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A comparative analysis of interpretive strategies and its implications to discipline-based art education

Politsky, Rosalie Helen, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1990

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS TO
DISCIPLINE-BASED ART EDUCATION

DISSERATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Rosalie Politsky, B.F.A., M.A

The Ohio State University
1990

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Approved by
Advisor
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DEDICATION

To my mother
Mildred D. Politsky

May all your love and prayers return to you a hundredfold.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professor Arthur Efland for his guidance and support through the many twists and turns of the final dissertation. Special appreciation goes to Professor Ken Marantz whom I have had the privilege of working with through the process of two degrees over the last nine years. Professors Kathleen Desmond-Easter and Judith Koroscik have also remained valuable personal and academic resources over the years, along with Professor Robert Bargar who has been a mainstay both to my work and to my personal development.

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CHAPTER I
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Before discussing the problem of interpretation within art education, it is necessary to situate this theme within the larger constellation of contemporary philosophy of art and art criticism. However, in investigating modern critical thought, it is helpful to turn to literary criticism. This is advantageous for several reasons. First, research in this field has been prolific in the last several decades; and secondly, it holds the possibility of informing art education and critical theory in art.

Culler (1982) asserts that, "To write about critical theory at the beginning of the 1980's is no longer to introduce unfamiliar questions, methods, and principles, but to intervene in a lively and confusing debate" (p. 7). In discussing contemporary interpretive procedures, Culler insists that one must confront the confusing and confused notion of post-structuralism and more specifically, the relation of deconstruction to other critical movements. Before surveying Derrida's work, Culler first addresses such interpretive theories as structuralism, phenomenology, feminist criticism, and psychoanalytic theory.

Eagleton (1983) also notes the striking proliferation of literary theory over the last two decades and draws
attention to the tremendous impact that has served to deeply alter the meaning of literature, reading, and criticism. Eagleton does not, however, share Culler's confidence in the familiarity of these recent movements. In Eagleton's view, this proliferation presents yet another problem. "But not much of this theoretical revolution has yet spread beyond a circle of specialist and enthusiasts: it has still to make its full impact on the student of literature and the general reader" (p. vii). Eagleton's purpose is to introduce and popularize these more or less elusive theories to the non-elitist and non-specialist. His list includes phenomenology, hermeneutics, reception theory, structuralism, semiotics, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, and political criticism.

Margolis (1987) is able to situate the problem of interpretive theories within the larger framework of philosophical thought. Margolis confirms that we are undergoing radical changes in conceptual orientation, not only in regards to the arts but to the very nature of human culture. The scope and depth of these changes are brought to light by the author who states:

...since the French Revolution, the major theoretical puzzles of the entire terrestrial community of understanding have been focused on the significance of history, the loss of conviction that the world is cognitively transparent, and the dawning realization that, whatever we make of the human condition, man cannot be assigned an essential nature sufficiently determinate that universally compelling characterizations of knowledge, communication, interpretation, interests, norms, desires, objectives,
or the like can be fixed or approximated by easy reference to its aptitudes. This is nowhere more evident than in the world of the arts. (p. vi)

According to Margolis then, the problem of interpretation is only one of several other significant themes undergoing major changes in contemporary art theory. He situates these changes first and foremost, in the "development of a comprehensive Western or European-oriented philosophical community that means to overcome the isolationist tendencies of the more narrowly Anglo-American" (p. vii). Many of these changes point to a dissatisfaction with the older ways of thinking about philosophy in general.

Margolis points to the accelerating pace with which these major changes are now succeeding one another. Some of the major themes of these changes are the appreciation of the hopeless inadequacy of empiricism—or empiricist-like insistence, the rejection of classical idealism and its corresponding confidence in large universal truths, the increasing drift in the direction of historicizing and relativizing within theory, the "deep suspicion that we cannot hope to fix any single ontology, any universally adequate or unchanging account of human cognition or human interests or human convictions," and the felt need on the part of both analytic and Continental theorists to bridge to gap between their work (p. xi).

These summary themes, Margolis asserts, can be recognized by anyone familiar with recent Western
philosophy—both Anglo-American and Continental—in terms of pragmatism, deconstruction, Marxism, hermeneutics, and late phenomenology (p. xi). The challenge, he continues, is to thread through the developments of recent philosophy of art in order to determine the extent that there is any congruity. He also estimates that this task will occupy the interests of investigators for the next generation.

Conclusion and Implications for Art Education

The proliferation of critical theory is a response to understanding the complexity and diversity of post-structuralism in literature and post-modernism in art. It is also a response that manifests itself in the disillusionment in the art object and the scientific pretense of objectivity (Levin, 1985). Marantz (1988) is among the scholars in the field of art education who is attuned to this important development. "...in the beginning was the [Art] Object. Such a dogmatic declaration immediately separates the artifact from its maker and user, from its social origins" (p. 259). And in this case, the user is one who engages in the process of interpretation. In terms of this investigation, then, two important questions come to light. First, how do these movements construe the task of interpretation? Secondly, how is the proliferation of critical theory effecting art education in general, and Discipline-based Art Education (DBAE) in particular?
Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of the study was to: (a) survey the range of contemporary interpretive strategies, (b) analyze their ideological assumptions, (c) analyze Discipline-based Art Education in terms of its ideological assumptions, (d) determine what interpretive strategies Discipline-based Art Education advocates, and (e) speculate as to Discipline-based Art Education's ability to effectively deal with contemporary art and post-modern interpretive strategies. More specifically, this study attempted to answer the following questions.

Research Questions

1. What is interpretation and what distinctions exist between it and other critical statements such as description and evaluation?

2. What is the range of art making taking place in the contemporary scene?

3. What is the range of interpretive strategies within contemporary art theory and what is the range of agreement and/or disagreement?

4. Can there be a systematic approach to the classification of the criteria for interpretation within contemporary art theory?

5. What ontological, epistemological, human nature views and methodological assumptions influence the criteria for interpretation within an interpretive strategy?
6. What are Discipline-based Art Education's (DBAE) ideological assumptions?

7. What interpretive strategies are advocated by Discipline-based Art Education?

8. Are these espoused interpretive strategies consistent with DBAE's ideological assumptions?

9. Will Discipline-based Art Education be able to incorporate post-modern interpretive strategies without contradiction or inconsistency to its values and goals?

**Theses of the Study**

1. The range of art making in the contemporary scene has influenced the proliferation of interpretive strategies.

2. The complexity and diversity manifested throughout the fields of criticism and aesthetics in regard to the notion of interpretation can be systematically and comprehensively explored by an examination of the ontological, epistemological, human nature views and methodological assumptions of respective interpretive strategies, thus providing a classificatory tool for art educators to approach the notion of interpretation.

3. The systematic classification of interpretive strategies will reveal fundamental elements of disagreement and paradigmatic discord.

4. Discipline-based Art Education's ideological assumptions may encounter paradigmatic conflict and
contradiction in attempting to incorporate the manifested
diversity among interpretive strategies.

Need for the Study

Art criticism has received quite a bit of attention
from researchers in art education during the past fifteen
years as a major component in educational reform (Barkan,
1973). Moreover, since Barkan, such writers as Clark and
and DiBlasio (1985) have prescribed curriculum reform in
relation to aesthetics as well (Russell, 1986).

The Need for Meta-criticism

Concurrent with this increased interest in critical
discourse and aesthetics, there has also developed a mode
of curriculum theorizing that is termed educational meta-
criticism (Geahigan, 1979). Educational meta-criticism is
a form of inquiry that attempts to explain what criticism
and aesthetics is and how each should function in various
educational settings (p. 3).

However, despite the growth in educational meta-
criticism, Geahigan (1979) asserts that there is a
surprising lack of reference to other metacritical theories
and a lack of debate about the adequacy of other theories
which are offered as models for curriculum development.

There would be no problem, of course, if educational
theorists agreed on the definitions and models prescribed
for the teaching and learning of art criticism and aesthetics. However, writers such as Geahigan (1979, 1980, 1983), Russell (1986) and Hamblen (1986) have noted some fundamental problems in terms of theory adequacy.

The literature in art criticism provides a list of key concepts that Geahigan (1979, 1983) has found to vary in meaning. Such clusters of related terms are criticism, description, analysis, characterization, interpretation, explanation, evaluation, and judgement.

It is simply a fact that different sets of these terms are employed by different educational metacritics to explain what criticism is. So that different writers either (a) present notions of criticism at variance with one another, (b) use terminology in different ways, or (c) do both of the above. (p. 4)

Geahigan refers to these as critical terms, critical nouns or critical verbs, which are both ambiguous and vague since critical terms can be used to express more than one concept. Meanings of critical terms then, are very much a matter of philosophical debate.

In discussing the characteristics of a DBAE program Clark, Day and Greer (1987) identify five main clusters of concepts within the realm of aesthetics that require critical reflection through conceptual analysis: the art object, appreciation and interpretation, critical evaluation, artistic creation and the cultural context of a work of art. Meaning is also a key concept in this model.

Hamblen (1986) identifies some of the concepts that are relevant to aesthetic literacy. Basing her argument on
Weitz's notion that art has no set of necessary and sufficient properties, Hamblen suggests that aesthetics may be understood as consisting of contested concepts that prompt one to examine such aspects as artistic response, meaning, function, and production (p. 67). Moreover, there is uncertainty in the literature as to what issues are relevant to aesthetic study. For example, Ecker notes that children are capable of describing, defining and interpreting art but that such talk is very difficult to accomplish because so many of the key concepts are problematic.

After summarizing the key concepts in the work of Clark, Zimmerman, and Lanier, Hamblen suggests that the lack of extensive work in curriculum design has perhaps been due to the problem with structuring content that is elusive, contested and resistant to definitional consensus (p. 73). What Hamblen suggests is a curriculum model that capitalizes on the problematic nature of aesthetics and uses debate as its integrating principle.

Summary and Conclusion

Thus, it appears that after only a brief examination of the literature in art education, the act of interpretation had been identified as a concept that appears as a contested concept in need of analysis and clarification. Nevertheless, despite the lack of
agreement, art educators have placed great significance upon the act of interpretation.

The Significance of Interpretation in Art Education

According to Smith (1973, p. 42, in Geahigan, 1979) the proper concern of interpretation is to find something about the meaning of the work of art as a whole. Smith asserts that interpretation is often taken as the most meaningful phase of the interaction between the viewer and the work of art. Furthermore, according to Day, Clark and Greer (1987), "Works of art present a complex of profound meanings in special forms that often are referred to as visual metaphors. To comprehend meanings embodied in works of art requires education that develops student's abilities to unravel such meanings" (p. 142).

Parsons (1987) suggests that the ability to unravel meanings is associated not only with one's cognitive development, but also with the assumption that art is capable of layers of interpretation and that one grows in the ability to interpret the expressiveness of works of art. Indeed, at stage five (the highest level of aesthetic development) Parsons suggests that the meanings discovered in works of art, though tried out in individual experience, are understood as publicly available and that judgement is a matter of objectivity (p. 54). The essence of stage five is the seeking of reasons for interpretation and judgement, reasons that are capable of being publicly validated.
Parsons' theory of interpretive frameworks suggest that even before people learn to describe or analyze works of art, they seek to interpret works of art, that is, to seek the meanings in art.

Parsons' notions of the many layers of interpretation is also congruent with Lankford's (1984) research that suggests that "no funded interpretation of a work of art ever exhausts the possibilities of meaning inherent in the work. A single work of art may speak with fresh significance to different people at different times under different circumstances" (p. 154).

It is apparent that although researchers in art education refer to interpretation as a key concept and one of the most desirable and enriching experiences in dealing with works of art, the concept is associated with vague and ambiguous concepts and activities as aesthetic response, meaning, significance, profundity, verification, and subjective and public experience.

Summary and Conclusion

Thus far in this work, we have seen that art educators such as Geahigan, Hamblen, and Russell are calling for continued meta-criticism in the realms of aesthetics and criticism. They have identified interpretation as a contested concept and have advocated for conceptual analysis of the term. However, it has also been pointed
out by several literary theorists that we need to deal with the notion of interpretive strategies as well.

Need for Ideological Analysis of Interpretive Strategies

We have already identified the various interpretive strategies manifested in contemporary philosophy of art and art criticism. The question remains, how are these methods to be dealt with?

Eagleton asserts that any attempt to define literary theory in terms of a distinctive method is doomed to failure (1983, p. 197). These methods have nothing whatsoever in common. He asserts that, "these forms of criticism differ from others because they define the object of analysis differently, have different values, beliefs and goals, and thus offer different kinds of strategy for the realizing of these goals" (p. 212).

Mitchell (1983) vividly acknowledges the conflict rather than consensus involving the arguments about the ideological and ethical implication of various interpretive strategies. He states that there is a revived need to historicize— that is, to scrutinize interpretive disciplines and their values.

Conclusion

When we combine the vagueness and ambiguity that surrounds the notion of interpretation as utilized in the field of art education, with the debate and confusion of recent interpretive movements such as deconstruction,
feminism, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, hermeneutics, reception theory, semiotics and political criticism, the problem explodes in scope resulting in an extremely fertile yet complex and confusing field of investigation.

However, even when we are dealing with an admitted confusion surrounding the proliferation of interpretive strategies, it is important to acknowledge along with Feldman (1988) our responsibility as educators. He asserts that "...teachers of literature are several light years ahead of us. That is, the theoretical materials we find new and innovative in art criticism have long been known to literary critics" (p. 54).

Nevertheless, while acknowledging both the complexity found within the various interpretive strategies, and our own lack of awareness concerning these strategies, it is necessary to make this investigation relevant to the kinds of problems found specifically within the field of art education.

**Discipline-based Art Education**

One means of limiting the problem is to focus upon a single approach to art education. For the purposes of this investigation, Discipline-based Art Education (DBAE) has been selected for such a focus. DBAE is particularly important because of its appeal to the experts from the various disciplines in regards to curriculum problems. But as Efland (1987) has warned, it is a fallacy to assume that
experts from the disciplines can be relied upon for consensus. This then is the pivotal point of this investigation, namely, that there is no consensus in regards to the task of interpretation and that any appeal to the experts will result in competing views.

**Ideological Analysis of Approaches to Art Education**

Several researchers in art education have examined the notion of ideology and ideological analysis in recent years. R. DiBlasio (1977) cautions against *ideological blindness*, that is, the uncritical reflectiveness that impairs reflective awareness and prevents the identification of ideologies. Smith (1983) asserts that it is necessary to conduct a critical examination of ideologies within art education by asking what the ideology assumes about education, and what it assumes about art. Lanier (1980) advocates a cleaning out of our intellectual cupboards by ridding the profession of ideologies deemed as inadequate. Finally, M. DiBlasio (1975) writes on the need for a critical examination of beliefs claims in art education curricula.

**Delimitations of the Study**

While it is hoped that this investigator will be able to contribute to a systematic analysis of the various interpretive movements within contemporary art theory, and formulate their implications for art education during the years to come, it is more feasible to limit this discussion
to theories significant to the field of art education. Therefore, for the purposes of this present work, the limitations are as stated:

1. The study is limited to a survey of contemporary art and contemporary philosophy of art and art criticism to be used as the background of the problem of interpretation.

2. The study is a theoretical rather than an empirical study, limited to meta-criticism of pertinent interpretive theories.

3. While there are significantly different approaches to art education, this study will limit itself to Discipline-based Art Education as the approach under investigation.

4. Although the range of interpretive strategies is extensive and complex, they shall be limited to those manifested within Discipline-based Art Education, that is, either as those strategies already articulated by DBAE or as those strategies suggested for further exploration.

**Definition of Terms**

1. **Anti-positivism**: An epistemological position that it is against the search for laws or underlying regularities in the world of social affairs. The world is essentially relativistic and can only be understood from the point of view of the individual. Social science is essentially a subjective enterprise. Anti-positivists
reject the notion that science can generate objective knowledge of any kind (Burrell and Morgan, p. 5).


3. Determinism: A view that regards human beings as completely determined by the environment.

4. Epistemological: Concern the grounds of knowledge—about how one understands the world and how one communicates this knowledge to others. Is it possible to identify the nature of knowledge as hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form or whether knowledge is of a softer or spiritual or subjective or even transcendental form, based upon the experience and insight of unique and highly personal nature (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 1-2).


6. Ideographic: A methodology that is based on the assumption that one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It seeks the analysis of the subjective accounts revealed in diaries, biographies and journalistic records.
7. **Ideology**: A system of ideas that has a bearing on educational practice (Smith, 1983). Also a system of values and beliefs (M. DiBlasio, 1975).

8. **Interpretive communities**: Those who share the same interpretive strategy.

9. **Literary Interpretation**: Telling what a work means; any such, statement or set of statements used to report discovered meanings in a literary text is called "literary interpretation" (Beardsley, 1987, p. 370).

10. **Metaphysical**: Assumptions about the nature of reality. The term *meta* means beyond and *physics* refers to nature. *Metaphysics* then is the study of that which is beyond or is the basis of natural phenomena (Schubert, 1986, p. 120).

11. **Methodological**: The way in which one investigates and obtains 'knowledge' about the social world.

12. **Nominalism**: An ontological position that revolves around the assumption that the social world, external to individual cognition, is nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality. There is no 'real' structure to the world which concepts are used to describe. Names are artificial creations or tools for making sense of the external world (Burrell and Morgan, p. 4).
13. **Nomothetic**: A methodology that emphasizes systematic protocol and technique. It is epitomized in the approach employed by the natural sciences which focus upon the testing of hypotheses with scientific rigor. It is reoccupied with the construction of scientific tests and the use of quantitative techniques for the analysis of data (Burrell and Morgan, pp. 6-7).

14. **Ontological**: Concerns the notion of essence or 'reality,' that is, whether the reality is external to the individual—imposing itself on individual consciousness from without—or the product of individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is an objective nature or the product of individual cognition (Burrell and Morgan, p. 1).

15. **Positivism**: Characterizes epistemologies which seek to explain and predict the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships. Knowledge is essentially a cumulative process in which new insights are added to the existing stock of knowledge and false hypotheses are eliminated (Burrell and Morgan, p. 5).

16. **Realism**: An ontological position that posits that the social world is external to individual cognition and is a real world that is made up of hard, tangible, immutable and empirical entities. Reality exists independent of an individual's apprehension of it (Burrell and Morgan, p. 4).
17. **Voluntarism**: A view that human beings are completely autonomous and free-willed. In so far as the social sciences are concerned, they must incline implicitly or explicitly to one or the other or adopt an intermediate point of view (Burrell and Morgan, p. 6).

**Assumptions of the Study**

The investigator perceived the study in terms of the following assumptions:

1. The discussion of literary criticism informs art criticism and is therefore valuable to the discussion of art criticism.

2. Knowledge of recent interpretive movements will lead to greater understanding of contemporary art and will enhance the theory and practice of art education in the realm of art criticism.

3. Since new directions are articulated first within the contemporary art scene and are then made sense of through philosophical discourse, contemporary art should be the starting place for an investigation of contemporary interpretive strategies.

4. Although there is a great deal of complexity and variation manifested within particular interpretive strategies, there are fundamental elements common to them that will allow for their systematic classification.

5. Discipline-based Art Education is a primary ideology within contemporary art education.
Procedural Overview

Chapter I will delineate the nature, scope, significance and purpose of the study.

Chapter II will include a brief survey of contemporary art, and will seek to identify and describe the range and scope of contemporary critical theory.

After surveying the scope of research concerned with educational and social paradigms and ideology, Chapter III will develop a matrix for the description and classification of interpretive strategies based primarily upon an adaptation of the work of Mitroff and Kilmann, and Burrell and Morgan.

The primary purpose of Chapter IV will be to demonstrate the lack of agreement and paradigmatic conflict among the experts concerning the task of interpretation. Using the developed matrix, Chapter IV will: (a) analyze the ideological assumptions of modernism and post-modernism, (b) speculate whether formalism can adequately deal with contemporary art, (c) analyze the paradigmatic assumptions of the various movements within contemporary art, (d) systematically analyze the paradigmatic assumptions of the various interpretive strategies, (e) analyze the ideological foundation of Discipline-based Art Education (DBAE), (f) investigate whether Discipline-based Art Education assumes agreement among the experts in regards to the task of interpretation,
(g) analyze DBAE's interpretive strategies and determine its correlation to the DBAE's espoused ideology, and (h) analyze the paradigmatic assumptions of representative cases of feminism, Marxism and psychoanalysis (interpretive strategies suggested by Clark, Day and Greer (1987) as representative of psychological and political criticism).

Chapter V will speculate as the correlation of these representative interpretive strategies to Discipline-based Art Education in particular, and to art education in general, concerning the integration and possible contradictions in their use. It shall also speculate as the DBAE's ability to deal with competing values manifested in contemporary art. Finally, Chapter V will include any other findings not stated in the original research proposal.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

Smagula (1983) puts us on the alert as to the complexity of the last two decades of contemporary art.

We face the most pluralistic, complex, and contradictory era the world has ever known....Nowhere is such disarming diversity more manifest than in the world of contemporary art....there exists such a dazzling array of possibilities that the casual observer (and sometimes the seasoned veteran) often feels confused and lost. (p. 1)

In order to analyze the diversity found within contemporary art, the review of the literature must first describe this diversity. The purpose of this chapter then, is to first survey the range of contemporary artmaking. It is hypothesized that the diversity manifested in contemporary art has influenced the range and complexity of interpretive strategies. Therefore, this chapter will also survey the range of interpretive strategies as well. It will remain the purpose of Chapter IV to analyze the sociological assumptions of these contemporary art movements and interpretive strategies in order to determine their paradigmatic elements.

The Dada Movement

Dada was not an art movement. It expressed itself primarily through words and often through journals that issued from Zurich, Berlin, New York, Cologne and Moscow.

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Although art was tertiary, it showed that performances can themselves be art as it embraced elements of cabaret, theatre, recital, exhibition and so on (p. 127). There is also the tradition of actions or performances carried out as works of art that exist only for one occasion. This element of nonpermanence questioned the social function of private art collection and the commerce that goes with it. Art events became a means of evading the system.

Dada art is very diverse, but what it has in common is the heritage of modernism and the intention of challenging established norms of what art should be. "Everything the artist spits is art," said Kurt Schwitters. "It is not the form, the matter, the content, the category, the skill that make a product art but that the artist knows it is art" (p. 127). Along with this notion, art will lose its distinctiveness and surrender its special status, becoming once again ordinary human behavior.

During the First World War there was an active group of Dadaists in New York, among them was Marcel Duchamp, Picabia, and Man Ray.

**Marcel Duchamp**

Marcel Duchamp questioned the role of the artist as artificer. In 1913 he dropped three pieces of sewing thread on to a canvas and fixed them into the position that they fell. He called it 3 Standard Stoppages. But control was relinquished even further in Bottle Rack (1914) and
Fountain (1917)—both an inversion of the object's intended function. The artist merely selects. The objects are commonplace and mass-produced and the public is deprived of the satisfaction it thinks it ought to have.

**Surrealism**

The Surrealist aim was to subvert citizens from good behavior and liberate them by teaching them to live on a superior plane of natural freedom (Lynton, 1980). Hence, it was founded on a belief in the higher reality of certain forms of neglected associations—dreams, disinterested play of thought (Lucie-Smith, 1984). Material pursuits would become irrelevant as they let go the bonds of rational order. The poet Andre Breton was leader of the movement. The essential method of the movement was to fix one's gaze on the inner life and to nourish others as well through artistic radicalism and political revolution. A journal named the *Surrealism in the Service of the Revolution* (1924-1929) was established to involve itself not only in literature and the arts, but social struggle as well (Lynton, 1980).

**War and Immigration to New York**

Much time was wasted in controversy so that when the war broke out the movement was in decline. The exiles included Brenton, Max Ernst, Roberto Matt, Salvador Dali, and Andre Masson. But the old rending of political arguments were no longer relevant.
Max Ernst

Ernst was able not only to provide the visual equivalents of automatism—proposed in the first Surrealist Manifesto of 1924 to the essential means of exploring the unconscious—but also unlinked images comparable to Surrealist writing. In 1924 in Paris, he made a picture relief titled *Two Children are Menaced by a Nightingale*. Mysterious, dreamlike, and with echoes of the Renaissance, he added the Dada element of nonsensical assemblage. "This has the effect of throwing doubt on any attempt to find a sensible interpretation of the pictorial drama and makes the Cubist trick of confronting us with different sorts of reality within one work, into a painfully disruptive device" (p. 173).

Joan Miro

In the first Surrealist exhibition of 1925, Miro's new style emerged as an ambiguous space created by staining the canvas. Rather than referring to universal, impersonal truth, his signs and symbols were a language and syntax as idiosyncratic as an intense inward focus could make them. Thus, the paintings of both Miro and Ernst presented personal themes through signs and symbols through the process of automatism.

Salvador Dali and Rene Magritte

Dali's lack of cool objectivity is seen in his work that purports to be scenes brought up from the unconscious
 itself. "Dali's professed purpose was to 'systemize confusion and this to help discredit completely the world of reality'" (Lynton, p. 178). By exploiting our perceptual processes, he made his viewers liable to misread what they saw. His aim was to reinforce such misreading until they threw doubt on the reading we call correct or normal.

Magritte struck at the traditional core of art—the value of art as communication. He set words against representations to set up paradoxes of reality. In The Use of Words I, he paints a picture of a pipe with the words, "This is not a pipe." His aim was to demonstrate that words are arbitrary, unreliable things.

Abstract Expressionism

The abstract expressionists were not interested in the world around them. Nor were they radical reformers but rather idealists who were concerned with the universals they found within themselves and in ancient myths. They responded to the philosophical and psychological ideas of Kierkegaard, Jung, Existentialism and American traditions of the spiritual. The pioneer abstract expressionists were Tobey (American), Rothko, de Kooning, Still, Gorky, Newmann, Kline, Pollock, and Motherwell. Gorky, de Kooning and Rothko were immigrants. They believed that this new art—which sprang partly from a resistance to the materialistic social system—was to be based on
stylelessness and on profound personal revelation (Lynton, pp. 227-229).

Lucie-Smith (1985) distinguishes two kinds of abstract expressionist painting. The first sort, typified by Pollock, Franz Kline, and William de Kooning, is energetic and gestural. The other is typified by Mark Rothko, who is more abstract and more tranquil. Rothko's work in particular, serves to justify Rosenberg's use of the term 'mystic' to describe this school. Pollock, Miro and Adolph Gottlieb, are all found to have used cosmic symbols in their work. Gottlieb, with his interest in Freud, deliberately filled his painting with cosmic symbolism.

Mark Toby, Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko

The techniques of Oriental art and philosophy made an impact on the movement. Rothko's work invites the spectator to contemplation, and Mark Toby--a forerunner to the movement--stayed in a Zen monastery and converted to Buddhism. He adopted a technique labeled 'white writing' which covered the surface with an intricate network of signs.

The American painter, Jackson Pollock, is best known for his free, 'gesture' painting and by his attitude of passivity and receptivity while in the process of painting. Pollock was an intensely subjective artist. For him inner reality was the only reality. He greatly valued the sand paintings of the Pueblo Indians, whose ephemeral works were
used for ritualistic purposes. His works too, were meditative and deeply intimate.

Rothko's work is also mystical. His characteristic composition of two or three color rectangles hovering above each other against another color is "suggestive of the mystery of divine power as it might have appeared to prehistoric mankind, or might appear now to man in extremis... the best Rothkos appear to move almost subliminally: the abstract composition become a living presence" (Lynton, p. 239). Thus, he carried out the first duty of abstract expressionism—not to look outwards for social themes or in criticism of the world, but in their subjective quest, to search for universal significance.

Post-Painterly Abstraction

One style which held its' own in the wake of abstract expressionism was 'Hardedge' abstraction. Josef Albers was one of the progenitors of this kind of painting in America. Very typical of the Bauhaus atmosphere—systematic, orderly and also experimental, it was very much interested in Gestalt psychology. Albers shared a similar aesthetic doctrine with the American painter, Ad Reinhardt.

The doctrinaire nature of post-painterly abstraction is striking. Rather as the logical positivists have concentrated on the purely linguistic aspects of philosophy, so the painters who adhere to the movement have been concerned to rid themselves of all by a narrow range of strictly pictorial considerations. (Lucie-Smith, pp. 102-103)
Post-painterly abstraction was concerned with the elimination of all elements which were not in keeping with its essential nature. Visual art was to be stripped of all extravisual meaning, whether literary or symbolic.

Morris Louis, and the veteran abstract expressionist, Barnett Newman, came to be thought of as its originators. The verdict of muteness, lack of passion and 'coolness' characterized the new form of American art. Frank Stella is more of a structuralist than a post-painterly abstractionist. His concern is not so much with color-as-color, as with painting-as-object, a thing that exists in its own right and which is entirely self-referring. This kind of painting directed itself to an informed audience. For at least a decade, it represented a kind of modernist orthodoxy—one of high status in terms of intellectual prestige.

**Pop Art and Environments**

**Jasper Johns**

Johns has been a major figure in opening up art to many pluralistic and individual approaches to art making. Smagula (1983) asserts that Johns' enigmatic icons of the twentieth century—light bulbs, rows of alphabets, flashlights, coat hangers and the like—have much to do with the present era and culture. Ordinary objects assume an uncommon presence, and the familiar world is transformed into the extraordinary. Their utter simplicity and
directness initiated intense debate as to their meaning. Many critics were writing on the hermeneutical implications of his work which seemed to defy interpretation.

His famous alphabet series embodied change and transformation, both thematically and literally through the use of repetition and subtle variation. Smagula argues that everything about this series suggests strong existential elements of change, contradiction, conflict, transition and continuity.

Rauschenberg and Hamilton

Robert Rauschenberg executed a series of 'combine paintings' using paint and photographic images from newspapers and magazines. The two artists belonged neither to abstract expressionism, nor to the post-painterly school. Some critics have identified them as Neo-Dadaists with its nihilistic challenge to America's high and solemn art.

But Johns and Rauschenberg were not alone. In London, during the years of 1952-1955, a small group of artists, designers and art historians were analyzing the symbolism and presentation of mass imagery found in comics, advertising, film and consumer-oriented design (Lynton, pp. 284-285). Here was an alternative world hardly studied. In 1956, Richard Hamilton produced a poster for an exhibition entitled, This is Tomorrow. It was a collage of
ready-mades that apparently summarized the life and dreams of every man in the Western world.

The public outcome of these instances was the Pop movement of the 1960's. It emerged concurrently and independently in both America and in Great Britain, but America was the prime source of mass-imagery. The term Pop was to cover a large range of different art activities. But they all shared a reliance on mass-media images and sometimes processes. Some critics called it the 'New Vulgarianism,' to express their disgust; others referred to its historical links by giving it the title 'New Realism,' or 'Neo-Dadaism.'

Roy Lichtenstein and Andy Warhol

The range of activity within American Pop was wider than the British, and the most blatant appeals to mass imagery were those of Lichtenstein and Warhol, who borrowed wholesale the visual language and subjects of the comic strips and the repetitiveness of advertising. Warhol added photographic images to his work. Well-known public figures as well as criminals and chilling car crashes were subjects for his repetitive work. "We are both repelled by the boringness of it all and made aware of our ready exploitation of people...and of our ready acceptance of daily manslaughter in the cause of mobility" (p. 294).
Oldenburg, Kienholz, Bell and Flanagan

It was during this period that environmental art was beginning to evolve. The Pop artist who combined both an exhibition and an art environment that surrounded the spectator was Claes Oldenburg. In 1961 he held an exhibition of surrealistic art of outlandish scale, the contents of which may be found in a New York general store. In 1962, he combined elements of The Store with giant soft sculpture—Giant Ice Cream Cone, and a hamburger as large as a bed.

In 1970, Larry Bell began making large sculptures of hinged sheets of glass which also became environmental in effect. The glass is coated with metallic compounds to make portions of it opaque and reflecting. The number of sheets, the arrangement and the opaque portions can be varied according to the setting. "The result was quite mysterious as we are forced to relate ourselves to these structures, which stand in our space yet give us contradictory and unreliable information about where they and we are in relation to each other" (Lynton, pp. 313-314). The physical character of the sculpture becomes the least reliable aspect of it. Unlike earlier modernism, the form, placing and matter seem temporary or provisional.

The sense of the temporary is also sensed in the work of Barry Flanagan. Not only is it shocking in its gruffness, but it also ignores the standards of
contemporary abstract sculpture. What it does suggest is poverty and a nomadic life rather than an art-collecting society.

Exactly what meaning such sculptures carry is ultimately open to individual questioning, and I suspect that this is precisely part of their significance: that by refusing inquiry into their aesthetic or formal functioning, they force us into interior argument. Art is never without a moral charge. Here it is very potent. We are not confronted by an artist's introspection but rather by a parable, and one we are likely to interpret in terms of world concerns. Such an awareness of the world, this insistence on making our cultural life fuse with our political awareness, is characterized by much of the art of the seventies. (Lynton, pp. 315-316)

**Conclusion**

As Lynton suggests, Pop was above all, an invitation to become critically conscious of the forms of communication through which the everyday life in the Western world are kept seductive to Western eyes (p. 299). In his estimation, the great Pop art is concerned with direct description of aspects of reality in the sense that the flood of images is part of modern life. The art of the sixties and seventies was a period of questioning both the nature of art, the artist and the values of society.

**Performance and Video**

Lynton (1980) calls attention to the influence of post-Marxian sociology as contributing to the philosophy behind happenings and performance. It is from within this frame of reference that the artist questions his or her role, and the lack of art experience in the public. In a
world divided by Marx into exploiters and exploited, it is simply enough to see artists in the latter category. Finding another market and another audience could be a ways of reintegrating art with contemporary life (p. 318).

**Yves Klein**

In 1956 the French artist Yves Klein—a major personality among the European Neo-Dadaists, presented **Anthropometries** in which naked women covered with his 'Klein international Blue,' flung themselves onto canvases spread over the floor. The ceremony was conducted in public while twenty musicians played Klein's **Monotone Symphony**, a single note sustained for ten minutes alternating with ten minutes of silence (Lucie-Smith, p. 132). In Paris in 1958, he held an exhibition of emptiness—a gallery painted completely white. Albert Camus came, and wrote, "with the void, comes full powers," in the visitors book (p. 130).

**Jim Dine**

With the rise of Pop art, both the environment and the Happening took on a new importance. The classic Pop art Happenings, such as Jim Dine's **The Car Crash** and Claes Oldenburg's **Store Days**, took place in environments especially prepared by the artists in a 'collage-environment of sounds, duration, gestures, sensations and smells. The spectators were not supplied with a plot or even characters, but were bombarded with sensation.
Joseph Beuys has been one of the most controversial artists in the contemporary scene. Beuys' aim has been to affect all sections of life with his art including the political arena. He sees himself as a social critic, a tireless activist and reformer, questioning the social values, structures and beliefs of his time. He is also a teacher-artist dedicated to bringing about social and deep personal change by realizing individual and social potential. Transformation is a key concept for this artist. His "actions" merge elements of art and life and break down what he feels are arbitrary barriers between theatre, music, poetry, visual art and dance (p. 228). Synthesis is very apparent in his work as he not only merges the arts but also merges his own person iconography with Celtic, Christian, and pagan imagery along with alchemical symbolism and scientific thought (p. 235).

At the heart of his work is the issue of autobiography. Weaved into his performances are all sorts of personal images—a shepherd, a stag, fat, and felt—all highly charged metaphors for his own traumatic life experiences. Understanding his work demands knowledge of his personal background.

Beuys was born in southern Germany in 1921—a place referred to as "terror landscape," referring to the marshy atmosphere and the superstitions of the people. Often in
his solitary play as a child, he would have visions. He remembers being a shepherd with a long stick of wood leading his imaginary flock or being the 'stagleader.' The stag and the hare were also potently symbolic images of the nomads as they transversed the political and cultural borders into other lands. Within his folk tradition, the stag appears in times of distress and danger, as it brings the warm and positive elements of life. It is also endowed with spiritual powers and insight and is the accompanier of the soul.

Along with these cultural symbols, extremely personal symbols appear in his work. During World War II, his plane was shot down and landed on the barren plains in a tremendous snowstorm. Although many of his close friends on the plane were pulverized on impact, he was thrown clear of the wreckage and rescued by a band of nomads who covered his body in fat to help his body regenerate warmth and wrapped him in felt as an insulation. Thus, these elements signified the healing and warmth that literally saved his life. After the war, he enrolled in a nearby university to study natural science but after his near death experience and "rebirth," it seemed inadequate to address the central issues of life which had become an obsession with him.

The philosophical notions of all of his work are summarized by his statement: "The key to changing things is to unlock the creativity in every man. When each man is
creative, beyond right and left political parties, he can revolutionize time" (p. 238).

Nam June Paik

Like Beuys, Paik too exhibits a sense of synthesis in his work. Believing that the modern is a curious synthesis of the great branches of thought, he laces Eastern and Western ideology and religion as well as Asian and European thought into his work. Paik performed his art with a vengeance and produced a series of terrifying musical events. They were so wild and violent that he became known as the "cultural terrorist" in that he smashed or burned exquisite violins and grand pianos—the very symbols of high European art. His belief in the wisdom and "tao" of chance operations (de-emphasized in European thought) led him to explore the use of the "automatic pilot" mode on the synthesizer to produce results that would be impossible through conscious manipulation (p. 245).

One of his most successful live-circuit events was the **TV Buddha**. An eighteenth-century Japanese Buddha from the artist's personal collection sits on a white cloth-covered table contemplating itself via a twentieth-century electronic icon—the television (p. 245). The artist here plays the role of a social critic who comments on the role of technology in present day life.
Sculptural Events and Earthworks

This generation of artists work to reject the coolness, overt rationality, and materialistic tendencies predominant in work of the sixties. Instead, they look for inspiration in early societies who cultivated close relationships with the earth and who manifested a sense of the spiritual (p. 261). This was a return to nature—not an idealized nature—but one that attempted to perceive in a fresh way the mystery of the world. Their goal is a broad visceral understanding of life and living.

Christo’s sculptural events explore the political, social and economic forces of modern life, Smithson’s earthworks are meditations of geologic time, Simonds creates scenarios of a symbolic social order and Oppenheim explores the realm of the artist-shaman.

Christo

Christo’s sculptural events are temporary and public, and require the collective efforts of a great many people, hence he brings to light in a dramatic way the socially interdependence of the world. His works such as Four Storefronts comment on the materialistic aspects of modern life, and springs from his belief that contemporary art could be an instrument of social dialogue and change.

Robert Smithson

Robert Smithson was discouraged by the limitations of Minimalist art and reductionist tendencies. Abstraction
seemed meaningless and far removed from reality. He looked to nature for complexity and meaning. Smithson understood geologic time and entropy as the measure of order and disorder, disintegration and reconstruction. These were the very processes of life. *Spiral Jetty* employs the spiral shape and symbolizes life itself as it at once expands and shrinks inward.

Michael Heizer and Walter De Maria

Heizer's and De Maria's work are remote and inaccessible earthworks that recall the mythic journey into the desert. Both of these artists work in reaction to the materialistic concerns and spiritual emptiness of contemporary life. "De Maria's mind is constantly engaged in elaborate ideation, he loves ironic, elegant and paradoxical elements to coexist in his art" (p. 288). One of his notions of paradox is the concept of invisibility. In 1966, he marked two parallel chalk lines and a 1000-foot-long cross in the desert. Within a few months they disappeared but the artist was willing to give up the object for the permanence of the idea.

In the *New York Earth Room*, De Maria filled the gallery with 220,000 pounds of earth to cover the 3600 square foot gallery to a depth of 21 inches. His equation—earth = dirt—sets up a whole range of implications and associations: dirt can signify filth, land of our nation, place of birth, real estate, the planet
earth and the substance we grow our food in. Smagula takes this work to be a political act. "It openly questions not only the gallery distribution system but the kind of art usually shown in it" (p. 293).

**Alice Aycock**

Alice Aycock reacted against the simple, primary-form nonliterate sculpture of the late sixties that functioned in an isolated way from its environment. Her quasi-architectural works (both indoor and outdoor) explore the idea of shelter from the psychological, literal and experiential points of view. Both Aycock and Dennis Oppenheim (whom we shall discuss later) are interested in investigating the more interior and intimate psychological space of the mind. Soon after one enters these dwellings, one has a sense of entering the artist's mind. **Low Building with Dirt Roof (for Mary)** is about transition. All that remains of the house is the attic. The artist feels that attics and cellars are important because they are usually storage areas for memorabilia. They are the most contemplative and meditative spaces (p. 307). One has to enter the dwelling on hands and knees—like entering the earth itself. The images of many of Aycock's works are shafts, tunnels, towers and inner chambers, as well as ladders, doorways and windows that at times lead to other doors and windows. The familiar architectural forms are subverted, confused and yet full of delight and wonder.
The recurrent themes of frustration and contradiction reinforce the non-functionalism of her work which blends personal experience and historic reference to "shelter" (pp. 309-310).

Dennis Oppenheim

In concluding with our final artist, Dennis Oppenheim, a quote from Smagula will serve to summarize his work and the work of the artists discussed thus far:

One of the themes that consistently runs through the work of process and environmental artist is the desire to impart meaning to their lives through their art activities. Isolating, meaningless activities that do not serve the real needs of the artists and their audiences are rejected. One of the most important needs today is a psychological sense of well-being to counter the fragmenting effects of contemporary life. (p. 312)

Although Oppenheim does not practice art therapy, there are interesting analogies between the nature of his work and its "therapeutic" value. The highly respected art critic and intellectual, Jack Burnham, discusses the aspects of the artist as Shaman to which Oppenheim resembles. The traditional Shaman undergoes a ritualized psychodrama that forces him to confront himself and his past. Having survived these ordeals, he emerges strengthened and transformed, through a mystical re-enactment of a psychic death and spiritual renewal. After this initiation, the shaman-artist possess the ability to reach others using the arts of song, dance, theatre, and poetry to bridge the gap between the worldly
and spiritual problems. Smagula asserts that it would be misleading to imply that Oppenheim has consciously directed his work towards shamanistic ends, but the similarities are very striking (p. 312).

Conclusion

There are a number of elements that these artists have more or less in common: (a) a return to nature and natural processes, (b) some type of mythic journey, (c) isolation or inaccessibility, (d) participatory action, and (e) personal and/or social transformation. All of these elements are in contradiction to the impersonal, observer-status, coolly objective works of the past decade. Some artists have questioned this passive role and have chosen to fight against the commodification of their products.

Lippard (1983) suggests that many of the artists who are now involved with earthworks had been Minimalists, who adopted the dictum "less is more," but who later came to see that "less is more--but it's not enough." This is clearly the case with Robert Smithson. The artists represented here have chosen to work from the inside, arriving at primal images from their own needs.

But at the same time, artists may be seen as keepers of human memory--as natural archaeologists. Dennis Oppenheim, whom Burnham uses as the model of "the artist as shaman" remarked that, "'Now that we're armed with all these intellectual weapons, can't we go back into something
more challenging in its range of reality? What art needs now is to bespeak its origins'" (p. 8).

The Foundations of Ritual

In introducing the notions of her book (1983), Lucy Lippard refers to the words of Antonio Gramsci:

Creating a new culture is not just a matter of individuals making "original" discoveries but also, and above all, of disseminating already discovered truths---of socializing them so to speak, and making them the basis of vital action and an element of coordination and intellectual and moral effort. (p. 1)

The artists in the 40's and 50's arrived at mythological themes via the classical sources. But many of today's artists tend to be less interested in the classical period and more attracted to the archaic and prehistoric. "These artists are rebelling against reductive purism and an art-for-art's-sake emphasis on form or image alone with a gradual upsurge of mythical and ritual content related to nature and to the origins of social life" (p. 5).

With the development of the "fetishistic object with it connections to primitive art via Surrealism and Dada, some have interpreted such undertakings as anti-progressive. But the truth is that they are a complex combination of reactionary and progressive elements. Lippard sees her purpose as:

By bringing together the deeply moving vestiges of a past so distant it is virtually unknowable and images made by artist today which are culturally familiar and yet lacking some necessary depth in history, I hoped to understand better the original connections between art, religion, and politics, the
ways in which culture contributes to and functions in social life. (p. 5)

Such conflicts did not exist in prehistory and many contemporary artists are trying to overcome the false dichotomies.

Lippard's book is based on the assumption that art has social significance and a social function. Art is a vehicle for understanding any aspect of life, whether it be social change, metaphors for emotion, or abstract conceptions. The important thing is that these are communicated. The social element, she insists, is crucial. In the late 60's, after a period in which most avant-garde art was drastically divorced from social subjects or effects, many artists became disgusted with the star system and the narrowness of the formal movements. Asking themselves larger questions, they found politics, nature, history and myth.

Lippard rightly incorporates Gramsci's thoughts as a way of describing her own fascination with nature and culture. The feminists are those who overlay personal on history and who strive to overcome the imposed polarization between the personal and the political—between culture and nature. Primitivism is one way of rebelling against the false dichotomy. "In the process of working with and understanding ancient myths, many artists began to understand how they were connected to them and why they
were so moving—not because of the form alone, but because of the content" (p. 10).

**Ree Morton**

For some artists like Ree Morton, the "ritual gesture" has a therapeutic value of an exorcism for both the artist and for the participants. In 1976 at Artpark on the Niagara River, Morton performed a piece called *To the Maids of the Mist*. She was inspired by a local Indian legend about the annual sacrifice of a "bride of the river," who was sent over Niagara Falls in a canoe filled with fruits and flowers. Morton's piece was dedicated to these women in a "symbolic rescue," a "gesture toward being female." Her props were a thirty-five foot celaster ladder and two life preservers. She lavishly decorated the preservers with celastic ribbons and roses and cast one into the river, and attached the other to the ladder which was placed between the cliffs and the river—hence a way out was provided for the young, doomed maidens. It was a valiant attempt to restore to life those already lost in the fulfillment of a mythic rite (Morton, 1980).

**Donna Henes**

The self proclaimed "Spider Woman," Donna Henes has been making public rituals designed to "make connections." She does this by building webs—webs that hold the world together. Henes soon began to make actual webs and cocoons
as sculptures. Continuing to wind, wrap, swaddle—
processes that have been used to characterize the work of
women, she uses line to transform landscapes, trees, herself
and others. In 1978 Great Lakes Great Circle traveling
ceremony performed at lakes and Indian mounds in the
Midwest, Henes performed a "head wrapping" ritual in which
she emerged a "sourceer, knottier, web-weaver, shaman,
dreamer, dancer, bruja, a witch (which means woman),
macro/micro cosmic traveller" (Lippard, 1983, p. 187). The
ritual ended with the chant "200 years ago I would have
been burnt."

Ulrike Rosenbach and Mary Beth Edelson

Edelson is one among many other women artists who are
attempting to understand more fully the maternal ties with
their own children, and to universalize and redesignify the
roles of childbearing and childrearing. Hera's Lifeways
was performed in Boston in 1977, followed by a black-garbed
"hag" as she resurrected (gave birth) to a nude young woman
and led her through a maze and a series of ritual actions.

Sharing the same interest in maternal ties as Edelson,
Rosenbach bonded together her own children to herself by
using very long bandages of transparent gauze. Lippard
suggests that this may have been a reverse birth piece,
retying the umbilical cord, grafting her child back to
herself.
But of the two, Edelson is the American artist most deeply interested in the study of the Great Goddess, who is resurrected from the past as a medium between nature and humanity. "For over a decade she has combined a multiplicity of ingredients—Jungian psychology, feminism, dreams, fantasies, the collective unconscious, politics, and collaborative artmaking—into a body of work that spans many mediums and millennia (Lippard, p. 69).

Charles Simonds and Dennis Oppenheim

Charles Simonds combines social action with highly personal imagery. Since 1971 the artist has constructed over 250 tiny clay dwellings built in the crevasses and on the sidewalks of the inner city. Writing is also very important to this artist as it serves to define his ideas and propel him into action. In 1975, Simonds wrote about the social customs, work habits and religious beliefs, as well as the whole philosophical basis for their existence. His other works, such as Growth House also explore ideas about decay, renewal, the symbolic meaning of shelter, birth, maturation, death and transformation.

Conclusion and Implications

If these archaic and prehistoric elements are to be understood by the public, and accomplish the social task that Lippard suggests is so crucial, the familiar interpretive tools will have to be revised to deal with the increased complexity of the artistic presentations made
manifest in contemporary art. As Lippard (1983) insists, self-knowledge has become more complex due to the heightened awareness that Marxism, feminism and the ecology movements have brought to our perceptions of our relationship to nature (p. 52). We need intellectual tools to help us to grasp this emerging complexity.

A Survey of Interpretive Strategies

One might estimate the development of literary theory in three stages: a preoccupation with the author (Romanticism and the 19th century); and exclusive concern with the text (New Criticism); and a marked shift of attention to the reader in the recent years.

Literary critics have been conducting extensive examinations of the major interpretive strategies. Eagleton (1983) and Culler (1986) both delineate the major movements before presenting their own theories of criticism. Of the two writers, Eagleton sets out to conduct a reasonably comprehensive account of modern literary theory. Included in his discussion is phenomenology, hermeneutics, reception theory, structuralism, semiotics, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis and political criticism. His analysis of these theories are within political and social contexts.
In 1918 Europe lay in ruins in widespread ideological crisis. Edmund Husserl was to lend absolute certainty to a disintegrating civilization. To establish this certainty, one must ignore or put in brackets anything which is beyond immediate experience. We must reduce the external world to the contents of our consciousness alone—this is called phenomenological reduction (p. 55). The kind of 'pure' phenomena that Husserl desired was that of universal types or essences. For example, not the experience of jealousy but the essential and unchanging essence. The aim of this theory was to return to the concrete and grasp the world with hard data. This would establish the grounds for genuine reliable knowledge. It was not a form of empiricism concerned with the random fragmentary experience of particular individuals. For Husserl, knowledge of phenomena is absolutely certain. Phenomena does not need to be interpreted. His intentional theory of consciousness suggests that being and meaning are always bound up with one another.

Phenomenology as a Science of Subjectivity

Phenomenology desired to secure a knowable world on one hand and also establish the centrality of the human subject with the other. It was a science of subjectivity. The world is what we posit or intend; it is grasped in
relation to the individual and is a correlation of the individual consciousness. The subject is to be seen as the source and origin of all meaning.

As with Husserl's bracketing of the real object, phenomenological criticism brackets or ignores the actual historical context of the art work, its author, and the conditions of production and readership. All of this is done to accomplish an **immanent** reading of the text. The text itself is reduced to a pure embodiment of the author's consciousness. Biographical criticism is banned—only those aspects of his or her consciousness which manifest themselves in the work itself are approved.

**Objectivity**

Complete objectivity and disinterestedness are the goals. One must purge oneself of biases and predilections. Criticism is not seen as an active interpretation of the work for it is feared that this method would lead to the critic engaging in his or her own interests and biases; it is rather, mere passive reception of the text. Eagleton characterizes this method as idealist, essentialist, anti-historical and formalist (pp. 54-60).

For Husserl, meaning is something that predates language: language is only a secondary activity which gives names to meanings. This is opposed to the linguistic revolution of Saussure and Wittgenstein who assert that language actually produces meaning.
Hermeneutics

Heidegger's Hermeneutical Phenomenology

Heidegger broke with Husserl's system of thought and recognized that meaning is historical. In his major work, Being and Time (1927) the question of Being is bound up with being-in-the-world—that is, bound up in the world with others and the material world. Heidegger decentered the human subject from the position of dominance. Human knowledge departs from what he called pre-understanding. Before we begin to think systematically, we already share a host of assumptions from our practical bound-upness with the world.

Understanding as historical.

Understanding then, is radically historical—it is always caught up on the concrete situation I am in and that I am trying to surpass. Language then, is a quasi-objective event. Heidegger describes his philosophical enterprise as the hermeneutic of Being, and the word hermeneutic means the science or act of interpretation. Heidegger's form of philosophy is generally referred to as hermeneutical phenomenology to distinguish it with Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger's form bases itself upon questions of historical interpretation rather than on transcendental consciousness. For Husserl, meaning was not objective in the sense that an armchair is but it was not simply subjective either. It was a kind of
ideal object in the sense that it could be expressed in a number of different ways yet still remain the same meaning. The meaning of a literary work is fixed once and for all; it is identical with whatever mental object the author had in mind or intended.

E. D. Hirsch and Objective Meaning

This position is taken up by the American hermeneuticist E. D. Hirsch Jr. whose major work, Validity in Interpretation (1967) is indebted to Husserlian phenomenology. It is not true for Hirsch, however, that because the meaning of a work is identical with what the author meant by it, that only one interpretation is possible. There may be a number of valid interpretations, but all of them must be in accordance with the 'system of typical expectations and probabilities' which the author's meaning permits (p. 67). Nor does Hirsch deny that a work may mean different things to different people at different times. But this is a matter of significance rather than its meaning. Significance varies throughout history—meanings remain constant; authors put in meanings—readers assign significance. Hirsch's basic position is that meaning is absolute and immutable, wholly resistant to historical change. He is able to maintain this position because meaning is linguistic. It is something that the author wills, by fixing it for all time in a particular set of material signs. For Hirsch, an author's meaning is his
or her own and should not be trespassed upon by the reader.

Hirsch concedes that his own point of view is quite arbitrary. There is nothing in the nature of the text itself which constrains a reader to construe it in accordance with authorial meaning; it is just that if we do not choose to respect the author's meaning then we have no 'norm' or interpretation, and risk opening the floodgates to critical anarchy. (p. 69)

Security here is only what Hirsch takes authorial meaning to be--pure, solid, self-identified facts. Eagleton asserts that this is a highly dubious position. Meanings are not as stable and determinate as Hirsch thinks. An author's intention, says Eagleton, is itself a complex text which can be debated and interpreted just like any other. Hirsch's aim is to discredit the hermeneutics of Heidegger, Gadamer and others who, in their insistence that meaning is always historical, opens the door to complete relativism.

Hans-Georg Gadamer and Mainstream Tradition

For Gadamer, the meaning of a literary work is never exhausted by the intentions of its author. As the work passes from cultural or historical context, new meanings are culled from it. For Gadamer, this instability is part of the very character of the work. All interpretation is situational, shaped by the historically relative criteria of a particular culture. There is no possibility of knowing the literary text as it is. Interpretation is a dialogue between the past and the present. "The event of understanding comes about when our own horizon of
historical meanings and assumptions 'fuses' with the 'horizon' within which the work itself is placed" (Eagleton, pp. 71-72).

Our values, beliefs, or prejudices, determined by history and tradition, are necessary conditions for all understanding (Mackenzie, 1986). We can become aware of these context-bound prejudgments in the attempt to understand works of art of the past when some of them do not do justice to the true objects. Then we need to revise the interpretation until it furnishes a unity of meaning. Understanding, therefore, always involves a fusion of two horizons (p. 41).

But Eagleton suggests that Gadamer did not worry that cultural preconceptions or pre-understandings may prejudice the reception of the work, since these pre-understandings come to us from the tradition itself. And tradition was construed as the single mainstream tradition, that all valid works participate in. Tradition holds an authority to which we must submit. Eagleton criticizes Gadamer's hermeneutics because it cannot tolerate a failure of communication. It cannot, in other words, come to terms with the problem of ideology. Hermeneutics tends to concentrate on the works of the past. It also suggests that criticism's main role is to make sense of the classics.
Contemporary Hermeneutics and Reception Aesthetics or Reception Theory

The most recent development of hermeneutics in Germany is known as reception aesthetics, and unlike Gadamer, it does not concentrate exclusively on the works of the past. Rather, it examines the reader's role in literature. Basically, this theory purports that reading is a process of speculating and inferring all the time while reading. We are given facts, but we must construct questionable interpretations of them. We are all the time engaged in constructing hypotheses about the meaning of the text. A reader makes implicit connections, fills in gaps, draws up inferences and tests hunches. In terms of the theory, the reader concertizes the work. The process of reading is a dynamic one, a complex movement and unfolding through time.

Iser and the Influence of Gadamerian Hermeneutics

In The Act of Reading (1978) Iser discusses the strategies or codes in interpreting works. The most effective literary work for Iser, forces the reader into a new critical awareness of his or her customary codes and expectations. The work transforms the beliefs we bring to it. It disconforms our routine habits of perception. Literature violates or transgresses these normative ways of seeing. This notion is parallel to Russian Formalism: in the act of reading, the conventional assumptions are defamiliarized. The whole point of reading is that it brings us into deeper self-consciousness, and causes a more
critical view of our own identities. Iser's theory is based on a liberal humanist ideology—a belief that in reading we should be open and flexible and prepared to put our basic beliefs into question.

Behind this notion lies Gadamerian hermeneutics, with its trust in that enriched self-knowledge which springs from encountering the unfamiliar (p. 79). Regarding interpretation, Iser grants the reader a greater degree of co-partnership with the text. The reader is free to actualize the work in different ways and there is no single correct interpretation which could exhaust its semantic potential (p. 81). The text as internally consistent.

However, there is one major restriction: the reader must construct the text so as to render it internally consistent—the parts must be made to adapt coherently to the whole. Behind this notion is the influence of Gestalt psychology. "There is absolutely no need," argues Eagleton, "that works of literature either do or should constitute harmonious wholes..." (p. 81). Textual indeterminacies spur one on to the act of abolishing them, replacing them with stable, tamed, normalized meanings. This proposition is exactly what Derrida and his deconstructive theory goes after.

Summary

It is evident by now that the art work is a very illusive phenomena. One theory asserts the supremacy of
authorial intention, as does Hirsch. Another theory, of
the likes of Fish, appeals to a shared interpretative
strategy—a kind of shared competence, at least among
academics. The argument is not likely to be around the
fact that an interpretation is unlike one's own, but that
the categories, conventions and strategies of
interpretation are transgressed (p. 89). These
transgressions are criticized as non-literary and beyond
the accepted boundaries of interpretation.

Structuralism and Semiotics

As North American society developed over the 1950's,
it grew more scientific and technical in its modes of
thought and more ambitious in its form of criticism. It
began to become more obsessive about isolating the 'text'
and tended to leave aside the broader aspects of
literature. What was needed was a literary theory which,
while preserving the formalist bent of New Criticism, with
its strict attention to the aesthetic object rather than
social practice, also became more systematic and
'scientific.'

Roger Frye

It was Roger Frye's belief that criticism was in a
sorry unscientific mess and needed to be tidied up by
eliminating all matters of subjective value-judgment. An
objective system was required. This could be accomplished
because literature itself formed a system that was built on
objective laws—the various modes, archetypes, myths and genres by which literature was structured. At the root of all literature lay four 'narrative categories': the comic, romantic, the tragic, and the ironic. Tragedy and comedy can be subdivided into high mimetic, low mimetic and ironic; tragedy is about human isolation, comedy about human integration. Three recurrent patterns of symbolism can be grasped as the apocalyptic, demonic and analogical. The whole system can put into motion a theory of literary history.

To establish his system, Frye had to clear value-judgments out of the way. "When we analyze literature we are speaking of literature; when we evaluate it we are speaking of ourselves" (p. 92). Literature must also be untainted by history except for other literary works. The modes and myths of literature are trans-historical, collapsing history to set of themes. For the system to survive, it must be kept rigorously closed. It demanded a formalism more full-blooded than that of New Criticism.

The New Critics allowed that literature was in some significant sense cognitive, yielding a sort of knowledge of the world; Frye insists that literature is an autonomous verbal structure quite cut off from any reference beyond itself, a sealed and inward looking realm which contain[s] life and reality in a system of verbal [visual] relationships. (p. 93)

All the system does is comment on the symbolic units in relation to each other rather than to any kind of reality outside of itself.
Eagleton criticizes this notion in that literature is not then a way of knowing reality but a kind of collective utopian dreaming which is the expression of fundamental human desires. Literature is not to be seen as the self-expression of the individual authors. Rather, the authors are seen merely as functions of this universal system that springs from the collective, which is how it comes to embody archetypes or figures of universal significance (p. 93).

Literature becomes a spiritual home, for Frye combines an extreme aestheticism with an efficient scientificity. "It displays an iconoclastic briskness..dropping each work into its appointed mythological slot with computerized efficiency, but blends this with the most Romantic of yearnings" (p. 93). It is a system of decentering the individual subject, and centering all on the collective literary system. In another sense this theory is the work of a committed Christian humanist (it is interesting to note that Frye is a clergyman for whom desire and will can only be fulfilled in the kingdom of God). Literature becomes, according to Eagleton, a displaced version of religion due to the failure of religious ideology itself.

Frye stands in the liberal humanists tradition, espousing to the notion that society is free and classless, while in effect, his notion of 'classless' is from his own
middle-class liberal values. It is important to note that while Frye's work can be called 'structuralist' in the loose sense, it is not in the strict sense. The doctrine of structuralism is the belief that the individual units of any system have meaning only by virtue of their relation to one another. In other words, a structuralist claims that the meaning of each image is wholly a matter of its relation to the other. "The images do not have a 'substantial' meaning, only a 'relational' one. You do not need to go outside the work, for the elements explain and define each other" (p. 94).

Moreover, the content can be replaced with entirely different elements and still have the same relationship between the units—parallelism, opposition, inversion, equivalence, etc. This is not the case with the psycho-analytical or humanist critics who value the intrinsic significance of the images, demanding that we go to knowledge of the world outside the text (pp. 95-96).

Saussure: Founder of Modern Structural Linguistics

Literary structuralism flourished in the 1960's with the insights of the founder Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure viewed language as a system of signs. Each sign was to be seen as being made up of a signifier (a sound-image) and a signified (the concept or meaning), i.e., as the marks c-a-t are a signifier which evoke the signified 'cat' in the English mind. The relation between signifier
and signified is an arbitrary one—only a cultural and historical convention. "In the linguistic system," says Saussure, 'there are only differences': meaning is not mysteriously immanent in a sign but is functional, the result of its difference from other signs" (p. 97).

Relationship to visual arts.

Structuralism is an attempt to apply this linguistic theory to objects and activities other than language itself.

You can view a myth, wrestling match, system of tribal kinship, restaurant menu or oil painting as a system of signs, a structuralist analysis will try to isolate the underlying set of laws by which these signs are combined into meaning. It will largely ignore what the signs actually 'say,' and concentrate instead on their internal relations to one another. (p. 97)

C. S. Peirce

The American founder of semiotics is the philosopher C. S. Peirce who distinguished between three basic kinds of sign: the iconic which resembled what it stood for (i.e. a photograph); the indexical in which the sign is somehow associated with what it is a sign of (smoke with fire); and the symbolic where the sign is only arbitrarily or conventionally linked with its referent. Semiotics takes up this and many other classifications such as denotation (what the signs stand for), connotations (other signs associated with it), codes, messages transmitted by them; 'paradigmatic,' syntagmatic, metalanguages, and polysemic signs (p. 101). "An individual word may relate to another
work through assonance, to another through syntactical equivalence, to yet another through morphological parallelism, and so on" (p. 102).

The meaning of the text is not just an internal matter; it is also in relation to wider systems of meanings, to other texts, to other codes and norms in literature and society as a whole. Its meaning is also relative to the readers reception theory as well. Semiotics created a whole new literary science—narratology. Roland Barthes belongs to this group.

Levi-Strauss and the notion of universal mind.

Modern structuralist analysis of narrative began with the French structural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1966), who viewed different myths as variations on a number of basic themes. Beneath the immense heterogeneity of myths were certain constant universal structures, to which any particular myth could be reduced. Myths were a kind of language:

...they could be broken down into individual units ('mythemes') which like the basic sound units of language (phonemes) acquired meaning only when combined together in particular ways....These relations, Levi-Strauss considered, were inherent in the human mind itself, so that in studying a body of myths we are looking less at its narrative contents than at the universal mental operations which structure it....the mind which does all this thinking is not that of the individual subject: myths think themselves through people, rather than vice versa. They have no origin in a particular consciousness, and no particular end in view. One result of structuralism, is the 'decentering' of the individual subject, who is no longer to be regarded as the source or end of meaning. (p. 190)
Outcome of Structuralism

The structuralist method questioned literature's claim to be a unique form of discourse..."since deep structures could be dug out of Mickey Spillane as well as Sir Philip Sidney, and no doubt the same one at that, it was no longer easy to assign literature an ontologically privileged status" (p. 107).

The major advance of structuralism is that meaning was neither a private experience nor a divinely ordained occurrence, but a product of certain shared systems of signification. The belief that the isolated individual subject was the origin of all meaning took a hard knock: language pre-dated the individual. The way you interpreted the world was a function of the languages you had at your disposal. Meaning, in other words, was not something which all men and women everywhere intuitively shared.

Traditional criticism reduced the literary work to little more than a window to the author's psyche. Structuralism made it a window to the universal mind. In Eagleton's view, if traditional critics composed a spiritual elite, structuralists constituted a scientific elite. "This system has its own independent life, and will not stoop to the beck and call of individual intentions" (p. 112). If the previous theories of meaning were narrow-minded in their dogmatic insistence that the intention of the speaker or writer or artist was paramount
for interpretation, the countering of this notion did not have to pretend that the intentions did not exist at all.

Structuralism is 'anti-humanist' in the sense that it rejects the notion that meaning begins and ends in the individual's experience. In the humanist tradition, meaning is something the individual creates, or that we create together. But Eagleton asks, how do we construct meaning when the rules which govern meaning are already there?

Post-Structuralism

The era of structuralism yields to post-structuralism, a style of thought which embraces the deconstructive operation of Derrida, the work of the French historian Michel Foucault, the writings of the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, and the feminist philosopher and critic, Julia Kristeva (p. 134). We shall discuss Derrida's deconstruction, Lacan's psychoanalysis, Kristeva's feminist theory and Eagleton's theory of political criticism.

Deconstruction

Saussure argues that meaning in language is just a matter of difference. If you want to know the meaning (or signified) of a signifier, you can look it up in the dictionary, but all you will find are more signifiers, so the process is infinite and circular. Language, therefore is a much less stable affair than the classical structuralists had considered. Nothing is ever fully
present in signs. "It is an elusion for me to believe that I can be fully present to you in what I say or write...the whole idea that I am a stable unified entity must also be a fiction....I will never experience 'full communion' with myself" (p. 130). In writing, the individual's meanings threaten to escape from his or her control. This notion of 'man' is very different from the view that man is able to create and express his own meanings and be in full possession of himself.

Just as Western philosophy has been phonocentric (concerned with the living voice and suspicious of script) and logocentric (committed to a belief in some ultimate 'word', presence, essence, truth or reality which will act as the foundation of all our thought and experience), it has yearned for the sign which will give meaning to all others—the transcendental signifier—unquestionable meaning to which all our signs can be seen to point, for example, God, the Idea, the Self, and so on.

Such a transcendental meaning is a fiction (though a necessary one) embroiled in an open-ended play of signification. It is just that, out of this play of signifiers, certain meanings are elevated by social ideologies to a privileged position—freedom, family, democracy, independence. Sometimes such meanings are seen as the origin of all the others, hence, a web-like complexity of signs.
"Derrida labels as *metaphysical* any such thought systems which depend on an unassailable foundation, a first principle or unpeachable ground upon which a whole hierarchy of meanings may be constructed" (p. 132). Derrida would see his own work as inescapable 'contaminated' by such metaphysical thought. But the first principle can always be *deconstructed* and can be shown to be a product of a particular system of meaning. First principles are commonly defined by what they exclude. They are part of a *binary opposite*. Thus, for the male-dominated society, man is the founding principle and woman the excluded opposite, and so long that the distinction is *tightly held in place* the whole system can function effectively.

Deconstruction is the name given to the critical operation by which such operations can be partly undermined, or by which they can be shown partly to undermine each other in the process of textual meaning. Woman is the opposite, the 'other' of man: she is non-man, defective man....But equally man is what he is only by virtue of ceaselessly shutting out this other or opposite....Woman is not just an other in the sense of something beyond his ken, but an other intimately related to him as the image of what he is not, and therefore as an essential reminder of what he is. Man therefore, needs this other even as he spurns it, is constrained to give a positive identity to what he regards as no-thing. (pp. 132-133)

**Deconstruction and Ideologies**

Deconstruction has grasped the point that the binary oppositions with which classical structuralism tends to work, represents a way of seeing typical of ideologies; that is, ideologies draw rigid boundaries between what is
acceptable and what is not—between self and other, truth and falsity, reason and madness, central and marginal. We may begin to unravel these oppositions demonstrating how one term of an antithesis secretly inheres within the other.

Structuralism was generally satisfied if it could carve up a text into binary oppositions (high/low, light/dark, Nature/Culture and so on) and expose the logic of their working. Deconstruction tries to show how such oppositions, in order to hold themselves in place, are sometimes betrayed into inverting or collapsing themselves, or need to banish to the text's margins certain niggling details which can be made to return and plague them....The tactic of deconstructive criticism, that is to say, is to show how texts come to embarrass their own ruling systems of logic...where texts get into trouble, come unstuck, offer to contradict themselves. (pp. 133-134)

Conclusion and Criticism

Post-structuralism attacks the positivist model of science—the rationalistic claim to a transcendental, value-free knowledge of 'the facts.' However, in Eagleton's view it frees one from assuming a position on important issues since what you are saying can no longer be taken as 'true' or 'serious.' In reality, it commits you to affirm nothing.

Barnes (1988), summarizes Derrida in the following: Derrida assumes that texts are signs that are essentially semiotically independent. Semiotic independence means that texts are independent of: (a) author's intentions, (b) the reader, (c) the objects of signification, and (d) the outside of language referents. This means that a text has
no one and only determinate meaning; and that a text has no meaning privileged by the culture or tradition.

**Feminist Criticism**

Feminist criticism begins, according to Sydney Janet Kaplan (chap. 2), in the personal response of women readers to women writers, with the rejection of any critical stance which claims to be objective. It then branches into revisionary criticism of the canon, the study of neglected or lost women writers, and the articulation of a distinctive female literary tradition.

Feminist criticism has revealed the many ways that women have been oppressed and trivialized by the dominant patriarchal tradition, and to show how these attitudes are reflected in the images of women. This stance is in strong contrast to the New Criticism of the early 1960's that was devoted to a detailed study of the text in isolation from outside influences--the author's life, historical, political events, and especially from the responses from the reader.

Feminist criticism began to seek information that the New Criticism ignored--letters, diaries, autobiographic materials, as well as social and cultural analyses, biographies, studies of anthropology, sociology and philosophy. And along with the challenge to objectivity came the development of a personal vision, that is, the inclusion of personal associations within a text.
At its best, feminist criticism is a political act whose aim is not to interpret the world but to change it by changing the consciousness of those who read it. It is political when it questions the canon and whose interests it serves. The feminist critic may either focus on the reasons for the exclusion or on the study of women writers. The search for lost women writers—especially those outside the mainstream who are either white, middle-class, or heterosexual, is an important one since these persons were not simply forgotten, but were deliberately buried usually because their writing is too critical of contemporary sexual norms. Therefore, feminist criticism tends to insist that it be sensitive to differences in class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation an historical contexts.

Tompkins

Jane Tompkins (1985) also addresses the larger social contexts of literature by attempting to move the study of American literature away from the canon—the small group of master texts that have dominated critical discussion for the last thirty years—and move into what she claims is a more varied and fruitful area of investigation, namely—into more popular works and works done by women.

One purpose of her work is to ask why these works have come to be judged as deficient and have been blotted from view. She contends that if canonical texts would be perceived not as products of genius but as the bearers of a
set of national, social, economic, institutional, and professional interests, then their domination of the critical scene would seem less the result of their excellence than the product of historical contingencies (p. xli).

By establishing the above point, she hopes to bring about a redefinition of literary study—to understand literary texts not as works of art embodying enduring themes in complex form, but as an attempt to redefine the social order. "When literacy texts are conceived as agents of cultural formation rather than as objects of interpretation and appraisal, what counts as a good character or alogical sequence of events changes accordingly" (p. xvii).

What lies behind the study she asserts, is a growing awareness of the extremely narrow confines of literacy study within the canon, and with that, a sense of the social implications of this exclusionary practice.

**Feminism and Psychoanalysis**

**Freudian Theory**

A common criticism is that Freud 'brings everything down to sex'—in the technical term, a pan-sexualist. This criticism is untenable. "The seed of the truth in the pan-sexualist charge is that Freud regarded sexuality as central enough to human life to provide a component of all
our activities; but it is not sexual reductionism" (Eagleton, 1983, p. 163).

Another accusation is that he is individualistic—that he substitutes private psychological causes and explanations for social and historical ones. This accusation again is a radical misunderstanding of his theory. The point of his work that it makes it possible to think of the development of the human individual in social and historical terms. We come to be what we are by the complex transactions which take place during infancy, the roles of parents, the practices of child care, and all the images and beliefs associated with all this. These considerations are cultural matters which can vary considerably from one society to another or from one time to another.

Jacques Lacan: Freud and Post-structuralism

One belief which has not varied within familial and cultural institutions is the assumption that girls and women are inferior to boys and men. This prejudice would seem to unite all known societies. Since it a prejudice that has deep roots in early sexual and familial development, psychoanalysis has become of major importance to some feminists.

Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst, is not a pro-feminist thinker. As a matter of fact, his attitudes toward the women's movement has been arrogant and
contemptuous. But because his work is a strikingly original attempt to rewrite Freudianism in a way that is relevant to all those concerned with the question of the human subject, its place in society, and its relationship to language—which is his appeal to literary theorists—feminists have taken an interest in his thinking. What Lacan attempts to do in his Ecrits is to reinterpret Freud in the light of structuralist and post-structuralist theories of discourse.

**Pre-Oedipal Development**

At early development, the child has no distinction between subject and object, itself and the external world. Lacan names the imaginary as the lack of any defined centre of self. In Lacan's so-called mirror stage, the child finds reflected back to itself a gratifying unified image of itself and has begun the process of constructing a centre of self. This self, as the mirror situation suggests, is essentially narcissistic: we arrive at a sense of an 'I' by finding that 'I' reflected back to ourselves by some object or person in the world. This image is an alienated one: the child 'misrecognizes' itself in it, finds in the image a pleasing unity which it does not actually experience in its own body. For Lacan, it in this view of images that we make up identification, but in the very act, we are led to misperceive and misrecognize ourselves.
**Predetermined Gender Roles**

The pre-Oedipal or imaginary phases—a dyadic between the child and the other body which is usually the mother—becomes a triadic one of the Oedipus complex. The father signifies what Lacan calls the Law: the child is disturbed in its libidinal relation with the mother, and must begin to recognize in the figure of the father that a wider familial and social network exists. "Not only is the child merely a part of this network, but the role it must play there is already predetermined, laid down for it by the practices of the society into which it has been laid" (Eagleton, p. 165). The appearance of the father divides the child from the mother's body and drives its desire underground into the unconscious.

For the Oedipus complex to come about, the child must become at least dimly aware of sexual difference. The phallus, in Lacan terms, denotes this signification of sexual distinction and distinct gender roles. By accepting the necessity of sexual difference, of distinct gender roles, the child becomes properly socialized.

**The Complex of Signified and Signifiers**

Lacan's originality is to rewrite the process of the Oedipus complex, in terms of language. The child, contemplating itself in the mirror, can be thought of as the signifier—something capable of bestowing meaning—and the images it sees in the mirror as a kind of signified.
Here, signifier and signified are harmoniously united as they are in Saussure's sign.

This, for Lacan, is an appropriate image of the imaginary as a whole: in this mode, objects ceaselessly reflect themselves in each other in a sealed circuit, and no real difference of divisions are yet apparent. It is a world of plenitude, with no lacks or exclusions of any kind....no gap has yet opened up between signifier and signified, subject and world. (p. 166)

The infant is happily unplagued by the problems of post-structuralism—language and reality are smoothly synchronized. But with the entrance of the father, the child is plunged into post-structuralist anxiety, and now must come to grasp Saussure's point that identities come about only as a result of difference—that one term or subject is what it is only by excluding the another.

**Difference and Absence Inherent in Signs**

The first discovery of sexual difference comes at the same time as the discovery of language. In gaining access to language, the child unconsciously learns that a sign has meaning only by its difference from other signs, and learns that a sign presupposes the absence of the object it signifies. In accepting all this, the child moves from the imaginary register into what Lacan calls the symbolic order, the pre-given structure of social and sexual roles and relations which make up the family and society.

The situation is not an entirely well one, for the child who emerges from this process is a split one:
radically divided between the conscious life of the ego and the unconscious, or repressed desire.

It has been banished from this 'full,' imaginary possession into the 'empty' world of language. Language is 'empty' because it is just an endless process of difference and absence....one signifier implies another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum....no object or person can ever be fully 'present' in this chain, because as we have seen with Derrida, its effect is to divide and differentiate all identities. (p. 167)

This potentially endless movement from one signifier to another is what Lacan means by desire. Human language works by such lack: the absence of the real objects which signs designate, the fact that words have meaning only by virtue of the absence and exclusion of others. Language divides up--articulates--the fullness of the imaginary: we now will never be able to find rest in the single object, the final 'meaning. We have to make do with substitute objects, what Lacan calls the object little a, with which we try vainly to plug up the gap at the very center of our being.

We move among substitutes for substitutes, metaphors of metaphors, never able to recover the pure self-identity and self contemplation which we knew in the imaginary. There is no transcendental signifier, as Lacan calls it--or if there is, such a transcendental reality is the phallus itself, but not the actual male sex organ: it is merely an empty marker of difference, a sign of what divides us from
the imaginary and inserts us into our predestined place within the symbol's order (p. 168).

**Post-Structuralism as Unstable Signifiers**

Post-structuralism is composed less of sign—stable meanings—than of signifiers. If you dream of a horse, it is not obvious what this signifies: it may have many contradictory meanings. It is a signifier which may be attached to many different signifiers. The unconscious is just a continual movement of signifiers, whose signifiers are often inaccessible to us because they are repressed. This is why Lacan speaks of the unconscious as a sliding of the signified beneath the signifier, as a constant fading and evaporation of meaning—never yielding a final interpretation. Therefore meaning is always in some sense an approximation, a part-failure, never mediated in a pure way.

**Marxist Criticism**

Louis Althusser

The French Marxist philosopher, Louis Althusser, wrote a famous essay written under Lacan's influence entitled 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in his book *Lenin and Philosophy*, in 1971. It was his aim to try to illuminate, with the aid of Lacanian psychoanalysis theory, the working of ideology in society. How it is that human beings often come to submit themselves to the dominant ideologies of their societies—ideologies which Althusser
sees as vital to maintaining the power of the ruling class? How does this come about?

It is important to note that Althusser has been sometimes seen as a structuralist Marxist, in that for him individuals are the product of many different social determinants, and thus have no essential unity. Under the science of human societies, individuals are studied simply as the functions, or effects, of this or that social structure or as occupying a place in a mode of production, as a member of a specific social class and so forth. But this is not all the way that we see ourselves. We perceive ourselves rather, as free, unified, autonomous, self-generating individuals. Furthermore, unless we do perceive ourselves in this manner, we would be incapable of playing our social parts. For Althusser, what allows us to experience ourselves in this way is ideology (pp. 172-173). How is this to be understood?

An individual does not feel to be a mere function of a social structure but as somebody with a significant relation to society, a relation that gives them enough sense of meaning and value to enable them to act purposefully. "It is as though society were not just an impersonal structure to me, but a 'subject' which 'addresses' me personally...I come to feel...as though it is significantly 'centered' on me, and I in turn am significantly 'centered' on it" (Eagleton, p. 172).
Ideology, for Althusser, is the set of beliefs and practices which does this centering. It is very subtle, pervasive and unconscious; it is the very medium in which I 'live out' my relation to society, the whole realm of signs and social practices which binds me to the social structure and lends me a sense of coherent purpose and identity.

What Althusser does, is to rethink the concept of ideology in terms of Lacan's imagery. For the relation of the individual to society as a whole is like the relation of the child to his or her mirror-image. The human is supplied with a unified image of selfhood by identifying with an object which reflects the images back in a closed circle. And it also represents a misrecognition, since it idealizes the subject's real situation--one is the really decentered function of several social determinants.

The Contribution of Lacanian Psychoanalysis

Although most commentators would now agree that Althusser's essay is seriously flawed--it sees ideology as completely oppressive, does not allow for ideological struggle, and seriously misunderstands Lacanian theory--it is one attempt to show the relevance of Lacanian theory to deep-seated implications to explore the relations between the unconscious and human society. The unconscious is not some kind of seething, tumultuous private region 'inside' us, but an effect of our relations with one another. The
unconscious is, so to speak, outside rather than 'within' us—or rather it exists between us in relationship.

It is elusive not so much because it is buried deep within our minds, but because it is a kind of vast, tangled network which surrounds us and weaves itself through us, and which therefore, can never be pinned down. (p. 173)

The best image of such a network is language itself. For Lacan, it is never something entirely within our individual control. Rather, it is something that internally divides us. Language always pre-exists us—already in place, waiting to assign us our place within it. We shall never be able to wholly dominate it or subdue it.

**Influence of Lacan on Feminist Theory**

**Julia Kristeva**

Another meeting point between the political and the psychoanalytical is in the work of the feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva. Although her thinking is very much influenced by Lacan, it presents major problems. For the symbolic order of which Lacan writes is in reality the patriarchal sexual and social order of modern class-society, structured around the 'transcendental signifier' of the phallus, dominated by Law which the father embodies (pp. 188–89).

The oppressiveness of the actual social and sexual relations of such a system is precisely the target of the feminist critique. Kristeva opposes the symbolic, not so much the imaginary, as what she terms the semiotic, which
is the pattern or play of forces which we can detect inside language, and which represents a sort of residue of the pre-Oedipal phase. The pre-Oedipal child does not yet have access to language but it does experience a formless flow of pulsions or drives which are relatively unorganized. For language to happen this heterogeneous flow must be articulated into stable terms, so that in entering the symbolic order, the semiotic process is repressed. The repression is not total and the semiotic can still be discerned. Kristeva looks to this language of the semiotic as a means of undermining the symbolic order.

The semiotic throws into confusion all division between masculine and feminine—it is a 'bisexual' form of writing—and offers to deconstruct all the binary oppositions—proper/improper, norm/deviation, sane/mad, mine/yours, authority/obedience—by which society survives.

In Lacanian theory, anyone who is unable to enter the symbolic order at all, to symbolize their experience through language, would become psychotic. "One might see the semiotic as a kind of internal limit or borderline of the symbolic order; and in this sense the 'feminine' could equally be seen as existing on such a border" (p. 190).

This situation is so because the feminine is at once constructed within the symbolic order and yet is relegated to its margins, judged as inferior to masculine power. The woman lives both 'inside' and 'outside' male society. She
is both the romantically idealized member of it and the victimized outcast. Women are represented within the male-governed society, fixed by sign, image and meaning (p. 190).

Criticism of Kristeva

Eagleton views her argument as dangerously formalistic in that it does not pay enough attention to the political content of a text, the historical conditions in which its overturning of the signified is actually carried out and the historical conditions in which all of this is interpreted and used. The dismantling of our given identities through art must be inseparable from the practice of producing a new kind of human subject altogether, of producing social solidarity and fighting political injustice.

Political Criticism

Political criticism makes a drastic turn in the way that the previously mentioned traditions have approached the problem of interpretation. For one thing, the object of interpretation is expanded—no longer a text in the strict sense, but a text which knows may no bounds. Secondly, this approach is fundamentally contextual and historical, seeking to look into the underpinnings—values, beliefs, etc., of various interpretive strategies. Mitchell (1983) asked his colleagues if there is a "politics of interpretation." The firm consensus among the
contributors of his book was that "...the relation between politics and interpretation has impressed itself upon the attention of intellectuals and academics in the last ten years" (p. 3). His book is a collection of essays which explore the proposition that criticism and interpretation, the arts of explanation and understanding, have deep and complex relations with politics, the structures of power and social value that organize every aspect of human life (p. 3). He asserts that ideologies are built into the very mechanisms and metaphors that organize the production of meanings.

Eagleton (1983) stands as a strong figure in political criticism, proclaiming that "pure literary theory is a myth" (p. 195).

For any body of theory concerned with human meaning, value, language, feeling and experience will inevitably engage with broader, deeper beliefs about the nature of human individuals and society, problems of power and sexuality, interpretation of past history, versions of the present and hopes for the future." (p. 195)

Literary theory is really no more than a branch of social ideologies, utterly without any unit of identity which would adequately distinguish it from philosophy, linguistics, psychology, cultural and sociological thought..." (p. 204).

Eagleton counters the theories set out in his book, not with another literary theory, but with a different kind of discourse which may be called culture, signifying
practices, or whatever. What is important is that it would include the objects of literature, but would transform them by setting them in a wider social context. The kind of study he has in mind would seek the effects which discourse produce, and how they produce them.

Conclusion

The review of the literature into contemporary art and critical theory has illustrated the immense diversity and complexity that has alarmed many who attempt to clarify and understand the present era. It is hoped that this chapter has both illustrated and confirmed what such theorists as Smagula (1983), Margolis (1987), Culler (1982), Eagleton (1983) and others have commonly voiced—namely, that to engage in discussion about either contemporary art or critical theory and interpretation is to engage in a confused and confusing debate.

In order to deal more effectively with this apprehended confusion, Chapter III will develop a matrix for the classification of both contemporary art movements, and interpretive strategies in order to determine their sociological assumptions. Chapters IV and V will then systematically analyze the paradigmatic elements and speculate as to the effects of this information upon the task of interpretation and art education's role in dealing with the range of interpretive strategies and contemporary art.
CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study, the analysis and classification of interpretive strategies, necessitated the development of a comprehensive conceptual design. This chapter involves a review of several educational and social theorists and the subsequent formulation of a matrix designed for the analysis of interpretive strategies based upon the works of Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) and Burrell and Morgan (1985).

Social and Educational Research

The research reviewed for an appropriate methodology involved the study of several educational and social theorists. Educational theorists such as Davies (1967), Giroux, Penna and Pinar (1981), Scrimshaw (1983), Eisner (1985), and Schubert (1986) analyze the diversity of educational ideologies by clustering them into a variety of categories or paradigms that share some fundamental educational assumptions. Others such as Pinar (1975), Lawn and Barton (1981) and Freire (1985) argue for one particular paradigm against the others—in these cases, radical or critical praxis.

From social and political theory, several theorists also emerge as analysts of large intellectual traditions.
Bernstein (1976), Bredo and Feinberg (1982), and Burrell and Morgan (1985) all focus upon the examination of empirical theory, phenomenology, and critical theory in some form or other.

Of the educational researchers who have attempted ideological analysis, both Pratte (1975) and DiBlasio (1977) have formulated impressive methodologies for systematic structural analysis of humanistic ideology. However, the only theorists which provided some type of paradigmatic mapping comprehensive enough for the analysis of the diversity evidenced across the field of interpretive strategies were the sociological paradigms of Burrell and Morgan (1985) and the social psychology classifications of Mitroff and Kilmann (1978).

**Introduction to Mitroff and Kilmann's Methodological Approach to the Social Sciences**

Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) assert that the institution of science in recent years has come under severe attack. The authors posit that the crisis in science and the serious defects that exist in the structure of science can be defined as a problem of methodological and epistemological reform. Intimately tied to this crisis is the fate of the social or "human" sciences whose nature has been perceived as incomplete and fragmentary due to the fact that the social sciences themselves have been conceived of and practiced largely in a fragmentary and incomplete manner. Mitroff and Kilmann's proposed solution
is to examine the sociology and the psychology of science in order to "identify distinct patterns in inquiry practiced by different kinds of scientists" (p. 3), and to posit alternative methodologies to the institution of science, that is, to capitalize on the intense differences in style between practitioners.

Theodore Roszak (1973) argues that coming to grips with the psychology underlying modern science is the most critical problem facing Western civilization, particularly because society has become increasing dependent upon modern science to provide its basic philosophy of knowing. That is, science has become the standard for both doing and for knowing. Mitroff and Kilmann take as their task a serious look at the psychology underlying science. For instance:

Is science largely the creation and dominance of a particular psychological type of style, the projection of a particular psyche, onto the world? And if so, are alternate forms of science based on alternate psychological styles possible? (p. 4)

To answer these questions, the authors construct a typology that identifies basic styles of thinking about and doing science. They have found four features to be necessary to any style of inquiry. First, each style has a preferred set of logics, or single logic which it accepts and conversely, which it rejects. There exists today, modern alternatives to classical Aristotelian logic. For instance, some logics insist upon the truth or falsity of a proposition. Others maintain that certain propositions are
neither true nor false but 'indeterminate,' that is neither true or false. The most radical are the dialectical logics, which contend that a proposition and its negation can both be true or false at the same time.

The second feature necessary to a style of inquiry is that each style must be capable of accounting for rational, nonrational, and irrational characteristics.

Each style of inquiry is made up of a combination of these aspects. No matter what standard of rationality we use, every style of inquiry has both rational and irrational features. By focusing on either the rational or the irrational to the exclusion of the other, we present a perpetuate a distorted images of each style. (pp. 5-6)

For instance, each model must describe both the procedures for both discovery of a scientific hypothesis, model or theory, and the subsequent testing.

...some styles of inquiry see discovery as irrational and testing as rational and the two as clearly separable from one another. Others see both as either rational or irrational and nonseparable or even indistinguishable. (p. 6)

The third feature of styles of inquiry concerns the institutional or social norms of science under which science operates. That is, some embody traditional norms of science and others non-traditional.

The fourth and most important feature is its set of concrete methodological rules that are specific to the preferred kinds of inquiries of that style. Mitroff and Kilmann attempt to define specific methodologies that lead to a set of alternatives for the conduct of inquiry.
Without such alternatives, scientists will not be able to choose the style of inquiry best suited to their purposes.

Before continuing, it is necessary to address the value and criticisms of constructing typologies. First of all, the authors claim that there has not been enough attention given to the styles of inquiry that fundamentally different kinds of scientists manifest in their practice of science. For example, there is little attention given to the difference in inquiry, cognitive, and epistemological styles between scientists. This situation, they assert, is disturbing.

They construct their inquiry on three assumptions: (a) they do not see the construction of a typology as compulsive categorizing nor do they wish to assign each scientist to one or another style of inquiry. A good typology does not reduce people to single 'types,' but serves as a signpost to help organize some of the complex patterns by which humans behave (p. 11); (b) the attributes of any particular type are not to be seen as immutable traits but as a broad style or cluster of potential attributes; (c) every typology is by nature limited in the number of types; Mitroff and Kilmann's typology has four typologies, but they do not imply that only four types are sufficient to describe the variety of styles exhibited by the complex body of social scientists (pp. 10-11); (d) for better contrast, the authors exaggerate the qualities of
each type; (e) Mitroff and Kilmann emphasize that, "in Jung's and Maslow's terms, the healthiest personalities are characterized by their transcendence of any one personality system" (p. 12); and lastly, no one type is eminently more desirable than the others; every style of inquiry has both strong and weak points, and every style becomes detrimental when pushed to its extremes.

**Antecedents to Mitroff and Kilmann**

Mitroff and Kilmann review five typologies that have been proposed by particular scientists for describing scientific styles of inquiry. They are: (a) the convergers and divergers of Liam Hudson (1966); (b) the integrators, problem solvers, problem recognizers and technicians of Gerald Gordon (1974); (c) Mitroff's (1974a, 1974b, 1977) survey of Apollo scientists; (d) the healthy and unhealthy scientists of Abraham Maslow (1966); and (e) the psychological types of Jung (1968, 1971). Mitroff and Kilmann integrate these theorists within the typological descriptions of C. G. Jung.

**The Jungian Framework as a Typology of Scientific Typologies**

Jung's psychological system is one of the very few that takes into account both affect (feeling) and cognition (thinking). There are two dimensions to his system: (a) informational: the individual's preference for the kinds of input data sought in the world, and (b) decision-making: the individual's choice of decision-making process.
According to Jung, individuals take in data from the world (inner or outer), either by sensation (S) or intuition (N) but not both simultaneously because they are antithetical processes. The sensation category consists of individuals who typically take in information via the senses, who attend to the details and specifics of a situation, and who prefer hard and realistic facts. Sensate types take a hard, objective stand with regard to reality, and are oriented to the 'here and now.' In contrast, the intuition category refers to individuals who typically take in information by means of their imagination, by seeing the whole—the gestalt. Intuition types prefer to look at the whole of any situation. They prefer the hypothetical possibilities, are idealists and are oriented toward the future or to take broad, long ranging views of a situation. According to Jung, there are two basic ways of reaching a decision. Thinking (T) is the process of reaching a decision based on impersonal, formal, or theoretical modes of reasoning. It seeks to explain things in scientific, technical, and theoretical terms, independent of human needs, purposes or concerns. Feeling (F) is the process of reaching a decision based on personalistic value judgments that may be unique to the particular person. Feeling, in Jung's usage is not emotion, but rather a style of reasoning, of valuing, and of reaching a decision. Feeling types are particularly
sensitive to people and to individual differences. They seek to empathize with and value things in human terms. Where thinking asks whether something is true or false, feeling asks whether it is good or bad, ethical or unethical.

As one takes in data (either by intuition or sensation), the individual will combine it with how he or she makes decisions about the data (either feeling or thinking), hence four personality types: (a) sensing-thinking (ST), (b) sensing-feeling (SF), (c) intuition-feeling (NF), and (d) intuition-thinking (NT).

This typology does not imply that a person is fixed in a single type for life. The concept of personality is dynamic, not static. Jung's most integrated individuals, transcended their types and integrated their opposite types. That is, not only does each pure type have its extreme opposite, but that the opposite functions represent the unconscious, blind, or undeveloped side of the personality. Thus, Jung's system is a dialectical in several respects: (a) each types has extreme positive and negative aspects, and (b) each type is defined not only by what it contains but also by what it opposes.

Each of the following typologies are examined according to the four characteristics as formerly described: (a) the main concern, (b) preferred style of
inquiry, (c) preferred sociological norms, and (d) preferred logic.

The Analytic Scientist Within the Sensate-Thinking Typology

Mitroff and Kilmann postulated that their four methodologies of social science were the outer manifestations of the inner psychological attitudes of Jungian typology. The methodology which they identify as the Analytic Scientist (AS) is the outer manifestation of the inner psychological attitude of the ST (sensing-thinking) quadrant of the Jungian typology.

Main concern.

The diverse set of attributes can be easily understood once it is appreciated that the AS's basic drive is toward certainty and the corresponding desire to eliminate uncertainty as much as possible in regard to knowledge and human affairs. Therefore, the need for certainty links up with other attributes—precision, accuracy and reliability. These attributes necessarily serve the ultimate aim of scientific knowledge, which is unambiguous theoretical or empirical knowledge. 'To know' is to be certain about something. Another important aspect of the AS's world is the belief in the value-free nature of science.

The contention is that science only uncovers impersonal facts upon which disinterested theories are erected. These theories are then tested (or ought to be) independent of the shifting desires of human interests and biases. (p. 33)
Given the same conditions, different observers can agree that they have observed the same thing. Indeed agreement or consensus is so important that it is a epistemic guarantor of the validity of a scientific observation. A number of implications follow. One is that value statements are necessarily ambiguous and do not represent knowledge at all. The second involves the status of other disciplines. What sets science apart is not only its consensus of opinion—a consensus lacking in such fields as philosophy, morals and art—but that science alone is capable of making clear progress and in this sense is superior as a method of obtaining knowledge.

**Preferred style of inquiry.**

The Analytic Scientist's methodology is based upon the analysis of variance (ANOVA) in experimental design. ANOVA methods allow one to consider various degrees of the presence of one factor. For example, are the changes in X and A accompanied by statistically significant changes in Y? Further, if factors X and A are not distinct—if they overlap—then it cannot be determined precisely which of the two factors contribute to Y—and there will be a 'confounding of effects.'

**Preferred sociological norms (ideology).**

The norms that are expressive of the AS's institutional outlook are deeply rooted in the impersonal structure of science and can be summarized by the acronym
Communism contends that science must be value-free. If ASs adopt any political attitude it is one of apoliticism or even anti-politicalism. Universalism means that scientific knowledge is independent of the personality of the individual scientist. Disinterestedness means that scientific ideas do not belong to individual scientists but to the community as a whole. Organized skepticism refers to the fact that scientists are expected to adopt a critical attitude toward the ideas of their colleagues.

Preferred logic.

The AS's conception of logic and the place accorded to logic is part of the AS's overall scheme of inquiry. This relates to (a) certain 'fundamental logical laws,' (b) classical or two-truth logic, and (c) logic as a special or preferred science in itself.

Two principles are basic to the AS's conception of logic. They are two principles of Aristotelian logic: (a) The Law of Contradiction—(p and ~p)—no proposition can be both true and false at the same time, and (b) The Law of the Excluded Middle—(p or ~p)—every proposition is either true or false. Another fundamental principle of logic is The Law of Implication or modus ponens. If a proposition p
is true, then by hypothesis q is true (p implies q); but p is in fact true; hence q is true. In symbols this is expressed [(p → q) and p] → q. When both p and "p are true at the same time, then the implications are as follows:

Therefore, ("p or q) and p are both true, and the whole expression [("p or q) and p] → q) is true for any and all statements q no matter how absurd or inconsistent with known facts or principles they may be. However, if we admit absolutely inconsistent propositions into our storehouse of knowledge, then from modus ponens we can derive the truth of any arbitrary proposition whatsoever—which is absurd. (pp.50-51)

The Conceptual Theorist Within the Intuitive-Thinking Typology

Main concern.

The Conceptual Theorist's (CT) prime concern is to seek or to produce multiple conflicting explanations of a phenomena that are dialectical, interesting, and global. Such multiple conceptual possibilities follow from their intuitive-thinking (NT) orientation.

The CT is a speculative theorist who values broad-ranging and novel ideas and who does not insist that these be bound to 'reality' in the sense of being verified by facts. "Whereas the AS works best within a single, well-defined, self-consistent explanation or paradigm, the CT prefers to construct bridges between paradigms" (p. 54).

While the AS breaks nature down into divisible and precise factors, the CT believes that nature must be treated holistically and conceptually. The CT also
believes, "that one must have recourse to many explicitly conflicting paradigms" (p. 55).

This process is so because the CT believes that paradigms or models are not reality but only conceptions of reality. Their purpose is to guide inquiry, not to constrict it.

Pierre Duhem (1954) and Paul Feyerabend (1975) are two well known philosophers of science who agree with this view. Duhem pointed out that the scheme \([(H \rightarrow ^{0}) \text{ and } ^{0} \rightarrow ^{"H"}]\) is a gross oversimplification of the process of science. "The scientist never tests a single hypothesis in isolation from other hypotheses but rather against a whole network of background assumptions, auxiliary hypotheses, broad metaphysical concepts, theories, and ideas" (p. 57). Duhem concludes that experiments are inherently ambiguous.

This problem is one of the major points of disagreement between the AS and the CT. The AS believes that one can test hypotheses in isolation from one another and distinguish false ideas from true ones. The CT, however, believes that the world is always more open-ended and ambiguous.

Preferred style of inquiry.

The style of inquiry of the CT can be summarized in the work of Murray Davis (1971) who posited that the great social scientists are not great because they produced 'true' theories but because their theories were
'interesting.' That is, it was one that (a) identified previously taken-for-granted underlying assumptions of a particular social science, (b) exposed the assumptions for critical and public scrutiny, and (c) argued that a set of counter assumptions is actually more plausible.

The CT does not seek resolution of conflict but strives towards the toleration, proliferation and enjoyment of ambiguity and multiple views of the world (p. 67). The two authors further explain:

Whereas the AS attempts to find the single schema that best represents the world, the CT is interested in exploring, creating, and inventing multiple possible and hypothetical representations of the world— even hypothetical worlds themselves. Further, the CT's emphasis is on the large-scale differences between these different representations rather than the details of any single schema. (p. 68)

The purpose of computing for the CT is not to determine the exact precision 'what is,' but rather, 'what if.' This allows the CTs to use their preferred inquiry pattern— conceptual, speculative investigation (pp. 68-70).

Preferred sociological norms (ideology).

Given that what is interesting for one may not be interesting for another, the CT has then a different view of universalism than the AS. Universalism means that the acceptance or rejection of a proposition is not to depend upon the personal or social attributes of the scientist but upon the intellectual merits of the proposition (Merton, 1968).
The CT will argue that the acceptance or rejection of a theory is a function of the assumptions that a particular scientific social group brings with them. Thus, they hold to the norm of particularism—that the acceptance or the rejection of a claim entering the list of science is to a large extent a function of who makes the claim. Furthermore, it posits that not only that different scientists and scientific groups hold different assumptions but that they ought to, otherwise, challenging them by presenting alternatives would cease. And the challenging leads to the dialectical interplay between contesting norms (p. 71).

Preferred logic.

The concept of dialectical logic is central to the Conceptual Theorist. It is to be illustrated that the four views of science presented by these authors is the logic of the dialectic. Most importantly, they note that the presence of explicit contradictions no longer poses serious threat to scientific explanation. The newer systems of logic are able to handle contradictions without total breakdowns. There are also systems in which (A and ~A) is a local axiom—that is, a property of the system itself for some of its propositions. These systems have to give up the concept of disjunctive syllogism in order to incorporate this property.

The procedure assumes that on any important social or scientific issue there are at least two different
points of view. The procedure also assumes that underlying each viewpoint is a set of critical, largely implicit and unarticulated policy assumptions. The purpose of the procedure is to make these implicit assumptions explicit and line them up side by side with their counter-assumptions from the opposing viewpoint. A debate is then conducted over the respective merit of the assumptions and counter-assumptions. (Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979)

Such theories are a necessity in social science, where the situations are exceedingly complex and where one cannot presume universal agreement. The conflict between A and "A means that there are at least two interpretations of the 'same' event, and that it is vital not to ignore this contradiction because it would mean ignoring an important social assumptions.

The Conceptual Humanist Within the Intuitive-Feeling Typology

The Conceptual Humanist (CH) (Mitroff and Kilmann, chap. 5) along with the Particular Humanist (PH) are two methodologies based on feeling. They are also the dialectical and psychological opposites of the thinking methodologies of the Analytic Scientist and the Conceptual Theorist. The Conceptual Humanist corresponds with the NF (intuitive-feeling) quadrant in the Jungian framework.

Main concern.

In comparing the CH with the CT, the CH defines a problem from the reference to one's personal being in contrast to the CT who defines a problem from one's capability of accomplishing some task or objective. Whereas the CT uses his or her conceptual breath to serve
thinking, the CH uses it to serves feeling, which is interpreted as serving people. "The overriding concern of the CH is not how science, methodology, and experimentation can serve some abstract theoretical concepts of truth per se but how they further humanity as a whole" (p. 78).

The CH is concerned with asking questions of (a) efficiency, (b) authenticity, (c) alienation, (d) politics, (e) patriarchy, and (f) dialectic (Rowen, 1976).

Mitroff and Kilmann agree with Rowan that authenticity (questions concerning the alienation that results from 'hiding behind a role' such as the disinterested observer or the passive subject, or, on the positive side, questions of personal growth and potential) and alienation (i.e., alienated researchers treat their subjects as less than human beings, as objects to be manipulated) are two of the perennial concerns of the CHs that best differentiate them from the CTs.

Preferred logic.

While the preferred logic of both the CH and the CT is dialectical, there is a vast difference between the brand of dialectics. The dialectic of the CT is formal and cognitive—as it is thinking based. The dialectical logic of the CH is behavioral and interpersonal—it is feeling-based logic. By logic the authors mean a style of conceptualizing reality, not just the strict sense of formal logics.
Mitroff and Kilmann refer to the work of Argyris and Schon (1974, pp. 66-67) as an example of the dialectics of the CH. The characteristics are: maximize valid information, maximize free and informed choice, and maximize internal commitment to decisions made. Another tool used by Argyris and Schon is the setting up of behavioral dilemmas that force the recognition of the gap between their ideal and espoused theory and their actual theory-in-use. Mitroff and Kilmann call this technique "the setting up of personal dialectics— an explicit tug-of-war between two personal views of the world" (p. 91).

Dialectic here is not abstract or theoretical; rather, it implies confrontation at deep levels of existence between what one has pretended to be and what one thinks one would like to be. The instructor's role in this situation is therapeutic; to guide the novice, with as much understanding and love as possible, through a difficult transition—if not a crisis. (p. 91)

Preferred sociological norms (ideology).

The ideal aims that the CH attributes to science are: (a) the generation of 'valid information' in the behavioral or human sense (information that affects the human condition), (b) the ability to make free informed choices, and (c) the ability to form commitment to one's choices. (p. 92)

The overriding aim of science is the greatest increase in human welfare for the largest number of people. The ultimate test of science is the universal betterment of mankind.
Mitroff and Kilmann close their investigation of the Conceptual Humanist by referring to C. West Churchman (1971) who suggests the Hegelian inquirer is a storyteller. The life of the story is its drama, not its 'accuracy.'

Stories can be used in a variety of ways: as amusement or as devices with which to peer into human desires, wishes, hopes and fears. In this sense, stories form an essential ingredient of the CH's method because they provide the 'hardest' body of evidence and the best method of problem definition. The best stories are those which stir people's minds, hearts, and souls and by doing so give them new insights into themselves, their problems, and their human condition. (pp. 92-93)

The question is not, "Is storytelling science?" but "Can science learn to tell stories?" (p. 93).

**The Particular Humanist Within the Sensing-Feeling Typology**

The Particular Humanist (PH) (chap. six) presents the greatest challenge to contemporary science although the dividing line between the CH and PH is very thin at times.

**Main concern.**

The characteristics of the PH can be appreciated within the intense concern with capturing the uniqueness of particular individual human beings. Therefore, they are not concerned with formulating general theories of human behavior, not because it is impossible, but because it is not desirable. In contrast with the AS who is interested in schema and law, the PH is interested in myth and mythical consciousness. Yet even the contents of the mythical consciousness are governed by a universal
principle—but one that is very different from the universal principle of logical content.

Preferred style of inquiry.

There are two parts to the PH's preferred methodology. These are the case study and personalized description. The case study focuses on the in-depth and detailed rendering of the life space (the study of capturing the total sense of an individual's world, not just a part of it as in the AS approach) of a single individual or social group. For the PH, all knowledge derives from a personal content. Not only that, but these subtleties of human spirit demand that there is an intense human relationship between the researcher and the individual. Therefore, a major part of this methodology is participant observation with an added dimension of 'co-participant.' Mutual therapy, then, is a phrase that describes the PH's style of interaction in which both the PH and the other person will be improved by the relationship.

The format in which the PH presents scientific results is in a personalized descriptive account that captures the richness of detail of the individual. The PH reflects the belief that one's work and one's life cannot be separated. The state of mind of the researcher is described by Torbert (1976):

The researcher must undergo an unimaginable amount of self-development before being capable of valid action. This self-development includes simultaneous disciplining and freeing of emotions, behavior, and
one's capacity for higher thought—thought capable of tracing the patterns of intuition, feelings, and behavior. (p. 80)

**Preferred logic.**

In essence, the PH is not opposed to logic, just the AS's brand of logic, and in this sense, the PH's contribution to logic takes the form of a challenge: "Is a formal logic of feeling (in the Jungian sense) possible? Can the PH's style of reasoning be captured by formal methods, that is, represented within some abstract formal system?" (p. 99).

Mythical thought, with its emphasis on personalization and storytelling, is analogous to the relationship between the parts and the wholes of the PH's world. In our everyday world and in ordinary science, the parts of an entity are strictly subordinate to the whole. This is not true in mythical thinking, where the part is more than just part. By its very presence, the part signifies the whole and becomes, as it were, identical with it. (Cassirer, 1955, quoted in Mitroff and Kilmann, p. 100).

Mythical thought sees that the whole man is contained in his hair or his footprints. In this way it does not know what is called the relation of logical subsumption. Mitroff and Kilmann ask, "Is a science (or logic) of the unique possible?" They prefer to think of the PH's challenge to traditional science as a newly emerging and distinctive form of inquiry rather than a nonscientific phenomenon (pp. 110-101).
Preferred sociological norms (ideology).

Mitroff and Kilmann assert that the AS and PH are most dialectically opposed. This can be readily seen in the following set of opposing norms and counternorms represented in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytic Scientist</th>
<th>Particular Humanist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. faith in the moral value of rationality;</td>
<td>1. faith in rationality and nonrationality;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. emotional neutrality;</td>
<td>2. emotional commitment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. universalism: the acceptance or rejection of claims depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist; rooted in the impersonal character of science;</td>
<td>3. particularism: the acceptance or rejection of claims depend on who makes the claim; rooted in the personal character of science;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. disinterestedness; serving the scientific community's interest;</td>
<td>4. interestedness; serving their special communities of interest;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the Particular Humanist challenges the dominant view of science to understand what a Feeling science would look like. Among other things, Mitroff and Kilmann suggest that it would not be to afraid to display an ever-present and underlying emotional basis beneath the apparently impersonal, logical and rational surface structure of science.

From another perspective, Maslow (1966) and others have asserted is that conventional science is strongly
masculine, reflecting traditional and stereotypical male values:

It is 'hard-nosed,' objective, value-free; it eschews the ambiguous, the speculative, the vague, the beautiful, and the good. A feminine, science in contrast is not afraid to the good, the speculative, the vague, or the unique; indeed, it courts them, openly confronts them, and makes positive virtues of them. (p. 104)
Table 2
The Characteristics of the Analytic Scientist (AS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Categories</th>
<th>Attributed Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. External Relations:</td>
<td>Occupies a privileged and a preferred position; value-free; apolitical, cumulative, progressive, disinterested, clearly separable from other fields, clear lines of demarcation, autonomous, independent, strict hierarchical ordering of scientific fields from precise to less precise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of science as a special field of knowledge in relation to others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Internal Properties:</td>
<td>Impersonal, value-free, precise, reliable, disinterested, accurate, valid, reductionist, causal, apolitical, cumulative, progressive, clear standards for judgment, realistic, exact, anti-mystical, unambiguous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Nature of scientific knowledge</td>
<td>Consensus, agreement, reliability, external validity, rigor, controlled nature of inquiry, maintenance of distance between scientist and objects studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Guarantor of scientific knowledge</td>
<td>Precise, unambiguous, theoretical and empirical knowledge or its own (disinterested) sake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ultimate aims of science.</td>
<td>Aristotelian, strict classical logic, nondialectical and determinate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Preferred logic</td>
<td>Classical norms of science: CUDOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Preferred sociological norms (ideology)</td>
<td>Controlled inquiry as embodied in the classic concept of the experiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Preferred mode of inquiry</td>
<td>Disinterested, unbiased, impersonal, precise, expert, specialist, exact, skeptical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Properties of the scientist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
The Characteristics of the Conceptual Theorist (CT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Categories</th>
<th>Attributed Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. External</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations:</td>
<td>Occupies a privileged and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of science</td>
<td>preferred position, but is not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as a special field of</td>
<td>clearly separable from other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge in relation</td>
<td>fields; no clear lines of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to</td>
<td>demarcation; not autonomous or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>independent, no strict others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hierarchical ordering of fields;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>all depends upon one another;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>science is, however, value-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and apolitical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Internal</strong></td>
<td>Impersonal, value-free,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Properties:</strong></td>
<td>holism, valid, disinterested,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>imaginative, multicausation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>apolitical, purposeful ambiguity,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>uncertainty, problematic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Guarantor of</strong></td>
<td>Conflict between anti-theoretical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>imaginative theories, holistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>theories, ever-expanding research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>programs, comprehensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Ultimate aims of</strong></td>
<td>To construct the broadest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possible conceptual schemes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>production of multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conflicting schemes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Preferred logic</strong></td>
<td>Dialectical logic, indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>logics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E. Preferred</strong></td>
<td>Norms are a function of one's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sociological norms</td>
<td>theoretical perspective and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ideology)</td>
<td>cannot be separated from one's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conceptual theoretical interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F. Preferred mode</strong></td>
<td>Conceptual inquiry; treatment of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inquiry</td>
<td>innovative concepts from multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>perspectives; invention of new</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>schemas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G. Properties of the</strong></td>
<td>Disinterested, unbiased, holistic,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientist</td>
<td>imaginative, speculative,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>generalist, impersonal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

The Characteristics of the Conceptual Humanist (CH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Categories</th>
<th>Attributed Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. External Relations:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Does not occupy a privileged and preferred position, is not clearly separable from other fields; no clear lines of demarcation; not autonomous and independent; all fields of knowledge depend upon one another; not value-free, political.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of science as a special field of knowledge in relation to others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Internal Properties:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Personal; value-constituted; interested activity; holistic; imaginative; political, multicausation; uncertain; problematic; concerned with humanity.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Nature of scientific knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Guarantor of scientific knowledge</td>
<td><strong>Human conflict between knowing agent (E) and subject known (S); inquiry fosters human growth and development.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ultimate aims of</td>
<td><strong>To promote human development on widest possible scale.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Preferred logic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Dialectical behavioral and interpersonal logics; use of behavioral dilemmas; personal dialectics.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Preferred sociological norms</td>
<td><strong>Ability to make free and informed choices; ability to form commitment.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Preferred mode of inquiry</td>
<td><strong>Conceptual inquiry; treatment of innovative concepts; maximal cooperation between E and S so that both may better know themselves and another.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Properties of the scientist</td>
<td><strong>Interested; free to admit and know biases; highly personal; imaginative, speculative, generalist, holistic; storyteller.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluative Categories</td>
<td>Attributed Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. External Relations:</strong> Status of science as a special field of knowledge in relation to others</td>
<td>Does not occupy a privileged and special position; may be subordinate to art, poetry, music, literature and mysticism as field of older, &quot;superior&quot; ways of knowing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Internal Properties:</strong> A. Nature of scientific knowledge</td>
<td>Personal, value-constituted, interested, partisan activity, poetic, political, acausal, action-oriented, nonrational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Guarantor of scientific knowledge</td>
<td>Intense personal knowledge and experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Ultimate aims of</td>
<td>To help this person know himself or herself uniquely and to achieve his or her own self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Preferred logic</td>
<td>The 'logic' of the unique and singular; mythical thought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Preferred sociological norms (ideology)</td>
<td>Counternorms to CUDOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Preferred mode of inquiry</td>
<td>The case study; the in-depth, detailed study of a particular individual; mutual therapy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Properties of the scientist</td>
<td>Interested, &quot;all-too-human,&quot; biased, poetic, committed to the postulates of an action-oriented science.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction to the Sociological Paradigms of Burrell and Morgan

Burrell and Morgan's paradigms are mutually exclusive views of the social world. Each paradigm generates theories and perspectives which are in fundamental opposition to those of the other paradigms. The authors' purpose is to address the assumptions which underwrite the different approaches to social science.

The authors posit that within any discipline a vast proportion of theory and research is likely to be located within the bounds of just one of the four paradigms. This concentration of effort is defined as the dominant orthodoxy. Rival perspectives either within or outside the same paradigm appear as satellite orthodoxies defining alternative points of view. (p. ix)

One major assumptions about the social world is identified in the order-conflict dimension, that is, the 'problem of order' or the 'problem of conflict and change.' These two sets of opposing assumptions define the four basic paradigms.

Assumptions About the Nature of Social Science

Central to Burrell and Morgan's thesis is the notion that all theories of organization are based upon a philosophy of science and a philosophy of society (p. 1). The philosophical assumptions which underwrite each of the paradigms are related to ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology.
Assumptions of an ontological nature concern the notion of essence or 'reality,' that is, whether the reality is external to the individual—imposing itself on individual consciousness from without—or the product of individual consciousness; whether 'reality' is an objective nature or the product of individual cognition (p. 1).

Epistemological assumptions concern the grounds of knowledge—about how one understands the world and how one communicates this knowledge to others. Some issues involve what forms of knowledge can be obtained, how is truth and falsity determined, is it possible to identify the nature of knowledge as hard, real and capable of being transmitted in tangible form or whether knowledge is of a softer or spiritual or subjective or even transcendental form, based upon the experience and insight of unique and highly personal nature (pp. 1-2).

The third set of assumptions concern human nature and the relationship between human beings and their environment. One view is that human beings respond in a mechanistic or deterministic fashion to the external world. They are products of their environment and are conditioned by external circumstances. A counter view attributes a more creative role to human based on the notion of 'free will.' Humans are the creators and masters of their environment. Thus, another great philosophical debate is born: determination and voluntarism.
The fourth assumption involves the methodological nature—the way in which one investigates and obtains 'knowledge' about the social world. Some methodologies employed in the social world treat the social world like the natural world—as being hard, real and external to the individual. Others view it as being a much softer, personal and more subjective quality. These issues can be illustrated in the following table.

Table 6
The subjective-objective dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The subjectivist approach to social science</th>
<th>The objectivist approach to social science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nominalism</td>
<td>ontology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-positivism</td>
<td>epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarism</td>
<td>human nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideographic</td>
<td>methodology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assumptions About the Nature of Society

Burrell and Morgan introduce the term sociology of regulation to refer to those explanations of society that emphasize underlying unity and cohesiveness. It explains why society tends to hold together rather than fall apart.

In stark contrast is the sociology of radical change that seek explanations for radical change, deep seated structural conflict, modes of domination and structural contradiction (p. 17). It is concerned with the
emancipation from the structures which limit one's potential.

The Nature and Use of the Four Paradigms

Burrell and Morgan have suggested that the nature of science can be thought of in terms of the subjective-objective dimension, and that the assumptions about the nature of society in terms of regulation-radical change. Taken together, they define four distinct sociological paradigms as illustrated in the following diagram.

Table 7
The Sociology of Radical Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Humanist</td>
<td>Radical Structuralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretive</td>
<td>Functionalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Sociology of Regulation

The authors note that while the term 'paradigm' denotes a commonality of perspective, it does not imply complete unity of thought. Within any given paradigm there is much debate that offers a good deal of variation within them. However, it is very important to note that interparadigmatic 'journeys' are very rare.

This is in keeping with Kuhn's (1970) notion of 'revolutionary science.' For a theorist to switch paradigms calls for a change in meta-theoretical assumptions, something which, although manifestly possible, is not often achieved in practice. (p. 24)
Thus, we witness what is known as the 'epistemological break' with one's intellectual tradition. The authors emphasize that the four paradigms are mutually exclusive and that a synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms, they are contradictory (p. 25).

The Functionalist Sociology

Antecedents

In its long history, this paradigm attempts to apply the ideas and methods of the natural sciences to social affairs. Its proponent, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), believed that society and knowledge was in a process of evolution. His notion of the positive mode was defined as one that has given over the vain search after absolute notions in order to pursue the study of their laws via reason and observation. His vision of the world was one of scientific 'rationality.' He thus laid the foundation for the functionalist paradigm based upon the natural sciences, utilizing the mechanical and organic analogies, distinguishing between statics (structure) and dynamics (process), and advocating methodological holism.

Herbert Spence (1820-1903), a 'positivist' in the Comtian tradition, elaborated on Comte's notion of 'structure' and 'function' particularly with the parallels between societies and organisms, and the view that parts of society function in a way that contribute to the maintenance of the whole in a self-regulating system.
Society was set on an evolutionary course with increasing differentiation and integration. Societies were viewed as 'super-organisms,' emphasizing unity and interdependence.

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) was influenced by the Comtian notion of a concrete social reality capable of rational scientific investigation. He saw the need to seek its causes—hence his causal analysis was required in addition to functional analysis.

Durkheim saw, 'traditional societies' as being held together on the basis of a 'mechanical solidarity' deriving from similarity of part, with the individual's 'conscience' a 'simple appendage of the collective....The conscience collective' was based on a system of shared values, norms, and beliefs. In the 'industrial' society, with its extensive system of division of 'labour' and functional differentiation, he saw an 'organic solidarity' arising from the interdependence of parts. (p. 45)

Durkheim's sociology reflects a strong emphasis for 'order' as a predominant social force, and is defined as a sociology of regulation in its concern for the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, cohesion, solidarity, need satisfaction and activity.

Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) is finally discussed because of his significance in the development of the notion of equilibrium.

His view of society was that of a system of interrelated parts which, though in a continual state of surface flux, were also in a state of unchanging equilibrium, in that movement away from the equilibrium were counterbalanced by changes tending to restore it. (p. 47)
Praetor's equilibrium was based upon a mechanical rather than biological analogy.

The Underlying Unity of the Functionalist Paradigm

At a superficial level, the diversity of these theories is apparent. However, beneath the diversity, there is an underlying unity in the fundamental 'taken for granted' assumptions about the nature of the socio-scientific reality. Ontologically, these theories regard the social world as prior to humans and they seek to place them and their activities within the wider social context. The concept of function involves 'the observer' rather than the participant. "Theorist located within the context of the functionalist paradigm tend to assume the standpoint of the observer and attempt to relate what they observe to what they regard as important elements in a wider social context" (p. 107). This perspective is common to the interactionist, the integrative, the social system theorist and the objectivist positions.

The functionalist position also assumes a continuing order and pattern. It is geared to providing explanations for what is, allowing to limited degrees of order, disorder, consensus and descensus, integration and disintegration, need satisfaction and frustration. The overriding aim is to provide an explanation of why the social fabric holds together, that is, it provides explanations for the regulated nature of human affairs.
The paradigm is based on an underlying purposive rationality in that it emphasizes the possibility of objective inquiry capable of providing true explanatory and predictive knowledge of an external reality. It assumes that scientific theories may be assessable through empirical evidence—attributing independence to the observer who is able to observe without affecting it. It also assumes that there are external and universal standards of science which can be used as a basis of what an adequate explanation of what is observed. It is, above all, a conception which assumes that there are external rules and regulations governing the external world. The essential rationality reflected in the view of science is that science can provide a frame of reference for structuring and ordering the social world—a frame of reference that emphasizes an order and coherence that is like that found in the natural sciences. Science becomes a tool for imposing order and regulation upon the social world.

Within the functionalist paradigm, there has been a fusion of traditions. The German idealist tradition has influenced the emergence of functionalist theories of a more subjectivist sort. Marxism is reflected in the functionalist theories which focus upon conflict and change. These differences, then form the reasons for debate within the paradigm. For instance, the integrative
theorists criticize the structural functionalists and systems theorist for not being able to handle the problems of conflict, change and deviancy. The interactionists criticize them for being too oriented towards structural elements and for ignoring the emergent nature of social organizations. "Process versus structure, voluntarism versus determinism becomes the issues for debate here....it reflects little more than a disagreement about the variations which characterize a commonly accepted theme" (p. 108).

The Structure of the Paradigm

The functionalist paradigm reflects the dominant influence of sociological positivism, fused at its junction with the interpretive paradigm with elements of German idealism. Four broad categories (described in length in Appendix B) are: (a) social theory, (b) interactionism and social action theory, (c) intergrative theory, and (d) objectivism.

Social system theory represents sociological positivism in its most pure form as it adopts biological and mechanical analogies for the study of social affairs. Interactionism and social action theory combines sociological positivism with German idealism, and therefore is found on the most subjectivist boundary of the paradigm.

Integrative theory bridges the gap between social system theory and interactionism. It is not fully
committed to either of its neighbors. Objectivism is closely related to social system theory and to sociological positivism. It represents an extreme form of commitment to the methods of the natural sciences.

The Interpretive Paradigm

Antecedents

The most influential figures who have shaped the interpretive paradigm are Dilthey, Weber and Husserl. The interpretive paradigm attempts to explain the social world from the framework of the actors directly involved. It is firmly rooted in the German idealist tradition which held to a view that ultimate reality lies in 'spirit' or 'idea' rather than in the data of sense perception (p. 225).

Kant (1724-1803) posited that a priori knowledge precedes any understanding of the sense data of empirical experience. Such knowledge was inherent and served as the organizing principles within a person's consciousness. A priori knowledge was seen as independent of any external reality. "...it was seen as the product of 'mind' and the interpretive processes which go on within it" (p. 227).

The end of the nineteenth century brought the rise of the neo-idealistic, or neo-Kantian movements. A great interest arose in the subjective and irrational that was reflected in the diverse writings of Freud, Weber and Husserl. The positivist position became to be seen in a problematic and unsatisfactory light. In the natural
sciences (Naturwissenschaften), it was clear that human values intruded into the scientific endeavor, making the process no longer value-free. And because it was perceived that human beings were actors, the realm of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) could no be studied using the same methods as those used in the natural sciences. Thus, there occurred a definite shift along the subjective-objective dimension.

Dilthey, Weber and Husserl greatly contributed to the interpretive sociology of the twentieth century. Dilthey (1833-1911) and Weber (1864-1920) worked to bridge the gap between positivism and idealism by attempting to give the cultural sciences 'objective validity.' Dilthey focused on the notion of verstehen (understanding) and posited that the difference between the natural and cultural sciences was one of substance—that the two types of sciences were concerned with two different kinds of subject matter.

Cultural phenomena was deemed to be the external manifestation of such inner experience. Therefore, the emphasis upon general laws and causal explanations was deemed inappropriate. The cultural sciences needed new methods based on verstehen to understand the inner experiences of human life that the art and institutions were a outward manifestations of. Verstehen was viewed as a method to be used by the cultural sciences to generate an objectivity comparable to that of the natural sciences. It
was a means studying the world of human affairs by re-enacting the experience of others (pp. 229-230).

Dilthey's view of \textit{verstehen} had a formative influence upon the hermeneutic school as well as other elements indicative of the interpretive paradigm. The notion of \textit{understanding} is a defining characteristic of all theories in this paradigm.

It was through the work of Weber that the notion of \textit{verstehen} as a method had the greatest impact on sociological thought. His solution was to posit that the essential function of social science is to be \textit{interpretive}--to understand the subjective meaning of social action. This definition, then, illustrates the fusion of the idealist and positivist positions. He accepted the positivists' concern for providing causal explanations but posited that such explanations be concerned from the point of the individual. "He is concerned to build an objective science of sociology upon the foundations of subjective meaning and individual action" (p. 231). He would take an intermediate and incongruent position along the subjective-objective dimension. Methodologically, both he and Dilthey's hermeneutics would be located on the boundary of the interpretive paradigm. He would appear to be more objectivist in regards to ontology, epistemology and human nature because he does little more than attribute an
element of voluntarism to the individual's interpretation of his world.

Weber is also significant to the interpretive paradigm because his work served as a point of departure for other philosophers which as Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of the phenomenological movement in philosophy, who adopted an extremely subjectivist position. Husserl challenged the notion that there is an objective external world which exists in space and time that is real for all human beings. Instead, the external world is an artifact of consciousness; phenomena that is willed into existence through intentional acts. Husserl, then takes an extreme position on the objective-subjective dimension.

Ontologically, the world constitutes a stream of consciousness; it is experiential; the subjective is the source of all objectivities. The task of epistemology is to explore and reveal the essential types and structures of experience....The methods of 'direct intuition' and 'insight into essential structures' are the principal means of penetrating the depths of consciousness and transcending the world of everyday affairs in search of subjectivity in its pure form. (p. 233)

Addressing himself to questions of ultimate truth and validity, Husserl developed a radically subjectivist form of transcendental phenomenology (p. 234).

The Structure of the Interpretive Paradigm

The intellectual roots of the interpretive paradigm been traced back to the early German idealists. Although it has been most decisely shaped by the works of Dilthey, Husserl and Weber, it can be viewed as a twentieth century
phenomenon (p. 234). Burrell and Morgan argue that there are four distinct but related categories of interpretive theory that are distinguished by their degree of 'subjectivity.' They are solipsism, phenomenology, phenomenological sociology and hermeneutics.

The Hermeneutic school lies in the least subjectivist region of the paradigm. Evolving from the work of Dilthey and the notion of verstehen, it was a method of study adapted to an idealist view of the world. Gadamer broadened the theory in relation to the role of language in social life. Solipsism is identified as the most subjectivist occupying a realm of metaphysics rather than sociology. Phenomenology occupies the middle ground and is distinguished between the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the existential phenomenology of Schutz. The later links the sociology of Weber and the philosophy of Husserl. Ethnomethodology fuses phenomenology and elements of ordinary language philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and Winch. Phenomenological symbolic interactionism uses a phenomenological perspective to interpret G. H. Mead. For a more detailed description of these theories, see Appendix C.

The Underlying Unity of the Interpretive Paradigm

The primary concern of the schools of thought presented in the interpretive paradigm is their striving to understand the subjective experience of the individual.
The imposition of external form and structure is resisted in the attempt to get inside and to understand from within. **Ideographic methods** are favored as opposed to nomothetic methods.

The frame of reference is the individual actor rather than the observer of action. Social reality is seen as an emergent process, that is, as an extension of human consciousness and subjective experience. The wider social environment is considered to be an extension and creation of the subjective experience of the individuals involved. **Ontologically,** the theories are nominalistic; in regards to **human nature,** they are **voluntarist.** All the theories of the interpretive paradigm are **anti-positivist** in that they reject the notion that the world of human affairs can be studied in the manner of the natural sciences.

The functionalist and the interpretive both reflect a common concern for the sociology of regulation. However, Interpretive approaches focus on the way that social reality is meaningfully constructed and ordered from the point of view of the actors involved. Individual actors negotiate, regulate and live their lives within the **status quo.** Within the interpretive paradigm itself, a line of demarcation can be drawn between the highly subjectivist orientation of solipsism and transcendental phenomenology on one side and existential phenomenology, phenomenological sociology and hermeneutics on the other.
The former remain within the realm of pure subjectivity and pure philosophical discourse, the latter is concerned more with the 'life world' and the role of language as a medium of practical social activity. The theory of language as developed by the later Wittgenstein (1963) has influenced existential phenomenology, ethnmethodology and hermeneutics. All of these approaches focus upon the meaning within a context.

As Wittgenstein puts it, 'an expression only has meaning in the flow of life.' In language, as in other areas of social activity, the process of communication is an ongoing accomplishment characterized by indexicality and reflexivity. All human activity takes much for granted, and what constitutes reality depends upon the rules which underlie what Wittgenstein call 'forms of life.' (p. 254)

What are the implications of science? According to Burrell and Morgan, what passes as science is no more than a particular form of life or language game. "Traced to their source, all activities which pose as science can be traced to fundamental assumptions relating to everyday life and can in no way be regarded as generating knowledge with an objective value-free status, as is sometimes claimed" (p. 255). Furthermore, the authors posit that, "what passes for scientific knowledge can be shown to be founded upon a set of unstated conventions, beliefs and assumption..." (p. 255). Knowledge is not so much 'objective' as shared.

This view of science has close parallels to Kuhn's (1970) notion of the paradigm. According to Burrell and
Morgan, Kuhn's work is characteristic of the interpretive paradigm, in that it is in the tradition of Schutz's analysis of multiple realities and Wittgenstein's 'forms of life.' "Scientific knowledge here is in essence socially constructed and socially sustained; its significance and meaning can only be understood within its immediate social context" (p. 255).

This view of science is adhered to by phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists within the interpretive paradigm, hence their indifference or skepticism of the views of science held by those theorists occupying the functionalist or radical structuralist paradigms.

Radical Humanism

Antecedents

The intellectual origins can be traced back to German idealism and to the Kantian notion that the ultimate reality of the universe is spiritual or ideal rather than material in nature. Both the interpretive and radical humanist paradigms are based upon the notion that the individual creates the world in which he or she lives. The difference is that the interpretive theorists are content to understand the nature of this process, and the radical humanists are subject the process to critique by focusing on the alienated state of human beings. There are two types of critiques: one from the 'subjectivist idealist'
position and the other from the 'objectivist idealist' tradition.

The 'subjective idealist' position derives from the philosophy of Husserl and other phenomenologists already discussed. Although the roots of the subjective idealist tradition can be traced back to Kant, it was Fichte (1762-1814) who gave it more explicit expression. Fichte was a follower of Kant and made the assumption that:

...individual consciousness is a continuously creative entity generating a perpetual stream of ideas, concepts and perspectives through which a world external to mind is created....any understanding of this created reality involves understanding the nature, structure and functioning of conscious mind. (p. 279)

For Fichte, the external world was understood as a projection of individual consciousness (p. 280). Human beings externalize their experiences into some form of reality which in turn is reflected back to them, thus, making themselves conscious of themselves and their actions. Note that this notion has had a widespread influence through the work of Husserl and other phenomenologists. Its influence upon the radical humanist paradigm is most evident in Sartre and his followers of the French existentialist movement. They have radicalized the perspective by viewing individuals trapped within the mode of existence that the individual creates. "Ontologically, they view the world as the product on individual consciousness; consciousness is seen as being projected
onto the external though acts of intentionality, thereby creating it" (p. 280). The subjective idealist within radical humanism focuses on the pathology of intentionality. By such an act human separated themselves from their true 'Being.'

The second kind of discourse within radical humanism is based upon the tradition of 'objective idealism' found in Hegel. In The Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel investigates the ontological status of human knowledge. He demonstrates how knowledge passes through a series of forms of consciousness until a state of 'absolute knowledge' is reached. It is within this state that the individual is at one with the 'absolute spirit' which pervades the universe. Ultimate reality rests upon 'spirit' (Geist) and 'Absolute knowledge' rests upon the realization that consciousness is 'spirit'—thus, the object of consciousness is nothing other than itself (p. 280). Hegel presents human beings involved in a dialectic—a constant interplay between individual consciousness and its objectification in the external world. As a method of analysis, the dialectic stresses that:

...there is a basic antagonism and conflict within both the natural and the social world which when resolved, leads to a higher stage of development. This dialectical process is seen as a universal principle which generates progress towards the state of 'absolute knowledge' in which the distinction between subject and object is overcome (italics added) and human consciousness becomes aware of its location with 'absolute spirit.' (pp. 280-281)
Both Hegel and Fichte have individual consciousness as a focal point for understanding the social world. They differ in that Fichte believes that the individual creates his or her own world—this is known as subjective idealism. Hegel believed that individual consciousness is subservient to an external pattern of universal reason which reflects the existence of a universal force—this is known as objective idealism (p. 281).

It is important to note that for Hegel, both human consciousness and human history are to be understood in terms of the unfolding of the universal spirit which will lead to a perfect society. But there were arguments among his followers. The 'Right Hegelians' who more or less accepted his system and the 'Left' or 'Young Hegelians' who directed his system toward different ends.

Among the 'Young Hegelians' was the young Karl Marx (1818-1883) who inverted Hegel's system by placing the individual rather than the 'absolute spirit' at the center of his dialectic. He argued that there was no absolute above man. All objectifications in the social world were humanly created, thus pointing the way to an emancipatory philosophy in which individuals, through self-consciousness, could create and change society (p. 281).

For Marx, the alienation of man was found in the domination of society: "He saw the society of his day as
dominating human experience; objectified social creations reflected back upon man as an alienating force..." (pp. 281-282). In Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) Marx attacks the capitalist system of production as the heart of human alienation.

In the later Marx, there is a movement away from the idealist position, known as the 'epistemological break' in Marxist thought. It signifies Marx's break with radical humanism and the beginnings of the move toward radical structuralism. Marxist theory lay dormant until early 1920's when Lukacs, under the influence of neo-idealism, sought to re-emphasize the influence of Hegel upon Marx.

The Structure of the Radical Humanist Paradigm

The radical humanist paradigm comprises both the subjective and objective idealist strains, both of which having as their origins German idealism. The four headings discussed by Morgan and Burrell are: a) solipsism, b) French existentialism, c) anarchistic individualism, and d) critical theory.

Solipsism is the most subjective just as it is in the interpretive paradigm. French existentialism occupies a middle range. Mostly deriving from the work of Fichte and Husserl, it receives its clearest expression in the work of Sartre which in turn has influenced literary interpretation. Anarchistic individualism is the most change-oriented and is an example of extreme social
theory—extreme in that its advocated radical change while focusing upon the individual consciousness as the basic unit of analysis. Critical theory is the principle line of development in the objectivist idealist tradition and is located in the least subjectivist region of the paradigm. The three schools within critical theory are Lukacsian sociology, Gramsci's sociology and the Frankfurt school. For a detailed description of the radical humanist sociology see Appendix D.

The Unity of the Radical Humanist Paradigm

The theorists within this paradigm share a common concern for the freedom of the human spirit. They focus upon human consciousness within the totality. There also tends to be a concern for the 'pathology of consciousness' by which human beings are trapped within a mode of social organization. Radical humanists are concerned with understanding the manner in which this occurs. Along with this is the notion of setting human consciousness or spirit free and facilitating the development of human potentialities.

Like those theorists in the interpretive paradigm, radical humanists are rooted in a subjectivism which posits a precarious ontological status of the social world. With varying degrees, the different schools of thought emphasize that reality is socially created and socially sustained. Thus, they are in fundamental opposition to the radical
structuralist and the functionalist paradigms. According to the radical humanists, functionalist theory creates and sustains a view of social reality that reinforces the status quo.

Within this paradigm attention has been given to the role of science, logic, rationality, technology, language and other aspects of the superstructure of capitalism as vehicles of cognitive domination which act as alienating barriers to full humanness.

It is the emphasis given to consciousness in general and alienation in particular which distinguishes this paradigm from radical structuralism. Radical structuralists place more emphasis upon deep economic and political 'structures.' The concepts of 'totality,' 'structure,' 'contradiction' and 'crises' make up for the unifying aspects of the paradigm as opposed to those of 'totality,' 'consciousness,' 'alienation,' and 'critique' which are the concerns of critical theory (p. 307).

Anti-organizational Theory

It has been mentioned that the radical humanist perspective stands in fundamental opposition to that of the functionalist paradigm, that is, a complete inversion of assumptions about the nature of science and sociology. If the implications of radical humanism are developed in terms of organizational theory, the result is anti-organizational theory (p. 310). This phenomena can be
demonstrated when considering the solipsist and existentialist perspectives. Because they both reflect a form of 'subjective idealism' which does not allow for the existence of organizations outside the realm of individual consciousness. Because the subjective idealist perspectives have a limited contribution to make to the theory of organizations it is necessary to turn to objective idealism. Burrell and Morgan argue that it is within this realm, particularly within critical theory that the radical humanist anti-organizational theory has the most to develop.

In terms of radical humanism, organizations are examples of the 'intermediaries' which contribute to man's alienation from his or her true being in that they serve to mystify human beings in their attempt to comprehend and appreciate the nature of the totality in which they live (p. 311).

Much of the writings of the anti-organizational theorists share the notion of fostering alternative realities through a radical humanistic critique of the status quo (p. 313). Some key dimensions of the alternative realities are the overriding concern for what Marcuse has described as the 'one-dimensional' nature of modern society, and the ideological domination of the positivist scientific ethos.

These various writers tend to present society as reflecting a form of totalitarianism based upon the
all-pervasive influence and control of factors such as work, rationality, science, and technology which shape, channel, and control men's consciousness. Their purpose is to articulate the nature of this influence and control, and stress that this totalitarianism makes men oblivious to alternative modes of consciousness and existence. (p. 317)

Some examples can be drawn from the work of Dickson (1974) who criticizes advanced technology and capitalism. Dickson posits that the problems associated with contemporary technology might be resolved through the use of 'alternative technologies' which would reflect the non-oppressive and non-manipulative modes of social production.

Anti-organizational theory seeks to demonstrate the sources of alienation inherent within a totality. It provides a systematic critique within the tradition of critical theory of the factors which impinge upon and dominate human consciousness. At present, anti-organizational theory exists in embryonic form. Consequently, Burrell and Morgan caution that:

...the perspective as a whole can only be developed systematically against the intellectual background of the radical humanist paradigm. It is necessary, therefore, for the anti-organizational theorist to be thoroughly conversant with the German idealist tradition and the way in which it is reflected in the various schools of thought.... (p. 324)

**Radical Structuralism**

**Antecedents**

The radical structuralist paradigm is rooted in a materialistic view of the social world. Its ontology
emphasizes the hard and concrete nature of the reality which exists outside the minds of human beings and which has an independent existence. This 'realist' view is supported by a positivist epistemology which focuses on discovering the patterns and regularities that characterize the social world. Radical structuralists see themselves as engaging in 'science' and share many points of similarity with the functionalists.

Unlike its interpretive neighbors, radical structuralists not only seek to understand the world, but to change it. They therefore, operate in the mode of a providing a critique of the status quo—namely, the structures within society. These theorists view society as composed of contradictory elements and they work to understand the effects of these contradictions, particularly in the role they play in creating economic and political crises. Deep-seated conflict is posited as the means of emancipation from the structures of the social world the are the causes of domination. It is important to note that there are many varieties of Marxism and the structure of Marxist thought is as complex and as rich as the former paradigms.

Karl Marx

The intellectual tradition that supports this paradigm is found in the work of Karl Marx. In The German Ideology (1846), Marx made a move away from his former Hegelian
objective idealism and took a more materialistic position, that is, he moved away from philosophical concerns to political economy. In so doing, he hoped to meet contemporary positivism on its own ground.

Marx's model of society consists of two elements—the 'superstructure' and the 'substructure.' The latter was used to refer to the economic base of society in which production was given the central role. He distinguished between (a) 'the mode of production' such as capitalism, feudalism or communism; (b) the 'means of production' such as technology, land, capital, or labor; and (c) the 'relations of production' such as producers, non-producers, owners and non-owners, the class system. Within each mode of production there were particular associations between the 'means' and the 'relations' of production. The 'superstructure' was used to denote other, non-economic factors within society, such as the state, art, religion and literature, etc.

The notion of 'contradiction' was given a central role in the analysis of society. Society was viewed as containing within it elements which stand in antagonistic relationships to one another, and which generated conflict. Such conflict leads to the breakdown of the mode of production and its related social configuration (p. 328).

Although Marx was interested in the contradictions that existed within the substructure of society, his
interpreters have also stressed the contradictions between the substructure and superstructure and within the superstructure itself. Within his later work, the concepts of 'structure,' 'contradiction' and 'crises' take over from the concepts of 'consciousness,' 'alienation' and 'critique' in his early work (pp. 328-329).

**Lenin and Weber**

The second and third line of development within the radical structuralist paradigm has been that of Lenin and Weber. Because Marx's later work retained certain Hegelian features. Lenin concluded that no Marxist was yet understood Marx since Hegel's work had been ignored for some fifty years. This line of development can be seen in Russian social theory. But it was also taken up in the 1960's by a group of Marxists who saw Lenin as the Marxist theorist who came closest to trapping the essence of Marx's work. The theorists stand in between the critical theory of radical humanism and the tradition of orthodox Russian Marxism (p. 331).

The third line of development focuses upon 'radical Weberianism' denoting the elements that were concerned with the sociology of radical change. Weber saw bureaucracy as a reflection of the process of rationalization which paralleled the development of capitalism. He then viewed capitalism as invading all aspects of social life, from politics to art. Radical Weberianism focuses upon
bureaucracy, authority and power as the points of concentration. But rarely does it produce radical alternatives to the social world. Rather it seeks to interpret critically rather than to change (pp. 332-333).

The Underlying Unity of the Paradigm

These theories of radical structuralism are based upon relatively objectivist assumptions in regard to the nature of social science and provide a radical critique of contemporary society. They focus upon the in-built forces that create deep-seated pressures. With the possible exception of conflict theory, revolution—sometimes bloody, plays a central role. Thus, the notion of radical change through non-violent action of the interpretive paradigm is left behind. The focus is in the changing of structures, first and foremost through political and economic crises. The status quo is torn apart and replaced by radically different social forms.

All schools of thought focus in varying degrees upon four central issues: (a) the notion of totality: the understanding of total social formations; (b) the notion of structure: the configuration of social relationships that characterize different totalities and which exist independently of human consciousness of them, and these structures are treated as hard and concrete; (c) the notion of contradiction: structure are posed in contradictory and antagonistic relationships; d) the notion of crises: change
as a process involving structural dislocation of an extreme form (contradiction reaches a point where it can no longer be contained).

When compared with the functionalist paradigm, both paradigms see society as ontologically prior to man and can be understood through positivist epistemology. But radical structuralism is for different ends—contradiction and crises. These factors receive no attention in the functionalist paradigm since it aims to account for the persistence and the survival of existing social forms. Functionalism is concerned with evolutionary rather that catastrophic change. Even the most change-oriented of the functionalist paradigm are conservative in comparison (pp. 357-359).
Table 8

Sociological Assumptions the Functionalist and Interpretive Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functionalist</th>
<th>Interpretive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nominalist:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realist:</strong></td>
<td>- social network is little more than a network of assumptions and intersubjectively shared meanings;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- regard the social world as prior to humans.</td>
<td>- ontological status of external world is questionable;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- assumes the existence of external and universal standards;</td>
<td>- social reality is an emergent process: an extension of human consciousness and subjective experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seek to place humans and their activities within the wider social order.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Anti-positivist:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positivist:</strong></td>
<td>- takes the position of the participant;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- takes the position of the observer;</td>
<td>- rejects the notion that human affairs cannot be studied in the same manner as the natural sciences;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seeks to explain and predict by searching for regularities and casual relationships;</td>
<td>- science is not value-free;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- purposive rationality: science is capable of objective inquiry and of providing true explanatory and predictive knowledge of an external world.</td>
<td>- knowledge is not so much objective as it is shared;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Nature:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Voluntarist:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Determinist:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideographic:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nomothetic:</strong></td>
<td>- delve into human consciousness in hopes of discovering the fundamental meaning which underlie the social world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- scientific theories may be assessed through empirical evidence; external and universal standards are used as the basis of what an adequate explanation is.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rooted in:</td>
<td>Regulation through and objectivist position; conservative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Concern:</td>
<td>to provide an explanation of why the social fabric holds together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis:</td>
<td>the underlying unity and cohesiveness of the social world; provides explanations of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity; the limited degrees of disorder, disintegration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Sociological Assumptions of the Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist Paradigms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radical Humanist</strong></td>
<td><strong>Radical Structuralist</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology:</strong> Nominalist:</td>
<td>Realist:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reality is socially created and socially sustained;</td>
<td>- society is prior to human beings;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- precarious ontological status.</td>
<td>- society is treated as real, concrete and tangible;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- society is external to individual consciousness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology:</strong> Anti-postivist:</td>
<td>Positivist:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- takes the position of the participant;</td>
<td>- takes the position of observer;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- seeks to understand how pathology of consciousness occurs from the reference point of the participant.</td>
<td>- involved in hypothesis testing in the search for underlying causal laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Nature:</strong> Voluntarist:</td>
<td>Determinist:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individuals are capable of radical change in their consciousness;</td>
<td>- individuals are 'subjects' rather than 'agents' within the mode of production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- increasing potentialities;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- overthrowing or transcending limitations of the social world;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- individuals critique the status quo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology:</strong> Ideographic:</td>
<td>Nomothetic:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- hypothesis testing in accordance with scientific rigor;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rooted in:</strong> Radical change through a subjectivist position.</td>
<td>Radical change through an objectivist sociological position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Concern:</th>
<th>-human consciousness within the ‘totality; radical change through non-violence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis:</td>
<td>-Release from social domination; emancipation; potentiality; human consciousness within the totality; alienation; critiquing the role of science, logic, rationality, technology, language and other aspects of the superstructure of capitalism as vehicles of cognitive domination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four central themes: totality: total social formations; structure: configuration of social relationships that characterize different totalities; crisis: structural disposition of an extreme form, with the hope of an entirely new social structure; contradiction: conflict leads to breakdown of mode of production.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methodological Conclusions

Each of the paradigms discussed draws upon a complex and rich intellectual tradition which generates its own kind of insight. But by assuming a posture from within a rival paradigm, it is possible to demolish the contribution of any individual theoretical perspective. Another form of investigation may take the form of moving within a given paradigm and critiquing it from within, evaluating it in terms of the consistency of its assumptions. Burrell and Morgan caution that this kind of academic demolition is simply all too easy and they have emphasized each paradigms coherence and their distinctive nature (p. 395).

They also caution against positioning oneself within the functionalist paradigm, assuming its dominance and then viewing any other critical perspectives as some form of 'radical stance.' These perspectives are then treated as 'points of view' which need to be considered and if possible, rebuffed or incorporated within the context of the dominant orthodoxy (p. 396). This view favors fusion as the natural line of intellectual development. But they forcefully caution that such a fusion does not do full justice to the respective problematic--indeed, it is "at the cost of their complete emasculation and a misunderstanding of their very nature" (p. 396).

Upon stepping outside the functionalist paradigm, one has an opportunity to become aware of the full nature of
many other intellectual traditions. Each of the paradigms are distinct, internally coherent and self-sustaining. However, at the level of organization studies these distinctions are less clear-cut. This is because the alternative problematics have been drawn into critique on the functionalist's ground and have been assessed as 'satellites.' This strategy is severely handicapped since each of the alternative perspectives are based upon completely different intellectual traditions.

It is important to note that the radical humanist and the radical structuralist paradigms are not fully-fledged theoretical perspectives but are embryonic in their development. Insofar as studies of organizations are concerned, they are virtually unexplored territories. While each contain illuminary elements, the work is very fragmentary and not altogether coherent. But again the authors caution that:

Theorists who wish to develop ideas in these areas cannot afford to take a short cut. There is a real need for them to ground their perspective in the philosophical traditions from which it derives; to start from first principles; to have the philosophical and sociological concerns by which the paradigm is defined at the forefront of their analysis; to develop a systematic and coherent perspective within the guidelines which each paradigm offers, rather than taking the tenets of a competing paradigm as critical points of reference. Each paradigm needs to be developed in its own terms. (p. 397)

In essence they advocate a form of isolationism or 'paradigmatic closure' in that they believe that each of the paradigms can only establish itself at the level of
organizational analysis if it is true to itself. This posture is, of course, contrary to the synthesis view. But insofar as they are taken from within the functionalist perspective, they will have very little promise of development.

One of the most important implications from Burrell and Morgan's study is their assertion of the immense need for organization theory to adopt methods of study which are true to the nature of the phenomena. Their review of the dominant orthodoxy has shown that a large portion of empirical research is based on highly objectivist assumptions.

The wholesale incorporation of methods and techniques taken directly from the natural sciences needs to be severely questioned. The problem of developing methods appropriate to the nature of the phenomena to be studied remains one of the most pressing issues within the whole realm of social science research. (p. 399)

**Similarities and Differences**

**Similarities**

The sociological paradigms of Burrell and Morgan have significant parallels to the methodological approaches of Mitroff and Kilmann. Specifically, these similarities are: (a) they both articulate the reality of different and competing world views; (b) they both acknowledge and address the crisis in the institution of science; (c) they advocate an awareness and appreciation of methodological and epistemological alternatives to the social and cultural
sciences; (d) they both use similar criteria in the analysis of the underlying assumptions—that is, they both examine the ontological, epistemological, methodological, and social norms of each paradigm and typology; and most importantly, (e) their individual examinations result in strikingly similar world views—that is, the paradigms of Burrell and Morgan share considerable parallels with the typologies of Mitroff and Kilmann.

Different World Views

The four paradigms of Burrell and Morgan constitute four mutually exclusive world views of the social world. Mitroff and Kilmann also formulate four distinct typologies that characterize the different styles of inquiry among scientists. Each frame of reference is built upon a series of assumptions, some of which are diametrically opposed to each other. These more or less unacknowledged assumptions underpin the great philosophical debates and rival intellectual traditions among theorists outside the paradigms. The same can be said about the typologies of Mitroff and Kilmann, whose different scientists see quite different realities and adhere to quite different norms.

The Crisis in the Sciences and the Call for Alternatives

The acknowledged conflict in the institution of science appears to be the foundation and motivation for both sets of theorists. Both works address the dominance of the positivist ideology in the sciences as setting the
standard for both doing and knowing, thus, placing in peril the social and cultural sciences which are either assessed as "fragmentary and incomplete" (Mitroff and Kilmann) or as "satellite or rival perspectives" (Burrell and Morgan) in relation to the dominant orthodoxy. In essence, each of the writers asserts that there is a need for theories to adopt methods of study which are true to the phenomena under investigation.

Mitroff and Kilmann are very explicit in their challenge to the institution of science and call for epistemological and methodological reform. Although the Analytic Scientist appears to remain the dominant view, they examine the Conceptual Humanist and the Particular Humanist typologies as emergent methodologies.

Burrell and Morgan are also consistent in pointing out the extreme commitment to nomothetic methodologies in which quantitative measures of reified social constructs dominate research endeavors (p. 106). The interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist are alternatives to the dominance of the functionalist paradigm.

The Analysis of Underlying Assumptions

As already mentioned, the two works appeal to strikingly similar criteria in the analysis of the paradigms--Mitroff and Kilmann implicitly analyze the ontological assumptions of their typologies. Both examine
the methodological and epistemological foundations, and each also peers into the sociological norms.

For Burrell and Morgan, the purpose of such an analysis is to formulate an "intellectual map" and "analytical tool" to appraise and evaluate theories against the backcloth of the intellectual traditions. They polarize the issues and use rough dichotomisations as a heuristic device rather than a set of rigid definitions. Also, no attempts are made to criticize the perspectives outside the paradigm which would result in academic demolition.

Mitroff and Kilmann too, exaggerate the characteristics of each of the typologies for the means of clarity of type. However, these serve merely as broad styles, not immutable traits. These writers too, refrain from criticizing the typologies from outside the perspective.

The Parallels Between the Paradigms and Typologies

Although Burrell and Morgan take more of a macro approach and Mitroff and Kilmann a micro approach, the parallels between the two different approaches are surprisingly similar. As will be illustrated later, the Analytic Scientist is parallel to the Functionalist paradigm. The Conceptual Theorist is parallel to the Interpretive paradigm. The Conceptual Humanist shares many similarities with the Interpretive and more with the
Radical Humanist. And lastly, the Particular Humanist is definitely within the Radical Humanist paradigm. Just as the Radical Humanist is diametrically opposed to the assumptions within the functionalist paradigm, the Particular Humanist is also opposed to the Analytical Scientist. Absent altogether though, is any parallel to the Radical Structuralist paradigm.

Differences

Despite the similarities between the two models, there are important differences to consider. These may be examined in terms of differences in: (a) approach; (b) antecedents; (c) range and scope; and (d) implications.

Difference in approach.

First of all, there are differences in the approach or orientation of each model. Mitroff and Kilmann's model is essentially a psychology of science based on the characteristics of particular scientists. That is, they examine the cognitive, the epistemological and the methodological styles between scientists. Their undertaking results in a general typology or demographic of differences in scientific styles.

Rather than focusing of the psychology of science, Burrell and Morgan are interested in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of sociology. In examining the philosophy of science, they explicitly examine the ontological, epistemological, methodological, and human
nature values of each of the paradigms. In examining the philosophy of sociology, they incorporate the order and conflict debate by examining the sociology of regulation and radical change within each of the paradigms. They also examine the objective and subjective dimension in each paradigm.

**Difference in antecedents.**

Concomitant with their approach, the antecedents for their study are also based upon other typologies that identify certain cognitive, epistemological or methodological characteristics of particular scientists rather than intellectual traditions as explored by Burrell and Morgan.

**Differences in range and scope.**

In examining the styles of inquiry among scientists, Mitroff and Kilmann take more of a micro approach to the problem of sociological methodologies. Burrell and Morgan, on the other hand, manifest an extensive and complex analysis of intellectual traditions that serve as the antecedents and structure of the paradigms. Manifested in their work is a macro approach to the study of the paradigms. They are interested in painting a broad picture of each of the various world views. Concomitant with their work is an analysis of the various theories that make up the paradigms. In this regard, they are much more comprehensive than the Mitroff and Kilmann model. However,
the analysis of the logics within the later model is more extensive than the former.

**Difference in implications.**

These distinctions have tremendous implications in terms of the writers' conclusions. Essentially, because Mitroff and Kilmann base their model on the psychological types of C. G. Jung, their research advocates the notion of transcendence and integration. That is, in regards to individual styles, each type is defined as much by what it opposes as by what it embraces. What it opposes represents the blind or unconscious and underdeveloped side of the personality. Thus, "the greatest scientists seem not only to combine the attributes of opposing types but to delight in doing so" (p. 12). They also warn that, "Every style becomes detrimental when pushed to extreme limits" (p. 12).

In regards to range and scope, the Mitroff and Kilmann model does not appear to be as comprehensive as the Burrell and Morgan model. There is no allowance for any distinction along the objective-subjective dimension or between the sociology of regulation or radical change, and it does not allow for as much diversity and complexity as the Burrell and Morgan model. Finally, there is no parallel within the Mitroff and Kilmann framework to allow for the characteristics of Burrell and Morgan's Radical Structuralist. However, the Mitroff and Kilmann model seems very appropriate in the analysis of individual theorists.
Integrating the Two Models

Differences notwithstanding, there is substantial evidence that there are significant similarities and parallels between the two models of Mitroff and Kilmann and Burrell and Morgan. These strong parallels make it possible to re-examine the Mitroff and Kilmann model in terms of Burrell and Morgan's four classifications of ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. And as evidenced in the treatment of the individual theories within each of Burrell and Morgan's paradigms, it is also possible to consider each theory in terms of degrees. For example, a theory may be mildly, moderately or highly nominalist.

Therefore, the following accounts of Mitroff and Kilmann's Analytic Scientist, Conceptual Theorist, Conceptual Humanist, and Particular Humanist have been analyzed in the following pages and have been assessed in terms of their correspondence with the Burrell and Morgan paradigms of the Functionalist, the Interpretive, the Radical Humanist and the Radical Structuralist.
Table 10

The Characteristics of the Analytic Scientist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Categories</th>
<th>Attributed Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Realist: Assumes universal standards; Impersonal, value-free; disinterested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Positivist: Main concern: Certainty; reliable, valid, reductionist, causal, apolitical; realistic, anti-mystical; theoretical and empirical knowledge for its own (disinterested) sake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Nature</td>
<td>Determinist: Individual is treated as a subject, (not an agent); maintenance of distance between scientist and objects studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Nomothetic: Systematic protocol; clear standards for judgement; rigor, controlled nature of inquiry; Law of contradiction: &quot;(p and (&quot;p)); Law of excluded middle: (p or (&quot;p)); Law of Implication: ({(p \rightarrow q) \land p \rightarrow q})); Aristotelian, strict classical logic, nondialectical and determinate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology of</td>
<td>Regulation: Solidarity; unambiguous, consensus, agreement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary in terms of Burrell and Morgan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology:</th>
<th>Highly Realist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology:</td>
<td>Highly Positivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Nature:</td>
<td>Determinist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology:</td>
<td>Highly Nomothetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology of:</td>
<td>Regulation through an objectivist position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11

The Characteristics of the Particular Humanist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Categories</th>
<th>Attributed Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nominalist</strong>: Reality is socially created and socially sustained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td><strong>Anti-positivist</strong>: against the search for underlying regularities; relativist; Main concern: the uniqueness of the particular person; interest in myth and mythical consciousness; personal, interested, value-constituted, partisan activity, poetic, political, action-oriented; acausal, nonrational; intense personal knowledge and experience; The logic of the unique and singular; all knowledge derives from personal content.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Nature</strong></td>
<td><strong>Voluntarist</strong>: Humans are autonomous; to help this person know himself or herself uniquely and to achieve his or her own self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideographic</strong>: The case study; presented in personalized description in-depth, rich in detail study of a particular individual; the subtleties of the human spirit demand an intense human relationship between S and E in mutual therapy—both improved by relationship; use of mythical thought with its emphasis on personalization and storytelling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sociology of</strong></td>
<td><strong>Radical Change</strong>: Committed to the postulates of an action-oriented science; partisan activity; political.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Summary in terms of</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong>: Highly Nominalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong>: Highly Anti-positivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Human Nature</strong>: Highly Voluntarist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong>: Highly Ideographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sociology of</strong>: Radical change through the subjectivist position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluative Categories</td>
<td>Attributed Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nominalist</strong>: Intersubjectively shared meaning; reality is socially created and socially sustained; adheres to multiple realities; Paradigms or models are not reality but only conceptions of reality; norms are a function of one's theoretical perspective and cannot be separated from one's conceptual theoretical interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td><strong>Positivist</strong>: The 'observer' approach; science capable of objective knowledge; Impersonal, value-free, disinterested, apolitical; unbiased; <strong>Anti-positivist</strong>: Knowledge is not so much objective as it is shared; science is not capable of strictly objective knowledge; takes a relativist view; Imaginative, multi-causation, uncertainty, conflict between anti-theoretical, imaginative theories, comprehensive, holistic theories, production of multiple conflicting schemas; dialectical logic, indeterminate logics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Nature</strong></td>
<td><strong>Voluntarist</strong>: Implies that humans have a choice about the construction of their particular world view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nomothetic</strong>: Multiple, dialectical, 'interesting', global theories; universalism: acceptance or rejection based on intellectual merits of proposition; speculative, and broad-ranging, novel ideas; does not insist that they be bound to 'reality' in the strict sense of being verified by facts; cannot test single hypothesis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in isolation because of its background assumptions, metaphysical concepts and theories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociology of</th>
<th>Regulation: Assumes an underlying unity and cohesiveness despite conflicting views.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Summary in terms of Burrell and Morgan | Ontology: Nominalist  
Epistemology: Moderate Positivist  
Human Nature: Moderate Voluntarist  
Methodology: Moderately Ideographic  
Sociology of: Regulation through objectivist position. |
Table 13

The Characteristics of the Conceptual Humanist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluative Categories</th>
<th>Attributed Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>Nominalistic: Social reality is an emergent process; social reality is a network of intersubjectively shared meanings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>Anti-Positivist: Human sciences cannot be studied in the manner of the natural sciences:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal; value-constituted; interested activity; political; takes position of participant;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imaginative; multi-causation; uncertain; problematic; holistic; concerned with humanity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Nature</strong></td>
<td>Voluntarist: Being: person recognition of one's existence as a separate and autonomous human being; conceptual breathe serves human development; to promote human development on widest possible scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Ideographic: Dialectical behavioral logics; conceptual inquiry; treatment of innovative concepts; maximal cooperation between E and S so that both may better know themselves and another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preference for small groups; promotion of interpersonal development; respecting differences in points of view; synthesis not consensus: a profoundly socio-emotional process--must rise above individual perspective; appreciate, tolerate conflict: dialectical.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13 (Continued)

| Sociology of Radical Change through changing individual consciousness and through non-violence. | Regulation: Respecting differences in points of view; synthesis not consensus—a profoundly socio-emotional process—must rise above individual perspective; appreciate, tolerate conflict and the dialectical. |
| Main concern | To help individuals learn about themselves; self-understanding through the sharing of themselves through others; |
| | Personal dialectics: a confrontation at a deep and personal level; |
| | Emphasis on authenticity: questions of personal growth of individuals concerned; promotion of potential; emphasis on alienation: questions of trust, growth, self-determination; asking political, patriarchal, and dialectical questions; |
| | Ability to make informed decisions; ability to form commitment to one's choice. |

| Summary in terms of Burrell and Morgan | Ontology: Nominalist |
| | Epistemology: Anti-Positivist |
| | Human Values: Highly Voluntarist |
| | Methodology: Moderately Ideographic |
CHAPTER IV

A PARADIGMATIC ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY ART,
REPRESENTATIVE INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES AND
DISCIPLINE-BASED ART EDUCATION

Statement of Purpose

The primary purpose of Chapter IV will be to demonstrate the lack of agreement and paradigmatic conflict among the experts concerning the task of interpretation. Using the developed matrix, Chapter IV will: (a) analyze the ideological assumptions of modernism and postmodernism; (b) speculate whether formalism can adequately deal with contemporary art; (c) analyze the paradigmatic assumptions of the various movements within contemporary art; (d) systematically analyze the paradigmatic assumptions of the various interpretive strategies; (e) analyze the ideological foundation of Discipline-based Art Education (DBAE); (f) investigate whether Discipline-based Art Education assumes agreement among the experts in regards to the task of interpretation; (g) examine the range of interpretive strategies suggested in DBAE; (h) speculate as to the paradigmatic relationships between DBAE’s educational ideology and representative cases of feminism, Marxism and psychoanalysis (interpretive strategies suggested by Clark, Day and Greer (1987) representative of psychological and political criticism).
The application of the following analysis of contemporary art movements and interpretive strategies is in accordance with the methodological paradigms of Burrell and Morgan, and the typological analysis of Mitroff and Kilmann as discussed in Chapter III. In order to make this procedure more accessible, it may be advantageous to first analyze the underlying assumptions of modernism and post-modernism. To the degree that this analysis yields a succinct demonstration of their paradigmatic structure, so too will the classification of contemporary art movements and interpretive strategies follow more clearly.

For the investigation involving modernism and post-modernism, the study will focus on two critiques: the first is Hertz's (1985) and Levin's (1985) analysis of the antithetical elements of modernism and post-modernism, and the second is McEvilley's insightful contribution to apprehending the levels of content within 20th century art.

It is also anticipated that the analysis will determine any paradigmatic shifts within 20th century art. The final portion of the investigation of contemporary art will attempt to speculate as to the interpretive strategies that are deemed as necessary and appropriate for apprehending the complex levels of content found within contemporary art.
Hertz and Levin's Critique of Modernism and Post-Modernism

To begin the investigation, a brief analysis of the characteristics of modernism and post-modernism will be reviewed with the caution that it is often difficult to distinguish between them in the application of individual works. Nevertheless, Levin (1985) proposes a caricature of the art of the 70's.

As art in the 70's became ornamental, moral, grandiose, or miniaturized, anthropological, archeological, ecological, autobiographical, or fictional, it was defying all the proscriptions of modernist purity. (p. 1)

Modernism's Paradigm

Hertz (1985) describes modernism as a complex theory of art which was developed in England by Clive Bell and Roger Fry, and promoted mainly in the United States by Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. The task of art was to oppose the infiltration of kitsch—art produced for mass consumption. Greenberg viewed kitsch as a compromise of aesthetic standards—an art of mere entertainment, and he proposed the pursuit of purity in painting and the irreducible essence of painting.

The Criteria for Fried.

In Fried's criteria, narration was rejected. The criteria for ambitious painting—comparable to the Old Masters, was "self-sufficiency," and "presentness," qualities which discourage narrative content. Hence, it does not address the concerns of its viewers (Hertz, p. 4).
Thus, modernism's aim was to be scientific. It was based on faith in the technological future, in progress and objective truth and experimentation. Levin tells us it shared the method and logic of science. For the modernist believed in scientific objectivity and the logic of structure that demanded purity, clarity, and order (p. 2).

Both democratic and elitist.

But by the late 1960's it became reductive and austere, in a word--formalism, which implied adherence to established forms and rigid structures and laws (pp. 2-3). Its vision was democratic--an emancipation of the individual from authority, but in practice it was elitist: the public never understood abstract art. It was as specialized as modern science with an emphasis on structure rather than substance (p. 3).

Summary of modernism.

Hertz summarizes several notions which can be said to characterize modernism. They are: (a) opposition to popular culture; (b) emphasis on high art; (c) self-sufficiency; (d) preoccupation with medium and purity; (e) the desire to maintain rigid distinctions between art and popular culture (p. v); and (f) the analysis of art via structuralism, linguistics and semiotics (Levin, p. 7).

Post-Modernism

If the artist was god-like, which was the leitmotif of modernism, the absent artwork--non-visual, shrunken or
expanded beyond visibility, hiding out in the world, or within the artist—has been the theme of the 70's. (Levin, p. 6)

Post-modernism began not just with a disillusionment in the art object, but with a distrust of the whole consumer culture, and the scientific pretense of objectivity. Steel and plastic objects have been replaced by the natural substances, ongoing processes, photographic images, language and real time systems (Levin, p. 4).

Back to nature.

By returning materials to their natural state, it ultimately meant far more than subjecting it to natural forces and sending art back to the land or internalizing it with the body. More importantly, it meant that the return to nature was not only an involvement with the natural world but was acceptance of the frailties of human nature (p. 4).

Post-modernism arose out of a conceptualist premise—that art is information—while protesting its modernist aridity. Post-modern is impure. It recycles the past. It synthesizes rather than analyzes. It is style-free and free-style. It is tolerant of ambiguity, contradiction, complexity, incoherence and inclusiveness. Subjective and intimate, it blurs the boundaries between the world and the self. Most of all it is concerned with context instead of style (p. 4).
Summary of post-modern art.

Briefly, post-modernism can be described as the following: (a) a preoccupation with the deconstruction of "real life" ideology, especially the languages of television, advertising, and photography; (b) the recognition that fine art exemplifies the prevalent political, cultural, and psychological experience of society; (c) the analysis of the hidden contexts of art—museums, dealers, critics, and art markets; (d) the willingness to borrow indiscriminately from the past; (e) a realization that more than one approach to art and artmaking is necessary in order to reflect contemporary life; (f) finally, it is psychological, narrational, filled with personal content, and inclusive of subjective facts. "In short, rather than exclusivity, purity, and removal from societal and cultural contexts, the emphasis is on inclusivity, impurity and direct involvement with the content of contemporary experience" (p. vi).

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modernism</th>
<th>Post-Modernism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ahistorical</td>
<td>historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scientific</td>
<td>psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-referential</td>
<td>narrational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reductionistic</td>
<td>political/synthetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objective</td>
<td>intensely subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analysis</td>
<td>synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elitist</td>
<td>inclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>structure/laws</td>
<td>substance/content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>special status</td>
<td>ordinary/amateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanency</td>
<td>impermanence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-mystical</td>
<td>mystical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clarity/purity</td>
<td>ambiguity/contradiction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Difficult to distinguish.

It is not easy to separate post-modern from modernist work—they co-exist, or are a confusing mix. Post-modernism is a mimicking of the methods of science and technology but at the same time, it romances science and technology into something personal and mystical. Many times it is not even recognizable, for mostly they are caught in the middle with sympathies on both sides.

Paradigmatic Analysis of Modernism and Post-Modernism

However, if the individual works of art are difficult to distinguish, the characteristics of modernism and post-modernism as described by Hertz and Levin are more polarized and antithetical, availing themselves more easily to paradigmatic distinctions. The above analysis strongly parallels the contrasts between the Analytical Scientist (AS) and the Particular Humanist (PH) which according to Mitroff and Kilmann, make for a complete reversal of each other's pursuits.

The AS is described as the disinterested observer of nature, is value-free, objective, apolitical, and positivistic in the sense of the search for underlying order and laws. Further the AS is non-dialectical, a specialist, in a privileged position, and anti-mystical. The PH, on the other hand, is the active participant in nature, is value-constituted, subjective, anti-positivist, dialectical, a non-specialist, mystical and autobiographical.
Using the paradigms of Burrell and Morgan, modernism appears to reflect a realist ontology, a positivist epistemology, and nomothetic methodologies. It also reflects a sociology of regulation. Post-modernism, on the other hand, demonstrates a nominalist ontology, a vigorous anti-positivism, an acute preference for ideographic methodologies and is also oriented toward the sociology of radical change.

Therefore, it may be surmised that modernism approximates the assumptions of the functionalist paradigm while post-modernism approximates the assumptions of the radical humanist paradigm. As discussed in Chapter III, Burrell and Morgan have demonstrated that the functionalist and the radical humanist paradigms are rigorously antithetical to each other. Therefore, it appears that there is a strong paradigmatic conflict arising from the underlying assumptions between modernism and post-modernism.

In order to ascertain more exactly the content found within contemporary art, it is helpful to turn to McEvilley (1984) who proposes several ways of apprehending the complex and overlapping levels of meaning.

**McEvilley's Method of Apprehending Levels of Content Within 20th Century Art**

**Ideological Analysis of Formalism and Modernism**

This investigation will analyze McEvilley's critique of modernism and formalism, along with the content that is
foregrounded in post-modern art, with the aim of apprehending the underlying ideological assumptions found within both modernism and post-modernism.

The historical roots of formalism can be traced to Plato who postulated the doctrine of Pure Form, and in so doing, set up a poignant dichotomy between content and form. And how is pure form made visible? In the seventh book of the Republic, Plato asserts that pure form is seen with the Eye of the Soul (McEvilley, 1984). This assertion resulted in yet another doctrine—the doctrine of the Soul which established another whole set of dualisms.

By the eighteenth century, Plato and the Soul was disregarded, but McEvilley asserts that it did not simply disappear but that it found its way into art theory. "From the Cambridge Platonists to the Earl of Shaftesbury to Immanuel Kant to Clement Greenberg, it would now be called: the Faculty of Taste" (p. 61). According to this theory, the Eye of the Soul simply sees contentless quality.

A major result of Soulism and 'contentless quality' was the primacy the esthetic experience. Kant asserted that the three human faculties of the esthetic, cognitive and practical were all independent of one another. This meant that no verbal or cognitive formulation could ever approach the esthetic experience (p. 67). Under Kant's influence, formalist critics Benedetto Croce and Clement Greenberg, denied the appropriateness of content whatever.
Soullsm in art theory was joined by the notion that history was evolving toward perfection. Hence, the foundation of the formalist evolutionary view of art. Friedrich Schelling and Georg Hegel, impressed with the advance of Napoleon, revived the notion that history is advancing toward a final perfection in which Spirit, when cleansed of the illusion of Matter, will be absorbed in itself (p. 61).

Schelling elevated the esthetic faculty above the other two postulated by Kant, the cognitive and the practical: Spirit expressed itself through Art, which was, as Hegel said, "the sensuous appearance of the absolute." Art making then, became the most crucial and urgent of all human activities: by driving art history along the path of formalist evolution toward the goal of pure Spirit/Form, the artist actually hastens (as by a kind of sympathetic magic) the advance of Universal Spirit toward Perfection. (pp. 61-62)

Thus, it is evident that beneath the formalist's 'neutral' facade lies a powerful metaphysical assertion.

How did these notions of Spirit and the striving toward perfection assert themselves in art? One way was through the aspect of scale—an element that can be traced back to the Egyptian tomb and the sculptures of the Roman empire. The awesome mass and height made ordinary human power seem trivial.

The Platonist view not only effected scale but the notion of the temporal as well. "The time-reality in which the art work lived was not precisely historical time: its proper time dimension was a posterity conceived as a
mingling of historical time and eternity..." (p. 63). Thus, McEvilley asserts that the artwork crossed the metaphysical boundary in which the things below die, the things above capture something of deity. The artwork is immortal, penetrating its way to higher metaphysical realms.

The ideas of duration, transcendency and the ultimate, are all integral to the formalist modern tradition. From this standpoint, it can be easily understood why the artwork is believed to have no relation to socioeconomic affairs. But there is a real irony in this content-free enterprise, especially because modernism arose in the context of a positivistic democracy which was steadfast in its assertion of its ability to solve social and cultural problems. This resulting paradox can be understood in terms of the formalist belief in transcendence and spiritual evolution and perfection.

Conclusion

What McEvilley has attempted in his analysis of formalism is actually to deconstruct it. By undermining the founding principles of formalism—Soulism, the notion of the evolution toward perfection and the ultimate—McEvilley has attempted a dismantling of formalism and its auxiliary principles as well. With this idea in mind, the next step is to conduct an ideological analysis of content.
McEvilley asserts that in this century, the pendulum swings away from the worship of pure Form. Indeed, he asserts that, "One of the great achievements of anti-formalist periods of 20th century Western art is precisely their deliberate foregrounding of categories of content that had been working on us unnoticed for so long." (p. 66). The basis of this anti-formalist stance was established by Marcel Duchamp, when in reply to Pierre Cabanne's question, "What is taste?", he replied, "Habit" (p. 62). In other words, the Canons of taste are not eternal principles but merely transient cultural habit-formations. And esthetic habits change as the web of conditions that contains them change.

Along with the notion of cultural habits comes another important assertion, namely, that no artwork or description of an artwork is neutral. "Even value judgments, insofar as they reflect what Althusserian critics call 'visual ideology,' are implicit attributions of content. If there is no such thing as neutral description, then all statements about artworks involve attributions of content, whether acknowledged or not" (p. 62). How then, does the anti-formalist assertion effect the analysis of contemporary art?
Contemporary Art as Foregrounding Content: The Ineptness of the Optical Theory of Art

Because much of 20th century art is anti-formal and content-bound, McEvilley substantiates several cases where the formalist theory of art is inadequate in apprehending the meanings manifested within contemporary art. It is important to note that the Masterpiece tradition may also be interpreted according to these various levels of content. The difference is that contemporary art deliberately emphasizes certain levels of content in reaction to the pure Form dictum of the formalist critics.

Therefore, in order to deal more thoroughly with the notion of content, McEvilley asserts that contemporary art is comprised of multiple, complex and overlapping levels of content. They are as follows:

1. Content that is understood as representational: Esthetic taste is a culturally conditioned habit response. We can't see anything that our pictorial tradition does not include (p. 62).

2. Content from verbal supplements: "Duchamp's famous remark that the most important thing about a painting is its title points to a weakness in the 'purely optical' theory of art" (p. 62). This notion is exemplified in the fact that Robert Smithson's essays have controlled their interpretations of them.

3. Content from genre or medium: This content shifts as cultural forces shift. In the 1960's painting was associated with the lack of direct experience while sculpture was perceived as a real presence of objecthood. Consequently, radical new genres were associated with sculpture, performance being called "living sculpture," installation as "environmental sculpture," "For an artist to choose to work in oils on canvas was seen as a reactionary political statement" (p. 62).
4. Content from the material of the artwork: The use of industrial I-beams reflects an acceptance of urban industrial culture, while the use of marble suggests nostalgia for the Pre-Industrial Revolution.

5. Content from the scale of the work: Huge scale has been a political statement as it reflect the trivialness of human power.

6. Content from temporal duration: The Platonist view that underlies the masterpiece tradition is one that has a metaphysical assumption of sharing in the Absolute, the eternal, the immortal. The opposite metaphysics are asserted in contemporary art which deliberately affirms the flux, the process and the changing sense of selfhood. Rather than the eternal Soul, the self is transient and caught in a web of conditions and subject to change.

7. Content from the context of the work: "When the work leaves the artist's studio, what route does it take into what part of the world? This decision always has political content" (p. 63). Mail art for example, resists the processes of commodity fetishism and exchange value.

8. Content from the work's relationship with art history: The most common mode is the use of allusions and quotations.

9. Content that accrues to the work as it progressively reveals its destiny through persisting in time: Whatever occurs to a work as its history unfolds becomes part of the experience of the work and part of its meaning.

10. Content from participation in a specific iconographic tradition: "Iconography is a conventional mode of representing without the supposition that natural resemblance is involved. Thus to Christians blue may be felt as Mary's color without a supposition that it looks like Mary" (p. 64).

Some iconographic conventions are based upon Jungian archetypes and saturate our responses to many works. Another very fruitful (yet seldom used) approach is to subject 20th century art to interpretation in terms of the iconographic stream.
that goes back in both East and West. William de Kooning's "Women," for example, may be compared with the goddess-representations from Hindu Kali to the Egyptian Isis.

11. **Content from the formal properties:** At one level the formal configuration are ontological propositions. "Merely by shaping energy one models the real..." (p. 65). Beethoven represents reality as stormy, turbulent and full of passionate striving, while Bach presents it as serene and orderly. A Jackson Pollock represents the flux and indefiniteness of identity.

"The assertion by Althusserian critics that esthetic feeling is merely and exclusively a response to visual ideology is based on the Lacanian model of how the self constitutes itself from the surrounding cultural codes and then, looking at these codes again, seems to recognize itself in them" (p. 65). Whether a purely esthetic response can be isolated from this process is a major question in art today.

12. **Content from attitudinal gestures (wit, irony, parody) that appear as qualifiers of any of the categories already mentioned:** It alters the meaning accordingly.

13. **Content rooted in biological or physiological responses or in cognitive awareness of them:** Formalism, with its "purely optical" trend, has a claim of this type. The psychoanalytical theories of D. W. Winnicott belongs in this category on the basis that it arises from memories of primordial phases in the development of the organism, i.e., the figure-ground relationship has a relation to the ego-world relationship (p. 65).

**Conclusion**

McEvilley's account of content suggests a nominalist ontology particularly evidenced in his appraisal of the aesthetic response as one that is culturally conditioned. His assertion that content shifts as cultural forces shift also indicates a nominalist view of reality. Another important point is that his account of multi-leveled
content appears to demonstrate that formalism is ill equipped to apprehend the multiple levels of meaning manifested in 20th century art. However, he does mention alternative interpretive strategies such as Lacanian and Jungian psychoanalysis, Althusserian (Marxist) criticism and feminism, as well as Christian and historical analysis.

These conclusions bring us to the next task of examining contemporary art and analyzing the paradigmatic assumptions of each of the particular movements. It is from the results of this forthcoming analysis that this study intends to determine what interpretive strategies would be deemed as necessary and appropriate in apprehending meaning within contemporary art.

The first step in accomplishing this task is to re-examine the contemporary art movements using the methodological tools of Mitroff and Kilmann and Burrell and Morgan. Along with appraising the underlying paradigmatic assumptions of each movement, paradigmatic shifts will also be made evident.

A Paradigmatic Analysis of Contemporary Art

The Dada Movement

McEvilley asserts that Duchamp and others have foregrounded context as a primary signifier in their work. Duration is a category in Western culture that has been regarded as fixed. However, the Dada performance in which Picabla drew on the blackboard while Breton erased behind
him have contradicted this notion in a kind of iconoclastic act. The Dada performance tradition questions the elements of permanence and the social function of the private collection and consumer culture.

In terms of this investigation, the Dada movement was founded upon a sociology of radical change. Its ontological premise is nominalist in that it questions the realist ontology of reality being real and concrete. Rather, it displays reality as merely socially created and socially sustained. It is anti-positivist and voluntarist in the sense that it seeks to understand and to change the pathology of consciousness. Hence, the Dada movement shares paradigmatic elements of the radical humanist paradigm.

**Surrealism**

The original task of the European Surrealists was artistic radicalism and political revolution. However, much of this revolutionary spirit dissipated after immigration to America where in its stead, the elements of the unconscious and the nonrational were explored. However the Dada element of nonsensical assemblage to subvert realist ontological premises were maintained. This aim is seen in Dali's and Magritte's attempt to discredit completely the world of 'reality.' Hence, the Surrealist movement was highly nominalist. Rather than referring to impersonal, universal truths, their work was intensely
idiosyncratic and inward bound. These elements characterize their work as anti-positivistic. In its critique of the role to science, logic and rationality, the Surrealists also share the assumptions of the radical humanist paradigm.

Abstract Expressionism

The Abstract Expressionists were not interested in radical reform but as a whole, they were rather idealists concerned with universals, cosmic symbols, ancient myths, Oriental philosophy and American Indian spirituality. Their work was intensely personal and subjective as it was purported to have sprung from profound personal revelation. They were not concerned to look outward to social themes but inward to a subjective quest that searched for universal significance.

This investigation has already discussed McEvilley (1984) who mentioned that Croce and Greenberg denied the appropriateness of any content whatsoever. However, in the written supplements of titles, interviews, and essays, artists such as Kandinsky, Mondrian, Rothko and Newman rejected the pure form interpretation of their work and set about specifying the contents of their work (p. 67). Hence, the artists of the 1950's were in fact metaphysical contentists and not esthetic purists.

In terms of Burrell and Morgan, the Abstract Expressionists manifest elements of the interpretive
paradigm in their nominalist ontology, their anti-
positivist, participant epistemology and their ideographic
methodology. However, they were not concerned with release
from social domination but with understanding the world
from an intensely subjective encounter. Therefore, they
hold more to a sociology of regulation rather than radical
change. In terms of Mitroff and Kilmann's typology, these
artists resemble the Particular Humanist (PH) in their
personalized, detailed study of a particular individual
through the use of mythical thought and personalization.

With the Abstract Expressionist, there occurs a
paradigmatic shift from radical humanism of the Dada and
the Surrealists to the interpretive paradigm.

Post-Painterly Abstraction

'Hardedge' abstraction was typical of the Bauhaus
emphasis on the systematic, orderly and experimental. It
shared a logical positivist concern for the strictly
pictorial, stripped away from the symbolic or referential.
It strove for muteness, coolness (lack of passion), high
status in terms of intellectual prestige and it was
entirely self-referential. From these elements, it shares
the assumptions of Mitroff and Kilmann's Analytic Scientist
(AS) who assumes a realist ontology evidenced in their
impersonal and value-free stance. It is positivistic in
that it is reductionist, apolitical, realistic and
anti-mystical. Hence, the post-painterly movement resembles Burrell and Morgan's functionalist paradigm.

**Pop Art and Environments**

McEvilley asserts that Pop art foregrounded the contradiction among the levels of content.

Pop art foregrounded...the iconic mode mocked by mundaneness of subject matter, grandiosity of scale mocked by triviality of subject matter, and so on. In general, Pop art employed the clean, hardedged representation that implies a world of ontological integrity composed of entities with fixed and knowable identities; yet the allusive or quotational content, with its references to a despised popular culture ant information as random, neutral, or meaningless, decried this declaration of ontological integrity as a sham or con job. (pp. 66-67)

Content arising from scale has been foregrounded in the work of Claes Oldenburg whose oversize objects are more than formal aspects but critical as well. McEvilley continues to assert that to the extent that Pop art was primarily critical rather than esthetic it was rightly referred to as Neo-Dada. To some degree, McEvilley sees the purpose of Dada and Pop as Neo-Dada, as to ridicule the ideas of the Soul and its timeless products.

The Pop art movement challenges realist ontology mass produced in contemporary culture. It is highly anti-positivist in its attempt to subvert appeals to certainty. In that it is political, it functions within the radical humanist paradigm. Here again, there is a paradigmatic shift from the functionalist paradigm.
Performance and Video

It was discussed in Chapter II that Lynton (1980) calls attention to the post-Marxian sociology that is behind performance, questioning, as Yves Klein (Neo-Dadaist) the Western notion of duration, as well as the role of the artist and the lack of public experience of art. In terms of Joseph Beuys, there is a strong resemblance between his assumptions and those of the radical Particular Humanist (PH). He a nominalist in his ontological assumptions, and highly anti-positivist and ideographic especially in his involvement in mythical consciousness, mutual therapy, shamanism, politics, social reform, and highly subjective iconography. Nam June Paik also resembles the radical humanist paradigm in that he aims to shock people into examining their social values and beliefs.

Sculptural Events and Earthworks

As McEvilley reminded us, earthworks foregrounded both context and scale. Walter de Maria's earthworks have to do with human scale and relativity. And in that these artists share some elements in common, i.e., a return to nature and natural processes, some type of mythic journey, shamanism, participatory activity and personal and social transformation, they contradict the impersonal, observer-status and coolly objective works of the past. These artists work from the inside, arriving at primal
images of their own, and in so doing channel the range of reality. They share assumptions that are nominalist, antipositivist, ideographic, voluntarist and radical. Thus, they may be perceived as fundamentally within the radical humanist paradigm.

Ritual

These artists rebelled against the reductive purism and art-for-art's-sake with its emphasis on form and image alone that drastically divorced art from social subjects and effects. This art is concerned with the connections between art, religion and politics, asking larger questions found in psychology, politics, myth, nature and history. Ritual art appears to be nominalist, antipositivist, ideographic and voluntarist. In its emphasis either on the sociology of regulation or on radical change, it would share the paradigmatic elements of the interpretive and the radical humanist, with a fundamental emphasis on the latter.

Summary and Conclusion

In general, the art movements that manifest elements of the radical humanist paradigm are Dada, Surrealism, Pop Art, performance and video, sculptural events, earthworks and ritual. Abstract Expression manifests assumptions parallel to the interpretive paradigm and Post-Painterly Abstraction to the functionalist paradigm.
Since Formalism was evaluated as being inept in dealing with the content of contemporary art, then it may be hypothesized that the interpretive strategies best suited in dealing with these movements are those that researcher will term as paradigm appropriate strategies. That is, interpretive strategies that are paradigmatically coherent with the proposed subject of analysis. The forecoming analysis of the underlying assumptions of the interpretive strategies is predicted to yield such evidence.

A Paradigmatic Analysis of Interpretive Strategies

It is recalled that for the purposes of this investigation, the analysis of interpretive strategies was restricted to a survey of major strategies rather than an in-depth analysis of one or a few. Such an approach will undoubtedly restrict that kind and quality of interpretive analysis. Nevertheless, this type of global approach will hopefully result in a kind of intellectual map for further singular and in-depth research into these complex theories of interpretation.

The purpose of the following section, therefore, is to analyze the underlying assumptions of interpretive strategies already described in the survey of the related literature in Chapter II. The analysis will include phenomenology, hermeneutics, reception theory, structuralism, semiotics, post-structuralism,
deconstruction, feminist criticism, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Marxist criticism.

The first step toward paradigmatic representation is to re-examine the interpretive strategies in terms of three opposing factions: (a) those of the analytic tradition who hold to the notion of objectivity, (b) those traditions who espouse to some sort of relativism, and (c) a third group whose traditions advocate some sort of political reform. To the extent that the paradigmatic features of these three major factions can be determined, then the assessment of the interpretive strategies that espouse to similar assumptions within each of the faction may also be deduced.

The Analytic Tradition

According to Smith (1987), the purpose of analytical aesthetics is to improve our understanding of aesthetic concepts by the use of conceptual analysis. While Beardsley (1987) and Hospers (1982), represent those of the analytic tradition, Hirsch (1987) represents the hermeneutic tradition. All of them advocate for the logic of objectivity and validation in interpretation.

Beardsley (1987) takes an analytical approach in concentrating on the question: "What sort of evidence can be appealed to in testing an interpretation?" He also tries to demonstrate that public semantic facts, the connotations and suggestions in poems, are the data with which the interpreter must come to terms. Without such
data, he says, the interpretive process is in danger of falling prey to idle fancy or arbitrary invention. Using such data, he argues that it is possible to check such hypotheses against reality. Beardsley's argument for objectivity in interpretation and meaning rests on Wittgensteinian insight that the use of language is guided by rules.

Hospers (1982) uses conceptual analysis to distinguish between "descriptive criticism" and "interpretive criticism." Relying strongly on the notions of Monroe Beardsley in regards to the testability of an interpretation, he also advocates for objectivity and verification of interpretive statements.

Hirsch's (1987) theory of interpretation aims at delineating how crucial the problem of norms are for preserving the validity of interpretation. His prime objective is to demonstrate how Gadamer's theory of interpretation contains inner conflicts and inconsistencies. By pointing out that "meaning" has two distinct senses—that which does not change because of linguistic reproducibility, and that which changes according to the "significance" it has to the reader or viewer—Hirsch attempts to rescue interpretation from psychologism and conflicts of interpretation.
Summary and Conclusion

The prime issues in regards to interpretation reflected in these analytical philosophers are objectivity, validation of interpretation and the defeat of incompatible interpretations. These philosophers hold that objective truth is possible and that it can be attained through reason and correct method. The truth or falsity of an interpretation is also of primary concern.

The analytic tradition shares some fundamental assumptions with the Analytic Scientist (AS) of Mitroff and Kilmann, and the functionalist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan. These theorists are realists in that they assume universal standards, positivists in that their main concerns are for certainty, consensus, agreement, reliability and validity. They are also apolitical and anti-mystical. They are determinist in the sense that they treat their subject (interpretation) impersonally. The use of their methodology in which they espouse to non-dialectical, classical logic characterizes them a nomothetic.

Interpretive Strategies within the Functionalist Paradigm or the Analytic Scientist Typology

Structuralism.

It is recalled that in Chapter II, structuralism is described as strictly involved with isolating the text from social practice. It also strives for the development of a more systematic, scientific and technical means of
analyzing works. It seeks out deep structures within a text and is based on the belief that the individual units of any system have meaning only by virtue of their relations to one another. Therefore, one does not need to go outside the work at all to explain the work.

**Relativism**

The simplest view of objectivity in interpretation is that objective judgments can be either true or false because they conform in appropriate ways to the actual properties that the artwork possesses (Margolis, 1987). However, if objectivity exists on a continuum with degrees of objectivity, then it moves into the realm of relativism.

The functionalist theorists tend to treat their subject of study as hard, concrete, and tangible empirical phenomenon that exists 'out there' in the 'real world.' However, interpretive theorists are opposed to such a 'structural absolutism,' as they argue that social science should be based upon a fundamentally different ontological status. Their purpose is to illustrate how the supposedly hard, concrete, tangible and 'real' elements of life are dependent upon the subjective constructions of individual persons (Burrell and Morgan, 1985, p. 260). Their nominalist ontology rejects the utility of the analysis of 'structures,' and a 'reality' that is independent of the minds of individuals who create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared meaning.
Summary and Conclusion

To summarize the description of the interpretive paradigm in Chapter II, the primary concern is to understand how reality is meaningfully constructed and ordered from the point of view of the actor. Ideographic methods are favored over nomothetic ones. Reality is seen as an extension of human consciousness in intersubjectively shared meanings. Ontologically, they are nominalistic in that all meaning is within a context. Knowledge is not so much 'objective' as it is shared. In regards to human nature they are voluntarist, and all the theories within the interpretive paradigm are anti-positivist in that they reject the notion that the world of human affairs can be studied in the manner of the natural sciences.

Theorists and Interpretive Strategies within the Interpretive Paradigm or the Conceptual Theorist (CH) or the Conceptual Humanist Typologies

Margolis (1987) represents a more moderate view of interpretation who still holds to some objectivity but who also retreats from the severe and exclusive values of truth and falsity to the weaker values of "plausibility" and "reasonableness" (Margolis, 1987). Gadamer (1987), the most prominent figure of contemporary hermeneutics, also posits some sense of objectivity in the tradition which construes objectivity. However, more extreme views of objectivity, or lack there of, are posited by theorists and
critics of post-modernism and post-structuralism: Stanley Fish, Barthes, Derrida, Levi-Strauss and Foucault.

Joseph Margolis.

Margolis' (1987) purpose is to show that a "relativistic conception" (a) of aesthetic appreciation; (b) of critical judgments (of value); and (c) of literary interpretations is not only viable, but "possibly even required by the ways in which we attend to works of art" (p. 495).

Because Margolis considers works of art to be "culturally emergent entities," he believes that like cultural phenomena, they cannot be directly accessible to the senses and are, therefore, notoriously open to intentional quarrels—that is, to identification under alternative descriptions. Consequently, the possibility of avoiding relativism is nonexistent.

Gadamerian hermeneutics.

Paramount to Gadamer's (1987) philosophic hermeneutics is the fundamental inexhaustibility of the text. This principle is based on what Gadamer calls the fundamental "non-definitiveness" of the horizon in which our own understanding moves (p. 511). Those of a different time, he says, will understand the text in a different way although it remains the same work. This is because the fullness of its meaning is proved in the changing process of events that bring out new aspects of meaning. However,
it is not only important that we regain the concepts of an historical past but that we do so in such a way as to also include our own comprehension of them. This process is what Gadamer calls the "fusion of historical horizons." However, Gadamer does not advocate arbitrariness since he presumes that the person reconstructing the object or historical event is also part of the tradition.

Roland Barthes and Stanley Fish and Graham McFee.

Roland Barthes (1987) does not present a theory of interpretation but a series of propositions in which he attempts to establish the plurality of meaning. He does this by distinguishing between the Text and the work. In essence, the work functions as a sign and is moderately symbolic; but the Text practices the infinite deferral of the signified and functions as radically symbolic and plural.

Stanley Fish, a contemporary literary critic, posits two mutually exclusive views of interpretation. Either literary texts are self-subsistent repositories of meaning that are responsible for the experience that readers have of them or literary texts are the end-products of reading experiences, that is, that they are objects that are constituted by such experiences and not the other way around. If they are the former, then the text remains unchanging over time; if the latter, then the text becomes variant. Fish advocates the latter alternative by
directing attention to the readers who themselves come to
the text equipped with interpretative strategies. And
since there are no limit to the potential number of
interpretive communities, there is no limit to the number
of meanings that a text may acquire.

Graham McFee (1980) argues for the historical
class of art in that a work may offer different
interpretations to different people at different times
because meanings of works of art depend on concepts and
conventional relations which change over time. He takes a
constructivist line similar to Fish in that art depends on
the relationships between the meanings of works of art and
the changes in concepts used in understanding and
explicating those meanings. Since the constructivist sees
criteria as partially determining sense, it follows that
the different criteria imply a difference in meaning
(p. 322).

Semiotics.

Semiotics is concerned with signs and their meaning.
According to Shapiro (1974), a sign is the sort of thing
that requires interpretation but no interpretation is
adequate. The sign is indeterminant because it is capable
of giving rise to a multiplicity of interpretants at a
given time and over a period of time (p. 37). However, not
all interpretations offered are acceptable. The major
focus is how a sign may condense several different aspects of signification.

One way of achieving such complexity is to combine various types of representation in a single product. A painting may be an icon of a certain scene, an index of the painter’s brush-stroke, and a symbol of his intentions. In other kinds of symbolism this overdetermination may be confusing or accidental, but in art it is central. (p. 41)

Shapiro concludes that whereas scientific intelligence is interested in fixing meaning, the artistic intelligence is committed to multiplying meaning (p. 42).

**Phenomenology.**

According to Burrell and Morgan, Phenomenology is placed within the interpretive paradigm as it shares the fundamental assumptions as stated above. It is recalled that for Husserl, knowledge of phenomena is absolutely certain. Phenomena does not need to be interpreted. This is because, according to Earle (1980), "In effect, the objective world of meaningful phenomena is a product of the meaning-bestowing activity, synthesis or intentionality of the transcendental ego. Essential meaning is always a synthesis...and the essential synthesizer is the transcendental ego" (p. 257). The transcendental ego is not a mere spectator but gives or makes sense of its world, and in fact is inseparable from it, as it is essentially bound to that which is objectively appears to it (p. 256).

The role of the transcendental ego is to isolate central meaning or the sense or essence of the phenomena,
and in this case, a work of art. In other words, Earle asserts that conglomerates, fragment, phases, parts are not intelligible and are not thoroughly constituted. "Only the essential whole can fulfill the deepest intentionality of the transcendental ego" (p. 257). Hence, the appeal to the classical work of art with its wholeness or integrity.

**Reception theory.**

It was discussed in Chapter II that reception theory is concerned with the reader's role. The act of reading forces the reader into a new and critical awareness of his or her own customary codes and expectations. The whole point of reading is to bring about a deeper self-consciousness and cause a more critical view of one's own identity.

**Conclusion**

While philosophers and critics of the analytic tradition adhere to the text or the work of art in their analysis via the use of formal and impersonal techniques, and also emphasize the truth, falsity and incompatibility of interpretations, post-structuralist and post-modernist theorists shift the emphasis to the availability of multiple interpretations and to the reader (or viewer) and analyze the effects the texts have upon them.

In terms of Burrell and Morgan, these theorists assume the characteristics of the interpretive paradigm. However, it is more difficult to determine whether they are assuming
the characteristics of the Conceptual Theorist (CT) or the Conceptual Humanist (CH) in the Mitroff and Kilmann typology. Essentially, the difference between the CT and the CH is found in their logics. The CT takes an apolitical, impersonal, value-free stance and enjoys imaginative, multi-causal, conflicting dialectical schemes. The CH on the other hand, will tend to use dialectical behavioral logics and will engage in profoundly socio-emotional processes. The major aim is to help this individual learn about themselves. The means to this accomplishment is by personal dialectics in which there is a confrontation at a deep personal level.

**Political Criticism**

Political criticism makes a drastic turn in the way that the previously mentioned traditions have approached the problem of interpretation. For one thing, the 'object' of interpretation is exploded—no longer a text in the strict sense, but a text which knows no bounds. Secondly, this approach is fundamentally contextual and historical, seeking to look into the 'underpinnings'—values, beliefs, etc., of various interpretive strategies.

Mitchell (1983) addresses the 'politics of interpretation' in that criticism and interpretation have deep and complex relation with politics, the structures of power and social value that organize every aspect of human life (p. 3). He asserts that ideologies are built into the
very mechanisms and metaphors that organize the production of meanings.

Terry Eagleton.

Eagleton (1983) stands as a strong figure in political criticism, proclaiming that "pure literary theory is a myth" (p. 195).

For any body of theory concerned with human meaning, value, language, feeling and experience will inevitably engage with broader, deeper beliefs about the nature of human individuals and society, problems of power and sexuality, interpretation of past history, versions of the present and hopes for the future. (p. 195)

Literary theory is really no more than a branch of social ideologies, utterly without any unit of identity which would adequately distinguish it from philosophy, linguistics, psychology, cultural and sociological thought..." (p. 204). What is important is that it would include the objects 'literature,' but would transform them by setting them in a wider social context. The kind of study he has in mind would seek the effects which discourse produce, and how they produce them.

Post-Structuralism and the Question of Paradigmatic Assumptions

As mentioned in Chapter II, the theorists associated with post-structuralism are the deconstructive operations of Derrida, the French historian Michel Foucault, the feminist critic Julia Kristeva and the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In essence, post-structuralism attacks the positivist model of science and the rationalistic claim to
a transcendental, value-free knowledge of 'the facts.' This investigation will also demonstrate that the Post-structuralist theorists are associated with Marxist theory and may be considered as either Marxists or quasi-Marxists.

This last assertion is particularly important for this investigation as the study will attempt to speculate as to whether or not Discipline-based Art Education will be able to incorporate post-structuralist interpretive strategies without paradigmatic discord.

**Marxist Criticism**

While an in-depth study of Marxist aesthetics and criticism is beyond the scope of this study, it is advantageous to: (a) summarize the assumptions of Burrell and Morgan in regards to the radical humanist paradigm; (b) consider Burrell and Morgan's analysis the range of Marxist sociology found in the work of Lukcas, Brecht, Gramsci, Marcuse, Habermas, Adorno, Schutz, Sarte, Althusser, Gramsci, Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, and Kristeva and apply these findings to Marxist aesthetics; (c) summarize fundamental assumptions common to Marxist criticism.

**The Radical Humanist Paradigm of Burrell and Morgan**

It is recalled that in Chapter II, the underlying assumptions of the radical humanist were developed (see Table 9). To summarize, these elements included: (a) a concern for emancipation; (b) a focus on human consciousness within the totality; (c) a concern for the
'pathology of consciousness; (d) the development of human potentialities; (e) a nominalist ontology rooted in subjectivism and the notion that reality is socially created and socially sustained; (f) a focus on the role of science, logic, rationality, technology, language etc., as superstructures of capitalism and as vehicles of cognitive domination and alienation; (g) the emphasis on radical change through human consciousness and non-violence rather than radical change through political and economic crisis, contradiction and violent revolution which is characteristic of the radical structuralist paradigm and; (h) an anti-positivist epistemology, a voluntarist view of human nature and the use of ideographic methodologies.

The Range of Diversity within Marxist Sociology and the Range of Diversity within Marxist Criticism

Georg Lukacs.

The essential character of Georg Lukacs may be understood when it is apprehended that his main concern was not to contemplate society but to radically transform it. Burrell and Morgan summarize Lukacsian sociology (see Appendix D) as essentially concerned with: (a) the revolution of the proletariat and its class consciousness to overthrow capitalism; (b) the role of superstructures in transforming society; (c) the emphasis on ideology, literature and art in understanding capitalism; (d) an intermediate ontology invoking a dialectic (the subjective and the objective act upon each other); (e) an intermediate
epistemology which does not seek general laws but stresses the methodologies of political action through revolt and revolution; (f) a voluntarist view of human nature stressing the freedom of choice in the type of class consciousness.

In regards to his aesthetics, Lukacs sought to restore the Hegelian influence to Marxism before the 'epistemological break.' He saw the role of art as the uniting of opposing aspects of reality, the abstract and the concrete, into a 'spontaneous whole' (Laing, 1986). This intensive totality of the work is the reflection in artistic form of the extensive totality of reality. The ideal type of artistic form is the Greek epic in which daily life is still felt to be meaningful and comprehensible. It is a utopia in which essence and life are one (p. 50). When the two fall away, then the epic is taken by tragedy which Lukacs shows to be a mode of disintegration of life.

Throughout his writing, Lukacs considered capitalism to be hostile to great art. He developed the concept of the fetishism of commodities found in Capital into a general theory of consciousness and ideology.

Thus, the determining factor in human consciousness within capitalism was the commodity form, in which the exchange-value of the products of human labour dominated their use-value. From this flowed the twin processes of alienation and reification, as a result of which men lived in a mystified relationship to their products and to each other. Social
relationships were seen as relations between things, not people.... (p. 52)

Furthermore, the division of labour resulted in the fragmentation of experience and thought that destroyed 'every image of the Whole.' Capitalism was viewed as a block to people forming a total view of the world.

Lukacs' belief in the evolution of history toward Hegel's 'Absolute Spirit' through the developing self-knowledge of humanity which was to take the form of a series of class societies has been criticized by many orthodox Marxist. Furthermore, his theory has been attacked as inadequate to guide the practice of the contemporary writer (pp. 53-55).

Bertolt Brecht.

Brecht's theory and practice of art coincides most forcibly in the 'epic theatre' in which the spectator is turned into an active participant. Where dramatic theatre provides the individual with sensations to observe, reinforcing the passivity of the audience through 'empathy' and 'catharsis,' the epic theatre 'forces him to take decisions.' The method of characterization was one in which the actor presents the character to the audience in a way that they can regard his or her behavior in an objective fashion. The play was open-ended so that the conclusion would be sought by the audience.

In Brecht's theory the main task of art was to encourage active participation in the world, by providing
occasions for thinking about the world that is necessary to change it. Theatre can develop critical thought which makes up class political consciousness (pp. 59-60). In contrast to Lukacs, the 'totality' of the work of art is 'open,' 'incomplete,' while the Lukacsian totality is completed by the artist.

Antonio Gramsci.

Gramsci's main concern is for a 'philosophy of praxis' which stressed the practical involvement in politics and radical change. According to Burrell and Morgan (Appendix D), Gramsci's presents: (a) a radical humanist critique of capitalism based upon the Hegelianism of Croce opposed to orthodox Marxism; (b) posited the 'philosophy of praxis' which stated that material coercion also rested within individual consciousness through ideological hegemony; (c) the individual worker is still able to resist the forces of hegemony; (d) asserted that the ruling class seeks to legitimate its power.

The importance of ideology.

In the schools of Marxist cultural criticism, an orientation emerged from the structural linguistics of Saussure that combined with concepts of psychoanalysis to produce a 'semiotic' approach to the ideological level of the superstructure (Laing, p. 88). This approach is not in question.
Gramsci, Althusser, Barthes, Macherey, Derrida and Lacan. However, Gramsci, Althusser, Barthes and Macherey emerge as major figures of this practice. Terry Eagleton is influenced by Macherey's approach in which he examines not only the finished product but also looks at it as the result of the process of literary production. Absence is an important concept in ideological analysis:

The Althusserian variant concerns the construction of the 'problematic' or underlying structure of concepts (a theory or an ideology) which inform the work, often by their absence as well as their presence. The result, in Macherey's work, is 'the total abandonment of a unified notion of the literary work as a finished form capable of resolving the conflicts of reality to which it is a response.' (pp. 89-90)

Essentially, unlike great art which has direct access to reality by 'reflecting it,' for Macherey, the artistic production takes place within ideology.

Derrida's deconstruction.

Deconstruction is also concerned with ideology. Essentially, he assumes that texts are signs that are semiotically independent. Semiotic independence means that texts are independent of: (a) author's intentions, (b) the reader, (c) the objects of signification, and (d) the outside of language referents (Barnes, 1988). This means that a text has no one and only determinate meaning; and that a text has no meaning privileged by the ideology of a culture or tradition.
Post-structuralism is an outgrowth of structuralism which uses structural analysis to probe deep patterns. But post-structuralism is not concerned to demonstrate how the structures of a work signify, but how a work manifests inadequacies of structure (Stevens and Stewart, 1987). Deconstruction is concerned with the gasps and incoherences which make the text violate its own conventions revealing the limits of 'ideological representation.' Derrida labels as 'metaphysical' any system that depends on a first principle or unpeachable ground. Since first principles are defined by what they exclude, they can always be deconstructed by sorting out the binary opposites.

Althusser and Jacques Lacan.

Some of the major characteristics of Lacanian psychoanalysis were discussed in Chapter II and his paradigmatic assumptions are of particular concern to this investigation. According to Laing (1986), "The concept of ideology involved, and the place within it of the 'structuralist' psychoanalytical theory of Jacques Lacan, represent Althusser's major contribution to the new Marxist aesthetics" (p. 90). He continues that, "Lacan's concept of the human 'subject' provides a theory of ideology with a way of escaping from the notion of ideological manipulation of the masses by the rulers, which previous theories had implied (e.g. the Frankfort School on the culture industry)" (p. 90). For Lacan, the individual is
de-centered constituted in the ideological formations in which it 'recognizes' itself. Ideology here refers to the whole terrain of conscious and unconscious experience. It is important to note that Lacan wrote for the Tel Quel, a review that had previously followed the formalist in their rejection of the notions of omnipotent author and passive reader (p. 100). More of this review will be discussed later.

The relevance of ideology for Althusser's theory of art is that he posits the inadequacy of the traditional base/superstructure model and suggests that the "function of ideologies is better explained as the reproduction of the relations of production of the society..." (p. 91). The reproduction of moralities and opinions ensures that the work-force and the family and school etc., that are responsible for re-producing these, are maintained in their subordination to the dominant class.

Barthes, the Tel Quel and Julia Kristeva.

Modern structuralist theory of the aesthetic began with Roland Barthes' Writing Degree Zero (1953) and his next book, Mythologies (1957). Saussure was influential to Barthes in that he described language as a 'system of relations.' The relationship between the sign and the signifier in language is an arbitrary one fixed by convention or through a system of difference (Laing, 1986,
In Mythologies, Barthes attempted to politicise this semiotic concept.

The mythification process, Barthes explains, is the means by which the dominant ideology works to present historically and culturally determined meanings as 'natural.' This naturalisation of the sign operates through a denial or repression of the activity of the signifier, which becomes a transparent (invisible) window onto the 'real' (the signified). (p. 96)

Meaning is not innate, but is determined by the dominant ideology. After Mythologies, Barthes proposed a science of literature that studied the process of production of meaning. This science would illustrate that a variety of interpretations of the same text were possible.

**The Tel Quel.**

The political implications of Barthes' work for a combative Marxist aesthetic was explored by the contributors of the review *Tel Quel*. "Ecriture refers to the practice of writing, exemplified in certain authors of the nouveau roman, which challenges the dominance of representation realism" (p. 98). It set as its task the means by which 'meaning' was produced in bourgeois society. In general, it offered a critique of the forms of the dominant ideology a capitalist society. This position is similar to quasi-marxist such as Barthes and Brecht whose critique of the dominant artistic modes focused on their repression of the contradiction with which bourgeois society. The *Tel Quel* group has been committed to a revolutionary political stance and has made an attempt to
resolve the problem of compatibility between Marx and Freud.

Julia Kristeva's work for the review has become dominant in this attempt to combine Marxism with Freudian psychoanalysis. The concept of the subject, borrowed from Lacan, is not the self-determining unified individual of the humanist tradition but is ever-changing and full of contradictions that are produced by the social institutions and signifying practices. Kristeva analyzes the process of significance which is the process of production of meaning though the medium of language. This is a very political process.

The relation between the symbolic and the semiotic in any signifying practice determines its political significance. Because the force of the symbolic is associated with the maintenance of structures establishing the institutions of the status quo.... (p. 101)

The literary avant-garde is the most important of these signifying practices for Kristeva because they are condemned as 'unreadable' by the institutions of realism, since their work is aimed at the dissolution of the fixed meanings that make up the security of realism (pp. 101-102). Her work, On Chinese Women (1977) represents an attempt to relate a different system of signification to the problem of destroying patriarchy.

Kristeva's work has been criticized for her concentration on individual subjectivity and 'the relativism of the Symbolic' rather than the struggle for a
different Symbolic Order other than the patriarchy (Johnston, 1976). Her theory has also been attacked by Marxists for it lack of reference to class, class position or class ideology (Laing, p. 103).

The Frankfurt School: Marcuse and Habermas.

Unlike the work of Lukacs and Gramsci, Burrell and Morgan summarize the Frankfurt sociology (see Appendix D) as essentially concerned less with political action and revolution than on philosophical and intellectual criticism. They are theorists rather than activists.

Marcuse is summarized by: (a) his attacks upon the 'one-dimensional' nature of modern technological society under capitalism, (b) his Freudian perspective that civilization rests upon the repression of man's internal drives, and (c) his view that people must be emancipated from surplus repression and technology which is seen as a political force dominating society.

Jurgen Habermas' work can be understood as a reaction against the shortcomings of the interpretive sociology in that he: (a) stressed the structure of domination embedded in language; (b) developed a theory of 'communicative competence,' to deal with the problem of ordinary language and consciousness; (c) asserted that 'work' is a 'communicative distortion' characterized by speech acts that reflect unequal power; (d) sought to invert and demolish the functionalist trend to the neutrality of
language as building blocks to value-free social theories; (e) demonstrated how science, ideology, technology, language, art and other aspects of the superstructure dominate the social order (Burrell and Morgan, 1985).

In discussing the Marxist theory of art, Laing (1986) characterizes the Frankfurt school as a critical theory which was in a symbolic relationship with Marxism rather than part of the Marxist mainstream. Major figures include Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas and Schmidt. From the beginning the school adopted a contemplative attitude towards the politics of the communist movement (p. 62). Writings of the Frankfurt School were of two main types: critiques of traditional philosophy and studies of various cultural or 'superstructural' phenomena (p. 63).

However, the school is marked by controversy. The work of Adorno, whose major contribution was in his Philosophy of Modern Music (1973), represents an attempt to incorporate Marx and Freud in an aesthetic that reacts against a totalitarian economic system. But both Brecht and Lukacs define the problems of art and literature in terms of a new 'realism.' "...Lukacs looks for a modern equivalent of the 'great realism of the past,' while Brecht wants as artistic representation of the specific characteristics and contradictions of contemporary societies" (p. 67). Hence, there are these contrasting versions of 'socialist realism.'
French Existentialism: Schutz and Sarte

This tradition is rooted in the subjectivist idealist tradition from Husserl and Fichte. It is paradigmatically located between solipsism and the objective idealism of critical theory. It is important to note that phenomenology and existentialism are often seen as related schools of thought and are sometimes considered identical. However, existentialism differs from phenomenology in its vigorous humanism and its political commitment to change the existing social order (Burrell and Morgan, p. 302).

The essential difference between Schutz and Sarte is that Schutz focuses on the social construction of everyday life as the basis for understanding, while Sarte is concerned with understand the pathology of social construction and the need to change it.

Laing (1986) asserts that the main contributions to the Marxist theory of art involve a Marxist theory with innovations from linguistics and psychoanalysis. Jean-Paul Sarte was the first to elaborate on a political aesthetic outside the Soviet orthodoxy. He and Maurice Merleau-Ponty had aligned their existential philosophies with the political left. Like the surrealists of the 1920's he also announced a link to writing and to revolutionary commitment.
Summary and Conclusion

What these theorists have in common is their focus on how meaning is produced within ideology. Meaning is not innate but determined by the dominant cultural institutions and signifying practices. They are at least implicitly political in their content and intent if not radically political with the emphasis on transforming society.

Laing (1986) also asserts that unlike the humanist traditions, these approaches de-center the human being.

If there can be said to be any common perspective amongst the variety of 'structuralists', from Lacan to Levi-Strauss, Foucault to Althusser, it lies in their resistance to what Foucault names as the essential feature of the contemporary epistememe, the placing of Man as the origin of social practice. (p. 94)

In terms of the ontological, epistemological, human nature views and sociological assumptions, there are manifested tendencies to be highly nominalist in the subversion of the dominant representation of 'realism', anti-positivistic in the ascertain that science, logic and language are value-free, voluntarist and determined in the belief that individuals are capable of radical change and are also products of cultural domination. Furthermore, energy is directed at demolishing the status quo in a sociology of radical change.

To summarize the paradigmatic structures of the interpretive strategies discussed, the functionalist paradigm parallels the analytic traditions of structuralism and formalism, the interpretive paradigm parallels the
relativist traditions of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and
semiotics, and finally, the radical humanist paradigm
parallels the political traditions of deconstruction,
Lacanian psychoanalysis, feminism and Marxism.

The next step then, is to analyze Discipline-based Art
Education's (DBAE) ideological foundations in order to
determine whether DBAE will be able to incorporate their
espoused interpretive strategies of feminism, psycho-
analysis and Marxism.

A Paradigmatic Analysis of Discipline-Based Art Education

The purpose of this discussion is: (a) to determine
what educational paradigm DBAE is based upon; (b) to
determine how educational paradigms may be integrated into
the paradigm models of Burrell and Morgan; (c) to examine
the range of interpretive strategies suggested in DBAE; (d)
to speculate as to the paradigmatic relations between
DBAE's ideology as reflected in its espoused educational
paradigm and the suggested interpretive strategies in terms
of conflict or consistency. The discussion will be limited
to "Discipline-based Art Education: Becoming Students of

The Education Paradigms of W. H. Schubert

In order to ascertain where DBAE establishes itself
within the paradigms of Burrell and Morgan, it is necessary
to examine how the various educational paradigms may be
subsumed within Burrell and Morgan's methodology. Schubert
(1986) offers three curriculum paradigms: the paradigm of practical curriculum inquiry, the paradigm of critical praxis, and the paradigm of the perennial analytic.

**Paradigm of Practical Inquiry**

This paradigm has its roots in the progressive education movement. It is based on the assumption that situations are essentially unique and therefore, it does not provide specific guidelines without knowledge of particular state of affairs. Practical inquiry centers on deliberation, the human search for meaning and understanding.

In deliberation, human beings are creators of knowledge who inform action in situations they encounter. Their search for meaning probes into the realm of intersubjective meaning shared by those who experience a similar historical, political and social context. Central to deliberation is the ethical commitment to contribute good and worthwhile decisions that enable those involved to grow in increasingly human ways.

The roots stem from the practical interests and interactive or democratic social organization of pragmatic philosophers such as Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey. It also has roots in phenomenology and existentialism.

**Paradigmatic Analysis**

It appears that Schubert's practical paradigm is parallel to Burrell and Morgan's interpretive paradigm.
Schubert's paradigm reflects a nominalist ontology in that the imposition of external form is resisted and social reality is seen as emergent. Also, the frame of reference is the individual actor rather than the observer of action. It is anti-positivist in that it rejects the notion that the world of human affairs can be studied in the same manner as the natural sciences. It holds to a voluntarist view of human nature and is rooted in the sociology of regulation.

It is also important to note that the practical inquiry paradigm parallels the concerns of the Conceptual Humanist (CH) in the Mitroff and Kilmann typology in its centrality to ethical commitment and the explicit fostering of human growth and development.

Paradigm of Critical Praxis

This paradigm is based on the unity of inquiry and action. This action-inquiry is political in nature. It is an effort to look critically at impingements of ideology and economics on human growth and development. Moreover, it seeks to vigorously point out inequities of educational access, opportunity, and quality experienced on the basis of race, gender, socioeconomic class and other differences. But it not only points out these constraints and inequities, it strives to overcome them. Therefore, it integrates political action with intellectual inquiry. It
also emphasizes emancipation and liberation along with social justice and questions of empowerment.

**Paradigmatic Analysis**

Critical praxis is rooted in the sociology of radical change. It posits a precarious ontological status and is highly anti-positivist in that it seeks to understand the pathology of consciousness. Its main concerns are emancipation and potentialities. It also posits a high degree of voluntarism and is ideographic. Therefore, it parallels the radical humanist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan.

**Paradigm of Perennial Analytic**

This curriculum is based on the Tyler Rationale. It uses broadly based or global statements such as the goal of excellence or the "cultured man." It advocates for basic skills and knowledge of the disciplines which are often stated globally: critical thinking, well-rounded education, moral integrity, etc. These are open-ended principles supporting the idea that professional educators should not be given recipes but are expected to interpret global goals creatively to fit the particular situation.

It is based on the apprenticeship system in which students master certain tasks. Bobbitt (1918, 1924) first made progress in curriculum by first making detailed observations of successful adult activities, then translating them into specific, itemized lists of
objectives for student learning activities—hence the use of behavioral objectives.

**Substantive criteria for selecting purposes.**

Tyler (1949), and Smith, Stanley, and Shores (1950, 1957) encouraged curriculum developers to recognize that purposes are derived from assumptions about the learner, society, and knowledge. They argued that none of the three can be left out of the curricular decision-making equation. Learner's needs are the basic human needs as well as social-cultural-biological needs. Social needs are based on what effective adults do, assuming that they should be models for the young. Knowledge is interpreted in terms of the disciplines of knowledge. Scholars are called upon to oversee and advise. Also each discipline has a basic structure.

**Substantive purposes.**

Socialization refers to the intent to use curriculum to induct the young into the ways of living in a society or culture and includes the mores, attitudes, information, skills, customs, values, and ideals of the social group. The social group is a generic reference to a range of societal dimensions: family, community, ethnic, racial, socioeconomic, nation and so on. The intent of the socializing agency is to provide the essential knowledge of the ways of life in society that would be unlikely or inefficiently acquired by ordinary experience.
Paradigmatic Analysis

The perennial analytic paradigm appears to share the fundamental assumptions of the functionalist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan. In its aim to induct the young into the ways of living in a society, it assumes a realist ontology that is prior to humans. It is positivist in its observer role and purposive rationality. It also tends towards determination and nomothetic methodologies.

The emphasis also on adult roles and the overseeing of the scholars reflects the Mertonian theory of social and cultural structure within the functionalist paradigm (see Appendix B) which reflects an emphasis on the predefined social context which aims at normative behavior. Merton's (1968) analysis of reference group theory which aims to "systemitize the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self appraisal in which the individual take the values or standards of other individuals or groups as a comparative frame of reference (Merton, p. 288, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, p. 91).

Important also is Kelly's (1968) distinction between two kinds of reference groups. The first is the normative function which is concerned with the setting and enforcing of standards (and the delivery of rewards and punishments), and the second is the comparison function which refers to the role reference groups provide in setting a standard or
the pointing of comparison against which persons can evaluate themselves (Burrell and Morgan, p. 92).

**DBAE Within the Paradigm of the Perennial Analytic**

Discipline-based Art Education has significant parallels to the perennial analytic paradigm with its emphasis on: the notion of the enlightened, educated adult; the four disciplines; an existing body of knowledge; a well-rounded education; the standards of excellence; the community of scholars; the notion of dynamic open-ended discipline; the use of behavioral objectives for learning; the idea of testing for the competence of learners; and the notion that the curriculum must address the subject matter (knowledge), the nature of the students (learners) and the needs of society. Reflected also with DBAE is Merton's reference group theory and Kelly's comparison function.

**Interpretation Notions Included in DBAE**

The next step is: (a) to investigate whether Discipline-based Art Education assumes agreement among the experts in regard to the task of interpretation, (b) to examine the range and variety of interpretive strategies within DBAE, and (c) to speculate as to the paradigmatic relationships between DBAE's educational ideology and the variety of interpretive strategies advocated within DBAE. These interpretive strategies will then be compared with DBAE's basic assumptions in order to access their either harmonious or problematic correlation.
In regards to the first task, "Becoming Students of Art" clearly acknowledges the lack of agreement among critics: "The methods critics use to describe and interpret works of art and the standards with which they evaluate them are diverse [italics added] and have varied throughout the history of art criticism" (p. 154). Furthermore, they describe the reasons for this diversity: "This is because of the different (and constantly changing) social, political, economic, religious, and geographic influences...under which art is made" (p. 154). Finally, the authors explicitly state the lack of agreement among critics:

While critics may not agree on exactly what methods should be employed and what standards should be used in criticism, they all attempt to discuss the meaning of the work of art by a critical commentary that is founded in perception of the work and that relates to the work. (p. 155)

The Range of Interpretive Strategies Within DBAE

In the discussion of the types of critical discussion of meaning, Clark, Day and Greer describe the internal and external qualities of a work of art.

Discussions of internal qualities focus on a work's inherent aspects and may be iconographic, symbolic, narrative, and so on. Discussions of external qualities view the work with a larger context, such as art-historical (style--e.g., Pop Art, Neoexpressionism, Hard Edge, etc.); historical; psychological (Freudian, Jungian, etc.); political and ideological (Marxist, capitalist, feminist, etc.), and so on. (1987, p. 154)

In an earlier discussion in this chapter, Marxist criticism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and feminism were
discussed as part of the problematic within political criticism. Along with Derrida's deconstructive criticism, these interpretive strategies are also recognized as problematics within post-structuralism, and it is within this framework that this final analysis will take place.

Post-Structuralism and Political Practice

Deconstruction

Stevens and Stewart (1987) assert that the essential difference between structuralism and post-structuralism is one of coherence. The conventions of structuralism is that through particular conventions—for example, the convention of metaphor or the rule of significance, the work of art is expected to cohere. However, the opposite is true for post-structuralism.

On one hand, it is an outgrowth of structuralism and uses structural analysis to probe the deep patterns of a work. On the other hand, it rejects many of the premises of structuralism and is concerned not with demonstrating how the structures of a work signify but with showing the inadequacy of these structures. (pp. 39-40)

Thus, with being concerned with the gaps, incoherences and indeterminancies of a text, the deconstructionist critic reveals more than the inadequacies of structure, but also the limits of ideological representation. Eagleton (1983) asserts that Derrida is clearly out to do more than develop a new technique of reading:

Deconstruction is for him an ultimately political practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which the particular system of thought, and behind that a whole system of political structures and social
institutions, maintains its force. He is not seeking, absurdly, to deny the existence of relatively determinate truths, meaning, identities, intentions, historical continuities; he is seeking rather to see such things as the effects of a wider and deeper history—of language, of the unconscious, of the social institutions and practices. (1983, p. 148)

Radical Politics and Psychoanalysis

John Brenkman (1987) asserts that, "What makes psychoanalysis relevant to hermeneutics is its attention to the formation of the subject in the 'discourse of the Other'" (p. x). Furthermore,

...what makes it relevant to socially critical hermeneutics is its practice of a dialogue designed to transform participants' relation to their own history and their own discourse. The social categories underpinning the specific concerns of psychoanalysis have to be made explicit to develop the relation between psychoanalysis and critical hermeneutics. (p. x)

Freud retreats from such a reflection but Lacan, by shifting the Freudian paradigm from intrapsychic mechanisms to intersubjective relations, and from quasi-biological instincts to language, partially opens psychoanalysis to cultural theory. Brenkman attempts to correspond the three fields of hermeneutics, Marxism and psychoanalysis to correspond to the theoretical framework of socially critical hermeneutics.

There is some disagreement in the literature about the political implications of particular psychoanalytic theorists. Contrary to Berkman, Eagleton (1983) asserts that in that Freudianism is committed to the emancipation of humanity from what frustrates their fulfillment and
well-being, it is a theory at the service of a transformative practice and has parallels with radical politics (p. 192). He further asserts that one of the richest traditions to have emerged from Freud's writings is a form of political-psychoanalytical work that is engaged with the problem of the well-being of whole societies. The German psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich, and the writings of Herbert Marcuse and other member of the Frankfurt School are prominent features in this link.

**Feminism**

It is recalled that Kristeva uses the language of the semiotic as a means of undermining the symbolic order. The symbolic order that Lacan describes is in reality the patriarchal sexual and social order of modern class-society, structured around the 'transcendental signifier' of the phallus dominated by law which the father embodies. This then is the essential element of the feminist criticism—making the oppressiveness of the actual social and sexual relations the target of their critique. And in so doing, it is an overtly political act.

In Lacanian theory anyone who is unable to enter the symbolic order at all, to symbolize their experience through language, would become psychotic. The 'feminism' could be seen as existing on this border in that the feminine is at once 'inside' the symbolic and yet 'outside'
male society as a victimized outcast (Eagleton, 1983, p. 190).

Feminist criticism then, is essentially concerned with the question of sexual ideology. The movement from structuralism to post-structuralism was in part a response to political demands to move beyond the personal dimensions of sexism and to engage in the larger cultural context. Another major relationship between feminism and post-structuralism is that for all the binary oppositions which post-structuralism sought to undo, the hierarchical oppositions between women and men was the most virulent (Eagleton, 1983, p. 149).

Holly (1977) suggests two aspects central to a feminist aesthetic: consciousness and authenticity. Criticism follows what is called 'consciousness-raising,' that is, "in order to recognize sexual stereotyping and authenticity in a literary work, we must first bring to a conscious level our own fundamental and perhaps erroneous beliefs about the nature, character, and destiny of women" (p. 40). That is, critics must reach an honest appraisal of their own ideologies and question their own adherence to sex, class, and race biases in evaluating a work. Feminism is based upon the questioning of reality. Realism demands that the perceptions go beyond the cliches to an authentic reflection of women's epistemology. "Feminist criticism is our attempt to find a congenial critical method, one that
units subjective responses, self-knowledge, and objective 'scientific' analysis. It is...unconventional and ultimately revolutionary” (Holly, 1977).

Summary and Conclusion

It has been determined that Schubert's educational paradigms are parallel to Burrell and Morgan's sociological paradigms. The paradigm of practical inquiry reflects the assumptions of the interpretive paradigm; the paradigm of critical praxis shares the assumptions of the radical humanist; and the paradigm of the perennial analytic shares the assumptions of the functionalist paradigm.

It has further been determined that Discipline-based Art Education parallels the fundamental assumptions of the functionalist paradigm. In regards to the varieties of interpretive strategies found within DBAE, it has been determined that several of them are framed within the post-structuralist paradigm. What implications do these findings have for the paradigmatic relationships between DBAE and post-structuralist interpretive strategies?

In so much as the post-structuralist interpretive strategies reflect the assumptions of Schubert's paradigm of critical praxis, they are also parallel to the radical humanist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan. This paradigmatic assessment places these strategies in complete discord with the Analytic or functionalist paradigm of which DBAE appears to be a part. However, the analysis of DBAE was
based upon its substantive purposes and criteria. Another set of results will emerge upon shifting to DBAE's claim to incorporate the range and variety of interpretive tools that it suggests. What other assumptions is DBAE making by suggesting the incorporation of such a diverse and contradictory mix of interpretive strategies?

Let us return to Schubert (1986) for further delineation of the notion of paradigms. He stresses that it is very important to emphasize that the three paradigms are not diametrically opposed to one another (p. 114). In fact, he says, it is possible to provide examples of overlap for all three. For example, although Tyler is credited with the rationale for an empirical-analytic mode of study that serves technical interest, his own consultation on curriculum and evaluation was practical in concern. There are different versions of phenomenology and hermeneutics and so on.

This is also consistent with the work of Burrell and Morgan in that solipsism transgresses the border between the sociology of regulation and the sociology of change to place it both within the interpretive paradigm and the radical humanist paradigm. Interaction and social action theory overlap into the interpretive paradigm while firmly rooted in the functionalist paradigm. Finally, the work of Max Weber served as a foundation in three different
paradigms by later theorists who made adaptations in his ideas.

**DBAE Within the Conceptual Theorist Typology**

The point of the above discussion is to attempt to formulate an answer to the variety and range of interpretive strategies within DBAE. What would such a range suggest? In Chapter III, the four typologies of Mitroff and Kilmann were discussed in detail. DBAE appears to have some of the characteristics of the Conceptual Theorists (CT) approach.

It is recalled that the CT's main interest and concern is to seek multiple explanations of phenomena. It tends to build bridges between disparate paradigms and it is speculative over broad ranging and novel ideas. The reason that it has this ability is because it takes a value-free, apolitical, objective stance toward this information. Therefore, its logic is of a dialectical nature, arguing both for and against the same phenomena and entertaining complete opposite points of view. The weight of an argument in which two opposing views are being discussed rests on its intellectual merits alone.

**Conclusion**

From this point of view, DBAE manifests elements within two paradigms. It is fundamentally within the functionalist paradigm while it does entertain the notion of multiple realities which places it slightly into the
interpretive paradigm. Chapter V will discuss the implications of this finding in terms of curriculum development and other approaches to art education.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Summary

The purpose of the study was to: (a) survey the range of contemporary art making and contemporary interpretive strategies, (b) analyze their ideological assumptions, (c) analyze Discipline-based Art Education (DBAE) in terms of its ideological assumptions, (d) determine what interpretive strategies Discipline-based Art Education advocates, and (e) speculate as to Discipline-based Art Education's ability to effectively deal with contemporary art and post-structuralist interpretive strategies. The study attempted to answer the following research questions:

1. What is interpretation and what distinctions exist between it and other critical statements such as description and evaluation?

2. What is the range of art making taking place in the contemporary scene?

3. What is the range of interpretive strategies within contemporary art theory and what is the range of agreement and/or disagreement?
4. Can there be a systematic approach to the classification of the criteria for interpretation within contemporary art theory?

5. What ontological, epistemological, human nature views and methodological assumptions influence the criteria for interpretation within an interpretive strategy?

6. What are Discipline-based Art Education's (DBAE) ideological assumptions?

7. What interpretive strategies are advocated by Discipline-based Art Education?

8. Are these espoused interpretive strategies consistent with DBAE's ideological assumptions?

9. Will Discipline-based Art Education be able to incorporate post-structuralist interpretive strategies without contradiction or inconsistency to its values and goals?

The theses pursued in the investigation were:

1. The range of art making in the contemporary scene has influenced the proliferation of interpretive strategies.

2. The complexity and diversity manifested throughout the fields of criticism and aesthetics in regard to the notion of interpretation can be systematically and comprehensively explored by an examination of the ontological, epistemological, human nature views and methodological assumptions of respective interpretive
strategies, thus providing a classificatory tool for art educators to approach the notion of interpretation.

3. The systematic classification of interpretive strategies will reveal fundamental elements of disagreement and paradigmatic discord.

4. Discipline-based Art Education's ideological assumptions may encounter paradigmatic conflict and contradiction in attempting to incorporate the manifested diversity among interpretive strategies.

Research Conclusions

A systematic analysis of the conclusions reached from the above research questions is as follows:

1. The task of interpretation was found to be distinct from other critical statements such as description and evaluation in that it is the apprehension of meaning or the production of the meaning of text or a work of art.

2. It was found that the range of art making taking place in the contemporary scene is pluralistic, complex and contradictory. As Smagula (1983) asserts, there is a disarming diversity that abounds in the contemporary scene with a profusion of individual styles, themes and processes. Further, there is no longer one particular aesthetic philosophy that dominates (p. 1).

The findings of this investigation are congruent with Smagula's assessment in that the manifest theoretical underpinnings found within contemporary art reflect a wide
diversity of complex and contradictory pursuits. Theoretical assumptions included: both highly personal iconography of intensely subjective psychological concerns and explorations into archetypical universals as well; feminist epistemology and imagery; political and ideological content, particularly Marxist aesthetic concerns; narrative supplements, commentaries and autobiographies; historical, anthropological, archeological, ecological, moral, spiritual and fictional content; communal artistic endeavors; positivist pursuits in vital form; reductionist undertakings, as well as self-referential and purist attitudes.

3. The range of interpretive strategies within contemporary art theory reflected the complexity and diversity manifested within contemporary art. Strategies for interpretation included formalism, structuralism, phenomenology, semiotics, hermeneutics, Jungian, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, deconstruction, Marxism, feminism and reception theory.

It was found that these interpretive strategies manifested a high degree of complexity, discontinuity and disagreement in the scope and purpose of interpretation. Each of these interpretive strategies comes from its own intellectual tradition and brings with it its own set of criteria to the task of interpretation. Hence, the task of interpretation is made difficult.
4. Through a review of the literature on educational, psychological and sociological paradigms, this investigation developed a research methodology that approached the diversity of the above interpretive strategies with systematic analysis and the ability to classify the underlying assumptions of the interpretive strategies according to their ontological, epistemological, methodological, human nature views and attitudes of sociological regulation or change.

The educational paradigms of Schubert (1986) and the psychological typologies of Mitroff and Kilmann (1978) were found to be fundamentally congruent with the four sociological paradigms of Burrell and Morgan (1985) and were reflective of the major intellectual traditions and assumptions found within the Burrell and Morgan's functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist and radical structuralist paradigms.

5. The fundamental assumptions that influence the criteria for interpretation within an interpretive strategy was found to be of either a realist or nominalist ontology, a positivist or anti-positivist epistemology, a voluntaristic or deterministic view of human nature, an ideographic or nomothetic methodology, and a regulation or radical change sociology.

6. Discipline-based Art Education's (DBAE) substantive criteria and purposes were found to be
fundamentally consistent with Schubert's paradigm of the perennial analytic which in turn, is congruent with Burrell and Morgan's functionalist paradigm. However, DBAE's apparent encouragement of the diverse range of interpretive strategies suggest a nominalist ontology reflective of Mitroff and Kilmann's Conceptual Theorist (CT) which would then place it over the boundary of the functionalist paradigm and into the interpretive paradigm.

7. The interpretive strategies explicitly advocated by Discipline-based Art Education are Marxism, psychoanalysis and feminism with an implicit assumption to include the full range of interpretive strategies as mentioned above.

8. Since deconstruction, Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and feminism were found to be post-structuralist interpretive strategies, manifesting the fundamental assumptions of Schubert's paradigm of critical praxis which in turn, is congruent with Mitroff and Kilmann's Particular Humanist (PH) and Burrell and Morgan's radical humanist paradigm, these espoused interpretive strategies would be understood as fundamentally inconsistent with DBAE's ideological assumptions.

9. Based upon this evidence, Discipline-based Art Education would have difficulty in incorporating post-structuralist interpretive strategies because of the manifest contradiction and inconsistency to its basic
ideology, particularly in that both the functionalist and the interpretive paradigms are founded upon a sociology of regulation, while the radical humanist paradigm indicative of the post-structuralist interpretive strategies is based upon a sociology of radical change.

**Unintended Findings**

Furthermore, in the investigation of the above research questions, other questions were raised and addressed. They are:

1. Can formalism adequately deal with contemporary art making? The evidence based upon the overwhelming contextual information manifested within contemporary art itself as described in Chapter II, along with the thirteen content levels described by McEvilley (1984), indicate that formalism, also known as the 'optical theory of art,' is inept in dealing with the multiple levels of content foregrounded within 20th century art.

2. What are the ideological assumptions of modernism and post-modernism? Upon analysis, modernist assumptions reflect a realist ontology, a positivist epistemology and nomothetic methodologies. These assumptions are antithetical to the assumptions of post-modernism which is reflects a highly nominalist ontology, a rigorous anti-positivism and acute ideographic methodologies. Further antithetical elements are perceived around the sociology of radical change.
3. Does Discipline-based Art Education assume agreement among the experts in regards to the task of interpretation? It was found that DBAE explicitly acknowledges the diversity and disagreement within the domain of art criticism concerning the task of interpretation.

4. What interpretive strategies would be appropriate in interpreting contemporary art? This researcher has suggested that interpretive strategies be paradigm appropriate from apprehending the levels of content.

**Theses**

In light of the above findings, the theses pursued in the investigation were found to be substantiated. That is:

1. The range of art making in the contemporary scene has influenced the proliferation of interpretive strategies.

2. The complexity and diversity manifested throughout the fields of criticism and aesthetics in regard to the notion of interpretation can be systematically and comprehensively explored by an examination of the ontological, epistemological, human nature views and methodological assumptions of respective interpretive strategies, thus providing a classificatory tool for art educators to approach the notion of interpretation.
3. The systematic classification of interpretive strategies will reveal fundamental elements of disagreement and paradigmatic discord.

4. Discipline-based Art Education's ideological assumptions may encounter paradigmatic conflict and contradiction in attempting to incorporate the manifested diversity among interpretive strategies.

Discussion and Implications

The implications of the study involve three major areas: (a) theoretical research, (b) curriculum development, and (c) approaches to art education.

It is recalled that in Chapter I, Edmund Feldman was quoted as saying that most teachers of language and of literature function as literary critics and are light years ahead of art educators. That is, the theoretical materials that art educators find new and innovative have long been used by literary critics. His statement was first made in 1973, and was again published in 1988 by The National Art Education Association in Research Readings for Discipline-Based Art Education: A Journey Beyond Creating. Since his first pronouncement in 1973, things have gotten worse in two respects.

First, the literary field has exploded in dimensions so that as Culler (1982) has said, to enter critical theory in the beginning of the 1980's is to enter into a confused and confusing debate. Eagleton (1983) and Margolis (1987)
have reiterated the tremendous impact that the proliferation of strategies of interpretation and meaning have had upon the literary field. Margolis further asserts that the problem of interpretation will occupy the interests of investigators for the next generation.

The above has important implications for art education. First and foremost, as expected, the research into interpretive strategies and interpretive communities was found to be overwhelming within literature and critical theory rather than the visual arts and art education. Furthermore, this investigation has substantiated the claims made by Margolis, Eagleton and Culler, that the research indeed is found to be extremely complex and diversified requiring a vast knowledge not only of the intellectual traditions from which these diverse interpretive communities have emerged, but also a sophisticated knowledge of the wide range of issues and concerns within each particular interpretive strategies.

It is hoped that this analysis has laid some kind of foundation for further research to be continued by this investigator, and hopefully by other art educators into further delineating the complex and varied approaches to the task of interpretation.

The second implication involves curriculum development. To the extent that the theoretical research involving the task of interpretation remains complex,
difficult and confusing, so too will the attempts in curriculum development also be made difficult. Therefore, greater efforts must be made by art educators to further delineate first, the philosophical and theoretical dimensions of interpretation and interpretive strategies, and second, to implement these findings through curriculum research and development.

The final implications involves the approaches to art education and the incorporation of post-structuralist interpretive strategies. It is recalled that in Chapter IV, it was found that DBAE manifests elements within two paradigms. It is fundamentally within the functionalist paradigm but in entertaining the notion of multiple interpretive strategies, it also holds to multiple views of realities which places it moderately into the interpretive paradigm. This is particularly true as it manifests elements of the Conceptual Theorist (CT) who deals with these multiple views of reality by taking a value-free, disinterested, apolitical stance toward such dialectic views.

A Question of the Quality of Integration

The major question here concerns the integration of post-structuralist interpretive strategies such as feminism, Marxism and some versions of psychoanalytic theory which occupy the radical humanist paradigm all of which range in contradictory assumptions regarding the
nature of reality, knowledge, human nature views, and methodology.

Returning to the conclusions of Burrell and Morgan we recall that they caution against assuming positioning oneself within the functionalist paradigm, assuming its dominance and then viewing any other critical perspectives as some form a 'radical stance.' The danger is that these alternative perspectives (feminism, Marxism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis) are treated as merely 'points of view' which need to be considered and if possible, rebuffed or incorporated within the context of the dominant orthodoxy (p. 396).

This view favors fusion as a natural line of intellectual development. But fusion does not do full justice to the respective problematic. Instead, it is at the 'cost' of their emancipation.

Burrell and Morgan, instead, advocate a form of isolationism or paradigmatic closure in that they believe that each of the paradigms can only establish itself at the level of organizational analysis if it is true to itself. This point of view is contradictory to the notion of synthesis. Insofar as the alternative perspectives are taken from within the functionalist paradigm, they will have very little promise of developing. This is of course, because the rival perspectives have completely different
intellectual traditions and generate its own kind of insight.

The final conclusion and implication involves other approaches to art education that maybe more paradigmatically suited to post-structuralist ideologies. It is important to note that the findings of this research are theoretically consistent with the work of Duncum (1969) and others who are concerned with the question of cultural pluralism and socially critical art education. Duncum has suggested that most art educators are indebted to the functionalist sociology and functional anthropology. Chapman (1978) advocates for the study of artifacts in terms of paired opposites. Feldman (1982) would study cultural artifacts as bearers of themes common to all humanity. He suggests that the end product of these approaches is description rather than 'issue conscious' (pp. 14-15).

Duncum lays the foundation for a cultural-pluralist approach to art education citing the theorists of critical praxis, Althusser and Gramsci, and in doing so, rejects the expression theory and reflection theory. It appears that this newly emerging approach to art education may have parallel paradigmatic assumptions to post-modernism, and post-structuralist interpretive strategies. This study suggests that more research needs to be done in developing alternative approaches to Discipline-based Art Education.
and for DBAE to reflect about the ideological implications of its approach to the task of interpretation. More explicitly, this researcher advocates the continued development of approaches to art education which articulate and develop the sociological assumptions similar to those manifested within the radical humanist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan and the critical praxis of Schubert—namely, the critical analysis of the assumptions about reality and knowledge that make up various world views, the analysis of how these underlying assumptions are articulated in various approaches to art education, particularly those that have become the dominant approaches, and finally, the analysis of the socio-cultural-political constitution of art, all of which the task of interpretation along with all its related issues are only a reflection.
APPENDIX A
BURRELL AND MORGAN'S FOUR SETS OF ASSUMPTIONS
BURRELL AND MORGAN'S FOUR SETS OF ASSUMPTIONS

Realism-----------------ontology-----------------Nominalism

Social world is external to individual cognition

The social world is made up of hard, tangible relatively immutable structures

Whether or not we label these structures, they exist as empirical entities prior to existence and consciousness

Regard the social world as prior to humans

 Assumes the existence of universal standards

Positivism--------epistemology---------Anti-Positivism

Seeks to explain and predict by searching for regularities and casual relationships

Advocates the 'observer' approach to the world

Sets as its goal the elimination of false hypotheses

Science is capable of producing objective knowledge

Social world is external to individual cognition

The social world is not made up of 'real' structures

Names, labels and concepts are only artificial creations

Against the utility of a search for laws or underlying regularities in the social world; takes a relativist view

Rejects the 'observer' approach; advocates the 'participant' approach

Sets as its goal to 'understand' the social world from the reference of the participant

Science is incapable of producing objective knowledge
Determinism---------human nature----------Voluntarism

Human beings are determined by the situation or 'environment'  
Human beings are completely autonomous and free-willed

Nomothetic----------methodology----------Ideographic

One can only understand the social world by systematic protocol and technique  
One can only understand the social world by first hand knowledge of the subject

Advocates the use of testing hypotheses in accordance with the canons of scientific rigor; uses quantitative techniques such as surveys, questionnaires and personality tests  
Advocates the use of diaries, biographies, and journalistic records that allow the subject to unfold its nature
APPENDIX B
THE FUNCTIONALIST SOCIOLOGY
THE FUNCTIONALIST SOCIOLOGY

I. Social System Theory

Structural Functionalism

Structural functionalism assumes a biological analogy of Comte, Spencer and Durkheim. It is concerned with holism and the interrelationship between parts. The social world is viewed as concrete and external to individual. Malinowski proposed that the functions of parts strive to maintain social whole. Parsons formulated the functional imperative which was concerned with adaptation, goal attainment, integration, pattern maintenance. It is epistemologically, ontologically, and methodologically based on the natural sciences.

Systems Theory

Von Bertalanffy

Bertalanffy uses the notion of 'system' to cut through the substantive differences between academic disciplines. The subject matter of chemistry, physics, biology sociology etc., are linked by their study of complexes of elements standing in interaction, that is 'system' (Burrell and Morgan, p. 58). The task is to discover the principles of organization which underlie such systems.

His position is archetypical of the positivist position is that it is based upon the search for underlying regularities and structural uniformities. However, he is a non-traditional positivist in that instead of reducing all phenomena of study to physical events, he advocates that we study them as systems.

He asserts that conventional physics is based upon closed systems, isolated from the environment. Such systems are characterized by equilibrium. Open systems however, engage in transactions with the environment. Closed systems must eventually obtain a state of equilibrium but open systems may not.

Closed systems still dominate social research through the use of controlled experiments and interview and questionnaire programs which attempt to measure social phenomena. "The paradox is compounded by the fact that such closed system methodologies are often employed within the context of theoretical perspectives which emphasize the importance of an open systems approach" (Burrell and Morgan, p. 60).
Limitations of the model.

The majority of systems models used in the social sciences are based upon the mechanical and biological analogies, although the cybernetic model has received more attention in recent years. The mechanical models are directly influenced by the physical sciences and are based upon the notion of equilibrium—only possible in a closed system. They modify the analysis to allow for disequilibrium or dynamic equilibrium characterized by homeostasis.

All these three strategies can be understood as attempts to save the notion of equilibrium as an organizing concept in open system situations where it is fundamentally inappropriate [italics added]. Homeostasis is an acceptable open systems concept, but it implies an organismic as opposed to a mechanical analogy as an organizing principle. Mechanical models of social systems, therefore, tend to be characterized by a number of theoretical contradictions and are thus of very limited values a methods of analysis in situations where the environment of the subject of study is of any real significance. (p. 61)

In other words, the influence of the environment is necessarily reduced to a secondary and very limited role. "Environmental change is of principle significance as a source of disequilibrium" (p. 62). Therefore, the mechanical model severely constrains the openness of the system under investigation.

Other principles of the organismic analogy.

Katz and Kahn (1966), Miller and Rice (1967) and countless other systems theorists analyze organizations in terms of general principles: (a) boundary transactions, (b) input, output, throughput and feedback, (c) system needs geared to survival or homeostasis, (d) mutual interdependence, (e) unable to really handle conflict; (f) the observance of behavior of its constituent elements (p. 63).

Limitations of the organismic analogy.

First, although the relationship between system and environment is seen as one of mutual influence, "the organismic analogy encourages the view that its is the environment action upon the system rather than the other way around" (p. 64). Second, it presumes a relatively stable system. Third, the general nature of the response is determined by the 'needs' of the system.
Interactionism and Social Action Theory

**Interactionism**

Georg Simmel (1858-1918): middle ground between idealism and positivism. The German idealist believed in the autonomy of human spirit. Society has no real existence beyond individuals. Therefore, it held to a nominalist view. The Anglo-French tradition, however, asserted that society has objective existence. Viewing it as a biological organism, it adopted the methods of natural sciences. Therefore it assumed a realist ontology.

Ontologically, Simmel rejected both extremes in favor of human association and interaction. He argued for basic patterns underlying social life. Patterns extracted through formal analysis and he used a nomothetic approach of dyadic, triadic and group process. He therefore is not a strict determinist since there is dialectic tension between individual and society. However, he incorporated conflict into status quo.

**Symbolic Interactionism**

Symbolic interaction involves the interpretation or the ascertaining of the meaning of the actions or the remarks of others (p. 78). Rose and Blumer have been influential theorists.

**Rose**

Rose (1962) asserted that humans live in a symbolic environment, that is, they can be they can be stimulated by them. Essentially, he asserted that (a) humans live in a symbolic environment, (b) that through symbols humans have the capacity to stimulate others, (c) that through the communication of symbols, huge numbers of meanings and values—and hence ways of acting can be learned, (d) that the individual defines meaning for himself or herself (Rose, 1962, pp. 5-12, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, pp. 79-80).

His view is characterized as a realist ontology, a positivist epistemology and his methodologies are usually firmly nomothetic in character.

**Blumer**

By way of contrast, B. Blumer is more of a subjectivist. Humans construct their objects rather than exist in pre-existing world of objects.
Blumer develops a view of society which constitutes a process of symbolic interaction, in which the individual 'selves' interpret their situation as a basis for action. Group or collective action is seen as consisting of an alignment of individual actions 'brought about by the individuals' interpreting or taking into account each other's actions (Blumer, 1962, p. 184). (p. 80)

Ontologically, he is much more of a nominalist. His views on human nature are also more voluntaristic.

Phenomenological influence.

Blumer is concerned with the meaning which underlie the process of interaction and with understanding how people align themselves with this situations. This is essentially a phenomenological standpoint and is a split between the behavioral and the phenomenological position.

Role theory.

Blumer's work has influences self and role theory in where the concern is to identify and measure the nature of the external situation in which the particular actors find themselves.

Burrell and Morgan assert that some researchers, because of their positivist epistemology and nomothetic methodology, violate the ontological assumptions. That is, the 'functional process' becomes lost in the 'empirical search for structure' (p. 82).

Social Action Theory

The theory of social action is derived from Max Weber and notion of verstehen (interpretive understanding). That is, 'understanding' play a crucial role in neo-idealist social though. Introduced by Dilthey and elaborated upon by Weber, it is well suited by the investigation of the subjective meaning of events.

Whereas the natural sciences deal with external processes in the external world, the cultural sciences deal with intangible processes of the human mind. The method of verstehen (placing oneself in the role of the actor) was introduced as a method of relating inner experiences to outward actions.

Weber was moderate positivist in that he wished to construct an objective social science capable of providing explanations of social phenomena that took into account how
Individuals attach subjective meaning to situations and orient their actions according to their perceptions of the situation. The actor has goals or aims and his or her actions are means to the attainment of these goals. Therefore, Weber injects a measure of voluntarism in that individuals interpret and define their situations and then act accordingly.

Weber attempted a synthesis of idealism and positivism within the bounds of a positivist epistemology. He therefore takes an intermediate position along the subjective-objective dimension.

**Integrative Theory**

Integrative theory occupies the middle ground of the functionalist paradigm. In essence it seeks to integrate elements of interactionism and social system theory and in certain cases to counter the criticism that the functionalist perspective cannot handle conflict. It is by no means a coherent body of theory.

**Blau's Exchange and Power Model**

Blau is against the reductionist explanations of society because they ignore the 'emergent properties' of human interaction. His emphasis is on the role of exchange and power on the emergence of social structure.

He also adopts the Simmelian view of society as one that is 'sewn together' by a variety of cross-conflicts between its component parts. "He analyzes the relationships between sub-elements of society and the way in which conflict produces a pattern of dialectical change" (p. 89).

However, his theory is characteristic of the sociology of regulation in that these cross-cutting conflicts are seen as oscillating under the influence of dis-equilibrating and re-equilibrating forces.

The cross pressures resulting from multi-group affiliation and the recurrent alignments of overlapping collectivities in different controversies prevent conflicts over issues from becoming cumulative and producing a deep cleavage between two hostile camps. (Blau, 1964, p. 311, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, p. 90)
Mertonian Theory of Social and Cultural Structure

Merton's (1968) early work on 'reference groups' theory and 'anomie theory seeks to understand how sub-groupings arise within the context of a social structure. He developed a typology of individual adaptation which not only considered 'conformity,' but 'innovation', 'ritualism,' 'retreatism' and 'rebellion' (Merton, 1968, p. 194).

However, his analysis actually strengthens functionalism rather than challenges it. His treatment of deviant behavior is not treated within the interactionist perspectives of norms and values which are socially generated and socially sustained, but as a part of a predefined social context in which social action takes place. Therefore, while his functional analysis of deviance move towards an interactionist view, it emerges as on the objective side of the subjective-objective dimension.

This intermediate position is evident in his analysis of reference group theory, which aims to "systemitise the determinants and consequences of those processes of evaluation and self appraisal in which the individual takes the values or standards of other individuals or groups as a comparative frame of reference" (Merton, 1968, p. 288, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, p. 91).

Kelly (1968) has distinguished two kinds of reference groups. The first is the normative function which is concerned with the setting and enforcing of standards (and delivery of rewards or punishments, and the second is the comparison function which refers to the role reference groups provide in setting a standard or the pointing of comparisons against which persons can evaluate themselves or others. Both, say Burrell and Morgan are fertile bases for empirical research (p. 92).

Conflict Functionalism

Conflict functionalism developed as a response to the criticism that functionalist theories were unable to explain social change and conflict.

Merton.

Merton (1968) laid the basis of conflict functionalism by arguing against three postulates of traditional functionalism: (a) the 'postulate of the functional unity of society'--the standardized social activities are
functional for the entire social or cultural system; (b) the 'postulate of universal functionalism'—that all social and cultural items fulfill sociological function; and (c) the postulate of indispensability—that these items are indispensable (Merton, 1968, pp. 79-91, quoted in Burrell and Morgan p. 93).

In essence he posited that societies are not unitary in nature, that societies may exhibit non-functional or dysfunctional elements. In essence, conflict functionalism has become the functionalists' response to Marxist criticism (pp. 94-95). It is still rooted in sociology of regulation—conflict is a tool for explaining social order.

Coser.

Coser (1956-1967) extended the notions of Simmel and Merton, especially elaborating on Simmel's assertion that 'conflict is a form of socialization' and therefore, every group requires disharmony as well as harmony.

Conflict is an essential aspect of social life that creates stresses and strains which the institution must cope with. However, there are strong normative elements in his work since he explains how conflicts can be controlled and channelled through a system of normative regulation (p. 97). His theory is essentially pluralist.

Both Merton and Coser are rooted in the sociology of social regulation which explains how society holds together despite the conflicts that arise in its midst.

Goulder.

Goulder (1959) carries the notion of conflict further to include the concept of 'functional autonomy' which addresses the probability of a system part's survival when separated from the system. "High system interdependence means low functional autonomy of parts, and vice versa" (p. 98). The emphasis on parts of a society is important in contrast to traditional functionalist emphasis upon the whole.

Goulder arrives at the notion of 'contradiction' which explains the incompatible elements of a social system. An attempt at system control is likely to generate conflict in that system parts may take positive steps to resist incorporation and containment. They may even generate changes within the system itself which are consistent within their overall autonomy. In other words, 'different
parts are likely to have greater or lesser vested interest in the system maintenance' (Goulder, 1959, p. 211).

Goulder gives a cautious but truly radical critique of the functionalist approach to social analysis and in so doing illustrates just how committed Merton and Coser are to the sociology of regulation. As he has pointed out, both of them are functionalists at heart in that they have not chosen to develop 'dysfunctionalism' as an alternative.

**Morphogenic Systems Theory**

This brand of integrative theory is associated with Buckley (1967) who claimed that the mechanical and organic systems model is inadequate to deal with conflict and descensus. These approaches are ineffective in that they are based upon an outdated view of science and they do not recognize the special qualities of the socio-cultural systems.

He explains how societies change and elaborate and how the socio-cultural system is linked by an inter-communication of information rather than being energy or substance-linked as are physical or organic systems.

It emerges as a network of intention of individuals in which information is selectively perceived and interpreted. Information is a carrier of meaning rather an entity that flows from one place to another. Society is an organization of meanings emerging from individuals dealing in more or less common environment. Society remains an intangible process in interaction.

**Objectivism**

The term 'objectivism' is used to refer to the work that is highly committed to the models and methods derived from the natural sciences. The social world is treated exactly like natural world and human beings are viewed as machines or biological organisms.

**Behaviorism**

This model is associated with B. F. Skinner who regarded humans little more than machines determined by external conditions. His experimental methods were geared towards those of the natural science. He is a realist, a positivist, and a determinist who works in highly nomothetic methodology.
Abstracted Empiricism

Abstract empiricism is characterized by highly nomothetic methods used to test a theory which is based upon an ontology, an epistemology and a theory of human nature of a more subjectivist kind.

It is a commitment to nomothetic methodologies in which qualitative measures of reified social constructs dominate the investigation. "It represents research in which the social world is treated methodologically as if it were of hard, concrete, tangible reality, whereas it is conceived as being a more subjectivist nature" (p. 106).
The Interpretive Paradigm

**Hermeneutics**

Concerned with interpreting and understanding the products of the human mind. Ontologically, it takes an 'objective idealist' stance. Humans externalize the internal processes of their minds. Art and literature are examples of the process of objectification.

**Dilthey's Hermeneutics**

Attempted to generate objectively valid knowledge in the Geisteswissenschaften (cultural sciences) through the method of verstehen (re-enactment). Social creations were avenues to the world of objective mind. Culminates in exegesis—the interpretation of the written record. He assigned hermeneutics as key discipline for human science. Scientists were to adopt the style of literary analysis. Textual analysis of meaning and significance were deemed more appropriate than the search for general laws.

**Gadamer's Hermeneutics**

Verstehen is not the entering into the subjective experience of another, but appreciating the interchange of the frames of reference. Language is central as a medium of intersubjectivity.

**Solipsism**

The most extreme form of subjective idealism. Denies the world's distinct independence. The world is the creation of the mind. Given that there is no external point of reference, knowledge must be limited to what individual's experience. Regulation and radical change have no significance.

**Phenomenology**

**Transcendental Phenomenology**

Husserl's quest was for the objective foundations of science and the analysis of consciousness was the new path. His task was the manipulation of ideal essences and he addressed himself to the question of meaning. He put reality in brackets and turned to ideal essences—not subjective representation (level of psychology), nor ideal reality (level of metaphysics), but the phenomena immediately in consciousness. He denied the possibility of independent reality. To save himself from
solipsism, he developed the notion of 'intersubjectivity' (ego's in intersubjective community which forms the objective) that is, the intersubjective world.

**Existential Phenomenology**

Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) agreed with Weber that the function of social science was to be interpretive, that is, to understand the subjective meaning of social action. He searched for the analysis of meaning in the stream of consciousness—consciousness is an unbroken stream of lived experiences that have no meaning unless reflected upon.

Attributing meaning also depends upon the actor's identifying a purpose or goal. Genuine understanding (the problem of intersubjectivity)---how we come to know the lived experience of others means the intentional grasping of the experience of others in a manner akin to looking into the other's stream of consciousness.

'Typification' is the process of understanding the conduct of others in which the actor classifies and organizes everyday life. Categories are derived from common sense and the stock of knowledge, but the stock of knowledge varies from context to context. We live in a world of *multiple realities*.

**Ethnomethodology**

Ethnomethodology is the detailed study of everyday life. It offers explanations of how individual actors order their world through the use of accounting practices.

**Phenomenological Symbolic Interactionism**

Emphasize the properties through which individuals create their social world rather than merely react to it. Social reality is very precarious. It comprises little more than a complete set of typifications that are intersubjectively shared. There is a precarious balance of intersubjectively shared meanings that are continually negotiated and changed.
APPENDIX D
THE RADICAL HUMANIST SOCIOLOGY
The Radical Humanist Sociology

Critical theory

Critical theory is built upon the work of the young Marx. It is meant to operate at both a philosophical and a practical level. It originates from the idealist tradition of critique deriving from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* whose aim was to lay the foundations for human emancipation through deep-seated social change. It is overtly political and it stresses the need to follow the logic of one's philosophical analysis with practical action of a radical kind.

Lukacsian Sociology

In the 1920's Georg Lukacs (1885-1974) sought to develop a critical theory that offered an alternative to orthodox Marxism of his day. He sought to restore the Hegelian influence of Marx before the 'epistemological break'. Lukacs sought to develop a theory of revolution which laid strong emphasis upon the role of the proletariat and its class consciousness in the overthrow of capitalist society. Lukacs stresses the role of superstructural factors within society and their part in transforming it.

Emphasis is placed upon consciousness, ideology, literature and art which are central to any understanding of capitalism. Lukacs replaced Hegel's notion of 'absolute spirit' with that of the proletariat. Lukacsian sociology occupies the least subjectivist position of the radical humanist paradigm. Ontologically, it invokes the dialectic, "since social processes are seen to consist of the 'objective' acting upon the 'subjective' and vice versa. The ontological nature of the world is neither crudely nominalist nor crudely realist. The dialectic is invoked to meet the need to synthesize objective and subjective factors.

Lukacs maintained that Marxism was a revolutionary methodology rather than a set of laws or truths. Lukacsians are not epistemologically positivists (seeking general laws of societal development). They are tacticians and methodologists of revolt and revolution stressing the scope of action open to the proletariat. They indicate the voluntarist aspects within capitalism, pointing to the freedom of choice in the type of class consciousness that the proletariat accepts (pp. 285-288).
Lukacsians seek to change the world; their epistemology and methodology blend to form a body of thought which seeks not general laws for future contemplation but practical methods for radically transforming society here and now. (p. 288)

**Gramsci's Sociology**

The influence of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), an Italian Marxist, presents, like Lukacs, a radical humanist critique of capitalism. Gramsci was influenced by the Hegelianism of Benedetto Croce, which opposed orthodox Marxism.

Gramsci believed that the Marxism of his day had lost its revolutionary zeal through a misguided incorporation of positivist notions and a crude almost mechanistic determinism which totally ignored the voluntarist, practical aspects of working-class radical potentialities.

What was need was truly a dialectical theory that would transcend the classical philosophical antinomies of voluntarism-determinism, idealism-materialism, and the subjective-objective. Such a theory would constitute the 'philosophy of praxis' which would represent a total world view in that it would transcend all previous philosophical dichotomies. It would also contain all the fundamental elements needed to construct a total and integral conception of the world (pp. 289-299).

This 'philosophy of praxis' was to introduce the notion of 'superstructural factors' into orthodox Marxism. Gramsci believed that power and domination in capitalism rested not only with material coercion but also within men's and women's consciousness through 'ideological hegemony.' "The ruling class...always seeks to legitimate its power through the creation and perpetuation of a belief system which stresses the need for order, authority and discipline, and consciously attempts to emasculate protest and revolutionary potential." (p. 289)

For Gramsci, it was precisely the idea of ideological hegemony in the schools, family and workplace that capitalism was most likely to increase. "But this is the crucial weakness of ideological hegemony, too. For whilst hegemony creates alienation, the individual worker is still his own theorist, his own source of class consciousness, and is therefore, the most able to resist the forces of
hegemony....Consciousness was not treated as being abstract or spiritual, but a concrete force for a political end" (p. 289)

Gramsci's 'philosophy of praxis' stressed the practical involvement in politics and radical change. Along with Lukacs, Gramsci's approach to Marxism stresses the Hegelian influence. Reality does not exist on its own account, but in a historical relationship with those who modify it. His position is one of objective idealism in the tradition of critical theory and the young Marx (pp. 289-290)

The Frankfurt School

In contrast to the work of Lukacs and Gramsci, critical theory in the Frankfurt tradition gives far less emphasis upon political action. Its proponents are theorists rather that activists, moving toward philosophical and intellectual criticism rather than revolutionary practice. The two contemporary theorists are Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas.

Marcuse is well known for his scathing attack upon the 'one-dimensional' nature of modern technological society, particularly under capitalism. For Marcuse, phenomenology was inadequate in that it ignores the scope of human potentiality. Positivism is also inadequate because of its false assumptions in regards to neutrality and its role as an instrument of control in the hands of the status quo.

Marcuse's special contribution lies in his attempt to incorporate the ideas of Freud and Weber within the Hegelian-Marxist perspective. In Eros and Civilisation (1955), Marcuse seeks to develop the links between human personality and the totality in which it is located. In Freudian perspectives, civilization rests upon the repression of man's internal drives.

The 'pleasure principle' by which these drives are allowed to follow an unconstrained search for satisfaction is seen as being subjugated in a civilised society by the 'reality principle', according to which men are prepared to postpone self-gratification in the interests of social order. (p. 292)

However, within the advanced industrial state, the problem is that of 'surplus repression'--constraint over and above that which is necessary to maintain civilization. He sees emancipation from this dominating social order as
being brought about by ridding society of surplus repression, this giving more emphasis to the 'pleasure principle.' (pp. 292-293)

In One Dimensional Man (1964) Marcuse moves to a more Weberian stance. Marcuse views society as essentially totalitarian, in that the technical apparatus of production and distribution imposes itself upon the whole society. Technology is seen as a political force, a system of domination in that it produces the 'one-dimensional' society. Marcuse argues that affluence and the creation of false need impedes the development of radical protest. Consciousness is seen as being muddled and controlled through the media.

It is the task of critical theory to investigate the roots of the 'totalitarian universe of technological rationality', and to examine their historical alternatives, as a means of revealing unused capacities for improving the lives of human beings. (p. 294)

Jurgen Habermas' work, in essence, can be understood as a reaction against the shortcomings of interpretive sociology and sociological positivism.

He distinguishes between the empirical/analytic sciences of a positivist orientation, which serve the interests of control; the historical/hermeneutic sciences of the phenomenological tradition, which aim at understanding meaning without influencing it; and the critical science perspective characteristic of the Frankfurt School, which aims both to understand the world and to change it (Habermas, 1972, paraphrased in Burrell and Morgan, p. 294).

The critical theory he favors incorporates notions derived from Parsonian systems theory; hermeneutics as reflected in the work of Gadamer (1965) and various concepts drawn from psychoanalysis. Habermas has stressed the structure of domination embedded within our language and everyday discourse.

Recent developments in linguistics and 'ordinary language' demonstrate to Habermas that the 'problem of consciousness' has been replaced by the problem of language. To deal with this, he developed a theory of 'communicative competence', "which borrows conceptualisations from hermeneutics in order to provide the link between the political macro-structure and speech acts within a contest of symbolic interaction" (p. 295).
His concept of 'ideal speech situation', in which there is genuine consensus is arrived at by consensus without the operation of power versus 'communicative distortion,' which is a supposed consensus arrived at through discourse of unequal power.

'Work' is seen as 'communicative distortion' characterized by the use of speech acts that reflect unequal power. "Interaction", on the other hand, is based upon communication between people in which shared norms develop and are reflected in an intersubjectivity shared ordinary language. Because Habermas focuses upon the liberating potential of self-reflective language, it is essentially based upon a 'pathology of communication' (p. 297).

In recent work, Habermas views the legitimatory superstructure of the political system as crucial. He believes that a permanent economic crisis is no longer likely within advanced capitalism. Thus, Marx's dependence on class struggles and their relationship to economic crises, is outdated. For him, then, the key problem within advanced capitalism is the 'legitimation crisis' (p. 296). The work of the Frankfurt school inverts the concerns of the functionalist paradigm:

The functionalist tends to accept the norm of purposive rationality, the logic of science, the positive functions of technology, and the neutrality of language, and uses them as building blocks in the construction of supposedly value-free social theories. The Frankfurt theorists concentrate upon demolishing this structure, indicating the essentially political and repressive nature of the whole enterprise. They seek to demonstrate the way in which science, ideology, technology, language (italics added) and other aspects of the superstructure of modern capitalist social formations are to be understood in relation to the role which they play in sustaining and developing the system of power and domination which pervades the totality of this social form. (p. 297)

The focus upon the 'superstructural' aspects is very significant in critical theory for it is the medium through which the consciousness of human beings are controlled and molded to fit the social formation as a whole.

Anarchistic Individualism

Anarchism is not so much a unified theoretical position as it is clustering of perspectives. Anarchistic
individualism represents one such perspective in which total individual freedom is advocated that is unshackled by any form of external or internal regulation. This doctrine is associated with Max Stirner, a German school teacher, who emphasized the primacy of individual existence and totally rejected any search for universal laws governing social life. "Only through a 'union of egoists'--men who pursue ruthlessly, without constraint, their own individual interest--can true release and human freedom be attained" (p. 300). Emancipation is through the total removal of the State and its trappings. This is done not through revolution (an armed rising; a political and social act) but through rebellion (a rising of individuals) and insurrection. Such a rebellion is not acting in any organized way but as individuals who are acting without awaiting any societal transformations. The core issues are the cognitive disposition of the individual, the attitude of mind rather than structural constraints or ideological hegemony.

Anarchistic individualism has never had a great impact except that many of Stirner's ideas have been incorporated into the canons of 'mainstream' anarchism. His emphasis upon 'cognitive liberation' and 'freedom for the ego' have been taken up by Murray Bookchin (1974).

French Existentialism

French existentialism reflects a philosophy firmly located in the subjectivist idealist tradition from the work of Fichte and Husserl. It is located between solipsism and the objective idealism of critical theory. Phenomenology and existentialism are often seen as related school of thought, and are sometimes considered to be identical (p. 302).

However, Burrell and Morgan make a distinction between the existential phenomenology characteristic of Schutz, and the existentialism characteristic of the work of Sarte. It is to be noted that these basis orientations are fundamentally distinct. While Schutz focuses upon the social construction of everyday life as a basis of understanding, the existentialism of Sarte is concerned with the understanding of the pathology of such construction, and the need to change them. "Existentialism differs from phenomenology in its vigorous humanism and its political commitment to the desirability of change in the existing social order" (p. 302).

In order to understand Sarte's notion of 'nothingness' it is necessary to three concepts of 'modes of being.'
Sartre identifies 'being-in-itself' (en-soi), the world of external reality or the stuff of which this real world is made up; 'being-for self' (pour-soi) which denotes consciousness and the inner subjectivity of men; and 'being-for-others'. Sartre's problem, like that of so many idealist philosophers before him, is the nature of the relationship, if any, between pour-soi and en-soi, between consciousness and reality. His treatment of his central issue rests upon the idea that consciousness is always of something in the real world, so that the relationship between pour-soi and en-soi is that between the knower and the known. This relationship, however, depends upon a distance or gap between the real world and the consciousness of individual men, so that the separation between them is always evident. Such a vacancy Sartre call 'nothingness', for herein lies the ability to conceptualise that which does not exist. (pp.303-304)

'Nothingness' allows human beings to think beyond the limitations of today to imagine non-objects, new forms of social life and any type of alternative reality. His theory amounts to a voluntarist theory of action.

It is also from this analysis that Sartre's notion of 'bad faith' emerges. It is a situation in which self-imposed constraints are placed upon human freedom. To the extent that human beings accept a determining, outside interference, their ability to conceptualize 'nothingness' is reduced and they are imprisoned in their roles. To live in one's roles is a form of self-deception. "We know that as conscious individuals it is false to see ourselves as objects..." (p. 304). The authors speculate that for Striner, Sartre's 'bad faith' would describe the constraining phenomenon that his 'union of egoists' would seek to overthrow.
Bukharin's Historical Materialism

Bukharin (188-1938) stands in the tradition of 'scientific socialism' developed by Engels and Plekhanov. He asserted that historical materialism is the general theory of society and the laws of its evolution—in effect a 'proletarian sociology'. Materialism for him stood for science and technology and his book is based upon the mechanical analogy derived in unmodified form from physics.

He did not deal with antithesis and synthesis of the dialectic but preferred 'the condition of equilibrium'. Considering 'systems theory' from the Marxist perspective, he viewed society as being in a state of unstable equilibrium because of imbalance with its environment. This disturbance of equilibrium takes the form of a 'catastrophe' or 'cataclysmic crisis'—'totality shift' of enormous proportions.

He is a Marxist committed to the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism (first overcome in Western societies) through violent, sometimes bloody conflict.

A system model of a crude but early type is seen as the best theoretical perspective through which to understand both this new socialist society and the laws of motion of pre-socialist societies (italics added). In this sense, Bukharin developed a kind of functionalism...with a concomitant focus upon understanding social life in terms of long periods of relative stability. In his case, however, it was first necessary to transform existing Western societies through violent and sometimes bloody revolution. (p. 337)

Ontologically, he is firmly realist in that reality is taken on a common-sense level. Epistemologically, he adopts positivism of the natural sciences. Historical materialism is a 'scientific sociology', that is, it explains the general laws of human evolution and serves as a method of history. It seeks, through the notion of equilibrium, to explain the story of human development. The work of Marx and Engels provides a means whereby such general laws provide causal explanations.
Anarchistic Communism

Anarchist communism is most closely associated with Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) whose aim was to show the logical connection between the modern philosophy of the natural sciences and anarchism. His aim was to put anarchism on a scientific basis by the study of the tendencies that are apparent in society, and to work out its further evolution. His objectivist stance is derived from his wholesale incorporation of the methods from the natural sciences. These aims, based on the 'laws of nature,' indicate his functionalistic orientation. Orientation is turned to radical ends.

While living with a small tribe in Siberia who lived as nomads according to 'anarchist principles,' Kropotkin became convinced that the natural attitude of humans was one of cooperation and solidarity—hence his belief in 'mutual aid' rather than fierce competition. He saw the principle of hierarchy as a recent 'pathological' development in human history and capitalism as an aberration in human evolution. Once the wage system was overthrown, a new society would be set up based on communes. All of this was to be brought about by catastrophe and revolution. (pp. 339-340).

Contemporary Mediterranean Marxism

These schools seek to temper the extreme objectivism of 'vulgar' Marxism and subjectivism of critical theory by adopting an intermediate position.

Althusserian Sociology

Louis Althusser is one of the world's most influential contemporary Marxist philosophers. He posited that social change depends upon the type and extent of 'contradictions' and their 'explosive interrelationships.' In the long run these will produce sweeping societal transformations.

Ontologically, he assumes a real, concrete world external to the individual and his/her consciousness. This real world consists of 'structures' which together, in the 'totality, represent given 'social formations.' His version of positivism is the search for universal causal laws. He also maintains a deterministic position in that individuals are not 'subjects' but agents within the mode of production—molded by the forces acting upon the economic practice.

Methodologically, he advocates the 'case study' method of analysis for any given historical 'conjuncture'.

Concerning human nature, he is fundamentally deterministic though a 'mild' or tempered objectivist.

**Colletti's Sociology**

Lucio Colletti's work detailed attacks against Hegelianized Marxism, particularly the Frankfurt School and orthodox Marxism represented in the main by Engels and Plekhanov. He polarizes Marxism on the basis of the relative emphasis put upon either the philosophical strand of 'alienation (which is dialectical opposition derived from Hegel in which oppositions of abstraction, concepts or ideas can be synthesized in a 'higher' reconciliation) or the scientific stand of 'contradiction' (which in the 'science' of Marxism is equated with the notion that there are 'real' extremes that cannot be mediated, that have no need for each other and are totally opposed, precisely because they are extreme).

His solution to such a polarization is found in the recognition of its existence. He viewed the social sciences as in their infant stages of development and was not sure whether this situation was detrimental or advantageous.

Ontologically, he assumes the real existence of the external world, but he rejects an extreme realism by considering humans as 'knowing subjects.' Nevertheless he sees the nature of the social world in what is fundamentally a realist way.

Epistemologically, he is a positivist in which he views Marxism as a 'science' which though not overly committed to empiricism, is based upon the method of hypothesis testing in the search for underlying causal laws.

Methodologically, he is anti-historic and does not seek a method of providing laws for all societies. Along human nature views, he assumes a tempered determinism, emphasizing that violence and revolution need not be interchangeable concepts and that there could be non-violent evolution. However, revolutionary activity by the working class is the main solution to the social problems posed by capitalism (pp. 346-349).

**Conflict Theory**

Conflict theory is a product of 'radical Weberianism' which focused on social relations within a capitalist society. Both Marx and Weber viewed capitalism as having its own forms of repression, oppression and human bondage. Radical Weberians of today, employ Weber's concepts in
the analysis of contemporary society, especially in his notions of the 'iron cage of bureaucracy,' social stratification, vast discrepancies of power and authority, and gross economic inequalities of capitalism.

For them, the interests of the power holders are so clearly distinct from the interests of the relatively powerless that deep-seated, irreconcilable conflict is viewed as the natural and only permanent feature of social life. Radical Weberians share Weber's pessimism (italics added); they see no end to such inequalities. Marxism is seen as Utopian if its expects an end to the principle hierarchy and imbalance of power. (p. 350)

The essence of the radical Weberian position is a trenchant criticism of capitalism but without any commitment to its transcendence by another form of social organization (pp. 349-352).
REFERENCES


