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Local interests and state territorial structures: Integration and fragmentation in metropolitan Columbus, Ohio, in the postwar period

Jonas, Andrew Edmund Gerald, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1989

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LOCAL INTERESTS AND STATE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES: INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN METROPOLITAN COLUMBUS, OHIO, IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Andrew E.G. Jonas, B.A. (Hons), M.A.

The Ohio State University
1989

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Approved by

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DEDICATION

To my teachers of geography, my family, and Pauline
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to acknowledge the assistance of the staffs of the Ohio Historical Society, the Franklin County Library, and the Ohio State University library system. Kevin Cox helped me conduct several interviews from which this dissertation draws. Thanks to Libby Wentz, Allaire Shaw and Jenny Zorn for their outstanding technical assistance. Very special thanks to Kevin Cox for his support and encouragement from the inception of this project to its near completion. I admire Kevin's dedication to scholarship and his concern for his students.
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1988 'Comment on 'Structuration theory and attempts at integration in human geography', PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER, 40:2, 219-221

1986 'Planning responses to fiscal crisis: local governments in the Great Depression', PROCEEDINGS: FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN PLANNING HISTORY, Columbus, Ohio, 593-608

1986 Review of Jane Jacobs' 'Cities and the wealth of nations', PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, 10:1, 131-133

FIELDS OF STUDY

Urban geography

Political geography

Social science methodology
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LOCAL INTERESTS AND STATE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES:
INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN METROPOLITAN COLUMBUS, OHIO, IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

By

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The Ohio State University, 1989
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This dissertation is a study of how jurisdictional arrangements in metropolitan areas are created and how those arrangements undergo transformation. The formation and transformation of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas are understood to be caused by a variety of mechanisms. These mechanisms are considered in relation to structures of social relationships. The social relations of interest in this dissertation are those in which local interests are inserted. These local interests include firms, people and local branches of the state. By virtue of such relations as their fixed investments and localized exchanges, these local interests are locally dependent upon different territories for their reproduction over the short to medium term. The interests of firms, people and local states are necessarily territorial because of relations of local dependence.

In order to protect or enhance their territory-specific patterns of reproduction, local interests may engage in collective activities. Activities such as the promotion of
local economic development, planning infrastructural improvements or upgrading the
quality of education in certain places may be regarded as important to the reproduc­
tion of firms, people and local branches of the state. New territorial arrangements
may then become desireable. Collective action by local interests may have as an objec­
tive changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas.

Conflict is a feature of the formation of state territorial structures in metropoli­
tan areas. Factional differences amongst local interests may emerge over the precise
form and function of jurisdictional arrangements. The state is implicated in such con­
flicts because it is a social relation which has an interest in its own territorial struc­
ture. Quite which state territorial structures are produced is contingent upon the out­
come of conflict. This conclusion is reached via concrete historical-geographical
analyses of postwar patterns of jurisdictional organization across metropolitan Colum­
bus, Ohio.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

THE OBJECT OF THIS STUDY

This dissertation is a study of how jurisdictional arrangements in metropolitan areas are created and how those arrangements undergo transformation. Thus, the focus is on territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. The object will be to investigate, both theoretically and through case studies, some of the processes which produce diverse state territorial structures in a metropolitan context.

Much of the literature depicts an ahistorical and static picture of jurisdictional arrangements in metropolitan areas (Bish, 1971; Bish and Ostrom, 1976). This dissertation rejects such a perspective. It argues that jurisdictional arrangements in metropolitan areas are not static and unchanging. Indeed, they undergo processes of

---

1 The term 'state' is used here to refer to the apparatus of government. This contrasts with 'State' which refers to political subdivisions within the federal system of the United States (for example, 'State of Ohio'). By 'metropolitan area', I am referring to a territory which includes a population agglomeration of no less than 250,000 people. Census definitions of the population and geographic sizes of metropolitan areas have changed over time as a consequence of changing patterns of urbanization. Thus, my use of the terms 'metropolitan area' takes into consideration such changes. In general terms, a metropolitan area can be delimited by the geographical extent of the labor market as measured by the mean commuting field of the workforce.
transformation and change. Given the possibility that state territorial structures can undergo transformation, an historical perspective on the formation of such structures is required.

While there are studies which have adopted an historical perspective on the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas, such studies tend to have an evolutionary tint, suggesting that some form of comprehensive, metropolitan-wide governmental arrangement is both a necessary and desirable end product (for example, Honey, 1976). Among other defects, this perspective tends toward the misleading conclusion that there are readily-identifiable ‘ideal’ forms of metropolitan government which are functional to the needs of different interest groups in the metropolis. But what constitutes the appropriate shape and form of metropolitan government is historically contingent. Indeed, the apparent demise of metropolitan governmental arrangements in many countries of the developed world (for example, the United Kingdom) underlines the problem of an evolutionary perspective. Metropolitan governmental arrangements can quite suddenly become dysfunctional for certain interests. What is lacking in these approaches is therefore an understanding of interests and their causal effectivities to generate changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. It is thus an investigation of interests and mechanisms of change which provides the central focus of this dissertation.

Changes in territorial structures in metropolitan areas have a variety of causes. These causes can best be considered in relation to structures of social relationships. The social relationships of interest in this dissertation are those in which local interests are inserted. Local interests of concern here include those of firms, people and the state, in particular local branches of the state. These local interests can be
conceptualized in terms of the powers and liabilities are entailed by the local dependence of firms, people and local governments on particular localities for their reproduction. The interests of firms, people and the state and its local branches are necessarily territorial in virtue of problems of local dependence. The scale of territoriality investigated in this dissertation lies at approximately that of the metropolitan.

In order to protect their territory-specific patterns of reproduction, local interests may engage in collective activities. Issues such as the promotion of local economic development, improving infrastructures or enhancing the quality of education in certain places may be seen as important to the reproduction of firms, people and the state and its local branches as local interests. Given such social relations are necessarily spatial, new territorial arrangements may become desirable. Thus, collective action by local interests may have as an objective changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. New jurisdictional arrangements may be generated such that collective needs are satisfied.

This is not to say that changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas will necessarily emerge from collective action. Firms and people may be perfectly able to address their locality-specific needs without drawing upon the powers of the state. Nevertheless, to the degree that state powers and responsibilities are drawn upon, new state territorial arrangements may become the foci of collective action. The diverse state territorial structures that are evident in metropolitan areas are best viewed therefore as possibilities, not necessities.

Conflict is a feature of the formation and transformation of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. There may emerge factional differences amongst local interests over the precise shape and form of jurisdictional arrangements in
metropolitan areas. The state is often implicated in such conflicts because it is a structured social relation which has an interest in its own territorial structure. Investigation of these conflicts, and participant local interests, is central to an understanding of how territorial structures of the state are produced and undergo change. Such conflicts will be investigated in detail in this dissertation.

TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES OF THE STATE IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

The concept of state territorial structure is not a surprising one for political geographers who have for some time been interested in different aspects of the spatiality of the state. For example, there has been considerable work on voting behavior in a spatial context, gerrymandering, federalism and local government boundaries. Geographers have also looked at the territorial organization of metropolitan areas, the focus of this dissertation.

At this more concrete level, it is common to distinguish between two types of territorial structure of the state in metropolitan areas (Wood, 1961). The first - metropolitan fragmentation - draws attention to the fact that metropolitan areas may be fragmented into numerous and overlapping jurisdictional authorities. Each authority has its own independent powers to raise revenues and provide one, or a combination of, services to populations within its jurisdiction. In a fragmented metropolis, there is a decentralization of power to multiple independent jurisdictional authorities. A typical pattern, in this instance, is to have a large central city responsible for certain functions surrounded by smaller, independent suburban municipalities which are fiscally and politically independent of the central city.
A second form of jurisdictional organization in metropolitan regions consists of a territorial structure that is more integrated. In the case of metropolitan integration there is a centralization of fiscal, administrative and judicial powers with respect to the metropolitan region. Typically there exists one jurisdictional entity, perhaps a central city or a metropolitan authority, which is responsible for service coverage to the entire metropolitan area. This may mean that a central city is not surrounded by fiscally and politically independent suburbs.

The two forms of territorial structure - fragmented and integrated - represent ideal types. In reality, there are no metropolitan areas which exhibit either one or the other territorial pattern. The extent of fragmentation or integration of a metropolitan region is a matter of degree. Moreover, drawing a division between fragmented and integrated territorial structures may be somewhat of an arbitrary exercise. While they usefully describe the morphology of metropolitan areas with respect to the spatial organization of jurisdictional boundaries, there is no necessary territorial correspondence between a particular jurisdictional form and the location of state powers with respect to that form, as will be shown.

The non-correspondence of territorial structure and state powers can be illustrated in a variety of ways. First, it may occur in a 'horizontal' direction in the sense that, given a particular geographical scale such as the metropolitan, powers may be centralized or decentralized within the one territorial structure. For example, it is typical in practice to find metropolitan areas which are centralized with respect to the delivery of some services while they are decentralized with respect to others. The merger of Indianapolis and Marion County in 1970 resulted in health services, pollution control and land use planning all becoming spatially centralized at the
metropolitan scale. Other services, notably the territorial provision of education, remained jurisdictionally fragmented into independent school districts and thus decentralized at the metropolitan scale. Under other circumstances, a single function, metropolitan, authority may result in integration of the metropolitan area with regard to that particular function. This may occur even though the metropolis remains fragmented in another sense, such as the continued existence of a number of independent suburban municipalities. The case of New York City is pertinent here. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is responsible for transportation planning throughout much of the metropolitan New York area (Warf, 1988).

The non-correspondence of state territorial structure and state powers can also be considered in the 'vertical' dimension. There is an hierarchical arrangement of powers internal to the state apparatus. The state can be considered as made up of a variety of territorial scales superimposed upon one another with each scale connected to the next via a range of powers and instrumentalities. These levels are not mutually exclusive. It is quite possible for instrumentalities and powers at 'higher' levels to influence those at 'lower' levels, as well as vice versa.

At the lowest levels in the hierarchy are municipalities, villages and townships. Each of these jurisdictions may elect representatives, appoint administrators and determine methods of taxation, legal representation and forms of service delivery. At this lower level, there may exist in addition numerous special districts such as sewer and water authorities or school systems. Each district may be fiscally and administratively independent of other local jurisdictional authorities. The existence of multiple jurisdictional authorities at this geographical scale has generated the perception of metropolitan fragmentation.
Further 'up' in the hierarchy are the counties and regional and metropolitan authorities. While counties in most cases have existed since States drew up their own constitutions, metropolitan and regional authorities are more recent creations. Metropolitan forms of government illustrate quite well the non-correspondence problem as it occurs in the 'vertical' dimension. With respect to individual jurisdictions within the metropolis, an encompassing metropolitan authority may signify a marked integration of the metropolitan area. But when viewed from still higher levels in the state hierarchy - for example, State or federal government - a metropolitan authority can embody a substantial decentralization of powers (for example, it may be used to disperse federal funds to local authorities). States themselves have powers to influence the territorial structure of metropolitan areas within their jurisdictions. Rights to home rule vary substantially from State to State so that municipalities possess different powers to determine their own futures (for example, with regard to annexations, consolidations, bonded indebtedness, etc.).

Finally, although the Constitution of the United States gives many powers to the States, it is not unusual for the federal government - as the jurisdiction of last resort - to intervene at the local level. Over the years, the federal government has intervened directly in the realms of school desegregation (Johnston, 1984), urban renewal (Weiss, 1980), the construction and maintenance of railroads, airports and networks of inter-State highways (Harvey, 1985), and metropolitan and regional planning (Wood, 1961).

Variations in the 'horizontal' and 'vertical' dimensions means it is extremely difficult to generalize about what functions, powers and
responsibilities are located at what level in the state apparatus. The territorial division of powers and responsibilities within the state apparatus may be more fluid and changeable than the distinction between integrated and fragmented allows. Thus the distinction between fragmentation and integration is at best simplistic. It is no more than an heuristic device which allows us to focus on territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. There is no straightforward pattern of either centralization or decentralization of powers across a metropolitan region. Instead:

All metropolitan areas are affected to a greater or lesser extent by the conflicting forces of centralization and decentralization. The interdependence of activities within metropolitan areas requires area-wide institutions for some functions or parts of functions of government. Just as clear is the need for units of government small enough to enable the recipients of government services to have voice and control over their quality and quantity. The usual result of this conclusion is to try to divide functions, assigning some to a more general level of government and others to the local level. However, the American federal system permits a much wider choice than such a clear-cut division would imply. Federalism has, in fact, undergone continuous change and the division of responsibility among levels of government has become much less distinct (Committee for Economic Development, 1970: 387).

Bearing in mind the above qualifying statements, the distinction between integrated and fragmented territorial structures will be maintained throughout this dissertation. This will be mainly for narrative purposes since the principal emphasis will be on explaining conflicts which have shaped those types of territorial structures.

If the variety of forms of territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas is great, then so to are the methods commonly used in achieving those forms. Metropolitan integration can be achieved by a variety of methods. These are summarized here for the purpose of exemplification. Typical methods include: annexation of unincorporated territory contiguous to a municipality; consolidation of two municipalities; mergers between a county, municipality and/or a township; the formation of single-function special districts with a metropolitan-wide mandate; the creation of regional councils of government; or State and Federal control of certain metropolitan functions.
Each of these methods contributes to a markedly increased degree of integration across a metropolitan area.

Methods which contribute to the spatial fragmentation of the metropolis are also diverse. Typical methods of fragmentation here include: the incorporation of new municipalities with their own independent powers of fiscal and home rule; the multiplication of special districts in a metropolitan area; the formation of federated metropolitan structures whereby some powers are devolved to special districts even though overall governance of the metropolis is more centralized; and the decentralized provision of public goods and services across the metropolitan area. These methods can produce a marked fragmentation of jurisdictional authority within a metropolitan area.

The complexity of methods involved in generating either integrated or fragmented territorial structures makes it difficult to generalize from case to case as to which will be most commonly used. This is not to say that researchers have not tried to do so. Two types of generalization are discernible: generalizations about the conditions under which different methods of fragmentation or integration are most feasible; and generalizations about the actors which promote each method. These attempts at theorizing state territorial structures in metropolitan areas are reviewed and critically evaluated in the literature review chapter.

SOCIETY, THE STATE AND THE SPATIAL ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

With its focus on the mechanisms that may shape the territorial organization of the state, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the advancement of social theory within
human geography. One particular aspect of social theory that this dissertation speaks
to is the issue of the territorial organization of social relations.

Debates on the relationships between social relations and spatial (territorial) struc­
tures have blossomed over the last decade. The collection edited by Gregory and
Urry (1985) covers a number of the crucial themes in this debate. Thus, for example,
several chapters in the volume confront the problem of incorporating space into theo­
ries of society and social relationships. As yet, however, the issue of how to conjoin
space in critical theory has been confined to a somewhat abstract level of analysis
and little substantive progress has been made in bringing together the arguments at a
more concrete level. Specifically, how should geographers incorporate their traditional,
concrete concerns for the spatial organization of phenomena within a more abstract
understanding of society and its emergent causal properties (Urry, 1985; Sayer, 1985a)?

Parallel to these debates has been a growing interest in the re-emergence of a
materialist political geography and attempts to generate a theory of the state (Taylor,
1982; 1985; Clark and Dear, 1984; Driver, 1985). Within geography, state theory thus
far has addressed itself to two issues: state form and state function. State form
refers to the organization of the state in an historical and geographical context.
Relatedly, it is an examination of the formation of the state as a process structured
by a variety of conjunctural mechanisms (Koch, 1980; and Chouinard and Fincher,
1987). State function, by contrast, refers to what the state does: ie: its policy and
programmatic outputs. Within the state theory literature, there are many examples of
functionalist interpretations of state forms and functions. Amongst other things, these
interpretations suggest that the state exists to reproduce capitalism and that state
forms and functions can be 'read off' from the logical requirements of the
accumulation process (eg: O'Connor, 1973; Cohen, 1978; and see Driver, 1985). *Non-functionalist* interpretations of state form, by contrast, see the state as a social relation whose form is historically contingent (Clarke, 1983). This would be consistent with the notion that the state is a contested social relation whose forms and functions are contingent outcomes of conflict. It would also suggest that a critical mechanism structuring conflict over state structure is the class relation between capital and labor. However, incorporating the class relation into explanations for empirical forms which are highly contingent in their (spatial) expressions may sometimes be problematic (cf. Thrift, 1983; Walker, 1985).

This dissertation regards territorial structure as a part of state form. Accordingly, it is hoped that a contribution can be made to the society-space problematic via an analysis of state territorial structures. As yet, the territoriality of the state has not been adequately addressed from a critical theoretical point of view. The book by Agnew (1987), which addresses the issues of the geographical mediation of the state and how national level political processes are often reshaped and reinterpreted in place-specific cultural contexts, is a possible exception. There is also the literature which looks at states in the world system (Taylor, 1985). But, beyond tangential references, proponents of what might be called the 'social theory and geography movement' have disregarded the state (see Gregory and Urry, 1985).

This is not to say that the groundwork for conceptualizing the territoriality of the state is not yet already laid out. Jessop (1982) has underscored the importance of a realist approach to state theory. And in his review of Clark and Dear's important contribution, Driver stresses:

_to explain aspects of contemporary state behaviour we need to examine concepts of varying degrees of abstraction and to establish how they can be put together at the level of the concrete_ (Driver, 1985: 270).
The issue then is how to develop an understanding of the territoriality of the state which combines an abstract understanding of determinant structures with a concrete synthesis of causal mechanisms and contingent conditions in the specification of state form, where state form includes its territorial structure. It is hoped this dissertation is able to address these issues in both abstract and concrete terms.

**OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION**

This dissertation proceeds along two major, and connected, lines. The first is largely conceptual and the second is largely empirical. In the conceptual part, the aim is to develop theory at a relatively high level of abstraction in order to understand the structures of social relations with which to explain territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. A number of important concepts are advanced via abstract research. These concepts are then marshalled to examine information derived from case study research. The objective is not to 'fit' the data to the 'theory'. Rather, the concepts will be employed to illuminate the case-study research in a theoretically-informative manner. Moreover, information discovered in the conduct of the empirical research is deployed in a manner such that the original concepts are modified. Thus theory is advanced in a manner sensitive to the contexts of the particular case studies.

The literature on the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas is reviewed in Chapter 2. One theme which emerges from this review is the tendency of the literature to treat production and consumption as separate social forces shaping territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. The literature is evaluated in terms of
its positive contributions, as well as its limitations. An abstract analysis of the interests of firms, people and the state is the topic of Chapter 3. This analysis attempts to shed light on those social structures which are deemed important for explaining state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the case studies which have been based on research conducted in Columbus, Ohio. This Chapter outlines the history of the Columbus economy and the jurisdictional organization of the Columbus metropolitan area. The two major empirical Chapters follow and are organized around two themes. Chapter 5 examines the mechanisms and conditions which have resulted in the jurisdictional integration of the Columbus metropolitan area in the postwar period. The case studies presented in this Chapter are situated in relation to the viewpoint that production considerations are central to the integration of metropolitan areas with respect to the provision of such services as water and sewerage. The consumption-side argument which stresses fragmentation tendencies is the subject of Chapter 6. The case studies deployed in this Chapter focus on the territorial provision of education. In the concluding Chapter, an attempt is made to bring together the arguments that production and consumption are separate social forces shaping the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas. The implications of this conclusion for future research are discussed.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Chapter is to develop a critical understanding of the literature on territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. As an object of study in both lay and academic circles, the spatial organization of government in metropolitan areas has received substantial attention. The main foci of this literature have been form and function rather than process. To those ends, detailed analyses from a diversity of case studies have provided a wealth of data on the social costs and benefits of different metropolitan jurisdictional forms. A variety of generalizations have been produced from those analyses about the functional character of different jurisdictional structures. But the literature is found wanting in its understanding of the nature of the mechanisms which shape the development of territorial structures of the state in metropolitan regions.

In the literature review section of this chapter, four bodies of literature are outlined and critically examined. The first body of literature looks at metropolitan government in an historical-evolutionary perspective. These studies examine concrete instances of metropolitan integration and metropolitan fragmentation, using Los
Angela as the major case-study area. The case studies of Los Angeles are rich in empirical detail, but weak on conceptualization since they fail to generate more abstract categories which may be deployed to shed light on situations outside of that particular geographic context. By contrast, the second body of literature reviewed is less concerned with concrete case-analysis and more interested in generating law-like statements about the processes shaping territorial structures in metropolitan areas. This literature is divided into two parts: one looks to the motives of actors in promoting territorial structures; the other generalizes about the conditions facilitating changes in such structures. The emphasis of these studies is thus on generalization. But they encounter problems with regard to contextualizing their findings.

The remaining two bodies of literature discussed are explicit in their attempts to generate theories of metropolitan jurisdictional organization. With regard to the first of these two literatures, public choice and liberal reform theories emphasize the politics of consumption in shaping the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas. In the second case, reform tradition and Marxist theories focus on the politics of production.

Having outlined these theories, the Chapter proceeds to develop a more critical appraisal of the literature on territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. The approach adopted will be to address a set of dualisms which relate to the perceived shortcomings of the orthodox and Marxist literatures. These dualisms cover such issues as: contextual analysis versus empirical generalization; functionalist versus historical approaches; idealism and determinism; society and space; and state versus society.

An attempt is then made to outline a method for analyzing territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas which can best reconcile these dualisms. The
methodological principles outlined owe their origins to a realist philosophy of science. The realist method is considered to be practically adequate for the aims of this dissertation to the degree that it pays critical attention to problems of conceptualization, the distinction of necessity from contingency, balancing composition and context and the transformative capacity of human agency.

CONCRETE STUDIES

Contextualizing the evolution of metropolitan jurisdictional structures

A useful starting point in reviewing the literature on the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas is to look at the specific case of Los Angeles. Of all the metropolitan areas in the United States, few have been studied in such detail with regard to processes of integration and fragmentation. Two 'classic' texts use the example of Los Angeles to analyze the contending forces of centralization and decentralization across a metropolitan area (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963; Fogelson, 1967). A third (Miller, 1981), takes a more critical stance on the issue of fragmentation and its distributional consequences. Miller's study, however, is geared towards an evaluation of the public choice literature on metropolitan jurisdictional organization. Thus his approach will not be evaluated until a later section in this chapter, when the public choice and liberal reform viewpoints are discussed in greater depth.

Crouch and Dinerman (1963) and Fogelson (1967) situate their studies of Los Angeles in an historical-geographical context. Their emphasis is on analyzing the evolution of local government across the metropolitan area. Both studies identify
integration and fragmentation as two competing and conflicting tendencies in the growth of the metropolitan area and its system of local government. They then attempt to contextualize the forces shaping respectively integrated and fragmented territorial structures. But, in the absence of a compositional analysis of such forces, these studies fail to produce more general statements which can be marshalled to explain territorial structures in other geographic contexts.

The distinction between fragmentation and integration provides the organizational framework for Fogelson's book. From the latter part of the nineteenth century until the early part of the twentieth century Fogelson identifies a marked centralization of local government powers with respect to Los Angeles. This contrasts with a second period, from about 1930 to 1960, in which there was a decentralization of powers to a system of independent suburban governments, creating 'the fragmented metropolis' (Fogelson, 1967). Fogelson's study is therefore an historical narrative of the emergence of the Los Angeles metropolitan area and its system of government from the days of its earliest foundation until the middle of the twentieth century. The narrative is situated with respect to the themes of integration and fragmentation.

Crouch and Dinerman (1963) also organize their book around the themes of integration and fragmentation. Unlike Fogelson, however, the emphasis is less on historical narrative and more on identifying the institutions and actors that have been most significant in the emergence of fragmentation or integration tendencies across Los Angeles. Crouch and Dinerman's book is therefore a systematic study of how the particular jurisdictional arrangements of the Los Angeles metropolitan area have been created and the institutions most responsible for their creation. But they make no effort to generalize beyond the Los Angeles context.
One important institutional feature of the drive to either more integrated or more fragmented 'political structures' which Crouch and Dinerman emphasize centers around the control of water supply in the Southern Californian Metropolis. The authors identify this as a critical variable in the competing and contradictory tendencies of centralization and decentralization, consolidation and fragmentation, in the local government system. Whereas up until 1927, the City of Los Angeles had a control of water in the metropolitan area which allowed it to expand territorially, it subsequently lost that control with the result that fragmentation tendencies intensified thereafter. Crouch and Dinerman thus identify the municipal government of Los Angeles as one important institution which, by virtue of its monopoly of water supply, was able to exert considerable leverage in promoting the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area.

Crouch and Dinerman do not explain how Los Angeles gained its leverage over annexations. Fogelson (1967: 95-99), however, does. Popular pressure appeared to be important. During the 1880s and 1890s, citizens led the drive towards municipal ownership of the water supply system when the costs of private utilities escalated and supplies became erratic and unpredictable in the rapidly growing unincorporated areas. In 1890, the electorate voted a $500,000 bond issue for a water works to be managed and operated by the City of Los Angeles. A Board of Water Commissioners was established in Los Angeles and began to encourage the city to take over ownership of private utilities operating within its municipal limits. In June, 1907, the Chamber of Commerce, the Realty Board, the Merchant and Manufacturers Association, the Municipal League, and the City Council of Los Angeles, together with the Los Angeles Times, all endorsed a $23 million bond issue to allow for the construction of an aqueduct between the City of Los Angeles and the Owens River Valley, some 200
miles away. When this bond issue was approved 10-1 by the electorate it consolidated the city's monopoly of water for the metropolitan area. Thereafter, Los Angeles was able to use this power to leverage the annexation of unincorporated areas contiguous to its jurisdiction.

According to Crouch and Dinerman (1963: 64-79), the legislative context was critical for the annexation of unincorporated areas to the City of Los Angeles. Although home rule charters adopted by California's cities gave them the legal powers to sell water outside their municipal limits, Los Angeles was able to use its monopoly of water supplies to leverage the annexation of unincorporated areas: property owners would be denied services unless their properties were annexed to the central city. Since property owners in unincorporated areas found it cheaper to tap into the Los Angeles water supply system than finance their own utilities, annexation to the central city was often the more financially attractive option. Moreover, the same home rule charters required that, upon annexation to a municipality, the ownership of private utility systems would automatically be transferred to the annexing municipality. Thus, by insisting upon annexation in exchange for services, the City of Los Angeles was able to consolidate its monopoly of services across the metropolitan area (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963: 141). Fogelson (1967: 223-228), however, suggests that there were in addition important political considerations. Most notably, by 1907 Los Angeles City Council conducted its elections at large rather than on a ward basis. The implication was that, with a strong mayor and a professionalized government bureaucracy, financial resources could be devoted to the expansion of the city into unincorporated areas rather than being channeled to the wards. Tellingly, when Los Angeles returned to a ward system in the mid-1920s, annexation became less of a priority (Fogelson, 1967: 223). Between 1907 and 1925, Los Angeles annexed over 400 square
miles of territory, resulting in a marked degree of integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the central city (Fogelson, 1967: 223; Crouch and Dinerman, 1963: 149-179).

But fragmentation tendencies intensified when Los Angeles lost its control of water supply. This happened in 1927. Increased demands for water in the metropolis necessitated a search for new supplies. The nearest supplies that could be fruitfully tapped were in the Colorado River. In order to secure those supplies, Los Angeles required the political and financial support of the governments of the richer suburban municipalities in the metropolitan area such as Pasadena, Glendale and Burbank. These jurisdictions organized to create the Metropolitan Water District of California and secured the Colorado River supplies. As a result, Los Angeles lost its control of water in the metropolitan area. But the City still managed to exert some leverage through its representatives on the Metropolitan Water District.

While the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and other business interests actively promoted Los Angeles' annexation program so long as the City retained its water monopoly, the same was not true subsequent to the creation of the Metropolitan Water District. Thereafter, as industry decentralized and commercial and residential development accelerated in unincorporated areas, the metropolitan region rapidly fragmented. As Fogelson claims, this process occurred beyond the control of any local government, and it was led by 'individuals and companies:

They, and not the authorities, evaluated the preferences of the consumers, measured the capacities of the market, and, in response to the logic of competition, completed the transformation of Los Angeles (Fogelson, 1967: 107).

As might be inferred from such a sweeping conclusion, little in the way of generalization about the nature of the mechanisms which have generated the observed changes
in the jurisdictional structure of Los Angeles emerges from Fogelson's analysis. Rather than analyzing such concepts as 'the logic of competition' or the 'preferences of consumers' which might be suggestive of generative processes, Fogelson instead places the emphasis in his historical narrative on an description of actors and events in their immediate settings. This typifies the contextual approach in social analysis which 'is an attempt to capture the flow of human agency as a series of situated events in space and time' (Thrift, 1983: 28). Fogelson does not attempt to abstract the social structures which, when considered in terms of their structural properties, might give rise to the 'logic of competition' that appeared to be the impetus for the 'transformation of Los Angeles'.

Although Crouch and Dinerman (1963: vi) explicitly take an 'institutional approach' geared towards the isolation of actors and institutions which have been important in shaping the pattern of government across the Los Angeles metropolitan area, their historical analysis also does not depart significantly from the contextual. Their focus is on 'interaction between various sets of competitors' which have shaped the 'governance of the metropolitan area' (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963: vi-vii). Interestingly, they distinguish (albeit briefly) between 'local' interest groups and 'regional' interest groups, although the grounds upon which they draw the distinction are empirical rather than theoretical (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963: 14-17). 'Local' interests are utilities (both public and private), construction firms, property owners, land developers and those who 'exchange goods with public officials'. These groups 'act locally' to influence politicians on particular issues, and they may be joined in their efforts by public employees and local newspapers. Other interest groups are 'area-wide' in scope and interest such as the Los Angeles Times newspaper, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles County, the Metropolitan Water Board, and the
Colorado River Association. Each of these groups has a particular stake in the political structure of the metropolis. They organize on an 'ad hoc basis' around particular issues and their 'cooperative and competitive' activities contribute to the fragmentation and consolidation of the metropolitan area:

The pattern of local government in the Los Angeles metropolitan area has been affected by the struggles between sets of competitors that have sought to control significant segments of the economic base of the area. Competition, however, has not been confined to groups in the private sector of the economy. Municipal corporations have been utilized as vehicles in the contest. In some instances, public policy has called for the use of municipal corporations as instruments to counter monopolistic efforts by private groups to gain control of a sector of the region's economic base. At the same time, there have been deliberate efforts by suburban municipalities to counter the tendencies of the central city to press its advantages in the competition to determine the governmental-economic pattern (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963: 63).

Although the Crouch and Dinerman study suggests the value of seeing processes of fragmentation and integration as being structured by a variety of 'competing' and 'struggling' interests, they do not have a coherent framework for investigating the nature of those interests. Nor do they account for the material stakes of those interests in respective territorial structures. Indeed, in the absence of references to structures of social relationships which might give rise to 'competition' and 'struggle', Crouch and Dinerman's institutional approach is best evaluated with respect to the immediate context of Los Angeles.

Nevertheless, some findings of a more general nature can be gleaned from the analysis. For example, Crouch and Dinerman's distinction between 'local' and 'area-wide' groups is provocative. It suggests that firms and public officials have interests in territories - and particular territorial structures - which may be located at a variety of territorial scales. However, what it is about those territories which has a fundamental influence on the material interests of firms and public officials is not immediately obvious. In addition, Crouch and Dinerman emphasize the diversity of
institutions forces which have promoted particular territorial structures. This is at
least suggestive of the usefulness of not developing an overly deterministic view that
territorial structures are the result of the collective activities of either 'economic' or
'political' forces but not both. And the value of a contextual approaches such as that
of Crouch and Dinerman lies in its capacity to situate events and actors in their
appropriate temporal and spatial settings.

Moving beyond context: generalization

Whereas the findings of the Los Angeles studies can best be evaluated with reference
to their immediate contexts, other concrete case studies of metropolitan jurisdictional
organization have attempted to move beyond particular contexts and produce more
general statements and principles. Two types of generalization are evident in these
concrete studies. The first type of generalization looks to the motives of different
actors in promoting changes in political boundaries in metropolitan areas. The second
type attempts to produce empirical generalizations about the conditions under which
political boundary changes may or may not occur.

Some concrete studies of metropolitan jurisdictional organization have attempted to
generalize about the motives behind attempts to generate more fragmented or more
integrated structures. Fleischmann's (1986) review nicely illustrates this approach.
Fleischmann identifies three major social groups which are perceived to have different
motives for attempting to alter jurisdictional boundaries. These are: private businesses,
public officials and residents. Fleischmann then assembles the findings of other case
studies within the framework of looking at the motives of these three social groups.
The first set of motives Fleischmann identifies refer to the economic interests of businesses. Fleischmann suggests that businesses are interested in promoting territorial structures which maximize their interests in local economic development. In 1909, for example, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, Los Angeles Times and city politicians sponsored a campaign to annex a sixteen mile strip of land connecting the city to its harbor near Wilmington. By annexing the strip to Los Angeles, business interests were guaranteed that the City of Los Angeles would subsidize the development of its port. This annexation was seen as crucial in the battle between Los Angeles and San Francisco to develop port facilities and promote local economic development (Fogelson, 1967). Other business interests may also be interested in changing political boundaries in order to promote their economic interests. Developers and builders, for example, have promoted central city annexation programs to ensure water supply and other services for their developments, and to lower the costs of infrastructure development by shifting the burden to the public sector (Fleischmann, 1977).

Thus, although in general businesses may have similar economic motives for pushing for changes in jurisdictional arrangements, not all businesses are the same and those differences have to be borne in mind.

Where jurisdictional integration by annexation is not desirable from an economic point of view, developers may promote alternative territorial structures. Tendencies towards political fragmentation are very evident in Texas where thousands of independent water districts have been created by developers, resulting in massive public indebtedness even as developers realize large profits (Perrenod, 1984). In other cases involving fragmentation, industries may push for the incorporation of independent municipalities so as to avoid heavy tax burdens. In Los Angeles, the cities of Industry and Commerce incorporated to exclude residential development and associated costs of sharing their tax bases with a large residential population (Hoch, 1984; Miller, 1981).
A second set of actors who can be identified as having their own motives for promoting different territorial structures are public officials (Fleischmann, 1986). Public officials have a stake in promoting a particular jurisdictional form where it has implications for their tax bases or their chances of being elected to another term of office. An extreme case of tax-grabbing through annexation is cited by Fleischmann (1986). The city of Port Arthur, Texas, annexed 9,000 acres of submerged and semi-submerged land in the Gulf of Mexico in 1979. Apparently the city stood to gain some $755,000 annually in property taxes from this action because the 'land' was to be developed by the Standard Oil Company (Thurow, 1982). Other studies suggest that municipalities (and therefore public officials who are concerned about tax bases under their jurisdictions) may benefit fiscally in the long run by promoting vigorous annexation programs. Cities that have not annexed often are surrounded by independent suburbs and can as a consequence experience fiscal difficulties when the level of economic activity in their jurisdictions declines (Muller, 1975). Fiscal concerns, therefore, can play a critical role in the decisions of public officials to promote a particular jurisdictional form.

But it may not be just local government that gains revenues through annexation activities. Many municipal governments operate public utilities such as electricity, water and sewage plants which require customers to offset costs of operation. By annexing land, municipalities may increase the market share of customers and so a public utility division within a municipal government may push for such a strategy. As noted earlier, the expansion of Los Angeles between 1907 and 1927 has been attributed to the leverage exercised by the City's division of water (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963). Thus there are divisions within local government which may be important to an explanation for differences of interest amongst public officials over particular territorial structures.
According to Fleischmann (1986), politicians may also manipulate boundaries so as to gain electoral advantage. Often this results in the disenfranchisement of social groups. In 1970, the city of Richmond annexed 23 square miles consisting of largely white, middle class residential subdivisions. This effectively changed the city's electorate from 52% to 42% black and weakened black power in the central city. The annexation was contested in court under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The U.S. Supreme Court found the annexation discriminatory against blacks, but the case was not resolved until 1976 when the city changed from at-large to district elections and the annexation was allowed to stand (Mooser and Dennis, 1982).

Third, residents also have certain motives for pushing for new jurisdictional arrangements. For example, the merger of Boston and Roxbury in 1868 is widely attributed to attempts by middle class residents in respective cities to gain leverage over mayoral elections (Warner, 1962). Middle and upper income residents may also organize to gain control over services and a tax base. Miller's (1981) study of incorporation in Los Angeles is a case in point. Many residents in unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County have pushed for incorporation in order to gain control of a tax base and avoid subsidizing poorer populations through their property taxes (Miller, 1981).

Fleischmann (1986) thus attempts to isolate three major groups of actors: businesses, politicians and residents. Each of these groups is presumed to have different motives for promoting particular jurisdictional arrangements. Those motives are isolated in terms of such categories as 'economic', 'fiscal' or 'electoral'. From a social-theoretical point of view, this approach is a distinct advance from contextual approaches in that it seeks to isolate more general characteristics associated with forces generating changes.
in jurisdictional structures. As such, it is consistent with a compositional approach in which human activities are split up into a broad set of structural categories founded on the properties of alikeness and dependent on a formal method of abstraction (Thrift, 1983: 27). The isolation of 'economic' or 'political' motives therefore is an attempt to identify abstract categories which may indeed refer to various properties of the agents isolated in the concrete case studies.

Yet this approach perhaps goes too far in the opposite direction to the contextual analyses. Concepts such as 'economic' and 'political' may be regarded as referring to the necessary properties of social objects. But the identification of those properties isolates only the sufficient conditions for change: it does not explain how change actually occurs in concrete historical-geographical settings. For example, while there may be strong motives for residents to promote new jurisdictional arrangements so as to gain control over services or to be able to influence local politicians, identification of such motives does not mean that those desired changes will necessarily occur. Change is contingent upon the conjecture of necessary relations with contingent circumstances.

In the case of Boston's Roxbury, by way of illustration, circumstances (and therefore motives) have changed since the nineteenth century. The low-income groups that now populate the Roxbury neighborhood have sought to consolidate their political and economic power and gain control over services and their own police force. A new organization, the Greater Roxbury Incorporation Project, has pushed for de-annexation from the city and the creation of an new independent city to be called Mandela (Overbea 1986). Yet, while their are strong incentives for low-income groups in Roxbury to promote such changes, they have consistently failed to create the desired
jurisdictional arrangements. Their efforts have met with resistance from the City of Boston and its elected officials.

Thus, to say that residents have certain motives for promoting a particular territorial structure says very little about the social relations which give residents powers to generate the desired changes. A shortcoming of the focus on motives is that it falls short of an analysis of power relations. It is important, therefore, to move beyond the identification of motives and to examine the social structures that may or may not give particular actors powers to generate changes and thus realise their interests in particular territorial structures.

Despite their theoretical shortcomings, however, these studies do give an indication of the diversity of interests which may coalesce around issues involving territorial change. But quite which interests will coalesce, and what strategies of territorial change are promoted, are contingent matters. Indeed, since a particular territorial structure is contingent upon those interests, there are likely to be situations in which a change in territorial structure is not desirable regardless of the 'economic' or 'political' motives of particular social groups.

Empirical generalization

A second type of generalization involves isolating common conditions under which political boundaries in metropolitan areas may or may not undergo change. This approach is common in studies which have looked at a variety of contexts and have attempted to produce from those contexts statements of general principles referring to jurisdictional change.
With regard to annexation, Jackson (1972; 1985) comments on a regional bias. Whereas in the postwar period annexation activities have been more common in the Sunbelt and west, central cities in the north and east of the United States had ceased annexation activities by the 1920s. The end of the annexation activities of the large central cities in the north and east is attributed to a growing opposition movement led by residents and businesses who incorporated suburban municipalities in order to avoid the higher taxes, crime rates and congestion of central cities. Since then, many central cities have not annexed because they have been surrounded by independent suburbs, the classic case of the fragmented metropolis.

Jackson is not alone in noting a regional bias in patterns of fragmentation versus integration. Other authors have attributed this regional bias to variations in State law (Dye, 1964). By the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, States in the north and east had passed constitutional amendments which favored the adoption of home rule charters and unified local government entities. This made it easier for residents and businesses in unincorporated areas to form their own local governments (Teaford, 1979). Under other circumstances, where States have put restrictions on the taxing powers of municipalities and their levels of bonded indebtedness, annexation has been foreclosed as an option because of the costs of servicing newly annexed areas (Wheeler, 1965). It should be noted, however, that there is no statistically significant correlation between variations in State laws and rates of annexation (Macmanus and Thomas, 1979).

Other studies have looked at common conditions under which mergers and consolidations may occur (Krefetz and Sharad, 1977; Marando, 1975). The point of departure for such studies is an uncritical acceptance of the necessity of some form of
territorial change to resolving a problem. The issue, then, is discovering what conditions enable or facilitate change, rather than an investigation of what actually causes change, or whether such problems are best served by manipulating political boundaries.

Typically in these studies, fragmentation is a problem, so some form of consolidation is 'required' (Honey, 1976). Noting that since 1957 city-county consolidations have only been successful on about a dozen occasions, Krefetz and Sharaf (1977) isolate five factors as being significant in the success or failure of such attempts at integration. These factors include: the perceived impact of mergers on citizen's taxes; the political strength of black groups in central cities; the strength and organization of local political leadership; levels of corruption in the existing political structure; and the degree to which merger with one municipality offsets the threat of annexation by another municipality. The authors use this organizational framework to analyze 20 case studies of merger referenda. They found that the most significant factors in the defeat of merger moves were fear of increased taxes (11 cases) and the threat of annexation (6 of the cases). But they also discovered that the position taken by central-city blacks on consolidation varied from case to case. Black leaders supported consolidation in five cases; in six cases they were opposed (Krefetz and Sharaf, 1977).

The authors confine their analysis to a very extensive survey across a variety of contexts. They make no effort to investigate in detail variations from one location to another. Indeed the five 'factors' they investigate are couched in terms so abstract that it is difficult to attribute them to any substantive causal group. Analysis of 'factors' such as 'political strength' or 'levels of corruption' may be of little use unless they are evaluated with respect to specific historical and geographical contexts.
For example, and with regard to whether or not the 'political strength' of black groups is significant, the ultimate success or failure of metropolitan merger proposals may depend upon whether or not blacks see opportunities in an integrated metropolis for the desegregation of schools (Katznelson, 1981; Katznelson et al., 1981). Mergers may also be regarded as a threat to black power where it reduces their electoral base (Trounstine and Christensen, 1982). In the latter case, local control of political and economic resources appears to be a critical factor: central city groups may see their power base weakened by the alteration of existing political boundaries (Marando, 1975). Moreover, there may be circumstances where minorities cannot manipulate boundaries to their material advantage regardless of how organized they are because they are prevented from doing so by other social groups (Aiken, 1987). Thus, for example, Trounstine and Christensen (1982) show how in Indianapolis an alliance forged between powerful business interests and Republican politicians at the County and State levels was instrumental in pushing for the merger of Indianapolis and Marion County despite opposition from minority groups in the central city who feared the dilution of their power base.

The identification of factors such as 'strength' and 'organization' would seem to refer therefore not to the necessary conditions for changes in territorial structures but to contingent circumstances. Minority groups may indeed be 'strong' and 'organized' but that does not necessarily mean that they will promote a particular territorial form. Nor does it say anything about their capacities to generate desired changes. Indeed, and in opposition to the above claims, it may even be that the strength and organization of minority groups itself depends (conditionally) upon their location with respect to a particular territorial structure. Thus what is important is not so much the form of that structure (integrated or fragmented) as the various ways in which
it actually empowers minority groups (for example, does it provide people with greater access to educational resources, to services, and/or to democratic institutions, etc.).

While contextual studies lack generality, extensive analyses of the conditions facilitating changes in territorial structures have tended to stray to the opposite extreme. In producing generalizations about the conditions surrounding such changes, they have failed to separate out what is necessary to a particular territorial structure from what is contingent. And, when removed from their original contexts, these findings have not proven successful in explaining changes that have taken place in other contexts. Not surprisingly, with regard to what conditions have the most influence on processes of integration/fragmentation, most authors are forced to conclude:

In the absence of a common framework for analysis these studies do not permit easy generalization, each concluding that the factors involved were unique (Krefetz and Sharaf, 1977: 175).

Empirical generalization must therefore be regarded as unsatisfactory in explanatory accounts for changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas.

THEORIES OF TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE

Whereas the previous section considered more concrete analyses of jurisdictional arrangements in metropolitan areas, theories of territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas are now discussed. These theories are divided into three major categories. The first category is located in the politics of consumption. Public choice and liberal reform theories attempt to explain territorial structures in relation to the
interests of different consumption groupings. A second theory is rooted in the politics of production. The reform tradition paradigm evaluates jurisdictional arrangements with regard to meeting requirements for production. Third and finally, Marxist approaches to jurisdictional arrangements are critically evaluated.

Consumption-based theories

One widely-held belief about the appropriate shape and form of metropolitan government arises from the so-called public choice perspective. The public choice paradigm is rooted in welfare economics. It is from welfare economics that it obtains criterion of efficiency for the provision of public goods and services across the metropolis (Tiebout, 1956; Buchanan, 1970). This argument favors metropolitan fragmentation. Fragmentation is regarded as a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for efficiency because it promotes competition between local governments and results in a matching of consumer preferences to public provision of services. The public choice perspective thus looks at fragmentation as an organizational response to the problem of satisfying the diverse preferences of individual consumers.

According to public choice theorists, problems of efficiency occur in the provision of services across a public economy because of the publicness of the goods involved. Because public goods are collectively consumed, once a public good is provided for a consumer, other purchasers of the good cannot be excluded from its consumption. As a consequence, consumers may understate their true preferences for a good and avoid payment. These leads to a situation identified as the 'free-rider' problem and results in a less than optimal output in the public economy (Pejovich, 1972; Whinston and Davis, 1962).
It is the absence of competitive market forces in the public economy which public choice theorists identify as being responsible for sub-optimal outputs. In a private economy in which consumption is for the individual, competitive bidding ensures that demand is matched to supply. But in the public economy there is no competitive mechanism which can ensure consumers will indeed reveal their preferences and hence express a demand to which local governments can respond accordingly. Moreover, governments themselves are monopoly suppliers of goods and, as such, need not be responsive to consumer demand.

In this context, public choice theorists argue that jurisdictional fragmentation creates conditions for efficiency. In the fragmented metropolis, local governments are forced into competition with each other through the residential preferences of consumers. Given a greater choice of jurisdictions, consumers can freely move from one local government to another. This mobility function means consumers are more likely to be forced to reveal their preferences for public goods by choosing to locate in those local government jurisdictions in which goods and services are offered at cost-effective rates. According to Tiebout (1956), people will 'vote with their feet'.

Mobility also has an effect on local governments and their capacity to provide goods and services at a cost-effective rate to consumers. There is a trade-off for public officials between the costs of service provision and attracting a 'desirable' consumer. Services must be provided at a sufficiently low cost to avoid outmigration of consumers. Outmigration may result in a loss of tax base and a failure on the part of local governments to exploit economies of scale (Ostrom et al., 1961; Bish, 1971). Thus public officials have to devise 'rational fiscal policies' or be voted out of office by those consumers that may have to face higher tax rates (Buchanan, 1970).
A second consumption-based approach to metropolitan government has largely arisen in response to the assumptions of the public choice paradigm. The liberal reform approach focuses on the perceived social benefits of metropolitan integration (Danielson, 1976). Like the public choice paradigm, the liberal reform approach is located in the realm of consumption. Unlike the public choice paradigm, however, this approach differs in its understanding of the implications of consumer behavior for the jurisdictional structure of the metropolis. Whereas the public choice paradigm looks to diversity in consumer tastes, liberals argue that variations between consumers in their statuses, incomes and racial characteristics are driving forces behind metropolitan fragmentation. And the issue is not a matter of maximizing preference outcomes, but a matter for minimizing social inequality. To that end, metropolitan integration provides for greater equality of opportunity because it reduces the capacities of differentially-privileged consumption groupings to structure the jurisdictional geography of the metropolis to their advantage.

The point of departure of the liberal approach is the empirical observation of significant discrepancies in the spatial distribution across the metropolis of certain indices of social well-being (Newton, 1975: 250-251; Danielson, 1972: 145; Cox, 1973: chapter 3). Quantitative estimates of per capita school expenditures, property tax rates, expenditures on public welfare and other variables reveal major fiscal disparities across metropolitan areas. The resultant 'metropolitan fiscal disparities problem' is most marked in the fragmented metropolis where there exist major disparities not only between a central city and its satellite suburbs but also between respective suburban municipalities (Cox, 1973; 1978). Research by Hill (1974) links the disparity problem to the location of residents of different incomes and racial characteristics. The ghettolization of the urban poor, especially minority groups such as blacks, in central cities
has produced marked income/fiscal disparities between central cities and suburban municipalities. Schneider and Logan (1983) aver that affluent families tend to concentrate in communities with stronger property tax bases, while poorer working class families are in residential suburbs where the tax base is not sufficiently diversified. These findings have led to the conclusion that resources are not matched to needs across the metropolis, so there is the issue of finding the most equitable method of redistribution (Miller, 1981).

In their efforts to discover such a method, liberals argue that the 'metropolitan fiscal disparities problem' can be attributed directly to the existence of spatially decentralized units of collective consumption. In this scenario, while the fragmented metropolis may not be the direct cause of welfare inequality, it facilitates the use of powers which reinforce those inequalities. For liberals, exclusionary zoning is the most salient power (Downs, 1973; Wingo, 1973: 14-16). Zoning facilitates the internalization of externalities and may be used to maintain a mix of land uses that can be distributionally advantageous. Zoning powers can also be deployed to protect more privileged consumption groupings from the social costs associated with 'less' privileged consumption groupings.

The problem, according to liberals, is that zoning powers encourage certain income groupings to manipulate spatial outcomes to their advantage. This is particularly the case in sensitive areas such as education (Wingo, 1973). The dependence of local school districts on the property tax for their revenues results in great significance being attached to the locations of school district boundaries, particularly whether or not such boundaries encompass areas of high property values. The basic strategy is for middle and upper income groups to define a set of resources - for example, high
value properties - as belonging to a local rather than wider community (Miller, 1981). Residents in areas of low value properties are, as a result, excluded from sharing in the resources of the richer school districts. Accordingly, fragmentation is not a result of people's diverse tastes and preferences but a mechanism for reducing equality of opportunity.

Liberals argue for a territorial solution to the 'metropolitan fiscal disparities' problem. Since political boundaries are a condition for such disparities so they must be eliminated through the integration of the metropolitan area into a single jurisdictional authority. Geographers Ziegler and Brunn (1980: 77) well illustrate the liberal 'solution':

What often occurs are needy and declining central cities that are surrounded by affluent suburbs, a picture that illustrates the acuteness of boundaries in the solution to metropolitan area wide problems. Metropolitan integration, it is argued, results in the centralization of control over such crucial powers as land use planning. And once such powers are taken away from more privileged consumption groupings, their abilities to segregate themselves into jurisdictionally fragmented structures is considerably attenuated. In this way, it is expected that there will occur, quite literally, an 'opening up of the suburbs' so that fiscal and other resources can be shared more equitably across the metropolitan region, or low-income groups can relocate to suburban municipalities (Danielson, 1976). Thus a territorial solution is presumed to ameliorate social problems of inequality as reflected in uneven distributional outcomes across the metropolitan area. Similarly, the elimination of 'point of origin' revenue sources through some form of centralized tax collection system is argued to decrease the likelihood of distributional inequities resulting from the 'rational fiscal policies' of spatially decentralized jurisdictional authorities (Miller, 1981). In summary, metropolitan integration - the centralization of
jurisdictional authority - is deemed desireable for liberals because of its more equitable effects on the welfare geography of the metropolis.

One area in which liberal reform arguments have emerged as significant is education. Specifically, they have come to the fore in debates concerning the impact of segregated school systems on the educational opportunities available to black children (Coleman, 1975; Lord, 1977). The issue of the territorial provision of education within metropolitan areas in the United States is thus worthy of special attention.

The passage of the landmark case Brown versus Board of Education in 1954 made the intentional segregation of schools on the basis of race illegal. In this case, the courts also found that schools segregated on the basis of race deprived minority groups equality of educational opportunity. Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have considered appropriate means by which the desegregation of school districts should be achieved. Amongst those means, the decision of Swann versus Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education determined that the desegregation of school districts could be achieved through the transportation of students in school buses. Since then, 'busing' has been associated with attempts to achieve a racial balance of students within, or the desegregation of, a school district (Lord, 1977).

Busing, along with other 'spatial' solutions such as the redrawing of attendance zones or the creation of magnet and alternative schools, represent highly territorialized interpretations of the problems of educational inequality within the large urban school districts of the United States. These forms of interpretation, moreover, have gained a certain efficacy in the degree to which the actual implementation of desegregation programs have had clear spatial impacts. Characteristically, busing has given rise to the problem of 'white flight' where lower- and middle-income, white residents with
school-aged children have relocated to independent suburban school districts so as to avoid a desegregating central-city school district. The degree to which busing has caused 'white flight' is a matter of some dispute, however. Large-scale surveys of major urban school districts suggest that it has (Coleman, 1975), although patterns vary considerably from one school district to another (Lord, 1977). In general terms, it has been shown that the relocation of white, middle class families to segregated suburban districts tends to accelerate immediately before and after the implementation of a desegregation program (Bosco and Robin, 1974). Studies have also revealed a strong correlation between 'white flight' and the ratio of black to white students in a desegregating school district. For example, Giles, Gatlin and Cataldo (1974) have shown that this ratio featured in the decisions of white, middle class residents to relocate to segregated districts.

Clearly, there is a jurisdictional geography associated with the phenomenon of 'white flight', although this geography has not been fully explored in the literature. One dimension which has been particularly susceptible to the liberal reform argument is the problem of the segregation of resources from needs across these metropolitan areas in which a schools desegregation program has been implemented. Accordingly, the suburban flight of white, middle-income populations from desegregating school districts has resulted in the concentration of poor, minority groups in central-city districts. Desegregation programs have as a consequence often been linked to attempts to consolidate central-city and suburban school districts within a metropolitan area so as to equalize the tax base amongst districts.

In addition, 'white flight' negates the de-segregating effects of busing. Thus there have been attempts to introduce metropolitan-wide busing programs in an effort to
eliminate segregation in suburban school districts (Pettigrew and Green, 1976; Lord, 1977). It should be noted, however, that attempts to implement metropolitan-wide busing programs have not been successful such as the case of Detroit (Milliken, 1974). Resistance to metropolitan-wide desegregation programs has been greatest in school districts with a predominantly white, middle-income population since higher income groups have often chosen to send their children to private schools (Lord, 1977).

Liberal reform and public choice paradigms represent polarized perspectives on the issue of metropolitan jurisdictional organization. But there are grounds for a commonality of perspective between them. One common theme which emerges is their treatment of space and spatial arrangements. Both theories argue that the spatial reorganization of government in metropolitan areas is socially desirable, although each justifies that desirability on different grounds. For public choice theorists, fragmentation is an important condition for promoting competition and it leads to efficiencies in the public economy of metropolitan areas (Bish, 1971). For liberals, integration alters the effects of the exercise of exclusionary mechanisms and leads to greater equality of opportunity (Downs, 1973). Both approaches clearly regard space and spatial form as having important effects on social processes.

Yet there are clearly problems attached to this conception of society and space. For one, it leads to the conclusion that questions of territorial organization can be considered separately from questions of social organization. Accordingly, all that is needed to change people's behavior is to alter their spatial relationships one to another. But this is to overlook the more crucial issue of why it is that matters of territorial organization are so central to the interests of social groups in the first place. This is an issue orthodox approaches do not address.
Another common emphasis in public choice and liberal reform theories is their exclusive focus on the politics of consumption. For, while political struggles amongst distributional groupings in the areas of education, health and welfare do give a certain credence to liberal arguments, it is important to note that public choice advocates are not naive about a politics of metropolitan jurisdictional organization rooted in the consumption sphere. Public choice theorists recognize that conflicts often occur wherever spillover effects are involved, although those conflicts are seen more in terms of departures from efficiency than from equity. For some public goods, there may be no appropriate spatial jurisdictional structure for the internalization of externalities and the elimination of spillover effects which result from their delivery. Conflicts may occur which then justify recourse to higher level jurisdictional authorities so that 'efficiency' is once more achieved. But:

Appeal to central authorities runs the risk of placing greater control over local metropolitan affairs in agencies such as the (S)tate legislature, while at the same time reducing the capability of local governments for dealing with their problems in the local context. To minimize costs of conflict to their power positions, administrators of local government agencies in metropolitan areas have tended to develop an extensive system of communication about each other's experience and to negotiate standards of performance applicable to various types of public services. These pressures to avoid the costs of conflict and seek agreement about metropolitan problems reflect the importance to local governments of resolving general public problems by negotiation at the local level in a metropolitan community (Ostrom et al., 1961: 841,842).

This represents some concession to the liberal viewpoint on the part of public choice theorists, at least in a formal sense. On the other hand, liberals are in agreement with the conservative viewpoint that 'government' should only intervene when 'normal' market mechanisms fail. Thus, liberals do not go so far as to question the centrality of the private property relation to distributional struggles: the fact that local government in the United States and its system of generating revenues through property and income taxes depends upon the sanctity of the private property relation and
the system of wage labor (Markusen, 1984). Both the public choice and the liberal reform paradigms are therefore squarely located in the politics of consumption. It is to the reform tradition paradigm and Marxist approaches that we must look for arguments located in the sphere of production.

Production-based theories

The public choice paradigm which favors metropolitan fragmentation largely arose in response to a reformist view of metropolitan government which held sway for the majority of the first half of the twentieth century (Teaford, 1979; 1986). The basis for this so-called reform tradition paradigm (Bish, 1971) lies in problems experienced in the realm of production, particularly as they are manifest in difficulties associated with the provision of physical infrastructures across metropolitan areas. Like the public choice approach, the relevant criterion is efficiency. But in this instance it is not a question of efficiency in the realization of preferences in the realm of consumption. Rather the criterion is efficiency in the collective provision of services across the entire metropolitan area. To that end, metropolitan integration is seen as desirable because it leads to economies of scale in service provision and to the internalization of externalities.

Traditional reform arguments commence with the observation that fragmentation - the multiplication of jurisdictional structures, the overlap of service delivery and revenue collection districts, and the decentralization of political powers - has created innumerable problems for the effective planning and management of the metropolitan area. Amongst the litany of ills traditional reformers cite, two are of particular importance: externality effects and the increasing costs of service provision (Bish,
Externalities arise because a problem originating in one local government (e.g., pollution) may impact upon another local government, but neither jurisdiction may have the resources or the jurisdictional authority to contain the problem. And costs increase because small jurisdictions cannot realize economies of scale in service provision. Moreover, there are intangible costs for those 'citizens' interested in planning the metropolis because of the difficulties of having to deal with a variety of jurisdictions in order to tackle 'area-wide' problems:

The bewildering multiplicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative, overlapping jurisdictions cannot cope with the staggering difficulties encountered in managing modern urban affairs. The fiscal effects of duplicative suburban separatism create great difficulty in provision of costly central city services benefiting the whole urbanized area. If local governments are to function effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have sufficient size and authority to plan, administer, and provide significant financial support for solutions to area-wide problems (Committee for Economic Development, 1966:44).

Traditional reformers identify a variety of problems which are perceived to be metropolitan-wide in scope. These include: housing, health care and hospitals, pollution control, the management of watersheds for sewage disposal and water supply, transportation, land use planning, the eradication of pests and diseases, education, and toxic and other types of waste disposal (Studenski, 1930; Jones, 1942; Committee for Economic Development, 1970). Traditional reformers see metropolitan integration as a sufficient, but not necessary, mechanism for addressing these area-wide problems and hence the effective planning of the metropolis.²

² It should be noted that adherents to the public choice viewpoint have argued against the validity of some of the traditional reformers' claims. One point of contention is the extent to which economies of scale, hence efficiency, cannot after all be realised in the fragmented metropolis. Public choice proponents suggest some services in fact can be provided more efficiently by spatially decentralized units, while others are best administered and financed metropolitan-wide. The solution often proposed is one which preserves the autonomy of consumption groupings while shifting the provision of physical infrastructures to the metropolitan scale. Costs of producing infrastructures can be externalized through, for example, contractual arrangements with higher jurisdictional authorities. Economies of scale may be realised, and the consumer benefits through lower overall tax rates even as they retain control over other functions which are more acceptable as 'local': viz.
Another source of inefficiency in planning the productive development of the metropolitan economy arises from a problem identified by traditional reformers as the 'suburban exploitation of the central city' (Neenan, 1970). The 'suburban exploitation of the central city' thesis arises from the following observation: Central cities are being 'exploited' by suburban commuters who use city services and facilities but pay property taxes to local governments outside the central city (Bish, 1971). Having identified this as a problem, traditional reformers look to possible solutions. The common solution has been to push for a more inclusive local government entity for the metropolitan area so that externalities can be internalized (Bish, 1971). Either this means some kind of areawide authority for a particular service (e.g., a regional airport authority, or a regional trash collection system) or it may mean imposing an income tax on commuters.3

Whatever the 'desired' solution, however, production interests have been central to promoting such integrated territorial structures:

Central to the solution of the nation's greatest urban problems is the creation of improved governmental machinery in metropolitan areas. Better machinery will not by itself guarantee the development and adoption of more effective substantive programs, but it is a necessary prerequisite. Aware of the need for change, enlightened business and civic leaders have spearheaded campaigns to replace small-scale and overlapping local governments with consolidated, federated, or other forms of metropolitan government. These campaigns have education and land use planning. Such a solution is consistent with the public choice viewpoint which privileges the relative autonomy of a politics of consumption: The separation of the provision (collective consumption) of public goods and services from their production opens up the greatest possibility of redefining economic functions in a service economy. By separating the production from the provision of public goods it may be possible to differentiate, unitize and measure the production while continuing to provide undifferentiated public goods to the citizen-consumer (Ostrom et al., 1961; emphases and parentheses added).

3 Interestingly, there are superficial grounds for a commonality of interest between traditional reformers and liberal reformers in integrated territorial structures. However, each theory has very different reasons for promoting integrated structures. For traditional reformers it is a matter of minimizing costs of production. For liberal reformers, it is a matter of enhancing equality of opportunity.
stressed the fact that the economic and social interdependence of metropolitan areas has created problems which can only be solved on an area-wide basis (Committee for Economic Development. 1970: 41-42, emphases added).

The reform tradition theory thus favors metropolitan integration because of its perceived benefits for minimizing costs of production and maximizing the efficient planning of metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas, so it is claimed, are economically and socially interdependent. It is that interdependence which gives some credence to the idea that 'metropolitan' solutions are most appropriate for resolving problems experienced in the realm of production.

Like public choice and liberal reform approaches, the reform tradition approach recognizes a central role for space in a theory of metropolitan jurisdictional organization. The creation of a more encompassing jurisdictional authority for the metropolitan area, so it is claimed, facilitates the productive development of the metropolitan economy. In this scenario, territorial reorganization is clearly presumed to alter the powers of social groups to produce and thereby accumulate in a metropolitan context.

But this raises the question as to what precisely are the social groups that see their material fortunes so closely tied to the political geography of metropolitan areas. This is a question not adequately addressed in the reform tradition approach. Case studies of successful reformist campaigns would indicate that economic elites in metropolitan areas play a central role, but the composition of such powerful elites may vary across different contexts (Sofen, 1963; Trounstine and Christensen, 1982). Moreover, given that such reformist campaigns depend upon the exercise of state powers, it is not clear at all from the reform tradition paradigm how the interests of reformist groups intersect with those of public officials so that the desired changes are indeed generated. To what extent, for example, does the state have a stake in seeing changes in its own territorial structure?
The reform tradition paradigm stresses production as a social force shaping the jurisdictional geography of the metropolis. This stress stands in contrast to liberal reform and public choice theories. Those theories emphasize consumption as a social force generating fragmentation tendencies. So how is it that the competing tensions between integration and fragmentation, production and consumption, are reconciled in the metropolis? Theories rooted in a Marxist perspective suggest that class conflict is central to an understanding of how territorial structures in metropolitan areas are created. It is these Marxist theories that this dissertation now turns.

**Marxist theories**

A significant alternative to production and consumption-based theories of metropolitan jurisdictional arrangements is one rooted in an historical materialist framework. This Marxist approach relates struggles over territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas, and hence those territorial structures, to the material interests of participant actors. These material interests are located in the class relations of the capitalist economic system. Different class interests may promote certain territorial structures, but it is a contingent matter how class struggles are worked out in practice to produce a particular territorial form. For the Marxist, class struggle is imbricated in the social relations of production. Its concrete manifestation is evident in struggles between labor and capital over the magnitude and distribution of the social product. Capital strives to appropriate surplus value which increases the rate of accumulation. Labor struggles to increase its consumption fund by cutting into capitalist profits. By focusing on class as a social relation, an historical materialist approach stresses the underlying unity of production and consumption, while recognizing that its empirical expression is historically and geographically contingent (Clarke, 1983; Walker, 1985).
This is not to say that the conjecture of production and consumption in theoretical analysis can easily be demonstrated by reference to empirical data. For example, some social theorists have suggested that there exists a relatively autonomous class politics of collective consumption which can be identified in struggles for state housing programs and improved public services (Saunders, 1981; Castells, 1977). Because such struggles do not occur in the workplace, they are not easily classified as 'class' struggles. This conclusion often gives the impression that historical materialist approaches have rather more in common with the orthodox accounts outlined above than respective protagonists might care to admit. For example, some Marxists and public choice theorists have both argued for the value of theorizing local governments as spatially autonomous units of collective consumption (eg: Dunleavy, 1980; Pinch, 1985). Others argue, however, that struggles outside the immediate workplace in the sphere of reproduction are best conceptualized as 'displaced forms of class struggle' (Harvey, 1975, p.25). Indeed, to the extent that relations of reproduction are highly commodified, there is considerable value in seeing struggles over the distribution of the social product as not confined solely to the workplace (Fincher, 1984). Thus there have been attempts by some Marxist social theorists to bring production considerations back into theories of metropolitan government.

Some of the earliest Marxist interpretations of metropolitan fragmentation can be found in Markusen (1984) and Hill (1977; 1980). Both of these authors draw upon the ideas of James O'Connor (1973). O'Connor's thesis is devoted to explaining the fiscal crisis of the capitalist state. State expenditures, it is argued, can be divided into three major categories. On the one hand, social investment expenditures are those which support the accumulation process. On the other hand, social consumption expenditures maintain the reproduction of labor power. A third class of expenditures,
social expense expenditures, are deployed by the state to quell social unrest and therefore assume a legitimation function. Class struggle is the determinant mechanism causing the allocation of state funds to these three categories (O'Connor, 1973). In the fragmented metropolis, the spatial distribution of each category of expenditure represents the outcome of struggles on the part of spatially-defined social groups to appropriate their share of state expenditures.

Markusen and Hill both take the view that metropolitan fragmentation is a function of conflicts over the distribution of value. Markusen's approach to metropolitan fragmentation is novel in its focus on class conflict as the driving mechanism behind fragmentation. This stands in contrast to orthodox approaches which, if they stress conflict at all, locate that conflict in the sphere of distribution/consumption (eg: Newton, 1975). Class conflicts, according to Markusen, have created the present spatial form of the metropolis:

(Class conflicts accompanying capitalist development in the United States and contemporary political exigencies, from inherited colonial and federalist structure to home-rule ideology, have resulted in a political configuration unique among capitalist countries: strong separate suburban government units that serve class-based neighborhoods but avoid production-associated costs that central cities incur (Markusen, 1984: 91).

Markusen claims that separate suburbs are not created through the individual preferences of consumers, or their avoidance of the corruption of the central city, as orthodox accounts have claimed (eg: Wood, 1958). Instead they are produced through class struggles over the distribution of the tax burden between capital and labor. Class groupings such as homeowners middle and upper class residents have sought to defend their consumption interests by segregating themselves into suburban enclaves which have low tax rates. Moreover, land speculators, developers and construction interests have profited from such patterns of segregation by appropriating differential
rents in suburban locations (Markusen, 1984; Oates, 1969; Harvey, 1975). Developer interests and homeowners have organized to insulate themselves from sharing in the costs of capital accumulation via avoiding the higher taxes of central cities (Markusen, 1984: 90-91). Because of the segregation of revenue sources from service needs, fragmentation has exacerbated the fiscal crisis of the central city:

In the current urban fiscal crisis, the salient function of suburban governments is to insulate class consumption and capital from the costs of social accumulation and social expenses in the central city, thereby forcing the poor to finance their own oppressive police force and welfare system (Markusen, 1984: 93).

While Markusen is correct to critique the idealism of public choice approaches, her theory of metropolitan fragmentation in fact shares some assumptions in common with liberal reform approaches. This is evident in the assertion that fragmentation results in the segregation of certain advantaged consumption groupings in suburban enclaves. One difference, however, is that Markusen does assume that production is geographically concentrated in the central city: liberals make no reference to production issues.

Markusen's analysis is functionalist, nevertheless. This functionalism is most evident in the assertion that metropolitan fragmentation is functional to the interests of capital because it insulates firms from subsidizing the accumulation process and labor's consumption fund via the public fisc. But it is a contingent matter that the fragmented metropolis is functional to the interests of capital since there are divisions within the capitalist class that Markusen ignores. While some capitals - especially residential developers, local industrialists and commercial capital - have generally supported the incorporation of municipalities, national monopoly capital regards fragmentation as dysfunctional to its interests and has actively pushed for integration of the
metropolis (Feshback and Shipnuk, 1973). Markusen therefore does not extend her argument to incorporate potential intra-class divisions, especially as they pertain to the capitalist class.

Cox and Nartowicz (1980), on the other hand, do attempt to differentiate between capitalist interests. They do this on the basis of their stake in a fragmented metropolis. They assign a central role to property capital (land companies, construction companies, property development companies, savings and loan institutions, mortgage bankers and small land speculators) (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980: 388). Fragmentation is a mechanism which enables property capitals to survive in a competitive market place:

For each and every property capitalist—all other property capitals represent, through the competitive relation, an obstacle to self-reproduction. Decentralized local government is an expression, direct and indirect, of the attempts of property capitals, or of localized coalitions of property capitals, to suspend the barriers mutually imposed (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980: 388).

Thus Cox and Nartowicz also have a functionalist view of fragmentation. While for Markusen fragmentation is functional in the class conflict between capital and labor, for Cox and Nartowicz it is functional to the resolution of intra-capitalist rivalries. Moreover, by discounting the activities of 'industrial' and 'merchant' capitals (p. 387), their's is a rather incomplete picture of the diversity of interests which may have a stake in one territorial structure or another.

Hill (1980) presents a more subtle portrait of how fragmentation can be functional for the reproduction of different classes. Unlike Markusen, Hill adds the important dimensions of race and racial oppression to the analysis of metropolitan jurisdictional form. Looking at the case of Detroit, Hill demonstrates how the concentration of blacks in central city Detroit has been functional to the labor power requirements of monopoly capital. Drawing on the 'internal colony' thesis which
stresses how cheap labor power can be politically and economically controlled in seg­
regated reserves, Hill shows how blacks in Detroit act as a spatially entrapped reserve
army of labor for the automobile industry, the latter being largely decentralized to
suburban jurisdictions. Historically, capital has drawn upon surplus labor in the cen­
tral city in times of economic growth; but in times of economic crisis, black labor
power has often been laid off first, and plants in the central-city closed before those
in the suburbs. This pattern of residential segregation in which black groups are
spatially-entrapped in the central-city reinforces the urban fiscal crisis: capital and the
white working class are located in tax-rich suburbs and avoid subsidizing the black
working class through the tax base. The result has been the concentration of the
poor and unemployed in the central city and the urban fiscal crisis of Detroit.

Hill's analysis is complicated by the fact that not all capital suburbanized: corpo­
rate headquarters of the major automobile firms remained in downtown locations.
Faced with a declining economic base, downtown corporate interests forged an unlike­
ly alliance with black leadership and small businesses to promote the restructuring
and 'rennaissance' of the Detroit economy. By contrast, low-income blacks and ethnic
groups in the central city found the fragmented metropolis to their advantage to the
degree that it concentrated their power base. Thus blacks and inner city ethnic groups
organized a progressive alliance to challenge the plans of corporate capital to complete
the renaissance of downtown Detroit, though the challenge met with little success.
Hill's analysis, therefore, does not so much explain metropolitan fragmentation as
show how it can be a condition for the emergence of a particular form of urban
politics, and class alliances constructed around the material interests certain groups
have in different parts of the metropolis. And Hill's analysis is revealing in that it
demonstrates how the meaning of metropolitan fragmentation can change over time as
it affects capital's accumulation fund. Based on their location across the metropolis, different capitals may come to see different advantages and disadvantages in a particular territorial structure at the metropolitan scale. These differences need to be accounted for in explaining the role of businesses in promoting particular territorial forms.

Hoch (1984) also shows how divisions within the capitalist class and their different locational logics can influence the territorial structure of metropolitan regions. Hoch's study attempts to explain incorporation attempts in Los Angeles County by looking at the different economic interests represented by divisions within the capitalist class. First, incorporation efforts tend to favor the capitalist interests above the working class because: (1) the legal structure of incorporation favors members of the capitalist class, and (2) property ownership is a necessary condition for incorporation (Hoch, 1984: 103). Second, Hoch classifies social groups most involved in incorporation efforts as follows: industrial organizations; commercial organizations; public relations firms; homeowners associations; county government; and city government (Hoch, 1984: 106-108). Analyses of incorporation proceedings in Los Angeles County leads Hoch to conclude that working class opposition to incorporation efforts, regardless of the tax base implications of such strategies, have been disorganized, weak and ineffectual. By contrast, industrial and commercial organizations were able, by virtue of their class positions, to gain control over the most valuable territory in the region, thereby avoiding the social costs of incorporating a large population, but acquiring the fiscal benefits of controlling valuable residential and commercial real estate. Significantly, Hoch (1984: 117) argues that national and regional capital were unable to exert influence over the structure of local government in Los Angeles County. The reasons for this are not well-articulated, but Hoch attributes the outcome to the abili-
ties of local capitalist interests to command information flows and influence municipal officials to protect them from the 'outside threat' of national capital (Hoch, 1984: 117). Indeed, efforts promoted by national capital to pre-empt the land use powers of local governments have met with little success in some cases (Plotkin 1980), despite the enormous financial power wielded by such groups over entire regional economies (Feshbach and Shipnuck 1973).

In his conclusion, Hoch takes issue with the arguments of Molotch (1976) and Cox and Nartowicz (1980) that 'pro-growth coalitions' which push for incorporation strategies tend to represent 'rentier' capitalist interests; that is, those land-based interests such as developers, small construction businesses and middle class investors who have an interest in maximizing the exchange value of land by attracting value-enhancing land uses (ie: mobile corporate investors) (Hoch, 1984: 117-118). Hoch suggests that such coalitions in fact also have 'their own commercial and industrial interests to protect, and local government is a powerful ally' (Hoch, 1984: 118). By highlighting that incorporation depends upon a process of coalition-building amongst a variety of interests, and that these interests include local government, Hoch reveals a critical dimension to struggles over territorial structures of the state hitherto ignored in Marxist accounts. Specifically, changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas necessarily involve the exercise of state powers; and the state itself (or branches within it) has a stake in its own territorial structure. However, no explanation for the participation of local governments in such coalitions is offered. Moreover, Hoch comes dangerously close to overgeneralizing from a short time-frame; and so his claim that:

One of the most significant effects of incorporations is that they provide a form of territorial political cohesion for small employers and members of the middle class, while simultaneously fragmenting the capacity for such cohesion among members of either the working or the capitalist classes at the local level (Hoch, 1984:102)
bears strong functionalist overtones.

The Marxist approaches reviewed above raise some important questions about the relationships between different actors in metropolitan areas, their interests in particular territories within metropolitan areas and how those interests may be important in explaining territorial structures of the state. For one, there are clear divisions of interest within the capitalist class which need to be considered. This observation is marked improvement on traditional reform approaches which tend to consider production in very abstract terms rather than a particular mode of production, let alone divisions of interest within such a mode. Moreover, it would appear from the Marxist analyses that divisions within the capitalist class have a territorial expression. Thus developers and construction companies have stakes in different territories at the metropolitan scale, yet other firms are more nationally orientated in terms of markets and other linkages. These differences need to be addressed in explaining the great variety of attempts of firms to generate new territorial arrangements. For example, it is not sufficient to consider 'capital in general' since particular capitals are likely to be localized at different territorial scales.

This review has also touched on the issue of accounting for the material interest of the state at the local level in its own territorial structure. This is a theme that has received little attention hitherto in the literature. Marxist analyses have stressed the class capacities of different social groups to influence the shape and form of metropolitan government. But they tend to fall into the same functionalist trap as orthodox approaches because they seek to demonstrate how different state territorial structures are functional to the reproduction of different social classes.
CRITICAL EVALUATION

The review of the literature on territorial structures of the state has generated a variety of issues which are worthy of more critical analysis. These issues can best be addressed in terms of a set of problematic dualisms: contextual analysis versus empirical generalization; functionalism versus historical approaches; determinism versus idealism; society and space; and society and the state. The first two dualisms refer to questions of method; the remainder address questions of social theory. These questions are closely connected, as will be shown.

Contextual analysis versus empirical generalization

Concrete studies of metropolitan jurisdictional organization tended towards two extremes in terms of their methods of analysis. On the one hand, the Los Angeles studies provided detailed narratives of events and actors in their immediate time-space settings, thereby being rich in descriptive information. But this contextual form of analysis had its shortcomings when it came to conceptualization. Specifically, they failed to generate statements about their research objects of interests which were generalizable to other contexts. Generalization in this instance would involve abstracting those social structures which are constitutive of the different ways of acting of social objects. This form of generalization typifies the compositional approach to analysis which involves an attempt to isolate the common properties of social objects across a variety of contexts based on a formal method of abstraction (Thrift, 1983).

On the other hand, it was shown that empirical generalization of the conditions surrounding changes in metropolitan government also proved less than satisfactory.
Some studies, for example, attempted to identify the common conditions under which merger moves take place. This involved identifying from a variety of contexts some common factors which appeared to determine the success or failure of merger attempts. Thus factors such as the 'strength' and 'organization' of social groups were regarded as important. However, empirical generalization proved to be less than conclusive with regard to explaining the causes of successful merger moves. One problem was that what was discovered was in fact not more general statements about the powers of social groups to generate changes but rather the regularity with which the identified factors were associated with particular patterns of change. In other words, empirical generalization only identified the contingent conditions for changes and not the necessary conditions. For example, in explaining how gunpowder works one could refer to the properties of its chemical constituents. Yet, in order for those properties to be activated, certain other contingent conditions must be in place: for example, a lighted match. Gunpowder may indeed possess powers capable of causing an explosion, but those powers may never be activated in the absence of the right set of conditions.

Having identified necessity in the world through an analysis of the causal properties of social objects, it is important to remember that the the powers of social objects to generate changes in their environments depend upon their conjunction with specific conditions. Thus, even if, for example, minority groups do possess powers to prevent mergers which threaten their access to local government services this says very little about the circumstances under which those powers may or may not be exercised. Having identified more general powers residing in social objects, therefore, it is important to show in practice how those powers are exercised in different settings. In other words, more general statements about social structures and causal properties
need to be contextualized. The value of a contextual analysis is its ability to analyze social action in its immediate time-space setting and it is therefore sensitive to contingency.

Methodologically, the implications of these studies for the analysis of changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas are readily apparent. There is a need to seek a balance between what Thrift (1983) has described as the 'compositional' and the 'contextual'. On the one hand, a compositional analysis which seeks to abstract structural categories based on properties of alikeness must be sensitive to the different ways of acting of social forces in different contexts. On the other hand, contextual accounts which attempt to capture the flow of human agency as a series of situated events should make some reference to their social determinants by identifying structures of social relations and through causal analysis. This, in turn, requires the researcher to be aware of what Thrift describes as the 'determination of social action': that people do indeed shape their own futures, but not in circumstances of their own choosing. As will be shown shortly, there are ways of reconciling the tensions between composition and context through the appropriation of methodological principles grounded in a realist philosophy of science.

Functionalism versus historical approaches

A second important dualism to be considered briefly is that of functionalism versus historical analysis. Functionalist accounts attempt to identify in societies or social groups more general tendencies and motives. These more general tendencies and motives are then deployed to 'explain' empirical outcomes which may be highly varied. In concrete case studies of political boundary changes, for example, the impetus
for such changes were held to be located in the 'economic' pressures facing businesses and the 'political' interests of public officials (Fleischman, 1986). And in Marxist approaches, fragmentation was regarded to be functional for the 'accumulation' needs of firms, although that depended very much on avoiding problems of 'legitimation' through the alteration of democratic arrangements.

The weakness of the functionalist approach lies in its assignment of more general motives to societies which cannot possibly possess them independently of the activities of social agents. In the Marxist approach to metropolitan government, for example, fragmented territorial structures were, in some cases, considered functional for the resolution of intra-capitalist rivalries. But in other cases, fragmentation served to deflect the class struggle between capital and labor. What the Marxist approaches failed to show, however, was how exactly, and why, particular capitals chose to promote particular territorial structures. For there is nothing in the concepts 'accumulation' or 'legitimation' which would lead one to expect a particular form of government in metropolitan areas. The problem of this form of analysis lies in the tendency to see social agents as mere 'dupes' of more general tendencies residing in social structures. Thus, it is not so much people who are active as social structures; people are agents only insofar as they realise the purposes of those social structures.

In historical accounts, by contrast, greater emphasis is placed on the actions and reasons of individuals in explanation. Thus, structures and institutions which perform certain functions are historically specifiable in relation to those actions and reasons. This means that historical accounts are more concerned to depict human agency as purposeful and goal-orientated and are less interested in the identification of broader social pressures and forces. The Crouch and Dinerman study discussed earlier illustrates the historical approach quite well (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963). Crouch and
Dinerman looked at the institutions and individuals that have shaped patterns of government in Los Angeles. An explanation for the patterns of government in Los Angeles was then situated in relation to the actions of those groups and individuals. There was no attempt to attribute those actions to broader social pressures or to the motives of the various social groups and individuals.

Functionalism attempts to simplify explanation through the identification of more general motives and pressures residing in social groups and societies. Historical accounts, by contrast, focus on the contingency of social outcomes. And, whereas the emphasis of functionalism lies in examining 'synchronic configurations' of social forces (see Sayer, 1988: 15), historical analysis tends to depict events in 'diachronic succession' and unmediated by broader social pressures. While this has the advantage of capturing the sequential flow of human activity as purposeful and goal-orientated, it runs the risk of failing to draw out the more general social forces which may be constitutive of those goals. As Sayer (1988) shows, quoting from Ricoeur (1982: 279), there are inevitable tensions in narrative accounts between the 'episodic dimension' (historical accounts) and the 'configurational dimension' (the synthesis of diverse social pressures in the examination of particular events). In seeking to resolve these tensions:

(T)he activity of narrating does not consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered events...The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, therefore requires that we are able to extract a configuration from a succession (Ricoeur, 1982: 278, quoted in Sayer, 1988: 15).

An alternative methodological approach to explaining territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas must therefore seek to resolve tensions between a functionalist approach directed towards isolating broader social pressures and an historical narrative stressing the sequential character of human activity.
Idealism and determinism

Methodologically, reconciliation of the context/generalization and functionalism/historicism dualisms have important implications for social analysis. Yet it is also clear that questions of method presuppose questions of social ontology: understanding how the social world works depends very much upon the concepts that are brought to bear upon it in the first place. One characteristic of orthodox theories of metropolitan government was their neglect of questions of social ontology.

The neglect of such questions was evident in the idealistic assumptions which grounded orthodox theories. Consider in this light the public choice perspective. The point of departure for this perspective is the assumption that the world is made up of individual, preference-maximizing consumers. Individual consumers are able to exercise a choice over residences. This choice is reflected in patterns of residential mobility as consumers locate in jurisdictions producing services such as education which best match their preferences. In this scenario, the mobility function facilitates the realization of individual preferences. But what this ignores is how preferences are in fact socially constructed.

Their neglect of questions of social ontology leads to other problems for orthodox theories. Specifically, they are naive about their own social origins. This leads to difficulties in so far as their proposed 'solutions' to the problems of governing the metropolis tend to be idealistic and therefore highly questionable.

By contrast, the advantage of an historical materialist approach lies in its self-reflexive social ontology. Not only was Marx able to develop a cogent analysis of the workings of capitalist society but also, in identifying the conditions for the
dissolution of capitalism, Marx was able to identify the limits to his own theory of capitalist society: without capitalism, there could not have been *Capital* (but with *Capital*, we know what capitalism cannot survive without). And because Marxism has a concept of social change which is rooted in historical materialism, it can show how concepts and ideas do in fact have a social and material basis. This can be demonstrated with reference to orthodox theories of metropolitan government.

For example, consider the preferences of consumers for good schools. The importance of schools, and their locational characteristics are decidedly social and material products which have a history in the development of capitalism and the extension of the social division of labor into hitherto non-commodified realms such as the community and the family. The declining significance of family and community in the reproduction sphere rest on what Marx described as the real, rather than formal, subsumption of labor to capital. The history of capitalist development in the twentieth century points to the progressive extension of the commodity relation into many pre-capitalist spheres, including the sphere of the reproduction of labor power. Thus within a capitalist economic system, education prepares the individual child for the competitive world of the workplace. Skills must be learned and acquired which are then sellable directly at the point of production or indirectly (e.g., state employees).

Not only are preferences for schools socially constructed, so it is also the case that the existence of social groups capable of exercising such 'preferences' cannot be taken for granted. Yet this is precisely what orthodox theories do and thus they tend to be naive of their own social origins. In the public choice approach, pre-eminence is given to high status, white consumption groupings in suburban locations. In the liberal reform approach, the emphasis is on the consequences of fragmentation for
lower status, black consumption groupings in the central city. How it is that such social and spatial divisions could ever exist in the first place is not investigated in either approach. For example, it might be important to consider how relations in the workplace are partly responsible for such divisions within society. Thus, Hill (1980) was able to attribute the segregation of low income blacks into central-city 'enclaves' to a long history of exploitative relations in the workplace. The social and spatial marginalization of blacks through the decisions of employers in the automobile industry was very evident in his study of Detroit.

Although orthodox theories may be naïve about their social origins, this does not mean that such ideas lack an understanding of material conditions and effects. Thus it would seem that liberals are correct to emphasize struggles amongst distributional groupings in explaining the fragmentation of the metropolis. Such struggles, it is argued, reflect competition between groups of differing status and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as the use of methods of exclusion to reproduce such income and status differences. But a failing of liberal theories is to account for the existence of such divisions in the first place. Rather their emphasis is on investigating mechanisms which reproduce those differences, for example exclusionary zoning.

But just as the preferences of individuals for neighborhood schools are socially constructed, so too are attributes of income and status. The craving for positions of personal wealth and status depend upon the prior existence of mechanisms of stratification within society (Hoggart and Kofman, 1986). Rigid career structures give material impetus to the attempts of individuals to climb the social ladder and reafirms them as 'other-directed' individuals (Riesman, 1957). Such career structures rest upon, on the one hand, the existence of extensive technical divisions of labor within
corporate and institutional locales and, on the other hand, the extension of the social division of labor into both public and private spheres. Career and status considerations in the workplace are therefore constituted by more fundamental mechanisms in society than mere 'preferences'.

Now, it is Marxism that has identified class struggle as a mechanism constitutive of relations in the workplace. A common critique of Marxist social theory, however, is that, in its attempt to isolate more fundamental mechanisms operating in society (for example, class struggle), it often leads to deterministic and reductionist views of social change. For example, there is a tendency to assign causal pre-eminence to the class relation between capital and labor while neglecting other dimensions of social conflict (for example, racism). At its extreme determinism and reductionism can be associated with attempts to 'read off' highly diverse situations from class interests.

However, not all activities can be reduced to class interests. Thus, workers do not sell their labor power in order to reproduce capitalism and the capitalist class. Nevertheless, it is as a consequence of such activity that the capitalist class is indeed reproduced. So, although it is important not to reduce all human agency to class interests, it is also crucial to realize, as Marx did, that people do indeed make their own histories, but under conditions not of their own choosing.

Another problem associated with some interpretation of historical materialism is that in emphasizing material-economic relations it ignores such issues as beliefs, language and consciousness. These non-material aspects of human relations are important because people rarely interpret their actions in terms of categories such as class. Indeed, it is in the absence of such concepts as 'class interests' that idealistic approaches and associated forms of discourse become quite plausible accounts of everyday events.
The material effects of such unexamined ideas and beliefs should therefore be treated seriously. 4

Society and space

Another theme worthy of critical attention which the literature review addressed is the relationship between social theory and questions of space and spatial form. This relationship was considered in the review of orthodox theories of metropolitan jurisdictional organization and it also emerged in the analysis of Marxist approaches.

Classical social theory has traditionally had problems incorporating concepts of space into the analysis of society and social relations (Gregory and Urry, 1985). Indeed, Marx, Weber and Durkheim were all able to develop cogent theories of society and social change with little regard to questions of space and spatial form (Saunders, 1985). Even in modern presentations of classical social theory, space enters rather awkwardly into the analysis of society (Harvey, 1982; Sayer, 1985a).

However, there is little comfort to be found from orthodox accounts. Although such accounts do assign a role for society-space relations (albeit, often unselfconsciously), theirs is a fetishistic view of the influence of space on society. Thus, one shortcoming of orthodox approaches is the tendency to see space as separate from society, and so having 'effects' on society. In the reform tradition approach, for example, the effects of the territorial integration of the metropolitan area were to generate economies of scale in service provision, to internalize externalities and to lower the costs

4 Saunders and Williams (1986: 393,394) have argued recently that Marxist urban scholars have tended to dismiss orthodox approaches outright without seriously considering them on their own terms, let alone critically evaluating them. (Hence the failure of the Left to develop a clear alternative to the politics of the New Right.)
of production. In what sense, however, can space be reasonably said to have an independent 'effect' on society? Clearly, it cannot. Space - territorial structure - cannot exist without social relations such as states. Moreover, territorial structures do not have 'effects' except in the context of particular ensembles of social relations and interests.

Now, this raises the issue of the nature of the interests which are attached to particular territories. There is no mention in the reform tradition literature, for example, of precisely what interests are best served through integrated territorial structures, though there are references to the importance of such structures for 'production'. In the liberal reform and Marxist approaches, by contrast, those interests are less opaque and more obviously social. Thus there are the divisions of interest between national monopoly capital and smaller firms operating in local markets, for example. But precisely what it is about those firms (or residents, as is the case for liberal reformers) which gives them an interest in particular territories is poorly theorized.

The importance of interests to territorial reorganization is readily apparent in that, as liberal reformers show, people will go to great lengths to struggle over territories and political boundaries. It might appear, however, that it is not necessary for such struggles to occur. After all, as public choice theorists might claim, people can choose to move to other jurisdictions rather than effect a territorial reorganization. This suggests that the relationship between social interests and territories is far more problematic than indicated in orthodox accounts. Indeed, it could be that there are fundamental tensions between mobility (privileged in the public choice approach) and immobility (highlighted in the liberal reform approach) which cause particular interests
to be attached to particular territories. The question of developing an adequate theorization of such tensions needs therefore to be addressed more coherently than in orthodox and Marxist approaches to metropolitan government.

State and society

A final issue to be considered is the relationship between society and the state. This relationship is not problematized in either orthodox or Marxist accounts. Consequently, it is not at all clear why changing the territorial structure of the state should necessarily lead to changes in social relationships.

One problem is the tendency to see the state as somehow apart from society and therefore a neutral social force. The neutrality of the state is clearly apparent in orthodox accounts. What is important here is how local government arrangements can be manipulated so as to be more responsive to the needs of different social groups. Miller's (1981) study of Los Angeles, for example, concludes that distributional inequities across the metropolis can be best addressed through higher-level jurisdictional arrangements: all that is needed is a method of sharing resources across a variety of jurisdictions.

But Hoch's study demonstrated that the state need not be a neutral force. Indeed, as the guarantor of private property rights, the state often acts in the interests of the capitalist class. Thus it is owners of private property that have used state powers, such as incorporation and zoning, to promote their class interests. Contrary to orthodox approaches, the state cannot be conceptualized apart from society: to some degree it is constitutive of society.
Nevertheless, it is important not to go to the opposite extreme and view the state as an instrument of privileged social groups or classes. Characteristically, and with regard to capitalist society, this viewpoint might argue that 'the state is the executive of the bourgeoisie' (cf. Marx, 1973). Such a viewpoint does not allow that the state is a contested social relation which is neither instrumentally controlled by, nor reducible to, particular class forces. Indeed, the state has its own material interests, its own pressures and responsibilities, and these may be expressed through the behaviors of state officials and employees. The state - including its territorial structure - is both a condition for, and outcome of, struggles amongst diverse social forces.

Having discussed a variety of dualisms which have a bearing on the relationships between methodology and social theory, some further methodological principles are now outlined in order to prepare the ground for developing an alternative approach to explaining territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas.

AN ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Developments in social philosophy have begun to have some influence on the academic discipline of geography. This influence is evident in the methodological principles adopted by geographers in examining their research objects of interest. Whereas much work in the past could generally be classified as empiricist and law-seeking, more recent work has paid far greater attention to problems of abstraction and conceptualization, the assumption being that all observations are theory-laden and therefore are mediated by prior conceptualization (Sayer, 1984; 1988). These themes are at the heart of recent advances in critical social theory where they engage with a realist

For the realist, explanation in social science involves an analysis of the social mechanisms which allow or make a given research object act, and so produce change (Sayer, 1982; 1984). These mechanisms are understood to exist by virtue of the necessary relations which constitute the structure of the object of analysis. Concrete realist research begins by examining a specific research object of analysis. This leads to statements about its structure and associated causal properties. Investigation of the structures of internal relations which are constitutive of the causal properties of social objects is known as the method of rational abstraction (Sayer, 1984).

Once a research object has been identified in concrete terms, abstract statements can be made about its structure and properties. Take, for example, a local government administration. A local government administration has numerous causal powers and susceptibilities. These powers and susceptibilities are partly constituted by the structures of social relationships in which a local government administration is inserted. Thus there are its relationships to an electorate, to a revenue base and to other instrumentalities within the state apparatus. These relationships are constitutive of a local government administration's powers to tax, to set policy agenda, to put in place programs, and to hire and fire employees. It has also a variety of causal liabilities. A local government administration is susceptible to popular pressures, to swings in public approval, to changes in its constitutional authority, or to downturns in the fortunes of the local economy over which it has jurisdiction.

The causal powers and liabilities which attach to a local government administration may not ever be exercised or suffered, and their activation need not lead to
similar results under all circumstances. It is a contingent matter, for example, whether or not a local government administration becomes subject to such popular disapproval that it is forced out of office. It depends, amongst other things, on the degree and level of organized opposition. Yet it is in virtue of the necessary relation between elected officials and their electorate that a local government administration could ever (contingently) be voted out of office.

One of the advantages, then, of the realist method over the orthodox approaches reviewed above is its ability to distinguish necessity in the world from what is contingent. Orthodox approaches often conflate necessity with regularity. Accordingly, explanation through empirical generalization requires the identification of regular conjunctions of events and the discovery of order through observation. This may be a plausible approach in the natural sciences where the relationship of an object to its external environment can be controlled through experimentation in closed systems. But in the social sciences regularities tend only to be approximate and, as demonstrated earlier, unique (Sayer, 1985b). This is largely because, in the social world, one is dealing with open systems: people can learn from the situations in which they are situated and can modify their actions as a result. Thus any approach to explanation which is based upon the discovery of the common characteristics of objects across different contexts is likely to encounter difficulties in virtue of the fact that the discovery of order in the social world tells us little about what may produce changes in it, regardless of whether or not those changes are regular or discontinuous.

From the perspective of the researcher, the openness of social systems has its advantages, however. A researcher has 'internal access' to her objects of analysis through powers of communication, understanding and reasoning. The relationship
between researcher and the researched in social analysis therefore involves a 'double hermeneutic' because it depends upon the study of ideas, meanings, beliefs and other phenomena which are intrinsically concept-dependent (Sayer, 1984: 37-38). This 'double-hermeneutic' is important in that it requires the researcher to be sensitive to the possibility that beliefs, reasons and ideas (or ideologies) are constitutive of social action, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of reductionism and determinism. Nonetheless, not only can a researcher think about beliefs and concepts, but also it is with concepts that a rigorous understanding of everyday situations can be achieved (Sayer, 1984: 39). Thus, to the degree that involves an analysis of people's commonsense understanding of their actions, and to the degree that explanation involves identification of the structural determinants of those actions, the researcher stands in a critical relation to her objects of analysis.

Realist methods of inquiry into social objects and their causal properties draw a distinction between extensive and intensive research methods (Sayer 1984: 221-224). Extensive methods of inquiry are largely descriptive and aim to discover the common properties and general patterns of a population as a whole. Typically such methods use inferential statistics and standardized questionnaires. Insofar as such methods rely on formal sampling techniques in order to reach a 'representative' population, they often are not equipped to distinguish meaningfully between individual members of a population on the basis of their causal relationships one to another. The advantage of extensive research methods, however, is that they are able to identify how widespread a particular phenomenon is and are an important first step in the analysis of causal relations.
Intensive research methods, by contrast, are geared towards discovering causal mechanisms and how those mechanisms work out in a particular case or a limited set of cases (Sayer 1984: 221). Such methods focus on social groups or individuals which interact causally with one another in a meaningful fashion. Typically, this requires the use of qualitative methods, such as participant-observation and interactive interviews. Because extensive methods are based on formal sampling procedures, they are unable to distinguish between individual members of a population on the basis of their (causally-relevant) connections one to another. By contrast, intensive methods are not necessarily 'representative' of a wider population. To the degree that they uncover significant causal groups and their interactions with each other, however, they are often more successful than extensive methods in generating testable explanatory accounts. Indeed, it is possible to test for causal explanations using intensive methods by corroborating the accounts of individuals and social groups in similar institutional and social situations.

In this dissertation, both extensive and intensive methods were used, but the greater emphasis was placed on the latter. With regard to extensive methods, quantitative data were collected from census and other sources in an effort to assess the extent and degree of jurisdictional fragmentation and/or integration in the Columbus metropolitan area in the postwar period and to compare those data with data for other metropolitan areas. In addition, a number of historical sources were investigated in order to identify a variety of key issues involving matters of jurisdictional organization. Thus, I conducted a content analysis of newspaper articles for the period 1945 through 1989. Initially, this involved looking through every Tuesday and Sunday edition of the major metropolitan newspaper, the Columbus Dispatch, for the decades
1950-1959, 1960-1969, and 1970-1979. Having identified various key periods within those decades, I then looked in more detail at daily summaries and also consulted other newspapers for corroboration of the information. In order to achieve some 'balance' in the coverage, I found it useful to compare information on the same event(s) in the central city and suburban newspapers since each newspaper is directed towards a particular market and clientele. In general, the extent and 'balance' of coverage was highly uneven both temporally and in terms of particular events. It was thus necessary to turn to more intensive methods for further corroboration of the findings. The adoption of intensive methods, however, proved more difficult for the 1950s and 1960s since many key actors were no longer alive, had moved from Columbus or could not recall events in great detail.

With regard to those intensive methods, in researching the activities of institutions and social groups promoting different territorial structures a number of interactive interviews were conducted with individuals selected on the basis of their involvement in the events under investigation. These interviewees were selected one by one as the research proceeded and were identified from the newspaper articles and other documentary sources; or they were recommended by other interviewees because it was assumed they could corroborate the events being described. In terms of covering a wide population, this interview method was not necessarily 'representative'. Yet it was determined to be far more satisfactory than other, more formal and standardized interview methods in that it was possible to interact in an intrinsically

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5 Tuesdays were chosen because Columbus City Council meets every Monday evening and the meetings are reported the day after. Sunday's edition of the newspaper contains weekly summaries of major events. Since 1980, The Ohio State University libraries have kept an index of all newspaper headlines in local newspapers organized by topic and date. Thus, for the decade 1980 to 1989, it was possible to refer directly to those articles without conducting a formal content analysis. I estimate that, in all, well over 2,500 newspaper articles were examined in the preparation of this dissertation.
meaningful manner with each respondent. Specifically, by adopting an unstructured but interactive style of questioning it was possible to elicit relevant information without the interviewee feeling that he or she was being forced into a rigid responsive grid. Moreover, during the course of the interviews, a number of questions which were originally not considered important had to be asked on the basis of the discovery of new information conducted in the interviews. A list of interviewees and sample questions is produced in an appendix.

Another advantage of the interactive interview method was that it was possible to discover the reasons for an individual's participation in particular events and relate those reasons to the individual's institutional position and the social determinants of that position. This 'retroductive regress' (Sayer, 1984: 97) from events through reasons and beliefs to structures and causes was not a simple matter, however. The identification of structures through abstract research must recognize what has been described as the 'geo-historical earthing' of social activity (Bhaskar, 1986: 212). In other words, although abstract research is concerned with powers and preconditions of social structures, it must take into account the fact that they are always constituted in particular spatial and temporal settings, and that those settings may make a difference to the way they work, a fact often ignored in extensive methods which tend to disregard context when standardized (Giddens, 1984; Sayer, 1988: 9). This has relevance for the relationship of composition to context and for addressing the functionalism/historical analysis dualism alluded to earlier.

To illustrate this point, some social structures may be relatively enduring across a variety of contexts. Thus, for example, the process of production within capitalism is largely context-independent. All firms may be subject to similar pressures to
accumulate and to extract value from workers regardless of the environments in which they operate. Indeed, the conditions for capitalist production can be met in a variety of settings. At a more concrete level, however, some social structures are more context-dependent and it may be difficult to isolate their various properties independent of those contexts. Thus certain forms of capitalist production - for example, coal mining - are highly context-dependent. Coal cannot be mined anywhere and this may make a difference to the powers and susceptibilities of particular coal-mining companies (see Massey, 1985).

As Sayer (1988) has argued, it is necessary to recognise the importance of context in explanatory accounts. This does not, however, necessitate a return to the kinds of contextual studies exemplified by Fogelson (1967) and Crouch and Dinerman (1963). As was argued earlier, those studies made no effort to abstract from their particular contexts and were not concerned to isolate more enduring social structures. Rather, it is to argue that concepts derived from such contexts may need to be refined in their application to new contexts. Nevertheless, to the degree that those social structures exhibit more enduring properties, it may be possible to draw more general conclusions about their properties and ways of acting without additional empirical information.6 This has implications for confronting 'episodic' and 'configurational' tensions in historical narratives for it may be possible to situate historical accounts in relation to broader structures and social forces. Theorizing within a realist framework should therefore be seen to be a creative process, and one which is sensitive to a diversity of contexts (Sayer, 1988).

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6 For examples of abstract analyses of the workings of the capitalist space economy see Harvey (1982) and Smith (1984).
Now, social structures have a contingent status and this should sensitize researchers and practitioners to the possibility of their transformation. While some structures of social relations are relatively enduring (for example, capitalism), as are their associated institutional forms (for example, banks or firms), others are less so (such as, citizens' action groups). Indeed, because social structures are both conditions for, and outcomes of, human activity, their reproduction is a skilled accomplishment and is contingent upon the activities of knowledgeable social agents (Giddens, 1984). This, then, is the value of a structurationist approach: it recognizes that social structures are only ever reproduced or transformed by the conscious activity of causally-powerful social agents (Giddens, 1984; Sayer, 1984: 87-88).

Another advantage of structuration is its recognition that social structures are simultaneously spatial structures, and that social theory should be about the time-space constitution of social systems right from the start (Giddens, 1981). If social structures undergo a process of reproduction/transformation through struggle and the conscious will of social agents, then it must be that spatial structures are likewise reproduced/transformed. In the context of society and the state, this suggests the value of seeing state territorial structures as contested social relations whose empirical expression is neither pre-determined nor indeterminant.
CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 2

This literature review has raised a number of issues pertaining to the analysis of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. In summarizing these issues, there are three major considerations which must be borne in mind.

First, the relationship between society and space has been problematized. Why is it that social agents have interests in particular territories and what are the consequences of those interests for struggles over state territorial structures in metropolitan areas? These are questions which largely remain unanswered - even unasked - in orthodox and Marxist approaches to metropolitan jurisdictional organization. But it is clear that, in addressing such questions, a more self-conscious approach must be adopted in the incorporation of concepts of space and territorial organization in social theory.

Second, a satisfactory approach to explaining territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas should stress the superiority of abstraction over empirical generalization (see also Gregory, 1985). This is not to argue that empirical research of particular state territorial forms should be discarded. Rather, it is to indicate that such empirical forms may only be possibilities and not necessities. Abstract research of causal mechanisms and social structures identifies what may be necessary to those particular territorial forms, even if it is a contingent matter that they materialize. From a realist perspective, empirical generalization only leads to contingent statements about research objects and therefore does not constitute satisfactory explanation.

Third and finally, a realist approach must be sensitive to historical and geographical context. While structures identified in abstract research may have relatively
enduring properties, they are subject to transformation under a variety of circumstances. The value of seeing the formations of state territorial structures as historically contingent is thus apposite. For these reasons, an approach similar to that of Crouch and Dinerman (1963) which is grounded in an historical and geographical case study would seem most appropriate. Generalization is still a priority in such a case-study approach but only to the extent that it reveals the existence of relatively enduring structures. The next chapter draws upon the themes of this literature review to develop an alternative approach which looks to the necessary preconditions for struggles around territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas.
CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUALIZING TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES OF THE STATE
IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

INTRODUCTION

The previous Chapter addressed a number of problematic issues in the various literatures on territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. One issue was the question of the relationship between space and society. Relatedly, there was the problem of conceptualizing the interests that attach to particular territories and the relationships of those interests to struggles over state territorial structures in metropolitan areas.

This Chapter attempts to develop these issues further in order to explain the connections between, on the one hand, territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas and, on the other hand, the material interests of capitalist firms, local governments and people. The idea is to construct theoretical arguments at a relatively high level of abstraction. These arguments concern those relationships of and between firms, public officials and people which give them material stakes in particular territories. To the extent that those stakes exist at the metropolitan scale, they form the necessary preconditions for the participation of people, firms and/or local governments in collective attempts to protect or enhance their territory-specific interests there. In certain contexts, such collective efforts may result in changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas.
The first part of this Chapter looks at the structured social relations of capitalism which give firms, people and public officials interests in particular territories. In the second section, it is shown how these social relations form the necessary preconditions for firms, people and public officials to participate in coalitions with the aims of promoting their interests in particular territories. The Chapter then considers in more concrete terms the strategies coalitions may pursue, including those that may lead to struggles around territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas.

THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL DEPENDENCE

An important idea around which this Chapter is organized is the concept of local dependence. In order to understanding the meaning of this concept for the analysis of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas it is necessary to consider in abstract terms how it is that particular interests are attached to particular territories.

The importance of territories to particular interests was demonstrated in the critical review of the orthodox and Marxist literatures on metropolitan government. Amongst other things, the Marxist literature demonstrated how different capitalist firms have different territorial scales of interest. Thus, for example, there are the

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7 This concept has been put forward by Kevin Cox and Andrew Mair. I have drawn on three of their works in particular. The original formulation of this idea is in Cox and Mair (1988); another article looks at the local dependence from the point of view of doing concrete historical-geographical research (1989); and Mair's dissertation (1988) deploys local dependence in the context of explaining private business coalitions and local economic development. While I have relied quite heavily on these works to develop my own framework of analysis, there are some significant differences between Cox and Mair's approach and mine, notably the emphasis on explaining state territorial structures.
divisions between national capital and those firms that operate in more localized markets, such as developers and builders. The concept of local dependence enables further light to be shed on what it is about these firms which gives them interests in different territories.

Local dependence can best be considered in the context of the spatial fixities of social and material relations which mediate the participation of firms, public officials and people in the wider space-economy of capitalism. In abstract terms, capitalism can be conceived of as a global social relation. But concretely, capital and labor are always localized to some degree, and necessarily so. Thus, for example, firms are enmeshed in particular commodity relations: money transactions, credit transfers, raw materials purchases, labor markets, etc. These relations exhibit a degree of spatial regularity and indeed they may become spatially fixed (Cox and Mair, 1988). Given the insertion of those firms in the wider space economy, such spatial fixities may become problematic. That is, in the context of spatially unstable value flows, it may become difficult for a firm to reconstitute its external linkages to other locations. Local dependence refers to the dependence of a firm on the health of a particular local economy. Local dependence is important because it is a potential obstacle to a firm's ability to appropriate enough circulating values for its reproduction (Cox and Mair, 1988: 308).

There are two major sources of immobility which constrain firms to a location and which therefore constitute the local dependence of firms. The first source of immobility arises from the fixities which attach to investments in the built environment (Cox and Mair, 1988). Fixed physical facilities represent investments in the built environment which may only be paid off over a lengthy period of time, or the
amortization period (Harvey, 1982). Abandonment of fixed facilities before they have reached the end of their turnover time may result in substantial losses for a firm. There are a variety of examples of firms which are immobilized through their investments in the built environment. Utilities and power companies, by way of illustration, have extensive investments in pipes, electricity lines and so forth which constrain their activities to particular locations. These patterns of immobility may be further reinforced by legislative fiat as is the case for utilities in the United States which are constrained by law to operate in particular market areas. Financial institutions, such as savings and loan institutions, may also be subject to immobilities by virtue of the mortgages they hold on property. Developers and property companies likewise invest heavily in the built environment and, as a consequence, may become immobilized at a variety of locations (Harvey, 1985: 66-79). Harvey (1982; 1985) and Smith (1984) have both paid considerable attention to the implications of such spatial fixities in the built environment for the reproduction of firms at particular locations.

A second form of local dependence for firms has less to do with investments in the built environment and more to do with the character of localized exchange relations. Many external linkages of firms depend upon transactions and flows of information with specific others. Many of these relations therefore are not easily substituted for or transferable to other locations (Cox and Mair, 1988). First-hand knowledge of the local market may be essential for firms in particular places. People acquire brand loyalties and an element of goodwill may be established between producer and consumer which are essential to maintaining the exchange linkages of firms. For retailers and merchants, such as neighborhood stores, customers are built up around relations of goodwill and a sense of being reliable and honest in
conducting transactions. Such relations may be extremely difficult to reconstitute in other places. Knowledge also has immobilizing influences. Thus lawyers and accountants build up local networks of contacts over time with other firms and an understanding of the operations of those firms. Civil engineering firms depend upon their connections with public officials in order, for example, to submit competitive bids for contracts. It may be very difficult to reconstitute those contacts and connections at other locations.

Just as there are immobilities that constrain the activities of firms to particular territories, so also are there immobilizing influences on people. To a certain extent, this is a matter of the nature of their jobs and prospects for career advancement. Moves can be experienced as disruptive to the chances for promotion within a firm's job ladder. However, it is often the case that considerations outside the workplace come to have immobilizing influences on people.

Thus, there is the immobilizing influence of homeownership. On the one hand, there are certain use values attached to this relation, such as proximity to quality schools, good services and a clean and healthy environment. On the other hand, there are exchange value considerations which, while partly constituted by use value considerations, produce quite distinct immobilities for homeowners. Houses consume a large proportion of personal income and therefore constitute substantial investment risks for individual homeowners. A move to a new location may entail major transaction costs (Cox, 1989).

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8 In some cases, however, promotion may entail a move to a new location.
Along with the immobilities associated with homeownership, come the spatio-temporal routines of everyday life. There is the matter of educating children. Moves can be experienced as disruptive to the socialization process of child-rearing. There are the local clubs, stores and churches that people regularly attend. The need for close contacts with friends and family may also have immobilizing influences.

Another source of mobility - one which liberal reformers have correctly identified - is the spatial entrapment of low income groups in the contemporary metropolis. Residential segregation and processes of exclusion have been contributory factors here. Historically, the metropolitan housing market has produced distinct patterns of segregation as measured by the locational patterns of households of different income and racial backgrounds. There are the now well-documented cases of red-lining and steering which have been practised by financial institutions operating in the metropolitan housing markets (Chatterjee et al. 1974; Jackson, 1980; Morrow-Jones, 1982). The significance of these patterns lies in the immobilities they create, and in associated problems of local dependence. It may just not be possible for certain social groups - minorities, the working poor, etc. - to move to new locations because of the institutional barriers imposed upon them.

Local governments are also subjected to immobilizing influences (Cox and Mair, 1988). To the degree that it depends upon a local tax base for its operating revenues, a local government experiences a fiscal form of local dependence. Taxes are levied on property, sales and/or income in the local economy. Local government revenues also come from user charges and fees on services. The volume of tax revenues a local state can accumulate will depend upon the continued flow of value through the local economy over which it has jurisdiction.
A problem arises because the jurisdiction of a local state is relatively fixed and unchanging. Whereas it is possible for some forms of capital to move relatively easily from one location to another (Harvey, 1982), jurisdictional boundaries are, quite clearly, not so readily moved. Consequently the activities of a local government are somewhat circumscribed by its boundaries. The geographic instability of value flows can have deleterious consequences for the tax base of a local government and has led to problems of fiscal stress (Markusen et al., 1981; Burchell et al., 1984; Sterlileb and Hughes, 1975; Tabb, 1982; 1984).

Second, a local government has its own fixed investments in a local economy. In particular it has invested in capital works including bridges, schools, police stations, water and sewer lines, streets, electricity plants and so forth. The local dependencies which arise from these local government investments are analogous to those having to do with a firm's investments in the built environment (Cox and Mair, 1988). Local government fixed investments are financed by bonds issued against future tax revenues emanating from a local government's jurisdiction. Whether or not those bonds can be paid back depends on the ability of the local government to appropriate from the local tax base. Given the instabilities that characterize the wider space economy, the appropriation of tax revenues by a local government can become problematic (see Shefter, 1987).

Of course, this statement needs to be qualified since, as will be demonstrated, the locations of political boundaries within the metropolis may become objects of struggle and can be altered. Moreover, many local government activities are not confined to their jurisdictions. There is a literature which speaks of 'municipal foreign policy': the fact that local government officials spend much time negotiating with higher level authorities. Local governments often act on a global scale, hosting international trade shows, conventions and so forth.
Third, local politicians are elected to office and this makes them dependent on a local electorate. Local governments therefore experience an electoral form of local dependence. Whether politicians are re-elected or not depends on how favorably they are viewed by a specifically local electorate. This depends to some considerable degree upon the economic fortunes of the territories within their jurisdiction.

Local government employees, moreover, rely on local government tax revenues for their incomes. They also therefore have a stake in ensuring the fiscal health of the jurisdiction. This means monitoring the behavior of elected officials with respect to such issues as their management of budgets and their handling of election issues which most impact upon the fortunes of public employees. Mismanagement of funds, significant abuses of power, or stances which jeopardize the careers of public employees are likely to be frowned upon. These are important considerations in explaining the behaviors of local government officials and public employees.

Whether in terms of fixed physical facilities or non-substitutable exchange relations, local dependence seems to be a necessary feature of the geography of capitalism (Cox and Mair, 1988). And it is something that is likely to be experienced to a greater or lesser degree by firms, people and local governments. With regard to firms, their participation in the wider space economy depends upon the formation of relatively immobile contexts of exchange relations. But the reproduction of those relations depends in turn upon a more global pattern of value flows. Given the dynamism of capitalism, there can be no certainty that value will indeed flow through a firm's fixed social relations (Harvey, 1982; Smith, 1984). At some point, then a firm is likely to experience problems of local dependence. That is, given spatial fixities in its external linkages, and in the context of instabilities in the wider space economy, a firm may experience a crisis of profitability.
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS OF LOCAL DEPENDENCE

Instabilities in the wider economy may force firms into a situation in which they must confront problems of local dependence. Something must be then done to mitigate those problems. In this regard, there are variety of strategies firms can adopt individually or collectively.

A common strategy is to pass risks associated with spatial fixities onto other agents. For example, many firms rent rather than own office facilities. Thereby, the financial risks attached to investments in office space are passed on to property companies. Other strategies involve spreading risks over a wider geographic area. Some firms adopt multilocalational spatial structures of production so that risks may be pooled across geographic locations (Massey, 1984). This strategy has been quite common amongst firms that have already established national market networks. Indeed multilocationality can have the effect of contributing to lower labor costs for firms that depend upon several labor markets in different localities. Worker unrest in one locality can be suppressed with the threat of closure of the local operation, without fear of significantly affecting profit rates for the firm (Hudson and Sadler, 1986).10

Another mitigating strategy for a firm may be to diversify market outlets so that profits from branches in growing markets can offset losses in declining market areas (Cox and Mair, 1988). Diversification can also extend to the products of the firm. Steel manufacturers and insurance companies have been known to diversify.

10 Of course, there are counter-strategies that labor has adopted. Thus, by organizing nationally into trades unions, workers have been able to enhance their bargaining positions with respect to national capital (including state-owned enterprises). Moreover, to the extent that labor has looked to national governments for wage subsidies and social security, so their dependence on local networks of social relations for subsistence has, to a certain degree, been mitigated.
into commercial and residential real estate in the hope of spreading risks amongst a variety of operations.

Rather than adopting individual strategies, however, firms may choose to adopt more collective approaches to mitigating problems of local dependence. Collective action means firms organize for their mutual benefit on the basis of their shared interest in a territory. Firms sharing a common interest in such a territory may form business coalitions (Mair, 1988). Such business coalitions are organized with the aim of ensuring that value does indeed flow through the shared 'territories of interest' of participant firms. Thus, it is with the aims of amortizing their fixed investments and reproducing localized contexts of exchange linkages that firms conjoin in business coalitions and develop a variety of local economic development initiatives designed to enhance conditions for profitability within a territory.

Quite which firms will participate in business coalitions with the aim of confronting problems of local dependence is a contingent matter, however. In the United States, it is a commonly held view that, at least in urban areas, utility companies, real estate interests, banks and newspapers are the most typical participants in business coalitions. Indeed, in recent years there has been a considerable growth of

11 For example, Norton Long (1971: 102) has argued: "If we were to make a typology of the key actors in the typical metropolitan area it might run as follows. First, we would have the metropolitan dailies. In almost all cases, they would exhibit a commitment to the preservation of downtown real estate, a consequent concern for mass transit, extending frequently to the advocacy of subsidy, a belief in planning and a disposition to favor some form of metropolitan integration...Frequently opposing the metropolitan dailies and following a particular line is the community press. Usually they support the interests of small businesses threatened by planning and the parochialism of suburban city governments...Of equal importance with the media are, of course, the public officials concerned with the production of public services that cut across political boundaries or require resources that must be allocated among a number of claimants...Downtown stores, real estate concerned with central city property values, commuter railways, central city banks, central city and even other politicians concerned with the implications of the worsening of the central city tax base make common cause
academic interest in business coalition activity and the consequence of that activity for the urban development process. Amongst these contributions, the works of Logan and Molotch and Mollenkopf bear attention because of their focus on the composition of 'growth coalitions' which promote the urban development process. Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that urban growth is driven by the need for certain types of firms in cities to attract exchange values circulating in the wider space economy. This need arises from the stakes of 'rentier' interests which are locked into particular locations because of their investments in land. Coalitions form around 'rentier' interests for the sake of promoting growth. Other local interests also promote urban growth, such as newspapers, politicians, utility companies and so forth, but these interests have only an indirect stake in rents. More often than not, public institutions also intervene in the urban development process in support of the coalitional activities of firms. This is largely for tax base reasons. Local governments depend upon revenues generated through local taxation and this provides them with a material incentive to attract revenue-enhancing economic activity (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone and Sanders, 1987).

The intervention of public institutions also features large in the works of Mollenkopf (1976; 1983) on 'pro-growth' coalitions. Such 'pro-growth' coalitions, he argues, have been forged in major US cities on the basis of their interest in securing federal urban renewal monies. Included in these 'pro-growth coalitions' are headquarters branches of major corporations with investments in downtowns, local merchants and retailers, and public officials (particular those with links to the National Democratic Party). Mollenkopf stresses how, in different cities across the US, partnerships may be forged between public and private institutions for the purposes of promoting urban

with the press, university professors, the foundations and the civic leaders in a crusade to save downtown". 
development. The literature on the politics of urban development is indeed rich in examples of such 'public-private' partnerships, although stereotypical views about the composition of business coalitions still prevail in this literature.

Another stereotypical view is that the activities of business coalitions are scale-specific. Thus it is urban development which is being promoted. Harvey (1985: 148-152) shows, however, that collective action by capitalist firms may occur at a variety of scales ranging from the neighborhood and metropolitan, to the regional, national and even international. Moreover, the state may be party to this process of, as Harvey describes it, '(regional) class alliance formation'. To the extent that the state itself is organized into a hierarchy of spatial scales ranging from the municipal level to the level of the nation-state, theoretically then 'class alliances' can be constituted at a variety of scales of territoriality.

CONFLICTS AROUND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Whatever their territorial scales of organization, business coalitions may draw upon a wide range of state powers and resources, and for a variety of reasons. Improvements in transportation and the extension of physical infrastructures such as water, sewer and utility lines may be required to prepare the ground for productive development of a regional or metropolitan economy. Freeway extension necessitates the deployment of local government powers to assemble and clear land in advance of its redevelopment. And bond issues for infrastructure development across a metropolitan economy may be vigorously pushed by business coalitions.
Business coalitions may exert a variety of pressures on local governments to direct the local economic development process in their favor. But local governments do not — in contrast to some orthodox and Marxist conceptions of state activity — remain a neutral force, instrumentally controlled by the local capitalist class (Cox and Mair, 1988). Rather, local governments have their own problems of local dependence. Of critical concern here is the local tax base. This concern makes a local government susceptible to the arguments of business coalitions promoting local economic development projects or 'accumulation strategies' (Jessop, 1983). A local government has an interest in a growing local economy (Swanstrom, 1985; Logan and Molotch, 1987). A local government's interest in a growing local economy means that it must adopt a variety of strategies to encourage that growth: economic growth must occur within its jurisdiction.

For example, improvements in transportation or changes in zoning laws can have the effect of concentrating fiscally-productive land uses in a local government's jurisdiction. In general terms, intervention in the land development process by local governments is likely to be an important precondition for generating net fiscal benefits. To the extent that local governments rely on the property tax for most of their revenues, this process is likely to be intensified (Wood, 1958).

The efforts of a local government to promote changes in patterns of land use and to encourage local economic development may come into conflict with the interests of people in residential neighborhoods. Land use changes can disrupt those everyday socio-spatial routines which were earlier described as constitutive of the local dependence of people. For example, a school closing to make way for a freeway can be experienced as disruptive for parents whose children attend the school threatened
with closure. Rezonings may affect property values and therefore pose a risk to investments in private property. There may be displacement caused by urban renewal. Or funds for local social services may be cut in the interests of channelling local government funds into local economic development projects.

Depending on the threat posed to their territory-specific patterns of reproduction, people may organize on a collective basis to oppose the threat. Some strategies may assume a popular-democratic bent. An example of this discussed earlier was the case of community-based opposition in inner-city Detroit to plans for the revitalization of the downtown which involved tax abatements to General Motors corporation and residential displacement through revitalization schemes (Hill, 1983). Other forms of citizen protest can be populist in character, involving alliances with small businesses so as to prevent, for example, urban renewal and the displacement of both residents and store owners in an affected neighborhood (Cox and Mair, 1988; Zimmer, 1966). To a certain extent, however, potential opposition to local government activities may be avoided through the appointment of citizens to the boards of local government agencies such as water and sewerage boards, neighborhood commissions or downtown redevelopment commissions. Conversely, citizen pressures may lead to more democratic local government institutional arrangements (Clavel, 1986).

Moreover, while in general terms business coalitions have an interest in planning, for example, an entire metropolitan economy, there are potential divisions within and between coalitions as to exactly which parts of the economy should be developed (Mair, 1988). Thus, for example, not all firms may wish to see a metropolitan economy industrialize. While small industrial suppliers may actively be interested in courting branch plants to a locality so as to forge new external linkages, other industrial
firms may fear the possibility of the unionization of the local labor force as those firms relocate.

There are also potential divisions between sectors. For example, developers, real estate interests and builders may be most concerned to see unincorporated and suburban parts of a metropolis receive local government services than, for example, inner city neighborhoods or the downtown. Since, in addition, zoning and land use decisions can significantly alter the geography of profit opportunities across the metropolis, coalitions of developer interests may seek to alter the spatial distribution of externalities across a metropolitan region by structuring land use decisions to their advantage (Harvey, 1985: 68). Other business coalitions - for example, those composed of restaurant owners, hotel and motel operators, retailers, etc. - may have more of an interest in planning the economic development of the Central Business District. The powers of local governments to condemn property, assemble land and clear it for urban renewal can therefore be of tremendous significance. Demands on the powers and resources of the state can come from a variety of sources within the capitalist class, and business coalitions may be organized at a variety of scales of territoriality and in a variety of locations so as to exert leverage over those powers and resources.

LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TERRITORIAL REORGANIZATION

Having considered the nature of those immobilizing influences upon firms, people and local governments which give them interests in particular territories, and having discussed the consequence of those interests for individual and collective attempts to mitigate problems of local dependence, this sections addresses the question of territorial reorganization in more concrete terms.
The powers and responsibilities which are attached to a local government are territorially constituted. Thus there are the (territorial) relationships of a local government to its tax base and to its electorate. There are also the relationships between a local government and higher level state instrumentalities. These are likewise constituted territorially such that powers and responsibilities located at higher levels in the state apparatus may apply to a variety of jurisdictions at the local level. But it is not a one-way relationship: a local government may exercise some influence on higher level jurisdictional authorities.

Now, it may be that, in confronting (its) problems of local dependence, as well as those of firms and people (within its jurisdiction), the territorial organization of the state can become a focus of activity. Whereas some mitigating strategies are more obviously conducted in class terms (perhaps as a conflict between firms and workers in a locality), others may be more directly addressed to territorial reorganization. Changing the territorial structure of the state is not necessary to the interests of firms, people and local governments in confronting problems of local dependence, however. But it is in virtue of problems of local dependence that territorial reorganization (contingently) could result. And the fact that the state and its local branches are organized territorially is significant for the justification of certain strategies which indeed confront problems of local dependence in territorial terms.

To put these initial ideas in more concrete terms, territorial reorganization may be a part of the local economic development strategies of local governments and business coalitions. The creation of an urban renewal authority with powers to condemn property and clear land for redevelopment within a given jurisdiction is just such an example at the micro-geographic scale. Likewise, an enterprise zone may be
established within a local government's jurisdiction with the aim of generating a highly localized 'good business climate' for local firms. It is often the case that such territorial reorganizations are designed to boost a local government's tax base.\(^{12}\)

Another strategy of fiscal amelioration for a local government is to externalize costs through contractual arrangements with jurisdictional authorities at higher levels in the political system. Since there are economies of scale to be realized in authorities which can serve a greater populations, costs can be externalized through mutual agreements and pacts between jurisdictions. A classic case in point is the Lakewood Plan in Los Angeles County where a number of municipalities contract with the county for such services as fire and police protection. The advantages of this form of arrangement accrue to the municipalities and their residents in terms of lower property tax rates and control over other services such as land use planning and zoning (Miller, 1981). Nor are these 'metropolitan solutions' just matters of efficiency, as has been claimed by public choice advocates. Rather they are strategic responses to material problems of local dependence for respective jurisdictions and residents.\(^{13}\)

The externalization of costs may not just involve drawing upon powers located in existing territorial arrangements. There may be incentives to create entirely new territorial structures. In the case of federal funds for planning the growth of metropolitan economies, the requirement often has been that these funds are available only to metropolitan-wide authorities. As a result local government officials have

\(^{12}\) But see Massey (1982) for a critique of the enterprise zone concept.

\(^{13}\) There are distributional consequences, moreover. Miller (1981) likens the Lakewood plan to California's Proposition 13 which involved a revolt by the middle and upper income classes over the payment of property taxes to local governments. Faced with declining revenue bases as a result of ceilings imposed upon their effective fiscal effort, jurisdictions within the California system of government have had to cut back services, and with adverse effects on those consumption groupings that cannot support their own service needs (Miller, 1981).
precipitated the creation of such authorities for fear of losing out on crucial revenues.

This situation is well illustrated by the case of Phoenix in the 1960s:

Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 required localities seeking federal development loans and grants to submit their applications to an "areawide agency which is designated to perform metropolitan or regional planning." This legislation was a successful carrot-and-stick approach to chaotic, undisciplined development of multijurisdictional areas. Threatened with losing grant-in-aid money, metropolitan governments rapidly organized multi-jurisdictional councils of governments and metropolitan planning agencies. In metropolitan Phoenix, the response to Section 204 was the creation of a council of governments for areawide program coordination (Dickinson, 1971: 383).

The activities of federal and other higher jurisdictional authorities cannot be ignored in explaining territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas.

In a similar vein, the creation of a metropolitan water and sewer authority, for example, may facilitate the externalization of debt from the municipality level to the county or metropolitan level. Costs and debt burdens are as a consequence shared amongst jurisdiction. More overtly territorial solutions like this can find ideological justification in the 'suburban exploitation of the central city' thesis. Thus the attempt to introduce a metropolitan-wide income tax on commuters, or the creation of a metropolitan airport authority, allows the sharing of tax burdens across a wider population.14 Local business coalitions may lend their weight to such initiatives wherever they are regarded as beneficial to their interests in local economic development. For example, the promotion of a county-wide sales tax levy rather than, say, a municipal income tax may be regarded as important for the financing of a new convention center or for securing federal matching funds for a mass transit system.

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14 Of course, it is not a matter of jurisdictions exploiting each other, but rather an issue of upon whom the fiscal burden should fall. To the extent that the tax burden falls on the workforce rather than on businesses, then the state may serve to redistribute resources from labor's consumption fund to capital's accumulation fund.
Territorial reorganization can therefore affect the accumulation process for firms. This then is a strong incentive for businesses also to push for new territorial arrangements. For example, although it is commonly regarded as a strategy of fiscal amelioration for a local government (Muller, 1975), annexation can also facilitate the 'accumulation strategies' of firms. Developers in unincorporated areas may lend their weight to supporting the annexation efforts of a municipality to the extent that services are involved. Indeed, this may be a condition for the formation of a 'growth coalition' around the project of the territorial expansion of a municipality. Fleischmann (1977: 160-161) shows how concerns over utility costs influenced the positions of developers on the annexation activities of the City of San Antonio in the postwar period. Similar patterns have been noted for San Jose (Trounstine and Christensen, 1982) and Los Angeles (Crouch and Dinerman, 1963).

To the degree that territorial reorganization becomes a part of the economic development initiatives of business coalitions and local governments, however, there is always the potential for conflict. Territorial reorganization involves a reconstitution of the relationships of a local government to its tax base and to its electorate. This process is likely to be closely scrutinized by members of local civil society and thus can become an object of criticism and substantial acrimony wherever local interests are threatened.

Consider, for example, the annexation activities of a central city municipality. A central-city local government may find itself in a struggle with suburban local governments over the annexation of land contiguous to respective jurisdictions. Indeed, it is possible that suburban municipalities may attempt to use their powers to control the land development process to their territorial advantage and this may cause a
central city to pursue a vigorous annexation strategy (Fleischmann, 1977: 157-158). In some contexts, residents in unincorporated areas may decide to organize and create their own governments so as to resist annexation, especially where it involves a loss of control over rural zoning or the transfer of schoolchildren to the central-city school system. The incorporation of a municipality may therefore be one outcome of such a land use conflict.

Land annexation battles may even take the form of a struggle between rival 'growth coalitions' in respective suburban and central-city jurisdictions as, for example, developers or industrial firms in unincorporated areas attempt to secure local government services or to avoid the tax burdens of a central city (Hoch, 1984; Jackson, 1985). Because of opposition of this nature from local growth coalitions, national capital has pushed for regional government arrangements in an attempt to centralize control over land use planning (Walker and Heiman, 1981; Wolfe, 1977).

Territorial reorganization can also lead to conflicts within territorially-contiguous branches of the state at the local level. This is particularly true where two different local government functions depend upon the same tax base or service area for their operation. Typically such differences are manifest in the division between the local economic development functions of local states and those to do with the reproduction of the workforce. For example, while municipalities are often responsible for infrastructure provision (production-related expenditures) and school districts are responsible for education (consumption-related expenditures), operating revenues for each may come from within the same territory. There may then be grounds for conflict over the distribution of those revenues. That conflict may be apparent in the attitudes of city administrators versus professional educators and school board officials.
over land use planning, the annexation activities of the municipality or tax abate-
ments to attract new business to respective jurisdictions.

It is important to recognize, however, the reciprocal relationship between conflict
and strategy. Not only can territorial reorganization result from conflicts over local
economic development, but it can also be used as a strategy to deflect opposition to
local economic development initiatives. Consolidation moves have had just such an
effect, as exemplified in the merger of Indianapolis and Marion County in 1970:

In the mid-1960s, Indianapolis politics were changing. Since the 1930s, Demo-
crats had controlled elections in the central city, while Republicans controlled
the Marion County offices and state legislative delegations. In addition, Republic-
icans generally ran the suburban municipalities that ringed the city. The old
city—had grown poorer and blacker than the rest of the county. Black leaders
felt they had a good chance of controlling city elections, and they were confi-
dent that the 1970s would see the city’s first black mayor. Republicans and
some white Democrats feared that same development. Partly in order to pre-
vent this turn of events, Mayor Lugar, L. Keith Bulen (GOP county chair-
man), and a few leading businessmen developed a plan to consolidate the city
and county governments. The mayor and four representatives would be elected
by the whole county and the balance of the 29-member city-county council
would represent separate districts. This scheme would greatly diffuse any
impact from a concerted inner-city black vote (Trounstine and Christensen,

The merger of Indianapolis and Marion County is widely regarded to have been an
important condition for the ‘economic revitalization’ of the central city (Trounstine
and Christensen, 1982).

Strategies such as the merger of Indianapolis and Marion County are likely to be
highly controversial, especially where democracy and due process are involved. Thus,
while business coalitions can exert a considerable influence over local governments
with regard to the control of monies for their accumulation strategies, there are ten-
dencies in the opposite direction which work more in the interests of labor (eg: Clav-
el, 1986). Thus, residents can use local government powers to their advantage and
gain greater control over services. In the case of Indianapolis, for example, residents have organized to gain control over neighborhood schools, thereby resisting the trend towards the centralization of government powers across the metropolitan area.

CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 3

A variety of conclusions can be drawn from this relatively abstract discussion of how coalitions are formed on the basis of the material interests of firms, local governments and people in particular territories and the consequences of those coalitions for the development of territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. In terms of necessary preconditions, it has been argued that local dependence is critical to an understanding of how coalitions are formed on the basis of a shared territory. Local dependence signifies that firms, local governments and people may be dependent upon a territory for their reproduction over time. The basis for that local dependence, in an abstract sense, lies in immobilities and the spatially circumscribed nature of exchange linkages.

Because of the unstable nature of the space economy, local dependence can become problematic. For firms, this may prompt individual or collective efforts to confront local dependence. Collective efforts may involve firms that share an interest in the same territory. To that end they may draw upon the powers of the state, which itself may be a willing participant because of its material interest in a healthy tax base and its electoral concerns. These are the necessary conditions for the formation of coalitions on the basis of territorial interests.
But there is no necessity that the formation of coalitions of firms, public officials and people impact upon the territorial structure of the state at the metropolitan scale. Even if participant members of coalitions share an abstract interest in such structures, their formation need not be a consequence or object of their efforts. This means that empirical generalization is unlikely to be successful as a means for constructing theories about territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. The interests that have a stake in a particular territorial structure are likely to vary historically and geographically, so too the coalitions which may arise to push for a particular territorial form. The only general statements can be made at an abstract level: that local dependence is a necessary prerequisite and that changes in state territorial structures at the local level presuppose the participation of the state in coalitional activity. All manner of contingencies will affect the participation of the state in such activity.

It is also clear that contradictions and conflicts are likely to emerge within and between coalitions on the basis of their shared interest in a territory. The internal politics of coalition formation, as well as the conflicts that arise between coalitions, are all conditions which structure conflicts around state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. In summary, then, whether or not the territorial structure of the state becomes an object of interest amongst coalitions of firms, public officials and people is a contingent matter. Actual state territorial structures are only possibilities, not necessities. The ensuing Chapters attempt to operationalize these ideas in the context of a set of case studies based on metropolitan Columbus, Ohio.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a broad overview of the history of Columbus, Ohio, the economic development of the metropolitan economy, and a summary of the jurisdictional organization of the Columbus metropolitan area. This will allow for contextualization of the arguments of the ensuing Chapters. The Chapter is divided into two major parts.

The first part of the Chapter presents a brief historical overview of the economic base and population of Columbus. This covers the period from 1812, when the City was first established, to the present day. The data presented mostly refer to

15 In 1980, the Columbus SMSA included Franklin County and four adjacent counties. In 1950, however, the metropolitan area included just Franklin County, Columbus being located at the center of the County. Since the majority of the population of metropolitan Columbus is still located in Franklin County, I have chosen to restrict my analysis of patterns of jurisdictional organization in the metropolitan area to Franklin County. More recently, however, as the City of Columbus has grown territorially, the activities of local governments in the central city and adjacent suburban municipalities have increasingly had an impact upon patterns of jurisdictional organization in the adjacent counties comprising the metropolitan area. This impact is recognized, where appropriate, in ensuing sections of the dissertation. Unless otherwise indicated, the phrase 'metropolitan area' refers to Franklin County, the City of Columbus and adjacent suburban municipalities.
The second major section of the Chapter provides a brief history of the jurisdictional organization of that part of the Columbus metropolitan area located within Franklin County. It is demonstrated that patterns of jurisdictional organization within Franklin County in the postwar period have been significantly shaped by the City of Columbus' annexation policy. This annexation policy was introduced in 1954 by the City as a major tool with which to leverage annexations of unincorporated territories contiguous to the central city, and mainly those areas within Franklin County. Data on the territorial growth of the City of Columbus illustrate the importance of the annexation policy in the history of the jurisdictional organization of the metropolitan area. Statistical evidence is also presented in an effort to evaluate the impact of the annexation policy on the fiscal health and population growth of the City of Columbus and surrounding municipalities. Comparative data are presented for other metropolitan areas in the United States.

The statistical portraits depicted in this chapter incorporate extensive research methods (Sayer, 1984). The aim is not to assign causal significance to the data, or to employ them to make long-term projections about the future of the Columbus economy or the annexation policy. Rather, the data give some indication of the magnitude and direction of growth in the Columbus metropolitan area. They serve as background for the more substantive research questions addressed in subsequent chapters.
A prewar history of Columbus

Columbus was founded as the seat for the government of the State of Ohio in 1812. The State capitol was located opposite a small trading post known as Franklinton, on the east bank of the Scioto River. Columbus incorporated as a municipality in 1834, with a population of 3,500 (Franklin County Regional Planning Commission, 1954). In addition to its role as State capital, Columbus also served as the seat for the government of Franklin County, both of which functions it performs to this day. Economically, the City developed as a market and distribution center for agriculture produce grown in the surrounding counties, a traditional function which still survives in the annual agricultural show which takes place in the State Fairgrounds located in the City.

Columbus began to develop as an industrial and manufacturing center after 1831 when the City was connected to the trans-Ohio canal system. The railroads came to Columbus in 1850, and these transportation links facilitated the distribution within Columbus' hinterland of agricultural machinery manufactured in the City. At this time, Columbus also assumed the role of a major wholesale and distribution center (Studer, 1873). With the discovery of coal in southeast Ohio, and the further development of the railroads, Columbus experienced rapid industrial growth between 1870 and the early part of the twentieth century. The major industries produced railroad equipment, mining machinery, iron products, boots and shoes, and carriages and wagons (Hunker, 1958).
Industrial growth was reflected in steady population increases (Table 1), and in 1870, the City began to expand its corporation limits by annexing the Franklinton area. Not hemmed in by natural or jurisdictional barriers, the City grew, though slowly, in all directions. The first municipal waterworks was built at this time (Harker, 1944). Despite industrial growth, the city continued to retain its importance as a service center with the location of the major State university in Columbus in the 1870s. By the 1930s, services and trade were classified as the most important sectors of the metropolitan economy as measured in total wages paid to employees. By contrast, the rest of the State of Ohio ranked higher in industrial employment, with services and trade ranked second and third, respectively (Bureau of Business Research, 1939).

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the city invested heavily in the expansion of physical and social infrastructures. After a series of typhoid epidemics which raised questions about the quality of the city's water supply, a bond issue for $1,200,000 was passed in November 1903 for the city's first municipal sewage treatment plant (Franklin County Regional Planning Commission, 1954). The City built and operated its first reservoir, Griggs dam, in 1905. A second municipally-owned reservoir, known as O'Shaughnessy, was completed in 1925, some eleven years after Columbus received its home rule charter (Harker, 1944).

By 1920, Columbus was the fourth largest city in Ohio with a population of 237,031. Within Franklin County, Columbus was the only incorporated municipality: there were in addition 18 villages, 18 townships and 32 school districts. At that time, the Columbus School District served an area of 14 square miles beyond the municipal limits of Columbus, the city itself being 30 square miles (Brown, 1927). In

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>A Columbus</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
<th>B Franklin County</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
<th>A/B</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>18,554</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,361</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>31,274</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>63,019</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>51,647</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>86,797</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>88,150</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>124,087</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>125,560</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>164,460</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>181,511</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>221,507</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>237,031</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>283,951</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>290,564</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>361,055</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>306,087</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>388,712</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>375,901</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>503,410</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>471,316</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>682,962</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>539,469</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>833,249</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>564,866</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>869,132</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>.65</td>
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</table>
1922, Columbus entered into contracts with the suburbs of Upper Arlington, Worthington and Grandview Heights for the use of the city's sewage system (Franklin County Regional Planning Commission, 1954).

Columbus experienced economic stagnation in the 1930s. Little or no municipal public works programs were initiated during the Depression, reflecting the fiscal crisis of the central city and the downturn in the wider economy (Meckstroth, 1951).

Columbus in the postwar period

During and after the Second World War, Columbus experienced rapid growth in its population and economic base. There was substantial industrialization of the local economy with the influx of defense contractors during the war. After the war, factories were retooled for civilian production. The Chamber of Commerce organized at this time to attract branch plant manufacturers which could take advantage of the skilled labor force and large number of small suppliers that comprised the manufacturing sector of the Columbus economy. Manufacturers produced road construction equipment, mining machinery, ceramics, automobile parts, shoe products, refined chemicals and oil derricks (Moody's Investor Services, 1950).

Between 1950 and 1960, Columbus grew in population from 375,901 to 471,316. But a greater rate of growth was experienced in Franklin County as a whole (Table 1). In order to handle the growth in population and industrial expansion, the City built its third reservoir, Hoover Dam, on Big Walnut Creek, using local funds raised from increased water rates (Meckstroth, 1951). This project was completed in 1956, two years after Columbus embarked upon a major annexation program (see next
section). The first bond issues for major capital improvements to the metropolitan economy since the 1920s were passed in 1945. A series of endorsements and campaigns organized by the Metropolitan Committee, a 'non-partisan' coalition of locally dependent business leaders, resulted in the passage of additional capital improvement bond packages in 1951, 1954, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1967 (Mair, 1986: 121). These bond packages contributed to the further physical and social development of Columbus and the metropolitan area with regard to hospital construction, schools, parks and recreation, urban renewal, streets and expressway construction, and police and fire protection.

From the mid-1960s onwards there was a perceptible re-emphasis in the economic base of Columbus and Franklin County away from manufacturing and towards the service sector (Table 2). The contribution of manufacturing to the metropolitan economy by employment in selected economic sectors declined from 26.2% in 1960 to 17.0% in 1980. Manufacturing employment in the Franklin County in 1980 was slightly higher at 19.0%. By contrast, growth was recorded in finance, insurance and real estate, as well as in government and wholesale and retail trade (Table 2). The Columbus Chamber of Commerce over this period focussed less on industrializing the local economy and more on attracting headquarters branches of major corporations. By 1986, Columbus boasted 25 headquarters of 'top' companies and was the location for 60 insurance companies. Major corporate headquarters firms in Columbus included Borden, American Electric Power, Ashland Chemical Company, Wendys, BancOhio, BancOne and the Huntington National Bank.

It should be noted, finally, that Columbus was the only major urban center in the North East region of the United States to grow continuously in population
TABLE 2: Population of Franklin County employed in selected economic sectors, 1930-1980
Source: U.S. Population Censuses.

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total employment</td>
<td>154,488</td>
<td>139,891</td>
<td>199,977</td>
<td>256,684</td>
<td>336,132</td>
<td>408,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>41,054</td>
<td>32,504</td>
<td>50,045</td>
<td>67,209</td>
<td>77,108</td>
<td>69,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.5%)</td>
<td>(23.2%)</td>
<td>(25.0%)</td>
<td>(26.2%)</td>
<td>(22.9%)</td>
<td>(17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>10,039</td>
<td>7,606</td>
<td>11,687</td>
<td>15,372</td>
<td>18,357</td>
<td>18,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.5%)</td>
<td>(5.4%)</td>
<td>(5.8%)</td>
<td>(6.0%)</td>
<td>(5.5%)</td>
<td>(4.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance,</td>
<td>6,337</td>
<td>6,511</td>
<td>10,369</td>
<td>13,682</td>
<td>23,351</td>
<td>34,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Real Estate</td>
<td>(4.1%)</td>
<td>(4.7%)</td>
<td>(5.2%)</td>
<td>(5.3%)</td>
<td>(6.9%)</td>
<td>(8.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and Retail</td>
<td>25,178</td>
<td>30,041</td>
<td>43,375</td>
<td>48,894</td>
<td>72,166</td>
<td>93,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16.3%)</td>
<td>(21.5%)</td>
<td>(21.7%)</td>
<td>(19.0%)</td>
<td>(21.5%)</td>
<td>(22.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>7,377</td>
<td>9,562</td>
<td>14,636</td>
<td>17,076</td>
<td>21,715</td>
<td>29,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.8%)</td>
<td>(6.8%)</td>
<td>(7.3%)</td>
<td>(6.6%)</td>
<td>(6.5%)</td>
<td>(7.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9,558</td>
<td>33,333</td>
<td>39,269</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.8%)</td>
<td>(9.9%)</td>
<td>(9.6%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
between 1960 and 1980 (US Department of Commerce, 1980). Nevertheless, there was a significant stagnation of population growth within the central city between 1970 and 1980.

THE JURISDICTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE COLUMBUS METROPOLITAN AREA

Introduction

In 1989, Columbus was the largest of 26 incorporated places within Franklin County. In 1950, there were 17 such places in the County other than the City of Columbus. In 1950, almost all of those incorporated places were responsible for raising their own taxes and providing services, such as fire and police protection, to their populations. In a few cases, however, municipalities contracted with Columbus for water and/or sewer services if they did not have their own well systems, treatment plants or septic tanks (Franklin County Regional Planning Commission, 1954). The 18 townships in the county provided minimal services to populations in unincorporated areas, but these unincorporated areas were served by independent school districts. In the 1940s and 1950s there was some consolidation of rural school districts with urban districts in the incorporated places for financial reasons (Roberts, 1987). Nevertheless, the metropolitan area of Columbus exhibited a characteristic degree of jurisdictional fragmentation up to the 1950s.
After 1950, however, there emerged a significant change in the jurisdictional organization of the metropolitan area. Although by 1978 it was estimated that there were over 70 separate units of local government in Franklin County (MORPC, 1978), a variety of local government functions were markedly more jurisdictionally integrated with respect to the metropolitan area. Two aspects of this jurisdictional integration stand out in particular. First, by 1989 the incorporated area of the City of Columbus included a significantly larger proportion of Franklin County than had been the case in 1950. Whereas in 1950, the City of Columbus was approximately 40 square miles, by 1989 it had reached 190 square miles. Second, and associated with the territorial expansion of the central city, there was an integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the delivery of central-city services, including (but not limited to) police and fire protection, streets and highways, and trash collection, but above all the provision of water and sewer. 90% of the population of Franklin County was serviced by Columbus water and sewer services in 1989.

This section shows how the territorial expansion of the central city and the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the delivery of water and sewer services are inextricably linked. This link is due to an annexation policy the City of Columbus has implemented since 1954. This annexation policy arguably has continued to be the single most important mechanism exercised by local government and structuring patterns of jurisdictional fragmentation and integration across the Columbus metropolitan area between 1954 and the present day.
The City of Columbus' annexation policy

The major process structuring the postwar jurisdictional organization of the Columbus metropolitan region has been the leverage exerted over the annexation of unincorporated territories within Franklin County by the City of Columbus. The City of Columbus has promoted the integration of the metropolitan area by means of a vigorous annexation policy (Portman, 1988). This annexation policy was introduced in 1954 with the approval of Democratic Mayor Maynard Sensenbrenner, City Service Director Floyd Redick, and the City Council of Columbus.

Columbus' quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services has made this annexation policy possible. This quasi-monopoly has resulted from the fact that the central city has been able to realize economies of scale in the provision of water and sewer services (Cremean, 1987). As the major supplier of services, Columbus has spread costs over a greater proportion of the metropolitan population. When property owners request services they must petition to annex to Columbus or to suburban local governments. Once petitions have been signed by a majority of property owners in an affected area, the petition to annex is passed on to the Franklin County Commissioners for approval. The Commissioners will approve the annexation request if it can be demonstrated that the annexing municipality can 'reasonably' provide services to the area to be annexed. Columbus' quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services has thus given the central city a distinct advantage over other local governments when it comes to annexations.

16 Up until 1967, only resident freeholders could sign annexation petitions. After 1967, any property owner could request annexation to a municipality. This has meant that absentee property owners can request annexation to Columbus. This has shifted the balance of power with respect to annexations away from resident freeholders and towards developer interests. The reasons for these legislative changes will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Upon receipt and approval of a petition, the Commissioners allow a 'grace period' of several weeks before an annexation request can be accepted by the city council of an annexing municipality. Although residents can request deletion from an annexation petition initiated by the majority property owners of an unincorporated area, it has been the policy of the Franklin County Commissioners, for the most part, not to allow such deletions because they contribute to irregular service areas and 'islands' of unincorporated territories within an incorporated municipality.

Property owners requesting services can also petition to annex to suburban municipalities. However, the annexation activities of suburban municipalities are restricted through contracts executed with the City of Columbus for the use of the central city's water and sewer services (Portman, 1988). Columbus has 21 such contracts. Each contract covers a twenty year period, subject to renegotiation upon the approval of city councils and service directors of respective municipalities. Most contracts were entered into after 1964, during the second term of the Sensenbrenner Administration (Portman, 1988). Some municipalities, however, entered into water or sewer contracts before 1954. Columbus also negotiated special contracts to serve unincorporated areas at New Rome (on the west side of the city) and, until 1987, contracted with the county to service Plain Township in north east Franklin County. Since 1967, only the municipalities of Westerville, Canal Winchester and Reynoldsburg have operated their own water or sewer plants (MORPC, 1978). All other incorporated areas in the county are serviced with Columbus water and sewerage. In unincorporated areas, property owners have for the most part depended on private utility systems, wells and septic tanks.
From the standpoint of Columbus, contracts with suburban local governments have performed two functions: they have allowed Columbus to control the annexation activities of suburban municipalities and, by doing so, they have contributed to the city's quasi-monopoly of services. First, the contracts define restricted growth areas for suburban local governments which are determined by Columbus officials in negotiation with suburban officials. These are areas which can be annexed to suburban municipalities as indicated by the master plans for respective local governments which were first drawn up in the 1960s (Cremeans, 1987). Each contract defines three major types of service area: these are designated 'A', 'B' and 'C' (Figure 1). 'A' areas delimit the existing service contract boundary for a suburb, usually coincident with the corporation limits of the municipality. These areas are automatically serviced by Columbus. 'B' areas are (often larger) unincorporated areas in which, should a property owner petition to annex to the suburban municipality, Columbus would guarantee provision of services. In a very few cases, suburban local governments also have negotiated a third, 'C', area with Columbus. In these cases, suburban expansion would be allowed only if the annexation met with the approval of the Columbus City Service Director (Cremeans, 1987). Thus each suburb that has a contract with Columbus agrees to a negotiated boundary line which indicates how far a suburb can grow through annexation. Beyond those lines, suburban municipalities cannot annex since they would not be able to provide water and sewer services (Portman, 1988).

Second, the contracts have further contributed to Columbus' quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services. Although the allowable service areas written into the contracts do permit suburban growth, that growth is quite severely restricted. This means that, on the one hand, suburban municipalities have found it difficult to capture sufficient economic base to be able to finance their own water and sewer systems.
FIGURE 1: Suburban service contract areas.
(Portman, 1988). This is important because, without control over water and sewer, municipalities cannot compete so effectively with Columbus for certain land uses. On the other hand, Columbus has left itself 'growth corridors' between suburban service areas into which it can annex, thereby foreclosing the possibility that suburbs might use their 'growth-inducing' contracts to surround the central city and restrict Columbus's territorial expansion.

The territorial growth of Columbus and suburban municipalities

The implementation of the annexation policy and the use of service contracts to control suburban growth have allowed the City of Columbus to exercise considerable leverage over annexations within the metropolitan area. This leverage is evident in the territorial expansion of the central city and in the locations of people and economic activity in the metropolitan area.

Figure 2 shows that Columbus' annexation policy accounts for at least three-quarters of the territorial expansion of the central city since Columbus became incorporated in 1834. Major annexations occurred in the 1870s, 1890s and 1920s, coincident with upswings in the local economy. Few, if any, annexations occurred between 1930 and 1950. This was partly due to the downturn in the local economy and Columbus' inability to finance services from its tax base.

The implementation of the annexation policy in 1954 clearly signified the beginnings of a major annexation program, as measured in land annexed on an annual basis to the central city (Figure 2). Between 1954 and 1960, Columbus grew from 40 square miles to nearly 100 square miles, with an average of ten square miles added
FIGURE 2: Land annexed to Columbus annually, 1834-1988.
to the city each year. A further spate of annexations occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Figure 3 shows the territorial growth of Columbus in relation to suburban local governments between 1950 and 1988. Several brief comments can be made from this map. First, it is significant that Columbus was not, and has never been, surrounded by independent suburban municipalities. This jurisdictional geography cannot be ignored since it clearly constitutes a significant condition which made the annexation policy possible.\(^\text{17}\)

Second, Columbus has employed its annexation policy not just to prevent itself from being surrounded but it has in fact surrounded 'suburban' municipalities. By 1970, Columbus had surrounded an 'inner ring' of six municipalities - Bexley, Upper Arlington, Grandview Heights, Worthington, Whitehall and Minerva Park - and is in the process of extending 'growth corridors' around the 'outer ring' of municipalities, notably Gahanna, Hilliard, Reynoldsburg and Grove City. The other major municipalities - Dublin, Westerville and Canal Winchester - have thus far avoided encirclement by Columbus.

Third, the majority of Columbus's territorial growth has been to the north. Indeed, the city has annexed all the way to the Franklin/Delaware County line, but has yet to extend services into the adjacent county (except insofar as some suburbs under contract with Columbus have extended their borders across county lines). This northwards growth can be explained by reference to the drainage pattern of Franklin

\(^{17}\) It is a notable feature of central cities with declining tax bases that they have for the most part been surrounded by independent suburban municipalities, cutting off their territorial growth and sequestering fiscally-productive land uses from them (Muller, 1975). One such city in Ohio, Cleveland, was already surrounded by 48 independent suburban municipalities by 1930.
County and the design of the Columbus sewer system. The major tributaries of the Scioto, as well as the Scioto River itself, all flow north to south. The major trunk lines of the Columbus sewer system follow these tributaries and extend to the southern part of the County where they meet and empty into the Jackson Pike and Southerly Wastewater Treatment Plants. Thus a combination of the drainage pattern of Franklin County, and Columbus’s reliance on a gravity-flow sewer system, has dictated to a large degree the geometry of development in Franklin County. Since development depends on water and sewer services, and since annexation follows development, so the City of Columbus has grown predominantly to the north.

When considering the more recent history of annexation in metropolitan Columbus, it is instructive to divide Columbus’s annexation policy into two major periods. The first period, lasting from 1954 to approximately 1970, was when the majority of annexations in Franklin County were to the City of Columbus. After 1970, and quite clearly since 1975, a second major period of annexations occurred. This period saw a marked increase in the proportion of annexations in the County to suburban local governments. More recently, however, the rate of annexation both to suburban municipalities and to Columbus has decreased. Instead, there has been an increase in development outside Franklin County and this is reflected in the overall distribution of population across the metropolitan area.

Table 3 shows the amount of land annexed by Columbus and suburban municipalities for the two periods in question. Between 1950 and 1970, Columbus annexed 103.9 square miles. Suburban municipalities annexed less than half that amount, 46.3 square miles. In the second period, 1971 to 1977, the ratio of central city to suburban annexations diminished significantly, with suburban municipalities annexing 27.8
square miles compared to 32.7 square miles annexed to Columbus. In the second period, suburban municipalities annexed into the allowable service areas written into contracts by the City of Columbus. For example, the suburb of Dublin annexed 11.5 square miles, most of the service area covered by its contract. Since many suburban municipalities have already annexed much of the growth areas written into the contracts, the rates of annexations to suburbs in more recent years have slackened.

Since 1975, there has been a noticeable decline in rates of annexation both to the City of Columbus and suburban municipalities. This pattern is evident from recent population trends in the metropolitan area. Whereas in past years, Columbus’s annexation policy allowed the central city to ‘capture’ much of the suburbanizing population and economic activity, population trends indicate that growth rates in the metropolitan area outside Franklin County have increased in more recent years. The rate of population growth in Columbus and Franklin County was 35% for the period 1950 to 1960, 22% from 1960 to 1970, and approximately 10% from 1970 to 1980 (Olson, 1977). But the seven counties surrounding Columbus and Franklin County showed an increase in their share of total metropolitan population from 27% in 1970 to over 30% in 1980. Finally, and to give some indication of the demographic implications of Columbus’s annexation policy, if the city had not annexed at all after 1950 it is estimated that the population contained within the 1950s ‘boundaries’ of the city would be approximately one half of the present population contained within the actual boundaries of Columbus (see also Little, 1970: 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>4.93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gahanna</td>
<td>6.73</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grove City</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.84</td>
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<td>Groveport</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.35</td>
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<td>Hilliard</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.86</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Obetz</td>
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<td>2.38</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.82</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.32</td>
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<td>Upper Arlington</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Urbancrest</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>6.26</td>
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<td>Worthington</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.74</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal (suburbs)</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>74.4</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Columbus</strong></td>
<td><strong>103.90</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>136.63</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (County)</strong></td>
<td><strong>150.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>58.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>211.03</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fiscal impacts of Columbus's annexation policy in local and regional context

In a 1978 report on 'growth management' in Central Ohio, the Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission noted that the City of Columbus had for nearly three decades pursued an 'aggressive' annexation policy, the aims of which were:

- to avoid being encircled by other municipalities (a result that has led to fiscal difficulties in other cities of the country)
- to keep its economic base growing as development spreads out from the central city
- to keep the per capita costs of public services down through improved economies of scale (MORPC, 1978: 6).

Successive city administrations of Columbus have also rationalized the annexation policy from the perspective of its perceived fiscal benefits. Characteristically, this rationalization has been conducted on a comparative basis so that Columbus and the metropolitan economy are presumed to possess distinct advantages over other places, the latter having been less fortunate with regard to the stability of their tax bases. For example, the Columbus Department of Development in 1970 claimed:

If Columbus had not undertaken an aggressive annexation program and exercised some of its influence to restrain the growth of suburban cities and villages, the city today would be hemmed in by a ring of medium-sized cities. The city would have all the problems of the inner city...including a smaller tax base. It would be viewed by many as simply another deteriorating middle-aged city instead of the vigorous, growing city which it is today (Columbus Department of Development, 1970, n.p.).

While there are partial truths to this rationalization, to attribute the fiscal health of Columbus entirely to the annexation policy would be to recourse to exaggeration.

Columbus' tax base is certainly more healthy than might be expected for a large central city in the north east region of the United States. Comparison of Columbus' tax rate with that of other large central cities in Ohio indicates that, on average, Columbus taxpayers have the lowest tax rate (Table 4). In more recent years,
however, the percentage of personal income of residents and workers in Columbus
deducted via the municipal income tax has become more comparable to that deducted
from residents and workers in other central cities in Ohio.

It is also instructive to consider the fiscal health of Columbus and the metropoli­
tan economy in a broader context. Columbus' location in the northeast region of the
United States might lead one to 'predict' that the city would possess those characteris­
tics 'typical' of Frostbelt central cities: declining populations, the outmigration of
industry and employment, and fiscal stress. A number of studies conducted in the
1970s and early 1980s isolated these as conditions symptomatic of the crisis of large
North American cities in the Frostbelt region (for example, Alcaly and Mermelstein,
1977).

Columbus, however, possesses characteristics which make it unusual, if not quite
unique. For one, Columbus is unusual in that it is one of a very few large central
cities in the northeast region of the United States that has grown both in terms of
population and geographic size. As depicted in Table 5, Columbus' growth patterns are
in fact more typical of a 'Sunbelt' than a 'Frostbelt' central city. Of the twelve larg­
est places that have grown geographically and in population, only two are in the
'Frostbelt' region: Columbus (because of its annexation policy) and Indianapolis (due to
a city-county merger). In contrast, almost all the large central cities that have
decreasing populations and have not grown territorially are located in the Frostbelt
region of the United States.

Second, a greater proportion of Columbus's economic base is comprised of firms
operating in the 'service' sector than is 'typically' the case for Frostbelt cities. What
this has meant is that, compared to other, more industrialized cities in the northeast,
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<th>City</th>
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<th>Tax rate (per $1,000)</th>
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<td>Akron</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 5: Territorial growth of major cities in the US which gained and lost population between 1930 and 1980.
Source: Jackson, 1985: 139,140 (Square Miles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
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<td>85</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>465</td>
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<td>Houston</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>114</td>
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<table>
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<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
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<td>299</td>
<td>304</td>
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<td>Chicago</td>
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<td>185</td>
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<td>130</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>79</td>
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<td>San Francisco</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
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<td>60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
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Columbus has not suffered so badly from the recent decline in manufacturing employment. This relative stability in its economic base has clearly had an impact upon Columbus’ tax base and the creditworthiness of the municipal government. Table 6 shows credit ratings for a sample of the largest municipalities in the United States. When a municipality decides to raise revenues for capital improvements, it can issue notes and bonds to cover the investment. These notes and bonds carry an interest rate which a municipality must pay to investors in municipal bonds. The principal and interest on bonds are paid out of future revenues from a municipality’s tax base, the amount being discounted over the lifetime of the bonds. If a municipality is a good investment risk, it receives a high credit rating (Aaa, Aa or A). A bad investment risk is denoted by a lower credit rating (Baa, Ba, or lower). Table 6 shows that Columbus’s credit rating is more typical of a ‘Sunbelt’ municipality. Municipalities in the northeast region of the United States have been assigned credit ratings in the range of Baa and lower over the last twenty years or so, reflecting patterns of disinvestment from those localities. To the extent that Columbus has been able to ‘capture’ a decentralizing tax base, then its annexation policy has helped to offset a possible decline in its credit rating. However, the relatively high rating can be more plausibly attributed to the characteristics of Columbus’s economic base, particularly the greater emphasis on employment in ‘services’ compared to ‘manufacturing’.

Although these statistics paint a relatively rosy picture of the fiscal health of Columbus, there are ‘hidden’ costs which have been attached to the annexation policy. Thus, by acting as the central supplier for the metropolitan area in the provision of water and sewer services, the City of Columbus has accumulated over the years a large debt burden on its fixed physical facilities. As a percentage of the City’s total

<table>
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<th>1976</th>
<th>1986</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
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<td>Columbus, Ohio</td>
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<td>Aa</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aaa: high quality investment - Caa: low quality, default issue
debts, the debt on water-related investments in Columbus increased from 3% in 1950 to 26% in 1976. In 1976, the combined debts of the water and sewer divisions of the City of Columbus constituted 52% of the total bonded indebtedness of the central city (Moody's Investor Services, 1976). Since then, the bonded indebtedness on water and sewer has decreased, but remains significantly high at 42% of Columbus's total bonded indebtedness. This gives some indication of the costs to central city taxpayers of Columbus's quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services in the metropolitan area. Moreover, according to data calculated from Moody's Municipal and Government Manual, in 1984 Columbus had a per capita bonded indebtedness of $1,273 which was by far the largest for any Ohio municipality (Moody's Investor Services, 1986). Some of this debt, however, may be accounted for by the city's recent investment in a $110 million trash-burning power plant which has failed thus far to realise a return on the initial investment.

CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 4

This Chapter has provided an historical overview of Columbus, its economy, and the jurisdictional organization of the metropolitan area. The chapter was aimed more at description than explanation. It has revealed the importance of Columbus' annexation policy for the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area in the postwar period. This annexation policy has depended on Columbus' quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services. Fiscally, this quasi-monopoly has resulted from economies of scale which have been exploited by the central city. Other fiscal benefits accruing to Columbus are evident in the data presented showing the city's overall lower tax rate and higher credit rating than other cities in the so-called Frostbelt region.
It would be unfair, however, to conclude from these data that the fiscal health of Columbus is entirely the result of the annexation policy. The fiscal health of Columbus has as much to do with the peculiar characteristics of the metropolitan economy, particularly the emphasis on employment in government, education, finance, real estate and retail and wholesale trade. By virtue of its fixed investments in water and sewer, Columbus in fact has fiscal liabilities which are not experienced to the same degree by municipalities in the Frostbelt region, many of which no longer have control over such services.

In the next Chapter, the origins of the annexation policy are examined. The approach adopted examines the particular interests which have coalesced around the annexation policy and their reasons for promoting the jurisdictional integration of the Columbus metropolitan area.
CHAPTER V
JURISDICTIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter examines the processes which have combined to produce the jurisdictional integration of the Columbus metropolitan area. The focus will be on the inception and implementation of Columbus' annexation policy. The objective is to understand the nature of the mechanisms which have produced this particular strategy of metropolitan jurisdictional integration.

In order to ground the argument theoretically, it is useful first to consider in abstract terms the nature of the interests that have a stake in integrated territorial structures. Theories of metropolitan jurisdictional organization predict that production interests are best served by integrated structures. For example, proponents of the reform tradition paradigm have argued for the benefits of economy and efficiency derived from such structures (Committee for Economic Development, 1966; Bish, 1971; Teaford, 1986). Covering a greater service area and population, an integrated structure generates economies of scale and spreads the tax burden across a wider proportion of the metropolitan population. Metropolitan-wide jurisdictional arrangements are also desirable because they facilitate comprehensive planning across the metropolitan area.
Problems such as pollution control, land use zoning and service delivery can be more readily addressed in such arrangements.

Adherents to the reform tradition paradigm would see distinct advantages in the integrated structure created through Columbus’ annexation policy. On the one hand, the central city has realized economies of scale in the provision of water and sewer services. As the single supplier, Columbus shares the costs of infrastructure expansion through its contractual arrangements with suburban local governments. On the other hand, and as will be demonstrated, negative externalities, such as pollution, have been internalized, and fragmented service areas have been eliminated because suburban municipalities have been prevented from developing their own water and sewer systems. Beyond the claim that production considerations are important, however, these theories provide few clues as to the particular mechanisms producing integrated territorial structures, and the contingent conditions which give empirical expression to those mechanisms.

This Chapter suggests that a combination of mechanisms has been at work. Although production considerations have been central, other conditions have played a part in the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area. Institutionalized coalitions representing locally dependent firms have found the annexation policy consistent with their interests in the productive development of the metropolitan economy. These coalitions represent firms who, by virtue of their fixed investments and localized exchange relations, have direct and indirect interests in the productive development of the metropolitan economy. But it has not been a policy all have accepted unconditionally since there have been attempts to promote alternative territorial structures. These alternative territorial structures have met with resistance from the City
of Columbus and other local government entities in the metropolitan area, suggesting that businesses are not alone in having a stake the territorial organization of metropolitan areas. These other interests have to be factored into an explanation for the jurisdictional integration of metropolitan regions.

The first part of this Chapter outlines the possible alternatives to Columbus annexation policy and attempts to understand why this particular strategy of metropolitan integration was chosen. The second part considers the nature of the interests which have combined to give impetus to the annexation policy and the conflicts which have been associated with it. These issues are addressed by means of case study analysis.

POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE COLUMBUS METROPOLITAN AREA

Introduction

Annexation was one of several possible approaches towards the jurisdictional organization of the Columbus metropolitan area. It evolved out of the particular economic and political circumstances of postwar Columbus, a period in which there was growing sentiment for a metropolitan approach to problems of infrastructure provision and the planning of the metropolitan economy. What circumstances caused approaches alternative to annexation not to be adopted will be investigated in this section.

A variety of alternative jurisdictional arrangements were indeed possible. For example, suburban local governments might have exerted greater control over
jurisdictional matters. By developing their own water and sewer systems, they could have gained greater leverage over annexation. Or it could have been that residents in unincorporated areas could have organized to resist Columbus's annexation activities. One strategy would have been to incorporate as new municipalities, thereby gaining control over zoning matters and developing their own service systems. Incorporation strategies would have resulted in the further jurisdictional fragmentation of the metropolitan area. This would have made suburban local governments a competitive threat to Columbus with respect to the control of new residential, commercial and industrial development.

As it transpired, suburban local governments did not develop their own water and sewer systems. Incorporation efforts also failed. As a result, suburban municipalities failed to compete early on with Columbus in matters of annexation. Rather, control of water and sewer services remained the prerogative of Columbus. How Columbus gained its quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services is therefore one condition which must be explained.

Second, it needs to be examined why the City of Columbus adopted the annexation policy as a strategy of fiscal amelioration. For, if the annexation policy was determined to be one possible answer to the fiscal problems of the central city, why were alternative strategies not so vigorously promoted? For example, Columbus could have pushed for urban renewal funds in the expectation that property taxes generated from slum clearance would have improved the fiscal standing of the central city. However, at least in the 1950s, urban renewal largely failed to galvanize the interest that it required to be a successful 'fiscal' strategy. There were indeed coalitions of private business interests already active in seeing bond issues passed, improving social and physical infrastructures within the central city and promoting the
industrialization of the metropolitan economy. Yet the particular balance of political forces in the central city worked against the emergence of urban renewal as a means to mitigate, or offset the potential for, fiscal problems in the central city. If anything, there were 'push' factors working in the opposite direction such that annexation seemed a more acceptable strategy. One condition of some significance here was the activities of the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber of Commerce pushed for annexation because it best fell in line with its interests in industrializing the metropolitan economy. Other private business coalitions were willing to accept the annexation policy to the degree that it addressed their own concerns for the productive development of the metropolitan economy, or did not interfere with their more localized interests in revitalizing the Central Business District and other territories within the central city.

Planning water and sewer services

One condition critical to the initiation of the annexation policy was Columbus' quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services. This quasi-monopoly gave the administration of Columbus the necessary leverage over annexation, allowing it to compete more effectively with suburban local governments. Without their own water and sewer systems, suburban local governments could not compete so effectively with Columbus for new commercial and industrial development, and their annexation activities were somewhat restricted. How was it, then, that Columbus came to have a quasi-monopoly of services?

In 1944, Columbus experienced a severe drought which lasted into 1945. This drought prompted several groups in Columbus to look at the issue of water supply,
as well as problems of extending water and sewer services to unincorporated areas, on a metropolitan-wide basis. For example, the Housing Committee of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce commissioned a study by the Jennings-Lawrence Engineering Company of Kansas City to investigate the problems of water supply and service extensions in Franklin County (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1944, Aug-Oct). Among other things, the study recommended that the Columbus's water supplies could be supplemented through the construction of a new dam and reservoir to the northeast of Columbus and that sanitary sewers could be extended beyond the municipal limits of Columbus. Also based on the report, the Chamber suggested the creation of a City Planning Commission for Columbus to draft plans for sewer service extensions and to implement new zoning categories for the city. The new planning commission was appointed by Mayor James Rhodes in 1947, but the first staff were not hired until 1950 (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1947, May-July; 1950, Aug-Oct).

The study by the Jennings-Lawrence Company was the first major attempt in the immediate postwar period to look at the problem of water supply and sewer service extensions in Columbus and Franklin County on a metropolitan basis. But there were also other groups within Columbus concerned with planning both in Columbus as well as beyond the jurisdictional limits of the central city. In 1945, the Metropolitan Committee had been organized to promote the passage of bond issues within Columbus and Franklin County (Slowter, 1975). Made up of civic leaders from some of the leading firms in Columbus, as well as labor leaders and representatives from civic and church groups in Columbus, the Metropolitan Committee endorsed two successful bond issues in the immediate postwar period, one in 1945 and a second in 1951 (Meckstroth, 1951: 11-12).
Based on the results of the Jennings-Lawrence study, the Metropolitan Committee pushed through a county-wide bond issue for sewer service extensions to unincorporated areas in 1945 (Meckstroth, 1951: 12). The Metropolitan Committee also helped the City of Columbus develop plans and a method of financing for the construction of the new reservoir. Work on this reservoir (Hoover dam) began in 1953 and the dam was officially opened in 1956.

There were two implications of the development of this new water source for the subsequent implementation of the City of Columbus's annexation policy. First, it was the City of Columbus which financed the project. Although federal monies were available for Hoover dam, it was decided that funding would be local (Adams, 1970: 290; Meckstroth, 1951: 33). The dam was financed out of water revenue bonds issued against increases in the city's water rates (Meckstroth, 1951: 33). The fact that the Hoover dam was financed and operated by the City of Columbus, and not the federal government, was important to the degree that it ensured that the City of Columbus alone had control over the new supplies.

Second, the reservoir was important for Columbus' quasi-monopoly of services in the metropolitan area. No other jurisdiction in the metropolitan area had participated in the development of this new, substantial source of water. Without that quasi-monopoly, it is doubtful that the City of Columbus could have implemented its annexation policy, at least to the extent that annexation subsequently became contingent upon the extension of services to unincorporated areas. Thus although the Hoover reservoir was not built in anticipation of the annexation policy, it was a condition which made the annexation policy possible.
At the same time as Hoover reservoir project was being developed, the Metropolitan Committee commissioned a new county-wide planning agency to complement the activities of the City Planning Commission. The Franklin County Regional Planning Commission was incorporated in 1950 and began looking at planning on a metropolitan basis. Membership of the Planning Commission included representatives from the eight largest suburban municipalities, representatives from the City of Columbus and a professional staff of planners (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 1/16/50, A1).

The Franklin County Regional Planning Commission began by evaluating problems of service provision to the unincorporated areas in the County. There was rapid development in the unincorporated areas of the County during the 1950s. Because of the lack of available land in the central city, developers began to lay out subdivisions in areas contiguous to Columbus (Meckstroth, 1951). These were also areas into which industries had relocated. The Chamber of Commerce, as will be demonstrated in more detail later in this Chapter, was instrumental in encouraging the relocation of industries to Columbus. But, although the Chamber of Commerce endorsed the creation of a regional planning agency, the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission made little headway in planning the extension of services to the new industries. In early 1952, the Chamber approached the Planning Commission with regard to the problem of extending services beyond the municipal limits of Columbus to the Westinghouse Corporation and other industrial plants which had located on the west side of the city (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1952, Feb-April). These plants had located near the Village of New Rome.

It appeared that the Chamber was encountering three major areas of difficulty in securing service extensions for those new industries. First, Franklin County no longer
had the financial resources to underwrite service extensions to those areas (Meckstroth, 1951: 19). Second, the City of Columbus did have the financial capacity to make the extensions but was unwilling to do so because they involved industrial and residential developments in unincorporated areas. Thus, Columbus would gain customers for its sewer and water services but the City would lose potential (property and income) taxpayers. In fact, by 1953 the City of Columbus had already granted some 30% of all its water and sewer service tap-ins to developments in unincorporated areas largely because the majority of new residential development in the County in the period 1951 to 1953 had located outside the municipal limits of Columbus (Bartholemew and Associates, 1954). Third, the State Board of Health objected to service extensions from Columbus across open land. This was a major problem when the Chamber attempted to secure sewer services for Fisher body plant of the Temstedt division of the General Motors Corporation, also located on the west side (Starkey, 1987).

The difficulties the Chamber faced in securing service extensions into unincorporated areas led to more concerted efforts to galvanize local governments into providing for infrastructure expansion. Because Franklin County could not finance the service extensions, and given resistance from the Columbus City Administration, the Chamber solicited the support of developers and builders to put pressure on the Columbus Administration to come up with a plan for service extensions (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1953, Aug-Oct). In October 1953, the Columbus Home Builders Association, the Columbus Real Estate Board and the Builders Exchange of Columbus, together with the Chamber of Commerce, requested from the Mayor of Columbus a statement

18 Ohio law places limits on the amount of debt that local governments can issue. Debt limitations imposed upon Franklin County in the 1940s and 1950s made it difficult for the County to finance services. By contrast, Columbus was not so limited in its borrowing capacity under State law (Priede, 1966).
of policy with regard to the granting of home permits for new development in unincorporated areas, as well as how, and under what circumstances, water and sewer service extensions would be granted (Chamber of Commerce, 1953, Aug-Oct).

No policy on tap-ins and service extensions was forthcoming from the City Administration, however. This was partly because an election was set for November, 1953, and there was the chance of a change in the Administration. The election was won in a close race by a Democrat, Maynard Sensenbrenner, who defeated the incumbent Republican mayor, Robert Ostreicher. Immediately after the election, the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission and the City Planning Commission hired a private firm of planning consultants to draw up a master plan for the city and the metropolitan area (for example, Bartholomew and Associates, 1954).

In February 1954, the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission took further steps in an attempt to create a climate in which a metropolitan approach to planning the local economy could find greater appeal. First, it organized a Metropolitan Committee on Intergovernmental Relations (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 3/14/54, 6A). This was an 8-person committee organized to coordinate negotiations between the Franklin County Commissioners, Columbus and the suburban municipalities over the metropolitan-wide provision of services. The Advisory Commission's main role was to coordinate the annexation activities of the various local government entities (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/15/54, 12A). Second, the planning commission investigated the possibility of establishing and financing a regional water and sewer district for all of Franklin County (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, Feb-April). This district would have been designed to operate independent of the control of any single municipality.
Neither of these approaches proved successful. The Metropolitan Committee on Intergovernmental Relations was beset with factional differences. Amongst other things, township trustees in the County objected to the fact that they were not represented on the Committee (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/9/54, 24A). But when representatives from the townships were appointed, they were hostile to its aims. The trustees were wary of any form of comprehensive metropolitan-wide planning:

There was an anti-growth feeling in the townships. Speculative development hurt the townships. Township people did not like taxation by the city. Residential growth beyond corporate limits in the 1940s put pressure on the township's tax bases. Plus there was a consolidation of school districts. They could not finance the schools or the governments of those areas (Roberts, 1987).

The anti-growth sentiment also sparked differences of opinion amongst members of the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission who represented the incorporated municipalities. The Commission could not agree upon any form of coordinated approach to metropolitan-wide planning. According to one of its earliest members:

The suburbs were not at all keen about regional planning under the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission. The Commission blundered along and had little purpose at all. The Commission did think in a metropolitan sense but there was no power base to it (Roberts, 1987).

Despite a growing climate of opinion that there was a need for a 'metropolitan approach' to planning, County agencies made little progress towards what were perceived to be desirable goals. Members of the Chamber of Commerce were frustrated by this lack of progress. Towards the end of 1953, the Chamber management hired a new employee exclusively to handle problems related to the provision of infrastructure across the metropolitan area (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1953, Aug-Oct). Clyde McBee was appointed as Executive Assistant in charge of the promotion of public works projects. Later it was claimed by the General Manager of the Chamber,
Delmar Starkey, that McBee was hired exclusively to lobby for a new underground parking garage below the State House (Starkey, 1987). Yet the Chamber’s reports indicate McBee devoted many hours to problems related to utility extensions into unincorporated territories (e.g., Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, May-July: A3).

The Chamber of Commerce created a new subcommittee to look into the problem of utility extensions. The Metropolitan Sanitary Sewer and Water Committee reviewed the plans being drafted by the planning consultants hired by the City Planning Commission. It was eventually agreed by the committee that the City of Columbus, rather than Franklin County, could best handle the enlargement and extension of programs for providing water and sewer facilities for the whole urban area. Included in this area were to be unincorporated areas in the county as well as the incorporated villages (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, May-July: A3).

The Chamber of Commerce thus was the first to recognize the need for an integrated water and sewer system for the metropolitan area. Between 1941 and 1954 it explored many alternatives before deciding that Columbus had both the jurisdictional authority and the fiscal capacity to develop such a system. But the Chamber’s endorsement of Columbus as the major regional supplier was more out of default than design. On the one hand, County agencies proved incapable of developing a metropolitan approach to planning the Columbus economy. Besides the lack of purpose evident in the Regional Planning Commission, Franklin County did not have the

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19 The Metropolitan Committee did endorse bond issues for sewer service extensions. But, at least until the early 1950s, these bond issues were financed by Franklin County and not the City of Columbus. It might therefore be inferred that the Committee did not have a strong opinion about the cost benefits of an integrated water and sewer system under the control of any one jurisdictional authority. Rather, it was concerned to see services extended regardless of which local government would provide them, so long as an adequate method of financing could be found.
taxing authority to finance a metropolitan wide water and sewer system. On the other hand, and before 1954, there was no organized effort on the part of other localized business interests to adopt a more comprehensive, metropolitan approach to the problem of water and sewer provision.

These were critical conditions which led up to the inception of the annexation policy. In early 1954, the new Administration of the City of Columbus found itself in a highly advantageous situation. On the one hand, there was rapid development occurring in the unincorporated areas of Franklin County but there was resistance from township trustees to service that development, and Franklin County did not have sufficient funds. On the other hand, the City of Columbus had a quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services and the financial capacity to extend services to unincorporated areas. The newly-elected Democratic Administration was in a position to use its quasi-monopoly of services to exercise some leverage over the annexation of unincorporated territories within Franklin County.

Annexation versus urban renewal?

The lack of organized pressure for a metropolitan approach to the provision of water and sewer services opened up a window of opportunity for the newly-elected mayor of Columbus and his service director. Upon coming to office, Mayor Sensenbrenner quickly organized his administrative staff. He expanded the number of employees on the City Planning Commission and brought in a new service director, Floyd Redick. The City Planning Commission and Redick immediately began plans to promote the annexation of unincorporated areas contiguous to Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 2/18/54, 1A). In January, 1954, plans were unveiled before the City Planning
In January, 1954, it was also announced by Redick that a freeze on new water and sewer taps in unincorporated areas would be put in place (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 2/18/54, 1A). Effectively, this freeze meant that Columbus would not be willing to extend utilities beyond its corporation limits without those areas being annexed to the central city. Redick's policy of denying service extensions was approved by City Council in February 1954 (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 2/18/54, 1A).

It is not clear exactly where the idea of a water and sewer freeze came from. Some claimed it was 'Sensenbrenner's idea' (Starkey, 1987), although he probably got the idea 'from another city' (Roberts, 1987). Sensenbrenner himself suggested the idea came out of a visit to Kansas City by a delegation of civic leaders from Columbus (Slowter, 1975). This delegation went to Kansas City to look into the problem of expressway construction. It was there that they learnt how to use municipal control of water and sewerage to leverage annexation to the central city (Slowter, 1975). This was certainly not a new idea since other cities, for example San Jose (Trounstine and Christensen, 1982) and Milwaukee (Gladfelter, 1971), had similar policies in place at the time.

Whatever its origins, the idea of a water and sewer freeze in Columbus quickly stuck and became a focal point of policy for the Sensenbrenner administration. The administration used the argument that Columbus could benefit from annexation because of its perceived fiscal impacts. These fiscal considerations were used to justify the annexation policy to the citizens of Columbus and the surrounding townships. For example, in 1954, when the City initiated an attempt to annex en masse six
adjacent townships, the major metropolitan newspaper featured an editorial in which it was argued:

Columbus, naturally, needs to grow. Its population and services are expanding. The demands on its services are becoming more pressing. It needs room to breathe and to remain solvent and strong, and it hopes, naturally, that the annexation voting will be favorable to its growth (Columbus Dispatch, 11/1/54, 2B).

In particular, it was argued that Columbus was in a unique position in not being surrounded by independent suburban municipalities. This was a problem facing other large central cities, such as Cincinnati and Cleveland, both of which were experiencing fiscal difficulties at the time. This was a strong selling point for the annexation policy such that Sensenbrenner and annexation quickly became synonymous:

Sensenbrenner made annexation his thing. Columbus would not be surrounded like Cleveland or Cincinnati. He even threatened to annex Cleveland (Roberts, 1987).

The threat of encirclement and the detrimental effects that might have had on Columbus's tax base were therefore central to the Administration's attempts to sell the annexation policy to the public. But, if such concerns for the fiscal health of the central city were indeed genuine, it is important to ask why other strategies were not adopted which could have been equally as advantageous in fiscal terms. One such strategy would have been urban renewal.

Interest in urban renewal in Columbus emerged from a growing sentiment that there was a necessity to generate a coordinated growth policy for the metropolitan area (Roberts, 1987). This sentiment was shared by a number of private business coalitions in Columbus, including the Metropolitan Committee and the Chamber of Commerce. Members of these coalitions expressed an interest in growth strategies that had been adopted in other cities, urban renewal being but one possibility. A delegation from Columbus, including representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, visited Pittsburgh some time after the war and were impressed by the level of
comprehensive, metropolitan planning being achieved within the Allegheny Conference (Starkey, 1987).

The visit of Columbus officials inspired city planners to mimic the Pittsburgh model of urban renewal. In 1953, planners from Pittsburgh were invited to Columbus in attempt to kindle interest and enthusiasm among local business leaders (Adams, 1970: 123-126). For example, downtown merchants, hotel operators retailers and other businesses in the CBD formed the Heart of Columbus organization (Roberts, 1987). This organization promoted street and viaduct improvements, the elimination of railroad crossings and the construction of expressways in order to secure greater accessibility to the downtown. From the activities of this organization, an expanded program for the revitalization of the CBD emerged under the auspices of urban renewal (Adams, 1970: 54-56).

Federal urban renewal monies had become available under the terms of the 1949 Housing Act. In 1952, the City Planning Commission organized an urban renewal authority and a program of slum clearance and redevelopment was initiated in areas immediately surrounding the CBD (Adams, 1970: 56). Plans for the construction of expressways and a beltway around the CBD were also drafted in the early 1950s (Bartholomew and Associates, 1955).

Little headway was made on an urban renewal program for Columbus which could match the scale of Pittsburgh's, however. Slum clearance and redevelopment projects were dogged by delays and factional differences (Adams, 1970: 80-105; DCGC, 1958; 1959; 1960; 1961). A slum clearance bond issue endorsed by the Metropolitan Committee failed in 1954 (Adams, 1970: 136-137). Problems were experienced in rehousing persons displaced by those clearance projects which went ahead (Adams,
There were rivalries within the local state apparatus over how urban renewal monies should be deployed (Adams, 1970: 78-84). Business leaders from the older Columbus firms were not at all receptive to federal intervention. And developers and builders were quite hostile to the 'socialistic' intervention of the federal government, mainly because of the association of urban renewal with public housing (Adams, 1970: 67).

Furthermore, urban renewal posed severe problems of legitimation for locally-elected officials. Large sums of federal money were being used by the City of Columbus to remove people from slum housing. And it was not at all clear to local planners that there were fiscal benefits to be gained from subsequent redevelopment. By contrast, annexation appeared to lead to clear fiscal gains for the central city. Indeed, the City Planning Commission was forced to concede in 1957:

As the age factor in itself constantly lowers the value of existing taxable land developed property, and with no undeveloped property available for new building, it is apparent that a city should always contain a substantial portion of undeveloped land; in fact it would appear that it must do so to remain healthy. Rehabilitation and slum clearance can only save a limited amount of the older section of town as a means to revitalize the city's tax base. With an orderly development of annexed land and an economic extension of utilities to these new areas, a city will receive a tax income to help pay for the installation of capital projects such as sewer, water, and major streets, as well as the ever-increasing cost of services to the city as a whole (Department of Public Service, Columbus, 1957: 14-15).

If a policy was required that would both protect the central city tax base and create a sound basis of support, urban renewal was not the most desirable option. The newly-elected Sensenbrenner administration regarded a full-scale urban renewal program as a major political risk (Adams, 1970: 144).

If local government officials in Columbus were ambivalent about urban renewal, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce showed little interest at all. For, the Chamber's
interest in the Allegheny Conference stemmed less from a concern for the revitaliza-
tion of the CBD and more for the example it offered in terms of a comprehensive,
metropolitan approach to planning the Columbus economy. The Allegheny Conference
had in part been organized as a means to broker conflict between Pittsburgh and sur-
rounding suburban local governments. The latter had their own chambers of com-
merce and other organized business coalitions and these were a competitive threat to
business dependent upon Pittsburgh and its CBD. The situation in Columbus was not
the same. In the opinion of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, annexation provided
the weapon which would ensure there would be no organized opposition in the sub-
urbs as had occurred in Pittsburgh:

The Chamber was interested in Pittsburgh and the Allegheny Conference. There was a need for a coordinated growth strategy adapted to the circum-
stances of Columbus. In Pittsburgh—the suburbs were already organized. But
Columbus did not have opposition in the suburbs. The Chamber supported
annexation around the suburbs to avoid the problems that had occurred in
Pittsburgh (Starkey, 1987).

What the Chamber of Commerce was concerned about was the potential for the for-
mation of rival 'growth coalitions' in the suburban municipalities. This was regarded
as a possible threat to the activities of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce insofar
as suburban-based firms might have put in place their own economic development
policies in order to attract new economic activity to their territories. Columbus-based
firms would quite possibly have lost potential customers and markets as a result.
Moreover, organized resistance from within suburban municipalities might resulted in
anti-growth policies. Resistance of that nature did indeed occur, as will be shown
later in this Chapter.

For the Chamber of Commerce, therefore, annexation was attractive because it
provided a weapon with which to eliminate the potential for a competitive or
oppositional threat from organized groups in suburban municipalities. As will be demonstrated, this strategy was only partially successful; and there were other reasons why the Chamber supported the annexation policy. Urban renewal was not a strategy the Columbus Chamber of Commerce pursued therefore. Without the support of the Chamber of Commerce, and given the failure of a broad-based 'pro-growth coalition' to galvanize around urban renewal such as had been the case in Pittsburgh, the annexation policy proved to be the more acceptable strategy.

Annexation was not a complete substitute for urban renewal, however. There was indeed a significant interest expressed in the redevelopment of inner city neighborhoods in Columbus through urban renewal funds. This was especially the case when modifications to the original urban renewal legislation made a larger proportion of funds available for the clearance of inner city slum properties for commercial uses (Adams, 1970, 146-170; see also Weiss, 1980). By the end of the 1950s, therefore, a number of sites had been cleared for redevelopment. But although sites were cleared, not all were subsequently developed. The factional differences that frustrated urban renewal in Columbus in the early 1950s were far from resolved by the 1960s (Adams, 1970). To the degree that it could be considered a strategy of fiscal amelioration, urban renewal proved a less successful strategy for the City of Columbus than annexation therefore.

But it is also important not to place undue emphasis on the putative fiscal advantages of annexation for the City of Columbus. In order for annexation to be successful, conditions had to be in place which would lead the City Administration to expect some fiscal gain. Such conditions included the dynamics of the wider space economy and the prospect that Columbus could indeed attract economic activity to its
spatial jurisdiction. Given the activities of the Chamber of Commerce and its efforts to attract branch plants to the Columbus metropolitan area, and given the fact that residential and commercial development was occurring in the unincorporated areas, the Sensenbrenner Administration had little cause to doubt the fiscal implications of such activity for Columbus. And there was a sufficient groundswell of support from other local interests to tip the balance of political considerations in favor of an annexation policy under the control of the Columbus City Administration.

By way of conclusion, this section has attempted to address some of the circumstances under which the City of Columbus retained its quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services and was able to implement its annexation policy. It is important to reiterate that the annexation policy was but one of several possible approaches to the jurisdictional organization of the metropolitan area which could have emerged at that juncture. Indeed, many chance factors were at work. Included in these were Columbus's historic control of water and sewer supplies across the metropolitan region. This was both a legacy of the early years of the twentieth century when municipal governments underwrote most local infrastructural improvements and of decisions made by localized business interests to ensure municipal ownership. And the City of Columbus was in the 'fortunate' position of not being surrounded already by independent municipalities.

While these perhaps constitute circumstances unique to Columbus, there were conditions which made the annexation policy more probable and other strategies of jurisdictional organization less possible. For one, there was an ideological climate prevalent in which some form of metropolitan-wide planning was both desirable and necessary. Whether that planning was coordinated by local government agencies or
private enterprise, however, was a contingent matter; in many ways they depended on each other. Private business coalitions such as the Metropolitan Committee and the Columbus Chamber of Commerce were instrumental in creating the 'appropriate' ideological climate. And the fact that the City of Columbus had control of services and was willing and able to annex swung the balance away from decentralized control of services and annexation towards a centralized system under the control of the central city.

Columbus's annexation policy thus killed two birds with one stone: it provided the much-needed 'metropolitan solution'; and it brought about centralized control of infrastructure provision. The annexation policy under Sensenbrenner provided a material fix, or the missing link, for the gap between the prevalent discourse of metropolitanism and the concrete circumstances of postwar planning in the Columbus economy:

Sensenbrenner built up pride and a metropolitan feeling that the planning commissions were never able to get across (Roberts, 1987)

The next major section attempts to account for the stakes of private business coalitions in the annexation policy, and the strategies they have adopted to protect and enhance their interests in the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area.
THE ROLE OF LOCALLY DEPENDENT BUSINESSES IN SHAPING THE ANNEXATION POLICY

Introduction

Reform tradition theories suggest, and concrete case studies show, that institutionalized coalitions representing private firms take the lead in the promotion of integrated structures (Committee for Economic Development, 1966; Glendening, 1967; Mohl, 1983; Sofen, 1963; Trounstine and Christensen, 1982). It might therefore be expected that private firms with an interest in the productive development of the metropolitan economy would have been the prime movers in the jurisdictional integration of the Columbus metropolitan area. If anything, however, the evidence indicates otherwise. As indicated in the previous section, it was the City Administration of Columbus which took the initiative and implemented the annexation policy. Nevertheless, it was private business coalitions which created the 'right' environment in which such an initiative became possible. In this section, it is demonstrated how, once the annexation policy was put in place, private business coalitions quickly organized to see the policy work to their advantage.

The two private business coalitions in Columbus that have monitored the annexation policy most closely have been the Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the Development Committee for Greater Columbus. The Columbus Chamber of Commerce's interests in the annexation policy were connected to its efforts to industrialize the metropolitan economy through attracting branch plants. The Chamber was active in support of Columbus's annexation policy not just because of the potential for competition or opposition from organized suburban-based coalitions but also because of its
implications for the provision of water and sewer services across the metropolitan area, beyond the municipal limits of Columbus. These services were regarded as essential to the success of the Chamber's industrialization policy.

The Development Committee for Greater Columbus (hereafter DCGC) likewise supported the annexation policy. Its interest lay in the provision of reliable and cost-effective services for the entire metropolitan area. To the extent that annexation enabled that process, the DCGC was willing to protect the central city's quasi-monopoly of services. To the degree that it did not, the DCGC pushed for alternative territorial structures in the interests of underwriting the productive development of the metropolitan economy. Thus, from its creation in 1956, the DCGC remained somewhat ambivalent about the annexation policy, but was willing to go along with it so long as Columbus was able to provide services.

With regard to other localized business interests, it is difficult to gauge their stake in, and impact upon, the annexation policy. The Metropolitan Committee, formed in 1945 to promote bond issues for social and physical improvements to Columbus and Franklin County, remained distant from the annexation policy. This was not regarded as a major focus of concern. It is likely, however, that whatever opinions members of the Metropolitan Committee had on the policy were expressed through the DCGC, since the latter was organized by members of the Metropolitan Committee.

Builders and developers did have a tangible stake in the annexation policy. These business interests regarded annexation to Columbus in favorable terms. This was because of the availability of services and favorable zoning regulations in the central city. But the advantages of annexation to Columbus for builders and developers
significantly diminished after 1973, and in particular after 1979. The reasons for this were linked to the introduction of busing for racial balance across the Columbus school system in 1979, a topic which is discussed in some depth in Chapter 6. But the fact that there was no consistent, organized effort on the part of developers makes it less easy to evaluate their role in promoting the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area before 1973. Thus conclusions as to their role are somewhat impressionistic. Suffice it to say, and given their very definite opposition to annexation to Columbus in the 1970s and 1980s, the lack of opposition in the 1950s and 1960s is at least indicative of builder and developer support for the annexation policy over that period.

The Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the industrialization of the metropolitan economy, 1941-1963

During and after World War Two, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce engaged in an explicit effort to industrialize the Columbus metropolitan economy (Meckstroth, 1951; Starkey, 1987). Under some motivated leadership, the Chamber of Commerce actively courted branch plants of major national corporations for the Columbus metropolitan area. This was a stark change from the pre-war period. Before 1941, few industrial firms located in Columbus, and indeed many were actively discouraged because the larger local industrial employers feared increases in labor costs consequent to the unionization of those plants (Mair, 1988). This situation changed in 1941 with the location of the Curtiss Wright aviation plant in Columbus. In its first years of operation, Curtiss Wright employed and trained 24,000 workers in factory employment (Meckstroth, 1951: 5). This generated a large labor pool of skilled employees, a 'location factor' the Chamber of Commerce and its membership actively touted in their efforts to industrialize the Columbus metropolitan economy.
After 1941, the Chamber of Commerce embarked upon a concerted public relations campaign to attract new industries to Columbus. Committees within the Chamber addressed such issues as transportation, housing, public safety, promotional information about Columbus and social events (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1944). The activities of the Chamber were, for the most part, successful. Between 1941 and 1963, North American Aviation (later Rockwell International), General Motors, Westinghouse Corporation and Western Electric all located branch plants in the Columbus metropolitan area. These firms moved to take advantage of the skilled labor pool created by wartime production at the Curtiss Wright aviation factory (Hunker, 1958).

They tended to locate, however, in unincorporated areas contiguous to the municipal limits of Columbus. Water and sewer services therefore had to be extended to the plants before production could commence (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954). But this became a problem in 1954 when the administration of the City of Columbus denied service extensions unless unincorporated areas annexed. Given Columbus's quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services, and in order to secure service extensions to relocating industries, the Chamber of Commerce became active in support of the annexation policy. To that end, the Chamber of Commerce pursued a variety of strategies in support of Columbus's efforts to see through the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area. These strategies were regarded by the Chamber of Commerce as essential to the implementation of its industrialization policy (Starkey, 1987).
The Chamber supports the annexation of six townships by Columbus

One of the first projects the Chamber of Commerce spearheaded was directed at unincorporated areas contiguous to the City of Columbus. In June 1954, the administration and city council of Columbus proposed the annexation *en masse* of six townships contiguous to Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 6/13/54, 1C). These were townships with a large concentration of industrial firms, many of which had membership in the Chamber of Commerce (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, Aug-Oct, A3). This annexation program was put before the voters of the townships in an election in November 1954. It received full endorsement from the Chamber of Commerce.

The decision by the city administration to initiate the annexation of the townships came after a series of piecemeal annexations failed to meet with the approval of the Franklin County Commissioners (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 2/18/54, 1A). Six annexations filed by resident freeholders totalling 6,319 acres were turned down because of uncertainty over Columbus's ability to extend services to the areas once they were annexed (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 5/30/54, 1D). The Commissioners also expressed concerns over the fact that Columbus threatened to reduce the tax duplicate of the townships by targeting industrial areas. Numerous signatures on the annexation petitions were deleted on the grounds that they were not resident freeholders (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 5/30/54, 1D). The annexation petitions in fact were circulated amongst the various industrial firms in the affected territories and, not being resident freeholders, the firm's employees could not petition for annexation (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 5/30/54, 1D).
Frustration at the lack of progress on the petition method of annexation led the City Administration to propose annexation by referendum in the six townships. This move was endorsed by resolution of city council in June of 1954 (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 6/6/54, 1A). The Columbus Chamber of Commerce took the lead in promoting the decision by the city administration and city council of Columbus to annex the six contiguous townships. Prior to the election, promotional fliers were circulated by Chamber members to all the households in the affected townships. Commercials on local TV and radio stations, and airplane promotions at Ohio State football games, all stressed the benefits derived by the areas annexed (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, Aug-Oct: A3). The Chamber also prevailed upon the Columbus Home Builders Association, the Columbus Real Estate Board and the Builders Exchange of Columbus to endorse the annexation bid. These groups registered some reluctance at first, but all eventually gave their approval (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, Aug-Oct: A3).

As it transpired, however, developer support for the annexation move by Columbus became more forceful. For example, the Columbus Home Builders Association argued:

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In 1947, there had been a similar move by Columbus to annex seven contiguous townships. As was the case in 1954, this move was motivated by fiscal problems facing the central city. In concert with the annexation move, the city administration proposed the introduction of a new municipal income tax to be levied on residents and workers in the central city. This income tax had the endorsement of the Metropolitan Committee, civic and church groups and other central city interest groups such as League of Women Voters. While the annexation bid was soundly defeated in the elections, the income tax proposal proved successful. The income tax was taken to a referendum by the Columbus chapter of the CIO. But the new tax was approved by the electorate in 1948 (Meckstroth, 1951: 17-19). After the 1947 defeat, the Ohio Manufacturers Association, together with the Ohio Township Trustees Association, pushed for legislative changes in the Ohio General Assembly which made the voting method of annexation extremely difficult. The new legislation provided that an entire township had to vote on the proposed annexation of any segment of that township by a municipality. This law was designed to prevent financially-strapped central cities from annexing unincorporated areas in which industrial firms had located, imposing increased costs on manufacturers and residents (Ohio State Journal, 3/8/54, 4).
The City of Columbus is being strangled by the lack of services to the communities beyond its boundaries and the only way Columbus can grow and make the entire area a better place in which to live is by orderly annexation (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 10/3/54, 1B).

The Home Builders Association went on to link annexation to their own economic interests:

The home building industry itself may be forced out of business due to the lack of sewers and water in the outlying communities and if this were to come about Columbus will become an acute housing market. Not only would industry cease to come to this area but may be forced to leave the environs (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 10/3/54, 1B).

Therefore:

We are urging the people in the townships who must make the decision as to whether they want to join the City of Columbus or not to take an objective view to the health and welfare, not only of the present generation but of the generation to come. Columbus, which is rated as one of the fastest growing communities in the nation, should be kept that way population wise, business wise and education wise (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 10/3/54, 1B).

For the building industry, therefore, annexation was important because it brought the potential for development in the unincorporated areas. Builders could thus see the potential for the expansion of their operations. The rapid industrialization of the metropolitan economy meant a growing market of first-time homebuyers and every chance that there would be growth in the local building and construction industry.

Individual speculator-developers also saw their interests dependent on the success of the annexation policy. These developers depended on Columbus for securing services for their planned developments in areas contiguous to the central city. One developer in particular, Don M. Casto, who was developing shopping centers at several different locations in the metropolitan area, was adamant about the benefits of annexation to Columbus. For example, between 1954 and 1956, Casto encountered difficulties in developing one shopping center to the north of Columbus, near to the City of Worthington. Residents in a neighborhood adjacent to the proposed $2.5 million shopping
center attempted to incorporate as a village rather than see the area annexed to Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/13/55, 7A). Their concerns centered on the loss of tax duplicate from the Worthington Exempted School District to the City of Columbus. Moreover, residents preferred to see the neighborhood remain residential and avoid the congestion problems that the shopping center might have brought (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/13/55, 1A).

The incorporation move was defeated in a special election and petitions were filed for the annexation of the proposed development to Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/13/55, 1A). Evidently, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce was active in securing the defeat of the incorporation move, and helped circulate petitions for annexation to Columbus (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955, Feb-April: A2). The incorporation move, however, had clearly worried Casto and he abandoned his usual 'non-political' stance on such matters:

We always prefer to remain neutral in the politics of the communities we serve with our shopping centers. However, when there is an attempt to form a political vehicle which would stymie the growth of the centers we are forced to oppose it. In the case of the petition to annex to Columbus, we will go along with the desires of the people because then there is no question of the future growth of the center due to the fact that all services can be provided by the city (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/13/55, 1A).

Given the circumstances dictated by Columbus's annexation policy, developers and builders eventually came out strongly in favor of it. They supported annexation because, with it, they could be sure that their developments would receive water and sewer services. This was an interest shared by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, but for different reasons. The Chamber of Commerce touted the virtues of annexation to Columbus, stressing the tax and service advantages which would accrue to residents in the affected territories. But in endorsing the annexation bid, the general manager of the Chamber noted:
A large percentage of our employment is industry and there have been situations in other localities where industry has been hurt and moved away. We don't want that to happen here (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, Nov-Jan: A2; Delmar Starkey).

The Chamber stressed the connections between annexation and its industrialization policy. Thus, and as will be discussed later, its concerns about annexation were somewhat different from those of builders and developers. Nevertheless, all of these local business interests eventually came out in favor of the decision by the City Administration of Columbus to annex the six adjacent townships. But this annexation bid was soundly defeated in the elections (Ohio State Journal, 11/3/54, 1). Residents in all six townships registered their opposition to consolidation with the City of Columbus. The defeat caused the Chamber of Commerce to rethink its position with respect to the annexation policy.

Changes in legislation on annexation and incorporations

In the years following the annexation defeat, the Chamber circulated annexation petitions amongst resident freeholders in areas contiguous to Columbus in the expectation that the Franklin County Commissioners would approve piecemeal annexations to the central city (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955; 1956; 1957; 1961). This strategy was regarded as necessary by the Chamber because of the failure of the voting method of annexation: under State law, Columbus was prevented from requesting the annexation of townships by the vote of residents for five years after the initial failed attempt. This put the onus of initiating annexations on resident freeholders in contiguous territories.
Piecemeal annexations orchestrated by the Chamber of Commerce were on numerous occasions frustrated by the activities of residents and officials in the townships (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955; 1956). These groups organized to resist annexation to Columbus by either initiating incorporation proceedings or by petitioning to annex to suburban municipalities. One case stands out as being especially significant. Between 1954 and 1961, the Chamber of Commerce almost single-handedly fought to prevent an incorporation move in Franklin Township, located immediately to the west of Columbus.

In April 1954, the residents of Franklin Township voted 1138 to 625 to incorporate as a village (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/21/54, A1). This was a defensive measure against the piecemeal annexations to Columbus which were eroding the township's tax base. As the location for industries such as Westinghouse, General Motors, a Coca-Cola bottling plant and television station, the township boasted one of the richest tax bases amongst all the townships in Franklin County (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 11/29/55, 1A).

The incorporation move had been promoted by the Franklin Township Citizens Association (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/21/54, A1). This group found support from township trustees, schools officials and local residents. Besides the loss of tax base, the two most contentious facets of the conflict centered on zoning and schools (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 6/10/55, 1A). Zoning was a cause for concern amongst local farmers. Annexation to Columbus meant less restrictive zoning categories and the potential for farmland to be rezoned commercial or heavy industrial. This posed a threat to the livelihoods of local farmers and was the basis of much opposition to Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 11/29/55, 3A).
Education was also a problem because the township was in the process of investing in the expansion of its school system, with two new elementary schools being constructed at that juncture (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/21/54, A1). Loss of tax base to Columbus threatened the capacity of the local school system to pay off its debts. Concerns were also expressed about Columbus's abilities to provide adequate schooling facilities if the areas were annexed to the central city (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/21/54, A1).

Local business leaders in the township, by contrast, were in favor of annexation to Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 4/21/54, A1). Through their representatives on the Franklin Township Civic Association, local industrial firms looked to Columbus for services such as water and sewer. Moreover, they saw annexation to Columbus as a means of avoiding the increasing costs of subsidizing the township's school system (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 11/21/55, 1A). The Columbus Chamber of Commerce reported that most firms in Franklin Township were in favor of annexation to Columbus. None were in favor of the incorporation move (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, Nov-Jan: 2).

The Columbus Chamber of Commerce went to extraordinary measures to secure the annexation of Franklin Township to the City of Columbus. One of its first actions was to finance an injunction to stop the original incorporation attempt. This injunction was upheld by the Franklin County Court of Common Appeals in May 1955 (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955, May-July: 2). This was followed by further attempts by Franklin Township residents to incorporate as a municipality and counter-strategies by the Chamber of Commerce. For example, representatives from the Columbus Chamber of Commerce met with local business leaders in Franklin...
Township in an effort to raise funds for a court case against the incorporation of the township (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1957, Aug-Oct).

The struggle between the township and the central city lasted from 1955 through to 1961. In 1960, Columbus City Council set an election for the annexation of the township by vote. This move was endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce. The election failed and a special election was set for the following year for the incorporation of Franklin Township as the Village of Westview Heights. Once again, the Chamber was active in opposition:

We at the Chamber masterminded the opposition to the incorporation by developing and executing the proper strategy which included occupant mailings, door-to-door distribution of well-prepared literature, newspaper editorials, and a full-page advert in the community newspaper which all the residents of the area received (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1961, n.p.)

For the third time in six years, the Chamber of Commerce was successful in defeating the incorporation of Franklin Township.

The Chamber of Commerce's longer-term response to resistance to annexation such as that represented by Franklin Township was to lobby for changes in State law regarding incorporations and annexations. In 1955, the Ohio General Assembly passed legislation which tightened up the laws on incorporations. The new law set as a requirement for incorporation a minimum density of 300 persons per square mile and a $1,000 per capita tax valuation (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955, May-July: 3). This legislative change made it almost impossible for freeholders in the townships contiguous to Columbus to petition for incorporation. Franklin Township was an exception because of its industrial property tax base.

In addition to changes in legislation regarding incorporations, the Chamber pushed for legislation which would have permitted business firms and private corporations to
sign annexation petitions. This legislation called for the elimination of the resident freeholder provision. It specified that persons authorized to petition for annexations had to be 'property owners' (Bridge, 1958). These legal changes were further endorsed by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1954, May-July: A3.).

Bills were placed before the legislature in successive years from 1955 to 1961. These were met with counter-legislation from the Ohio Township Association representing township trustees from all the counties in Ohio. The strong rural element of the Ohio legislature was initially successful in blocking the attempts of the Chamber of Commerce to change the annexation laws. Moreover, legislators themselves showed little inclination to resolve the conflict by direct State action (Bridge, 1958). Sufficient pressure was brought to bear by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce on urban legislators, however, such that in 1967 the required legislative changes were enacted (Columbus Dispatch 10/29/67: 21A). After 1967, non-resident property owners could sign annexation petitions. This legislative change facilitated Columbus's annexation policy because it hindered the incorporation efforts which had been led by township trustees and residents in territories contiguous to Columbus.

Explaining the interest of the Chamber of Commerce in annexation

Especially between the years 1954 and 1961, the Chamber of Commerce devoted considerable time and energy to seeing Columbus's annexation policy succeed. In addition to lobbying for legislative changes, the Chamber of Commerce attended many hearings on annexation hosted by the Franklin County Commissioners. Chamber members acted as spokespersons for the Columbus administration on matters of annexation:
These annexation petitions would have had less chance to go through had it not been for the continuous display of interest on the Chamber’s part by our presence at all such hearings, with frequent talks to the Franklin County Commissioners urging approval (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955, Aug-Oct: 3).

The Franklin County Commissioners at first refused to approve annexation requests to Columbus. The Commissioners justified their actions on technical grounds: maps accompanying annexation petitions were often badly drawn; signatures were deleted from many petitions; and not all those who signed petitions qualified as resident freeholders (eg: Columbus Dispatch, 5/30/54, 1D). At least one Commissioner doubted Columbus’s abilities to provide services and, in the interests of his constituents in the townships, the Commissioner regularly voted against annexation to Columbus in the early years of the policy. The other Commissioners were generally more willing to permit annexations to Columbus, albeit with guarantees that services would indeed be forthcoming.21

Despite the obstacles it faced, including some resistance from the Franklin County Commissioners, the Chamber of Commerce did not modify its support for the annexation policy. It did not pursue other strategies of jurisdictional integration, for example. This contrasts with the activities of institutionalized coalitions of private firms in other metropolitan regions. Chambers of Commerce in Miami/Dade County and Indianapolis/Marion County, for example, were instrumental in promoting the

21 In many instances, services were not forthcoming. Columbus annexed large sections of contiguous township territory which did not receive services up to ten years after the annexations. In some cases, this resulted in inadequate fire protection as the nearest Columbus fire stations were often over ten minutes away (in terms of response time). Because of inadequate protection, the costs of home insurance in certain residential neighborhoods rose faster than in other areas of the City. Residents in those neighborhoods organized to put pressure on the City of Columbus to enhance the quality of service and improve public safety. However, there were no reported incidents of developers failing to see their projects to fruition as a result of Columbus not providing services (Parkinson, 1988).
consolidation of central cities and counties (Sofen, 1971; Trounstine and Christensen, 1982).  

The Chamber of Commerce clearly viewed the annexation policy in a very positive light. An explanation for the stake of the Chamber of Commerce in the annexation policy can be made with reference to three considerations. First, and has been indicated earlier in this section, the Chamber's industrialization program depended in part on securing physical infrastructures for relocating firms. Columbus was the major supplier and, so long as the city retained control of water and sewer and was able to annex, so the Chamber of Commerce could guarantee services for new industries (Chamber of Commerce, 1955, Nov-Jan: 4). The Chamber's leadership accepted the fact that Columbus acted as a de facto metropolitan authority. By pushing for an alternative form of integrated structure, the Chamber of Commerce feared Columbus would lose its control of water and sewer services and this might have jeopardized the Chamber's industrialization policy (Starkey, 1987).

This industrialization policy was important because the Chamber's membership mainly consisted of small industrial firms which specialized in subcontracting relations with large firms upstream in the production process (Mair, 1988). The Chamber was attempting to attract branch plants to Columbus so that the smaller firms could find

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22 It should be noted, however, that although there was enabling legislation written into the Ohio Constitution for consolidations (city-county mergers), it was written in a manner that made it unlikely a consolidation move would be successful. Specifically, there had to be majority approval in four major categories of voters: those within the major city in the county; those within the county; those within all other municipalities and villages in the county; and those in unincorporated areas in the county. A constitutional amendment calling for a majority vote just in the affected county was proposed in 1957, and endorsed by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1957, Aug-Oct). But it was soundly defeated in a State-wide referendum in 1957. Analysis of the voting patterns suggests that the rural and suburban electorate of Ohio was strongly opposed to such an amendment.
new outlets for their products by contracting with the larger companies. Thus, for members of the Chamber of Commerce, annexation was not important so much in terms of the amortization of fixed investments in plant and equipment. Rather, it was important because there was a greater possibility that, with the guarantee of water and sewer services, branch plants would indeed relocate to Columbus, and new exchange linkages could be forged between relocating firms and those firms already in Columbus.

Second, the Chamber of Commerce weighed the advantages of annexation to Columbus against the disadvantages of decentralized control of annexation by suburban local governments. The Chamber of Commerce doubted the capacity of suburban local governments to underwrite the industrialization of the metropolitan economy. At the time, suburban local governments were largely residential and lacked the fiscal resources to compete with Columbus for new industrial growth by developing their own service systems. Without those services, the Chamber of Commerce saw few advantages in encouraging new firms to locate in suburban municipalities. Suburban officials themselves were not sympathetic to the Chamber's industrialization policy (Starkey, 1987).

Third, and relatedly, the Chamber of Commerce feared opposition to its industrialization policy from suburban and township residents. In order to make sites attractive for prospective firms, the Chamber of Commerce encouraged the Columbus Planning Commission and Columbus City Council to adopt fairly liberal zoning categories for the city. This was important because the necessary rezonings could not always be secured in the townships; and suburban residents were in general opposed to seeing heavy industrial land uses in their jurisdictions. The Chamber complained about the lack of available industrial sites in Franklin County and saw annexation as a means
of ensuring that suitable sites would become available, since they could then be rezoned according to the zoning categories adopted by the City of Columbus. In some cases, however, even when the Chamber of Commerce was able to secure rezonings from the Columbus City Council, residents in neighborhoods adjacent to proposed industrial sites registered strong opposition to the zoning changes. The Chamber had every reason to believe that such resistance would have been even stronger in suburban municipalities. This would explain its concerns to see Columbus annex as much territory as possible.

The Chamber of Commerce regarded annexation by Columbus as important to resolving these difficulties. In many ways, however, it was contingent whether or not annexation fitted in with the needs of the Chamber of Commerce and the firms it represented. Other studies show, for example, how industrial firms have preferred to locate in suburban municipalities, often orchestrating incorporation efforts themselves (Hoch, 1984). These efforts allowed firms to avoid taxation by larger municipalities. In Columbus, annexation was the more desirable option for the Chamber of Commerce. But the Chamber's support for the annexation policy had less to do with considerations for fiscal economy and more to do with its need to secure infrastructure for relocating industries. The Chamber of Commerce supported the annexation policy only to the degree that its industrialization policy was in jeopardy.

In 1955, Ford Motor Company attempted to locate a $44 million steering gear and small parts plant to the north of Columbus near residential neighborhoods in the Beechwold/Clintonville area. Residents strongly resisted the efforts of the Chamber of Commerce to secure the necessary zoning changes. When Columbus City Council approved the rezoning request, there was an attempt to take the issue to a City-wide referendum. City Council subsequently reversed their decision before the referendum went ahead. But by that time, Ford had chosen to locate its plant in Indianapolis instead (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955, Nov-Jan: 4). "Politics" also delayed construction of a sewage plant on the southeast side of the City which the Chamber of Commerce regarded as essential to its industrialization program: residents and civic groups registered strong opposition to the proposed plant (Columbus Chamber of Commerce, 1955, Nov-Jan: 4).
Finally, this section has also touched on the role of developers and builders in shaping the annexation policy. While the Chamber of Commerce was the institutionalized business coalition most active and outgoing in pushing the annexation policy, builders and developers did not take a 'hands-off' stance. For example, the Columbus Homebuilders Association came out in favor of the policy. And individual speculative developers, such as Don M. Casto, also revealed a pro-annexation position whenever circumstances dictated. However, there is no evidence of prolonged and consistent support for annexation from these interests as was the case with the Chamber of Commerce.

On the face of it, it is difficult to account for this apparent lack of prolonged and consistent support. On the one hand, both builders and developers, by virtue of their fixed investments and exchange linkages, clearly stood to gain from the annexation policy to the degree that it encouraged speculative development in the townships. On the other hand, developers in particular must have had a stake in the legislative changes pushed by the Chamber of Commerce which made annexations easier and incorporations more difficult. For, the removal of the resident freeholding provision on annexation petitions made it far easier for absentee property owners to assemble land contiguous to Columbus and hold onto it in anticipation of services from Columbus. Yet there is no evidence that developers lobbied for these legislative changes.

One explanation for this apparent lack of initiative on the part of developers would perhaps refer to the peculiar nature of their local dependence. Specifically, successful speculative development requires the kinds of knowledge and personal contacts with local officials which can only be built up over a lengthy period of time (Cox and Mair, 1988). Individual developers, such as Don M. Casto, use those contacts
to determine the direction and pace of development and when, for example, local government services may be forthcoming (Cremeau, 1987). In a land and housing market which is growing, 'local' knowledge can be a distinct competitive advantage. This means developers are less likely to 'reveal their hands' on more sensitive matters such as annexations, zonings or controversies over school districts, both because they may lose the competitive advantage and because they must strive to maintain good relations with the other local actors upon which they depend. Thus, unlike the Chamber of Commerce, developers and builders, for the most part, chose not 'reveal their hands' in support of the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the provision of water and sewer services.

BUSINESS COALITIONS AND THE ANNEXATION POLICY: THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE FOR GREATER COLUMBUS

The formation of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus

Another private business coalition that has actively pushed for the jurisdictional integration of the Columbus metropolitan area is the Development Committee for Greater Columbus (hereafter DCGC). The DCGC was created in 1956 as a private business coalition charged with planning physical infrastructures across the metropolitan region (DCGC, 1957). The DCGC grew out of the Heart of Columbus organization (Roberts, 1987). Initially it was organized to promote the physical and social redevelopment of
the CBD. Indeed its earliest members largely represented firms with a stake in the revitalization of the inner city: hotel operators, local merchants, builders, retailers and developers (Mair, 1988). Although the DOGC assisted local government in Columbus early on in what urban renewal was taking place in the inner city, it quickly expanded its scale of interest to beyond the CBD (DOGC, 1957; 1958).

Members of the DCGC regarded themselves as acting in an advisory capacity to locally elected officials. In a statement of purpose, it was noted:

The committee was organized in 1956 when it became apparent that existing organizations and local governments needed organized citizen support in their efforts to make significant improvements in a community laboring to keep up with an exploding population (DCGC, 1968: 2).

The community was 'laboring' because of 'a number of frustrating bottlenecks in civic improvements' for which the DCGC provided a 'citizen response' (DOGC, 1958). These bottlenecks were the result of the indecisiveness of the City and County Planning Commissions (Roberts, 1987).

Very early on, the DCGC defined its scale of interest as metropolitan:

(The DCGC is) a full fledged partner of public officials in metropolitan endeavours (DOGC, 1957: 3).

The DCGC saw itself as transcending the parochial concerns of individual jurisdictions, signifying its concerns for a more all-embracing approach to the planning of the metropolitan area:

We are over 200 citizens who are concerned about our community and who recognize the significance of long range planning—All of Central Ohio is an integrated metropolitan area which is interdependent and must be treated as a whole. Planning has to be always thinking about, analyzing and directed towards the needs of the entire region, be they social, economic, recreational or whatever. Solutions to problems must be on a regional basis since what is a benefit, or detrimental, to one local government has a secondary effect on the others (DCGC, 1987: n.p.).
The Committee organized an executive board with representatives from forty major firms in Central Ohio. Members were elected through sponsorship from local firms. Sponsorship increased very quickly to include some 200 firms (Mair, 1988). The activities of the DCGC were coordinated by a steering committee. Five technical committees were then organized to oversee different aspects of the metropolitan economy (DCGC, 1957; Mair, 1988).

Members of the DCGC saw themselves as being dependent upon Columbus's economy:

We of the Development Committee can do no less than our best for the community to which we owe so much (DCGC, 1964:2).

But the DCGC regarded the metropolitan economy as extending well beyond the municipal limits of the City of Columbus. This is important to an understanding of the committee's stance on the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area.

Planning infrastructural improvements

The DCGC's major area of concern was planning the development of infrastructure for the metropolitan area. Two technical subcommittees were organized to look into the problems of transportation and water supply. Transport was regarded as the 'most urgent in the thinking of the members' (DCGC, 1957: 5). The subcommittee examined the master plan which had been drawn up in 1954. Plans for an expressway system were approved and, later on, the DCGC proposed an inner belt and outerbelt freeway system. The DCGC transportation technical committee came up with a formula to secure matching funds from State and federal government to get these projects under way (Creamean, 1987). Much later on, the DCGC became involved in the development of a public mass transit system for the metropolitan area.
With its focus on facilitating the productive development of the metropolitan economy through the provision of physical infrastructures, a second major area of concern for the DOGC was planning water and sewer services (DOGC, 1957). The DOGC first looked into the introduction and provision of an adequate sewerage system for the metropolitan area. The plan was to have a metropolitan-wide system. A report produced by the Committee in 1958 was presented at a meeting of Columbus and suburban officials. The 'entire range of administrative solutions' was discussed before it was decided that the City of Columbus should continue as the primary administrator of the sewerage system (DCGC, 1958). Thus the DOGC very early on in its history regarded Columbus as the major supplier and supported every effort of the city to develop its services on a metropolitan-wide basis (DOGC, 1957; 1958).

The DOGC initiated a variety of programs to facilitate Columbus officials in the development of a sewerage system to serve the metropolitan area. First, it recommended the relocation of the southeast sewage treatment plant (which according to the master plan was to be located at the confluence of Alum Creek and Big Walnut Creek) to a point eight miles further south of the location in the City's original plan. This move effectively opened up the entire area west of the Scioto for development: sewer trunk lines could be run up the Scioto River valley to serve new development (DCGC, 1957).

Second, the DOGC proposed the immediate construction of sewers and sewer treatment systems costing $38,185,000. The DOGC proposed that the investment be paid off through the issuance of $3 million in general obligation bonds of 40 years maturity to be issued annually for 10 years commencing in 1959 (DCGC, 1957). The Committee drew up a rate schedule to finance the bonds and subsequently proposed that
the city adopt a capital improvements program to budget for its long term investments. The DCGC was also instrumental in securing changes in State law with regard to the retirement of municipal bonds. In June 1958, Committee representatives appeared before a special session of the Ohio General Assembly to testify in favor of legislation extending the maximum term for municipal sewage bonds from 25 to 40 years (DCGC, 1959).

Third, the DCGC came up with the idea for the City of Columbus to enter into contracts with suburban local governments for the use of the city’s expanded sewage system (DCGC, 1959). The DCGC made the following proposals with regard to contracts:

- Columbus agrees to construct all trunk sewers in the master plan from sewer charges
- these sewers are to be constructed over a term long enough to allow proper financing
- determination of rates by a proper rate analysis, with suburban rates subject to an automatic adjustment up or down as the Columbus rate may fluctuate
- inclusion of an adequate means of settling disputes
- limiting additional sewer taps to existing corporation limits as agreed otherwise by legislative bodies
- line extensions to unincorporated areas to be done only on an emergency basis
- allow rates to adjust to an appropriate construction schedule

These strategies and recommendations signalled a clear willingness on the part of the DCGC to support Columbus’s annexation policy.

By 1959 the Committee had completed work on assisting Columbus to develop a Capital Improvements Program for sewer service extensions and turned its focus to the provision of water for the metropolitan area. Once again, a more comprehensive,
metropolitan-wide approach was adopted. The DCGC explored the idea of using the
Scioto-Sandusky Conservancy District as the jurisdictional basis for an integrated water
management system for Franklin and surrounding counties (DCGC, 1960). The water
and sewerage subcommittee was renamed the 'Water Management Committee' as if to
emphasize this comprehensive, long range approach to planning water supply for metro-
politan Columbus (DCGC, 1961).

The DCGC proposed that a new flood control reservoir be built at Alum Creek
in order to boost the City's supplies. The Committee recommended a 30% increase in
water rates and proposed that federal funds be used for the new reservoir. Those
monies were secured, but only after a dramatic conflict which pitted the DCGC,
property owners and the Columbus Board of Realtors against the finance and banking
interests of one of the oldest families in Columbus, the Wolfes. The conflict centered
on the use of federal funds for the expansion of the City's water supply. This meth-
od of financing was objected to by the Wolfe interests on the grounds that it would
have 'diluted' local control of infrastructure development (Barlow, 1968).

All of these programs were developed by the DCGC with a view to developing
a comprehensive, metropolitan-wide approach to the planning and provision of water
and sewer services for the metropolitan area. The programs were designed to fulfill
the 'planning needed because of perplexing problems of utility extension' (DCGC,
1964). In 1965, the Committee reiterated its goal of 'encouraging operation of water,
sewer and sewage treatment by a single public agency for the equitable benefit of all
users' (DCGC, 1965). And, the Committee members visited Detroit to see a 'successful
example of regional management of water and sewer services' (DCGC, 1965, n.p.).
Thus, by the mid-1960s, the DCGC seemed to be well on its way towards securing 'a
climate of cooperation in which operation by a single public agency becomes possible' (DCGC, 1965, n.p.).

To that end, the DCGC pushed ahead with enabling Columbus to develop its integrated system. The next step was to encourage Columbus to enter into contract negotiations with suburban local governments. Negotiations commenced in 1964. By 1968, most suburban local governments in Franklin County had signed contracts with Columbus for the use of water and sewer services. But the contracts were not negotiated without some opposition from suburban officials.

The politics of contracts between Columbus and suburban local governments

In 1964, prompted by the Development Committee for Greater Columbus, the City of Columbus entered into contract negotiations with suburban local governments for the use of the central city's water and sewer services. Several suburbs already contracted with Columbus. But others did not. These latter suburbs relied on their own utilities, or had entered into agreements to use County-operated plants.

The context for the contract negotiations between Columbus and suburban local governments was the rapid development of unincorporated areas contiguous to the various municipalities. By the mid-1960s, such development was beginning to have an impact on suburban municipalities. Those municipalities that operated their own sewage treatment plants or water facilities began to reassess their policies on new development. Whereas in the past, suburban residents and officials had largely resisted development, several now began to draw up master plans and to implement their own policies of territorial expansion. The suburbs of Westerville and Hilliard, respectively to the north and west of Columbus, were two cases in point.
In 1962, Westerville had already drawn up a town plan which included future growth areas (Columbus Dispatch, 8/19/65, 21A). And in 1965 both Westerville and Hilliard were considering annexation of a total of 7,000 acres contiguous to their borders (Columbus Dispatch, 2/21/65, B2). In the case of Westerville, the prospect that the suburb would be able to tap into water supply from the new Alum Creek reservoir provided a strong incentive for territorial growth (Columbus Dispatch, 8/2/66, 20A). Moreover, there were concerns expressed for the future of the local school district (Columbus Dispatch, 7/8/65, 40A). Residential development was occurring in the unincorporated areas in Franklin County, but Columbus's annexation activities were taking industrial tax base away from the townships. Suburban school districts, to the extent that they also served areas in the townships, were experiencing problems handling the rapid pace of new residential development (see Chapter 6). In the case of Westerville, these concerns over school financing provided some incentive for the expansion of the city in the expectation that Westerville schools could compete with Columbus for industrial and commercial tax base. In order to provide an institutional basis for this growth activity, a growth commission, comprised of local business interests, was formed in August 1965 (Columbus Dispatch, 8/26/65, B2). Members of Westerville City Council also proposed the construction of a new $2 million sewage treatment plant to support the expansion program (Columbus Dispatch, 10/23/66, 31A). This plant was designed to supplement the existing sewage treatment plant which had already reached over-capacity.

A similar set of events were unfolding in Hilliard during the mid-1960s. Hilliard's sewage treatment plant was operating at over-capacity (Columbus Dispatch, 9/13/64, 10A). The suburb had taken over operation of this plant from the County in 1959 and was as a result encumbered with a large debt (Columbus Dispatch,
This debt problem was one reason why City Councillors in Hilliard imposed a sewer rate hike on consumers outside the city limits in 1966 (Columbus Dispatch, 12/13/66, 12B). Hilliard officials also imposed a sewer freeze on services to unincorporated areas. The City had plans to annex potentially tax-rich land, including a site in 1967 slated for a $4.5 million industrial development, and the freeze was designed to leverage the annexations (Columbus Dispatch, 9/7/67, 1B). Thus, as was the case in Westerville, there was significant growth activity occurring at that time in Hilliard.

In 1964, officials from the City of Columbus approached officials in Hilliard and Westerville with the aim of entering into contract negotiations for the provision of sewer services and the use of Columbus's water and sewage treatment facilities (Columbus Dispatch, 9/13/64, 10A; 2/21/65, 11A). According to the Columbus Service Director responsible for the contract negotiations, the major concerns that Columbus had related less to the annexation activities of the suburbs and more to problems of pollution (Creeman, 1987). Both suburbs were a pollution threat because they were dumping untreated effluent from their sewage plants into the various streams that fed into Columbus's water supply system (Columbus Dispatch, 10/24/65, 11A). In the case of Hilliard, the pollution of Griggs reservoir was a major concern for Columbus officials. In the case of Westerville, it was more the potential threat a new sewage plant would pose for the City's water supply that led to the contract negotiations (Columbus Dispatch, 10/24/65, 11A).

While pollution may have indeed been an important condition for the contract negotiations, there can be little doubt that Columbus also feared for the future of its annexation policy. The proliferation of sewage treatment plants in suburban and
unincorporated areas posed a competitive threat to Columbus's own utilities and the ability of the central city to control the locations of new development in the metropolitan area. Moreover, there were the large investments in the City's fixed facilities for water and sewer to be concerned about. The City of Columbus had already invested large sums of money in the extension of sewer trunk lines in the vicinity of respective suburbs (Columbus Dispatch, 11/21/65, 33A). With respect to Hilliard, these extensions went ahead even though it was by no means certain that the suburb was willing to enter into a contract with the central city (Columbus Dispatch, 11/21/65, 33A). This strongly suggests that Columbus's intentions were less motivated by the desire to eliminate pollution sources and were more focused on developing a system which could compete with suburban-operated utilities. Indeed, it was reported that 'some people' in Columbus were worried that the City would lose customers unless contracts agreements with the suburbs were reached. These 'people' expressed a fear that Columbus would not be able to retire the debts on its water and sewer system (Columbus Dispatch, 6/11/67, 21A).

In the case of Hilliard, there was in fact a groundswell of support for a sewer service contract with Columbus, but the precise details of such a contract were negotiable. Local economic interests in Hilliard came out in favor of a contract, for example. The Hilliard Businessmen's Association were reported to 'endorse overwhelmingly the sewer contract idea with Columbus' (Columbus Dispatch, 7/4/65, 19A). These local economic interests were concerned about the capacity of the City's existing plant to service territories the suburb might have wanted to annex in the future (Columbus Dispatch, 5/28/67, 21A). The Franklin County Commissioners had already turned down one annexation petition to Hilliard involving land which was developed as an industrial park (Columbus Dispatch, 11/20/66, 4A). The annexation request was
denied on the grounds that Hilliard could not provide adequate service coverage. If Hilliard did enter into a contract with Columbus, not only would service coverage be provided but also growth areas would be written into such a contract which would allow the suburb to annex contiguous territories up to the 'allowable service area'. Local business interests thus saw a connection between their own economic interests and the territorial expansion of the suburb under the terms of a contract with Columbus. For example, a local lawyer acting on behalf of Hilliard businesses suggested that, without a contract, residents and businesses in Hilliard would be subjected to 'high taxes and utility costs, a depressed real estate market, and the loss of jobs' (Columbus Dispatch, 5/28/67, 21A). The lawyer urged the Hilliard City Council to enter into a contract 'or be responsible for the decline and demise of the Hilliard empire' (Columbus Dispatch, 5/28/67, 21A).

The mayor of Hilliard and members of City Council were generally in favor of a contract with Columbus. But they expressed some concerns about the size of the proposed service contract area and the higher rates for suburban consumers compared to those in the central city (Columbus Dispatch, 10/24/65, 33A; 4/30/67, 23A). Nevertheless, and consistent with the interests of local businesses, Hilliard officials saw distinct economic advantages in a contract with Columbus. These economic advantages hinged on the ability of the suburb to use its contract to leverage annexations. According to the City Finance Director, 'more jobs and a better payroll' would result if Hilliard could annex new developments. Moreover, these payroll increases would translate into increased sales for merchants and businessmen in Hilliard, or so it was argued (Columbus Dispatch, 6/4/67, 25A).
In contrast to the pro-contract stance of city officials and business interests in Hilliard, a former mayor and a City Councillor were very much opposed to any contract with Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 11/21/65, 33A). These two pointed to the fact that Hilliard had, since the 1950s, tried to contract with Columbus but the central city had refused to negotiate terms acceptable to the suburb. As a result, Hilliard developed its own sewerage facilities. Hilliard took over the operation of a utility in 1959 which had formerly been operated by the County. The suburb was now encumbered with large debis and an over-capacity plant. As the former mayor and councillor argued, Columbus was using the issue of pollution as a 'scapegoat' to negotiate a contract more favorable to the interests of the central city (Columbus Dispatch, 10/24/65, 33A). This argument proved to be quite persuasive, apparently. Hilliard City Council failed to agree to terms for a contract with Columbus in November 1966 and August 1967 (Columbus Dispatch, 12/13/66, 12B; 8/29/67, 1B).

The situation in Westerville was somewhat different to that in Hilliard in terms of the arguments for and against a contract with Columbus. Whereas in Hilliard, there was evidence of a coalition between local business interests and public officials forged around the issue of securing a contract with Columbus, no such coalition was evident in Westerville. Moreover, Westerville had yet to invest heavily in a sewage treatment plant and the suburb was less debt-burdened than Hilliard. However, voters in Westerville had approved construction of a $2 million sewage treatment plant and the City planned to use those services to encourage annexations to the municipality (Columbus Dispatch, 1/10/67, 1B).

Westerville's growth prospects suffered serious blows, however, when the Franklin County Commissioners turned down annexation requests totalling over 7,000 acres
in 1966 and 1967 (Columbus Dispatch, 10/24/65, 11A; 1/10/67, 1B). Moreover, the Franklin County Commissioners put pressure on Westerville to sign a contract with Columbus on pain of denial of future annexation requests (Columbus Dispatch, 1/10/67, 1B). But Westerville Councillors could not agree to the terms of a contract. City officials preferred to see the suburb develop its own system (Columbus Dispatch, 10/1/67, 29A).

Residents in Westerville began to express doubts about the ability of the suburb to finance the development of its own system. These concerns became evident in a town meeting held in October 1966 (Columbus Dispatch, 10/23/66, 31A). Not only did the cost element have to be factored in, but a location for the new sewer plant had to be chosen. On the one hand, the new plant that was proposed could only serve 20,000 people and there was the possibility that, sometime in the future, another plant would have to be constructed to update the existing utility (Columbus Dispatch, 10/13/66, 31A). Westerville would then be left with a system that was 'not useable and not paid for' (Columbus Dispatch, 5/11/67, 5A). On the other hand, residents did not want such a plant close to residential neighborhoods because of the odor threat (Columbus Dispatch, 10/13/66, 31A). Moreover, objections were also raised about the pollution problems that might result. These concerns were forcefully expressed by Columbus officials, the Franklin County Commissioners and the City of Bexley, located downstream from Westerville (Columbus Dispatch, 11/5/67, 67A). The County Commissioners, for example, made the annexation plans of Westerville contingent upon finding a solution to the sewage problem (Columbus Dispatch, 10/13/66, 4A).
Resolution of the conflicts: the role of state institutions

The contract negotiations between Columbus and Hilliard and Westerville were protracted. Officials in both suburbs registered strong opposition because the contracts compromised their abilities to annex and thereby ensure the growth of their tax bases. And so, after three years of negotiation, from 1964 to 1966, officials in neither municipality were in positions to reach agreements with Columbus officials. It took the intervention of an outside agency to tip the balance away from a more decentralized water and sewer system in metropolitan Columbus to one in which control was further consolidated for the City of Columbus.

The outside agency in question was the Ohio Water Pollution Control Board. In 1964, the State Water Pollution Control Board had given both Hilliard and Westerville permits to dump untreated effluents into Griggs reservoir and Alum Creek respectively. However, when these permits expired in 1967, the Board refused to renew them (Columbus Dispatch, 2/14/67, 4A). The Board imposed additional punitive measures on Westerville and Hilliard. No construction was permitted in either suburb until officials agreed to a contract with Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 6/11/67, 21A).

These punitive measures forced the issue in Hilliard to a relatively quick resolution. Upon the approval of City Council, the suburb entered into a contract with Columbus in October 1967 (Columbus Dispatch, 10/8/67, 21A), allowing Hilliard to tie into the Columbus system. The State Water Pollution Control Board lifted its ban on new construction and, soon after, Hilliard City Council voted 7-0 to accept the annexation to the suburban municipality of 1,470 acres, including a large industrial development (Columbus Dispatch, 11/14/67, 4A).
In Westerville, the conflict was more protracted, despite the intervention of the State Water Pollution Control Board. Westerville officials, including the city manager, refused to agree to the contract terms set by Columbus. The sticking points were the size of the service contract areas and the rate differential between the suburb and the central city (Columbus Dispatch, 6/11/67, 21A). Westerville officials wanted the service contract area kept to the same size as the town plan which had been drawn up in 1962. Indeed, officials used this issue to try and muster support from residents on the issue of pressing ahead with the construction of a new sewage treatment plant (Columbus Dispatch, 11/9/67, 21A). The argument was that the service contract area proposed by Columbus was insufficient to finance the Westerville school system. A larger service area would make the school district more economically viable (Columbus Dispatch, 5/11/67, 1B).

The rate differential was also a source of controversy. Westerville officials objected to the fact that Columbus would charge 150% of inside-city rates for suburban consumers of the City's services (Columbus Dispatch, 5/30/67, 1B). Columbus officials, however, refused to compromise on the issue of rates. The Columbus City Service Director claimed that, by lowering the rates for Westerville, Columbus would be setting a precedent which could potentially compromise the central city's contracts with other suburban local governments in the metropolitan area (Columbus Dispatch, 6/4/67, 25A). Moreover, Columbus stood to lose $540,000 in future revenues for capital expenditures if the 50% surcharge was not enforced (Columbus Dispatch, 5/30/67, 1B). Thus concern for investments in fixed facilities featured large in the decisions of Columbus officials not to compromise on the rates issue.
The attempts of Westerville to find popular support for their resistance to the terms of a contract negotiated with Columbus were unsuccessful. The contract issue was put to a referendum in November 1967. Voters in Westerville came out strongly in favor of the contract with Columbus, although a few registered opposition on the grounds that they did not want to be 'dependent on Columbus' for services (Columbus Dispatch, 11/19/67, 29A). In the event, Westerville City Council voted 5-2 to accept a contract with Columbus. This put an end to the efforts of Westerville officials to develop their own sewer services and to embark upon their own program of territorial expansion.

The conflicts over water and sewer contracts between Columbus and suburban local governments raise an issue that has not yet been considered closely in explaining the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas. That issue relates to the activities of local branches of the state. The examples presented here show that, although localized business coalitions such as the DCGC were indeed an important influence, circumstances may dictate a significant role for local government in promoting integrated territorial structures.

Columbus was willing to enter into contracts with suburban local governments, albeit after being encouraged to do so by the DCGC, because those contracts allowed the central city to control the annexation activities of the suburbs and hence protect its own tax base. If Columbus had not entered into such negotiations, it was likely that the suburban local governments in question - Hilliard and Westerville - would have retained control of their own water and sewer services and these would have posed competitive threats to Columbus's systems. The suburbs planned to use those services to leverage annexations. Also at issue were the abilities of respective local governments to pay back debts accumulated on their fixed investments.
But fiscal problems of local dependence were not the only concerns of local governments. The status and career interests of locally elected officials also factored into the struggles. It was local officials, not residents, after all, who strove to retain control of services in their hands. By contrast, suburban residents and, as was most evident in the case of Hilliard, local business interests in the suburbs, registered little opposition to Columbus. Indeed, to the extent that citizens and civic interests in the suburbs were not in agreement with their elected representatives, the latter faced a potential loss of legitimacy by pushing for local control. Electoral considerations - the fear of being voted out of office by the electorate - probably explain why respective City Councillors were willing to bow to pressure from Columbus. By contrast, public officials that had not been elected to office - for example, Westerville’s city manager - were more willing to force the issues through to the bitter end. For such officials, the conflicts were rationalized in economic terms, in particular the effect the contracts would have had on school district revenues and city payrolls. The potential political fallout for those non-elected public officials was not so great as for elected representatives.

The fiscal crisis of the central city, federal intervention and the Development Committee for Greater Columbus

Columbus entered into contracts with suburban local governments in the interest of preserving its quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services and financing its fixed capital expenditures. The City hoped to gain new customers and to spread costs over a wider proportion of the metropolitan population. This was consistent with the interests of such local business coalitions as the DCGC in providing cost-effective services for the metropolitan area.
After 1965, however, the DCGC began to show concern over Columbus's ability to service the entire metropolitan area. This concern reflected the fact that between 1965 and 1970 it became increasingly apparent that Columbus was having difficulties financing its water and sewer services and this threatened the future development of the metropolitan economy, at least to the degree that new developments required services from the City of Columbus.

In 1965, the Committee reported that all sewer construction funds had been exhausted. The DCGC proposed a 35% increase in sewer rates and this proposal was accepted by City Council (DCGC, 1965). This increase was designed to offset some of the costs of the new Southerly Wastewater Treatment Plant. This treatment plant was completed in 1967 at a cost of $19.5 million to the city. No State or federal funds were used in the project (DCGC, 1967).

The new treatment plant provided 'a new potential for growth in the city' (DCGC, 1967; n.p.). The DCGC heralded its completion because it 'had provided the necessary capacity to create through contracts with suburban municipalities the single modern regional sewer system' (DCGC, 1967, n.p.). It caused the Committee to recommend a new $70 million sewer improvement program in 1968, to be completed over a 6 year period (DCGC, 1968). This put the onus on Columbus to underwrite future growth in the metropolitan area both within its municipal limits and, given the contracts, within suburban municipalities too. Thus, Columbus experienced a fourfold increase in its bonded indebtedness for water and sewer between 1965 and 1970, a period when many of the contracts were negotiated with suburban local governments (Little, 1970).
By 1970, members of the DCGC were clearly troubled by the financial problems of local governments:

As demands for services and physical improvements rose in geometric fashion, the financial and personnel resources of local governments have grown less rapidly—on a regional scale we have no effective bridge between plans and execution (DCGC, 1970:5).

The Development Committee later released a report which looked at the 'Future Development of Columbus Under Critical Conditions' (DCGC, 1975). This report made numerous references to the 'increased costs of government' and how public borrowing was 'crowding out' the private investor (DCGC, 1975:6, 12-13). The report made connections between the fiscal problems of the central city and broader political and economic conditions, notably high inflation and interest rates which were, at that time, placing extra burdens on local governments that had borrowed heavily (DCGC, 1975:15).

Thus, aware of the debt problem, and concerned about Columbus's capacity to finance service extensions, the DCGC promoted a variety of strategies. On several occasions it pushed for water and sewer rate increases for consumers in the independent suburbs under contract to the city. But it also explored the idea of a water and sewer authority independent of the City of Columbus which would serve the entire metropolitan area (DCGC, 1972; 1973). Such an authority would have allowed debt burdens to be spread evenly amongst jurisdictions. This strategy was consistent with the longer-term goals of the DCGC:

(The) Committee set as an objective the development of integrated water and sewer systems to provide these services when and where needed at the most equitable and reasonable costs possible for the Greater Columbus area (DCGC, 1957; n.p.).

The DCGC hosted meetings of local governments and organizations whose 'concerns spread beyond the corporation limits of one city' (DCGC, 1971: n.p.). The DCGC began
to foster an environment in which 'regional solutions' could become more acceptable. This meant planning for the 'real city', the one million people of Central Ohio, rather than, presumably, just Columbus (DOGC, 1972: n.p.). 'Regionalism', according to the DOGC, was 'an idea whose time had come' in 1973 (DOGC, 1973: n.p.).

The DOGC regarded itself as a catalyst for promoting intergovernmental cooperation at the regional scale. The Committee promoted the idea that a mechanism was needed to overcome the fragmented delivery of services that came from a balkanized system of local government. Amongst other things, this meant:

A balance between economies of scale and a need for a responsive, democratic system (DCGC, 1972: n.p.).

Along with a private research organization, Battelle Memorial Institute, the DCGC provided forums for 'regional thinking' (DCGC, 1973). In 1973, several new task forces were organized within the DCGC with the aim of addressing some of the Committee's more traditional concerns on a regional basis. Those task forces that in particular looked at the regional management of infrastructure were the Capital Improvements Program Task Force, the Storm Drainage Task Force and the Wastewater Treatment Task Force (DCGC, 1974). The DCGC also formed an organization to look into the possibility of creating a regional form of government for Central Ohio, although the precise form of government was never specified. The Regional Planning and Development Organization was staffed by eight members of the DCGC (DCGC, 1974).

Regional planning and regional government were very much on the agenda therefore:

A new kind of citizenship role is emerging throughout the country and especially in Central Ohio as persons who are concerned about resolving complex urban problems don the hats of "regional citizens." This is not a role which replaces other styles of citizenship - citizenship in the nation, in the state, in
the central city or the suburbs. It is an additional responsibility, one which focuses on those community problems which transcend the neighborhood or local concerns (DOGC, 1972: n.p.).

This agenda was consistent with regional government arrangements being propagated at that time by the federal government. Working through federal agencies, regional and national firms had promoted the idea of regionalism, and many metropolitan areas were adopting regional government arrangements (Feshback and Shipnuck, 1973).

The idea that Columbus should relinquish its quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services was also clearly apparent in the push towards regional government. Columbus City officials were in fact, and quite surprisingly, also sympathetic to the idea of a metropolitan authority for water and sewer (Parkinson, 1988). From the point of view of the central city, the advantages of such an authority were twofold. First, the large debt burdens in Columbus's water and sewer divisions could have been spread over numerous jurisdictions. This would have alleviated the fiscal problems of the central city. Second, more debt could be issued under such an authority without the need for voter approval. This would have enabled the expansion of the water and sewer system and the overall growth of the metropolitan economy. But it was pressure on the City from the DCGC which caused Columbus to look into the benefits and costs of 'going metropolitan' in its water and sewer system. The DCGC closely monitored the city's Capital Improvement Program and once again investigated changes in State law with regard to the indirect debt limitations of municipalities (DCGC, 1974).

However, although there was much talk within the DCGC between 1970 and 1974 of creating a water and sewer authority independent of the City of Columbus, the idea never translated into a coordinated business-led strategy. There was little consensus with other localized interests within the metropolitan area at the time.
that this was a viable alternative to the annexation policy. For one, the City of Columbus had to weigh the benefits of offloading its debt obligations onto a new authority against the costs of losing its quasi-monopoly of water and sewer. Without that quasi-monopoly, there would have been no annexation policy and less chance for Columbus to control the locations of new development in the metropolitan area.

A second factor which worked against the adoption of a metropolitan authority came with the intervention of the federal government. In 1974, Columbus's debt problems became less severe when federal monies for water and sewer expansion became available in the form of a grant to the amount of 75% of the costs of system expansion (Parkinson. 1988). In order to obtain those monies, Columbus agreed with the federal government to continue to act as the major supplier for the metropolitan area (City of Columbus, 1980). This was a strategy the DCGC was prepared to accept in the interests of preventing suburban local governments from gaining greater control over water and sewer and possibly developing their own competitive systems (DCGC, 1981).

In fact, the US EPA had its own ideas about what should constitute an appropriate 'regional solution' to Columbus's water and sewer problems. The US Environmental Protection Agency objected strongly to Columbus's quasi-monopoly of services on the grounds of 'equity'. On the one hand, Columbus was surcharging suburban customers for use of what was supposed to be a 'regional' system. On the other hand, Columbus was using its quasi-monopoly of services to restrict the annexation activities of the suburbs. From the standpoint of the EPA, this was problematic because developers that preferred not to petition to annex to Columbus to gain services tended to build their own package sewer treatment plants (City of Columbus, 1980). These
plants caused further pollution problems. The DOGC intervened formally on behalf of Columbus, arguing that the annexation policy was in fact designed to control peripheral development and that, by executing contracts with the suburbs, Columbus was preventing the proliferation of sewage treatment plants. Indeed, the DOGC claimed the more 'equitable' solution the EPA proposed (i.e. that Columbus should cease its annexation policy) opened up the possibility for a proliferation of sewage treatment plants across the metropolitan area:

The DOGC is the one single agency which has worked diligently to encourage and assist in the development of an integrated system to service the entire Franklin County area. The US EPA's position would seriously hamper continuation of that program. A proliferation of plants throughout the Columbus metropolitan area would be a step backwards (DOGC, 1981: 33).

Although the DCGC was willing to accede to Columbus's quasi-monopoly of services on this issue, it less easy to explain why an alternative, metropolitan-wide territorial structure for the provision of water and sewer did not emerge at this juncture after all. Federal monies could still have become available for sewer-system expansion without Columbus necessarily having control. After all, the City of Columbus was itself contemplating alternatives. Thus there must have been other mechanisms whose exercise shifted the balance in favor of the annexation policy.

Why the annexation policy was acceptable to local business coalitions.

The DCGC worked hard to promote the jurisdictional integration of the Columbus metropolitan area in the years following its formation in 1956. The Committee took particular pride in its interventions in the area of planning the expansion of physical infrastructures:
Our policy in the past, insofar as public improvements are concerned, has been to smooth the path for the geographic expansion of the metropolitan area over a wider and wider area. The streets and highways and the water and sewer lines have served that expansion (DCGC, 1975: 19).

The DCGC's policy was consistently orientated towards some form of metropolitan approach to planning the expansion of the metropolitan economy. With regard to water and sewer provision, that did not mean the DCGC was always sympathetic to Columbus's annexation policy. Alternative regional forms of government were indeed seriously considered. But:

That delicate balance which is implied in the creation of regional cooperative organizations was not created (DCGC, 1974: n.p.).

What shifted the balance of forces away from alternatives to Columbus's annexation policy?

One explanation would perhaps refer to the composition of firms in the Development Committee for Greater Columbus and the nature of their local dependence. Analysis of the firms that sponsored the DCGC by Mair (1988: 138) shows that regional and national firms were conspicuously absent from the Committee's membership. Rather the membership was heavily populated by Columbus-based firms: local manufactures, banks, utilities, real estate developers, accountants, consulting engineers, architects, lawyers and insurance companies were well-represented (Mair, 1988: 138). Most of these firms indeed could be considered highly locally dependent on Columbus and the immediate metropolitan area. While this in itself did not necessarily preclude an interest on the part of participant firms in alternative territorial structures to the annexation policy, the absence of national and regional firms meant that such alternatives were less likely to be vigorously promoted. Moreover, and as shall be argued, there was no compelling reason for sponsors of the DCGC not to support the annexation policy given that their economic interests in Columbus could be adequately met by such a territorial structure (or, at least, were not threatened by it).
But perhaps of critical importance was the lack of consensus amongst local business coalitions other than DCGC for alternatives to Columbus's annexation policy. By the early 1970s, there had been a change of leadership in the Chamber of Commerce. No longer so interested in industrializing the metropolitan economy, the Chamber focused its concerns on attracting headquarters branches of large corporations. Rather than promoting the extension of utilities to newly-annexed territories, the Chamber devoted much of its attention to revitalizing the Central Business District (Roberts, 1987). Whereas the Chamber of Commerce had in the past expressed little interest in urban renewal, it now shared, along with the DCGC, an interest in capital improvements for the CBD.

But even with this reorientation of its 'territory of interest', the Chamber of Commerce, and the firms it represented, continued to have a stake in the annexation policy. This stake arose from a connection between annexation and capital improvements in the central city. It was a stake, moreover, shared by the DCGC. Since 1956, the DCGC has monitored a capital improvements fund which comes from 25% of the income tax receipts of the City of Columbus. The income tax, introduced in 1947, is levied on residents and employees within City of Columbus. The income tax fund is used for public-voted capital improvements within Columbus. As Columbus has annexed new industry and residential development, so this income tax fund has grown, a connection which has been made on several occasions by a local attorney, Harrison Smith (see Chapter 6), who has acted as legal counsel for annexation petitioners since the 1950s:

The most obvious advantages of annexation are economic...It is the income tax dollar which has been the greatest economic reward in Columbus. And it flows not just from major industrial and commercial activities but from that suburban population working in Columbus...In a static central city where there remains for the resident, the retailer or the office tenant a continuing option to move out of the city, the effect of time is devastating. Everything gets
old, maintenance costs go up, rents go down, the population gets poorer, taxes go down, and municipal costs go up. The process accelerates and the result is - Cleveland...So the real economic result of a continuing annexation program is to insulate and protect the central city from generalized decay (Smith, 1979: B3).

The connection between the absolute geographical expansion of the central city and the circulation on an expanding scale of revenue generated from income tax receipts would therefore seem to account for why firms with a stake in the productive development of the CBD, as well as other territories within the metropolitan economy, would continue to support Columbus's annexation policy. In effect, local business coalitions have used the annexation policy - and consequently the powers of local government to effect a redistribution of the tax burden - as a method of regulating the local economic development process. To argue, therefore, that annexation has served as a policy of fiscal amelioration for local government in Columbus, as many of the annexation policy's chief ideologues have done, is to overlook its fiscal impact on other localized interests within the metropolitan area: viz. local business coalitions and their stake in maintaining conditions for the 'smooth' production and circulation of value through the metropolitan economy.

The Chamber of Commerce and the Development Committee for Greater Columbus were two institutionalized business coalitions that supported the annexation policy and the territorial integration of the Columbus metropolitan area. But support for the policy also came from non-institutionalized sources. Here, the activities of speculator-developers bear consideration.

At least until the mid-1970s, developers regarded annexation to Columbus in highly favorable terms. There were several reasons for this. First, Columbus could provide water and sewer services at lower costs, and with fewer technical difficulties, than suburban local governments. The rate differential between Columbus and
the suburbs certainly gave the City a cost advantage over suburbs when it came to annexations, though such an advantage meant little when developers passed the extra costs onto first-time homebuyers (Carver, 1986). But Columbus also had the technical support and qualified personnel to guarantee the effective and efficient provision of services for developers. This meant that developers generally found Columbus officials more predictable and easier to deal with on matters of annexation (Cremean, 1987).

For the most part, suburban local governments did not have professional planners, or other technical personnel, capable of assisting developers in their, often large-scale, plans.

Second, developers generally found zoning arrangements in Columbus more in line with their interests than was the case in the suburbs (Carver, 1986). The City Planning Commission of Columbus permitted smaller lot sizes and higher density developments. This was especially advantageous for developers of apartment complexes. Most suburban municipalities had very restrictive zoning regulations, especially with regard to lot sizes (Cremean, 1987). Furthermore, Columbus's apparently liberal zoning regulations actually encouraged speculative development at the periphery. Developers bought land cheap in unincorporated areas and held onto it until service extensions from Columbus were forthcoming. Upon annexation to Columbus, the land was rezoned and subdivided and developed with minimal legal and technical delays. This speculative process was facilitated by the legislative changes in 1967 which made it possible for absentee property owners to petition to annex to the central city (Columbus Dispatch, 1967, 10/29/67: 21A).

Some measure of the willingness of developers to build in Columbus rather than at other locations within the metropolitan area can be gauged from Figure 4. After
1954, on average between 60% and 70% of all new building permits issued in Franklin County involved new residential development in Columbus. This is all the more significant when it is considered that developers could have chosen suburban locations where, given the existence of the contracts, Columbus services were also available. Another striking feature of Figure 5 is that, in the years immediately preceding the introduction of the annexation policy, as little as 25% of new residential development in the County was locating within Columbus. Thus, not only did developers come out in favor of annexation to Columbus, but also the annexation policy clearly facilitated the exercise of Columbus' powers to regulate the economic development process to its territorial advantage.

In many ways therefore, the conditions dictated by Columbus' annexation policy were entirely consistent with the interests of speculator-developers. Such firms, dependent as they were on close contact with public officials and information about development trends, were likely to find Columbus the more attractive option than suburban municipalities. And even though developer support for annexation strategies of municipalities can become institutionalized (e.g., Fleischmann, 1977), in Columbus that form of support was not so necessary. This was because of the support for the annexation policy from the Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the Development Committee for Greater Columbus (whose membership did include developer interests) in conjunction with the interest of the City of Columbus in its own policy of territorial expansion.
BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED ANNUALLY
COLUMBUS, 1950-1987

CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 5

This chapter has examined the nature of the interests that have coalesced around Columbus' annexation policy. The purpose of the chapter was to examine, via concrete analysis, the mechanisms structuring the jurisdictional integration of metropolitan areas, and the conditions which give empirical expression to those mechanisms. The analysis was situated in relation to theories of territorial structure which emphasize production as a social force leading to jurisdictional integration. The more general conclusions which emerge from the analysis can most usefully be developed in relation to those theories.

The reform tradition paradigm suggests that production considerations are central to the jurisdictional integration of metropolitan areas. Private firms promote integrated territorial structures in the expectation that such structures facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale and lead to the internalization of externalities. An historical-geographical analysis of the processes resulting in integrated structures such as that presented in this Chapter indicates, however, that the processes involved are more complex.

While private firms dependent on the Columbus metropolitan economy have indeed promoted the integration of the metropolitan area, their reasons for doing so have varied according to how integrated territorial structures have enabled them to realise their particular interests. Firms have lent their support to jurisdictional integration via their participation in institutionalized business coalitions. The Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the Development Committee for Greater Columbus in particular were active in support of Columbus' annexation policy and the consequent integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the provision of water and sewer services.
It was its interest in industrializing the metropolitan economy which caused the Chamber of Commerce to support the extension of water and sewer lines by Columbus to unincorporated areas in the County. This interest was linked to the possibility that participant firms would forge new exchange linkages with relocating branch plants. For the Development Committee for Greater Columbus, the annexation policy proved acceptable to the degree that it enabled Columbus to realize economies of scale in service provision and mitigated the potential for the proliferation of sewage treatment plants in the County. Other firms, notably developers and builders, also saw advantages in the policy. Developers could rely on Columbus for reliable, cost-effective services, and the necessary technical support to see their projects to fruition. This was important because developers had often invested heavily in land and improvements in areas contiguous to Columbus. Without the extension of services by Columbus, uncertainty would have been projected onto the abilities of developers to amortize their fixed investments.

Although private firms, via institutionalized business coalitions, have lent their support to the annexation policy, the activities of local governments also have to be taken into consideration. The evidence from Columbus suggests a local government's investments in fixed physical facilities such as water and sewer may be critical. Concerns for the long-term growth and stability of its tax base caused the City of Columbus to use its annexation policy to surround suburban municipalities and to regulate local economic development to its territorial advantage. This policy enabled the central city to include a larger proportion of the metropolitan population within its water and sewer service area. And there were the fiscal benefits to be realized from the income tax on commuters and property taxes on new residential development at the periphery. Important conditions facilitating this strategy of fiscal amelioration
were the dynamics of the wider political economy within which Columbus was inserted: the relocation of branch plants to the Columbus metropolitan area; the decentralization of a tax base via the speculative ventures of builders and developers; and a climate of opinion in which some form of metropolitan-wide planning was regarded as ideologically and materially acceptable.

On occasion, the annexation policy has been called into question by private business coalitions. The attempts of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus to promote an alternative territorial structure are instructive in this regard. These attempts contrast with the activities of the Chamber of Commerce and its interest in the industrialization of the metropolitan economy. But so long as the City of Columbus has continued to provide services at a cost-effective rate, business interests with a stake in the productive development of the metropolitan economy have encouraged this particular strategy of integration.
CHAPTER VI
JURISDICTIONAL FRAGMENTATION AND THE POLITICS OF CONSUMPTION

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter examines the nature of the mechanisms which may combine to produce changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. Specifically, it focusses on the conditions which have recently shed some doubt on the future of Columbus' annexation policy. Whereas in Chapter 5 the causal mechanisms and contingent conditions facilitating this particular territorial structure were examined, in this Chapter the nature of countervailing tendencies is assessed. To what extent has there been a tendency towards a more fragmented metropolitan area?

At an abstract level, it has been predicted by liberal reformers that fragmentation results from struggles between differentially-privileged consumption groupings (Downs, 1973; Danielson, 1976; Newton, 1975). Coalitions of individuals of a similar socio-economic status or ethnic or racial background attempt to share out positive

24 The sections in this Chapter on the 'Wexley' conflict have relied on a number of detailed articles published in the Rocky Fork Enterprise between January 1987 and January 1989. Special thanks to the staffs of the Franklin County Board of Elections and the Office of the Secretary of State (State of Ohio) for information about the campaign contributions of Political Action Committees in Franklin County.
externalities with one another. Such coalitions push for jurisdictional arrangements which protect them from negative externalities associated with other individuals. Fragmentation enables this process because consumption groupings can gain control over mechanisms such as zoning to keep in the socially-desirable, and keep out the 'socially-undesirable'.

The liberal reform approach merits attention because of its recognition of the potential for political conflict around the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas. For liberal reformers, such conflicts generate fragmentation. But the possibility that production considerations may also generate fragmentation tendencies is overlooked in the liberal reform argument. Thus there is a need to examine exactly under what circumstances, and with what results, particular localized interests generate fragmented territorial structures in the metropolis.

The section focusses on two case studies of recent conflicts around Columbus's annexation policy. The first conflict involved attempts by the City of Columbus School District to annex suburban school district territory located in the City of Columbus. This strategy amounted to a drive to integrate the metropolitan region in a retrospective fashion with respect to one territorial structure: that relating to the provision of education. This strategy evolved in the context of federal intervention in the affairs of local government through a schools desegregation suit. One result of this was the recoupling of infrastructure provision with education via Columbus's annexation policy. This conflict lasted from 1980 to 1986.

The second conflict involved the location of a large new residential development in the northeast part of Franklin County. This conflict centered on the provision of water and sewer services to a development which, as a result of the schools annexation controversy, was contingent upon annexation both to Columbus City and to the
Columbus School system. It provides a fascinating illustration of the conjuncture of production and consumption interests in struggles over state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. This conflict began in 1987 and intensified on into 1988 and early 1989. At the time of writing, the conflict had yet to be fully resolved.

The aim of this Chapter is to shed light in more general terms on the conditions which bring about changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. By focusing on two detailed case studies of conflicts around Columbus's annexation policy, the Chapter examines the nature of the localized interests which have produced a more marked degree of fragmentation across the metropolis. The focus will be on the formation of coalitions around particular issues and the composition of those coalitions. The strategies adopted by such coalitions are considered with respect to their impact on the jurisdictional structure of the metropolis. The purpose of this analysis is not to dwell on predictions about the future of Columbus's annexation policy. Rather it is to examine the particular nature of the interests that have congealed to generate the two conflicts examined. The more general statements that will be made concern: (1) the necessary conditions for the formation of coalitions; (2) their interests in a particular territorial structure; and (3) the contingent circumstances under which those interests may or may not be realized.
Columbus schools and annexation

As discussed in Chapter 5, a variety of localized business coalitions have promoted the territorial integration of the Franklin County part of the Columbus metropolitan area with respect to the provision of infrastructure. From the point of view of those localized business coalitions and also the City of Columbus, production considerations have been central to the successful implementation of the annexation policy. But a critical condition for this success was the separation of infrastructure provision from the territorial provision of education. School district annexations did not occur in sync with municipal annexations. This was important because, as suggested by the conflicts over the incorporation of Franklin Township and the contract negotiations between Columbus and Westerville, concerns about the financing of suburban school districts often led township and suburban officials to resist Columbus's annexation policy.25

Prior to 1955, however, the Columbus School District did pursue congruence of municipal and school district boundaries. As the central city applied the 'water/sewer freeze' very early on in the history of the annexation policy, newly annexed areas would automatically be transferred to the Columbus School District. The Columbus School Board had a policy of 'grandfathering' students in suburban and rural school

25 In the United States, education is not a municipal function. Rather, public schools are financed and operated under a system of independent school districts. These districts raise much of their revenues from the local property tax. This is a system virtually unique to the United States. The decentralized character of the American education system is one reason why education tends to be so highly politicized at the local level.
districts whenever those territories were annexed to the central city. Specifically, the Columbus School District promised to cover the tuition costs of those students still attending suburban schools but who were subsequently transferred to the central-city school system (see Columbus Evening Dispatch, 11/15/55, A1). In addition, the Columbus School District would assume a portion of the bonded indebtedness of the schools it took over from suburban school districts.

Despite such policies, there was considerable opposition to Columbus (both the City and the School District) when it sought the annexation of suburban and rural school district territories to Columbus. One example of this opposition in the early years of the policy stands out in particular. This was an annexation bid by Columbus for territories contained within the Worthington Exempted School District, located north of Columbus in Sharon Township. Throughout 1954 and 1955, substantial opposition to the City of Columbus was expressed by residents and school district officials in Sharon Township. For Sharon Township Trustees, members of the Worthington School Board and local residents, the annexation activities of the central city were of concern because they threatened to take tax base away from the Worthington Exempted School District (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 9/25/55, A1). These concerns led residents in the affected areas to file petitions to annex to Worthington (Worthington News, 3/18/54, B1). Their objective was to prevent Columbus from sequestering tax base from the school district.

Worthington officials, together with local business interests in the suburb - merchants, professionals and retailers - were also concerned because the future expansion of the suburb was at stake (Worthington News, 9/10/53, A1). Worthington contracted with Columbus for sewer services and, when the contract came up for renegotiation,
there were fears expressed by suburban officials and Worthington businesses that Columbus would use its quasi-monopoly of services to restrict the suburb's growth. These local, suburban interests used the issue of school district financing to advance their own cause (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 3/18/54, B1; Worthington News, 9/10/53, 4). Led by the local newspaper, the anti-Columbus lobby in Worthington promoted the annexation of Sharon Township territory to the suburb, a strategy designed to avoid encirclement by the City of Columbus (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 9/26/55, 8).

Worthington City Council adopted an emergency ordinance in June 1954 to annex a large portion of Sharon Township territory. The annexation move was justified in terms of the future financial viability of the suburban school district (Worthington News, 6/10/54, A1). Although the voters in the suburb were in favor of the annexation move, the Franklin County Commissioners rejected it on the grounds that Worthington could not provide adequate service coverage, especially with regard to the provision of water and sewer services (Worthington News, 3/24/55, 4). Builders, developers and other commercial interests operating in areas contiguous to Worthington and Columbus filed petitions to annex to the central city so as to obtain Columbus's services (Worthington News, 11/17/55, 1). Nevertheless, Columbus's attempts to annex Worthington School District territory in Sharon Township continued to meet with strong resistance throughout 1954 and 1955. And attempts by the nascent Metropolitan Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations to mediate the conflict largely proved ineffectual (Columbus Evening Dispatch, 7/4/54, 15).26

26 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Metropolitan Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations was formed in 1954 in an effort to broker conflict between Columbus and surrounding townships and suburbs. Headed by professionals and technocrats, including Professor Harvey Walker of the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, the Advisory Committee focused on the impact of Columbus's annexation policy on the provision of schools and infra-
What reduced the acrimony between the City of Columbus and Sharon Township residents and local school district officials were changes in State laws with regard to school district annexations. These changes came about in 1955 when it was determined that the newly-created State Board of Education, and not municipalities or school districts, would have jurisdiction over the transfer of school district territories. Although these legislative changes did not occur because of the Worthington Exempted School District controversy, it was controversy of that nature which brought them about.  

structure within the metropolitan area. Zoning matters were also considered. But like other regional organizations at the time, such as the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission, the Advisory Committee failed to generate a suitable climate of cooperation between the central city and the suburbs. Indeed, it is likely the organization was dissolved very soon after it was formed. There is no mention of it in newspapers or other sources after 1955. Walker himself apparently became quite bitter about Columbus's aggressive annexation policy, as evidenced in a thesis written by one of his students some time later on (Priede, 1966).

27 Although schools no longer factored into the conflict, Worthington officials and businesses continued to fight Columbus over the terms of a new sewer contract. Annexation battles between Columbus and Worthington raged from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. In 1958, the Worthington Chamber of Commerce was organized to attract new industrial activity to the suburb, and a new master plan was drawn up for industrial areas (Worthington News, 1/1/59). A Municipal Development Commission and a Board of Zoning Appeals were also created in 1958. Land was set aside for light industry with the aim of creating sufficient tax base to maintain a viable school district (Worthington News, 3/24/55, 4). This self-conscious growth activity eventually gave rise to plans for a sewage treatment plant to be constructed in the suburb. In the event, Worthington renegotiated a contract with Columbus and the central city was able to use its quasi-monopoly of services to surround the suburb (Columbus Dispatch, 1/10/65, 33A).
The Columbus School Board considers the annexation of suburban school district territory located in the City of Columbus.

The significance of these legislative changes was that school district annexations no longer went hand-in-hand with municipal annexations. After 1955, as the City of Columbus implemented its annexation policy, there would be no guarantee that school district territories in unincorporated areas which requested annexation to Columbus would indeed be transferred to the Columbus School District. From the standpoint of the City of Columbus, this was an advantageous situation because the City Administration could proceed with its annexation policy in the expectation that there would be little opposition from township residents and suburban school district officials. From the standpoint of those residents and officials, their school districts stood less chance of losing out to Columbus schools in terms of tax base and enrollments. From the standpoint of those residents and officials, their school districts stood less chance of losing out to Columbus schools in terms of tax base and enrollments.28

The separation of infrastructure provision and education was therefore critical to Columbus's continued abilities to exercise its leverage over the annexation of territories contiguous to its municipal limits (Crevean, 1987).

Controversy over school district annexations re-emerged, however, in 1980 with the prospect of the recoupling of municipal and school district annexations. In April 1980, the Columbus School Board considered conducting a study which was to look into the possibility of annexing in a retrospective time frame suburban school district territory located within the municipal limits of Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 1980).

28 The new legislation which gave authority to the State Board of Education to determine school district transfers did not always work to the advantage of suburban and rural school districts, however. At least until the mid-1960s, the State Board favored transfers to the larger school districts in the interest of creating financially-viable school systems. Where this policy threatened to decimate the poorer districts, the State Board of Education encouraged consolidation of districts. For example, after 1955 several small districts in the south west part of Franklin County consolidated into one large district. This new district was named South Western Schools.
Between 1954 and 1965, as the City of Columbus had implemented its vigorous annexation program, the Columbus School System had annexed in conjunction with the City. After 1965, however, central city school district annexations did not always match municipal annexations. The result was that, by 1980, some 40% of the City of Columbus was located in suburban school districts (Figure 5). Those areas received Columbus services such as water and sewer, but residents in those locations sent their children to suburban schools. The School Board study proposed in 1980 was designed to estimate the impact of annexing suburban school district territory in Columbus (hereafter the 'discrepant areas') on the school district's tax valuation, pupil density and projected costs of operation.

A variety of conditions motivated the Columbus School Board to consider annexation of the discrepant areas. Two in particular stand out as significant. First, the School District stood to gain significant taxable industrial, commercial and residential property. 21% of the property tax base of Columbus was located in the discrepant areas. This tax base would have contributed $43.7 million (1980 monies) in annual revenues to the Columbus school system if it were annexed (Columbus Dispatch, 7/31/80, 8A). At that time, the school district was experiencing financial difficulties. Not one tax increase had been passed by the voters between 1973 and 1979. Moreover, residential disinvestment had also put downward pressure on the district's tax base. Only one new residential subdivision had been constructed in the district since 1973, while residential development in the discrepant areas had continued to grow. In 1978, Schools Superintendent Joseph L. Davis proposed that twenty schools be closed in order to cut costs (Columbus Dispatch, 4/15/79, B1). Thus at a time when the School District was experiencing fiscal difficulties, the annexation of tax-rich suburban school districts appeared an attractive option to members of the School Board (Columbus Dispatch, 7/31/80, 8A).
FIGURE 5: Columbus City and suburban school districts.
Second, with annexation the Columbus School District would increase its student enrollments. 16,586 students enrolled in suburban school systems resided in the discrepant areas. The new enrollments were important because, throughout the 1970s, Columbus schools had experienced declining student enrollments. Between 1973 and 1979, the enrollment in the Columbus school district declined by 47,300—from 106,104 to 58,804. This was in contrast to an earlier period of expansion, partly created by the baby-boom era and partly due to the rapid economic development of the Columbus metropolitan area and consequent patterns of immigration. Enrollments increased from 46,352 in 1950 to 110,000 in 1970, before commencing their downturn during the 1970s. By 1979, enrollments were approaching the same level as they had been in the early 1950s. A federal court decision which in 1977 found Columbus guilty of operating a segregated school system was an important condition for declining enrollments in the Columbus school district.

The federal government and schools desegregation in Columbus

Declining enrollments during the 1970s were the result of outmigration from the Columbus School District to other schools and school districts in Franklin County and outside Central Ohio. As Table 7 shows, the majority of these migrations involved white students. 39,369 white students left Columbus schools between 1973 and 1979. 7,242 blacks were recorded to have left over the same period, 15.3% of the total lost by Columbus schools to suburban and private schools. Since 1970, the number of black students enrolled in Columbus schools remained at 29,000; but the proportion of black students in the school system increased from 26.5% to 49.3%. These figures are indicative of a significant flight of predominantly white students and families from the Columbus school district.
TABLE 7: Migration of students from Columbus School District, 1973-1978. Source: Columbus Dispatch
March 20, 1979, p.B6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School district</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bexley</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal Winchester</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>Grandview</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>183</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamilton Local</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jefferson Local</td>
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<td>106</td>
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<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>92</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1122</td>
</tr>
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<td>155</td>
</tr>
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<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>425</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>3750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Arlington</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Local</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerville</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthington</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>977</td>
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<td>941</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7393</td>
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<td>15332</td>
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<td>Total number</td>
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<td>15.3</td>
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+ County totals

* Classification unknown
One of the major conditions prompting the flight of students from the Columbus school district during the 1970s was the prospect of the commencement of busing for racial balance within the Columbus school system. The passage of the landmark case Brown versus Board of Education in 1954 made the intentional segregation of schools on the basis of race illegal. Up until 1954, the Columbus School Board had practised a dual (racially separated) school system in which they had caused a number of schools to be attended predominantly by black students (Penick et al., 1977). The School Board had drawn attendance zones so that white students would not be enrolled in those schools. Moreover, black teachers were assigned to predominantly black schools, those located mainly on the east side of the City. At that time, there were no black schools administrators in the Columbus School District. Through the 1950s and 1960s the Columbus School Board continued to practice a dual system (Penick et al., 1977).

During the 1960s, at a time when the Civil Rights movement was spreading to the Northern cities, activist groups in Columbus began considering the issue of the integration of the school system on the basis of race. In August 1966, for example, the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) presented a position paper to the newly-created Council on Intercultural Education in Columbus protesting that unconstitutional schools segregation was being practiced in Columbus schools. In May 1967, the Columbus Urban League called for the integration of the school system and proposed measures for the desegregation of the district. In response, the School Board adopted a voluntary transfer program to improve racial balance across its school system (Penick et al., 1977). This plan existed for six years but 'it had little integrative impact on the school system' (Penick et al., 1977, n.p.).
It was not until 1973 that a schools desegregation suit was filed in Columbus. The suit had the support of the national chapter of the NAACP, as well as other national organizations which had taken an active stance on Civil Rights such as the UAW, the American Civil Liberties Union, American Jewish Congress, the League of Women Voters and the National Education Association. Local support came from the Urban League, the local branch of the NAACP and the local teachers' union, the Columbus Education Association. The court case, involving Gary L. Penick et al. versus Columbus Board of Education et al., was not resolved until 1977, when Columbus Schools were found guilty of operating a segregated school system (Columbus Dispatch, 3/8/77, A1). In 1979, the school district became subject to court-ordered busing.

The possibility of a schools desegregation suit was part of the context within which the Columbus School Board chose to revise its annexation policy. Between 1965 and 1973, a period when racial tensions were severe and there was the prospect of a schools desegregation suit, the rate of annexation to the Columbus School District diminished dramatically. In 1965 and 1966, the State Board of Education turned down all but one of eleven requests by the Columbus School Board to transfer recently annexed territory to the Columbus school system (Columbus Dispatch, 7/31/66, 31A). At that juncture, the Columbus School Board revised its own policy on the annexation of territories contiguous to the City of Columbus. The School Board focussed its attention on the annexation of mainly tax rich commercial and industrial property, and largely avoided residential development (Ebright, 1989). The implication of this was that, with the suburbanization of population and employment continuing throughout the 1960s, many people moved to suburban school districts located within the city of Columbus, but these were areas which the Columbus School Board did
not annex. Moreover, developers operating in those areas could secure water and sewer services from Columbus but could build in suburban school districts (Columbus Dispatch, 3/23/75, B5).

After 1967, the State Board of Education did not allow the transfer of school district territory if the per pupil assessed valuation of the annexed area was higher than the area to which it was being transferred. The result was that, as the City of Columbus annexed territory, tax rich commercial and industrial property in the areas being annexed remained in suburban school districts. While the City of Columbus benefited from the income tax levied on the workforce in those areas, the Columbus School District lost potential property tax revenues. For example, in 1965, the City of Columbus annexed 2,300 acres to the east of the suburb of Worthington where the large Anheuser-Busch brewery was being constructed (Columbus Dispatch, 9/19/65, 31A). The brewery was, at the time, worth at least $20 million per year in terms of its contribution to the local tax duplicate. The State Board voted against the transfer of the brewery to the Columbus School District. Instead it remained in the Worthington School District. The argument offered at the time was that Columbus was taking tax base away from suburban school districts even as suburban school district enrollments were rapidly increasing. As one suburban schools superintendent argued:

We were growing at a rate of 1,000 students a year and the one thing we didn’t need was Columbus taking part of our tax base. We did not have the wealth that Columbus did (Columbus Dispatch, 5/6/85, B2).

29 One exception to the State Board of Education's policy of denying the transfer of tax-rich property to an annexing School District occurred in 1971. The State Board approved the transfer of 8.7 square miles of commercial and industrial property worth $22 million (1970 valuation) to Columbus in exchange for the Columbus School District taking over the operation of the financially-troubled Mifflin school system to the north east of the City. Although this decision was contested, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that the State Board had the power to approve the annexation, so the decision stood.
As annexations by the Columbus School District lagged behind the growth of the central city, enrollments in the discrepant areas increased. This process accelerated when the Columbus School Board was found guilty of operating a segregated school system. In the year before and after busing was introduced, some 10,000 students left the Columbus school system, many relocating with their families to the discrepant areas (The Columbus Booster, 3/16/86, n.p.). The Columbus school system experienced declining enrollments and tax base, becoming, as one Board of Education member much later put it, 'poorer and blacker' (Columbus Dispatch, 11/8/87, 1A).

The Columbus school district had indeed become 'poorer and blacker'. Whereas in 1960, the blacks comprised less than 25% of the student enrollment in the school district, by 1980 they comprised close to 50%. The combination of 'white flight' and the tendency for new development in Columbus not to occur in the City School District meant, moreover, the segregation of tax resources from needs, a problem exacerbated by the lower socio-economic status of the black central-city population compared to that of white, middle income groups in the suburbs and in suburban school district. The annexation of suburban school district territory located in Columbus was an attractive option for black central-city parents because, amongst other things, it meant the reallocation of $43 million in property tax base to the Columbus School District. This, therefore, was the context within which the School Board entertained the idea in 1980 to annex suburban school district territory located in Columbus.
The nature of the opposition

The decision by the Columbus School Board to reopen the issue of the annexation of suburban school district territory located in the City of Columbus provoked a variety of oppositional responses. There were two major periods of oppositional activity. The first period occurred in 1980 when suburban schools district officials organized parents to pressure legislators to place a moratorium on all future school district annexations. This moratorium lasted until 1986. A second period of opposition was evident from 1985 to 1986. This second period saw more concerted activity on the part of suburban schools officials and residents who found themselves in conflict with central city schools activist groups. Developers, realtors and organized business coalitions also played a role in this conflict.

The Columbus School Board moved to consider the annexation of the discrepant areas in April 1980. The last major annexation to the Columbus School District occurred in 1976 (Columbus Dispatch, 1/5/80, 1B). The discrepant areas amounted to 40% of the total area located within the City of Columbus. This move by the School Board provoked an immediate response from suburban school district officials.

Suburban school district officials were nearly unanimous in their opposition to the Columbus School Board (Columbus Dispatch, 2/5/80, 1A). The perspective of suburban schools officials was that annexation would have a devastating financial impact on local school districts. While individual school districts would not be entirely decimated, the affected areas constituted a substantial proportion of the tax base of respective suburban school districts. Enrollment losses would have also been significant but these were, for the schools officials, of less concern. Richard Kettell, President of the Groveport Madison School Board, summarized the officials’ perspective:
Annexation (of suburban school district territory in Columbus) would put us in a bind financially. Columbus would be taking our kids but we'd still have the schools to run (Columbus Dispatch, 5/13/80, 1B). Potential losses in terms of revenues and enrollments varied considerably from one school district to another. Table 8 shows data compiled in 1985 for net revenues, percentage of tax base and school enrollments for each affected school district. Of the 14 school districts involved, Hilliard schools stood to lose the most in terms of its overall tax base. Worthington, Dublin, Gahanna, Groveport-Madison and South Western Schools also stood to lose substantial revenues and percentage of tax base. South Western Schools would have lost the most students.

The initial reaction of the suburban schools officials was to muster support from residents with school-aged children in the affected areas (Columbus Dispatch, 5/13/80, 1B). Individual School Boards convened meetings to which residents were invited. At these meetings, schools officials and superintendents organized petition drives and planned strategies to oppose the Columbus School Board (Columbus Dispatch, 6/8/80, 1C). For example, South Western Schools officials organized a meeting at which 400 parents were present, as well as representatives of other affected School Boards. At this meeting, they proposed the formation of a group called MASA, Movement Against Schools Annexation. This group planned and organized a Statewide petition drive to protest the possible annexation activities of the Columbus School Board (Columbus Dispatch, 5/25/80, 1C).

The decision by the Columbus School Board to consider the annexation of the discrepant areas sent a signal to other large central-city school districts across the State. Districts in a similar predicament to Columbus schools included Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Akron. Surrounded by wealthy independent suburban school districts,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School District</th>
<th>Valuation ($000)</th>
<th>Tax base</th>
<th>Enrollments (Number)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Citizen's Group</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worthington</td>
<td>9600</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>2856</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dublin</td>
<td>3200</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Arlington</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilliard</td>
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<td>43.6</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandview Heights</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>South-Western</td>
<td>5900</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Local</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groveport Madison</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>2887</td>
<td>48.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canal Winchester</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pickerington</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Reynoldsburg</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gahanna-Jefferson</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plain Local</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerville</td>
<td>4000</td>
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<td>2779</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Olentangy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32257</td>
<td></td>
<td>16611</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data on total assessed valuation not available
these districts faced financial difficulties. What began as a 'local' issue quickly translated into a controversy which had implications for central-city school districts throughout the State and even in other States (Columbus Dispatch, 5/25/80, 1C). The involvement of school districts around the State meant that legislators in the Ohio House and Senate could not ignore the petitions of their constituents.

In May 1980, suburban school district officials and parents in Franklin County pushed legislators to introduce a bill in the Ohio House of Representatives which would give residents in school districts a right to vote on land transfers (Columbus Dispatch, 6/5/80, 1B). A similar bill had been introduced in the mid-1970s when Westerville schools had lost over 2,000 acres in a land transfer to Columbus. But the bill failed and the State Board of Education retained its right to determine school district transfers without the approval of voters. HB385 was introduced in May 1980 by Republican Representatives Gilmore, Conley and Kasich, all of whom had constituents in the affected districts (Columbus Dispatch, 6/5/80, 1B).

In June, however, HB385 was stalled through the activities of Democratic legislators representing the large central-city constituencies (Columbus Dispatch, 6/26/80, 1A). In Columbus, these legislators received support from schools interest groups and schools lobbyists. Columbus education officials and the Columbus Education Association in particular spoke out against the bill. These groups pushed legislators to make amendments to HB385. In September 1980, amended HB385 was passed by the Senate 27-1 and the House 69-5 (Columbus Citizen Journal, 9/19/80, 20A). With the passage of the bill, a moratorium was imposed upon all future schools annexations. This moratorium lasted for two years. It was then extended for a further four more years after 1982.
One interesting feature of this early phase of the schools annexation controversy involves the different responses of suburban school district officials and suburban residents with school-aged children. For the schools officials, the prospect of annexation by the Columbus School Board led to a response which was rationalized in terms of the fiscal impact of such a move. By contrast, the involvement of parents led to more of an emotional response. In particular, it was the prospect of seeing their children bused across the City of Columbus school district which motivated parents into agitating for legislative changes. As one parent suggested:

We don't want our children bused clear across town in Columbus, when they can walk to our schools here (Columbus Dispatch, 5/13/80, 1B).

Columbus Schools officials were keenly aware of the emotion provoked by their decision, but regarded it as a racial issue which also had fiscal implications. Columbus School Board Vice-President Bill Moss was reported to comment:

We are surrounded by increasingly hostile white suburban districts which continue to close schools and disrupt the educational process in the central city (Columbus Dispatch, 4/3/80, 1B).

The Columbus Dispatch took a 'hands-off' stance on the issue and underplayed the racial dimension in its editorial summary of the year's events. However, it made reference to the differing responses apparent in the conflict:

The school district annexation issue is an emotional and pragmatic one which demands thorough consideration by the legislators (Columbus Dispatch, 11/17/80, B-2).

The imposition of the moratorium on annexations caused the dissipation of these 'emotional and pragmatic' feelings. But they re-emerged in early 1985 with the prospect that the moratorium would not be extended beyond November 1986.
Moratorium on schools annexation expires, 1986

The prospect that the moratorium on schools annexation would not be extended beyond 1986 led to a variety of interest groups once more staking out their positions on the annexation of suburban school district territory in Columbus. In February 1985, the Columbus Dispatch was reporting that 6 out of 7 Columbus School Board members were opposed to the annexation of the discrepant areas, but that members had no official position on the matter (Columbus Dispatch, 2/20/85, 1A). This was despite the fact that legislators had indicated the moratorium would not be renewed at the end of 1986.

Elections in 1984 had brought new membership to the School Board. One new member, Jim Ebright, took up the issue of schools annexation in his election campaign and, once elected, he began rallying further support from activists within the City of Columbus. Ebright's position was that the School Board should push for the annexation of the discrepant areas:

'It's extremely bad educational policy to confine all the poor and minority students to one school district and then deprive the district of all the resources it needs (Columbus Citizen Journal, 10/5/85: 10).

Ebright convened a meeting in April 1985 at which some 100 parents of Columbus school children were present (Columbus Dispatch, 4/18/85, 5A). From this meeting, a schools activist group called the Apple Alliance was born. The Apple Alliance was led by a Columbus lawyer, Martha Crossen, who led a vigorous campaign to persuade the Columbus School Board to take a stand on the annexation of the discrepant areas. Although the Apple Alliance mainly consisted of parents of Columbus school children, it had some support from the black community in Columbus (Ebright, 1989; Evans, 1989).

30 The Apple referred to the Columbus schools' logo.
Activity amongst anti-annexation groups in suburban school districts had waned between 1981 and 1984 when schools annexation issue was removed to the legislative level. During that time, however, suburban school district officials had not ignored the issue of the annexation of the discrepant areas. Individual school districts set up organizations of parents and residents in opposition to annexations, and kept them informed of developments. As indicated in Table 8, districts that stood to lose the most from annexations were the most organized in terms of institutionalizing their opposition. Some of these organizations were described as extremely 'radical'. The Groveport Madison organization called ROTA (Residents Opposed to Annexation), in particular, were:

Considered the most radical group fighting annexation (Columbus Dispatch, 2/23/86, 8B).

In a later interview, Jim Ebright suggested these groups were ready to 'stand at the schoolhouse door' (Ebright, 1989). The image invoked was presumably in reference to, the sort of opposition that had greeted the busing of children across school districts in other major cities of the US.

In addition to organizing opposition in individual school districts, there had been an effort amongst suburban schools officials to institutionalize support for their cause across all suburban school districts. In 1983, this effort led to the formation of CLASS. CLASS stood for the Coalition for the Local Administration of School Systems. It was an institutionalized coalition of school district officials, schools superintendents and residents and parents representing suburban school districts in Franklin County. CLASS's mandate was to keep school districts informed of developments related to schools annexation. It also lobbied legislators for legislative changes related to schools annexation, and representatives of CLASS attended public meetings and
hearings throughout Franklin County. For some, the acronym CLASS was regarded as a fitting epithet to a controversy that was 'as much a class struggle as a racial issue' (Ebright, 1988).

Growing activism in Columbus, led by Ebright and the Apple Alliance, resulted in the reactivation in early 1985 of anti-annexation groups in the suburban school districts. At a meeting of 1,300 'anxious' parents and civic leaders from Dublin and Worthington schools, a decision was made to support a bill being sponsored by Representative Deshler (Republican), whose constituency included residents in the affected school districts (Columbus Dispatch, 6/4/85, 5A). Deshler's bill would have given residents the right to vote on schools annexation, just as had been proposed in 1980. Essentially this was a 'voting rights' bill: it was designed to give residents the right to vote on annexation issues rather than have the issue decided by a 'neutral' body such as the State Board of Education. For residents, such a bill affirmed the sanctity of individual property rights and the freedom to choose in which district to buy a home. This was a clear appeal to public choice ideology. But residents also argued that having such a choice made the decision on land transfers 'fair and equitable'. For the Apple Alliance and Ebright, however, the bill was representative of the 'sort of democracy one finds in South Africa' since, he argued, 'only white people get to vote in Representative Deshler's bill' (Columbus Dispatch, 10/5/85: 10). HB586 sponsored by Deshler was introduced into the Ohio House in June, 1985.

While the introduction of the bill embodied the 'voice' option of residents, 'exit' options were also being explored (compare Hirschman, 1970). By August 1985, local newspapers were reporting that residents in the discrepant areas were considering selling their houses and moving to suburban school district locations within suburban
municipal limits (Columbus Dispatch, 8/14/85, NW31). Fearing panic-selling and wholesale disinvestment, local realtors downplayed the urgency of the situation. One resident in a large residential development on the north west side of Columbus in the Dublin School District reported in reference to the termination of the moratorium:

We were told (by the local realtor) it would be years before they (legislators) did anything about it (Columbus Dispatch, 8/14/85, NW31).

Around that time, a new bill was introduced in the Ohio House by Representative Beatty (Democrat) of Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 8/14/85, NW31). This bill required the freezing of existing school district boundaries.

By the end of 1985, the issue of the annexation of suburban school district territory located in Columbus had once more become polarized between suburban and central-city interests. But whereas in 1980, the Columbus School Board had resolved to consider the annexation of the discrepant areas, no such resolution had been forthcoming in 1985. If anything the School Board opposed such a move, and Jim Ebright had been alone in his efforts to force the issue. For Ebright and activists in the Apple Alliance, the prospect of a schools desegregation suit at the metropolitan scale had become a real possibility, given the intransigence of the Columbus School Board and the depth of resistance from suburban residents, officials and their representatives in the Ohio House and Senate. One month after Ebright resigned from the School Board - apparently for personal reasons - he claimed:

If this (annexation) problem ends up with desegregation litigation, the plaintiffs won't go for a partial solution, they'll go for complete abolition of suburban school districts (Columbus Dispatch, 10/5/85, 10A).

A Franklin County School District was therefore one possible, future, metropolitan state territorial structure which was seriously being considered at the height of the schools annexation controversy. That solution had been considered before, however, in
the 1960s when the Columbus School Board had been pushing to annex tax-rich commercial and industrial property, removing tax base from suburban local governments (Columbus Dispatch, 7/31/66, 31A). But the schools desegregation issue made the prospect of a county school system more likely in the 1980s.

1986 witnessed an interesting shift in the direction of the controversy. Suburban school district officials had begun to feel that, with the involvement of parents, the controversy had 'got out of hand'. Whereas CLASS had retained its 'low key' stance, parents of school-aged children continued to express concern. On the one hand, CLASS seemed willing to come to a cooperative arrangement:

We hope that cooperation between the school districts could be achieved that would allow the city (school) system growth and, at the same time, cause no educational upheaval for students or erosion of the tax base in the suburbs (Columbus Dispatch, 2/14/86, 3D).

On the other hand, the threat of busing loomed large in the minds of mothers in suburban school districts:

The schools were the reason for moving here. It is my right to decide where my children are going to school (Columbus Dispatch, 2/5/86, NE1).

And:

I work full time and I don't want my child bused across town. I want to be actively involved in the school (Columbus Dispatch, 2/5/86, NE1).

Through their individual school district organizations, such as ROTA, parents and residents continued to put pressure on their representatives in the House and Senate. For example, Senator Watts (Republican) introduced SB298 which, complementing HB586 in 1985, would have given residents in the affected areas the right to vote on annexations (Columbus Dispatch, 2/6/86, 4D).

Because of the heightened emotions aroused by the schools annexation issue, superintendents of suburban school districts proposed a negotiated solution. The idea was
to depoliticize the issue by taking it out of the public arena and conducting 'professional' negotiations. To that end, schools officials agreed to invite in an impartial negotiator to monitor the proceedings. The person chosen was sociologist Irving Goldaber who was described as 'an expert in riot control, hostage negotiations and labor disputes' (Columbus Dispatch, 2/7/86, 1D). Goldaber had a reputation for generating so-called 'win-win' solutions to problems such that all parties stood to gain from a negotiated compromise. Goldaber was invited to Columbus in April 1986, and was offered $20,000 for his services.

The schools superintendents entered into private negotiations in April. All 14 affected suburban school districts were involved, together with Columbus Schools. In May, 1986, a compromise was reached and shortly thereafter 'win-win' was signed by respective school boards (Columbus Dispatch, 5/16/86, 1A). The major points of this 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement, or 'win-win', were as follows:

- there would be no retroactive annexation of the discrepant areas by the Columbus School Board
- all future schools annexations would be linked to municipal annexations such that, for example, if land were annexed to the City of Columbus it would automatically be transferred to the Columbus School District
- past land transfer agreements between respective school districts would be honored
- tax revenues from future non-residential developments in suburban school districts in the City of Columbus would be split 50/50 between respective school districts and Columbus schools

At the same time as 'win-win' was being negotiated, several bills were being debated in the Ohio House and Senate which had a bearing on the agreement. HB904 introduced by representatives Conley and Stinziano of Columbus called for the sharing of revenues between districts and the elimination of the State Board of Education's
powers to determine school district annexations. By contrast SB298, sponsored by representative Watts, called for such annexations to be contingent upon voter approval. Both bills were sent to the House Senate Conference Committee where a compromise was hammered out (Columbus Dispatch, 5/22/86, 1A). This compromise, the terms of which were similar to win-win, was signed into law by the Governor in June.

The Columbus Dispatch praised the final agreement as an 'equitable solution':

The school districts of Franklin County have a workable, equitable annexation policy—thanks to the diligence and cooperative efforts of the county's schools superintendents, school boards and legislatures. We believe the annexation agreement embodies the goal that all those involved kept in mind: the academic and economic stability of the Franklin County school districts (Columbus Dispatch, 5/22/86: 14A).

Discussion

While the metropolitan newspaper felt moved to praise the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement as 'equitable and workable', not all parties to the agreement stood as winners. Indeed, the schools annexation controversy raises a variety of important issues regarding the roles of different locally dependent interests in shaping the outcome to the controversy.

The first issue concerns the activities of suburban school district officials. One strategy they adopted in 1986 which stood in contrast to the 1980 controversy was their attempts to depoliticize the issue by removing negotiations over school district boundaries from public view. This was regarded as a necessary step to impose a degree of 'rationality' onto a controversy which, because of the fears of suburban school district parents and residents, had become emotionally-charged. While in the
1980s suburban school district officials had actively solicited the support of parents and residents, in 1986 they strove to channel this vocal opposition in directions which were less likely to kindle an emotional outcry. According to Jim Ebright:

Suburban school district superintendents actually induced the formation of CLASS - it was a bureaucracy-led issue. They got the PTA's volunteers to form the group. The superintendents grew to hate it, according to Jim Hyre (Columbus Schools Superintendent), when it gained an energy of its own and grew, became uncontrollable. The parents reached a point when they'd stand at the schoolhouse door, lay down in front of school buses. The bureaucrats lost control of it. On their part, it was a cold, rational calculation. When parents were involved, it became an emotional issue. (The) bureaucrats (originally) just wanted someone behind them (Ebright, 1989, parentheses added).

The schools annexation controversy thus reveals a fascinating difference in the interests of locally dependent members of civil society compared to those of professional employees within the local state apparatus.

Other locally dependent interests that emerge as critical in this controversy were builder-developers and realtors. It is difficult to provide concrete evidence as to their exact roles. But there is no doubt that realtors and builder-developers were in favor of a compromise solution to the schools annexation problem. At the same time, they tried to avoid being implicated in the conflict by adopting a 'hands-off' stance.

In March 1986, the executive director of the Building Industry Association (BIA) of Central Ohio suggested that residential development in Columbus would 'screech to a halt' if the school board were allowed to annex land in suburban school district territory (Columbus Dispatch, 3/20/86, 2C). The BIA came out in favor of HB904 which advocated the freezing of existing school district boundaries. There is other evidence that realtors and builder-developers were actively pushing for passage of this compromise legislation.
Analysis of the campaign expenditure reports of candidates who took an active stance on the schools annexation issue indicates the roles of realtor and builder-developer groups in the controversy. Throughout the 1980s, these groups operated Political Action Committees which gave campaign contributions to candidates in election years. Table 9 shows the campaign contributions of two such PACs and the candidates to whom they donated funds. Tellingly, the Realtors PAC (which represents the Boards of Realtors for Columbus and other major Ohio cities) contributed in substantial terms to the candidates that pushed through compromise legislation. Representatives Beatty and Conley in particular received large contributions. The BIA PAC (Builders PAC) also tended to favor candidates who did not speak in favor of the annexation of suburban school district territory in Columbus. This constitutes sufficient evidence that realtors and builder-developers took more than a ‘hands-off’ stance on the schools annexation issue.

An explanation for the role of builder-developers and realtors in the conflict would draw attention to the nature of their local dependence. For realtors, accumulation depends upon finding a market in housing which is stable and predictable over the short to medium term. Annexation of the discrepant areas, however, would have projected uncertainty onto the Columbus housing market, particularly in the discrepant areas, and panic-selling might have resulted. This would explain the efforts of realtors whose ‘territories of interest’ coincided with the discrepant areas to downplay the intensity of the conflict, while at the same time supporting legislation which would have brought stability to the localized market in housing. For their part, builder-developers had invested in land and buildings, and the amortization of their investments depended on the capacity and willingness of people to buy into property at a given market rate. For these locally dependent interests, annexation was perceived to
TABLE 9: Campaign contributions of Realtors PAC and Build Pac in election years, 1984 and 1986 ($) Source: Franklin County Board of Elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidson</td>
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<td>Miller</td>
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<td>Deshler</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schwarzwalder</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stinziano</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R=Realtors Pac   B=Build Pac   +Sponsor of HB904
have the effect of lowering future rates of return on their investments. According to the Executive Director of the BIA:

There is no demand amongst new home buyers to live in the Columbus school district (Columbus Dispatch, 3/20/86, 2C).

Members of the Apple Alliance objected to the claims of the BIA arguing that there was no market because developers largely did not build in the Columbus School district. And when they did, homes were not advertised as being in the Columbus school district. By contrast, subdivisions in suburban school districts were advertised as being proximate to suburban schools (Columbus Dispatch, 3/20/86, 2C).

The developers' support for compromise legislation might therefore be attributed to the fact that they had profited from white flight to suburban school districts in Columbus during the 1970s. A measure of this can be gauged from the fact that, whereas building permits issued for new single family housing in the City of Columbus grew steadily throughout the 1970s (allowing for cyclical trends in the wider space economy), only one residential subdivision was reported to have been built in the Columbus school district after 1976. In 1985, there were 1,825 single family building permits issued in Columbus. But of these, only 18 involved new homes built in the Columbus school district (Columbus Dispatch, 3/20/86, 2C). This provides some indication of the extent to which builder-developers had invested in territories within the City of Columbus but in suburban school districts. This would account for their interest in pushing through compromise legislation on the schools annexation issue.

But rather than interpreting the conflict in racial or even class (income-related) terms, the developers projected their own understanding on the annexation issue. Because of the nature of their investments in the affected territories, this interpretation assumed a highly territorialized form:
People won't pay $100,000 plus to live in the City of Columbus. If you allow unrestricted annexation, growth in the suburbs will be astronomical (Columbus Dispatch, 3/20/86, 2C).

The implication was that developers would in the future invest in suburban municipalities rather than in areas annexed to Columbus. In the short run, however, this seems hardly plausible given that builder-developers had already committed substantial resources to suburban school districts in Columbus. Massive disinvestment from the discrepant areas would have cut heavily into firms' profits.

Pro-annexation groups such as the Apple Alliance argued that, given the terms of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement, the Columbus School Board had capitulated to suburban interests. By gambling with the future, the Columbus school board had given up their claims to territories which were already developed. But there could be no guarantee that, even if the City of Columbus continued to annex unincorporated areas and those areas ended up in the school district, residential development would occur. According to Martha Crossan of the Apple Alliance:

Builders and developers have made it painfully and publicly clear there will be no residential development in the Columbus school district, now or in the future... So we won't get any students there to speak of and, for all practical purposes, there won't be much land annexed anyway (Columbus Dispatch, 5/21/86, A1).

This raises the question of why the Columbus School Board was so ready to back down from its intentions to annex the discrepant areas (as evidenced in the decision to reopen the issue in 1980). In addressing this question, three conditions stand out as important: the composition of pro-annexation forces; the membership of the school board; and the role of other business coalitions representative of firms locally dependent on the Columbus economy.
First, the particular composition of pro-annexation forces suggests that insufficient pressure came to bear on elected officials at the height of the controversy. Such pressure might have produced an outcome more favorable to the Columbus school district and interests therein. Although they provided support for the Apple Alliance, the lack of concerted and prolonged pressure on the School Board from the black community appears to be critical in this regard.

Clearly, the annexation controversy raised the specter of another schools desegregation suit. But rather than just the Columbus school district being party to segregation, all school districts in Franklin County were implicated under the terms of the 1986 Annexation Agreement. Effectively this agreement was an endorsement of *de facto* segregation at the metropolitan scale: without the annexation of the discrepant areas, Columbus schools were indeed likely to remain poor and substantially black.

At the same time, however, it was becoming increasingly apparent to the black community in Columbus that busing was not necessarily going to address adequately the educational needs of the black community. Indeed, there was a growing sentiment that busing had hindered rather than helped the educational progress of black children enrolled in the Columbus School District. Indeed:

> The black community has paid the brunt of it (busing) because the black community were not equipped to deal with it and were not prepared to address the effects of it. Blacks would be wary of a metropolitan desegregation suit. Not so much to do with busing but because of the effects of desegregation... (the) black community's role in addressing the role of education has to change (Evans, 1989, parentheses added).

Their fear that a metropolitan-wide busing program might in the future be implemented would partly explain why the black community was reluctant to support the Columbus School Board in the annexation of the discrepant areas.
Moreover, so long as busing continued to be the major method of desegregation within the Columbus School District, there was little incentive for the black community to push for schools annexation. While annexation may have meant increased tax revenues for Columbus schools, there was nothing to prevent further 'white flight' from newly annexed areas and, in any case, developers had already demonstrated an extreme reluctance to build in the Columbus School District, suggesting that the fiscal gains to Columbus schools in the long run may have been minimal. Thus, even though there was the possibility of a county- or metropolitan-wide schools desegregation suit, the black community in Columbus was not prepared to press issue and file such a suit. On the one hand, similar suits in cities such as Detroit had proven unsuccessful. On the other hand, the black community could expect strong resistance to such a suit from lawyers representing the predominantly white suburban school districts and it was not prepared to commit its resources to a long-drawn out legal battle (Evans, 1989).

Second, the reluctance - even extreme reluctance - of the Columbus School Board to push the issue of the annexation of the discrepant areas needs to be explained. And this relates to the third condition: the role of other locally dependent business interests in the Columbus metropolitan area. In early 1985, members of the Columbus School Board were already expressing a reluctance to consider the annexation of the discrepant areas. But with the prospect of a negotiated settlement in 1986, they adopted a more hardline stance before entering the negotiations. Presumably this was

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31 In interviewing several people involved in the schools annexation controversy, I suggested that the long-term impact of 'white flight' would be a central-city school district in which the black population would have a greater chance of electing their own School Board representatives. It was generally felt by the respondents, however, that given the limited fiscal resources available within the school district there would be few long-term benefits to be derived from black control of a economically-impoverished central-city school district.
a strategy designed to give them a strong bargaining position.

But in agreeing to the terms of the 1986 Annexation Agreement, the School Board gave up any prospect of matching municipal and school district boundaries. Moreover, they showed their willingness to let developers rather than local governments dictate the location of residential development and hence the resources of school districts. This willingness might be explained by the membership of the School Board and their empathy for the interests of the Columbus business community. For example, in 1982, there had been an attempt by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce to raise the 'quality' of the school system. Members of the Chamber approached both chairmen of the Franklin County Democratic and Republican Parties with a view to selecting candidates for the School Board. This was at a time when the Columbus Chamber of Commerce was vigorously selling the attractiveness of the metropolitan economy through its 'Columbus, we’re making it great' campaign. Later, in 1986, the Chamber of Commerce endorsed a slate of candidates for election to the Board of Election who would be less likely to open up the issue of schools annexation (Ebright, 1988).

There can be no doubt that the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement raised concerns in the minds of City Council, the City Administration of Columbus, and representatives of the Columbus firms dependent on the metropolitan economy about the prospects for the future growth of the City of Columbus. These concerns were expressed in terms of the relationship between future local economic development and the territorial growth of the City of Columbus. Council President Jerry Hammond argued:

Obviously the plan will have an impact on growth. (The) City must decide if it will be supportive of the schools and leverage its water/sewer services to force developers to go pro-Columbus. Or go for its own development and be supportive of the schools (Columbus Dispatch, 5/27/86, C1).
Harrison Smith, the attorney involved in annexation proceedings since the 1950s, suggested:

There will be no annexation of single-family development—I think the plan substantially limits the growth of the City of Columbus. And the agreement is not in the best interests of the City. It doesn't accomplish anything in terms of the student racial equation. There is nothing wrong with the Columbus schools. Developers and builders would do anything to make it different (Columbus Dispatch, 5/27/86, C1).

INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION, SCHOOLS AND RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT: FRAGMENTATION IN THE METROPOLIS

Introduction

In April 1987, a series of land purchases in the north east of Franklin County between the Village of New Albany and the City of Gahanna (Figure 6) caught the attention of the local and metropolitan-wide media. These land purchases, totalling some 2.5 square miles by July 1987, were linked into plans by a consortium of developers to create a large 'upscale' development. Although there was some commercial property planned, the development was to be mainly residential, consisting of 'homes for executives' in the range of $125,000 to $1 million (Columbus Dispatch, 11/13/87, C1). The land purchases in fact began in 1986 and continued on a piecemeal basis throughout 1987 (Columbus Dispatch, 6/14/87, 7A). The developers created several different land purchasing companies and these purchased tracts from local residents and farmers, offering prices up to four times 1984 land valuations. By April 1987, it had become clear that the land sales were all connected to the one proposed development.
FIGURE 6: The location of Wexley.
Moreover, it was apparent by November 1987 that the project had been planned, and was to be developed, on a scale larger than any previous residential development in Central Ohio. Covering some 4,000 acres, the development was to consist of a series of small villages supposedly modeled on those of the Cotswolds region of England, each linked by a series of horse trails and paths, surrounded by green spaces and small lakes (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 3/2/88, 1). Complementing the 'equestrian and water' theme was a large golf course to be designed by Jack Nicklaus and the establishment of a Country Club for hunting. Nicklaus already had strong ties to Columbus and Franklin County, having attended The Ohio State University and because of the Muirfield development and golf course which he had designed in the northwest part of Franklin County. The involvement of Jack Nicklaus signified the intention of the developers to create a plan which would hopefully have widespread approval within Franklin County and Columbus because of the golfer's local, national and even international reputation; indeed the intention was to create a development which would match and even surpass Muirfield in quality.

The development was dubbed 'Wexley' by the local media because of the involvement of one of the principal partners in the development, Leslie Wexner, who happened to come from the wealthy suburb of Bexley, located on the east side of Columbus. The other partner, Jack Kessler, was a developer who also had close links to Columbus and Franklin County. Besides the Wexley project, Kessler had been involved in developing a large new retail shopping center known as Capital South located in the Central Business District.

Leslie Wexner's ties to Columbus and Franklin County were extensive. Wexner was (and is) President and Chief Executive Officer for a large retail clothing
company called the Limited, headquartered in Columbus, and with retail outlet and warehouse facilities throughout the metropolitan area and the United States. Wexner also had substantive interests in the northeast part of Franklin County (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 6/17/87, 1). Besides the company headquarters and a warehouse facility located within three miles of Wexley, Limited officials had actively intervened in planning the future growth of the area. For example, they were involved in promoting the construction of an interchange linking the company facilities to the I-270 outerbelt freeway surrounding Columbus. And both Wexner and Kessler (the latter being on the executive committee for the Limited directors) were involved in planning the development of I-670, a freeway linking downtown Columbus to the east and northeast portions of the city and county, as well as the municipal airport on the east side of the city.

Besides the local connections, Wexley was a project which required considerable outside investment. Amongst the 'non-local' interests were the Sasaki Company of Massachusetts which had been involved in planning similar large scale developments around the country such as at Sea Pines on Hilton Head Island and the Boston Waterfront. Wexner also received support from other national planning and architectural firms, including Elizabeth Plater Zirbeck of Florida, and Harvard Dean of Architecture and Planning, Gerald McCue. The firm of Bohm-NBBJ supplied additional 'local' material support (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 3/2/88, 1). The Wexley interests also received material support from the Huntington National Bank of Columbus, which was reported to have extended $25 million in credit to the project (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 10/14/87, 3). The Wexley development, therefore, involved a loose coalition of 'local' and 'non-local' interests.
No sooner had the Wexley development been 'officially announced' by the developers towards the end of 1987 when it precipitated a major conflict. This conflict centered on the provision of water and sewer services for the development. While the quasi-monopoly of services by the City of Columbus made it the obvious choice as provider, the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement meant that the provision of water and sewer was coupled with education. If the development was to be serviced by the City of Columbus, and if it were annexed to the central city as a result, then it also had to be annexed to the Columbus School District.

This was a scenario the developers were reluctant to deal with. The basis for their reluctance lay in the existence of busing for racial balance in the Columbus School system. Investment in a large upscale residential development such as Wexley constituted a risk worthwhile only if purchasers for the houses could be secured. To that end, Columbus Schools were not regarded as a desirable option. It was estimated that there existed a 20% difference in the value of property in suburban school districts over and above that of property located in the central-city school system. It is fair to say, the developers were reacting to a popular perception that the market at which they were pitching their development would be reluctant to buy into the central-city school system.

For the City of Columbus and the Columbus School District, annexation of Wexley was regarded in highly positive terms, though for different reasons. For the City, there was the issue of maintaining its annexation policy and a competitive advantage over suburban municipalities. For the School Board, Wexley was the first test of the 1986 annexation agreement in which future municipal annexations would go hand-in-hand with school district annexations. And it was also an opportunity to gain tax
revenues from the high value properties. But the possibility of annexation to Columbus posed a threat to suburban and township residents and officials. The school district within which the Wexley land was located, Plain Local Schools, had much to lose through annexation to Columbus, and much to gain in the event Wexley property were included in its school system.

Wexley precipitated the formation of a variety of coalitions and counter-coalitions. As the conflict developed, each coalition adopted a variety of strategies in anticipation of the activities of other coalitions. Instrumental in these activities were the developers and their lawyers, suburban and township officials and residents, central city interests including the Columbus Council and City Administration, the Columbus School Board, and a variety of schools interest groups. The tactics adopted by the developers and the Columbus City administration were particularly noteworthy. Wexley served to bring together issues of production and consumption in a struggle over state territorial structures in the metropolitan area.

Coalitions and strategies

The developers hired the local law firm of Smith and Hale to handle the negotiations between the various local governments over the provision of services and education to the development (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 6/17/87, 1). Harrison Smith was an attorney who had been involved in annexation proceedings in Franklin County since the 1950s. It is likely he was hired on the basis of his knowledge of the machinery of local government and his familiarity with the principal officials involved. Indeed his firm specialized in annexation and zoning issues. Both Smith and Hale were quite at ease with this particular development on account of their involvement in the Muirfield
development during the 1970s. It is likely, then, that the lawyers were hired because of the nature of their local dependence. They also solicited the help of two other lawyers Greg Lashutka and Chan Cochran, both of whom had done work in the past for the City of Columbus. Thus very early on in the process, the developers had forged alliances with key individuals who, by virtue of their knowledge and contacts, could handle the complex negotiations involved.

The lawyers approached Columbus City officials early on in 1987 with a view to securing water and sewer services for the development (Rock Fork Enterprise, 6/24/87, 1). It appeared at that point that the developers wished to take advantage of an anomaly in Columbus’s annexation policy. In April 1973, the City of Columbus had entered into two 20-year contracts with the County to service Plain Township (Columbus Dispatch, 11/11/87, D1). This included an area covering most of what subsequently became the Wexley development. These were the only two contracts Columbus had with the County, the remainder being standard suburban service contracts. The County sewer service contracts had been signed in anticipation of Columbus securing federal monies for sewer service expansion to New Albany (Columbus Dispatch, 11/6/87, 10C). During the 1970s, the US EPA had insisted on the integration of most of the developed parts of the metropolitan area into the Columbus water supply and management system (City of Columbus, 1980). The aim was to eliminate sources of pollution across the county in exchange for grants for infrastructure expansion. For the developers, the existence of these contracts was clearly advantageous. Columbus had a legal obligation to service the Wexley area with water and sewer. But those services could be provided without the development having to be annexed to the central city, and hence the Columbus School District.
In August 1987, however, the City of Columbus took steps to cancel the service contracts with the county (Rock Fork Enterprise, 9/16/87, 1). In exchange for cancelling the contracts, the City of Columbus agreed to take over the operation of twenty small package sewer treatment plants the county had been managing on behalf of developers in unincorporated areas. This move was consistent with an agreement reached between the federal government, the county and the city in 1980 wherein it was determined Columbus would be the major service provider for the County (City of Columbus, 1980). With the cancellation of the contract, Columbus no longer had a legal obligation to service the Wexley area, although Columbus Mayor Dana 'Buck' Rinehart suggested otherwise shortly afterwards. Moreover, residents and officials of Plain Township and New Albany saw their chances of securing water and sewer without the threat of annexation to Columbus seriously jeopardized by this action.

Cancellation of the contracts appeared to be a course of action the City of Columbus pursued without the knowledge of either the developers or the other implicated parties. But there can be no doubt that the developers' lawyers were aware of the prior existence of the contracts. For example, the Rocky Fork Enterprise (9/16/87, 1) reported that Ben Hale was the attorney hired by the County Commissioners to obtain easements for the sewer extensions to New Albany in the early 1970s. Thus, given their close relationships with Columbus officials, it is difficult to understand why the developers' lawyers failed to prevent cancellation of the contracts. Indeed, when the contracts were cancelled the lawyers were reported to be dismayed (Rock Fork Enterprise, 9/16/87, 1). Moreover, Plain Township officials were made aware of the contracts at a meeting with the Franklin County Commissioners in May of 1987. One of the Commissioners, Jack Foulk, had been anonymously mailed a copy of one of the contracts in March 1987, a month before Wexley became newspaper headlines.
For Plain Township officials, the contracts were security against the possible threat of annexation to Columbus and their cancellation was a serious blow to their prospects of avoiding the loss of taxable land and school enrollments to the territorial expansion of Columbus. Plain Township Trustee Henry Reeb accused the county of 'not trying to protect the townships at all' (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 9/16/87, 2) But the same could have been said for the entire history of Columbus's annexation policy.

For the Columbus City Administration, however, the existence of the contracts posed problems. The contract areas had been drawn in such a way that, should the entire area be annexed to the Village of New Albany, the potential for Columbus's growth to the north and east would have been compromised. For example, there would have been no room for Columbus to continue its past policies of maintaining 'growth corridors' contiguous to suburban service contract areas. Noting that in terms of its development prospects the area was 'on fire' and that Columbus wanted to capture some of the action, Columbus Development Director Ray Lorello summarized the administration's position:

We will continue to maintain corridors and the ability to go out and surround the suburbs. It allows a major city like Columbus to continue to capture some economic growth, and it still allows compatibility with the suburbs (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 7/1/87, 1).

The relationships between the territorially-defined interests of the City and the dynamics of the wider space economy therefore continued to play a determinant role in the Administration's decision to cancel the contracts. From the Administration's point of view, the cancellation of the contracts with the county reaffirmed its intention to pursue the annexation policy. In addition, it presented at least a gesture on the part of the City to the School Board that it was prepared to consider annexation
of all of Wexley. This would have been consistent with preserving the 'spirit' of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement (Columbus Dispatch, 11/5/87, Bl).

In their original plans, it seems the developers had no intention of annexing the development to Columbus, let alone allowing for a corridor. With the cancellation of the contract, however, the growth corridor became an important bargaining-chip between Columbus and the developers. Thus in negotiating for water and sewer from the city, the developers made a concession on the issue of a corridor. And as one of the chief ideologues of Columbus's annexation policy, Harrison Smith no doubt saw the rationale in such a compromise. The developers' aims were to avoid conflict at all costs in case it jeopardized their plans. Harrison Smith captured their attitude succinctly:

"We want to avoid land wars between the jurisdictions. We are doing something that requires everyone's cooperation" (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 7/1/87, 1).

As the conflict over the location of Wexley continued, the developers continued to make overtures to Columbus so as to minimize the potential for political fallout if their true intentions were made public. Jack Kessler, for example, was reported to have promised Mayor Rinehart that the entire development would be annexed to Columbus (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 11/8/87, 1A). This promise appeared to conflict with an earlier position expressed by Harrison Smith that it had never been the developers' intention to annex any of the development to Columbus. In the event, most of the development remained outside the municipal limits of Columbus.

It was clear, however, that the developers' overtures to Columbus reflected their dependence on the City for the necessary infrastructures to commence the project. There were few viable alternatives to Columbus's water and sewer supplies. The Delco Water Company of Delaware County to the North provided one possible option.
But that would have necessitated permission from respective County Commissioners to extend pipes and water lines across county borders. Given a history of antagonistic relations between the City of Columbus and the County of Delaware, this was not considered a feasible option. Another strategy would have been for the developers to construct their own water and sewer system; but the costs involved would have been prohibitive. Moreover, private wells and septic tanks were regarded as unsatisfactory for the sort of upscale development entailed by the Wexley project (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/27/88, 1).

With no feasible alternatives, the developers looked to the City of Columbus to subsidize the major fixed investments in water and sewer. Because of the cancellation of the contract with the county, the most attractive option from the developers' point of view was to put pressure on Columbus to negotiate a standard suburban service contract with the Village of New Albany (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 10/21/87, 1). This would have avoided the possibility of annexation to Columbus and the city school system. To that end, the developers even offered to subsidize the Plain Local School System which had suffered financially throughout the 1980s because of declining enrollments and failed bond issue campaigns.

The developers were not the only ones worried about water and sewer services in this part of Franklin County. When the Wexley land purchases became public, Jefferson Township officials woke up to the reality that development was immanent. Located to the south of Plain Township and to the east of Gahanna, Jefferson

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32 Part of that antagonism can be explained by the fact that the largest reservoirs Columbus had built to supplement its water supply were located in Delaware County. In the case of the Alum Creek reservoir, this was a source of much acrimony between the City and Delaware County Commissioners because, in order to construct the reservoir, Columbus caused the removal of a large area of land from the Delaware County tax duplicate.
Township lay on prime land which, if developed, would end up in contiguous municipalities if action were not taken by township officials. Indeed, three annexation petitions involving township territory had already been filed by June 1987, including a 161.5 acre proposed development to be annexed to Columbus (Rocky Fork Enterprise 8/5/87, 1).

In July, Jefferson Township officials began to explore the possibility of forming their own water and sewer district (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 7/8/87, 8). The aims of this strategy were broadly twofold. First and foremost, the district would have allowed township officials to service any new developments within their jurisdiction, thus avoiding the loss of land and tax base to Columbus and suburban municipalities. Second, the district offered an opportunity for the Jefferson officials to explore the idea of servicing some of the Wexley development, in particular a 450 acre tract that was earmarked to be annexed to the City of Gahanna. To that end, they solicited support from the Wexley developers, who eventually donated $25,000 towards start-up costs of the district. To what extent the developers were serious in their intentions to use Jefferson Township supplies is difficult to tell. This may have constituted another strategy to pressure Columbus into a contract with New Albany. For the developers, according to Ben Hale, cheap and readily-available infrastructures were the main priority:

All the group wants is reliable, cost effective and timely services. And we'll go where we can get it. We've had a number of contacts with the Jefferson trustees (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 11/18/87, 2).

Besides the Wexley interests, Jefferson Township officials were supported in their efforts to form a water and sewer district by local property owners, some 200 of whom responded favorably to the idea in a survey conducted by the officials in
August (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/12/87, 1). In order to get the district organized, under State law township officials had to petition the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. In December 1987, a Franklin County Common Pleas judge approved the establishment of the Jefferson Township water and sewer district and with apparently little opposition from the county or Columbus officials (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 12/30/87, 1). This paved the way for the trustees to appoint a 5-member board to oversee the district (under State law, it had to operate as an independent authority). The board then explored ways of raising the estimated $4.5 million in start-up costs. In addition to the initial tap-in fees board members requested from property owners and developers, a $2.5 million bond issue was proposed (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 12/30/87, 2). The board also looked into the possibility of securing grants from federal and State authorities. With the Jefferson Township water and sewer district in place by the end of 1987, yet another territorially-defined interest was competing for a stake in the development of Wexley.

By November 1987, the contours of the Wexley conflict had been outlined, the major protagonists had staked out their positions and the battlegrounds had been established. But it was only then that the real battle began. This battle was sparked by a resolution passed by the Columbus City School Board that the entire development should be annexed to the City of Columbus. Once the position of the School Board on Wexley became clear, the conflict intensified. Moreover, the connections between Wexley and the conditions of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement now became apparent and were reflected in the positions taken by the major protagonists.
The resolution of the Columbus School Board to annex Wexley

Up until November, the Columbus School Board had not made public their stance on Wexley, despite the fact that the issue had been brewing for several months. Wexley was the first major test of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement. That agreement stipulated that in future as Columbus annexed territory the City School District would expand in concert with the municipality. The Wexley development presented the City and the School Board the first opportunity to annex territory since the signing of the agreement. But it was also clear that the City Administration and the School Board were not in unison over this particular issue.

On the one hand, the cancellation of the contract with the County could be interpreted as a gesture on the part of the City that it might be prepared to push for annexation of the development. On the other hand, the cancellation of the contract brought the School Board into the controversy. With the cancellation of the contract, the door was open to the School Board to push for the annexation of all of Wexley. And it had every right to suppose that the City administration and the Council would support it, given the spirit if not the terms of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement.

Thus in late October, the School Board convened a private meeting and passed a resolution to pressure the City to annex all of Wexley (Columbus Dispatch, 11/1/87, 1B). At this early juncture, there seemed to be some consensus amongst School Board members on this issue. School Board Vice-President Robert J. Weller suggested the School Board would 'fight like hell' to ensure the 1986 Agreement would not come undone (Columbus Dispatch, 11/5/87, B-1). He later added, Columbus would become 'poorer and blacker' if the area were not annexed (Columbus Dispatch, 11/8/87, 1A).
Weller clearly saw this as a major test of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement. His attitude was echoed by Richard Fahey, also on the Board of Education:

This is a point of principle which goes to the heart of the 1986 Annexation Agreement (Columbus Dispatch, 11/5/87, B1).

The Columbus School Board strove to secure an ally on their hardline stance from Columbus City Council. School Board member Loretta Heard was quick to point out that the Columbus City Council and the School Board had a verbal agreement in 1986 that the city would continue to annex property in surrounding townships so the city would grow:

They very definitely said they would support and honor that agreement (Columbus Dispatch, 11/18/87, 4E).

In July 1987 City Council had even passed a resolution to that effect.

Members of City Council and City Administration, however, were not so willing to support the School Board. In fact, the resolution of the School Board to insist on the annexation of all of Wexley took a variety of people and interest groups by surprise. Furthermore, it provoked substantial acrimony because officials were suddenly forced into compromising positions on the issue as to whether or not the development should be annexed to the City. Thus throughout November and December, the newspapers reported a variety of contradictory positions adopted by members of the City Administration, the City Council and the School Board. For example, in statements made to the press, Mayor Rinehart continued to assert the primacy of the annexation

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33 Later on, Weiler's vocal stance on the Wexley issue became muted when it was discovered he had sold $4.4 million in land to the Wexley interests. As a major property owner and developer in parts of Franklin County outside Columbus corporation limits, Weiler's position on the Wexley issue was highly contradictory. Indeed some of the land he owned lay in those areas of Plain Township which were protected from annexation to Columbus under the terms of the 1986 Annexation Agreement (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/27/88, 1).
policy:

The City should stick to its longstanding policy of requiring annexation before extending water and sewer lines (Columbus Dispatch 11/8/87, 1A).

Other officials were quick to point out that such statements misrepresented the terms of the annexation policy. In a position paper on the Wexley issue, councillor M.D. Portman (who had been on Mayor Sensenbrenner's administration at the inception of the policy) noted that the 'freeze' on water and sewer extensions was a feature of the policy in the 1950s but not the 1980s (Portman, 1988). Columbus now entered into contracts with suburban local governments for water and sewer. Such contracts did not require annexation to Columbus, but they did restrict the abilities of suburban local governments to annex.

The developers were also not immune to contradictory statements, despite their efforts to calm the waters apparently stirred up by the School Board's resolution. On the one hand, Kessler and Wexner both claimed:

We want to annex as much land as possible to Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 11/8/87, 1A).

Yet on the other hand Ben Hale expressed concern about Columbus Schools:

There is no anti-Columbus bias...but we have to have concern about that school district (Columbus Dispatch, 11/8/87, 1A).

Above all else, however, the School Board's resolution posed in the minds of the developers a direct threat to their development. There was a real possibility the City would be forced into a position of having to annex the entire development.

And there was pressure to do just that, mounting from those central city interests that had been vocal in the Schools Annexation issue. This pressure came from the 600 member Metropolitan Area Church Board, the Columbus Education Association, Columbus Council of Parents and Teachers Associations and the schools lobbying.
group, the Apple Alliance. The Columbus PTA presented the City Council of Columbus with a petition signed by 300 Columbus residents which urged the City to support the School System in its stance on annexation. These groups also put pressure on one of the two black Democratic Councillors, Ben Espy, to introduce a resolution in council which would have required annexation of all of Wexley to the school district in exchange for providing water and sewer services.

Espy commanded quite widespread support from the local black community and from Columbus schools interest groups. Surprisingly, Ben Espy was initially supported by one Republican Councillor, Arlene Shoemaker, who also proposed that the City should take an aggressive annexation stance (Columbus Dispatch, 12/6/87, D1). The resolution was introduced at a council meeting in mid-December. But Council voted 6-1 to table the resolution (Columbus Dispatch, 1/22/87, B1).

The resolution was tabled in favor of awaiting the findings of a task force on the annexation of Wexley. This task force had been set up by Council President Jerry Hammond and Mayor Rinehart in late November in an effort to diffuse some of the hostility created by the original School Board resolution (The Columbus Booster, 12/2/87, 6). However, the task force was also established as a forum for investigating the possibility of a negotiated water and sewer service contract between the City of Columbus and the Village of New Albany. The task force consisted of representatives of all the major jurisdictions involved in the controversy: officials from the Columbus Administration, New Albany, Plain Township, Plain Local Schools and Columbus Schools. Both the developers and Columbus City Council were also represented.
Hammond and Rinehart were looking for a compromise on the Wexley issue. Hammond in particular expressed dismay at the School Board's hardline stance, arguing that it had jeopardized the future of not just the City school system but the future growth of the City as well. Hammond was clearly on the side of the developers. This was a fact that the Columbus Dispatch, owned by one of the oldest and most powerful families in Columbus - the Wolfes - was able to exploit. In December 1987, the newspaper ran a series of front-page stories linking Hammond directly to the developers. According to the newspaper, Wexner, Kessler, Smith and Hale had invested a total of $20,000 in a jazz club owned by Hammond which had just been opened near downtown Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 12/23/87, A1). When news of this was leaked to the press, the investments were withdrawn and given instead to the local Martin Luther King Community Center. Hammond was subsequently instrumental in getting the Espy resolution insisting upon the annexation of the entire development to Columbus defeated in council. In doing so, he claimed he had:

> Enough support from city council to give the developers what they want (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 11/25/87, 1).

And what the developers wanted was being negotiated by the task force: a contract to service New Albany and Plain Township with Columbus water and sewer services. This contract would have allowed the developers to secure Columbus's services and there would have been no necessity to petition to annex the Wexley development to the central city.
Opposition to the annexation of Wexley by Columbus

The School Board resolution prompted activity amongst other interests. Plain Township and Plain Local Schools officials in particular were spurred into more concerted action. At stake was the decimation of the township because of the possibility that Columbus would decide to annex not just Wexley but other parts of the township too. A member of Plain Local Schools Board of education responded to the resolution of the Columbus School Board in the following manner:

(The resolution) threatens the very existence of our local schools and we as a board of education must stand firm in preserving the longevity of our district (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 12/23/87, 2).

Other officials saw the broader implications of the resolution. Noting that property owners rather than School Boards determined the annexation process, one official suggested:

Well, they're not going to get it all. And their stance, if not quickly modified could start residents in suburbs all around the outerbelt moving to make sure the Columbus City School District ends up with nothing (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 12/23/87, 2).

At a meeting in early November, Plain Township and New Albany officials and residents conjoined to form a Civic Association. This 'informal' group also discussed the idea of forming a Community Improvement Corporation for the area (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 12/2/87, 10). Such a corporation would have allowed township and village officials to apply for State and federal loans and grants in the hope of developing their own water and sewer system should Columbus refuse to enter into a contract with New Albany. The CIC was a necessary first step since neither the Village of New Albany nor Plain Township had the fiscal capacity to develop their own systems. For example, New Albany's total annual budget amounted to only $80,000,
while throughout the 1980s the township had failed to have any tax increases passed by the electorate. Additionally, at the height of the Wexley controversy, the local newspapers featured several articles detailing the likely impact of the development on the local governments involved, in particular the costs of building schools, tax increases necessitated by development, and problems of congestion and unplanned growth (for example, Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/27/88, 8). The CIC was regarded as an important step in the efforts by local officials to plan for future development in their respective jurisdictions.

To what extent residents were as receptive to the idea of a Community Improvement Corporation for Plain Township and New Albany is difficult to determine. For example, only 50 residents showed up to the first meeting of the Civic Association. While many residents of Plain Township were not opposed to the Wexley development, they clearly regarded in negative terms the prospects of annexation to Columbus. Throughout the 1970s there had been a number of attempts by Columbus developers and the city to open up Plain Township to development (Walker, 1989). These efforts were vigorously resisted by township people who organized to gain control over zoning in the township from the County and even pushed to annex to New Albany, although this strategy came unstuck at election time. In the 1970s, then, urban development was perceived to be a threat. Local farmers, many of whose families had owned land in Plain Township for several generations, wished to preserve their 'agrarian way of life' (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/13/88, 1). But for a variety of reasons, not least of which was the aggressive land purchasing tactics of the Wexley developers, this older generation of farmers adopted a different stance in the 1980s. Many sold their properties and moved to neighboring townships.
In contrast to the older generation of residents, the younger generation were more receptive to the prospects of development. While Columbus lawyers tried to portray New Albany residents as backward, rustic and 'rugged individualists' - 'as long as their faucet turns on and their toilet flushes, they don't care' (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 11/11/87, 2) - residents themselves objected to such caricatures. In fact, and by contrast, local business people, in particular realtors, builders and insurance salespeople, saw prospects in the development for expanding their operations (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 4/20/88, 1). The greatest concerns expressed over the development, however, centered on schools and property values (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 4/27/88, 1). While the younger generation of residents were willing to accept the inevitability of development, the prospect of annexation to Columbus Schools was not regarded in favorable terms. The Rocky Fork Enterprise detailed the advantages of local control of schools from the perspective of one young mother, a member of the Plain Local Middle School PTA. These perceived advantages were:

- the children had greater choices over courses in a local school district.
- she could be close to her children, rather than having them bused several miles away to the nearest Columbus schools.
- transition between different levels in the school system was easier in the local rather than city school system (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 4/27/88, 1).

In addition to these schooling concerns, younger residents also noted that because they had already invested heavily in their own homes (for example, construction of septic tanks and wells), moving was a difficult option (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 4/13/88, 1). With property values rising because of the development prospects of the area, residents regarded holding onto their homes as a sound investment risk, unless the area ended up in Columbus Schools. In general terms, the development varied in its potential impact on local residents and their patterns of response were highly uneven as a result.
This was not the case for officials of Plain Township and New Albany. Plain Local Schools officials in particular took up the initiative and vigorously pushed for formation of a CIC. Jack Porter, Plain Local Schools superintendent, stood out as an active defender of the school district:

We are not going to sit idly by and see the dismantling of this school district. (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 11/18/87).

Porter claimed he and the developers were seeing 'eye to eye' over the water and sewer issue: specifically, the necessity of securing a contract between Columbus and New Albany. This would have allowed the township to annex to New Albany and Plain Local School District to remain, in consequence, intact. Moreover, the district stood to gain from the tax duplicate increases caused by the Wexley development. Porter claimed that the task force was ignoring his advice on the location of water and sewer district boundaries, hence his support for the CIC. Plain Township and New Albany officials at this juncture also contacted Jefferson Township officials with a view to developing a joint plan to create a water and sewer district which would compete with Columbus's plans for the Wexley area.

By the end of 1987, therefore, the conflict over the Wexley development had reached a zenith. At the heart of the conflict lay the issues of infrastructures and schools. On the one hand, Columbus School Board and central city activists had put pressure on City Council and the City Administration of Columbus to continue its annexation policy and honor the 1986 Schools annexation agreement by pushing for the annexation of Wexley, hence the continued territorial integration of the metropolitan area with respect to Columbus. On the other hand, the developers and suburban and rural township officials and residents strove to block the aggressive tactics of the Columbus School Board by exploring strategies that suggested a more marked
fragmentation of the metropolitan region. In doing so, the developers in particular forced the City of Columbus and City Council into an increasingly compromising position.

Developers and suburban officials promote a merger move

Up until November, the developers' strategy had been to work behind the scenes and manipulate public officials into positions that maximized their interests. Once the issue became highly politicized, however, the developers became more openly involved in the conflict. Their first more public action was to come up with a name for the development. The developers revealed plans for a 4,000 acre residential development to be named 'The Villages at Rocky Fork' (named after a small creek in that part of Plain Township) at a meeting of over 400 New Albany and Plain Township residents in mid-January (Rocky Fork Enterprise. 1/20/88, 9). Apparently, some of the developers and their representatives were disgruntled about the label 'Wexley' being attached to the development (Rocky Fork Enterprise. 11/18/87, 1); and no doubt the new name was designed to depersonalize the issue and draw the focus away from the direct involvement of Leslie Wexner. Basically, this was a public relations campaign designed to rekindle enthusiasm for a project which looked in serious danger of falling apart.

Indeed around the end of 1987, a sense of urgency could be detected amongst those most closely involved in planning the development. This urgency was reflected in the sense of frustration at the lack of progress in negotiations for a water and sewer contract between Columbus and New Albany, and the apparent intransigence of the Columbus School Board. But there were other considerations too.
For example, Wexner had just lost a considerable amount of money in the Stock Market Crash of October 1987. This alone probably caused him to rethink his ambitious plans to commit so much money to an area in which hitherto he had little experience: viz. residential development. Some of those interviewed a year later— at a time when the developers were submitting rezoning requests for the first stages of the development—observed a significant 'downgrading' in the 'quality' of the development (Walker, 1988). Rather than the 'homes for executives' and 'tract mansions' on large lots, the rezoning requests indicated smaller lot sizes and less expensive housing.

Moreover, the urgency of the developers can be attributed to the announcement of several competing developments in close proximity to Wexley. While these were not made public until March 1988, the developers probably were aware of prospects for competition in a part of Franklin County which was widely regarded to be 'on fire' in terms of development prospects (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 7/1/87, 1). Two developments in particular posed a competitive threat.

First, developers Thomas and William Schottenstein had paid $9 million to purchase 380 acres in Jefferson Township. The Schottensteins already had considerable investments in property in downtown Columbus and the suburb of Bexley (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 4/6/88, 2). They were also locally dependent in another sense: as owners of a large retail chain which was well established in Columbus, they represented the 'old money' of Columbus and occupied an elevated position in the Columbus power structure. Their plans to create a development in Jefferson Township with an 'equestrian and water' theme represented a direct challenge to the Wexley interests (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 4/6/88, 2). As one of the Schottensteins suggested:

In terms of Wexley, we're hardly impartial, but we think our location is far superior... We just view that the majority of the Wexner development is going to be some years behind us (Columbus Business First, 10/3/88, 1).
The Schottensteins planned to have housing in the range of $175,000 to $1 million and a golf course, whose front 9 holes would have a 'European and Scottish motif' while the back 9 would be 'American' in style.

The second development was also financed by a Columbus developer. Michael A. Dehlendorf took out options in early 1988 to purchase 377 acres in Jefferson Township. The Dahlendorf development was to include a country club and golf course, each costing $3.5 million to build, and homes in the range of $300,000 to $1 million (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 3/30/88, 2). Along with the Schottensteins, it was the intention of Dahlendorf to tap into the newly created Jefferson Township water and sewer district. The Jefferson Township Water and Sewer Board arranged for these developers to pay their tap-in fees in advance and to subsidize the construction of water lines (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 3/30/88, 2).

This activity on the part of rival developers posed a competitive threat to the Wexner interests. And the Schottensteins and Dahlendorf had an advantage since schools were not an issue in their developments. By uniting with Jefferson Township officials to create a competitive water and sewer system in the area, there was no prospect of having to annex to Columbus for services, or to the Columbus school system. Indeed, Columbus officials were alarmed to learn of the Jefferson Township system since prospects for annexation east of Gahanna were now threatened. This fact alone probably played a significant role in the attempts of Columbus officials to negotiate a growth corridor to the east in the water and sewer contract with New Albany. And the Wexley developers saw the speedy negotiation of such a contract as their major hope for getting their development quickly off the ground.
To that end, the developers adopted a more concerted strategy to force Columbus into negotiating a service contract. This strategy was to orchestrate a merger move between Plain Township and New Albany. If the merger had gone ahead, it would have effectively closed off any opportunity for Columbus to annex the Wexley development. Under State law, once a merger petition was approved by the electorate there could be no annexation in the territory concerned for three years thereafter. Moreover, such a merger move would have ended any chance of Plain Township territory being annexed to the Columbus School District. Thus it was the hope of the developers that the prospect of a merger between Plain Township and New Albany would precipitate efforts by the Columbus Administration to enter into an agreement with New Albany to service the Wexley development with water and sewer.

Ohio Law provided enabling legislation for mergers between villages, townships and municipalities. The first successful merger petition had been initiated in 1981 in northwestern Ohio. Since then there had been four other merger attempts in the State. The proposed merger between New Albany and Plain Township represented the second case in Central Ohio. Another merger move had already been initiated on the northwest part of Franklin County. This merger involved Washington Township and the City of Dublin. Whereas the Plain Township/New Albany merger was designed to secure infrastructures for developers, the Dublin/Washington Township merger was regarded to be a defensive measure in response to the threat of annexation of township and suburban school district territory by Columbus under the terms of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement. But the implications for the future growth of Columbus and its School system were the same in both cases: they threatened the further territorial expansion of the city in the northern part of Franklin County. Thus they were symptomatic of more intense fragmentation tendencies across the Columbus metropolitan area.
The merger move in northeast Franklin County was announced in January 1988 (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/13/88, 1). Although early on it was reported to have been the initiative of Plain Township and New Albany officials (Columbus Dispatch, 2/19/88, C1), it subsequently became apparent that the process was orchestrated by the lawyers representing the developers. Harrison Smith admitted as much at a meeting organized by members of the Plain Township and New Albany merger commission in August 1988 (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/10/88, 1). It transpired that the merger commission members had been selected at a private meeting in which the developers' lawyers Smith, Lashutka and Cochran were present.

Nonetheless there was a groundswell of support for the merger move from New Albany and Plain Township residents alike. Prompted by the rhetoric of such officials as Jack Porter and Civic Association President Bob Brandner, between 800 and 900 residents attended a meeting in early February to sign a petition to initiate the merger process (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 2/24/88, 1). This represented around 50% of the registered voters of New Albany and Plain Township, even though only 174 signatures (10% of the voters) were required to initiate the merger process. Since the ten merger commission members had already been 'appointed' by the lawyers, the voters were not offered the opportunity to select their own candidates, despite the extent of grassroots support for the merger move (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/10/88, 1).

Other events may have precipitated such widespread support for the merger. By late January (1988), it had become clear that the Task force established by Hammond and Rinehart was going to fail to meet its self-imposed deadline of the first week in February to come up with a 'compromise' on the water and sewer contract issue. Thus the possibility that the City would accede to the demands of the Columbus
School Board seemed very real. Indeed, New Albany and Plain Township officials expressed dissatisfaction at the lack of 'progress' on the part of the task force (Columbus Dispatch, 2/17/88, 5E).

As the task force's deadline approached, various central city interests took action to try to prevent Columbus from entering into a contract at all. The Apple Alliance led by Martha Crossen began collecting signatures from Columbus Schools parents to put the issue of a contract to a referendum in the following November (1988) elections. And the Columbus branch of the NAACP threatened a recall election for both Rinehart and Hammond if a contract offer was made (Columbus Dispatch, 3/3/88, 3D). While the referendum issue was treated seriously by officials, the recall drive was widely regarded to have been a token gesture which did not have widespread support in the black community (Moss, 1989). Task force member and Council President Jerry Hammond was openly hostile to the referendum proposal:

I would hope that everyone understood a referendum would mean no growth (for Columbus and its school system). The development is going to take place anyhow, with or without the city water and sewer, so if you force the issue, the development would take place over a period of time and the Columbus school system would not be involved in it. That would be awfully short sighted (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 2/3/88, 1, parentheses added).

This statement was symptomatic of the tendency not to single out the developers as being responsible for the conflict. If anything, in the minds of most of the protagonists, the value of the development was never questioned and much of the blame for the conflict was placed on the Columbus School Board. The portrayal of growth as something inevitable, to which the City and School System must respond, was particularly striking.

The failure of the task force to come up with a 'compromise' solution thus had much to do with the position of the School Board on the annexation of Wexley.
The School Board refused to compromise, turning down contract proposals made by task force members on at least two occasions in December 1987 and in February 1988 (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 2/11/88, B1). Reports from these meetings gave an indication of the shape of the contract proposal being negotiated. The major details which emerged indicated:

- The City of Columbus was prepared to negotiate a standard water and sewer service contract with New Albany
- This contract would be designed to include most of the 4,000 acre proposed Wexley development
- The proposed service area would be substantially smaller than the original service contract with the County cancelled in July 1987
- Some acres of Plain Township would not be included in the contract area, leaving it open for annexation to Columbus
- the contract would allow for a growth corridor for Columbus along Morse Road, subject to negotiations with the City of Gahanna

The proposed package being negotiated also contained details of possible land transfers involving territory in Plain Local School District and the Columbus School District. Specifically:

- Nearly 600 acres of Plain Local School District located in the City of Columbus would be transferred to the Columbus School system
- 296 acres of Wexley would be annexed to Columbus involving land earmarked mainly for commercial development
- a further 104 acres of Wexley earmarked for 1,361 housing units would be annexed to Columbus, involving some 800 students

The proposals emerging from the task force meetings clearly did not suit the interests of the Columbus School Board. One major, and paradoxically, sticking point was the possible transfer of territory between Plain Local Schools and the Columbus School System. As proposed by the task force, such a transfer constituted a violation of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement. In that agreement, suburban school district territory located in Columbus would in the future not be transferred to Columbus Schools. By agreeing too readily to such a compromise, the School Board might have exposed themselves to criticism from suburban schools officials, thus jeopardizing the chances of securing land annexed in the future to Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 2/9/88, D1).
- the remainder of the Wexley development included in the service contract area would be open for annexation to New Albany

But the insistence of the City Administration to offer a water and sewer contract rather than annex all of Wexley put the School Board in a very awkward position: whatever compromise it made was bound to contradict the terms of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement. One suburban newspaper columnist suggested that the Columbus School Board were not helping matters because they had failed to come up with their own suggestions. Although the same commentator noted:

In principle they (Columbus School Board) are right when they blast another lily-white upper class suburban school district for managing to isolate itself from Columbus (The Columbus Booster, 1/24/88, n.p.).

This was in reference to the proposed merger move between Washington Township and the City of Dublin. Thus after two months of intense negotiations amongst task force members, the City Administration and the School Board were still reported to be 'poles apart' (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/20/88, 1).

Columbus pushes for a contract with New Albany

The failure of the task force to come up with a compromise, together with the threat of the merger move between New Albany and Plain Township, led the Columbus Administration to approach the School Board directly, rather than indirectly through the task force. While Mayor Rinehart had every intention of granting a contract to New Albany, he regarded support from the School Board as a necessary prerequisite:

Achieving a close partnership between the City of Columbus and Columbus Schools will be essential if we are to avoid the dismal prospect of being cut off from future growth opportunities as has happened in so many of America's big cities (Columbus Dispatch, 3/15/88, B1).
Between February and July, the Administration and the School Board negotiated in private a compromise package. Details of this package were not forthcoming, indeed the press devoted relatively little coverage to the Wexley controversy after the furore of the period from November through February. But the few reports leaked to the press indicated the package was not vastly different from that negotiated by the task force during the earlier period.

By July 1988, the Administration was in a position to present a contract for approval by City Council before offering it to the Village of New Albany (Columbus Dispatch, 7/13/88, 1A). The only major changes apparent in the proposed contract included two punitive clauses, one requiring the termination of the merger move between Plain Township and New Albany and the other mandating a tenfold increase in water and sewer rates for residents in the contract area should the merger move be continued. Columbus City Council reviewed the contract at a council meeting held on Monday July 25, 1988, and resolved 7-0 to accept it as amended. This opened the way for the contract to be formally offered to the New Albany Village Council.

Members of schools interest groups in Columbus were not happy with the terms of the contract. The Apple Alliance suggested there were 'problems' with the contract, while the NAACP were more vocal, as testified in a reported statement from the first Vice President:

'This proposal sets a precedent. We think its outrageous. The Columbus community has said loud and clear that it doesn't want a water and sewer contract without a major portion being annexed to Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 7/17/88, 1D).

This statement, however, reflected the tendency of the NAACP to overestimate the degree of organized opposition to the contract amongst central-city interest groups, in
particular the black community. Amongst other things, the black community, as suggested in the earlier schools annexation controversy, was no longer in agreement with the idea that annexation was the answer to the educational needs of black children. Indeed, to the degree that it was negatively regarded by the black population (both locally and nationally), the focus of its energy was in developing an alternative to busing (Evans, 1989).

The contract was put before the New Albany Village Council in early August. The Village Council also began to put pressure on the President of the Civic Association, Bob Brandner, to terminate the merger move between New Albany and Plain Township (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/10/88, 1). At that point, there became evident a major division of interests within the merger camp (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/3/88, 1). On the one hand, New Albany officials were ready to accept the terms of the contract and terminate the merger process before the deadline of September 15, 1988. On the other hand, there remained a groundswell of grassroots support for the merger from residents of Plain Township. One of their areas of concern lay in the fact that, given the terms of the contract, some 18,000 acres of Plain Township were vulnerable to annexation by the City of Columbus and only 4,000 acres would be annexed to New Albany.

This split between Plain Township and New Albany officials became further evident when Bob Brandner tried to muster support for a second merger move. At a meeting of 150 residents of the township and village towards the end of August, the alternative merger was proposed (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/17/88, 1). While sufficient support from Plain Township residents was evident, only four residents of New Albany volunteered to act as merger commission members, so the proposal never got off
the ground (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/24/88, 1). For the merger move to have been legally acceptable, five members had to represent the Village, and five the township.

Thus Plain Township residents complained that the ten original members of the merger commission had been selected by the developers’ lawyers and not democratically elected. Moreover when the merger charter had been drafted, residents of Plain Township had expressed concern about a clause which required the merger process be terminated if more than half the commissioners resigned (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/17/88, 1). Thus Plain township residents’ worst fears were confirmed when New Albany Village Council voted to accept the terms of the contract with Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 9/7/88, C1). And just before the deadline of September 15, seven of the merger commission members resigned their positions. This effectively spelled the end of the merger move and the prospect that Columbus would be denied its growth corridor to the north and east. It paved the way for Columbus to service the Wexley development with water and sewer and for those parts of Plain Township within the service contract area to be annexed to New Albany.

Several residents of Plain Township who had supported the merger move felt they had been betrayed. One resident in an area which was destined to be annexed to Columbus under the terms of the contract agreement complained bitterly:

At first the developers talked about what was good for our community, but its a year later and now they want to do what’s good for Columbus and Leslie Wexner. I resent being lied to. I feel this (annexation to Columbus) has been the plan since day one. We’re just a piece of the puzzle and we’re falling into place (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 8/17/88, 1).

What is revealing about this statement is the explicit reference to the relationship between the developers and the City of Columbus, the fact that from day one the interests of the two were mutually reinforcing. But no reference is made to the
Columbus School Board, which earlier had been portrayed as the source of the conflict. Others noted that, if the School Board had maintained a more aggressive posture, the outcome might have been quite different. Columnist Herb Cook, for example, commented in a suburban newspaper:

For the Wexley developers, the merger commission has served its purpose. It applied enough pressure to prod Columbus into offering New Albany a sewer/water contract, despite the feeble protests of the Columbus Board of Education. Now the developers want to kill the merger and get on about the business of building homes and making money (Worthington Suburbia News, 7/13/88, 4).

Most Columbus School Board members were willing to compromise on the issue of a water and sewer contract. Board member Annie Hall, an employee of Banc One in Columbus, captured well the new mood amongst School Board members:

I believe the schools' major role was to impress upon City Hall the critical importance of designing a water and sewer contract that was absolutely as small as possible (in area), and I believe the schools did their job (Worthington Suburbia News, 7/13/88, 4; parentheses added).

The issue for the School Board, then, was not whether there should or should not be a contract. Rather, they bowed to the pressure of the Administration to accept that a contract was both desirable and necessary. The Columbus school board backed down from its early hardline stance, a shift reminiscent of its position on the Schools Annexation Agreement not two years earlier. School board President, Bill Moss, however, refused to accept the terms of the contract (Columbus Dispatch, 9/10/88, B1). Earlier in the year, he had complained that the Board was too willing to bow down to the powerful economic interests in the Columbus power structure. For example, the Board had already compromised on the Schools Annexation Agreement, and in 1986 it had given the Limited a $19.4 million tax abatement on property it owned in Columbus Schools. At the time of the Wexley controversy, the School Board was also negotiating the sale of the closed Central High School site near the downtown to the City; and the price they agreed to was well below the potential marketable value of
the property. Moss's objections, therefore, were that the School Board was effectively subsidizing economic development in the metropolitan area, at the same time as developers were boycotting the School District by choosing to invest in locations beyond its jurisdiction. Moss's argument was:

1 would suggest that our city officials are bending over backwards to please the developers—instead of their very own constituents—the (Columbus) taxpayers are being cheated (Columbus Dispatch, 9/15/88, B1).

The readiness of the School Board to succumb to the pressure of the City Administration is indicative of the dependence of local states on a growing local economy, and the readiness of officials to bow to pressure in the interests of maintaining local conditions favorable to capital accumulation.

Aftermath

In the months following the signing of the contract between New Albany and Columbus, action was taken by the developers' lawyers to get the first stages of the project under way. This meant initiating proceedings to annex the major portions of the proposed Wexley development to the appropriate municipalities. Compared to the earlier period, this phase thus far has not proven problematic.

Above the protests of Jefferson Township officials, 500 acres of the proposed Wexley development in the township was annexed to the City of Gahanna in early December (Columbus Dispatch, 2/11/88, 3E). In mid-September 1988 a petition to annex 2,760 acres of Plain township to the Village of New Albany was filed with the County Commissioners. This tract constituted the large portion of the proposed development. The Commissioners approved this annexation at a public hearing on January 4, 1989 (Columbus Dispatch, 1/5/89, 3D). Later their decision was nullified
when 12 property owners requested deletion from the tract being annexed. Later in February, with 103 acres deleted, the annexation was one more approved. In March, after negotiation with the City of Gahanna over and the Franklin County Commissioners over who would maintain the road, a 30 foot wide and two miles long strip of Morse Road was annexed to Columbus (Columbus Dispatch, 3/2/89, 4D). This represented the city's growth corridor out to the north and east. One reporter declared this to be:

What could be the most important 30 foot wide strip of land in Columbus's history (Columbus Dispatch, 3/24/89, 4B).

By Spring of 1989, construction was commencing on the first stages of the Wexley development.

Interpretation

The Wexley conflict reveals some interesting dimensions of the processes by which metropolitan areas become jurisdictionally fragmented. Fragmentation, according to liberal reformers, is a consequence of a politics of consumption. It involves a process by which more privileged consumption groupings attempt to share out positive externalities by segregating themselves from less privileged consumption groupings. The deployment of zoning powers, for example, facilitates the segregation process. Yet the Wexley conflict suggests a richer context for fragmentation than might be gleaned from the liberal reform argument.

One important dimension to fragmentation revealed by the Wexley conflict is the role of developer interests. Their role suggests the importance of including production issues in a theory of fragmentation. There is the issue of the diverse strategies
locally dependent economic interests may adopt to enhance the returns on their investments in the local economy. Specifically, developers adopted a variety of strategies to protect and promote their interests, including drawing on the powers of local government. Moreover, to the degree that local governments had a stake in local economic development, they were willing participants.

For the developers, Wexley represented a substantial investment risk. The value locked up in the land purchased and housing to be constructed could only be realized if a market for the product could be found. Three conditions were thus critical for the successful amortization of their investment. First, infrastructures had to be secured. Second, the development had to be packaged as an attractive commodity. Third, there had to be a potential market in place.

Infrastructures posed a problem since, with Columbus as the major supplier, there was the issue of annexation to Columbus schools. This was regarded by the developers as less than desirable because of its effects on property values and the attractiveness of the product to the consumer. As Ben Hale put it:

I know that as long as Columbus was under a busing order, no one was going to take (the) risk. Developers are not social engineers (Columbus Dispatch, 3/15/88, B1).

But clearly they were, since they engineered a contract between Columbus and New Albany which diminished the chances of the development being annexed to Columbus School District. To that end, developers had a stake in generating a more fragmented metropolis.

But fragmentation threatened the ability of Columbus to regulate the local economic development process to its own advantage through its annexation policy. Moreover, the City Administration feared for the future of any new residential
development within Columbus borders if the School Board had pushed for the annexe-
lation of Wexley. That would have sent a signal to suburban residents and officials
to organize and take actions to put an end to Columbus's annexation policy and the
possibility of further School District annexations. Indeed, residents in Washington
Township and the City of Dublin had already initiated a merger move which threat-
ened to cut off the territorial growth of Columbus in the northwest part of Frank-
lin County. Either way, the School Board stood to lose. This point was made evi-
dent at the height of the Wexley controversy:

If the Columbus school system comes out of either the negotiating room or
the courtroom looking like a loser, developers in other unincorporated areas
will begin to lick their chops. They will tailor the Wexley strategy to their
own situations (Worthington Suburbia News, 12/2/87, 6).

In the event, the School Board were once more prepared to bow to such pressure.
And the willingness of the School Board to bow to pressure can be explained by ref-
erence to the composition of the Board's membership and lack of strong pro-annexation
forces in the central city. As with the earlier schools annexation issue, the fact that
members were, because of their professional backgrounds, largely sympathetic to busi-
ness interests played a critical role. Hence, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce's
endorsement of candidates is pertinent here. Moreover, central city interests, such as
the black community, were not willing to press issue, a situation similar to the earli-
er schools annexation controversy. Without a groundswell of pressure, the School
Board would not be likely to press through the annexation of Wexley.

Another aspect of the Wexley controversy which is revealing concerns the power
and status interests of the major participants. The local dependence of Leslie Wexner
is salient in this regard. Although the Limited is a retail clothing chain with a
national market orientation, many aspects of the firm's operation are highly localized.
For example, there is the reputation of the founder of the Limited and the principle developer of Wexley, Leslie Wexner. It was widely recognized that Wexner was a man of 'quality tastes' whose word could be trusted by the local community. Indeed, many noted the respect with which Wexner and Kessler were held by other local business people. One lawyer described them in the following manner: 'Jack and Les are kind of transcendental—they think at a level which is beyond most ordinary people' (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 1/20/88, 9).

But the awe with which Wexner in particular was held by some stood in contrast with the general indifference of others. Wexner was regarded as 'the new boy on the block' in the Columbus power structure (his company did not rank in the top 20 employers in metropolitan Columbus). And his rise to power and money had been rapid and recent (the Limited had been founded by him in Columbus only in the 1960s). This contrasted with the 'old money' of Columbus as represented by such interests as the Wolfe family, the Schottensteins and the Lazarus family (see Mair, 1988).

At another level, therefore, it is possible to interpret the Wexley controversy as symptomatic of an inter-capitalist struggle for power and control over the Columbus metropolitan economy. This power struggle pitted the Wexner interests, who aligned themselves with the Democratic leadership in the city council, against a coalition forged between Wolfe interests and the Republic leadership in the City Administration. For example, the Wolfe-owned Columbus Dispatch was generally indifferent, and at times hostile, to the Wexley development. This is evident in the extensive coverage the conflict was given, despite possible negative ramifications it may have had for the overall image of Columbus. The fact that the Dispatch went out of its
way to discredit Councillor Jerry Hammond by drawing attention to his ties to Wex­
er interests is also highly suggestive. At the height of the conflict, Hammond went
so far as to claim:

The issue isn't over schools annexation. It's not even an issue of water and
sewer. The issue is one of personalities. It is an issue between the Dispatch
and the developers (Rocky Fork Enterprise, 11/18/87, 1).

Also indicative of the struggle for power and status was the decision by the Schot­
tensteins to locate a development similar to Wexley in the northeast part of Franklin
County. This was a crucial element in a conflict which was as much about status
and power as it was about the material issues of infrastructure and schools.

CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 6

In this Chapter, two conflicts have been examined with respect to their impact upon
territorial structures of the state in the Columbus metropolitan area. The two issues
involved struggles related both to consumption and to production considerations. The
attempt by the Columbus School Board to annex/integrate the metropolitan area in a
retrospective manner with respect to the territorial provision of education involved a
conflict over consumption. By contrast, the Wexley issue revealed the nature of the
interest groups implicated when consumption and production considerations are con­
joined. Four main issues emerge from an analysis of these conflicts.

First, the conflicts suggest that a diversity of coalitions may be forged to oppose
a particular state territorial structure, such as that being generated through Columbus's
annexation policy. These coalitions were forged around particular issues which by
their nature did not necessarily involve changes in state territorial structures. The
issues of concern were education and infrastructure provision. But since the territorial provision of education and infrastructure in this instance were linked inextricably via Columbus's annexation policy, the conflicts converged around attempts to transform state territorial structures to the advantage of coalition members.

Second, it is not possible to produce empirical generalizations about the composition of the coalitions implicated in the two conflicts. Indeed, the conflicts illustrate that a variety of interests may conjoin in particular coalitions, the latter being fluid and changeable as circumstances dictate. In general terms, the schools annexation issue resulted in the forging of a broad coalition of suburban interests including residents, school district officials, civic groups and politicians representing suburban jurisdictions in opposition to a coalition forged amongst central city interests including members of the Columbus School Board, black community activists and parents and unions representing central city schools. But whereas developers and the city administration and city council of Columbus did not intervene directly in the schools annexation issue, their activities were more concerted on the issue of infrastructure provision. By contrast, other businesses locally dependent on the Columbus metropolitan economy did not intervene in the infrastructure issue, but took more concerted action in the case of schools annexation, witness the indirect intervention of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce.

Third, while the fluidity of the coalitions forged around these two issues precludes empirical generalization, some conclusions of a substantive nature can be reached. Central to the formation of coalitions were problems of local dependence experienced by participant members. In both issues, relations of consumption (reproduction) and production were core concerns. In the schools annexation issue, these
amounted to the concerns of parents, in particular mothers with school-aged children, for a quality education. The issue also highlighted the interests of central city and suburban school district officials in the fiscal and territorial integrity of their school systems. Developers' concerns for the productive development of their investments featured large in the infrastructure conflict. But these concerns were tempered by the threat of annexation to the Columbus School District and the possible devaluation of their fixed investments in land and buildings. Intersecting with these were the efforts by the Columbus City Council and the City Administration to preserve over the long term the municipal tax base and their control of fixed investments in infrastructures.

Fourth, the two conflicts illustrate the value of theorizing the underlying unity of production and consumption in struggles over state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. Feminist scholars, for example, argue that relations of reproduction intersect with the production process to the extent that the reproduction of the laborer is involved. The education of children is thus of significance here. Moreover, while infrastructure provision is a necessary precondition for production of commodities, such as quality homes and amenities, those commodities must be consumed for the value locked up in them to be devalorized. To the extent that production interferes with consumption such that their underlaying unity is jeopardized, there is scope for conflict. This is well illustrated by the two case studies: various strategies have been adopted by participant coalitions to keep production and reproduction as separate spheres. These strategies are implicated in the territorial structures produced out of the conflicts.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation has investigated some of the mechanisms structuring the jurisdictional organization of metropolitan areas. These mechanisms were related to the activities of private firms, people and local branches of the state which, when organized on a collective basis, may promote changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. More specifically, the dissertation examined the processes of the formation of more or less integrated (or fragmented) state territorial structures across metropolitan Columbus, Ohio, in the postwar period.

The dissertation had two broad aims. First, a series of abstract theoretical arguments were constructed in an effort to isolate the social structures which were determined to be important in explaining territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. This was the purpose of Chapters 2 and 3. Second, the abstractions isolated in those Chapters were deployed to shed light on concrete case studies of conflicts around state territorial structures in metropolitan Columbus, Ohio. These case studies were presented and analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 was situated in relation to the argument that production interests are best served by integrated territorial structures. Chapter 6 critically evaluated the theory that struggles in the consumption sphere lead to fragmented territorial structures.
The purpose of this concluding Chapter is to use the findings of the case studies to advance some of the theoretical ideas developed early on in the dissertation. In particular, the importance of the idea of local dependence is reasserted. That is, what gives firms, people and local states an interest in promoting changes in territorial structures are problems associated with spatial fixities in their social and material relations. An attempt is made to advance the concept of local dependence in a direction which may be fruitful for further empirical research of the processes shaping territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas.

COALITIONS, LOCAL DEPENDENCE AND STATE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES

Introduction

In the literature review Chapter, it was argued that previous studies of metropolitan jurisdictional organization have failed to generate adequate theoretical arguments with which to explain their objects of interest. Indeed, such studies were characterized as empiricist, idealist and functionalist. Nevertheless, the literature review did isolate a variety of economic and political actors which might be expected to promote particular jurisdictional forms.

In the case of integrated territorial structures, a central role for organized collectives of private firms could be predicted from traditional reform theories. These theories rationalize such structures from the point of view of the efficiencies they generate in the provision of infrastructures across metropolitan areas. The reform tradition approach is a production-centered theory of metropolitan jurisdictional organization.
By contrast, liberal reform theories have predicted a more central role for consumption interests in the formation of fragmented territorial structures. More privileged consumption groupings push for territorial structures which protect their interest in, for example, a quality education for their children, from the negative externalities associated with less privileged consumption groupings. The two major empirical Chapters of this dissertation were situated in relation to these two theories. The analysis examined the nature of interests which have organized to support or oppose the jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area via the City of Columbus's annexation policy.

The analyses presented in the two empirical Chapters suggest that local interests promoting respectively integrated and fragmented territorial structures are far more wide-ranging than those predicted by reform tradition and liberal reform theories. Indeed, given the necessary involvement of the state, the analyses identified a great variety of possible combinations of local interests promoting different territorial structures via their participation in coalitions. Several conclusions can be drawn from these analyses in terms of the mechanisms generating changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. The major conclusions address in turn the composition of coalitions and the necessary conditions for coalition formation.

Composition of coalitions and resultant territorial forms

The analyses clearly demonstrated that the composition of coalitions promoting particular state territorial structures in metropolitan areas is likely to be historically and geographically contingent. A variety of local interests may participate and there is no necessary correspondence between those interests and particular territorial forms. For
example, there is no empirical basis for a division between production/consumption interests and integrated/fragmented territorial structures. In a general sense, however, some patterns were discernible from the case studies.

With regard to the period 1954 to 1973, institutionalized business coalitions including the Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the Development Committee for Greater Columbus, in concert with the Democratic Administration and City Council of Columbus, were most active in promoting the integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the provision of infrastructure via Columbus's annexation policy. These interests forged what could be described as a 'public-private partnership', or 'growth coalition', the aim of which was to promote the absolute geographical expansion of the central city as a strategy of local economic development. As circumstances dictated, developers and builders were also willing participants in this 'growth coalition'. It is fair to say, therefore, that local capitalist class interests in Columbus, almost without exception, lent their weight in support of the annexation policy and the consequent jurisdictional integration of the metropolitan area, at least from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. To the degree that it did indeed facilitate the 'accumulation strategies' of firms dependent on the Columbus economy (and indeed the accumulation of revenues by the City of Columbus), the annexation policy constituted what might be described as an 'hegemonic project' (Jessop, 1983).

Opposition to this Columbus-based 'growth coalition', albeit in the earliest years of the policy, came from township and suburban officials in the territories contiguous to the central city. This opposition was particularly active whenever suburban school districts were threatened by the annexation activities of Columbus. Because schools did not feature in municipal annexation decisions after 1955, however, resistance to Columbus's annexation policy from suburban and township residents was muted. But
there were coalitions forged between local, suburban business interests and public officials around the issue of growth in suburban municipalities. These rival growth coalitions to the Columbus-based growth lobby focussed their activities on the terms of contracts negotiated between suburbs and Columbus for the use of the central city's water and sewer services, and whether or not suburbs should develop their own services so as to implement their own policies of territorial expansion. These rival, suburban-based 'growth coalitions' were not successful in opposing the growth policies of Columbus. Economic interests in Columbus were instrumental in causing Columbus and suburban municipalities to sign water and sewer contracts which restricted the annexation activities of suburban municipalities.

After 1973, and most evidently from 1980 onwards, there was a perceptible shift in the composition of coalitions both in support of, and opposed to, Columbus's annexation policy and the territorial integration of the metropolitan area. One crucial issue which brought about the realignment of pro- and anti-annexation forces was the recoupling of school district annexations with municipal annexations. Associated with this was the desegregation of the Columbus school system and the prospect that the Columbus School Board would push for the annexation of suburban school district territory located in the City of Columbus.

The conjuncture of production (infrastructure provision) with consumption (education) in the territorial integration of the metropolitan area precipitated the formation of various coalitions of well-organized anti-annexation forces in the suburbs. These coalitions comprised of suburban school district officials, parents of school-aged children, suburban residents and local politicians. In defense of their school districts, these interests found allies in developers operating in areas contiguous to Columbus but
within the water and sewer service area of the central city. Thus, whereas speculator-developers and builders had supported Columbus’s annexation policy for its first two decades of operation, their roles had changed by the 1980s. Builders and speculator-developers operating in areas contiguous to the municipal limits of Columbus and suburban municipalities organized with suburban and township officials to promote more fragmented territorial structures. Such structures were designed to allow developers to secure adequate water and sewer services (perhaps from Columbus, or from decentralized authorities) and avoid having to build in the central-city school district.

By the early 1980s, new forces had been added to the pro-annexation lobby in the central city. While the City Administration and City Council of Columbus continued to implement the annexation policy throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the schools annexation issue was constitutive of the formation of a coalition of central-city schools interest groups, black community activists and parents and teachers' unions representing the interests of Columbus schools in favor of achieving a territorial correspondence between municipal and school district boundaries. This coalition proved largely ineffectual, however, both because of the strength and organization of anti-schools annexation forces in the suburbs and because neither the Columbus School Board nor minority groups in the central city were willing (or able) to push the schools annexation issue very far.

Pro-schools annexation forces in the central city were not able to solicit support for the territorial integration of the metropolitan area (albeit with respect to the financing and administration of schools) from the institutionalized ‘growth coalition’ forces in the central city. For example, although the Development Committee for
Greater Columbus had promoted 'regional government' in the 1970s, their position on the schools annexation issue was not at all apparent: that is, they did not come out in support of, or opposition to, the Columbus School Board. Although in the 1950s and 1960s, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce had been active in support of Columbus's annexation policy, that support was less evident in the 1980s. Indeed, with education entering annexation decisions in the 1980s, the Chamber clearly reconsidered its position with respect to the annexation policy. This was evident in the fact that the Chamber went out of its way to endorse candidates for the Columbus School Board who were less likely to push for the annexation of suburban school district territories located in the City of Columbus.

The future of the annexation policy is clearly in doubt given that the schools annexation controversy has intensified fragmentation in the metropolis. There has been a noticeable shift in the composition of local interests comprising the 'growth coalition' that was active in support of Columbus's attempts to integrate the metropolitan area in the 1950s and the 1960s. The positions with respect to the annexation policy of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus, the Chamber of Commerce and other local capitalist class interests are not immediately obvious but, if the recent attempts by developers to avoid locating in the Columbus school system are at all indicative, there is evidence that the power structure in Columbus is carefully reassessing its position on annexation, particularly to the extent that municipal and school district annexations remain conjoined. Annexation under the control of the City of Columbus can therefore no longer reasonably be described as an 'hegemonic project', even though there is little evidence to suggest that the City of Columbus is willing to give up its quasi-monopoly of infrastructure and its ability to regulate economic development to its (territorial) advantage. Quite which future territorial structures
will emerge is contingent upon the balance of political forces in the metropolitan area and, most important of all, the territorial scales at which future coalitions are forged.

Local dependence

In the theoretical Chapter, it was argued that problems of local dependence are necessary to the participation of firms, people and local branches of the state in coalitions with the aims of protecting or enhancing their interests in territories lying at no greater than the metropolitan scales. Problems of local dependence may arise because of the insertion of spatially fixed social and material relations in a space economy in which value flows are unstable. For capitalist firms, such local dependencies exist by virtue of their fixed investments and localized exchange relations. Tax base and electoral concerns feature large in problems of local dependence for local states. And for people there are their investments in housing, career and status concerns and the spatio-temporal routines of daily life which cause them to be dependent on particular localities.

The case studies clearly demonstrated the explanatory importance of local dependence. The annexation policy, it was demonstrated, materialized as a strategy of fiscal amelioration for the City of Columbus and therefore represented an attempt by the City Administration and City Council to mitigate fiscal problems of local dependence. By using its quasi-monopoly of water and sewer services to capture a decentralizing tax base within its spatial jurisdiction, Columbus was able to structure the geography of value flows to its territorial advantage. Not only was there concern over the long term fiscal impact of being surrounded by independent suburban municipalities, but also there was a concern over the municipality's investments in fixed
physical infrastructures. These concerns became very apparent when the Development Committee for Greater Columbus pushed for a water and sewer authority independent of the City of Columbus. Built environment fixed investments also featured in the controversies between Columbus and suburban municipalities over contracts for the use of the central city's water and sewer facilities. The execution of contracts enabled suburban local governments to externalize some of their fixed facility costs onto the City of Columbus.

The shape and form of the annexation policy was as much determined by problems of local dependence experienced by local interests other than local governments, however. The prospect that utility extensions to relocating industries would enable new external linkages to be forged with large-scale producers encouraged the smaller industrial firms in Columbus, via the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, to support the annexation policy. For these and other firms, the activities of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus in promoting a cost-effective integrated water and sewer system for the metropolitan area were critical to their interests in the stability and growth of the metropolitan economy. By encouraging the City of Columbus to operate such a system, the DCGC ensured the costs of infrastructure provision were socialized across the metropolitan population. But, to the extent that Columbus experienced problems financing an integrated service system, there were also attempts to socialize the costs to higher levels in the state apparatus. The formation of a metropolitan water and sewer authority independent of the control of Columbus was one territorial structure which could have emerged as a strategy to mitigate the central city's fiscal problems of local dependence.
The conflicts around schools annexation clearly illustrated how the problems of local dependence of people may feature in struggles over state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. It was the career and status concerns of suburban school district officials which led in part to resistance to the Columbus School Board's attempts to match municipal and school district boundaries. Suburban officials solicited support from parents with children attending suburban schools. For their part, parents were forced to confront their dependence on the use values associated with a decentralized educational system. Reinforcing that dependence were exchange value considerations. These included the values locked up in homes purchased in suburban school districts and the dependence of those districts on revenues circulating through the territories under their jurisdiction.

Developers in the Columbus metropolitan area have invested heavily in land and improvements in a variety of locations, including territories within Columbus but in suburban school districts. These considerations were important to an understanding of why developers have more recently solicited the support of suburban and township officials and residents in areas contiguous to the City of Columbus in their efforts to ward off the annexation threats of the Columbus School Board.

Local dependence, therefore, constitutes the necessary conditions for the formation of coalitions of local interests. But whether or not those interests will promote changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas is a contingent matter. Thus it is important to specify exactly what are the contingent conditions which activate the powers of coalitions of local interests to generate such changes.

Only through empirical research of particular case-instances of conflicts around state territorial structures in metropolitan areas is it possible to specify contingencies.
In the case of the coalescence of interests around Columbus' annexation policy, the contingencies were quite apparent. Thus, for example, a variety of circumstances (contingencies) helped to explain why annexation and not urban renewal was regarded more favorably by local interests as a strategy of fiscal amelioration for the central city. Included in those contingencies was the fact that Columbus was not already surrounded by independent suburban municipalities since this would have precluded annexation as a possible strategy. Other contingencies included the emergence of differences of opinion amongst local business coalitions as to the costs and benefits of an urban renewal program for the inner city, and the reluctance of the Sensenbrenner Administration to pursue a politically risky program so soon after being elected to office.

In other instances, the contingencies referred less to conditions unique to Columbus and more to changes in the wider space economy. Thus, for example, it was federal intervention in the mid-1970s which (contingently) led to the abandonment of the efforts of the Development Committee for Greater Columbus to promote a metropolitan water and sewer authority independent of the control of the City of Columbus. Federal intervention via schools desegregation also significantly altered the exercise of the powers of developers and as a consequence their interests in territorial organization changed. Whereas before desegregation developers were willing to build within the Columbus School District, after the suit was filed developers explored alternative strategies. The identification of the contingencies activating the powers of coalitions of locally dependent interests was thus important in specifying in practice how problems of local dependence led to attempts to generate changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan Columbus.
Although the idea of local dependence was found to be useful in explaining the participation of firms, people and local states in coalitions, the concept did have its limitations. Specifically, local dependence could not explain how particular territorial structures materialized from conflicts between coalitions of local interests. It is to other mechanisms that we must look in order to understand the processes of formation and transformation of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas.

HOW PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION ISSUES ARE RECONCILED IN STATE TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES

An issue that was not fully addressed in the case studies was how production and consumption considerations are reconciled in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. This is an important issue because it speaks directly to the value of incorporating class into explanations for conflicts around such structures.

Chapter 5 abstracted away from the consumption-side argument in order to isolate social structures in the production sphere which were considered important for understanding the territorial integrations of the Columbus metropolitan area. Specifically, the activities of private business coalitions forged around problems of local dependence were considered in terms of their influence on Columbus's annexation policy. It was demonstrated how integrated territorial structures can create conditions which facilitate the production of value. In the case of Columbus's annexation policy, the integration of the metropolitan area with respect to the provision of water and sewer facilitated the accumulation process for firms dependent on the Columbus economy for their reproduction.
But other social structures had to be incorporated into the analysis in order to grasp fully the conjuncture of mechanisms producing this particular territorial structure. Thus it was important to recognize how the annexation policy facilitated the interests of local branches of the state. Successive City Administrations of Columbus saw in the annexation policy an opportunity to mitigate potential fiscal problems for the central city. By capturing a decentralizing tax base within its jurisdiction, the City of Columbus could regulate the circulation of value (as taxation) to its advantage. This fitted in with the accumulation needs of local capitalist interests to the degree that values appropriated by the local state as taxes were subsequently reallocated into infrastructural improvements and other local economic development projects across the metropolitan area. Clearly, the annexation policy facilitated not just the production of value but also its circulation (via local state institutions) through the metropolitan economy.

Chapter 6, by contrast, abstracted from production issues and focussed instead on social structures in the realm of consumption. Specifically, the emphasis was on how territorially-based consumption groupings have attempted to structure educational opportunities to their advantage. The Chapter demonstrated how coalitions forged amongst schools interest groups in the central city have confronted suburban-based organizations around issues such as matching municipal and school district boundaries and schools desegregation.

But the focus on consumption groupings proved too restrictive. It was necessary to incorporate other social structures into the analysis. For example, the activities of local governments were often central to ensuing struggles. Their concerns focussed less directly on relations of reproduction (the education of children) and more on the
distribution of revenues across the metropolitan area, and how that distribution affected their own career and status concerns. For example, the Columbus School Board's resolution to annex suburban school district territory in Columbus was perceived by suburban schools officials to be a threat to the financial viability of their school systems. Threats of this nature prompted suburban and township officials to resist the annexation activities of the Columbus School Board.

Nor could production issues be ignored in explaining the territorial provision of education across the Columbus metropolitan area. Education became a problem whenever it was coupled with the territorial provision of infrastructure. Thus developers wishing to harness the powers of local government to secure water and sewer services had to be aware of how education factored into the provision of those services. This was very clearly demonstrated by the Wexley controversy in which developers forged an alliance with township and suburban school district officials to circumvent the terms of the 1986 Schools Annexation Agreement. That Agreement required the City of Columbus, in exchange for extending water and sewer services, to annex unincorporated territories for both municipal and educational purposes. In order to maximize returns on their investments, and avoid the liability of locating in the Columbus School District, developers promoted alternative jurisdictional arrangements which had the effect of fragmenting the metropolis.

The case studies thus indicate that the conjuncture of production and consumption issues within the territorial state apparatus can lead to an intensification of conflict. A variety of strategies may then be promoted which mitigate conflict. Included in such strategies are attempts to segregate consumption from production via new jurisdictional arrangements. Such strategies are analogous to the (territorial) separation of
human service functions from economic development functions which Piven and Friedland (1984) theorized as being causative of the urban fiscal crisis.

But it is clear also from the case studies that the separation of production from consumption within the state apparatus was symptomatic of more fundamental processes. When considering these more fundamental processes, an important first step was to situate the analysis in relation to the idea of local dependence. Yet even that had its limitations since it proved almost impossible to separate out the problems of firms, people and local states in order to explain the variety of coalitions forged with the aim of generating changes in state territorial structures in metropolitan areas. Thus, while local dependence was important in explaining the participation of local interests in coalitions, it could not explain how conflicts between coalitions were resolved nor the resultant territorial forms.

In order, therefore, to grasp the dynamics of processes of formation and transformation of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas, it may be necessary to incorporate a more fundamental mediating mechanism. That mechanism is class struggle. For, it is conflicts rooted in the class relation between capital and labor which is determinantal of how problems of local dependence for firms, people and the state are confronted and mitigated in practice. It is a class relation, moreover, in which the state is necessarily implicated. Different factions of capital, and of labor, harness state powers in their attempts to gain concessions from each other. The formation of new territorial arrangements within the state apparatus involves a redistribution of the social product to the advantage of capital, of labor, and at times the state itself.

Hitherto, Marxist analyses have not successfully incorporated class into theories of territorial structures of the state in metropolitan areas. Future research grounded in an
historical materialist framework must therefore take this as the starting point: a non-functionalist class analysis of state territorial structures in metropolitan areas must recognize the contingent status of such structures. Such structures are generated from the conjuncture of a variety of mechanisms. And central to an analysis of those mechanisms are the social and material relations which cause private firms, people and local states to organize collectively to protect and enhance their interests in particular territories.

Class therefore has a necessary territorial expression. The abilities of one set of class interests to gain concessions from others, via state instrumentalities, will of necessity depend upon the scale at which coalitions of class-based forces can be organized. Their capacities to harness state powers at a variety of territorial scales can be a significant weapon in the class struggle. One possible future area of research would be to look at the composition of coalitional forces at scales above the metropolitan in order to explain the formation of territorial structures at a variety of levels in the state hierarchy. State territorial structures forged at different geographic scales can then best be viewed as territorialized instances of the class struggle as it unfolds in particular historical and geographical conjunctures.
Appendix A

INTERVIEWS

The interviews conducted in this dissertation were unstructured and interactive. The attempt was to be rigorous in the coverage of key issues and events. The purpose of the interviews was to elicit from the interviewees a more complete understanding of particular issues and events surrounding the implementation of Columbus' annexation policy. Each interview began with a few key questions. Follow-up questions enabled further clarification of events. The aim of the interviews was to generate coherent explanations for the events that occurred. If the interviewee was directly involved in particular issues, the questions were designed to enable a greater understanding of the reasons behind their various actions. The answers of each respondents were subsequently corroborated with those of others involved in the same issue. In this way, it was possible to test for the accuracy of competing explanations for the events that occurred. (An example of this interview method is presented in Appendix B.)

The following people (and their positions of office) were generous in their willingness to respond to a variety of questions:

Warren 'Hap' Cremean (former Columbus City Service Director under Mayor Maynard Sensenbrenner)

Robert Parkinson (former Columbus City Service Director under Mayor Tom Moody)

Kline Roberts (former Director of the Columbus Area Chamber of Commerce)
The late Delmar Starkey (former General Manager of the Columbus Chamber of Commerce)

Harmon Merwin (former Planner, City of Columbus)

William Habig (Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Commission)

Lin Carver (Planner, formerly of City of Columbus)

Jim Evans (Chairman, Franklin County Democratic Party)

Jim Ebright (former Member, Columbus Board of Education)

Bill Moss (President, Columbus Board of Education)

Ellen Walker (Rocky Fork Enterprise)

In addition to the above interviews, I acted as 'participant-observer' at public hearings on the Wexley controversy held at the Columbus Board of Education and in the Offices of Franklin County.
Appendix B

EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS ASKED AT INTERVIEWS

The following are examples of questions asked in the interviews. These questions concern the schools annexation controversy in the early 1980s:

(To the interviewee:) Please describe your position of office at the time of the schools annexation controversy.

What circumstances surrounded the decision of the Columbus School Board to consider the annexation of suburban school district territory in Columbus?

What alternative strategies were considered and why were they not pursued?

What did the Columbus School Board stand to gain from the annexation of those territories? Tax base? Students?

Which groups/individuals came out in support of the Columbus School Board?

What do you think these groups/individuals hoped to gain from their support of the School Board on this issue?

Was support for the School Board unanimous amongst those groups?

What about the position of other Columbus-based interests on the Schools Annexation issue? For example, the City Administration? City Council? Chamber of Commerce?

Who stood to lose most if the discrepant areas were indeed annexed?

How do you explain the opposition to the School Board’s decision?

(Follow-up question.) How would you account for the more emotional response from parents compared to the pragmatic concerns of schools officials?

What is the position of the black community in Columbus on schools annexation?

(Follow-up questions.) Why do you think the black community did not press issue? What might explain their different response in the 1970s compared to the 1980s?

Was there any evidence that realtors, builders and developers played a part in the controversy (for example, newspaper articles reported that builders expected develop-
ment in Columbus to 'screech to a halt' if suburban school district territories were annexed to the Columbus School District?"

What is the future for schools annexation in Franklin County? What are the implications of the 'Wexley' controversy for future annexations by the Columbus school district?

In general terms, who have been the winners and losers in this particular controversy?
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