control of the military was exercised partly by prohibiting a strong link of the military to social and political groups. The active military officers were not in principle allowed to be engaged in active political or military activities. Indeed the relative isolation of the military from the society — the socioeconomic and political groups and activities — was an important characteristic of the Park regime that distinguished it from some other military or military-backed regimes. Except in such places as the KCIA and Korean embassies abroad, the active military officers did not participate in the civil administration or business corporation.\(^4\) Military officers did not receive any press coverage, and individual officers or military institutions generally did not make any independent political statements. Few people in the street knew the names of the top military leadership, except during the Korean participation in the Vietnam War, when the commander of the Korean military in Vietnam, Chae Myung-shin, received some public attention and even popularity.\(^5\) Only in case of martial law or garrison decree, the military was mobilized dutifully.

Although there was interaction between the high-ranking military officers and the DRP politicians, their ties were never allowed to develop

\(^3\) Sung-jae Kang, "Yun Pil Yong, Park Jong Kyu, Lee Hu Rak, grigo na" [Yun Phil Yong, Park Jong Kyu, Lee Hu Rak, and Me], pp. 372.

\(^4\) The Ministry of Defense was the only branch of the cabinet in charge of the military affairs, and its minister was a retired army general.

\(^5\) Partly for this reason, he was retired and "persuaded" to go abroad as an ambassador.
into a strong, autonomous power structure. Approaching ambitious politicians could be detrimental to officers' occupational success. Kim Jong Pil was a particular concern for Park. Military officers were advised directly or indirectly by Park not to associate with Kim too closely.\(^6\) Park's concern about the relationship between the military and politicians can be also seen in the case of Chung Il Kwon, who was the army chief of staff during the Rhee regime. When Chung Il Kwon, then prime minister, in 1971 recommended to Park an army general for promotion, the general was simply retired.\(^7\) Thus only limited connection existed between the military and politicians. The military officers' connection with the opposition would be most dangerous to their career.

While strictly preventing the majority of military officers from political involvement, Park's close associates had to be more politicized due to Park's need for them for political purposes. High-ranking military officers who had a close tie to him -- generally from Kyungsang Province, Park's home province -- occupied politically important positions. Park also gave special favors to selected elements of the middle-level officers. These officers were exclusively composed of the graduates of the elite 4-year Korean Army Academy (modeled after the U.S. West Point), and generally from Kyungsang Province. Secretly organized as Hahna Club,\(^8\) they became more politicized military elements loyal to Park. They were

\(^6\) See for example Sung-jae Kang, "Yun Pil Yong, Park Jong Kyu, Lee Hu Rak, grigo na," p. 372.

\(^7\) Sung-jae Kang, "Kim, geu-neun jungbu apandaeman chillu" [Kim, He Always Touches the Government on a Sour Point], pp. 317-318.

\(^8\) Hahna means simply "one". The organization was also called Ilishim (One Mind) Club. It appears that these names were designated essentially to emphasize the unity of the organization and the loyalty to Park.
appointed to strategic military posts crucial for the regime stability such as the Capital Defense Force, Special Combat Force, Presidential Security Guards, and ASC. They also received favors in promotion. While power within the state was highly concentrated in Park, a limited pluralism and factionalism existed among more powerful military officers and politicians below Park. Competition for Park's ear and even antagonism, often deliberately promoted by Park, checked and balanced one another.

There was a limited pluralism within the ruling group until 1971. Thus when Park decided to revise the constitution to allow him a third term, there was initially significant opposition within the ruling DRP. Many, if not most, of them were supporters of Kim Jong Pil. To get the two-thirds of the National Assembly votes that were necessary for the constitutional revision, Park, the KCIA, and pro-revision forces were involved in persuading and even threatening the DRP members. Kim Jong Pil himself was successfully persuaded to support the revision.

After the 1971 presidential election, there still remained at least two major factions within the DRP, the Kim Jong Pil faction and the Four-Men faction. By the end of 1971, serious conflict developed within the ruling group. Oh Chi-Sung, the new Minister of Home Affairs and supporter of Kim Jong Pil, apparently under the permission of Park, began to eliminate the followers of the "Four-Men" faction in the local government and police. When the opposition NDP introduced a vote of no-confidence against 3 cabinet members including the Minister of Home Affairs, the

89Seung Wha Chung, Ship-yi ship-yi saqun: Chung Seung Hwa nun malhanda [December 12th Incident: Chung Seung Hwa Speaks], p. 113.
Four-Men faction led by Kim Sung-kon joined the opposition party to pass the bill despite Park's order not to do so. Apparently perceiving this as a serious challenge to his authority (or potentially dangerous), Park ordered a severe punishment for them. In this "October 2nd Disobedience Incident" (Ship-yi hangmyung padong), 23 DRP assemblymen were taken into custody and interrogated by the KCIA, and at least 9 of them including Kim Sung-kon were tortured. Park probably thought the Four-Men faction had increased their independent power, and if they were unchecked, could lead to a serious problem for his rule. By punishing Kim and his followers, he showed that the tolerance level for disobedience would be very low in the coming period. The use of highly coercive measures against them suggests that Park had already decided to prolong his power. The elimination of the Four-Men faction within the governing DRP reduced further the degree of pluralism within the ruling group.

From the perspective of the power structure, the Yushin system could be established because Park already exercised effective personal control over all the coercive institutions in a highly centralized system. Without these factors, Park could not have successfully imposed the regime change. Ambitious ruling party politicians would have opposed the regime change, and there was no significant demand for regime change even within the state.

This chapter has examined the emergence of the Yushin regime. The analysis of the socioeconomic conditions and political situations in the pre-Yushin period suggests that there was neither socioeconomic disorder.

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98 For more details on this incident, see Kyung-jae Lee, *Yushin kudaeta*, pp. 107-154.
nor political crisis that created social demand to change the regime. Even within the state and the ruling party, there was no active discussion or demand for the regime change. The regime change was caused by Park's determination to remain in power when the constitutional option to continue his rule was no longer available. Realizing the opposition they would face, Park and his loyalists prepared the regime change secretly and carefully well before its imposition, and executed it by using coercive state instruments, particularly the military, in a coup-like fashion.

It was essentially the political structure -- a strong state with its coercive power concentrated in Park -- which made Park's will realized. Although there is a cultural and historical tradition for the three political variables that contributed to the regime change, the post-Korean War political situations that led to the establishment and maintenance of the strong anti-leftist state should be also considered.

Finally, if the political factors discussed above were crucial factors contributing the emergence of the Yushin system, what was the role of the U.S. in the regime change? Unlike the cases of Latin American countries and the Philippines, the U.S. did not support the regime change. In fact, when martial law was declared to impose the Yushin system, it was reported that the U.S. had conveyed to Korean government in the "stiffest terms" its disapproval of the imposition of martial law. However, it did not attempt to engage in negative sanctions as in the earlier period. One reason seems to be the declining influence of the U.S. Also, the successful economic development, military strength, the apparent political order, and the friendly attitudes and policies (such as the dispatch of

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troops to Vietnam) that were provided by the Park regime seem to have made the Nixon administration not uncomfortable with the continuation of Park's rule.\footnote{In fact, President Nixon told Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil in January 1973 that "unlike other Presidents, I do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of your country." U.S. House of Representatives, \textit{Korean-American Relations}, p. 39.}
CHAPTER IV

SOURCES OF THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE YUSHIN SYSTEM:
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND DEMAND DURING THE PRE-YUSHIN PERIOD

While authoritarian characteristics of the Korean regimes have been sufficiently emphasized by almost all observers and analysts of Korean Politics, democratic elements have often not been adequately analyzed. One forgets that the repressive measures by the pre-1972 regimes were largely a result of their efforts to resort to the temporary violation of the political rules of the game without massive destruction of the principle of the democratic institutional arrangements. Compared to the Yushin regime, there had been also substantially more political freedoms to oppose the regime, without encountering harsh repression by the state. Furthermore, the demand for more democratic rule by the attentive public was already high prior to the emergence of the new regime.

To understand why the Yushin regime was ineffective in maintaining long-term regime stability despite the regime's economic performance and its possession of very strong coercive instruments of political control, one has to first look at the democratic components, as well as the characteristics and strength of democratic demands, that already existed in pre-1972 Korean politics. This is so because the willingness of the opposition groups to challenge the regime and demand democratization in spite of the repression by the state is partly dependent on the extent and
the kind of democratic experience prior to the imposition of the authoritarian regime.

The maintenance and dynamics of the authoritarian regime is also affected by what Alfred Stepan calls the "defensive" and "offensive" projects and the institutional cohesion of the repressive apparatus. As Stepan puts:

In any regime, but especially in a BA regime, the capacity to lead the regime's political allies depends on the degree to which the regime has both "defensive" and "offensive" projects that potential allies consider to be feasible, crucial for the preservation and advancement of their own interests, and dependent on authoritarian power for their execution. Since coercion is particularly important part of the regime's power, the degree of internal institutional cohesion of the repressive apparatus is also a key variable.

For the long-term maintenance of authoritarian regime, then, there are essentially three variables that are important. These are democratic experience, the project, and the strength and unity of the coercive institutions. The authoritarian regime can be maintained longer, if (1) there are less democratic experience; (2) there are more relevant projects; and (3) the coercive institutions are stronger and more unified. Socioeconomic and other political variables as well as external and international variables influence these three variables.

In this chapter, I will analyze both the democratic aspects and demands in the pre-1972 Korean politics since independence, and look at the forces that initiated and sustained them. To present a balanced presentation, the authoritarian characteristics of the regimes will be also examined along with the democratic elements. I will argue that the

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democratic experience and demands that had existed prior to 1972 produced significant constraints on the Yushin system, when the latter did not have a new project of significance. Thus while the specific dynamics of the Yushin regime will be examined in the next chapter by looking at the projects, regime coercion, and the opposition movement, this part is very important in understanding the discontent of the political opposition during the Yushin regime.

Rhee's Authoritarianism and Political Apathy of the Public

There is no doubt that despite the adoption of the democratic constitution, the actual working of the First Republic under Rhee Syngman was basically authoritarian. As was examined in Chapter 2, post-liberation ideological conflict, the Korean War, and the subsequent confrontation with North Korea contributed to the strong anti-Communist state, and furthered the trend toward authoritarianism. The gap between the formal political institutions and its actual functioning was also due to the lack of democratic experience and culture. Korea had never had experience with formal democratic institutions prior to the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 under the sponsorship of the U.S. The unwillingness to share power and the lack of ability to compromise and bargain among politicians were deeply rooted in Korean political culture.

Within this general cultural and historical context not conducive to more competitive and inclusive democracy, the leadership was also crucial. Rhee, portraying himself as a founding father of new Korea, thought that

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\(^2\)Gregory Henderson's work presents a strong argument on cultural problem of Korean political development. See his *Politics of the Vortex.*
only he could lead the country. As Allen says, "[Rhee] wanted Korea to be set up as a democratic republic, but only if he could be chief executive and his power be supreme."\(^3\) His life-time devotion to the independence movement, his close tie to the U.S., and his adamant anti-communism (and even his academic achievement -- Ph.D. in the U.S., which was very rare at the time), all facilitated Rhee's achievement of effective control of the newly emerging anti-Communist state apparatus, particularly the police and the armed forces, and drew the support of various rightist groups. To maintain his rule, he concentrated power in his hand by relying on those who were personally loyal to him.

During the earlier period of the First Republic after the elimination of the leftists, the main political conflicts were essentially between Rhee and his supporters (particularly the police) on the one hand and the opposition politicians in the National Assembly (and the press to some extent) on the other hand. The main source of conflict between these conservative groups involved a pure power struggle without any significant ideological difference. The public initially showed political apathy to this conflict. Student protests, which would later become almost a tradition, did not appear until the end of the regime despite numerous authoritarian methods Rhee employed.

As Rhee was confronted with recalcitrant opposition politicians who continued to challenge his political power, he and his loyalists used authoritarian measures to repress opposition politicians and to maintain his powerful rule. Police, rightist youth groups and thugs were regularly used to harass and repress the political opposition, who were often

\(^3\)Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee*, p. 237.
falsely charged as Communists. With coercive instruments under his control, Rhee used constitutional revisions (with illegitimate procedures) and violations to continue his rule. Let's first examine in the following the authoritarian rule of the Rhee regime and the persistent challenge to it by the opposition politicians, which by 1952 looked futile.

The first general elections were held in May 1948 to choose the members of the Constituent Assembly to sit for a two-year term. Because of the nonparticipation for the assembly elections of those who were opposed to the establishment of separate government in South Korea, the first National Assembly was dominated by the rightists that supported Rhee.\(^4\)

Rhee became the first president of the Republic of Korea for 4-year term in 1948 by an indirect election in the Assembly that supported him by

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\(^4\)One of the most important political incidents during the earlier period of the Rhee rule was the assassination of Kim Ku, a leading nationalist leader and main opponent of Rhee, by an army officer, in June 1949. Although the assassin was arrested and convicted, he was soon released and returned to the military service.

\(^5\)The distribution of the 200 Assembly seats was: 55 for the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, 29 for Korean Democratic Party (KDP), 12 for the Taedong Youth Corps, 6 for the National Youth Corps. Most of the remaining seats went to the independents, who took 85 seats, 42.5 percent of the assembly seats. Many independents were actually the KDP members who had deliberately avoided declaring their party affiliation. It was estimated that between 70 and 80 of the 198 members elected were associated with the KDP. All assemblymen except some independents, who were centrists, were the rightists and supporting Rhee at this time. See Chungang son'go kwalli wiwon-hoe [Central Election Management Committee] (hereafter cited as CEMC), Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa [History of Elections in Korea], vol. 1, pp. 452-453; and Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 82.

To portray that he stood above politics, Rhee did not organize political party until the end of 1951, when he lost the support of the Assembly.
a vote of 180 out of 196. Soon after Rhee's assumption of political power, however, there developed confrontation between Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) due to Rhee's unwillingness to share any substantial political power with the KDP. The KDP turned against Rhee, and in late 1949, it merged with other assembly members to form the Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP). In March 1950, the DNP introduced constitutional amendments for the cabinet system in an attempt to seize the state power and to reduce Rhee's political power by making him a ceremonial head of the state. Although the amendments failed, the vote distribution indicated the Assembly support for Rhee became weak.

The result of the 1950 Assembly election, despite police harassment of some candidates during the electoral campaign, indicated unpopularity of both pro-Rhee forces and the DNP. Only about 57 seats out of a total of 210 assembly seats went to Rhee's supporters, and the DNP won merely 23 seats.

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6 The constitution adopted by the Assembly prescribed a modified presidential system with the president (and vice-president) to be elected by the Assembly. For the characteristics of the constitution, see W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study, pp. 39-41.

7 For more details on the conflict between Rhee and the KDP, see for example Ibid., pp. 39-41.

8 While 71 votes were casted for the amendment, only 33 votes were against it. 66 abstained, and 1 was invalid. CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, pp. 457-458.

9 In this election, every group except the Communist was participated. At this point, police harassment was essentially directed against leftist and moderate candidates during the electoral campaign. As a result, several dozen candidates were forced to withdraw, while thirteen were arrested. John Merrill, Peninsular Origins, p. 170.

10 126 seats were occupied by the independents, many of whom were moderates or progressives. CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 459.
Faced with the weakness of his supporters within the assembly, and as the end of his first term approached, Rhee directed the construction of a new political party, which he hoped would increase his power base and push for his reelection. However, the division within Rhee's supporters resulted in the establishment of two political parties under the same name of the "Liberal Party". The so-called "Liberal Party outside the Assembly", which was created by incorporating various pro-Rhee groups, fully supported Rhee's intention to change the constitution for the direct popular election of the president. However, most members of the "Liberal Party inside the Assembly", mainly composed of the assemblymen, either wanted a parliamentary government or the existing system which would retain the legislative authority to elect the chief executive, and would give them a better chance for their appointment to the cabinet post. As a result, when Rhee introduced in November 1951 a constitutional amendment bill providing for the direct popular election of the president, it was decisively defeated in the Assembly by a vote of 143 to 19.

The defeat of his amendment bill resulted in a crisis for the maintenance of Rhee's rule. The regime mobilized various pro-Rhee groups such as the Korean Youth Corps and the National Society, as well as the thugs, to hold mass rallies protesting the rejection of the amendment

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11 These included the National Society, Korean Youth Corps, Korean Federation of Labor Union, Farmers Union, and Korean Women's Association. Tae-su Han, Han'guk chongdang-sa [History of Korean Political Parties], p. 188. The latter three groups, of course, were not genuine interest groups, but political groups organized from the top to support Rhee.

12 The assembly reintroduced its own amendments for a cabinet system in April 1952, and the vote on these amendments fell just short of receiving the necessary two-thirds majority. Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 137.
bill, and to launch a campaign to "recall" the assemblymen who opposed it.

The wartime atmosphere provided Rhee an opportunity. Under the pretext of guerrillas activity, he proclaimed martial law in the southern region including Pusan, the wartime capital, in May 1952. Rhee's loyalists, Lee Pom-sok and Won Yong-dok, were newly appointed Home Minister and Provost Marshal General respectively, and began to repress the opposition politicians in an atmosphere of increasing tension and fear.\(^\text{13}\)

While the pro-Rhee groups and thugs were mobilized to demonstrate "people's power" now calling for the dissolution of the Assembly, Rhee himself threatened openly several times to dissolve the Assembly if it does not pass the constitutional amendment, arguing that "the will of the people is more important than the letter of the Constitution."\(^\text{14}\)

The unjustifiable declaration of martial law and the intimidation and arrests of the opposition politicians received verbal protests from the U.S. and other allied countries that were engaging in the Korean War, but they were ignored by the regime.\(^\text{15}\) The U.S. government, despite its objection to Rhee's repressive measures, decided not to intervene against him because it was more preoccupied with the need to end the war than to "overthrow the Rhee regime and face a democratic government of unknown

\(^{13}\) On May 26, for example, 47 assemblymen were arrested by the military police under the pretext that they did not show their identification cards. Although all except 4 were released next day, by this time there remained 12 assemblymen in custody including 7 who were prosecuted on charges of "Communist conspiracy." For these and other repressive measures, see Reeve, Republic of Korea, p. 45.

\(^{14}\) Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 145.

\(^{15}\) CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 462.
stability." The Korean public also showed no mood of protest in the wartime atmosphere. In this context, the opposition politicians began to realize the limit of their resistance to the regime. The assemblymen were virtually in captivity for two days by the police and military police until the amendment was passed by a vote of 163 to 0.\(^6\)

After the constitutional change, Rhee won the presidential election in August 1952 by capturing 74.6 percent of the vote.\(^7\) Rhee's victory was well expected because no other presidential candidates at that time were so well known as he was.\(^8\) In contrast to the opposition candidates, who had little organizational capacities, the regime had the police, which played the key role in mobilizing the rural voters, which constituted about 80 percent of the total voters at the time.\(^9\) Also, the police were involved in harassing the opposition candidates.\(^10\)

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\(^6\) Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 259. The U.S. military leadership in Korea was opposed to the Rhee's demand to move troops for martial law purpose. The Korean army chief of staff, Lee Chong-chan, partly in accordance with the wishes of the U.S., refused to commit the military forces to Pusan. He was later fired. Sung-jae Kang, Cham-gunin Lee Chong-chan [General Lee Chong-chan, a Real Soldier], pp. 72-95.

\(^7\) For a detailed analysis of this event, see for example, Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, pp. 141-149.

\(^8\) CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 736.

\(^9\) Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 149.

\(^10\) For the role of the police in election campaign and voting, see for example, Ibid., p. 151; and Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 140.

\(^11\) According to Allen, Cho Bong Am who ran for the president was so harrassed by the police that he spent most of the nine-day "campaign" in hiding. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 150.
The role of police was clearly demonstrated in the vice-presidential election. Lee Pum-sok was nominated vice-presidential candidate by the Liberal Party, which the members of his National Youth Corps dominated. However, apparently thinking that Lee became too powerful and ambitious, Rhee chose to endorse Ham Tae-yong, an unknown political figure. Due to the police involvement in the election, Ham was elected by defeating Lee by a vote of 41.3 percent to 25.5 percent.

After capitulation to the naked power of the Rhee regime in the 1952 political crisis, the opposition politicians' morale declined, while the strength of Rhee and the Liberal Party increased. After the election, Rhee restructured the Liberal Party by purging the National Youth Corps (Jok-chong) faction, and by placing the party under the leadership of Yi Kipung, an absolute loyalist to Rhee. The strength of the regime further increased after the May 1954 election in which the Liberal Party won a comfortable majority of assembly seats. After the election, the joining of some independents into the Liberal Party increased the party's total assembly seats to 137.

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22 During the First Republic, the president and the vice-president were elected separately.

23 The Liberal Party, by this time, meant the "Liberal Party outside the Assembly."

24 CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 637. Although the Liberal Party won only 36.8 percent of the vote, the party's new methods of nominating one candidate for each election district contributed to its electoral success. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 205. Out of a total of 1,102 candidates, only 182 were the Liberal Party candidates. Thus in most districts, the Liberal Party candidates competed with several opposition candidates. Tae-su Han, Han'guk chongdang-sa, p. 201.

25 Tae-su Han, Han'guk chongdang-sa, p. 201.
While his second term would end in 1956, Rhee had no intention to step down. Thus, Rhee introduced in November 1954 another constitutional amendment including a provision that removed the two-term restriction on the tenure of the first president. The amendment bill was defeated as it received 135 of the 203 votes, one vote short of the two-thirds majority required. Three days after the defeat of the amendment, however, it was announced that since the two-thirds of 203 is 135 rounding off the fractional numbers, the amendment bill has been passed. With the passage of the constitutional amendment by another illegitimate means, Rhee’s rule looked secure for the rest of his life.

Maintaining a Formal Democracy

The above discussion clearly shows Rhee’s authoritarian methods to continue his rule. On the other hand, it is also clear that he did not introduce a formally authoritarian regime. After the 1952 constitutional change, his rule was still accountable to the direct popular election. The introduction of the 1954 constitutional revision for the unlimited term for the presidency was limited to the first president, and there was no other attempt to adopt an institutional mechanism for the automatic election of Rhee. The reason why he maintained a formal democracy was partly because Rhee thought that with these constitutional changes, he could continue to rule for his life time. There was also no significant group in the state and society that advocated a formally authoritarian regime.

26 The two-thirds of 203 is 135.3. Thus 136 votes were needed to pass the amendments.
At fundamental level, a total disregard of democratic institutions would have been strongly opposed by the U.S. As a country that sponsored the establishment of the Republic of Korea, and that became deeply involved in the building of Korea as an anti-Communist bulwark, the U.S. wanted to see at least some functioning of democracy in Korea as long as it does not conflict with the U.S. security interest. Thus, for example, although Rhee wanted to postpone the May 1950 Assembly elections until November of the year for the reason that the Assembly had not acted on his budget proposals, the pressure from the U.S. led to the holding of the election on schedule. During the 1952 political crisis, the U.S. prepared a plan for possible American intervention against the Rhee government in the case that the situation deteriorated seriously.

The national elections were held at regular intervals. Assembly elections were held in 1948, 1950, 1954, and 1958; and Presidential and vice-presidential elections were held simultaneously in 1952, 1956, and 1960. An examination of the elections does show that democratic characteristics of the elections were significantly compromised by several factors. These included the involvement of the police and government

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27 CEMC, Taehan Min'gu k son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 458.

28 The Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that "the United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea has been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic. Free, popular elections, in accordance with the constitution and other basic laws of the Republic are the foundation of those democratic institutions." Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 31. See also, Reeve, Republic of Korea, p. 42.

29 Another contingency plan ("Operation Everready") was prepared by General Clack on May 4, 1953 as to be implemented in the event of continued opposition of Rhee to the armistice agreement. John Kotch, "The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea," p. 247.
officials in the election campaign, the harassment of the opposition (e.g., preventing registration and threat to withdraw from registration), the mobilization of passive rural people to vote for the pro-regime candidates, and the electoral irregularities during vote counting.

The precise methods and the degree of the election frauds were different with elections. One indication of these election irregularities was an unrealistically high rate of voting participation. Especially an extremely high level of voting participation in some rural areas indicates that there was a significant level of mobilization of the voters, through direct and indirect pressure, and other election irregularities by the pro-Rhee elements including the police (see Table 7).36

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<td>Turnout</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
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<td>94.4%</td>
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Source: CEMC, Taehan Min'gu, son'go-sa, vol. 1.

Democraticness of the regime was also weak because the local elections were held only twice -- 1952 and 1956 -- during the First Republic. Furthermore, with the superior organizational power of police and pro-Rhee organizations, as well as the employment of election frauds, the regime used the elections as a means to expand its power base in the local area. In December 1958, the pro-regime dominated Assembly simply

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36 In the 1956 election, for example, 98.2 percent of the voters in Kwangwon Province cast their ballots, and this region showed the highest support for the Rhee regime.
abolished the local elections apparently feeling they no longer served the interests of the regime.

As we will see below, the maintenance of the formally democratic elections would create an entirely new situation by the 1956 national elections. Even before 1956, elections were not totally devoid of their meanings, however, particularly when we consider that there had been no popular election before the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Despite many constraints and distortions, elections reflected popular attitudes in some cases. For example, the result of the 1950 election fairly well indicated the unpopularity of both the pro-Rhee groups and the DNP.

There were two institutions in society -- the press and education -- that distinguished Korea from some other more rigid authoritarian regimes. Within the anti-Communist context, the press maintained a significant autonomy from the regime.\(^3\) It provided independent sources of information, which critically influenced the political attitudes of the more educated public. In fact, the major newspapers tended to take a pro-opposition position by criticizing actively the regime on various issues including the corruption and authoritarianism.\(^2\)

\(^3\)Richard C. Allen, despite his highly critical view of Rhee's authoritarianism, noted that "In contrast to most authoritarian regimes, South Korea was notable for a considerable degree of press freedom." Korea's Syngman Rhee, p. 204.

\(^2\)According to Joungwon A. Kim, out of five biggest Korean newspapers, three were pro-opposition, and two neutral. See his Divided Korea, p. 156. The result of the content analysis of the 4 major newspapers in early 1950s shows that three were pro-opposition and one was pro-government. See Gon Ho Song, "Han'guk hyundae ullah-sa-ron" [The History of Mass Communication since the National Liberation], p. 191.
While the educational institution was highly centralized allowing little autonomy to individual schools, the school education involved extensive teaching on the subject of liberal democracy, as well as anti-communism. Consequently, democratic ideology was rapidly accepted by the students.

Much of the conflict between Rhee and the Assembly during the earlier period of the regime was also a part of experience with the democratic institutions. Rhee’s first choice of vice-president was rejected by the Constituent Assembly, and he had to settle with an alternative. The regime was also threatened by the introduction of the constitutional amendments in 1950 and 1952 by the opposition politicians, who wanted to seize the state power. The finding by the Assembly during the Korean War of the corruption involving the National Defense Corps led to the execution of five high-ranking officers of the Corps.\(^{11}\) While the opposition looked very weak by the end of 1952, it will reemerge again by the mid-1950s.

Increasing Public Support for the Opposition Party

After the 1952 crisis, the Rhee regime looked to have finally consolidated its power. Rhee continued to control the coercive instruments of the state. The result of the 1952 elections indicated that Rhee and his regime would not have any problem in winning the 1956 elections. The opposition in the Assembly had significantly weakened as the Liberal Party

\(^{11}\)For this case, see for example, Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, pp. 39-40; and Un-sun Back, "Gukmin bangwi-kun sagun kwa yangmin haksal sagun" [The National Defense Corps Incident and the Kuchang Innocent People Massacre Incident], pp. 76-81.
enjoyed electoral success in 1954 by attaining a two-thirds majority in the Assembly. The Liberal Party was restructured and under the control of Rhee's absolute loyalists.

Despite its visible strength, there were increasing legitimacy problems for the regime. Rhee's authoritarian methods to continue his rule, through the repression of the opposition politicians and the illegitimate constitutional revision, were not popular among the attentive public, particularly when the War had ended and the leftist forces were completely eliminated. The Rhee regime also received low marks for its performance. Appointment to the top governmental and political positions were made on the basis of personal loyalty to Rhee, and as a result many of them were professionally incompetent and corrupt.

Economic performance, considering massive U.S. aid, which averaged about 10 percent of GNP from 1953 to 1960, was not good. The average annual GNP growth rate was 5.5 percent from 1954 to 1958, and per capita income rose from $80 to about $90 during the same period. Corruption was widespread with business making "illicit fortunes" with their connection with the government officials. It was also believed by many that the effectiveness of Rhee's rule declined as he became senescent and was surrounded by a handful of persons, who prevented him from adequate

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34Mason, et al., Economic and Social Modernization, p. 15.
36For more discussion on corruption during the Rhee regime, see Reeve, Republic of Korea, pp. 96-100.
information. The press contributed to the increase in the political discontent by exposing many of these issues to the public.

The passage of the constitutional revision by another illegitimate means in 1954 had an important impact on party politics. 14 young Liberal Party assemblymen got out of the party and joined the opposition. Soon, 61 opposition assemblymen joined to organize the Friendship Association for the Preservation of the Constitution, which eventually led to the merger of conservative opposition parties into the Democratic Party in September 1955. The Democratic Party maintained political conservatism by excluding the participation of Cho Bong Am and his progressive followers.

When the 1956 presidential and vice-presidential elections came, the wartime atmosphere largely disappeared as the Korean War had been ended for three years. Through their challenge to Rhee's authoritarian rule, the criticism of corruption and incompetence, and the consequent suffering, the opposition politicians gradually acquired an image as a democratic force more committed to serve public interests. Thus, the Democratic Party and its presidential candidate Shin Ik-hee now offered a clear alternative to the regime, particularly for the discontented urban and educated public. The opposition party conducted vigorous campaigns touring many parts of the country and criticizing the regime for its violation of democratic rules. The Democratic Party's criticism of Rhee's rule -- with the main slogan of "We can't live [like this], so let's change" -- particularly touched the right chord of the public discontent.

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37 On this point, see Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Nation, pp. 148-150.

38 There were, however, some controversies among the opposition politicians whether the progressives should be allowed into the new party.
The popular interest in the election and support for the opposition was such that it surprised not only the ruling party, which was not ready to deal with it, but the Democratic Party. In one major election campaign in Seoul, for example, an estimated 200,000 people, 10 percent of the city's population, gathered to listen to Shin's speech. Many shops and businesses in Seoul closed their doors as people attended the election campaign. Comparatively much less people were attending the Liberal Party's campaigns. Judging from these indications, there seemed to be a possibility that the Democratic Party could win the election. Realizing that there was a possibility for the victory of the opposition party, some government officials and police officers covertly approached the party and promised to support it. Unfortunately the possibility of the regime change disappeared when Shin suddenly died just 10 days before the election.

While the death of Shin frustrated the hope for regime change, the election result still reflected increasing anti-government sentiments among the public. Rhee, who had won 72 percent of the vote in the 1952 election, received only 55.7 percent. Cho Bong Am of the Progressive Party carried 23.9 percent, while the invalidated votes, which came primarily

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40 The apparent cause of Shin's death was heart attack. He suddenly died in the sleeping car of the train after he woke up early in the morning. He was heading for the election campaign tour. The death of Shin resulted in the riots in Seoul by those who suspected that the regime was involved in his death.
from the supporters of Shin, counted 20.5 percent. The distribution of the vote probably did not reflect the relative popularity of the 3 president candidates, because it is likely that due to the death of Shin, the votes for Shin went to other candidates. Indeed, many people believed that had Shin not died, he could have won the election.

More dramatic development was the victory of the Democratic Party in the vice-president election as its candidate Chang Myon defeated Yi Kipung of the Liberal Party by 46.4 percent to 44.0 percent. This happened despite significant electoral irregularities committed by the ruling party and the police. The victory was significant because the vice-presidency was an important position to succeed the president in case of the death of the president, which many people thought possible given Rhee's old age.

The 1956 elections were, then, the turning point in Korean electoral history. The public displayed unprecedented interest in the elections. Despite all the constraints and distortion, the elections reflected the unpopularity of the ruling group among a significant proportion of the public, particularly the majority of those in the urban area, where the

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4. CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 739. There is little doubt that most of the invalidated vote came from the supporters of Shin. The invalidated vote for the vice-president election in that year was 4.7 percent. Ibid., p. 741.

4. Ibid., p. 741.

Also, when the defeat of its vice-presidential candidate looked likely, the Liberal Party stopped the vote counting in the city of Taegu under the pretext that the Democratic Party members committed irregularities in vote counting. Because of the national attention and the determination of the Democratic Party members to keep the ballot box, the regime finally gave up in three days by admitting its defeat. This and other events during the 1956 elections are well described in Samsung Munwha pyonjip-bu, ed., Chonggye unmo [Conspiracy in Political Circle], vol. 6, pp. 77-124.
ruling group had difficulty in manipulating the election. Out of the 41 urban election districts, Rhee won more votes only in 10 districts than the combination of the votes for Cho and the invalidated votes.\(^44\) In Seoul, where Rhee won 82 percent of the vote in 1952, he secured only 33.7 percent this time. Invalidated votes constituted 46.7 percent of the total vote, while Cho received 19.6 percent. In the vice-presidential election, Chang defeated Yi in all urban area except in 4 districts. In Seoul, Chang defeated Yi by 76.9 percent to 16.3 percent.\(^45\) The election, by allowing the victory of the opposition in the vice-presidential election, demonstrated that direct popular election, which seemed to offer an automatic victory for the governing party in 1952 elections, no longer ensured the victory of the Liberal Party.

The Fall of the Rhee Regime

Despite its declining popularity, and the increasing electoral pressure on the ruling party, the regime acted little to increase its popular support. On the contrary, to maintain its rule, the regime continued to use coercive measures which further decreased its legitimacy. This first took the form of the effort to eliminate the main political opponents. In September 1956, for example, there was an assassination attempt of Chang Myon. In January 1958, Cho Bong Am, who received 23.9 percent of the vote in the 1956 presidential election, was arrested on charges of espionage and the violation of the National Security Law. The

\(^{44}\)Computed from CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 2, pp. 1012-1019.

\(^{45}\)Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 1012-1027.
registration of his Progressive Party was cancelled in February, and subsequently Cho himself received the death sentence and was executed.

For the obvious purpose of repressing the opposition activities including the critical press report, the Liberal Party-dominated Assembly passed in November 1958 a new National Security Law. The regime then closed down the Kyunghyang Shinmun, a major national newspaper, in 1959 under the new security law. The closedown of the newspaper was due to the fact that it was very critical about the regime, and supported Chang Myon.47

These efforts by the regime to weaken the political opposition failed to achieve the purpose. Whenever these incidents happened, there was an active report in the press with extensive coverage, which drew the attention of the attentive public. This was followed by the investigation by the press and the Assembly, which almost always revealed the regime's involvement in the incidents. After the attack on the Maeil Shinbo in 1955, for example, the Assembly investigative committee found out it was the "terrorist activity." After the attempted assassination of Chang Myon, the investigation by the press revealed the identities of those directly involved in the case including the police officers.48 Thus, the existence of more or less independent opposition party and the press meant that the

46 For more details on the provisions of the law, see Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 57. The Democratic Party assemblymen, who were occupying the Assembly chamber to prevent physically the passage of the bill, were locked in the basement of the Assembly building by the assembly guards.

47 Other major instances of the repression of the press include the attack in 1955 of the Maeil Shinbo facilities in Taegu by hoodlums, and the closedown of Dong-A Ilbo for several months.

48 Song, "Han'guk hyundae ullan-sa-ron," p. 197.
regime's use of coercive measures was often counterproductive. The opposition politicians and the press played important roles in narrowing the legitimacy of the regime by continuing to publicize and criticize the various negative aspects of Rhee's rule such as corruption and anti-democratic behavior of the regime.

The elimination of Cho and his Progressive Party demonstrated the fate of progressives in an anti-leftist political system. However, it had unintended consequences of benefiting the Democratic Party as those who had supported Cho now shifted their support to the Democratic Party, the only main opposition party that competed with the Liberal Party for the state power. In the 1958 Assembly election, thus, the reduction of the votes for the independents was accompanied by an increase in the vote for the Democratic Party.

By the time the 1960 presidential and vice-presidential elections approached, the popularity of the Liberal Party was very low, and the chances of the Democratic Party's winning the elections looked very good. Cho Byung-ok and Chang Myon were nominated as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the Democratic Party respectively. But

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The strong resistance of the press to government repression and its activities against the authoritarianism during the Rhee regime are well presented in Ibid., pp. 178-215

For the result of the 1958 election, see, CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, pp. 1148-1149. Election results did not reflect the popular opinion because there was a significant election frauds in the rural districts. According to a study of people in a rural county in North Kyungsang Province, 28.9 percent of the respondents said that their vote for a candidate in the 1958 election was due to the "coercion". Chon-ju Yun, Han'guk chongch'i ch'egye [The Korean Political System], p. 242.

Quee-Young Kim, Fall of Syngman Rhee, pp. 24 and 32.
once again its presidential candidate, Cho Byung-ok, died in the U.S. one month before the election.52

As the opposition presidential candidate died, Rhee would be elected unopposed, and the attention was now focused on the vice-presidential election. The stake in the vice-presidential election was perceived very high because Rhee was 85 years old at the time, and most people, as well as the two main parties, thought that there was a good possibility that he would not survive his fourth term. Chang Myon, who had won the 1956 vice-presidential election, seemed to have become more popular. However, the Liberal Party was determined not to repeat the experience of the 1956 vice-presidential election, and the systematic execution of election rigging on a massive scale was instructed by Choi In-gyu, the Minister of the Interior.53 It included group voting, ballot stuffing, and invalidation or removal of opposition ballots. When the election result showed that Yi Ki-pung won 4.5 times more votes than Chang, it was obvious that election irregularities were committed on a massive scale.

On election day, the riot at a coast city of Masan against the election rigging led to 15 death following clashes with police.54 The regime tried to justify the killing by announcing that the incident was caused by the Communist instigation. But the investigations conducted by several organizations including the Special Investigation Committee of the

52Cho died at the Walter Reed Hospital in the U.S. 10 days after the abdominal surgery. Following the autopsy, the hospital announced that death had been due to coronary thrombosis. New York Times, February 16, 1960.

53Quee-Young Kim, Fall of Syngman Rhee, p. 35.

54Tae-su Han, Han’guk chongdang-sa, p. 262.
Assembly, the press, and the Office of Prosecutor, did not find any evidence that Communists were involved in the incident.\(^5\) The discovery of the body of a young student floating in the harbor with a tear gas canister in his eye sparked another riot in Masan, which resulted in the death of 15 people.\(^5\)

The press played an important role in escalating the political crisis. Even before the election, the press began to report that the election was going to be rigged. The newspaper gave extensive coverage to incidents of political terrorism and student demonstration.\(^5\) After the Masan riots, newspapers presented "vivid and sensational reports of the riots in Masan, characterizing them as a legitimate uprising in protest of unjustifiably massive election fraud."\(^5\) There is little doubt that the active report by the press increased public attention on the issue and tension.\(^5\)

Now there emerged an almost complete consensus among the urban-intellectual population in the opposition to the regime.\(^6\) Seoul, which

\(^5\)Quee-Young Kim, *Fall of Syngman Rhee*, pp. 65-68. A secret report which was prepared for the president and the Assembly by the Office of the Prosecutor said, "Citizens were infuriated by the rigging and demanded a reelection; this was not instigated by Communist elements." *Ibid.*, p. 66. This study contains most detailed description of the process that led to the breakdown of the Rhee regime.

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 72.


\(^5\)Quee-Young Kim, *Fall of Syngman Rhee*, p. 49.

\(^5\)One observer noted, "The most decisive influence on . . . the revolutionary atmosphere was without doubt the power of the newspapers." Song, "Han'guk hyundae ullon-sa-ron," p. 215.

was the center of the opposition strength but did not see any major protests, finally saw the anti-regime street demonstration on April 18, when 4,000 Korea University students went to take a sit-in protest in front of the Assembly building. On April 19, about 100,000 students from almost all universities and high schools in Seoul gathered in the main streets in front of the Assembly building and demanded a new election. When several hundred demonstrators marched toward the Presidential Mansion, the police opened fire on the crowd, killing and wounding many students. During the day, 125 people were killed and more than one thousand wounded in Seoul. 183 people were killed and over 6,000 people were wounded throughout the country.61

As the police lost the capacity to control the revolt, the regime declared martial law in major cities shifting the main responsibility for maintaining political order to the military. At this crucial juncture, the military took politically neutral stance. The reason for the behavior of the military can be partly explained by its own assessment that the Rhee regime completely lost popular legitimacy. Also, the control of Rhee over the military was partly dependent on the U.S. support for Rhee.62 Although there has been no explicit acknowledgement by the military officers on the U.S. influence on the Korean Army, given the strong influence of the U.S., we cannot exclude the possibility of informal influence.

61Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, pp. 62 and 211.

62According to Gregory Henderson, then American official at the U.S. embassy in Korea, the U.S. embassy, by the late 1950s, had built "control knobs at almost all important points of Korean polity except the Presidency." Quoted in Quee-Young Kim, Fall of Syngman Rhee, p. 141.
Faced with the popular revolt against the Rhee regime, the U.S. became highly critical of Rhee, and supportive to the cause of the popular protests. The U.S. State Department issued a statement that:

This government believes that the demonstrations in Korea are a reflection of public dissatisfaction over the conduct of the recent elections and repressive measures unsuited to a free democracy. . . . The Secretary suggested that the Korean government should take necessary and effective action aimed at protecting democratic rights of freedom of speech, of assembly and of the press, as well as preserving the secrecy of the ballot and preventing unfair discrimination against political opponents of a party in power.\footnote{63}

The U.S. privately urged Rhee to resign.\footnote{64} Thus at the end of the regime, its political resources for political control simply ran out. The First Republic ended when Rhee resigned and went to Hawaii, where he died five years later.\footnote{65}

Many variables influenced the fall of the Rhee regime. During the First Republic, there were rapid social changes involving the increase in urbanization, education and mass media: The percentage of people in cities of 50,000 or more increased from 17.7 percent in 1949 to 28 percent by 1960.\footnote{66} From 1948 to 1960 the college student enrollment increased from 24,000 to 97,819.\footnote{67} The circulation of leading newspapers expanded

\footnote{63}{Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 63. The Voice of America and the U.S. armed forces radio network in Korea repeatedly broadcast the content of the State Department. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 64.}

\footnote{64}{Henderson, \textit{Politics of the Vortex}, p. 480.}

\footnote{65}{Choi In-gyu, Home Minister, was tried and executed for rigging the March 15 elections. Yi Ki-pung, the chairman of the Liberal Party, made an apparent suicide with his family members.}

\footnote{66}{Sung-joo Han, \textit{The Failure of Democracy}, p. 26.}

\footnote{67}{Henderson, \textit{Politics of the Vortex}, p. 170.}
rapidly. These changes increased public discontent against the incompetence, corruption and the authoritarianism of the regime.

The rapid social changes, however, did not result in the populist mobilization, let alone the radical ideologies and groups. As we have seen, the opposition to the Rhee regime came primarily from the conservative opposition politicians and the press. When the progressive forces emerged, they were simply eliminated as the case of the Cho Bong Am and his Progressive Party. The 1960 revolt was led by the students and directly caused by the massive election rigging by the regime. It was the purely political and non-radical nature of the protests and riots that insured the support of the conservative elements of the society as well as the military and the U.S. The weakness of the Rhee regime was the lack of project: it was considered a purely personal dictatorship by the overwhelming majority of the politically relevant strata, who were largely conservative.

It was also the formal democratic institutions that set the significant constraints for the continuation of the Liberal Party's rule. The regime failed to control the mass media and education for the purpose of institutionalizing authoritarian rule. The democratic ideology, which penetrated the mass media and education, means that Rhee's authoritarian

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68 For example, the circulation of Dong-A Ilbo went from 17,000 in 1945 to 400,000 in 1960, Ibid., p. 172.

69 For the conservative nature of the 1960 student revolution, see Quee-Young Kim, Fall of Syngman Rhee, p. 136; and Sung-joo Han, "Student Activism: A Comparison between the 1960 Uprising and the 1971 Protest Movement."

70 Robert A. Dahl mentions the importance of a regime's control over the "socioeconomic sanctions" which include mass media and education in political stability. See his Polyarchy, pp. 48-61.
rule was not based upon ideological legitimacy. The press, despite occasional repression by the regime, maintained its autonomy and informed the public and criticized a variety of the negative aspects of the regime, increasing the discontent of the public. To Korean students of the post-independence generation, who were taught the virtue of democracy, the gap between the democratic education they received in school and the authoritarian rule was too great.

The regime also could not eliminate important democratic rules such as holding elections on schedule and allowing the opposition party activities particularly for the elections. Consequently, the increasing urbanization led to the increase in electoral pressure with the reduction of the electorates that the regime could manipulate. The massive election frauds to maintain the regime led to the fall of the Rhee regime.

The fall of the Rhee regime by the "Righteous April 19th Student Uprising" was a historical experience that has had a significant influence on student political behavior and political development since then. The April student revolt has been considered by virtually all Koreans regardless of their political perspective a great event that overthrew a corrupt and incompetent authoritarian regime. Even the 1961 military coup makers justified their actions in terms of the "spirit" of the April movement. The military regime under Park also provided a stiff penalty for the high-ranking officials under the Liberal regime. The constitutions adopted since then refer to the April revolt in their preambles as venerable heritage of the nation along with the March First Independence
Movement in 1919.\textsuperscript{71} Authoritarian methods Rhee employed are taught in schools to illustrate Rhee's authoritarian rule contributing to political learning by students. The corruption and incompetence of the Rhee regime has provided stories for the public. In a rigid anti-Communist system, democratic "revolution" became also legitimized. The April revolt had a particularly significant impact on student political behavior by providing a model for the student political action against the authoritarian regime in the coming period.

Breakdown of Democracy and Military Rule

After the fall of the Rhee regime, pro-Rhee forces including the Liberal party simply disintegrated. The fast disappearance of the Liberal Party proved once again that the party was a mere instrument of one-man rule, and completely lost its popularity among the public. During the three-month period of interim government under the acting president Ho Chong, political stability was maintained and, constitutional amendments including a cabinet system of government with two houses was adopted by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{72}

The national elections, which were held in July 1960, were conducted fairly and freely with a participation of 82.6 percent of the voters. As expected, the Democratic Party won an overwhelming majority of the vote in the lower house election, and secured 175 out of 233 seats. In the

\textsuperscript{71}The military coup leaders also included the 1961 "military revolution" in the constitutional preamble. Unlike the other two events, there is no consensus on the inclusion of the military coup.

\textsuperscript{72}For important features of this constitution, see Reeve, Republic of Korea, pp. 143-144.
election of the less important House of Councilors, Democrats won 31 out of the 58 seats. Most of the remaining seats of both houses went to the independents. Although moderate leftist political parties emerged and participated in the election, they received an insignificant proportion of the popular vote.\(^7\) As the new democratic system also adopted a local-autonomy law, which provided for elections of provincial governors and mayors, the local elections also took place in December 1960.\(^7\) The democratic regime that emerged after the fall of the Rhee regime was then essentially conservative.

The experience of the Second Republic was not positive as the establishment of a democratic regime did not bring social and political order. Within the Democratic Party, a serious power struggle between the new faction and the old faction developed as soon as the Rhee regime fell. When the position of the prime minister went to Chang Myon, the leader of the new faction, the old faction refused to cooperate with the Chang government.\(^7\) Then in October 1960, most members of the old faction left the Democratic Party to organize the New Democratic party (NDP). In addition, younger members raised their voice to increase their power within the government. Although Chang's Democratic Party attained a majority of the assembly seats by the end of his regime, the power

\(^7\)For more details about this election, see, CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, May 1948-October 1972, pp. 493-499.

\(^7\)The local elections did not draw much popular interest as an average of only 38.2 percent of the qualified voters actually cast their ballots. Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 180.

\(^7\)Yun Po Sun of the old faction was elected president, the ceremonial head of the state.
struggle among the party politicians created an atmosphere of political instability.

More seriously, political demands and protests sharply increased in a free political atmosphere. According to one study, there were approximately 1,800 separate demonstrations participated in by a total of 970,000 people during the one-year period following the student uprising. 470,000 students participated in these protests. About 675 labor demonstrations involved some 219,303 individuals. Although most of these protests were not serious in nature, the occurrence of a large number of demonstrations created an atmosphere of political and social disorder. There were also increases in social disorder due to the increase in various publications and crime.

Maintaining public order was not effective partly because of the low police morale, which resulted from their previous service to the Rhee's authoritarian rule. In addition, the Chang regime tried to maintain democratic rule, and did not act harshly to the protesters believing that political and social disorder would be a temporary phenomenon which would disappear as time passed.

The major disturbances came largely from the students, teachers, and the progressive opposition parties. Their demands were broadly in three categories. One was the demand to punish the "traitors of democracy" who rigged the March 1960 elections and ordered to shoot the protesters in

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76 Ibid., p. 179. Another estimate puts much lower figure: 51 demonstrations by university students, and 117 by students of high school level and under, with a total of 119,000 students participating. 35 demonstrations were held by unions with a total of more than 20,000 participants. This seems to include only major protests. Ibid., pp. 431-432; and Korea Annual, 1967, p. 39.
April 1960. The Chang regime made efforts to ameliorate public discontent by purging a large number of government officials and police officers who served under the Rhee regime.

Another significant development was the strong efforts to organize an autonomous union by the primary and secondary school teachers. Finally, there emerged more "radical" demand for new foreign and unification policy by a small minority of the progressive or leftist organizations (students and non-students) and parties. They demanded, through demonstrations, negotiation for national unification with the North and the neutralization of the country. Particularly, a small number of students at Seoul National University formed the "National Student League for National Unification", and issued a statement in early May 1961 that they would meet North Korean students at Panmunjom.

Within the military, junior officers called for the purge of those high-ranking military officers, who took part in the 1960 election rigging, or who were corrupt or incompetent. As a result of this

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77 The most serious incident in this regard occurred when a group of students, angry about the light sentences given to the former officials of the Rhee regime, invaded the National Assembly chamber and occupied the platform to demand appropriate actions for achievement of the "revolutionary goals."

78 Sung-joo Han, Failure of Democracy, pp. 158-159; and Henderson, Politics of the Vortex, p. 178.

79 For this, see Sung-joo Han, Failure of Democracy, pp. 188-197.

80 Sung-joo Han, Failure of Democracy, p. 165.

81 Se-jin Kim, Military Revolution, pp. 77-78.
pressure, several top military officers resigned, weakening the power structure within the military.\(^82\)

The democratic Second Republic was overthrown by the military coup led by Major General Park Chung Hee in May 16, 1961. Many explanations have been offered for the breakdown of the democratic Chang regime.\(^83\) Here I will look at the crucial aspects of the coup, which are important to understand Korean political dynamics since the coup. The most important characteristic of the coup, it seems, is the fact that the coup was secretly and effectively organized by a very small segment of the military without civilian demands or support. The lack of civilian support for the coup is related to the nature of the social and political disorder prior to the coup. Although there were many protests, little serious violence developed. The leftist and progressive forces were vocal but very small. The Chang government was completely dominated by the conservatives, who would not allow any significant "radical" challenge.\(^84\)

While the coup was executed by a small segment of the military without social support, many of the military officers, as well as the

\(^82\)For the examination of this aspect of development within the military, see Ibid., pp. 77-82.

\(^83\)For a brief survey of these explanations, see Sung-joo Han, Failure of Democracy, pp. 2-4. Han himself exclusively focuses on the social and political disorder. He argues that a crucial variable in the breakdown of the regime was the "social and ideological polarization between the conservative and radical political groupings and that between the pro- and anti-Syngman Rhee groups." (p. 212). See also, Se-jin Kim, Military Revolution, pp. 18-35 and pp. 77-101.

\(^84\)As Henderson says, "The nation was taken by almost complete surprise. Talk of coup has been confined to small circles. . . . Popular grumblings had arrived at no consensus on replacing the Democratic government, let alone on the choice of its successor." Politics of the Vortex, p. 182
The primary motivation for the core element of the coup organizers -- Park Chung Hee and the 8th class group of the military academy led by Kim Chong Pil -- was not the radicalization of the society. They had planned to execute the coup at the end of the Rhee regime when there were no radical groups, but this plan was aborted by the student uprising.\textsuperscript{85} By the end of 1960, Park and several other military officers once again decided to execute a coup, and since then made efforts to recruit secretly their supporters. They scheduled the coup for April 19, 1961, but postponed it because the expected student demonstrations (for the first anniversary of the 1960 uprising) did not occur.\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{86}Kim and Park, Kim Hyung-wook hoego-rok, vol. 1, pp. 41-84.
A critical issue here is that there emerged a group of military officers to overthrow the civilian regime, whether it is incompetent, corrupt or weak. The core members of the coup makers were ambitious and self-confident in their abilities to create political order and achieve economic development. The coup leaders, with no significant linkage to any social group or institution, acted not in support of some groups in society, but autonomously to seize the state power in the name of the elimination of social disorder, and the national development. It was the autonomous nature of the coup (and its rule subsequently) that contributed to the cleavage between the coup makers and the civilian politicians and to the subsequent opposition to the military rule by a majority of the attentive public. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of the military institution with the enlarged conception of the national security (but weak commitment to democracy) provided the structural context in which the Korean political system became vulnerable to the military coup in the case of the failure of the regime to maintain social and political order (which would weaken the loyalty of the security-conscious military officers) and to exercise effective control over the military.

The U.S., which had a very strong interest for the stable anti-Communist state and was highly sensitive to political development in Korea

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87As John Kie-Chiang Oh points out, it is very probable that the coup leaders were also encouraged by the military coups in other developing countries in the late 1950s. See his Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 99.

88For example, according to a study of 5,883 students at 5 universities conducted in 1968, to the question whether "the military revolution like the [1961 coup] should not occur again," 69.9 percent of the respondents agreed, while only 10.7 percent of them disagreed. Yong-shin Chun, "Han'guk taehaksang ui chongch'i jeok taedo" [Political Attitude of Korean University Students], p. 49.
was strongly opposed to the coup. This was because (1) the democratic regime was fully cooperative to the U.S. policy objectives; (2) political order, which was threatened in the initial period of the democratic regime, was gradually restored; (3) The coup was organized by those who were least connected to the U.S., and the U.S. thought that the coup group might not recognize the U.S. national interests; and (4) the Kennedy administration was generally committed to the civilian democratic rule.

Carter B. Magruder, the commander-in-chief of the U.N. forces in Korea and the commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, requested President Yun to mobilize counter-coup forces, but Yun declined it for the reason that it would lead to a bloody civil war, which might invite the North Korean invasion. The U.S. recognized the military government under the condition that the civilian rule would be restored in the near future.

After the coup, the military officers directly seized the control of the state by establishing the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction.

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89 The U.S. initially suspected that the coup might be based upon a radical political ideology. A major factor in this suspicion was the fact that Park was involved in the 1948 Yosu-Sunchon rebellion by the leftists. He received death sentence, but released after apparently providing some information, which led to the arrests of other leftists.

90 After learning the breakout of the military coup, Prime Minister Chang Myon escaped to a Catholic nunnerie and was not available. There has been much speculation on the behavior of Yun. As the leader of the New Democratic Party and the main political opponent of Chang Myon, he might have expected that the coup could give him a chance to have a power as a chief executive. Whatever the motivation of Yun, had he strongly opposed to the coup, the coup might have failed.

91 According to Henderson, despite the U.S. opposition to the coup, the U.S. could not use the somewhat risky option of the direct military intervention, which was advocated by the top U.S. military official in Korea, because the Kennedy Administration was already in a difficult situation in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Politics of the Vortex, p. 433.
(SCNR), and were engaged in consolidating their power and "purifying" politics and society.\(^2\) They arrested the leaders of the Chang Myon government, purged the armed forces and the civil service. They also arrested 2,100 "suspected Communist sympathizers" and 4,200 hoodlums.\(^3\) Businessmen were also the target: over 5.8 billion won was confiscated from 59 "illicit fortune makers."\(^4\) Political parties and other organization were disbanded, and 4,369 persons were initially barred from political activities.\(^5\) More than a thousand newspapers and periodicals, most of which sprang up during the Chang regime, were forced to close down. Purification campaign reached one time even to a point of closing bars and coffee shops and burning the imported "luxury" goods.\(^6\) The only group that were benefitting from the coup was the rural people, as the junta decreed the abolition of all usurious debts on the part of farmers and fishermen.\(^7\) Park Chung Hee also had to deal with a serious power struggle within the military. From June 1961 to May 1963, thirteen antirevolutionary or counterrevolutionary cases were discovered, and as a result many original participants of the coup were arrested.\(^8\)

\(^2\)For a discussion of the extensive power of the SCNR and its internal organization, see for example, Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, pp. 118-123.

\(^3\)Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 232.

\(^4\)Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, pp. 138-139.

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 140.

\(^6\)Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 232.

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 232.

\(^8\)Se-jin Kim, Military Revolution, pp. 112-118.
The U.S., while temporarily recognizing the military government, used American assistance as leverage to influence the junta.

If the SCNR could satisfy the [U.S.] Ambassador that it would restore representative government, recognize the U.N. Command's operational control over the ROK Armed Forces, and make certain fiscal and economic reforms, then [the ambassador] was authorized to indicate willingness to release $28 million in remaining military aid for fiscal year 1961 and offer U.S. support for various economic projects and technical assistance in drawing up a 5-year economic development plan.

There is no doubt that this was an effective policy. On August 12, 1961, Park Chung Hee, the chairman of the SCNR, announced that the military would return power to the civilian government in May 1963. In a November 1961 meeting with President Kennedy, Park reiterated his pledge to return the government to civilian control in the summer of 1963, and this was publically announced in the joint communique.

The new Constitution was adopted by the support of the 78.8 percent of the vote in the referendum held in December 1962. The constitution, despite some authoritarian characteristics, was essentially democratic. It provided for a strong presidential system and the direct popular vote for the president, who was limited two consecutive 4-year terms. In early

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101 Ibid., p. 126.

102 For a discussion of the constitution, see, Oh, *Korea: Democracy on trial*, pp. 157-164.
1963, open political activity was allowed to resume, and the opposition politicians began to organize political parties.\textsuperscript{103}

Within the military junta, Kim Jong Pil, the director of the newly created KCIA and second most powerful man after Park, had been preparing for the participation of the coup makers in civilian politics by secretly organizing the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) which had a tightly centralized structure with a powerful administrative secretariat. Many people -- college teachers and government officials -- "uncontaminated" by the old politicians were recruited (often under pressure and threat) and went through political education. However, a strong opposition arose within the military junta against the "Communist-style" party, as well as Kim Jong Pil's complete control of the party. As a result the structure of the DRP was modified by weakening the secretariat structure, and many other politicians and former military officers joined the party.\textsuperscript{104}

However, on March 16, 1963, Park announced that military rule would be extended for four more years. This produced immediate protest by the public and opposition politicians. More serious opposition to the extension of military rule came from the U.S. The U.S. State Department issued a statement opposing the prolongation of military rule, which "would constitute a threat to stable and effective government." President Kennedy sent a stern massage to Park urging him not to break the earlier

\textsuperscript{103}By this time, 269 persons remained on the list of ban on political activity. These included some of the members of the Democratic party including Chang Myon, and most of the leaders of the progressive parties.

\textsuperscript{104}Joungwon A. Kim, \textit{Divided Korea}, pp. 250-251.
pledge. 105 Furthermore, the U.S. denied the request by the military government for the $25 million in economic aid, and it was reported that the United States considered an end to all economic aid. 106 Given the fact that the U.S. economic aids provided more than one half of the Korean budget, and 72.4 percent of the defense expenditures, 107 the significance of the U.S. action was clear. Park decided to end the military rule, and retired from the army in August 1963 to become the presidential candidate of the DRP. The role of the U.S. was, thus, indispensable in making the military junta reverse their decision to extend their rule, and the formal democratic institutions be restored under the name of the Third Republic.

Contesting Semi-Authoritarianism under Park

Like the Rhee regime, the Park regime could be classified as authoritarian. But there are significant differences in their characteristics. The most significant change occurred in the arena of the civil-military relationship. Unlike the First Republic, which was a civilian rule, the Third Republic was dominated by former military officers. For example, 35 percent of the Cabinet ministers, 32.1 percent of Provincial Governors, and 33.3 percent of the Assembly Speakers during the period 1963-1975 were occupied by the ex-military officers. 108

105 Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 155-156; and Se-jin Kim, Military Revolution, p. 132.

106 Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 248.

107 Ibid., p. 341.

108 C. I. Eugene Kim, "Value Congruity Between ROK Civilian and Former Military Party Elites," p. 841. However, since the formal military rule ended in 1963, no active military officers participated in the civil administration except in some special agencies such as the Defense
Another change occurred in the arena of the coercive instruments of political control. The Rhee regime had relied on the police, the rightist youth groups and thugs, and some segment of the military (especially the Army Counter-Intelligence Agency and the military police). After the military coup, the newly created KCIA emerged as the most powerful instrument for political control in normal time, while the role of police, the rightist youth groups and thugs were relatively weakened. The Park regime also exercised a strong control over the military through the Army Security Command. Along with this, the U.S. influence on the Korean military declined significantly. The role of the military institution in the regime stability and maintenance increased as the army was called in to restore order in 1964, 1965, and 1971. It was this methods of political control by the KCIA and the military as well as the governing style by the formal military officers that gave the Park regime strong authoritarian characteristics.\footnote{See Chapter 3 for more discussion the strength of the state vis-a-vis society.}

While the state increased the coercive capacities, the demand for democracy also increased. During the Rhee regime, despite repeated violations of democratic rule, the opposition activities were generally limited to the politicians and the press. Students protested only at the end of the regime after the massive election frauds. During the Park regime, there were almost always protests, particularly by the students, when the democratic rules were significantly violated. The protest movement in 1964 and 1965 against the Korea-Japan normalization talks was
caused partly by the concern that the talks were politically motivated. After the Assembly election in June 1967, students and opposition NDP protested the election irregularities, which even the government admitted to some extent. In 1969, students and opposition politicians and groups protested over the issue of the constitutional revision that would enable Park to run for a third term. The 1971 protests, which led to the imposition of the garrison decree, were largely motivated to challenge the authoritarian rule and other negative aspects associated with it.

In the confrontation between the state, which wanted to maintain its control over society, and the politically articulate members of society, who demanded more democracy, the state almost always prevailed by utilizing its strong coercive instruments. This meant that there was much resentment among the attentive public against the overly authoritarian methods of the rule. But it would lead to an inadequate analysis of Korean politics to view that the Park regime primarily relied on coercion. The Park regime received a good deal of public support for its economic performance. The political space was not large enough to satisfy the attentive public, the press and the opposition politicians, but it was qualitatively different from the Yushin regime. Limited political rights and freedoms existed. Presidential and Assembly elections were held competitively and seriously. The level of direct coercion against the political opposition was much more moderate as long as the opposition activities did not go beyond the anti-leftist boundary. The protesting students (besides activist leaders), if they were unlucky, would face the police beating and temporary arrests. The reporters, who wrote articles, which were very critical about the regime or which exposed very sensitive
issues related to the regime, may encounter interrogation by the KCIA, physical attack by the unidentified thugs, or even expulsion from their company, but generally without suffering very harsh treatment or long-term jail sentence. Consequently, dissident groups and political prisoners, as well as the harsh treatment of the prisoners, were relatively few and they did not attract a public attention.\textsuperscript{110}

A most crucial aspect of the Third Republic, that contributed to its legitimacy, was that the Park regime was accountable to the popular election. During the period, there were 3 Presidential and 3 Assembly elections held in regular intervals. If we compare these elections with those in Western democratic system, it is easy to find out the distortions of the democratic electoral rules. Let's first examine these aspects. Democratic characteristics of the elections were compromised by the illegal involvement of the government in the election, which led to the significant organizational and financial advantage for the ruling party.\textsuperscript{111} The ruling party enjoyed disproportionate advantages in financial resources including campaign funds, which was collected largely from business by illicit means.\textsuperscript{112} The KCIA, police, government and public

\textsuperscript{110}Once again it should be noted that those who were genuinely suspected of espionage or pro-Communist activities were severely repressed. But in an anti-Communist milieu that existed in Korea, these cases did not become much public issue. While the regime used the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law to suppress more or less conservative opposition and the press, in most of these cases, they were released soon.

\textsuperscript{111}During this period, the local elections were not held -- another aspect that reduced the democraticness of the regime.

\textsuperscript{112}For example, it has been estimated that the Korean business receiving foreign loans was required to pay 10 to 20 percent of the loan amount in payoffs to obtain the necessary government guarantees. Joungwon A. Kim, \textit{Divided Korea}, p. 264. The ruling party's obtainment of the
officals (including the Blue House officials) as well as the ruling party were involved in the election in various ways. Compared to the Rhee regime, the election management by the Park regime was much more sophisticated, because of its increased capability to analyze various situations carefully and assess their impacts on election. The efforts were made to eliminate or change the negative factors. The government could also temporarily manipulate political and economic situations for its advantage before the election. More important was the role of the government and public officials as election campaigners (once again, this was illegal). As was during the Rhee regime, this was most effective in the rural area.

Table 8 presents the voter turnouts during the Third Republic. Seoul, the most urbanized city in Korea, had among the lowest voter turnouts. The higher voting rates in rural areas seems to be associated with the government's mobilization of the voters although it is difficult to know exactly how many people were influenced by the government mobilization.

Table 8 presents the voter turnouts during the Third Republic. Seoul, the most urbanized city in Korea, had among the lowest voter turnouts. The higher voting rates in rural areas seems to be associated with the government's mobilization of the voters although it is difficult to know exactly how many people were influenced by the government mobilization.

payments also extended to foreign businesses in Korea. See for example, U.S. House of Representatives, Korean-American Relations, p. 8.

See for example, U.S. House of Representatives, Korean-American Relations, p. 36.

For the inverse relationship between the urbanization and the vote participation, see also Jae-on Kim and B. C. Koh, "Electoral Behavior and Social Development in South Korea," pp. 832-835.

Chong Lim Kim found out in his nationwide survey in 1973 and 1974 of the 2,276 adult that 8.6 percent of them were "mobilized voters" in the 1973 Assembly elections. Mobilized voters were identified those who meet simultaneously all the following three criteria: (1) his (or her) voting decision depends heavily and exclusively upon the advice (or pressure) of another person; (2) he (or she) does not know either name of the two representatives from his district; (3) he (or she) fails totally
TABLE 8. Vote Participation during the Park Regime, 1963-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presidential Elections</th>
<th>Assembly Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1.

The above-mentioned distortion in the democratic election process did not critically deprive the opposition parties and the voters of the significance of the elections. The opposition parties were allowed to operate practically, and the electoral system was generally fair. Although there were election irregularities, the problem of outright election frauds was not serious.116 Even in the 1967 Assembly election, which had more frauds than any other elections under the pre-Yushin Park regime, the degree was probably not as serious as any elections under Rhee. The voting participation also became more realistic than it had been under the Rhee regime. A main reason for a relatively low level of election frauds resulted from the different environment the Park regime had to operate from than the Rhee regime did: The public, by this time, had an experience of inefficacious regarding his (or her) role in politics. Kim shows that most of the mobilized voters were located in rural area (with some regional variation). Other socioeconomic characteristics of the mobilized voters included low education, low class and occupational status, old age, and female. One of their attitudinal characteristics was high submissiveness toward political authorities, which make them vulnerable to mobilized voting. See Chong Lim Kim, "Political Participation and Mobilized Voting," pp. 119-141.

of overthrowing the Rhee regime, which rigged election, and this must have reminded them of the danger of outright election-rigging by the new ruling group.

While the opposition parties had significant organizational and financial disadvantages, they fought seriously to win state power, attacking actively the regime on many issues and problems that would appeal to the public. The voters showed a moderate or high interest in the elections, particularly the presidential ones, and casted their ballots seriously with the expectation that the opposition party could win the election and the state power. The relatively strong interest in the presidential elections was indicated by the high rate of voter turnout in urban areas, and the non-existence of a large scale of blank and null voting, which has been seen in some authoritarian regimes.117

From a comparative perspective, the elections during this period were distinguished from those in some other Third World countries (e.g., Taiwan, Malaysia, Lee Kwan-yu's Singapore, and Suharto's Indonesia) in a sense that the elections in Korea were not simply social control mechanisms but provided the opposition with much more meaningful chances to challenge the state power than the cases in those countries.118 As Sung-joo Han says, "All three presidential elections [during the pre-Yushin Park period] were close and could have gone the other way if there had been a greater degree of unity, popular appeal, and determination

117 In Brazil, for example, the proportion of null and blank votes was 33.7 percent of the votes cast in the 1970 national elections. Stepan, "State Power," p. 334.

118 Obviously this does not mean that the opposition would have been necessarily successful in seizing and maintaining state power in case of their electoral victory.
within the opposition.\textsuperscript{119} In terms of electoral competition, then the Park regime became more democratic than the Rhee regime had been.

An examination of political development during the period demonstrates the degree of competitiveness and seriousness of the election as well as the decreased tolerance by the public (particularly students) for the violation of democratic rules. In the 1963 presidential election, although there were several candidates, the contest was essentially between Park Chung Hee and Yun Po Sun, former president of the Second Republic and the leader of the newly created Civil Rule Party. The candidates conducted vigorous campaigns throughout the country. The opposition candidates, including Yun, criticized the military coup and the subsequent rule by the junta. Yun identified "Five Vices" of the military rule as "hunger, corruption, unemployment, illegality, and disunity," and emphasized the need for civilian rule.\textsuperscript{120} In response to Yun's appeal for civilian rule, Park argued that the election was an "ideological contest between the hypocritical democracy [of the opposition] and the nationalistic democracy."\textsuperscript{121} The "ideological dispute" further escalated when Yun alluded to Park's involvement in the leftist rebellion in Yosu and Sunchon, and even charged that the DRP was organized with the help of a North Korean Communist.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{119} Sung-joo Han, "Political Institutionalization in South Korea, 1961-1984," p. 119.

\textsuperscript{120} Kim and Park, \textit{Kim Hyung-wook hoego-rok}, vol. 2, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{121} Oh, \textit{Korea: Democracy on Trial}, p. 166; and Sang-woo Lee, \textit{Park Chung Hee shidae} [The Park Chung Hee Era], vol. 1, pp. 126-161.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 166.
When the vote counting began, it was Yun who initially led, creating much panic within the ruling group. The result showed that Park defeated Yun by 46.6 percent to 45.1 percent of the vote. There was almost complete consensus among the observers that Yun could have won the election, had other opposition candidates cooperated with Yun in one way or another.

Partly reflecting the geographical origin of the two candidates, Park performed well in the southern provinces of Korea while Yun did well in the northern provinces, particularly in the northwest region including Seoul. Park did well also in the rural areas, but reflecting his unpopularity among urban population, Park received only 37.8 percent of the vote in the urban districts as opposed to the 57.1 percent for Yun. In Seoul, Park received only 30.2 percent of the vote while Yun captured 65.1 percent. Perhaps most of the urban voters, partly due to the historical tradition of civilian supremacy, looked at the former military men with suspicion, and some of them with hostility. The performance of

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123 The story revealed by Kim Hyung-wook, the former KCIA director, tells the anxiety and tension within the ruling group. Some of them became quite impatient, and strongly asked Kim to have the ballot counting stop and take some measures. The KCIA chief, however, thought Park would win, and refused to succumb to their demand. Park Chung Hee himself had a great anxiety during the vote counting. For these and other stories about the difficulties of the election for the DRP, see Kim and Park, Kim Hyung-wook hoego-rok, vol. 2, pp. 78-88.

124 CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 752.

125 See for example, Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 168; and Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea, p. 253.


the military government was also not good. The military officers overthrew
the democratic regime and used various coercive measures to eliminate "old
evil", but suffered from their own factionalism and corruption. Economic development did not show the positive effects yet.

In the Assembly elections, although the DRP won 33.5 percent of the
vote, it captured 110 of the 175 Assembly seats, because the opposition, divided into 11 parties, had an average of six candidates per district.

Park now could claim increased popular legitimacy after the
election, and his DRP had a majority within the Assembly. Park, however, had to face serious opposition during the period of 1964 and 1965 when it was engaged in the negotiation of the Korea-Japan normalization treaty. Due to the massive protests against the signing and ratification of the treaty by students, intellectuals and religious leaders, the government had to declare martial law in June 1964 and a garrison decree in August 1965.

Despite widespread protests in 1964 and 1965, Park increased his legitimacy through his economic performance. Unlike the Rhee regime, Park was very committed to the rapid economic development based upon export-led

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128 Particularly significant scandals were the so-called Four Suspicious Incidents. The public suspected these scandals were caused by the efforts of the military regime to acquire political funds for the operation of the Democratic Republican Party. See Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, p. 143.

129 CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 1226. During the Third Republic, out of a total of 175 assembly seats, 131 seats for the election districts were based on single-member district plurality system. A supplementary 44 seats were distributed by a proportional representation system. For more about the electoral system during the Third Republic, see for example, Seung Heum Kihl, Kwang Woong Kim and Byung Man Ahn, Han'guk son'go-ron, [A Study of Korean Elections], pp. 49-50.

130 For a study of this protest movement, see Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-
Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System.
industrialization.\textsuperscript{131} As a result of the successful completion of the First Five Year Plan (1962-1966), the overall growth rate of GNP during the period averaged 8.3 percent a year. Per capita income had increased from $83.6 in 1962 to $123.5 in 1967.\textsuperscript{132} This was the first time since independence that a definite economic improvement was felt by the public.\textsuperscript{133}

About 3 months before the 1967 elections, the two main opposition parties were merged to form the New Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP nominated Yun Po Sun, who had been narrowly defeated by Park in 1963, as its presidential candidate. The reelection of Park was expected this time even before the election because of the good economic performance by the Park regime. Despite Yun's criticism of the regime on a variety of the issues -- such as dictatorship, corruption, "abuse of privileges", "subservience" (to foreign powers), and economic inequality -- to appeal to the public, Park won the election by capturing 51.4 percent of the vote as opposed to 40.9 percent for Yun.\textsuperscript{134} Elections were conducted fairly and freely in Korean context, and there was no serious dispute about the result of the election.

Particularly significant in this election was that despite urbanization, Park's popularity increased in the urban areas. In fact,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131}Economic policies of the Rhee regime were designed to maximize the U.S. aid without any efforts to encourage export. For this see Cole and Lyman, \textit{Korean Development}, pp. 169-171.
\item \textsuperscript{132}Joungwon A. Kim, \textit{Divided Korea}, p. 268.
\item \textsuperscript{133}For economic development during this period, see Cole and Lyman, \textit{Korean Development}, pp. 121-221.
\item \textsuperscript{134}CEMC, \textit{Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa}, vol. 1, p. 757.
\end{itemize}
Park defeated Yun in urban districts in terms of the overall votes (see Table 9). Even in Seoul, where Yun had won Park by a margin of 34.9 percent of the vote in 1963, Yun led Park by only 6.1 percent this time. The only area that Park lost electoral support was in North and South Cholla Provinces, where the government was considered to discriminate against them in economic investment despite their support of Park in the 1963 election.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Candidates</th>
<th>Urban(^3)</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Seoul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yun</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yun</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\)Urban means cities with population of 50,000 or more.


Thus, despite all the political turbulence involving Korea-Japan normalization treaty, and his semi-authoritarian rule, Park increased

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\(^{135}\)See also, Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial, pp. 182-183.
public support through economic performance. And the result of the election seemed to have further legitimized Park's rule.

Like Rhee Syngman, however, Park did not want to step down after the end of his second term. Since the constitution limited him to only two consecutive 4-year terms for the president, Park had to secure the two-thirds of the Assembly seats to revise the constitution for continuation of his rule. Presumably for this reason, the regime acted to decrease the legitimacy by resorting to some irregularities in the Assembly election held in June. In the election, the DRP and the NDP received 50.6 percent and 32.7 percent of the vote respectively, and the DRP won 129 seats, 12 seats more than the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. The NDP secured only 45 seats. The overwhelming victory of the DRP in the Assembly election was partly caused by the overrepresentation of the DRP due to the single-member district plurality system. But there was evidence that the regime resorted to the more widespread electoral irregularities this time, particularly in some rural districts.

After the elections, student protests broke out against the election fraud, and clashed with the riot police. The regime responded by

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137 In Seoul, for example, while the NDP and the DRP captured 52.4 and 33.3 percent of the vote respectively, the overall strength of the NDP across the districts in Seoul led the party to win 13 of the 14 seats for the districts. Likewise, the strength of the DRP in small cities, the rural areas, and Park's home province led to its complete victory in these areas, which comprised a majority of the election district. See *Ibid.*, vol. 1, pp. 1284-1285.

138 Ki-taek Lee, *Han'guk vadang-sa* [History of Korean Opposition Parties], p. 231; and Joungwon A. Kim, *Divided Korea*, p. 270.
temporarily closing those schools involved in the protests, but the
demonstrations spread to most universities. On July 3, for example, over
20,000 college students in Seoul refused to take final examinations, and
took to the street in demonstrations.¹³ As student protests continued,
most universities and high schools were closed throughout the country and
began summer vacation early.

The opposition NDP, arguing that the Assembly elections involved
"complete irregularities", strongly demanded a new election and the
punishment of those who were involved in electoral irregularities. The NDP
protested in various ways including the boycott of the Assembly.¹⁴ Faced
with strong protests by the student and opposition politicians, the regime
took conciliatory measures. In June, Park admitted that the electoral
irregularities had been committed, and stated that the government shared
with the public in "deploiring and being enraged with" the election
frauds.¹⁵ One elected DRP candidate was arrested, and the recounting of
the ballots in one district resulted in the reversal of the decision that
led to a NDP candidate's victory. The DRP also expelled 6 of its elected
candidates who were suspected of involvement in election irregularities,
although they retained their seats in the Assembly.¹⁶ The NDP, however,
continued to boycott the Assembly for 6 months until the DRP made some

¹³Korea Annual, 1968, pp. 15-17.

¹⁴For more details about the protests by the NDP during this time, see
Ki-taek Lee, Han'guk yadang-sa, pp. 233-239.


¹⁶Korea Annual, 1968, pp. 15-16
concessions in December 1967 including the amendment of election laws to ensure a fair election in the future.

In conducting the constitutional revision, the regime tried to give the impression to the public that the revision itself was not the violation of the basic democratic rules. In early 1969, some leaders of the ruling party began to advocate a constitutional revision to allow Park to run for a third-term. They argued that Korea needed a strong political leadership to achieve national modernization and to defend the country from the North Korean threat.\(^\text{14a}\) To give the impression that he respected the democratic rule, Park himself publically stated that it was his belief that constitutional revision should not be done unless there was a special reason and that constitutionally it was entirely the authority of the Assembly to decide on the issue. He himself did not offer any special reason for the constitutional change.

The constitutional revision issue touched off protest rallies and demonstrations by students. Students regarded that the revising the constitution for the sole purpose of prolonging Park's rule was unsuited for democracy. As a result, nearly all of the universities and colleges were closed by mid-July for early vacation.\(^\text{14b}\) The opposition NDP was determined to block the proposed change in the constitution. The opposition assemblymen called in and questioned the cabinet members on the

\(^{14a}\) Korea Annual, 1970, p. 58; and CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, pp. 559-560.

\(^{14b}\) Korea Annual, 1970, p. 58. For more details about the student protests during this period, see for example, NCCK, 1970 nyondonae minju-wha undong [Democratic Movement in the 1970s], vol. 1, pp. 77-78.
revision issue for ten days. The NDP, along with the Pan-National Struggle Committee for the Opposition of the Constitutional Revision, which was organized by some prominent opposition figures and politicians, was engaged in an active campaign against the revision in several cities.

The issue of the constitutional revision also drew opposition within the ruling DRP. The opposition came primarily from the supporters of Kim Jong Pil, who was recognized by many as a potential successor to Park. In April 1969, Kim's supporters, to demonstrate their solidarity and voting strength, revolted against the party leadership (i.e., Park) by joining with the opposition party members to pass a no-confidence vote against the Minister of Education, Kwon O-Pyong, by a vote of 89 to 57 with 3 abstentions. Park punished the five members who had led the revolt by ousting them from the DRP. Using persuasion as well as pressure, the regime acquired the supporting signature of more than two-thirds of assemblymen including 3 NDP members by the end of July. Kim Jong Pil himself, probably figuring out that opposition would be futile, turned to support the constitutional revision. In September 1969, an amendment bill was passed secretly by the ruling DRP members, without the presence of opposition party members, who were determined to block the bill.

To defeat the revision in the national referendum, the opposition party conducted campaigns against the revision throughout the country.

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145 CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 560.
146 Ki-taek Lee, Han'guk yadang-sa, p. 249.
147 This meant that more than 40 DRP assemblymen crossed the party line.
As the student protests resumed as soon as the school opened for fall semester, the regime closed universities for 40 days until the constitutional revision was passed in the referendum.\(^{149}\) When the constitutional amendment was put to a national referendum on October 17, it received support of the 65.1 percent of the vote.\(^{150}\) (77.1 percent participated in the vote). The constitutional amendment did not result in the destruction of democracy, but allowed Park to run for a third term of office. And he would have to compete for the popular vote to be elected. Political opposition was not brutally suppressed, but was given a chance to oppose the constitutional revision through the nationwide campaigns. The national referendum was conducted in a generally fair manner in Korean context.

When the 1971 elections came, Park had been in power for ten years. Kim Dae-jung was nominated as the NDP's presidential candidate. Election campaigns were conducted vigorously. The DRP conducted a total of 1,115 election rallies throughout the country while the number of rallies conducted by the NDP party leadership only was 240.\(^{151}\) The opposition groups organized the National Committee for the Preservation of Democracy, and engaged in the campaign for free and fair elections. Specifically, the organization sent 6,139 people to observe the election.\(^{152}\) The public interest in the election was high, as large crowds gathered to listen to

\(^{149}\)Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae, Vol. 2, pp. 55-56.

\(^{150}\)CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 1385.

\(^{151}\)Ibid., vol. 1, p. 581.

the campaign speeches by both candidates. In one election rally held in Seoul, an estimated 300,000 people came out to listen to the Kim Dae Jung's speech. While Park advocated uninterrupted modernization and political stability, Kim criticized the regime on a wide range of the issues -- including government corruption, Park's long-term rule, regional and urban-rural developmental gaps, income inequalities, and military and foreign policies. As one observer put it, "the most critical issue of the 1971 elections was perhaps the very fact that Park and his DRP have been in power too long, and official abuses and corruption have become associated with it." Kim Dae Jung charged that Park would not step down after the third-term, and that Park was preparing for the indefinite rule. To eliminate the suspicion that Park would attempt to rule indefinitely, Park announced two days before election day that this election would be his last try at the presidency. Park also said that he would promote his successor. Park won the election by capturing 53.2 percent of the vote, while Kim Dae Jung received 45.3 percent (see Table 10).

Once again, the most salient dimensions of voting patterns were urban-rural cleavages and regional differences. Some of the opposition

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153 Ibid., p. 581.

154 For more details on election campaigns, see CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, pp. 567-582. See also Chae-Jin Lee, "South Korea: Political Competition and Government Adaptation," p. 38.


157 CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 762.

TABLE 10. Urban-Rural Votes in the 1971 Presidential
Election (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Park</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Urban means cities with the populations of 50,000 or more.


claimed that the election involved serious irregularities and insisted to
boycott the Assembly election, and there were some scattered student
protests against the election frauds. However, the election frauds were
not serious enough to receive a response from the opposition NDP and the
public.

In the following Assembly election, the DRP won only 4.4 percent
more popular vote than the NDP, as it captured 48.8 percent of the vote
and the NDP received 44.4 percent. In terms of the assembly seats, the NDP
increased its seat to 89, while the DRP attained a majority of the
assembly seats by capturing 113 seats.\(^\text{158}\) The possibility for another
constitutional revision by the DRP, however, disappeared.

Korean Political Attitudes during the pre-Yushin period

We have seen that the increase in the demand for more democratic
rule during the Third Republic was indicated by the student protests. An

\(^{158}\)CEMC, Taehan Min'guk sogn'go-sa, vol. 1, p. 720
examination of the empirical data available provides some insights into the nature of democratic demands and political discontent during the period. It is evident that Korean students did not demand a full-fledged democratic system. For example, in a study of 5,883 students in 1968, 76.5 percent of the respondents agreed, and only 14.2 percent disagreed to the statement that "It is better to maintain the domestic order, even if it could result in restricting the freedom of people to some extent." This reflected the public perception of the existence of the North Korean threat. However, there was widespread recognition that election should be conducted with a reasonable degree of fairness. Thus, in the same study, 86.7 percent of the respondents agreed to the statement that "Even if the small irregularities can be accepted, we can not stand up the corrupt election which makes the basis of democracy unstable." This reply is consistent with the student protests against the election frauds in 1967 and the constitutional revision in 1969.

A significant proportion of the attentive public were already dissatisfied with the existing political situations before the emergence of the Yushin regime. In a survey conducted in April and May 1972, when asked to offer opinion to the statement that "Considering her many difficult problems, it may be said that Korea is doing all right in political matters," 51.6 percent of the university students provided negative answers while only 10.9 percent of them answered affirmatively (see Table 11).

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160 Yong-shin Chun, "Han'guk taehaksaeng ui chongch'i jeok taedo," p. 49.
161 Ibid.,
TABLE 11. "Korea is doing all right in political matters."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>True</th>
<th>False</th>
<th>No Idea</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University Students</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Students</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sung-Chick Hong and Young Ho Lee, "Popular Perceptions of Political Leadership," p. 137.

Journalists showed slightly more negative attitudes than the students. Both of their attitudes contrast sharply with the farmer's response. Although the question was worded ambiguously, it is probable that the negative answer to the question was largely the expression of the opposition to the authoritarian tendencies, which increased since the declaration of the national emergency at the end of 1971.

In a survey conducted in June 1971 (that is, before more authoritarian tendencies were taken by the end of 1971), the reporters were found to be already very critical about the Park government. 70.1 percent of the reporters voted for Kim Dae Jung while only 16.1 percent voted for Park Chung Hee in the 1971 presidential election (see Table 12).\(^\text{142}\)

\(^{142}\) How well the reporters here represent the whole population of the reporters is not a critical issue here, because we are here primarily interested in comparing the political attitudes of the same reporters in different categories of the questions. However, in connection to the survey discussed in the above, there is little doubt that a majority of the journalists were critical about the Park regime during the period.
TABLE 12. Vote by Occupation in the 1971 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Park</th>
<th>Kim</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>No Vote</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Workers</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functionaries</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporters</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1971 data by Nack-jung Kim

The voting behavior of the reporters contrasts greatly with that of the workers. Within the workers, the support for Park was negatively related to the level of their skill (which, in turn is very strongly related to the educational level and income) The engineers, who had generally a college education and higher income, tended to show slightly higher voting support for Kim Dae Jung. Table 13 shows the negative relation of income to the support for Park.

TABLE 13. Vote by Monthly Income in the 1971 Presidential Election (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Park</th>
<th>Kim</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>No Vote</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below 10,000 Won</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-20,000</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-30,000</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000-40,000</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000-50,000</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 100,000</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1971 data by Nack-jung Kim
These studies show rather clearly that it was the educated public with higher income, rather than the popular classes, who were critical about the regime. There seems to be many reasons for this. They considered the Park's authoritarian methods of rule, with its utilization of the KCIA and the military, were somewhat excessive even considering the North Korean threat because they were exercised in the absence of the internal threat from the radical or popular forces and were imposed against the conservative opposition. It is for this reason that even many pro-regime politicians considered that the KCIA activities for domestic political control was excessive and unjustified in many cases. The constitutional revision in 1969 was also opposed by the majority of the attentive public, who considered that the purpose of the revision was solely to prolong Park's rule. While the attentive public recognized that there had been economic improvement, many of them thought that there were many problems accompanied with it such as corruption and inequality. That the critical attitudes of the reporters were essentially non-radical and politically motivated is indicated in their response to the question relating to the inflow of the foreign capital (see Table 14).

While recognizing the authoritarian characteristics of the Park regime, Koreans still regarded the Korean political system as more democratic than authoritarian by June 1971 (that is, before the more authoritarian tendencies took place in October 1971).163 (See Table 15).

163 The question was "To what extent do you think Korea is free democratic state?" The term "state" (gukga) in this context has broader meaning than the governing regime (chunghwon) and is close in its meaning to the political system (chaejae).
TABLE 14. Attitudes toward the Inflow of Foreign Capital (in percentages)

Question: What do you think about the inflow of the foreign capital from such countries as Japan and the U.S.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporters</th>
<th>Unskilled Workers</th>
<th>Skilled* Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely support</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Not oppose&quot;</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolutely oppose</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/No answer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>5,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Skilled workers include functionaries, skilled workers, and engineers.


TABLE 15. Political Attitudes toward the Korean Political System (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporters</th>
<th>Unskilled Workers</th>
<th>Skilled* Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely free and democratic</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free democratic to some extent</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>55.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian without much freedom</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completely authoritarian</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>5,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Skilled workers include functionaries, skilled workers, and engineers.


63.3 percent of the reporters viewed the Korean political system as more or less democratic. Among the workers, the proportion was much higher.
Thus it is rather clear that in comparison to the support for the Park regime, the public support for the political system was rather high.

I have argued in this chapter that there existed in the Republic of Korea important democratic aspects and demands prior to the imposition of the Yushin regime. Since the establishment of South Korea under the sponsorship of the U.S., democracy was adopted as the basic principle of Korean politics within the narrow boundary of anti-leftism. Democratic institutions and ideology was widely accepted by the attentive public. No alternative political institutions were openly advocated by any significant group in state and society. The violations of the democratic rules of game by the Rhee and Park regimes were significant (and for this reason, they were basically authoritarian rather than democratic regime), but did not go so far to destroy and deny democracy all together. Limited political rights and freedoms existed; Opposition political parties were practically allowed to operate; The president was accountable to the election, which was held with increasing significance; and democratic ideology, which was constrained by anti-leftism, was not denied at fundamental level.

Using the democratic ideology, the opposition politicians and the press during the Rhee regime continued to criticize and oppose the regime's authoritarian measures, corruption, and incompetence. There also emerged a new generation of students who had received extensive education on democracy. The discontent against the great discrepancy between the formally claimed democracy and its actual violation through the massive election frauds contributed to the fall of the Rhee regime. The overthrow of the Rhee regime by the student-led revolts in April 1960 had an
important impact on Korea politics as it gave legitimacy to the student protests against the authoritarian regime and resulted in the more active involvement of students later on.

While the social and economic disorder increased during the democratic Chang regime, the 1961 coup was executed autonomously without any significant civilian demand and support. Although the military coup reflected the strength of the military in an anti-leftist state, the junta had to return to the formal democratic system due to the domestic opposition and, probably more importantly, the U.S. pressure. Despite its military characteristics and strong control over the society by the KCIA and the military, the Third Republic, like the Rhee regime, was formally based upon democratic institutions and accepted democratic ideology. The level of repression against the conservative political opposition was not very harsh, and there existed few political prisoners recognized by the public. Most importantly, the Park regime was legitimized by the popular elections.14

Particularly important in our discussion of democratic aspects in pre-Yushin regimes, then, is the electoral experiences at the national level. During the Rhee regime, the initial public apathy for the system dominated by conservative politicians began to disappear by mid-1950s, and the popular interest in the elections and the conservative opposition party sharply increased in 1956 and 1960 elections. In both elections, the

14 Indeed, many people point out that had Park stepped down after the two-terms (or even three-terms) in office, he would have become a hero because of his contribution to both economic and political development in Korea.
opposition parties competed seriously to achieve the state power (or a part of it in the case of the 1960 elections).

The elections during the Third Republic became more competitive and serious than those during the Rhee regime. From the regime's perspective, the April uprising must have reminded of the danger of the outright election frauds. Both opposition politicians and the voters considered that while there were many constraints and distortions in the elections, there was a possibility of changing government through the electoral process. The violations of democratic rules, such as the election frauds in 1967 elections and the 1969 constitutional revision, were less tolerated by the attentive public, particularly by the students.

By the end of the pre-Yushin regime, there were already widespread demand among the politically articulate members of society for more democratic rule. While there was public recognition that some political restrictions were inevitable due to the existing North Korean threat, the majority of the attentive public thought that many of the authoritarian measures were imposed without the internal threat to the national security or economic development.

The Yushin system for the first time in the ROK history almost completely destroyed the democratic rights and freedoms, eliminated the possibility of changing government through election, and took very harsh measures against the political opposition. "Korean-style democracy" was proclaimed, and disseminated in society including schools. In the absence of a new and clear project, this was the core problem of the politics under the Yushin system.
CHAPTER V
DYNAMICS OF THE YUSHIN SYSTEM

We have examined in the previous chapter the factors that would provide fundamental constraints for the Yushin regime -- important experiences with democratic institutions (particularly national elections and limited freedom to criticize and oppose the regime) and the widespread demand for more democratic rule among politically articulate members of society. Given this democratic experience and demands, a new and clear project was needed to maintain the new authoritarianism and to justify the increased coercion it accompanied.

We have seen in Chapter 3, the Yushin regime was imposed by Park and a handful of his associates without social demand or support. Park justified the regime change in terms of the national unification and problem of the rapidly changing international political situation (particularly the changing U.S.-China relationship). After the seeming importance of these issues largely disappeared, the national security issue began to be emphasized again. Particularly after the victory of communism in Indochina in 1975, the North Korean threat was used as the main justification for the maintenance of the Yushin regime. Throughout the Yushin regime, Park also made effort to use economic performance for the legitimation of his new authoritarianism.
Since these projects were not very effective in generating popular support for the regime, it was largely coercion that maintained the Yushin regime by the repression of the opposition movement. The strong and highly centralized state with a broad conception of national security confronted the weak political opposition. With the exclusive possession of the violent means of coercion in its hands, the regime now severely restricted political rights and freedoms, and raised sharply the cost for challenging the regime.

A main problem for the regime was that strong support was largely limited to the state officials. Even for these people, their support was for Park's rule rather than for the political institutions of new authoritarianism. Thus there was little prospect for the maintenance of the Yushin regime after Park. The lack of the projects meant that the regime did not have social groups that by criticizing and confronting the political opposition, would have legitimized the coercive measures against the political opposition by the regime.

The weakness of the state also resulted from the conservative nature of the political opposition. The opposition came from university students, intellectuals, Christians, the press, and the opposition politicians. Their basic demand was to go back to the pre-1972 political system, as the popularly used term, the "restoration of democracy", testified. Although there were a small minority of progressive activists, who suffered greatly from the harsh repression, it was the conservative and largely political nature of the opposition that made the application of the regime's coercion less legitimate.
In addition to the lack of a clear new project, weakness of social support, and the essentially conservative nature of the opposition movement, the authoritarian Korean regime faced another weakness for its long-term maintenance. There was an external, particularly U.S., influence that constrained the excessive repression of the state.

In this chapter, I will first examine the dynamics of the Yushin regime by looking at the interaction between the regime and the opposition. This involved the regime's effort to create new projects, and the regime's employment of its coercive capabilities (which is dependent on the strength and unity of the state) on the one hand, and the opposition movement on the other hand. (their composition and demands, as well as the intensity and extensiveness of the political opposition). The external and internal factors (the U.S., the Vietnam War, and the North Korean threat) also influenced the dynamics of the Yushin regime. Finally the socioeconomic changes and their political consequences should be also examined.

This chapter will also look at the breakdown of the Yushin regime. While the assassination of Park by the KCIA director was unexpected, we can understand retrospectively that there were factors which by increasing political tension, contributed to the disintegration of the core element of the state. For an adequate understanding of the way the regime broke down, once again we need to look at the political structural characteristics of the regime and the nature of the regime.

*The Failure of the New Project*
There were essentially 3 projects that the Park regime tried to utilize for its maintenance — North-South dialogue, economic development, and national security. Here, we will look at the issue of North-South dialogue. The latter two issues will be discussed later.

Park and his loyalists justified the regime change in terms of the issues of North-South dialogue and national unification. It was specifically argued that the regime change was necessary for the unity of the South Korean people in pursuing the dialogue with North Korea. Although the contact with North Korea was interpreted by most South Koreans as an indication of new hopeful era in the North-South relationship, the imposition of the more authoritarian regime was neither demanded nor expected by any groups in society. However, the dialogue might have played an important role in containing the emergence of the opposition movement by confusing the public for the time-being under the situation of the tight press censorship.

The South-North meetings continued to be held in Seoul and Pyongyang after the imposition of the Yushin regime. After two cochairmen's meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that were held in November 1972, the SNCC was created in November 1972 to discuss the various issues involving national unification. Subsequently 3 meetings of the SNCC were held until June 1973. In addition, several meetings of the South and North Korean Red Crosses were also held to discuss the issue of

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1As we have seen, the "rapidly changing international situation" was also emphasized when Park declared the Yushin regime, but this issue attracted much less public attention than the unification issue. See Chapter 3.
the families that were separated between the North and South. These contacts accompanied a great reduction in the hostile activities and attitudes on both sides.

However, the meetings between South and North Korea did not produce any substantive agreement due to the sharply different positions each side held. The South advocated a "step-by-step approach" in which tension should be reduced first through various socioeconomic exchanges prior to the discussion of any military and political issue. The North, however, argued that political and military issues should be also discussed. Their proposal included the cessation of arms reinforcement and the arms race, mutual troop reductions down to 100,000 or less, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two sides. While the South wanted to join the U.N. separately, the North criticized it as an attempt for a permanent division of Korea, and insisted to enter the U.N. as one state. North Korea also insisted to establish a South-North confederation under the name of the Confederated Republic of Korea. Same problem happened in the Red-Cross meetings: the South wanted to discuss only the family-reunion project, while the North also demanded the repeal of the anti-Communist law in the South.

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2Korea Annual, 1974, p. 8.
3Byung Chul Koh, Foreign Policy Systems, pp. 177-178; and Hak-Joon Kim, The Unification Policy of South and North Korea: A Comparative Perspective, pp. 276-282.
4Hak-Joon Kim, Unification Policy, pp. 282-288.
The different positions of North and South Korea indicated that there was no change in the deeply held mutual distrust between the two. The South viewed that the North continued to pursue the strategy of unifying Korea under communism. The North Korean proposals on political and military issues were unacceptable because they were, in the South Korean view, designed to weaken its national security. North Korea, on the other hand, argued that without discussing the political and military issues, the dialogue was meaningless. Given these dramatically opposed views, there was little possibility that the dialogue would achieve any meaningful agreement.  

The dialogue practically ended in August 1973, as North Korea in the aftermath of the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping incident announced that it could not discuss the unification issues with a South Korean government that "represents the patriotic democratic people insisting on peaceful unification." It also criticized the proposal of the South for the separate joining of the U.N. "completely reversed the North-South joint communique." Although contacts continued on a less meaningful level, there was little hope for a major breakthrough in North-South relationship. Each side resumed their propaganda activities, and the South Korean government began to talk about the North Korean threat again.

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6By late November 1972, a knowledgeable observer already reported that the North-South dialogue was clearly used for political propaganda purposes by both sides. See New York Times, November 30, 1972.

7The Kim Dae Jung kidnapping incident will be discussed in the below.

8Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae [The Park Chung Hee Era], vol. 1, pp. 342-434.
Regime Coercion and Opposition during the First Half of the Yushin Regime

The opposition movement had been silent for nearly two years since the end of 1971. The most important reason for this was not only the public confusion involving the unification issue but the increase in the level of the regime coercion. The sudden declaration of martial law was sufficient to make the political opposition and the public fearful. The press was placed under tight censorship, and the regime increased surveillance on the known opposition activists. A severe form of coercion was used to the targeted opposition politicians immediately after the imposition of the Yushin system. Particularly, 13 NDP assemblymen, who had used to attack the regime strongly in one way or another, were taken into custody and tortured as it was revealed later. The punishment of the politicians for their acts done prior to the emergence of the Yushin regime made it clear to the opposition politicians that the regime would no longer tolerate the opposition activities. Several opposition activities of a very small scale occurred, but were easily repressed by the regime.

While coercion continued to exist, the regime moved to establish a normal functioning of the new political system. As examined in Chapter 1, the restructuring of political society led to the significant weakening of

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10 For a detailed description of this incident, see for example, Kyung-jae Lee, Yushin kudaeta, pp. 30-59.

11 For these cases, see Hae-Chan Lee, "Yushin ch'eje wa haksaeng undong" [The Yushin Regime and Student Movement], p. 233.
the political parties and the National Assembly, but not their elimination. Given the public experience of formal democratic institutions, the low level of threat prior to the imposition of the Yushin regime, and the conservative nature of the political opposition, the complete elimination of democratic institutions would have resulted in much more negative reaction from the public as well as from the U.S. The regime probably calculated that given the strength of the state, the weakened opposition party and restricted democratic process would be sufficient to prevent the effective challenge by the political opposition to the regime.

Martial law was lifted on December 13, 1972, and elections were held in February 1973 for the two-thirds (146) of the 219 members of the National Assembly. Elections were conducted in an essentially quiet atmosphere, because the new Assembly election law severely restricted campaign activities.\(^\text{12}\) Despite the fact that the elections lost much of the practical meaning, 72.9 percent of the voters participated in the election. The election result showed that the ruling DRP, by capturing 38.7 percent of the vote, received less votes than the combined votes for the 2 opposition parties (see Table 16).\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\)For example, individual campaign activities such as canvassing and using placards were prohibited. Campaign speeches by the candidates had to be made collectively in each electoral district, and was limited to 2-3 times. Criticism on the Yushin regime was not allowed. The new system also eliminated the voting observation team by the parties. CEMC. Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 2, October 1972-December 1973, pp. 45-47; and Sung-il Choi, "The Electoral Reform, the New National Assembly, and Democracy in South Korea: a Functional Analysis," p. 1093.

\(^{13}\)The new electoral system under Yushin adopted a system of multi-member election districts. Each voter cast one ballot, and the top two vote-getters in each district were elected. CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 2, pp. 45-47.
TABLE 16. Distribution of Votes and Seats in the 1973 Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DRP</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>DUP</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Votes</td>
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<td>32.5%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
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The DRP, however, captured 50 percent of the elected seats, and with one-third of the Assembly members appointed by Park, the pro-regime assemblymen occupied the two-thirds of the assembly seats. The National Assembly, whose power significantly weakened, opened its session in May 1973. The regime also felt secure enough to open the school for spring 1973, and to allow most of the students who had been expelled for their involvement in the 1971 demonstrations to return to school.¹⁴

By summer 1973, two developments created problems for the regime, providing a space for the political opposition to protest. One was, as we discussed earlier, a virtual end of the North-South dialogue: It became clear that the unification issue no longer provided the justification for the Yushin regime. The other was the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, the opponent of Park in the 1971 presidential election. Kim, who was in Japan at the time of the imposition of the Yushin regime, decided to have a self-imposed exile, and subsequently engaged in anti-Yushin activities in the U.S. and Japan. In August 1973, Kim was kidnapped from Japan by KCIA agents and brought to Korea. According to Kim, the kidnappers tried to

kill him by throwing him to the sea. Although the regime initially
denied its involvement in the kidnapping incident, the investigation by
Japanese government found out that KCIA agents were involved in the
incident.

Strong protests came from the Japanese government. The Japanese
government postponed the Korea-Japan ministerial conference which had been
scheduled for early September at which time Japan was expected to offer
economic assistance. The issue was settled somewhat after prime minister
Kim Jong Pil was sent to deliver the Korean government's official apology
for the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung with the promise that such an incident
would not be allowed to happen again.

The kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung disturbed the opposition, and the
KCIA's involvement in the kidnapping of the leading opposition figure put
the regime in a defensive position. In this context, student
demonstrations demanding democratization began to break out in early
October at Seoul National University.

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16 See for example, Ibid., September 8, 1973.
17 Sungjoo Han, "South Korea: The Political Economy of Dependency," p. 46.
18 Ibid., p. 47; and Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato, U.S. Policy Toward
Japan and Korea, pp. 157-158.
19 The regime, however, officially continued to deny its involvement
in the kidnapping case.
20 In the first protest by the Liberal Arts and Science students, the
distributed leaflets included the following demands: first, an end to the
"fascist rule" and establishment of the liberal democratic system; second,
an end to subordination to Japan and the guarantee of the people's right
to livelihood by establishing a self-reliant economic system; third, the
dissolution of the KCIA and disclosure of the true story of the Kim
The regime initially responded by taking tough measures against the protests. After the protests at Seoul National University, the police arrested a total of 215 students, and 23 of them prosecuted. In addition, disciplinary actions were taken against 97 Seoul National University students, including 23 expulsions.\footnote{\textit{NOCK}, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong [The Democratization Movement in the 1970s], vol. 1, pp. 276-279.} Despite these measures, student demonstrations protesting the arrests of the students and demanding democratization spread to about 30 universities and their intensity increased by the end of the year.\footnote{In 1974, there were 69 four-year colleges or universities with the number of their students totalling around 180,000 and 11,000 faculty members. \textit{Korea Annual}, 1974, pp. 204-205. It is normally the major university students at big cities (particularly Seoul) who participated in demonstration.} For example, 4,000 students of Ewha Women's University held a campus rally on November 12, demanding the establishment of the democratic regime, freedom of assembly and the press, and the immediate release of the jailed students. The students decided to wear black ribbon until their demands were met. On November 15, 2,000 students at Korea University clashed violently with the riot police. In addition to these and other major student protests in Seoul, major protests began to occur by early December in other cities such as Taegu, Pusan, and Kwangju. On December 1, 1,000 Kyungbuk University and 1,000 Pusan University students participated in the protests against the regime. On December 3, 1,000 students at Chunnam University took the campus rally.

The size and mode of the participants in the protests varied. In
some cases, it involved hundreds of students while in others it involved thousands of students. Some refused to attend class or school or to take exams. Others went to sit-ins, rallies, and street demonstrations. Still others went to hunger strikes. The content of the student statement or declaration always included the demand for the release of the jailed students, the criticism of the repressive Yushin regime, and the demand for democracy. As a result of the student protest movement, the universities went into winter vacations 3 weeks earlier.

The eruption of student demonstrations was accompanied by the reporters' protests. The reporters were particularly dissatisfied with the government censorship, which prohibited the news coverage of the ongoing opposition movement including the student protests. Their demands were thus specifically focused on freedom of the press. In November 1973, reporters of the Dong-A Ilbo, after their efforts to report the student protests failed, undertook several overnight sit-ins demanding freedom of the press. The protest, largely in the form of issuing a statement demanding freedom of the press, rapidly spread to the major newspapers and broadcasting companies in Seoul. The Journalists Association of Korea also adopted a resolution rejecting "any unfair and unreasonable political pressure on press activities."
Faced with the widespread protests among students and journalists, the regime took conciliatory measures to reduce the discontents. In late November, Education Minister Min Kwan-sik announced that the government had instructed the "agencies concerned" to stop all surveillance activities on the campuses.28 Prime minister Kim Jong Pil said in early December that government will "quietly remove various restrictions on the press."29 Park replaced the KCIA director, Lee Hu-rak, and reshuffled the cabinet on December 3.30 He then ordered that all the students who had been arrested for anti-regime demonstrations be released and that all disciplinary actions against the students be cancelled (although some of them were already inducted to the military service after being expelled from school).31

Another challenge to the regime came from some intellectual and religious leaders.32 They organized the Movement for the Petition of the Constitutional Revision by the end of the year, and declared that "all situations of today ultimately boil down to the issue of complete restoration of democracy." Specifically, they were engaged in the campaign to collect signatures supporting the constitutional revision, which would

28Ibid., 1974, p. 16.
30The replacement of the KCIA director was believed to be largely due to the agency's involvement in the kidnapping case.
31Ibid., December 8, 1974.
32These people, who were not participated in the political party, but engaged in opposition activities, are known as chaeva insa in Korea. Chaeva literally means "staying in the field." Insa means figure. Many chaeva figures and groups tended to be more progressive and/or nationalist than the opposition party members.
"restore the original form of the democratic constitution that existed before the current constitution." It claimed to have collected 300,000 signatures in 10 days.

The opposition NDP was deeply divided by factionalism when the Yushin regime was imposed. As a result, a segment of the leading party members broke away from the NDP in December 1972 to form the Democratic Unification Party. The NDP elected in May 1973 Yu Chin San president of the party. Although the party adopted a new party platform, pledging itself to the restoration of democracy, the party did not seriously challenge the regime at this time. In the wake of the harsh punishment of its members by the regime, the cost of attacking the regime seemed to be too great. In fact, the NDP didn't even disclose the torture of its members by the regime until 1975. The weakness of the NDP, which was partly due to the moderate party leadership, was reflected in the "message to the people" in the May 1973 party convention. The NDP, while recognizing there had been "retreat in the constitutional polity", said that the so-called "hard-line" opposition attitude, which "solely attempt to attract public popularity", should be avoided. "Advice" and "persuasion" should be preferred methods.

Thus the NDP was cautiously demanding to change certain undemocratic measures without directly demanding regime change. For example, the NDP presented a bill calling for the restoration of the harbeas corpus

34 Korea Annual, 1974, p. 73.
35 Ki-taek Lee, Han'guk yadang-sa, pp. 301-302.
system. After the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping, the opposition members questioned the government officials about the incident, and submitted a bill for the resignation of the Cabinet members. Both of the bills were of course defeated, and the opposition party did not even participate in the constitutional revision campaign initiated by chaeva leaders.

The regime became seriously disturbed by the increasing activities of the political opposition involving the public campaign for the constitutional revision. Park first warned to stop the campaign. When this warning was not effective, he declared in January 1974 the Emergency Measures (EM) Nos. 1 and 2 claiming that the anti-regime activities were "a direct challenge to the legitimacy of popular mandate endorsing the Yushin structure and also a serious threat to the basic order and security of the nation." The EM No. 1 made illegal any political activities that criticized or attempted to challenge the Yushin system. It also prohibited not only the "fabrication or dissemination of the false rumors" but the reporting or publishing of the opposition activities. The regime declared anyone who violated or criticized the EM No. 1 was subject to "arrest, detention, search or seizure, without warrant", and could be punished up to 15 years in prison. The emergency court-martial was set up by the EM No. 2 to punish the violators of the decree.

To show its seriousness, the government arrested dozens of selected opposition activists for the violation of the EM No. 1. They included 2

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36 Korea Annual, 1974, pp. 9-10.
37 Ki-taek Lee, Han'guk yadang-sa, p. 306.
38 Korea Annual, 1975, p. 328.
39 For the text of the EM No. 1, see Ibid., 1975, p. 329.
leaders of the constitutional revision campaign; 11 clergymen and staff in the Urban-Industrial Mission, who called for the rescission of the EMs and the restoration of democratic order; and 7 Yonsei University students who protested against the Yushin regime.\textsuperscript{40} They were tried in the emergency court-martial, and sentenced up to 15 years in prison.\textsuperscript{41}

Compared with the pre-Yushin regimes, these were clearly harsh measures against the opposition. However, the student demonstrations resumed in 1974 as students returned to school for the spring semester. Furthermore, student activists from several universities now initiated a bolder attempt to coordinate their protests so that they could demonstrate at the same time. Along with this, the rumors were circulated that there might be a "crisis" in March or April. Because of the arrest of the key organizers in advance, the major demonstrations they planned failed to occur. Only scattered protests took place.\textsuperscript{42} Despite the failure of the major student demonstration, the regime was alarmed by what appeared to be the organized nature of the student movement. Determined to eliminate opposition activities including student protests, the regime decided to raise sharply the cost of challenging the regime.

\textsuperscript{40} NOCK, 1970 nyon\-dae minju\-wa undong, vol. 1, pp. 312-318; and Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae, vol. 3, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{41} Meanwhile, EM No. 3 was proclaimed on January 1974 to "stabilize the people's livelihood." The decree included, among others, the reduction or exemption of taxes for low income people; special low interest loan for small and medium businesses; stabilization of the rice price, etc. Korea Annual, 1975, p. 16. These measures, which were designed to decrease any possible economic discontent of the public, did not have any lasting political or economic impact.

\textsuperscript{42} Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae, vol. 3, p. 52; and Hak-Kyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea, pp. 69-70.
On April 3, 1974, Park declared the EM No. 4 claiming that there emerged "illegal activities involving a preliminary stage of the united front, which is commonly carried out by the Communists to achieve the unification under communism." The target of the EM No. 4 was against the so-called "Democratic Youth and Student League" (DYSL), which the government claimed, in alliance with the "anti-state groups" such as the People's Revolutionary Party, the leftist-reformist force in Korea, and the pro-North Korean organization in Japan, attempted to establish ultimately worker-peasant regime after overthrowing the government by the violent demonstration.

The EM No. 4 added new and tougher measures to the existing EM No. 1. The EM No. 4 prohibited the DYSL, and the students were forbidden to absent themselves from school and to refuse to attend classes or examinations without a legitimate reason. The decree allowed the permanent closing of the school whose students violate the EM. Furthermore it allowed a minimum of five years in prison and the maximum sentence of death for those who violated the EM No. 4.

The regime began a massive roundup of people. About 1,200 people (most of them students) were arrested, and among them 180 people were prosecuted at the emergency court-martial. Among those 180 people, 107 were students and 23 were the "members of the People's Revolutionary

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Also arrested were such prominent figures as former President Yun Bo Sun, Poet Kim Chi Ha, Bishop Chi Hak Soon, and Protestant Minister Park Hyung Kyu. In a tense atmosphere, the emergency court-martial sentenced all of them to more than 5 years in prison, including 8 people to death and 12 to life in prison. A defense lawyer, while defending the arrested students in the court, got so angry about the regime and criticized severely the Yushin system and the EMs in the court. He himself was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in prison for the violation of the EM No. 4. This was the first time in the history of the Republic of Korea that a lawyer was arrested for a statement made in court. It was clear now that there would be no exception in punishing the opposition to the regime.

For the more articulate members of the society, the credibility of the government's claim that there was a major threat from the radical group was very low because many of those arrested were known anti-Communists and the Christians. In fact, the regime manufactured a significant part of the story to distort and exaggerate the nature and the threat of the opposition. For example, the members of the so-called People's Revolutionary Party had no relationship to the other convicted

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7 Initially 14 people including several students were sentenced to death. The death sentence for the students was commuted later. The decision was possibly influenced by the advice of the Korean Ambassador to the U.S., who advised Park that the execution of the students would result in a negative reaction from other countries including the U.S. See Kang, Cham-gunin, pp. 244-245.

8 In an interview with this writer, the defense lawyer, Kang Shin Ok, said that he was released briefly before he was rearrested. According to him, this indicated that the order to punish him came directly from Park. Interview in May 1989.
opposition activists.\(^{49}\) The investigative report by some Catholic priests suspected that the case of the People's Revolutionary Party itself was probably concocted.\(^{50}\) The regime, with the tight control of the mass media, minimized the independent sources of information, and consequently the majority of the general public wondered about the real nature of the situation.

These tough measures against the political opposition, although they were successful in temporarily eliminating the student protests, created new problems for the regime. A significant proportion of the Christian community was seriously disturbed by the arrests of many Christians in the incidents. Protestant churches and church organizations held prayer meetings, and made petitions and issued statements demanding the release of the arrested. The Catholic church held many masses and prayer meetings to protest the arrest of Bishop Chi Hak Soon.\(^{51}\) Also, there was increasing criticism within the U.S. against the overly repressive measures of the Park regime: Some intellectuals and Congressmen called for reductions in American aid and the withdrawal of American troops to show disapproval of the political repression.\(^{52}\) The Congress held hearings in late July on the issues of human rights in Korea.\(^{53}\) President Ford and the State Department

\(^{49}\)Interview with Kang Shin Ok. May 1989.

\(^{50}\)See for example, NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 1, pp. 453-458.

\(^{51}\)Young-il Kim, "Han'guk kidogkyo ui sahoe chamnyo" [Social Participation of the Korean Christianity], pp. 75-76.

\(^{52}\)New York Times, August 14, 1974.

\(^{53}\)U.S. House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements, Human Rights in South Korea: Implications for
expressed concern over political repression.\(^54\) There were also protests, particularly against the arrests of Bishop Chi, from the Vatican and some European countries such as Belgium and France.\(^55\) As a result of the mounting domestic and international criticism, there began to appear some indications by early August that the regime might lift the EM and reduce the sentences for those convicted.\(^56\)

An unexpected incident intervened in this context. In the Independence Day ceremony in August 1974, a Korean resident in Japan who attempted to assassinate Park ended up shooting the First Lady to death. Public sympathy for the death of the first lady was outpouring because she, with her public image of simple appearance, warmth and caring, had been rather popular among most Koreans regardless of their attitude toward Park and the regime. The state funeral for her, as it was nationally televised live, increased solemn mood among the public. Government announced that the assassin acted under the instruction of the pro-North Korean organization in Japan, and thus the order of Kim Il-Sung. Rallies and demonstrations were held to denounce the North Korean regime for engineering the attempted assassination of Park, and to demand that Japanese authorities sternly punish all those involved in the "conspiracy".\(^57\)


\(^{57}\) *Korea Annual*, 1975, p. 18.
In this atmosphere, Park lifted the EM Nos. 1 and 4 in August 24, 1974, announcing that he believed that "our people, after having witnessed the August 15th tragedy, have once again realized the real nature and intentions of the North Korean Communists" and that "the incident has greatly strengthened our national solidarity." The lifting of the EM Nos. 1 and 4 was essentially motivated to reduce the domestic and international criticism against Park's overly repressive measures.

However, it became clear that the sympathy for the first lady did not spillover to the support for Park. The discontent of the opposition was not reduced because the regime did not show any indication for democratization, and did not release those who were in jail for the violation of the EM Nos. 1 and 4. As the level of coercion decreased due to the lift of the EM and the expected visit of Ford in November, the opposition activities increased. The university students began to protest again, particularly demanding the release of the jailed students. As a result, 44 out of 72 universities temporarily closed by the end of October 1974, and most schools went in early winter vacation.

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58 Ibid., p. 21.

59 Some observers point out that the decision to lift the EM was also affected by the forthcoming visit of Ford to Korea in November 1974. Sung-joo Han, "South Korea in 1974: The 'Korean Democracy' on Trial"; and Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition, p. 77. This might be the case if the visit was known to the Korean government by this time. The official announcement of the Ford's visit was made in early September.

60 The schools were closed not because problems were very serious in those campuses. It was essentially a preventive measure to avoid the further deterioration in the situation. Usually this measure was effective in stopping student demonstrations temporarily, because students normally did not protest during the vacation. For student protests during this period, see NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 1, pp. 418-428.
Although the Ministry of Education instructed the universities to take tough measures against student protest, most private universities refused to do it under the more "liberal" political atmosphere, arguing that the punishment of students alone could not solve the problem. For example, the president of Korea University said:

The current student behavior indicates a disturbance not by the minority but by the majority and should be seen as a disturbance with a reason. Most students are possessed of the potential explosiveness, and many students show the personality orientation that could stand up as a leader [in protest movement]. It appears that student disturbances are happening because the atmosphere of complaints and discontents of the whole society is reflected into the campus.

The president of Yonsei University argued that the problem of student protests could not be solved within the universities. He urged the "elimination of injustice, corruption, and distrust, and the presentation of the blueprint for democratization."

The reporters and editors, who were discontented with the government censorship and the arrest of the reporters, demanded freedom of the press. They deplored the situation in which even "passive obedience" was not allowed. The reporters' protests began in October 1974 when about 200 young reporters of Dong-A Ilbo, one of the most influential Korean newspapers, made a Declaration of Practicing the Freedom of the Press. In that statement, they declared that "the freedom of the press -- a

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\(^{61}\) During the fall, 90 university students received various disciplinary actions because of their active participation in demonstrations. This included 19 expulsion and 36 indefinite suspension. Chungsa Pyonjip-bu, ed., Chilship-nyondae han'guk ilji, p. 208.


\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 66.
fundamental social function to maintain democratic society and to develop free nation -- cannot be repressed with any excuse and be interfered by anybody."64 They specifically demanded the end of external (i.e., governmental) interference, the removal of "agents" from the newsroom, and the stop of the illegal arrest of the reporters. They refused to print the newspaper until their demands were reported.65 The reporters' protests and the resolutions for the press freedom rapidly spread to other newspapers, television networks, and news agencies including even some of those that were considered pro-government.66

Reporters, particularly those at Dong-A Ilbo, were most determined to fight. As a result of their refusal to publish the newspaper, the reporters temporarily achieved some of their objectives, and began to report the opposition movement. This time, the regime used more covert methods to control the press: the advertisers, under the pressure of the government, stopped buying the commercials of the daily and its affiliated broadcasting company, causing a serious financial problem for the company.67 In an unprecedented move, opposition groups and the readers tried to support financially and morally the daily by buying small advertisements, by collecting donations for the newspaper, and by helping to expand the daily's circulation. These new advertisements, which totaled

64Pu Young Lee, "Chilship-nyondae han'guk saehoe wa ullon," p. 316.
65Ibid.
more than 9,000 for 3 months, encouraged the daily with various slogans.68

The most dramatic development in the opposition activities was the emergence of a significant opposition force in the Christian community. There had been criticism against the Park regime by some priests or religious organizations prior to the emergence of the Yushin regime,69 and a small segment of Christian activists adopted more progressive theologies. However, in the pre-Yushin period, the Korean Catholic church and protestant churches as institutions were conservative and were not engaged in major opposition activities.70 The opposition by some church leaders and organizations also did not develop into a serious conflict between the regime and the churches because the regime had not used harsh measures against the anti-government religious figures.

The increasing opposition activities of the Christians in 1974 was the result of the arrests of the prominent religious leaders that was

68 NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 2, p. 569. The sensitivity of the regime to any indication of political opposition within the military is well illustrated in one case. After the personal advertisement supporting Dong-A Ilbo by an army second-lieutenant appeared in the newspaper, three people working in the advertising bureau, including the bureau chief were arrested and taken into custody for interrogation at the Army Security Command. They were released in 3 days after the overnight sit-in by Dong-A Ilbo reporters. Un-ho Kim, "Chayu ullon undong," p. 168.

69 For example, Kim Su-hwan, who was elected the first Korean Cardinal in may 1969, became increasingly critical about the regime. Bishop Chi Hak Soon was also engaged in the Campaign for the Elimination of the Government Corruption in 1971. When Park attempted the constitutional revision for his third term, the NCCK, a major interdenominational organization, made an opposing statement. NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 1, p. 82.

70 See Chapter 2. As one observer puts it, the positions held by Cardinal Kim and Bishop Chi was "lonely" among the conservative priests before the arrests of Bishop Chi in 1974. See, Young-il Kim, "Han'guk kidogkyo," pp. 79-80.
unprecedented in the pre-1972 period. In the case of the Catholic church, it was the arrest and imprisonment of a prominent Bishop Chi Hak Soon on the charges of subversion and the violation of the EM Nos. 1 and 4, that immediately mobilized Catholic clergy and laymen. The Catholics held protest masses, prayer meetings, and even street demonstrations, demanding particularly the release of the political prisoners including Bishop Chi. From July to December 1974, there were 63 prayer meetings and 8 street demonstrations involving about 120,000 Catholics.

In addition to the protests, an important anti-regime organization emerged within the Catholic church in the aftermath of the arrest of Bishop Chi. About half (300) of the Korean Catholic priests organized the National Priests Corps for Justice Realization (NPCJR) in September 1974. The priests who participated in the NPCJR considered the "social participation" by the Catholic church legitimate as it was declared such by the second Vatican Council. The creation of the NPCJR reflected the conflict within the Catholic church on the proper role of the church in society. The members of the NPCJR were in a sense reacting against the Korean episcopacy which, as a conservative body, did not challenge the regime. Bishop Ham Se-oong, a member of the NPCJR said: "Although the Vatican already announced the principle of social participation ten years

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71 According to an Archbishop, "the church as a whole was awakened" as a result of the arrest of Bishop Chi. Wolgan Chosun, July 1986, p. 256.

72 Sung Wook Chang, "Katolic jungui kuhyun junguk saje-dan" [Catholic National Priests Corps for the Realization of Justice], p. 330. By 1974, the Catholic church had 790,000 followers, 3,500 clergymen, and 438 churches. The number of Catholics exceeded one million in 1975. In 1974, the Protestant churches had about 3,460,000 followers and 17,562 clergymen and 13,417 churches. See Korea Annual, 1975, pp. 221-222; and Ibid., 1976, pp. 218-219.
ago, our episcopacy never applied it to the specific situations in Korea. . . . Thus we organized the [NPCJR]."\(^7\) Its members considered that the Peace and Justice Commission within the Korean Catholic church, as it was under the authority of the Conference of Bishops, had not been effective in dealing with various problems the church faced. By creating unofficial organization, which was not approved by the Conference of Bishops, it was expected to enjoy more autonomy in its activities.

After its establishment, the NPCJR was directly engaged in the democratization movement and touched other issues that were considered important for human dignity. In its first Declaration of the National Situation, for example, the NPCJR demanded the repeal of the EMs, the release of the political prisoners, the ensurement of the political rights and freedoms, and the establishment of economic policy to ensure minimum livelihood and welfare.\(^7\)

The repression of the church clergymen and laymen also increased the opposition movement among protestants. When the Yushin regime was imposed, there was no immediate response from the protestant churches. However, the arrests of the protestant ministers began to disturb the churches. In January 1973, a minister was arrested for his anti-regime remarks during his sermon. Then in July 1973, several clergymen including a prominent minister were arrested for "attempting to overthrow the government by force" after they distributed anti-regime leaflets at an Easter Sunrise

\(^7\)Cited in Il-oong Yun, "Yushin ch'eje wa jungui kuhyun junguk saje-dan" [The Yushin regime and the National Priests Corps for Justice and Peace], p. 109.

\(^7\)Young-il Kim, "Han'guk kidogkyo," p. 77.
Service.\textsuperscript{75} The arrests of the protestant ministers, due to their unprecedented nature, received increasing attention of the churches. Particularly, the latter incident, because of the involvement of a prominent minister and the seriousness of the charge, "threw a stone to a quiet church circle."\textsuperscript{76} A significant segment of church organizations and groups petitioned and demanded the release of the minister, and the regime yielded to their demand by releasing him on bail soon after the sentence was given. The DYSL incident produced a more serious situation because many of those arrested in the case were associated with the protestant churches and organizations. For example, more than 40 of those prosecuted for the case were church clergymen or those associated with the Korea Student Christian Federation (KSCF).\textsuperscript{77}

Protestant churches and various church organizations began to have prayer meetings, and issued statements demanding the release of the political prisoners. The National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), a main interdenominational organization, emerged as a major opposition force.\textsuperscript{78} The NCCK established the Human Rights Committee in April 1974.

The National Conference for the Restoration of Democracy was organized in November 1974 by the 71 prominent political, religious and

\textsuperscript{75}Sang-woo Lee, \textit{Park Chung Hee shidae}, vol. 3, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{76}NCCK, \textit{1970 nyondae minju-wha undong}, vol. 3, p. 1051.
\textsuperscript{77}Young-il Kim, "Han'guk kidogkyo," p. 53.
\textsuperscript{78}The NCCK was participated by 6 denominations. These are: Christian Presbyterian church, Jesus Presbyterian church (Tonghap group), Anglican church, Salvation Army, Evangelical church, and Christian Methodist church. They represent one-third of the protestants.
intellectual figures. As its name indicates, its goal was the democratic restoration.

The NDP, the main opposition party, with the change of the leadership to Kim Young Sam in August 1974, attempted a more vigorous challenge to the regime. As soon as he assumed the leadership of the NDP, Kim stated that unless the government decided to revise the constitution, the NDP will be engaged in the struggle for constitutional revision. While repeatedly demanding the restoration of democracy, the NDP established within the party the committee for constitutional revision and made its own draft for a new constitution. To demonstrate its resolution for democratization, the NDP performed at the end of the year the ceremonies of hanging a signboard for the Campaign for the Promotion of A Constitutional Amendment on the national headquarters, and the Kwangju and Taegu party branches. However, Kim Young Sam's hardline position, which advocated the street demonstration and the boycott of the Assembly session, had to be moderated because this met a strong opposition by other party leaders, who opposed the hard-line strategy for the reason that the demonstration should be conducted as a last resort.

In addition to the domestic challenge, the criticism from the U.S. continued. In early September, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed that American military aid to Korea be sharply cut and phased out completely by 1977 because of what it called "increasingly repressive measures" of the Park regime. At the end of 1974, Congress subtracted

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79Ki-taek Lee, Han'guk yadang-sa, pp. 316-317.
80Ibid., p. 376.
$93 million from the proposed amount of economic aid, with a provision that an additional $20 million would be made available if the President of the U.S. certified a significant improvement in human rights. The President did not do it. A Congressional committee recommended either relocating the U.S. division in South Korea well back of the front line or taking it out entirely.

Faced with the mounting opposition activities and foreign criticism, the regime decided to release the political prisoners after holding the referendum on the continuation of the Yushin constitution. The regime probably calculated that while the approval of the referendum would be used to claim the popular legitimacy of the regime, the release of the political prisoners after the referendum would subdue the opposition activities and the criticism.

Arguing that the Yushin constitution should not be abolished at least until the threat from North Korea no longer existed, Park asked the people to determine whether to maintain the Yushin system for "security, freedom, peace and prosperity" or return to the previous system, "ridden with confusion and retrogression." He stated further that he would resign if the people, without recognizing the "historical relevance" of the Yushin regime, wanted the abolishment of the Yushin constitution. The referendum that was held in February 1975 was participated in by 79.8%

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82 See Ibid., December 12, 1974; Ibid., December 18, 1974; and Ibid., December 19, 1974.
83 Clough, Embattled Korea, p. 99.
84 The visit of President Ford in November 1974 also may have affected these measures.
85 Korea Annual, 1975, p. 22.
percent of the voters, and was approved by 73.1 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{66} Announcing that the result of the national referendum reconfirmed the popular support for the Yushin constitution, the regime released many of the political prisoners. Of the total 203 persons who were serving the sentences for the violation of the EM Nos. 1 and 4, all but 35 people were freed.\textsuperscript{67}

While these measures decreased the protests by the Christians, they were ineffective in increasing popular support for the regime. The referendum, as it did not allow any opposing opinion, was not considered to reflect genuine public support for the regime. The opposition did not provide any legitimacy to the referendum, as they decided to boycott the referendum. The result of the referendum was perceived as the outcome of governmental manipulation. The release of the political prisoners, while it reduced discontent in a certain segment of the opposition, created another problem: By releasing those who had supposedly committed very serious crimes against the state and thus received stiff sentences, well before the completion of their sentences, the regime actually proved the political nature of the DYSL incident and legitimized the opposition movement. As soon as they were released, they exposed in the press (which was temporarily regaining a limited autonomy) in detail the various tortures they had experienced and the fabricated nature of the DYSL

\textsuperscript{66} CEMC, \textit{History of the Korean Elections}, vol. 3, p. 331. The extent of the fraud in the referendum is not known. But the prohibition of the opposing opinion made the plebiscite much less legitimate than the controversial 1969 referendum, which had allowed the opposition activities.

\textsuperscript{67} Those people who were not released from jail were convicted under the charges of the violation of the Anti-Communist Law or the involvement in the so-called People's Revolutionary Party. \textit{Korea Annual}, 1975, p. 22.
incident, and declared that they would continue the fight against the regime.

As the school opened for spring semester in March 1975, university students began to protest demanding that the expelled student be allowed to return to school. In Seoul National University, 2,000 students protested and, as a result, 126 students were arrested. This was followed by other major protests at Yonsei University and Korea University. In response to the student protests, the regime declared EM No. 7 on April 9. The EM No. 7 specifically targeted Korea University whose students at that time protested the most actively. It closed Korea University and army troops were sent to occupy its campus. It prohibited any form of meetings and demonstrations, and the violators would be sentenced 3-10 years in prison. The message was clear: other schools could be closed, even for a long period of time, if their students demonstrate. 32 students were expelled from the school and the university president was replaced. The regime's tough policy was reflected in the execution on April 9 of the eight "members of the People's Revolutionary Party", who received death sentences after the DYSL incident. Also, in March and April 1975, in Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo, two major newspapers, 81 reporters were dismissed and 118 were indefinitely suspended. However, in 3 days of the declaration of the EM No. 7, a Seoul National University student made a dramatic suicide in front of a group of students to protest the harsh

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authoritarian rule. Had other events not intervened, this incident could have sparked an escalation of the student protest.

National Security Project and the Rule by EM No. 9

The most significant factor that weakened the opposition movement and strengthened the regime came outside Korea -- from events in Indochina. The news of the fall of Vietnam to communism on April 30, 1975 reached Korea and created a widespread sense of insecurity within the state and among the public. Koreans considered that the defeat of Vietnam, by showing apparently declining commitment and ability of the U.S. to defend its allies, could lead to a serious miscalculation by Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea.

Kim Il Sung's visit to Peking in April 1975 was unusual in that he had not visited the country in years and that it occurred at the time of the impending Communist victory in Indochina. Many people suspected that Kim went to China possibly to ask the Chinese assistance in its attack against South Korea. Park claimed that Kim "might have concluded that what he called a decisive moment had now arrived for unleashing another aggressive war against the south to realize his cherished dream of communizing the whole Korean peninsula." Furthermore, Kim increased this suspicion by his Peking speech, which seemed to indicate his aggressive

\[^{90}\text{In his "Open Letter to the President" that was read before his suicide, Kim Sang-jin pointed out the basic discontents the political opposition against the Yushin system shared. He said that while there should be a limit in the freedom to enjoy, there should also be a limit in restricting the freedoms. He argued that to overcome the Communist threat, national consensus based upon democracy was necessary. NCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 2, PP. 653-655.}\]

\[^{91}\text{Korea Annual, 1976, p. 26}\]
intention. The South Korean government announced that the North had relocated its major tactical air force units near the DMZ, and deployed "almost all artillery pieces in their arsenal to the frontline along with other weapons." Whether Kim Il Sung wanted to invade South Korea and whether the offensive military line-up of North Korea constituted a new development were not critical issues. The important fact was that there was a perception of the increased North Korean threat by the Koreans as well as the U.S. government. Consequently, the problem of national security, which had always preoccupied Koreans, now became the most important issue to them. Various public rallies often inspired and organized by the government to promote national security were held, in which the political opposition often participated. The issue of the North Korean threat occupied even the students and intellectuals. For example, the Korea University Student Association made a statement that "We deeply realize our responsibilities for our recent excessive actions, and will stand at

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92 Kim said, "If revolution takes place in South Korea, we, as one and the same nation, will not just look at it with folded arms but will strongly support the South Korean people." See Byung Chul Koh, "Unification Policy and North-South Relations," p. 289.

93 Korean Annual, 1976, pp. 27 and 74.

94 After Kim's visit to China, the latter made pretty clear that she does not want another Korean War by strongly indicating through several channels of communication that it wanted peaceful reunification in Korea. New York Times, May 29, 1975. As far as the North Korean troop movement during the period was concerned, there was a report that the elements of two armored divisions moved into position close to demilitarized zone. Ibid., May 23, 1975. Discovery of the underground tunnels built by North Korea will be discussed in the below.

95 For example, see Ibid., May 29, 1975.
the front of the national consensus." Professors at prestigious universities such as Seoul National University and Korea University also announced their resolutions for strengthening national security. The opposition New Democratic Party decided to stop the constitutional revision campaign for some time.

In this atmosphere of national unity and the public preoccupation with national security, Park declared the EM No. 9 on May 13, announcing that Korea faced an "unprecedented difficulty" because there existed "a growing danger of miscalculation on the part of the North Korean Communists that their invasion of the South would succeed on the strength of the recent tragic turn of events in Indochina." The EM No. 9 prohibited virtually any form of opposition to the Yushin regime. The decree prohibited not only direct opposition to the regime but also such activities as "fabricating and disseminating false rumors or making false presentation of facts" and student activities which "interfere with politics." "Publicly defaming" the EM No. 9 or any form of dissemination of the information (including the press report) on the anti-regime activities was also prohibited. Violators of the decree would be "subject to arrest, detention, search or seizure, without warrant," and could be punished by a minimum of 1 year in prison. In addition, suspension of civil rights for no more than 10 years can be imposed.

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98For the text of the EM No. 9, see Ibid., pp. 328-330; and Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae, vol. 3, pp. 305-306.
Although most members of the opposition recognized the political use of the security issue by the regime, they could not effectively challenge the EM No. 9 because of the prevailing mood of "national security first." When a NDP assemblywoman criticized severely what she considered the regime's political use of the security issue in her floor speech, she was forced to resign. Unlike other EM that lasted only for several months, the EM No. 9 was effective for four and a half years until Park died. The EM No. 9 was not as harsh as the EM No. 4 of 1974, but it was still severe. The length of the EM No. 9 testifies to the difficulty that the Park regime could be legitimized in society.

Visible anti-regime activities declined rapidly after the imposition of the EM No. 9. The opposition NDP did not go beyond introducing the bill for the repeal of the EM No. 9, which of course was defeated by the ruling group-dominated Assembly. Clearly the fall of Indochina to communism helped Park greatly. The regime's restrictions on political rights and freedoms was overshadowed, at least for the moment, by the increased importance of national security. The regime, however, would continue to emphasize the security issue to an extreme degree, even after the psychological impact of the fall of Vietnam among the public decreased significantly, thus reducing the effectiveness of the national security project.

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100 The only major protest occurred in May 22 by about 1,000 Seoul National University after the memorial service for Kim Sang Jin, who made suicide to protest the Yushin regime. As a result of the protest, about 300 students were arrested, 53 students were expelled from the school, and the university president and the national police chief were replaced. Sang-woo Lee, Park Chung Hee shidae, vol. 3, p. 312; and Hae-chan Lee, "Yushin ch'eje wa haksaeng undong," pp. 242-243.
During the latter part of the 1970s, then, the issue of national unification almost disappeared as a stated rationale for maintaining the authoritarian regime, and that of national security was constantly and very strongly emphasized. In fact, Park began to emphasize "the various acts of provocation perpetrated by the North Korean Communists" as early as January 1974, when he declared the EM No. 1. He announced also in January 1975 that the constitution "cannot be amended until the threat of the North Korean invasion of the South no longer exists." The constant emphasis of the regime on the North Korean threat went beyond verbal statements this time as the state took various drastic measures to increase the "self-reliant" defense capabilities and discipline society.

The first major change was the increase in the militarization of society by creating new paramilitary forces. The Civil Defense Force was created in all communities and at places of employment for all males between 17 and 50 years old, who were not in the military, police, and other paramilitary forces. The Student National Defense Corps (SNDC) was also established in all high schools and colleges across the country. The SNDC, which basically adopted military organizational forms such as division, regiment and company, replaced the student government at university as the "representative" student body. The chiefs of the SNDC were appointed by the university authorities. The intensification of the

101 Korea Annual, 1975, p. 327.
103 Its principal activities included air-raid-defense, prevention of disasters and protective, rescue and rehabilitation activities in times of disasters, and such other activities as are auxiliary to military operations. Korea Annual, 1979, p. 87.
student military training accompanied the establishment of the SNDC and since 1976, all male freshmen were required to undergo ten days of "collective training" at Army bases.\footnote{Ibid., 1980, p. 26.} In addition, the Combat Reserve Force was organized which was equipped with "modern heavy fire arms and communications equipment such as those provided for the regular army."\footnote{Ibid., 1979, p. 87.}

Along with the increasing militarization of society, the 5-year, $5 billion Force Improvement Program (FIP) was initiated in 1975 to improve "self-reliant" defense capabilities. In this context, the military expenditure also increased. The percentage of the defense budget to the GNP rose from about 4 percent in 1970 to 5.3 percent in 1975 to almost 7 percent in 1977.\footnote{U.S. House of Representatives, Korean-American Relations, p. 205} According to a South Korean government source, while the defense budget in South Korea was no more than $440 million compared to North Korea's $749 million in 1971, South Korea spent $2,030 million for military purposes and North Korea, $1,920 million in 1977.\footnote{National Unification Board, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, p. 54.} To support the increase in defense expenditures, the national defense tax was imposed in July 1975. The defense tax, which was designed to raise approximately $400 million annually in most cases meant an additional 20 percent over the existing tax rates.\footnote{Korea Annual, 1976, p. 34.}

In addition, Park apparently made efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Park stated publicly in June 1975 that "South Korea would and
could develop its own "nuclear weapons if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is withdrawn." In an apparent effort to acquire a capacity to produce nuclear weapons, Korea purchased from France a small reprocessing plant for separating plutonium from spent fuel from nuclear reactors. It was cancelled as a result of strong U.S. pressure. Subsequently, the Korean government signed and ratified the nonproliferation treaty, declaring that it had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. The potential for South Korean nuclear capability, however, remained a U.S. concern.

There is little doubt that the fall of Indochina, by increasing the perceived need among the Korean officials for stronger and more self-reliant defense, contributed to the decision of the Park regime to take such drastic measures to increase the military capabilities and expenditures during this period. The measures were an acceleration of the ongoing effort to establish "self-reliant" defense. The self-reliant defense had been pursued after the withdrawal of one U.S. division from Korea after the announcement of the Nixon's Guam Doctrine in 1969, which was perceived as possibly weakening of U.S. commitment to the defense of Korea. With the financial help of the U.S., Korea embarked on the Force Modernization Plan (1971-1975). Along with this, a defense industry for the domestic production of the armaments began to be developed since 1974.

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110 Clough, Embattled Korea, p. 100.
111 The concept of "self-reliant" defense was vague and interpreted differently, but it generally meant the development of independent South Korean capacity to defeat the North Korean invasion when it is conducted without the assistance of the outside forces such as the Soviet Union and China.
The increased proportion of military spending to the GNP and the imposition of the defense tax can be partly explained by the reduction of the military assistance. Since the U.S. had phased out defense budget support and other forms of grant aid by the mid-1970s, South Korea had to buy its arms from the U.S. either through the foreign military sales (FMS) program or on a commercial basis.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 98.}

In addition to the Communist victory in Indochina, there was another development that helped to increase the perception of a high level of North Korean threat. In November 1974, it was announced that the U.N. Command discovered at the DMZ area an underground tunnel illegally built by North Korea. According to the U.N. Command, it was of sufficient size to allow the infiltration of a regiment in an hour. The second tunnel was discovered in March 1975 which was said to be large enough to be capable of handling the passage of small armored vehicles as well as a division of armed men in an hour.\footnote{\textit{Korea Annual}, 1975, p. 24. In October 1978, it was announced a third tunnel was discovered. Henderson presents a skeptical view on the official assessment of the capacity of the tunnel to deliver such a large force. See Gregory Henderson, "Korea: Militarist or Unification Policies," p. 136.} On May 23, 1975, it was announced that 17 tunnels have been identified by sensors.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, May 23, 1975.} It was said that North Korea dug the tunnels during the period when they were engaging in North-South dialogue, thus further supporting the view of those who argued the aggressive intention of the North Korean regime.\footnote{Another incident that raised tension was the murder of two U.S. duty officers by North Korean guards at Panmunjom (in the DMZ) in August 1976.}
Thus, there is little doubt that various measures to increase the defense capabilities were fully supported by the state officials including the military officers. Along with this, the loyalty to Park also seemed to be unchanging, despite his authoritarian methods.

The U.S. repeated its commitment to the defense of Korea, and also supported the Korean effort for the rapid improvement of the defense capabilities (besides nuclear capability) because its concern for the security of South Korea increased by the end of the Vietnam War. When U.S. president Gerald Ford made a formal visit in November 1974, he reaffirmed the strong commitment of the U.S. to defend Korea, and assured that the U.S. had no plan to reduce the level of the American troops in Korea. Ford praised "the rapid and sustained economic progress" of Korea, but made no public statement, either directly or indirectly, Park's harsh repression of the political opposition.

A significant military development involving the U.S. after the fall of Vietnam was the conduct of the "Team Spirit", an annual U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise, which began in 1976. It was a major military exercise that by 1979 included 100,000 Korean and 40,000 American troops (the latter from Japan and the U.S.) and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The purpose, according to one observer, was to improve the capacity of U.S. and Korean forces to react swiftly in the case of a North Korean

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118 Clough, *Embattled Korea*, p. 98.
attack and to demonstrate U.S. determination to fulfill its commitment to the defense of South Korea.\textsuperscript{119}

Not all indicators showed an increased hostility by North Korea during this period. According to one observer, for example, North Korean armed violations, while showing a slight increase since 1973, was far below the level of the late 1960s (see Table 17).

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{lcccccccc}
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829 & 761 & 134 & 106 & 58 & 1 & 7 & 9 & 17 \\
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\end{tabular}
\caption{Aggressive Actions by North Korea in the DMZ Area, 1967-1975}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{a}through August 1975.


It was also clear that the Soviet Union and China, which had an important interest in development in the Korean peninsula, did not want the war to break out again in the region. Without the support of any of the two superpowers, the full-scale invasion of the South by the North was very unlikely. The Korean and U.S. government officials, however, considered that North Korea might use a limited warfare attempting to capture Seoul, which is located only 30 miles from the DMZ. They also thought that Kim Il Sung was not all that rational. The issue of national security was thus crucial for Park to maintain support from the military and the U.S. government (particularly the executive branch).

\textsuperscript{119}ibid., p. 98.
Park's very strong emphasis on the North Korean threat, which continued until the end of his regime, went hand in hand with the attempt to discipline the society and to repress the political opposition. Determined to prevent the emergence of any significant opposition forces, and with the EM No. 9 in its hand, the regime became more systematic in controlling opposition groups. The surveillance of the opposition activists became constant and extensive. For example, police agents attended and recorded the sermons preached by anti-regime ministers. Another preventive measure the regime strengthened was the keeping of the leading opposition activists in house arrest whenever it was thought necessary. For students, the expected cost for challenging the regime increased sharply after the imposition of the EM No. 9. Unlike the EM No. 4, which was tougher but unexpectedly declared, the EM No. 9 made it clear that student activists who lead the protest would face the expulsion from school and the long-term jail sentence.\(^\text{120}\) Due to the systematic suppression, the opposition activists went underground, meeting in relatively safe places like churches. As a result, only isolated, very small scale anti-regime activities were occurring, without giving much trouble to the regime.

Major protests did not occur until October 1977. The only publicized incident prior to the period was the Myungdong Incident in March 1976, which led to the arrests of 17 prominent opposition leaders including former President Yun Po Sun, former NDP presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung, and civil rights leader Ham Sok Hon, after they issued a statement demanding the regime to rescind the EM and restore all political freedoms, \(^\text{120}\)Hae-Chan Lee, "Yushin ch'eje wa haksaeng undong," p. 243.
while they were participating in the ceremony for the March First Independence Movement Day in Myungdong Cathedral. They were arrested on the charge of internal subversion and sentenced up to 8 years in prison.

The apparent political stability was also partly due to the opposition party leadership. Kim Young Sam, who was elected the NDP president, met Park in May 1975, and advised the abolishment of the Yushin regime and the restoration of democratic institutions. Apparently Park implicitly, but persuasively, suggested that he would restore democracy, although he did not present a specific timetable. Park asked the opposition party leader to keep their conversation secret because the premature public announcement would result in the instability in the power structure. Kim, believing that Park would restore democracy at least by the end of his 6-year term, stopped criticizing the regime despite considerable criticism within his party against his change of attitude toward the regime.\[121\] This factor as well as the prevailing mood for national security probably prevented Kim from engaging actively in the democratic movement.

The weakness of the NDP continued after Lee Chul Sung was elected the party president in the party convention in September 1976 after serious intraparty factional struggle.\[122\] Lee concentrated essentially on practical policy matters and did not show any indication of challenging the regime. He advocated a "middle-of-the road" line to "establish and maintain a proper and optimum balance between liberal democracy and

\[121\] Kim later said that either he was too naive or Park was pretending perfectly. Kyung-jae Lee, *Yushin kudaeta*, pp. 298-307.

national security, order and freedom." Sometimes he made statements that could be considered by some as advocating the Yushin regime. For example, he said in September 1976 that "there should be a limit in the free press in consideration of national security, and the current regime should not be denied [of its existence]." On another occasion, he said that "excessive public pressure from the U.S. for democratic reforms in South Korea may provoke strong nationalistic reaction" from Park and South Korean people. Thus, until the reemergence of the major student protests by the end of 1977, the regime successfully controlled the political opposition.

During this period, the revelations in the U.S. of the influence-buying activities by the Korean government (including the KCIA) in the U.S. constrained the relationship between the Korean and U.S. governments. But the Korean government minimized the domestic impact of the so-called Koreagate by tight press censorship. On the part of the Ford administration, it continued to assure the Korean government that U.S. military ties to Korea remain unchanged. After President Carter took office in January 1977, the U.S. increased political pressure on the Korean government to permit the testimony of Park Tong-sun, who was believed to be centrally involved in the influence-buying activities,


125. New York Times, March 8, 1977. This does not mean that Lee supported Park's repressive measures. For example, he occasionally called for the abolishment of the EM. Ibid., January 1977.

126. See for example, New York Times, November 6, 1976.
before U.S. judicial and legislative bodies, but compromise was taken between the two governments to allow Park to testify under legal immunity.\textsuperscript{127} By the end of 1978, the issue became largely settled.

Two more issues were added between the U.S. and Korea after Carter's assumption of the U.S. presidency -- the plan to withdraw U.S. ground troops from Korea and Carter's emphasis on the human rights issue.\textsuperscript{128} The withdrawal decision was based on the assessment that there existed a satisfactory military balance between North and South Korea.\textsuperscript{129} However, serious opposition emerged within the U.S. Congress and among the military leaders.\textsuperscript{130} In addition, new intelligence estimates came out regarding the North Korean troop strength in January 1979. The new intelligence analysis

\textsuperscript{127}See for example, Lee and Sato, \textit{U.S. Policy}, pp. 80-87. For the result of an investigation of the Korean influence-buying activities, see U.S. House of Representatives, \textit{Korean-American Relations}.

\textsuperscript{128}Carter's position on the two issues emerged clearly during his election campaign as presidential candidate. In June 1976, for example, he had called for the withdrawal of all ground troops "on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan." He also said that "At the same time, it should be made clear to the South Korean Government that its internal oppression is repugnant to our people and undermines the support for our commitment there." U.S. House of Representatives, \textit{Korean-American Relations}, p. 71. For more discussion about the Carter's decision, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, \textit{U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea: A Report by H. Humphrey and John Glenn}, pp. 19-21.

\textsuperscript{129}Other stated rationales for the withdrawal plans were: that South Korean forces, combined with adequate U.S. logistic, air, and naval support would be more than enough to defend against a North Korean attack; that all four major powers surrounding the peninsula -- Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the U.S. -- shared interest in preserving stability in the peninsula; and that the United States would maintain a clear defense commitment to South Korea. See Larry Niksch, "U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past Shortcomings and Future Prospects," p. 326.

\textsuperscript{130}For more discussion about the opposition within the U.S. to Carter's withdrawal plan, see Lee and Sato, \textit{U.S. Policy}, pp. 104-127. See also U.S. House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigative Subcommittee, \textit{Review of the Policy Decision to Withdraw United States Ground Forces from Korea}.
placed North Korean ground forces at between 600,000 to 700,000 rather than the 440,000 previously estimated. North Korea now seemed to "have dramatically surpassed South Korea in every major category of military strength." Consequently, Carter practically reversed the withdrawal decision in February 1979 by announcing that the U.S. would hold in abeyance any further cutback of the U.S. ground troops in Korea.

There was no visible indication that the troop withdrawal issue weakened Park's domestic political position by damaging the credibility of his claim about the North Korea threat. To implement the withdrawal plan (before the reversal of the decision) without endangering South Korean security, the U.S. had to reconfirm its commitment to the defense of Korea and promise to provide significant material compensations. The security consciousness of the Korean public meant that even the political opposition, including the NDP and the church leaders, did not want the withdrawal of the U.S. ground forces. There were also no significant groups in Korea that supported the withdrawal. The opposition thought that the withdrawal of the American ground troops, by increasing the public perception of the North Korean threat, would give the Park regime a chance to increase its repression against the political opposition. For example, the NCCK stated in May 1977 that the withdrawal plan was in contradiction with "moral politics" and asked to reverse the decision until a "sound

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131 It has been said that U.S. intelligence agencies, concentrating their effort on Vietnam during the first half of the 1970s, were not aware of the large buildup of the North Korean forces in the 1970s. Clough, Embattled Korea, p. 102. For skeptical views of this new assessment, see Weinstein, et al., Security of Korea, pp. 27-36.
democratic society" could be achieved in Korea. The opposition thus wanted that instead of withdrawing troops, the U.S. should put more pressure to force Park to restore democracy.

In the case of the Carter administration's human right's policy, its expressed concern through various channels over human rights violations in Korea moderated Park's behavior somewhat. However, the administration made it known that the U.S. would not use its aids for the purpose of pressuring the Park regime because of overriding security commitment to Korea. The security concern for Korea, thus, limited the options of the Carter administration to achieve its influence on Korean domestic politics.

Maintaining Park's Control over the State

Since the imposition of the Yushin regime, the basic characteristics of the internal structure of the state had been maintained. The state was highly centralized, and state power was extremely concentrated in one man. A solid control over the coercive instruments of the state -- particularly the military, the KCIA and the Army Security Command -- was a crucial factor in maintaining Park's power within the state.

There were some changes, which further strengthened Park's power during the Yushin regime. With the institutional weakening of the

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133 The basic methods of Park's control over the state was the same with those in the Third Republic. Because these were discussed in Chapter 3, they will not be repeated here.
Assembly, the pro-regime politicians, while they were dominating the Assembly, had virtually little autonomy. On important political issues that were related to the regime maintenance, the pro-regime assemblymen were now playing the role of the rubber-stamp.

Important development also occurred in the military-security apparatus. Yun Pil Yong, the commander of the Capital Garrison Force and probably the most powerful person in the military, was arrested in March 1973 along with 9 other military officers under the charges of "extortion, bribery, and disobedience". Subsequently, they were convicted in court martial, and Yun was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In addition, 30 military officers who were close to Yun were retired, and about 30 KCIA agents were convicted or retired. This incident resulted from Park's belief that Yun had become too powerful and less reliable politically. Although there was no indication to mobilize the troops, Yun apparently made some critical remarks against Park. As a result of the elimination of some powerful military officers, Park's control over the military

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135 Korea Annual, 1974, p. 9.

136 The military officers were members of the Hahna Club, powerful informal organization within the military. For Hahna Club, see Chap 3. Some members of the Hahna Club, who were close to Park Chong Kyu, the chief of the Preisdential Security Guards, survived and continued to occupy the strategic military post. Chun Doo Whan and Rho Tae Woo, the president of the Fifth and Sixth Republics respectively, were the leading members of the Hahna Club. The director of the KCIA, Lee Hu Rak, was also investigated in this incident, but was not punished. Joong-Ang Ilbo, U.S. Midwest Edition, December 22, 1990.

137 Interview with Kang Chang Sung, former chief of the Army Security Command, in May 1990. This case involved one of the most extensive investigations by the military intelligence agency on the military-security apparatus. There has been some speculation that the reason why not just Yun, but other officers were arrested was partly due to the power struggle among those below Park.
became further strengthened. This incident must have also reminded many of those within the state the danger of criticizing Park.

Thus the power structure within the state further concentrated on Park, and almost all the decisions on politically important matters were made or approved by Park. This means that unlike some other authoritarian regimes, there existed little autonomy to the coercive institutions. Any government official who lost Park's confidence or exhausted his political usefulness was removed or transferred to a less significant position. Those who still looked ambitious after the removal or the position change became the object of surveillance.\(^\text{138}\) Thus, during the Yushin regime, coercion played a more important role in maintaining Park's control over the state.

In addition to the central role played by coercion, there was widespread support for him within the state, at least until more serious opposition activities occurred in 1979. State officials, with their political and social conservatism and sensitivity to the national security issues, considered Park as a proper leader who could continue national development (i.e., economic development and the military buildup). They also considered most opposition activists as a minority of trouble-makers. Their support for the Yushin regime as the long-term institutional arrangements, however, was weak, because state officials considered that

\(^{138}\) The case of Kim Hyung-wook, the former director of the KCIA for more than six years, well illustrates how once powerful man could end up. After he was removed from the position in 1969, he lost his power, and became the object of surveillance. Later he virtually escaped to the U.S., and greatly angered Park by testifying in the congressional hearings on Korean influence-buying activities. In addition to his testimony, Kim Hyung-wook was also writing memoirs, which would expose negative aspects of Park and his regime. Kim disappeared in Paris in early October 1979. He is believed to have been killed.
the Yushin regime was nothing more than a tool to prolong Park's rule, and because there was no consensus on the proper political institutions after Park. With the indication of widespread and increasing public discontent against the regime, most state officials would increasingly think that the Yushin regime should be significantly modified or discarded. Their views, however, were not allowed to express openly. The personalistic nature of the regime and its highly concentrated power structure explains the way the regime broke down in 1979.

Expansion of the Political Opposition

The decline of the visible protests after the imposition of the EM No. 9 did not mean the reduction of the discontents by the opposition. As we have examined earlier, there was an increase in opposition activities, when the government control was loosened somewhat in the latter part of 1974. While the political opposition temporarily shared the view that there was an increased North Korean threat after the fall of Vietnam, they believed that Park was exaggerating the North Korean threat to use it for political purposes. Specifically, the EM No. 9 was regarded essentially as a measure designed to repress the opposition in the name of national security. While the regime argued that national unity was needed in view of the North Korean threat, the political opposition argued that it was the repressive rule by Park that divided the nation and weakened national security. Thus the regime's effort to use the security issue to maintain the regime was not very successful in reducing the discontent of the political opposition.
During the Yushin regime, there emerged the dissidents and the anti-regime organizations that were fighting for the "restoration of democracy". The immediate effectiveness of these organizations were minimized by their small scale and the strong capacity of the state to repress. Besides the Catholic and protestant organizations, we discussed earlier, the Writers Association for the Practice of Freedom was organized in November 1974. In March 1975, The Struggle Committee for the Preservation of the Free Press was organized by 160 reporters expelled from the Dong-A Ilbo and the Chosun Ilbo. In December 1977, the Committee of the Expelled Professors was organized by 29 former professors. Association for the Families of the "Conscience" Prisoners also emerged.\textsuperscript{139}

The emergence of the dissident organizations was unprecedented in the history of the Republic of Korea, and was an indication of the increased discontent in society since the imposition of the Yushin regime. The expansion of the opposition was, more than anything else, a direct reaction to the elimination of the crucial democratic institutions (including the presidential election), the severely restricted political rights and freedoms, and the increased repressive measures by the regime, which now had much lower tolerance for the political opposition. For those who had wanted to see the change in government by voting for the opposition candidate in the previous presidential elections could no longer expect it. While the high cost for opposing the regime prevented

\textsuperscript{139}For a study of the dissident groups during the Yushin regime, see for example, Kun-sung Lee, "Yushin chongkwon kwa chaeya saeryuk ui deungjang" [Yushin regime and the Emergence of the Chaeya Group], pp. 21-42.
many from participating in the opposition activities, a majority of the politically articulate members of society considered the demand for the "restoration of democracy" legitimate. Thus the severe punishment of the opposition activists, who demanded democratization, expanded the political discontent in society rather than containing it.

Furthermore, the Yushin system, with its severe restrictions on political rights and freedoms -- particularly, its prohibition to criticize or oppose the regime, directly affected the life of the attentive public and politicians. Important social groups with higher education, such as students, priests, intellectuals, and reporters, as well as opposition politicians were particularly opposed to the regime under which they had to be careful in private and public lives not to express the critical remarks against the regime.

In an effort to maintain political order, the regime increased its control over social institutions. In case of the university, the autonomy of the student body was virtually eliminated due to the replacement of the student government by the Student Defense Corps. Various extracurricular student "clubs" were allowed to be maintained, but their activities were somewhat restricted. Increased military training on campus accompanied tougher discipline. For example, students had to wear proper para-military uniform during the military training class, and their hair should be short enough to show the whole ears. Many students considered these measures as excessive.

The school authorities including professors had some responsibility for preventing and stopping the student protests. The school authorities were also pressured to punish the students, who were involved in the
protests. Also, the Faculty Tenure Renewal System was introduced, and by February 1976, 460 faculty members were excluded from reappointment as professors and expelled from 98 universities.\textsuperscript{140} It is not clear how many were affected by their political views, but given the tight government control over the educational institutions, the new policy probably played an important role in both punishing the active anti-regime professors and preventing the challenge to the regime by the professors.\textsuperscript{141}

Due to the increasingly tight government control, there was a sharp reduction in the issues the media was allowed to report. The media could not report opposition movements and other issues that were considered politically sensitive to the regime. For example, in October 1974, the government asked the media not to report not only opposition movement, but other issues such as anti-government movement in Vietnam, and the shortage of briquette, a main household fuel in Korea.\textsuperscript{142} The government's control of the media went further beyond the restrictions on reporting the news.

\textsuperscript{140}NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 4, p. 1688.

\textsuperscript{141}In December 10, 1979, the Ministry of Education instructed the universities to allow to return to school the 181 former faculty members who left college due to the Tenure Renewal System. Thus at least this many college teachers had been expelled for political reasons. One incident clearly demonstrated the consequences of the anti-regime activities by the professors. In June 1978, 11 professors at Chunnam National University made a statement, "Direction for Our Education," in which the National Education Charter was criticized as reflecting "education . . . under Japanese Colonialism" and "statist ideology of education". They called for the "humanization and democratization of the daily life and educational institution." All 11 were expelled from school and 2 of them were prosecuted. NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 4, pp. 1689-1690; and Kun-sung Lee, "Yushin chongkwan kwa chaeya saeryuk ui deungjang," pp. 30-31.

\textsuperscript{142}Minju ullon undong hyupui-hoe [Committee for the Democratic Press Movement], Bodo jichim [Instruction on Reporting], p. 20.
It controlled even the terms that were used in reporting. For example, "student demonstration" was replaced by a more moderate term of "academic situation". The increase in the tax rate should be expressed as the "upward readjustment of tax" or tax reform. These measures made it clear that the regime did not allow even passive acceptance of the regime by the press. It pushed the press to play the role of the transmission belt of the regime's position on various issues. Consequently, the news contents appearing in one newspaper sometimes reappeared in another newspaper without any difference. This kind of phenomenon happened particularly when they dealt with political issues.

To prevent the foreign report on Korean political situation from reaching Korean readers, the foreign news material were censored simply by cutting or blacking out the part that contained the reports critical to the regime. In 1975, the criminal code was amended to make it a crime punishable by up to 7 year imprisonment for a Korean citizen to say or do anything that might be harmful to the regime to any foreigner.

The regime's attempt to attain political stability by increased authoritarian measures achieved its purpose at the surface level. However, because of the lack of the project, it increased the discontent of the

\[^{14}\text{Ibid.}, p. 144.}\]

\[^{15}\text{Song, "Han'guk hyundai ullon-sa-ron," p. 274. A study of 1,109 reporters during the period indicated how the reporters perceive the situation. To the question whether the newspapers in Korea have individual characteristics, the overwhelming majority agreed. 48.2 percent of the respondents said that "It is true that there is no individual characteristics" and 45.9 percent said "It cannot be denied that there is such an aspect." When asked the reason, 70.5 percent chose "restrictive factors", indirect expression for government restriction. Jae-chun Yu, Han'guk ullaon kwa ullaon munhw [Korean Media and Media Culture], p. 199.}\]

\[^{16}\text{U.S. House of Representatives, Korean-American Relations, p. 40.}\]
attentive public, who had been accustomed to the relative political freedoms, including freedoms of expression and press, since the independence. Less repressive and more flexible policy could not be used by the regime as a strategy for maintaining the regime because given the Korean experience of democratic institutions, liberalization without democratization was not acceptable to the people. Liberalization would only increase the demand for the popular presidential and Assembly elections, which the Korean opposition thought was a minimum requirement for democracy.

Socioeconomic Change and Political Consequences

Thus far we have focused on political sources of discontent. The extent to which socioeconomic changes produced political opposition and support should also be examined. Soon after the imposition of the Yushin regime, the government increased its emphasis on economic development by readjusting the planned rate of economic growth at a higher level. Park also promised to achieve $1,000 per capita income and $10 billion in exports by the beginning of the 1980s.146 This reflected Park and his government's belief that the economy would grow more rapidly with the attainment of more solid control over society and economy. With the destruction of the democratic institutions, economic performance now

became a more important source from which the regime could generate popular support.\textsuperscript{147}

During the Yushin period, Korea continued the rapid economic growth based upon export-led industrialization. The average annual growth rate in real GNP during the period was 9.6 percent, one of the highest in the world. Per capita real income rose from $318 in 1972 to $1,640 in 1979 (see Table 18). By December 1977, the regime achieved its goal of $1,000 per capita income and $10 billion export per year.\textsuperscript{148}

**TABLE 18. Major Economic Trends, 1971-1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP (Won)</th>
<th>GNP Growth rate</th>
<th>Per Capita GNP ($)</th>
<th>Export (mil. $)</th>
<th>Import (mil. $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18,564</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>2,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>19,547</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>2,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>22,278</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>4,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>24,177</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>6,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>25,815</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>5,081</td>
<td>7,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>29,286</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>7,715</td>
<td>8,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>32,408</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>10,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>35,981</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>12,721</td>
<td>14,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>38,503</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>15,055</td>
<td>20,339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{147}One important change in economic development plan during the period was the development of the heavy and chemical industries. The Heavy and Chemical Industry Development Plan was initiated in 1973. It was thought to have both economic and military significance. For a discussion of the problems involved in the development of the heavy and chemical industries during the period, see Pung-yun Park, "Chung-whahag gongup-gae ui naemag" [The Inside Story of the Heavy and Chemical Industries]; and Stepan Haggard and Chung-In Moon, "The South Korean State in the International Economy: Liberal, Dependent, or Mercantile," pp. 171-180.

\textsuperscript{148}The early achievement of these goals was largely due to the international inflation.
The economic development benefited, in absolute terms, most people across the socioeconomic strata. Table 19 shows that those below the absolute poverty line were significantly reduced.

### TABLE 19. Proportion of the Absolute Poverty Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Minimum Living Expense (Won)</th>
<th>Absolute Poverty Class (1,000 people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>11,749 (40.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>16,165</td>
<td>7,554 (23.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>47,160</td>
<td>5,198 (14.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>64,650</td>
<td>4,547 (12.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A Study of the Korea Development Institute. Quoted in Nishimura, Taeman dae han'guk, p. 136.

In rural area, the average rural income increased from 1.41 million won in 1971 to 2.87 million won in 1979 (at 1980 constant income). A factor that contributed to the improvement in the rural living standards and conditions was Sanaul Undong (The New Community Movement), which was initiated by the government in 1971 to mobilize the rural population with the goals of "improvement of living environment, spiritual enlightenment, and increased income." The improvement in the standard of living in the rural areas is indicated by the fact that the proportion of the rural

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150 *Korea Annual*, 1980, p. 192. Constructed during the 1970s were 14,000 kilometers of farm feeder roads, 73,000 bridges, 43,000 kilometers of farm village roads, 10,000 small reservoirs, 4,400 kilometers of irrigation canals and 28,000 dikes. Also, 4,671 community workshops and 18,656 village financial institutions opened during the period. Ibid., p. 193. During the period from 1971 to 1978, 2.5 million rural families has sustained about 10.5 million Sanaul projects in 37,557 villages. Choong Yong Ahn, "Economic Development of South Korea, 1945-1985," pp. 111-112.
households that had television sets increased from 0.8 percent in 1970 to 83.2 percent in 1980. During the same period, the possession of refrigerators increased from 0.4 percent to 19.1 percent. 99 percent of the rural households had electricity by 1980. Urban labor's incomes also continued to rise in the 1970s. The annual real wage in the manufacturing sector increased 9.8 percent from 1971 to 1979.

Pointing to his economic achievement, Park stated in 1978 that "Today when [we] look around any part of the country, there are clear signs of change and progress. Instead of poverty and discouragement, there are full of dream and self-confidence." The survey data available supports somewhat Park's statement -- in the economic area -- as they show general optimism among the public on the prospects of economic development. In a study of 937 citizens and 1,509 college students in 1977, 85.6 percent of the citizen respondents provided with positive response to the statement "Before long our country will get to join the group of economically advanced nations." 60.4 percent of the student respondents answered affirmatively to the same statement, while only 17.5 percent responded negatively. In a survey of 2,111 adults conducted in

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151 Han'guk Ilbo-sa, ed., Han'guk ui jungsan-cheung [Middle Class in Korea], pp. 70-71.
153 Nishimura, Taeman dae han'guk, p. 130.
154 Kang, Cham-gunin, p. 273.
156 Ibid., p. 56.
November 1979, 87.1 percent of the respondents replied that their living standards improved during the 1970s.\footnote{Dong-A Ilbo, January 1, 1980.}

While these studies do not support the view of some opposition activists who focused on negative aspects of the Korean economy, it would be inaccurate (as some proponents of the regime did) to consider that all of those who recognized the economic development and the improvement in living standards in absolute terms supported the regime. Had it been the case, the regime would not have had much problem in maintaining it. One should remember that in the 1971 presidential election, about 45.3 percent of the voters voted for Kim Dae Jung, the opposition NDP candidate. In urban areas, the figure was 51.5 percent. In the Assembly election of that year, the vote for the ruling DRP was only 47.8 percent. The 1971 elections were held after the continuing rapid economic development and under the regime, which had significantly more democratic aspects than the Yushin regime.

Despite the rapid economic development that heavily benefited them, and despite their political conservatism, the majority of the educated middle class already opposed by 1971 the regime's authoritarian aspects, because the regime coercion, which was autonomously executed without the threat posed by internal social and economic disorder, restricted their own political rights and freedoms. Because the level of coercion increased after the imposition of the Yushin regime without clear project, the political discontent increased among the attentive public. On the other hand, the rapid economic development and the increase in the living
standards seems to have moderated somewhat the intensity of political discontent of most of the public against the new authoritarianism.

We have seen in Chapter 3 that already before the emergence of the Yushin regime, the negative consequences of rapid economic growth were criticized, often severely, by many opposition activists, and significant proportion of the public also shared the feeling to some extent. This continued to be the case. For those who had had economic discontent during the Third Republic, Park did not demonstrate that the Yushin regime works better than the previous regime. Thus the regime's effort to use economic development as a rationale for the new authoritarianism largely failed.158

The rapid economic development and improvement in the living standards during the Yushin regime did not improve the problem of economic equality and created issues in some other areas of living. In fact, economic distribution deteriorated somewhat during the 1970s (see Table 20). The subjective feeling of economic inequality was probably greater than the data suggest. By the end of the 1970s, the rise in the price of real estate, the emergence of high-rising, upper-middle class apartment complexes, and the increasing number of cars probably increased the perception of the relative inequality, particularly in major urban area.

The urban-rural gap, while there was some improvement, remained substantial during most of the 1970s. In proportion to urban household incomes, the average incomes of the rural households, which had been 83.0

158 Haggard and Moon argue that high growth policy with emphasis on the heavy and chemical industries, which disfavored many sectors of the population, largely explains the growth in political opposition during the Yushin regime. See their "South Korean State," pp. 178-180. This differs from my view, which considers the main source of the political opposition as the authoritarian rule.
TABLE 20. Economic Inequality in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lower 40%</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle 40%</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher 20%</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Development Institute. Quoted in Nishimura, Taeman dae han'guk, p. 135.

percent in 1972, increased to 104.6 percent in 1974, but declined to 84.7 percent by 1979.159

In the case of the workers, despite the improvement of the living standard in absolute terms, the wage increase lagged significantly behind the increase in labor productivity (see Table 21).160 Also, the monthly incomes of the average workers remained less than their monthly household expenses.161 Because there existed a big difference in one's income depending on the educational level and sex, the female workers and/or those with low education received less benefit of the economic growth. For example, the wage for the new worker in manufacturing sector was 60,000

159 Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1987, p. 71. Because rural households had generally large family members than urban ones, per capita income in the rural area was still lower in 1974.

160 Wage increased sharply in the latter part of the 1970s. But this seemed to be a result of the shortage of workers in particular skill categories. See Paul W. Kuznets, "The Dramatic Reversal of 1979-1980," pp. 77-78.

161 NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, p. 185.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>nominal wage</th>
<th>real wage</th>
<th>labor productivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, p. 246.

won for middle school graduate, 90,000 won for high school graduate and 150,000 for college graduate.162

In addition, there continued to be a problem in working hours and conditions. According to the International Labor Organization, Korean workers in the manufacturing sector, by working 52-53 hours per week, had one of the longest working hours among the countries that provided data.163 In October, 1973, the government Office of Labor Affairs said that nearly 96 per cent of the total workshops (3,810) employing over 30 labors nationwide had been found violating the Labor Standard Law.164 The regime obviously did not enforce the law because of its policy to maintain

162 Nishimura, Taeman dae han'guk, p. 132. Across the occupation groups, the gap was wider. When the wage for primary school graduate was set 100, it was 172.9 for high school graduate, and 399.4 for college graduates. NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, p. 440.

163 International Labor Office, Year Book of Labor Statistics, 1987, pp. 674-679. Not only in manufacturing but also in other non-agricultural sector, the working hours were one of the longest. See, Ibid., pp. 669-673.

164 Korea Annual, 1974, p. 15. See also, NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, pp. 441-442.
a low wage which was thought essential for labor-intensive, export-led rapid economic development.

The concentration of industries, which had been already high in the 1960s, further increased during the 1970s (see Table 22).

TABLE 22. Chaebols' Value-Added as Percentage of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Chaebol</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chaebol means a big business conglomerate. In Korea, it is generally owned by a family.


To increase exports and achieve rapid economic growth, Park continued to give excessive support to chaebol. Furthermore, the development of heavy and chemical industries contributed to the increasing concentration of the industries. During the period, Korea also saw a rapid increase in foreign debt, and by the end of 1978, with the amount of $18.2 billion, it ranked sixth among Third World countries in foreign indebtedness, although the ratio of debt service payments to export of goods and services declined from 19.4 percent in 1970 to 10.5 percent in 1978. Throughout the 1970s, air and water pollution, and urban congestion also increased

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165 See for example, Pyung-yun Park, "Chung-whawag gongup-gae ui naemag," pp. 198-200.
166 Lim, "Dependent Development," pp. 91-94.
due to the rapid industrialization and urbanization. The rate of the traffic accidents became one of the worst in the world.

When we look at the political consequences of the socioeconomic changes on the popular sector, there were basically no changes in the political behavior of the urban poor and the farmers, while there were some changes in the case of the small segment of the workers.

There was no major protest by the urban poor during the 1970s. The rural area remained politically most stable. The most significant protest involving the farmers during the Yushin period was the so-called Hampyong Sweet Potato Incident that began in 1976. It happened when the farmers protested the breach of promise by the Agricultural Cooperative Association (ACA) in Hampyong county to buy all the sweet potatoes produced in the region at a higher price than the farmers could receive from merchants. The farmers led by the members of the Catholic Farmers Association protested demanding compensation for their financial loss. The protest ended in May 1978, after the 160 farm houses received compensation. The incident was significant in that the organized protest by the farmers was unprecedented since the end of the Korean War, and indicated incipient influence of the Catholic Farmers Association in rural area.

The proportion of the manufacturing workers increased from 12.8 percent of the active labor force in 1968 to 22.9 percent in 1979. In

\[\text{In the process of investigation, the government investigation found out the corruption within the ACA. As a result, 658 ACA officials including the head of Hampyong ACA were fired or received various disciplinary actions. Hun Jung Hu, "Hampyung goguma sagun yi-hu ui nongmin undong" [Farmers' Movement after the Hampyong Sweet Potato Incident], p. 246.}\]
terms of the number, they increased from 1,170,000 to 3,126,000 during the same period. Despite the increase in their proportion, labor remained weak because of the government control of the national labor union, the restrictions on the labor activities, and the increased authoritarian tendencies of the regime. When the workers' demands for higher wage and better working conditions were refused by the management, the workers had very limited options, besides illegal protests. The workers' attempt to organize an independent labor union in the factory failed due to strong opposition from the management, which considered any autonomous union dangerous for their businesses. While the state and the employers had ample methods to control labor, most workers were politically and socially conservative during the period without much consciousness about the labor union or determination to organize the autonomous labor union.

While the workers were generally very weak in their capability of challenging their employers and the state, and did not cause a threat to the political and social disorder, some labor movement with new characteristics occurred among a small portion of the workers. This is related to the emergence of the church-based organizations, such as the Urban-Industrial Mission (UIM) and the Jeunesse Ouvriere Chretienne (JOC), that attempted to raise the "consciousness of the workers" by teaching them the labor standard law, and helping workers to organize autonomous

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168 Jang Jip Choi, "Interest Conflict and Political Control in South Korea," p. 69.
169 See, Ibid., pp. 150-153.
labor unions. Due to the lack of viable activities by the officially recognized labor union leaders, a small segment of the workers looked at the UIM and the JOC for support.

The UIM and the JOC were very weak organizationally. In 1973, for example, there were only several UIM groups which were consistently active, and as of 1978, there were only 59 full-time UIM staffs throughout the country including 33 in Seoul. Considering their small number, they were active, particularly in Seoul and Inchon area. There is no reliable information on the number of the workers associated with the UIM and the JOC, but those who actively participated in the labor protests were small.

The UIM activists concentrated their effort on the female workers in light industries. It is pretty clear that the workers' involvement in these organizations heightened the awareness of their economic interests and labor rights, because most of the intense labor protests under the

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170 According to Cho Wha-soon, an UIM activist, the activities of the UIM, besides general religious activities, include educating the leadership of labor movement, supporting labor union movement, protecting human rights of workers, improving the workers' welfare, protecting urban poor, and realizing social justice. See, Wha-soon Cho, "Minjung ui taldul kwa hamke" [With the Daughters of the Mass], p. 66.

171 NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, p. 256; and Gap-jae Cho, Yugo! [Incapacitated!], vol. 1, p. 205. See also, Choi, "Interest Conflict," p. 124.

172 The number of the JOC members was estimated widely differently from several hundred to 50,000. Young-il Kim, "Social Participation of the Korean Christianity," p. 71. Jang Jip Choi, based upon interview with a JOC activist, notes an estimate of 6,000 active JOC members as of December 1980. See his "Interest Conflict," p. 124. Choi also found out that 10.5 percent of the 102 unions he surveyed was organized by "help from outside", which seemed to mean the influence of the church organization. According to Choi, the industrial mission group educated about average 12,000 factory workers every year, and organized 40,000 workers from 1970 to 1974. See Ibid., pp. 149 and 127.
Yushin regime were led by some female workers of the light industries, who were associated with the UIM and JOC.\footnote{One important exception is the spontaneous riot in September 1974 by the 2,500 workers of the Hundai Shipbuilding Company. There was no labor union in the company, and the riot was caused by the sudden threat to the workers' job status and security by the company decision. The riot resulted in the injuries of 200 workers and policemen, and 663 workers were taken to the police and 21 were prosecuted. It was the biggest labor protest in the 1970s in terms of its level of violence and the size of the labor participants. For a description of this incident, see Tae-ho Lee, "1970 nyondae nodong undong ui goejueok" [The Track of the Labor Movement in the 1970s], p. 199.}

The case of the Dong-Il Textile Industry illustrates the characteristics of the labor movement influenced by the UIM. In 1972, the female workers associated with the UIM took control over the company's labor union, which had been very weak. Initially, the labor union managed to function achieving some of their economic demands. By February 1976, there developed a serious confrontation between the union workers and the company, which was very determined to destroy the autonomy of the union. At one time, the police were called in and arrested 72 workers, who were protesting against the repression of the union. In the process, 50 workers passed out, 70 were injured, and 14 were hospitalized. In another incident in February 1978, several male workers attacked the female workers with human waste. The union activists were fired from the company.\footnote{NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, pp. 370-371 and 495-496.} However, the fired workers continued to protest in one way or another with great determination. For example, in March 1978, during the Labor Day ceremony attended by the FKLJ and government officials including the Prime
Minister, about 80 workers chanted slogans criticizing the Textile Union leadership and demanding solutions to their problems.\footnote{Several protests by the Dong-il workers and the police repression are vividly described in \textit{iibid.}, pp. 494-501.}

The workers of the Dong-Il Textile company were engaged in one of the most active labor protests (thus one of the extreme cases) in the 1970s, but their demands were still purely economic-oriented. They did not attack the regime directly, let alone the capitalist system. They received attention, sympathy and support from some opposition activists and church organizations, but they had no link with the opposition parties and most of the student population.\footnote{The general public and students were not informed much about the labor movement. Neither did they hear the names of the UIM and the JOC until the Y.H. incident broke out in summer 1979 (This case will be discussed later).} The workers who were engaged in active protests were also small in their numbers. Consequently, the impact of the church-influenced labor movement on political and economic developments had little significance.

The regime took tougher measures in dealing with the labor movement that was associated with the UIM and the JOC. The regime made efforts to eliminate the influence of the religious organizations on labor without outlawing these organizations. Particularly, many UIM staffs, mostly clergymen, were criticized as pro-Communists or ideologically suspicious, and were constantly under surveillance. They suffered greatly because they were engaged not only in the labor movement but in anti-regime activities. The protesting workers were sometimes brutally beaten by the police, and interrogated to find out whether there were any "impure elements" behind
them. However, the EM, the National Security Law, and the Anti-Communist Law were generally not applied to the protesting workers, and they were treated as light criminals (by giving them less than a month prison sentence). It was precisely the economic nature of their demands as well as political isolation that led the regime to apply different measures to control the labor. Police and other government agencies did not always arrest the workers even when the latter resorted to the illegal strikes or protests.

As will be discussed later, it was the Y.H. incident in 1979 that significantly disturbed the regime. In contrast to most other labor problems, the Y.H. incident became an important political issue, which attracted widespread public attention. The reason for this resulted from the occupation by the workers of the opposition party building, and the brutal and indiscriminate use of force by the police.178

Thus, while there emerged labor protests (largely by some female workers in labor-intensive, light industries) with new characteristics during the Yushin regime, they did not have much impact on political and economic development due to the effective control by the regime. Unlike the case of the political opposition, the regime successfully contained the labor activists without triggering major labor protests. The workers did not participate in anti-regime activities and did not constitute a major political opposition.

177 The repression of the UIM by the regime is well discussed in NCCK, 1970 nyondae minju-wha undong, vol. 3, pp. 1183-1228.

178 After this incident, the regime, specifically the KCIA director, considered formal restriction on the activities of the UIM and JOC, but gave up the idea after it was opposed even by the pro-government politicians. Gap-jae Cho, Yugo!, vol. 1, p. 149.
Most opposition members were critical about the economic policies of the Park regime that seemed to solely focus on rapid economic growth. They pointed to the various problems such as the economic inequality, urban-rural gap, low wage for the workers and their working conditions, the concentration of the business, the increase in foreign debts, dependence on the Japanese economy, and the import of the pollution industry from Japan. The intensity with which the opposition to the regime was based on these issues was widely different with various groups.

In the case of the opposition activists, many, if not most, of them were deeply concerned about the socioeconomic issues, and severely critical about the economic policies of the government. The leaflet distributed by the student activists on April 3, 1974, for example, said that the "national economy" was in "destruction in all aspects." It argued that the problem resulted from the sell out of the resources and labor force in cheap price, the penetration of the foreign monopoly capital, and the "feudalistic exploitation" of the farmers. But those who put the Korean economy in extremely negative terms composed only a small minority of the political opposition. Those who seemed to go beyond the criticism of the government policies to advocate the overthrow of the capitalist system were virtually insignificant in their numbers. Even the UIM and the JOC groups, who were often attacked by the regime as pro-Communist were not revolutionary but reformist. Many opposition members criticized the

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180 One observer says "It is an illuminating irony that the UIM and JOC groups . . . did not attempt to translate specific industrial demand into general, political demands and question capitalism and the capitalist ethic or to offer any other alternative ideological orientation." Choi, "Interest Conflict," p. 128.
negative Japanese economic influence on Korea (some opposition activists calling it Japanese neocolonialism), but there was no visible anti-Americanism except the complaint about weak U.S. support for democratization. As noted earlier, the U.S. troop withdrawal plan was opposed by the political opposition.

Most members of the political opposition demanded the government to pay more attention to issues other than the rapid economic growth. They identified the problems not as inherent in the "dependent capitalist industrialization" but in the authoritarian rule. Their demand for the labor rights and the minimum level of living standards for the labor was not a denial of the capitalist system but a part of the demand for a liberal democratic system.

For most opposition, the Yushin regime was opposed primarily for political reasons. As one observer puts it regarding church opposition, for example, "the human rights movement of the church was in general passive and defensive." Bishop Chi, who were imprisoned for the violation of EM No. 4 stated that the reason why he opposed the regime was corruption, the concentration of political power in one man, the long-term rule by one person, and the violation of the basic human rights. In

181 NOCK, 1970 nyondae minju-pha undong, vol. 1, p. 25. Kim Kwan Suk, general secretary of the NOCK, after his participation in the international conference on "Salvation Today" in Thailand in early 1973 noted that the problems confronted by churches in other countries were not related much to those of Korean churches. He said, "For us, the most urgent problem is political one, rather than the issues of ethnic conflicts, poverty, and religious prejudice, which are generally treated as important in international conference." Ibid., pp. 235-236.

182 Ibid., p. 360.
fact, in almost all the statements made by the opposition groups and organizations during this period, the central demand was the restoration of the liberal democratic system. South Korean society remained essentially conservative with low tolerance for communism still widespread in society.133

In the case of the university students, most of the protests occurred at prestigious universities in major cities, particularly in Seoul. Most of these students considered themselves as social elites who should speak for freedom and justice. They were also sons and daughters of the middle class, and were brought up in a constantly improving economy. Born in the post-war period, most of the students did not experience severe economic hardship or war as their parents had. They tended to regard the steady improvement in economic development as natural and focused its negative side. A minority of them were attracted to the leftist and nationalist ideology, but their ideological structure was neither deeply rooted nor coherent. The main political discontent of the majority of the student, like other middle class opposition, was that economic development or national security did not justify the elimination of democratic institutions and the harsh political repression.

The sentiments of regional discrimination should be also noted. People in the Cholla provinces, traditional rivalry of Kyungsang

133 A nationwide survey of 2,000 people conducted at the end of the Yushin regime indicates the conservatism of Korean public. When asked about the responsibility for the poverty of some people in Korea, 53.0 percent of the respondents attributed it to the individual, 27.8 percent to both the individual and the government, and 13.2 percent to the government. Those who live in the more rural area and those with lower income attributed the poverty more to the individual responsibility. See Young Mo Kim, Han'guk-in ui bokji uishik [Welfare Consciousness of the Koreans], p. 37.
provinces, considered that the Park regime, which was dominated by those from Kyungsang provinces, discriminated against the Cholla region politically and economically. The kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, who came from the province, and the continuing political repression against him, increased the political discontent of the people in that region.

Reemergence of the Opposition Protest

The major student demonstrations, which had not been seen since 1975, reappeared in late 1977 despite the stiff penalties provided by the EM No. 9. On October 7, 1977, about 1,500 Seoul National University students protested demanding the restoration of democracy and academic freedom. As a result of this protest, 400 students were arrested, 8 prosecuted, 23 expelled from school, and 38 suspended. Classes were suspended for more than two weeks. Since then, sporadic student protests of a major scale continued to occur throughout the rest of 1977 and 1978 (see Table 23). While the occurrence of the student protest was not frequent, given the high level of the regime coercion, it reflected the widespread political discontent among the students and the attentive public.

The student protests, which were not seen in major form in the first half of 1979, reappeared in September. On September 3, about 800 Kwangwon University students demonstrated demanding the abolishment of the Yushin constitution. This was followed by several other major student protests in the month. These include the protests by 1,500 Kaemyung University students on September 4, 1,500 students at Seoul National University on September 11, 1,000 Seoul National University students on September 21, and 3,000 Ewha

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185 These include the protests by 1,500 Kaemyung University students on September 4, 1,500 students at Seoul National University on September 11, 1,000 Seoul National University students on September 21, and 3,000 Ewha
TABLE 23. Major Student Protests during 1977 and 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Arrests</th>
<th>Prosecution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul National</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>10/07/77</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunsei</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>10/25/77</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul National</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>11/11/77</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul National</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>05/08/78</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ewha Women's</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>05/09/78</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul National</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>05/19/78</td>
<td>30-40% of the total students$^a$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul National</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>06/01/78</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several universities</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>06/26/78</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunnam</td>
<td>Chunnam</td>
<td>06/29/78</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul National</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>09/13/78</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>09/14/78</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyungbuk</td>
<td>Kyungbuk</td>
<td>11/07/78</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$In this case, students were engaged in the refusal to attend school.


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University students on September 26.
The Breakdown of the Yushin Regime

Since the latter part of 1977 then there had been an increase in opposition activities, mainly in the form of the student protests, despite the heavy penalties provided by the EM No. 9. Political discontent became more widespread as the authoritarian rule produced a stifling situation with the passage of time. In this context, the political situation deteriorated in 1979 after Kim Young Sam, who was known as hard-line opposition, was elected the NDP president in May. Democratization did not seem to be near, however, because there was no visible sign of the weakening of the state strength and unity. Even after the riots in Pusan and Masan, few observers, if any, thought that the imminent breakdown of the regime was possible. The assassination of Park by the KCIA director, the one who was the most responsible for the domestic order and one of the most trusted men by Park, surprised everybody in Korea. The collapse of the regime simply followed the assassination of Park.

While the breakdown of the regime was not inevitable and caused by a crucial decision by the KCIA chief, it was by no means an accident, and we can analyze it in a meaningful way, though retrospectively. There were factors that, by giving increasing pressure to the regime, contributed to the disintegration within the core elements of the ruling group. The assassination and the subsequent breakdown of the regime also could not be understood adequately without attention to the political structural characteristics of the Yushin regime as well as the nature of the regime.

In December 1978, Park was once again "elected" president receiving 2,577 votes out of 2,578 votes casted (1 vote invalidated) by the members of the National Council of Unification. This meant that Park would rule at
least 6 more years. After election, Park gave amnesty to 106 political prisoners including 77 people who had already been released. In fact, despite the reemergence of the major opposition protests, the regime released more than 250 political prisoners from July 1977 to August 1979. The release of the political prisoners was not a sign of liberalization as the regime continued to arrest and imprison those who were involved in opposition activities. It was largely the measures to reduce the criticism of the Carter administration.185

There were 2 important new developments in "political society" that contributed to the collapse of the Yushin regime.186 One was what was perceived as the victory of the NDP over the DRP in the National Assembly election held in December 1978. Like the 1973 election, the election was conducted essentially quiet due to the restrictions on the campaign activities.187 Because the direct attack on the Yushin regime was prohibited, the opposition politicians focused their criticism on economic issues and corruption.188 When the result came out, the NDP won 32.8 percent of the vote while the DRP received only 31.7 percent. This was the first time in Korean electoral history that the major opposition party

185 Particularly, the decision to release 139 people in July and August 1979 seems to have been influenced by the U.S. During the carter's visit to Korea in June and July 1979, the U.S. presented a list of political prisoners and appealed to release them. New York Times, July 2, 1979.

186 For a definition of political society, see Chapter 1.

187 In this election, there were some minor changes in the election law: the number of collective campaign speeches by the candidates increased; the use of the placards was allowed; and the observation of the voting process by the political parties was also allowed. See, CEMC, Taehan Min'guk son'go-sa, vol. 3, January 1974-December 1979, p. 365 and p. 379.

188 Ibid., p. 365; and Ki-taek Lee, Han'guk yadang-sa, pp. 340-341.
received more popular votes than the ruling party (see Table 24). The vote for the DRP declined by 7.0 percent compared to the 1973 elections, and the combined votes for the two opposition parties were 8.5 percent more than the vote for the DRP. Although the ruling group still composed an absolute majority in the Assembly due to the Park's appointment of one-third of the assemblymen, the outcome of the elections was taken as the victory of the political opposition and certainly increased the legitimacy of the opposition movement.

Table 24. Distribution of Seats and Votes in the 1978 Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>DRP</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>DUP</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Second, there emerged a new NDP leadership that was more strongly dedicated to the democratic movement. We have seen earlier that the NDP had been since 1976 under the "moderate" leadership of Lee Chul Sung, who chose not to challenge the regime directly, and did not pose any significant threat to the regime. In May 1979, however, Kim Young Sam, who was known as a "hard-liner", became the president of the NDP, by defeating Lee at the national party congress by a narrow margin of 378 to 367 votes. The victory of Kim was significant because it was achieved despite the effort of the regime to prevent him from taking the opposition party leadership. As one observer points out, if Lee relied on the his informal organizational power within the party, Kim used the "wind" (i.e., the
dominant public opinion). Kim was a recognized political conservative and popular among educated middle class and the students due to his strong commitment to democratization. Kim's popularity was reflected by two thousand students and young party members who gathered outside the party building during the voting and chanted his name. Two important political figures, Yun Po Sun and Kim Dae Jung, also contributed to Kim Young Sam's victory by supporting him.

As soon as he took the party leadership, Kim began to actively criticize the regime and publicly demanded the abolishment of the Yushin system. Underlying Kim's hardline policy was the total mistrust of Park. Kim had not engaged in active opposition in 1974 and 1975 partly because of Park's apparent promise that he would restore democracy. According to Kim, Park totally betrayed the promise. The past experience with Park led the opposition party leader to believe that negotiation with Park was futile, and that there was no hope of ending Park's rule without a direct confrontation with it.

Compared to 1975, Kim Young Sam was now in a better situation to mount active opposition to the regime. The Communist victory in Indochina, which sharply increased the perception of the North Korean threat was 4 years behind. Public discontent against the authoritarian Yushin regime increased as time passed. The Carter administration showed increased

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189 Young-sok Lee, Yadang saship-nyun-sa [Forty Years History of the Opposition Parties], p. 356. In fact, many people suspect that Lee was also supported by the regime in various ways.

190 For a discussion of the process that led to Kim Young Sam's victory, see Ibid., p. 349-359.
concern about the violation of human rights and political repression in Korea.

Carter, after a summit meeting in Japan, visited Korea in June 1979. While the main purpose of the visit was to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea, there were indications that compared to the Nixon and Ford administrations, the Carter administration was more concerned about the human rights issue in Korea. Carter met the church leaders and the NDP leadership. He also made speeches, in which he stated moderately and indirectly about the problem of authoritarian rule in Korea. The joint communique between the two presidents reflected the Carter administration's concern by saying that the two presidents noted "the importance to all nations of respect for internationally recognized human rights." During the visit, the U.S. also presented to the Korean government a list of more than 100 political prisoners and called for an investigation and their release. The U.S. request was made public. Most members of the political opposition considered that Carter's human rights policy was not aggressive enough. Although Carter's human rights policy did not weaken the political position of Park, there were, as mentioned in the above, some moderation in Park's behavior including the release of some political prisoners.

The tension between the regime and the opposition party became further heightened by the "Y.H. Incident". In August, the female textile workers of the Y.H. Industrial Company were occupying the headquarters of

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192 *Korea Annual*, 1980, p. 33

the NDP to protest vehemently their loss of job due to the closure of the factory. They argued that the closing was unjustifiable because the owner of the company had transferred much of its financial assets to the U.S. The female workers, who were influenced by the UIM, were extremely determined to achieve their demands with their emotions charged on a very dangerous level. After the initial negotiation with the workers failed, the regime demanded the opposition party to have the workers leave the party building. But the opposition party refused and asked to find the solutions to the problem. About 1,000 riot police finally moved into the party building, and exercised indiscriminate and brutal use of physical force, which resulted in the injuries of not only the workers but also Assemblymen, party members and the reporters who were at the party building at the time. Overall, about 100 people were injured and one worker was found dead.

The regime argued that the Y.H. incident was caused by the influence of the protestant ministers working for the UIM, who "advocate that it is the mission of the Christianity to construct the social system in which the proletariat rule." Several opposition figures including 3 UIM staff were arrested on charges of manipulating the Y.H. workers from behind, and the regime began an investigation of the UIM. The regime's methods of dealing with the case, however, only dramatized the brutal aspects of the regime to the politically relevant people in Korea. The U.S. State

\[1^{14}\] On the background of this incident, see NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, pp. 577-586. For a detailed description of this incident, see Gap-jae Cho, Yugo! [Incapacitated!], vol. 1, pp. 129-149.

\[1^{15}\] NCCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, p. 585.

Department also issued a statement that characterized the police action as "excessive and brutal", and proposed to "take disciplinary action in the case of those responsible" for it.\textsuperscript{197}

While the tension between the regime and the NDP increased, a suit against Kim Young Sam was brought by three party members who were close to the formal party president Lee Chul Seung. The three said that the election of Kim to the party president should be nullified as some party delegates who took part in the election had been declared by the Central Election Management Committee as unqualified NDP members. In September the Seoul district civil court ruled Kim was disqualified as the president of the NDP until the lawsuit against him was settled, and designated Chung Un Gap to be acting NDP head.\textsuperscript{198} Kim Young Sam refused to accept the court decision. Arguing that it was essentially a part of the regime's conspiracy to eliminate him politically, Kim declared that he, as the president of the political party that was "supported by the absolute majority of the people," would be engaged in the "pan-national struggle by gathering people's power" to bring down the Park regime. He then demanded the resignation of Park.\textsuperscript{199}

Within the NDP there were debates whether the court decision should be accepted. Chung Un Gap, who was appointed by the court as the acting president of the NDP decided to take the position with the support of some NDP assemblymen. Kim and his supporters became dominant within the party, however, as they received the support signature of 42 out of the 62 NDP

\textsuperscript{197}Ibid., August 15, 1979.

\textsuperscript{198}Korea Annual, 1980, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{199}Gap-jae Cho, 

assemblymen. Underlying this dynamic was public opinion: although the majority of the NDP assemblymen personally supported the acting presidency of Chung Un Gap, partly because they perceived Kim was dangerously challenging the regime, they decided to support Kim because of the overwhelming public opinion against the deprivation of Kim's party leadership. The names of those who supported Kim Young Sam were made public.

Despite this turmoil, Kim continued his strategy of confrontation, which was widely supported by the public. In an interview with the New York Times in September 16, 1979, he asked the U.S. to end support for the "minority dictatorial regime." He criticized the U.S. for not applying "public and direct pressure on Park" to "bring him under control", and declared that "the time has come for the United States to make clear choice between a basically dictatorial regime . . . and the majority who aspire to democracy."202

Kim's vocal opposition now clearly went beyond the limit that Park would tolerate. After Park's order to do so, the expulsion from the Assembly of Kim Young Sam was faithfully carried out by the members of the government parties on October 9. The expulsion of the popular opposition party leader increased public discontent against the regime. In accordance with the public opinion, the entire opposition party assemblymen, including three Democratic Unification Party members, resigned in protest. In reaction, the pro-regime parties were discussing the possibility of

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201 Interview with Lee Kyung-jae, the chief of the Political Bureau of Dong-A Ilbo. May 1989.

selectively accepting the resignation, which further angered the public. The U.S. displayed its displeasure with the expulsion by temporarily recalling the American ambassador to Korea to discuss the political situation in Korea.\textsuperscript{203}

Political crisis entered a new stage on October 16, as the expulsion of Kim Young Sam resulted in the explosion of the popular discontent in the form of the student-led anti-regime riots in Pusan, the second largest city and Kim's hometown area. The protests, that started by about 4,000 Pusan University students on campus, evolved into the major street riots in which many civilians joined. The protesters attacked the symbols that were associated with the government such as the police stations and cars as well as provincial government building, the pro-government newspaper and television offices.\textsuperscript{204} They also occasionally tore down or burned the picture of the president in the public offices. The demonstrators chanted such slogans as "Down with the Dictatorship" and "Abolish Yushin Constitution". There were virtually no attacks on the private properties, and no looting was observed.\textsuperscript{205} The anti-regime riots spread to the nearby city of Masan on October 18, where same pattern of violence occurred. The government imposed martial law in Pusan and garrison decree in Masan, mobilized 10,000 military troops, and put down the unrests.

\textsuperscript{203}Ibid., October 6, 1979. The U.S. State Department spokesman also said publicly that "This action is inconsistent with the principles of democratic government." Ibid., October 5, 1979.

\textsuperscript{204}Ibid., October 18, 1979. Between October 17 and 18, 28 government and public offices, including 23 police stations and sub-stations, were attacked in Pusan. Gap-jae Cho, Yugo!, vol. 2, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{205}Ibid., p. 39.
The number of those injured and arrested in the incidents were not great. For three days of riots, nobody died, and 132 policemen and 56 civilians were reportedly injured in Pusan.\textsuperscript{206} 1,058 people (397 of them were students) and 505 people were arrested in Pusan and Masan respectively.\textsuperscript{207} But given the existing atmosphere of great fear toward the regime, this was considered an extraordinary event.

The significance of the event also lied in the fact that it clearly indicated the extent of unpopularity of the Park regime. When the protest broke out at Pusan University campus, almost all the students who were present on the campus at the time (estimated about 4,000) participated in the protest.\textsuperscript{208} The protest also broke out at Koryo Theology Seminary, which was run by one of the most conservative protestant denominations in Korea, that opposed the social participation by the Christians and was generally critical about anti-regime activists. The participation of the non-student civilians in the anti-regime riots was also the first time since the 1960 student revolution. The general public, even if they did not directly participate in the protest, were supporting the student causes for democracy.

The assassination of President Park and Cha Chi Chul, the chief of the Presidential Security Guard, by the KCIA director and his subordinates on October 26 happened in this context. Kim Jae Kyu shot Park and Cha at

\textsuperscript{206} The casualties of the civilians were underestimated because most injured people, for obvious reason, did not report to the police.


\textsuperscript{208} Hae-chan Lee, "Yushin ch'ejje wa haks\"aeng undong" [The Yushin Regime and the Student Movement], p. 254.
the dinner party in a secret KCIA compound. The major reasons for the assassination seems to be the perception of the crisis after the Pusan-Masan riots by the KCIA chief; his belief that the crisis could be overcome only by killing Park; and his belief that only he had the ability to do it.

The KCIA chief was losing control of the situation, after the regime failed to prevent the assumption of the NDP power by Kim Young Sam. The police invasion of the NDP building, and the brutal repression of the Y.H.

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209 Several KCIA agents shot 5 bodyguards of the president who were in a separate room. At that time, Kim Ke Won, the presidential chief of staff, was also at the dinner table, but he was not affected. Chung Seung Hwa, the army chief of staff, was in a separate building of the KCIA compound, but he was not involved in the assassination plan. Chung was invited by the KCIA director, who wanted to use him after the assassination to control the military and the political situation. Apparently Chung did not know who killed Park until Kim Ke Won decided to inform him several hours later.

210 There have been much speculation on the assassination. Some people attribute the assassination to the unintended consequence of Kim's animosity to Cha. Others say that the U.S. was behind the assassination and Park's efforts to develop nuclear weapon contributed to his death. The first explanation, I think, is inaccurate. Regarding the second explanation, although I do not have information on Park's effort to develop nuclear weapon, it is unlikely that the U.S. directed the assassination. There are other factors that might or might not have contributed to Kim's decision to kill Park. Kim Hyung Wook, a formal director of the KCIA, disappeared in Paris in mid-October. There were also rumors that Kim Jae Kyu would be relieved of his position.

Kim Jae Kyu said that he was opposed to the Yushin regime from its beginning, and was contemplating to kill Park three times since the imposition of the Yushin regime. See, Chong-Sik Lee, In'gan Kim Jae Kyu [The Life of Kim Jae Kyu], pp. 99-114. Until now there has emerged no evidence to support Kim's words, but Kim's personality was possibly a factor that contributed to the assassination. Kang Shin-ok, a defense lawyer for Kim, suggested that Kim had a "spirit of Samurai", apparently meaning that he was willing to risk his life for what he thought was right. Interview in May 1989.
workers and opposition party members further escalated the tension. Kim Jae Kyu made serious efforts to settle the crisis in one way or another. When there was a turmoil after Kim Young Sam's interview with the New York Times, the chief made contact with the opposition party leader and suggested him to make a public "explanation" for his previous anti-regime statement, so that he could prevent Kim Young Sam from expulsion from the Assembly. The opposition party leader rejected the suggestion because it would mean he should give up his hardline policy toward the regime. After the Pusan-Masan riots, the director tried to restructure the NDP by replacing the hardliners with the "moderates".

All of the efforts failed, and now Park and his chief of bodyguards pushed Kim Jae Kyu with the tougher measures, which meant the arrest of the hard-line opposition politicians including Kim Young Sam. The KCIA director, however, was opposed to the idea. He identified the Pusan-Masan riots as a spontaneous civilian uprising, which indicated a widespread popular discontent against the regime. In his opinion, rather than further antagonizing the public by arresting the opposition politicians, some conciliatory measures should be taken to alleviate popular discontents.

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211 It was revealed later that it was the KCIA director who ordered the attack on the opposition party during the Y.H. incident. The reason, according to him, was that if left, the situation would deteriorate further, given the extreme determination of the female workers occupying the NDP building. See Gap-jae Cho, Yugo!, vol. 1, p. 145.

212 Young-sok Lee, Yadang sahip-nyum-sa, pp. 367-368.

213 Ibid., pp. 371-372; and Gap-Jae Cho, Yugo!, vol. 2, pp. 119-121.

214 The point made by Linz in his discussion of the Brazilian politics is particularly apt in this case. As he puts it, "The success of . . . policies based on repression and development can assure some stability in periods of prosperity, but it can never satisfy those who ask questions about legitimacy, except perhaps in purely subject political cultures,
Park's advocacy of the hard-line policy, and his willingness to use force against the political opposition presented Kim Jae Kyu with a great dilemma. The intelligence estimate suggested that there was a great possibility that the protests will resume again. Given the strong determination of Park to maintain his power, the result could be a large loss of life. Kim Jae Kyu began to express privately his dissatisfaction with the way Park handled the opposition, and showed animosity against Cha, who the KCIA chief thought was abusing the power and leading Park to the wrong way. Kim thus thought that the only way to end the crisis was to eliminate Park and Cha, and that only he could do it.

While the conflicts within the leadership with regard to the issue of the proper strategies of dealing with the increasing opposition challenges seem to have led to the assassination of Park, there is a

with traditional rules in the most narrow Weberian sense of the term. .. . They will be asked ... ultimately by some of those who have to use coercion. ... Anyone in a position of responsibility ... must ultimately ask questions about why he should do so and whether he should obey in a crisis situation." Juan J. Linz, "The Future of Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," p. 240.

215 The KCIA director argued that unlike Rhee Syngman, Park would not have given up his power even if violent challenge occur by the public. See Chong-Sik Lee, In'gan Kim Jae Kyu, pp. 182-184. At least there is one indication that Kim Jae Kyu perceived the situation very seriously. After the Pusan-Masan riots, he asked the NDP floor leader, one of the "hard-line faction", to resign saying that if they could not cope with the situation well, there would be bloodshed. Gap-jae Cho, Yugo!, p. 120.

216 The conversation at the last dinner party, as it was revealed later, illustrates the situation. While Kim advocated a moderate approach, Park and Cha urged the KCIA director to take tougher measures including the arrest of some opposition party leaders. Apparently so much annoyed by Cha, Kim was said to call Cha "worm-like bastard" before shooting. See, Chong-Sik Lee, In'gan Kim Jae Kyu, pp. 114-117.
political structural factor that should be considered in the analysis of the breakdown of the Yushin regime. Park's firm control over the extremely centralized state structure did not allow any moderate solutions to the political problem when Park opposed it. By the end of the regime, the state structure became more rigid with important change in the power relationship in the core element of the state. This resulted from Park's allowing of the growth of power of Cha Chi Chul, who became the chief of the Presidential Security Guard in 1974. Cha increased his control over important segment of the military. By the presidential decree, for example, Cha could command the powerful Capital Defense Force when it was considered necessary for the security of the president. With a three-star army general serving as the vice chief of the Presidential Security Guard, Cha was considered behaving as if he was the army chief of staff. Cha also acquired the control over who could see the president, which had been the prerogatives of the office of the presidential staffs. It was said later that by 1979, even the KCIA director could not see the president without the permission of Cha. Finally, Cha became deeply involved in political matters. He created his own intelligence agency, and in a daily reporting to the president, Cha often saw Park earlier than the presidential chief of the staff did. With his increasing involvement

Seung Hwa Chung, Ship-yi ship-yi sagun: Chung Seung Hwa nun malhanda [December 12th Incident: Chung Seung Hwa Speaks], p. 22 and pp. 143-144.

Ibid., p. 155.

As this became problem, the presidential chief of staff helped the KCIA director to see the president.

Gap-jae Cho, Yugo!, vol. 1, pp. 75-76. By this time, the Army Security Command became significantly weakened. Chun Doo Whan, who became the head of the agency in March 1979 did not have a chance to make a
in political matters, Cha intruded in the sphere which had been the prerogative of the KCIA, and collided with Kim Jae Kyu with his hard-line policy.

Of course, it was Park who allowed the increasing power of Cha, who seemed to perform better than others for the maintenance of Park's rule by showing absolute loyalty to him and by defeating moderate opinions within the state. Within the state, there was covert criticism against the abuse of power by Cha and his hard-line position. Particularly, many pro-regime politicians disagreed with (but could not oppose directly) the decision made by Park and Cha to expel the NDP leader, and their subsequent advocacy for the arrest of the hard-line opposition politicians.

As a person, who had a virtually all important information on the domestic political situations, Kim Jae Kyu knew that there was widespread public discontent against the Yushin regime, and that the opposition was essentially against the authoritarian rule of Park. Kim Jae Kyu also thought that Park's excessive authoritarian measures were not popular even among the state officials. 221 Because of Park's effective control over coercive instruments, however, there was little possibility of alliance among the moderates within the state.

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personal presentation of the report on intelligence matters to the president. It was believed by the Agency that its intelligence report was examined by Cha Chi Chul before arriving at the president's desk. Gap-jae Cho, "Che auh gongwhaguk" [The Fifth Republic], no. 1, p. 294.

221See Chong-Sik Lee, In'gan Kim Jae Kyu, p. 178. American officials said that "high-ranking South Korean [military] officers had told American officials several days before President Park's death that they were dissatisfied with the harsh manner in which he had been dealing with opponents." New York Times, October 31, 1979. Chung Seung Hwa, the army chief of staff, also said that he was dissatisfied with Park's long-term power although he noted that he still had a high respect for Park. Seung Wha Chung, Ship-yi ship-yi sagum, p. 66.
The KCIA director thus thought that the elimination of Park would receive support from the Korean public. The control of the state would be exercised by using the military leadership. He also thought that the U.S. would not oppose his action, given the increasingly critical attitude of the U.S. toward Park's rule. Thus, he considered that by killing Park and Cha, the Yushin regime would breakdown.

Like the emergence of the regime, the breakdown of the regime came suddenly. Koreans did not know about the conflict within the leadership, and were surprised that it was the KCIA chief who killed Park. The dominant public mood after the death of Park was neither overt exhilaration nor sadness. Most of the attentive public seemed to have been relieved. Partly because of the declaration of martial law, the country was essentially quiet waiting for further development toward democratization.

Some observers point out that the economic slowdown in 1979, by contributing to the Pusan-Masan riots, was an important factor that led to the fall of the Park regime. In fact, the economy in 1979 was not as good as previous years. After the two years of economic boom, the GNP growth rate in real terms decreased to 7.1 per cent. Export declined in real terms. The slowdown in economic growth resulted in an increase in unemployment from 2.7 percent in June 1978 to 4.0 percent in the first quarter of 1979. The economic slowdown was in large measure due to the

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222Kim, in his last statement in the court, identified 5 reasons for the assassination of Park. One of them was to improve the relationship with the U.S. Four others were: to restore liberal democracy, to prevent people's casualties, to prevent communization, and to improve the national image. Chong-Sik Lee, In'gan Kim Jae Kyu, p. 89.

223NOCK, Nodong hyunchang kwa cheungun, p. 434.
overinvestment in 1977 and 1978 and the international economic conditions, such as sharply rising oil prices.\textsuperscript{224} It is also said that the imposition of the value-added tax became a source of discontent among those in business.

While the economic issues perhaps have contributed to the increase in public discontent, one should not push the economic argument too far. Economic discontent was not the main reason for the riot: there was no demand by the protesters that was related to the economic issues. The participation by underprivileged young people -- coffee shop workers, waiters, and shoeshine boys -- can be interpreted as the expression of their social discontent that had continued to exist. The Pusan-Masan riots were led by the university students, and the primary discontent was against the authoritarian rule of Park. Explosion of the discontent occurred after the expulsion of Kim Young Sam from the Assembly.

The swiftness with which the promise of democratization was delivered by the post-Park government shows that the bases of support for the Yushin system were very narrow and essentially personalistic.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{224}For analysis of the domestic causes of the economic slowdown in 1979, see Paul W. Kuznets, "The Dramatic Reversal of 1979-80: Contemporary Economic Development in Korea." For an examination of general economic trends in 1979, see Office of the Prime Minister, Office of Planning and Coordination, Evaluation Report of the Third Year Program.

\textsuperscript{225}Thus Kim Jae Kyu was right in his analysis of the situation. But he seriously misjudged the trustworthiness of Kim Ke Won, the presidential secretary. He also underestimated the strength of military officers, who graduated from the regular 4-year military academy and were led by Chun Doo Whan, the chief of the Army Security Command. The KCIA chief was arrested with other KCIA agents several hours after the assassination as Kim Ke Won decided to inform the army chief of staff of Kim's involvement in the incident. Chun Doo Whan and his associates took control over the military after arresting the army chief of staff in a practical coup on December 12, 1979. Kim Jae Kyu and his subordinates were executed in May 1980.
state officials, who had seemed to support the Yushin regime when Park was alive, considered that the rationale for the maintenance of the regime was exhausted after Park's death. Choi Kyu Ha, prime minister, became the acting president, and subsequently became the president on December 6, 1979, but promised to revise the constitution as soon as possible after broad public opinion is gathered and to hold general elections. The EM No. 9 was abolished and most political prisoners (several hundred people) were released on December 8. Immediately after Park's death, schools received instruction from the Education Ministry that the education advocating the Yushin regime be terminated. This was accompanied with the decision to eliminate the subject on the Yushin regime from the textbook. In February 1980, all students and teachers who were expelled from school or in jail for their opposition to the Yushin regime returned to school. The civil rights of the most dissidents (numbered 684) were also restored.

The telephone poll of 1,000 adults conducted by the Joong-Ang Ilbo in October 1989 illuminates public attitudes toward the Yushin regime. When asked about the opinion about the Yushin regime, 33.2 percent said the "measures" were unnecessary, 26.0 percent said necessary, 40.4 percent said don't know. Table 25 shows that one's educational level is

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226 Tscheong, et al., Han'guk kovyuk chongcheck ui yinyum, vol. 2, p. 84.


228 Observers were generally surprised that the popularity of Park in this survey seemed to be higher than they thought. In fact, judging from other evidence, some of which will be discussed in the below, the result of this survey does not seem to reflect correctly the public attitudes at the end of the Yushin regime. One could speculate that part of the discrepancy might be the time elapse: By the time the poll was taken a decade was passed, and the public attitude might have changed. Keeping this in mind, we can still see very meaningful findings in this poll.
negatively related to the support to the Yushin regime. Among those with college education, only 20.9 percent said that the Yushin regime was necessary, while 56.8 percent presented the opposing opinion. They also present a clearer position than those with less education, who provided more "don't knows". This makes clear ones again that the major opposition to the regime came from the attentive public.

### TABLE 25. Public Opinion on the Yushin Regime, by Education (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Necessary</th>
<th>Not Necessary</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle School</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Student</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1989 opinion poll by Joong-Ang Ilbo.

The same survey also shows that Park did not receive public support in the area of political order. When those with college education were asked to choose 2 major achievements by Park, only 4.4 percent went to political and social stability, and the strengthening defense capability received 15.5 percent. On the other hand, economic development/overcoming poverty received 77.7 percent. This was followed by Samael Movement/rural development (47.6 percent) and construction of the highway (27.2 percent). The result of the survey shows that while those with higher education had no significant difference with those with lower education in terms of evaluation of Park's economic performance, the former tend to be more
critical about the authoritarian rule of Park. This confirms my argument that the main source of the opposition to the Yushin regime was political.

A survey of 2,111 adults conducted less than one month after the death of Park clearly indicated the high aspiration for more democratic rule by the public. 72.8 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively to the statement that "democratization, which promote political participation and human rights, is desirable even if we slowdown economic growth and postpone the improvement of the living standards."

The most important indication of the unpopularity of the Yushin regime is that there was nobody who publicly supported continuation of the Yushin system after Park's death. Another indication of the low support for the Yushin regime by the attentive public and intellectuals is that there has been almost no published material that defended the Yushin regime after Park's death. On the other hand, the newspaper and monthly intellectual journals as well as the works by the social scientists are replete with the criticism of the Yushin regime. Even the strong supporters of the Yushin regime later admitted that although the Yushin regime was justified in its imposition, problems happened by the end of the regime.

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229 61.0 percent of the respondents considered Park's overall performance during the whole years of his rule (1961-1979) positively while 13.7 percent evaluated negatively. Among the college graduates, it was 62.8 percent to 17.4 percent.

230 Dong-A Ilbo, January 1, 1980.

231 For example, Han Seung-jo, a most notable proponent of the Park's rule, said that in the latter half of the Yushin regime, he "lost hope". See Joong-Ang Ilbo, U.S. Midwest edition, October 26, 1989.
Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the dynamics of the Yushin regime. I have argued that given the democratic experience and demands in the pre-1972 periods, the new authoritarian regime needed a clear and new project. The lack of such a project meant that the regime had to rely essentially on coercion to maintain itself. The strength of the regime was based upon primarily the variables that we discussed in the emergence of the regime: The strong state with expanded conception of national security, the concentration of state power in one man, and Park's determination to continue his rule. During the Yushin period, Park's control within the state tightened, and the autonomy of the government officials and the ruling parties was reduced further. At the same time, the loyalty to Park of the coercive state institutions including the military, which was crucial to the maintenance of the regime, seemed to have remained strong largely due to their emphasis on political order in the face of the North Korean threat. Despite their support for Park, most state officials considered the Yushin regime as a tool to prolong Park's rule, rather than a proper institutional arrangement on a long-term basis.

The regime tried to create a project. When the issues that were used to impose the regime -- rapidly changing international situation and national unification through North-South dialogue -- became more or less irrelevant, the security issue began to be emphasized again. Particularly after the Communist victory in Indochina in 1975, Park's emphasis on national security substantially increased, resulting in the growing militarization of society. The support of the government officials including the military and the U.S. on the security issue strengthened the
regime's position toward the political opposition. Park systematically repressed the political opposition with the EM No. 9 in his hand. The public perception of the increased North Korean threat, however, did not last long, and the political opposition believed that Park exaggerated the North Korean threat for the maintenance of his power, and argued that this led to the weakening of national security.

Park also emphasized economic development throughout the Yushin regime. While there was rapid economic growth accompanied by the improvement in the standard of living, Park did not show that economic performance of the Yushin regime was better than the less authoritarian Third Republic. Since the Yushin regime was imposed and maintained without significant threat from the popular or radical forces, most opposition did not believe that the hard authoritarianism was needed for the continuation of economic development. In fact, many argued that negative consequences of economic development resulted from excessive authoritarian rule. Thus, the use of the economic development for the maintenance of the Yushin regime was not effective.

Along with the general failure of the projects, there emerged a growing public perception that authoritarian rule was essentially designed to maintain Park's rule rather than to maintain national security or fundamental socioeconomic structure. The opposition came primarily from the educated non-radical middle class -- students, intellectuals, clergymen, and journalists. The main demand made by the political opposition was essentially political: they demanded to go back to the previous system, which should include the popularly-held, seriously contested, presidential and Assembly elections. The regime responded to
the opposition by employing to unprecedented degree various forms of
depression such as extensive surveillance, detention,
interrogation, torture, and heavy jail sentence. Although there were some
progressive activists, it was basically the conservative nature of the
opposition that the regime's employment of harsh coercive measures could
not be legitimized in society and expanded the opposition rather than
containing the opposition activists.

On the dynamics of the regime, the popular forces had only a minor
impact. With the imposition of the more authoritarian regime, the workers
were more or less effectively controlled. Workers protests, despite
occasional violent outbursts with some new characteristics, largely
remained in the economic realm, small in scale and relatively isolated.

The Park regime, although more independent from the U.S. influence
than the Rhee regime had been, still was far from obtaining genuine
autonomy. While the concern of the U.S. for the security of Korea was an
obstacle for directly pressuring Park to restore democratic institutions,
the Park regime often had to moderate its authoritarian measures due to
the U.S. concern and request.

The breakdown of the Yushin regime was directly caused by the
assassination of Park by the KCIA director. However, the assassination was
cased by the disintegration of the core element of the regime due to the
increasing pressure by the opposition activities. The emergence of the
hard-line opposition party leader in an atmosphere of widespread public
discontent against the authoritarian regime, as well as under increasing
concern by the U.S. with the Park's authoritarianism, escalated political
tension until it finally exploded in a student-led popular revolt in Pusan
and Masan. The immediate collapse of the Yushin regime after the assassination resulted from the fragility of the personalistic, highly centralized state power after one man's death.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In studying the emergence and dynamics of the Yushin system, I have argued that a comparatively oriented, contextually sensitive, and disaggregated approach that looks at not only socioeconomic variables but also political and institutional variables and international and external factors is more appropriate than general theory or rigid application of a theory that is developed in a substantially different context. I have identified (in Chapter 2 and 4) as important two basic characteristics of the Korean political system in the pre-Yushin period -- the strong state with enlarged conception of national security based upon anti-leftism, and the public experiences with important democratic institutions. The establishment and development of the two seemingly contradictory institutions was influenced by the complex interaction of the variables. Based upon the discussion of these two variables, I have developed a study of the emergence, maintenance and breakdown of the Yushin regime by adding other variables in each of the phases.

I have shown that the perspectives that focus on socioeconomic and cultural variables do not adequately explain the emergence of the Yushin regime. The optimistic version of the modernization/political development theory does not fit into the empirical realities of Korean politics in the 1970s. Cultural theory also does not explain the reason why the openly
authoritarian regime emerged within the same (or even modernizing) cultural context. Because O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian model was used by some to explain the emergence of the Yushin regime, I have presented the reasons why the theory does not apply to the empirical situation in Korea. Popular classes have been conservative and very weak under the strong anti-Communist milieu and effective state control which did not allow any autonomous organizational capability for them. In addition, rapid growth without serious economic inequality also contributed to the prevention of a reemergence of the radical or populist movement. In this context, social class simply was not a basis of main political conflict. I have also argued that the power structure, which was highly concentrated in Park, was a distinguishing factor, that did not allow much political pluralism among state officials as in many other countries.

To understand the imposition of the Yushin regime, one should first look at the nature of the anti-Communist state in Korea. The anti-leftist state was established after the Japanese colonial rule not as a result of indigenous development or the so-called dependent capitalist industrialization. It was an outcome of the operation of political and external variables -- a result of the incorporation of Korea in a bipolar international political system after World War II. Korea was occupied by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which for the geostrategic interest, structured the power relationship among political and social groups in each of their occupied territories. The experience of the Korean War, and the subsequent ideological and military confrontation with North Korea furthered the trend toward a rigid anti-Communist state in South Korea.
The establishment and institutionalization of the security-conscious anti-leftist state in Korea had a crucial impact on the dynamics of Korean politics by constraining domestic political processes as it restricted political rights and freedoms and opposition activities and narrowed the scope of political conflict by virtually eliminating the possibilities of the reemergence of any significant leftist forces and political mobilization of popular classes. The anti-leftist state, then, significantly altered the context of political conflict in Korea. The anti-leftist state also was accompanied by the dramatic expansion of the military institution with a broad conception of national security. Within this context, the weakening of the authority structure within the military after the fall of the Rhee regime, and the failure of the democratic Chang regime to effectively control the military were crucial factors for the breakout of the coup in May 1961. While there existed social and political disorder, the fact remains that a segment of the military took state power without social demand or support. Despite the formal civilianization of the regime since 1963, the state, now firmly backed by the military and the newly created intelligence apparatus, strengthened its control over society (in political as well as economic arena) by using the rigid anti-Communist atmosphere.

In addition to the emphasis on the political nature of the strong state, I have also argued that we should look at the internal structure of the state. Until the end of the Third Republic, Park allowed, within the concentrated power structure, a limited pluralism within the state to an extent that there existed groups struggling to take state power after Park's rule. On the other hand, Park was successful in achieving an
effective control over the coercive instruments of the state. Park knew that the failure to control the military-intelligence apparatus could be detrimental to the survival of the regime. After the purge of the four-man faction in 1971, pluralistic elements within the state largely disappeared, and the personalistic nature of the state became more predominant.

The emergence of the Yushin system in October 1972 was caused by the strong commitment of Park to prolong his power for life-time, after it became clear that constitutional means of continuing his rule were exhausted after the 1971 elections. The necessary political structural conditions that provided him with the capability to achieve his motivational goal was the strong state and his control over the coercive state instruments.

These characteristics of the imposition of the Yushin regime are related to the other aspects in society and state that distinguish Korea from other countries that turned into the openly authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and the early 1970s. There was no socioeconomic disorder or political crisis that by threatening Korean capitalist industrialization or anti-leftist political system, were serious enough to necessitate the imposition of the Yushin regime. The popular classes were not mobilized as they remained very weak in their autonomous organizational capacity, politically conservative, and isolated from politically active groups in society. In fact, the anti-Communist state was perceived by many members of the public as already excessively strong. For this reason, there was neither societal demand nor support for the regime change. Most
politically articulate members of society wanted more liberal and democratic rule.

It is also crucial to recognize that even within the state, the regime change was neither demanded nor expected. There were significant elements within the ruling groups who strongly wanted Park to step down after his third presidential term. The preparation for the Yushin system was made autonomously (within and without the state), carefully and secretly by Park and a handful of his loyalists long before its imposition. Without Park's firm control of the coercive state instruments, the imposition was highly unlikely. Ultimately, it was Park's decision that was the most crucial in destroying the democratic institutions.

Park and his loyalists probably calculated that given the strong coercive capacities of the state and Park's firm control over the state, the opposition could not make a serious threat to the regime stability. The containment of the opposition activists could be achieved by a high level of coercion. And with the good economic performance of the regime, the general public would not become rebellious, and political order would be maintained. The external conditions did not present a serious obstacle to Park because the regime change was not actively opposed by a crucial external power, the U.S.

While this study has emphasized the importance of the political leaders's motivation and the political structural conditions in the examination of the regime emergence, other variables have been added in the discussion of the dynamics of the Yushin regime. Arguing that a broad classification of the political regime, while it may be very useful in some cases, is not appropriate for our empirical focus, I have gone beyond
the analytical framework that defines the Korean political system as authoritarian to identify important democratic elements in the pre-Yushin periods. These democratic components provided crucial constraints for the long-term maintenance of the regime, despite Park's control of the coercive capacities of the strong state, and by making largely ineffective the regime's efforts to manipulate various issues to create credible projects. The emphasis on the institutional variables is also one of the distinguishing characteristics of this study from a crude model of the state-society interaction.¹

By the time the Yushin regime emerged, the Korean public already had a limited but important experience with the democratic institutions within the context of anti-leftism, strong state, and weak society. Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 under the sponsorship of the U.S., democracy was adopted as the basic principle of Korean politics within the narrow boundary of anti-leftism. It is true that the democratic rules of the game were often violated. But democracy as a system of government was never discarded in principle. Limited political rights and freedoms existed; opposition political parties were practically allowed to operate; the presidential and Assembly elections were held at regular intervals with increasing significance except during the two-year period

¹For a strong argument that the neglect of the purely political and institutional variables constrained the analysis of the Brazilian politics prior to democratization, see Bolivar Lamounier, "Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura," pp. 43-55. As Lamounier points out, among the contributors to Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, Juan Linz was the only one who emphasized the importance of these variables in strongly constraining the institutionalization of the Brazilian authoritarian rule. See Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil."
of the military rule. Democratic ideology, which was spread through mass media and education, was widely accepted, if not internalized fully, by the attentive public. No openly authoritarian regime was advocated in state and society, although strong anti-leftism and political conservatism dominated within the state.

Our examination of the dynamics of these democratic institutions have shown that they were dialectically evolved by complex interaction of the variables over time. These include not just socioeconomic variables such as urbanization, increase in literacy, and communication. They were also affected by the U.S. influence at crucial historical junctures, the lack of internal threat by the radical and populist forces, and the acceptance of important democratic ideology in society. During the Third Republic, despite the increase in the state control over society, elections became more realistic that those in the First Republic. The violations of the democratic rules, particularly electoral irregularities, were less tolerated by society, as was seen in the increase in the student protests compared to the Rhee regime.

By 1971, democratic experiences had cumulated and there were widespread demands among the attentive public for more democratic rule. As was indicated by the 1971 elections and survey data, Park's rule, despite rapid economic development, was not supported by a majority of the educated urban population. A major reason for the opposition was purely political: The majority of the attentive public considered that many of the authoritarian measures were excessive because they were imposed in the absence of internal threat to the national security or economic development. Many of them also became critical of Park's long-term rule
(by 1971 he had been in power for 10 years), which seemed to generate corruption. The majority of the attentive public were conservatives and their demands were related little to the basic structure of the capitalist development. While there existed criticism of the negative consequences of the rapid growth, there was widespread support among the public for the economic development based upon the export-led industrialization.

The demand for more democratic rule was related to the very success of the anti-communism. The elimination of the leftist forces and the political passivity and weakness of the popular classes created and legitimized the demand for a more democratic regime. Under Korean anti-communism, the main political conflicts, which were fought exclusively among conservative forces, were less about fundamental socioeconomic issues than about the procedural rules of the political games and about the extent of the limits in political rights and freedoms. The major opposition groups were elite groups such as the students, intellectuals, journalists and opposition politicians.

In addition to the emphasis on the democratic experiences and expectations of the attentive public as presenting a great constraint on the long-term stability of the openly authoritarian regime, I have borrowed the concept of the project from Alfred Stepan and applied it to the Korean situation. Following Stepan, I also emphasized the role of coercion by the state and the institutional cohesion of the repressive apparatus that is associated with it. In fact, the qualitative analysis of the specific interaction of these three political and institutional variables seems to be important to the study of the dynamics of any authoritarian regime.
Given the democratic experiences and expectations of the attentive public, a new and clear project was necessary to maintain the Yushin system, which destroyed democratic institutions, and to justify the increased coercion it accompanied.

The regime's effort to create such a project was only temporarily effective. The dialogue with North Korea failed in less than a year, and the regime lost a critical rationale for the maintenance of the regime. Soon then, the regime returned to the security issue as a justification for the maintenance of the regime. Faced with the increasing opposition activities, which seemed to have a more organized characteristic, the regime declared the EM No. 4 against the so-called Democratic Youth and Student League (DYSLL), and attempted to characterize it as a radical movement. The fall of Indochina to communism in 1975, as well as the discovery of the underground tunnels built by North Korea, helped the regime by increasing temporarily the perceived threat from North Korea. There was strong support within the state for measures to increase the "self-reliant" defense capabilities.

The national security issue, however, did not provide an enduring project for the attentive public. In the case of the DYSLL incident, the regime's claim did not have much credibility because many of those arrested were known anti-Communist and Christians. Although the issue of national security became more salient after the fall of Vietnam, politically articulate members of society considered that Park exaggerated the North Korean threat to maintain his power. Because no significant radical groups emerged within South Korea, the EM No. 9 was considered essentially as the means to repress the political opposition. While the
regime argued that the national unity was needed in view of the North Korean threat, the political opposition argued that it was the repressive rule by Park that divided the nation and weakened national security.

Economic performance was a crucial source with which the regime wanted to build the popular support. Throughout the Yushin regime, the economy continued to achieve rapid growth based upon export-led industrialization. There was also general recognition by the public that economic improvement was made in absolute terms. However, the political opposition did not think that economic development justified authoritarian rule, because the regime did not show that the economy under the Yushin regime functioned better than that under the Third Republic, which had fewer authoritarian characteristics.

Due to the lack of an appropriate project, the regime had to rely largely on coercion to maintain itself. With the exclusive possession of the violent means of coercion in its hands, the regime severely restricted political rights and freedoms, and raised sharply the cost of challenging the regime. In response to the emergence of the opposition movement in the latter part of 1973 and early 1974, the regime declared EM Nos. 1 and 4 respectively, which prohibited not only opposition activities but even the discussion or the press report of the anti-regime protests. The loosening of control following the abolishment of the EMs No. 1 and 4 in August 1974 lasted only several months. After the fall of Indochina to communism, the efforts of the regime to increase the defense capabilities and the militarization of society went hand in hand with the increased political repression by the means of the EM No. 9, which lasted until Park's death.
Political repression in the context of the lack of a clear project increased political discontent because never before in the history of the Republic of Korea had the public experienced for a sustained period such a high degree of curtailment in political rights and freedoms and a harsh repression of the political opposition. Many people were arrested and imprisoned during the period simply because of their criticism of the Yushin system and the emergency decrees, which the regime argued was an anti-state (or anti-Yushin) activity that should be punished harshly.

As was seen in the case of the unprecedented mobilization of Christians in 1974, the harsh repression against the opposition activists expanded the size of the political opposition rather than containing it. Excessive repression also drew an expression of concern and criticism from the foreign countries, particularly from the U.S. As a result, the regime occasionally had to show some moderation. For example, the EM was temporarily abolished in August 1974, and political prisoners were released on several occasions. However, the regime never showed any signs of genuine liberalization and democratization.

The opposition came from university students, intellectuals, Christians, the press, and the opposition politicians. While there were opposition activists, who were deeply concerned about the socioeconomic issues, the basic demand of the political opposition was to go back to the pre-1972 political system as the popularly used term, the "restoration of democracy," testified. It was the conservative nature of the opposition that deprived the legitimacy of the regime's harsh repression.

The basic characteristics of the internal structure of the state was maintained during the Yushin regime. In fact, the state power was more
concentrated in Park, who continued to hold firm control over the military and intelligence apparatus. While no opposing opinions to the Yushin regime were allowed, there was widespread support for Park among the state officials, at least until more serious opposition activities occurred in 1979. However, their support for the Yushin regime as an long-term institutional solution was weak because they considered it essentially as a tool to prolong Park's rule.

Like the pre-Yushin period, the popular sector generally remained passive politically. There emerged no significant movement among the farmers and the urban poor. While there emerged labor protests of new characteristics (largely by some female workers in labor-intensive, light industries) under the influence of the church organizations such as the UIM and the JOC, which tried to "raise the consciousness of the workers", they were more or less effectively repressed by the regime.

In examining the breakdown of the regime, we have looked at the dynamics within the weakened democratic institutions, which played an important role in increasing the pressure on the regime. The regime weakened but allowed the existence of opposition parties. While one-third of the Assembly seats was appointed by Park, the winning of the 1978 Assembly elections by the opposition NDP in terms of the popular vote increased the legitimacy of the political opposition. The regime also failed to control the process of selecting opposition party leadership. The emergence of a new NDP leader, Kim Young Sam, who was strongly committed to the democratic movement, resulted in the escalating tension with the regime due to Kim's confrontational strategy, which was supported by a majority of the attentive public and perhaps encouraged by the
increasingly critical attitudes of the Carter administration toward the Park regime. The expulsion of Kim Young Sam from the Assembly by the regime led to the spontaneous student-led riots of major scale in Pusan and Masan, which was put down by the mobilization of the troops under martial law and garrison decree.

The riots in Pusan and Masan, by demonstrating the extent of unpopularity of Park's authoritarian rule, created disunity among the top state leadership on the proper strategies of dealing with the opposition. The KCIA director, who advocated a moderate strategy, decided to assassinate Park. The assassination was based upon his analysis of the situation. These included the widespread public discontent, the increasing skepticism about the Yushin regime among the state officials, and the increasing U.S. criticism against the regime. He thought that the regime would break down after the assassination given the highly concentrated state power and the personalistic structure of the regime. The director's assessment was right in that after Park's death, the Yushin regime was rapidly discarded by the state officials as an appropriate form of political institution.

The Fifth Republic in Perspective

Political development after the breakdown of the Yushin regime once again showed the political nature of the political conflict and the important of the coercive capacities. The breakdown of an authoritarian regime did not lead to the establishment of democracy. The military revolt occurred on December 12, 1979, only one and a half months after the death of Park. The so-called December 12th incident was organized by some of the
first graduates of the regular four-year military academy, who were located in the strategic military post, and were politicized under the favoritism by Park. The revolt was led by Major General Chun Doo Hwan, head of the Army Security Command and the chief of the Headquarters of the Combined Investigation on the assassination of Park. Although it occurred under the pretext of investigating the army chief of staffs in relation to the assassination of Park, the major motivation of the revolt was the power struggle within the military.²

After the establishment of their control over the coercive institutions, they waited until May 1980 when the military junta decided to take over the state power and impose another 7-year military dictatorship. This event clearly and dramatically demonstrated the ability of a small, but strategically placed, segment of the military sector of the state structure to impose its will on the whole society and the state despite the hope for democracy by the overwhelming majority of the Korean people. The imposition of another authoritarian regime was neither the attempt to restore the Yushin order nor a response to socioeconomic disorder. It was purely motivated for political power. Like the imposition of the Yushin regime, the December 12 coup was essentially based upon their confidence in the strong coercive capability.

But this time, the authoritarian rule was established only after the brutal suppression of the most violent civil challenge to the state since the Korean war. In May 1980, hundreds of thousands of angry

²After Park's death, there were voices within the military that the military officers who were politicized under the Park rule should be retired. Thinking that Chun Doo Hwan was abusing his power, Chung Seung Hwa wanted to transfer Chun to another less powerful post. See, Seung Hwa Chung, Chung Seung Hwa Speaks.
citizens in Kwangju, from which Kim Dae Jung originated, protested against the military regime. In reaction to the brutal use of force, they took arms and fought against the Special Combat Force. After the repression of the Kwangju revolt, which resulted in about 200 deaths, Chun Doo Whan became the president by the undemocratic process, and took various harsh measures against any possible political opposition to consolidate his power.3

Thus more than anything else, it was the way Chun came to power that deprived the legitimacy from the regime. The bloody repression created almost complete opposition to the state authority, particularly by the people in Cholla provinces. It also rapidly increased the student radicalism and anti-Americanism because many students believed that the U.S. tolerated or even permitted the repression of people in Kwangju. Student activists now began to talk about the "U.S. imperialists".4 Thus the repression of the Kwangju uprising had a great political impact on the people in Cholla provinces and the students.

Democratization

The democratic institutions were restored in June 1987, when the regime finally yielded to the popular demand, which was indicated by the massive street demonstrations led by the students. Had the regime decided

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3 For more about the Kwangju uprising, see for example, Young-chin Kim, Chungjung jakjeon kwa kwangju hangjang [Chungjung Operation and Kwangju Resistance Fighting]. For general political development in 1980, see Chong-Sik Lee, "South Korea in 1980: The Emergence of a New Authoritarian Order."

4 See for example, Yong Han, et al., Korean Society and Student Movement in the 1980s.
to mobilize the troops and repress the protesters, the result could have been bloodshed. The announcement for democratization was made in a dramatic form by former army general Rho Tae Woo, who was at the time the chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party and the second most powerful man after Chun. It was perceived by the public that the regime's decision was a result of the winning within the state of the moderates, with which Rho was identified, over the hardliners. Subsequently, a new constitution was adopted, and the direct presidential election was held freely and fairly (in Korean context) in December 1987. Due to the division between two main opposition leaders, Rho Tae Woo, the candidate for the ruling Democratic Justice Party, who received only 36.6 percent of the vote, was elected president. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, both of whom perceived that state power was near at their hands, did not want to give up the presidential candidacy. Had either of the two opposition leaders withdrawn from the candidacy, the opposition probably would have won the election. Thus at a crucial historical juncture, it was the division within the opposition that prevented the first transfer of the state power to the opposition through election.

The public, many of them reluctantly, accepted the result of the election. However, there were strong demands in society to punish those who were involved in the authoritarian rule of the Fifth Republic. As a result of the increasing public pressure, Chun Doo Whan apologized to the nation for his misrule and went into internal exile with his wife in a

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5 Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung received 28.0 percent and 27.0 percent of the vote respectively. Another candidate Kim Jong Pil received 8.1 percent of the vote. Chosen Ilbo-sa, Jae 13 dae daetongnyong son'go jaryo-jip [Source Material for the 13th Presidential Elections], p. 190.
remote temple in November 1988. Assembly hearings were also held in October 1988 on the Kwangju revolt and other wrongdoing of the regime.⁶

I have argued that the main political conflict in the 1970s was among conservatives regarding the issue of democratic processes, and that the majority of the educated middle class were opposed to the authoritarian measures of the regime because of the lack of the internal threat from the radical forces or popular classes. This view helps the analysis of the politics of democratization since late 1980s. On the one hand, the middle class generally supported the demands made by farmers and workers reflecting their view that the interests of the popular classes had not been well served. This was because the nature of the demand was not radical. Even state officials considered that the workers' rights have not been adequately recognized until now and the businesses now should deal with the labor demands more seriously.

While many members of the public are critical about the remaining authoritarian features of the Rho regime, the public and the press have become increasingly critical about a minority of opposition activists, who were engaged -- with increased organizational strength -- in extremist tactics and radical slogans. There have been many arrests of the radical and progressive activists, but this have not created a serious opposition by the attentive public. Unlike the Park and Chun regimes, thus, the repression of the opposition activists have not created an expansion of the political opposition. Democratization also resulted in the realignment

⁶In April 1988, the government redefined the Kwangju uprising as "part of the efforts by students and citizens of [Kwangju] for democratization of the nation" and offered an official apology. Korea Annual, 1988, p. 7. Substantial material compensations have been also provided to the victims of the repression.
among professional politicians. Most members of the opposition Reunification Democratic Party led by Kim Young Sam, a long-time opposition leader, who contributed to the fall of the Park regime, along with the Democratic Republican Party headed by Kim Jong Pil, united with the ruling Democratic Justice Party to form the Democratic Liberal Party. While Kim Dae-jung's Peace-Unification Party became the main opposition party, it received strong support largely from those in Cholla provinces.

Democratization, by providing more political freedoms, has also benefitted the popular classes. Although the regime would not allow complete autonomy of the popular classes, various organization have sprung up and been engaged in the promotion of the interests of popular classes. Since the increasing pressure by these groups cannot be totally ignored, they now have more chance to protect their interests.

For Democracy in Korea

The question for most people now has changed from how to oppose the authoritarian rule to how to improve and maintain democratic characteristics of the regime. There is much to be done for this goal. Democratic transfer of political power to opposition and/or genuine civilian leadership has yet to be made. The state control over society is still strong without allowing significantly autonomous social organizations. Progressive democratic forces have still many constraints on their activities.

The serious security problem involving North Korea has been detrimental to the development of democracy in Korea by expanding coercive state instruments with extreme sensitivity to national security and by
restricting political rights and freedoms. In this situation, the control over the coercive state instruments became the most crucial power resource for the regime. Likewise, the weakening of the control over an important segment of the military had led to the coup in 1961 and 1979. Thus the reduction of tension and mistrust between North and South Korea, which would be necessary for decreasing the role of the coercive institutions including the military, is crucial to the development of democracy in Korea. Significant improvement in the relationship between North and South Korea, which has occurred during the Rho regime, contributed to the more liberal and democratic regime. However, the military and the intelligence apparatus are still largely intact in their size and remain very security conscious. Thus, the effective control of the coercive instruments of the state by the democratically minded political leadership is crucial for maintaining and improving democracy.

Another problem is the highly centralized nature of the Korean political system. Korea had little experience with the local autonomy. This has contributed to what Henderson calls the "politics of the vortex", in which political forces are highly attracted to the central power. The elections for the local assemblies that are undergoing now are small improvement in this regard, but administrative decentralization has yet to come.

One should recognize, however, that control of the state is not a panacea for the political problems in Korea. The improvement of democracy involves a crucial issue of overcoming sociocultural obstacles such as uncompromising factionalism (based upon power calculation rather than

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7See his, Politics of the Vortex.
policy matters), authoritarian relations in society, and oppositionist attitudes. Continuation of the harsh authoritarian rule without any meaningful participation has created oppositionist attitudes among some members of society. Along with democratization, the overly critical attitudes should be reduced along with the increase in the sense of responsibility in the political community.

There are also the issues of economic development and equality. The capacity of achieving continuing development in the capitalist world system is also important for the development of democracy in Korea. On the other hand, the demand for economic equality would increase with the process of democratization. While one cannot totally exclude the possibility that long-term economic slowdown coupled with the increased economic demand by labor could create political disorder, future Korean economic development would not seriously affect Korean democratization because of the existence of a broad consensus in state and society on the importance of export-led industrialization and the largely conservative nature of Korean society. For Korean democracy, events within the state and political society will be more important than what is happening in society, at least for some time.


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