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How should leaders lead? A study of individual and institutional needs and expectations of legislative leaders

Little, Thomas Hamilton, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1991

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HOW SHOULD LEADERS LEAD? A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS
DISSertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Thomas Hamilton Little, B.A., M.A.

* * * *

The Ohio State University
1991

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To My Parents, Tom and Phyllis Little

and

To My Wife, Dr. M. Catherine Scott-Little
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I: LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP AS WE KNOW IT

The purpose of this study is to investigate the ways in which the institutional and individual environments of legislators affect their perceptions of legislative functions and responsibilities. Interviews were conducted with one-hundred and twenty senators in three states in order to examine the relationship between leadership responsibilities and the nature of the legislative environment. The unit of analysis is the individual legislator, and the functions that he or she associates with legislative leadership. This study seeks to answer three questions vital to our understanding of legislative leadership:

1) What are the functions and responsibilities associated with legislative leadership?

2) Are there significant differences between the types of functions that individual members expect their leaders to emphasize?

3) Is there a relationship between components of the legislative environment of a legislator and the leadership functions and roles he or she emphasizes?

The Study of Legislative Leadership

Leadership is perhaps one of the most studied topics in legislative politics, and indeed in all of political science. There are studies of the formal powers associated with leadership. There are studies of the selection of
leaders and the characteristics of people selected to lead. There are studies of the functions and influences of legislative leaders. There are studies of the styles and methods of individual leaders, or their activities on a particular issue. There are studies of the factors which enhance or inhibit the performance of legislative leaders. Why is legislative leadership such a popular topic of study? I propose at least two central reasons. First, leaders are studied because the tasks they perform are necessary if the institution and its members are to carry out their legislative and lawmaking duties. Second, given the indispensability of leaders, their presence and significance are inevitable.

The Indispensability of Legislative Leadership

Leaders perform functions which are vital to the operation of the legislative institution as a governing body and to its members as constituent servants and representatives. Their responsibility is often to bring a sense of order to a disorderly and decentralized process. Rules and accepted norms contribute to this order, but they are no substitute for leadership. "The mere existence of these laws, of course is not enough to keep the legislature from drifting toward a chaos of conflict. There must also be leaders for lawmaking task groups. There must be judges-known, authorized, and indifferent- for settling intralegislative squabbles," (Wahlke, et al., 1962: 170).
In addition to performing this impartial parliamentary role, leaders have been described as spokespersons, coalition builders, peacekeepers, (Sinclair, 1983: 2), janitors (Davidson, 1985), managers, policy initiators, agenda setters, (Davidson, 1981), and more recently, campaigners, public advocates and fundraisers (Peabody, 1981; Rosenthal, 1987:90).

Effective performance of these responsibilities contributes to the attainment of leadership, membership, or institutional goals. Leaders, and the decisions which they make, have a tremendous influence on the public (image), political (electoral), and policy (issue) results of the legislative process. The functions and tasks associated with formal leadership contribute to the success of legislators as individual representatives as well as members of a collective governing body. Leaders are indispensable in the sense that they perform functions which are necessary if the body is to be effective.

The centralizing and coordinating effects of legislative leadership may be more significant now than in any time in the history of legislative decisionmaking. While trying to confront increasingly complex and challenging problems, modern American legislatures find themselves characterized by a high degree of decentralization. At the national and subnational level, elections are becoming increasingly candidate centered,
(Jacobson, 1987; Salmore and Salmore, 1988) with each member controlling his or her own electoral destiny. Committees and subcommittees are becoming increasingly important and increasingly autonomous (Francis, 1990; Hall, 1989) as substantive issues have become more complex and more demanding. The level and influence of personal and committee staff have increased dramatically. Every member is virtually a sovereign and self-sufficient entity, with little incentive to cooperate with colleagues for a greater legislative good. Leaders are indispensable in the sense that they are the centralizing force charged to bring cohesive policy from this decentralized structure, enabling the body to govern the nation or state and the individual members to serve their constituents. This, if nothing else, makes them worthy candidates for study.

The Inevitability of Legislative Leadership

Because the functions which leaders perform are essential to the success of the institution and its members, the development of formal legislative leadership positions is inevitable. Verba notes that leaders naturally emerge from any group, wielding power with the encouragement, if not the blessings, of the other members (1961: 113). In the legislative context, leadership is likely to become quite formalized over time, developing into institutionally sanctioned positions of influence. The stability of such ascribed leadership seems to be a function of the multiple
goals of the legislative institution, and the extended
tenure of its members (Wilson and Jillson, 1989).
Rosenthal wrote of this inevitability in reference to the
development of formal leadership positions,

All legislators are created equal....But even in a
body of equals there is a hierarchy of sort. A
few members are elected to leadership positions to
preside in the chamber and to head a legislative

While the development of formal positions of leadership
in the legislative context has been inevitable, their
indispensability and increasing policy importance are
characteristics of a more recent past (see Ripley, 1967 for
a discussion of the House, and Patterson, 1989 of the
Senate). As scholars have come to recognize the influence
of leaders on the policy process, legislative leadership has
become an increasingly popular topic of research.

The State of Knowledge: What We Know About Leadership

While there has been considerable study of legislative
leadership, increased focus does not necessarily breed
consensus or understanding. In fact, heightened scholarly
interest may lead us to more questions than answers.
According to Cooper and Brady,

Leadership is an aspect of social life which has
been extensively studied in a variety of
institutional or organizational settings. Yet it
remains a topic in which our intellectual grasp
falls far short of pragmatic sense of the impacts
leaders have on organizational operations and
performance. "This is as true, if not more true,
of Congress than of other organizations," (1981:
23).
Peabody adds that the "definitions of leadership are almost as ubiquitous as the phenomenon itself" (1986: 240).

This study seeks to build on our knowledge of legislative leadership by focusing on the particular environmental characteristics that contribute to the varied perceptions of legislative leadership described by Peabody above. I propose that the expectations that legislators have of their leaders will be a function of various characteristics of the legislative environment. The primary functions and tasks associated with formal leadership positions in one context may be ignored or even frowned upon in another situation or environment. The variety of political and structural environments associated with different legislatures may explain the variance and confusion associated with legislative leadership evident in much of the literature. By their design, focus and fundamental approach, many of the studies from which our understanding of legislative leadership has evolved do not lend themselves well to understanding the variable nature of leadership responsibilities.

Before challenging these studies, it seems appropriate to present them and the many valuable contributions that they have made to our understanding of legislative leadership. Given the wide variety of topics studied under the rubric of legislative leadership, this discussion will be limited to studies that focus on aspects of leadership
pertinent to this research. More specifically, this review of the literature will focus on studies which discuss the following leadership issues:

1) The dynamic nature of legislative leadership.
2) Leadership functions and responsibilities.
3) The environmental characteristics that determine the nature of leadership responsibilities.
4) Leadership selection as a function of membership needs.

It is clear that leadership and the influence associated with it are not restricted to those legislators in formal positions of power (Ripley, 1969b; Hammond, 1989; Little, 1990). Studies in sociology as well as political science indicate that in any group situation, a person (or persons) will inevitably rise to lead the group in the achievement of the appointed task. Virtually every member of every legislative body wields a degree of influence with someone else in that body, hence making them a leader in their own right. However, most studies and surveys of legislators, lobbyists and members of the media indicate that members in official leadership positions tend to be the most influential (N.C. Insight, March, 1989). Like most studies of legislative leadership, the current study focuses on formal leaders (president, floor leaders and whips) and the responsibilities and expectations associated with their positions of leadership. The review of research
literature concerning legislative leadership will focus on these leadership responsibilities and expectations.

The Origins and Evolutionary Nature of Formal Leadership

One hypothesis of this study is that leadership positions are dynamic, responding to changes in the needs of the legislative institution and its members. Research supports the proposition that formalized positions of leadership are evolutionary and dynamic. It appears that in their early stages most legislative bodies are slow to develop centralized and formalized leadership structures, relying instead on temporary leadership structures which may vary from issue to issue and session to session. For example, Wilson and Jillson discovered that the fledgling Continental Congresses (1774 to 1779) was noted for its:

....absence of institutional leadership. This is not to say that leadership was not exercised in the Congress. Certainly very powerful men....exercised considerable influence over issues and events in the Congress. Yet the influence they and others held was impermanent, a function of each man's personality rather than a function of the roles they filled within the institution. (1989: 34)

In his study of the U.S. House of Representatives, Ripley found that this trend continued into the early years of that institution, noting that formal leaders began to take control only after the Civil War (1967: 17). Similarly, Patterson indicates that by the turn of the century, "William Allison, a Republican from Iowa, and Senator Author Gorman, Democrat from Maryland, served as their parties'
leaders in every modern sense....though the designation of 'leader' was not formalized in the Senate until the 1920's" (1990:36).

In their 1962 study of eight state legislative bodies, Wahlke, et al. found legislative leadership in various stages of development. Rosenthal notes that in 1978, there existed several state senates in which there was little in the way of a leadership hierarchy beyond the office of lieutenant governor (1978: 152). We know then that formal leadership positions and the responsibilities associated with them develop over time. Given this, we may be able to predict the path of development that leadership is likely to take as a function of its environment. This could prove quite helpful in understanding leadership differences across legislative institutions, and in proposing potential paths of leadership development in relation to other institutional developments.

**Leadership Functions: What They Do and How They Do It**

Virtually all studies of leadership, either explicitly or implicitly, are concerned with or make assumptions about exactly what a legislative leader does. Studies of the origins and evolution of legislative leadership indicate that leadership positions are formalized when the functions assigned to the leader are considered valuable to the operation of the institution or the party. Leaders must perform certain functions if they hope to maintain the
support of their followers. The literature on legislative leadership reveals at least five roles or sets of responsibilities which have been associated with legislative leadership: administering the institution, providing information and services, building coalitions, interacting with other government officials, as well as interacting with the general and electoral public, on behalf of the party, institution or members.

The earliest studies of legislative leadership functions focused on the formal powers associated with the leadership position. For example, in his study of the office of Speaker of the House at the turn of the century, Chui (1928) noted the responsibility of the Speaker to appoint committees, appoint and chair the committee on rules, recognize floor speakers, execute the rules of the chamber and assign the bills to the calendar. He further noted how each of these formal powers could be used to the political advantage of the leadership. This administrative responsibility permeates through modern discussions of legislative leadership as well. Ripley (1967) offers several administrative tasks in association with leaders of the House of Representatives, including organizing the party and scheduling the votes (54). Likewise, Sinclair describes the primary responsibilities of the majority leader as scheduling matters for the floor, as well as managing issues on the floor (1983: 42-50). Perhaps more significantly, she
describes the speaker as an "officer of the House," who is the "presiding officer and charged with many administrative responsibilities" (1983: 34). As Peabody (1981) argues, such administrative responsibilities may be performed on behalf of the party or the institution. According to Wahlke, Eulau, Ferguson and Buchanan, such administrative responsibilities are closely associated with leadership in the states as well. They noted that a plurality of all responses (of the 467 legislators interviewed) concerned either institutional or administrative responsibilities (1962: 172).

A second role which has consistently been associated with legislative leadership concerns the need to build legislative coalitions to pass legislation. While early studies (Chui, 1927; White, 1914) discussed this in terms of coercive activity, recent studies were more likely to focus on the necessity of leaders to "persuade members to act in accord with their leaders" (Ripley, 1967: 54). In one study, Froman and Ripley (1966) discussed successful leadership completely in terms of the ability to unite the party, analyzing the importance of coalition building, as well as the factors that contribute to its success. Almost twenty years later, Sinclair divided leadership responsibilities into two categories, one of which is building a winning coalition on major legislation—legislation important to the party as a collectivity"
In describing senate leadership, Ripley focuses on a similar leadership responsibility,

the members expect their leaders to make appeals for unity and loyalty on important bills. They do not, however, accept coercion as legitimate.... [but rather] noncoercive and personal appeal (Ripley, 1969: 105).

As with administrative tasks, this responsibility is not limited to congressional leaders. In his study of the 1959 Connecticut House, Barber focuses our attention on the importance of consensus building, tasks that are very similar to what Wahlke, et al. described as "decisional" (1962: 172). Wahlke, et. al (1962) found that forty-three percent of their respondents (N=467) expected the presiding officer to "coordinate members' ideas, promote teamwork" (185). Almost thirty years later, Rosenthal reiterates the importance of this responsibility for leaders:

....contemporary leaders have to build consensus. That is probably their principle objective during the course of a legislative session...effective private and public leaders alike must devote 90 percent of their time to consensus building.

Leaders are often judged almost completely on their ability or inability to pass legislation, making the responsibility of building coalitions essential for legislative leaders at the national and subnational level.

According to the literature, leaders are also expected to provide services and information to their followers. They are expected to provide procedural, substantive and political information. Ripley describes this as their
responsibility of "distributing and collecting information" (1967: 54) in the House, and "to distribute and to collect information on scheduling and substance" in the less organized Senate (1969: 106). Sixteen years later, Sinclair offers a similar description of the job of the speaker, but adds to it a service dimension, noting his role as "provider of services to members and information gatherer" (1983: 36). She notes that such services may range from appointing members to boards and commissions to posing for a picture with a constituent (36-39). Leadership in the House and Senate has in recent years become focused on serving the needs and interests of the members, with the hope of encouraging what Waldmen called "fellowship" (1977:374).

Wahlke, Eulau, Ferguson and Buchanan (1962) discovered a strong informational component of leadership in four state legislatures, noting the expectation of leaders to provide "factual background for substantive matters being considered by the legislative groups" (1962: 189). While Wahlke and colleagues found that a quarter of their respondents (N=467) expected their presiding officer to "help individuals" and "assist with personal problems," most early studies of state legislative leadership (Wahlke, et. al, 1962; and Barber, 1966) make little mention of this more service-oriented aspect of legislative leadership. However, recent scholars find the service component increasingly important in professionalizing legislatures.
Salmore and Salmore's discussion of the "congressionalization" of state legislatures implies that modern state legislative leaders must be able to respond to increasingly independent members (1988: 188-190). Discussions of recent contests for leadership positions in the states also indicate an increasingly service oriented component of legislative leadership in the states (Sullivan, 1988; Gallagher, 1989; Morgan, 1989). Jewell sums up the effects of these new demands: "Those leaders who have been deposed, or have had their power curtailed, have often been ones who failed to adapt to the demands of today's legislators" (1989: 11). The strongest proponent for the prevalence of such leadership roles is Alan Rosenthal who argued that modern legislative leaders:

In order to maintain their positions, leaders who feel pressed must devote more and more of their energies to serving and placating their members, not to wielding power (Rosenthal, 1989: 32).

While legislative leaders have always served at the leisure of their followers, studies of legislative leadership indicate that these service and informational components are becoming an increasingly central aspect of effective legislative leadership.

Although much of the legislative leadership role focuses on activities which promote the effective performance of the party or institution as a decisionmaking body, studies also indicate that leaders play a significant role in linking the legislature to the outside world.
Leaders are expected to represent the interests of the party or institution to the executive, the other chamber, the opposing party and other governing groups. Among his six primary functions associated with party leadership, Ripley notes the necessity of "maintaining liaison with the president and his top advisors" (1967: 54). Likewise, Peabody found the executive liaison function to be a central part of Senate leadership responsibilities, adding that the nature of the relationship may depend on various situational characteristics (1981: 95). In addition, Peabody discussed this liaison role in terms of the relationship with the other legislative chamber, but argued that interbranch cooperation was made difficult by numerous environmental differences (Peabody, 1981: 91-92).

Scholars of state politics have discovered a similar liaison responsibility. In his study of governors and legislatures, Rosenthal found that executive interaction with the leadership was inevitable and necessary:

Whatever the circumstances, governors cannot avoid some involvement with legislative leadership. Most governors interact with legislative leaders on a regular basis (Rosenthal, 1990: 90).

Thirty years earlier, Wahlke and others found that one quarter of the legislators in four states expected their party leaders to "coordinate, communicate, provide liaison with other officers and systems" (1962: 185). Interaction with the other legislative chamber was included as part of
this function, as was liaison with the governor and the public.

Finally, many have discussed this external liaison responsibility in broad terms of representing the party or the institution to the general public, as well as to the district public with campaign assistance. Noted Sinclair,

...the Speaker is often called on to act as spokesman for his party and for the House...they expect the speaker to communicate Democratic positions not only to the Washington community, but also to the public at large (Sinclair, 1983: 40-41).

Peabody (1981) and Roberts (1990) note the rising importance of the media in the performance of this liaison task, arguing that there is a symbiotic relationship between the leadership and the press (Peabody, 1981: 97; Roberts, 1990: 85). However, both were quick to add that no legislative leader can compete with the president for media attention.

As with studies of Congress, recent studies of state legislative leadership have found an increasing importance for the responsibility of representing the party or the institution to the public. Oregon Speaker Vera Katz discussed the effects of such activity:

In dealing with the public, whether the general citizenry, the news media or special interest groups, legislative leaders should try to build consensus and solve problems. Improving public relations can pay off in successful programs (Katz, 1987: 262).
Rosenthal discussed "handling the press" as one of the most important, and most frustrating aspects of state legislative leadership, noting the result is often a standoff (1981: 174-175). Increasingly, legislators are casting their ballots for leaders with an effective media presence and the ability to project a public image (Rosenthal, 1989).

As part of this public relations role, recent research indicates that legislative leaders are becoming increasingly active in efforts to maintain or gain majority status by participating in legislative campaigns. While early behavioral studies of congressional leadership (Huitt, 1961; Ripley, 1967; Ripley, 1969) found no indication of such a responsibility, more recent studies find it increasingly important. Sinclair discusses the campaigning responsibility in the context of helping members get re-elected, noting that:

The leaders can help members with campaign funds....The leaders can speak for a member in his district and by so doing, raise the member's status among the attentive public there (Sinclair, 1983: 24).

Peabody discussed this campaign function in a somewhat broader context, indicating that leaders can assist an individual campaign by appearing with the candidate, encouraging others to appear with the candidate, assisting with fundraising and offering technical advise and support (1981: 80). In his study of Tony Coehlo, then chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, Brookes
Jackson (1987) explored the dangers and pressures associated with this campaign responsibility, finding it an increasingly significant part of leadership. These recent studies indicate that campaign functions may become an increasingly important part of congressional leadership.

Studies indicate that many state legislative leaders are under far more pressure to see that their party maintains or increases its proportion of the membership than are their national counterparts. Rosenthal adds, "In those states where political parties compete vigorously in legislative elections, the main job of the leader has been winning or maintaining the majority of seats in the chamber" (1988: 90). In many states, the primary leadership responsibilities now revolve around these functions. Gierzynski and Jewell found that functions related to maintaining or gaining legislative seats include raising campaign funds and distributing those funds wisely, usually to marginal incumbents or promising challengers (1989: 3). Legislative leaders are even involved in the recruitment of qualified candidates. Of California leaders, Richard Clucas wrote, "No longer content to just raise funds, these leaders participate in all aspects of elections today, from recruiting candidates to managing campaigns" (1989: 1).

In addition to these five particular functional categories of leadership responsibilities, studies of legislative leadership suggest two other distinctions that
contribute to our understanding of legislative leadership. First, it is clear from most studies that legislative leaders are leaders of the institution as well as leaders of their party. In describing the responsibilities of the Speaker, Galloway noted that he was "the presiding officer of a parliamentary body" as well as "head of his party in the House" (Galloway, 1961: 424). In a similar manner, Sinclair argued that the speaker "wears two hats: he is an officer of the House, and a leader of his party in the chamber." (Sinclair, 1983: 34). Likewise, she indicated that the floor leaders perform institutional, as well as partisan functions. In his discussion of Senate leadership, Patterson implies the same distinction, noting in his description of the floor leadership roles that "the capacity of the Senate to operate as a legislative body depends on the ability of these two leaders to cooperate. Moreover, both are top leaders of their legislative parties" (Patterson, 1990: 50). Such distinctions are even greater in the states, where some leadership appears to be almost solely institutional because of the absence of party competition (Rosenthal, 1981).

In addition to the institutional/partisan distinction, recent studies have given greater emphasis to the distinction between internal and external responsibilities. While early scholars (Chui, 1927; Huitt, 1961 and Ripley, 1967; Jones, 1970) focus on internal responsibilities,
recent studies of Congress are giving equal billing to what Peabody called "links to the outside" (Peabody, 1981: 90). While focusing on the major internal tasks of leadership, he added that "no party leaders work exclusively within the Senate; their jobs involve them in countless interactions with other important political actors" (Peabody, 1981: 90). Roberts argued that such external responsibilities have become increasingly important for "politicians who grew up in a media age" (Roberts, 1990: 96). Recent studies of state legislatures make the internal/external distinction as well, citing the growing importance of the external components of leadership. Perhaps Rosenthal made the strongest case for the dual nature of modern leadership in the states:

   Legislative leadership has a role that no one else in the legislature can perform. It is up to the leadership to take a statewide perspective, deal with the other chamber and with the governor, represent the legislature to the press, serve and protect its members and maintain the legislature as an institution (Rosenthal, 1989: 34).

Influences on the Nature of Formal Leadership

A primary tenet of this study is that the nature of legislative leadership is a function of the particular environment in which that leadership is performed. Many studies find this to indeed be the case. What a leader is expected (and able) to do will be greatly influenced by the context in which he or she must provide those services:

   The context or environment shapes and constrains leadership styles and strategies. Rules, the
characteristics of the membership, and norms are the most salient aspects of the internal House environment for the leadership. The size of the party is a basic resource. Membership stability and factors such as member goals and reelection needs which influence leadership styles are feasible. Norms affect how resources can be used. To a large extent, the broader political environment determines the House's larger policy agenda. (Sinclair, 1983: 3)

According to Cooper and Brady (1981) institutional context is the primary determinant of leadership power and leadership style, both of which are a reflection of party strength (1981: 44-46).

Congressional scholars have pointed out several environmental or contextual factors which determine leadership responsibilities and limitations. As noted above, Sinclair (1983) includes formal rules, informal norms, and the goals of the members (analyzed as reelection, policy and power), and various characteristics of the membership as a whole. In a more recent study (1990), she makes an even stronger case for the effect of environmental characteristics in outlining a research agenda for the study of congressional leadership (1990: 130-132). Other studies of leadership in Congress (virtually always analyzed in terms of the majority party) indicate the importance of the party, popularity and legislative posture of the president, the nature of "the governmental mandate" (Ripley, 1967: 2-6), and the size of the majority (Cooper and Brady, 1981). Leadership in the 1970's and into the 1980's has had to adapt to the demands of the "me
generation" of legislators, reflecting the importance of the nature of the membership to the performance and success of the leaders (Loomis, 1981). Likewise, the leader's ability to function is influenced by the degree of cohesion or cleavage in the party (Ripley and Froman, 1966). While Ripley (1969) notes the importance of regional distinctions in the distributions of influence, cleavages which constrain the responses of leadership may also stem from ideological, gender, cohort or issue differences. Recent studies (Peabody, 1981) have discussed the influence on leadership responsibilities of the nature of legislative elections and the place of political parties in that process.

In response to the performance of one specific responsibility, that of consensus building, Froman and Ripley (1966) note several conditions which contribute to successful role performance. They argued that leadership success was in great part a function of leadership cohesion, the nature of the issue (procedural vs. substantive), visibility of the issue, visibility of the action, constituency pressures and the activity of state delegations (1966: 52-63). The degree to which a leader may be able to count on membership support is not always a function of the leader, but often times a function of the situation.

Perhaps the clearest contextual distinction made in the leadership literature is the difference in responsibilities assigned to leaders of the majority and the minority. Party
status is accorded a dominant role in determining leadership responsibilities. In fact, most comprehensive studies of legislative leadership focus only on the majority party because of their importance to the institution (especially given the traditional dominance of House Democrats). In *The Minority Party in Congress*, Jones is keenly aware of the limitations associated with minority status, noting that the functions of the minority leadership are in great part a response to majority action and activity. (1970: 15-16). Given this, he structures his study of the influence of the minority around the effects of contextual variables. These variables include constitutional conditions (effects of a system that is federal, representative and bicameral), political conditions outside of Congress (temper of the times, external strength of the minority, party unity outside Congress, and presidential power) and political conditions inside Congress (procedure, size of majority, majority leadership, length of time in minority, the relative strength of party in the other House) (Jones, 1970: 9-15).

In his study of the Senate, Robert Peabody did acknowledge the minority leadership and noted similar environmental constraints (1981: 83). While studies of minority leadership are far less numerous than those focusing on their majority counterparts, they may be more informative as to environmental constraints. Minority party
leaders have fewer institutionally mandated responsibilities or tools than their majority counterparts, so the nature of their responsibilities is more likely to change in response to a changing environment. While some aspects of majority leadership will change as a function of context, certain institutional functions are necessarily associated with majority leadership regardless of context. And yet, studies of the responsibilities associated with minority parties are few and far between.

As with most other aspects of legislative research, studies of environmental constraints in the states are not as comprehensive as the studies of Congress, but there is considerable evidence to indicate the importance of such factors. The authors of The Legislative System explicitly recognize the distinction of functions assigned in partisan versus nonpartisan legislatures (1962: 183). Further, their discussion of the "problems of generalization" implies several contextual characteristics associated with the "power" of particular title holders, including the degree of formal powers, party of and relationship with the governor, size of the majority party and the cohesion or factionalism within the parties (190-191).

In his study of the Connecticut House, Barber noted several conditions that contributed to the success of leadership in their consensus-building role:

In the 1959 session of the Connecticut House of Representatives, certain conditions brought forth
maximum leadership efforts for party cohesion. Democratic Governor Ribicoff, elected by a massive landslide, began the session with a Democratic majority of three seats in a House of 279 members. The Democrats had been in the minority for 82 years....Only a quarter of the Democrats had any prior experience in the legislature, as opposed to 62 percent of the Republicans. (Barber, 1966: 348)

Recent studies focusing on leaders as sources of campaign assistance have indicated the importance of partisan competitiveness in the institution and partisan competitiveness at the individual election level (Gierzynski and Jewell, 1989: 6-8). In addition to these factors, Clucas notes the effect of leadership ambition on the distribution of campaign resources by legislative leaders in California (1989: 1). While Gierzynski and Jewell (1989) had data from seven states, they did not attempt to analyze why there might be variations across the states. However, the data indicated considerable disparity across the states. In the 1986 House races, the average Democrat in California received $33,574.24 while the average Minnesota Democrat received $362.90 (1989: 29). These are differences that one might expect to be, at least in part, a function of the different state environments. Further, the increasingly professional nature of state legislatures and the increasing independence of members complicate further the responsibilities of legislative leaders (Rosenthal, 1988: 87-92). Recent research concerning legislative leadership
has established a strong argument for a connection between
the legislative environment and legislative leadership.

Leadership Recruitment and Characteristics

In a very pragmatic sense, the link between the
environment and the leader is provided by legislative
elections. Members use these elections to select leaders
that meet their expectations, or remove those that fail to
do so. "Leaders are always, covertly or overtly, pre­
selected by their supporters according to the situational
needs of the group. Leadership is a nexus of need
fulfillments that binds situational demands and group

While many studies have focused on the demographic or
ideological characteristics of leaders (Truman, 1959; Simon,
1989), others have focused on leadership contests as
mandates for a particular type of action. The latter
studies are of primary interest for this research. Again,
much of the work has been done at the congressional level.
Led by Robert Peabody (1967), many scholars have adopted a
case study approach to analyzing leadership recruitment and
selection, studying particular instances of leadership
selection in order to find commonalities and explain
differences. In Leadership in Congress, Peabody (1976)
examines three contests in the House and three in the Senate
and classifies the nature of the contests along three
dimensions: the existence of an incumbent leader, the
presence of a pattern of succession, and the degree to which
the selection process was contested. He finds that leaders
were often selected because of particular skills or
abilities that members felt were appropriate for leadership
at that time. Recently, Brown and Peabody (1987, 1990) have
updated that argument, studying first the 1986 succession of
Wright, Foley and Coelho to leadership in the House, and
then the looking at the rise of Foley, Gephart and Gray in
1989. They establish a strong link between the particular
abilities possessed by these individuals and their ability
to be elected to leadership. For example, in discussing the
election of Richard Gephart to the position of majority
leader, they wrote:

As a former Caucus chair, he had experience in
leadership politics; he had already shown his
style—low-key, earnest, willing to listen—well
suited to advancement in the house. He was
personally well liked and, with a more partisan
edge than Foley, seen as a good counterpart to the
new speaker... Richard Gephart epitomized the
driving, pragmatic, issue-oriented, media-
conscious, new-breed of political leader (Brown

In 1962, Nelson Polsby argued that there were two
distinct strategies by which a member may choose to build
support for a leadership bid. In analyzing the 1973 contest
between Speaker Carl Albert and insurgent Richard Bolling,
Polsby notes two "strategies of influence:" insider strategy
and outsider strategy. Albert's insider strategy was
characterized by coalition building among those already in
power, and in some degree beholden to Albert. As the
outsider, Bolling made considerable use of the media and "pulled strings" with the members who for various reasons were predisposed to his candidacy (Polsby, 1976). Again, these election styles offered a hint at the leadership styles of the two members. The style of Bolling was rejected, that of Albert was not.

The bulk of the congressional research on leadership recruitment and characteristics highlights the changing nature of leadership contests and the effect of the environmental contexts on the leadership contests, the leadership candidates, the electoral campaigns and the abilities of the winner. It should be made clear that policy considerations are not the only determinate of leadership selection. Often, votes are cast along regional, seniority or other personal lines. However, I argue, and the studies cited above seem to support, that even a leader elected for primarily personal reasons must perform the appropriate functions, or find his or her support weakening to the point were a successful challenge is possible. Recent leadership changes in the states (which will be discussed later) support such an argument.

While most of the research on leadership recruitment is from the United States House and Senate, some scholars have ventured to state houses to look at leadership there. In most state legislative bodies, leadership recruitment has not reached the level of predictability or stability that
seems to have developed in Congress over the last twenty years. Many states are characterized by a tradition of rotating leadership, with no leader serving more than one two or four year term (Rosenthal, 1981: 153). However, the changes that have produced more professional and active state legislatures in recent years (Rosenthal, 1989), have also begun to produce leaders who serve extended tenures and consider themselves fulltime (Rosenthal, 1983). Those new leaders bring with them different experiences and policy positions that indeed affect the way they perform. Lucinda Simon emphasized the uncertainty of reaching a position of leadership in the states:

No two legislative careers follow the same path, and certainly the rungs of leadership are less predictable than those in business or government bureaucracies. The choices along the way are shaped by the tug of issues, partisan politics and personal loyalties. But one thing is clear—those who become legislative leaders do so not solely by chance but by a mix of ambition, timing, political fortune, institutional savvy and hard work (Simon, 1988: 79).

Unlike leadership selection in Congress, cross-party coalitions have formed to elect speakers in several states, usually as a result of a common ideology or a mutual dissatisfaction with the incumbent leader. In fact, 1988 saw the ouster of legislative leaders by bipartisan coalitions in Illinois (Kemp, 1989), Oklahoma (State Government, July, 1989), Connecticut (State Government, July, 1989) and North Carolina (Jewell, 1989). Many state legislatures have yet to develop "leadership ladders" that
virtually make leadership selection a forgone conclusion. Instead, many leadership elections in the state are competitive, and more likely to reflect responses to the contemporary environment.

These studies indicate that state legislatures do indeed offer us a perspectives different from, but no less valid than, those gleaned by scholars of congressional leadership. While few scholars have attempted to comparatively analyze differences across states or institutions in order to understand the nature of the distinctions, the examples cited above indicate considerable variance in recruitment practices in the states. However, research does indicate one clear commonality across state legislatures and the United States Congress: in legislative institutions at the national and subnational levels, leadership elections are becoming an increasingly effective method of ensuring responsiveness.

Limitations of Our Understanding of Legislative Leadership

While the literature on legislative leadership seems quite comprehensive in its scope and foci, I propose that several characteristics of the study of legislative leadership contribute to a rather limited knowledge of the topic. The literature is characterized by the following:

1) A restrictive focus on leadership in a singular institution, primarily the United States Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives.
2) A similarly restrictive focus on majority party leadership at the expense of minority party leadership.

3) A propensity to assume certain functions assigned to leadership without investigating their universality.

4) A tendency to ignore the variation of leadership expectations and responsibilities that are a function of the goals of individual members.

5) A tendency to define leadership from the perspective of the leaders rather than from the followers.

Constraints of a Single Institution Focus

The bulk of our understanding of legislative leadership uses the United States House of Representatives and the Speaker of the House as the primary referents. The earliest studies of formal leadership development (Busby, 1927; Chiu, 1928) as well as the most comprehensive (Ripley, 1967) focus exclusively on that institution. The only comprehensive studies of leadership that give equal attention to the Senate and the House are the recruitment studies of Peabody (1967, 1976). While a concentration on particular events like those analyzed by Peabody have some limitations (as noted above), the study does utilize the advantages of comparative analysis, drawing distinctions between patterns in the two institutions. However, scholars of leadership functions and performance have not been quite so quick to tackle multiple institutional studies. In fact, the only comprehensive studies of the functions associated
with formal leadership at the national level focus on the House (Ripley, 1967, 1969; Hinckley, 1983).

While these studies have contributed a great deal to our understanding of legislative leadership, they have bound us by describing leadership under a restrictive set of conditions. If we accept that leadership is contextual in nature (Jones, 1981; Cooper and Brady, 1981; Sinclair, 1990), one would hope to examine it in various environmental settings. However, given the usually slow (Polsby, 1969), and generally marginal rate of change experienced by any large institution, we must accept that analysis of a single institution does not offer a wide variety of environmental characteristics. Instead, our central understanding of leadership is derived from an institution that is highly professional, highly partisan, dominated for forty years by one party and increasingly populated by full-time and district-oriented members. Clearly, these conditions affect the nature of leadership and do not necessarily exist in such form in all legislative institutions.

Attempts to overcome this dilemma by analyzing leadership historically (Jones, 1970; Ripley, 1967), although admirable, face considerable difficulties as to the accuracy and comparability of data. For obvious reasons, direct observation and personal interaction with the members of the institution are not viable research
methods for historical studies. Aware of these limitations, Jones writes:

I experienced more problems than I expected in collecting data for study. The data sources for Congress in this century are uneven in quantity and quality....In some cases, accounts of events are totally unreliable because different sources provide different facts regarding the same event....based on 'bits and pieces' collected from a variety of sources, many of which are of questionable reliability." (Jones, 1970: 7).

In other words, our concentration on single-institution-studies has forced us to either draw our knowledge from a very limited environment, or rely on questionable resources to reconstruct alternate environments.

The only subnational comprehensive study of leadership responsibilities is that of Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson (1962). While they study eight very distinct legislative environments, the authors failed to take full advantage of those varied environments. First, because the purpose was to study the legislative process as a system, the study of formal leadership was only one part. In fact, the development of individual role orientations, rather than the leadership descriptions, is still considered the primary contribution of this study.

Second, given the emphasis of the research on particular roles, the analysis focused more on differences across leadership positions than across institutions. Thirdly, in the cases where institutional differences were discussed, the environmental differences contributing to the
distinctions were seldom noted or offered. Finally, while their groundbreaking research contributed considerable knowledge to our understanding of legislative behavior, it is now almost thirty years old, and it seems safe to assume that some of the factors and relationships described have undergone considerable change.

Constraints of a Majority Party Focus

While studies of leadership development and selection have managed to include studies of both parties, case studies and especially analysis of leadership functions have focused on the majority party. This distinction is not altogether unjust, because it is clear that the majority party leadership does have a broader degree of responsibility than the minority and usually has a far greater impact on public policy. Patterson discussed the institutional responsibility of majority leadership (1989: 410) in the Senate, as does Ripley (1967:189-190) in the House. In introducing the single comprehensive study of the minority party in Congress, Jones writes: "Majority and minority parties behave differently in Congress. Despite this obvious distinction, few scholars have made an effort to define these differences in any but the most superficial manner," (1970: 3). Instead, scholars have tended to focus on the majority, ignoring the functions and roles associated with minority leadership.
However, the apparently less institutional nature of minority leadership should make it a no less noble focus for analysis. Like leaders of the majority, leaders of the minority are selected on the basis of certain characteristics (in fact, the studies of Peabody on leadership selection indicates that minority members are more concerned with particular attributes than the majority that has established a more predictable pattern of leadership selection (1976: 477), and are expected to perform certain functions in that leadership capacity. In addition, Jones' study indicates that the roles assigned to minority leaders and the minority party are even more strongly tied to internal and external environmental constraints than are the more institutional majority responsibilities. Finally, Jones also makes it clear that under particular conditions, the minority party can have a major policy impact, and this indeed affects the performance of its leadership (1970: 98-151). The distinction of being in the minority party should not disqualify leaders from being the focus of study, but rather make them particularly interesting topics.

Clearly, leaders of the minority party do fulfill certain demands, or the offices would not exist (as supported by the fact that in some states dominated by one party, these positions do not exist). As the minority party can afford to be more extreme and more political than the
majority party, it stands to reason that their leadership would operate differently from their majority counterpart. Finally, given the less institutional nature of minority leadership, functions assigned to it are likely to vary widely across environments, even more so than those of the majority.

Tendency to Assign Roles Without Investigation

As noted above, leadership positions are formalized because certain responsibilities must be met and certain functions performed. However, there is the danger of assuming that roles discovered in one particular institution are similarly assigned in another, without investigating whether that is indeed a primary role of leadership, or why it does or does not exist in a particular institution. Generalizability is a function of context, and responsibilities associated with leadership in one context may not be expected in another, or may be altered considerably.

Partisan coalition building is a role discussed by several scholars, including Ripley (1967, 1969), Sinclair (1983) and Peabody (1981). However, in looking at the Connecticut General Assembly, Barber begins with the assumption that coalition building is a significant and in fact dominant role, without investigating its importance relative to other tasks, or conditions specific to that institution that contribute to it. He begins with the
assertion that "No one doubts that leadership is important in producing legislative party cohesion....." (1966: 347). Explicitly or implicitly, studies of leadership and friendship or respect networks (Monsma, 1965; Caldiera and Patterson, 1987; Caldiera, Clark, and Patterson, 1989) are built around a similar assumption of leadership responsibilities.

Recent research has focused on the rising role of leaders in fundraising and campaign activities, at the expense of other roles (Gierzynski and Jewell, 1989; Clucas, 1989). Such studies force an artificial constraint on our understanding of leadership by focusing attention on one particular aspect while ignoring or giving merely passing reference to others.

On the other hand, attempts to paint a broader picture of subnational legislative leadership also have shortcomings. While Rosenthal makes many valuable contributions to our understanding of state legislatures (and their leadership), most of his assertions about leadership functions are based on specific cases, rather than more rigorous analysis. The nature of the analysis requires the reader to either assume that all of the roles are distributed in a manner similar to their distribution in Congress or acknowledge likely variation with no ability to explain it across environments. Rather than attempt to systematically understand leadership variations across
institutions, scholars seem content to focus on particular functions that they assume to be universally important, or assume that all functions attributed to congressional leaders are distributed in like manner in all legislative institutions. The existence of multiple institutions and environments is a valuable resource in understanding the many facets of legislative leadership, but many scholars seem unwilling to take advantage of that diversity.

**Limited Membership Input into Defining Leadership Roles**

Increasingly, scholars have found that one can only understand leadership by understanding the followers as well as the leaders:

> The key to understanding leadership lies in the membership, not in the leaders...Leadership is generally acknowledged to be an interactive phenomenon between leaders and followers (Jones, 1981: 118).

> If followers believe that a leader has been negligent or ineffective in providing them with net benefits, they may overthrow the leader and select a new one, or they may remove some of the leader's powers (Calvert, 1987: 85-86).

Many scholars go so far as to note the various factors that effect leadership performance. According to Sinclair, "An understanding of majority party leadership thus requires an analysis of membership goals," (1983: 22) including re-election, power, and policy. Similarly, Rosenthal observes that legislative leaders in the states "face markedly greater pressures as members expect far more in the way of benefits that will help them serve their constituencies, win
re-election and advance their own political careers," (1988: 88). However, while universally acknowledging the importance of varied membership demands on leadership, scholars seldom structure their studies to analyze those effects.

Studies are usually based on a small (and sometimes unrevealed) sample of members such that analysis by traits of the respondents is impossible. Ripley's study of influence in the Senate (1969) is based on "meetings" with eighteen Senators (less than a fifth of the total). His study of House leadership (1967) is based on interviews with less than ten percent of the House membership (35 members). Studies by Jones and Sinclair are based on "interviews with several leaders, members and staff." While these samples may be quite valid and indeed representative of the population (in fact Ripley appears to have gone to considerable pains to obtain a representative sample), they are clearly not large enough to make confident assertions about different expectations from types of members. Clearly, different members will expect and indeed need different things from a leader. However, most leadership studies are unable to provide empirical support for this oft stated and reasonable assumption.

The problem is further compounded by the tendency of scholars to view the functions associated with leadership from the perspective of the leaders, rather than the
followers. The relatively small number of members involved in the "meetings" or "interviews" noted above will obviously include a disproportionate number of leaders. In fact, Ripley and Sinclair are both writing from within the offices of leadership, a fact that no doubt influences their perspective. The dominant leadership perspective in no way invalidates the contributions of this research. However, it seems safe to assume that a shift to a more membership centered approach, focused on the expectations of leaders as well as followers, will yield a different perspective. And, if we agree that leaders do indeed serve at the pleasure of the members, then it seems to be an approach that can yield some very valuable information.

Summary of Leadership Knowledge

Everything we know about formal legislative leadership positions and performance gives evidence of a dynamic process. The studies of the origins and evolution of legislative leadership are based on this premise of a developmental process. The studies of recruitment and traits associated with elected leaders make it clear that characteristics appropriate for a leader at a particular point in time may be inappropriate or unnecessary in a different time or in a different context. Finally, the studies of leadership functions introduce a variety of different responsibilities and emphases such that it is
impossible to define the leadership responsibilities without describing the environmental contexts that produced them.

And yet, seldom have studies of leadership been structured to answer the most fundamental questions concerning the effects of context on legislative leadership. Instead, most studies have focused on a particular party in a particular institution at a particular time, making comprehensive comparisons difficult, if not impossible. Efforts to understand the influence of contextual factors have been valiant (and at times quite creative), but rendered considerably less potent than they might have been by the constraining nature of the studies and the data. If we accept the assertion of the literature that legislative leadership is to a great degree a function of its environment, then it becomes obvious that we can best understand that leadership if we study it in a variety of environmental contexts.
This study is designed to increase our understanding of formal leadership positions by expanding our focus to multiple institutions and multiple parties, and focusing on individual level as well as institutional level environmental contexts. More specifically, the study looks at the nature of leadership responsibilities and performance as discussed by state senators in North Carolina, Maryland and Ohio. These institutions exhibit variation in internal structural, internal political and external political characteristics, thereby affording the opportunity to take advantage of the comparative nature of such a study. One hundred and twenty personal interviews with over eighty percent of the senators in each of the three states serve as data for the current examination of leadership responsibilities and expectations. Unlike much of the analysis discussed above, this study examines the responsibilities of minority and majority party leaders, because it is expected that both fulfill certain needs of their followers individually and collectively (Calvert, 1987). The nature of the legislative environment is determined from the interviews and secondary sources.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between members' expectations of formal legislative leaders and the individual and aggregate level environments in which the leadership responsibilities are expected. As noted in Chapter I, the central question of this research concerns the degree to which the institutional and individual environments of legislators affect their expectations of legislative leaders. The use of multiple institutions enables us to more fully understand the variety of environmental components which influence legislative leadership. It is to the particulars of this study, and the nature of those environments that we now turn.

Contributions of the Multiple Environment Study of Legislative Leadership

State legislative bodies are a resource for comparative studies which have remained largely untapped. However, the benefits of such a focus for the study of legislative leadership are many. Most state legislative institutions are relatively similar in terms of basic structure, with formal organization along partisan and committee lines. Further, most state legislatures have as their primary purpose participation to some degree in the policymaking process. These similarities render most state legislatures similar enough to be comparable. However, they are distinct enough in other environmental characteristics that one can draw conclusions as to the relationship between leadership responsibilities and the
structural and political context that creates them. Second, because many of the characteristics examined are very similar to those in national and international legislative institutions, findings may well be generalizable beyond the particular institutions studied, further expanding our understanding of legislative leadership in general. Third, in a very practical sense, state institutions and state legislators are generally much more accessible than their national counterparts, enabling the investigator to obtain more information and perhaps a more representative sample than would be possible in national institutions. In a state context, one is much more likely to have access to the decisionmaker (rather than staff or secondary documents) and may expect a higher rate of participation, making various types of analysis more feasible than they would be with a smaller sample. Finally, a less scholarly and more political justification is the recent "Reagan revolution" and its concordant shift of power back to the states. This shift in policy focus has made state policymaking bodies interesting units of analysis in their own rights. Rosenthal noted that:

Perhaps the greatest change has been the enhancement of legislative capacity. [State] Legislatures are hard working and spend considerably more time performing their functions....greater attention is devoted to both major and minor issues, and the legislature tackles problems it could not otherwise address (1989: 3-4).
As a result of reforms occurring in the 1970's and political changes of the 1980's, state legislatures appear both willing and able to accept legislative responsibility. If we accept that formal leaders have the strongest impact on legislative policy output, it behooves us to attempt a more comprehensive understanding of their influence as state institutions become more powerful and move toward parity with their national counterparts.

As noted above, leaders of the majority and minority perform similar and dissimilar functions; however, most studies give only cursory attention to the minority. This study is designed to examine leadership performance and functions of both parties, relying on evaluations and expectations of members of both parties. While leaders of the minority party may perform different and perhaps less institutional functions, those functions are no less important to the legislative process (especially to the members of the minority party) than those of the majority leadership. In fact, depending on environmental conditions, it appears that the minority party can have a considerable influence on public policy (Jones, 1970). A research design that includes responses of majority and minority members enables one to examine partisan differences that are so often taken for granted in the literature (Ripley, 1967; Sinclair, 1983). It may be that the similarity of such environmental conditions as objective and subjective
electoral vulnerability, leadership status, occupational status and level of ambition may incline all members to expect quite similar things from their respective leaders, regardless of party status. As a result of the inherent differences between minority and majority status as well as the similarities of environments faced by members of both parties, leaders of the minority are no less valid units of study than their majority counterparts, and can indeed shed some light on conditions that may cross that partisan barrier.

One assumption of this work is that leaders are responsive to the demands of members (or they will not serve in their position for very long) (Jones, 1981; Blanton, 1965; Sinclair, 1990). Therefore, leadership functions are defined by the members themselves, rather than the leaders alone, or the investigator. Shifting the emphasis from leadership as defined by the perceptions of the leader or the scholar which dominates the literature yields several advantages. First, one might expect that members perceive the nature and level of performance quite differently than do the leaders, especially in times of environmental flux where the apparatus of leadership is slower to respond to a rapidly shifting environment. Where the conceptions of leaders and members differ dramatically, one might anticipate challenges to leadership in the future. Second, reliance on interviews with a large
number of senators allows for analysis of leadership demands as a function of the particular needs and situation of a particular respondent. For example, it would not be unreasonable to expect an incumbent in a volatile district (of either party) to expect leaders to focus on their responsibility to provide campaign support or for a politically ambitious member to expect effective policy guidance and a positive public presence from the party leaders. Using the responses of an individual member as the unit of analysis makes the examination of such intriguing questions possible. Third, by surveying members, one can assure comparability and applicability of data rather than relying on secondary historical or narrative data that may or may not apply to the particular question at hand. Early attempts to study the effects of environmental conditions on leadership (Ripley, 1967; Jones, 1970) were constricted by the limited availability, accuracy and comparability of data. The proper use of interviews in multiple environments allows one to skirt this problem while maintaining the advantage of the multiple environments.

Finally, the comparative nature of the study enables the investigator to test the many propositions made by scholars concerning the effect of environmental characteristics on leadership functions. The use of three institutions (and therefore six sets of party leaders) makes testing of institutional level hypotheses possible: is
there a difference between leadership in the three states, between minority and majority parties, or between gubernatorial and opposition parties. These distinctions are implied in the literature, but seldom investigated. Further, the relatively large number of cases (120 members interviewed) allows for investigation of the individual level environments noted above. Specifically, do members focus their attention on different aspects of leadership as a function of their own electoral status, representational role, leadership status, political ambitions, or experience? The multi-state, multi-party, membership-focused study makes the examination of such questions possible.

**The Relationship Between Leadership Expectations and Actions**

Given the pivotal role that members' expectations and perceptions of leaders plays in this study, it is essential that we establish the nature of the relationship between the functions which members see as important and the functions which leaders perform. While the focus of this study is expectations rather than leadership performance, the significance of the study is inferred from the assumption that leaders must respond to these expectations. In her review of congressional leadership research, Barbara Sinclair explained the relationship quite well:

The relationship between party leaders and their members is, by consensus, the most critical relationship to understand. As leaders are chosen by members, leaders must at least minimally satisfy member expectations to keep their
positions. Consequently, leaders should be more responsive to the expectations of their members than to those of any other actor (1990: 130).

In theory, if leaders do not meet the demands of their members and perform functions that those members deem important, their hold on the position of leadership will be in jeopardy. The implication is that members will either choose leaders on the basis of those expectations, or incumbent leaders will adjust their behavior to meet those expectations in the face of changing environments. However, the question of this relationship in practice is less clear. Recent leadership changes in the U.S. Congress and state legislatures provide ample evidence of the importance of such elections on the nature of leadership.

In the United States House of Representatives and Senate, patterns of leadership ascension have developed which may make such elections less a function of particular abilities and more of position on the "leadership ladder," therefore muting the influence of leadership elections on leadership performance. However, even in the highly organized House, leadership ladders are broken, and new members are added to the ladder based on particular abilities. While current speaker Thomas Foley rose through the normal leadership chain (although via unusual circumstances), his election reflected a welcome change of style and attitude for many (Brown and Peabody, 1990: 10)
Democrats. Noted one elated Democrat about the new leadership,

It is the passing of the torch from the World War II generation to the next generation, and with it comes a much better ability for the party to communicate (Congressional Quarterly, June 10, 1989: 1376).

Even more telling may be the election of Newt Gingrich (R-GA) over Dave Madigan (R-IL) (who had the support of Minority Leader Michel) to succeed Richard Cheney as Minority Whip. The more partisan and "media-able" Gingrich appealed to the young, ambitious Republican conservatives who have grown tired of minority status.

Likewise, the election of George Mitchell to head the Senate Democrats over two more senior colleagues seems to reflect a change in expectations, and a victory for the young, ambitious senators. Mitchell's promises to delegate responsibility, maintain a predictable schedule and schedule reasonable hours all appealed to the needs of this younger cohort of members and contributed to his election (Congressional Quarterly, December 3, 1988: 3423). Mitchell's abilities as a telegenic spokesperson were widely seen as an asset. A senior Democrat explained the change,

[the Republican in the White House necessitated] a very visible and vocal party spokesperson. There is a unanimous feeling that among all of us, even those who voted for the other two candidates that George Mitchell could well fit that bill (Congressional Quarterly, December 3, 1988: 3426).

Like Foley in the House, Mitchell seems to be a reflection of a new generation of members and leaders.
Given the variety of leadership structures and patterns across the states, the effects of membership expectations may be even greater. Indeed, recent years have seen a dramatic increase in leadership challenges and overthrows in the states, and a corresponding responsiveness from leaders. Responding to a style that many felt was dictatorial and closed, twenty dissident Democrats joined with forty-six Republicans to remove four term Speaker Liston Ramsey in the North Carolina House (Mavretic, 1989: 18; Beyle, 1989). In Oklahoma, a group of dissident Democrats overwhelmingly (72-25) voted to oust Speaker Jim L. Barker, citing directionless policy setting and a heavy handed style, just nine days before the close of the 1989 session. According to members, the move was orchestrated by "a new breed of Oklahoma legislator ... who chafes at the kind of autocratic leadership once considered, well, just the way things are" (State Legislatures, July, 1989: 2). In 1989, Florida Speaker "heir-apparent" Tom Gustafson faced a serious challenge in "a state that traditionally rotates its speakers every two years, and decides years in advance who will get the job" (Morgan, 1989: 22).

In Rhode Island, Senate Majority Leader David R. Carlin, Jr. survived a 22-19 vote, with the support of "the younger and newer members of the chamber [who were] more likely to speak out on broader issues," while his opponent gathered support form "the older, veteran legislators, more
interested in the nuts and bolts" (Sullivan, 1989: 19). During the same 1989 session, veteran Richard Balducci put together a coalition of dissident Democrats and Republicans to defeat incumbent Speaker Irv Stolberg in Connecticut (State Legislatures, April, 1989: 14-15). Even in states where leadership change has occurred in a more orderly fashion, leaders are feeling the need to respond to demands for a less autocratic style of leadership (Gallagher, 1989: 18). Events in state legislative chambers around the country support the argument that leaders must be responsive to their members, or face the consequences.

Such leadership challenges have taken place in each of the three sample institutions during the 1980's. Perhaps the most dramatic and telling effort was the attempted ouster of Ohio Minority Leader Harry Meshel prior to the start of the 1989 session. With only five of the eight votes necessary to defeat Meshel, the dissident Democrats (four younger members, and one former leader) acknowledged their dissatisfaction with Meshel's performance of his leadership role.

We need to run a more professional caucus—develop staff, skills and technology to gather and disseminate political information....the positions now go as political rewards— not in a professional manner (personal interviews).

He [the leader] just got distracted, and while he was being distracted, the Republicans were putting together a juggernaut of a campaign apparatus. I really think some time has passed Harry by in terms of political skills (personal interviews).
Failing to defeat the leader, the members hoped to send a message to the leader that change was needed. A supporter of the incumbent noted that change does not always require a change of personnel, and indicated a desire to give "him the opportunity to change." However, the 1990 general election brought the loss of two more Democratic seats in the Ohio Senate and the subsequent ouster of Minority Leader Meshel.

With no incumbent majority leader in 1989 (the previous leader having been defeated for the post of lieutenant governor), there was a very competitive campaign (20-17) for the position in North Carolina. While some members noted support out of loyalty or "he asked me first," several noted the importance of their expectations in the way they cast the ballot. Compare the evaluations of the losing candidate by a supporter and an opponent,

I supported Conder because I think he is more capable of doing the things that I want a majority leader to do (personal interviews).

He is a roamer in the Senate. He is very seldom in his seat, he is out roaming the halls. Check his voting record. A lot of afternoons, he would come in, vote once and then go play golf. Is that the kind of leader you want in the Senate (personal interviews)?

Majority Leader Kaplan put together a coalition of women, minority members and younger members, while Conder built a coalition of more senior members. In Maryland, the last serious leadership challenge occurred in 1982, when current Lieutenant Governor Mickey Steinberg defeated incumbent Jamie Clark. Again, the challenge was rooted in
dissatisfaction with the leader's performance, including complaints about his failure to provide direction, or stand up to the House leadership. The current president was considered the "heir apparent" to the position.

These examples should make clear the very strong and real relationship between expectations and performance. Now, more than ever, leaders that don't fulfill at least the minimal expectations of their members must keep a watchful eye on their position. A leader must define his role in the mirror of responsibilities ascribed by his or her members. Further, the nature of those expectations is not constant, but rather a function of the changing nature of the environment, and of the membership. To be effective, a leader must be aware of and able to respond to changes in the environment or the membership.

Organizing and Understanding Leadership Responsibilities

According to the literature discussed above, leaders are expected to be and do many things. They are expected to perform administrative functions including bill and committee assignment, bill scheduling, and floor management. They are expected to perform liaison functions with other government officials, including the executive, the other legislative chamber, and the opposing legislative party. They are expected to provide the members with information and direction concerning matters of procedure, politics and policy. In addition, they are charged to build coalitions
on pieces of legislation that are important to the institution, party or members. Finally, leaders are the embodiment of the legislative branch, representing its members to the public, the district, the electorate and the media.

As noted above, the legislative literature suggests a framework in which we might organize these rather diverse functions. Most students of legislative leadership make a distinction between the leaders' responsibility to act in the interest of the legislative institution, and their responsibility to protect their legislative party. The actions of a leader may be taken on behalf of the party (and its members) the party, or the entire institution (and all the senators). In addition to the partisan/institutional distinction, scholars are increasingly recognizing that leadership has both an internal and external component. A particular function may be performed within the party or institution (internal) or on behalf of it in relation to someone else (external).

Combining these two dimensions yields the following fourfold typology for organizing and analyzing leadership responsibilities:

1- Institutional Internal Responsibilities
2- Institutional External Responsibilities
3- Partisan Internal Responsibilities
4- Partisan External Responsibilities

Each legislative function can be placed in one of the four categories noted above. Leaders in a legislative body will
most likely perform some functions in each of these categories and probably do so in varying degrees. One would expect the degree of emphasis and the combinations of functions associated with leadership to vary according to the environmental context, and it is this variation that is of central interest.

A member who defines the leader's job primarily in terms of the institutional internal orientation looks to the leader to concentrate on functions which facilitate the operation of the legislative body (in this case, senate) as a whole. The person occupying a position defined more in terms of institutional external responsibilities is expected to expend considerable time and energy representing the position and perspective of the legislative institution to other political actors. A partisan internal orientation of leadership expectations refers to leadership which is defined by effective coalition building, agenda setting and other functions that promote partisan unity and effectiveness. Finally, a leader expected to focus on partisan external responsibilities is one who must spend much time making the case of the political party before actors outside of the party including the executive, the other party, the general public and individual electoral districts and constituencies. The particular functions associated with each of these types of leadership
responsibility will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII.

The implications of this typology are quite clear. The definition of formal leadership can be very different depending on which of these types of functions are emphasized and what set of responsibilities is associated with leadership. One would expect to find that the nature of functions associated with leadership varies in relation to the particular environmental context in which it is performed, as well as the immediate environment of the individual defining it. Further, one should find that each legislator will associate a particular level of institution or partisan functions with leadership, as well as a certain level of internal or external functions, depending on the institutional and individual environments noted above. The types of responsibilities associated with leadership then may vary not only from state to state, but from individual to individual, and session to session.

To put these abstract concepts in more practical terms, consider leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives as defined by Chiu in 1928 and Hinckley in 1983. Chiu's Speaker of the House appears to be defined almost singularly in institutional internal terms, emphasizing such formal responsibilities as committee assignments, control of the floor and bill assignments, all used primarily to facilitate the proceedings of the floor
(of course they can be used to personal and partisan advantage). Sinclair's Speaker, leading in an institution dominated by Democrats and ambitious, independent members, appears to be more associated with internal partisan functions, striving to "keep peace in the family" as well as "promote coalition building." The distinct environmental contexts (singularly and combined) which exist within each institution are reflected in the definition of leadership necessarily associated with leadership by the Speaker.

**Defining the Legislative Environment**

Empirical studies suggest two sets of environmental conditions that can be organized according to the relationship of the leaders and nonleaders to the environment. At one level, there are characteristics which are shared by the party leaders and their members by virtue of their common partisanship. While leadership will be discussed in the context of several such characteristics, only three will be included in the multivariate analysis: party status, party of the executive and level of party competition. Besides the institutional characteristics, there are particular characteristics that may be shared by members across party lines. A member may face a fiercely competitive election or harbor higher political ambitions whether or not his or her leader is in a similar position. For the purpose of analysis, these individual characteristics will include a subjective measure of
electoral vulnerability, years of political experience, degree of political ambition, leadership status and relative campaign expenditures. Given that leadership positions develop and prosper in order to meet both collective and individual needs (Calvert, 1987: 83; Rosenthal, 1988: 87), the mutual effects of the two levels of environment should be of no surprise.

Characteristics of the Institutional Environment

Party Status. Explicitly or implicitly, the biggest distinction made by scholars (and politicians) concerning legislative bodies is that of majority and minority status. When comparing the functions of the majority and minority floor leaders, Peabody noted that the minority role is different "precisely because his party is the minority party- competing with fewer resources, inherently at a numerical disadvantage in committee and on the floor" (1981: 83). One would expect the role of the minority leadership to be defined almost exclusively in terms of partisan functions, with the majority leadership bearing the brunt of the burden (and power) associated with functions performed on behalf of the institution. Therefore, one would expect members of the minority party to focus their attention on such partisan responsibilities as well. Former Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd made clear the distinction,

a majority leader, who is the agent of the majority in the Senate, does speak for the Senate. He is the leader of the Senate....the minority leader speaks for his party. The minority leader
does not speak for the Senate (quoted in Patterson, 1989: 410).

While party status indicates a distinction in terms of institutional and partisan functions, it offers little insight into distinctions across the internal/external dimension or distinctions between functions within the partisan role.

Partisan Competition. A second institutional characteristic, degree of partisan competitiveness within the institution, appears important as well. Not all majority or minority parties are created equal. Legislative parties may be divided as numerically dominant majorities, competitive parties (majority and minority) and numerically dominated minorities. Noting the effects of size on majority leader performance in the Senate, Peabody argued that "Johnson, Mansfield and Byrd have had to work within the constraints of the size of their party majorities," (1981: 68). Jewell and Patterson (1983) noted that leaders of a large majority may find that party organization or the party role as we know it plays a relatively insignificant role. These leaders may indeed find their responsibilities more defined by nonpartisan cleavages (like region, ideology or issue factions) such that their job is for all practical purposes institutional and not partisan.

On the other hand, majority and minority party leaders in a competitive situation may find their jobs considerably
more similar than one might expect. According to Rosenthal, "In those states where political parties compete vigorously in legislative elections, the main job of the leader [of either party] has become that of winning or maintaining the majority," (1988: 90). One would expect the leaders of both parties in a competitive situation to put an increasing emphasis on partisan matters and especially partisan external functions which enhance the electoral prospects of the party.

Party of the Governor. Finally, leaders of a numerically dominated minority are likely to find their role quite different from their minority counterparts in the competitive situation. "A wide margin for the majority party usually places severe restrictions on the range of strategies available to the minority party," (Jones, 1970: 16). One might expect to find a minimal role for the minority leadership in internal partisan affairs (because of small numbers) and perhaps a surprisingly large institutional role, if the minority is perceived as nonthreatening to the majority. In other words, knowing the size of and competitiveness of a given party does imply different expectations beyond those derived from knowing only the partisan status of the respondent.

Ripley (1967) and Jones (1970) note the importance of the executive in defining leadership responsibilities. The partisanship of the executive in relation to the parties of
the legislature clearly effects the nature of leadership functions. In fact, Ripley (1967) used the partisanship and degree of activity of the executive as the determining factor in categorizing leadership activity in the House since 1900. In her study of executive and legislative relations, McCalley (1986) discussed the importance of the party of the governor in the nature and importance of that component of leadership.

Regardless of their party status, one would expect members of the party of the executive to focus increased attention on the external liaison responsibilities described above, perhaps at the expense of other traditional leadership responsibilities. One is also likely to find a decreased role in importance of such internal functions as agenda-setting and coalition building to the degree that the executive is the "chief legislator" (Munchmore and Beyle, 1986). Further, one might find legislative leaders forfeiting certain public relations or external political functions to a popular executive, especially in cases where the success of the legislative party is perceived to be a function of executive popularity.

While these three institutional variables are obviously not the only characteristics of the party or institution which affect legislative leadership, for methodological reasons (mostly problems of multicolinearity, to be discussed later), they will be the only ones included in the
statistical model predicting the nature of legislative leadership. However, previous studies of legislative leadership, as well as common sense, isolate other characteristics which influence the nature of the leadership task. Research indicates that the functions associated with legislative leadership are related to constitutional restrictions, institution size, level of intraparty legislative cohesion, relationship with and popularity of the executive, and the cost of legislative campaigns.

**Constitutional Restraints: Powers and Size.** The functions associated with legislative leadership are surely constrained by the constitutional and statutory boundaries placed on the legislative institution (Jones, 1970). Two seem particularly significant: constraints on the legislative schedule, the number of members established by law or constitution and the formal relationship with the executive. One would expect leaders of an institution with strict limits on session length or statutory power to focus attention on making the most of those valuable commodities, perhaps emphasizing efficient and cohesive policy making. Further, any study comparing the House and Senate indicates that size of the legislative body has dramatic impact on the behavior of members and leaders alike. Finally, the constitutional balance of power between the executive and the legislature will surely affect the responsibilities associated with legislative leadership, as well as the
resources he or she may use to meet them. For example, one might expect a leader facing a powerful executive to pay particular attention to institutional independence, and use that as an argument for coalition building.

**Partisan Cohesion.** One strikingly consistent component of any discussion of congressional leadership in the 1950's and 1960's is the mention of the regional and ideological division within the Democratic party caused by the presence of conservative southern Democrats (for an excellent discussion of the effects of the conservative coalition in leadership, see Ripley, 1985). Research concerning interpersonal relationships in state legislatures indicates that factions are likely to exist in the states as well. In his study of interpersonal relationships in the 1955 Wisconsin Legislature, Patterson (1959) found cliques based on region (Milwaukee vs. the rest of the state), tenure (new member clique) and common district interests (agriculture). Even in a relatively balanced legislature, (58 Republicans and 52 Democrats) like the 1964 Michigan House, Monsma found that factions may indeed cross party lines and be a significant part of the environment (1965: 356). A leader facing such factionalism may find that each faction expects very different functions of the leadership. A minority leader who faces a fractionalized majority may find himself or herself quite effective in affecting policy and as a
liaison on behalf of the party (partisan external function) with either of the majority party factions.

**Relationship with the Executive.** While we generally associate legislative majorities and executives of the same political party with harmony, having an executive of the same political party may not naturally imply compatibility, especially in states dominated by one party. For example, where the legislative party views its success as independent of that of the executive of their own party, one would expect less interaction with the executive and a greater public relations effort on the part of leadership. On the other hand, where the electoral success of the governor and the electoral success of the legislative party have occurred simultaneously, you are likely to see a heightened emphasis on external functions pertaining to executive liaison and a reduction of external public relations functions.

**Nature of Legislative Elections.** One additional component of the external political environment that one may expect to affect leadership functions is the cost of running for office. In those cases where considerable resources are expended on elections (which often coincide with competition), one might expect an inordinate amount of emphasis on fundraising and other partisan external functions.
Characteristics of the Individual Environment

Legislative leaders derive their legitimacy and power from a willingness of members to give power to them. Therefore, one would rightly expect the conditions and needs of individual members to have an influence on leadership demands—different members may emphasize different aspects of leadership depending on their particular situation. However, while many have speculated about such effects, few studies have structured the data in such a way as to examine them empirically. Therefore, most of our propositions regarding the pertinence and effect of certain individual level conditions must be based on rational conjecture rather than empirical data.

Electoral Vulnerability. Legislative literature in general recognizes re-election as a central focus for many legislators (Fenno, 1973; Mayhew, 1974; Sinclair, 1983; Sinclair, 1990). In fact, it is the prerequisite for the fulfillment of any other more institutional goal (policy or influence). Further, Sinclair (1990) noted that the re-election goal has a great deal of effect on the relationship between the member and the leadership. Members from competitive districts must be keenly aware of the needs of their district and of their own vulnerability. Further, as state legislatures move in the direction of professionalization, one may expect to see fewer open seats and more contested (in terms of candidates, if not in terms
of margin of victory) elections (Salmore and Salmore, 1989). However, there is also some indication of increased incumbency strength as those in office seek to solidify their hold on an office that has become considerably more valuable in recent years (Rosenthal, 1989: 83).

These seemingly contradictory trends (increasing competition and increasing incumbency return rate) imply that competitiveness must be measured in two ways: objectively and subjectively. Objectively, a competitive seat is one in which the incumbent won by a particularly small amount. This electoral margin may indeed affect the leadership demands of a member. However, some members who were elected by a larger margin may still consider themselves vulnerable for various reasons such as electoral or registration trends in the district. Therefore, one must accept a more subjective measure of competition, based on the perceptions of the member. One who is objectively vulnerable, but does not perceive that vulnerability may behave the same as a person from an electorally safe district. Likewise, a member from an objectively safe district who feels vulnerable may act no differently than a member from a marginal district.

The implications of this distinction for leadership are quite strong. Noted Rosenthal, "Leaders face markedly greater pressures as members expect far more in the way of benefits that will help them serve their constituencies, win
re-election and advance their political careers" (1988:88). One would expect members from competitive districts (defined objectively or subjectively) to emphasize external functions which contribute to electoral success (fundraising, campaigning etc.) and to internal functions with a similar focus (distribution of resources, provision of political information and selecting issues that benefit the party).

Individual Campaign Expenditures. Rosenthal (1988) and others note the increasing expense associated with legislative election. Given the increasing emphasis leaders are expected to place on fundraising, campaigns and recruitment, one might expect a difference between those members who find their seat relatively inexpensive, and those who must spend a considerable amount to win their seat. While focusing on the distribution of campaign funds rather than the reason they are expected, Gierzynski and Jewell (1989) note the increase in such activity, and Clucas (1989) finds that electoral competitiveness is indeed a major factor in explaining the distribution of funds in the California General Assembly. We might expect those members with greater financial demands to focus their demands on external functions, particularly fundraising and campaign activities.

Political Ambition. A second component of the individual environment is the degree of political ambition harbored by the respondent. Rosenthal (1989) found that
many leaders were expected to use their position in order to further the ambitions of their members. Sinclair (1983) argued that the degree of ambition harbored by a member does indeed affect the way he or she interacts with the leadership and his or her expectations of them. According to Rosenthal,

Fewer of the old-timers harbored career ambitions in politics. They intended to serve a while and return to private careers. Many of the new breed, by contrast, would like to spend their careers in government or politics...They take pleasure in their status, delight in their exercise of power and have policies they want to advance... (Rosenthal, 1988: 76-77).

Individuals who perceive their position as a means to another office or to a larger political purpose (even within the institution) are likely to perform a job differently than others who see the office as a career unto itself. One might expect ambitious members to encourage leaders of their party to take a more active external role in terms of presenting a positive image for the institution or party, This type of leadership will further the ambitions of the member by enabling them to expand their electoral base. While all legislators undoubtably poses some degree of ambition as evidenced by their desire to seek their current office, the reference here is to ambition to move beyond the senate and make politics a full-time vocation. Although many state legislatures have made great strides in professionalization in recent years, most state legislators must rely on some second income. If they wish to make
politics a career, most state legislators must seek a more fulltime position. Rosenthal wrote of these new "professional" legislators, noting that "above all, they are committed to careers in politics. They want to remain in the legislature at least until they can run for statewide office or Congress" (Rosenthal, 1988: 93). Even in the state legislatures of the 1980's, most ambitious politicians must look beyond their present position if they wish to have a "career in politics."

Years of Political Experience. Rosenthal's discussion of this "new breed" of state legislator directs us to another distinction which is worthy of investigation. Do these less experienced politicians expect different things from their leaders than their more politically seasoned colleagues? As discussed above, Rosenthal found that newer members seemed to be more ambitious, competitive, policy and media focused, and partisan than their senior colleagues were when they were neophytes. These differences would suggest a more external and partisan emphasis from these younger members. It seems reasonable to expect that a member who has had several years of electoral political experience (legislative or otherwise) and has cultivated his own political attitudes and constituencies would have different needs than a relative political neophyte. Members who cut their political teeth in an environment that was characterized by open decisionmaking processes, highly
responsive government and media-centered campaigns may have different needs than those who developed their political values in a less competitive and more private environment.

**Leadership Status.** While leaders are somewhat distinct from followers, they are still members of the institution and therefore recipients of their own product, leadership. It is said that where you stand depends on where you sit, and such is likely the case when it comes to comparing the expectations of leaders and nonleaders. There has been no systematic analyses of differences between the two, because most studies adopt a leadership oriented perspective as noted above. However, one might expect that leaders would be more keenly aware of the institutional responsibilities and the internal roles associated with the job than would be nonleaders. One is more likely to find leaders emphasizing certain roles in addition to those expected by the individual members. As noted above, leaders are responsible not only to the individual members, but to the collective membership as an institution. While nonleaders may be most aware of the responsibilities pertaining to their own goal achievement, leaders cannot ignore the institutional and internal responsibilities.

**Conclusion: Leadership Responsibilities, Environmental Constraints and Propositions about their Interactions**

Having established the theoretical and practical link between the responsibilities which members ascribe to leaders and leadership performance, the primary purpose of
this study is to explore and define the nature of that relationship. In light of the literature on legislative leadership and the relationship between leaders and members discussed above, one can make several propositions regarding leadership functions and expectations, and the constraints posed by the institutional and individual environments of the respondents. The above discussion suggests that:

1) The particular functions associated with formal leadership positions are varied and may be arrayed along two distinct dimensions.

2) The institutional/partisan dimension concerns whether or not the particular function is performed on behalf of all members of the institution, or just members of a respective party. The internal external/dimension focuses on the distinction between functions performed within the party or institution and those performed on its behalf with other actors.

3) Each legislator (leader and member) exists within a particular configuration of environmental factors that may be divided into the institutional and individual environment.

4) The institutional factors include party status, partisanship and relationship with the executive, party competitiveness, constitutional restrictions, intraparty cohesion and the cost of campaigns (for methodological reasons discussed above, only the first three of these will be included in the statistical analysis).

5) The individual environment is defined by a respondent's electoral vulnerability, ambition, political experience, leadership status and campaign spending.

6) The particular leadership roles and functions a respondent chooses to emphasize are a function of his or her perception of their institutional and individual environment.

7) Respondents will emphasize the responsibilities and functions which best reflect
their own interests, the interests of their party or of their institution. In particular, individual characteristics will have the greatest effect on the internal/external distribution of functions, while characteristics of the institutional/internal environment will have their greatest influence on the institutional/partisan dimension.

The definition, discussion and analysis of these relationships will be explored further in the following chapters. In Chapter III, we turn to the methods of gathering and analyzing the data for this study.
CHAPTER III: 
THE DATA AND THE METHODOLOGY

The primary purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the nature of legislative leadership and various characteristics of the legislative environment. In order to do that, the study focuses on leaders, followers and legislative institutions that exhibit a wide variety of environmental characteristics. Interview and secondary data regarding three state senates was gathered and analyzed to establish the nature of the relationship between leadership and context.

The States

One advantage of this study over most studies of legislative leadership is the opportunity to examine leadership in multiple environments. Therefore, it is imperative that the states analyzed exhibit a myriad of environmental characteristics. As the characteristics in Table 1 indicate, the three states and their upper chambers seem to meet that requirement quite admirably. The institutions are similar in purpose (lawmaking), institutional placement (bicameral and in configuration with an executive and judicial branch) and the formal internal organization (partisan leadership and committee structures). However, more outstanding than these similarities are the
Table 1:  
Characteristics of the Sample States and Chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>State</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maryland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
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<td>Majority</td>
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<td>Trends - # Democrats</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>Turnover (1986-1988) (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(A) Leader selection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pres. Pro Temp</td>
<td>SE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Floor Leaders</td>
<td>AP</td>
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<td>Whips</td>
<td>AP</td>
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<tr>
<td>(B) Professional (1970)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(C) Power Structure</td>
<td>Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>(A) Length of Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>(A) Session Limits</td>
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<td>(A) Staff Support</td>
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<td>Personal Year</td>
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<td>Institutional Session</td>
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<td>(A) # Standing Committees</td>
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<td>(A) Committee Assignments</td>
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<td>Characteristic</td>
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<td><strong>(D) Power of Governor</strong></td>
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<td>Ranking Index</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>Gov. Tenure</td>
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<td><strong>Ranney Indices</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(E) 1946-1963</td>
<td>.70</td>
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<td>(E) 1976-1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>(F) 1980-1988</td>
<td>.76</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Senate Elections</strong></td>
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<td>% Compet. (&lt; 60%)</td>
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<td>Average Spending</td>
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<td><strong>(G) Party Reg. 1989 (%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(H) Pol. Culture</strong></td>
<td>Trad./Ind.</td>
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(A) *Book of the States*, 1978-1990; PE=Popularly Elected; SE=Elected by Senate; PE=Elected by Party; AP=Appointed By President; AFL=Appointed by Floor Leader.
(B) Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, 1971.
(C) Francis, 1990.
(D) Beyle, 1990.
(E) Beck, 1990.
(F) Bibby and others, 1990.
(H) Elazar, 1984.
* Ohio leaders often run on slate, with leader selecting the other three candidates.
** N.C. House Leadership elected by Bipartisan Coalition.
*** See note on Ohio registration later in Chapter III.
many differences that characterize the three states. Significant political and structural characteristics within the legislature make up the internal environment. This includes those factors that define the institution and how it operates, including the partisan nature of its membership and recent history, its leadership and decisionmaking structures, and its level of professionalism. The external environment revolves primarily around the relationship with the governor and the electorate.

It is clear from Table 1 that these three states exhibit a wide variety of such characteristics. Of all characteristics listed, the three states are congruent only on length of term for the executive. Keeping in mind these differences, we now turn to a brief discussion of the particular characteristics which have a significant impact in each of the three states.

Maryland. Two characteristics seem to stand out most clearly about the Senate of Maryland. First, its major cleavages and coalitions are more often geographic or ideological than they are partisan. According to the Ranney index, Maryland (based on elections from 1980-1988) is a "modified one-party Democratic state," (Bibby, Cotter, Gibson and Huckshorn: 1990). Further, other studies define it as modified one-party forty years ago as well (Beck, 1991). While most of the nation was moving in the Republican direction during the 1980's, the Maryland
The electorate was actually exhibiting more Democratic tendencies (score of .76 from 1980-1988).

Rather than party, many of the coalitions seem to revolve around geographic distinctions which have long been a part of the political landscape. Describing pre-revolutionary Maryland, historian George H. Calcott wrote,

A fourth dimension in society, always sharp in Maryland, was sectionalism. The tobacco dominated southern and eastern shore counties depended on trade with England, disliked boycotts, wanted a stronger central government to negotiate treaties, disliked taxes and feared the mobs of the French revolution. Western settlers on the other hand, wanted protection against the Indians, cheap land, and state development of canals and turnpikes; they were suspicious of national government and hated the national tax on whiskey. Then there were the towns. (Calcott, 1986: 21)

Compare this statement to a description of Maryland, 1990:

You have your urban areas, Baltimore City, Montgomery County and P.G. County. You have Southern Maryland with its very rural areas...the eastern shore which is also very rural and the Western mountains, so you have a variety of interests that have to be blended....you couldn't propose a standard in Southern Maryland that you needed on the shore. (State Senator, interview, 1990)

In addition to its regionalism, the role and activities of the Maryland Senate are driven by their relationship with the executive. The governor of Maryland is considered the most powerful governor in the country. Having taken an active policymaking role in the early 1980's, the Senate found it difficult to assert its independence under an ambitious and abrasive governor late in the decade (Rosenthal, 1990: 81, 59). This relationship has given the
legislative leaders considerable incentive to maintain the integrity and position of the Senate of Maryland.

Internally, Maryland exhibits the rudiments of party structure accepted in almost every state. However, as discussed by Francis (1989) the power is distributed along committee rather than partisan lines. In his study of the importance of party leaders, committees and caucuses in decisionmaking, Francis found that in Maryland, committees were the center of decisionmaking (noted by at least 50% of his respondents). There are four major standing committees and those committees are not required to report out legislation, which makes the chairman very powerful.

The president of the Maryland Senate is elected by the majority party, but in recent years has faced no minority party nominee. In fact, at the opening of the 1990 session, the new president was escorted to the podium by the minority leader. The senate president makes the committee assignments, appoints committee chairs, makes bill assignments and presides over floor proceedings, and distributes assignments for other party leadership and vice chairmen positions. Party leadership on the majority side includes a majority leader, assistant majority leader, a whip, and an assistant whip, all appointed by the president. In all, the president appoints twenty-one members to "positions of leadership," in a body of forty-seven members.
In terms of staffing and professionalization, one might consider the Maryland Senate moderately professional. With recent increases in personal and clerical staffing, as well as modernization of facilities, the infrastructure of a professional body exists. However, the body is limited to a session of ninety calendar days (which is evaded by meeting weekly or biweekly in "informal" committee meetings during the year) annually, and an annual salary of $32,560 (including $85 per day during session), a moderate figure given the cost of living in much of the state.

The membership of the Maryland Senate mirrors the typical part-time legislature with backgrounds including education, farming, urban planning, business and law, as well as retired persons. No member listed his or her occupation as legislator in their biographical sketches. The 1990 Senate included seven women, seven Republicans and five blacks among its forty-seven members. While several Democrats faced moderate to strong primary challenges (State Board of Election Laws), less than a dozen members defined their district as competitive, and the majority were from "safe Democratic districts".

North Carolina. If ever an institution were in a state of transition it would indeed be the North Carolina Senate. Perhaps the most traumatic changes in the last year have taken place within the institution. Traditionally, the lieutenant governor in North Carolina has been independently
elected and responsible to preside over and organize the Senate. Therefore, the statewide elected officer was traditionally the most powerful individual in the senate. However, with the 1988 election of the first Republican lieutenant governor in ninety-two years, the Democratic majority set about restructuring the legislative leadership and redistributing power (Winston-Salem Journal, January 12, 1989), giving many of the powers to the previously ceremonial position of president pro tempore. Additional responsibilities were also ascribed to the positions of majority leader, minority leader, rules chairman and principle clerk.

In addition to creating new avenues of influence, the changes also created considerable confusion as to expectations of these new roles, prompting one member to note,

"You see, this is a whole new ballgame for us....[the president pro temp] is pretty much having to define his position as he goes along. As for the majority leader, there again, I really don't know what to expect, because we've never really had one before." (interviews).

The position of majority leader was created in 1981 so that the particular member appointed to the position could have a title when attending national conferences, not out of a need for party leadership. Likewise, there is confusion as to the nature and extent of responsibilities associated with the newly defined lieutenant governor role. Prior to these structural changes, Francis described the North Carolina
Senate as "leader-committee" driven, a placement that seems to remain accurate, although the rising importance of party is likely to increase the role of the caucus.

As for professionalization, in its 1971 study of the "sometimes governments," the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures placed the North Carolina legislature 47 out of fifty in overall effectiveness, giving it its highest marks for facilities (26th, behind both Ohio and Maryland) and its lowest (47th) for representation (1971). Since that time, the state has built a new office building (1982) and allotted funds to provide each senator with a session secretary and increased institutional support staff (Book of the States, 1990). In terms of process, the recent structural changes and resulting distribution of powers makes for a process that is more "institutional" and less personal, an important component of institutionalization according to Polsby (1969).

However, several characteristics of the North Carolina Senate indicate a less than professional status. According to the Book of the States, a North Carolina Senator could expect to receive about $22,000 (including the $81 per diem and $460 per month allowance during session) in odd numbered years, and much less during the short sessions. Likewise, while staffing has increased, the session-only provision of clerical staff and the absence of professional staff for each office put the chamber behind most other institutions
in that aspect of professionalization. Finally, an unwieldy committee system, with 34 standing committees (with only 37 majority members!) prohibits the efficiency and membership expertise often associated with a professional body. Each North Carolina senator serves on a minimum of eight committees. Given these factors, one would be tempted to place North Carolina behind Maryland in terms of legislative professionalization, even with the latter's constitutional limits. It seems the staffing, structural and financial advantages in Maryland may outweigh the greater session length in North Carolina.

Like the internal structure, the internal composition of the North Carolina Senate is undergoing marked change as well, most notably in terms of partisanship. The 1989 Senate included thirteen Republicans among its fifty members, second only to the 1974 session which boasted fifteen two years before the 1976 election reduced the Republican membership to a single senator. As one might expect, this increasing competition and partisan challenge has created a body with a considerable rate of turnover. Of the fifty members of the 1989 Senate, sixty percent (30 members) had less than five years Senatorial experience in 1989 (N.C. N.C. Manual, 1989). In this traditionally Democratic state, almost two-thirds of the Senate had no senatorial experience under a Democratic governor. In terms of minority representation, the Senate has four black
members and four women (one who resigned in 1990 to take an appointive position and was replaced by a black man).

Like the membership of the Maryland Senate, no North Carolina Senator listed legislator as his or her profession and the membership includes a wide range of occupational backgrounds including a funeral director, fruit seller and retailer, educators, executives, farmers and attorneys (compiled from N.C. Manual). Finally, the rising Republican ranks have pressed many Democrats who once felt little electoral challenge from the opposing party. Over forty percent (42%) of the members won with less than sixty percent of the vote in 1988. This competition was particularly acute among Democrats, almost half of whom had objectively competitive races in 1988.

Much of the internal change described above is a result of a transition in the electorate as a whole. As noted earlier, scores of interparty competition indicate a state moving toward two-party status. If one considers only the 1980's, North Carolina elections approach the category of two party competitive, scoring an average Democratic percentage of .6667, just above the necessary .6500. Republicans have been making inroads in terms of registration, as well as in local, state and national elections throughout the 1980's. While still in the minority, Republican registration topped one million for the first time ever in 1988.
In 1986 and 1988, the Republican governor made Democratic control of the general assembly an issue in the legislative campaigns, a fact not forgotten by Democratic legislators. Noted Democratic Lieutenant Governor and Senate President Robert Jordan, III, following the 1986 elections, "It's going to make it tough for those people who want to work with him. I think he made it more difficult for himself to ever become a more effective governor," (Charlotte Observer, Nov. 6, 1986). Coupled with the fact that the governor of North Carolina has no veto power and is generally considered to be among the weakest of the nation's fifty governors, one might expect the Senate to ignore the Republican governor. However, the popularity of the governor indicated by approval ratings more than twice that of the general assembly in 1986, 1987 and 1989 (the North Carolina Polls) and his effects on the elections of 1984 and 1988 made such arrogance politically risky. North Carolina is a state in political, structural and organizational transition.

Ohio. While North Carolina and Maryland are marked to differing degrees by one-party dominance, Ohio is marked by its partisan competitiveness. While Beck's comparison of Ohio from 1946 to 1963 with its behavior from 1976 to 1988 finds the electorate moving in the Democratic direction (Beck, 1991), unlike Maryland, this Democratic change has increased rather than decreased partisan competition. The
measure of interparty competition from 1981-1988 was .54, (Bibby, et al, 1990) indicating a slight Democratic advantage, but placing the state solidly in the two-party competitive category. This level of partisan competition is not lost on the Ohio Senate. Since the late 1970's, the majority has changed hands three times. Republicans have, however, recently begun to solidify control to some degree, having remained in the majority for six years. However, as late as 1979, the Democrats held a commanding (21 to 12) majority which they lost in 1980 (15 to 18), regained in 1982 (17 to 16), only to lose again in 1984 (15 to 18).

The effects of this intense party competition permeate throughout the structure, processes and relationships of the Ohio Senate. The leadership is structured on a purely partisan basis with the four elected leaders of the majority party wielding the preponderance of influence. Each party selects four leaders from its ranks, with the highest official of the majority party serving as President of the Senate and the highest official of the minority party as minority leader. Noting the importance of both party and leadership in the chamber, Francis described the decision-making process in the Ohio Senate as "leadership-caucus" oriented. In terms of power, the party leaders make committee assignments and chairmanships (although seniority seems of greater significance here than in the other two states), but bill assignment and referral are done by
committee. In terms of influence, the dominant characteristic associated with influence in the Ohio Senate is party position (Little, 1990).

Several factors indicate that the Ohio Senate is among the most professional in the country. A 1979 study (cited in Rosenthal, 1981) found that the number of staffers in the Ohio legislature ranked it in the top ten, and growth in caucus staffs in the last ten years have likely moved it up that line. In addition to a professional caucus staff that includes twelve to fifteen people for each party, each senator has fulltime professional and clerical staff, as well as allocations for pages and some session assistance. Further, there are central staff agencies to assist with fiscal matters, bill drafting and committee activity. As noted above, another component of professionalization is salary and enumeration. The annual salary of an Ohio Senator is about $39,000 (depending on seniority), including per diem expenses. This is well above the other two states in the study (especially considering the higher cost of living in Maryland). Finally, according to the Book of the States many of the decisions concerning bill scheduling, referral, etc. are automatic, rather than decided by an individual. Unlike the other two states, several (10) of Ohio's thirty-three members claimed legislator as their occupation on their legislative biographies.
As noted above, the partisan make-up of the Ohio Senate has undergone considerable change over the last decade. In addition to the change in party balance, the heightened levels of competition have obviously resulted in a high degree of turnover among the members. As in North Carolina, almost half (16) of the members have less than six years of senatorial experience. In terms of demographic factors, Ohio senators include three women and two blacks among their membership. The higher pay and more fulltime status of the Ohio Senate noted above contributes to an occupational make-up less diverse than in the other two states. In addition to the twelve "full-time legislators," Ohio has thirteen attorneys, combining to comprise over two-thirds of the membership. In addition, there are two educators, five businessmen and a farmer (compiled from The Ohio Senate, 1988).

Over a third of the Ohio senators (22) anticipate running for another office at some point in the future. Fourteen of the respondents indicated definite plans to seek a different office in the future. On a similar note, and in reflection of the intense partisan competition, a much larger proportion of Ohio senators view their districts as competitive than in the other two states, with half of the Republican members defining their district as "safe Democratic." Finally, the intensely partisan nature of the chamber and ambitiousness of the members have led to rather
expensive elections with one incumbent Republican spending over $500,000 in 1988 (in addition to over $300,000 in services from the Republican caucus).

The Ohio governor is considered a moderate to strong governor, wielding strong appointive powers, tenure potential and veto potential, and very strong budget making powers, but weak potential to alter the budget (Beyle, 1990). In the particular cycle of time studied, the senate is the only Republican controlled unit of the legislative and executive policymaking trilogy. The Speaker of the House is entrenched and powerful Democrat Vern Riffe and the governor is a lame duck Democrat who is constitutionally required to step down in 1991. Unlike the Republican senators in North Carolina, most of whom owe their election to the Republican governor, most Ohio Democrats feel no such debt to Democrat Celeste and some in fact place some of the blame for their minority status on him and a 1983 tax increase (interviews). The Ohio governor has only moderate influence over his party, and the Republican senate president is the highest elected Republican officeholder (Beyle, 1990: 573). The Ohio Senate is a well staffed and independent body which seldom relies on the governor for policy innovation, issue development, candidate recruitment and selection or campaign funding. Rather, those functions are performed by the professional partisan and institutional staff and the party leadership.
The Interviews

Most of the information for the present study was gathered in semi-structured interviews conducted with 120 senators from the three states from April, 1989 to May, 1990. Full or partial interviews were conducted with 45 senators from Maryland (95.7%), 46 senators from North Carolina (92.0%) and 29 senators in Ohio (87.8%). All but five interviews were conducted in person and in the legislative office of the member. One interview was conducted in the law office of a member, two in district offices (one of which also was an optometrists office) and two by telephone. Interview time ranged from 11 minutes (an abbreviated North Carolina interview) to 75 minutes. Additional data was gathered from North Carolina senators (43 of the 46 responding) using a single page mail survey (see Appendix) concerning questions about ambition, committee assignment and role of the president pro temp and the lieutenant governor. In order to shorten the interview time in Ohio, responses to particular closed ended questions were taken from similar surveys done in Spring, 1988 as part of the Ohio Legislative Research Project under the supervision of Samuel C. Patterson. Any unattributed quotes in this study are from the interviews described above.

The sample seems quite representative of the three senate populations. The table in Appendix A gives the comparison of the sample (120) to the population (130). No
member refused to be interviewed. Scheduling conflicts prevented the missing interviews from taking place and all 130 members were given equal opportunity to participate including letters, follow-up letters and phone calls and numerous personal contacts. The sample includes all but one party leader, all but four major committee chairmen (Appropriations and Judiciary I in North Carolina, Ways and Means and Judiciary in Ohio), all women, all but two members of the respective minority parties and all but two black legislators. The sample approximates the population in terms of seniority and political experience as well.

While the basic structure of the survey instrument was the same for all three states (see Appendix B), certain questions were altered, deleted or added to fit the characteristics of the particular institution. For example, inasmuch as Maryland Democrats caucus once a year to elect a president, questions about caucus meetings asked in Ohio and North Carolina were redirected toward the weekly leadership meetings in Maryland. Given the importance of the party caucus staff in Ohio, specific questions were directed toward its functions in Ohio, while such questions were not necessary in the other states. Additional questions in North Carolina were focused on the effects and nature of the structural changes discussed above. While abiding by the interview protocol as much as possible, some interviews strayed as members directed the discussion in
particular directions, and three senators were queried primarily on the questions of leadership central to this research because of time constraints.

All but seven of the interviews were audiotaped, with the permission of the respondent. Three members requested that the interview not be taped, two were interviewed on the telephone, and two could not be taped due to technical difficulties (weak batteries). The interviews were not transcribed, but copious notes with quotes were taken on each interview and then the information was coded into computer readable form.

**Additional Data Sources**

In an effort to limit the length of the interviews, as much background information as possible was gathered from printed material. In particular, biographical information such as tenure, occupation, party and committee positions were gathered from biographical sketches of each member (*The Ohio Senate, 1988; General Assembly of Maryland List of Committees and Roster, 1989; and The North Carolina Manual, 1989*). Similarly, various electoral and campaign data were compiled by the author from election results provided by the Offices of the Secretaries of State and Boards of Election in the three states. Campaign spending information was compiled by the author using a variety of sources, including newspapers (*The Charlotte Observer*), board of elections documents, secretary of state documents and figures provided
by the Ohio Senate Democratic Caucus. Finally, background information concerning particular legislative activities (bills, conflicts and leadership contests) was gathered from various newspapers, magazines and other periodic literature.

**Measuring the Concepts**

As noted above, this research deals with two sets of key concepts: 1) the multiple dimensions of leadership roles (internal/external and partisan/institutional) and 2) the various environmental factors that influence the distribution of those role expectations. All of the responses concerning leadership functions and responsibilities were coded based on the interviews described above. In an open-ended question, legislators were asked to describe their expectations of legislative party leaders as a group in their own words (see question 21 in Appendix B, the North Carolina Interview schedule) and then to do the same for each leader individually (president, floor leader and whip) (questions 24, 26, 28). In addition, the members were asked if they could suggest any improvements in leadership performance (questions 22, 28). The answers to these questions were used to develop the expectations of each member concerning leadership responsibilities, although particular voluntary remarks referring directly to a leadership function was assigned a category as well.
The questions concerning leadership were designed to focus the attention of the respondents on their expectations and their particular definition of legislative leadership. Most answers did indeed reflect a notion of appropriate leadership behavior, with responses preferred by statements such as "I would expect," "a leader should," "they ought to," "he has to," or "a leader must." However, even responses which seem more descriptive reflected a tendency for members to emphasize the particular functions that they felt important. Therefore, these responses were included in the member's definition of appropriate leadership functions along with more proscriptive responses. Obviously, behavior that respondents described as inappropriate for leaders was not included.

The responses were analyzed to determine what functions the respondent associated with the particular leaders, or with leadership in general. Each function was then coded as either institutional or partisan, and internal or external, depending on the nature of the function. For example, the comment of one North Carolina Democrat,

I think that when there is competition with the executive branch, or with the other House of the bicameral legislature, the president pro temp should take the lead for the whole body. Not the Democratic position or the Republican position, but the Senate. He is the Senate's leader. He should espouse the views of the Senate,

indicates two distinct functions: liaison with the governor and liaison with the house. As indicated in the comment,
these functions are performed on the behalf of the institution, rather than the party, so they would be coded as institutional in nature. Further, in that they entail interaction with actors outside of the legislature, they would be coded as external rather than internal functions.

Multiple responses were assigned to a category if the respondent referred to different components of a function (ie. polling, fundraising and candidate recruitment would warrant three separate campaign oriented responses), or if the respondent referred to the function in his or her response to questions concerning more than one leader (ie. if one ascribed the responsibility of facilitating the legislative process to both the floor leader and the president, two responses would be noted in the institutional internal category of process facilitator).

Particular functions were not coded twice if they were referenced in response to the general leadership question and then again in response to expectations of a particular leader. Further, one sentence could contain multiple responses. For example, the response that the leader should,

...take a four pronged approach to that [external responsibilities]—the public should be one of those four equal prongs. Second would be in relation to the House. Third would be in relation to the minority party in the senate, and the fourth prong would be in relation to the governor, would be coded as four separate responses in the partisan
external role. Specific examples of coding for each function are discussed in the next chapter.

To arrive at a particular measure of each dimension for each respondent, the absolute number of responses in each category (external or internal, and institutional or partisan) were totalled and then divided by the absolute number of functions offered by that respondent to arrive at a proportion. For example, a respondent who made seven external responses out of a total of ten responses would have a score of .70 (7/10) on the external scale. The same process was used to arrive at a proportion of partisan vs. institutional responses. Finally, the total number of responses was used to represent the absolute demands made on the leaders by the members. For example, a respondent with eight coded responses could be said to expect more of his or her leaders than someone who made only five demands. Therefore, each respondent was assigned three different scores measuring the nature of his or her leadership expectations: the proportion of responses which were partisan (measure of the institutional/partisan dimension), the proportion of responses that were external (internal/external dimension) and the total number of functions associated with leadership (measure of the absolute demand that person associated with leadership). Those three distinct measures of leadership expectations will serve as dependent variables.
Operationalizing the environmental factors is not quite so complex. For the most part, measures of the institutional environment are based on party membership and party of the governor. Membership in the minority party, as well as membership in the governor's party was coded as a dichotomous variable (opposite party =0, same party=1) as was party status (minority=0, majority=1). While the party status of the respondent, as well as the partisan relationship to the governor are rather self explanatory, the degree of partisanship requires considerably more justification.

A simple test would be distribution of legislative seats by party, with a certain percentage qualifying a state as one party, another as becoming competitive, and another as competitive (one third of the Ranney Index). However, this measure, while objective, ignores electoral and registration trends, as well as partisan changes in other offices that reflect the partisan environment. It further ignores the perceptions of the legislators who must operate within that environment. This study attempts to use indicators from various sources to establish levels of competition within each of the three institutions.

Several characteristics of the Maryland political environment qualify it as a one-party Democratic state. First, the majority Democratic party comprises over eighty-five percent of the senate membership (40 of 47), and have
held less than that (39 of 47) only once in the last fourteen years. Further, the Democratic party has held a similar dominance over the House (122 of 141 members in 1990) and governor's office since the mid 1960's (the last Republican governor was Spiro T. Agnew, elected in 1966). The dominance is reflected in voter registration as well, with Democratic registrants comprising over two-thirds (69.3%) of the two-party registration in 1990.

As discussed above, other scholars have also described the dominance of the Democratic party in Maryland. Measures of the Ranney Index of Interparty Competition traditionally put Maryland in the One-Party or Modified One-party categories. Bibby and others (1990) found the 1981 to 1988 score of competitiveness in Maryland an even more one-sided .76 (out of possible 1.00), with Maryland tying with Georgia as the tenth most Democratic- dominant state. While Republicans are showing substantial gains in most traditionally Democratic states (Beck, 1991), their electoral gains in state and local Maryland elections have been virtually nonexistent and in registration, below the national average.

Finally, the members of the Maryland Senate, Republicans and Democrats alike clearly perceive their state (and institution) as dominated by the Democratic party:

There is no party.... the opinion of this party is that it is beat. We don't have to fight the Republicans. We haven't had a Republican elected statewide in years...the party is ignored.
We have never had a strong party, at least not in my [twenty year] tenure, in the rural areas. The party, at best, in my opinion has been in Baltimore and that is where they concentrated and pretty much neglected the rest of the state.

In the legislature, we are not really partisan. We're tied to geographic concerns. Those should be the biggest driving forces.... we are not a political party driven legislature.

According to electoral history, scholars and members of the Maryland Senate, the political environment of Maryland is dominated by the Democratic party (in name if not structure).

Geographically, economically (Cash, 1941), sociologically (Reed, 1972), and politically (Key, 1949), North Carolina has traditionally been grouped with several other states to form the old south, with its characteristic Democratic dominance. However, in recent years, especially since 1980, North Carolina has shown signs of emerging two-party competition. Following Watergate, the 1976 Senate had a single Republican member. Since that time, the party has grown to hold a post-Nixon high of thirteen seats (26%). In the House, the Republicans gained ten seats in 1988, giving them over a third of the seats, and igniting a bipartisan coalition that removed a four term speaker. In the 1980's, North Carolina voters have elected an increasing number of Republicans to national, state and local offices. While registration is still almost two-thirds democratic (65.5%), Republicans have made substantial gains in the past twenty
years, growing from seventeen percent in 1966 (Goodman and Betts, 1987) to thirty percent of the registered voters in 1988 (Congressional Quarterly, February 17, 1990).

Scholars also make note of Republican growth in the state. According to Goodman and Betts (1987):

> In the past twenty years, North Carolina has undergone a quiet-- and sometimes noisy-- revolution. A state dominated by Democrats since the turn of the century, North Carolina has since 1966 been transformed into a state with a new political balance (1987: i).

As discussed above, measures of interparty competition over time add to the case for increasing party competition. Using data from 1946 to 1963, Beck places North Carolina in the One-Party Dominant category, but notes considerable Republican growth (.86 to .72) when compared to the 1976 through 1988 average. Using data from 1980 to 1988, Bibby and others (1990: 92) find North Carolina with an interparty competition score of .70 approaching competitive status of .65. Finally, in their recent study of southern politics, Black and Black (1987) find two-party status imminent in North Carolina.

Many North Carolina senators were fully aware of the changing nature of their political landscape, especially changes that have occurred in the 1980's, leading one Democrat to note, "the bomb fell in 1984". Others echo similar sentiments:

> We've never had a situation before in which we had a Republican lieutenant governor and on top of that, you've got a Republican over on Blount
street [governor's mansion], and I guess more Republicans in the Senate than we have ever had before.

I think the numbers are changing. I think we've got a two-party state that we didn't have when I first got down here (1982)....They [Democrats] see the handwriting on the wall from the last election, that it could be and would be if they didn't start paying a little more attention to their constituents, some of them might not be back around next time.

One Democrat indicated that the Democratic advantage in registration noted above may not be as substantial as it appears:

There are 33,000 registered Democrats in my district, and 15,000 registered Republicans. But we have found in recent decades an overwhelming tendency for Democrats to vote Republican.

All indications point to a future of increasing party competition in North Carolina similar to the changes evident in the recent past.

Finally, recent elections, especially in the state senate, indicate that Ohio is a very competitive state. Both parties have held the senate majority in the 1980's (Democrats, 1982-1984) and only in the most recent session was the partisan difference greater than three seats. While the House has a substantial (though shrinking) Democratic majority, the executive office has been competitive. Since 1962, Republicans have held the office sixteen years (with the same candidate) and the Democrats twelve. With the election of Republican George Voinovich to the executive office in 1990, Ohio witnessed another partisan change in
that office, while Republicans and Democrats solidified their holds on the senate and house respectively. While party registration figures in Ohio indicate a large group of independents (Democrat = 31%, Republicans = 20% and Independents = 48%) (Congressional Quarterly, February 17, 1990: 509), these figures are somewhat misleading. Partisans are only those registered voters that voted in one primary or the other, and the independents include nonvoters with those that are truly independent. Survey results from the 1988 Ohio State Survey give a truer indication of the partisan balance. Of the 1,548 respondents, 34 percent reported a strong or weak Democratic identification, 33 percent an independent or leaning partisan identification and 32 percent a weak or strong identification with the Republican party (cited in Baum and Patterson, 1991).

Measures of interparty competition reveal a similar partisan balance. A state dominated by Republicans through the 1960's, with Republicans controlling the house, the senate and the governorship during several points, the interparty competition score from 1946 to 1963 made it modified one-party Republican (Beck, 1991). However, elections of the 1970's ushered in an era of competitiveness that intensified in the early 1980's, with an index score of .55 from 1976 to 1988 (Beck, 1991). The 1980's found the state moving even more to the competitive center with a score of .54 (Bibby, et al, 1990: 92). While
moving in the Democratic direction, Ohio still has strong regional pockets of support for each party (Baum and Patterson, 1991).

However, it may be the legislators themselves who are most cognizant of the fact that a loss of one or two seats in their election can be the difference between minority and majority status:

Ohio is a swing state. It has all of the demographics of what we traditionally call a Democratic state. We maintain this majority in the senate, and we have done quite well at the governor's level. For the Republicans to win, they need all the breaks....there are no giveaways.

You have to be very aware that one slip up can cost you the majority. The Democrats are always proposing very sexy amendments hoping to catch us and use it for the next election.

The level of partisan competitiveness may have been most reflected in members comments concerning the importance of majority status. Given the volatility of majority status, it is a coveted position, leading one member to note, "The difference between majority and minority status is like night and day, they are calling the shots....as we did when we were in charge." Ohio politics in the 1980's, particularly in the senate, is defined in terms of fierce partisan competition.

Given the discussion of partisanship above, members of the Maryland Senate were coded as members of a one-party environment (partisan competition=1). North Carolina respondents were coded as members of an environment moving
toward party competition (partisan competition=2). Finally, members of the Ohio Senate find themselves in an environment characterized by strong two-party competition (partisan competitiveness=3).

Efforts were made to establish the nature of the relationship with the governor between each party and that state's executive based on the interviews and articles describing the relationship. The relationship was deemed strongest when the member and the governor were of the same party and the interviews and secondary data indicated a positive relationship (very positive relationship=1; North Carolina Republicans). The relationship was considered somewhat less positive if the interaction seemed positive, but the partisanship of the member and the executive differed (positive relationship=2). Regardless of partisan relationship, relationships were coded as neutral if there was no indication of a positive or negative relationship between the party and the executive (neutral=3; Maryland Republicans and Ohio Republicans). The relationship was coded as somewhat negative if the respondent and the governor were of the same party, but interviews and other sources indicated a tenuous relationship (somewhat negative relationship=4; Maryland Democrats). Finally, the relationship was coded as most negative if there was a partisan difference as well as external indications of
conflict (very negative relationship=5; North Carolina Democrats).

Finally, an additional institutional variable concerned the session limitations in Maryland (discussed more fully above). Given the ninety day session limit in Maryland and the absence of such a limit in the other states, the constitutional limits variable was coded as dichotomous (limits=0, no limits=1). Respondents in Maryland were coded as being in a legislative environment with session limits, while the North Carolina and Ohio respondents were not.

The factors comprising the personal environment of each respondent were gathered from various sources noted above. Leadership position and ambition were coded as dichotomous variables (nonleader=0, leader=1; no ambition=0, ambition=1). For the measure of ambition (Question #4 on the North Carolina Supplemental Survey, Appendix B), the responses of tentative (maybe) and definite (yes) political plans were collapsed because the distinction between the two did not seem defined enough to justify an ordinal measure. Political experience was measured as the number of years that the respondent had held an elective political office, including, in addition to state senator, the offices of state representative, county commissioner, city council member, mayor, and elected school board member. The years of political experience ranged from forty-five to one.
As discussed above, both an objective and subjective measure of electoral competition were offered. The objective measure was the percentage of the two-party vote received by the respondent in his or her most recent election. In North Carolina, the measure of vote received by a respondent in a multimember district was based on that respondent's vote divided by that vote plus the vote of the most successful losing candidate of the opposing party. The subjective measure of competition is based on the person's assessment (Question # 3, the North Carolina interview Schedule, Appendix B) of their district (ranging from safe Democrat to safe Republican) and their party. The least competitive districts are those in which the member classifies the district as safe for his or her party (Safe for Own Party=1). Those respondents who noted that their district was leaning in the direction of their own party were considered the next safest (Leaning toward Own Party=2). Any candidate who responded that their district was competitive was next (Competitive for Either Party=3). Members who perceived their district as leaning in the direction of the other party were considered vulnerable (Leaning toward Other Party=4). Finally, those who perceived their district as safely in the camp of the other party were considered the most competitive (Safe for Other Party=5).
Finally, measures of campaign expenditures were based on campaign finance reports gathered for each respondent. Because of the wide variation in average spending across institutions (Maryland= $45,156, North Carolina= $20,611, Ohio= $234,046), campaign spending for each respondent was measured as a proportion of the mean for that particular institution. For example, if a North Carolina respondent spent $40,000, his or her expenditure proportion score would be 1.94 ($40,000/ 20,611), while a $40,000 campaign in Ohio would warrant a score of .17 ($40,000/ 234,046).

Methods of Analysis

The primary statistical method of analysis used to establish the relationship between the environmental characteristics and the nature of leadership responsibilities is an ordinary least squares multiple regression. The purpose of this statistical technique is to establish the total effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable, as well as to clarify the effect of each independent variable (Lewis-Beck, 1980: 47). Three regression models were analyzed, regressing three dependent variables (proportion external responses, proportion partisan responses and total number of responses) on the institutional and individual environmental characteristics (independent variables).

The adjusted $R^2$ of each model is analyzed as a measure of the total proportion of variance explained by the model.
(Hanushek and Jackson, 1977). Further, the Beta or standardized regression coefficient is used to establish the importance of each independent variable relative to the other independent variables in a particular model. The level of significance of the relationship between each variable and the particular independent variable in the model is measured by the t-statistic \((p < .1)\) (Blalock, 1979: 190). While statistical significance will be recognized as \(p < .05\), other strong relationships will be discussed based on their relative strength and their substantive contribution to the understanding of legislative leadership (these relationships will be referred to as moderate, rather than significant, and should be interpreted accordingly). The comparison of the effects of environmental characteristics across models was made only in general terms, because of the questionable statistical validity of such comparisons (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977: 78).

The use of the multivariate analysis did result in the elimination of two theoretically significant independent variables because of evidence of multicollinearity. The correlation between party of the governor and relationship with the governor was found to be unacceptable (Pearson's product moment correlation= .89), as was the relationship between the measure of constitutional limitations and state partisanship (Pearson's product moment correlation= .87).
According to Berry and Feldman, such multicollinearity makes it "impossible to separate out the effect of one [independent variable] with any degree of precision" (1985: 40) and jeopardizes the precision of the model. No other combination of independent variables was correlated at a level above .41.

Further, in the multivariate analyses, the independent variable, campaign spending (discussed in Chapter 2) was found to have no significant relationship with each of the three dependent variables; therefore, it was dropped from the analysis. Finally, the multivariate analysis revealed that while the two measures of competitiveness were significantly independent of one another to warrant inclusion in the model (Pearson's product moment correlation= .49), the subjective measure exhibited a stronger relationship with the proportion of external responses and the total number of responses, and a comparable relationship with the proportion of partisan responses as the objective measure. On the basis of the theoretical arguments made above and the strength of its relationships with the dependent variables, the subjective measure was selected to measure electoral competition.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to determine the particular functions associated with legislative leadership, and to examine the effect of environmental characteristics
on the degree to which respondents associate those functions with leadership. In order to do that, data was gathered from three states using interviews and secondary data. The leadership functions were derived from the interviews and coded as internal or external and institutional or partisan. Using ordinary least squares regression, these responses were analyzed as a function of the party status, partisanship of the governor, party competition, political experience, ambition, leadership status and electoral vulnerability of the respondent.
CHAPTER IV:
EXAMINING THE DIVERSE NATURE OF MEMBERS' EXPECTATIONS
OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Legislative leaders in these three states, as in Congress (Davidson, 1988; Patterson, 1990; Sinclair, 1983 and Ripley, 1969) and in other state legislatures (Wahlke and others, 1962; Rosenthal, 1988), are expected to perform many functions and fulfill many roles. In the eyes of some members, they are primarily repositories of substantive, procedural and political information. To others, they are the central unifying and organizing force in a frantic and disorderly body. For others yet, the primary duties of the leaders revolve around their roles as linkages to other political actors, such as the governor, the opposition party and the speaker of the house, or to the general and electoral public. They are at times expected to be leaders of an institution, and at other times leaders of their party, often leaders of both, and sometimes leaders of neither.

The Distribution of Expectations by Functional Categories

The findings presented in Table 2 indicate the diverse nature of functions associated with legislative leadership. The interviews revealed membership support for twenty-six
different leadership functions. These functions can be organized into five functional categories indicated as important by previous studies of legislative leadership: administrative responsibilities, coalition building, source of information and services, liaison with other governmental actors and public relations/campaign related activities.

Table 2: The Distribution of Responses by Function and by Institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Function</th>
<th>Percentage Citing the Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Tasks</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informat./Services</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Relations</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus Build.</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Liais.</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Administrative tasks are those functions which must be performed if the body is to fulfill its legislative responsibility. The primary (although not necessarily single) purpose for performing these functions is to facilitate the efficient performance of legislative responsibilities. Administrative tasks include presiding over the floor or caucus meetings, organizing the body or the party, and facilitating an orderly legislative process. These tasks were noted by all but six of the one hundred and twenty respondents. As indicated in Table 2, such functions were strongly associated with leadership in all three chambers. Ohio was the only state in which the
administrative function was noted by less than ninety percent of the respondents.

In these three states, as in the United States Congress and other state legislatures, leaders are viewed as sources of information and services. More three of every four respondents (77.5%) associated legislative leadership with the provision of information or services. Members turned to their leaders for procedural (noted by forty-five percent of the respondents), substantive (forty-five percent of the respondents) or political (twenty-five percent of the respondents) information and direction. In addition to being administrators, members expected their leaders to be repositories of information. Unlike the distribution of expectations concerning administrative responsibilities, there was considerable variation between the institutions concerning the informational components of leadership. In highly partisan Ohio, all but two respondents noted such tasks, while less than sixty percent of the Maryland respondents made such a demand on their leaders.

The third most widely ascribed leadership responsibility concerned efforts to link the legislature and its members to the general public and constituents beyond the legislative party and institution. Over seventy percent (72.5%) of the respondents noted the expectation that their leaders should represent the party or the institution to the general public, their particular district or the district
voters (via campaign responsibilities). This public relations component of leadership includes functions as broad as "protecting the image of the institution" and as specific as recruiting good candidates for the upcoming election. Again, the distribution of responses reveals considerable interstate differences with senators in partisan Ohio giving considerably more attention to this responsibility than did their colleagues in less partisan environments.

The responsibility of building legislative coalitions in order to insure the passage or defeat of particular pieces of legislation was noted by just under two-thirds of the respondents. Sixty-five percent (65%) of the respondents discussed legislative leadership in terms of uniting members of the party or institution in response to a particular legislative issue or action. While this responsibility was noted by a significant number of respondents, it is interesting that its recognition was far from universal. This is somewhat surprising given the great degree of emphasis such coalition building responsibilities generally receive in the legislative leadership literature (Barber, 1966; Ripley and Froman, 1969; Sinclair, 1983). In no state was this particular function cited by more than two-thirds of the respondents.

Finally, just over sixty three percent (63.3%) of the respondents discussed their expectation that legislative
leaders should also represent the position and independence of the party or institution with members of the government community. These respondents noted the responsibility of the legislative leaders to interact with leaders of the house, the executive, the other party, the entire body of senators and the state party officials. Not only were leaders expected to negotiate with these officials, they were also expected to guard the interests and prerogatives of their own party or institution. Once again, it is clear from Table 2 that the emphasis on leadership responsibilities in each state were rather diverse. Members from Maryland, with the strongest governor in America (discussed in Chapter 3), were most likely to discuss their expectations in terms of this liaison role. Over half of the Maryland respondents turned to the leaders of the senate to protect the prerogatives of the institution (limited as they may be) from control of an aggressive executive.

The Internal/External Dimension

Whether responding to the needs of their party or the entire senate body, leaders were expected to perform functions that facilitate the internal operations and legislative success (internal functions) of that group. They were also expected to represent the members and protect their interests in the world beyond the senate and legislative party (external functions). Internally, members looked to their leaders to help organize the party or
chamber, as well as guide them through the maze of a legislative session. Further, as noted above, members expected to turn to their leaders for advice concerning the substantive, procedural and political implications of legislation. Members expected the leaders to utilize the talents of the individual members, facilitate the solution of substantive and procedural conflicts, promote an orderly legislative process, and provide them with the necessary information to make decisions beneficial to the party, the institution and their own particular goals.

On the other hand, members also turned to leaders to promote those policies and interests beyond the party and legislative institution. These functions comprise the external component of this dimension of legislative leadership. Leaders were expected to be the spokesperson of the party or the institution in relation to the general public, the governor, the house, and the state party. They are also expected to voice the position and ideas of the party (or the party's governor) on the senate floor and in negotiations with members of the other party. Finally, members turned to their leaders to prepare them, and other members of their party for the political campaign by representing them to the public, the district and the individuals and groups that will contribute to their campaigns.
While it is possible that a respondent might think of leadership as all external or all internal, one would expect their descriptions to include a combination of both types of functions. As the distribution in Table 3 indicates, there was indeed considerable variation in the degree of emphasis that members put on the external component of leadership responsibilities. To calculate the proportion of respondents in corresponding internal categories, subtract each categorical classification was subtracted from 100 (the forty five respondents with between 21 percent and 40 percent external responses also made between 60 percent and 79 percent internal responses).

Table 3: Distribution Respondents According to the Proportion of External Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% External</th>
<th>Maryland</th>
<th>N. Carolina</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 to 20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 to 60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 to 80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 reveals variations according to levels of emphasis on external functions by the respondents, as well as variations across states. It is clear that for most respondents (ninety percent), effective leadership included both internal and external responsibilities. Only twelve
respondents associated no external responsibilities with leadership, and none viewed leadership as completely external. As one might expect, the great majority of respondents viewed leadership as a somewhat balanced combination of internal and external responses. External responses comprised between twenty and sixty percent of the total number of functions associated with leadership for over two-thirds of the senators in the sample. While the larger proportion of respondents ascribed more internal than external responsibilities to legislative leaders, it is clear from Table 3 that there is considerable variation between respondents concerning the degree of external emphasis associated with legislative leadership.

In addition to variation by degrees of emphasis, Table 3 also reveals differences across the states. In general, North Carolina respondents were least likely to emphasize external responses, followed by Maryland and Ohio respondents, respectively. Over three-fourths of the North Carolina respondents gave greater emphasis to the internal component of leadership, while over three-fourths of the Ohio respondents focused most of their attention on external responsibilities. Although there is clear variation across the states, Table 3 reveals that at least one respondent in each state fell into each response category. Even in Ohio, with the high degree of external emphasis, one member made no references to external functions and another attributed
less than twenty percent of their responses to external functions. Likewise, although both Maryland and North Carolina respondents exhibited a tendency to emphasize internal functions, external functions comprised over sixty percent of the responses for three members in each state. It seems clear from Table 3 that there exists considerable variation in the degree to which members will focus their expectations on internal or external responsibilities.

The Institutional/Partisan Dimension of Responses

In addition to being categorized according to their internal or external nature, leadership expectations may also be analyzed according to whether they are performed on behalf of or in relation to just members of the party, or all members of the legislative institution. This distribution of responses will be referred to as the institutional/partisan dimension of leadership expectations.

The institutional component of this dimension refers to functions which are designed to be of benefit to all members of the legislative institution, rather than just members of the party. Internally, they include such responsibilities as committee assignment, floor management, scheduling, nonpartisan procedural and substantive direction and bipartisan coalition building. These responsibilities are considered institutional because members of both parties are likely to benefit from their performance. If the legislative institution is perceived as effective, efficient
and responsive, all members are likely to reap the political rewards. Externally, leaders are expected to promote the activities, policies and positions of the institution in relation to the public and other government officials. Further, they were expected to protect the reputation and legislative prerogative of that institution. As one might expect, campaign activities were not considered a nonpartisan function by any respondent. Again, these functions were considered to be institutional when the referent made it clear that the benefits of the activity would be shared by all members of the institution. All incumbent legislators will benefit if the leadership effectively promotes the idea that the legislature is active, effective, responsive and independent of the other branches.

The second component of the institutional/partisan dimension included responsibilities which are performed with the intent of benefiting or serving the members of one particular party. Internally, leaders were expected to organize and coordinate the party and its members so that they would have the most effective voice in the legislative process, while allowing each member to maintain a level of political independence necessary for political survival. In order to do this, leaders were expected to help coordinate, build support, for and enact an appropriate legislative agenda, convene and preside over meetings of the party
members, make committee assignments with an eye cast toward electoral demands and provide appropriate direction and cues on the floor. Externally, respondents turned to their leaders to represent the interests of the party to the general and district public, and government officials, just as they turned to them to represent the institution in those interactions. Leaders were expected to take the position of the party to the public, the executive, the house, the members of the opposing party, the leaders of the state party and members' particular districts. In addition, party leaders were expected to prepare their party for the ensuing political campaign by recruiting candidates, raising funds, speaking in the districts of members and projecting a positive image to the public concerning the activities and positions of the party.

Like the distribution of responses concerning the internal/external dimension, one would expect most members to view leadership as a combination of institutional and partisan activities. Table 4 reveals considerable variation in the degree to which respondents emphasized partisan rather than institutional activities in describing their expectations of legislative party leaders (the proportion of institutional responses may be calculated in the same manner as the proportion of internal responses was calculated above). As with Table 3, the information in Table 4 reveals differences across the sample and between states.
Table 4: Distribution Respondents According to the Proportion of Partisan Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% External</th>
<th>Maryland</th>
<th>N. Carolina</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 to 20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 to 60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 to 80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 to 99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The proportion of partisan responses associated with leadership varied considerably across the sample. While eighteen percent of the respondents associated no partisan responsibilities with legislative leadership, one Ohio senator mentioned no institutional responses in his discussion of legislative leadership. The other eighty percent of the respondents described legislative leadership as some combination of institutional and partisan functions. For forty-two percent (41.6%) of the respondents, partisan responsibilities comprised at least sixty percent of the responsibilities which they associated with legislative leadership. However, for close to another forty percent (38.3%), such partisan functions made up less than forty percent of the responses. The final twenty percent of the respondents had a relatively balanced view of institutional and partisan components of leadership, ascribing between
forty and sixty percent of their responses to partisan functions.

It is clear from Table 4 that the respondents cover the entire range of possibilities concerning partisan emphasis, ranging from no partisan functions to no institutional functions. However, Table 4 reveals further that the distribution of respondents varies considerably across states. There are clear differences in the degree of partisan activities associated with legislative leadership in the three states, particularly between Maryland and Ohio. Almost three-fourths (73.4%) of the Maryland respondents associated less than twenty percent of their responses with partisan functions, while no Ohio respondents gave less than forty percent of their responses in partisan terms. North Carolina respondents fall between the two extremes, with all but one respondent describing leadership as having between twenty and eighty percent partisan components. Table 4 reveals considerable variation across respondents concerning the degree to which leadership is a partisan or institutional responsibility.

Conclusion

It should be quite clear from the discussion above that there is considerable variation in the tasks associated with legislative leadership. Responsibilities associated with five different functional categories (administrative, informative, public relations oriented, coalition building,
and governmental liaison) were each noted by at least sixty percent of the respondents with the most universal being administrative tasks (95.8%) and the least cited being government liaison (63.3). Effective leadership is clearly in the eye of the beholder.

The following four chapters present an in depth discussion of the responsibilities associated with legislative leadership. The expectations are organized along categories of the two dimensions discussed above. Chapter V offers a discussion of the responsibilities which are performed within the legislative institution on behalf of all of its members (institutional internal). In Chapter VI, we discuss the nature and performance of responsibilities associated with representing the members of the institution to external actors (institutional external). Chapter VII is a presentation of functions which promote the internal operations of the party and its members (partisan internal). Finally, Chapter VIII is a discussion of the methods by which leaders are expected to present and protect the interests of the party and its members to actors outside of the party (partisan external). These chapters are presented so that one might more fully understand the multiple responsibilities that members associate with legislative leadership.

The diverse nature of leadership expectations is a reflection of diversity among individual members. This
difference in expectations is reflected in the degree of external (Table 3) and partisan (Table 4) emphases that individual members placed on leadership responsibilities. While ten percent of the respondents perceived leadership as completely internal, the same number cited at least sixty percent external responses. Further, respondents exhibited even greater diversity concerning the level of partisan responses associated with leadership, with eighteen percent noting only institutional responses and one noting only partisan functions. At least ten percent of the respondents were in each of the remaining five categories (twenty point intervals form 1 to 1 to 99). These findings reinforce the assertion that the nature of effective legislative leadership may vary from one person to the other, and the state differences suggest a pattern for those differences.

In Chapters IX, X and XI we examine the relationship between this variation in leadership responsibilities, and characteristics of the legislative environment. Chapter IX concerns the question of differences in the proportion of external responses (displayed in summary in Table 3). Chapter X concerns the factors associated with variation in the degree of institutional or partisan emphasis (displayed in summary in Table 4). Finally, Chapter XI concerns a similar variation in the number of functions which each member associates with legislative leadership.
CHAPTER V: THE INSTITUTIONAL INTERNAL FUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP

Over a third (34.8%) of all references to leadership responsibilities concerned institutional internal functions. Institutional internal functions are those particular responsibilities performed on behalf of the entire institution which facilitate effective performance of the legislative process, as well as orderly and timely conduct of that process. The institutional internal functions include the day-to-day technical responsibilities central to the success of any large organization, as well as particular political, procedural and policy functions more specifically associated with a lawmaking body. Institutional internal functions were divided into seven types: distribution of resources, administrative functions, agenda-setting, cross-party coalition building, provision of policy direction and information, and facilitation of the legislative process. While very diverse, all of these functions promote the effective internal operation of the legislative institution.

Distribution of Resources. The distribution of legislative resources, primarily coveted committee positions and chairmanships, is a significant and powerful responsibility
given to most legislative leaders. Such activities were cited by thirty-six legislators in the three states. One senator described his leader as effective because of his performance of this distributive responsibility,

he [the president] is able to put people in the places that they are needed for those jobs to do the jobs. I think he has utilized all of the talents. He seems to have a keen eye on how you delegate. He does it with a great deal of confidence.

Table 5:
The Distribution of Institutional Internal Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of the function</th>
<th># of References</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proced. Facilitation</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-part. Consensus</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribute Resources</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set Issue Agenda</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Advice</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advice/ Dir.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# of References= The number of times the particular function was mentioned by the respondents. It may be higher than the number of references, because a respondent may cite a function more than once.
# of Respondents= the number of individuals citing a particular function (those who mention a function more than once are only counted once).
% of Sample= the proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).

One leader described the selection of his four chairmen and noted how they can make the institution as well as its leader look good:
I picked four unique chairmen. They are great. They are without question the four strongest members of the senate. They are all smart. They are all talented. They all have diverse thought processes... they are all strong and all different. They are from all over the state and all have a strong work ethic. They were all selected on their abilities...I could not have four harder working or more loyal chairmen. Apart from my role as president, this has been the smoothest session here, and that is because of my committee chairmen.

These assignments are considered a resource because they can allow members to accrue influence, represent their constituents, cultivate their own interests and utilize their legislative and nonlegislative experiences. In discussing factors affecting committee assignments, members mentioned all of these criteria (experience, interests and abilities, and constituency), along with loyalty to the leadership, seniority, political or electoral needs, philosophical considerations and various demographic and political characteristics, including regional, gender, racial and partisan balance. While committee assignments in the senates of Maryland, North Carolina and Ohio, as well as in most chambers, are the responsibility of the party leaders (president for the majority and minority leader for the minority), for the present study, they were considered partisan functions only when the respondent noted use of the assignment process for partisan or electoral advantage. Otherwise, references to committee and chairmanship assignments were considered institutional in nature because
of their centrality to the lawmaking and representative activities of the legislative institution.

This is not to imply that the assignment process is not political, but rather that the politics involved may be as much personal as partisan. It appears that on the occasions when assignments are used as political rewards, it is not an issue of party loyalty, but rather leadership loyalty. Noted one leader's aide actively involved in the assignment process:

We don't look just at loyalty, but if you have two equally qualified and senior members, and one has been loyal to us and the other has not been, it defies imagination to think you will not reward the loyal member.

Many senators also expected the leaders to make assignments in such a way as to insure a fair hearing of their [the leader's] own position, if not its enactment.

In addition to committee assignments, leaders have at their disposal various legislative perks, including assignments to conferences, staffing, etc., prompting one Maryland senator to remark, "If you want to raise your secretary's salary, that goes through the president." Others noted the significance of trips, "junkets" and other legislative rewards.

Administrative Functions.

He is the leader of the senate, Democrats and Republicans. We expect him to conduct the business of the senate... he is the elected leader of the senate, he is the chief executive officer of the senate, as it should be.
Especially for the leaders of the majority, leadership brings with it considerable responsibilities associated with the day-to-day functioning and operation of the body. The performance of this institutional administrative function was the most universally accepted responsibility associated with senate leadership in the three chambers. Administrative functions, usually including such necessary activities as presiding over floor debate, bill assignment and scheduling, were mentioned one hundred and twenty two times by eighty-nine members (74% of the sample). While presiding over the institution may not be glorious, it can be a rather influential responsibility. Discussing the fact that a Republican would be presiding over the Democratic controlled senate in North Carolina, Ran Coble of the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research explained that,

The power to preside is a tremendous power. The presiding officer decides who to call on. When things get really close, if you know that somebody is going to make a motion to table as opposed to approve a bill, in the momentum and emotion of that moment, the ability to call on the right person can determine the outcome. (Winston-Salem Journal, December 18, 1988)

It is the responsibility of the presiding officer to "manage the floor," but other party leaders are often expected to help them in that regard. Further, the presiding officer makes rulings as to roll call or voice votes, which bills are to be engrossed or signed, who is to be recognized and what motions are in or out of order. One senator may have summed it up best by noting that the primary task of the
presiding officer and floor leaders is to "conduct the senate chamber to see that each issue gets a fair hearing."

In addition to presiding, administrative duties include assigning bills (given the constraints of committee jurisdiction) and scheduling bills or "setting the calendar." Leaders were expected to make bill assignments based on the same sense of fairness associated with committee assignments,

I expect the president of the Senate to retain the integrity of the body by being perfectly straight. Seeing that bill assignments are made according to the code, not who your friends are; that the bills don't get held up at the president's level.

One Maryland senator described the job of the president as "rolling up his sleeves, jumping right in and deciding when we are going to handle what.... what will come first, and what will come second." Leaders set the calendar of events, taking into account the various demands and schedules of the members, as well as the political ramifications of a particular bill.

In Maryland, the leaders hold weekly bipartisan meetings during the annual legislative session in which bill scheduling and "presenting legislation in an orderly process" are the primary foci of business. Discussing these meetings, one leader volunteered,

When something comes out of committee where leadership is involved, if this hits the floor the same time that hits the floor, we are going to have problems and we don't want that. You know, we want a smooth running floor. Hold back that
one until we clear the floor with this one....we do timing.

Effective scheduling appears to bear particular significance in Maryland, where the session is constitutionally limited to ninety days. In addition to assisting in the flow of legislation, scheduling is also done on the basis of potential success. No leader (of the institution, party or committee) wants to be embarrassed by a defeat on the floor, so bills may be held until the time that votes are assured, or they may not be scheduled at all.

In Ohio and North Carolina, majority party caucus meetings are the primary arena for determining bill scheduling. Describing a typical caucus meeting, one member indicated that the main purpose of the caucus meetings was to determine if there were enough votes to carry a particular issue. If the votes were not available in the majority, members may seek votes from members of the minority party. If there are insufficient votes to ensure passage, the bill would not be scheduled because "frankly, it would be quite embarrassing if we took a bill to the floor without the votes to pass it."

These administrative functions seem to be a common denominator for legislative leaders. Among those members who ascribed a very limited role for legislative leaders, such administrative functions were almost sure to be mentioned. While the factors determining the processes by which administrative tasks were performed may vary as
discussed above, it seems that their performance is necessary if the institution is to function as a lawmaking body. Therefore, they are central to the conception that many members have of a leader. As indicated in Table 5, such functions were cited by just under three-fourths of the respondents. In fact, some senior members of the Maryland Senate attribute the defeat of an incumbent president in 1982 to the fact that he failed to adequately perform those administrative functions, "People just got a little tired of a place without any order...you have got to have a strong leader."

Procedural Advice and Information. As chief administrative officers and central players in the operation of the legislative process, leaders have access to procedural, substantive and political information. While this is a role more often performed on a partisan basis (majority members looking to the president or majority leader and the minority to their leaders), ten respondents noted that the president and sometimes the majority leader are a source of such information for all members. These members acknowledged their willingness to defer to the leader for procedural advice as to how best to approach a particular issue and deal with it on the floor, and "talk to the leaders and bounce ideas off of them."

This particular function was often defined in terms of keeping the members informed as to particular processes and
events that were taking place, or were expected to take place on the floor (referred to as "procedural acrobatics"). Leaders were expected to understand and to be able to manipulate the process, and indeed elected leaders were more likely to be referred to as "procedural experts" (defined as those members "with a better understanding of how to get things through this process, regardless of the issue area") than any other members in Maryland and Ohio, while the president pro tem in North Carolina ran a close third to two senior committee chairmen with no formal party leadership position. References to the better communication of such procedural and policy expertise were the most commonly mentioned suggestion for leadership improvement (13 of 105 responding).

Policy Direction and Information.

I expect him to give us direction, not just for the party, but for the senate as a whole... I would like maybe to see even more policy direction. I think strong leadership is very important.

Just as leaders are a source of procedural information and direction, they may also be a beacon for direction or substantive information on policy for the institution. As with procedural direction, most members indicated this as a significant partisan rather than institutional function, deferring to their respective party leaders for policy or philosophical direction that is in the best interest of their party. However, six members (5%) mentioned the
responsibility of leaders to give a signal or direction to the entire body on major issues,

He has to be well informed about anything we are going to deal with....he has to look at the total picture of the state because I think everything rises and falls in the way they [the leadership] comes down on an issue.

While members expected their leaders to offer position-neutral policy information, they also turned to those leaders for direction on matters of policy.

I think his role is to give a clear and concise direction to the senate. Fundamentally that is his biggest role as far as I am concerned. With respect to the issues, I think that is his biggest role... he has to be my light tower in a storm, he's got to give some direction.

The willingness of this member to seek and accept the advice of the leader underscores one of the advantages most leaders have in giving both procedural and policy advice: a predisposition for it to be accepted and acted upon. Several members echoed the sentiments of an Ohio Senator who indicated that a vote for a leader represented a willingness to follow that person, therefore it was only logical that you would seek that leader's advice.

Two members made it clear that the intention of seeking advice did not necessarily imply that the advice would be obeyed. One member recalled a case where unsolicited policy direction was offered on the floor via a telephone call from the podium. While this particular member noted that such direction was appropriate for the president, the advice nonetheless went unheeded. Leaders tend to be at the center
of the information network, having greater access to policy information by virtue of their position. A few members felt that they should be privy to that information as well.

**Issue Agenda Setting.** Senate leaders are expected to select the particular issues that the body will consider. While the leaders may be free to offer direction on the issue they have adopted for the agenda, most viewed issue selection and support as two separate functions. In fact, references to this function (twenty-five members) were much more common than to the provision of policy direction (six members). According to one member, it is the job of the leader to "make the judgment as to the most important issues of the session and see that they are taken care of."

Again, while this agenda setting function may be performed to partisan advantage, over one fifth (20.8%) of the members referred to it as institutional in nature, "He should be in front in defining the issues for the Senate in general."

In making the determination as to what issues to select, senators expected leaders to rely on their own intuition, the perceived desires of the members and the interest of the public and the electorate. Some viewed this agenda setting in very concrete terms, arguing that the leaders should determine the specific issues that the senate should deal with:

There are certain issues, for example PAC limitations that [the leaders] might want to talk about. You know, whether or not he wants to make that a leadership issue or leave it up to the body
to decide and let it roll as it may....taxing and revenue issues seem to be big leadership issues.

Others spoke of the agenda setting responsibility in broader and more abstract terms, referring to "setting the tone of the senate," having "an enlightened self interest, an enlightened view of the future" and "setting priorities as to how the people in Ohio are going to be better off ten years down the road." One eloquent senior senator from Maryland may have described the breadth of this function best when he noted the responsibility of the president and other leaders to:

set the tone for the policy direction of the senate. We constitutionally are the policymaking body. It becomes the responsibility of the presiding officer, in conjunction with his members of leadership [other party and major committee leaders] to determine the direction and policy of the senate and uphold that policy whether or not he agrees with it personally.

While the leaders are out in front on issue selection, they must at times put their own feelings aside for the interest of the body and its members, being "aware of and as responsive as possible to the whims of forty six senators."

Members and leaders alike acknowledged that acceptance of a leadership position indicated a willingness to sometimes suppress one's personal feelings for the good of the party or the institution.

Bipartisan Coalition Building. In addition to allowing the leader to select issues of importance, just under thirty percent (29.2%) of the members emphasized the responsibility
of the leaders to build coalitions across party lines to secure the passage of that legislation and achieve a particular policy outcome. Describing the job of leadership, senators from Ohio and Maryland offer similar descriptions,

The real sense of the job I think is building consensus, coalitions when things are controversial.... the work comes when you get difficult bills, then he [the leader] has to use his skills to get people together.

The magic of leadership is being able to convince a working minimum that a particular action is in their best interest- that they are not giving up a piece of the pie, but rather that both sides can get a piece. Being able to find that common ground or common interest is the magic of leadership.

While majority status may mean that leaders of the majority could build a sufficient (winning) coalition within the party (where much such activity does occur), several factors necessitate cross-party coalitions on some issues. First, members noted that many issues are not partisan in nature, therefore, coalitions often cross party lines, forming instead, along ideological, regional, or urban/rural fissures. Second, even the smaller minority parties, much less larger majority parties are heterogenous, such that leaders can't always count on unified support from party members. Therefore, several respondents noted that a wise leader was one who "is not held hostage by his caucus," but rather always keeps contacts open with members of the other party to build the necessary coalitions. This is
considered an institutional, rather than partisan function because the coalition builder deals with members of both parties on an individual and even basis.

Leaders and members alike indicated the possibility that on particularly important (in terms of policy or politics) issues, leaders may seek nonpartisan coalitions. For example, in light of the rising concerns about the quality of education, leaders sought bipartisan coalitions for education initiatives in all three states. In Ohio, a Democrat noted that the majority,

came to us early on the education reform bill... we were given every opportunity and most of our ideas were taken and we feel in fact that the bill that came out was more a reflection of Democratic opinions than Republican.

A similar description of passage of an education bill is offered by North Carolina senators where the bill was an agenda item for the Republican governor, which made it particularly beneficial for the Democratic leadership to integrate minority opinion into the process. Numerous formal and informal meetings were held with the minority members primarily voicing the opinion of the governor.

While such temporary bipartisan task forces are not unusual, only Maryland has a regular forum for minority input on major issues. The Tuesday morning leadership meetings include leaders of the majority party, committee chairmen and vice-chairmen, as well as leaders of the minority party. Observation of some of these meetings, as
well as discussions with leaders, made it clear that minority participation was significant and welcome. Likewise, only in Maryland is the budget process regularly considered a bipartisan issue with the minority leader a vocal and active leader on the Budget and Taxation Committee. The committee chairman noted that the minority leader was placed in such a position almost as an act of procedural preservation. When the minority leader was not involved in the early stages of the budget process, "it would take us four or five hours on the floor to get it through. Now we do it in a half hour."

Obviously, leaders seldom use partisan arguments to build cross-party coalitions, but that does not remove politics from the art of persuasion. In addition to making arguments on the merits of the legislation, some members expected leaders "to step down hard at times and say 'damn it, we have to do this,'" and reward or punish accordingly. A common thread in efforts to build bipartisan coalitions was the sense of urgency or necessity conveyed by the member who discussed "stepping down hard." Often, leaders make the case that passage of the bill, while perhaps not in the short term interest of the party or even the member, is in fact necessary for the long-term well being of the public, and the image and performance of the institution. In Maryland, where the governor is a dominant figure, the institutional argument of "us against the governor" seemed
quite effective in building leadership coalitions across party lines. Leaders were expected to build coalitions on major issues, using the tools described above, crossing party lines when it appeared necessary or advantageous.

Facilitative Functions. Finally, legislative leaders are not only responsible to see that the legislative process functions, but over forty-four percent (44.2%) of all respondents note the responsibility of the leaders to see that it functions in an efficient and timely manner. One senator with over forty years of government experience defined effective leadership solely in those terms,

this year we have good leadership, excellent leadership, and they are carrying us right along—very effective. I think it's the best leadership we've had in my five years down here... how busy we are staying, how organized it is, and with our deadlines and all, how we are pushing to accomplish what we came down here for and then leave.

As legislative facilitator, leaders should perform many of the functions described above with the express goal of making the process move efficiently and effectively. Leaders may use committee assignments and other resources as incentive for cooperation on potentially divisive issues, as well as appoint chairmen that are likely to "work well together and move the process along." At its very nature, this function is administrative. However, it is distinct in that administrative functions such as presiding, bill assignment or scheduling may be used to stymie as well as facilitate the process. Facilitative functions included
administrative functions performed with the express purpose of promoting an orderly process. Unlike agenda setting and coalition building, facilitative functions were generally policy neutral,

"...calling balls and strikes, moving the body and legislation along in an efficient manner. It is one of not taking a position on issues. One of not influencing the outcome of decisions. They have the job of watching out for potholes and pitfalls, things that would bog the legislature down... it is important that we not waste time. That bills are in and out.

In short, these members focused on the leaders' responsibility to conduct the business of the senate in a manner that is "timely," "smooth," "harmonious," and "efficient."

Leaders have several tools available to assist in encouraging that orderly flow of business. Especially in Maryland, with its ninety day limit, the effective use of deadlines and the interim between sessions is vital. Most committees meet at least semi-monthly during the legislative interim and recent changes encourage committees to begin holding legislative hearings a week before session begins, "so that we can vote the first or second day and we now have bills on the floor in the first week." In North Carolina and Maryland alike, recent sessions have witnessed an increased emphasis on filing deadlines and marked decrease in the number of "duplicate bills" filed by members of the house and senate, as well as multiple senators. The
chairman of the Rules Committee in Maryland noted with pride, recent changes that have enabled the body to take substantive votes on the second or third day of the session.

In addition to rules and deadlines, leaders may use their influence over the committees and bill scheduling to move things along. According to some, a leader is expected to go to a committee chairman and make sure that particularly volatile bills are dealt with in a timely manner. Several members discussed the activities of the Maryland President on a controversial piece of gun control legislation in 1987. Notes one member of the committee discussing the bill,

...the president called the committee in and said I want you guys to vote on this thing. I don't care how you vote, up or down, kill it, save it, but give it a vote so that we will not be confronted with the idea that scullduggery occurred and it was not given due process.

The primary concern was not the political outcome of the bill, but rather the legislative process and its perception by the public. Many respondents expressed a desire that the leadership schedule bills to minimize disruptive effects on the day-to-day legislative process. Leaders may employ the threat of weekend sessions to encourage efficient processing of legislation. One leader met early in the 1989 session with the committee chairmen and assured them that "if you stay up, and ahead, we will not have Friday sessions." Particularly controversial bills are capable of tying up the legislative process for days or weeks, and it appeared to be
the responsibility of leadership to "develop a strategy to deal with the issue so that both sides feel treated fairly, but neither side has the opportunity to stymie the other work of the Senate."

As one might expect, extended debate, or filibusters can be a major threat to an efficient legislative process, especially given the constitutional constraints in Maryland and the citizen's legislature in North Carolina. The presiding officer must walk a fine line between allowing the filibustering opposition speak their piece, seeing that the majority (in terms of numbers, not just party) opinion prevails and seeing that other issues continue to be dealt with. In the 1990 session, the Maryland Senate experienced an eight day filibuster lead by conservative senators opposed to abortion liberalization legislation. The president was the central figure in efforts to settle the dispute and end the filibuster, while vowing to remain neutral on the issue (Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1990).

In describing his efforts to end the filibuster, the senate president said "I begged, pleaded, cajoled... battles are determined by the smallest of events." Using his prerogatives as presiding officer, the president initially mandated that the filibuster be around the clock, hoping to increase the pressure for compromise, but instead the move intensified positions and solidified the two camps (Washington Post, March 21, 1990). Votes to end debate
(requiring 32 of the 47 senators) were called every few hours, with the hope that the growing support for cloture would convince those leading the filibuster that the tide was turning against them. Finally, the president met with each member separately and in groups, offering compromises and attempting to satisfy both sides. While the most effective argument to stop the filibuster is usually an institutional one concerning the necessity to proceed with the business of the Senate, it was clear that the emotional nature of this issue muted the traditional argument. The senate president volunteered,

The thing that I did not anticipate was that people on the floor of the senate would make this issue so paramount that they would risk doing great damage to the senate. They would rather see the whole senate in disarray than have this issue pass. I did not realize the intensity of the debate.

In the end, it was the responsibility of the president as both agenda setter and consensus builder that brought the filibuster to a close. After crafting a compromise bill, the president met individually with each senator to gather support for it, arguing that it was the best possible compromise in "these difficult times" and that it was necessary for the senate to move on. The measure passed the senate unanimously.

While members understood the necessity of this facilitative role, several found fault with unintended consequences. Several members indicated that recent
efforts to streamline the process have resulted in legislation that is not properly conceived or considered and members that are not properly prepared to examine those issues. While members realized the negative effects of filibusters on legislative activity, they were also aware that on a future occasion they could be the one using the filibuster to exact legislative compromises, and a vote for cloture today may result in justification to defeat their filibuster tomorrow. Added one minority senator,

I think it [the filibuster] is probably the greatest tool for the democratic process and I'm certainly not going to do anything to damage it.

Conclusion

Functions that comprise the internal institutional role are those performed on behalf of and within the institution as a whole and those which are necessary to the performance of the institution. Internal institutional functions were the most universally ascribed expectations of the four roles, being noted more often and by a larger (and more diverse) number of respondents than any of the other three roles. These functions were most often ascribed to the president (and president pro tem in North Carolina) and comprise the minimum or baseline definition of legislative leadership. If they define legislative leadership in terms of a single responsibility, for most members, that responsibility is internal institutional in nature.
Legislators look to their leaders to represent the institution and its members, interests, positions and image to those outside of the institution. These institutional external responsibilities comprised about twelve percent of all references to leadership responsibilities. Leaders were expected to be the voice of the institution in interaction with political and nonpolitical actors alike, as well as remember that individual members must be responsive to an external constituency. They were expected to promote the cause of the senate to the governor, the House, the general public as well as the member's particular district, while upholding the image of the senate.

Relationship with the Executive. Over a quarter (27.5%) of the respondents associated legislative leadership with the job of representing the legislative position (in conjunction with the leaders of the house) with the executive. One member noted the difficulty of the job, indicating that the leaders "are presumed to speak on behalf of a body that can't agree on anything." While this role may refer to negotiating and bargaining with the executive branch as noted in Rosenthal (1990: 82), the members seemed
much more likely to view executive activity as an intrusion on legislative initiative and the leadership responsibility as protector of that initiative.

Table 6:
The Distribution of Institutional External Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th># of References</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Governor</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With House</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With General Public</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With District</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain Instit. Image</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# of References= The number of times the particular function was mentioned by the respondent. It may be higher than the number of respondents, because a respondent may cite a function more than once.

# of Respondents= the number of individuals citing a particular function (those who mention a function more than once are only counted once).

% of Sample= the proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).

As one might expect, senators in Maryland were most likely to see the leadership as the protector of legislative integrity, given the immense power granted the state's governor (discussed above). One senior Maryland senator made the case quite effectively,

We are in a little different situation. Now, if you have a weak governor, he will not exercise the power that he has. However, if you get a strong governor, he will go well beyond what he is allowed and we have one right here, right now. So, I think a time like this is when the checks and balances really work at their best and I
think a governor like that tests the leadership of
the legislative branch. I mean, he has to hang
tough...

Another member attributed the success of the Maryland
president to his ability to maintain the independence of the
institution.

He [the governor] wants to be the sole power. He
doesn't recognize us, he wants a limited partner,
and [the president] keeps saying we are general
partners. He keeps trying to break us. [The
president] is doing a good job. He's been very
strong. We came into our own under [former
governor] Harry Hughes. We started establishing
legislative priorities, spending limits, all sorts
of things we put in. Responses to a weak
governor... now we have a very strong governor.

While the institutional weakness of the governor in North
Carolina made him less of a threat to legislative
independence than his Maryland counterpart, several North
Carolina respondents indicated that the apparent popularity
of the Republican governor made such interaction a political
necessity.

One traditional component of the relationship between
the executive and the legislative leadership that was
noticeably absent from the responses, and seems to be less
important in smaller bodies, is the role of the
intermediary. As Rosenthal notes, sometimes leaders are the
intermediary between the executive and rank and file members
(1990: 82). However, no respondent explained this
executive-legislative liaison function in terms of the
governor having to negotiate with the leaders rather than
lobbying individual members. In fact, several respondents
in each state made clear the independent nature of members of "the upper chamber" that precluded such a role. According to one Ohio Senator,

    We are not going to allow [the party leader] to speak for us. If the governor wants our vote, he has to come talk to us. It is a different situation in the House. If he would try to contact individual members in the House, the Speaker probably would punish him. The Speaker would demand that he go through him. In the senate, the leader is no more than first among equals and if you want our vote, you don't go to the leader. You come to us and ask for it.

The senate leaders were expected to "do the bidding" of the senate and its members in relation to the governor. However, while some aspects of the partisan relationship with the governor are more personal in nature (to be discussed later), the institutional relationship with the executive appears quite limited to a rather adversarial relationship.

    While periodic meetings on particular issues do occur in these three states, no leaders had regularly scheduled leadership meetings with the executive on behalf of the institution (the Republican minority in North Carolina did have such meetings on behalf of the party). However, there were meetings on major issues such as the governor's two major initiatives, highway package and education plan in North Carolina and the budget in Ohio. The nature of the relationship in Maryland, with its Democratic legislative majority and governor, are best exemplified by the absence of interaction with the governor concerning the dominant
issue of the 1990 session, the eight day abortion filibuster which crippled the senate (Washington Post, March 23, 1990). According to this and other studies (Beyle and Munchmore, 1986; Rosenthal, 1990), while executives appear to play an agenda setting role, independent legislative bodies are increasingly determined to make their own decisions and then rely on their leadership to defend that position with the executive.

**Relationship with the House.** Most often referred to in the context of presenting a unified front to the executive, twenty percent (twenty-four members) of the respondents cited the responsibility of the leaders to interact with the chief executive in the other legislative chamber (in this case, the speakers). This interaction seems to involve three components. First, the legislative leaders work together on matters of scheduling, establishing deadlines and projecting the senate conclusion. Second, senators expected the leaders of the two chambers to cooperate so that the legislative branch would not be divided by the executive. Finally, as in their relationship with the executive, senate leaders were charged to uphold the "integrity of the senate" and maintain its position in negotiations with the "lower chamber."

In Maryland, where session length is constitutionally restricted, and in North Carolina, where recent leaders have made a concerted effort to adjourn in a more timely fashion,
several members noted the necessity to schedule activity in the two chambers in a timely fashion. This problem became particularly acute in the 1989 session of the North Carolina General Assembly where the senate sat idly by (not so patiently), waiting for the house to finish its business and move to conference on several issues that the senate had acted on earlier (Winston-Salem Journal, July 9, 1989). This coordinating responsibility becomes particularly significant as the session's end draws near and calendars become crowded.

One Maryland senator noted that it was important that the "house and senate stay together. Sometimes I think the governor tries to divide us." While members in North Carolina cited this function as well, one member there indicate the particular difficulty of the task given the, very volatile situation in the House. There has always been a very unsettling situation between the two, but this is certainly compounded by the changes at the first of the session.

This interchamber cooperation may include formalized negotiations such as the weekly Wednesday Budget meetings in Maryland, or much more sporadic interaction, as in Ohio, where the chambers are controlled by different parties.

However, most members were unwilling to sacrifice senatorial independence in the name of a unified front. In fact, as with executive relations, the most commonly described interaction with the house concerned maintaining the independence and integrity of the body. One junior
North Carolina Senator mentioned them both in the same breath, as though they were inseparable:

I think that when there is competition with the executive branch, or with the other house in the bicameral legislature, the president pro tempore should take the lead for the whole body. Not the Democratic position or the Republican position, but the senate...He should espouse the senate's position.

A Maryland member added that a leader must "do the bidding of the senate in the bicameral legislature." In fact, while the current president of the Maryland Senate is praised for his relationship with the executive and the house, one member explained that the perception that the senate was being dominated by the house contributed to the removal of a previous leader.

He seemed to be overshadowed, not just on policy matters, but also administratively by his counterpart in the house. It seemed that the upper house, the senate was dominated on every issue by the lower house. [The speaker] took politics very seriously. He was here almost on a fulltime basis. [The president], on the other hand, had other things to do....the senators felt that they were falling behind.

While members looked to senate leaders to negotiate with the other chamber in order to present a unified legislative front to the executive, members seemed more concerned that the leaders guard the independence and integrity of the body in those negotiations.

Relationship with the General Public. In a broad sense, the senate president was viewed as being the senator elected to represent a statewide electorate as well as his district.
As leader, he must represent members who are elected from across the particular state, and in being responsive to them, he becomes responsive to the entire state.

As presiding officer of the senate, he has a statewide constituency.... in order to have the Southern Maryland Senators support the position of the senate, those senators become his constituency who represent their constituency, which may not be consistent with the constituency that elects him to the senate. That happens across the state.

added another,

The President can't be too conservative. The president can't be too liberal. He is the state senator of the entire state. He is the senator of [the state].

These responses imply that legislative leaders should adopt the representational role orientation (Wahlke, et al.) of trustee for the entire state. While acknowledging the needs of their district, legislative leaders were expected to be most mindful of the best interest of the people of the state.

The most widely accepted interpretation of this particular function concerns the responsibility of the leaders to represent the position of the senate before the public, as they do before the executive and the lower chamber. The leaders, especially the president or president pro tem, were described as the personification of the senate on issues as well as image. Notes one North Carolina senator, "He has got to be our front man,
internally and externally to give the senate a good image with the people." Another member agreed,

He has agreed to go out and meet with the press, travel and meet with the people and that has given him an opportunity to take the senate image to the people. I think he is doing that very well.

While leaders in all three states make public appearances and speak to the press on behalf of the institution, only in North Carolina is there a regularly scheduled avenue for such activity. In 1989, the new senate president pro tem and house speaker instituted a series of "legislative press conferences" around the state "in an effort to improve the image of the General Assembly." (Greensboro Daily Record, February 26, 1989) and "cultivate better media relations and improve the public's understanding of what legislators do." (Winston-Salem Journal, February 1, 1989). However, the fact that these two legislative leaders were Democrats (while the Republican lieutenant governor, the constitutional leader of the senate, is not involved) and the governor is a "telegenic and articulate" Republican, even this example of institutional public relations has definite partisan overtones. As we will see later, much of the public relations responsibilities are more partisan than institutional.

Regular press conferences are not the only medium for such public relations. On a more random basis, the leaders avail themselves to the media, as well as particular public
groups. One Maryland member spoke approvingly of the president's efforts to "take the lead. He speaks out on issues... I know he has been doing editorials, too." A North Carolina member added his approval of leadership efforts "to try to present our position in a positive nature to the public." In addition to the media and the public, leaders were expected to keep important interest groups and broad constituencies abreast of the activities of the body. For example, in a speech to a group of statewide businessmen, the president of the Maryland Senate noted "that there have been many achievements already [in the session] and I would speculate the best is yet to come," and then proceeded to outline legislation enacted in five issue areas, stage of the budget process, and legislative activity on several other significant issues. According to his assistant, the Maryland president makes one or two such appearances weekly to civic and business groups across the state. Members looked to leaders to use whatever means available to make the public aware of the importance, activities and actions of the body.

Protect the Senate Image.

The leader has to keep the senate, whatever we do, keep its reputation.... to keep its place where it has been given to us. You know, sometimes when you have sorry leadership, you lose respect and your reputation... for the senate to hold her position that I think she rightfully has, I think it is going to take that kind of leadership.
In addition to presenting the positions of the senate to the public, ten percent (twelve) of the respondents indicated a desire for legislative leaders to protect the image of the senate. The leaders were held responsible to conduct the activities and procedures of the body in such a manner that the senate was well perceived by the public. While public relations functions are concerned primarily with the presentation of issue positions, this guardian responsibility focuses more on the perception of how the decision is made. While dealing with such internal functions as procedure and decorum may not technically qualify as an external activity, the intent of the activity is clearly external. The goal of such actions was to conduct the business and operations of the senate in such a way as to gain public favor for the institution and hence, for its members.

Most members, especially those who had served previously in the house, described the senate as "something special," an "august body,"

Your perspective changes when you come from the house to the senate in the feeling that you are something special. They are very good at doing that to you....you are sort of absorbed into it.

Some members in each chamber noted the responsibility of upholding the "feeling" described above. One Maryland senator noted this as the central function of the senate president,
I think, first and foremost, the president of the senate is in charge of a body that people expect great things of....he must maintain a kind of atmosphere such that anyone sitting in the chamber looking down would have a hunger to be in the Maryland Senate.

In fact, references to image and decorum (eight) were second only to requests that the process and facilities be professionalized when members were asked what institutional changes they would like to see.

In addition to maintaining a certain level of decorum, protecting the public image of the institution also included efforts to avoid party politics, to operate the senate in an efficient manner, to maintain avenues of public access, to avoid the appearance of interest group domination and to make decisions in a fair and impartial manner. The common factor that unites this rather diverse set of activities is the indication by the respondent that such activities would enhance the image of the institution in the eyes of the public. The following responses should make clear the relation to public perception:

We should avoid the appearance of partisanship. I think partisan politics is bad, and the public thinks partisan politics is bad.

All I want from the leaders is to keep us moving, so we can get out of here. There is a perception that the longer we are down here, the more damage we can do.

A major part of my job as leader is to see that the people of North Carolina have access to the senate.
As noted above, leaders in all three chambers have initiated efforts to increase the efficiency of the legislative process by instituting and enforcing bill introduction and passage deadlines and discouraging multiple introductions. For example, because recent challenges by the Republican governor and Republican senators have left the image of the North Carolina Senate somewhat tarnished, Democratic leaders ended the time honored "porkbarrel process" for distributing discretionary budget funds (Thompson, 1986) in 1989. This same effort at "damage control" has resulted in other procedural changes including equal apportionment of Republicans on most major committees, Republican participation in the committee assignment process, and consideration of sweeping open meeting laws. (Raleigh News and Observer, May 2, 1989).

In addition to stronger deadlines to increase efficiency and maintain the status of a citizen's legislature, several Maryland members offered their support for recent efforts by the presiding officer to maintain a particular decorum of process as well as facilities. In Ohio, several members praised the new president for running a much more orderly body than his predecessor and strongly encouraging respect from members on the floor, as well as from lobbyists who generally gather just off of the floor. All of these changes were made at least in part to maintain a positive institutional image among the general public.
Relationships with Members' Districts. In addition to keeping in mind the interests of the entire state as noted above, just over one in ten respondents (10.9%) expressed a concern that the leaders be willing to accept the different needs of the particular districts and the individuals that represent them. In a direct sense, some leaders were expected to visit the districts of all members, touting the accomplishments of the body on behalf of the members. While this is generally done on a partisan basis, thirteen senators argued that the leadership should play such a role for all senators. One Republican noted with appreciation the activities of the Democratic President,

He spends a lot of time up in Western Maryland and he has been very good to that part of the state. He is very good to me.

Perhaps even more surprising to those familiar with more partisan legislatures, one Democrat showed no displeasure or surprise when noting that the president usually leaves his annual fundraiser to attend one held by a Republican member on the same day.

More common than this direct intervention in the district, however, was the understanding that the leaders must accept the responsibility of all members to represent their districts, doing what they feel is in the interest of the constituents that will elect or defeat them. The institutional relationship of the leaders to the members and
their districts was best summed up by a senior Maryland Senator:

He's got to satisfy 46 egos other than his own, because they are all elected by different districts. For instance, if the president of the senate says do this or do that, that is my decision, because my constituents are going to make that decision at the polls... no one up here can help get you elected or re-elected.

Not surprisingly, it was those members from districts in the geographic, partisan, ideological or ethnic minority that were most likely to mention the importance of district recognition, as well as respondents from relatively competitive districts. Because of their "minority" status, these members have the most to lose if the interests of their district are not taken into account by the president.

Conclusion

Functions that comprise the institutional external component of legislative leadership are those that directly or indirectly concern the relationship between the leaders and external actors on behalf of all of the members of the institution. According to the senators, it is the responsibility of leaders to uphold the positions of the senate in negotiations with the house or the executive. Those leaders were charged to represent the image and positions of the senate before the press, particular groups and the general public, and to ensure that they and the legislative process were accessible to the electorate. Members look to their leaders to conduct themselves and the
legislative institution in such a manner as to protect the image they were expected to project, making it an institution that those watching will have "a hunger" to serve in. Finally, the leaders must not allow the interests of the corporate body to overwhelm the particular needs of a member and his or her district. In the eyes of the senators, leaders are the personification of the needs, interests and values of the institution in which the legislator's serve, as well as the districts they represent.
CHAPTER VII: THE PARTISAN INTERNAL FUNCTIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP

Just as leaders were expected to perform functions that contribute to the successful operation of the institution, members also look to them to perform functions that contribute to the successful performance of their party apparatus. One fourth of all responses concerned functions in this partisan internal category. These functions are similar to those in the institutional internal role in that many such functions promote the successful completion of the legislative task, as well as meet the daily political and tactical needs of the members. However, these functions differ from their institutional internal counterparts in that they are performed in service to and on behalf of the members of one particular party. Administrative functions involve running the party caucus rather than the senate. Resources are distributed with an eye to partisan political advantage as much as to institutional performance. Policy and procedural advice are metered out on a partisan basis and "agenda setting" means selecting issues which will promote the best interests of the party. Finally, partisan consensus building revolves around efforts to unify one
party against the other, or in an effort to gain concessions from the other.

Table 7: The Distribution of Partisan Internal Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th># of References</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Advice/ Direction</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part. Coalition Building</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Set Party Issue Agenda</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34.2</td>
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<td>Administrative</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proced. Advice/ Direction</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribute Resources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* # of References= The number of times the particular function was mentioned by the respondents. It may be higher than the number of respondents, because a respondent may cite a function more than once.

* # of Respondents= the number of individuals citing a particular function (those who mention a function more than once are only counted once).

* % of Sample= the proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).

Administrative Functions.

Clearly, there has to be someone who is the leader. Someone who is going to run the caucus and run the caucus administratively. It's like the military.

Like any organization, a legislative party needs someone to perform particular nuts and bolts functions that facilitate the operations of the caucus. According to over one fifth of the respondents (22.5%), most of them in the more partisan North Carolina and Ohio senates, the party leaders
are given these responsibilities. These administrative functions seem to involve at least three components. First, members noted the responsibility of leaders to organize the party by filling appointive partisan positions. Second, party leaders usually preside over and administer the meetings of the legislative party, or the party caucus. Finally, members appeared to hold their leaders responsible for the effective performance of any partisan staff.

In all three states studied, certain top level party positions are filled by election of the membership, but several others are then filled at the discretion of those elected officials. Party leaders in the Ohio Senate are generally elected as a slate, with the candidate for president or minority leader selecting his or her running mates (president pro tem, majority leader and whip for the majority; assistant minority leader, whip and assistant whip for the minority). In North Carolina, the minority leader selects a whip and the freshman majority leader in 1989 selected four "quadrant whips," one seated in each sector of the chamber. In Maryland, the president distributes numerous party positions, including the majority leader, assistant majority leader, whip and deputy whip.

It is clear that many of these positions are distributed in exchange for support of the leader's bid for that office. Many North Carolina respondents pointed out that the three additional whip positions (from one to four)
were enough to assure victory for the majority leader who
won a hotly contested race (20-17) and indeed appeared to
have an insufficient number of votes on the eve of the
election. The attractiveness of leadership positions in
Ohio and the efforts to remove the minority leader were
discussed above. One member notes,

The key is do you have the votes. And you get the
votes because people are dissatisfied, not
necessarily with the leader, but with the way
they have fared in the whole situation. They
say.... if we put this together, we can get what
they have.

While not all leadership positions bring great influence,
yet they do bring a title which can be presented to the
electorate as an indicator of influence, and they often
serve as a stepping stone into more powerful positions.
These characteristics make such assigned positions
valuable, and increases the importance of assigning them.

In addition to assigning people to fill these
positions, it was also evident from the interviews that
elected leaders, to a great extent, define the nature and
responsibilities associated with the appointive positions.
In response to questions concerning the responsibilities of
whips and majority leaders, many members noted the
discretion of the president or the floor leader (for the
whips) in assigning responsibility to them. For example,
the Ohio president pro tem noted the ambiguous nature of
his position saying that he and the new leader were still
defining their roles. He expected to have less of a role
than the previous position holder because the newly elected president is considerably more hands on than his predecessor. This role definition and distribution of responsibilities is particularly difficult in North Carolina, where political changes have forced a redefinition of the tasks and responsibilities associated with leadership positions, especially the president pro tem,

Really, he has new duties that they never had down here before and he's been thrown into a situation that I don't think he anticipated when he first ran for it.... he's had to kind of beat his way around.

Further, the position of majority leader was created less than four sessions earlier, and the first whip was appointed in 1987.

While parties in one-party states seldom hold regular party meetings (caucuses), parties in more competitive states find them necessary and beneficial for coordinating the activities of the party. Neither party in the Maryland Senate holds regular caucus meetings (other than the pre-session meeting to elect the president). However, in the other states, such meetings are common and called at the prerogative of the party leaders. The leaders were given the responsibility to schedule the meetings, inform the rank and file (the most common role of the whips) of their time, place and focus, set the agenda for the meetings and preside over them.
While some parties attempt to have regular weekly meetings (North Carolina Democrats), it is more common that periodic meetings would be called to discuss issues that arise or are expected to arise in floor debate. In conjunction with the members, leaders were expected to determine when a meeting was necessary as well as organize an agenda for the meeting. In describing a typical meeting, most members indicated that the leader (either president or floor leader) would preside, be responsible to recognize those who wish to speak, and facilitate constructive discussion. The meetings were used by the leaders to provide information to the members, and leaders often enlisted the expertise of administration officials, staff specialists and members familiar with a particular bill to provide information about the procedural stage, and the policy or political impact of the legislation. Members expressed a desire that leaders preside over the meetings in such a manner as to "get a feeling for the direction of the caucus" and "try to arrive at a position satisfactory to all." Leaders, according to respondents, are charged to work toward the enactment of the strategy and policy determined by the caucus to be in the best interest of the party.

Finally, where there is significant partisan staff, leaders were held responsible for their performance. Leaders were expected to hire and fire the party staff, as
well as offer technical and substantive advice. An Ohio senator made the importance of this function quite clear in describing the necessity for caucus staff direction,

It [the caucus staff] needs a leader and that starts with the leader that is elected. It starts with [the floor leader]. You've got to be here to lead these people.... it's called leadership from the person that is elected. It's called leadership, a role model. The person that is elected is here to give them guidance and direction.

The elected leaders were held responsible to see that the party staff had the necessary resources and facilities to assist the party and its members. In airing their grievances with the minority leader, several Ohio Democrats noted the discrepancy in equipment between the majority and minority offices, as well as particular personnel decisions made by the leadership. The party staff is considered an arm of the leadership, and part of the leader's success is measured by their success, as are a portion of his or her failures.

Policy Direction and Information.

I think it is the purpose of the leadership to provide policy direction that we as a group in the senate would like to see the state embark on. That may be a different agenda from the Democratic caucus in the house. That may be different from the governor's agenda and I am almost certain it will be different from the senate Republicans or the house Republican caucus. I think we've got to define our agenda and that it the job of the caucus.

Members looked toward the elected leaders of their party for policy direction and information. Four of every ten
respondents (40.8%) expressed a desire that leaders possess the political and legislative experience to provide them with critical information about a bill as well as advice as to the position that the party should take concerning the bill. Members referred to policy information in three contexts. First, members indicated that leaders should be a repository for direction-neutral policy information; what the bill actually does. Second, members looked to leaders for guidance concerning their vote on particular pieces of legislation. Finally, several members indicated a desire for a broader policy direction, arguing that it was the responsibility of the leaders to move the party in a particular philosophical or ideological direction.

The seniority of most leaders makes them ideal sources of knowledge as to the impact of particular information. One Ohio senator noted the benefits of experience,

When I first came down here....I would think, my golly that guy sure is smart. Just listen to the questions he is posing to the witness.... after a couple of years, I realized that the reason they were so smart is that they've heard it all before....

Members appeared likely to turn to leaders of their party when they had questions about what effect a piece of legislation might have on them or the state. Members looked to leaders for pertinent and timely information so that they might develop their own positions.

Obviously, sometimes bills are very complex and you can't guess all the issues until someone comes and explains them to you. The intricacies of a
bill, or the history of it... those kinds of things are invaluable.

In a similar vein, some members expressed a desire for leaders to make them aware of the policy positions of significant party officials, most often that of the governor. As with knowledge of legislative impact and history, leaders are usually better positioned than other members to have such information by virtue of their position. Several described the leader as "our link to the governor," if there is a position, for instance word would come over from an agency that they oppose or support a bill, or from the governor's office... he should share that with us.

Those noting this function seldom implied a willingness to blindly follow that position, but rather expressed an interest in having the information available for their own decision making calculus. In fact, in all three chambers, some members of the party of the governor were quick to note that they indeed did not see it as the job of the leadership [or members] to "parrot the governor's position if it is not in the best interest of the party as a whole." In Ohio, a Democrat indicated the possibility that the position of the Senate Democrats "may not be that of the governor," and a Republican described the relationship saying, you have absolutely no play between the Democratic minority in the Senate and the governor." Therefore, while the leader was expected to make the position of the executive known to the
members, there was less agreement as to the obligation of the members to support that position.

Members also expressed a tendency to turn to their leaders for policy direction and advice on particularly partisan issues. One member made the point that leaders should be in a better position than the rank and file members to know the political and policy implications of a particular issue, therefore, they are a logical source of voting cues.

I expect that if there is a critical issue, if they felt like it, me being a first termer, if there was a hidden something in a bill and I wasn't familiar with that, I would expect them to come and tell me what to do.

In addition to personal interaction, this partisan advice was often transmitted by two broader avenues. One of the primary foci of party caucus meetings is to find out the position of the leadership so that it might be considered in the development of party positions. One party leader noted his role at the caucus saying, "I make my opinion known and then see how it flies." As presiding officer at caucus meetings, leaders were expected to use that forum to make their position known to the rank and file.

Second, while whips were mostly used to gather information for the leaders concerning the position of members and to inform members of meetings, several respondents noted their [the whips'] responsibility to inform the members of the leadership position in crucial
situations. One North Carolina senator volunteered that he always looked to his quadrant whip for the party position when an unexpected vote on a significant matter arose. Either directly, through the whips, or indirectly, through their input at caucus meetings, leaders are expected to have an impact on the position or direction the party adopts in response to a particular issue.

Finally, some members expressed an interest in broader policy direction. These respondents noted the responsibility of leaders to establish positions on major issues that reflect a particular ideological or philosophical bent. In North Carolina, a Democrat and a Republican voiced similar expectations of their leaders concerning this policy direction:

What I would like to see from the leadership is to have some overall philosophical policy direction for where we need to go on major issues from a philosophical standpoint....

Ever since Roosevelt, the Democratic party has been moving in the liberal direction, and we've about liberaled ourselves out... knowing we're going to get the liberal vote, we need to shift back to the right to attract some of those conservative votes.

Leaders were expected by some members to adopt or encourage party positions that reflect a reading of the political map. They should select positions that distinguish them from the other party in such a way as to give their party an electoral advantage. They were held responsible to use the powers of their office to move the party in a particular
direction and work to see that such a direction is reflected in the positions taken and the decisions made by the party.

Procedural Direction and Information. A smaller group (19.2%) of respondents associated leadership with the provision of strategic procedural advice and direction. At the nuts and bolts level, this involves helping inexperienced members learn the intricacies of the legislative process. One senior leader voiced his concern about inexperienced members by describing his own leadership responsibilities in mentoring terms,

You know, we've got three or four new members and we want to help them so that they understand the ropes and they don't have to stumble around here.... try to keep them from making some of the same mistakes that you made when you were a freshman. If they have a bill and want to know how to handle it on the floor, or how to handle themselves in committee.

Especially in the case of a party that is growing quickly, like the North Carolina Republicans, this type of mentoring can become a crucial function of leadership.

In fact, both North Carolina Republican leaders, as well as the person later elected to succeed the minority leader in 1990 following his nomination to an administration post, stressed the importance of this mentoring function. One respondent voiced the sense of inferiority felt by many new members while indicating the responsibility of leadership of "letting them know they belong and sticking their noses in the right direction." While the legislative staff provides orientations for new members in each of the
chambers, only the North Carolina Republicans have attempted to maintain some type of systematic guidance throughout the session. Each new member was assigned a senior "buddy" who was expected to advise them on matters of policy as well as process. The freshmen sat near these "buddies" on the floor and were encouraged to turn to them for assistance.

In addition to the nuts and bolts kind of procedural advice, leaders may also provide procedural advice concerning political mores of the system. As Matthews (1958), Asher (1973), and others indicate, there are certain things that you do or do not do in a legislative institution which may not be part of the official rules. Younger members looked to their more senior colleagues to guide them through the maze of informal norms, as well as formal rules. It was the responsibility of the leaders to help a member understand that while a particular option (political or procedural) may be correct according to the rules, it may not be politically or practically viable. Such mistakes may cause irreparable damage to the political reputation and prospects of a member, so these members looked to their leaders to warn them of the legislative pitfalls.

Distribution of Resources. As noted in the discussion of Institutional Internal functions, most resource distribution revolves around the distribution of committee assignments for the benefit of the institution. However, there were a few (only six) instances, where references to resource
distribution were clearly partisan in nature. First, one North Carolina member noted the particular perks at the command of the leadership that were used to persuade individuals to support the party:

If you don't get along with the leadership, you probably won't be going along to some of the other things that will be happening. And the other thing is that you've always got local bills that you need. Sometimes, leadership support can help you get your bill, to help you get whatever you want for your district.

Leaders have at their disposal numerous rewards described above, but if they are used as a reward, it is usually less partisan than what one member noted as "a leadership thing," where it is reward for support of the leader rather than to advantage the party.

One such resource common in North Carolina is the much maligned "porkbarrel," or "discretionary funds," a portion of the budget set aside for district projects distributed to worthy members, usually senior Democrats (Thompson, 1986). However, in the increasingly scrutinized two-party system, the distribution of such funds to the exclusion of Republicans is no longer practiced and was not noted as a leadership role by a single individual, although several did argue that the system, whatever its weaknesses, was often responsible for worthy projects.

The most commonly cited resource at the disposal of the leadership was the committee assignments. Again, this is traditionally an institutional rather than a party function.
However, because committee positions can be used for electoral advantage, their distribution can be used for partisan advantage. For a committee assignment to be classified as partisan, the response had to meet two qualifications. First, in answering the question about factors considered when committee assignments were made, these respondents had to note the importance of political/district oriented considerations (will help get them re-elected, or should go to those from competitive districts). Second, those same respondents had to volunteer committee assignments as one of the responsibilities of the leaders. Five respondents met the requirement.

A small number of respondents in each state indicated that consideration of political implications was appropriate in making committee assignments. One Ohio member explained,

I don't know about the Democrats, but if you look, I bet you will find that almost all of the Republicans that are on the Finance committee are from competitive districts, because that looks good back home. They can get things for their district and that helps them get re-elected.

Of 112 (eight were not asked) respondents, thirteen (12%) noted that committee assignments were made on the basis of the particular electoral and district needs of the member. The ability of members to sit on committees that handle issues of significance to the district, or to sit on committees that enhance their claims of legislative influence to their constituents is thought to help increase
their chances of re-election (Mayhew, 1974). In a competitive state like Ohio, the re-election or defeat of that member might mean the difference between majority and minority status. Therefore, committee assignments are often highly partisan and political decisions. However, while Ohio members were more likely to describe assignments in partisan terms, they were less likely to associate committee assignment as a significant part of the leadership responsibility. While the distribution of resources for partisan advantage does occur, it was not perceived as a significant characteristic of the partisan internal responsibilities associated with leadership.

Issue Agenda Setting.

[Leaders must]...prioritize the big issues... we defer to them as to the big issues of the state. How do we prioritize them. They should at least have those big issues in pencil and bring them before us in terms of making final drafts in how we will address them.

Help keep our caucus focused on issues. I guess we are trying to keep some focus on goals that as a caucus we can use for the campaigns. Look at the agenda we just accomplished....he needs to help set an agenda, push that agenda through so that we can say look what the Republican majority did and I was a part of that.

The third most commonly noted partisan internal responsibility, mentioned by more than one-third of the respondents (34.1%), concerned the selection of issues for the party to consider and promote as party policy. While on some issues the leaders may give their opinion as to how the issues should be resolved, agenda setting may also be
policy neutral. Members looked to their leaders to help the party determine which issues shall be "party issues," as well as avoid those that might harm the image of the party or the electoral chances of its members.

In terms of actively selecting issues, leaders were expected to use certain criterion when selecting issues. Perhaps the first and foremost criterion is the partisan impact of the issue. A senior North Carolina senator described it as taking,

...the lead in finding the issues that might affect the party, bring them to the forefront and present them to the membership for partisan action and consideration.

Another respondent described the function in terms of the responsibility of the majority leader to "focus on those issues that mean something to the party." Several members indicated that the selection of such issues was not particularly difficult. According to one Maryland Republican, the few partisan issues that arise are quite easy to recognize: "If they are trying to ram some kind of campaign or election bill down your throat, then you know it is partisan." In North Carolina, issues most often noted as partisan were those that were given high priority by the Republican governor. In discussing negotiations on such bills, the partisan nature is evident in the words of one Democratic leader, "If you get the governor, then the Republican members will follow right along." In Ohio, the most partisan issue was unquestionably the budget, but one
Democrat argued that philosophical differences increased the propensity for certain types of issues to develop along partisan lines,

There are a few issues that have a tendency toward party lines: worker compensation, labor management, campaign type issues, issues dealing with party facilities.

In other words, while leaders were expected to be cognizant of issues that impact the party or reflect party differences, often those issues select themselves.

A second, and probably more significant criterion for elevation to the party agenda is the desire that an issue "present the party in a positive light." As one would expect, members expressed a desire for leaders to select issues and present a policy agenda that would make them look good, or make the opposing party look bad, in the upcoming election. One party leader described the partisan side of his job as a responsibility to "be on the look out for bills that may bring some good light to the party, and adopt those issues." Leaders need to know "the public pulse" and select issues accordingly. In a similar manner, members wanted their leaders to select issues and offer amendments that placed the members of the other party in a politically awkward or embarrassing position. For example, when the Republicans proposed the 1990 Budget for Ohio, Democrats offered twenty-three amendments, "some of them real sexy amendments designed to make us [the Republicans] look bad,"
to the budget. All twenty-three amendments were defeated on a party line vote.

Finally, some issues must be placed on the agenda not because they are necessarily partisan or necessarily "sexy," but because the particular situation is one that cannot be ignored. This is especially likely for leaders and members of the majority party. A certain amount of responsibility comes with majority status, and that may include dealing with issues that are not particularly easy or politically rewarding. One Ohio Republican described it as "the good government side. What agenda do the Senate Republicans want to set and how can we implement it." AIDS legislation was such an issue in Ohio in 1989. The issue was not particularly popular with the public and indeed was potentially explosive, but several Republicans noted the necessity of action and the responsibility of the majority to deal with it. An often noted "good government" issue was taxes or budget cuts, that, although unpopular, were necessary to maintain economic stability.

Revelations of a $2 billion budget deficit prior to the 1990 session of the North Carolina General Assembly moved such politically unsavory issues as tax increases and entitlement reductions to the top of the agenda of the Democratic leadership in an election year. In Ohio, such a tax increase is credited with contributing to the loss of the majority by Democrats in 1984, which has caused the
party leader to establish that the Democrats will support no tax increases at all in election year 1990.

As with policy direction, there were several members who perceive agenda setting as more than a case by case responsibility. Instead, they envisioned leadership that established a long-term goal or offered the party a series of options and then charged the members to select issues within those boundaries. Many described the responsibility of the leaders to be visionaries or long-term planners for the party. One young, ambitious North Carolina Democrat decried reactionary policymaking,

I am more interested in setting an agenda, setting a course, putting something out there and going toward it and as the things happen throughout the journey, you deal with them... but you still have that vision, that course that you follow.

Another respondent added that,

...their [the leaders'] role should be to stake out guidelines, the parameters of the playing field in which they would like the party to move and try to develop a consensus within those parameters.

Finally, several members discussed the role of agenda setter not so much in terms of selecting good issues, but rather in terms of avoiding bad issues. One member voiced his concern that the majority leader "avoid taking us down the primrose path." Elected legislators expected their leaders to avoid issues that might harm the electoral chances of the party and its members. Further, leaders should avoid issues that divide rather than unite the
legislative or electoral party. One senior respondent noted that Democrats in the past have tackled controversial issues like abortion, an issue whose resolution he asserted could please neither side. "We have got to stop choosing issues that tear the Democratic party apart."

Several members mentioned the responsibility of the leaders to bring a particular issue before the caucus and determine if it should become a party issue. Leaders were most often expected to perform this agenda setting function in conjunction with the party members. If the rank-and-file party members were unable to reach a consensus about a particular issue, the leader was expected to remove that issue from the party agenda. Leaders were expected to bring issues before the caucus to "test the waters," and then respond according to the results of that interaction. While many members looked to leaders for policy direction as well as agenda setting, the comments of a senior member in North Carolina indicate the inherent limitations of the effect of such direction,

I guess I expect him to look at the legislation and bring to our attention that which he thinks we as a party can support.... Even though I expect that of him, I am very likely to do what I want.

Partisan Coalition Building. It is not enough that leaders select issues and take positions. They were expected to put together a coalition of votes within the party to see that the position agreed upon by the caucus is passed, or at least has the united support of the party members. Over
forty percent (41.7%) of the respondents cited the responsibility of leaders to "build a consensus on most any issue... you try to get the votes in caucus." The importance of building a consensus on major legislation is further highlighted by the acknowledgement of members and leaders alike that "If the votes are not there, you don't take it [the issue] to the floor and embarrass the member."

According to respondents, party leaders might use several approaches in an effort to build this consensus. The fact that almost half of the members interviewed accepted the responsibility of the leaders to build consensus indicates a predisposition that eases the difficulty of leadership. Members seemed predisposed to follow their elected leader unless given a compelling reason not to:

They [the party leaders] were elected by members of the caucus to be in leadership. Quite frankly, it would be a very embarrassing situation if leadership in the majority could not get enough votes to get a bill passed on the floor.

Members of the minority party noted a similar attitude of unity, explaining that a united minority might be able to get some concessions from a divided majority. Especially in North Carolina, Republican members seemed keenly aware of splits in the majority party and of the powerful bargaining chip of thirteen united votes (half of the twenty-six needed to pass a bill or amendment, and two-thirds of the votes
necessary to place a constitutional amendment on the ballot).

Clearly, members often feel a sense of obligation to the leadership of their party. This makes coalition building easier. For some, this obligation is so strong that they will suppress their own interests for the good of the party. Some members noted a strong sense of responsibility to support the leaders and the party even if they were not in full agreement with the caucus position:

If I can't win my position among the caucus, if I can't do it among my own.... after debate, we make some sort of decision. If it goes totally against my conscience, then I should talk to the majority leader and I need to either get the devil out of the chamber, or.... vote the party line, because this is a singled out issue saying this is something we need.

Often, leaders would use this partisan loyalty as a direct appeal in building a consensus on a party issue. Members were often asked to act "for the good of the party." One North Carolina Republican explained that the leader might make such a case at the caucus meetings, arguing that "If you can see your way clear, we really need to stick together on this one." A party leader cited a similar appeal as his primary source of persuasion within the caucus,

I make the case that this is good for the caucus. The Knute Rockne approach, this is good for the team.... sometimes it is a question of how you will get hurt the least. Whether killing the gun control bill or passing it hurts the caucus the least....
Most members noted that partisan appeals need not be so direct, but were often understood on major issues. Most Ohio members discussed the budget negotiations with such an obligation in mind,

I think you go into the budget knowing that you have to stick together... those decisions were made in caucus and you have to carry them out. We work it out in caucus and once we have, we have unanimity from that point on.

Partisan appeals were found to be mingled with other persuasive approaches. For members of the majority party, partisan appeals on major issues were usually buttressed with the understanding that it is the institutional responsibility of the majority party to come to a consensus on major issues. Especially concerning a politically volatile issue, majority party leaders and members understood that they could expect little support from the minority. However, the responsibility of governing necessitated a resolution and the majority party would unite. For members and leaders of the parties of the governor, the partisan appeal is often a thinly veiled appeal for united support of the executive. Members were often asked to support the legislation because it was a major initiative of the partisan executive. On the other hand, leaders of the "loyal opposition" often used opposition to the governor to unify the party. One Ohio Republican described a particular action as "clearly a party
position not to cowtow to the governor on this." Finally, partisan appeals were often reinforced by common ideologies and "philosophical perspectives" among party members. One member noted that she found it easy to follow the party line on most occasions "because my philosophy helped me arrive at that position anyway."

In addition to leadership loyalty and partisan persuasion, party leaders may take advantage of their knowledge of the issue to gather the support of members. With so many issues before the body, information becomes a powerful tool of persuasion. Notes one respondent,

> On any given issue, probably only a third of our group will have a real working understanding of it, so a lot of it is just explanation, warning us where the landmines are. Sometimes there are points of controversy...

Given their seniority, leaders should have knowledge that can calm the fears of dissident party members. They would make the case based on their understanding of the strengths of the particular issue, often acknowledging the validity of membership concerns but explaining that "this was the best we can do for now."

Often leaders would make concessions to ease the fears (or meet the demands) of a particularly reluctant partisan in order to get his or her vote. As noted in the discussion of bipartisan coalition building, one former legislative leader described this as the "magic of leadership," being able to find that "common ground" which serves the interest
of all concerned. This is no less true for partisan consensus building. Building a coalition of support for the very partisan Ohio budget is a good example of such give and take.

We'll look at it [the budget] and we'll go into caucus and go around and say what do you think of the budget and they'll say well, I can't support it. I asked for this and I didn't get it.... you've put some stuff in your priorities that I don't agree with. And we will be outspoken about our concerns. Then you work out a compromise.

In order to keep everyone in line, they usually target things important to the members so that everybody has a reason to vote for the budget and not let everything go up in chaos.

Leaders build consensus by offering concessions to recalcitrant members.

Finally, leaders may make appeals with an eye cast toward the electoral vulnerability of one or all members of the caucus. In a broad sense, leaders may make the appeal that a particular position promotes the electoral chances of the party which in turn may help them to gain or maintain the majority. It is understood that majority status is important for "effective policymaking," so that "sometimes you have to mute your personal views to accommodate the broader interest." Often, the case is made that a particular position is in the electoral interest of all members of the caucus. Republican leaders in North Carolina were quick to remind their members that most of them owe their election to the popular Republican governor and it is
perhaps in their best interest to unite behind his initiatives as a party.

On the other hand, appeals were also made on behalf of a particular member who expected to face a competitive election. The case may be made that support for the particular issue would really help this colleague, so party members should stick together if possible. Some leaders discussed a concerted effort by the party to make particular members look good, or make particular members of the opposing party look bad, by supporting particular amendments or pieces of legislation. Whether it is to point out the political advantages of a vote for the caucus as a whole, a colleague or the recalcitrant member himself, pointing out the political realities of an issue is an effective mechanism for gathering support.

While much of this is done by the president or the floor leader on an individual basis, a great deal of the consensus building occurs at the party caucuses. At these meetings, members feel free to voice their opinions, make concessions and try to persuade their colleagues to support a particular position. One senator likened the caucus to a football huddle where the members of the partisan team select and agree on particular plays and then adopt the best strategy to see that those plans are implemented. In the privacy of the closed caucus meetings, members feel free to discuss the political realities of an issue. As one senior
member noted, "There is a reason to vote for this bill, and then there is the real reason to vote for this bill." Most members in Ohio and North Carolina viewed party caucuses as the place where consensus might be achieved based on the discussion of the "real reasons."

In addition to building consensus at the caucus meetings, presiding officers and floor leaders often look to their whips to help mold this consensus. While many viewed the whip positions as primarily nominal, others noted their significance in helping build that consensus. They are often responsible to "count noses and let the leader know where we stand." Further, one whip described his job as helping the floor leader find out where the votes are and "working toward a consensus." Whips may provide that communication link, whether it is informing members of caucus meetings, counting votes, or indicating leadership positions, that seem to be so essential to partisan consensus building.

Conclusion

Partisan internal functions concerned those functions that contribute to the legislative success of the caucus and its members. As one might expect, these functions were quite often interrelated. In distribution of resources, as well as performing partisan administrative jobs, leaders were expected to make the best use of the available talents and abilities. The provision of information may include
political and procedural, as well as policy information. Finally, while a leader is supposed to prioritize issues, an effective leader will likely gather information, build a consensus within the party and then work to develop a strategy for implementing that position. A North Carolina Democrat described the interaction of these functions quite well:

I expect the leaders to anticipate issues that may be of significance that have party ramifications, and consider, recommend and then help implement strategies to help put the Democratic party in the best possible light.
CHAPTER VIII: THE PARTISAN EXTERNAL FUNCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP

The partisan external functions include those functions that are focused on, directly or indirectly, the responsibility of party leaders to represent their members to members outside of the senate party. Over one quarter of all references concerned such partisan external responsibilities. As one might guess, some of these functions are very similar to those discussed under the institutional external role except that they are performed on behalf of the party rather than the institution. The ultimate purpose of these functions is to protect the political and electoral interests of the party and its members in interactions with other actors, be they executives, party leaders, legislative leaders or voters.

Relationship with the Executive. In dealing with the governor, leaders of the governor's party seemed to face the same two-edged sword on behalf of their party as the institutional leaders did when representing the institution: how far can the legislators go in supporting and representing the governor before they sell out their own identity as independent decisionmakers? Therefore, for members of the party of the governor, this interaction
involved several components. Leaders were responsible for negotiating with the governor on behalf of the party, informing him of the positions of the party, as well as bringing back information to the caucus as described above (partisan internal).

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<tr>
<th>Description of Function</th>
<th># of References</th>
<th># of Respondents</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Activities</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>With Governor</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<td>With Other Party (Senate)</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>With House</td>
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<tr>
<td>With State Party</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
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# of References= The number of times the particular function was mentioned by the respondents. It may be higher than the number of respondents, because a respondent may cite a function more than once.

# of Respondents= the number of individuals citing a particular function (those who mention a function more than once are only counted once).

% of Sample= the proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).

One North Carolina Republican described the function as follows,

The minority leader is .... the direct link between the governor and the Republicans in the Senate. He meets on a regular basis, or should meet on a regular basis with the governor and the governor's staff so that he conveys information back and forth.
Party leaders inform the governor of the particular desires of the party and the senate, and "try to keep them informed on the status of things."

If leaders are to keep their members informed of the governor's position on issues as noted above in the partisan internal functions, it is necessary that the leaders meet with the executive to get that information. Only in North Carolina did the leaders of the party of the governor meet with him on a regular basis to perform such liaison activities. During session, the minority leader, whip and caucus leader of the Republican party met with the governor and his legislative liaisons every Monday afternoon prior to the opening Monday evening session for the week. The legislative leaders presented the position of the senate Republicans, provided the governor with procedural and strategic advice as to how best to implement the initiatives, and gave him their perception of senate activity and positions concerning his legislation. The governor, on the other hand, used the time to make clear his priorities, positions and strategies.

Party leaders are also expected to maintain the independence of their party in the same manner that the leaders discussed earlier had to maintain the independence of the legislative institution. The party leaders were charged to negotiate with the executive, but many members argued over the cost of those negotiations. Several North
Carolina Republicans balked at the assumption that "If you have the governor on board, the Republicans will go along."

A nine year veteran of the senate volunteered,

The governor could come talk to us before he comes out with his package, not come out with it and say here it is, support it. That's where he gets in trouble- he ought to have input from the legislature before he makes his decision.

Another member added that the governor "just is not a good listener" and tries to "bring his people down here and tell us what to do." In Ohio, there was virtually no interaction between the Democratic minority leader and the Democratic governor, who had what one member described as an "icy" relationship. While some North Carolina Republicans argued for less interaction, many Ohio Democrats seemed to agree on the need for more open communication with the governor.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the relationship between the governor and the legislative party leader was its noticeable absence in the discussions of most members. Even members of the party of the governor were inclined not to emphasize the relationship- only a tenth of all respondents (13) recognized the partisan liaison role as important, and several of those were more concerned with maintaining independence from the governor than with working with him. Perhaps this is a function of personalities, but it is more likely a function of the professional and
independent attitudes of the modern and increasingly professional state legislatures (Rosenthal, 1989).

**Relationship with the House.** Institutional independence is even more noticeable in relation to the other legislative institution. Only nine of the one hundred and twenty respondents discussed the relationship between the two chambers in partisan terms, and the reference was usually noted in a litany of other external relationships rather than discussed at length.

Ideally, the relationship would be one based on a common philosophy and ideology with party leaders from each institution working to institute common policies. An Ohio member described the traditional relationship that one would expect between a Democratic senate minority and a Democratic house majority as one "party with three parts" working together to present unified policy. In the Ohio case especially, one would expect negotiations between the two so that the senate Democratic minority might use its majority status in the house to gain support for its policies in conference committee or other negotiations. Like the references to the relationship with the executive, the responses concerning the house were associated more with maintaining senatorial independence than fostering interinstitutional cooperation.

In all three states, there appeared to be more factors that divided the legislative parties than ones that united
them. First, other than conference committees, the bodies are structurally independent and fiercely guard that independence. Sometimes personal styles of party leaders add to the institutional barriers. While Maryland Republicans in the senate seemed quite willing to work with the Democratic majority, several Republicans noted that their house counterpart was much more belligerent. Further, legislative parties may face differing institutional environments that make cooperation difficult. For example, it seemed that the weakening Democratic minority in the Ohio Senate had little in common with the Democratic speaker sometimes described as "autocratic." Likewise, the North Carolina Senate Republicans appeared to have little in common with the house Republican minority that helped to orchestrate a bipartisan overthrow and now actually hold leadership positions in the house. Finally, philosophical and ideological differences seemed to widen the gap between legislative parties in some states. Republicans in North Carolina and Democrats in Maryland noted that the relations with their house counterparts were strained by the ideological extremism of members in the other chamber (conservative North Carolina Republicans and liberal Maryland Democrats), while the Democratic leadership in the Ohio Senate was most noted for taking "a position that is different than most Democrats today."
While one might expect partisan interaction between legislative leaders, and indeed some respondents did associate it with leadership, it is quite low on the list of leadership responsibilities. Only ten of the one hundred and twenty respondents volunteered this function in their discussion of leadership responsibilities. There seemed to be more factors discouraging such a relationship than there are encouraging it.

Relationship with the State Party. An additional external relationship of significance to a handful (only six) of respondents was the relationship between the state party and the legislative party. Interaction with the state party referred mostly to making sure that the position of the senate party was voiced in decisions made by the state party. One member (a former state party official and activist) noted the responsibility of leaders to see to it that the senate party has,

more of a voice in the Democratic party. I don't know what voice they've got now, but.... we [the senate Democrats] should be a very vital and important part of what the Democratic party is going to do. It appears that you have got one crowd that elected the senators and another group that elected party leaders and they don't seem to be talking much.

Two senior Democrats (in North Carolina and Ohio) discussed the problem in more specific issue related terms, noting that it was the responsibility of the senate Democratic leaders to direct the state party away from issues that "split the party wide open" on a statewide level.
In addition to issue input, two North Carolina senators discussed the responsibility of the leaders to promote the state party and its activities, as well as to protect its interests. One member noted with disappointment and a degree of anger that leaders had done little to make members feel like part of a statewide Democratic party. He argued that such interaction is fundamental if the party is to be successful in the growing two-party environment of the state:

I think a majority leader should do his very best to see that the members, elected as Democrats, of the General Assembly would participate in party functions... they ran as Democrats, they won as Democrats, they need to have the interest in the Democratic party as a whole. They need to go to the precinct meetings. They need to go to the county meetings. They need to go to the district meetings. They need to go to the state conventions.

Finally, two party leaders noted their responsibility to protect the interests of the statewide Republican parties in Maryland and Ohio on issues that directly pertain to election laws or party facilities or regulations. The Ohio member discussed leadership efforts to separate partisan and public facilities, while the Maryland Republican discussed efforts to protect the minority party from particularly detrimental electoral laws.

Representing the Party to the Senate.

He gets up and represents our party to the senate as a whole... he is our spokesperson on the floor. I expect him to represent us on the floor and know how to get things done on the floor.
Members of leadership were expected to take the lead in presenting party issues on the floor. This function, which was noted by just over thirty percent of the respondents (sixty percent of the minority party members), had three distinct components. First, as the above quote indicates, leaders were expected to present and to defend the position and issues of the party to the chamber. Second, the leader (usually of the minority) was expected to protect the interests of the party when it appeared that the party was being placed at a political or procedural disadvantage. Finally, it seemed to be a somewhat common (although far from universal) responsibility of the leaders of the party of the governor to represent his position on the floor as though it were that of the party (which it often is).

Floor leaders were often described as "the first lieutenant of the party, leading the troops on the floor and taking the shots for them if necessary." Once the party position was established, many saw it as the responsibility of the floor leader to present that position to the chamber and defend it from challenges. In all three chambers, this was generally assigned to the majority leaders rather than the presiding officers on the majority side. In fact one respondent's suggestion for leadership improvement was a desire that the presiding official refrain from taking a position on the floor, and instead leave that to the majority leader. For members of the majority in particular,
leadership success is often equated with the ability of the leader to represent the party on the floor and implement the party's policies. One Ohio leader noted,

I think my success or lack thereof goes hand in hand with the success of the caucus and the caucus policies on the floor. My success is directly proportionate to the success of the caucus.

In addition to being proactive and presenting the position of the party on the floor, minority leaders in particular found their job to be primarily reactive, protecting the interests of the minority in the face of perceived majority domination. If they were unable to implement their own policies, leaders were at least expected to defend the philosophy or position of the legislative minority party when it appeared threatened:

In the checks and balance system, [the minority leader] is to see that things don't just get out of hand. That the majority doesn't just run away with things. Obviously, with seven votes, we can't stop it, but if you're vigilant, it won't happen to begin with...you try to steer them by just being there.

A North Carolina Republican noted that the degree to which a minority leader must protect the rights of the party is very much contingent on the activities and attitude of the majority party. He notes that in a session characterized by cooperation, the minority leader should be cooperative and willing to work with the majority, but under more hostile conditions, he voiced a preference for a "bulldog, someone who is aggressive and tenacious, a real fighter on the floor."
Because the minority party, by definition, did not have votes to pass legislation, its members and leaders often turned to the use of rules and the process to assist their cause. Notes one North Carolina Republican,

During the last session (with a Democratic presiding officer), he had to espouse the views and positions of the Republican party on rulings and stuff like that.... this time, it is sort of unique and you don't hear him jumping up and down saying I challenge your ruling Mr. President, because he would be challenging his own man [a Republican lieutenant governor].

Given the reliance of the minority party on the rules and what one member described as "procedural acrobatics," it should come as no surprise that each of the minority leaders was noted by several colleagues as procedural experts (Maryland—seventeen; North Carolina—eight; and Ohio—seven). One minority member described the floor leader as "the best rules man we got. He knows them backwards and forwards."

Finally, for members of the party of the governor, representing the party on the floor was often equated with representing the position of the governor on the floor. While the two positions are not always congruent (as noted above), it is the traditional role of the floor leader of the governor's party to represent him on the floor:

....he is the person on the floor who represents the official position of the governor, unless he relinquishes that and indicates that someone else in the caucus is representing the governor on that particular issue. So, when he stands to speak, I always assume he is representing the governor's position.
Many felt it was the responsibility of the leaders of the governor's party to defend the policy or political position of the governor from attack, "denouncing the majority for what they are doing to the governor, or applauding them for what they are doing to help the governor." A prominent characteristic of party leadership, especially for leaders of the minority party was the expectation that the leaders would represent the policies and interests of their party on the floor.

**Relationship with the Other Party.** While representation of the party in a public forum such as the senate floor is important, the actions of the leaders in more private negotiations may have more effect on the legislative success of the party, particularly for those in the minority. Leaders were expected to be aware of opportunities for negotiations with the opposing party and faithfully represent the interests of the party in those negotiations. One leader on the minority side described his job primarily in such terms, noting his responsibility to,

> work with the Democrats on some types of issues. There are two sets of Democrats over there, so every once in a while, we will try to put a coalition together....with twelve or thirteen of us and twelve or fourteen of them, you have a majority.

A minority member in Maryland described how such negotiations might take place at the behest of the majority party:
There have been times when the president has come to the minority leader on issues and the minority leader agrees with him and the minority leader will convey the message to the rank and file Republicans that we back the president on this issue.

Such strategy must have the active or at least tacit support of a number of people on the opposing side if it is to be effective. The minority party was most likely to be effective at interparty negotiating in the cases where there was no consensus in the majority party, or the particular issue at hand required an extraordinary majority, such as a constitutional amendment or a rules change (both examples cited in North Carolina). Minority members in all three states noted the presence of some majority members that could be persuaded to break ranks with their party on particular issues. The potential for such bipartisan coalitions made the ability to negotiate very significant for the minority party and its leaders.

For leaders of the majority party, the need for such negotiations seemed to arise under two conditions. First, such leaders could seek support from the other party and its leader if they were unable to get the votes in their own caucus. Noted one Ohio Republican, "We try to get the votes in caucus first, and then go to the Democratic leader if we have to." Again, issues that required extraordinary majorities were likely candidates for such interaction. Second, leaders of the majority party seemed likely to seek
the cooperation of the minority party to remove particular issues from the political agenda,

He [the presiding officer] said, will that be agreeable to ya'll and we talked about it in the caucus and we agreed that we would not make a political issue out of it... we talked about whether caucuses should be opened or closed and we agreed that we would not make an issue out of it.

It was clear that such interparty negotiations were likely to take place when they were in the interests of both parties. For the minority party, legislative success may hinge on using its bloc of votes as leverage for concessions, and majority party leaders may find that support particularly beneficial on issues where no partisan consensus has emerged, or a partisan position could be a political liability.

Relationship with a Member's District.

The answer to politics is this- folks don't care about how many speeches you give and most don't even know how you vote. Constituent service is the key. We do a lot of that around here. I've never forgotten that.

Most members were keenly aware that it is their constituents and not their colleagues or leaders that elect them. Leaders were expected to help members keep their districts satisfied, and help the members represent their district in ways that keep them in office. It seems that leaders were expected to assist members in representing their district in at least three ways. First, members looked to leaders to help them get particular projects for the district, or to respond to legislation that had an effect on their
district. Second, it was the responsibility of leaders to understand and accept when a person found it necessary to break the party line to vote what he or she felt was in the interest of the district (or his or her own electoral prospects). Finally, leaders should help members avoid making mistakes that may not be in the interest of the district or the member.

In the eyes of some members, party leaders were supposed to help them meet the needs of their district, which may not always be the same as the needs of the legislative party. In fact, given the diversity of districts (in terms of demographic characteristics, ideology, electoral safety and partisanship) in these three states, such conflicting interests are likely to arise. However, even on issues that have little partisan significance, but may have considerable affect on a member's district, party leaders are expected to assist the member in responding to the issue:

He certainly should try to help individual members of the caucus get individual things that we want. He should help us in our districts. If there is some particular thing that affects our district, he should help us with that.

The senator quoted above later indicated that his one disappointment with the leadership was that they did not take "a little more interest in a senator's particular district."
Perhaps more important than helping members with particular projects and issues which affect the district is the mutual understanding that leaders must allow them to act in the interest of the district, even if that action might be in conflict with the party position or the interest of the party as a whole. This is not to say that such a privilege should be invoked lightly in breaking with the party, but rather, "that person has got to justify their action and prove that it is a legitimate political consideration for their district." Many members seemed very aware of the potential effects that their actions could have on their re-election bid,

There are some issues that, regardless of what somebody else feels, if you are going to run for re-election, you've got to take some positions that your people want done, regardless of what somebody else wants done. On the issues that we consider to be campaign issues, each person has to do according to his wishes.

This conflict seemed particularly acute for those members who are from districts that are considered electorally safe for the other party. As one Republican from a "safe Democratic" district noted when queried as to her success, "I look out for my district and try to be as nonpartisan as I can."

Finally, members looked to their leaders to select issues and advise them in ways to avoid the electoral difficulties described above. Leaders were not only expected to allow members to vote their district interest,
they were expected to help them know what that interest is (or utilize staff for that purpose), and help protect them at home. Noted one member, if I do something, I go to the leader-directed staff and say, "I have this problem in my district. What have I done, what do you hear? Have I screwed up." So, in relation to the members' individual districts, leaders were expected to help members look good, keep them out of trouble, and allow members to keep themselves out of trouble.

**Relationship with the General Public and the Media.**

We expect them [party leaders] to be the point men. They are the ones that are going to be interviewed, they are going to be on TV and do the news conferences and press conferences and to project an image of our party in a manner that we feel appropriate.

Modern party leaders must represent the positions and images of the legislative party to the public and the media, as well as be aware of the positions of the general public (Katz, 1987). More respondents (forty-six) noted this function, than any other single partisan external responsibility. It seems that this public liaison function manifested itself in several ways in the interviews. First, and perhaps foremost, the leaders should represent the position of the senate party with the media, holding press conferences and fielding queries from the media. Second, members looked to their leaders to represent the party when speaking to groups across the state. Finally, in addition to representing the positions of the legislative party, they
were perceived as the personification of the party's image. Obviously, effectively performing this public liaison role requires that the leader be aware of the interests and desires of that public, "as well as the political ramifications to the party."

As one Ohio Democrat noted, members want a leader that will represent them well before the media so that when they speak, you "can say that's my leader and you can be proud of them." Members indicated a preference for a leader that was adept at dealing with the media and "competent enough to handle the kinds of things that come up." Describing the job of a party leader, one member explained,

> I expect a willingness to go to the press and say this is what we as the Republican members of the general assembly feel and would like to see this represented in the debate....there is a basic philosophical view that we feel like needs to be played out in the dialogue on these particular issues.

While party leaders in all three states were accessible to the press, there seemed to be little effort to encourage that interaction on a regular basis. One minority leader tried holding weekly press conferences, but they were suspended for lack of interest from the press. In an effort to compete with the Republican governor, Democratic leaders in North Carolina have modernized and updated the press room in the general assembly, and have begun holding regular press conferences. However, these too became less regular late in the session. In the minds of most party members, it
seemed sufficient that leaders were willing and able to present the position of the party to the media.

In addition to presenting the position to the media, other respondents discussed this function in terms of scheduling events and taking the position of the party directly to the electorate, that a leader "get around the state and present the position of the caucus to the state." The breadth of this function was exemplified by the comment of one senior member who noted that "everywhere the Democratic party is represented, he has a voice. That is his job." Most references to this public relations functions were made in terms of presenting a positive message about party's position and policies, as discussed by one North Carolina Democrat,

We need to espouse the Democratic position. We need to let the people of North Carolina know what a good job the Senate of North Carolina is doing, what a good job the senate is doing and what a good job the Democratic majority of the senate is doing. That is his [the majority leader's] job.

However, others spoke of the function more in terms of pointing out the deficiencies of the policies and positions of the other party, speaking to the general public as well as those particular constituencies most effected by the policy. Several members cited specific issues on which they felt the leader should have "brought to the forefront" problems with particular actions or positions promoted by the opposing party. Whether extolling the policies of
their party or ridiculing those of the other party, leaders were expected to represent the position of their party.

Finally, in a much broader sense, party leaders may be viewed as guardians of the image of their legislative party. In addition to representing the party on matters of policy, they must also represent and protect the reputation of the party. Describing the evolving role of majority leader, a senior North Carolina Democrat noted that "he is supposed to look out for the interest of the party in the senate and how it comes across." One leader described with frustration the image of his party and his efforts to change it.

I'm tired of the Democratic image being the party of no defense and raising taxes and I am doing what I can to change that.

In protecting the image and interests of the party, leaders need to be aware of the "political ramifications of a particular issue for the party" and act in a manner that will minimize the negative effects for the party and its members.

Preparation for Campaigns. Perhaps the most rapidly expanding arena of leadership activity involves active participation in various aspects of the campaigns of party candidates, including issue development, strategizing, recruitment, fundraising and resource allocation (Gierzynski and Jewell, 1989; Clucas, 1989). Particularly in situations where the minority party has a realistic chance of gaining
majority status, much of a leader's success or failure revolves around the electoral success of the party's candidates (Rosenthal, 1989b). One Ohio Republican described the primary responsibility of the senate president to "keep the majority in the senate and/or add to it." Noting the importance of majority status for political impact, a leader of one minority party discussed the importance of the campaign function on leadership success in straightforward terms,

Run good campaigns, raise money for the campaigns. If you win elections, they don't give a damn for the most part, what else you do. Because if you gave them the whole shop to run, but couldn't win elections, that's when you get in trouble.

The function of preparing the party and its candidates for the next legislative campaign may involve many particular responsibilities, from very vague references to "the party image" in relation to campaigns, to very specific tasks like raising and allocating funds. In a very general sense, members looked to leaders to use their agenda setting responsibilities to focus the party on issues that "put the caucus in the best possible light and give them [the candidates] the best record to run on." Leaders were responsible to make their decisions based on their perception of the demands and reaction of the electorate.

In addition to preparing the party for the election, leaders were expected to be aware of the electoral needs of particular party candidates. Members discussed the
responsibility of leaders to focus attention and resources on particular races, going "into a person's district, sitting down with that person and his or her staff to work with them." One respondent described the responsibility of the party leaders and staff as,

Helping each of the senators get re-elected. Know where the weaknesses and strengths are. They are constantly polling our area and finding out how people feel. Can we do things better?

The party leaders (especially in the majority) are in a position to make an incumbent look particularly effective, or particularly ineffective (if he or she is from the other party). Noted one leader,

We had a guy we wanted to get rid of something fierce.... we kept giving him such shit on the floor that the press in the district was so negative. The reason the Democrat had such an easy time is we made the Republican look like such an ineffective ass....We can also make legislators look really good by legislation they introduce.

Leaders can use their position and knowledge to assist members somewhat indirectly in their re-election bid.

Leadership was also associated with contributing to the campaigns of party members in direct, as well as indirect, ways. As the cost of campaigning has risen (the average Ohio incumbent spent almost $300,000 in 1986 and 1988 including uncontested races, and even in Maryland, the 1986 average was almost $50,000), so has the pressure for party leaders to use their position to raise funds for the caucus:

On the political side [the leader] is an awesome fundraiser, and that is helpful too. In the modern day and age, you have to have someone who
can fuel the machine... everybody in leadership does that. We each had fundraisers this year, leaders do that.

Their positions make leaders "the focal point to raise money for the caucus so that we can elect members to the senate." One freshman member who had received substantial money (over $200,000) from the party caucus noted fundraising as the single most important task of leadership, citing it in reference to the responsibilities of each leader, sources of influence, staff functions and its importance in his own successful campaign.

In Ohio, where this function is most prevalent, its significance and importance to the members is not lost on the party leaders. One leader noted that he used numerous methods of fundraising, including making personal contacts, lobbying particular groups, holding meetings across the state and in the capitol, and sponsoring fundraising events of all sizes, in order to meet the increasing need for assistance. In 1988, of the $2.7 million spent by the Republican caucus, almost one fifth ($550,000) came in the form of loans or contributions from the campaigns of the four legislative leaders. Likewise, of the $1.6 million raised by the Democrats, almost $200,000 came directly from the leaders. This is in addition to the fundraising the leaders do on behalf of the caucus.

However, many members argued that it was not enough just to raise the money, but that the leaders must also be
able to allocate it wisely. Leaders were expected to
distribute the resources based on need and winnability, not
favoritism. Describing the allocation process, one leader
noted,

It is decided by the campaign committee [leaders]
... who can win, what do the numbers tell you,
what does your gut tell you. I think the biggest
thing is do you have the candidate. If you have
the candidate you can do it.

Another added,

Money goes where we can win. Leadership picks
them on the assumption that they can win. It
doesn't matter whether they've supported us, but
whether they can win.

In fact, both parties in Ohio vigorously supported
incumbents in 1988 and 1986 who had broken with the party
on major issues and many felt were out of the "philosophical
mainstream of the party."

Of the three states studied, only the parties in Ohio
distribute campaign resources on the basis of need.
Recently the senatorial Republican parties in North Carolina
and Maryland have begun to raise money, but the rather token
contribution was distributed quite equitably to all
incumbents. In the most recent election, North Carolina
incumbent Republicans got $800 and Maryland incumbent
Republicans received $1,500 or $2,000. While it was not in
existence in 1988, the newly (1989) created Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee in North Carolina is moving to
be the campaign arm of the Democratic leadership. Finally,
although not under a party rubric, the Maryland senate
president has raised a considerable sum of money in the most recent election cycle in a district that is decidedly Democratic. Many expect that money to be distributed to partisans in preparation for a re-election bid to the presidency.

In 1988, the two Ohio parties distributed over $4.3 million to candidates in the form of direct contributions or in-kind services. In 1986, a nonpresidential year, the parties still spent over $3.8 million. A Republican leader discussed the professional nature of the resource distribution:

We are probably the most centralized campaign system in the country in that it is not friendship based, but purely need based, strictly a function of polling, quality of the competition...we only have twelve Republican districts, so we couldn't win if we didn't have a centralized system. We would have twelve seats.

In all three states, leadership responsibilities also appear to include candidate recruitment, convincing quality candidates to seek the office (or convincing reluctant incumbents to seek reelection). Noted one leader, "We basically decide who our candidates will be." Given the tendency for incumbents to seek reelection, recruitment usually involves convincing potential candidates to accept the formidable task of challenging an incumbent. According to discussions with several leaders, "winning candidates" are those that have some name recognition, can raise money and are attractive on the issues. In seeking those
candidates, the leaders seemed likely to look to the house
delegation, state party officials and local office holders.
Noticeably absent from most calculations was any type of
philosophical or partisan litmus test—Ohio leaders from
both sides of the aisle noted the importance of winnability
over philosophy.

Because "incumbents make the best candidates" recruitment sometimes included convincing a wavering incumbent to seek re-election. Noted one member,

I was going to quit last time. I was frustrated
and said why was I here. But, we had a very
tenuous political situation. The Democrats had
four seats to protect and we had twelve to protect
and six of them were in heavily Democratic
districts. With me dropping out, no one contends
that the Republicans could have held that
seat...that sent shock waves through the party and
they said how can we induce you to stay.

This particular candidate did decide to run, won handily,
received $215,000 from the caucus in-kind assistance and is
chairing the committee he desired.

Conclusion

The relationship between party leaders and external
actors is clearly a two way avenue. They represent the
positions, actions and image of the legislative party to
various groups and individuals outside the legislative
party. However, they are also expected to be aware of the
particular demands and positions of those actors and their
effect on the members of the senate. In performing these
liaison functions, leaders must be keenly aware of the
political and policy ramifications of particular actions on the relationship between the party, its members and the house, the executive, the state party, the general public, the district and the voting electorate.
CHAPTER IX:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT AND THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS

According to the literature discussed earlier, leaders usually perform functions which facilitate the internal operations of their party or institution as well as functions which represent the interests of those groups and their members to other legislators, policymakers and the electorate. The findings of this study support those assertions. In discussing their expectations concerning legislative leaders, the one hundred and twenty senators cited both internal and external responsibilities. Every member cited at least one responsibility that contributed to the internal operations (see Chapter IV for the distribution of respondents) of the legislative party or institution in their discussion of leadership expectations. In addition, over eighty percent of those same respondents cited at least one external function, requiring the leader to represent the institution or party to other actors. While there is considerable support for both components of the internal/external dimension (as the data presented in Chapter IV indicates), there is considerable variation in
the degree of internal or external emphasis that each senator associated with leadership.

According to the discussions above, we expect a relationship between characteristics of a respondent's environment and the way he or she defines the role of leaders (Sinclair, 1990 offers an excellent discussion). In the case of internal and external functions, we hypothesized that members would emphasize the particular functions which were most likely to serve their interests as defined by their personal environment. Members with political ambition were expected to place more emphasis on external functions because external representation brings the accolades and publicity necessary to extend ones electoral base and constituency. Likewise, we expected electorally vulnerable members to expect a greater concentration on external functions because the associated publicity, focus on their district and campaign assistance (all classified as external functions) would be more likely to contribute to re-election and electoral security than would more internal activities. We also predicted that years of political experience would effect the demands placed on leadership, with "the new breed" of politicians being much more focused on external activities. On the other hand, we expected more experienced members to focus on the internal legislative process, of which their seniority has likely made them an integral part. Finally, we hypothesized that those in leadership positions
might be more likely than their rank-and-file colleagues to discuss a broad range of functions, focusing on the multiple dimensions of their job, and less likely to overemphasize the internal or the external role to the exclusion of the other.

As for the characteristics of the institutional environment, other than party of the governor, our expectations were far less clear. We expected members of the governor's party to place a higher emphasis on interaction with the governor, thus increasing the external emphasis of the job. However, it is also possible that such an increase may be offset by a decrease in the role of party leaders as public spokespersons and agenda setters, deferring instead to their governor to perform those functions. One might expect leaders of the majority party to be more likely to emphasize internal operations, given the responsibility of the majority to govern. Finally, while we noted that individual level competition should affect the degree of external emphasis, it seems logical that interparty competition would increase the emphasis on external functions as well, in that the successful election of one's members in a competitive institution is the difference between majority and minority status. Any function that contributes to the electoral success of the party members is likely to be in greater demand in a competitive institution like Ohio. While we do have some
expectations concerning the relationship of institutional variables and the emphasis on internal and external functions, the strongest predictors are expected to be the characteristics of the individual environment.

The dependent variable (proportion of external responses) is measured as the proportion of each respondent's references which are external in nature (see Chapter III for a further discussion of the measure). Each respondent received a score ranging from zero (no external references) to one (all internal references). Given the complementary nature of the relationship between the internal and external measures (1.00 minus the proportion external equals the proportion internal), an increase in external proportion is equivalent to a decrease in the internal proportion of responses. Therefore, in the multiple regression below, a negative beta can be interpreted as less external or more internal.

**Findings**

The findings presented in Table 9 indicate that our expectations are met for the most part, especially those concerning the effects of the individual level characteristics. First, there is a significant (p < .001) relationship between the institutional and individual environments of the respondents and the internal or external nature of their responses concerning leadership functions. The adjusted $R^2$, a measure of variance explained, indicates
that the seven variables combined explain just over 29 percent of the variance in the proportion of external responses. Using as a minimum threshold a significance level of \( p < .05 \) (see discussion in Chapter III), three of the seven independent variables exhibit a statistically significant relationship with the proportion of external responses. A fourth, subjective level of competition, appears to be moderately \( (p = .08) \) related to the independent variable, although it did not meet our prescribed measure of statistical significance.

### Table 9: The Role of Environmental Factors in Explaining The Proportion of External Functions Associated With Legislative Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Character.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Status</td>
<td>-.02974</td>
<td>-.06840</td>
<td>.4499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Competition</td>
<td>.03222</td>
<td>.12932</td>
<td>.1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Governor</td>
<td>.07769</td>
<td>.20180</td>
<td>** .0364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Character.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj. Competition</td>
<td>.02406</td>
<td>.15377</td>
<td>*** .0823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Position</td>
<td>.05483</td>
<td>.10837</td>
<td>.1721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Exper.</td>
<td>-.00705</td>
<td>-.29186</td>
<td>* .0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ambition</td>
<td>.11075</td>
<td>.28576</td>
<td>* .0011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( N = 120 \)
\( R^2 = .33440 \)
Adjusted \( R^2 = .29280 \)
Significance of \( F = .0000 \)

* Significant at .01
** Significant at .05
*** Significant at .1
Three of the four individual level characteristics, including years of political experience, political ambition, and a subjective measure of electoral competition, were significantly or moderately related to the dependent variable in the predicted direction. The strongest relationship was between the proportion of external responses and years of political experience, with more experienced members being less likely to emphasize the external responsibilities associated with leadership (Beta = -0.291, p = 0.00). Members from competitive districts or with political ambition were more likely to emphasize the external components of leadership as well.

The only significantly related institutional characteristic is the party of the governor. Senators of the executive's party were much more likely (Beta = 0.202, p = 0.04) than members of the opposing party to emphasize external functions. This is in line with the prediction that such members might expect a greater external orientation by virtue of the leaders' interactions with the executive. While not statistically significant (Beta = 0.129, p = 0.18), the data indicates that members from more partisan states do tend to emphasize external functions to a greater degree than their counterparts in less competitive institutions. Finally, there is little evidence (although the sign is in the predicted direction) to support the claim
that members of the majority party were significantly more likely than their minority colleagues to emphasize external responsibilities. Rather, it seems that members of the majority and the minority accepted the importance of both components of the dimension.

Discussion

According to Table 9, the strongest indicator of an external emphasis is the years of political experience of the respondent. This finding is in accordance with Rosenthal's discussion of the "new breed of legislator" that came of age in an era of media politics and has little time to "learn the ropes" or be an apprentice (Asher, 1973). Less experienced members in my sample focused on a more public avenue of success because their relative inexperience and low tenure tends to exclude them from the more traditional means of legislative influence associated with seniority and experience. Especially for those politically inexperienced members with very little seniority, publicity may be the only means to legislative success given the importance of seniority in legislative influence and position. One North Carolina senator noted that influence "was all seniority. You have to start out on the low end of the pole." An Ohio leader noted the importance of seniority in making important committee assignments:

If you fragment seniority very much you generally get a revolution and the member passed up becomes a dissident, so you have to have a very good
reason to do it and then coax the senior member off of the committee.

Having gained their formative political experiences in an era of rising electoral costs and media escalation, many less experienced members find themselves more comfortable in the public arena than in the more private "cloakroom politics" often dominated by senior members. These members looked toward leaders to help them take advantage of this external avenue which may lead to political success within and outside of the institution.

On the other hand, senior members, even those with ambition and subjectively vulnerable districts were less likely to emphasize the external components of leadership. Instead, they focused more on internal functions designed to facilitate the legislative process, including administrative responsibilities and efforts to facilitate the legislative process, than on the external relationships. Given their enviable position in the process based on their seniority, it is in their interest to focus on functions that facilitate that process. Noted one North Carolina senator of two very influential senior colleagues, "They have built up a core of loyal supporters over the years and that is their influence." Likewise, such electorally successful members have developed a core of loyal supporters outside of the institution as well. Therefore, they find both the legislative and political rewards of external
leadership less necessary for the achievement of their own goals.

The nature of these differences between political generations is highlighted by the distribution of particular functions mentioned by the respondents of each group (see Table 13 in Appendix C). The less experienced respondents were more likely than their more seasoned counterparts to refer to campaign, public relations, district relations and floor representation functions. According to recent research in state legislative leadership (Rosenthal, 1989b; Salmore & Salmore, 1989: 189), we would expect this "new breed" of legislator to be more likely to focus on public relations, district service and costly campaigns. These expectations are met—especially in the efforts to protect the district. Almost half (47.0%) of those respondents with less political experience noted the importance of either institutional or partisan district interests, compared to less than one fifth (17.3%) of their more experienced colleagues. In addition to district oriented functions, these less experienced members were characterized by greater emphasis than their colleagues on public relations and campaign activities (differences of 13.4% and 17.2% respectively). As for the internal functions, there was little difference (less than 5%) between the requests of the two groups on twelve of the thirteen functions, with the
exception of policy direction with a difference of almost nine percent (8.8%).

Controlling for other factors, the degree of political ambition which a member possesses has a statistically significant ($p = .0011$) effect on the external nature of leadership expectations. As Table 9 indicates, the relationship between ambition and the proportion of external responses ($\text{Beta} = .286$) is second in strength only to the effects of political experience ($\text{Beta} = -.292$). Ambitious legislators place more emphasis on the external components of legislative leadership even when other factors are controlled. This seems to fit one's expectations of an ambitious "rising star" who is more likely to view the legislative office as a step into higher political office.

The distribution of particular functions offers support for this interpretation of the data (see Table 14 in Appendix C). The functions which are most closely related to political ambition are those functions that will not only solidify the present electoral base of a member, but will also help to expand that base to a broader constituency. Most notably, three out of four (76%) of the ambitious members noted the responsibility of leadership to represent the party or the institution to the public compared to less than forty percent (39.1%) of their less ambitious colleagues. An Ohio Democrat explained this relationship,

"Political people tend to be ambitious, or we wouldn't have done what it took to get
...most of us have an ambitious streak and if your ambition is beyond the Senate district— you'd like to be a statewide leader— you need to be prominent statewide.

The electoral consciousness of these ambitious members is evident in that they were almost three times more likely than their less ambitious colleagues (47.1% to 18.8%) to associate campaign responsibilities with leadership. As with younger members, ambitious respondents focused more attention on district service than their less ambitious colleagues, but the function was not as important as those functions that might help them expand their political base beyond that district.

On the other hand, these ambitious members were less likely than their contented counterparts to note such internal responsibilities as bi-partisan coalition building (41.8% to 25.4%) and administrative functions (76.8% to 70.6%). They were considerably more likely than their more contented colleagues to note only one internal function, procedural facilitator (50% to 40.1%), a function that many made in reference to improving the image of the institution and its members. Ambitious legislators appeared more likely to focus on leadership services which might enable them to attain their goals of solidifying their political base, as well as expanding that base to a statewide electorate.

The findings presented in Table 9 support assertions of congressional scholars concerning behavior of electorally vulnerable legislators (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Jacobson,
Members from partisan competitive districts (see chapter III for a full discussion of the measurement of this variable) were more likely than their safe colleagues to focus on external leadership responsibilities (Beta=.154). While the relationship did not meet the pre-determined measure for statistical significance (p <.05), it does approach that level. The relationship should be interpreted with that distinction in mind. Interestingly, the relationship is statistically significant (p=.05) if the measure of external responses excludes multiple references to the same function. In other words, vulnerable members are significantly more likely to associate a wide range of external functions with legislative leadership, if not to put undue emphasis on a particular function.

One Ohio Republican discussed the difficulties associated with electoral vulnerability,

The numbers are definitely Democratic in the district.... last year I went to 341 events in the district. Now, there was a political benefit to that because people got to know me. And, I got a lot of help from the caucus, and the leader.

Those members who perceived their district as electorally vulnerable in the general election were most likely to focus attention on the external responsibilities associated with leadership.

The distribution of responses (see Table 15 in Appendix C) by function for the safe and the competitive members
illustrates this emphasis on the district and campaigns. The greatest difference in leadership functions noted by these two groups concerned references to the interests of the district, followed closely by an emphasis on campaign activities. Seventeen percent (45.2% to 28.2%) more of the vulnerable members cited district related responsibilities and fifteen percent more indicated the importance of campaign functions (40.4% to 25.7%). On the other hand, there was no particularly strong relationship between the level of competition and the references to institutional and partisan public relations (57.1% to 53.8% for both partisan and institutional responses), and references to protecting the image of the institution were more often noted by less vulnerable members. This indicates that while members from competitive districts were similar to less experienced members and those with political ambition in their emphasis on external leadership activities, they were much more concerned with using those external functions to solidify their election in a vulnerable district, and much less concerned with using leaders to help them expand that base by promoting the party or the institution to a statewide constituency. The final individual variable, leadership status, does not appear to be statistically related to the external nature of leadership expectations.

The only statistically significant institutional variable was the partisanship of the governor in relation to
the party of the respondent. Members of the governors party were significantly ($p = .04$) more likely than their colleagues from the opposing party to mention external functions when we control for other relationships ($\text{Beta} = .202$). One might expect this external emphasis to be driven by expectations concerning interaction with the partisan governor.

The distribution of functions by partisanship of the governor does indeed reflect an increased expectation of interaction with the executive by members of the governor's party. Members of the governor's party were more likely than their colleagues from the opposing party to expect the leaders to interact with the executive, either on behalf of the institution or the party. Over forty-four percent (44.4%) of members from the governor's party noted the importance of that relationship, while just under twenty-five percent of their opposing party colleagues made it a part of their description of leadership (see Table 9 in Appendix C for the distribution of functions). As noted above, some of the references to executive interaction concerned antagonistic, rather than adversarial relationships. This, in part, may account for the substantial number of members from the opposing party who noted the importance of executive relations to leadership.

A second proposition concerning the effects of the governor on leadership was the possibility that the role as
partisan public spokesperson might be reduced if the governor were of the same party as the particular member (and hence, of their party leader). This seemed to be the case as well. While partisanship of the governor had little or no effect on the proportion of members noting the role as institutional spokesperson, members from the "loyal opposition" to the governor were twice as likely (23.8% to 54.4%) to mention the function of public relations with the general public than their counterparts in the party of the governor. For members of the same party as the governor, it appears that this function as spokesperson is in great part usurped by the governor, and to some degree replaced by an emphasis on the relationship with the governor. On the other side, several members of the party not holding the governorship, especially in North Carolina and Ohio, spoke of the importance of their party leaders to play that public role as "the highest elected [Republican or Democrat] in the State." Members of the governor's party are more likely to emphasize the functions which highlight that relationship (executive interaction) and less likely to emphasize a public relations function which might conflict with it (by creating a separate party voice). This relationship appears particularly strong among the North Carolina Republicans, who have seen the electoral fortunes soar with the success of their Republican governor.
Neither competitiveness of the parties or party status (majority or minority) had a significant impact on the proportion of external responses cited by a member. Competitiveness of the parties does affect the distribution of functions (see Table 18 in Appendix C), but not in a manner which is strongly reflected in the internal/external dichotomy. Except for interaction with the executive, members of the one-party Maryland Senate were more likely than their counterparts in Ohio and North Carolina to focus on internal responsibilities. Members in the two chambers with some element of partisan competition were much more likely to reference functions concerning public relations (33.3%, 54.3% and 69%) and campaign responsibilities (4.4%, 24.0% and 67.0%). On the other hand, senators from Maryland (with its ninety day session limit) were significantly more likely to emphasize internal functions like process facilitator (73.3%, 17.4% and 41.3%), that contribute to institutional achievement.

The relationship between party status and external functions does not approach significance (p = .4499). It appears that members of both parties expect their leaders to perform functions within and on behalf of their institution and their party.

Conclusion

According to the data discussed above, there is a strong relationship between the factors which characterize a
legislator's environment, and the external nature of that respondent's definition of leadership. Members with particular characteristics are more likely than colleagues without these characteristics to define leadership in terms of the relationship of the leader with some external group or individual. It is clear that the strongest relationship is with individual level characteristics. In particular, years of political experience, competitiveness of the district and degree of political ambition are significantly related to the proportion of external responses. Members who are less politically experienced, ambitious and from competitive districts are much more likely than their counterparts to define leadership in terms of external functions.

The institutional characteristics do have some effect on the external nature of leadership, particularly the partisanship of the governor. Members of the governor's party were more likely to emphasize external relations, particularly the relationship with the executive. The effects of party competition were less clear, but tended toward external emphasis as the level of institutional interparty competition rose. The effects of party status were insignificant.

Further, it is clear that these characteristics also affect the distribution of the functions such that each individual is likely to emphasize functions which serve
their own interests. Members from competitive districts put a great emphasis on campaign activities and district relations, ambitious members on public relations and campaign activities and junior members on district relations and public relations. Members from the party of the governor put a greater emphasis on the interaction with that executive, at the expense of public relations functions (presumably using the public relations of the executive as a surrogate). Finally, the respondents from Democratic dominated Maryland (with very little party competition) were more likely (although not statistically more likely) to note the internal function of process facilitator, and less likely to emphasize more potentially political functions as campaigning and district relations.
CHAPTER X: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT AND THE INSTITUTIONAL/PARTISAN DIMENSION OF LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS

The distribution of roles and functions described above makes it clear that this study of leadership expectations supports the findings on leadership responsibilities of other scholars which indicate that legislative leaders have both institutional and partisan responsibilities (Ripley, 1969; Ripley, 1970; Peabody, 1981; Rosenthal, 1981; Rosenthal, 1989a). In describing their expectations of party leaders, including the president (or pro tem), floor leaders and whips, the one hundred and twenty respondents noted institutional as well as partisan responsibilities. All but one of the respondents cited at least one function to be performed on behalf of all members of the legislative institution (see Table 4 in Chapter IV for a discussion of this distribution). On the other hand, over eighty percent of these same senators noted at least one function to be performed in the primary interest of the legislative party and its members (partisan functions) in discussing their expectations of their leaders. There is considerable support for each component of the institutional/partisan dimension of leadership responsibilities. Further, the distribution of respondents presented in Chapter IV makes it
clear that senators vary considerably in the degree of emphasis on partisan responsibilities that they associate with legislative leadership.

As with the internal/external distribution of responses, we expect a relationship between the characteristics of a respondent's political environment and his or her tendency to describe leadership in institutional or partisan terms. It was argued in Chapter II that institutional characteristics would be more strongly related than individual characteristics to the distribution of functions along the institutional/partisan dimension. Given the responsibility of the majority party, as well as the majority status of the presiding officer, one would expect a more institutional emphasis from members of the majority party. However, it was also argued that independent of the party status, party competition should effect this distribution as well. In institutions where the parties are relatively balanced and the minority party has recently experienced the benefits of majority status, or has a realistic hope of attaining such status, one would expect an increased emphasis on partisan functions. On the other hand, in institutions dominated by a particular party, one might expect a greater emphasis on institutional functions. Finally, one might expect the party of the governor to behave in a more institutional way, while the members of the
opposing party might feel the urge to play the more partisan role of loyal opposition.

As for the effects of the individual level characteristics, there seem to be few clear indications in the literature concerning their effect on the distribution of functions along the institutional/partisan dimension. In terms of district competitiveness, one might expect those from safe partisan districts to emphasize the party, while those from districts that have electoral tendencies toward the opposing party (the most competitive districts in our measure) may wish to de-emphasize partisan functions. Given the partisan and institutional nature of leadership, it is difficult to predict differences between leaders and nonleaders, but one might expect leaders to be more inclined toward the institutional responsibilities that enable the body to function. The effect of political ambition may depend on the particular institution—whether the political environment in the state and the institution rewards partisan or nonpartisan activities. Finally, given the institutional position and institutional access to influence associated with seniority, one might expect more experienced members to emphasize the institutional nature of the job, while Rosenthal's new breed would follow a more partisan route.

As with the measure of the internal/external dimension above, the institutional/partisan distribution of functions
is measured as a proportion of the total number of responses. Each member is assigned a score ranging from zero (no partisan responses) and one (all partisan responses), based on the proportion of their responses which are associated with the performance of the party rather than the institution (see chapter III for a fuller discussion of the measure). Given the complementary nature of the proportional measure (discussed in chapter IX), a decreased partisan focus represents a concordant increase in institutional focus. Therefore, in the multivariate analysis, a change that has a negative relationship with the dependent variable may be interpreted as resulting in either a de-emphasis of partisan functions, or an increased emphasis on institutional responsibilities.

Findings

Table 10 indicates that there was a very strong relationship between environmental factors and the distribution of leadership functions along the partisan/institutional dimension. Three-fourths of the variance (Adjusted $R^2 = .76$) in the distribution of the partisan proportion of responses made by legislators can be explained by the seven characteristics of the environment described above, and the relationship is statistically significant ($p = .00$). Four of the seven environmental characteristics are significantly ($p < .01$ in Table 10) related to the partisan proportion of the leadership
functions noted by the respondents. When defining legislative leadership in terms of partisan and institutional responsibilities, legislators are clearly cognizant of the demands of their environment.

Table 10:
The Role of Environmental Factors in Explaining The Proportion of Partisan Functions Associated with Legislative Leadership

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Ambition</td>
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<td>N=120</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R-Squared= .77318</td>
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<td>Adjusted R-Squared= .75900</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of F= .0000</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at .001
** Significant at .01
*** Significant at .051

As expected, institutional characteristics had the strongest effect on the partisan distribution of responses. The degree to which a member will define leadership in terms of partisan functions is in great part determined by the
level of partisan competitiveness of his or her particular institution, majority or minority status of his or her party and the partisan relationship of his or her party to the executive. The relationship is so strong that a multivariate analysis using only these three variables could explain almost three-fourths (Adjusted $R^2 = .738$) of the proportion of partisan responses.

According to Table 10, members from more partisan competitive institutions ($p = .00$), or the minority party ($p = .00$), or the party opposing the executive ($p = .00$) were all significantly more likely than their less partisan, majority colleagues of the governor's party to refer to leadership functions in a partisan sense. The only individual level characteristic which was significantly related to the partisan distribution of leadership functions is the years of political experience, with younger members more likely to cite partisan functions than their more experienced colleagues. No other characteristic of the individual environment (competitiveness of the district, the possession of a leadership position or political ambition) exhibited a statistically significant relationship with the proportion of partisan functions that members ascribed to their legislative leaders.

**Discussion**

Responses on the internal/external dimension seemed for the most part to reflect the needs of the individual and
the characteristics of his or her particular political environment. However, the proportion of partisan responses appear to reflect the environment of the party or institution in which the respondent serves, rather than their own particular situation. While ambitious or electorally vulnerable members seemed to be responding to their particular situation when looking to his or her leader to represent them in public, the institutional environment seem to determine whether they define that representation in terms of the legislative party or institution. The distribution of functions along the institutional/partisan dimension is primarily a function of characteristics of the party or institution as a unit. For example, it was more in the interest of parties in a competitive situation to act in a partisan manner than it was for a party which has no fear of losing (nor hope of gaining) majority status.

The strongest indicator of the partisan nature of leadership is the degree of partisan competitiveness in the institution. Using the Beta as an indicator of the strength of the relationship with the dependent variable, the relationship was twice as strong as it was for any other variable except party status. Party status (Beta = .357) was a distant second to party competition (Beta = .621) in its effect on the proportion of partisan responses associated with leadership. When majority status depends on the maintenance or loss of one or two seats, functions that
could well be performed on behalf of the institution (for and in relation to all members) were performed for the benefit and gain of one particular party. As parties move toward electoral parity (or at least toward mounting a credible challenge), members began to define leadership and its functions in terms of partisan gains and losses, even when other institutional and individual differences are held constant.

In Maryland, with its one-party Democratic dominance, less than one in six responses (15.7%) were partisan in nature, while Ohio members noted party oriented functions almost three-fourths of the time (74.0%). In North Carolina, the growing strength of the Republican party is reflected in the fact that six out of ten (60.5%) responses were partisan. The range of responses from the three states is indicative as well. Whereas over a quarter of the Maryland respondents made no reference to a partisan function, no Ohio senator ascribed less than half of the leadership functions to be performed on behalf of the party.

The high level of institutional focus in Maryland was also probably a function of the institutional demands of the session limit— the necessity of governing in a ninety day annual session means leaders must focus on institutional efficiency rather than partisan politics.

The effect of partisan competition was not lost on the respondents. Members of each chamber noted the contribution
of the partisan balance in their body to the institutional or partisan nature of leadership. The most telling were perhaps the remarks of several Democrats in Maryland who noted that while the leaders were very important, "as a party role, I see no significance." The effects of party dominance on the traditional partisan responsibilities is evident in the comments of Republicans and Democrats alike:

In Maryland, because the Republican party is not very strong, partisan roles for [the president] or the governor don't take shape like they might in a more competitive state, so they don't occupy those party roles to a great degree.

When you have so many Democrats, I don't even notice the Republicans. They just sort of blend in. We have as many women and blacks as we do Republicans... they sit in leadership.

Republicans note the pragmatic side of cooperation in a state dominated by Democrats, as well:

It's hard for some people to understand. It's hard for Republican party officials to understand, why we are not a more outspoken loyal opposition. We would get killed down here if we started jerking people around and imposing what is a minority opinion.... pragmatically in this state we can't.

Finally, several Maryland senators were quite aware that increased partisan competitiveness would in all likelihood change the nature of leadership and minority participation:

We include the minority in almost all decisions... if we reached a point of the numbers getting closer, I think you would see that change, because [now] we are not threatened.

I think the [party role] would be more important if we were split 23 to 24. I think it would be a central role, but since it is so heavy handed we
are not vying with minority, I don't see much of a role.

A Democrat from one of the few partisan competitive districts in Maryland talked about his concern that the Democrats have not taken advantage of the partisan dominance, noting that:

I would like to see the Democratic leadership be a little more partisan, I think what they are going to find is that when the other side grows, they will be as partisan as can be... for the most part, I don't look at issues as partisan, but it won't do you much good when you are sitting down here fifty-fifty.

As noted earlier, North Carolina is a state in partisan transition from one-party to competitive, and the effects of the growing Republican party were not lost on the leadership. Whereas the minority Republicans in Maryland were included, their minority counterparts in North Carolina have been ignored, with the Democrats traditionally fighting among themselves, rather than along party lines. However, members noted that the growing Republican numbers have brought about changes in leadership, and a greater awareness of party. The new awareness of party manifested itself in the comments of several members concerning the relationship of the president pro tem and the majority leader. Many argued that while the pro tem should be nonpartisan, the increasingly powerful majority leader position should play a quite partisan role. As for the change in leadership behavior, one Republican leader noted,
They [Democratic leadership] might have used to think it was fun to take a Republican bill and send it to oblivion, but they have found that politically it doesn't help. The Republican party is becoming a pretty substantial minority on a statewide basis.

Republicans and Democrats alike argued that leadership was adapting to a more competitive system. Several indicated that this increasing partisan competitiveness had increased, or would soon increase the sense of partisanship. This change was reflected in the fact that the 1987 session was the first time that the Democrats held regular caucus meetings (see Little, 1989, for a discussion of past meetings) and the majority leader took an active partisan role. The growing sense of partisanship was indicated by one Democratic leader,

[my job is] helping members have some sense that this is a party issue, they are Democrats and we need to stick together...we are acting more like a party, because we have more Republicans and the Republican lieutenant governor.

One young and ambitious Democratic leader may have summed up the difference between past and future leadership in the senate:

We have perhaps been too concerned with governing and not so concerned with protecting our position, and I think that has got to stop. We have got to protect our position as well as govern. I don't think we have done that perhaps as well as we should have in the past. In the past, we didn't really have to, but now the challenge is here, and I think we need to do more of that.

Finally, virtually all major functions and decisions associated with leadership in competitive Ohio were
performed with an eye cast on partisan advantage. For example, even on major issues of statewide importance, the senate leadership seemed keenly aware of its partisan impact:

Even on a major issue, why should we put our feet to the flame if the House will not pass it or the governor will veto it. It is up to the leaders to get more information before the party acts.

This same member noted that because Ohio is a swing state, with all of the demographics of a traditional Democratic state, the only way Republicans can win is to protect themselves and "get all the breaks."

Functions that might be performed on behalf of all members, or issues that might not be partisan in a less competitive institution, found partisan outlets in this competitive state. Leaders and members of both parties were very aware of the importance of majority status, and of the rather tenuous hold the Republican party has on it. Added one ambitious Republican,

Because over time our majority has flipped back and forth, there is the idea that one misstep could cost us the majority. So, the other side is always ready to seize that opportunity.

Another Republican discussed the effect of that posture,

Last time a lot of things became partisan because they [the minority] were trying to build a record for the election... some things become partisan that no one expected.

The propensity for "institutional-type" functions to be performed on a partisan basis in more competitive settings was reflected in the distribution of leadership functions
across the three states (Table 18 in Appendix C). Maryland members were considerably more likely than their colleagues in the other two states to refer to coalition building, interaction with the governor, and the house and the public in terms of the institution rather than the party. On the other hand, members in Ohio were much more likely to refer to functions that facilitate the actions of the party (through agenda setting, administrative functions and procedural advice) and to use external functions to promote the interests of the party rather than the institution. Of the four interactions that might be performed on behalf of either the institution or the party, only in relations to the governor, were Ohio respondents less likely than their colleagues to refer to this as a partisan function. The best indicator may be the preoccupation with campaign functions in Ohio, noted by sixty-seven percent of the Ohio respondents, with an average of more than two references per respondent.

Controlling for the effects of competition, the expected relationship concerning party status holds up as well. Members of the minority party were more likely to view leadership through partisan blinders. Members of the minority were significantly (p = .00) more likely than their majority counterparts to cite partisan functions (Beta = .357). All else being equal, the average minority member was thirty-five percent more likely than his or her majority
colleague to focus on partisan responsibilities in describing legislative leadership.

There seem to be at least three logical reasons for this difference between majority and minority party members. First, there is a certain degree of institutional responsibility associated with majority status. Several members of the majority party mentioned this responsibility in qualifying their description of leadership roles:

It is different when you are in the majority. There are some responsibilities you have to assume when you are in the majority.

Our main goal is to lead the Senate, do our jobs and still be the loyal opposition. I think you will see that we view ourselves as not just the loyal opposition, but as a people or institution that makes the system work.

By its very nature, majority status and the responsibilities to "make the system work" that are associated with it, imply a more institutional orientation of majority members.

In addition to this responsibility to govern, one would expect majority policies to reflect the positions of majority members more than minority members. Therefore, members of the majority should be more likely to view the positions and advice of the leadership as institutional in nature, reflecting the interests and voice of a majority of the body. Several respondents noted the advantage of majority status in the policymaking process and the propensity of the institutional position to reflect that of the majority party:
Being in the minority or the majority is as different as night and day. Basically, our [minority] legislation isn't moving.... I'm not being critical, that is how it was when we were in the majority and we ran the show.

It is the responsibility of the president to see that the business of the state gets done and that it reflects the position of the Republican caucus.

Members of the majority party seemed to anticipate that the positions of the institutional leaders (primarily president in Ohio and Maryland, and president pro tem in North Carolina) would reflect their interests, they were more likely to refer to them in an institutional nature. With the exception of two functions central to the operation of the institution (administration and resource distribution), a larger proportion of majority party members referenced each institutional function than did their minority counterparts. On the other hand, with the exception of interaction with the house and state party, members of the minority were significantly more likely to describe functional performance in partisan terms. Because of the majority party's disproportionate influence on the outcome of public policy, majority members often saw little distinction between the institutional and partisan voice, whereas, minority members assigned primarily administrative functions to the institutional leaders, but did not rely on them as much for information or expect to be represented in their external relations.
Finally, given their smaller numbers, it is in the interest of the minority party members to focus on partisan matters and unity if they are to have an impact. This means that although smaller in number, minority parties may find functions contributing to internal partisan cohesion and cooperation even more important than the larger majority party. Noted one Maryland Republican,

We only have seven votes, but seven votes can be a lot if there is a split in the majority. So, we have to be organized and together.

Therefore, over half of the minority members noted the importance of building a consensus in the party, compared to just over a third (37.5%) in the majority. While most majority parties can afford the loss of one or two votes, the strength of the minority lies in its ability to use its bloc of votes as a bargaining chip, reflecting the emphasis of minority members on negotiating with the other party and representing the party on the floor. In a similar manner, if members of the minority can expect to rise above that status, they must keep their current members and elect new ones, explaining the greater emphasis on partisan district interests and campaign functions for the minority.

The least important of the three institutional variables was the partisanship of the governor, but it remained statistically significant (p = .00) even when the other factors are controlled for. Table 10 indicates the increased partisan nature of responses from the respondents
of the party opposite the governor. All other factors being held constant, members of the party of the governor exhibited a fifteen percent increase ($B = -.151$) in institutional responses over their colleagues from the "loyal opposition."

Not having a governor to look to for partisan direction and public relations, members of the "loyal opposition" appeared to turn to their legislative leaders for that type of partisan leadership. The effects of this may be most distinctly seen in the much greater propensity of respondents from the opposing party to rely on senate leaders to present the views of the party (see Table 19 in Appendix C) to the public (54.4% to 23.8%) and to protect the district interests of party members (29.9% to 17.5%). Party leaders were expected to abdicate the more public responsibilities of party leadership to the executive, who should be the titular, if not actual head of the state party (Munchmore and Beyle, 1986).

Apparently, being of the party of the executive also has the effect of diminishing the traditional responsibility of leaders to provide partisan policy advice and agenda direction. Members of the governor's party were much less likely to look to legislative leaders for policy development and direction, indicating that perhaps the governor is the primary agenda setter (Table 19, Appendix C). One North Carolina Republican indicated that the
primary responsibility of the party leaders was to "keep us informed about the position of the governor and the administration," rather than develop issues and positions themselves.

On the other hand, members of the party opposing the governor were quite likely to turn to legislative leaders for partisan advice, direction and representation. It seemed that the partisan responsibilities of a legislative leader were much greater and more inclusive when he or she did not have to compete with an executive of his or her own party. These members must look to their legislative leaders for party direction they cannot expect from a governor of the opposing party.

Finally, on the side of the individual environment, those members with greater political experience less likely to speak of leadership in partisan terms. The years of political experience of a respondent were significantly (p=.00) related to the proportion of partisan responses, with the less experienced members more likely to describe legislative leadership in terms of partisan functions (Beta=-.177). Each additional year of political experience was associated with seven-tenths of a percentage increase in the proportion of institutional responses (B=.007).

There seem to be at least two plausible explanations for this generational difference. First, it is possible that senior members are suffering from what Wahlke and
others (1962) refer to as "cultural lag," responding on the basis of their environment as they perceived it in the past, rather than adjusting to the current surroundings. This case is supported by the fact that the junior members in North Carolina and Maryland alike were more likely to discuss the political climate in terms of growing Republican strength than were their more experienced colleagues who seldom mentioned the effects of growing party strength. Even competitive Ohio witnessed prolonged periods of one-party dominance through the 1970's (strong Republican prior to reapportionment in the early 1960's and solid Democratic legislature in 1970's). It may be that more politically experienced members are more likely to perceive the legislative and electoral environment through the eyes of the past when partisan competition was less of a factor, and they were reacting to those "gentler days."

A second reason for the generational differences may be the perceived electoral benefit of partisan activity for younger members who are most likely to be electorally vulnerable. As noted earlier, these less experienced members are more likely to look to their leaders to represent and protect their interests beyond the chamber (see Chapter IX). It is clear from Table 10, that they prefer to define those functions in more partisan terms than their more experienced colleagues. For this more goal-oriented "new breed," a more partisan mindset may be a
necessity for advancement within or beyond the senate chamber. Even in one-party dominant states, the political party is the only avenue for political success. As Patterson (1989) notes,

It is difficult to overstate the pervasiveness of political parties in the states. All of the fifty state governors are either Democrats or Republicans. The other statewide elected officials are either unanimously adherent to one of the two major parties. All of the 7,461 state legislators are Democrats or Republicans except for the members of Nebraska's unicameral legislature and a handful of independents.

If these younger members are to have influence within or beyond the legislative body, they must play within the confines of the predominant two-party structure. Reflecting on recent demand for leadership changes in North Carolina, a freshman noted, "The young turks in the Senate.... realized that we have our political futures on the line."

Senior politicians, on the other hand, appeared to be much more concerned with the effective performance of the institution. They have, for the most part, achieved influence within the institution, and have little desire to gain influence outside. Their interest in leadership is rather focused on the operation of the institution. The ambivalence of many senior members toward the partisan aspect of leadership is exemplified by the comment of one North Carolina senator with twenty years of state legislative experience (dating to the mid 1960's),
To me the job of majority leader could be done away with. I guess there is a role for him, but I don't know what it is. I don't particularly pay any attention to him. I don't see any real importance of it. Nobody really pays any attention to him.

This member, and several others of his political generation, were much more likely to focus their attention and their leadership demands solely on institutional internal functions like facilitating the process, administration and agenda setting. A forty year veteran of state and local politics may have summed up this restrictive leadership role when he defined "good leadership" solely in terms of "moving things along so we can get out of here."

As for the remaining three individual characteristics, none approached a significant relationship with the proportion of responses that are partisan. While leaders showed a weak tendency to emphasize institutional functions (as one might expect), the relationship is not statistically significant (p= .49). However, as with their distribution along the internal/external dimension, offering a greater proportion of external responses than their colleagues, party leaders appear less skewed toward one end (partisan) of the continuum than their rank-and-file colleagues. The leaders were somewhat more likely to recognize both components of the institutional/partisan dimension.

As for competition and ambition, while the multivariate analysis indicates no statistically significant relationship to the degree of partisanship (p= .49 and .39
respectively), the mean proportion of partisan responses for the categories of respondents indicates a strong relationship (when other factors are not controlled for). According to the average proportion of partisan responses, ambitious members were more likely to be partisan (.51% to .43%), as were members from the most competitive districts (.61% to .32%). However, when one controls for other factors (primarily party competition), these bivariate relationships lose their significance.

Conclusion

According to the data, there is a very strong relationship between the legislative environment and the balance of partisan and institutional functions associated with legislative leadership. The seven environmental characteristics explained almost seventy-five percent of the variation in the distribution of functions along the institutional/partisan dimension. Four of the seven characteristics were statistically related to the dimension.

Whereas the distribution of functions along the internal/external dimension appears to be driven by individual level factors, the proportion of responses along institutional/partisan dimension seems to be almost solely a function of institutional variables. In ascribing functions of a partisan nature, members seemed to be responding to the environment which they face as a member of
the party or institution. Specifically, respondents from partisan competitive institutions, the minority party or the party opposite that of the governor, were significantly more likely to view leadership from a partisan perspective. While the traditional majority/minority distinction is significant, the dominant characteristic is not party status, but rather level of party competition. The implications of this finding are significant for our study and understanding of legislative leadership.

Members of the minority party in one institution may have leadership expectations which are more similar to the majority in that institution than to expectations of minority members in an institution with a different level of party competition. Although both are in the minority, the job of an Ohio Democratic leader and a Maryland Republican leader have very little in common, when it comes to the emphasis on partisan functions. In a similar manner, the partisanship of the executive had an effect on leadership roles independent of party competition or status.

The only individual level variable to bear a significant effect on the partisan distribution of functions was the political experience of the respondent. Those members with less political experience (and a potential political future) were more interested in the partisan nature of leadership than their senior colleagues. It seems that "politically younger" legislators viewed the partisan
route as necessary for future political success, while the more senior colleagues were less concerned with future success than current institutional achievement, which requires leadership focused on the operation of the institution.
CHAPTER XI:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO LEADERSHIP FUNCTIONS

It should be clear from this and other studies of legislative leadership that the nature of the leadership expectations is rooted in the environment of the legislative body and the members who elect the leaders. The distribution of expectations across the two dimensions (internal/external and institutional/partisan) are significantly related to characteristics in the legislative environment. Members are likely to emphasize functions that promote their own interests, as well as those of their party or institution. However, this proportional approach to analyzing the nature of leadership responsibilities fails to address one significant question concerning the relationship between institutional and individual environments and leadership functions. Do particular environmental characteristics influence the total number of demands made on party leaders as significantly as they influence the nature of those demands?

There was considerable variation across the 120 respondents concerning the number of references made to particular leadership responsibilities. The number of
functions an individual member expected of his or her party leader ranged from one to sixteen. If we can use this count as a surrogate for total demand on leadership, it is clear that some members had considerably greater expectations of their leaders than others, and relied on them for more services. Further, if we do not count multiple references to the same function, the high degree of variance remains. In his discussion of leadership responsibilities, one North Carolina senator noted fourteen different leadership functions which he associated with the successful performance of the president pro tem, the majority leader and the whips. On the other hand, the immediate response of a senior North Carolina colleague to the question of leadership was, "I would be happy if they would leave me the hell alone."

The purpose of this chapter is to use the environmental characteristics in an effort to explain part of the variation in leadership demands. It seems reasonable to expect the total number of functions which a member expects leaders to fulfill, as well as the diversity of those functions, to be at least in part a function of the environment. As discussed earlier, leadership functions are highly related to the needs of individual members. Therefore, members in particular environmental situations should be more aware of the diverse responsibilities associated with leadership. The total number of functions
a member associates with leadership should reflect the characteristics of that respondent's particular environment, just as his or her proportion of responses along the above dimensions reflects that environment.

The most obvious effect may be related to the leadership status. It would seem reasonable to expect those in leadership positions to be more aware of the multiple responsibilities associated with their positions. Further, one would expect the needs of less experienced members to be greater. In addition to having come of age in an era of more open politics (thus being comfortable with leaders taking a public role), these members have yet to build up a knowledge of the politics, processes or procedures of the institution. One would expect them to rely on leaders to help them to develop the knowledge their colleagues already have, as well as help them promote their outside interests. While it seems clear that ambitious and electorally insecure members would expect leaders to perform external functions, it is less clear as to whether that responsibility is in addition to, or instead of, more internal functions.

Given the necessity of institutional functions (discussed earlier) for the performance of the body, one would expect the performance of partisan functions to be, at least in part, an addition to institutional demands, increasing both the number and diversity of leadership demands. This seems most clearly related to the effects of
party competition and party status. In a one-party state, it is feasible that institutional functions can exist to the virtual exclusion of party roles. However, the inverse (that party functions might exist to the exclusion of institutional responsibilities) in a competitive state seems less likely, given the necessity of institutional performance. In a similar manner, given the institutional responsibilities of the majority party, most partisan functions may be in addition to, rather than instead of, partisan functions. Again, this would result in a greater number of responsibilities associated with the performance of more leadership tasks.

The dependent variable is the total number of functions that a particular member associated with legislative leadership. Multiple references to the same function were counted when they were ascribed to different members of the "leadership team" (usually the president, floor leader or whip). Multiple references to the same function were not counted a second time if they were associated with the same particular leader in both references (see Chapter III for a further discussion of coding). Each member was assigned a score based on the number of functions they noted, ranging from one to sixteen.

Findings

According to the data in Table 11, there is indeed a significant relationship between the respondent's political
environment and the number of functions which he or she associated with leadership. The seven independent variables explained almost half (Adj. $R^2 = .46$, $p = .000$) of the variance in the number of particular references made by legislators concerning leadership functions. Three of the seven independent variables were significantly ($p < .05$) related to the number of references made by each senator.

Table 11:
The Role of Environmental Factors in Explaining The Total Number of References to Leadership Functions

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<th>Sig.</th>
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<td>Political Ambition</td>
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N= 120
$R^2 = .48793$
Adjusted $R^2 = .45593$
Significance of $F= .0000$

* Significant at .001
** Significant at .01
*** Significant at .05

Whereas the proportion of references along the two dimensions of leadership seemed quite clearly to reflect
characteristics of either the institutional (institutional/partisan) or individual (internal/external) environment, the number of functions a legislator associated with leadership appeared to reflect a combination of both. The strongest correlate to leadership responsibilities was the level of partisan competition (Beta= .477, p= .00), an institutional variable. However, the second and third strongest predictors were individual level variables: political experience (Beta= -.286, p = .00) and leadership position (Beta= .214, p = .00). Finally, party status, an institutional variable, was related, although the statistical significance was above prescribed limits (Beta= .111, p = .16). Neither the remaining institutional variable, or the two individual characteristics approached a statistically significant relationship with the number of functions associated with leadership.

Discussion

As expected, certain types of members did associate greater responsibility with positions of leadership, and expected more from members filling those positions. Further, the findings indicate that at its minimum, leadership was institutional, and partisan functions were an addition to, rather than a surrogate for, those institutional responsibilities. Three of the four characteristics related to the number of functions
associated with leadership (level of competition, political experience and party status) were also related to the proportion of partisan responses (see chapter X). In other words, members who cited a higher ratio of partisan functions mentioned those functions in addition to institutional references, hence the higher number of total responses. The same phenomenon does not occur with the characteristics associated with the internal/external dimension. Only one of the four variables (political experience) significantly related to the proportion of external responses was significantly related to the total number of responses. While partisan leadership does not serve as a surrogate for institutional leadership, members who emphasized external responsibilities seemed to be more willing to cite those functions to the exclusion of the more traditional internal responsibilities of leadership.

As noted earlier, the level of partisan competition was the strongest predictor of the total number of references to leadership functions. Increased competitiveness appeared to bring with it increased leadership expectations and responsibilities. Members of the one-party Maryland Senate cited an average of almost five and a half (5.489) functions, while senators in the changing North Carolina environment made an average of just over seven and a half (7.630) references to specific leadership functions. Finally, in the competitive atmosphere of the Ohio Senate,
there was an average of almost ten functions (9.828) per respondent.

In a competitive environment, not only were leaders expected to oversee the adequate performance of that the chamber and the party, they were further saddled with the responsibility of gaining or retaining the majority status. Therefore, the additional functions were primarily associated with partisan matters, both internal and external. While the number of institutional functions associated with leadership was relatively stable across the three institutions (Maryland= 4.63, North Carolina= 3.01 and Ohio= 2.55), there was considerable variation in the average number of partisan responses (Maryland= .859, North Carolina= 4.62 and Ohio= 7.27). This study clearly indicates that leaders of both parties in a competitive state are expected to focus their attention on partisan matters in addition to (and in conjunction with) running the institution.

The effects of competition are evident in the distribution of functions across the states (Table 18, in Appendix C). At least seventy percent of the respondents in each chamber noted the importance of functions associated with administrative activities or procedural facilitation. However, while Maryland members were somewhat more likely than their colleagues in the other states to note institutional functions, their most distinguishing
characteristic was the relative absence of partisan references relative to Ohio and North Carolina respondents. Given their session limitations, centralized structure (Francis, 1989), and institutional rivalry with the executive, the Maryland leaders were expected to focus on institutional, rather than partisan responsibilities. The only external response of particular interest to Maryland senators involved the relationship with the powerful executive.

Ohio and North Carolina respondents, on the other hand, were significantly more likely than their Maryland colleagues to mention the six partisan internal functions, as well as all of the partisan external functions, with the exception of floor representation. Further, the pressure to maintain or regain the majority in a highly competitive environment is reflected in the fact that Ohio respondents were much more likely than North Carolina and Maryland respondents (in that order), to emphasize the partisan functions that most directly affect the electorate (issue selection and agenda setting, distribution of resources for electoral gain, public relations, district relations and campaign activity). The greater levels of leadership activity in competitive states reflects the increased demand for partisan activities.

In other words, leadership responsibility in one-party Maryland is not associated with a great number of
responsibilities because it is focused primarily on institutional internal functions, and one primary institutional external function (relationship with the executive). Members in the increasingly competitive North Carolina Senate adopted the primarily institutional Maryland concept of leadership, but add to that an additional emphasis on partisan internal responsibilities. Finally, while maintaining an interest in institutional and partisan internal responsibilities, Ohio respondents added a strong focus on responsibilities associated with partisan external relationships, primarily concerning the general public and campaigns. This study indicates a pattern of increasing leadership responsibility as institutions become more partisan and competitive.

Although not statistically significant, the relationship (Beta = -.111) between the number of responses and party status of the individual is moderate and warrants some discussion. However, given the level of significance, these findings must be considered tentative at best, and the discussion is offered with that in mind. Controlling for other factors, minority members tend to expect more, rather than less from their leaders. The average member of the minority ascribed over eight functions to legislative leaders, while majority members ascribed only six.

As noted above, the additional responsibilities of leadership usually tend to be partisan in nature. This is
particularly evident in the relationship with party status, given the inherent responsibility of the majority to perform certain institutional functions. Members of the majority party were more likely than their minority colleagues to refer to institutional functions (Majority X = 4.159; Minority X = 2.793). However, the difference is considerably smaller than that between the party responsibilities each group associated with leadership. Members of the minority party were twice as likely to note partisan functions (Minority X = 5.988; Majority X = 2.682). As above, the additional responsibilities are most closely associated with increased partisan responsibility.

The reasons for this emphasis on partisan functions by members of the minority parties is not clear, but at least two reasons seem feasible. First, while members of the majority may be likely to blur the line between institutional and partisan functions (especially in terms of agenda setting and external representation), members of the minority will be more likely to distinguish the two, assigning institutional functions to the president (or pro temp) and separately assigning partisan functions to their party leaders. For example, a majority member noting the role of the senate president to represent the interests of the institution knows implicitly that his party's position will be represented, while a minority member will likely
divide those into two functions, institutional and partisan public relations, and ascribe them accordingly.

A second hypothesis is that the position of minority status itself mandates more active leadership. According to the literature, there are two primary goals for minority party members: 1) policy impact (Jones, 1970) and attaining majority status (Sinclair, 1990). The attainment of either of these goals requires considerably more activity from a minority leader than it does for one with the advantages of majority status. If a minority party is to use its small numbers to full advantage, the members must be unified behind a position and able to negotiate with the majority party and the senate as a whole. This is reflected in the fact that minority members were considerably more likely to cite party leaders as sources of policy and procedural advice, coalition building and agenda setting, as well as three times as likely (59.4% to 20.5%) to indicate the responsibility of representing the party on the floor and five times (5.7% to 25.1%) as likely to refer to negotiations with the other party. Given their limited resources, members and leaders of the minority party must work harder to have the policy impact that comes to members of the majority party by virtue of their majority status.

Likewise, if the minority is to improve its status, the leaders must see that the incumbents are protected, and the public has reason to elect additional members of their
party. This too is reflected in the distribution of functions (Table 17 in Appendix C). Minority members were twice as likely to note functions relating to district interests (37.5% to 18.2%) as well as more likely to refer to public relations and campaign functions. In other words, members of the minority party and their leaders must work harder and be more active to achieve what members of the majority party have by virtue of their numbers: policy impact and majority status.

On the individual side of the environment, members in positions of leadership are more cognizant of the multiplicity and diversity of functions associated with the positions they hold. An average leader cited nine particular functions associated with leadership, while rank and file members cited only seven. No leader cited less than five functions associated with leadership, compared to seventeen (18%) of the nonleaders who ascribed no more than four functions.

While increased leadership demand by members in competitive environments and the minority party were associated with an increased emphasis on partisan functions, the higher number of references by party leaders reflects a greater recognition of both partisan and institutional functions. The average party leader ascribed more institutional (4.579 to 3.752) and more partisan (4.469 to 3.248) functions to leaders than did the average nonleader.
Those in leadership positions were more aware of the extent and diversity of the responsibilities that they were expected to bear. This pattern is reflected in the distribution of functions presented in Table 16 in Appendix C. In eleven cases across all four roles, the proportion of leaders referring to a particular function is at least five percent greater than the proportion of nonleaders.

On the other hand, only in the case of references to institutional district needs does the proportion of nonleaders exceed the proportion if leaders by a similar margin. As if to reiterate the diversity of their responsibilities, leaders were most distinct from their followers in citing four functions, one in reference to each category of functions: institutional administrative functions (90.6% to 70.7%), protecting the institutional image (23.8% to 7.1%), partisan coalition building functions (61.9% to 37.3%) and partisan district relations functions (38.1% to 20.2%). While the propensity of leaders to assign greater responsibility to their positions than do rank-and-file members may reflect the ego of the leaders to some degree, it also seems to reflect their perception of the multiple dimensions of leadership. Interestingly, on averages, leaders cited two more responsibilities than did nonleaders and those additional responses reflected the diversity of their expectations. The average leader cited one more partisan function, one more institutional function,
one more internal function and one more external function than did their followers. The greater expectations of leaders reflects an understanding of the diversity of the job, rather than an emphasis on one particular component.

Finally, members relatively new to the political scene appeared to have a greater reliance on leaders than their more established colleagues. This seems to bear out Rosenthal's assertion that this "new breed" of legislator expects active and service oriented leadership, with leaders meeting the needs of the member (1989b). According to Table 11, there was a significant (p = .000) relationship between a respondent's level of political experience and the number of functions he or she associated with legislative leadership.

Whereas the greater demands of members in competitive institutions, minority members and party leaders revolved around differences in the institutional/partisan dimension of requests, the source of higher expectations made by less experienced member was more a function of differences along the internal/external dimension. The average number of internal functions cited by the two groups (those above and below the mean years of political experience in each institution) is virtually identical (4.647 and 4.624), but the "new breed" was much more predisposed to note external responsibilities (3.309 and 1.942). The increased demand by the younger cohort is, at least in part, a function of their
reliance on a more public political role as discussed in Chapter IX.

One would expect inexperienced members to have two major needs: 1) procedural and policy direction within the institution, and 2) assistance in solidifying their new political base outside of the institution. The distribution of functions (Table 13 in Appendix C) according to political experience finds novice politicians more likely to expect leadership assistance in these areas. On the policy side, those members with less political experience were more likely to look to the leader for institutional or partisan policy direction (47.1 to 40.4), procedural advice (29.4 to 23.1) or agenda setting assistance (50 to 44.2). More politically mature members, on the other hand, focused their expectations on more administrative functions and less service-oriented responsibilities.

As for solidifying the external base, the less experienced members were much more likely than their colleagues to expect services that placed the party (and the institution, to a much lesser degree) in a positive light. Most notably, they were more likely to turn to leaders for campaign assistance, public relations and district relations. It seems that inexperienced members have a higher and more diverse set of expectations of leaders because they have a greater and more diverse set of needs. Lacking institutional experiences, they look to
leaders for guidance and direction. Lacking a secure political base built up over time (like Fenno's primary constituency, 1978), they look to the leaders to promote their electoral interests beyond the bonds of the institution.

An analysis of the mean number of references across categories of competitiveness (ranging from 6.133 to 9.556) and ambition (6.609 and 8.373) yields a similar pattern. As a function of increasing external demands, electorally vulnerable and ambitious members have greater expectations of legislative leaders. However, these differences lose their significance in the multivariate analysis. In a similar manner, members not from the party of the governor are more expectant of legislative leaders than their executive-led colleagues. However, when controlling for the effects of other characteristics, this relationship loses its statistical significance as well.

Conclusion

There is clearly a relationship between the legislative environment confronting a member and the number and diversity of functions he or she views as appropriate for the leaders. Members in competitive institutions, of minority status, in leadership or with less political experience all tend to see a more significant and far reaching role for legislative leaders. However, the nature of that greater role and the particular functions that
comprise it were a reflection of the needs or position of the respondent.

For members in competitive institutions, most of the increased demand was a function of increased campaign and partisan external activities. While the performance of internal functions remains necessary, leadership becomes more and more defined by partisan external activities as parties strive to gain or maintain majority status in a competitive environment. The greater expectations (although not statistically significant in the multivariate relationship) from minority members indicate a similar pattern. While being a little less likely to note institutional functions, they are almost three times more likely than their majority colleagues to cite partisan functions, especially those that may assist them in gaining access to the policy process or move them to majority status, or at least toward some measure of parity with the majority party.

Those holding leadership positions were also more likely to assign greater responsibility to the positions which they hold. However, their emphasis was not driven by an increased focus on institutional or partisan functions, but rather an acceptance of the multiple dimensions of the job. Leaders were more likely to cite institutional and partisan, as well as internal and external responsibilities associated with their job. Finally, focusing on their need
for information and external representation, political novices had greater expectations of leaders than did their senior colleagues. While they emphasize different functions (information for juniors and administrative for seniors), there is little difference in the total number of requests for internal functions. However, this new generation of politicians was considerably more likely to refer to the external components of leadership, particularly those components that most directly influence the electorate and the general public.
CHAPTER XII: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS: LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP IN ITS ENVIRONMENT

To a considerable degree, the responsibilities that members associated with legislative leadership are clearly a function of the interaction between characteristics of the institutional environment in which a leader functions and the needs and demands of the legislators who elevated him or her to leadership. The comments of a senior senator from Maryland illustrate the interaction of these two levels of environment which mold the nature of legislative leadership.

Different times require different leaders and different types of leaders. So there have been a lot of different styles and a lot of different needs for different styles, perhaps. Maybe some of these leaders became what they were because the situation at hand compelled that.

While personality and individual leadership style are a central part of effective leadership, this study of membership expectations concerning leadership activities indicates that often the style may be selected or adapted to fit the particular needs of the chamber and its members at any given time.

The dynamic nature of leadership expectations has been the focus of this work, and can be traced to two sources implied in the comments above, and developed fully in
earlier chapters. "Different styles" of leadership may be necessitated by an alteration in the institutional environment in which a leader must function (level of party competition, for example), as well as an alteration in the collective environments of those legislators whom he or she must satisfy in order to maintain that position of leadership. In other words, the nature of leadership responsibilities (in response to the expectations of the followers) is likely to change if characteristics of the parties or individuals in that institution change. A leader whose party gains the executive office, or majority status is likely to find his position radically altered, as is the leader who finds among his followers a large number of inexperienced and ambitious freshmen following an election.

The various combinations of institutional and individual environments in Maryland, North Carolina and Ohio offer the opportunity to focus on the influence that such characteristics have on leadership responsibilities. Each state has its own unique political and structural environment, as well as a unique combination of legislators. The combination of characteristics and legislators in each institution and party is reflected in the nature of leadership expectations and responsibilities in that party and institution. To conclude then, we will look briefly at the major environmental characteristics associated with the
three states (as discussed more fully in Chapter III), and their association with leadership responsibilities in each party in that institution.

**Maryland**

Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Maryland politics in general, and the senate in particular is the absence of two-party competition. Republicans held only seven of the forty-seven senate seats in 1989, and anticipated no major gains in the near future (although they did pick up two seats in the 1990 elections). Second, while the governor is Democratic as well, the relationship between the executive and the legislative branch is quite tenuous because of the constitutional advantages in power that the executive has, and the current governor's willingness to use those powers. Internally, all legislative activities are colored by a constitutional ninety day session limit and limited pay.

The average Maryland legislator is relatively experienced, but considers the legislative job part-time. Less than fifteen percent (6) of the Maryland legislators view their office as a potential stepping stone to higher office. Rather, most see the office as the pinnacle of their political service. Finally, the electoral dominance of the Democratic party is reflected in the fact that only six of the legislators described their district as
competitive or leaning in the direction of the opposing party.

The Democratic Party

The one-party nature of the state is reflected in the emphasis of all Democratic legislators on institutional rather than partisan responsibilities. Over ninety percent of all Democratic responses in Maryland were associated with institutional functions. In the absence of strong party competition, Democrats see their leaders as speaking for the institution rather than the party. This emphasis is magnified by their majority status and the institutional responsibilities associated with it. Two dominant leadership expectations reflect the characteristics noted above. The Democrats look to the senate president to maintain legislative independence with the powerful governor and to effectively guide the senate through its turbulent ninety day session, taking actions to administer the body, and advance the legislative process. The competition with the governor rears its head as well in the emphasis on maintaining a positive senate image and representing the institution to the public.

The average Maryland Democrat has sixteen years of political experience and fourteen years of legislative experience, so there is not a great demand for partisan or institutional policy or procedural advice from the leaders. Further, only one Maryland Democrat received less than
fifty-five percent of the two-party vote in the most recent election, so that the degree of external campaign activities associated with leadership was minimal (the single reference was made by one of the six Democrats to classify his district as competitive). Sixty percent of the Democrats classified their districts as safe Democratic, while only one described his as safe Republican. It is of little wonder that campaign responsibilities are not strongly associated with Democratic leadership in Maryland. The interest in future public office of forty percent of the Democratic respondents is related not to campaign activities, but rather to an interest in leadership promoting the image and positions of the institution (and hence, the ambitious member). The number of potentially ambitious members indicates a need for external representation, but the level of party competition and the institutional competition with the executive proscribe that such activities be institutional rather than partisan. Given the high number of women (six), blacks (six) and regional differences, Democratic leaders are expected to focus on district interests as well.

The Republican Party

The most striking factor about the Republican party in Maryland is its perennial minority status at all levels of state politics. This affects the responsibility of leadership in several ways. First, the leaders are not
expected to take a combative stance with the dominant Democrats. Rather, leadership is defined as cooperation and assimilation on most major issues. Second, many of the leaders' responsibilities revolve around traditional minority responsibilities of representing the minority party on the floor and with the Democrats. Finally, the responsibilities that minority members associate with leadership are considerably more partisan than those of their majority colleagues, and the leaders are expected to promote the minority message to the public. The combative relationship with the executive appears to transcend party lines, with Republicans and Democrats indicating a desire to maintain institutional independence. The most striking effect of the one-party dominance is the tendency of the Republicans to give considerable latitude of responsibility to the Democratic leadership.

The greater emphasis on partisan external activities by Republican members also seems to reflect the fact that all of the members defined their district as either competitive or safe Democratic, although only two faced serious competition in the recent election. The public role that Maryland Republican leaders associate with leadership is muted by the fact that no Republican has definite plans to seek higher office. Further, the informational role is minimized by the fact that the average Republican has thirteen years of political experience and ten years of
legislative experience. It is significant to note that the Republican who described the leadership role in the most traditional "loyal opposition" terms (campaign for the party members, help the party members in their district, voice the party position on the floor and voice the party position in public) was a recently appointed freshman with no legislative experience, a vulnerable district and indications of political ambition.

**North Carolina**

The North Carolina political and legislative environment is best described as being in a state of transition. The electorate and the elites are moving in the direction of partisan parity. The senate is adapting to a more disperse power structure initiated by the election of a Republican lieutenant governor. The Democratic party is watching its advantage shrink and finding it necessary to bind ideological, political and geographic cleavages, as the Republicans work to take advantage of recent gains. The senate must respond to a traditionally weak executive that is popular and taking his case for a stronger office to the public that overwhelmingly re-elected him in 1988.

The North Carolina membership is characterized by a strong generational split, with just over half of the membership elected since 1984. Further, the increasing partisan balance made a large number of the members appear quite vulnerable in the 1988 elections, with over forty
percent (21 respondents) winning by less than sixty percent. There also seems to exist a core (15) of members who show an interest in seeking higher office, mostly from the younger generation described above.

The Democratic Party

The changing nature of North Carolina politics seems to have hit the Democratic leadership directly. The Republican gains, and the ensuing leadership reorganization have left considerable uncertainty as to the responsibilities associated with certain positions. The rising partisanship is reflected in the increasing importance of the minority leader position (especially for younger members) and an increasingly partisan role for the president pro tem. Given their majority status, Democrats associate both institutional and partisan responsibilities with the president pro temp. The ideological, generational and regional cleavages in the Democratic party manifest themselves in a demand for partisan coalition building. The popular Republican governor mandates that the Democratic leadership be active in offering policy advice to the Democrats and setting a Democratic agenda to compete with the executive. Further, the leader is expected to speak effectively to the public on behalf of the party and the institution.

Over half of the North Carolina Democrats had less than six years of senatorial experience, and no senate experience
under a Democratic governor. Further, of the twenty-one respondents who had contested elections in 1988, seventeen won by less than sixty percent, and nine by less than fifty-five percent. Eighteen of the respondents described their district as competitive or leaning toward either party. Over thirty percent (10) of the Democratic respondents expressed an interest in higher office. All of these characteristics indicate the necessity for a leader with some ability to represent the interests of the membership beyond the institution. The growing number of inexperienced members needs a leader who can offer policy and procedural advice, as well as partisan public relations, district assistance and campaign relations in a political world they view as increasingly hostile to their party. Further, they expect an effective voice because they have not known the luxury of a Democratic governor. The electoral vulnerability has yet to manifest itself fully in terms of a demand for active campaign assistance from the parties (but both parties are moving in that direction), but rather appears in the emphasis on general public relations functions, and a desire to protect the image and integrity of the institution and party. Given the diverse experiential and electoral make-up of their members, Democratic leaders find themselves focusing on partisan and institutional internal responsibilities, and giving increasing attention to partisan external responsibilities
as the "new generation" grows large, the Republican governor grows stronger and the Republican party grows bolder.

The Republican Party

Bolstered by growing numbers of young and ambitious members, a strong Republican governor, and a fractious Democratic majority, Republican leaders are finding their jobs increasingly demanding, but increasingly rewarding in policy and political terms. Most of the responsibilities expected of the Republican leaders revolve around the Republican governor. Nine of the thirteen Republicans noted the importance of interacting with the governor, and the remainder discussed the leader's responsibility of representing the governor on the floor. Further, the presence of a Republican governor seemed to minimize the leadership responsibility of setting the policy agenda, or representing the party in to the public. Support of the governor was a central factor in any discussion of the partisan coalition building expectations, and that support was considered a valued part of any Republican's decisionmaking calculus. Leaders were quick to point out to recalcitrant members that the legislative party's gains were undeniably linked to the success of the executive. The Democratic divisiveness described above, coupled with the relative ideological unity of the Republicans also led several members to focus their attention on the potential
for negotiations with one of the Democratic factions as an important leadership responsibility.

The growing number of Republicans has resulted in a relatively inexperienced set of legislators. Only four of the thirteen had more than five years of legislative experience, and the average senate experience was less than five years. This influx of new members increased the responsibility of the Republican leadership to perform mentoring functions on matters of policy and procedure. Further, the generational difference resulted in considerable disagreement over the degree to which the leadership should "parrot the governor," with the younger members feeling a considerable obligation to the governor who was in great part responsible for their success. Six of the thirteen Republicans expressed an interest in future office, but given the electoral strength of the governor, that manifested itself more in partisan public relations and executive interaction than in campaign and district responsiveness. Whereas almost half of the North Carolina Democrats survived competitive elections in 1988, over two-thirds of the Republicans won with more than sixty percent of the vote. References to campaigning and public relations on behalf of the party seemed more reflective of individual ambition, and efforts to elect more Republican senators than to the electoral needs of a particular member. Although the generational differences indicate different leadership
expectations, the current leadership seems to be responding primarily to the demands of the younger, more ambitious members, who comprise a growing majority of the legislative party.

Ohio

Since the late 1970's, the Ohio Senate has been marked by very competitive parties, competitive and expensive elections and increasingly professional and fulltime legislators. While the Republicans opened up a five seat advantage in 1988, the majority in the 1980's generally hinged on one or three seats (17 to 16, or 18 to 15). Further, the Democratic minority had majority experience as recently as 1984. The institution is marked as well by political and institutional independence from the executive, with Republicans paying little attention to the Democratic governor and many Democrats blaming his actions for their electoral difficulties.

On an individual level, a third of the Ohio senators consider themselves fulltime legislators, and over half classify their districts as competitive or leaning in the direction of the opposing party, and view their office as a stepping stone to higher office. Further, the average successful senate candidate in the 1988 and 1986 elections spent over $300,000 in their election and won with just under sixty-five percent of the vote. The average senator had over nine years of experience in the senate, and had
several paid staff members to assist them in their legislative tasks.

The Democratic and Republican Parties

While the environment and diverse membership of the legislators in Maryland and North Carolina produced markedly different leadership styles and emphases, party leadership in Ohio is marked more by similarities than differences. The competitive nature of the institution is felt by members of both parties, and it necessitates that virtually all responsibilities be performed in a partisan nature (less than a quarter of all responses were institutional in nature). The only institutional responsibility mentioned by more than half of the Ohio respondents (of both parties) concerned the day-to-day administrative operation of the institution. The absence of interaction with the executive meant that both parties looked to their leaders to establish and help enact a partisan agenda, as well as to present that agenda to the general public. The more professional nature (in terms of staffing, salary and length of session) of the Ohio senate meant that there was less need for leaders of either party to provide information, or perform certain administrative tasks.

As they face similar institutional environments, Republican and Democratic leaders are elected by members with quite similar needs. A majority of Republican and Democratic respondents noted an interest in future office,
but were also concerned that their current seat was far from electorally secure. While the Republican victors in 1988 and 1986 spent almost three times that of their Democratic colleagues ($322,000 and $109,000, respectively), financing is central to successful campaigning for any relatively junior senate candidate in Ohio, Democrat or Republican. Finally, unlike North Carolina, there are few generational differences within or between parties in Ohio. The average Ohio Democrat had just over nine years of senate experience, and the Republican just under nine, while the average North Carolina Democrat had about fourteen years of political experience and the average Republican just over twelve and a half. The large portion of fulltime, electorally vulnerable and politically ambitious members in each Ohio party indicates a leadership focus on external responsibilities in general, and public relations, district relations and campaign responsibilities in particular. Further, the partisan competitive nature of the body mandates that such responsibilities be carried out in partisan terms. Indeed, the primary responsibilities of Republican and Democratic leaders in Ohio revolve around those functions which help the members appear effective, provide for the needs of their district, and present a positive image and policy program to the public. Further, the primary internal responsibilities of partisan coalition building and agenda setting provide a
successful platform on which these vulnerable, but ambitious legislators might try to build a career within their party.

Leadership in Ohio is for the most part defined in terms of minimal institutional responsibilities, with an emphasis on those internal and external partisan functions that advance the interests of a competitive legislative party and its vulnerable and ambitious members. However, certain characteristics make the emphases a little different between the parties. First, the responsibility of majority status means that Republicans were more likely [although partisan functions still predominate] to note the institutional responsibilities associated with leadership. Second, the fact that only one Republican described his seat as safe Republican would indicate a particularly strong emphasis on campaign responsibilities, and indeed Republicans were more likely than Democrats to describe leadership in such terms. Finally, although the relationship between the Democratic speaker in the house, the Democratic governor and the Democratic senate minority leader is not particularly strong, Democrats were more likely to associate leadership with these government liaison responsibilities than were their Republican colleagues.

This study clearly indicates that leadership and what members expect of their leaders do not exist in a vacuum. The responsibilities associated with leadership are a function of the needs created by the institutional
environment, and the needs of the particular members. Leadership that is effective and responsive to the members in a particular setting is a function of the unique combination of members, relationships and conditions associated with that institution and state.

**Understanding Legislative Leadership Responsibilities**

As hypothesized at the beginning of this study, legislative leaders have a myriad of responsibilities. The interviews revealed membership support for twenty-six different leadership functions, which were organized into five functional categories (see Chapters IV through VIII for a full discussion of the functions and distribution): administrative responsibilities, coalition building, source of information and services, liaison with other governmental actors and public relations/campaign related activities. Administrative tasks comprised the most widely accepted set of leadership functions, referenced by all but six of the one hundred and twenty respondents. Over a quarter (253 of 879) of all responses were associated with administrative responsibilities. The function of coalition building, which scholars most often associate with leadership, was less universally recognized. Just under two-thirds (65%) of all respondents associated leadership with the task of building coalitions within or across the two parties. In these three states, as in the United States Congress and other state legislatures, leaders are viewed as sources of information.
and services. Just under four of every five (78.3%) respondents associated leadership with the provision of either services, procedural (forty-five percent) advice, substantive (forty-five percent) information or political (twenty-five percent) direction.

On the more external side, these findings support recent studies which indicate an increasing public relations component to legislative leadership, but find somewhat less evidence of a particularly strong role as conduit with other government officials. Under two-thirds (63.3%) of the respondents associated leadership with the responsibility of representing the interests of the party or institution with the governor, the house, the other party or the senate as a whole. More notably, many of those who did cite such responsibilities with the executive and the other chamber described it more in terms of conflict than cooperation. Finally, in accordance with recent studies, this research provides evidence that a substantial portion of legislative leadership is associated with public relations and campaign activities. Seven out every ten (70.8%) respondents noted the significance of such public-oriented activities as campaign assistance and interaction with the district and general public. The universality of these responsibilities is reflected in the fact that no category of tasks was noted by less than six out of every ten respondents.
It was further hypothesized that one could organize these functions according to whether they were performed on behalf of party members (partisan) or all members of the senate (institutional), as well as whether they concerned legislative matters within that group (internal) or referred to the job of representing that group to other actors (external). According to this study, there was substantial support for arraying functions along these dimensions. Forty-six percent of all responses referred to functions performed on behalf of all members of the institution, while fifty-four percent referred to tasks designed to promote the interests of the party and its members. While internal responsibilities were still predominant, accruing almost sixty percent of the references to leadership tasks, forty percent of the leadership expectations were associated with more external functions.

While the aggregate data described above finds a relative balance between institutional and partisan functions, and internal and external functions, individual respondents varied considerably in the weight they gave to each type (discussed in Chapter IV). The findings of this study support the assertions of many scholars that the nature of legislative leadership is a function of characteristics of the legislative environment. Six characteristics of the institutional and individual environment were found to be significantly (p < .05) related
to the nature of responsibilities associated with legislative leadership, and a seventh exhibited a moderately strong relationship \((p = .08)\) with the proportion of external responses. The large number of cases and the quantitative analysis used in this study enable us to develop a much fuller appreciation of the importance of each characteristic than was possible in earlier studies. Leaders in competitive chambers are expected to be significantly more partisan than their colleagues in less competitive states. Further, legislators of the minority party are more likely to focus on partisan responsibilities, particularly those responsibilities that promote the interests of the members within (coalition building, agenda setting, and floor representation) and beyond (public relations and campaigning) the legislative institution. Members who are not of the same party as the executive define leadership in more partisan terms as well, while their colleagues of the governor's party tend to delegate many of those partisan functions (especially agenda setting and public relations) to the executive.

While the amount of money spent by a particular candidate does not appear to be significantly related to a member's expectations of leadership, other individual level variables are. Less experienced members expected their leaders to be more partisan, more external and more active than their more senior colleagues. Rosenthal's "new breed"
clearly placed more emphasis on information and public relations. Likewise, members with a degree of ambition were significantly more likely to focus on external responsibilities of leadership, primarily public relations and campaign activities. Those respondents who perceived themselves as electorally vulnerable showed a strong tendency to turn to leaders to solidify their district base and ensure electoral success. Finally, those in leadership were significantly more likely than nonleaders to assign greater and more diverse responsibilities to the leadership role. This research clearly indicates that the nature of legislative leadership expectations and responsibilities is to considerable degree a function of the institutional and individual legislative environment. Understanding leadership in these terms has several implications for leaders, as well as for the scholars who study them.

**Implications for Leaders**

Given the recent surge of leadership challenges and incumbent defeats discussed above, it is clear that leaders must be very cognizant of the multiple roles and functions they may be expected to perform if they hope to maintain their influence and position. More importantly, this study implies that leaders must be able to perform the particular functions and roles which are appropriate for the particular environmental conditions if they hope to satisfy the members who elect them. Effective leaders must be able to adapt
their leadership styles and abilities to fit the demands of a dynamic environment. A leader who focuses on internal institutional functions while his or her party loses its majority status is likely to find himself or herself removed from leadership unless he or she begins to perform the roles appropriate to the new environment. The skills necessary to provide leadership and fulfill the expectations of the members in one context may be completely ineffective in another— a wise and effective leader is the one who knows which skills are appropriate in a given situation.

In addition to being able to perceive and respond to the institutional environment, it is also clear that leaders must tailor their performance to meet the individual needs of at least a majority of the members electing them. The prerequisite for leadership is building a sufficient coalition of support to be elected to the position. Given the importance of individual environment to leadership expectations, it is necessary for leaders to know their members, and to perform leadership functions that help those members deal with their problems, meet their legislative demands and fulfill their ambitions. Leaders must be able to satisfy the multiple desires of a majority of party members from different backgrounds and environments if they are to maintain their influence. This implies leadership which must be creative and responsive to the changing demands of the members, the party and the institution.
Finally, the distinct needs of this "new generation" of state legislators implies a particular kind of leadership. Members of the "new generation" are more ambitious, dynamic and impatient than earlier generations of members. They have been reared in a more open political environment and are less willing to accept seniority as the only road to legislative and political success. This implies leadership based more on the carrot than the stick as leaders use their substantial resources of information, political rewards and access to the public, electorate and campaign funds to help members achieve their own goals. Alan Rosenthal, (1989) may have described the best way to lead tomorrow's legislators:

The survival of even the strongest leaders is a function of their ability to serve member's needs, anticipate their dissatisfactions, sense their insecurities and keep them as happy and as comfortable as possible. In order to maintain their positions, leaders who feel pressed must devote more and more of their energies to serving and placating their members and not wielding their power. (Rosenthal, 1989: 32)

Leaders of increasingly partisan or competitive institutions are likely to find much of their time consumed by partisan and external activities. Even in cases with limited partisan competition within the institution, leaders of ambitious or vulnerable members must be prepared to serve the external needs of those members in a less partisan capacity.
Implications for the Study of Legislative Leadership

The breadth and variety of functions associated with legislative leadership indicate that there is much to be learned by focusing on particular responsibilities. For example, this study notes the importance of campaign assistance in particular legislative bodies. While studies like those of Gierzynski and Jewell (1989) and Clucas (1989) help explain the distribution of such resources, further study is needed to understand its impact on the legislative process in general, and leadership in particular. The persistence of coalition building as a leadership responsibility should direct scholars to further examine the static and dynamic factors which affect that process, much like the recent analysis by Hornajcki (1990), which finds leaders of both parties in the Ohio House at the center of a fifty-two member (out of ninety-eight) voting cluster. Knowledge that leaders must build coalitions should encourage us to develop a further understanding of how that is accomplished. The broad acceptance of administrative leadership responsibilities in three very different environments should encourage us to take a closer look at the efforts of leaders to maintain order in the face of increasingly decentralized legislatures and increasingly independent members. On the other hand, the virtual absence of liaison responsibility with the executive and the speaker implies a growing institutional independence which one would
expect to have long range effects on political cooperation and policy coordination. This too warrants further study. The wide acceptance of leadership importance and the breadth of leadership responsibilities requires that we focus attention on the performance and the political, procedural and policy impact of the behavior of legislative leaders.

However, the same diversity of responsibilities which should direct us to focus our attention on particular leadership responsibilities also implies a caveat concerning the dangers of any arbitrary selection of responsibilities to be associated with leadership. The multiple dimensions and responsibilities associated with leadership in particular environments preclude scholars from automatically associating particular roles with legislative leadership. The nature of legislative leadership is a function of the interaction of institutional and individual variables, rather than the assumptions of a scholar. The definition and operationalization of successful leadership used in one situation may be completely inappropriate in another institution or during a different time period in the same institution. The findings of this study make it clear that while legislative leaders perform many functions, those responsibilities are not given equal weight by all legislators and should not be treated as such by scholars.

The fact that the leadership functions seemed to fit so naturally along the two dimensions (institutional/partisan
and internal/external) should not lead us to believe that these are the only ways to organize leadership responsibilities. Indeed, it should encourage us to test the fitness of these dimensions, as well as to develop other organizational schemes. For example, one may wish to analyze the responses according to more functionally contrived categories similar to those discussed by Wahlke, Eulau, Ferguson and Buchanan (1962: 189). This current research suggests four such functional groupings of responsibilities that one may wish to examine: administrative, informational, governmental liaison and public relations. The categories of such a schema could be analyzed for the degree to which responses converge around or diverge from particular sets of responsibilities and the acceptance of particular leadership roles.

Finally, perhaps the clearest implication of this study involves the obvious relationship between legislative environment and leadership responsibility. Scholars must continue to think of leadership in the contextual manner noted by Jones (1981) and Sinclair (1990). The only way to fully understand leadership is to understand the goals, needs and ambitions (individually or corporately) of those being led and how those factors affect the relationship between the leader and the follower. This necessitates further studies of legislative goals like those of Fenno (1973, 1978; Goodman, et al, 1982) so that we might better
understand the effect of those goals on leadership responsibilities. This current study clearly indicates that legislators turn to leaders to help them fulfill their personal or institutional ambitions, therefore, a broader and more comprehensive understanding of those goals, ambitions and needs is essential if we are to understand legislative leadership.

The findings indicate that particular focus on certain groups of members may be warranted. Most obviously, the broad effect of political experience (significantly related to both dimensions of leadership, as well as to the total number of responses) indicates that there is clearly something different about this group. However, only a longitudinal study could determine if those differences are generational or simply a function of the lack of political experience (which will be remedied with time). In a similar manner, the effects of ambition and competitiveness should be examined to see if the attitudes concerning leadership remain once the member is electorally secure, or the ambition for higher office has waned. Further, a longitudinal study could help us determine how much of the difference between the expectations of members and leaders is a function of the greater legislative and political experience of the latter.

Such an emphasis implies a continued focus on leadership from the perspective of the members as discussed
in Sinclair (1990). While studies of the behaviors of members (i.e., roll call votes) and leaders (i.e., distribution of resources) offer invaluable data to serve as evidence of leadership activity, they offer little in the way of explaining motivation for such activity. This study indicates a relationship between membership expectations and leadership responsibilities that necessitates a continued focus on those expectations. However, the significance of expectations also implies that leaders act as their followers expect. While recent findings by Rosenthal (1989a: 1989b), as well as this research imply such a relationship, further study is warranted concerning this relationship.

This focus on the link between membership expectations and leadership behavior seems to necessitate a reexamination of the significance of the leadership selection process. Perhaps we should be less concerned with the physical (Simon, 1989), ideological (Truman, 1954) or political (Graham and Moore, 1990) characteristics of legislative leaders, and more concerned with the nature of the coalition that elected them (Peabody, 1976; Brown and Peabody, 1987; 1990). Leaders (especially in the states where leadership races are usually more competitive) could be expected primarily to focus on the needs of those particular members who were their winning coalition. Further analysis of recent successful challenges to incumbent leaders may
indicate that the deposed leader had either failed to satisfy those who had originally selected him or her, or had responded to a coalition of members who no longer comprised a majority of the party (or chamber in the case of bipartisan coalitions). The findings of this study indicate the benefit of the study of new leaders and the coalitions that elected them.

The variance of leadership expectations across institutions suggests yet another fruitful avenue of study. While the differences between majority and minority leadership (Ripley, 1969; Jones, 1970), and the effect of the partisanship of the executive (Jones, 1970; Rosenthal, 1990) are quite well documented, there has been little study of the effects of increasing partisanship on leadership. This study indicates that such increasing partisanship has a significantly greater impact on the nature of leadership than party status or partisanship of the executive, and it further suggest the existence of a pattern of leadership development associated with partisan competition. When partisan competition is virtually nonexistent, leaders are expected to focus on institutional internal responsibilities. As the minority party begins to show signs of life, the leadership emphasis shifts to partisan internal responsibilities, while maintaining the necessary institutional internal responsibilities. Finally, in the case of highly competitive parties, leaders are expected to
focus on partisan responsibilities, with a particular emphasis on the external functions, often to the detriment of institutional responsibilities. Based only on three states, this very preliminary finding warrants closer investigation, and encourages a further examination into the patterns of leadership development.

Finally, these findings should encourage us to broaden our studies of leadership to encompass as many different environmental contexts as possible. This study indicates that leadership expectations are related to these seven environmental characteristics. It could well be that other environmental characteristics significantly affect leadership activity as well, and it is the responsibility of the scholar to determine if those factors do indeed exist by systematically studying leadership in as many contexts as possible. The findings in this study indicate that future leadership studies should shift their focus to the relationship of member and leader, and broaden their perspective to include as many theoretically significant environmental characteristics as possible.

**Conclusion**

The findings of this study are in general agreement with early studies of legislative leadership. Based on interviews with one hundred and twenty senators in three states, leaders are expected to be many things to many people, and the nature of those expectations may change
according to context. However, the nature of this research allows for a more systematic analysis and a more thorough understanding of the relationship between the legislative responsibilities associated with leadership and the environment that creates those leadership expectations. When members are defining leadership, they are clearly ascribing responsibilities that reflect their personal needs, as well as those of the party and institution as a whole. According to the findings of this study, legislative leadership and the expectations that shape it are, to a considerable extent, a function of the environment in which that leadership is performed. Given this fact, leaders, as well as the scholars who study them must be keenly aware of the institutional and individual needs of the legislators who select those leaders every two or four years.
APPENDIX A:
COMPARISON OF SAMPLE AND POPULATION
Table 12: Characteristics of the Sample and the Population

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APPENDIX B:
INTERVIEW SCHEDULES FOR NORTH CAROLINA, OHIO AND MARYLAND
Schedule For North Carolina Interviews

1. Generally speaking, regardless of your party affiliation, do you describe yourself on most issues as very conservative, conservative, middle of the road, liberal, or very liberal?

2. Is your district mostly urban, mostly suburban, or mostly rural?

3. How would you classify your district politically- safe Democratic, leaning Democratic, competitive, leaning Republican, or safe Republican?

4. On the one hand, it is sometimes said that the job of a legislator is to carry out the wishes of their constituents (Delegate); on the other hand, sometimes legislators are expected to use their own best judgement on policy issues, even if their constituents disagree (Trustee). Which of these views comes closest to your conception of what a senator should do?

5. Who are 4 or 5 members of the senate with whom you frequently discuss legislation?

6. I realize that the senate is faced with many important issues. What, in your judgement, are the most important issues facing the senate this session?

7. Which members of the senate have the greatest expertise in these areas? (Probe in each area)

8. In addition to specific issue knowledge, are there certain members who have an exceptional expertise in the "rules of the game?" I mean, an expertise in the legislative process and how to use the rules and norms to achieve a legislative goal? If yes, could you name them?

Now, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your committee assignments.

9. Did you get the committee assignments you desired? Is there a formal request process?
10. How do you think those decisions are made?

11. (For Chairmen) How about chairmanships? You are chairman of (appropriate committee)- How do you think those decisions are made?

12. Do you feel you were any more or less likely to receive requested committee assignments this session than in the past? If yes, why?

13. Now, who are some of your closest personal friends in the senate- I mean, the members you see most often outside the chamber, at lunch, dinner or parties and other social events?

14. We are told that some legislators have more influence on legislation than others, and that sometimes the members holding official positions are not always the most influential. Who are the 3 or 4 most influential members of the senate? Why is that?

Next, I would like to ask you a few questions about the party caucus meetings.

15. How often does the party meet in caucus?

16. Would you describe a "typical" caucus meeting, if there is such a thing?

17. How are decisions as to party positions made in the caucus meetings- do you feel like your opinion is taken into account, or is the decision made by a set of leaders?

18. (Senior members) Have you seen a change in caucuses since you came here? What kinds of changes?

19. Once a position has been decided, do you feel an obligation to follow it, even if you did not initially agree? Do you feel pressure from leaders or other members to support it?

20. Whether or not they have an official title, who do you consider the leaders of your (Democratic or Republican) party in the senate? Why is that?

Now, let's talk about the role that the elected party leaders- the president pro temp, majority or minority leader and whips- play in the legislative process.

21. Overall, how do you see the role of the party leadership? What do you expect these members to do as legislative party leaders? What purpose do they serve?
22. Are there things they are not doing, that you would like to see them do, or perhaps do better?

23. Can you recall a particular issue from this session or last where the leadership was particularly active? What was it? Could you tell me about the issue, and the leadership activity? (Probe for specific activities)

24. Now, more specifically, how would you describe the job of president pro tem of the North Carolina Senate? What do you expect of him?

25. Why do you think Sen. Barnes was chosen for that position?

26. How would you describe the job of majority (minority) leader? What do you expect of someone in that position?

27. (For Democrats) I understand there was competition for the position of majority leader. Could you tell me about that? Why was Kaplan chosen for that position? Did you support Kaplan or Conder? Why?

28. Finally, how would you describe the job of the whip—what should the whip do?

29. (For Veterans) Have you seen changes in the nature of leadership in the North Carolina Senate since you came here? What types of changes? Why do you think that has occurred?

30. If you suddenly became president pro tem, or floor leader, what, if anything would you do differently?

31. If you could change one thing about the senate of North Carolina, what would it be?

Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about the process of allocating "special appropriations."

32. Last session, did you make a formal request for such funds?

33. Did you get most of what you requested? Why or why not?

Thank you very much for your time!
Schedule For Ohio Interviews

1. How would you classify your district politically—safe Democratic, leaning Democratic, competitive, leaning Republican, or safe Republican?

2. I realize that the senate is faced with many important issues. What, in your judgement, are the most important issues facing the senate this session?

3. Which members of the senate have the greatest expertise in these areas? (Probe in each area)

4. In addition to specific issue knowledge, are there certain members who have an exceptional expertise in the "rules of the game?" I mean, an expertise in the legislative process and how to use the rules and norms to achieve a legislative goal? If yes, could you name them?

Now, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your committee assignments.

5. Did you get the committee assignments you desired? Is there a formal request process?

6. How do you think those decisions are made?

7. (For Chairmen) How about chairmanships? You are chairman of (appropriate committee) - How do you think those decisions are made?

8. Do you feel you were any more or less likely to receive requested committee assignments this session than in the past? If yes, why?

9. We are told that some legislators have more influence on legislation than others, and that sometimes the members holding official positions are not always the most influential. Who are the 3 or 4 most influential members of the senate? Why is that?

Next, I would like to ask you a few questions about the party caucus meetings.

10. How often does the party meet in caucus?
11. Would you describe a "typical" caucus meeting, if there is such a thing?

12. How are decisions as to party positions made in the caucus meetings—do you feel like your opinion is taken into account, or is the decision made by a set of leaders?

13. Once a position has been decided, do you feel an obligation to follow it, even if you did not initially agree? Do you feel pressure from leaders or other members to support it?

I would like to ask you a few questions about the caucus staff.

14. What is their purpose? What do you expect from them?

15. How well do they meet those needs?

16. Who selects the staff, and who are they responsible to?

17. Whether or not they have an official title, who do you consider the leaders of your (Democratic or Republican) party in the senate? Why is that?

Now, let's talk about the role that the elected party leaders— the president, majority or minority leader and whips—play in the legislative process.

18. Overall, how do you see the role of the party leadership? What do you expect these members to do as legislative party leaders? What purpose do they serve?

19. Are there things they are not doing, that you would like to see them do, or perhaps do better?

20. Can you recall a particular issue from this session or last where the leadership was particularly active? What was it? Could you tell me about the issue, and the leadership activity? (Probe for specific activities)

21. Now, more specifically, how would you describe the job of president of the Ohio Senate? What do you expect of him?

22. Why do you think Sen. Arronoff was chosen for that position?

23. How would you describe the job of majority (minority) leader? What do you expect of someone in that position?

24. (For Democrats) I understand there was competition for the position of minority leader. Could you tell me about
that? Why was Meshel chosen for that position? Did you support Meshel or Boggs? Why?

25. How about the position of assistant minority leader (for Democrats)- what do you expect from someone in that position?

26. Finally, how would you describe the job of the whip- what should the whip do?

27. (For Veterans) Have you seen changes in the nature of leadership in the Ohio Senate since you came here? What types of changes? Why do you think that has occurred?

28. If you suddenly became floor leader (or president), what, if anything would you do differently?

29. If you could change one thing about the Senate of Ohio, what would it be?

Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about your most recent campaign.

30. Did you receive assistance from the party caucus?

31. What was the nature of that assistance (money, technical assistance, in-kind services, campaign consulting)?

32. How important was that assistance in your victory- very, somewhat, little, or not important?

33. [If they received assistance] Did you request the assistance- why do you think it was offered?

Thank you very much for your time!
Schedule For Maryland Interviews

1. Generally speaking, regardless of your party affiliation, do you describe yourself on most issues as very conservative, conservative, middle of the road, liberal, or very liberal?

2. Is your district mostly urban, mostly suburban, or mostly rural?

3. How would you classify your district politically- safe Democratic, leaning Democratic, competitive, leaning Republican, or safe Republican?

4. Would you like to run for some other political office at some point in the future? Any particular office?

5. Who are 4 or 5 members of the senate with whom you frequently discuss legislation?

6. On the one hand, it is sometimes said that the job of a legislator is to carry out the wishes of their constituents (Delegate); on the other hand, sometimes legislators are expected to use their own best judgement on policy issues, even if their constituents disagree (Trustee). Which of these views comes closest to your conception of what a senator should do?

7. I realize that the senate is faced with many important issues. What, in your judgement, are the most important issues facing the senate this session?

8. Which members of the senate have the greatest expertise in these areas? (Probe in each area)

9. In addition to specific issue knowledge, are there certain members who have an exceptional expertise in the "rules of the game?" I mean, an expertise in the legislative process and how to use the rules and norms to achieve a legislative goal? If yes, could you name them?

Now, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your committee assignments.

10. Did you get the committee assignments you desired? Is there a formal request process?
11. How do you think those decisions are made?

12. (For Chairmen) How about chairmanships? You are chairman of (appropriate committee)- How do you think those decisions are made?

13. Do you feel you were any more or less likely to receive requested committee assignments this session than in the past? If yes, why?

14. Whether or not they have an official title, who do you consider the leaders of your (Democratic or Republican) party in the senate? Why is that?

15. Now, who are some of your closest personal friends in the senate- I mean, the members you see most often outside the chamber, at lunch, dinner or parties and other social events?

16. We are told that some legislators have more influence on legislation than others, and that sometimes the members holding official positions are not always the most influential. Who are the 3 or 4 most influential members of the senate? Why is that?

Next, I would like to ask you a few questions about the leadership meetings Sen. Miller holds during session.

17. What is the purpose of the Tuesday meetings- what goes on at a typical meeting? Do you participate? Why does the minority participate?

18. How about the Thursday meeting- what is the purpose of that meeting? What goes on at a typical meeting?

Now, let's talk about the role that the elected party leaders- the president pro temp, majority or minority leader and whips- play in the legislative process.

19. Overall, how do you see the role of the party/ senate leadership? What do you expect these members to do as legislative party leaders? What purpose do they serve?

20. Are there things they are not doing, that you would like to see them do, or perhaps do better?

21. Can you recall a particular issue from this session or last where the leadership was particularly active? What was it? Could you tell me about the issue, and the leadership activity? (Probe for specific activities)
22. Now, more specifically, how would you describe the job of president of the Maryland Senate? What do you expect of Sen. Miller?

23. Why do you think Sen. Miller was chosen for that position?

24. How would you describe the job of majority (minority) leader? What do you expect of someone in that position?

25. Finally, how would you describe the job of the whip—what should the whip do?

26. (For Veterans) Have you seen changes in the nature of leadership in the Maryland Senate since you came here? What types of changes? Why do you think that has occurred?

27. If you suddenly became president pro temp, or floor leader, what, if anything would you do differently?

28. If you could change one thing about the Senate of Maryland, what would it be?

Thank You for your time!!!
APPENDIX C:

DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONS BY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
### Table 13:
The Distribution of Functions By Political Experience

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<th>(52) Above Mean Year</th>
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<td>B</td>
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</table>

(A) References= The number of times the particular function was mentioned by the respondents may be higher than the number of references, because a respondent may mention a function more than once.
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(C) % of Sample= the proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).
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(C) % of Sample= the proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).
Table 15:  
The Distribution of Functions By Subjective Competition  
(78) (42)  
Less Competitive More Competitive

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</table>

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Table 16: The Distribution of Functions By Leadership Status

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Table 17:  
The Distribution of Functions By Party Status  

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### Table 18: The Distribution of Functions by Political Competition

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(A) References = The number of times the particular function was mentioned by the respondents may be higher than the number of references, because a respondent may mention a function more than once.
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(C) % of Sample = The proportion of the sample (120) citing a particular function (# of Respondents / 120).
Table 19:
The Distribution of Functions By Party of Executive

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LIST OF REFERENCES


Brown, Lynn P. and Robert L. Peabody. 1987. Patterns of


