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Poverty politics and political transformation in North Carolina: A comparative case study of three cities

Moseley, Samuel Andrew, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1989

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POVERTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA:
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THREE CITIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Samuel Andrew Moseley, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1989

Dissertation Committee: Approved by
William E. Nelson, Jr. Adviser
Randall B. Ripley
Aage R. Clausen

Department of Political Science
To My Family

Arimental, Ayanna,
and Jawanza

and

My Parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The list of individuals to whom I owe so much for their unwavering support over the years is too long for me to mention in this brief allotted space. But there are those that gave support in various ways that I must single out and express my deepest and most sincere gratitude.

This research effort would never have come to fruition had it not been for the members of my dissertation committee. Professors Nelson, Ripley, and Clausen provided understanding, analysis, guidance, and gentle prodding throughout this entire process. I must give special thanks to my dissertation adviser, Dr. William Nelson. Dr. Nelson always provided support and guidance throughout the author's association with The Ohio State University. His scholarly insight and unselfish committment to social, political, and economic justice for all people, served as an inspiration to the author, especially during the dissertation writing process. Never, did he not find time in his busy schedule to help the author through a dissertation impasse, and provide encouragement by reminding the author that "we're almost there". For this, and so much more, I am thankful.
Thanks must also go to my supportive and understanding family. Special recognition goes to my forebears for making the sacrifices throughout the generations that enabled the author to reach this point. To my father, the late Melvin Moseley, I am thankful for the fortitude and determination he taught me that has sustained me during the years. I feel he shares equally in this accomplishment. To my mother, Amanda Moseley, I am appreciative of the encouraging words she always provided her son, and most of all I thank her for just being "momma".

I was blessed to have been surrounded by so many encouraging individuals, but two that I must recognize are my sister, Vickie Moseley-Jones, who has always been one of the author's biggest boosters, and to Mary Ellen Smith, the best mother-in-law one could have.

My children, Ayanna and Jawanza, are the joys that made this endeavor worthwhile. Their faith in the author, and the author's determination to show them that dreams are attainable, were motivating forces. I am very proud of the understanding they have given over the years when I was allowed to pursue the dissertation when other pursuits would have been more enjoyable.

Finally, to my wife, Arimental Moseley, the young lady who embarked upon this endeavor with me years ago, I say "thank you". Her encouragement, support, gentle persuasion, and unswerving faith in the author's abilities throughout
the years, enabled the author to successfully complete this dissertation. Too often she had to be mother and father while the author pursued this degree. Her strength and love has carried the author at times when he seriously considered terminating this pursuit. Thank God she never listened, and the author thanks God for her.
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City and Regional Planning

Housing and Land-Use Zoning
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<tr>
<td>ADD</td>
<td>Action for Durham Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCCPB</td>
<td>Black Citizens Concerned with Police Brutality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEOs</td>
<td>Black Elected Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>Black Solidarity Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Community Action Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Citizen Action Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Charlotte Area Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Action Program</td>
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<td>Community Action Programs</td>
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<td>CATs</td>
<td>Community Action Technicians</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBPT</td>
<td>Charlotte Bureau of Placement and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMNC</td>
<td>Charlotte Model Neighborhood Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Charlotte Placement Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>Civil Rights Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWP</td>
<td>Communist Workers Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Durham Committee on Black Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCPC</td>
<td>Durham Community Planning Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DU</td>
<td>Domestics United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOA</td>
<td>Economic Opportunity Act of 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Economic Opportunity Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESC</td>
<td>East Side Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCD</td>
<td>Foundation for Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAPP</td>
<td>Greensboro Association of Poor People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCA</td>
<td>Greensboro Citizens Association</td>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Model Cities Program</td>
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<td>MFDP</td>
<td>Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party</td>
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<td>MWRD</td>
<td>Mecklenburg Welfare Rights Organization</td>
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<td>MXLU</td>
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<td>NCF</td>
<td>North Carolina Fund</td>
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<td>NCN</td>
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<td>NYC</td>
<td>Neighborhood Youth Corp</td>
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<td>OBT</td>
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<td>OEO</td>
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<td>UOCI</td>
<td>United Organization for Community Improvement</td>
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<td>War on Poverty</td>
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CHAPTER I
BLACK POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY:
EMERGENCE OF BLACK POLITICAL POWER

Introduction

Black political power in America today is merely a reflection of the continuing social, economic, and political changes that have taken place in the black community. Professor Hanes Walton (1972, p. XV) reminds us that "no matter what the dimensions, the nature, or variety, black politics in the final analysis, reflects the black experience in America." That black experience has changed over the centuries, decades and years to the point where blacks in the 1980s see electoral politics as an integral part of black liberation. Across the nation blacks are occupying elected positions not held by members of their race since Reconstruction. In black communities throughout this nation, leaders have been thrust forth into the political process to address the needs of the black community. Blacks now vie with other participants for influence over policies that affect their community.

The obvious questions are how did these leaders differ from the traditional leaders that the black community has witnessed and what events/experiences precipitated these
changes? This chapter addresses these questions by analyzing the forces and public policies that helped to shape the direction of black politics and leadership for the period beginning in the mid-1960s through the 1980s. This analysis will proceed as follows. First, an overview will be given of the importance of the civil rights movement and the rise in political consciousness. These two forces moved blacks to demand a new black politics. Second, a discussion will be given of the discovery of poverty during a time when political consciousness among blacks was on the rise, and how this issue became politicized and resulted in a massive federal directive to alleviate this economic and political concern. Third, the political implications of these resulting poverty programs will be analyzed as a factor in the development of black political leadership. Finally, the chapter concludes by presenting the thrust of this dissertation and showing the importance of a study that examines the extent to which poverty programs in three North Carolina cities aided in the development of black political leadership.

The Civil Rights Movement

Black political leadership emanates from the changes that were brought about because of the civil rights movement. The significance of the civil rights movement and its contribution to political success is perhaps expressed
best by Nelson and Meranto (1977). Professors Nelson and Meranto believe that the student sit-in demonstrations, which emphasized confrontation through direct action, contributed significantly to the growth of political consciousness in the black community. Under the guidance of the leaders of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), protest activity began to be viewed as a power resource by which concessions could be obtained through the use of force rather than persuasion (Nelson and Meranto, 1977). When concessions were granted to student protesters and the symbols of southern white supremacy came tumbling down, blacks throughout America learned a lesson of enormous political importance: power when strategically applied can produce results in situations where all the efforts at persuasion in the world will have little, if any effect (p. 16).

The success of the student sit-in movement in the South created among black Americans everywhere a keen sense of their power potentialities (Nelson and Meranto, 1977, p. 16). The authors further note that southern protest was for all strata in the black community, an assertion of their human worth—an affirmation of their value as human beings and their determination to remove the yoke of racism whatever the cost. With it being evident that gains were being made with direct protest action by blacks, in the
South, the apathy and sense of hopelessness that had so long paralyzed the energies and emotions of the black masses--North and South--began a swift and decisive dissipation (Bennett, 1968, pp. 199-204). The civil rights movement showed blacks that as a racial group they could and must stand together as a unit if they were to destroy the economic, social and political repression suffered by blacks. This newly mobilized unity was transformed into a political resource that would change forever the role played by blacks in the political system.

Nelson and Meranto (1977), in their assessment of why Stokes and Hatcher were successful in Cleveland and Gary, surmised:

Civil rights action on the national level was, of course, an important stimulant in this process, but local civil rights activities were even more significant. Numerous demonstrations and other activities performed the double function of involving in direct political action thousands of blacks who had previously been politically inactive, and exposing the stubborn racism of the white establishment. The combination of these two factors contributed to several developments: it encouraged a growing number of blacks to engage in politics; it shattered the notion that blacks were experiencing normal progress and thus were satisfied with their lot; it reinforced the idea that blacks had to act in unison, not as individuals, if they wanted to improve their socio-economic-political condition; it provided blacks with a growing sense of group consciousness and cohesion. . . . In other words, the civil rights movement served to mobilize black resistance to the prevailing system of domestic colonialism. (p. 323)
This awakening placed a strain on the traditional leadership; they now had to respond to the increased militancy in the ranks of the lower socio-economic class.

**Urban Rebellions and Black Power**

The civil rights movement, with its student sit-in demonstrations in the South, also had a profound effect on blacks in the North. Nelson and Meranto (1977) emphasize the fact that when the protest movement went North during the middle sixties the basic theme of the movement shifted from "Freedom Now" to "Black Power" (p. 17). Black Power, which was an extension of the civil rights movement, expressed itself in various dimensions.

These various dimensions of black power—black pride, black unity, self-help, cohesive political action—have all played major roles in laying the attitudinal foundation essential for the political mobilization of blacks in city politics. (p. 17)

The most startling change in black politics during the 1960s resulted from the urban riots. In cities throughout the nation, primarily in the North, each Spring and Summer saw black people actively involved in street protests and engaging in confrontations with the police. Between 1964 and 1968 at least 220 persons were killed, 871 injured and 52,629 arrested (Downes, 1970, p. 354). Feagin and Hahn (1973, p. 105) observed that in the single month following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, riots broke out in 172 cities and 27,000 persons were arrested.
These ghetto riots had a number of consequences for blacks in city politics. The most obvious called attention to the fact that:

... the political system (traditionally an important vehicle for minorities to participate effectively in decisions affecting the distribution of public resources) has not worked for the Negro as it has for other groups. (NACCD, 1968, p. 287)

It also stressed the point that, incremental change in the oppressive social, economic, and political status of blacks, no longer had validity in the black community.

From these assaults on an intolerable status quo the group consciousness that developed provided a vital political resource. Verba and Nie (1972) concluded,

... if there is any impact on participation associated more directly with race, it is one that gives some boost to black citizens, particularly if they have a sense of group consciousness. Black Americans have, in group consciousness, a great resource for political development. (p. 173)

Black leaders enunciated the black power theme in terms of black pride and tried to channel these attitudes toward effective political work. Nelson and Meranto (1977) show that black power was used in the black community very skillfully by Stokes and Hatcher in their quest of the mayoral posts in their respective cities, Cleveland, and Gary, Indiana. Kenneth Clark argued that

... the most important unintended benefit of the black power movement was that it became a most effective smoke screen behind which the hard, thorough job of planning, seeking and obtaining genuine direct
political power for blacks could proceed with a minimum of interference. (Clark in Dymally, 1971)

The protests, marches, boycotts, and urban rebellions were all a stage of development that blacks had to pass through in order to secure entrance into the political arena. This point was first underscored by Baynard Rustin, with his plea for blacks to move from "Protest to Politics" (Rustin, 1965, pp. 25-31).

As blacks moved their demand-making strategy from the streets and into the polling places and board rooms throughout the country, America started to witness the emergence of a distinct and visible black political orientation. "By the mid-1970s, the idea that electoral politics provided the best avenue for advancing black interests had gained broad acceptance in the black community" (Nelson, 1982, p. 187). This acceptance was due in large measure to the significant gains by blacks in the electoral arena during the 1960s and 1970s. Black politicians, elected to public office with broadscale community support, began to monopolize leadership positions in the black communities across the country. These new leaders of the black community replaced in the minds of blacks such names as Dawson, DePriest and even the flamboyant Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. During this transitional period of two decades, such figures as Carl Stokes, Richard Hatcher, Tom Bradley, Howard Lee, Charles
Evers, Kenneth Gibson, Andrew Young, Barbara Jordan, Shirley Chisolm, et al., began to dominate black leadership networks and to shape the images of black people in the minds of blacks, as well as whites, in America. Blacks have become convinced that they can exercise control through the ballot, and that this control is the key to black liberation.

This massive shift in political strategy by blacks from the period 1965 to 1985 has produced definite results. During this interesting period of black electoral politics, we have witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of black elected officials. In 1964, there were 280 black elected officials in the United States. Included in this number were 6 members of congress, 90 state legislatures and 184 other state and local officials (Fleming 1966). In 1970, when the Joint Center for Political Studies began its annual survey of black elected officials, there were 1,469 black officials. By 1978 there were 4,503 black elected officials in the United States. In January 1988, blacks held 6,829 elected offices. This increase, which is impressive, conceals the political reality that blacks comprise 12 percent of the population, 11 percent of the voting-age population, and yet black elected officials represent only 1.5 percent of the total 490,770 elected officials in the United States (JCPS, 1988, p. 1).
The move by blacks into the electoral arena is significant and thus worthy of investigation. But the point must be made that these gains are the direct results of other factors that came into being due in part to the civil rights movement. Various social scientists have stressed the different factors that have influenced the present growth in black elected officials. Those most agreed upon are demographic changes and the removal of political barriers (poll taxes, grandfather clauses, white primaries, literacy tests).

Demographic change in an area is one easily acceptable explanation for the success of blacks being elected to public office. The movement of blacks out of the South during the twentieth century (see Table 1) has led to major urban areas becoming or approaching a black majority (see Table 2). This provides an electoral base for blacks to launch political careers. Data on the Black Congressional Caucus makes this point.

In fact all black representatives are from urban districts, and all but three—Ronald Dellums, Julian Dixon, and Mickey Leland—represent districts where the majority of the population is black. (Williams, 1982, p. 88)

The election of blacks to mayoral posts in cities with substantial black populations like Atlanta, Newark, Detroit, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, Gary, Cleveland,
Philadelphia, and Chicago lends even more support to this argument.

The removal of political barriers due to the civil rights movement, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 have had positive effects on blacks in politics. In fact, the most basic consequence of these events has been the removal of the legal basis for racial oppression in the United States,

Table 1: Black Out-Migration From the South, 1910-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net Black Out-Migration From South</th>
<th>Annual Average Rate</th>
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<tr>
<td>1910-1920</td>
<td>454,000</td>
<td>45,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1930</td>
<td>747,000</td>
<td>74,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1940</td>
<td>348,000</td>
<td>34,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1950</td>
<td>1,597,000</td>
<td>159,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1960</td>
<td>1,457,000</td>
<td>145,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1970</td>
<td>1,380,000</td>
<td>138,000</td>
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Table 2: Cities With Highest Percent Black Population—
1980

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<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. East St. Louis, Il.</td>
<td>55,200</td>
<td>52,751</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. East Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>36,957</td>
<td>31,980</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. East Orange, N.J.</td>
<td>72,025</td>
<td>64,354</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Compton, Ca.</td>
<td>81,286</td>
<td>60,812</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prichard, Al.</td>
<td>39,541</td>
<td>29,129</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gary, In.</td>
<td>151,953</td>
<td>107,644</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Washington, D. C.</td>
<td>637,651</td>
<td>448,229</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Atlanta, Ga.</td>
<td>425,022</td>
<td>282,912</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Detroit, Mich.</td>
<td>1,203,339</td>
<td>758,939</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Newark, N.J.</td>
<td>329,248</td>
<td>191,743</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Inglewood, Ca.</td>
<td>94,245</td>
<td>54,010</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Birmingham, Ala.</td>
<td>284,413</td>
<td>158,223</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. New Orleans, La.</td>
<td>557,482</td>
<td>308,136</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Baltimore, Md.</td>
<td>786,775</td>
<td>431,151</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>84,910</td>
<td>45,008</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Richmond, Va.</td>
<td>219,214</td>
<td>112,357</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Wilmington, De.</td>
<td>70,195</td>
<td>35,858</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Savannah, Ga.</td>
<td>141,634</td>
<td>69,441</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Richmond, Ca.</td>
<td>74,676</td>
<td>35,799</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Memphis, Tn.</td>
<td>646,356</td>
<td>307,702</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Albany, Ga.</td>
<td>73,934</td>
<td>35,173</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Durham, N.C.</td>
<td>100,831</td>
<td>47,474</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Jackson, Ms.</td>
<td>202,895</td>
<td>95,357</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Oakland, Ca.</td>
<td>339,288</td>
<td>159,234</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. St. Louis, Mo.</td>
<td>453,085</td>
<td>206,386</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Trenton, N.J.</td>
<td>92,124</td>
<td>41,860</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Portsmouth, Va.</td>
<td>104,577</td>
<td>47,185</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Macon, Ga.</td>
<td>116,860</td>
<td>52,056</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

thereby increasing the range of maneuverability for blacks in the polity (Smith, 1978, p. 22).

The successes and failures of blacks in removing the repulsive stench of legal exclusion are darted with court rulings and civil rights legislation. Accounts of these events are well documented (see Stone [1968]; Franklin [1961]; DuBois [1961]; Bennett [1967]; Broderick and Meyer [1965]; Brisband [1969]). But, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was perhaps the single most important piece of legislation enacted that facilitated the entry of blacks into electoral politics. This legislation was vital because it provided voting examiners to register people to vote; suspended literacy tests; required prior approval by the federal courts or government for changes in voting and/or voter laws and municipal boundaries; and perhaps most importantly, it had enforcement power.

Since the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) provided the constitutional basis for the revolution in black political participation, it is noteworthy to show the increase in the number of registered black voters after the enactment of the VRA. Table 3 shows that the overall registration for blacks increased from 29.3 percent in 1965 to 56.6 percent in 1972.

Table 4 confirms the 1971-72 estimates of Table 3, which shows that the VRA of 1965 had a positive effect on


## TABLE 3:

Registration by Race and State in Southern States Covered by the Voting Rights Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Pre-act Estimate</th>
<th>Post-act Estimate</th>
<th>1971-72 Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The gap is the percentage point difference between white and black registration rates.
** The race was unknown for 14,297 registered voters in Alabama, and for 22,776 in Georgia.

## Table 4: Percent Reported Registered, 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

reducing the gap between white and black registration levels. With these legal barriers removed in the South blacks cast their votes in unprecedented numbers. This act, which was amended in 1975 and 1982, has enabled those states covered by the act to witness impressive black political gains. These changes prompted Professor Linda Williams (1987) to observe,

[I]n the seven states originally covered by the act, the number of black elected officials increased from 497 in 1970 to 2,351 in 1985. This rate of increase was more than one and one-half times the rate of the increase for the nation as a whole. (p. 113)

The emergence of these black elected officials is significant qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The sheer numbers are impressive, but these new officials also represent what is referred to as the new black politics. A new black politics differs from traditional black politics, since it is aimed at exercising independence. Perhaps, the new black politics is best explained by Nelson (1982) when he asserts:

At bottom the new black politics is a politics of social and economic transformation based on the mobilization of community power. A central premise of this approach . . . is the notion that genuine progress can be made only if the pursuit of community goals is placed ahead of individual goals as an organizing priority. . . . Those who would seek to represent the community in public life must have their roots planted in the cultural and institutional network of the community and must manifest an unabashed concern for the enlargement of the community's impact on the policymaking process. (p. 188)
Nelson's position, as he acknowledges, is in the vein of Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) in their treatise on the politics of liberation. This view reflects the political consciousness that emerged out of the continuing civil rights movement. A new breed of black politicians emerged that owed its allegiance to the expanded black electoral base. This base seeks to become independent of and participants in, rather than objects of, the political process.

As an independent force blacks could advance the needs of the entire community by forming coalitions that were only mutually rewarding. Reciprocity was mandatory in order to receive the support of the black community. Blacks were following the advice of Malcolm X (1964) who exhorted blacks to revere ballots just as they would bullets, thus one would not use a ballot until one sights an identifiable target. Here even a black nationalist like Malcolm was conceding the legitimacy of (at appropriate times) moving from "protest to politics."

This view of black politics calls for a community-oriented leadership that can be trusted not to exhibit a "sellout" mentality. This core of leadership saw embedded in electoral politics the strengths of community based organizations that could promote a unified community. This was the optimistic future held for the new black politics.
But more than twenty years after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 the reality of the black community's social, political and economic status has caused some to question this devotion to electoral politics. Keech (1968), in his study of Durham and Tuskegee, questioned whether the vote could eliminate the inequality brought on by three and one-half centuries of discrimination. Piven and Cloward (1977) see political participation as a means of coopting black leadership, and Mack Jones (1970) contends the black elected officials cannot reorder such priorities as housing, employment, police-community relations and public education. Thus he concludes that the "keys to black liberation lie somewhere external to electoral politics." Nelson (1982 and 1987) in his examinations of Cleveland after a "new breed" black politician found that for the black community there is still an unfinished agenda.

The black community after two decades of struggle remains caught up in a web of traditional politics. . . . The goal of political independence has been broadly rejected in favor of the goal of personal enrichment. (1987, p. 195)

This comes twenty years after the election of Carl Stokes, a new breed politician.

The debate between the optimists and the pessimists is one that continues and will not be settled in this study. But for the new black politics, it does demonstrate that serious questions concerning its basic assumptions must be
addressed and adjusted if its goals are ever to be achieved. This correlates with the argument put forth by Hanes Walton (1972) that black politics is continually changing, just like the black man's economic, social and political position is constantly undergoing change.

It is exactly this type of change that has occurred over the past twenty-five years that has brought black political leadership to this stage of development. The aforementioned factors have shaped the present core of leaders in the black community. Those factors produced public policy choices that sought to respond to the perceived needs of an aroused urbanized black electorate. The 1960s also witnessed the genesis of the War on Poverty. These programs were in part the results of the federal government's response to a new interest group seeking entry into the local decision making process.

The Politics of Poverty

During the 1960s the federal government under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations expanded its scope of issues deemed to be in the nation's interest. The alleviating of social problems in the cities such as joblessness, poverty, poor education, crime and juvenile delinquency, gained the media's attention and was thus placed on the nation's political agenda.
The Kennedy and Johnson administrations were well aware of the growing importance of the black vote and the crumbling of the historic solid Democratic South. The 1960 contest was a photo finish with Senator Kennedy edging Vice President Nixon with a scant 49.7 percent of the vote to 49.6 percent of the total votes cast respectively. The northern black vote in strategic states which held large electoral votes provided the balance needed to be victorious when Kennedy won by only 112,827 votes (Stone, 1970, p. 47). John Kennedy entered office knowing that the black vote had given him the victory. His famous call to Coretta King had stopped the defection of the black vote to the Republican Party. Blacks who suffered disproportionately from unemployment, poverty housing, expected the Kennedy administration to practice reciprocity for their support. Professor John Donovan states that Kennedy had in place a framework to address the poverty of the black citizenry when he was assassinated in November 1963. Lyndon Johnson, who inherited the proposed policy initiatives, was also impressed by Michael Harrington's work, *The Other America*. Harrington vividly described the massive poverty amid a nation of plenty. This discovery of the poor prompted Johnson, who was a product of the New Deal and having personally emulated Roosevelt, to choose poverty to be the theme of his domestic program. This also allowed him to
personalize the program and rise out of the shadow of his slain predecessor (Donovan, 1973). Being the politically astute man that he was, Johnson was able to have in July and August 1964 the Senate and House enact the Economic Opportunity Act in time for a Johnson signature during the presidential campaign.

With this change in legislative intent old theories on poverty were changing. Social Darwinism was no longer as easy to defend when so many obvious contradictions were abounding. One thesis that emerged was that of "structural opportunity," which emphasized the political relationships between the poor and the structures of the social and political system. Here the structuralist argued that social and political institutions systematically deny opportunities to the poor, frustrating their attempt to join society's more affluent members through better education, jobs, and social status (Clark, 1969, pp. 19-20).

A variation of this theme stressed the effects of powerlessness upon poor individuals. Poverty was reinforced by feelings of powerlessness, alienation, frustration and despair. This theme gave rise to the concept "poverty cycle," wherein poverty breeds feelings of inadequacy and frustration, which leads to a lack of motivation. If this theory was the explanation for poverty then one way of breaking the cycle was to have individuals who suffered from
poverty to participate in programs affecting their lives. This way they could learn leadership skills and participation (Judd, 1979).

Under Section 2 of the Economic Opportunity Act the Community Action Programs (CAPs) received their funding. This program, aimed at bringing individuals that felt they were outside the decision making process back into government, had many different interpretations. But the most controversial part of CAPs was Section 202(a)(3) that called for "maximum feasible participation." Local elites differed greatly with the poor in the community concerning the level of participation by the poor. The additional controversy centered around the fact that funding for CAP bypassed state and local governments. This threatened to basically alter the focus of neighborhood power. The Green Amendment went a long way in killing any attempt at independent action by blacks. In short, vested interests at both the national and the local levels resisted mobilization of the poor except on their own terms (Cahn, 1968).

A second poverty program, the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, barely made it out of Congress. Unlike the CAPs, Model Cities (which is a name much less political) suffered criticism from many sides. In order to get passage concessions had to be made which diluted the potential of the program from the beginning.
Southerners stressed no integration and state and local officials kept an eye on the amount of participation. The MCP was to be the last federal program of a grand design. "Citizen Participation" was the term to be watched in this program and after the planning period, control over the program was decided at city hall. By the time Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, the tide had significantly shifted towards giving more power to the local governments. This was accomplished via revenue sharing programs, part of Nixon's New Federalism, that can be viewed today as "Reaganomics" in its embryonic state (see Frieden and Kaplan, 1975; Haar, 1975).

These two programs that were the centerpieces of the Johnsonian War on Poverty appeared briefly on the political landscape, but left a legacy as "turbulent" as the '60s. CAP, which was born from the political upheaval of the decade, could not escape playing a role in the struggle for power on the local level throughout the country. In fact that was the major concern of federal, state, and local officials once the program started operation. Donovan (1973) points out that southern democrats especially were very disturbed to find some federal programs being associated with "known civil rights agitators." But it was not just Southern segregationists like Mississippi Senators John Stennis and James Eastland that voiced concern. The
cries of subversion and rebellion came from mayors like Sam Yorty of Los Angeles, John Shelley of San Francisco, and Mayor Wagner of New York. They were accusing the Poverty Czar, Sargent Shriver, of "undermining the integrity of local government by organizing the poor into militant, politically active groups" (Donovan, 1973, p. 55).

So a program that had been the brainchild of Johnson's poverty task force had unleashed a program that had the potential for altering the power relations between the poor and the rich. The task force felt that the primary reason for the poor remaining poor was their lack of political power. So the attack had to go beyond economic poverty but must also encompass political poverty. During this time period urban poor was a euphemism for black. Piven and Cloward (1971) argue that the War on Poverty programs were really an attempt by elites in the Democratic Party to secure the loyalty of the aroused black voter. The direct funding allowed the federal government to go directly to the funding (black) agency, thus circumventing the obstructionist governors and mayors. This was a political necessity when channeling money to blacks in the oppressive South.

Whatever the reason for the poverty programs, their potential for bringing about change was not lost on the black community. Organizing the poor for political action
with federal money was the perfect opportunity for community leaders to enhance their power in their respective communities. James Sundquist (1973) wrote about that period:

Among the Negroes, civil rights groups were gaining political power in the mid-1960s, . . . But OEO through the CAAs multiplied the political strength of the poor many times over by offering them the jobs, the status, the governmental sanction, and the authority over public programs that the civil rights and comparable movements alone could never provide. In many instances, moreover, the civil rights movement and community action reinforced each other through the overlapping of leadership and membership. The activities of the CAAs provide a ready-made training ground for new leadership cadres for minority groups and for the poor in general. (p. 62)

It was apparent that a community that was resource-poor would not allow these readily available federal resources to come into their community without there being a struggle for control. The civil rights movement which had politicized the black community with its racial and political consciousness was producing new political leaders in the black community—leaders who wanted to open the political process, leaders who wanted to participate. CAPs provided for "maximum feasible participation" which eventually guaranteed at least one-third representation on the governing boards. Local ambitious leaders seized upon this opportunity to organize and encourage participation of the poor. Through participation and, as Sundquist observes, "the overlapping of leadership and membership with the civil
rights groups," a new black leader that was influenced by these events emerged. This theory advances the belief by many that the War on Poverty had economic as well as political implications for the black community.

Political Implications of the War on Poverty

The Johnsonian War on Poverty has received much attention concerning its legacy and effectiveness. This study concentrates on the role that these programs played in the development of black political leadership. As it was noted above, numerous factors have been credited with the formation of the new black politics. But one area that has not received parallel importance is the role that CAPs played in the development of black leadership. The Study that guides this research and makes a strong argument linking the development of black political leadership with CAPs is Peter Eisinger's "The Community Action Program and the Development of Black Political Leadership" (1979). Eisinger in this work agrees with one of the program's sharpest critics, Daniel Moynihan, who suggested that community action would leave an important and enduring imprint on the structure of black politics. Moynihan stated:

Very possibly the most important long run impact of the community action program of the 1960s will prove to have been the formation of an urban Negro leadership echelon at just the time when the Negro masses . . . were verging towards extensive commitments to urban
politics. Tammany at its best (or worse) would have envied the political apprenticeship provided the neighborhood coordinators of the anti-poverty program. (1970, p. 129)

Eisinger felt that nearly a decade after Moynihan's prediction, it was appropriate to begin to explore the degree to which Moynihan's prediction has in fact been the case. In his effort to establish a link between CAP involvement and black political development, he observed that CAPs provided highly visible settings in which people traditionally excluded from responsible public positions could gain political or administrative experience, as well as public reputations. Eisinger further argues that elected politicians comprise only a portion of the black community's leadership echelon, but a focus on this group offers a reasonable starting point. As noted earlier in this chapter, there has been the development of a substantial pool of public figures in a rather short period of time. Eisinger says this raises questions about the means by which such people were identified, trained and supported politically.

To the extent that community action played a role in fulfilling these leadership development functions, one might conclude that government policy and public resources were successfully employed to aid and encourage the political mobilization and representation of a disadvantaged group. (1979, p. 130)

Eisinger, in his sample drawn in 1977, interviewed by telephone 210 black elected officials. These respondents
represented nine percent of the universe of black officials in the three offices (mayors, aldermen or city council, and state representatives) in the two years (1970 and 1976) chosen for study. This strategy was designed to maximize the possibility of analyzing the effects of community action experience on the emergence over time of the black leadership pool (N=2,254). In his study Eisinger notes three questions that are basic to an understanding of this problem: (1) Did significant numbers of black elected officials have experience in CAP prior to election; (2) Do those who had CAP experience differ in any important ways from other black politicians; (3) Did CAP experience seem to serve the leadership development functions of identification, training and support.

In answering the first question he discovered that 42 elected officials representing 20 percent of the total sample reported that they had been involved in one capacity or another in a community action agency. (An additional seven officials had been involved in CAPs after their initial election to office, but these were not included in the CAP group in the analysis.) The incidence of prior CAP experience increased over time. Eisinger found that the proportion increased each year since 1964, suggesting CAP experience was more than a short-run epiphenomenon of the mid-1960s.
When the second question was addressed, Eisinger had to try to trace the independent effects of community action involvement on the political careers of the respondents. This was difficult because most respondents had a multiplicity of pre-election experiences that may have provided political visibility, training, and support. Eisinger found that involvement in the civil rights movements, for example, appeared to have the kind of universality among black officials that service in the "Resistance" was once claimed to have among French public figures. Of the entire sample, 74 percent said they had significant experience in civil rights organizations. In order to deal with this problem of controls, he chose to compare three different groups. The first group, called "CAPers," (N=42) were public officials that had experience in community action programs. The second group was referred to as "Civil Righters," (N=118) because these officials had experience in civil rights organizations. The third and final group, (N=50) contained those with neither CAP nor civil rights experience, hereafter referred to as "Neithers." A pure comparison between CAP and civil rights experience was not possible. But one could juxtapose the two and determine whether the addition of CAP experience to that of the civil rights movement produces any difference. When we make comparisons, it is shown that CAPers tended to
come from large urban areas (52%); this was the case in the South as well as the North. The CAPers tended to be younger and better educated than the other two groups. It was also shown that CAPers had a modal distribution at the state level, while the civil righters and the neither groups preferred the local level. Eisinger also found that the CAPers, once in office, also appear to display a surer sense of ambition and commitment to office. When asked if they would run for office again, the CAPers responded "yes" 53 percent of the time, while the civil righters and the neithers responded in the affirmative only 31 and 36 percent, respectively.

Finally, he examines the extent to which the leadership development functions of identification, training, and support were served in the three groups. To a significant degree, CAP seemed to perform all three functions for those black officials who were involved in those programs. The overwhelming majority of those officials with CAP experience gained it in cities or towns in which they subsequently ran successfully for office (86%). Most were in highly visible positions which were usually beset with controversy involving their incumbent, in intense neighborhood struggles. In many places these figures gained substantial personal notoriety.
In terms of training, board members had to campaign for office and some of the jurisdictions were as large as some substantial cities. Once in office they had to learn the fine art of diplomacy, many became expert advocates and bargainers. One thing that the author found to be very important in Eisinger's findings was the fact that the CAPers had to become familiar with budgeting, grantsmanship, personnel practices, and how to deal with an occasional militant clientele.

In terms of support, the CAPers were more likely to employ grassroots organizations and the least likely to employ or seek the support of local party organizations, even though two-thirds of the CAPers had worked actively for a political party prior to their initial election.

Eisinger concludes that there is strong evidence to support the general hypothesis that CAPs strongly facilitated the emergence of a black leadership cadre nationally.

The work by Eisinger is pivotal to the focus of this research. This dissertation will draw heavily on the conceptual approach of Eisinger's national study by focusing on parallel developments in the state of North Carolina. What role did the War on Poverty programs play in the leadership development process in the black community? Did they provide a forum for black leaders to receive training,
name recognition, and support? These questions will be central to this research.

Review of the Literature

Eisinger's national study is very important when one examines the community action factor of leadership development in the black community, but Eisinger is not alone in this effort. Much has been written by scholars on the effect that federal antipoverty programs of the 1960s had in stimulating black leadership. Clark and Hopkin (1969) believed that developing leadership of the poor was one of the main goals of CAPs. Others have also commented on the leadership training function provided by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) projects. Piven and Cloward (1971, pp. 275-76) argue that the programs helped to integrate blacks into the political system. They observed that several black leaders of poverty programs who later went into politics were individuals such as Kenneth Gibson, Mayor of Newark, who began his political career as vice-president of the local Community Action Program. Other black elected officials that followed this avenue into politics were: Johnny Ford, Mayor of Tuskegee, Alabama, who was the Director of the local Model Cities Program (Berry, 1978, p. 68); and Parren Mitchell, U. S. Congressman from Maryland's 7th Congressional District, who was Executive Director of Baltimore's Antipoverty Program during the 1960s.
Piven and Cloward believed the programs were an effective source of political patronage and leadership training for blacks and other non-white minorities, just as municipal departments once served for the Irish, Italians, and Jews.

Looking further at some of the literature, it is evident that other researchers have noticed the impact of CAP and Model Cities agencies in stimulating black political leadership and organization. Included in the studies that have examined this topic would be Bachrach and Baratz (1970) with their study of Baltimore; Kramer (1969) with his study of the San Francisco Bay area; Perotta (1977) machine influence in Providence, R. I.; Pressman's (1975) Oakland Study; Greenstone and Peterson (1973) with their comparative study, and their reassessment of that period (1977); Judith May (1971), Oakland's Model Cities program; and Strange's (1972a, 1972b, 1972c) three works which dealt with the poverty programs in North Carolina and Durham. All of these works, despite their mentioning of formidable obstacles and internal divisions among the poor, acknowledge that the antipoverty programs gave previously powerless groups, notably blacks, the opportunity to generate some organization and thus stimulate the development of leadership within black communities (Karning and Welch, 1980, p. 22).
In more recent years there have been three studies that examined the impact of antipoverty programs in fostering greater political leadership in the black community. Browning, et al. (1979, p. 219) in their longitudinal study of 10 northern California cities found "apparent links between minority winners and candidates, and the Model Cities, poverty, and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs in the cities." They conclude that "these programs appear to serve as a route to electoral participation just as civil rights activities have in the past."

Eisinger (1979) acknowledged the contributions made by Browning, et al. (1979) yet noted that this study was limited to generalizations applicable to the Bay area. For this reason he felt a nationwide sample was necessary for a systematic examination of the importance of community action in the emergence of black political leaders. Eisinger went further in depth in his study, not just in a quantitative sense, but also qualitatively in that he explored and asked questions concerning the number of BEO's that had prior CAP experience and the extent to which this experience differed from that of those without CAP experience.

Browning, et al. (1979) did not explore this line of inquiry and in effect presented the CAP leadership link as a by-product of what they viewed as more substantive
information. This was possibly due to the fact that their study was an exploratory study seeking to discover factors that possibly contributed to the political mobilization of blacks. Eisinger on the other hand continued what researchers like Browning, et al. and Moynihan had hypothesized. Eisinger indeed did discover a strong link between CAP experience and black leadership development in his national study.

The Karnig and Welch 1980 study examines the factors that have been correlated with black electoral success, but it does not examine the role of community action in the background of black candidates. The only work that has emphasized CAPs as an integral part in the shaping of leaders in the black community to date is the work done by Eisinger.

The Importance of This Study

The material presented above emphasized the breadth of explanations for black leadership development in the political process. This dissertation adds to that body of literature by adding CAP anti-poverty programs as a variable. Significantly, these programs came into being at a time when grassroot movements challenged the structure and the distribution of power and benefits in society. Demands during the 1960s centered on the political process and the need to include those groups that had been excluded. Blacks
were pressing to gain access, which was a priority; participation became the byword (Gittell, 1980, p. 30).

Some have argued that the anti-poverty programs were an attempt by social engineers to allocate federal resources to organize the poor so they could exert pressure for the redistribution of power and challenge the existing local power structure (Moynihan, 1969). In a similar vein, Peterson and Greenstone (1977) state that CAPs provided:

... new participatory channels outside the key electoral and allocative structures of the society. Black leaders were increasingly successful at using the resources provided by CAPs not just to win electoral campaigns, but also to pressure other agencies to acquire new positions of influence in the central, established arenas of bureaucratic and partisan politics. It is in this sense that CAP had its own political impact. (Peterson and Greenstone, 1977, p. 273)

This research makes a contribution to the field of political science by exploring an area that continues to be overlooked by social scientists, especially as it relates to the South. Studies on black elected officials, such as Cole (1974) and Conyers and Wallace (1976), fail to make a connection between the experience blacks receive in the federal programs and their success at the polls. Two studies by Stone (1978 and 1980) which look at the recruitment of blacks into the electoral process fail to address the impact of the CAPs. At this point, it is certain that the astute reader is toying with the question, if Peter Eisinger has filled this gap, what then is left to add to the literature
In this area? In order to answer that question several points must be made. First, it has to be noted that Eisinger's work dealt with a national sample of black elected officials. This is very good because it provides a national scope and a preliminary guide of what to expect. But we cannot forget one very important fact when studying black politics, "we need to know how these factors operated in specific cities with varying political structures and institutional bases of racism" (Smith, 1978, p. 28). Professor Hanes Walton (1972) expresses this view quite profoundly by noting that black politics springs from the particular brand of segregation practices found in different environments in which black people find themselves. In other words, the nature of segregation and the manner in which it differs not only in different localities, but within a locality, have caused black people to employ political activities, methods, devices and techniques that would advance their policy preferences.

Basically, the differences lie in the variety of forms that segregation and discrimination have taken in this country. Most have long noticed the difference between the manner in which segregation has manifested itself in the North and in the South. But they have failed to go further and state how the practice of segregation has differed even in the same region. (pp. 11-12)

The point that Walton makes is very important and applicable to this research. Greensboro, Durham, and Charlotte all have different social histories, economic institutions and
political regimes. Because racism has evidenced itself in many different forms throughout this country and particularly in the South, black politics has by necessity had to respond to the local environment in order to be effective. As Nelson and Meranto (1977) asserted, the presence of a local civil rights movement and successful political mobilization are correlated. This factor within itself accounts for much of the similarities and differences among the three cities.

This dissertation proposes to expand on Eisinger's study by giving greater detail to the impact of the poverty programs at the local level. This researcher intends to fill the gaps in terms of how CAPs and their black political elites were effective in particular localities under different environmental factors. Although the author examined different cities in this study, one state was chosen for study rather than several states (which could give insight into how different segments of the country responded to CAPs). Thompson (1983) quotes Matthews and Prothro (1963), who concluded that the most important factor in explaining variation in black political participation were the states themselves. By limiting the study of black politics to one state many factors that vary across states can be held constant. It is this researcher's view that there still exists a need to examine in detail a city's
response to the War on Poverty as it relates to the development of leadership in the black community. By studying Greensboro, Charlotte, and Durham, one can trace the use of benefits provided (intentional and unintentional) to political activists by CAPs, as they sought to move from "protest to politics."

Conclusion

Chapter I has detailed the emergence of a core of black political leaders that began in the middle 1960s. The increased number of black elected officials were a direct result of the forces of change put into motion by the civil rights movement. This continuing movement produced a political and racial consciousness that enabled blacks to mobilize enough grassroots pressure to ensure legislative responses that eased the difficulty of political participation. The 1965 Voting Rights Act was very important, and it was symbolic of the actions taken by the government to guarantee blacks fundamental rights available to other citizens. The removal of barriers had positive results in swelling the number of black elected officials. Most importantly these politicians represented the New Black Politics, a politics that emphasized the uplifting of the entire community rather than personal gain.

An invigorated underclass was able during the 1960s to force their concerns into the political spotlight. This
produced legislation that dealt with "social welfare" policies. Paramount among this legislation was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This act produced the War on Poverty programs that brought unprecedented resources to the black community during a period of political consciousness. The inevitable results were black leaders working in the poverty programs, using them to actualize the New Black Politics.

This study examines the impact of these programs in helping this new core of black leaders to mobilize the poor and form grassroots organizations. This is the central focus of this research. Eisinger (1979) and others have studied poverty programs and their role in black political development, but not with the detail needed on the local level in the South. This study will examine the applicability of Eisinger's national study to events that transpired in three cities in the state of North Carolina. The study also examines the forces that helped to shape the scope and character of black political action in these cities.

The following chapter will introduce the methods of procedure used in this study and an outline of the remainder of the study.
CHAPTER II
METHODS OF PROCEDURES

Introduction
This chapter will present the procedures used in this research that guided the collection and the analysis of the data. The research sites chosen, the reasons for their selection, and the propositions that will direct this study, are explained in this chapter.

The comparative case study was chosen for use in this study. In the methods section, the researcher will explain why the case study method was selected. This will include the advantages of this method, followed by a description of the interview schedule (various types) and the sample population used in this study. The method employed to determine the truth or falsity of the proposition is presented, and finally an outline of the remaining chapters is given which shows the correlation between the propositions and analysis stage of the research.

The Research Sites
This dissertation analyzes three urban areas in the South that have shown great potential for political action by blacks. Charlotte, Durham, and Greensboro provide three
excellent opportunities to study the impact Community Action Programs (CAPs) had on black political development and the political environment of North Carolina. These cities were chosen because of the researcher's intrinsic interest in North Carolina politics and because of the valuable insights that can be gleaned from an examination of the operations of CAP programs in three urban centers in one state. CAPs played a very political role in North Carolina. John Strange (1972a) observed in a study of North Carolina that CAPs caused a lot of tension in localities. "Protest organizations developed that challenged the status quo and unified the black community" (p. 139). Strange (1972b, p. 56) also states that: "through June of 1968 fifty-three and a half million dollars had been funneled into North Carolina's eleven Community Action Agencies (CAAs)." This was taking place at a time when blacks in the state were making strides politically.

There are several other reasons for selecting these research sites. According to the Joint Center for Political Studies (JCPS) (1980), North Carolina ranks seventh in the nation in terms of the number of BEOs, with 247. In the South, only Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi have higher numbers of BEOs (JCPS, 1980, pp. 4-5).

In order to put those figures in some type of perspective, this researcher will use Chuck Stone's Index of
Proportional Equality, which establishes minimum standards for measuring the political power of an ethnic group (Stone, 1968, pp. 58-81). In 1980 blacks constituted 21.5 percent of the population, but held only 4.66 percent of the elected positions in the state, up from 1.8 percent in 1968 (JCPS, 1980, p. 10). According to Stone's Index, blacks in North Carolina have made progress, but are still far behind minimum standards of participation.

Durham has several important features that make it an excellent setting for the analysis of the impact of CAP programs on black leadership. First, it is one of the few cities in America where the black poor was able to capture virtual control of the poverty program as a result of their success in community organizations (Strange, 1972b, p. 60). Also due to the federal programs, in 1968 a coalition of blacks and liberals captured control of the county Democratic Party. Strange (1972a) notes something in his study which makes Durham an excellent choice for study.

There is the unsettling conclusion that so far, at least, regular political action has worked even less often than has confrontation politics. Bill Keech notes this phenomenon in his study of black politics in Durham. Durham is a community where blacks enjoy unusual political advantages. There is a wealthy, independent black community. Blacks of all economic levels are well organized. There is a minimum factionalism in the community, some white support exists, including some financial backing for black protest activities. And last but not least Durham's black leadership, poor and rich alike, is well trained, highly sophisticated, and politically astute. If
blacks have difficulty in Durham, what responses do they receive elsewhere? [italics added] (p. 145)

Durham's black leadership has been held together by powerful leadership from the black middle class. Its tool for unity has been the Durham committee on the Affairs of Black People. Most concessions from the white power structure were negotiated via the Durham Committee.

Durham is located in the central part of the state in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill Triangle Area, a rapidly growing area. In 1970 the population was 95,438; blacks were 38.8 percent of the population. By 1980 the population had increased to 100,831 with the black population being 47,474, which made Durham 47 percent black.

The second city examined in this study, Greensboro, is located in the Piedmont section of the state. The 1970 census listed the population to be 144,076 and the black population was 28.2 percent. Greensboro is a city whose black community is well organized politically. All candidates, black and white, running for office and desiring the support of the black community, must meet with the Greensboro Citizens Association (GCA), the political action committee of the local NAACP. This committee interviews the prospective candidate to determine his/her political suitability, which is based upon a battery of questions surrounding racially sensitive concerns. The committee
selects a usually bi-partisan ticket for endorsement. Each registered black voter is then mailed a copy of this endorsement. Bass and DeVries (1977, p. 54) state that each endorsed candidate is charged a fee which some feel is a very good investment. Several political observers concur with this assessment, but were reluctant to have their names used, thus confirming the influence of the GCA.

Greensboro had a slightly different relationship with its poverty programs. Greensboro had the Guilford County Economic Opportunity Council (EOC) as its CAA. This agency was challenged in the black community by a grassroots organization named the Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP). GAPP was not a federal agency and was thus more militant in its approach toward alleviating poverty. GAPP was swept to the forefront of confrontation as a result of its Black Power orientation. Local white political elites could not control GAPP. The leaders of this organization moved ideologically from the black nationalist view to the socialist perspective, with some members eventually joining the Communist Workers Party (CWP). This organization clashed with Nazi-Klan members on November 3, 1979, which left five members of the CWP dead. Greensboro has a long history of confrontation politics which establishes a different political setting than Durham or Charlotte.
The third and final city analyzed in this study, Charlotte, is the largest city in the state with a population of approximately a quarter of a million. In 1970 blacks were 30.3 percent of the population. Charlotte, which had a CAP and a Model Cities Program (MCP), has an active black community. In 1978, Harvey Gantt, a black, ran unsuccessfully for mayor, but surprised many with his showing at the polls. He ran again in 1983 and won. Charlotte's black leadership has a history of factionalism which saw the poverty programs as avenues to securing their role as the leader in the black community. The civil rights movement never reached the level of unity and confrontation as was witnessed in Greensboro or Durham.

These three cities have provided the state with BEOs on the State, County, and Municipal levels. They have also produced candidates for the various positions of U.S. Congressperson, Governor, Lt. Governor, Federal Judge and State Supreme Court Justice.

Any focus on black politics in North Carolina would be incomplete without an analysis of these three cities. Although limited black political participation has a long and significant history in North Carolina, most participation is centered in the cities. Bass and DeVries (1977, p. 242) account for this fact because of the resources and successes found in the cities, Durham with its
relatively large black middle class, Greensboro, where blacks developed a strong and effective organization in Guilford County, and Charlotte with a black state senator.

Finally, these three cities were chosen because of their geographical locations and the realistic constraints of time and resources. Durham, Greensboro and Charlotte are connected by Interstate 85. Durham is 56 miles northeast of Greensboro, which is approximately a one-hour drive. Charlotte is 100 miles southwest of Greensboro, which makes it roughly two hours by car. The proximity of these cities in relation to Greensboro made it possible for this researcher, who lives in Greensboro, to travel daily to these locations to gather data and follow up on missed interviews.

This research explores the extent to which the Community Action Programs in three North Carolina cities had an impact on the development of black political leadership. Were these programs instrumental during the sixties in providing a fertile base from which blacks were able to close the gap between protest and politics? A search of the literature (Chapter I) and personal experience with these programs have shown that the war on poverty programs were indeed the center of much political activity during the sixties and early seventies. These programs have been studied extensively as they related to the effort by the
federal government in cooperation with local policy-makers to combat economic poverty and its consequences. But very little effort has been made to address in a very systematic manner, exactly how CAPs attacked political poverty on the local level. In what way, if any, did CAPs stimulate individuals in these programs to move into politics? Why were some cities more successful than others in attacking political poverty?

Given the above questions and observations, this researcher feels that the following propositions can lead in a very fruitful way to answering these questions.

Propositions

1. Community Action Programs helped to promote the "identification function" for black leaders by providing unique visibility to CAP officials active in politics on the local level.

This proposition stems from observations made by Prewitt (1970) and Eisinger (1979) who note that an important facet of the recruitment process is the identification function. By this, the authors argue that if one is to emerge in the community and have visibility, the population must identify the individual with certain causes that can be translated into political capital. What evidence is there that this actually happened? Were there leaders thrust forth by CAPs that have moved on to political success? Were blacks able to circumvent the "screening-out
process" (Stone, 1978) in the political arena by using CAPs instead of the traditional party structure? What was essentially the role or non-role played by CAPs, and most significantly, why?

2. The Community Action Programs produced political organizations that enhanced political consciousness and arousal among grassroot blacks involved in the program.

This proposition asserts that CAPs produced political organizations that were "activist oriented" rather than "service delivery oriented." In those cities where political organizations emerged, did the CAPs unleash in the black community a new political consciousness among grassroot blacks? Piven and Cloward (1971) and Donavan (1973) argue that prior to these programs many blacks had never been involved in the workings of the political arena. But these programs served a much needed purpose for Democrats by cementing the black poor to the Democratic party. Once their political consciousness was aroused, this evidenced itself by involvement in other aspects of their lives, such as police-community relation boards, city council politics, and education. Did this political consciousness actually manifest itself? If so, did it lead eventually to mobilization? If it did not, why not? Was the arousal or lack of it, due to factors totally disconnected with CAPs?
3. CAPs-inspired organizations developed new kinds of skills in the black community.

This concluding proposition follows the reasoning from the prior proposition in that if these organizations were present and effective, they had to produce and make use of skills that had not been present before the existence of CAPs in their respective communities. Matthew Holden (1973) speaks of a shortage of bureaucratic and technical expertise in the black community. It can be argued that CAPs developed management skills that allowed its participants to outline, implement and read federal regulations. Other skills that were developed could entail proposal writing and the writing and manipulation of budgets (Eisinger, 1979).

One skill that threatened city halls across the nation was the adeptness with which participants were able to organize the poor, engage in fund raising, organization of rallies and rent strikes against the political establishment, and organize voter registration drives among people that had previously existed outside of the political arena (Donavan, 1973). Exactly how were these organizations able to develop these skills? Was this the case in most communities or only a select few deviant cases? Did these skills develop in those people coming out of the poverty programs? Were they attributable to other factors in the communities? If they did not develop, why not?
The propositions presented above constitute the pivotal substantive foundation for this dissertation. How valid are these propositions? Did CAPs bring about new leadership or any leadership in the black community? If new leadership did emerge, why and in what ways did this emergence transpire? If it did not emerge, why not? All three propositions build upon the common theme that CAPs served an independent function in black political development.

Method

The research strategy employed in this study is the case study approach. Its unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations. The case study method blends well with this investigation. In order to test the three propositions, this researcher will use the comparative or multiple case study. A work that explains the comparative case study very well is "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" by Arend Lijphart (1971). The comparative case study is more compelling in its findings than the single case study. More than one case study of similar situations or events may generate findings that point in the same direction, thereby permitting a weak confirmation or disconfirmation (Lijphart, 1971, p. 684). Lijphart lists six types of case studies, of which he makes the following distinctions: (1) atheoretical case
studies; (2) interpretative case studies; (3) hypothesis-generating case studies; (4) theory-confirming case studies; (5) theory-infirming case studies; and (6) deviant case studies. Since this study deals with an area that has not moved into the mainstream of formal theories, it is this researcher's belief that important steps will be made by using a hypothesis-generating case study. Referring to Lijphart (1971):

The hypothesis-generating case studies start out with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. Their objective is to develop theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists yet. (p. 692)

Since very little theory exists in this area, we have a situation where, according to Selltiz, et al. (1958, p. 33):

(f)ew well-trodden paths exist for the social investigator to follow; theory is often either too general or too specific to provide clear guidance for empirical research. . . . In these circumstances exploratory research is necessary to obtain the experience which will be helpful in formulating relevant hypotheses for more definitive investigation.

This study will also move forward from the exploratory or formulative perspective. By providing information about a given environment, personalities, and political overtones, this investigator will lay the foundation for more structured, generalizable hypotheses.
Procedures and Limitations of the Study

This study makes use of three sources of data: documents, archival records, and interviews.

Documents

The first source that was used in this study provided this investigator with a lot of invaluable data. The first documents utilized emerged from a systematic examination of the microfiche of the three daily newspapers for Charlotte, Durham and Greensboro. This was done for the period 1964 through 1980. By doing this, the researcher learned about major events and how they had shaped the course of history in these cities. This way the researcher could approach the interviewees with some conceptualization of their roles and ask them to clarify, broaden, and enrich the data being collected.

Another source of documentation were several dissertations that had been completed during the actual operations of these programs. Especially useful were Steven F. Redburn, Protest and Policy in Durham, North Carolina; Richard Hoffman, Community Action: Innovative and Coordinative Strategies in the War on Poverty; and Anne Murphy, Involving the Poor in the War on Poverty. Works that provided excellent background material for two of the cities and covered the period of investigation very well were William Chafe's book, Civilities and Civil Rights:

Fourthly, reports issued by the Human Relations Commissions of Charlotte, Durham, and Greensboro afforded this researcher the opportunity to assess the racial as well as the social and economic conditions of their respective cities. Finally, the National Roster of Black Elected Officials, issued annually by the Joint Center for Political Studies, provided the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and terms in office for elected blacks in the three cities. These yearly rosters enabled the researcher to compile a list of all blacks that had been elected up through 1980.

Archival Records

Archival records, when used in conjunction with other sources of evidence, also served as a corroborative tool in this investigation. In this study, this researcher has used three types of archival records.

The first form of archival record used was the reports and studies prepared by the North Carolina fund. The agency's reports covered all eleven poverty agencies in the state, which provided this researcher with insight into the structure, objectives, successes, and failures of these local poverty agencies. Durham and Charlotte were given extensive evaluation by the state agency.
The second form of archival record utilized in this study was census records of the three cities. This compiled data supplied the needed demographic data that enabled this researcher to make assessments concerning the economic, social, and political environments of these cities.

The third and final form of archival data was the information gathered from the county boards of election of Durham, Guilford, and Mecklenburg. At the boards of elections, the researcher compiled data not only on elected blacks, but also other candidates, black and white, who ran for office during the time span 1964-1980.

**Interviews**

The third and final source of evidence used in this study is the interview. Although the interview is more frequently associated with the survey, the interview is one of the most important sources of case study information.

This researcher employed a standard interview schedule in this study. A combination of the closed and open-ended forms were used in order to ascertain the appropriate data. The questions asked the respondents to cover different areas, and thus necessitated a "closed" format at one point and the "open" format at other times.

The interview schedule sought information concerning personal background, political background, and organizational background. These questions required "closed
or fixed alternatives" (Selltiz, et al. 1959), especially as it related to the level of involvement in CAPs. After the background information was gathered, the interview probed for information surrounding the history of CAPs in the respective city, the social history, significant events, groups or individuals perceived to exercise power, and finally his/her perception of a politician's public responsibility. These latter questions required the interviewer to probe for clarification and meaning from the responses offered. Quite often the respondents were asked to relate histories, perceptions, and opinions about CAPs, the city, and the Civil Rights movement. For this reason the "open" format was instituted, and many times with great success. This format allowed the respondents to open up and provide information that was not initially solicited.

Three separate questionnaires were used in this study. One was prepared for successful black candidates, a second one for unsuccessful black candidates, and a third questionnaire for political informants. By using three different questionnaires, the researcher was able to include in the universe of individuals interviewed black elected officials, blacks that were political but not successful, and finally within the political informants were found individuals who had knowledge of CAPs or the politics of the respective city.
The interviews for this study were conducted in two waves (see research note, appendix). This first wave of respondents included black elected officials and reputational leaders in the three cities. These interviews were conducted between March 1983 and June 1983. One interview was conducted in August 1984. This set of interviews consisted of 17 personal interviews. These respondents were able to provide the researcher with valuable information regarding the respective city's racial and political histories. Each respondent was contacted by telephone prior to the interview so that the respondent would be familiar with the interviewer prior to his arrival. The researcher discovered during the first wave of interviews, when elected officials were contacted elected, that these individuals had no overall CAP association. This would not meet the objectives of this study. The researcher then concentrated his efforts on interviewing respondents that held positions in the local CAAs or were viewed as leaders in the black community. These respondents constituted the second wave of interviews. The second wave was conducted from October through December 1987. These interviews were telephone interviews which allowed the researcher to contact more respondents, more efficiently, over a shorter span of time. This was especially true when the respondents resided in areas like Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Letters were sent to each individual alerting them of a call from the interviewer so that a convenient time for an interview could be scheduled. From these efforts, 20 additional interviews were completed. A total of 37 interviews were conducted for this study.

Each interview was taped with the permission of the respondent. This allowed the researcher to record verbatim responses from the interviewees. No one appeared to be uncomfortable with the use of a tape recorder.

The respondents were informed at the onset of the interview that the information gathered from the interview would be used for only scholarly purposes and would remain in the possession of the researcher and his academic advisor at The Ohio State University. They were also promised anonymity and that any sensitive information given would not be presented in the final report in a manner that could be associated with them. For that reason the names of the respondents are not mentioned and are referred to only as respondents or informants.

Limitations

This study makes an analysis of Charlotte, Durham, and Greensboro, North Carolina. The time span covered is from 1964 through 1980. This study has included in its sample, a representative number of black elected officials in the three cities. Not all of the blacks elected during this
period were interviewed (see research note, appendix). It was felt that by interviewing unsuccessful candidates as well, a broader perspective could be gathered. Those candidates that had prior CAP experience could provide this study with background information on the organizations and whether that experience played a role in their decisions to enter the political arena. In order to get an in-depth perspective on the poverty programs, selected past directors of the programs, board members, community organizers, and civil rights officials in each city were interviewed.

Mode of Analysis

In this comparative case study this researcher faces the problem most researchers doing case studies must encounter, that being the analysis state. Yin (1984) points out that:

the analysis of case study evidence is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies. . . . Unlike statistical analysis, there are few fixed formulas or cookbook recipes to guide the novice. (p. 99)

Taking this into consideration, this researcher, having employed general propositions (that have already been listed), used the propositions to guide the data collection stage, thus allowing the author to focus attention on certain data and to ignore other data. Given this guide in gathering data, the researcher employed a longitudinal analysis which examined events over a period of time.
A longitudinal study is one that takes place at several different points over a span of time. By comparing the patterns of response . . . over an extended period, one may not only make statements about the degree of stability or the direction of change of patterns, but also relate such patterns to external historical conditions or changes in the social and economic environment. (Eisinger, 1976, p. 38)

This analysis covers many different types of variables and is not limited to a single independent or dependent variable. This allows the researcher to reconstruct the events of the past as they are described by the respondents and informants. By documenting the movement of individuals involved with CAPS from the time they left these organizations, securing their personal assessment of the impact of these programs, coupled with cross-checks by community knowledgables, this researcher will be able to gather from the data the extent of development, politically or professionally, which is attributable to CAPs involvement.

Outline of the Chapters

The remaining chapters in this dissertation will be presented in the following manner.

In Chapter III, the researcher will examine the social and political setting for "poverty politics" in the state of North Carolina during the period 1964-1980. This will be followed by an evaluation of the social, political, and
economic patterns of development in each of the three city's poverty program.

Chapter IV starts the exploration of the propositions for this dissertation. In this chapter the researcher begins with the proposition that the poverty programs, according to Eisinger, played a role in the recruitment process. This question will be answered by an analysis of whether or not the CAP programs served the leadership development function of identification in the recruitment process. By examining each city, a determination of the role or non-role played by the poverty program can be made.

Chapter V will examine the proposition that the CAP produced political organizations that enhanced political consciousness and arousal among blacks involved in the program and in the city. Did this happen in the cities analyzed in this study? This chapter will examine what happened in the "consciousness-raising process" and the impact it had on the local political environment in Durham, Greensboro, and Charlotte.

Chapter VI examines the question, did new skills develop by involvement in the poverty programs? What were these skills and how did they overall differ from skills that existed prior to CAP involvement?

Chapter VII concludes the study by summarizing the major findings, describing the significance of these
findings in relation to previous research. The chapter will continue by assessing the implications of these finding on the continuing campaign for social justice and mobilization of the poor. Finally, an assessment will be made of the heuristic value of these findings and suggestions given as to where future research in this area should proceed.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II


3 Ibid., no. 83.

CHAPTER III
POVERTY POLITICS IN NORTH CAROLINA

Introduction

This chapter traces the development of the Community Action Agencies (CAAs) in Greensboro, Durham, and Charlotte. An assessment is given of how successful they were in furthering the political role of blacks in each city.

This examination starts by reiterating the importance of national forces in the formation of the poverty program. Similar forces shaped the response to the issue of poverty on the state level. North Carolina's response was the North Carolina Fund (NCF). How this agency came about will be discussed with special attention given to its goal of including the poor.

Following the discussion of the NCF, each city will be examined to illuminate the ways in which the political structure, and social and economic conditions shaped the style of black politics in each city and its response to the War on Poverty. This discussion will highlight the similarities and differences in each city and the effect these factors had on the success or failure of the local CAA.
The chapter will conclude with a comparison of the policy outcomes in each city and an explanation of why these cities experienced different levels of political activism.

The political activism of the 1960s had a profound impact on this nation moving to address "a backlog of unfinished business in the field of human welfare traceable to Franklin Roosevelt" (Donovan, 1973, p. 22). The March on Washington in August of 1963 served as an example of the rising political consciousness in the black community. Donovan (1973) asserts that the march signaled the need in the black community for both freedom (the vote) and jobs. The Kennedy-Heller economic policies in 1963 had lowered the 1961, 7 percent unemployment rate to 5.3 percent. But it did not reveal the explosive reality that unemployment in the black community was at least double that in the white community. This unemployment differed from previous levels of unemployment, for it was caused by a lack of skills among certain segments of the population. No matter how much the economy expanded, the structurally unemployed would not be reached. This presented a problem for the Democratic Party, because blacks were becoming more vital to the survival of the new Democratic coalition.

A concern for the rate of poverty nationally prompted Kennedy and Johnson to move the federal government into a position of enlarging its role in an area previously
reserved for the state and local governments. Although Roosevelt's New Deal started the tilt towards more federal involvement, it was the War on Poverty programs that moved poverty to center stage for the federal and state governments. Moreover in addition to federal initiatives, states were also beginning to take concerted efforts to address the issue of poverty. This research concentrates on North Carolina and the politics surrounding its poverty programming effort. In order to analyze that process, it is necessary to survey the forces that shaped North Carolina's response to poverty. The principal thrust of this state's response was the North Carolina Fund.

The North Carolina Fund

North Carolina, with its history of poverty, illiteracy, and low-income industries, stood as a graphic example of Michael Harrington's *The Other America*. Harrington, in his classic evaluation of poverty in America, could have been talking about North Carolina when he brought to the attention of Americans the specter of wasted human resources in this country. North Carolina, at the time of Harrington's writing, was a microcosm of the "Other America." The state's borders covered the spectrum of human desperation. In the western part of the state, one found counties that included Appalachian whites that were poverty-stricken. Moving to the piedmont and south-central
sections of the state, one found cities like Charlotte, Winston-Salem, Durham, and Greensboro with inner city poverty that rivaled any found in any of the major cities in the country. In the eastern part of the state, one found rural poverty that attested to the impact of an agricultural past that still holds firmly to a tenant farmers system which kept the majority of blacks at or below the poverty line.

It is within this context that North Carolina, on July 18, 1963 (paralleling the Kennedy activity in Washington), took its first step in attacking the protracted poverty in the state. It was at this time that the North Carolina Fund, a non-profit, charitable corporation, was incorporated by Governor Terry Sanford, Charles F. Babcock, C. A. McKnight, and John H. Wheeler. George H. Esser, Jr. was its Executive Director.

Under the articles of incorporation, The Fund had the following specific functions:

To study the problems involved in improving the education, economic opportunities, living environment and general welfare of the people of North Carolina, of all ages and in different parts of the state; to make and recommend grants for research, pilot experimental and other projects toward the solution of such problems; to make available professional staff services to private and public agencies, both state and local, seeking solutions to such problems; to encourage cooperative state and community action in devising such solutions; and to encourage wise use of public and philanthropic funds devoted to any of these purposes. (N. C. Fund, 1963, pp. 6-7).
North Carolina was convinced that simply too many people in North Carolina were too poor. The North Carolina Fund was established as the first statewide (not state) agency in this country with the explicit purpose of making an all-out assault on the "cycle of poverty." Along these lines on September 30, 1963, Governor Sanford announced the initial $14 million, five-year program for the Fund. Of that total, $9.5 million was being provided from three foundation grants: $7 million from the Ford Foundation; $1,625,000 from the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation; and $875,000 from the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation. The remainder consisted of matching funds (N. C. Fund, 1963, p. 6).

The original conceptualization for approaching poverty in North Carolina reflected the Ford Foundation's work with "Grey Areas Projects." Community action and innovation were the major thrusts of the Fund. Governor Sanford and his staff knew that this new approach would rock the boat in some communities. In fact Sanford (1966) observed that the first impact was to upset the existing power structures within communities so that changes in the status quo could exist. He states:

In most cases this amounted to radical changes in community relations and activities--but this we did knowingly, realizing that positive results would occur when existing structures are challenged. . . . That this was a revolution is obvious--but a revolution
within a structure established to encourage revolution. (pp. 81-82)

Immediately after its incorporation the Fund elicited proposals from communities throughout the state who were interested in waging a coordinated attack on poverty. Fifty-one proposals were received representing organizations in two-thirds of North Carolina's 100 counties and affecting 85 percent of the state's population. From these proposals only seven communities were chosen to receive grants from the Fund.

After the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA), the Fund designated four additional communities that would receive grants. Under the EOA these eleven organizations were converted into community action programs. This occurred shortly after they had been designated as NCF grantees and before they had begun to implement their proposals to the Fund (NCF, 1966).

The eleven programs had the advantage of funding from two sources, OEO and NCF. George Esser, who was the Executive Director of the NCF, viewed the new source of money as an opportunity for the NCF to move forward with a greater emphasis upon experimentation. These organizations, which had originally been chosen by the NCF, would be encouraged to take bolder steps in attacking the cycle of poverty. Esser (1966) states "the Fund could not in good conscience spend its limited resources for the same programs
now funded by OEO but could be a catalyst for change by experimenting in other areas and exploring new frontiers for action" (pp. 7-8).

Two of the three cities being investigated, Charlotte and Durham, were NCF cities. The third city, Greensboro, was not chosen as an NCF project, and in 1968 was refused a Model Cities program due to its lack of dedication to ending discrimination in education and housing (Chafe, 1980, pp. 232-233). Although there were marked differences among the cities, there were also similarities in the emergence of poverty programs in these cities.

The most troubling aspect of the emergence of poverty programs in North Carolina surrounded the OEO guideline that stipulated increased "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in these programs. Much has been written on this topic as it relates to the macro-level (Boone, 1966; Donovan, 1967, 1973; Strange, 1972). On a micro-level in North Carolina it can be shown that there were regional differences which highlighted the problem even more.

Anne Murphy (1970), in her study of the involvement of the poor in the War on Poverty in North Carolina, made some enlightened observations about the state's poverty politics. Murphy observed that although the state had a running start in forming comprehensive poverty programs, by the early weeks of 1966 the state's programs had spent only one-sixth
of the federal monies for FY 1966 that had been allocated to the state economic opportunity programs. Two and a half million dollars had been spent during the first half of FY 1966; fifteen million had been allocated (p. 102).

Robert Ward, who was Governor Dan K. Moore's anti-poverty coordinator, noted several reasons why North Carolina was slow in starting its programs. First of all OEO required that at least 35,000 people should be served by the community action agency. In this case with the rural composition of the state's population, sparsely populated counties found themselves having to ally themselves with other counties to meet this federal requirement. This proved to be time consuming because of the restructuring of organizations.

The second obstacle, according to Ward, was the requirement imposed by OEO that one-third of the membership of the community action committee be drawn from among the economically deprived people of the area. Ward saw this as a major stumbling block for North Carolina because "people see no reason for including the poor on the anti-poverty committees. They do not understand how leadership can be found in this level of society." This comment by Ward was very illuminating in that it struck at the root of state and local governments' reluctance to adhere to this federal guideline. As Murphy (1970) relates, "involving the poor in
the South requires crossing the caste line" (p. 101). North Carolina was not different in this respect. In fact in the early stages of development the board members were attorneys, clergymen, school superintendents, with a smattering of public officials. The original boards tended to reflect the emergence of a new set of leaders in the South; young-thinking cosmopolitans, well educated and exposed to national values, who thought of themselves as moderates, if not liberals. Civic minded junior executives, even the country club set, were the backbone of the first committees. Early success of the Fund in mobilizing support among experienced leadership may have been at the cost of not involving the poor (Murphy, 1970, p. 100). Officials felt that the traditional leadership had to take the lead due to default by the poor.

The North Carolina Fund, realizing the importance of federal monies, adopted as a major objective helping the poor to be effective, both in identifying their needs, and also in participating in the decision-making process of the entire community. Murphy (1970, p. 107) summarized the early stages of the development of the role the poor and blacks played in the poverty programs when she noted:

the issue quickly became not whether to include blacks on the boards, but how to include them. . . . [A]n unprecedented involvement of theretofore non-participants in positions of potential power and influence, and of immediate prestige. No longer were blacks asking to be served. . . . They were confronting
the established leadership with demands, and they were
backed by the law of the land and the administrative
guidelines of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

It did not take black leaders long to realize that
these programs represented an opportunity for them to open
up the political process at the local level. As this
researcher will show next, the strategy employed was
determined by the political environment in which they had to
operate.

An analysis of the CAPs in each city cannot take place
in a vacuum, but must be considered within the political
environment of each city. An example of how each poverty
program fits into the respective city's political process
provides a background for examining the uniqueness of each
city and the role that blacks play in the political process
in urban committees in North Carolina.

James Q. Wilson (1960) says that the structure and
style of black politics reflect the politics of the city as
a whole. Black politics can be viewed as a set of "learned
responses," which blacks acquire from the distinctive
political system of the city in which they live.

Negro politics [today black politics] cannot be
understood apart from the city in which it is
found. . . . The student must cast a wide net, inquiry
must begin with the city as a whole in order to
understand fully the actions and problems of the Negro
politician in that city. (p. 23)

It must be noted here that the point stressed above by
Wilson (although for his research purposes he addresses the
North) parallels the argument made by Hanes Walton that was presented in Chapter I. Walton argues that the South presented the opportunity to study on the local level each city's own brand of segregation. So as each city differs in structure and brand of segregation, we must expect the black community to have acquired distinctively different "learned responses," which shaped the form of black politics that emerged.

Charlotte, Greensboro, and Durham present for this study contrasts in city politics which show the difference between a unified black leadership and a leadership that is apparently fragmented.

Greensboro and Durham represent unified leadership, whereby Charlotte's leadership can be characterized as fragmented. Greensboro and Durham are influenced more by political organizations than Charlotte. Greensboro and Durham have nonpartisan, council manager forms of government with independently elected mayors. For the period studied in this investigation (1964-1980), at-large elections have prevailed. Charlotte on the other hand moved to a partisan mixed district and at-large system in 1977.

Nonpartisan at-large systems tend to depress black political development. The black candidate must appeal to the entire city (black and white) so he must be "reasonable" on racial questions (Banfield and Wilson, 1963). Recent
studies support the proposition that blacks do not fair well in reformed systems (Karnig and Welch, 1980; Heilig and Mundt, 1984). These two factors partially explain some of the differences that Charlotte exhibited from the other cities. So it is appropriate to start with an examination of Charlotte.

Charlotte is located in the southern piedmont section of the state and serves as the nucleus of the urban industrial region. Charlotte is equidistant between the Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean. Mecklenburg County is bordered on the south by South Carolina.

Charlotte is the largest city between Washington and Atlanta. Census estimates for 1985 place the city population at 336,893 and the county estimate at 426,154. The Census figures of 1980 for the city and county were 314,447 and 404,270, respectively. Between the period of 1970 and 1980 Charlotte's actual population increased from 241,178 to 314,447, an actual 73,269 increase in population.

Charlotte's role has been one of serving as the settlement area for rural Carolinians seeking a better life away from a declining agricultural existence. With its location being situated on the borders of North Carolina and South Carolina, Charlotte has become the recipient of both states' displaced workers. Charlotte prides itself with its
economic growth and progressive image, but the Charlotte that applied for funding of a local poverty agency in the 1960s was significantly different.

An August 1965 report prepared by the North Carolina Mental Health Planning Staff (NCMHPS) substantiated that the pattern of urban development in Charlotte was not so different from other parts of the Southeast and the nation, nor were the social and economic conditions which traditionally accompanied economic growth. The pattern that prevailed in Charlotte-Mecklenburg paralleled the pattern seen in many other urban centers. The disparities in social and economic indicators fall along racial lines. When one examines occupations for whites and non-whites in 1960, one finds that 12.2 percent of the white families have incomes under $3,000 versus 52.3 percent of the non-white families having incomes under $3,000 (p. 263). The per capita income for whites is $2,243 while for non-whites it is $806. In terms of educational attainment, 11.6 percent of the whites had only a sixth grade education, whereby 43.7 percent of the black population had only a sixth grade education (p. 263). The figure that drives the point of inequality home even more forcefully is that the rate in which white males are sentenced to do "hard labor" on the road was 145.8/10,000, and for non-white males this rate was 542.5/10,000.
Charlotte during the early and mid-sixties was a city that exhibited all of the ills associated with an urban area. It was very clear that blacks in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg area were a dependent people lacking sufficient economic and social resources.

**Factional Black Politics**

Blacks have been involved politically in Charlotte since the Reconstruction period. From 1868 until 1896, there was at least one black on the 12-member board of aldermen—that era's city council—every term but one. That black was usually a resident in the Second Ward, where two-thirds of the 2,000 residents were black ("Black Presence," 1981). The evidence from this period stresses the importance of the ward/district system to the enhancement of the electability of blacks, provided the social and political climates were favorably disposed to this happening. In Charlotte (like Greensboro and Durham) blacks were not totally barred from voting, but the limits on their political participation left them with only indirect influence in public affairs. When whites felt threatened, which happened in 1948, whites changed from a ward to an at-large system.

It was not until 1965 that a black was elected to the city council under the at-large system. That black, out of necessity, was a political moderate, Fred Alexander, who
enjoyed support in both the white and black communities. The official nonpartisan system remained in effect until 1975 when a partisan, mixed system was established in Charlotte. It is significant that this change was supported by unlikely political allies, blacks and working-class whites who both felt left out of the political process. Even though the municipal elections had a nonpartisan ballot, before 1975 the elections were partisan in their campaigns with the media (electronic and print) identifying the candidates on a partisan basis (Arrington, 1978, p. 253).

The existence of partisan campaigns in Charlotte had an impact on the factionalism that has been described in Charlotte among black spokespersons. In an apparent effort to be spokesperson for the black community and one that can deliver the black vote, various groups have battled for the external recognition bestowed by the leadership in the two major political parties. Recognition by the white city fathers enhances political legitimacy.

The black leadership in Charlotte has been hurt by internal dissension. During the 1960s, leadership could be divided into two camps. One camp was that of the Alexander brothers, Fred and Kelly, and the other, Dr. Reginald Hawkins. Dr. Hawkins, a local prominent dentist, was a very vocal and uncompromising advocate for civil rights. The
Alexander brothers, prominent due to their family funeral business, were much more accommodating in their approach to dealing with the question of "white supremacy" (i.e., Holden, 1973).

Kelly Alexander was the head of the local NAACP chapter and later became prominent at the state and national level. Fred was active in local and state democratic politics. The Alexander brothers were viewed as taking more of a "go slow approach" and stressing the need to form coalitions with whites.

Dr. Hawkins has maintained his vocal denunciation of the "racist" white power structure in Charlotte, who in his assessment, "never did anything that they weren't forced to do" (Watters, 1964, p. 18).

These factions in the early 1960s are important because part of the disunity prevalent in the community during the 1970s and into the 1980s was the basis for new organizations coming into existence, hoping to fill what they saw as a void in black leadership. When a strong organization does not exist, it allows for the formation of splinter groups and thus a loss in the effectiveness of the black vote. Fred Alexander expressed dispair with the "multiplicity" of black organizations (Watters, 1964). Even during the period of this research, the existence of a multiplicity of
organizations was still prevalent. A veteran political observer of the black political organizations observed:

We have organizations, but we ain't organized. We got the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Black Political Caucus, the Black Elected Officials at the Tuesday Morning Breakfast Club, the Black Women's Caucus, the Forum, and we got Focus, and we go on and on. . . . Most of the organizations I mentioned splintered out from the caucus. It's sometime recycled NAACP leadership, recycled Caucus leadership, and sometime recycled SCLC leadership. So it's the same folks over and over again. (Davis, 1987)

In Charlotte for the past twenty-five years the black leadership has been dominated by a social elite, namely lawyers, academicians, ministers, and undertakers. The pattern has been one of securing the backing of the right organization, and if not satisfied with the leadership then forming your own organization. This type of leadership is "ripe" for a divide and conquer assault from the majority community. This division explains the inability of the black community to capitalize upon the new resources provided by poverty programs when they were formed in Charlotte. How these programs came to Charlotte is a matter that is now addressed.

The Charlotte Area Fund

The Charlotte Area Fund (CAF) served the city of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County. Hoffman (1968) points out that during the formulation of CAF there was local concern for race relations in Charlotte. Hoffman notes that the
proposal, for the establishment of CAF, called attention to the smooth integration of restaurants, but further stated that:

While a practical astute achievement such as this delights us, the disparity of opportunity is still very great with half of our Negro families falling below the poverty lines. . . . We are restless about the fact that traditional methods do not offer adequate solutions. (p. 138)

In an effort to uphold the progressive image of the city, the economic and political leaders sought to use new techniques to approach poverty problems. "Traditional methods" over the years were shown to be inadequate, but NCF provided the new avenue needed to deal with the problem of poverty.

The Charlotte plan sought to include city officials and members of the city's power structure in order to give the program as much total support as possible. On April 13, Stanford Brookshire, the city's Mayor, spoke in Raleigh as a participant in a conference on poverty. His speech, "Attacking Poverty Through Hereditary and Environmental Controls," made it very clear that he considered the challenge of breaking the cycle of poverty second only to that of meeting the demands of disadvantaged minority groups for equal rights and opportunities, and he emphasized that the two challenges could not be separated (N. C. Fund, 1968, pp. 20-21).
Another indication of the city's support for CAF was Pete McKnight inviting Paul Ylvisaker of the Ford Foundation to speak at the annual United Fund dinner. It was felt by city leaders that this would give Charlotte a better chance of being chosen as an NCF participant, and they were correct.

On August 29, 1963 the Charlotte Area Fund was incorporated. The incorporators included the Mayor, the Chairman of the County Commissioners, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, the Chairman of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, and the Chairman of the Social Planning Council. It was evident from the above list that the leadership for this program would come from the "reputational leaders" in the city. They in turn were to appoint eight to ten members of both races to make up the board of directors.

The incorporators included in their plan a program that took a narrow educational stand. Between August and February 1, 1964 when the plan was presented to the NCF, the Fund encouraged CAF to broaden its emphasis and ensure that more indigenous members of the community would serve on the board. This meant more poor and black members would have to be included. The proposal also expanded to include a section on crime prevention, an idea initially advanced by a
small black organization, the Eastside Council, which hoped to provide job placement services for blacks.

In February of 1964 an on-site visit by NCF officials and staff was held and an evaluation of the content and methods used in the poverty fighting effort was discussed. During this time vocal dissent surfaced when a black leader, Dr. Reginald Hawkins, lambasted the CAF for not including black leadership in the planning of CAF. This incident was important because it brought to the surface the division in the black community and also showed the paternalistic approach that whites in Charlotte and the state adopted towards the poverty programs.

On April 20, 1964 it was announced by Terry Sanford that Mecklenburg County had been chosen as one of seven projects initially selected by the NCF to fight poverty in the state. CAF received its initial administrative grant in July 1964. From that point until December 1964, CAF did not even cash the check received from the Fund. The President of CAF, William Mullis, defended this saying they did not have an office nor a payroll so they had no need to cash the check. William Darity of the Fund called it "lethargy." This charge from the Fund prompted members of the board to go to Washington, D.C. and consult with the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to learn what was necessary to qualify for federal funds. Upon their return the emphasis
of the project had changed from experimental programs to large packaged programs from Washington. The first year the program components consisted of office administration, neighborhood centers, a health program, a pre-school nursery program, and a remedial reading program. This project reflected the influence of NCF and the Ford Foundation (Hoffman, 1968, p. 142).

The first director of the CAF was Dr. Leslie Bobbitt, Assistant Superintendent of Schools. He held this position temporarily from February to June 1965. During that time he wrote proposals to be submitted to Washington and established relationships with OEO.

June 15, 1965 marked the coming aboard of John Zuidema as the permanent project director. This also marked the start of CAF as an active organization with programs aimed at helping the poor. With CAF qualifying for "90-10" funds, it now had to adhere to OEO guidelines calling for more representation of the poor.

Zuidema brought to the CAF movement a style that included delegating components to different subcontractors, both public and private. By doing this it was felt that this would free the CAF staff and organization to deal directly with the poor through the operation of neighborhood centers and the encouragement of community organization. Zuidema believed in allowing the poor to prepare to help
themselves. He believed that his agency should show the poor how to put pressure on local government while at the same time "keeping them under control." He knew that if his project was to succeed it had to still maintain the recognition and acceptance of the city's influential groups and individuals.

Model Cities

Charlotte was one of a select number of cities in North Carolina to have both an NCF project and a Model Cities Program (MCP). With a grant provided by NCF, Charlotte gathered data necessary for a proposal that was submitted in April of 1967. The CAF, through staff and financial assistance, was instrumental in preparing the proposal. In November of 1967 the proposal received approval.

The CAF had fought hard to remain independent of the city's control and supported the residents of the targeted Model Cities neighborhoods who wished to have representation on the policy-making executive board. Initially, the board consisted of two members from the city council, county commissioners, and the board of education. Later, they decided to include two members from the target neighborhoods and one from the business community. This board was to advise and direct the Executive Director of the program while representatives from the eighteen separate neighborhood organizations (the Charlotte Model Neighborhood
Council) would only advise the Charlotte Model Neighborhood agency. It was clear that the MCP was in the hands of the governing officials with the poor "on the outside, looking in."

The organizations within the CAF's domain opposed this plan and demanded a nine-man Executive Board with six representatives of the poor to match the city and county officials. Both sides held firm and could not reach a compromise. Gus Campbell, a county commissioner and a board member, blamed the CAF for trying to have too much influence in the board's policies. On the other hand, Micki Riddick, the Director of Community Development, defended the CAF, saying they were only fulfilling their purpose for existing, that purpose being to develop indigenous leadership in the targeted areas. The CAF took a stand with representatives of the Model Neighborhood communities and helped to negotiate a compromise. The compromise was a board that would have fifteen members, six representing the poor, six from the city and county, and three from the business community. The representatives of the poor entered into this agreement thinking that labor would be represented in one of the three remaining positions. The board decided against this move, but because of an impending deadline, the representatives acquiesced.
This crisis over the leadership role in the MCP provided an opportunity for the poor to force the city officials to deal with them as a power in the city of Charlotte. Even more significant was the fact that with a program that was clearly intended to provide more direction from city officials, poor residents had learned how to exert pressure on city officials (Hoffman, 1968, pp. 265-272).

Although early in the program Model Cities was seen as potentially controversial, and that threat passed quickly. In 1968 the mayor made it perfectly clear that the MCP was under the direction of local government. Later its director, Paul Jones, was dismissed by the city manager. The program never proved to be a threat to the status quo and was eventually phased out.

The CAF suffered a similar but somewhat different fate. The CAF was an organization that was controlled by local black and white elites who kept it on a relatively short leash. This was accomplished by the involvement of governmental and middle class blacks who saw local control as beneficial to the health of the program. The CAF has been described as a program that was more reflective of the wishes of the board and director than the wishes of the people it was set up to serve (Fund, 1968). Area Fund Board members viewed the CAF as a tool to help ensure continued economic growth with the development of its human resources.
Also the CAF would have the responsibility of solving difficult racial problems in the city. This required that the board and the governing coalition permit enough flexibility to the CAA to bring about changes necessary for Charlotte's continued growth. To illustrate this, Hoffman (1968) gives the following example:

The board supported the CAA staff in its effort to involve the poor . . . provide citizenship education, and to train indigenous leadership, so long as its plans were negotiated through existing channels. That is, board members, would not tolerate the CAA staff organizing the poor into power blocs directed at changing the existing structures through such tactics as demonstrations and rent strikes. [italics added] (p. 145)

The consensus strategy best defines the approach used by the CAF in the formative years. The strategy is reflective of the consensus approach to politics and decision making in Charlotte. Just as long as change came about in incremental steps, the board was not antagonized.

The CAF and its board were very much aware of the political environment in which they existed. Charles Lowe, a leading Mecklenburg Democrat and liberal, was chairman of the board and the go-between for CAF's board and the influentials in the business community. He was able to convince power structure types that the new programs were beneficial to the economic well-being of the progressive "New South Charlotte." But 1967 was a pivotal year for the CAF. The Green Amendment, which allowed cities to take over
CAAs, shifted the federal urgency for "maximum feasible participation" to local discretion. With the enhancement of the local role in decision-making, the outcome of the 1966 county commissioners' race was even more significant to the future direction of CAF. In that November 1966 election Republicans won four of the five commissioner seats. Many observers saw this as a portent of the days ahead for the organization. Mecklenburg County has a history of strong Republican support (Bass and DeVries, 1977, pp. 234-39). The new commissioners were fiscal conservatives and questioned the return on taxpayers' money for a program aimed more at the black poor than the entire poverty community in Charlotte. They did not intend to see the CAF expand the political activism that was being reported in Charlotte and throughout urban America.

The CAF was never allowed the freedom to confront racial issues in Charlotte. In fact when the CAF was forced to reorganize (or forego local funding), it was under the direction of a good bureaucrat that happened to be black. In 1968 John Zuidema was replaced by the one-time deputy director of the program, Robert Person, Jr. Person remained in that position until 1973. He later went to the Department of Manpower and Training where he retired (1987). Person in effect changed the CAF to an acceptable form for
local officials so that it conformed with the model of consensus politics.

In 1971 CAF received its funding from the Community Services Administration, and in 1982 it shifted to Community Services Block Grants. All of this meant that the agency's advocacy role was phased out and the delivery of services enhanced.

After 1968 reorganization began to compete with local agencies for funds to deliver services to the poor. From that period forward it has been a case where leadership has played within the boundaries of acceptable behavior. With CAF being taken over by the city and county governments, the poverty officials were mere civil servants. They may have thought of themselves as changing the system from within, but ultimately they were absorbed by the local bureaucracy. We now turn to Greensboro where political circumstances produced a different response to the poverty programs.

Greensboro

The Guilford County Economic Opportunity Council was the anti-poverty program that serviced Guilford County. Guilford County in 1960 had a population of 246,520. Guilford has two major urban areas located within its borders, Greensboro and High Point. Greensboro at that time was the second largest city in the state, and as the county
seat, served as the heart of the urban Piedmont section of North Carolina.

Greensboro is a city that has grown due to the natural attraction of more job opportunities for blacks and whites in industries such as textiles, clothing manufacturing, tobacco processing, and cigarette manufacturing. An enticement for young whites and blacks seeking middle class jobs has been academics. Greensboro is the home of five colleges and universities. The schools of higher learning are Guilford College (a Quaker school), Greensboro College (liberal arts), Bennett College (black, all girls liberal arts school), University of North Carolina-Greensboro (state supported), and North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University (black, state supported). All of these schools have provided jobs, leadership and natural population growth for the large numbers of individuals who come to the city as students and after graduation choose to remain in the city and become part of the community.

During the early 1960s when poverty had political relevance, the economic conditions in the cities were important justifications for the existence of the city's poverty program. The disparities in Greensboro during the 1960s were as prevalent as those found in the other cities. According to the NCMHPS (1965) 15 percent of the white families have incomes less than $3,000, whereby 47.5 percent
of the non-white families have incomes less than $3,000. The per capita income of whites was $2,024 and only $891 for non-whites. In terms of education 19.2 percent of whites had less than a sixth grade education, and 38 percent of the non-whites had less than a sixth grade education. Finally, the criminal justice system, that clearly expresses itself in racial and class disparities, showed the familiar pattern of white males being sentenced to the roads at a rate of 81.1 per 10,000 people and non-white males at the rate of 242.5 per 10,000 people, nearly three times greater.

Although blacks comprised 26 percent of the population, they occupied only 14 percent of the city's space. Due to racial segregation, blacks from all economic classes resided in the southeast quadrant of Greensboro. In 1966, 1,437 new family units were constructed in Greensboro, but only seventy-seven were built in the black neighborhoods. The black area contained the largest share of substandard housing (Chafe, 1980, p. 224).

The patterns of unequal justice and economic opportunities in Greensboro and surrounding Guilford County are the patterns of the black community as a whole. Greensboro blacks, like blacks in all southern cities, are dependent upon a white economic system that has operated two separate and unequal systems. It is this type of dependency that has produced the following political responses from the
black community as it sought to cope with a politically oppressive system.

Organizational Black Politics - Greensboro

Black politics in Greensboro is a style of politics that reflects the influence of a strong political organization. This organization, the Greensboro Citizens Association (GCA), has been able to hold the middle class leadership together so that blacks could use the bloc vote more effectively. But this has not always been true. In fact in 1960 and earlier, white politicians made their trek to black sports events, or civic gatherings in southeast Greensboro, to slip a few dollars and a few fifths to one of the so-called ward-heelers who could reportedly deliver the black vote. The black vote was at that time small and could not make or break a candidate ("Blacks Develop," 1979).

The civil rights movement changed this type of vote selling in Greensboro. The sit-in movement, which unleashed the student movement in the South and throughout the nation, changed Greensboro's political consciousness. The black community united with grassroot blacks and prominent blacks realizing that the only way it could obtain concessions from the "city fathers" was to take to the streets. Students from A & T in 1960 and 1963 served as the vanguard in Greensboro's civil rights movement. Marches and demonstrations, lead by students and supported by the
community, placed white leaders in the city on the
defensive. Like most cities in North Carolina, Greensboro
did not want to lose its reputation as a progressive city.
Business leaders and politicians agreed to desegregate some
public facilities, but only after being pushed to do so.

This activism had spillover effects in the political
arena. One important reflection is the change in the size
of the black vote. The number of registered black voters
more than tripled from the mid fifties to November 1978.
That number increased from 4,887 to 16,330 respectively.
The increase constituted 22 percent of the total city vote,
one and one half times the growth rate of the white voting

The increase in the number of registered voters can be
attributed to the Greensboro Citizens Association. The GCA
was formed in 1949, "by an alliance of older, well respected
black leaders to eliminate those political parasites . . .
who were selling the vote" (Chafe, 1980, p. 35).

The traditional leadership, which was reform oriented,
had been frustrated continually in its attempt to get blacks
into elected and appointed positions. It was not until 1951
that Dr. William Hampton, president of the GCA, was elected
to the city council and served from 1951 to 1955. And from
1960 to 1963, Waldo Falkner, a black bondsman, served on the
council, but maintained a low profile (Chafe, 1980, p. 231).
Politically blacks in Greensboro did not see a true change until 1969 when Jimmy Barber, an A & T instructor, was elected to the council and served simultaneously with Vance Chavis, a retired principal. Chavis was appointed to the council to fill a vacancy caused by the death of William Folk, Jr. With two blacks on the council in 1969 and then again in 1971 when both Barber and Chavis won seats, moderate blacks in Greensboro felt that incremental change was working. This feeling was supported by the fact that in 1968 Henry Frye, a local attorney, was elected to the State House. Frye was the first black in the state to serve in the state legislature in this century. Later that year another lawyer, Elreta Alexander, was elected to a district court judgeship. All of the breakthroughs were seen as a result of bloc voting on the part of blacks to elect members of their race. Blacks attached special significance to this because they were operating under the burden of an at-large election system. Because of the electoral system the blacks that were elected had to also appeal to the white community. This in essence produced a moderate type of black politician that preferred not to aggressively pursue racial issues. All of the successful politicians were dependent upon the GCA. This organization was dormant until the early 1960s when Dr. George Simkins, a local prominent dentist and president of the local NAACP, revived the organization. Its
endorsements during the 1960s and 1970s for blacks and whites made it a virtual impossibility for a black leader to emerge politically without the support of the GCA. This has brought about charges from the media and the public that George Simkins is a "kingmaker" in Greensboro, something that Simkins denies. When asked how endorsements are determined a member of the organization responded:

We let them tell us about themselves and we ask certain questions . . . what they plan to do for the black community and housing, transportation, recreation, employment, these types of things. Then we check out their background, what kind of background they have in race relations and then decide who is the best. Sometimes you don't have much to choose from.

He went on to point out that they do not vote for a candidate merely because he/she is black; the candidate must be independent of white influence. Concerning a black that was aligned with a conservative political group that was against a proposed district system, he said:

We knew that the whites were trying to use him to just put him on as a token, and we just didn't fall for that. He allowed himself to be used by them and we just couldn't go along with it.

The informant best summarized the GCA's position on endorsing blacks when he pointed to the fact that in a district election the candidate they endorsed had a history of working with their organization. Their endorsement in the general election was the decisive factor in this candidate's ability to come from behind to win in the
general election. He explains the organization's posture in the following manner:

We didn't want X because the power structure was pumping a lot of money into his campaign. They wanted X in there. Well anytime the whites start pumping a lot of money into your campaign that makes us very suspicious. I get nervous. This ain't the right man we want . . . with our help Y beat X in the general election. Y has done an outstanding job, he's representing the people, bringing up the issues, and he relates to us and comes back and gives us reports of what's going on and we are very happy with him. [italics added]

Although this incident applies to an election after Greensboro adopted a 5-3-1 mixed ward/at-large system in 1983, it does show very clearly the determined use of the black vote in Greensboro. By using the bloc vote intelligently, the black community has been a true force to be dealt with in Greensboro.

The GCA along with others, like ministers, educational leaders, and lawyers, form the core of Greensboro's traditional black leadership. Successful political leaders have had to be acceptable to this segment of the black community to use their visibility to get concessions from the white power structure in Greensboro. It is under these conditions that the poverty programs entered Greensboro and Guilford County. Just how and why that happened is explained next.
Guilford County Economic Opportunity Council

The black community's arousal during the 1960s placed pressure on the white political and economic elite to make adjustments in the allocation of resources. Feeling that something had to be done with local racial unrest eating at the city's facade, the Chamber of Commerce, United Fund, and the Jaycees encouraged the city to apply for poverty funds as early as 1963.

In November of 1963 the Greensboro Community Council decided to explore all avenues to attack on a countywide basis poverty in the area. In January of 1964 the Council submitted a $348,000 request for a project involving 11 local agencies to the North Carolina Fund. The request was not approved and no explanation was given (Davis, 1965).

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was signed into law by the President in the spring of 1964. That fall the Guilford County commissioners appointed a local evaluation committee headed by Dr. John Benson of High Point. The committee started meeting in November to hear requests from local agencies for special projects. The requests equaled $873,318. In April of 1965 the committee recommended to the county commissioners that a new agency be organized to coordinate and implement the county's anti-poverty program. The commissioners in May of 1965 created the Economic Opportunity Council. This council would have representation.
from the Chamber of Commerce, United Fund, Community Council, Jaycees, one county commissioner, and five members at large. Later that month the board was expanded to 23 members to include two representatives of low-income groups and four representatives of minority groups. Guilford's Economic Opportunity Council (EOC) got its start in January of 1966 with a $44,829 planning grant from OEO ("Money Provided", 1966).

Guilford County was slow in moving to a poverty program due in large measure to the commissioners' reluctance to commit to entering into an alliance with the federal government. An incentive for them agreeing was the fact that it was a 90-10 funding arrangement with the 10 percent being provided by the county in goods and services. But even with that, one commissioner is reported as saying: "In the second year of this program when it gets to a 50-50 matching basis, . . . we might wish to take another look at this program" ("Money Provided", 1966).

EOC's board chose as its first executive director, Paul M. Gezon. Van S. Allen, a black, was named deputy director. EOC opened its headquarters in the heart of the black community in Greensboro. In fact it was located in the same building that housed the office of Dr. George Simkins, a local prominent dentist, and head of the city's NAACP and GCA. This gave the impression that the EOC was a black
program. Gezon later admitted that maybe the location was not the wisest, because it impeded their efforts to involve poor whites in the program. That fact coupled with what Gezon called an active Ku Klux Klan organization in the county, stymied the participation of low income whites in the program. The EOC served Greensboro, High Point and rural Guilford County.

There was no doubt during EOC's tenure that private and public concerns controlled this agency. Even though minorities were provided one third representation, they were able to flex their muscles when Gezon resigned in 1969, and the board in fact hired a replacement, Donald Leahy, who was also white. The blacks on the board violently dissented and forced the board to back away from its choice, thus causing Leahy to resign after only three days in office. Dr. George Simkins, a member of the board, proudly proclaimed that the council president, Walter E. Gray, and Donald Leahy had backed down because of "black power." In a compromise the board, in August 1969, selected Charles E. Davis as a director of EOC. Davis was black and a resident of Greensboro who had worked with groups in the city for desegregation.

Although the new director was viewed as a victory by the black members of the board, unfriendly white board members and county commissioners did not approve of an
activist CAP. Due to this view the program was allowed to end its operation in 1973. Greensboro, with its two black members on the council, took a "hands-off" position on extending funding for the agency.

EOC could not adequately respond to criticism and pressures placed on it by the media, its board and the county commissioners. The political process in Greensboro would not allow the CAP to be used as a resource by the black community during a period when it was going through a political transformation. The black community would have to look elsewhere for the mobilization of the grassroots. Exactly how they were able to do this will be shown in later chapters.

Durham

The third and final city in this study is Durham, North Carolina. Durham is the county seat of Durham County and is located in the central Piedmont area. It is located approximately 12 miles from Chapel Hill and about 23 miles from Raleigh, the state capital. Located several miles southeast of Durham is the Research Triangle Park, an area that has attracted high tech corporations from around the world.

According to the 1960 census, Durham County was the eighth most populous county in the state and fifteenth in population density at 111,995. The city of Durham comprised
78,302 or 70 percent of the county total. Of the total county population 32 percent were non-white; of the city of Durham 36 percent were non-white. As a SMSA 76 percent of the population was classified urban, 21 percent as rural non-farm, and 4 percent as rural farm.

Durham's economy in 1960 (and to a large degree even today) was tied very heavily to health, education and the tobacco industries. In 1960 approximately half of the industrial employees were engaged in the manufacture of tobacco products. Education's influence on the economy was seen primarily through Duke University which had the largest payroll in the county. North Carolina Central University, a predominantly black institution, has always enhanced the overall economy of Durham as well as the economy of the black community.

According to the NCMHPS (1965) report in 1960, 45.9 percent of the white workers were in white collar jobs in comparison with only 12.4 percent for non-whites. Fifty-one and one-half percent (51.5%) of the white workers were in blue collar jobs, while 82.2 percent of the non-white workers were so employed.

In 1960 in Durham County 14.9 percent of the white families had income under $3,000, while 52.9 percent of the non-white families had incomes below $3,000; the per capita income for whites was $1,986 and $849 for non-whites; in
terms of education 20.4 percent of the whites had completed six grades or less, whereas for non-whites 45 percent had completed six grades or less of education. Finally the less educated, the poor, and non-whites dominate the criminal justice system. In Durham, white males were sentenced to work "hard labor" on the roads at a rate of 77.2 per 10,000 people. For non-whites the sentences were 251.6 per 10,000 people (NCMHPS, 1965, pp. 597-620). The pattern of economic dependency runs constant for all three cities. But there is also an important difference found in Durham that has impacted on the politics of the black community. The major difference is a substantial middle class.

Organizational Black Politics - Durham

Political influence in Durham traditionally has been found among those well-heeled in the areas of education and business. The leadership from NCCU and Durham's unique middle class have joined together to provide direction for the black community.

Durham is the home of North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company, the largest black-owned insurance company in the world. Durham blacks also own and operate The Mechanics and Farmers Bank, a newspaper, and the Mutual Savings and Loan Association. Durham, undoubtedly, ahead of its times in terms of black economic development in the sixties, is still today regarded by many (living in Durham) as the "Black
Mecca of the Southeast." And in order to build and protect their economic base, wealthy blacks formed a political organization that has been admired and studied (Keech, 1968; Eamon, 1982) by students of politics.

Organized political activity by blacks in Durham goes back to the 1930s. Durham, like Greensboro and Charlotte, is a city where blacks were not systematically denied the right to register and vote. Perhaps this was in part due to their not being perceived as a numerical threat. This is quite different from black belt counties in the South. Black "ward-heelers" in Durham controlled the black vote in Durham and in exchange for cash would deliver that bloc vote to the highest bidder. "Disgust at this sort of activity was one of the stimuli for the establishment of the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs (DC) in 1935" (Keech, 1968, p. 26). Durham's substantial black middle and upper class founded the DC and with its independent economic base was able to affect participation by other blacks in their organizations and the community.

C. C. Spaulding of North Carolina Mutual, and others of his economic class, were believers in blacks achieving and "bettering" themselves. They were also acutely aware of the need to have the ear of the white politicians, in order for a favorable economic environment to continue. Throughout the Durham Committee's history, key individuals from among
the social elite have cast long shadows in Durham's black politics. A black who was active in politics and a member of the DC during its early formation points out that economic independence of blacks in Durham enabled them to encourage political activity that otherwise would not have existed. He stated:

Now when North Carolina Mutual hired as many as a hundred people and the bank [Mechanics and Farmers] had its share, those were people under supervision and leadership of black people from the start. Now that's different from so many other places, where every black person gets a job from a white person. And any time that white person passes out your check he is going to influence how you're going to think, and act, whether you think that way or not. . . . But these people were leaders in the black community, and they cast their influence among the people. I don't want to use the word control but that's what it was. So they could get up in a meeting and say, 'Now I want every one of you to go to the polls and vote.' And no white person would do that, at least not in those days. . . . See that created a climate of progress.

Expanding on the personal clout of individuals in the organization, he related:

Now it used to be a time when I went to the meetings, I expected to see Mr. C. C. Spaulding there, and he was there. And when he was there the heads of his departments were there. And Dr. Shepard [president of North Carolina College] didn't come often, but on crucial times, special times, he would come. Other influential men of the community would come, and the people under them would come.

The type of allegiance commanded by the Durham Committee enabled the black community to unify around a common purpose. By the mid 1950s Durham had elected its first black using "single-shot" voting, and by the end of
the seventies, five of the twelve council seats were occupied by blacks. During the 1970s most politicians knew that 20 to 40 percent of the total city vote would possibly reflect the endorsement of the DC (Eamon, 1982).

Like the GCA, the Durham Committee allows prospective candidates to appear before them to appeal for their support. After the interviews an endorsement slate is passed out at the polls of the candidates deemed by the Committee to serve the interests of the community best.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the leader of the DC was John Wheeler. Wheeler was president of black-owned and operated Mechanics and Farmers Bank. He was the key figure in directing black leadership and its development in Durham. John Wheeler long held the position of de facto leader as well as chairman of the DC. Even after his death in 1978, his legacy played a role in Durham politics (Eamon, 1982, p. 61). As one respondent commented:

Wheeler was Mr. Black Politics in Durham. He had the contacts with the whites. He determined if a street was going to be paved and if it was, where the paving started and definitely where it stopped.

John Wheeler was heralded as a man with tremendous political skills, who commanded the respect of even the most militant elements of the black community. That point is attested to when one observes the comments of a militant voice of the 1960s and 1970s, who at times challenged the
traditional leadership during that period. Concerning Wheeler, he said the following:

He was not a screaming, hollering, demanding kind of person. His control came from the staff. We gave him control because we respected him. We always called "Shag" Stewart, "Shag," we called "Babe" Henderson, "Babe." We called a lot of guys by their crazy names, but we always called Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Wheeler!

So it was this type of middle class dominance that the poverty programs had to rely on in order to mobilize the poor.

Operation Breakthrough

The origin of Operation Breakthrough (OBT) illustrates the influence of John H. Wheeler, who was one of the four incorporators of the North Carolina Fund. Wheeler, during the summer of 1963, approached Robert Foust, the Executive Director of the Durham Community Planning Council (DCPC), about the Fund and asked who might be the appropriate agency to prepare an application to the Fund for a local poverty agency. Foust in turn met with the Redevelopment Commission and then his own council. Instead of the DCPC preparing a proposal, the council recommended that an ad hoc committee be appointed by a group of four: the Mayor, County Manager, Chamber of Commerce President, and Foust (NCF, 1968c, p. 5).

It should be stated that these leaders in Durham had motivations other than alleviating poverty when they moved to bring this program to Durham, for 1963 was the year of
the uprisings in Durham. There had been sit-ins, demonstrations, and boycotts that brought many of the racial, social, and economic harsh disparities of the Jim Crow South to the attention of the nation and the world. This type of civil rights action was sweeping the entire South at this time. Durham, in its effort to deal with local tensions, sought the poverty programs as an effort to put something in place.

On November 17, 1963 it was announced that a committee of 43 persons would write a proposal for an anti-poverty program in Durham. The official name of the group would be Action for Durham Development (ADD) and the vice-chairman would be J. A. McLean, Vice-President of Central Carolina Bank and Trust Company. ADD submitted a proposal to the North Carolina Fund for a project called Operation Breakthrough (OBT). As in the case of the Charlotte Area Fund, on April 20, 1964, Governor Sanford, who was also chairman of the Fund's board of directors, announced Durham as one of the original seven projects to be funded.

Initially, OBT had as its major emphasis the educational component. It was the responsibility of Dr. Everett A. Hopkins, Vice-President for Planning and Institutional Studies at Duke University and a key figure in the writing of the proposal, to make OBT a reality. In
August of that year OBT became incorporated and a Board of Directors appointed.

On the national scene, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) was passed by Congress which allowed even greater possibilities for funding and attacking local poverty. So in a very short period of time OBT became a CAA.

On December 28, 1964 OEO approved OBT's grant. Operation Breakthrough then became an official CAA after staffing had been completed. It was at this point that OBT started to assume the form for which it became famous, that being one of the most grassroots oriented CAAs in the country. James Cunningham (1967) in a report prepared for the Ford Foundation states:

> It was in Durham that [we] found one of the most significant experiments in resident participation sparked by the anti-poverty program. . . . This was community action in Durham: tough, massive, and black. (p. 157)

The question has to be asked, how could a program that was white, middle-class government, and elitist in 1964, be so appraised in 1967? A very large part of that can be explained by one name, Howard Fuller. Murphy (1968) writes:

> In retrospect it is clear that the turning point for participation by the poor in Operation Breakthrough came with the hiring of Howard Fuller. With a Master of Social Work from Western Reserve University, he had come from the staff of the Chicago Urban League to become Coordinator for Target Area A. (OBT had three target areas, all in the black community.) He arrived just in time to set up the summer program, using Community Action Technicians trained by the North Carolina Fund, North Carolina Volunteers and other paid...
workers, to start a community development program.
(p. 179)

With Fuller's arrival in May of 1965, OBT was able to recruit and train indigenous personnel who were hired as the core of his staff to work in the targeted areas. Because of his educational background (with a concentration in community organization), charisma and powerful oratory, Fuller was tailor made for the role to be played in Durham during this racial consciousness period in this country.

OBT, under the leadership of Fuller, organized the poor to the point that they exercised their political clout at the polls, harassed local officials, and built organizations that were geared to the needs of the poor in Durham. The most noticeable one was United Organizations for Community Improvement (UOCI). This organization grew out of OBT in an effort to gain independence from federal control. UOCI took on the armor of Black Power in Durham and changed the relationship between blacks and whites in this city.

Involving the poor was a massive success in Durham. An NCF (1968c) report stated:

It is a long way from the fall of 1963 when . . . the professional and business elite of Durham built around the thesis that 'Operation Breakthrough' would coordinate close to 1,000 volunteers from the existing agencies with a staff of 32. Instead, Breakthrough has organized volunteers from the poor themselves with the thesis that self-help and not service is the first step to eliminate poverty. (p. 19)
Operation Breakthrough encountered many obstacles as it broke new grounds for "maximum feasible participation," but one thing that remained constant was the unity shown in the black community's leadership. OBT and UOCI took the leadership role in moving against injustices in Durham. The old guard surprisingly was very supportive of this new and militant group of leaders. OBT suffered from funding cuts just like other CAAs nationally after 1968. But the leadership developed in OBT was able to move on to other programs that were made possible by North Carolina Fund resources. Unfortunately NCF closed its doors in the fall of 1968 after having a statewide impact on poverty politics. The poverty programs in Durham survived into the early seventies. The programs challenged the city administrators and even antagonized congressmen, which was a taboo that they would not be allowed to forget. OBT is still in existence today as an appendage of the city government and exists only as a service agency. OBT like all CAAs had to abandon political activities in order to receive the funds it needs to survive.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the emergence of the antipoverty programs in Charlotte, Durham and Greensboro. These programs were the extensions of the national War on Poverty. Just as the national program was a response to national
forces, so were the poverty programs in North Carolina a response to state and local, political and economic conditions.

The national civil rights movement awakened a political consciousness among blacks that enabled them to pressure a Democratic administration and Congress to attach a high priority to political and economic poverty in the black community. In the state of North Carolina a governor that was deemed a "moderate segregationist" (Black, 1976) responded to a civil rights movement led by college students that eliminated de jure segregation. Governor Terry Sanford knew that a program that would respond to the needs of the black poor in North Carolina stood no chance of emerging from the conservative/racist political process, so he opted for a solution from the private sector. The Ford Foundation was instrumental because the private sector could move into politically sensitive areas while the public sector had to proceed with caution (Allen, 1969). The North Carolina Fund developed from this venture and set the agenda for how North Carolina would address the poverty issue. How each city responded to its respective poverty program was determined by the political environment that existed in these localities.

All three cities had similarities and differences which influenced the ability of the poverty programs to mobilize
the black community. All three cities had an economically dependent black community, with only Durham differing in that it had a strong black middle class whose wealth did not "trickle down" to the masses in Durham. Additionally, in each city blacks operated as a minority under the debilitating effects of nonpartisan at-large election systems. Charlotte changed to a mixed district/at-large partisan system in the late 1970s. Finally all three cities operated under the guise of being "progressive, New South" cities. This factor figured into the city fathers accepting the programs to help to address a century of economic neglect that was symbolic of the South. Their aim was to alleviate economic poverty, not political poverty.

The major differences in the cities surrounded the impact of the civil rights movement, the unity of the black leadership, and charismatic leaders. The civil rights movement was never as confrontational in Charlotte as those witnessed in Greensboro or Durham. In fact the ease with which Charlotte leaders acquiesced did not allow the movement to expose the white power structure as a racist institution standing in the way of blacks eliminating de jure segregation. For this reason the unifying political consciousness that was needed to mount a continuing struggle to address the problems of economic and political oppression never materialized. This was not the case in Greensboro and
Durham. In both cities the student movements backed by the overall black community placed pressure on the white political and business leaders to change the organized discrimination in these cities. Locally political organizations were re-energized by these movements which had spillover effects in the political arena. The stubbornness of the white power structure united the black community to the point that it realized all black cities were in the same boat. It was from this perception that Greensboro and Durham were able to maintain unity among their black middle class leadership through strong political organizations. So pervasive was the tie between the civil rights movement and the political arena that respondents in Durham viewed the Durham Committee as a civil rights organization as well as a political organization.

The poverty programs in each city represented a new resource available to the black community to pressure local governments. In Charlotte the political fragmentation carried over into the politics of poverty. The CAF was used by each faction to further its own position as a leadership force in the black community. This weakened the ability of the CAA to move beyond a service orientation. The local government absorbed the program and capitalized upon a fragmented leadership.
Greensboro had a unified leadership, but it was not powerful enough to use the EOC as a vehicle to bring about political change. When a move was made to gain control of the program, its funding was cut off. The civil rights movement was active, but it brought into the picture black power advocates that pressured the traditional leadership to be more aggressive. The pressure that was placed on the system came from outside resources provided by the North Carolina Fund.

Durham was unified and had the support of the middle class as well as the masses. The DC's leadership was instrumental in bringing the CAA to Durham and supported the organization's political activist role. The DC in fact provided protection from hostile white forces for community organizers. The NCF was pivotal to Durham's success because there was a degree of independence from federal control that allowed organizing activity to continue. But in the end all three cities suffered the same fate, the lack of an independent funding source that was not sensitive to political pressure.

Finally, the CAA in Durham was much more effective than any of the other CAAs in the state because of Howard Fuller, a trained organizer and a black power advocate. Fuller helped to develop indigenous leadership in Durham and impacted on programs throughout the state. Most
significantly he forced the middle class dominated Durham Committee to broaden its base to include the aroused poor in the city of Durham.

The War on Poverty came to North Carolina, but it was a controlled skirmish where some battles were won. However, the overall War was lost on the economic and political battlegrounds.

During their existence in each city, the CAAs offered the opportunity for black leaders to move into the political arena, with the help of political resources provided by the federal government. In the following chapter this study examines the role the poverty programs play in the recruitment process.
FOOTNOTE TO CHAPTER III

The following sections covering The Charlotte Area Fund, Inc. and Operation Breakthrough have drawn heavily from the official reports of the North Carolina Fund in the work "Part II: A Profile of Ten North Carolina CAA's Affiliated with The North Carolina Fund 1968" and "Part III: A Case Study of the War on Poverty in Durham, North Carolina 1968."
CHAPTER IV
POVERTY POLITICS AND BLACK POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Introduction

Chapter IV starts the analysis section of this dissertation. The role that CAPs played in the political process for blacks is examined by first discussing political recruitment overall, and then how political recruitment in the black community differs from that found among other ethnics. Once that has been established the chapter discusses the literature which argues that CAPs did enhance the recruitment of blacks into electoral politics. This literature suggests a model that has allowed civil rights and/or CAP experience to launch political careers. That model is then presented.

From that point the study examines whether or not the model provides an accurate picture of what actually happened in the three cities. After that assessment a possible extension of the model is presented, followed by the conclusions drawn from the data.

Political Recruitment

This chapter examines the role that CAPs played in the recruitment process for black elected officials. The
decade of the 1960s was a turning point for black political activisms. With the War on Poverty being fought within the same time frame, an obvious question has to be raised. Did the new federal programs provide opportunities for blacks to increase their demand-making strategy in the political system?

Traditionally other ethnic groups have used the political process to garner benefits for their class and ethnic interests (Harrigan, 1985, Chapter 3). These leaders have emerged from the social and economic elites to assume the leadership positions in their community. America's capitalistic economic system places a high premium on wealth. So the road to political office often starts with money. But as studies of the recruitment process and political ambition note (Prewitt, 1970; Matthews, 1973), political aspirants have consciously or unconsciously gained experience at some point that prepared them to seek office. These experiences may also provide the recognition necessary for one seeking an office. This recognition places the candidate in a favorable position for being elected. Being identified as an individual who has a reputation as one who might appropriately fill a responsible public role is often accomplished by service in civic or auxiliary governmental or party organizations (Prewitt, 1970; Wahlke, et al., 1962). These prepolitical careers have traditionally served
as the path for white politicians as they place themselves in serious contention for elected positions. Local political parties and civic organizations have played pivotal roles in recruiting individuals that are viewed as being capable of winning. This simple path (which is more complex) has not been as efficient or predictable for all groups that have sought to engage in electoral politics.

Political Recruitment and the Black Community

Contrary to the belief of many social scientists, blacks have not been able to use the same path of other ethnics into politics. Ethnic analogies with accounts of the Irish, Italians, Poles, and Jews as skillful power brokers, able to garner skills, resources, and political sophistication for their ethnic group as a whole, is legendary (Stone, 1970; Cruse, 1967; Wilson, 1960). In fact James Q. Wilson argues that the resistance to recognition suffered by blacks is no different than that experienced by earlier ethnics such as the Italians, Poles, and Jews, by the Irish. But as Nelson and Meranto (1977) point out:

Implicit in the ethnic analogy is the assumption that America is a democratic and pluralistic society open to effective competition by all groups who wish to use the political process as a lever to social and economic progress. But this assumption does not take into account the unique position of blacks in the American social order—a fact that renders the ethnic analogy totally inappropriate as a frame of reference for the analysis of black political development in American cities. (p. 18)
The authors cite the existence of a "mobilization of bias" (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970) in the political system that denies to blacks the necessary resources which allows them to compete effectively for important benefits. They go on to conclude:

Thus, whereas the Irish, Italians, Poles, Jews and other ethnic groups have been able to mobilize resources within the political process and to make their collective weight felt on policymaking, no such opportunity for resource mobilization has been available to the black community. Blacks have, in large measure, been systematically locked out of the political process by institutional procedures and mechanisms that foster white success at the expense of less favored nonwhite groups. (p. 18)

Because blacks are locked out of the political process, a different type of leader has developed in the black community, a leader who politically has not been able to deliver to his constituents in the same manner as his white counterpart. In addition, Wilson (1963) argued that black politicians

... who are elected to office generally find it necessary to be politicians first and Negroes second. If they are to stay in office, they must often soft pedal the racial issues that are of the most concern to Negroes as Negroes. (p. 293)

Chuck Stone (1970) is even more critical in his assessment of the black politician. Stone feels that the black politician has been overlooked by both the black and white communities. Stone states, "There is probably no other ethnic group in America that would accept athletes,
comedians and retired civil-rights leaders over politicians as its principal leaders" (p. 8).

It must be stated that the black politician is one of many leaders in the black community. He must share this position with others that the political environment has allowed to develop. In fact, since World War I the principal sources of black leadership have come via certain rather well-known formal organizations. The organizations and their managers, civil rights and church related, have provided a structure within which deliberations about strategies and purposes might take place (Holden, 1973, p. 6). It is for this reason that preachers, teachers, lawyers, doctors and other economic elites have dominated the leadership roles of the black community.

James Q. Wilson in his study of black leadership in Chicago in 1960 identified four different types of leaders within the black community. They were the prestige leader, the token leader, the organizer and the new Negro leader.

The prestige leader was a successful businessman or professional who participated in civic activities but avoided controversy. This leader had more contact with influential white leaders, was moderate in leadership style and publicly immune from an "Uncle Tom" charge because of noninvolvement.
The token leader was "selected" by the white community to represent the black community in civic activities. Militants attacked him for not speaking up for issues they see as being in the best interests of blacks. The label "Uncle Tom" is used in private conservations by blacks.

The organizer was a community leader who maintained organizations whose purpose was the attainment of community goals. Typically, he was of secondary status, although occasionally he was of high status. Most importantly he was usually self-employed or otherwise master of his own time.

The fourth and final type was the "New Negro" which was an imaginary composite reflecting wishful thinking in the community. He would be militant, outspoken on racial issues but cooperate with other blacks on joint ventures. When he worked with whites, it would be as an equal partner.¹ These are the dominant views put forth when black leadership is mentioned.

Holden (1973) points out that this state of powerlessness within the politics of the black "nation" is present due to some very good reasons. Those reasons, according to Holden, surround the scarcity of organizational resources needed if one is to be effective in community decisionmaking. Holden identified these resources as: 1) technical bureaucratic skills, 2) money, 3) internal attention, and 4) external recognition. Because each leader
and organization wishes to maximize its effectiveness, there is in the black community inevitable competition over these scarce resources. This in turn leads to political factionalism and jealousy that retards unity. Social class tension and different ideological perspectives help to promote internal feuding that allows white leaders to exploit the situation. Nelson and Meranto (1977, p. 29) summarize this condition in the black community in the following manner:

Given the mosaic of ideological positions and approaches . . . it is hardly a surprise that unity is difficult to obtain, and conflict and competition represent the more normal conditions of black life. . . . Thus an aspiring black politician may find that the greatest resistance to his political success will emerge not from the white community but from the black community among forces with whom he is in sharp philosophical and political disagreement.

Jones (1972) stresses that factions of this type grow out of the ideological distance between black political activists, who may find their views further apart than the views of political activists in the white community.

Traditionally the black middle class has served as the leadership force in the black community. This black elite tends to be found among the group Wilson referred to as the "prestige leaders." The prestige leader is a product of the North. His southern equivalent is, as Ladd (1969) stated, the conservative leader. "They have sought to be known as prominent educators, businessmen, civic leaders . . . rather
than as race leaders" (p. 161). These were the individuals that were moved into the political arena prior to the 1960s. In the South only those blacks that conformed to certain Anglo-Saxon characteristics were accorded the prestige of the vote. The black bosses enlisted only those middle class blacks who exemplified the behavior of which the whites approved. The end result was that northern blacks became wards of political machines and southern blacks lost interest in politics (Walton, 1972).

This dependency changed with the commencement of the civil rights movement and the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The 1960s marked a period in this country's history that changed forever the docile participation of low-income and minority groups in politics. This movement launched the political careers of black politicians throughout the country. The traditional, moderate to conservative leaders and organizations had to become more assertive, due to the increased racial consciousness among blacks. Working to end the brand of discrimination found in their respective communities, blacks were able to gain recognition and leadership positions. In the South, political parties that excluded blacks were bypassed as blacks made independent inroads into politics. This movement served as the launching pad that provided name recognition and training by working with protest
organizations, thus enhancing negotiation skills and support. Political organizations that could exercise control over the "bloc vote" fostered the unity that moved blacks into office, provided as Stone (1970) notes, ceteris paribus—all other things—were equal.

The recruitment process for blacks has broadened to include a more diverse group, but conflict has not been eliminated by the results and impact of the civil rights movement. There is still found in the black community the scarcities identified by Holden (1973). As blacks struggle to move up the leadership ladder, quite often the "external recognition" provided by the white community enhances his/her reputation as a "responsible black." Conflict is heightened in this process as scarce resources are fought over as ambitious blacks seek to enhance their status and recognition in the black community. It is in the context of this pattern of conflict and competition that the role of CAPs in the political recruitment process can best be assessed.

Political Recruitment and CAPs

Peter Eisinger (1979) argues that those political officials that were involved in the CAPs were aided in their ascent to public office by the name recognition they gained from their association with these programs.
The CAPs provided a new political resource to those who were resource poor. As Greenstone and Peterson (1977) suggest, these programs were to the black poor an alternative means of exploiting the weakness of the political system.

By working in any of a number of positions within the CAPs, the participants were in a position to take advantage of opportunities not previously available to them. Moynihan (1969) spoke of the poverty programs rivaling the political machines of Tammany Hall with its development of leaders.

These programs often pitted a community organizer, a beleaguered executive director, an embattled chairman of the poverty board, or an angered resident against a local political official, or any individual that could be identified as representing the interest of the local white power structure. This scenario has been played out in cities all over the country. With media coverage inspiring the civil rights struggle, participants throughout the country became local leaders and spokespersons. Confrontations and the ensuing bargaining and negotiations thrust forth these new leaders into new roles. Thus, these individuals were given prominence and visibility under circumstances that would not have existed if CAP programs had not been developed.
Professor John Strange (1972b), who was Director of Research for the North Carolina Fund, adds to our argument that CAPs aided in the recruitment process when he states:

The leadership structure of the minority community has been altered, primarily through the addition of younger and more militant spokesmen. This broadening of the leadership structure may have far reaching consequences for the minority community which cannot be easily anticipated. Finally the minority group members have obtained some significant control over resources such as jobs, access to mimeographs and other equipments providing opportunities or disseminating information, recognition, prestige and money. All of these resources are vital politically to successful participation in the American political process. [italics added] (p. 467)

In fact this whole process is more in line with what Holden (1973) refers to as "street level populism." This is a term he used to apply to the growing participation of lower-middle class and lower class persons in the black community, with a growing resistance to participation by professionals and the middle class. This strain of populism is produced by the difference in interests that exists between the social classes. Street level populism enhances the position of lower income blacks as they compete for scarce resources found in the black community. Holden (1973) argues the same point when he states:

In part, it is a kind of doctrinal and organizational effect, not of 'the black revolution,' but of the Office of Economic Opportunity. That is, for several years during the Johnson administration, the doctrine of participation was assiduously cultivated by the OEO staff and spread through the population at large by the mass media. The availability of OEO resources [money] and the availability of the doctrine provided
opportunities for much wider development and cultivation of organizational skills, by formally uneducated people, than had ever been possible before. (p.71)

The literature suggests that the political recruitment process in the black community is one that necessitates blacks making adjustments in order to be effective in the political system. This is a reflection of the environment in which they find themselves. Figure 1 shows the steps blacks follow in the recruitment process. The civil rights movement, as it has been shown, was the impetus that thrust individuals forward to gain recognition that could possibly be translated into electoral popularity and ultimately political office. The CAPs literature argues that the CAPs were a second step in this recruitment process. Political resources that were gained in the civil rights movement were enhanced by CAPs involvement.

Was this the case for Charlotte, Durham and Greensboro? What was the actual impact of CAPs in the overall recruitment process? In order to answer those concerns, this researcher will move to an analysis of what the interviews revealed about poverty politics in three of North Carolina's cities.
Figure 1. Poverty Politics and Political Recruitment
An Overview of the Three Cities

The aggregate data for all three cities reveal that of the respondents interviewed for this study, 53 percent (n=19) were CAPers, while 42 percent had civil rights experience only (n=15) and 5 percent (n=2) had neither CAP nor civil rights backgrounds. The number of respondents active in electoral politics was 24 (66%) with 12 (50%) being successful.

This data also reveals that civil rights experience was almost universal (94%) among those interviewed for this study. Among the CAPers 100 percent had civil rights experience. Being able to show the independent effect of CAP experience and civil rights experience is impossible. But observations can be made concerning whether the additional CAP experience increased the likelihood of the individual moving into politics or some other area.

Table 5 shows that the CAPers were less likely to enter into electoral politics than the civil righters. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of the CAPers chose to use their experience in other areas. The data also revealed that of the eight that sought office four were successful. This meant that 15 or 79 percent of the CAPers either chose not to enter electoral politics or were not successful. Stated another way, only 21 percent of the CAPers in this study were able to use CAP experience successfully in the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sought Public Office</th>
<th>Civil Righter N=15</th>
<th>CAPer N=19</th>
<th>Neither N=2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>93% (14)</td>
<td>42% (8)</td>
<td>100% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7% (1)</td>
<td>58% (11)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

political recruitment process, whereby 53 percent of the civil righters were successful. A look at the individual cities will reveal that there were uneven levels of success among the cities. This analysis will also show how important it is to address the question, "what other avenues did CAPers pursue with their poverty experience?" In an attempt to deal with that concern the research now examines each city individually.

**Charlotte: Poverty Politics and Political Recruitment**

The city of Charlotte with its poverty programs, including the Charlotte Area Fund (CAF) and the Model Cities Program (MCP), did not provide the avenue for blacks into electoral politics that the literature would suggest. In fact during the time period covered by this study, 1964-1980, there were only two blacks elected in Charlotte that had poverty experience: Fred Alexander, who was on the
MCP board, and Robert Walton, who worked in the New Careers Program.

Six people were interviewed in Charlotte that were leaders in the black community and had knowledge of the War on Poverty in Charlotte or were actively involved in the programs. Three of the six were CAPers, and all six were civil righters. Only one of the three CAPers ran for office, and he was unsuccessful. The remaining two carried their talents into community organizing and grassroots organizations, independent of the CAF. The three civil righters had among them two who ran unsuccessfully for office.

These findings suggest, along with observations made by the informants, that the CAF was not a platform from which successful political careers were launched. It really reflected more of the constraints that were placed on the management of the programs by the community. The programs gave recognition to blacks that worked in them but whether one was provided the resources by CAF was determined by the political orientation of the individual.

The political factionalism in the black community carried over into poverty politics, with conflict arising among the conservative Alexander faction, the moderate James Polk faction, and the confrontational Hawkins faction. An issue that exposed the disunity in the community was the
Manpower controversy, where CAF contracted to award control of Manpower training to the more moderate Charlotte Placement Bureau (CPB). James Polk, the director of the organization, got along well with the board and was supported by the local Democratic party. This political support allowed Polk to have an advantage in receiving funding for his organization from CAF. Polk felt the CAF experience helped to provide him with visibility. He stated:

The program allowed me to get to know people in the community socially, and they got to know me. I was able to serve on agencies and pay some dues. I felt some obligations in the community. I felt I could really give something when I decided to run and I was remembered. (Polk, 1987)

Although Polk expressed a very positive image of his involvement with CAF, Hoffman (1968) pointed out very clearly in interviews with staff of the CPB and the CAF that Polk had been placed in the executive director's position for political consideration. His brother was a Democratic Precinct Committeeman, and the Chairman of board of the CAF, Charles Lowe, was a strong Democrat in Mecklenberg County. Many felt that Polk sought the position for some future opportunity to seek office. This also was viewed as a battle for the black vote (Hoffman, 1968, pp. 250-256).

The principal organization that vied with the Placement Bureau was the local Occupational Industrialization Council (OIC). This organization developed in Charlotte because of
Reverend Elo Henderson of the United Presbyterian Church. His assistant, Reverend Robert Shirley, had been trained especially for work with the community, organizing and helping the poor.

OIC maintained a more militant posture in dealing with the city fathers than that taken by CPB. Reverends Henderson and Shirley were aligned with Dr. Hawkins who felt that the CAF did not have the support of the low-income black community and that those in control of the CAF (black and white) were representatives of the power structure.

When the CAF awarded the training contract to the CPB and placed OIC under the CPB (which later became the Charlotte Bureau of Placement and Training--CBPT), Hawkins, Shirley and Henderson were very resentful.

Hawkins, Henderson, and Shirley saw the funds from the CAF as an opportunity to establish new leadership and for that reason the struggle for funding was so intense. Let this researcher point out that the CAF could not merely disregard the OIC camp because "these leaders had the support of the grassroots and the manpower controversy was a battle for the black vote" (Hoffman, 1968).

Reverends Henderson and Shirley did not fare well in the political circles once CAF and city officials labeled their militant positions as not being complimentary to their "consensus" political strategy. In fact this incident,
coupled with the federal government in 1967 moving away from direct funding, placed political outsiders in very vulnerable positions. When the leadership in the Presbyterian Church changed and Reverend Henderson was no longer in a position of power, Reverend Shirley's freedom to agitate disappeared.

Dr. Hawkins's firebrand leadership carried over into the political arena. He may have antagonized the white community but not the black community. His willingness to take a stand gave him clout beyond just Charlotte's black community. In 1968 he ran for Governor, the first black ever to do so, and won a very respectable 131,000 votes, which was 21 percent of the votes cast in the primary ("Hawkins: Vote," 1968).

Dr. Hawkins has maintained visibility in Charlotte and the state by speaking out against injustices in the black community. Dr. Hawkins was not one who needed the poverty program to give him visibility. He had it before, during and after the high periods of CAF's existence. But due to his insistence that the program reflect the poor and not what he called "power structure types," he was viewed in the black community as a spokesman for the common man. It can be safely said that even if CAF or MCP had not existed Dr. Reginald Hawkins would have still maintained the
visibility and name recognition political leaders need in order to muster a following.

The third and last group that enjoyed visibility via the CAF was typified by the late Fred Alexander. Alexander, elected to the city council in 1965, was the first black to serve on the council in Charlotte this century. Later in the seventies, Councilman Alexander was elected to the state senate. It was Fred Alexander's acceptance as a man dedicated to change (that may have been too slow for some members) in the black community and being viewed as a responsible leader by the white community that enabled him to progress politically. Even though Hawkins and his followers disagreed with Alexander philosophically, they still worked for his election in 1965. This did not help to heal the political wounds, for after Alexander was elected, Hawkins and Alexander remained diametrically opposed—the division continued.

An examination of Charlotte reveals a situation where the local CAA did not lead the participants inevitably into electoral politics. The recognition came from the external recognition provided by the white community. This played a greater role in determining if one had electoral popularity in the recruitment process. In fact the evidence points more to CAPers using their experience in areas of private
industry, governmental bureaucracies, and community organizing, thus straying away from electoral politics.

**Greensboro: Poverty Politics and Political Recruitment**

In Greensboro the Guilford County Economic Opportunity Council (EOC) did not play a significant role in the recruitment process. As it was shown in Chapter III, movement into electoral politics had to be by way of the local political organization and (due to an at-large system) acceptance by the white community. The 17 interviews in Greensboro suggest that this was true. Among the 17, eight were civil righters, with two having neither CAP nor civil rights experience. There were seven CAPers, and all of them had civil rights experience in their backgrounds.

The question posed here is, were those individuals with the additional CAP experience predisposed to enter electoral politics more than those with only a civil rights background? The data reveals that three of the seven CAPers (43%) sought office with only one being successful. A qualification must be made about this victory. He was not actually elected, but was appointed to serve the unexpired term of a black who had to step down due to failing health. When this individual sought election to the position in his own right in 1981, he was defeated. Only 14 percent of the CAPers were successful, and 43 percent sought an elected position. The civil righters were more inclined to seek
office, for all eight (100%) sought office, and 50 percent of them were successful.

With CAPers being less successful, six of the seven CAPers (87%) were either unsuccessful or chose not to run for office. Since CAP was mildly significant in producing politicians, what were the routes taken by CAPers after the programs ended? In Greensboro, of the six, two continued with independent organizing in the community, one went into law, one moved on to another federally funded program, and two returned to self-employment in the private sector. To look at just the electoral output of the political recruitment process in Greensboro as well as Charlotte distorts the broader impact of the local CAAs.

The political environment in Greensboro did not encourage the success or entry of the more militant leaders into the electoral process. The traditional leaders shared the spotlight with an increasingly nationalistic group once the political resources were made available to the black community. But because the county commissioners were not desirous of an activist CAA, EOC was allowed to go out of business in 1973. Even with the support of traditional and militant segments of the black community, EOC was not saved. In fact EOC was overshadowed during the late 1960s by an NCF inspired organization named GAPP, the Greensboro Association of Poor People.
The tradition of "civil politics" prevailed in Greensboro; consequently, the traditional route of political recruitment was the only one available for success. Participation in the EOC provided recognition, but the more moderate civil rights experience was the type needed for electoral politics.

Even though success for participants in the poverty programs for the period studied has been dismal, there is evidence that the CAP experience was helpful. One respondent when asked if the program gave him "name recognition" responded: "Sure, it did because I worked in Morning Side Homes, Ray Warren Homes; all of those people got to know me because of my work" (Gist, 1987).

From his position of visibility, Representative Gist, who was a brick mason by profession, was able to gain legitimacy. Another respondent, Lewis Brandon, who was active in both EOC and GAPP, felt these experiences helped in the political arena. He said, "Yes, [they helped] because I think in terms of votes and other things, I was able to draw upon my past association with people. I had the name recognition in certain parts of the community."\(^2\)

**Durham: Political Recruitment and Activism**

Durham, through Operation Breakthrough (OBT), attempted to expand the recruitment process by forcing the Durham Committee to include poor people in the struggle to enlarge
their role in Durham politics. Durham was also the home of NCF, which placed at the Durham black community's disposal a tremendous amount of political resources coupled with those already present. This is evident from the data of the 13 respondents interviewed in Durham. There were seven successful candidates and only one unsuccessful candidate. All 13 had civil rights backgrounds, but only four were civil righters (31%) and nine of the 13 (69%) were CAPers. From the nine, four sought office with only one being unsuccessful. So 44 percent sought office with 33 percent of all the CAPers being successful. But 75 percent of those who sought office were elected.

This compares with those who had civil rights backgrounds, in that all four were successful in the electoral process. Viewed another way, all of the seven elected officials had civil rights backgrounds and three had the additional benefit of CAP experience. So three successfully used CAP and civil rights experience to gain name recognition, convert it into electoral popularity, and then ascend to public office. All three CAPers were endorsed by the DC and had middle class backgrounds. Their political orientations were the same with the exception of Howard Clements who moved from being a radical to a conservative.
Six of the CAPers either chose not to run or were defeated in the process. From this six, one continued as a community activist on the state and national level, four became bureaucrats working with organizations and agencies that addressed the needs of poor and black people, and one returned to his self-employed practice in the private sector.

Durham had many middle class blacks involved in the poverty experience that used their involvement to highlight their visibility in the black community and, for some, throughout the state and nation. These leaders were not shy about acknowledging the role that organizations like OBT, NCF, UOCI, and BSM played in their movements in the political process. Even Howard Fuller claimed benefits from CAPs. His ability to remain visible by attacking issues that concerned the poor and minorities in general continues today to make Howard Fuller a beneficiary of poverty politics in North Carolina.

Ben Ruffin was another recipient of the status afforded poverty warriors in Durham. In 1976 Ruffin ran unsuccessfully for a district seat on the city council and lost by 276 votes. When asked to assess the impact of his CAP experience he responded: "Name recognition and credibility are a lot of what it takes to run. . . . I don't
think I would have gained this had the poverty programs not been in Durham" (Ruffin, 1987).

Like Ben Ruffin, Howard Clements traced part of his political maturation to his involvement with the poverty organization, UOCI. Commenting on his poverty involvement Clements notes, "It gave me an opportunity to develop a sense of community or sensitivity to other concerns, concerns which I gave short shrift prior to my exposure" (1987). This exposure provided him with the next logical step, electoral politics.

Finally, another successful figure in Durham politics that played a role in poverty politics was Henry "Mickey" Michaux. Mickey Michaux, a lawyer, realtor and politician, worked with UOCI and was on the board of United Durham Incorporated, a low income organization that promoted business development. When asked if his work with these agencies helped in his runs for office, he responded: "Yes, it did. It helped because they knew me. They knew that I was out there working to help break down barriers in housing here in Durham" (Michaux, 1987).

Few individuals knowledgeable of Durham's history would chronicle black political development in the post sit-in period and not note the tremendous impact of CAPs. It is doubtful that this realization would have come about had it not been for the alternative resources provided by CAPs. In
essence CAPs placed poverty and political activity among the poor on Durham's political agenda.

The Non-Electoral Impact

In each city it was suggested that the majority of the CAPers were not successful and went into other areas. An overview of the total number interviewed shows the areas into which the CAPers carried their poverty experience, since electoral politics was not their primary focus.

It should be remembered that there were 19 CAPers and only four successful CAPers, which left 15 (79%) that were unsuccessful or chose not to run. Table 6 gives a breakdown of the career choices for the remaining CAPers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governmental Bureaucrats</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Community Organizers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greensboro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 suggests that the CAAs were more successful at training individuals to move into the governmental bureaucracy. This impact has been long-term in that these individuals have remained in these areas from the time they left the CAAs through 1980. On the other hand, the second most prominent group in many ways is the most interesting. The number five could be considered an appropriate legacy to the War on Poverty. But this designation is an indication of the short-term impact. As federal and foundation monies for organizing disappeared, the community organizers were pressed to find their own resources. In all five instances the churches (Presbyterian and Episcopalian) were the primary sources of funding, but by the early 1970s this source also ended. Two have withdrawn from active participation due to age, and the remaining three have pursued graduate degrees and with the master organizer of one city being granted the Ph.D. degree. All three are now in the area of education.

The third group entered the private sector and have become very successful in their individual professions. The unique aspect of that is the fact that all four are self-employed and exercise a degree of economic independence in their respective cities. This has, over the years, allowed them to be outspoken on issues relating to the black community.
Finally, all 15 have maintained visibility in their respective cities as individuals that are politically aware and concerned about the welfare of the black community. As one respondent remarked:

We had the commitment and dedication, and we knew these programs wouldn't last. Black people who came out of that struggle are still out there hustling and doing positive things, and you can't take that away.

Conclusion

The role that CAPs played in political recruitment in the black community ranged from minor to moderate. Overall and individually, CAPers were both less successful and inclined than the civil righters to enter electoral politics. CAPers provided 33 percent of the elected officials. The typical comment given when asked if the CAA gave the respondent name recognition was, "It gave me name recognition, but it also let the people know that I was trying to do some things that could help."

The extremely high level of civil rights involvement on the part of CAPers confirmed that both civil rights and CAPs involvement moved them in the direction of politics. But it was the political environment that determined the level of electoral involvement and success. Both Greensboro and Charlotte were hampered by a low number of black elected officials; so when additional resources were introduced into the community, they were not used as effectively as Durham.
Further political advancement in the electoral process by these individuals were hampered in Charlotte by fragmentation and in Greensboro by competition between traditional and militant leaders. Durham's strong economic base and the coalition-building of the DC enabled them to maximize the resources available to them. Also the identification of middle class blacks with the concerns of the poor broadened their base of support among low-income blacks who were then becoming more politically aroused.

External recognition from the white community was more significant in Charlotte and Greensboro because civility and moderation prevailed in their style of politics. Militants were not as insulated from white economic and political reprisals as was the case of Durham.

This chapter has shown also that the impact of CAPs goes beyond electoral politics as a gauge for developing political leadership. Those individuals that were elected were more representative of the political environment than the militant posture of the black community during the 1960s and the 1970s. The minority status of blacks in each city meant that politicians who stood any chance of being successful had to campaign as a politician for "all of the people" and not a black politician. In fact those candidates that were defeated had been identified too closely with the black power movement to be palatable to the
white community. Simply because these individuals lost did not mean that they withdrew from the political arena and ceased to put political pressure on the community to change.

Organizations that could press for interest group goals were led oftentimes by these CAPers. They pressed the traditional leadership to be more demanding for concessions from the white controlled political and economic systems. The community organizers were very instrumental in all three cities in shaping the political agenda to reflect more of the needs of the masses of black and poor people. The self-employed individuals along with ministers were able to foster the mobilization efforts. And the bureaucrats did not "forfeit their citizenship" and are still active in organizations that advance change in these cities.

The aforementioned leads this researcher to suggest that the model presented in Figure 1 does not go far enough in explaining the recruitment process as it relates to Charlotte, Durham, and Greensboro. As the model stipulates, community recognition can emanate from both civil rights experience and poverty experience. In this study CAPers were able to combine their civil rights experience in order to establish themselves as people in the community who were identified with a cause. Whether or not the recognition was positive or negative determined how well one fared in the next step, electoral popularity. Those that received
external recognition, as Holden (1973) stipulates, were afforded more political resources to increase the likelihood (not guarantee) of success in electoral politics and ascend to public office.

This research suggests that electoral outputs are not synonymous with political outputs. To focus only on elected positions as a gauge of the political impact of CAPs dismisses as unimportant the long-term influence of CAPs on those that were unsuccessful and saw other areas as just as important. For that reason, this researcher suggests that Figure 2 is a more accurate representation of the recruitment process and the impact of CAPs. It provides steps for CAPers that do not seek elective office and those who were unsuccessful. These individuals moved into the three broad areas of community activism: bureaucracy, the private sector, and a residual movement into education. Also those CAPers that were successful and left office moved into one of the four categories.

By incorporating the steps of Figure 2, the broader impact of CAPs can be seen. These CAPers exerted pressure on the political system and established themselves as part of the leadership core in the black community. With this being the case, it challenges Holden's rule of external recognition and suggests that blacks no longer allow the majority community to dominate the selection of who the
Figure 2. **Political Recruitment and Political Outputs for CAPers**
leaders of the black community will be. Quite often those who had negative community recognition went into other areas that attempted to change the political environment and the brand of segregation practiced in each city. Black politicians do not constitute the only core of leadership in the black community.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV


2. Herman Gist in 1983 and Lewis Brandon in 1986 were successful candidates for office. Gist was elected as a State Representative and Brandon as Water Conservation District Supervisor. Each CAPer received the endorsement of the GSA in their respective political race.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Introduction

The development of political organizations and the enhancement of political consciousness are considered in this chapter. First the significance of organizations in the struggle for political empowerment is stated, followed by how low-income organizations have different goals from that of many middle class organizations of the past. The poor seized upon the resources made available to them during the civil rights period and changed the demands of black leadership.

It is argued in this chapter that CAPs helped to provide organization, one of several resources needed for successful mobilization. From that point the researcher reviews how these factors combined to produce a service or advocacy type of CAA. After a review of the literature which examines this issue, each city is analyzed to see the extent to which a service or advocacy role existed in the respective cities.

After each city has been examined an assessment will be made of whether or not the local CAA produced a sense of
political consciousness in the city. Finally the assessment will conclude with why the organizations chose the service or activist path, and the impact that decision had on the likelihood of the establishment of permanent political organizations and raising of political consciousness.

The Significance of Political Organizations and Political Consciousness

This study emphasizes the politicizing effects that the poverty programs had on the black community. Chapter IV showed that even though the programs did not provide a direct route to political success, they were stepping stones to other areas of leadership in the cities. Recruitment is only one aspect of the entire process of political mobilization. There are several other components that are absolutely essential in order for the mobilization process to realize its significance. Among these are the factors of political organization and political consciousness. Both factors are seen as crucial in the mobilization process. Nelson and Meranto (1977) are very clear in stating that the mobilization process needs to be buttressed by unity and political consciousness. This entails "the realization by the group and its leadership that their common fate can be influenced by group political action" (p. 26).

The civil rights movement ignited this call for group action by revealing, especially in the South, a resistant
white power structure that was determined to maintain a power relationship that subordinated the black community. The bus boycott in Montgomery, the 1960 sit-ins in Greensboro which spread across the nation, the 1963 March on Washington, the eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, were all evidence to the black community that demands strategically applied from a united community could be successful. This view was perhaps best argued by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) when they stated:

Before a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this we mean that group solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position of strength in a pluralistic society. (p. 44)

Political consciousness is evidenced when a group realizes that the authoritative allocation of values in our society have placed them in a more or less "frozen position of inferiority" and that the only way to alter that relationship is through political power.

Political consciousness also accepts two premises. The first is that action taken by the group must be for the attainment of indivisible benefits, benefits that cannot be or ordinarily are not divided among specific individuals. The second inferred premise is that black people have to fight as black people to overcome their suppression. The laws they are contesting were enacted only to suppress them
as a group (Hamilton, 1972). So only group political action can hope to lead to political mobilization.

Political organizations are vital to this overall process because political consciousness must be maintained and nurtured in any movement. It must rely upon a vehicle that can sustain it and promote change in society. The vehicle that traditionally serves that function is a political organization. Political organizations are significant in this respect, as Wilson (1973) states, because:

If the causes represented by . . . mass efforts are to . . . be espoused, they will . . . through organizational efforts or not at all. Passions can be aroused and for the moment directed; they cannot be sustained. Organization provides continuity and predictability to social processes that would otherwise be episodic and uncertain. (p. 7)

Piven and Cloward (1974) argued that organizations are important because they bring to the political process a superior capability for influence. They have the resources to engage in regular surveillance of the processes of government and to initiate issues. They have the ability to generate public issues through regular organizational liaisons and to gain access to the media and political parties (pp. 79-80).

Lower-class people have not been able to develop these types of organizations to advance their interests.

The reasons are not mysterious. To be poor means to command none of the resources ordinarily considered
requisites for organization: money, organizational skill and professional expertise, and personal relations with officials. (Piven and Cloward, 1974, p. 80)

This assessment echoes Matthew Holden's (1973) belief that there is a deficit of resources in the black community.

The resource deficit in the black community posed problems not only for blacks, but also for the political interests that discovered during the 1960s the importance of the black vote to its survival. Piven and Cloward (1971) are very adamant in their argument that due to the crumbling of the solid Democratic South, the Democratic Party sought to offset the defection of white southerners by bringing blacks into the party. The appeal was to northern blacks because they were strategically located in key northern and midwestern states that could provide the electoral votes needed for victory. "The story of how Kennedy captured Illinois by a mere 8,000 votes, the result of landslide majorities in the black South Side wards of Chicago, quickly became fixed in Democratic lore" (Piven and Cloward, 1971, p. 271). In an attempt to cement the black vote to the Democratic Party, the national party had to invent ways of providing resources to the black community in a manner that would not be circumvented by state and local officials that would be hostile to such a move. The CAPs programs provided the appropriate vehicle because it directly funded the
agency in an effort to make local governments more responsive to the needs of the poor.

The civil rights movement and civil rights organizations had given the black community a sense of unity and political consciousness, but the anti-poverty programs infused the black community with resources that had previously been in short supply. These resources increased the probability of political organizations developing in the black community. These programs changed the politics of the black community by allowing civil rights leaders to expand their demand making strategy through federally financed programs. As Chapter IV established, a civil rights background for CAPers was virtually universal. But the federally funded organizations must not be confused with their middle-class counterparts prevalent during the 1960s. These inspired organizations were concerned with the need to change the system, to redistribute power and provide access to public resources (Gittell, 1980).

Marilyn Gittell continues this theme by pointing out that the 1960s provided the "first widespread encouragement for the development of community organizations for low-income and minority populations" (1980, p. 30). The Great Society programs of Lyndon Johnson were an admittance that a group had been excluded and that "if the poor could be organized to exercise power in the system, they could then
influence policy" (Gittell, 1980, p. 31). Gittell also agreed with Moynihan (1969) who observed that the anti-poverty programs were an attempt by social engineers to allocate federal pressure for the redistribution of power and challenge the existing local power structure.

The thrust to organize the inner city poor (blacks) had a definite impact on the politics of the black community. The observations of William J. Wilson (1978) is indicative of the position taken by those who argue that CAPs aided in the transformation of black politics and politicians throughout the nation. Wilson reasons:

Although the result was not intended by the federal authorities, these poverty programs were transformed from community service agencies into local political structures staffed and directed by lower-class militants. Across the country the lower-class leaders used these agencies in efforts to politicize the heretofore politically inactive ghetto blacks (welfare mothers, gangs, unskilled and semiskilled workers, school dropouts). (p. 138)

In terms of the direction in which CAPs caused politics in the black community to move, Wilson was very direct as he further observed:

Black professional politicians were also caught up in this new mobilization of political power. With increased politicization of the black lower class, black middle class politicians found it necessary to articulate in a more forceful manner the particular needs and problems of their constituencies. This resulted in a shift from . . . politics whose issues emerged from the concerns of professional civil rights organizations and which focused primarily on problems of race discrimination, to a politics whose issues were defined in response to the urban unrest of the 1960s and which focused on problems of defacto segregation,
class subordination, welfare state measures, and human survival in the ghetto. (p. 138)

The views of Wilson are not shared by all who studied that period. Another argument contends that the CAPs were not as change-oriented as some would have one believe. Instead of producing political organizations, these programs sought to deliver services (Gilbert, 1970; Rose, 1972; Hopkins and Clark, 1969). An even more cynical assessment noted the anti-poverty programs, even when they were political, served the purpose of co-opting poor blacks in the political programs of white leadership. The push for change by the masses was controlled by making the leaders WOP directors, board members, or recipients of contract grants, in effect, giving them a stake in the system (Piven and Cloward, 1971; Allen, 1969; Alinsky, 1965). This way any change that may have resulted can be viewed as simply the absorption of another interest group seeking entrance into the political process.

The final word has not been written or argued concerning why CAPs came into existence or their true effect on the poor (see Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974; Peterson and Greenstone, 1977). However, one area of agreement is that the CAPs could be divided into two camps, one being those CAPs that were aimed at providing coordination and service to the community and the other being those that saw their function as being change-oriented or politically active. It
is from this perspective that this researcher will explore the development of political consciousness and political organizations in the three cities. If the city had a service orientation, then naturally little could be expected in terms of consciousness and organization. It is within the change-oriented CAPs that one would expect these two factors to emerge in the mobilization process. Most importantly, this chapter will explore why these orientations emerged and how. It is to these concerns that this investigation turns, starting first with Charlotte, followed by Greensboro, and ending with Durham.

Charlotte

It was shown in Chapter III that Charlotte operated on the principle of consensus politics. Radical change pushed by any group goes against the accepted civil decorum afforded southern politicians. Moderate and conservative black leaders in Charlotte saw the willingness of white leaders to diffuse the civil rights impasse by voluntarily integrating downtown facilities as a sign that more could be accomplished by discussion and mediation. Then it was not surprising to find that the city fathers were reluctant to allow the Charlotte Area Fund (CAF) to upset the rich-poor/black-white power relationship in the city.

The black leaders in Charlotte who adhered to the consensus politics did not exploit the new resources made
available to the black community via the anti-poverty programs. The factionalism in the black community allowed the white community to dictate the direction of the program and determine its objectives. City leaders were concerned about the stark poverty in the city and were amenable to using external funding to deal with it, but not at the expense of empowering the poor.

The obvious omission of the poor and black from the formulation of the CAF reflected the desire to move expeditiously and a lack of sensitivity to the inclusion of blacks. Given this, it is easy to understand the difficulty encountered by blacks in Charlotte to develop a change-oriented program that promoted political consciousness and political organization.

The choosing of a director for CAF was indicative of the control exercised by a business-oriented board. The board wanted someone who had an accommodating style. William Mullins, chairman of the board, pointed out that the process was long and arduous because "there has been a little bit of the zealot in the candidates we have interviewed." Mullins implied that the board wanted someone who would work for change through existing structures and political patterns rather than attempting sweeping change through aggressive tactics that might jeopardize the community's economic progress (Hoffman, 1968, p. 146).
To accomplish this objective, John Zuidema was named executive director in July of 1965. Hoffman (1968) capsulized Zuidema and the subsequent effect he had on CAF when he observed:

Zuidema saw as his first duty . . . to be the survival of the organization, and he was willing to pay the price necessary to assure the adjustment of the organization to the community. (p.149)

Federal politics dictated the pattern and future directions for local CAAs, and for that reason the years 1966 through 1968 were the most active for most CAAs nationwide. Charlotte was no different in that respect. As it was pointed out in Chapter III a conservative Republican backlash placed the agency in a vulnerable fiscal position. Zuidema, who was the director through 1968, felt that working within established channels would best ensure the survival of the agency. He was initially supportive of the strategy of delegating services to already existing agencies. The Health Department was a prime example. But controversy developed in such areas as dental clinics vs. private dentists to dispense services to the poor. Also the Health Department's leadership saw the CAF staff as incompetent people telling professionals how to do their jobs.

Because the CAF staff was aided by NCF community organizers, more and more it (NCF) emphasized the need to organize and involve the poor in the CAF. Even Zuidema
began to realize that the service strategy was not working as he had hoped. The staff wanted to build something among the residents that would survive and endure after the CAF had gone. This change in strategy was reflected in an effort to allow the poor to make their own decisions and seek solutions to their problems. An organization that sought to exert more independence was Domestics United (DU).

**Domestics United**

This organization, which was incorporated in October 1967, grew out of an effort by the Christian Social Relations Committee of the Mecklenburg County United Church Women's Organization. They approached Ms. Micki Riddick in March of 1966, who was at that time Director of the Area Fund's Westside Neighborhood Service Center, about church women becoming concerned about the problems of the poor. The plight of the domestic workers in Charlotte was suggested as an appropriate area to start, due to their dismally low wages. Ms. Riddick called a meeting of the domestics in Charlotte, and the response was very encouraging. Under her guidance over 200 organized in a period of three months. With the October 1967 incorporation under the laws of the state of North Carolina, Domestics United was a force to be dealt with and aimed at improving the status of domestics in Charlotte. The poor viewed this as a victory. The director of CAF was very apprehensive at
first because he did not know how his board members would respond, especially since many of them employed domestics. But surprisingly, the board endorsed this satellite organization of the Area Fund. The NCF, in their assessment of CAF, was very pleased to see the amount of leverage given the poor whereby they could "define the issues themselves." Not only did this improve the image of the CAF with the NCF, but it also enhanced its image with the poor. Later, many of the domestics came on board the staff at the CAF. The programs developed by DU were educational in nature.

Organizing the domestics of Charlotte proved to be a low priority to the Fund and the local government, and this caused DU to aggressively seek private funding. The outside funding came in the form of money from the Foundation for Community Development (FCD). It was FCD's hope that programs aimed at uplifting and building indigenous leadership could continue even after the federal government cut back on funds being funneled through OEO. DU went far in making the poor (domestics) aware of their potential power, but when the outside funding ended, so did the organization.

**Mecklenburg Welfare Rights Organization**

One organization that stirred the emotions of the low-income residents and brought the ire of the white leadership in Charlotte, was the Mecklenburg Welfare Rights
Organization (MWRO). This organization grew out of the efforts of community organizers within CAF. The leadership of CAF was opposed to the type of agitation that would harm CAF's image within the entire Charlotte community and would move outside of the boundaries of what is considered "consensus" politics. The tentative support that was initially given to DU was totally absent in relations to MWRO.

In the spring of 1968 Noble Coleman, an Area Fund community organizer, started the Welfare Rights Organization. This was due in part to the rise on the national and state level of a political awareness among the poor (see Cloward and Piven, 1972). Among the stated goals of the organization were: (1) to work with other organizations around the country to teach welfare recipients what their rights are under government regulations, (2) an adequate income for welfare recipients, and (3) a commitment that welfare recipients be treated with dignity and respect.

During 1968 and 1969, MWRO was a constant irritation to the Welfare Department. Under Coleman's leadership, recipients questioned and criticized the department and its case workers. The Welfare Department witnessed increased politicalization among its clients, a group who prior to that time were submissive clients. This action by members of the CAF could not be tolerated by the County
Commissioners or the City Council. With the passage of the Green Amendment, Congress cleared the way for the local government to reassert control over the local CAA. Numerous elected officials nationwide had appealed to Congress to correct the situation. In October of 1968 the County Commissioners and the Charlotte City Council exercised power over the local CAA by refusing to contribute their respective $25,000 in matching local funds to enable CAF to receive the $204,000 from the federal government. They did not agree to release the local monies until the CAF board was reorganized and two controversial organizers were dismissed. Noble Coleman was one of the controversial organizers released when he refused to work within the reorganization plan which prohibited conflict and confrontation by staff (Canfield, 1969). Coleman was able to convince some sympathetic members of the CAF board to grant MWRO funds that were very restrictive. MWRO's independent mobilization of the poor was held hostage by the lack of an independent funding source.

The contribution that MWRO made in Charlotte, the largest city in North Carolina, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential or lacking statewide impact. For there is evidence that on a statewide basis welfare recipients were moving to impact the political process. Schwartz (1975) relates a significant event that showed how the status quo
had changed in poverty politics in North Carolina. He states that in 1969 the state reduced AFDC payments and received an unexpected response:

At an earlier time this strategy might have worked because welfare clients would have suffered the cutbacks in silent resignation. But the War on Poverty had developed a new political consciousness among the poor. They had become more aware of their rights and had learned to protect them [italics added]. Under the leadership of the National Welfare Rights Organization, protests mounted throughout the state culminating in a massive demonstration by welfare mothers at the state capital the day before Christmas. (p. 216)

This demonstration proved to be significant because pressure from the welfare recipients generated activities at a more critical point in the political structure. Federal officials soon arrived on the scene to investigate the failure on North Carolina's part to provide adequate funds.

Although no one can be certain about causal relationships, it is significant that the Department of Social Services shifted its position shortly after the Christmas demonstration. . . . In January of 1970, it . . . restored the cuts. . . . (Schwartz, 1975, pp. 216-217).

It was this type of consciousness raising that MWRO brought to Charlotte. The organization mobilized but suffered from a lack of independent funding. Federal dollars were reduced, at a time when nationally the Nixon administration was seeking to spinoff programs of the OEO to already existing agencies (Sundquist and Davis, 1969). Lacking the permanent foundation funding and political backing from the black community Coleman hoped would sustain
his organization, he and his organization withered away in the early 1970s, like a plant denied essential nutrients.

Both Domestics United and the Mecklenburg Welfare Rights Organization were efforts to organize poor blacks to make local government more responsible. DU was service oriented, while MMRD was of an activist orientation; but neither organization could overcome the shortage of political resources in the black community, factional leadership, the antagonism of the Republican conservative leaders, and a non confrontational civil rights movement. CAF, which was constrained in its impact locally, was able to spin-off the two organizations, but neither were able to make a long term institutionalized impact on the accommodationist style of politics practiced in Charlotte.

Greensboro--Foundation Mobilization

In Greensboro the local CAA, the Guilford County Economic Opportunity Council (EOC), like the CAF, emphasized the service strategy over an activist or action strategy. But this did not mean that there was a lack of consciousness-raising in Greensboro. Due to federal constraints and the different political orientations of the officials staffing the agencies, the brunt of the activism fell upon the shoulders of the Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP).
The EOC was organized in 1966 and was terminated in 1972. During its tenure, the CAA was beset by problems ranging from internal dissension to financial irregularities and an executive director being convicted of embezzlement. From 1966 through 1969 the EOC had a favorable image in the white community. It was not until after the first director, Paul Gezon, resigned and was replaced with a black that irritation with the organization began. Observers of that period point to the way in which the new director was hired. Blacks/poor citizens comprised one third of the board. The individuals who held these positions were those who had extensive involvement in the civil rights movement. This forceful leadership persuaded the board to reverse itself in hiring a white by the name of Don Leahy of Connecticut and to instead name Charlie Davis, a local black to that position.

Charlie Davis encountered problems with the staff immediately after taking the position. Davis sought to keep a tight rein on his staff in its mission of providing service to the indigent. But this did not mean he was not sympathetic to calls from his staff for agitation. In fact, community organizers in conjunction with grassroots organizations in the city supported a picket line for cafeteria workers. Davis ran interference between the staff, the board and the press. Being placed in the middle
was not an easy job. Davis found himself constantly putting out fires.

Many felt that the dissension surrounding the EOC was the result of a power shift from white control of the program to one of black control. The board was not one that wished to have great input from the poor whom they served. The board and the white political community supported the program and contained its criticism of the program while Gezon was the director. The board was willing to have a black director, but it had little tolerance of the demand for a black chairman of the board. When it appeared that control of the program was moving away from the white community, it ceased to support the program and threw all types of obstacles in the new director's path (Brandon, 1987).

The county and city governments rejected the movement to independence that the black community tried to implement with EOC. And when they could not control the money, they did not want anything to do with the program. The conservative board discouraged political activities on the part of organizers and effectively blocked any attempt by Davis to bring into the organization new blood that had an orientation for organizing. Davis concluded from his three years as director of EOC two things:

First as a race of people we have a long ways to go, we are still divided. The second thing is that as far as
this community is concerned, unless you are willing to do what the white business community wants done in the area of anti-poverty programs, you'll find it very difficult to carry out a program where you can succeed. (Davis, 1984)

Davis resigned in March of 1972 amid charges of sloppy bookkeeping practices and unaccounted for funds (Brock, 1972). The turmoil at EOC did not improve afterwards, for in April of that year Preston Wiley was named the new executive director of EOC. Wiley really was able to only supervise the dismantling of the organization; in July the United States Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) terminated funding for the agency. So in November EOC's board of directors voted to terminate the agency (Harris, 1972). To add insult to injury, later in 1972 Wiley, the last director, was charged with embezzling almost $5,000 in federal funds.

Different groups within the black community appealed to the city council to bail out the financially troubled EOC. The appeals were broadbased including GAPP, NAACP, GCA, EOC staffers, youth and the elderly. But this was all to no avail. The city council followed the lead of the county commissioners in denying funding to replace lost federal funding. Both used a 1971 state law that prohibited either from donating money to a CAA ("Legal Point," 1972).

The impact of EOC was minimal due to a conservative and hostile local government that deserted the program when it
attempted to mobilize the black poor. EOC's service orientation enabled it to exist, but EOC's move to exercise control by blacks placed the organization outside of the mainstream of accepted political action for blacks. Non threatening programs like Headstart were adsorbed by the county beaucracy. EOC in its six-year existence was not allowed to seriously challenge the power relationship that existed between blacks and whites in Greensboro and Guilford County.

Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP)

The challenge to the status quo in Greensboro was left to GAPP, the Greensboro Association of Poor People. It should be made clear at the onset that GAPP was not a federally funded poverty program, but a grassroots community organization financed from private foundation funds. GAPP had an entirely different genesis than that of EOC. GAPP owed its existence to forces operating in two different areas. They were the private sector with Ford Foundation funds and locally the growing intolerance of low-income Greensboro residents to suffer racial oppression silently. In September of 1968 the Greensboro Association of Poor People, GAPP, was founded.

GAPP was very clear from the beginning about what its objectives were and who they served. In a fact sheet published by GAPP in 1969 entitled "What is GAPP," Barnes
(1983, p. 65) brings forth the following quote, which is most revealing of the organization's political orientation.

It is the opinion of GAPP that most poor people are poor because of laws, policies and traditions which operate historically in the interests of property owners and the wealthy. . . . GAPP is designed to organize poor Black people around their immediate problems in such a way as to create the power and determination sufficient to effect change on the policy level. GAPP will attempt to break the apathy by developing pride in self and race by working toward establishing a sense of independence in the Black community.

These stated goals by GAPP were new and different from what Greensboro had been accustomed to seeing in organizational objectives. The best explanation given for seeking change via an organization of this type was stated by Johnson when he observed:

Black people, in order to have a decent life, had to control whatever portions of this world that they lived in and to do that the people had to be organized, had to be conscious, and to be used to fighting for what they wanted. [italics added] (Barnes, 1982)

The second force that made GAPP a realization was the local racial climate. Blacks in Greensboro had a history of having to fight for every gain or advancement that they received. Chafe (1980) documents the resistance to change by the white community from the sit-ins of 1960 to desegregating businesses, neighborhoods, and schools throughout the 1960s. As Barnes points out, one area that escaped Chafe's scrutiny was police brutality, an area that affected the black community disproportionately more than
the white community. Blacks were well aware that the police department was insensitive to the sanctity of black life and were generally viewed as just another extension of the white man's racial oppression (Johnson, 1987).

GAPP was structured differently from EOC in that GAPP's power emanated from the bottom upward, whereas EOC's power emanated from the top downward. This meant that the people who made the decisions and helped with the planning were people from the community who were actually poor. Half were from the neighborhoods, and half were elected at large. Whereas with EOC only one-third of the representatives were poor, thus never being able to dominate decisions.

GAPP had a cultural dimension that solidified support among low income blacks. This cultural dimension expressed itself in the form of "black awareness." Blending its militant appeal of the black power period with black is beautiful, black consciousness, and racial pride, GAPP was able to attract the imagination of young blacks who felt the traditional leadership and programs like EOC were too conservative in their response to the immediate needs of poor people.

Nelson Johnson, who was a "master organizer" for Greensboro, knew that if they were going to be successful they would have to give people something concrete in terms of issues they could identify with and, most importantly, it
would have to be a broad base of support. This coalition would have to include the moderate and respected leaders in the black community as well as poor people, college students and high school students.

An issue that struck at the core of concerns among the poor and blacks in general was housing. The Washington II project which was undertaken by the Greensboro Redevelopment Commission was aimed at destroying black neighborhoods and black businesses (Barnes, 1982, p. 66). In August of 1968 GAPP helped to organize the poor residents in demanding the city council hold hearings on the destructive policies of this project. GAPP was not successful in stopping the project, but they were able to mobilize hundreds of blacks to attend meetings and receive better code enforcement of the existing housing. GAPP was now known as an advocate for the poor and the dispossessed.

Nelson Johnson, who had been working with FCD and Howard Fuller, was well aware that momentum was very important to successful mobilization. Johnson worked hard to bring all levels of the community together to mobilize on a community-wide basis. One group that continually supported change in Greensboro were students.

The militancy that surrounded college campuses during the late 1960s was never more visible than at North Carolina A & T State University and Bennett College, a private
Methodist all girls school that always supported A & T students in efforts for change. (This bond predates the famous 1960 sit-ins). Johnson, while serving as a GAPP organizer, was also Vice President of the Student Government Association (SGA), and with this direct contact with militant leadership among students, he was able to influence the political agenda for students at A & T State University.

Johnson's organizing skills grew, as did GAPP's reputation of helping the poor. No problem was too small. If anyone had a problem downtown, GAPP would go with them to redress their grievance. It was not a surprise to many when A & T students were supportive of the boycott of classes at an all black high school in May, 1969. The students at A & T became supportive of a high school student, Claude Barnes, who was declared a militant and ineligible to run for student council president. The incident strained racial tensions so much in the city that National Guard units had to be called in to reassert state control over the A & T campus and the black community. This one incident, where one student was killed from the gunfire that ensued, united all segments of the black community. It was viewed as an attack on the entire black community (see Chafe, 1980). Dr. George Simkins told the North Carolina Civil Rights Committee, who investigated the entire incident, that what happened was just another manifestation of the double
standards that existed in Greensboro. "Would the same
things have happened," he asked, "at a white school or
university?"^2

Black leaders went to great lengths to hide their
differences. The militancy of GAPP and the moderation of
the traditional leadership allowed previously untouchable or
unimportant issues like rent strikes and cafeteria workers
to be placed on the political agenda. This level of
involvement with the poor in the black community was
unprecedented in Greensboro, and 1971 saw GAPP at a
crossroads. Division over the issue of integration of
schools between the militants and the moderates in the black
community had lessened the strength of GAPP, but issues such
as police brutality still enabled GAPP to maintain a
foothold in the black community. When an elderly black
woman was beaten by city police, the black community was
outraged. From this incident GAPP lead the way in forming
Black Citizens Concerned with Police Brutality or BCCPB.
The organization stretched the continuum within the black
community with an extremely broad base.

GAPP was ever mindful of the fact that it had to retain
legitimacy among the moderate leadership in the black
community. So it worked in traditional political circles,
also. In 1968 and 1969 GAPP supported voter registration
drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns for leading black
candidates. But in the early 1970s GAPP was heavily influenced by the North Carolina Nationalists (NCN) (Barnes, 1982). This influence paralleled the African Liberation Movement that stressed Pan Africanism. Marxists-Leninists views moved GAPP leadership from working on a day-to-day basis in the community dealing with grassroots concerns to an examination of the problems of the people being a class issue. Thereby, "Proletarianization" or getting a job in the factory and organizing workers were considered the only worthwhile activities (Barnes, 1982, p. 112).

Funding for GAPP ended after FCD's grant, and it was not able to secure independent funding. When the money ran out, individuals volunteered their time and effort (Brandon, 1987). Funding was a problem, but even more devastating was the internal ideological debate over the classic question, "is it a race question or a class question?" By 1975 GAPP was for all practical purposes dead. Nelson Johnson and his followers from the old GAPP organization moved ultimately to the Communist Workers Party (CWP), which placed them at the extreme left of the political spectrum and caused them to lose the base of support that they had with GAPP. Even their deadly confrontation with right-wing Nazis and Klansmen on November 3, 1979 in a neighborhood that GAPP once organized did not bring the kind of outpouring of support from the black community as these individuals had
experienced in the past. In this situation they led the organization in a direction that poor people could no longer identify with and were not willing to follow.

**Durham: Foundation Mobilization**

In Durham the local CAA is Operation Breakthrough (OBT). OBT is still in existence today but operates in Durham as a deliverer of services, an arm of the local government. But in terms of its impact and its legacy, OBT was one of the most activist oriented CAAs in the nation. After studying OBT, the question that haunts this researcher is, if Durham could not transcend the limits of federal guidelines and local white political domination, then where could it have been possible?

OBT, incorporated in 1964, was born in controversy. The selection of the first executive director was a hint of the level of involvement that blacks in Durham intended to play in the running of OBT. Initially upper income blacks were appointed to the board, and John Wheeler of the Durham Committee on Black Affairs (who was instrumental in bringing the North Carolina Fund [NCF] to Durham) insisted on black and poor participation.

In 1964 there was only one black on the board of directors of OBT; by 1967 the number had increased to 15, equal to that of the white members on the board. The executive committee was balanced racially so, in essence,
actual control was consistently achieved by blacks because of their superior attendance record (approximately 75 percent as against slightly less than 50 percent for whites) ("Crisis," 1968). OBT took a strong stand in support of community organization by stating:

There are other kinds of poverty, too, in addition to economic deprivation. There is the poverty of not knowing, of being 'left out' in community affairs, of lack of self-respect. . . . Operation Breakthrough is seeking to help the poor break these shackles of poverty, too.

The North Carolina Fund's board of directors also endorsed these organizational activities:

We [believe] that the direct participation and involvement of the poor is essential to a successful community action process. . . . It should be noted that . . . we speak of encouraging the poor to act for themselves in neighborhood councils or in participation in community action boards or in other agencies. ("A Case Study," 1968, p. 23)

With this type of stated focus, an individual committed to citizen participation, and who also had the experience, was needed to guide a pro activist program like OBT. Howard Fuller was naturally suited to fulfill this leadership role (see Chapter 3). He was quoted as saying, "I want to get people together on the basis of the things that bothered them" (NCF, 1968). Fuller did not use any particular methodology; this was his first attempt at community organizing. "I acted like I knew what was going on for the benefit of my staff," Fuller noted. After observing Howard Fuller and his confrontational style with poor people, it
could be argued that he had possibly been influenced by the works of Saul Alinsky. This was not the case, for Fuller related:

I didn't know a whole lot about Alinsky at that time. Actually I'd read some stuff, but I can't really say that I learned a lot about direct action in grad school. But I did work with CORE, and then when I finally went down to North Carolina, I was just trying a lot of stuff that made sense. We would just throw it out there and go from there. (Fuller, 1987)

That which Fuller "threw out" was enough to change the way the poor viewed themselves and the political system; perhaps more importantly, Fuller's leadership action significantly changed the way the political system viewed the poor in Durham. In a move reminiscent of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), in 1966 neighborhood residents and the Community Action Technicians (CATs) led by Fuller, surprised the Durham County Democratic convention by arriving unexpectedly at two precinct meetings and electing representatives to the convention.

This type of action was unprecedented in Durham; it was very atypical poverty behavior. Robert Foust, the executive director, had to look at the technicality involved with this incident, OBT workers being involved in partisan precinct meetings. Forced to admit that at least two vehicles had been used, Foust could cite a legal opinion, which stated:

Since Operation Breakthrough was not under government control, he found no 'misuse' (i.e., violation of the Hatch Act) of Federal funds was involved. ("Crisis and Conflict", 1968, p. 6)
This incident was labeled a misunderstanding, but it was sufficient ammunition for those forces that were critics of OBT. OBT alienated city officials with its involvement later that year with an old issue surrounding the refusal of landlords to repair substandard rental units. OBT pressed the issue and alienated the mayor, who was appalled that the residents would not take the city's word to resolve this issue. He felt the incident confirmed his view that the poverty program had fallen into "irresponsible" and "ultra-liberal" hands. Thus emerged an estrangement between city hall and OBT that would only worsen with the progression of time. "He would feel that until purged and put back under the control of 'responsible people' (such as he had first appointed to the ADD Committee) the agency would cease to be an asset to the community" ("Crisis and Conflict," 1968, p. 26).

OBT, with its mobilization of poor people, was considered fair game by its opponents. Following the first primary of 1966, the local (white) Citizen's Council launched a blatantly alarmist campaign that alleged an extremist plot against the city. The culprits were (in order) Operation Breakthrough, The North Carolina Fund, the Durham Council on Human Relations, and the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs.
The opposition did not stop there, because soon the controversy caught the attention of the conservative freshman Congressman from North Carolina's Fourth District, James Gardner. Gardner, who had a reputation as a right-winger and segregationist, served on the House Education and Labor Committee. In July, 1967 Gardner leveled charges that OBT workers were "handing out sample ballots, telling people how to vote."

Initially, Sargeant Shriver, then Director of OEO, backed OBT, declaring that no federal or state law, nor any OEO regulations had been violated ("Crisis and Conflict," 1968). As pressure from the Gardner forces and the more liberal democratic Congressman, Nick Galifianakis, in the Fifth District increased, Shriver started to weaken his support of OBT. The final collapse came during the summer when low income residents who had been organized by OBT's CATs had reached an impasse with Durham Housing Authority. These residents had joined forces with a more independent organization called United Organization for Community Improvement (UOCI). Fuller and Ben Ruffin, UOCI's executive director, warned the city council that the black community was becoming impatient. The council held firm in their reluctance to move on the housing issue. A march downtown that was orderly, except for a few rocks that were thrown,
led to an investigation of OBT and a reprimand for the director, by Sargent Shriver's office.

The agency and the director had the support of the black poor, but the federal restrictions caused it to be ineffective in mounting a challenge to the local political system. And because the crisis had so weakened the effectiveness of the director William Pursell, in October 1967 he offered his resignation to be effective December 1967.

**United Organization for Community Improvements (UOCI)**

From that point forward, OBT had to play a greatly diminished role. But the poor were not left to fend for themselves without any support. The burden of mobilization of the poor now fell upon the shoulders of United Organization for Community Improvements (UOCI).

UOCI was an independent organization, funded by The North Carolina Fund, that included the poor in decision making and supported confrontational politics. UOCI received its charter from the state of North Carolina in January 1966 and from Durham County in February 1966. Ben Ruffin, who had worked as an organizer with OBT, became the first executive director of UOCI.

UOCI began its involvement in issues that concerned the poor by organizing assaults on the school system and city council meetings. While it could not involve itself in
conflicts, UOCI continued to mobilize the communities. UOCI's independence was short lived, because if it was established that UOCI's activities were legislative lobbying, then it would lose its tax exempt status. This was one of the reasons why UOCI joined forces with a group called the Citizens Action Committee (CAC) to form CAC-UOCI. This way CAC could carry much of the weight for pressing demands for the community. CAC-UOCI had community support that was witnessed in a meeting in July 1967 where UOCI had packed the council chamber; John Wheeler, spokesman for the Durham Committee, told the council that they supported the objectives of the CAC-UOCI. In September of that same year, again with the city council chamber packed, broad support was apparent from the community. For that night:

Representatives from all economic levels of the black community spoke vigorously against the annexation of Bacon Street. Speakers included millionaire Asa Spaulding, president of North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, the largest black business in the world, as well as Mrs. Ann Atwater, UOCI employee; Dr. Ray Thompson, a professor at North Carolina College; and Jim Porter, who cleaned laboratories in Duke's biological science building. (Strange, 1972a, p. 133)

It was this type of consciousness among blacks in Durham that enabled them to push for change and entrance into the economic and political system. This surge brought about gains, some significant and some minor, but all were made possible only after the exertion of tremendous amounts of time, energy and resources (see Redburn, 1970).
In 1968, after pressing for changes in hiring practices among Durham merchants and receiving a token response, UOCI came together with another organization that included poor, middle and upper class blacks and called itself the Black Solidarity Committee (BSC). Ruffin would for the next year share the spotlight with insurance executive, Howard Clements of North Carolina Mutual. BSC pressed for "essential" demands dealing with employment, education, welfare, police and fire, private housing, public housing, the creation of a human relations commission, and increased black representation on 15 city and county decision-making bodies (Redburn, 1970, p. 162). In an effort to bring pressure on the private as well as the public sector, BSC launched a selective buying campaign that lasted from July 28, 1968 through February 16, 1969. BSC was able to effectively boycott downtown merchants (especially during the Christmas shopping season) and get some of the demands they wanted satisfied.

Also in 1968 the political mobilization process was evident as blacks became more aware of the political system. For in May of 1968 a coalition of blacks and liberals captured control of the Democratic Party machinery. Mrs. Ann Atwater (UOCI) was elected vice chairman. In the 1968 Democratic primary, two blacks were nominated for the five-man county commission, both were firsts. And a black
led the Democratic ticket for county school board, which was also a first for Durham.

Moving into the 1970s, UOCI changed its focus and moved more to the development of economic and social institutions within the black community and away from attempts to win concessions in a white dominated political system. Moving away from protests was reflective of the general pattern nationally, but it also points out the difficulty in keeping people focused on an issue over extended periods of time. As Ruffin noted after calling off the boycott,

>You have to know your people, and you just don't drive people to death. I mean you just don't do that. If the boycott doesn't work, is not effective, you're not getting results after nine months, then maybe you're not going to get them anyway, so you regroup and you come back with another program. (Redburn, 1970, p. 191)

UOCI was able to challenge and at times be irreverent because their funding came from religious groups such as the Episcopalians and primarily the Foundation for Community Development (FCD) after NCF closed its doors in 1968. Organizations around the state that could not receive traditional funding relied heavily upon FCD to prolong their unpopular political positions.

**Foundation for Community Development (FCD)**

FCD was a major force in North Carolina poverty politics. This analysis would not be complete without showing how it impacted on events in Durham and beyond. In
1966 federal poverty programs were generating more and more controversy by protesting against local political officials and bureaucracies. As local groups promoted "maximum feasible participation," OEO was under continued pressure from local communities and Congress to emasculate that potentially revolutionary concept. With the OEO placing increased restrictions on the political activities of federally assisted community action programs, a growing number of North Carolina Fund staff members became convinced that the Fund should play a larger role in the promotion of community organization ("Foundation," 1968). In order to allow for community organization to continue, it was felt that an organization should be created that could provide financial and technical assistance to the poor, since these were essentially the two basic resources that they lacked.

Nathan Garrett, the deputy director for the Fund, was given the responsibility of writing a proposal for an organization that would address the lack of independence of the poor. Garrett's proposal also addressed the issue of the poor being distrustful of the political system and feeling left out of important decision making. It stated: "The poor must be convinced that there is a good chance for success and must have confidence that they can achieve this success" ("Foundation," 1968). The proposal had no trouble
being accepted by the board and FCD became operative in December 1967.

Garrett was executive director, and Howard Fuller was named director of community organizations. This enabled Fuller to work statewide with community groups. FCD emphasized the need for economic development, but its major emphasis was on community organization.

FCD was not reluctant about initiating controversy. The best example would be FCD's willingness to play a role in 1969 in the founding and funding of Malcolm X Liberation University (MXLU). MXLU was originally founded in Durham, but later in 1970 moved to Greensboro. The school offered an alternative black centered education for black people. Howard was the charismatic leader of the school and left his position with FCD in order to devote full time efforts to the survival of MXLU. But even with his efforts, the lack of continuous funding caused MXLU to close its doors in 1973.

FCD had to defend itself continuously against accusations that it fomented violence in Greensboro and other racial trouble spots throughout the state. FCD even warranted the condemnation of Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina for its activities as an antipoverty agency (Chafe, 1980, pp. 272-273).
Throughout the state FCD was committed to empowerment for poor people. It felt that by providing financial and technical training, the organization could continue and escape the constraints of federal dollars. But ultimately even FCD in 1975 closed its doors when funds dried up and community organizing was no longer the emphasis of organizations during the retrenchments of the 1970s both in public and private sector funding.

Conclusion

The guiding proposition of this chapter has been that Community Action Programs brought about political mobilization by developing organizations that enhanced political consciousness in the black community. Was this the case? Did political mobilization come about in these cities due to the presence of a CAP? The evidence shows that there were different levels of mobilization that can be traced to the presence of a CAA in the respective cities. When viewed from the perspective of service as opposed to activist political orientations, research shows that Charlotte clearly had a service focus and did not allow for political organizations to form that would promote political mobilization. Greensboro is located between Charlotte and Durham with a combination of a service and activist orientation. Durham is classified as an example of an activist orientation and exhibited the most
mobilization and political consciousness of the three cities in this study.

The likelihood of a city adopting an activist or a service orientation, and their ability to promote consciousness and mobilization, was determined by seven factors: (1) the orientation of the board of directors and the executive director; (2) the cohesiveness of the black leadership; (3) the level of resistance in the white community; (4) the amount of political resources already present in the black community; (5) the funding source; (6) the militancy of the local civil rights movement; (7) the form of the electoral system; and finally (8) the presence of a master organizer.

Charlotte with its service orientation could not garner the political strength to overcome a sophisticated white business elite that was able to co-opt the local civil rights movement. Black leaders were not able to cast the leadership in a villainous role so that galvanizing issues could be used to mobilize the black community.

The fragmented leadership found in Charlotte was not represented by one umbrella organization, thus, decreasing the political resources available to the black community. The lack of resources hampered the community's ability to pursue a demand-making strategy and win concessions from conservative city and county governments. Local governments
were able to control the board and the director and forced a service orientation on the local CAA which did not allow for experimentation with or emphasis on political mobilization.

MWRO and DU were organizations that owed their genesis to organizers from the CAF, but these organizations did not have a lasting impact on the black community. Once these organizations moved outside of the boundaries of "consensus politics," they lost their funding and most of the leaders were absorbed into CAF or other governmental bureaucracies.

Finally, Charlotte did not allow CAPs to develop a master organizer that forced unpopular issues and the empowerment of the black community on the political agenda. Instead, issues continued to be funneled through existing agencies and the service orientation perpetuated a status quo relationship between blacks and whites and the rich and poor in Charlotte.

Greensboro was similar to Charlotte in that the local CAA was constrained by federal guidelines like the CAF, but differed from Charlotte with a grassroots organization like GAPP, that was able to foster an activist orientation for the black community. Political consciousness was enhanced in Greensboro by the poverty programs, but the enhancement was indirect. EOC was not able to organize the poor and continue protest actions that would fundamentally change the
status quo in the city. A conservative board and director that did not agree with an activist orientation controlled the local CAA and enforced a service posture. When the black community's leadership pressed for control of the board and a change in leadership, support from the white community dissipated. This lack of support also resulted in the local government's refusal to fund EOC.

It was because of EOC's limitations that leaders in the organization welcomed the mobilizing efforts of GAPP. GAPP which benefited from the spillover frustrations of EOC leaders, gained the support of the black community and made a concerted effort to raise the consciousness of the leaders and the community.

The poverty experience in Greensboro was different because the resources available to the community (strong active middle class, strong support from the educational community and churches) enabled the leadership to unite the black community. The unified leadership eminated from a strong civil rights movement and a stubborn white business community. The diverse leadership used the new resources to support civil rights and political mobilization efforts as long as federal and foundation support was available. EOC's funding was determined by the federal and local governments, and GAPP relied upon foundation funding. When the
organizations lost their funding, their independence also ended.

The efforts of GAPP were particularly effective for a brief period. This was due to the presence of a master organizer and the support he received from the traditional leaders in the black community.

Durham offers an example of a local CAA that was able to adopt an activist orientation and spinoff organizations that raised the consciousness of the leaders and the community. OBT differed as a CAA from EOC and CAF because the strong black middle class had input in the formation of OBT and a highly charismatic master organizer.

OBT's board and the executive director were supportive of efforts to organize the poor. As more control developed over the organization by the poor and less control by the city government, demands for control over funding emerged in Durham. This lead to the formation of numerous organizations that sought to escape the controls of being a governmental employer. Organizations like UOCI and FCD were very successful at making the poor an integral part of the political arena and conscious of their power potential.

The success and effectiveness of the spinoff organizations can be attributed to the master organizer. The organizer energized the black community and made the poor so important to the middle class black community that
an alliance was formed which challenged the tradition of black exclusion from Durham politics and decision making.

The perennial funding problem of poverty organizations hampered Durham's poverty program also and forced a retreat by OBT to a service orientation in order to survive. Those organizations that did not conform were allowed to close their doors when private foundations (Ford Foundation, Z. Smith Reynolds, Episcopal church) no longer supported independent organizing of the black poor.

Durham's activist orientation reflected the presence of tremendous political resources (DC, business and educational elites) by the black community and its unity enlarged by the presence of a militant civil rights movement commensurate to Greensboro's civil rights activities. The poverty experiences of the three cities show the possibilities and the limitations a federal mandate can have on implementation at the local level. Each city with its own particular brand of racism responded differently, thus causing different initiatives from the black community.

The poverty programs were not intended to bring about structural changes. When it did happen, it was only after extraordinary efforts on the part of the black community. In city after city, blacks had to use resources provided by the government and resources that were there before the poverty programs existed. These programs, when they
mobilized blacks, showed that confrontational politics had its merits, but it also revealed how difficult it was to bring about change through the incremental nature of the political system—a system that appeared to work for the white community yet threw all types of obstacles in the way for blacks. The best example of this was in Durham where it required of UOCI months of bargaining, threatening, and the support of the entire black community to get the city government to grant their demand of denying a housing project in their community. An identical demand was presented by whites with their lawyer appearing before the city council with 100 signatures on a petition. After 15 minutes, he was successful (Strange, 1972c, p. 61). This researcher is reminded of Strange's (1972a) statement: "If blacks in Durham with all of its resources experience such difficulty, what responses do they receive elsewhere?" The author feels the answer to that question has been demonstrated by the evidence presented.

After all of the confrontation, some were disillusioned about what the poverty programs were supposed to accomplish. With the tremendous resistance offered locally and nationally, one may not be taking a completely cynical view when one's assessment of their purpose is stated as follows:

I feel they [local elites] were concerned about the programs because they were racists and they were not interested in seeing black people and poor people really become empowered through the use of the vote or
any mechanism. What people really wanted to happen was for the community action programs to simply be another service agency that would teach people how to manage their poverty and not get involved in anything that would bring about radical change. (Fuller, 1987)

These three anti-poverty programs reveal the dependence of the black community upon external forces to sustain change. When the federal government provided resources to alter the delivery of services to the poor, political pressure applied at the federal level changed the policy focus of the programs that curtailed activism immediately. The point cannot be overlooked that public and private funding respond to the prevailing political winds. Foundation support which enabled the poor to circumvent governmental control effectively stopped their financial support after the 1969 revision of the Internal Revenue Code. This revision jeopardized officials with criminal penalties if the funds were determined to be supporting political action (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974, p. 234). Experimentation for the upper class had become too politically and financially expensive.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1 Claude Barnes, A Consideration of the Relationship Between Ideology and Activism in the Black Nationalist Movement: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of the Greensboro Association of Poor People (GAPP). M.A. Thesis, Atlanta University, 1982 is the basis for some of the material presented in this section.

CHAPTER VI
SKILL DEVELOPMENT IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY

Introduction
This chapter analyzes the extent to which CAP-inspired organizations developed new kinds of skills in the black community. First the premise is established concerning why skill development is necessary and ways to overcome this limited resource. After that the chapter examines the literature that supports the proposition that the local CAAs provided the arena for skills to be developed. This is followed by an analysis of each city, determining whether or not skills were developed and the type of skills that developed. If they were acquired, were there other forces or mechanisms in place that could have been as equally responsible? The chapter concludes by assessing the differences found in each city, why they existed, and the impact they have had on the black community.

Chapter V examined CAPs and the effect that they had on the arousal of political consciousness. Given that each city had a CAA and other poverty related programs, the question addressed in this chapter is, did these programs benefit the leaders by supplying them with new skills?
And if they did, were they skills that could have been obtained elsewhere?

This analysis operates from a premise espoused by Matthew Holden. Holden (1973), in his assessment of the "Politics of the Black Nation," offers the observation that within the black community, among its leadership, there is a scarcity of organizational resources. The resources are technical-bureaucratic skills, money, internal attention and external recognition. Internal attention and external recognition were examined as sources of power and conflict in the black community in Chapter IV. There it was shown how blacks (especially in Charlotte) were vying for external recognition when the resource, money, was made available to the community. Due to the shortage of these organizational resources and the inherent competition over them, black mobilization is made that much more difficult. But Durham and Greensboro showed these obstacles can be overcome. Did CAPs enhance technical-bureaucratic skills?

Skills - Definition

First it must be pointed out what exactly is meant by technical-bureaucratic skills. Technical-bureaucratic skills are those skills that allow a group to possess the management of competencies necessary to anticipate, counteract, and outmaneuver the dominant forces (Holden, 1973, p. 9). These skills, which enable blacks to mount
campaigns, tenant or rent strikes, and negotiate with city fathers or bureaucrats, are all vitally important to successful mobilization. The main reasons for the lack of available skills in the black community are the limited scope of occupations and education. The limitations in these two areas have curtailed the development of a skillful pool of individuals to whom leaders are able to turn for support and expertise. This, Holden (1973) says, "is the behavioral consequence of the institution of segregation" (p. 10).

Skills limitation may be overcome, in part, by using money to hire people (Holden, 1973, p. 10). And this is precisely the effect that CAPs and poverty related programs had on the black community. The main point that Nathan Garrett made in his proposal to the North Carolina Fund for the establishment of the Foundation for Community Development was the need to provide to the poor funding (money) and technical expertise (master organizer). The interns that worked in Charlotte, Greensboro, and Durham were all part of an effort to expand the limited skills in the black community, so that these communities could mount an attack on the structures that maintain "domestic colonialism."

The view that the poverty programs imparted skills is argued by several students of the urban setting and public
policy. In discussing the development of skills, Holden notes the very important and basic point that:

All the denunciations of the Office of Economic Opportunity should not obscure the great importance of the enlargement of the black communities' skills pool which came simply because 'maximum feasible participation' got a lot of people used to doing things. (Holden, 1973, p. 38)

The skills that the literature constantly refer to are centered around organizational skills. Kramer (1969) refers to them as "acquired community caretaking skills that may contribute to the political socialization of minority groups" (p. 262). These needed skills span the spectrum from those espoused by Holden, to organizing the black community to defy social, political, and economic suppression. Shank and Conant (1976) are very clear about what they saw as the long-run effect of the War on Poverty programs when they observed:

In the period from 1964 to 1966, about one-third of the local CAP field representatives were blacks, Puerto Ricans, or Mexican-Americans. Staff workers were major beneficiaries of the program as they gained extensive experience in executive, technical, and professional positions in the CAPs. The poverty program in effect took on the function of the old political party system which . . . afforded opportunities when other avenues of mobility were limited or blocked. [italics added] (p. 289).

Donovan (1973) attributes skills development not only to the organizational experiences of professionals, but to the political experiences of sizable numbers of indigenous workers and the experiences of the neighborhood poor
themselves. All of this blends well with Eisinger's (1979) findings in his national survey, where CAPers benefited from their CAP experience, while at the same time enriching the limited skill pool found in the black community.

The above literature suggests that involvement in CAPs was the precipitating experience that enlarged the skill pool in the black community. But as it was shown in Chapter IV, the question of how much of this skill enlargement is attributal to the civil rights movement must be analyzed. The answer to this question is significant, because in it resides a better understanding of whether or not the skills that were developed would have been present without the added CAP experience.

It was shown in Chapter IV that a pure comparison of CAPers and civil righters is impossible because 94 percent of the respondents had civil rights backgrounds, and all of the CAPers had civil rights backgrounds. But insight can be gleaned from asking the respondents which experience should be credited for skill development or if it was a combination of both. From these responses this researcher was able to ascertain the types of skills this elite developed and how they were used by those involved in this political attack on poverty.
An Overview of all Three Cities

The respondents in this study, who were selected based upon their demonstrated skills in leadership positions during the period studied, were asked if these skills emanated from CAP and CAP related involvement or civil rights involvement. For those who could not affix responsibility clearly to one category, only then were they allowed to choose the third option, "a combination of both."

An examination of all the respondents in Table 7 show that 56 percent (n=20) attributed their skill development to civil rights, with 42 percent (n=15) acknowledging that it was a combination of both, and only two percent (n=1) feeling it was CAPs alone that developed their skills. This shows again the strong impact the civil rights movement had on the black political elite.

The CAPers in this study, who all had civil rights backgrounds, were more divided in their perception of where their skills originated. Only 16 percent (n=3) felt a civil rights background was the dominant factor in providing skills. At the same time, only one respondent credited CAP as being primarily responsible. The overwhelming majority, 79 percent (n=15), thought it was a combination of both experiences that provided them with the skills that were of value to them later in life. This overall picture of the three cities conceal the disparities found among the
Table 7: Summary of Skill Development For All Three Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Skills</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>CAPers Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPs Related</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights and Previous</td>
<td>20 (56%)</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of Both</td>
<td>15 (42%)</td>
<td>15 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N =</td>
<td>36 (100%)</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

individual cities. It is to those differences and the type of skills developed that this analysis now addresses.

Charlotte

Skill development in Charlotte reflects the influence of the civil rights organizations and churches on the movement of blacks into mainstream politics. An examination of the views of all of the respondents and the CAPers substantiated this fact. Table 8 shows with all respondents 83 percent (n=5) felt that civil rights and previous organizational experience contributed to their skill development, while 67 percent (n=2) of the CAPers gave similar credit to civil rights. For those viewing a combination of both civil rights and CAP experience as the determinants of their skills, of all respondents 17 percent
Table 8: Source of Skill Development - Charlotte

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Skills</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>CAPers Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPs Related</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights and Previous Experience</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of Both</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N = 6</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(n=1) responded yes, while for the CAPers 33 percent (n=1) were of this opinion.

Table 8 above does not provide the entire story, but it is reflective of the actual picture of the people involved in the poverty programs. With limited involvement of the poor in the local CAA and contained leadership from the middle class, the black community could not rely solely upon the Charlotte Area Fund for change oriented leadership. Institutions that had the responsibility of fighting injustice and poverty prior to CAF entering the picture seized the opportunity to expand their influence and programs via the federally funded programs. The black leadership in Charlotte that was associated with CAF was composed primarily of individuals that had a combination of civil rights and religious background. This point is
significant due to the role these organizations were forced to play in developing skills before the CAF was formed. Skills existed, but CAF provided an opportunity for the leaders to further develop and enhance their skills.

The nature of the acquisition of additional skills was determined by the relationship the individual leader had with the service oriented CAF and the city fathers. The pattern that emerged in Charlotte was reflective of the fragmented leadership found in the black community. The divided leadership consisted of the more militant faction, who espoused pressure tactics, and the moderate to conservative faction, who were supportive of Charlotte's consensus style of politics.

The pressure oriented militant leadership was involved in the civil rights movement and threatened the white leaders with demonstrations, boycotts and marches that would have destroyed Charlotte's New South image. The role that churches and civil rights organizations played was essential to providing the black community with leaders who directed the campaign for the destruction of de jure segregation and greater political and economic parity. One respondent appropriately stated: "We weren't just sitting here waiting for the poverty programs to come and rescue us" (Shirley, 1987). The poverty program presented the opportunity for the enhancement of skills that were currently possessed.
The most notable example of this is with an individual like Reverend Elo Henderson, a Presbyterian minister who started organizing in the early 1960s. Reverend Henderson was a gentleman of his 50s when the CAF came to Charlotte. His skills of negotiating with city officials were perfected in the early 1960s. CAF, which felt it was at times being challenged by OIC, did not offer additional skills for Reverend Henderson. His skills came about through the activist nature of his ministry.

Reverend Robert Shirley is another interesting example of skills being developed during the pre-CAF period. Reverend Shirley was known in the community as an activist who did not mind confrontations. But the tactics he used were representative of his involvement with such organizations as the NAACP, Urban League, and CORE, which made him an organizer. It could be argued that experience in writing proposals and formulating budgets were skills only CAF associated activities would produce. But as Reverend Shirley pointed out, this was not necessarily the case, for he related:

We were here with our programs before CAF. I was special projects director for the Presbyterian Church in this area with 113 churches, and under that umbrella we dealt with housing, tutorial programs, and child care programs. . . . OIC was one of our programs. We had to formulate budgets and everything, no government funds at all were involved. . . . We did all kinds of proposal writing in those days. (Shirley, 1987)
Later OIC was funded by the CAF, and the organization grew and increased his contacts with governmental officials on the state and federal levels. So Shirley, like others, is an example of his skills being given an opportunity to broaden with federal money coming into Charlotte, but the United Presbyterian Church in conjunction with local civil rights organizations, initially developed the skills which made him a rather formidable opponent to city hall.\(^2\) And because these leaders were confrontational, their skills were less rewarding for them later in life.

James Polk, on the other hand, was a follower of consensus politics in Charlotte. He occupied a position as head of the Charlotte Bureau and benefited from poverty experience. Polk is an example of a CAPer who enhanced and enlarged his skills with the approval of the local power structure. The board of directors of CAF allowed the Charlotte Bureau to be its training arm, which placed Polk in the position of receiving grants from CAF, NCF and the Department of Labor. Polk states that this experience helped him immensely in the following ways:

Working with the program helped me to understand how one can work with and negotiate with different groups. It gave me the ability of reaching the point of really making something happen, to co-opt a situation and turn it to something positive. \ldots\) That experience provided that kind of opportunity but more important than that, I learned 'where the buttons are,' know where resources are so that you can impact on a situation. For example, if you want to do something in training, we now know that much of training is housed
in the Department of Labor—we know where in the Department of Labor to get certain kinds of funds and certain kinds of support for training people to get in certain kinds of industries and jobs. So it does provide you with a lot of know-how about how to get resources. (1987)

This type of skill attainment was evident with individuals who continued to work in the bureaucracy and became acculturated to the local bureaucracy. But even Polk placed limitations on how much credit the CAF should be given for his skills. He reminded this researcher that his ability to work with other groups and to negotiate was actually started with the East Side Improvement Council. This was the organization that brought in white city leaders and confronted them with questions concerning the improvement of their neighborhood. The discussions were at times intense, but they opened up an avenue for the East Side Council (ESC) to deal with getting jobs for blacks in Charlotte. This organization was formed in 1963 before CAF, but later became known as the Charlotte Bureau and was funded by the CAF. James Polk sharpened his skills initially with the neighborhood organization that he headed, not with the CAF.

The additional resources provided by the local CAA was able to enlarge the pool of resources available to the black community, but it did not start the development of skills among the black leadership. Skill enhancement is a more accurate description of what took place among those leaders
that were associated with CAF and the leaders overall. Institutions and organizations that were already in place in Charlotte had a greater impact. It was evident that leaders who practiced a moderate political style were given greater opportunities to enhance their skills at the federal government's expense, than those leaders that were confrontational and activist oriented. But even a political moderate, who viewed the conservative Fred Alexander as his political mentor, observed the following about the leadership that was absorbed by the city: "They don't kick the traces, they are not about to rock the boat." The skills that were acquired in Charlotte have been skills at the elite level that are viewed as legitimate, useful, and within the boundaries of the acceptable political and bureaucratic norms of consensus politics in Charlotte. Skills like organizing against city hall fall outside the mainstream in Charlotte and have been effectively disregarded as illegitimate tools by Charlotte's own mobilization of bias.

**Greensboro**

Greensboro is a city known for its civil rights movement. Skill development in this city reflects the impact of that movement. It is apparent that the local CAA, (EOC), and the grassroots organization, GAPP, were both influential in skill development in Greensboro. This point
is emphasized by the fact that, of all the respondents in Greensboro, 65 percent (n=11) attributed their skills to civil rights and previous experiences, while 35 percent (n=6) felt it was a combination of civil rights and CAP experience. But when only the CAPers are examined, it becomes clear that the respondents are less inclined to credit solely civil rights, but give more credit to both factors. Table 9 shows only 14 percent (n=1) of the CAPers credited civil rights and 86 percent (n=6) thought a combination of both was more accurate. This table further shows that the leaders valued the civil rights experience, but also would not discount the importance of CAPs and CAPs related experiences.

It must be reemphasized that the original reason for the lack of available skills in the black community are the limited scope of education and occupations. This limits

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Skills</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>CAPers Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPs Related</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights and Previous Experience</td>
<td>11 (65%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of Both</td>
<td>6 (35%)</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N =</td>
<td>17 (100%)</td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the pool of skillful individuals that can provide leadership for the black community (Holden 1973). Greensboro's blacks have been fortunate in that they have political resources that have enlarged the pool of skills available to leaders. The resources that provided skills for leaders in Greensboro are found in four primary areas: business, education, the church, and civil rights organizations.

Greensboro is similar to Charlotte in that skills were enhanced rather than solely developed among the black leaders. Institutions and organizations provided bases for skill development prior to EOC or GAPP being formed in Greensboro. The overlapping of poverty leadership and civil rights leadership allowed the community an opportunity to continue the civil rights struggle with additional funding provided by the federal government.

The business community was very important in providing skills because the black middle class was a major force behind the civil rights movement. This middle class that included doctors, lawyers, dentists, and bankers were also prominent in the local CAA. These individuals brought to these programs a broad array of skills that were untapped in some instances and only needed the legitimacy offered by the poverty programs. Skills that were developed from knowledge of the budgeting process, writing grants, and negotiating
Examples of the intermingling of skills must start with George Simkins. Simkins, a board member of EOC, a local dentist, and a power within the NAACP and GCA, describes himself as "a thorn in the power structure's side for many years" (Simkins, 1987). Simkins' work at organizing the GCA into a political organization that unified the black vote in Greensboro from the 1960s until today proves that he brings numerous resources to the bargaining table. His stint on the board only presented an opportunity for him to garner more benefits for himself and the black community.

Another member of the board was B. J. Battle, a civil rights activist and a member of the NAACP. He is also a bank officer with a local the black-owned and operated savings and loan. His skills with budgeting, audits, and federal regulations were developed in the black community also prior to EOC. Herman Fox, a board member, is an engineer, civil rights activist, and member of GCA. Fox brought skills to the board that had been tested with his work to get blacks registered and making them a political force in the city. It was due to the skills that these individuals brought to the board that they were able to demand a black director in the form of Charlie Davis. Again, the CAP program presented an opportunity for blacks
who had skills to embellish them at the government's expense.

The second resources that provided skills to the community was the church. Ministers in Greensboro who were supportive of the poverty programs, like Reverends Otis Hairston and Prince Graves, were individuals who developed their skills of negotiations, budgeting, organizing, and outmaneuvering the local white elites through the efforts of the church and the political inspirations of individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr. Morris (1984) and Chafe (1980) document the vital roles that civil rights organizations and institutions like the church played in developing leaders with skills that were so vitally needed in the black community.

The local black high school and the black colleges were the third pool of skills that the community could draw upon for leadership. Although A & T State University is state supported and its leadership has been conservative at times, the school has always played a role in providing manpower (students) and expertise (faculty and staff) that supported the community during the entire civil rights movement. Bennett, like A & T, provided manpower and expertise that supported the black leaders in the city (Chafe, 1980).

The fourth political resource that enlarged the skills pool for blacks was the area of civil rights organizations.
The NAACP and the GCA were vital in providing the talents needed to unify the black vote and leadership. But there were other leaders that emerged during the civil rights period that were not traditional in their approach to civil rights. This group of younger, more radical leaders learned grassroots organizing in such organizations as SNCC, CORE, and SCLC. GAPP was an organization that received the benefits of the younger more radical participants.

Nelson Johnson, who was a master organizer, is a typical example of individuals that emerged from this type of background and who pushed for radical change. GAPP was the logical extension for this orientation; other organizations were too moderate. Lewis Brandon, a board member of EOC and GAPP, is another example of civil rights influence and poverty experience. Brandon had an activist background. He was active with the student movement in the early 1960s, NAACP, Vice Chairman of CORE, and member of the Democratic and Reform Democratic parties. All of these activities, he felt, "prepared him to confront the conservative white leadership on the board and not sit back and rubberstamp the actions of others" (Brandon, 1987). Lewis Brandon saw organizing as an important skill that he developed. He stated:

Organizing, that was the key thing. Most of us who came out of it [GAPP] were able to pull people into organizing and to train and direct activities in certain directions. The ability to make various
analytical assumptions about political issues or conditions in the community. And then to generate some kind of movement around issues. (1987)

GAPP and EOC attracted individuals that had been pushing for change and political mobilization prior to the arrival of these organizations. But like most communities during this period, momentum was waning. The infusion of monies and technical expertise gave new life to the movement. Now these individual could sharpen their skills knowing that power from the federal level had (originally) sanctioned their attack on political poverty. So it is for these reasons that the respondents understandably attribute skill development to both the civil rights movement and the poverty programs.

Durham

Durham is a city that differed from Greensboro and Charlotte in important ways. The data shows a lower influence of strictly civil rights experience for skill development than either of the other two cities. This is reflected in the overall assessment and even moreso when you control for CAPers only. Table 10 shows that 61 percent (n=8) of those interviewed in Durham felt that a combination of civil rights and CAPs involvement contributed to their skill development, while 31 percent (n=4) credited civil rights only, and 8 percent (n=1) note CAPs as being the primary factor. The 31 percent is the lowest of the three
Table 10: Source of Skill Development – Durham

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Skills</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>CAPers Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPs Related</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights and</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination of Both</td>
<td>8 (61%)</td>
<td>8 (89%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N =</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cities for civil rights involvements. Charlotte and Greensboro were 83 percent and 65 percent, respectively. The difference in Durham is highlighted among the CAPers due to the fact that none of the nine respondents attributed civil rights involvement only as the primary factor in their skill development; yet, Durham is the only city to produce a CAPer that attributes skill development to CAPs solely.

An explanation for the low civil rights and previous experience percentage can be found in the fact that the local CAA (OBT) and other organizations like NCF, FCD, and UOCI dominated the political and social landscape of Durham during this period. A fact that is also emphasized is that civil rights in Durham was promoted through the Durham Committee (DC). Membership in both the poverty programs and the DC was common place, so it is understandable that one
would denote both experiences as being responsible for skill development.

The analysis goes much further than dual membership in explaining how and what types of skills developed in Durham. Possibly the reason why Durham's poverty programs were so active was due to the fact that blacks in Durham were well on their way to political mobilization and empowerment when the programs arrived.

The organizational resources of Durham's black community far exceeds the resources found in the other cities included in this study. The leaders in Durham had at their disposal a pool of skills that was similar to that found in Greensboro (business, education, the church, and civil rights/political organization). In the area of economics, Durham's black business community is legendary. The black churches in Durham have benefited from a middle class that is affluent and involved with community development. For this reason prominent ministers play a valued role in the community. And thirdly, the presence of the local university, North Carolina Central University, has been closely tied to growth and development of the broader black middle class community. Finally, the Durham Committee (DC) has been able to galvanize these resources and mount a challenge to white insensitivity to the plight of the overall black community.
Prior to the entrance of the poverty programs in Durham, the black middle class dominated the political scene. OBT and the North Carolina Fund changed this middle class domination and awakened the low-income black community. During this process skills were developed and enhanced in the entire black community. Some of these skills would benefit maintaining the status quo, while others were of a change-seeking nature.

Skill development and enhancement in Durham was tied to the civil rights movement and CAPs involvement. The aforementioned superior political resources found in Durham enabled the dominant black middle class greater opportunities to enhance skills that they possessed and the lower class an opportunity to obtain skills.

Durham provides a picture of the dominance of a black political organization whose leadership overlapped with the poverty leadership. Like Greensboro and Charlotte, local civil rights leaders wanted to co-opt the federal resources and advance their civil rights agenda. Examples of leaders enhancing their skills are numerous, but a few that are representative of Durham's leaders should suffice for this study's purpose.

At the highest level of the NCF, which also funded OBT, was John Wheeler. John Wheeler was a member of the board of NCF and its treasurer. These positions, which were highly
visible, increased his clout among whites and blacks. The position of treasurer was most befitting due to his position as president of the black-owned and operated Mechanics and Farmers Bank. His background with the DC and the NCF made him a more powerful individual in the political arena. This was coupled with his close association with Governor Terry Sanford. His negotiating skills may have been challenged but not necessarily from only the white community. Wheeler had to expand his abilities here in order to contain community organizing of low-income residents. But due to his involvement with CAPs at an earlier time, he was (like any true leader) able to do those things necessary to maintain power.

Nathan Garrett was another example of a participant who had skills that were further developed with the NCF and later with FCD. Garrett, who was also active in the DC, was very blunt about the skills he felt he acquired by working in these programs that were carried over into politics.

My experiences as the Controller and then ultimately Deputy Director of NCF and chief with the FCD gave me a tremendous insight into management and managerial procedures. [So as county commissioner,] one of the things I think I did was to help open up the managerial process. (1987)

Nathan Garrett's experience rubbed off on those who were associated with him. Even Howard Fuller, who stated that he "grew into adulthood in North Carolina," gained skills that were beneficial to his own personal and
professional growth. When asked if he felt his NCF experience helped him to develop any particular skills that he now possessed, he was quick to respond:

Yes, Nathan taught me a lot. General administrative things, because we had a small agency, plus I worked with him on the budget. I think one thing people didn't realize about me was that I was a competent administrator. Nathan never had to worry about the board; I kept him informed. If things came up that he needed to know, I told him about, so he would be able to respond. (1987)

Fuller was able to take those experiences and use them later in his stint as Secretary of State Personnel in Wisconsin. He noted that it was because of his credentials and administrative background that he was chosen for this position, but also because he organized a grassroots effort that delivered the needed votes for victory. Fuller's organizing skills were embellished in North Carolina by "doing things that seemed to make sense." While in Cleveland, Ohio, working with CORE, Fuller participated in many voter registration drives, school boycotts, and other demonstrations. "It was also there that Fuller began developing his theories about effective ways of organizing poor people" ("United Organizations," 1968, p. 5). North Carolina provided the laboratory for Fuller to experiment with and refine his bureaucratic and grassroots skills.

Ms. Ann Atwater is a textbook example of the indigenous resident developing leadership skills as a result of local CAA involvement. Ms. Atwater noted that it was her training
as a Community Action Technician (CAT) that was most beneficial to her development. Ms. Atwater learned not only to have faith in herself, but was also able to instill that faith in others that followed her lead. Part of her job was to go to different agencies and find out how they worked, and this she did so well that she became a virtual authority on the city's bureaucracy and could tell anyone who they had to see in order to have a problem resolved. There is no doubt that Ms. Atwater, who now works as a housing liaison for the Durham Housing Authority, would not have gained the respect and aggressive organizing skills that she now possesses had it not been for the War on Poverty in Durham.

A final example of the type of individual that emerged out of the Durham poverty experience with a combination of skills is Ben Ruffin. Ruffin was a community organizer for OBT and later became the director of UOCI. Ruffin was a militant with civil rights experience and membership in the DC. Coming out of college and working for the poverty programs gave Ruffin the communication skills and socialization needed to ascend to a leadership position, especially when the programs were seeking to develop black leaders from the ghetto. As he traced his skill development he remembered:

I did fund raising for UOCI, learned how to budget, to organize. With UOCI we had a grant, but I had to go out and try to figure out a way to leverage these monies. I also developed skills of management by
working with people, managing staff, managing programs. (1987)

Ruffin felt that because of his experience with OBT, NCF, and UOCI, he developed contacts across the state. This prepared him for the problems with which he had to deal in the Governor's office. He viewed his survival as being attributable to the reputation he had gained earlier.

The list of individuals that garnered skills from the poverty programs is extensive. But a central theme that runs through all the respondents was their involvement with the Durham Committee. Even the militants respected the power and community support of the DC. This organization with other political resources provided the base from which skills were developed. CAP, UOCI, FCD were all opportunities for Durham's middle class to enhance skills and the poor to begin to develop political skills.

Grassroots Organizational Skills vs. Technical Bureaucratic Skills

In all three cities it was shown that leaders received unequal benefits from the skills they acquired, both from civil rights and previous experiences, and through CAP experience. Militants and those who were confrontational were not absorbed into the local bureaucracy or allowed to transfer their skills into mainstream political and bureaucratic arenas. It was also shown that certain skills
were acceptable while others proved to be liabilities. The analysis started by emphasizing the acquisition of technical bureaucratic skills. These are skills that emphasize the competencies needed to guide the black community against not only overt barriers to political exclusion, but also institutional barriers that have been just as effective. The institutional barriers have taken on a greater significance, because the reform movement has put in place new machines that do not respond to political pressure that European ethnics used when they captured city halls (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974). Now it is necessary for blacks to be able to challenge and counteract the impact of these islands of power. Budgeting, grant and proposal writing, greater familiarity with the negotiation process with Federal, state and local officials, networking and "knowing where the buttons are located" are skills that reflected the middle class bias the majority society uses to maintain the status quo. Acquiring these skill have been an asset for the middle class blacks that were absorbed by the local government.

In each city different skills that attacked the status quo were also developed, and these skills are referred to as grassroots organizational skills. These skills entailed organizing the poor to press for economic boycotts, rent strikes and escrow accounts, marches, mobilizing a community
to stop discrimination and police brutality, and challenging the omnipotence of local bureaucracies. These are skills that sought to increase resources to obtain welfare goals for the poor. These skills were not developed in a vacuum or exclusive of technical bureaucratic skills. The leaders had to be proficient in both areas in order to be effective in the ghetto. The poor needed and respected organizers that possessed technical bureaucratic skills also, especially when this meant the organizers could help the poor put pressure on the right agency to get medical or day care benefits or to prevent them from being evicted because due process was not observed.

Grassroots organizational skills were enhanced more in the activist CAAs than in the service CAAs. Durham had more individuals gaining grassroots organizational skills when the agency had independent funding. Durham also provided the best example of indigenous leaders developing grassroots organizational skills, as well as middle class organizers developing these skills. The master organizers were middle class and had a background of involvement with civil rights organizations. In this case they were enhancing skills while the indigenous were for the first time in their lives developing grassroots skills.

Grassroots organizational skills were not transferable to other arenas. It was for this reason that the Colemans
of Charlotte, Ruffins and Atwaters of Durham, and Johnsons and Brandons of Greensboro withdrew from the activist positions or moderated their positions in order to survive in their respective cities. The white power structure did not reward dissent. The irony is that the middle class had a choice; the few indigenous leaders did not have a choice. They were handicapped by their lack of middle class credentials that would open the local government or bureaucracy to them if they decided to move in that direction. The distance back to the center was not as great for the black middle class as it was for the black poor.

Technical bureaucratic and grassroots organizational skills were both enhanced by the poverty programs. Whether the individual chose to pursue the application of technical bureaucratic skills vs. grassroots organizational skills depended on the individual's political orientation and the orientation of the organization.

Conclusion

The availability of technical bureaucratic skills that Holden spoke of was enhanced with the movement of CAAs into the three cities studied. With money being the most expeditious answer to alleviating the shortage of skills, public and private funding fulfilled that need temporarily. In all three cities individuals were able to garner skills that could be used in a selfish or selfless manner. Either
way, the acquisition of skills was at the government's expense.

The cities that had an effective civil rights movement and a sizeable pool of skillful leaders were the most successful in building and enhancing skills. Greensboro and Durham fit this mold more than Charlotte, and Durham more than Greensboro.

The skills that the respondents felt were most important paralleled the skills highlighted in the literature. Those were budgeting, grant and proposal writing, increased knowledge of the mechanics of the bureaucracy, managerial skills, grassroots organizing, negotiating with officials, voter registration drives, rent strikes, boycotts and electoral politics (Donovan, 1973; Holden, 1973; Eisenger, 1979; Kramer, 1969; Piven and Cloward, 1971). The indirect effects of this skill development in all three cities, and especially Durham, were the confidence that the individuals began to exhibit and the increase in political efficacy in the individuals involved in the poverty programs.

Would these skills have developed without the poverty programs? The answer is yes, but at a slower rate. The civil rights movement was moving to break down barriers to occupations and education, which are the major causes of skill limitations. The poverty programs gave the change
seekers an official status, external recognition that coincided with the militant phase of the civil rights movement. But change was possible to any significant degree only when group cohesion and political consciousness guided these newly embellished skills.

A sad note about the skill development stage of CAPs is that in each city only those persons that were accorded "external recognition" achieved a level of success. If in the process one acquired organizing skills, political disruption skills or any skills that could be classified as grassroots organizational skills, the 1970s and 1980s have had very little use for them. On the other hand, those skills that were viewed as acceptable (budgeting, management, communication, negotiating compromises) and most reflect the dominant political culture were skills most beneficial to the individuals. Whether they were beneficial to the black community will be addressed in the concluding chapter.
Footnotes to Chapter VI

1 NAACP—National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. CORE—Congress of Racial Equality.

2 Typical of the atmosphere surrounding Reverend Shirley's contact with the CAF's board is the following: "A board memeber told Shirley in a heated exchange, "You all will get funded over my dead body." Shirley replied, "Well, get ready because you're dead!"

3 A strictly Southern expression, which refers to two side straps or chains connecting a harnessed draft animal to a vehicle. The traces are confining and keep the animal under control.

4 B. J. Battle in 1986 replaced George Simkins as president of the local NAACP. Simkins retired from a position he held for over 25 years.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

Chapter VII concludes this study of CAP influence on the development of the black political elite in three cities in North Carolina. The emphases of the chapter will be the impact of CAP agencies on the recruitment process, group consciousness and political organizations, and skill development among black leadership that had CAP experience.

In order to assess the true significance of this study and to summarize the findings of the preceding chapters, this chapter will unfold in the following manner. The first section will provide a brief overview of the emergence of CAP agencies in each city. The second section will summarize the findings of this study. The third section describes the significance of the chapter in relation to previous research. The fourth section of this chapter will provide an assessment of the implications of these findings on the continuing campaign for social justice and the political mobilization of the poor. Finally, the author will suggest avenues for future useful research in this field.

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Poverty Program Emergence in Three Cities

Poverty programs in North Carolina had a head start on the rest of the country. The state of North Carolina declared poverty to be a threat to the economic, social and political stability of its major urban areas before the federal government. Other parts of the country were experiencing social unrest during the early 1960s, but the South lead the way in the civil rights movement. The civil rights movement and the position that the National Democratic Party was forced to take on the race issue started the dissolution of the New Deal Coalition that had given the Democratic Party dominance on both the national and state levels, and particularly in the South. This New Deal Coalition was comprised primarily of the South, labor, urban Catholics and blacks (Asher, 1984, p. 23) and was a strained coalition with white Southerners and blacks (Northern) in the same party. This was tolerable for whites in the South because prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) blacks were political objects and not political participants in the southern political system. But with the advancements of the Civil Rights Movement and the national party being perceived as being in favor of civil rights and social programs, the white South deserted the Democratic Party at the presidential level. Lyndon Johnson, who was a strong supporter of civil rights legislation, was a
Southerner who could not keep these states from supporting a Republican candidate that had voted against this legislation (Asher, 1984). This movement of the South, out of the control of the National Democratic Party, caused a dilemma that has prevailed even into the 1980s. Paul Abramson (1973, p. 7) has noted that "the major Democratic liability is that blacks share an integral part of their coalition, and that black votes are costly." These "costly" votes were the only chance left for the Democrats to still maintain power. In an effort to empower the black vote in the major industrialized states, the Democratic party bypassed state and local officials in order to place resources directly in the hands of the poor (blacks). This was the only means of patronage that was feasible due to the impact of the reform movement (e.g., Civil Service) (Piven and Cloward, 1977).

Nationally the demographics of the black community enabled blacks to play a greater political role, and also on the state level this shift had ramifications. Just as the black migration had swollen the northern inner city, so did the 1950s and 1960s increase the black populations in the southern cities. These cities drew rural blacks to the city; and, while they were placing more demands on the cities for services, they were also developing a sizable potentially volatile group that was being drawn into the local political arena via the civil rights movement. Cities like Greensboro,
Durham, and, to a lesser degree, Charlotte were all experiencing more demands being placed on city governments to destroy Jim Crow segregation and address the abject poverty caused by 100 years of black powerlessness. Governor Terry Sanford in the early 1960s was viewed as a New South Governor. He spearheaded the launching of the North Fund to combat political and economic poverty in the state.

The political and business elites in each city initially played very significant roles in bringing NCF programs to their cities. Greensboro sought inclusion in NCF, but was denied. When OEO was formed, these federal funds enabled the state of North Carolina to empower the formulation of 60 CAPs across the state (Murphy, 1970).

The importance of the Fund's participation in 11 of North Carolina's CAPs cannot be overlooked. NCF's involvement lead to more participation by the poor and greater experimentation with new ways to combat an ageless problem like poverty.

In each of the three cities the city leaders were very interested in luring Northern capital south, but they could not expect to accomplish this if Southern extremists prevailed (Piven and Cloward, 1979, p. 240) and the poverty of its black population continued to grow without abatement. All three were very sensitive to the pressure being placed
on the local customs by the civil rights movement. This movement placed on the political agenda black demands for an end to Jim Crow laws and more jobs. The black and white communities had long been aware of the poverty, but it was not until the 1960s that blacks gained enough political power to force governments to address it.

City officials in the South may have been sensitive to these demands, but were not insulated from the constraints placed on city officials throughout the country. Reform movements and the decrease in patronage limited city officials' ability to address the demands of another group without at least the appearance of conceding something of the advantaged position of whites. The poverty funds from the federal government and private foundations like the Ford Foundation allowed progressive Southern political elites to expand resources and opportunities to the black community without having to subject these decisions to the political process. Southern politicians knew that whites would not allocate funds to programs that had such redistributive potential. With the federal government paying 90 percent of the cost for these programs, they became more palatable to local officials. The National Democratic Party was aware of the opportunities for obstruction in the South and insisted that there be a direct link between the federal government and the local funding agency that would bypass governors,
commissioners, mayors, and council persons. This funding arrangement became the center of controversy for the CAPs because this arrangement went far in determining who would control the new agencies. In each city, how the poverty programs emerged was determined by the amount of control blacks had on each of the boards. Control was largely determined by the degree of unity in the black community and the amount of political resources already present that could be used to demand participation in the programs.

Charlotte

The resources that the black community in Charlotte brought to the bargaining table were weakened by the fragmented leadership in the black community. The white business leaders in Charlotte were wise enough to deflate Charlotte's civil rights bubble by taking the lead in token desegregation. This move offered hope to the moderate and conservative leadership in the black community by enabling them to claim credit for moving the white community forward with moral appeals. The more militant leadership claimed credit for this action because of their threat of marches and demonstrations of the magnitude witnessed in Greensboro, Durham, Birmingham, and Selma, Alabama. With the leadership at odds about who had more influence with the white elites in Charlotte, it was not a surprise that when the CAF was incorporated, blacks did not play a strong role in the
direction of the program. In fact, local officials reluctantly agreed with the provision that low income and/or minority residents constitute one third of the board. Because the CAF was jointly funded by the NCF, pressure was placed on the board for broader participation by blacks. As expected, those that served on the board came from the ranks of the moderates and conservatives.

Like all three programs, the choice for executive director of the programs foretold the direction in which the board wanted the agencies to travel. The common practice was for the director to be white and the position directly under the "director was established early in the development of the CAA with responsibility for neighborhood community development. This staff position was filled by a black professional social worker" (Austin, 1972, p. 416). In Charlotte this was the case in that the director wanted the community organizers to go slow in mobilizing the residents. The black community did not like the direction of the program, but were not able to change it. When the additional resources were extended by the CAF, previous organizational efforts in the black community that addressed the needs of the community felt threatened. The divided leadership viewed this as an opportunity to embellish their individual leadership in the black community. The spokesperson that received the funding of the CAF would have
a decided advantage in claiming to be the leader of the community. This competition for scarce resources only aggravated the division among the various factions and allowed the business and political white leaders to fashion the CAF after the type of politics that symbolized Charlotte: "Consensus Politics" (Holden, 1973). Internal dissension in the black community weakened a call for control of the board and greater activism among the poor. In fact, black participation in the emergence and development of the CAF mirrored the token desegregation of Charlotte led by the business community. The white community ceded rewards only to those blacks deemed to be responsible leaders, and these leaders sought inclusion into the process, not fundamental change in the goals of this repressive process.

Greensboro

In Greensboro the emergence of EOC, the local CAA, was formulated in an environment of white resistance to black demands, which unified the black community. Greensboro was not like Charlotte and Durham where the business and political elite took the lead in pressing for desegregation of public accommodations (Chafe, 1980). Greensboro's leaders were stubborn, and due to this reluctance a new force was mobilized that forced the city to reluctantly accept desegregation. A new force that emerged in
Greensboro was the student movement. CORE and the students put Greensboro on the defensive and threatened to destroy the progressive image of Greensboro (Chafe, 1980). The massive demonstrations were a signal that the only way concerns in the black community could be placed on the agenda was to force the white community to move in the direction of change. With poverty in the state serving as a focal point for the Governor's office and the National Democratic Party, major cities in the state competed for the incentive monies provided to local governments to solve the dilemmas of poverty in the black community. Charlotte, Durham, Winston Salem, and Raleigh were all moving ahead of Greensboro in all areas that would enhance its New South image (i.e., desegregating public accommodations, schools, housing, and hiring practices) (Chafe, 1980). In comparison with these other cities, Greensboro did not fare very well. The city was not granted incorporation as a NCF city; and, when it applied for a grant under the Model Cities program, the agency turned the city down on grounds of the city's lack of "commitment to ending racial discrimination in education and housing" (Chafe, 1980, p. 233).

EOC was a program that was accepted and pursued with tight control by the conservative forces of the county commissioners and a board of directors that wanted to provide only services to the poor. The board did not wish
to mobilize the poor as a political force that could
do, the poor as a political force that could coalesce with the rising confrontation-minded groups in Greensboro. This pattern was similar to what was witnessed in Charlotte, in that the white director was able to maintain the support of the conservative, business and government representatives on the board and direct an OEO program that operated through accepted channels. The major difference between the two cities was that in Greensboro the moderate and militant leadership factions realized the need for unity in seeking control of the board of directors. In fact, the power exercised by blacks on the board (which enabled them to hire a black director) was accomplished due to unity among the diverse leadership from the community. But even with this push by the black community, the support for participation on the federal level had disappeared and allowed resentful political elites to close down EOC since it was evident (to the white leadership) that the program had lost sight of its mission.

This action was symbolic of the stubbornness found in Greensboro in granting concessions to organizations with power that would have a redistributive impact on the power relationship between the black and white communities. This resistance legitimatized the call for more militant action on the part of the black community and embolden the militant faction of the black community in its call for unity under
the umbrella of Black Power. GAPP became the ideological alternative for meaningful activism on the part of the poor. EOC was not able to bring about solutions to problems whose root causes emanated from decades of paternalism, lack of economic opportunities and institutional racism.

Greensboro sought to use the poverty programs as an extension of the governmental services provided by the county, with funds provided by the federal government. There was not a commitment to solve fundamental problems of power imbalances, but rather acceptance of the programs as a short term solution to the worsening economic and social crisis in the black community. This crisis threatened to destroy the progressive mystique that the business and political elites saw as a requirement for economic expansion in the future. This was their way of limiting the legitimacy of the demands for change by the black community.

Durham

The black community in Durham was able to play more of an active role in the emergence of its poverty program than any of the other cities in this study. First of all, the black middle class exerted influence on the formation of the program. The Durham Committee's strength in the black community and the city of Durham enabled the organization to ensure black representation on the early board of directors.
The second factor that contributed to OBT's emergence was the presence of NCF. NCF was based in Durham, and the influence that the leadership in the DC had with the NCF enabled a major funding source to be an ally. This fact proved to be extremely important when local and national commitment to participation waned.

Durham, like Greensboro, was compelled in 1963 to confront problems years of neglect had caused in the black community. Demonstrations and sit-ins had aroused the masses in the community and strained not only the white leadership, but also the control of the black middle-class leadership in Durham. The funds available to Durham by way of NCF and later OEO strengthened the leadership of the DC but also forced the DC to expand its concerns beyond status goals to also include welfare goals.

The united push from the black community allowed for increased representation of the interest of the poor on the board that encouraged the organization of neighborhood councils. The shift in the FY 1967 budget to community development as the major emphasis of OBT signaled an acceptance by the overall black community that "maximum feasible participation" in Durham meant blacks pressuring the local government to open the political arena to a new interest group (Murphy, 1970). The center of this effort was a professional organizer who moved OBT in the direction
of Black Power as a goal of the poverty program. Due to the joining of the OBT with the local civil rights efforts, the white community became very resentful of outside forces "stirring up their Negroes." With attacks coming from the local government, the media, right-wing extremists, and Congressmen, the withdrawal of federal support forced the black community to form independent organizations that were not tied to federal dollars and control. To the extent that it could organize the poor, OBT continued to press for change but had to allow more militant organizations like UOCI and FCD to move center stage in the struggle against a resistant local government that did not want to respond to the calls for change emanating out of the black community.

Durham had divisions like all communities, but the need for unity outweighed these differences. Blacks realized that their resources coupled with the resources provided by OEO were instruments of power on which they could not afford to turn their backs. The rich and poor in Durham's black community welcomed these programs as an opportunity to enhance their civil rights efforts and pursue an attack on political and economic poverty.

Unity and the amount of resources found in all three cities occurred at different levels. The role played by the black community in the direction of each program was determined by these factors. Charlotte had the least amount
of unity and less political and economic resources to force
their demands on the local board. Greensboro exhibited more
unity in its leadership than what was found in Charlotte.
Greensboro also had more resources in the form of a
politically active middle class, a mobilized student
movement, and strong support from the churches in
Greensboro. These forces enabled blacks to press for
control of the new federal resources, and when this
ultimately failed they were still willing to transfer
support to a more militant organization like GAPP and
continue to press for change in Greensboro.

Durham represented the most dramatic example of blacks
exercising control over a poverty program. This was
possible because of the power exercised by the DC and the
superior political and economic resources the independent
black middle class brought to the bargaining table. These
central factors discussed in this section, coupled with the
national and state political climates, all set the stage and
shaped the emergence of the poverty programs in these three
medium sized southern cities.

Summary of Study's Findings

This study has investigated the impact of CAPs on the
development of black political leaders in three North
Carolina cities and concludes that the poverty programs did
not strongly facilitate the development of a black elected
leadership cadre. This conclusion is arrived at by analyzing three broad areas which facilitate black political development: political recruitment, political consciousness and organizations, and political skill development.

**Political Recruitment**

The first proposition of this research posited that CAPers used the visibility and recognition associated with WOP involvement to launch political careers in their respective cities. This exposure to CAPs was seen as providing the political resources needed by the black community to compete with the majority community for positions in the electoral arena. The findings of this study show clearly that CAPs did not play the role of being a launching pad for blacks into political campaigns or office.

The study compared civil righters with respondents that had civil rights and CAP experience to determine if the additional exposure to CAPs led to increased political ambition and success. Contrary to what was anticipated, civil righters proved to be both more ambitious and successful. Table 5 substantiates that 14 of 15 civil righters sought office, whereas, only eight of 19 CAPers were similarly inclined. In terms of political success, CAPers represented one third (4) of the successful candidates, and three of that four were from Durham.
The black political elite in all three cities identified more with civil rights organizations and could be classified as "responsible" leaders in the black communities. This assessment is made because these leaders were more moderate in their political ideology, middle class, and non-threatening to the white community. It appears that the more militant posturing found among CAPers did not fare well in the political arena. This point explains why those CAPers in Durham (the only city with enough successful CAPers to make comparisons) were similar to civil righters in socio-economic values and relied upon the dominant black political organizations (DC) for support rather than the poverty programs.

In Greensboro and Charlotte, CAPers were not successful or ambitious in their pursuit of elected positions. The traditional routes of unifying a sizable black vote and seeking office in a ward, or a combination ward/at large electoral system, had more impact on political success than CAP experience coupled with civil rights experience. The author notes this observation based on the fact that in Greensboro, for example, four of the respondents (two civil righters and two CAPers), when interviewed for this study, were unsuccessful or not interested in seeking office, but have since become successful BEOs. The primary reason for the respondents' success has been the fact that the state of
North Carolina (1983), Guilford County (1987), and Greensboro (1983), all made it easier for minorities to win elections by discontinuing at large election systems that had a discriminatory impact. Significantly, all four candidates relied upon the endorsements of the local political organization to deliver the black vote. In fact, the two former CAPers down played their CAP involvement. The pattern found in all three cities revealed that political recruitment was not dominated by CAP involvement, but by other factors such as civil rights involvement, the type of electoral system and an independent black political organization.

The poverty program had only a slight facilitating effect on electoral politics, and to concentrate only on that arena would severely limit the recruitment impact of CAPs. The findings in this study reveal a non-electoral impact of CAPs. The generally accepted model of black political recruitment stipulates that civil rights and poverty experience fostered community recognition and political involvement, which lead to electoral popularity and eventually political office (see Figure 1). The three cities in this study point clearly to different avenues followed by CAPers other than elected positions.

It was stated above that CAPers were not successful or ambitious in terms of political office, so an obvious
question was where did these CAPers carry the resources and exposure gained following their CAP involvement? The evidence shows that those CAPers that were in this category moved into four areas: community activism, where they continued to work with grassroots organizations; governmental bureaucracies, where they could use their acquired knowledge and skills to finesse (and be finessed by) the system; the private sector, where contacts that were made in the poverty program enhanced their marketability as it relates to such areas as minority affairs and community relations; and finally, education, where undergraduate and graduate programs absorbed the disappointed political activists. This group felt that credentialization would broaden their standing in the black community and add legitimacy to their leftist views. It was also found that the successful candidates gravitated into the four broad areas noted above once they left office. It is for these reasons that Figure 2 is a more accurate and complete model of poverty politics and political recruitment in the black community than the previously proposed model in Figure 1. The increased resources made available to the black community produced an elite that has expanded its influence beyond electoral politics and into other institutions that impact on the daily lives of black and poor people.
Political Consciousness and Political Organizations

The second proposition asserts that successful political mobilization is also dependent upon the presence of political organizations and political consciousness. The funding of poverty programs at a time when the national civil rights movement was awakening the black community with funds that were not tied to the local political and economic elites posed an opportune moment in the black community for the development of organizations that reflected a new consciousness in the black community. This research also viewed the likelihood of political organizations and consciousness coming to fruition would be determined in great measure by the presence of a service or an activist oriented program in the individual cities. The study shows that the three cities spanned the continuum with Charlotte being a service oriented city, Greensboro reflecting aspects of both a service and an activists orientation, and Durham being very representative of the activist orientation.

This research found that the poverty orientation adopted in each city was determined by seven factors. These factor are: (1) the orientation of the board of directors and the executive director; (2) the cohesiveness of the black leadership; (3) the level of resistance in the white community; (4) the level of political resources already present in the black community; (5) the funding source;
(6) the militancy of the local civil rights movement;
(7) the form of electoral system; and, finally; (8) the presence of a paid professional "master organizer." These eight factors are not intended to be exhaustive, but they are the factors found to have played major roles in determining a poverty program's orientation.

Charlotte's CAF had a service orientation because the fragmented leadership could never assemble sufficient resources to combat the power of the business and political white elites in Charlotte. CAF had to succumb to the only avenue available to them. The black community's virtual powerlessness in this situation can be explained by the control conscious board of CAF and a director that was chosen due to the fact that "he did not appear to have an ax to grind," but also because he perceived the role of the organization as one of coordinating services for the poor through existing institutions, thus, limiting the effectiveness of the organization. The black community could not mount an attack on the constraints because the leadership was divided and it lacked the type of economic independence necessary to protect dissident individuals and organizations. In fact, the added resources further deepen the division in the leadership community. A non-confrontational civil rights movement never brought the black community to the point where the white power structure
was viewed as the common enemy to the black community and
the single most important obstacle to black liberation.

A final factor that made Charlotte different from the
other cities was the lack of a paid professional organizer
that could be classified as a "master organizer." A master
organizer was never allowed to mature in Charlotte.
Resistance emanated not only from the white community, but
also from within the black community. The closest this city
came in producing such as individual was with MWRO in the
personage of Noble Coleman. Coleman was a divisive element
in the community who had to compete with others in the
factional black leadership core. This factionalism
perpetuated a dependent relationship between the black and
white communities and never allowed political organizations
to survive that fostered the type of political consciousness
that would lead to successful political mobilization via
poverty politics.

Greensboro differs from Charlotte in significant ways.
The Greensboro poverty programs represented a blending of
the service orientation and political activism. The EOC was
service oriented, while the board and the director adhered
to this as a proper role for the program. The program
maintained the support of the white political elites as long
as the program was controlled by conservatives. When blacks
exercised influence in the hiring of a black director who
wanted to move in the direction of an activist organization, support dwindled and the program was allowed to cease operations.

Due to the vulnerability of EOC's funding, activists in Greensboro saw the need to organize a grassroots organization that would politicize the poor. GAPP served as the grassroots organization that was able to lead the political struggle in Greensboro from 1968 to the early 1970s. GAPP's activism stemmed from many sources. Paramount among these sources was diverse leadership that included radicals and moderates who respected the need for mutual support in attacking a resistant white power structure that repressed the entire black community. The acceptance of a need for mutual support among the diverse leaders resulted from a strong local civil rights movement, which ranged in levels of confrontation from the sit-ins of 1960 to the armed and fatal confrontation with Greensboro city police and the North Carolina National Guard on the A & T campus in May of 1969. These events cut across all segments of the black community. Traditional leaders (ministers, civil rights leaders, economic elites), militants and students were enraged by the blatant disregard for black life by white decision-makers in Greensboro and the state of North Carolina. A strong force that provided this type of unity
among blacks and also control of the black vote was the leadership of the NAACP and its political arm, the GCA.

GAPP was also able to address issues that had broad-based support within the black community (e.g., housing, police brutality, redevelopment, and at large elections). With broad support, GAPP could press the more moderate and acceptable black leaders to more militant positions, so that the movement would not leave the traditional leadership behind. But even the radicals realized that the political resources of the active black middle class in Greensboro provided safety from retaliation from the powerful white political and economic elites in Greensboro. GAPP was able to continue unencumbered by the lack of external recognition because the funding came from foundations and churches who placed poverty high on their agenda during that period in history. But it is doubtful that GAPP would have survived as long as it did had it not been for the presence of a master organizer like Nelson Johnson. His organizational skill and ability to incorporate the unrest on campuses with the poverty issues guaranteed GAPP's visibility and a reputation as a power broker for the black community. It is for these reasons that the author views Greensboro as a service/activist combination. But the activism prevalent in Greensboro took place outside of the constraints of federal dollars. Government employees were not allowed to defy
local customs without the support of the federal government. Political organizations formed and political consciousness flourished briefly, but it cannot be attributed to CAPs.

Durham completes the continuum by being representative of an activist orientation. The obvious question posed when considering Durham is how could this city avoid the shortcomings of Charlotte and Greensboro? The reasons are several and varied. First of all, Durham's black community entered into the poverty programs with more political resources than Charlotte or Greensboro. The black elite played a significant role in the founding and organization of the NCF, a key poverty program for the entire state. NCF was based in Durham and provided additional manpower, funds, and technical assistance to the black community. NCF's close proximity to Durham's CAP, OBT, enabled organizers in both organizations to work closely and provide mutual support in their attacks on local institutions. Another example of the resources available to Durham's black community was the Durham Committee. This organization represented black economic and political elite's support for the poverty movement and unity among the black leadership. The diverse leadership in Durham was similar to Greensboro's leadership, because it also saw the need for mutual support among the leaders. The militants needed the support of the DC to protect them from a hostile white community, and the
DC needed the militants to force the issues that the city government refused to address.

A second reason for Durham's activism was the white community (represented by the government) being viewed as an obstacle to the black community moving to empowerment. This view was brought about due to an active local civil rights movement that also (as in Greensboro) energized the students in the city and made them active participants in the community's struggle. Total black community support of OBT enabled the agency to organize the poor for political action against city officials, who retaliated by calling for greater control of funding. When this happened, the funding of organizations like the FCD and UOCI enabled the poverty leaders to move into more direct forms of protest and consciousness raising in the community. These organizations mobilized the poor and pushed for the inclusion of the poor in decision-making and a more visible role in the DC. When independent funding ceased, the neighborhood councils remained in place, but served only in an advisory capacity.

Finally, the impact Howard Fuller had on Durham and the state of North Carolina cannot be overlooked. His organizing ability and charismatic leadership all dominated the direction of poverty politics and Black Power in North Carolina. Fuller's extraordinary efforts brought into the movement college students and poor people that were
convinced that they could make a difference in their political and economic conditions. The importance of a hired professional to articulate the frustrations of the poor, to defy and taunt their oppressors, is an elusive factor to quantify. But the presence of a master organizer at critical moments in both Greensboro (Johnson) and Durham (Fuller) points to this factor as possibly being the glue that was sufficient when the other necessary factors needed for mobilization were present.

The aforementioned seven factors were found to be the most important factors in determining whether or not a city would exhibit an activist or a service political orientation. It was felt that an activist orientation would most likely produce political organizations that would challenge the status quo. It was also deemed likely that an activist orientation would also produce the political consciousness needed to bring the black community together as a unit to move towards empowerment. This proved to be the case with Durham, and, conversely, a service orientation would be the least likely to produce such results. Charlotte did prove this to be the case, and Greensboro was a combination of both orientations with political organizations and consciousness existing, but that being only partially attributable to CAPs.
Skill Development

The final proposition in this study stressed the point that when new resources were injected into the black community, CAP leaders would be exposed to new situations and conditions that would allow for the development of skills that were not present during the pre-CAP period. The first question addressed was the origin of the respondents' skills and, secondly, what types of skills were developed from CAP participation?

First of all, the respondents in this study overall viewed the source of both civil rights and previous experiences. A combination of both civil rights and CAPs related experience was the second most reported response, followed by one response of "CAPs only" as the source of their skills. This overall pattern prevailed in Charlotte and Greensboro, with only Durham differing with a combination of CAPs and civil rights experience most influential. This can be explained by remembering the prevalence of civil righters in the political recruitment process of the respective cities. Durham was the only city where CAPers were in sufficient number to make more meaningful comparisons. So it is not surprising that these two factors played a role in Durham's political landscape. It is also instructive to note that the lone CAPer that
credited poverty experience as the source of his skills was from Durham.

In the three Southern cities, civil rights experience and institutions that already existed in the black community (churches, educational institutions, social and fraternal organizations) provided the skills that the black elite overall possessed. It was also shown in a city with an activist organization that produced political consciousness, the emerging leadership was more inclined to reflect skills that were a combination of civil rights involvement and CAP experience. Similarly, the less influential the CAP role in a city such as Charlotte the greater the incidence of civil rights and previous experiences being the source of skills developed during this period.

The results of this study actually call into question the use of the term development. The respondents and the CAPers in particular all went to great lengths to point out that they possessed skills prior to CAP entering the scene. CAPers note that the poverty experience "added to" already existing skills. It is for that reason that the author concludes that the CAPs enhanced the skills of the CAPers that they were able to use when the black community was undergoing a push to be included in the political process.

The skills that were enhanced can be divided into two broad areas. These skills can be classified as
technical-bureaucratic skills and grassroots organizational skills. Technical-bureaucratic skills were felt by Holden (1973) to be in short supply in the black community. The reason for the shortage of skills surrounds the limitations of income and education, which are two very important political resources. CAPs played a role by enlarging the pool of resources that were at the disposal of poverty participants.

When CAPs were added to the resources in the black community, often members of the black middle class were the ones that initially garnered skills of a technical and bureaucratic nature. Budgeting, grant writing, negotiating disputes with service agencies, and managing and running agencies are examples of the technical and bureaucratic skills that were acquired under the CAPs. The author stresses the gains made by the middle class because these were the individuals that were primed with the middle class social skills and values that were needed when the programs were attempting to organize swiftly and did not have the time nor the inclination to search through the ghettos to locate and train workers to take leadership positions. The poverty programs also provided a prime source of employment for middle class blacks. The private sector, especially in the South, was opposed to altering discriminatory employment practices. These practices over the years promoted "good
relations between the races" by not exposing whites to
direct competition with blacks in the job market. This
indifference and hostility experienced by middle class
blacks prompted them to enter the public sector via CAPs.
The money was encouraging, but many also realized that these
programs would provide them with the opportunity to practice
skills that were being ignored and wasted. Entrance into
CAPs also allowed them to learn the "system" by being
inside, rather than outside of the governmental system. The
major advantage gained by this new access was perhaps best
explained by James Polk in Charlotte who had received
funding for his program through the CAF. He stated: "When
I worked in these programs it allowed me to find out where
the buttons are located" (1987). Technical-bureaucratic
skills in this study were enhanced by CAPs, especially when
the individual possessed a middle class background.

The opposite end of the skills spectrum contained what
this research has classified as grassroots organizational
skills. These skills embodied organizing ghetto residents
for economic boycotts, rent strikes, marches and boycotts
against discriminatory hiring practices, challenging
bureaucracies, voter registration drives and court
challenges and are all representative of the grassroots
organizational skills that sought to gain welfare goals for
the poor. Both middle class and indigenous leaders
developed a grassroots class of skills. Middle class leaders were armed in both types of skills (technical and grassroots). These leaders had the option of deciding which skills they would foster. Indigenous leaders (who were smaller in numbers) did not have as many options available to them. They usually pressed for change in the conditions that affected their neighborhoods. And in order for them to accomplish that goal, they also had to possess technical-bureaucratic skills. If the low income leaders were to be successful at getting welfare mothers benefits from social agencies, it was imperative that they learn the state and federal regulations that guaranteed benefits. When low income residents were being evicted or could not get landlords to address their problems, the community organizers had to be armed with knowledge of the city's housing codes, records of enforcements, agencies that were responsible for these complaints, and the legal rights of the tenants. A combination of both types of skills were needed to be effective in the community.

A final point must be made about the effectiveness of these skills. In the three cities studied effectiveness appears to have been in the eye of the beholder. Some leaders used their skills to advance personal gains, while others pressed for permanent change in the distribution of resources between the rich and the poor, blacks and whites.
In the final analysis the overall black community was enriched by the increased skills available in the community, but whether they were used to empower the entire community was left to the individual to decide. Personal commitment was the motivating force that determined the direction and use of both types of skills. The middle class benefited most because they entered the CAPs with more of society's acceptable skills than low income leaders and could in the end transfer the technical bureaucratic skills into the existing bureaucracies with much greater ease than indigenous leaders. Bureaucratic acculturation proved to be more difficult for the latter than for the former.

The difficulty of transferring grassroots organizational skills to areas outside of the ghetto shows the dependent state in which the black community still exists. The majority society dictates which skills are acceptable to change society from the "inside." In all three cities the grassroots skills have not been rewarded. The technical bureaucratic skills enhanced by the middle class have been beneficial and accepted. Those among the middle class that enhanced both grassroots, and technical-bureaucratic skills have enjoyed a decided advantage over their lower class brothers and sisters. By simply having the advantage of choice, the middle class have in the 1970s and 1980s chosen to abandon the experiments of grassroots
organizing and move into the mainstream of interest group politics. Even the master organizers of Greensboro and Durham discovered that their college backgrounds allowed them to regain respect in the black community by returning to institutions of higher learning and completing graduate and terminal degrees. The option of moving back into the mainstream was not available to the few indigenous leaders that were recruited to be community organizers. Some indigenous leaders were able to acquire technical-bureaucratic skills and became employed in social agencies. Indigenous participants are predominantly employed in positions like community representatives or dispute settlement officers. These positions were established due to the impact of CAP-type agencies. The indigenous participants benefited even though they did not have the options (and salaries) available to them that were available to the black middle class leaders. If the CAPs had not been in place, it is doubtful these leaders would have been given an opportunity to participate in the black community's decision-making bodies. In all three cities prior to the poverty program, leadership was the sole domain of the black middle class. CAPs enabled a small number of the poor to expand the pool of resources available to the black community and the pool from which leaders were chosen.
In conclusion, the impact of CAPs on skill development in the black community was important to the development of black leaders. The middle class leaders experienced skill enhancement, while indigenous leaders witnessed skill development. These processes took place in the cities during a time when other forces were at work. The other prominent forces were the civil rights movement and black institutions (e.g., churches, businesses and educational institutions). CAPs provided an arena for skills to be enhanced and developmented. The impact of these skills on a micro and macro level has been unequal and representative of the maldistribution of political resources in the respective cities and society as a whole.

The above material summarized the findings for only three cities in North Carolina. This study, as the researcher stressed in Chapter II, does not strive to be a representative sample of all of the CAP participants in the three cities. This study sought to provide insight into how the leaders in these cities were affected by involvement in the poverty programs. These findings are not presented as being generalizable for all CAPs but only limited to the cities in this study. This is one of the weaknesses of a case study approach and even more with the sample size of this study. But the author also notes that a comparative case study does provide more support to these findings than
a single case study approach. The concern of how
generalizable these findings are to other similar cities
leads this researcher to address the significance of these
findings as they relate to previous research in this area.

Significance of Findings in Relation to Previous Research

The previous research in this area centers around the
ability of the War on Poverty programs to foster black
political development. Many have written on the link
between the poverty programs and the political development
that emerged in the black community during the 1970s and the
1980s. As this author argued in Chapter I, Peter Eisinger
(1979) with his nationwide sample of black elected officials
actually explored the independent effects of CAP involvement
on the political careers of a segment of the black
community's "leadership eschelon." Prior to his study, no
one had undertaken a systematically generated data analysis
of the role community action has played in leadership
development. Other factors have been established as being
crucial to the development of black leaders (e.g., civil
rights movement, demographic changes, and removal of
barrier), but Eisinger's study and this study have
incorporated community action as an integral factor in that
development.

Eisinger's (1979) study provided direction because of
his overview of the national perspective provided a norm by
which this author could gauge the results of this comparative case study of three southern cities. The uniqueness of the South and the racial politics practiced in this section of the country (although not exclusively) had tremendous bearings on the development of black leadership and programs that were aimed at a particular racial group (Piven and Cloward, 1971). The individuality of the three cities adds more depth to our understanding of how these programs facilitated political development.

This author argued in Chapter I that Hanes Walton (1972) was correct when he emphasized that black politics springs from the particular brand of segregation practices found in different environments in which black people find themselves. The uniqueness of each locality has fostered blacks fashioning activities, methods, and techniques that are applicable to their particular local agenda. The uniqueness factor inspired this researcher to examine the application of Eisinger's national study to events transpiring in Greensboro, Durham, and Charlotte. The study also focused on the forces that helped to shaped the scope and character of black political action in these cities. Whereas Eisinger spoke of a facilitating impact that CAP had on black elected officials, this study showed that environmental factors were extremely important to the level of successful mobilization found in the black community.
The implementation of CAP's federal agenda had to bow to each city's unique political environment.

Eisinger's study in 1979 was a national survey, while this research analyzed local CAPers and probed in depth the uniqueness of the political environment in which the BEOs existed. Eisinger concentrated on the political arena in that he studied the number of CAPers who became BEOs. This means that Eisinger studied only those CAPers that were successful and had survived the unique screening process that is involved in electoral politics. Lost from Eisinger's analysis were the CAPers that were unsuccessful and those that chose not to enter the political arena. The indepth interviews and comparative analysis of this study concentrated on the unsuccessful CAPers as well as the successful CAPers. This study also included interviews with community knowledgeables who were primarily civil righters. The community knowledgeables and unsuccessful CAPers provided a broader picture of the relationship between CAP experience and political success. These interviews allowed the author to tap dimensions of the political process unexamined by Eisinger.

Eisinger (1979, p. 131) found that 23 percent of the BEOs elected since 1964 reported CAP involvement as part of their background prior to being elected to public office. Eisinger felt the 23 percent represented "a moderately
significant role" (p. 141) played by CAP in training and supplying black officials in state and local governments. The inference was that there was a one-to-one relationship between CAP involvement and political success. In contrast to Eisinger, this study found CAP involvement had only limited influence on the political success of the black leaders. The process was found to be much more complex and more dependent upon local factors than the individual's CAP experience. In fact, it was not the CAP experience that enabled the CAPers in this study to move successfully into electoral politics. In Durham, in particular, where CAPers were most representative, the successful CAPers relied upon the support of the Durham Committee to produce votes, not the poverty organizations. Besides, the type of federal restrictions placed on poverty warriors (e.g., Hatch Act) dissuaded the type of support Eisinger reported in his study. Permanent organizations that could mobilize voters did not emerge in this study. In fact, the CAPers that were elected could not rely solely upon CAP exposure and identification to become elected officials. The successful CAPers were traditional, moderate, middle class blacks. The unsuccessful CAPers tended to come from the ranks of the militant or lower class groups that Eisinger ignored in his study. Thus, to the extent that the CAP experience was helpful in promoting the political careers of black leaders,
its contribution took the form of a training laboratory to enhance administrative skills rather than as a mechanism for the formal mobilization of organizational resources.

A more significant contrast in the author's findings than those of Eisinger's lies in the fact that Eisinger limits his investigation only to electoral politics. The data in this study reveals that CAP may possibly have made its greatest impact by moving CAPers successfully into the public and private sector. Governmental bureaucracies and the private sector appear to have been the primary beneficiaries of the CAP program. Following the career paths of the unsuccessful CAPers was beyond the scope of Eisinger's national survey type study. This was a major weakness of Eisinger's research methodology. Contrastingly, this author's comparative case study was able to compensate for this weakness in its comprehensive examination of CAP involvement. This case study provides a broader, more complete analysis of the impact of CAPs on the career development of black leaders.

Another contrast in the findings of this study with those of Eisinger reflects the differences found in the idea of political activism and the reality of implementing the programs in local communities. Eisinger (1979) and Moynihan (1969) spoke of the development of a black leadership cadre that would emerge due to the resources provided by the
poverty programs. In particular, Eisinger argues that CAPs provided access for those people "who have been hard pressed to amass on their own the kinds of resources necessary to achieve such benefits" (p. 141). In this research the individuals that were able to monopolize the new resources were resource-rich within the black community. The middle class, which was already inclined to compete in the electoral arena, used these resources to enhance its position in the political arena. In contrast, the urban poor were basically locked out of this process. The CAPs did little to develop grassroots leadership out of the grassroots sector of the black community. The cities studied were void of leaders that were electorally successful via CAPs experience. In addition, local political constraints made it impossible to implement many of the poverty goals established at the national level in local communities.

Finally, the conclusion of this study contrasts with the findings of Eisinger by putting forth the idea that true political leadership in the black community does not emerge from programs constructed above or by forces outside of the community, but rather from community based activism that becomes cumulative over time and develops outlets for independent black actions. Resources can be provided, but there are no guarantees that those resources will be
accepted into the community and follow a textbook example of middle class empowerment. Allowances must be made for the impact of the political culture that exists in the city and the limitations that culture places on political activism in the black community (see Figure 3). Eisinger's national study could not take these particularities into consideration. The comparative approach utilized in this study was able to detect and chronicle how CAPs intermingled with the particular style and substance of politics practiced in individual local communities to establish a pattern of poverty administration and leadership development that produced sharply divergent outcomes in the three North Carolina cities under examination.

This study further showed that the development of black leaders was helped by CAPs increasing the political resources available to the black community, but this reason also elevated the tendency for competition for scarce resources among leaders in the community. It was shown that the division and competition was mitigated by the presence of a strong black political organization. The central thrust of this study is that with new resources provided, the black community could overcome their disadvantaged political and economic position in urban government. The findings of this study show details that most studies have overlooked.
First in terms of BEOs, Eisinger (1979) and Browning, et al. (1979) viewed CAP experience as a starting point in examining the leadership echelon in the black community. This study found the facilitating impact of CAPs, but also saw CAPs experience as being farther down the list of factors that moved blacks into elected positions. This study agrees with studies that emphasized areas outside of electoral politics as the areas where the political impact of CAPs were most noticeable. Peterson and Greenstone (1977) saw the new resources as not just winning electoral campaigns, but also to place pressure on other agencies to acquire new positions of influence in the central established arenas of bureaucratic and partisan politics. It is in this sense that CAPs had its own political impact (p. 273). The non-electoral impact of CAPs in the cities highlighted the recruitment of CAPers and the long term impact of CAPers. The four areas of community activism, governmental bureaucracy, private sector, and education, parallel closely Piven and Cloward (1979) with their conclusion that organizers were absorbed into electoral politics, universities, government bureaucracies, and business and industry (p. 331).

Secondly, the WOP resources were suppose to increase political mobilization with the formation of political organizations that fostered political consciousness among
blacks. Organizational and consciousness levels of development depended upon whether a service or activist orientation was present in the local CAA. This study suggests that the political culture of the individual cities and the political resources present in the city prior to CAP entrance determined the orientation of the local poverty program. The aforementioned factors also determined the longevity of organizations and the level of political consciousness in the respective cities. Cities with a service orientation never really challenged the status quo; whereas, the activist agencies sustained movements in their cities for a brief period. After a loss of support at the federal level, the local CAAs that were active had to concentrate more on survival than on organizing the poor. The CAAs that remained in existence did so as service agencies. Kittell (1980) concluded in her study that mandated lower-class organizations over a period of time shifted away from advocacy and political action and toward a service role as the result of two problems: inability to sustain long-term advocacy efforts which required major investments of time by large numbers of people and the inability to secure financial support to maintain structure (p. 40). Similar reasons existed for the shift in Durham and Greensboro, only independent funding allowed organizing
of the poor to continue after the implementation of the Greene Amendment.

It was also shown that simply because an organization continued to exist does not mean that the usefulness of the program will also survive. Durham and Charlotte both have their CAAs in existence today, but the agencies that exist are merely shells of the early agencies. Durham especially has become a service agency that provides services to the black community and does not pretend to be an advocate for poor rights by political empowerment. In Greensboro the EOC was dismantled, and conventional wisdom may infer that Greensboro's CAA was a failure and the Charlotte and Durham CAAs experienced at least some measure of success. This assessment derives from the belief that whatever is stable is good, whatever survives is right, and for a group to want more than incremental change is bad policy. Wilson (1973) is a proponent of the view that organizational survival is the prime objective, and effectiveness in accomplishing its objectives is not as high a priority (Kittell, 1980). The findings of this study suggest that this argument needs revising and that possibly new measures of evaluation should be considered when lower-class groups are involved. In fact the findings in this study are closer to the findings of Kittell (1980) who points out that the "demise of an organization does not have to be viewed as a failure."
Success and failure should, in fact, be measured by effects" (p. 37). Kittell also argues that:

In judging such community organizations [for effectiveness], the ability to rally support around issues, to enhance collective strength, and ultimately to influence the distribution of benefits and resources are important measures. . . . If maintaining an organization promotes group cohesion and goals, it is effective; if the organization survives but abandons its collective goals and serves only individual needs, it may be ineffective. (p. 38)

In judging the success or failure of Durham verses Greensboro, the more appropriate measure would be the effectiveness of the organization. Many were dismayed that EOC was dismantled; but if it had abandoned even the rhetoric of collective goals, survival is secondary. Whereas Durham with a very activist oriented agency has survived, today it does not influence the distribution of benefits and resources. With survival being the highest priority, the organization was forced to abandon its objectives and fell far short of the original hope local black leaders once held for this new resource in the black community.

Finally, the findings of this study relate that skill development varied according to the development of institutions in the black community and the social-economic level of the participant. Holden (1973) clearly noted the impact of OEO when he stated "it [OEO] got people in the habit of doing things" (p. 38). Most of the literature of
Kramer (1969), Shank and Conant (1976), Donovan (1973), and Eisinger (1979) all emphasize the gains made by the black community due to the new resources provided by CAPs. This research also comes down very close to this conclusion. In each city the skills pool of the black community was enlarged. The enlargement came primarily from the young more militant leaders that were also the most articulate and middle class spokespersons for the poor.

The employment policies of the poverty programs also helped to enlarge the pool of skills for the black community. Numerous ghetto residents were employed in the programs and learned from their organizational as well as their political experiences.

CAPs skills development hasten the inclusion of the black leadership into public and private institutions and blunted a once potentially disruptive element in the political process (Piven and Cloward, 1971). The absorption of this leadership strata of the black community made it necessary to analyze the implication of this study's findings in the continuing campaign for social justice and the political mobilization of the poor.

Implications of Findings on Campaign for Social Justice and Political Mobilization of the Poor

This research has emphasized the attempt on the part of the federal government under the leadership of the National
Democratic Party (Piven and Cloward, 1979) or National Progressives (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974) to expand resources to a segment of the population that has been systematically excluded from the American political system. Few pieces of domestic legislation have caused as much tension in the urban political arena in recent years as the enabling legislation that created the War on Poverty. This package of programs that sought "maximum feasible participation" actually legitimized the plight of the poor as an issue worthy of consideration among other long established national concerns. An attack on poverty, economic and political (Greenstone and Peterson, 1977), ensued but fell short in both areas. This research has concentrated on the political squirmishes, and these findings offer little encouragement for mandated organizations of the 1960s to overcome the gross injustices found in the American political system and the lack of mobilization among the poor.

The leaders that emerged came both from the middle and lower classes but gained what they originally sought, inclusion into the political system. The spokespersons for the poor often were young leaders with middle class backgrounds. Surprisingly these individuals tended to be the most militant. Banfield and Wilson (1963) shed some light on this paradox and observed within that time frame a
growing number of young blacks who had more education than the job market allowed them to use. For those with college degrees upward mobility has been blocked, they were underemployed; "with plenty of time on their hands" and nothing much to lose, they became the activists in Negro civic associations. As such they were dedicated, militant and highly articulate" (p. 206). Blacks with this type of background served on boards, as directors and organizers during the 1960s in the poverty programs. As this research shows these leaders gravitated into politics, bureaucracies, education and community activism, and business. The leaders used the new resources to confront local governments with organizations that could mobilize the community. Unfortunately as Piven and Cloward (1971) concluded, these programs serve to siphon off the leadership that could move the black community. Once the leaders deviated from federal guidelines, local resistance was free to berate and dismantle the programs. Federal employees are not free to organize when the federal commitment no longer exists. Piven and Cloward's theory of co-optation only partially explained the inability of CAPs to liberate the poor.

It must be remembered that CAPs came into existent during a time when Old Federalism dominated national-city relations. The federal government shaped and fine-tuned assistance to cities in ways that targeted resources to the
poor (Kantor, 1988, p. 372). The importance of blacks to a ruling coalition was seen as being significant enough to press for poverty programs by liberal national democrats. This push for change at the federal level subsided in the final days of the Johnson administration and started a virtual reversal under the Nixon administration (Donovan, 1973). Nixon's approach to administration was one of moving to greater decentralization of authority to state and local government—New Federalism. At the same time blacks were moving almost exclusively into electoral politics striving to gain a foothold in the governing of local governments. The increase in BEOs has been impressive, but not without its setbacks (see Nelson and Van Horne, 1976). As cities often became hollow prizes, a shift was seen in the locus of power centers in central cities. Strong political machines or institutions that once delivered patronage to interest groups were no longer in place when blacks gained access. The reform movements had put in place entrenched bureaucracies that were resistant to change and had no intentions of allowing recent arrivals to wrench advantages from their control; in effect "New Machines" controlled the power centers of the cities (see Lowi, 1968). Blacks were allowed to move into bureaucracies, but as Fainstein and Fainstein (1974) point out, even within bureaucracies the impact of the progressives had closed these agencies to all
but the black middle class. Civil service examinations and other qualifications limited access for the poor, so that once again unequal rewards were given within the black community. Further support of this point shows that the absorption of the black middle class came about by the expansion of "soft money" in cities budgets. It was much easier to accede to the demands of blacks by increasing the welfare rolls for the black poor and open up new jobs for the black middle class to oversee these programs (Kantor, 1988). "Increasing relief rolls was not less threatening to white political constituencies and city economic development; in most cities the cost was largely borne by the state and federal government" (Kantor, 1988, p. 374). Strange (1972) affirms that new employment did not result in the displacement of previously employed persons by minority members or the poor. These concessions prompted by CAPs were much more palatable than stopping urban renewal, integrating schools and housing in white neighborhoods, or building more public housing (Kantor, 1988, p. 375).

The black middle class were not immune to benefits from the poverty programs. In fact, between 1960 and 1976 expanding public social welfare employment served as a major port of entry for the new black middle class. Fifty-five percent (55%) of the 1960-1976 increase in black professional, managerial, and technical (PATs) employment
occurred in the public sector, compared with 34 percent for whites. At the state and local level 68 percent of all black PATs employed outside of education (compared with 39 percent of whites) were in social welfare agencies (Brown and Erie 1981, pp. 308-309). The net effect of this expansion in service and employment was the unprecedented inclusion of minorities and local governmental programs, but they did not control "hard" monies that were included in the city's base budget (see Pressman, 1975). These redistributions of resources were gained only through the concerted efforts of pressure politics from the black community. The appearance of substantive gains has been in the public sector and not the private sector where tremendous amounts of power resides.

By the mid and late 1970s, blacks felt that increased visibility of blacks in terms of BEOs and bureaucrats did not warrant the organizing efforts of the past. The end results of the poverty programs reveals that the black community may be in a weaker position today than it was in the mid 1960s. The potential for mobilizing the poor may be harder to achieve in the post-CAPs period than it was during the pre-CAPs era. Some scholars support this assessment for the following reasons. Charles Hamilton (1979) argues that one of the results of the War on Poverty programs is that it has developed a patron-recipient
relationship instead of a patron-client relationship. With a patron-recipient, the recipient receives goods and services from the patron merely because they meet a needs test, not because they have actively participated in a political bargaining process. In fact, this encourages the recipient to be a passive partner in the political process. No political activity is needed in order to receive the benefits.

This is very different from other ethnics who captured institutional positions of power. Positions that were supported by hard money, tax revenues that had patronage jobs attached to them and that offered divisible and indivisible benefits to the polity. (p. 214)

Blacks, on the other hand, have captured "soft money" institutions that rely upon grants that offer social services to low-income recipients.

Brown and Erie (1981) expanded Hamilton's argument and point out that blacks were accepted into the political system when they made their demands by expanding public employment in the social agencies. Middle class blacks have been called upon to administer agencies that serve the black poor. This arrangement has produced a type of social and economic isolation where the middle class service provider is more concerned with the politics of administrative budgets and grants, and rarely the activities of the recipient. This means that there are disincentives for middle class blacks to encourage the recipients to mobilize
since their funding rarely depends upon the political mobilization of the recipients. So in effect what has happened is that programs that were fostered by the War on Poverty now function solely as service agencies that provide employment for middle class blacks. This way both low-income and middle-income blacks have been accommodated in the pluralist bargaining process. The system expanded to include blacks in competition with other interest groups, but the price for entrance has been a loss of political incentives to participate. Mobilization will be more difficult because benefits are now received without the poor seeing a connection between mobilization and receiving cash and in kind transfers (Brown and Erie, 1981, p. 372).

The political condition of blacks in Charlotte, Greensboro and Durham reflect very clearly the weaker political position of blacks in North Carolina. As the wave of citizen participation waned and national support evaporated, entrenched racial conservatives have regained control of resource distribution in these respective cities. The black middle class has re-emerged as the responsible leaders in the black community, and activist spokespersons for the poor have moved to more acceptable modes of political participation that receive the support of traditional black leadership.
In fact, those organizations and institutions that organized the black community before CAPs still remain and have regained the leadership role that they were forced to share during the 1960s and 1970s. The poor no longer serve the function of mobilizing the black community. No truly indigenous leaders of the 1960s are "in place" to foster their class interest. This condition of the misuse of the black poor is best epitomized by the comments made by a Durham respondent very familiar with the Durham Committee and politics in Durham for the past 25 years.

They (DC leadership) rarely want the poor people to participate now days. The only time they want to see you is when its a few days before election time and they need someone to go and knock on some doors. (Atwater, 1987)

The findings of this study and the research reported by scholars in this area leads this researcher to conclude that poverty programs have not eliminated social injustice nor has it sustained a leadership core that will continue to mobilize the poor for political empowerment. They have not accomplished these goals due to the factors discussed in previous sections of this chapter, but also because of the way the programs were formulated and the black community's dependency on weak coalitions.

The poverty programs of the 1960s have done little to change the status quo and the fundamental economic and political positions of blacks overall, and the black poor in
particular. Nelson (1982) quoted Professor James Jennings who states that political participation may either seek to achieve structural change in the distribution of wealth and poverty or to maintain the status quo. But as Nelson observes, black political activities have been heavily weighed toward the maintenance of existing social, economic, and political arrangements (p.195). The "existing arrangements" prolong a state of dependency that brought the poverty programs to the black community. Blacks were not lobbying for a poverty program. Liberals in the Johnson administration designed the poverty program for the black poor, without the poor's input and without a broad political base in the Congress. When the administration reduced its support, the War on Poverty did not have the support needed to sustain such a controversial program (see Donovan, 1973; Piven and Cloward, 1971). When moves like the Green Amendment aligned the federal government with the state and local entrenched white interests, blacks were left to fight for change alone. Permanent organizations and financial support had not been put in place to sustain independent political action in the black community.

The only evidence of blacks continuing to organize was through institutions financed by funds from private foundations and churches (NCF, FCD, MXLU, Domestics United). When these sources dried up, the most militant segments of
the black leadership did not sustain a movement that sought to change the distribution of wealth and power.

Fainstein and Fainstein (1974) captured the dilemma of urban minorities quite well when they pointed out that financing of community groups was effectively stopped by the 1969 revision of the Internal Revenue Code. This revision placed the foundation's tax-free status in jeopardy if funds were determined to be used to support political action. "As assention of the needs of minority groups became increasingly risky for politicians and foundations, the lack of shared material interests between minorities and their upper class allies meant that there was little basis beyond moral appeal for continued ties" (p. 234). Blacks were not in viable coalitions.

Hamilton and Carmichael (1967) were correct when they argued that viable coalitions are difficult to sustain when they are based on three dominant myths. The first myth states that in the context of present-day America, the interests of black people are identical with the interests of certain liberal, labor, and other reform groups. Secondly, that a viable coalition can be effected between the politically and economically secure, and the politically and economically insecure. Thirdly, that political coalitions are or can be sustained on a moral, friendly or sentimental basis by appeals of conscience (p. 60).
The poverty programs violated aspects of all three myths. First, it was never shown that the liberals or progressives at the national or local level wanted the programs to redistribute power in the communities. At the local level the young New South progressives soon lost their enthusiasm for the programs once blacks sought to gain control of boards, programs, and resources. It was soon realized that the interests of the two communities were not the same. Secondly, the individuals that stressed experimentation with ways to end poverty and maximum feasible participation for blacks in North Carolina were economically and politically secure. The efforts of this group produced the North Carolina Fund. The members of the Fund's board represented the rich and powerful, and also part of NCF's funding came from the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, philanthropists from the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco empire. Even though John Wheeler was included in this group, his political and economic standing (although great in the black community) paled in comparison to whites involved with this undertaking. The point must be stressed that the NCF with the establishment of the FCD took a lot of heat for continuing to support Black Power advocates like Howard Fuller and Nelson Johnson. But ultimately when support was needed to put in place permanent organizations, they refused to jeopardize their economic and political
interests for the sake of black people. Most of all, the black community did not have the resources to prevent this economically and politically secure group from withdrawing their support. Finally, the belief that a coalition based on moral or sentimental basis also has its flaws. The foundations and the churches continued their support when OBT, EOC, and CAF moved exclusively to a service orientation. Organizations like GAPP and UOCI sought to empower the poor and were not hesitant about using pressure politics tactics that were not popular with the white leadership or some of the traditional black leaders. Malcolm X Liberation University, which denied the legitimacy of the way American society was structured, offended their major funding source, the Episcopal church. When blacks moved in directions that were not deemed to be the correct position for them, funding ceased. The moral or friendly basis for continued funding was bankrupt in terms of a viable coalition.

If mobilization of the poor is to become a reality, the goals and objectives must be espoused and formulated by the poor or spokespersons for the poor that can be held accountable by the poor. The prospects of this being actualized are not very good. The poor that are expected to make fundamental change have less political resources than any other groups competing for benefits from the political
process. Their strength resides in their numbers and their ability to disrupt the political process. CAPs showed the poor their potential, but the leadership was not willing or able to sustain a mobilization of the poor because their class interest were not being served.

North Carolina no longer has a need to place special emphasis on poverty and the elimination of Jim Crow laws. The New South "progressive myth" has become entrenched in the mores and customs of the South. Middle class blacks and the poor have been given a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. As Piven and Cloward (1971) argue the War on Poverty is over, and it was a startling success!

Suggestions of Avenues for Future Useful Research

This study has provided insight into how three cities in the South used the increased political resources in their respective city to develop black political leadership. Future research should expand to include a determination of whether or not the new leadership that developed reflects what some students of black politics refer to as New Black Politicians, (Preston, et al., 1987). Did CAPs actually produce a new type of politician significantly different from the politician not exposed to CAP experience? A determination of the extent of this actually taking place was beyond the scope of this study.
The emerging theory argues that if blacks are to use electoral politics as one of several strategies to liberate the black community, then the politicians that are produced must go beyond seeking merely their fair share of the existing services and benefits provided by the government (Nelson, 1987). With an expansion of the research to more southern cities, conclusions can be made concerning the long term effects of CAPs on the emerging new BEOs in the South.

Future research should also include the roles and career paths of the participants in the poverty programs. This study has shown that electoral politics did not dominate the career choices of the participants in this study. Participants gravitated into public and private bureaucracies, education, and community activism. Future studies should tighten our definition of poverty participants. As Levitan (1969) noted, CAP was a catch-all for projects to combat poverty; all sorts of programs ranging from day care to community organizing, to consumer education, to birth control clinics, all could be funded through it. Research from this study suggests that one should expect more activist views to be found among the community organizer verses the many other positions that were classified as CAPers. This research used respondents who held various positions in CAPs. This was also the case with Eisinger (1979) in his national study. Minorities that
were brought into these programs held a myriad of views and political orientations ranging from the radical to the moderate to the conservative. Viewing the CAP agencies and its staff as a monolith may have its drawbacks.

Research of this type will provide a more definitive assessment of the impact of mandated community organizations on the reordering of local priorities—reordering priorities that during the 1960s America viewed as intolerable and dangerous to the furtherance of democracy. Research of this nature will allow policy makers to avoid mistakes of the past if they decide to resurrect programs that address economic and political poverty.
This study consisted of 37 personal and telephone interviews. A clarification should be presented concerning who was selected and why.

Between 1964 and 1980, the three cities studied (Charlotte, Durham, and Greensboro) had 39 BEOs. Durham led the way with 24 BEOs, followed by Charlotte with 10, and Greensboro with five BEOs. These figures along with the names, offices held, length of term served, number of terms served, and addresses, were taken from the *National Roster of Black Elected Officials* (1971-1980), published by the Joint Center for Political Studies. For the years 1964 through 1970, this information was gathered from the boards of elections of Mecklenburg, Guilford, and Durham counties. The data from the boards of elections also enabled the researcher to cross check the data taken from the *National Roster*, and also obtain the names of the unsuccessful candidates during that time period.

The first 17 interviews were personal interviews of BEOs and unsuccessful candidates in the three cities studied. The logic of this study suggested that BEOs would
possess CAP experience and that interviews with these officials would reveal the impact of CAPs on the officials political success. An effort was made to include the unsuccessful candidates so that a comparison could be made concerning whether CAPs experience was an asset or liability to black political success. It was discovered early in the data collection stage of this study that the BEOs who served between 1964 and 1980 did not produce data relevant to CAP involvement by BEOs.

The first wave of interviews was very useful for reasons other than information on the background of the city and the respondents. These interviews revealed which BEOs in the cities did and did not have CAP experience. This was extremely helpful because it allowed the researcher to concentrate on those BEOs that had CAP experience and knowledge of the poverty programs' impact on their political development. Thus, for this study it was not necessary to interview all of the BEOs in each city. The limited information that these non-CAP BEOs could provide for the study did not justify the time and resources needed to complete interviews with all of the BEOs who held office during this time frame. This point is particularly important in the case of Durham. The initial interviews in Durham revealed that only four of the 24 BEOs were CAPers or had CAP related involvement. Three of the four CAPers were
interviewed, and the only reason the fourth CAPer was not interviewed was due to the fact that this individual had moved away from the city and could not be located. The remaining four BEOs were not CAPers, but civil righters, which provided a balance to this select group of BEOs in Durham. The remaining six respondents were CAPers who were visible and active in the programs during the height of the poverty programs' existence. Many of the BEOs and the informants were difficult to interview, either because of their "lack of time" once they discovered that the interview may last longer than one half hour, or because they were not available during the interviewing periods. All interviews were attempted at least three times.

Charlotte had the second largest number of BEOs which was ten. From the ten, only one official was a member of the CAPs program during the 1960s and the 1970s. That individual was Fred Alexander, who is now deceased. Ron Leeper, a city councilman from the Second District, was a late comer to the poverty program after CAF had been taken over by CSA. Leeper could not be interviewed because he was in the midst of a re-election campaign and could not find the time for an interview.

Seven community knowledgeable were interviewed in Charlotte who were highly visible in the CAF or had knowledge of Charlotte politics. Charlotte was unique in
that many of the past participants had either left the city with no forwarding address, were deceased, or had failing health which prevented an interview. Charlotte also provided the only white respondent. This respondent was included because he was the director of CAF during the interviewing period and was very knowledgeable of the agency's metamorphosis. The respondent is not included in the overall figures presented in the study. For that reason in some of the tables the totals equal 36, and not 37.

Greensboro had only five black elected officials during the time frame studied. None of the officials were involved in the poverty programs. Two of the five granted interviews, while the others' schedules would not permit interviews or were out of town. Greensboro provided 15 interviews from unsuccessful candidates and CAPers who all served as community knowledgeables. The CAPers and civil righters had to provide insight into the poverty programs because the BEOs were totally detached from involvement in the poverty programs.

With all cities, attempts were made either in person or by telephone to contact selected respondents, as stated, at least three times. In some cases attempts were made as many as five times to complete some of the interviews.
The first wave of interviews was also beneficial because it produced a pool of CAPers and political knowledgeable that could provide the "whole CAP story." It should be stressed that this study was interested in informants who were knowledgeable of CAPs and the political arena, more so than BEOs that happened to be elected, which was the case in the initial interviews. Each of the BEOs were asked during the course of the interview to suggest the names of political informants. From the BEOs' responses, the researcher successfully completed 20 additional interviews.

The two waves of interviews differed in terms of the length of the interviews. The first wave of interviews was personal, whereas the second wave was conducted by telephone. The first interviews ranged in length from one hour and thirty minutes to four hours, with the average length of the personal interviews being approximately two and a half hours. The telephone interviews ranged in length from thirty minutes to two hours. The average length of these interviews was approximately one hour and thirty minutes.

Table 11 on the following page provides more detail of the interview schedule for this study and a profile of the respondents interviewed.
Table 11: Explanation of Interview Schedule*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Respondent</th>
<th>Charlotte</th>
<th>Durham</th>
<th>Greensboro</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of BEOs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of BEOs with CAP experience</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of BEOs interviewed with CAP experience</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of BEOs interviewed without CAP experience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of non-BEO informants or knowledgeable</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of persons interviewed in each city</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of persons interviewed for the study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In addition, the following numbers of BEOs, not interviewed, were contacted and served as sources of guidance and information in the interviewing process: Charlotte-4; Durham-5; Greensboro-7.
APPENDIX B

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON BLACK ACTIVISM
IN THREE NORTH CAROLINA CITIES

Figure 3. Dimensions of Political Culture
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