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The effects of characteristics of judges and attorneys on decision-making in domestic relations court: An analysis of child support awards

Ellis, Walter Lee, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1989
The Effects of Characteristics of Judges and Attorneys on Decision Making in Domestic Relations Court: An Analysis of Child Support Awards

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Walter Lee Ellis, B.S., M.S.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1989

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Finally, a special thanks to my mother, Elfrancis Ellis, for her love, support and encouragement.
VITA

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Of all decisions individuals and families make, family formation decisions have the greatest financial repercussions for children. The percentage of children living with two parents decreased from 87.7 percent in 1960 to 73.9 percent in 1985, while the percentage living with one parent rose from 7.1 percent in 1960 to 18.0 percent in 1985. Children under 18 years old who lived with one parent were more likely to be living with the mother only, 20.9 percent compared to 2.5 percent living with the father only (Bureau of the Census, 1986). In 1986, 34.6 percent of female headed households were poor (Bureau of the Census, 1987). The social significance of these trends is that children are being deprived of financial support.

The increase in the number of children living with one parent has brought increased public concern over the issue of child support from the absent father. In 1987 the Bureau of the Census reported that over a quarter of eligible mothers with two children from an absent father were not awarded child support payments. And, when mothers were
awarded child support payments, the mean amount of income received was only $2,597 dollars per year (United States Bureau of the Census, 1987). Considering that in 1987 the average estimated cost of rearing a 10-11 year old child was $5,811 dollars per year (United States Department of Agriculture, 1988), these figures clearly indicate inadequate child support awards.

Robins and Dickinson (1984) suggest that without adequate support from the absent parent many female single parent families rely on welfare. Indeed, the changing nature of, and large increase in, the most popular welfare program, Aide to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) reflect the preceding trends for single parents (Robins and Dickinson, 1985). The AFDC program provides benefits to poor children and to one or two adults caring for the children because of a parent's death, mental or physical incapacity, unemployment, or continued absence from the home (Rejda, 1984). Although AFDC eligibility is contingent upon all of the above mentioned factors, virtually all AFDC cases involve an absent father, and almost half involve a father not married to the mother (Robins and Dickinson, 1984).
1. STRATEGIES TO REDUCE WELFARE BUDGETS

There is public interest in reducing welfare dependency. Basically two strategies for reducing welfare budgets have been used: 1) work incentive programs and 2) child support legislation (Table 1).

Table 1
Strategies to Reduce Welfare Budgets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Options for recipients</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>Register (if not in an exempted group) before receiving welfare payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWEP</td>
<td>Work on useful public projects in return for AFDC grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJP</td>
<td>Take a job or receive lower AFDC benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE IV-D</td>
<td>Register with child support enforcement agency before qualifying for AFDC eligibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Work Incentive Programs

In recent years, most attempts have centered on increasing the employment of the custodial parent (Robins, 1986; and Robins and Dickinson, 1984). In 1967 amendments were made to the Social Security Act, which included a work incentive program (WIN). The WIN program required every qualified AFDC recipient not in a specifically exempted
group to register for a work or training program administered by the United States Department of Labor before receiving welfare payments (Turnbull, Williams and Chiet, 1973). However, Rejda (1984) reported that many states have inadequate WIN programs, and that the number of AFDC recipients who benefit is small. In 1981, Congress passed legislation granting states more flexibility in administering their WIN program with new options added. The first option was the Community Work-Experience Program (CWEP) which required AFDC recipients to work on useful public projects in return for their AFDC grants. The second option was the Subsidized Job Program (SJP) which gave the states the option to use AFDC funds to subsidize jobs with public or nonprofit agencies. Under the SJP, AFDC recipients are given a choice between taking a job or accepting lower AFDC benefits (Rejda, 1984).

B. Child Support Legislation

One important alternative to policies aimed at increasing employment of the mother is to collect child support from the absent father (Robins, 1986; and Robins and Dickinson, 1984). Concerned with increases in welfare costs, as well as with the diversity among states in establishing and enforcing child support awards, Congress in 1975 established the Child Support Enforcement Program as Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act. The Title IV legisla-
tion (IV-D Program) required each state to develop a child support enforcement program that provides services for establishing paternity, locating absent parents, and establishing child support obligations as well as enforcing such obligations. The states were required to provide these services free to all AFDC families and to non-AFDC families for a fee. The states, contingent upon federal approval, are reimbursed 70 percent of program costs. In addition, a federal Parent Locator Service was established to provide access to Social Security Administration earning records as well as Internal Revenue Service tax records (Public Law 93-647, 1975).

Although the IV-D Program has been called a success (Schlosser, 1979), national statistics indicated room for improvement. In 1981 only 59 percent of eligible women were awarded child support. Of those awarded child support only about half received the full amount with about a quarter receiving partial payment. Fully 28 percent received nothing (Bureau of the Census, 1985). Garfinkel and Uhr (1984) believed that the inequity of the child support system came directly from the legal system's irresponsibility. In fact, testimony by various grass roots organizations before the Senate Finance Committee in 1983 found an "astonishing" lack of order and predictability in how the legal system dealt with child support obligations. Testi-
mony revealed: 1) a lack of uniformity in the establishment of support obligations, 2) variability in state laws on entitlement, 3) lack of clarity in court interpretation of child's basic needs and rights, and 4) failure of the child support system (Senate Committee on Finance, United States Senate 98th Congress, 1st Session, 1983).

In an attempt to restore some uniformity to the child support system, Congress in 1984 passed amendments to strengthen the IV-D Program. The 1984 amendments required states to: 1) deduct child support from wages and other income of absent parents, 2) reduce state income tax refunds to absent parents by the amount of past due child support, 3) impose liens against real and personal property of absent parents for amounts of past due child support, 4) include medical support as part of child support orders whenever health care coverage is available to the absent parent at reasonable cost, 5) establish State Commissions on child support, and 6) establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the state. The guidelines are to be made available to all judges and other officials with the power to determine child support awards within the state. The guidelines are not to be considered binding (Public Law 98-378, 1984).
2. OHIO CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES

Ohio law resulted in complaints concerning fluctuations in alimony and child support awards from one county to another when judges were given wide discretion in making these awards (Norris, 1974). As pointed out by Garfinkel and Uhr (1984)

The amount of support an adult parent pays depends not just on the ability to pay, but on the varying attitudes of both parents, the current relationship between the parents, and the skills of their respective lawyers. Nearly every absent parent can find someone earning more who pays less. And nearly every custodial parent knows someone who is receiving more though the child's father earns less. This and the absence of firm legislative guidelines make child support a major source of continuing tension between many former spouses (p. 115).

Ohio law permitted judges to order either or both spouses to support their children, but prescribed no guidelines in setting this responsibility (Norris, 1974). In conformity with the federal requirement that states adopt guidelines for child support awards by October 1, 1987, the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Child Support Enforcement developed such guidelines. The Ohio child support guidelines are based on an income sharing model.

The determination of the amount of child support is based upon the parents combined gross income. A few income resources (eg. benefits received from means-tested public
assistance programs and child support received for child(ren) not of the current marriage) and expenses (eg. health insurance for the children(s) due support and any pre-existing child support payment obligations) are excluded from the calculations.

After these calculations, the parents' combined gross incomes are compared to a Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations. The Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations is a table which matches the combined gross income of the parents with the number of children involved. The corresponding figure represents the basic child support obligation. Any child care related expenses are added to the basic child support obligation, the sum of which comprises the total child support obligation. The obligation of each parent is computed by multiplying each parent's share of income by the total child support obligation. Allowances for extraordinary expenses, split custody, joint custody and visitation rights are recognized (the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Child Support Enforcement, 1987). In addition, Ohio Senate Bill Number 42, Section 3109.05 (1987-1988) mandates that in determining the amount of child support, including the medical needs of the child, the courts should consider:

(1) The financial resources of the child;

(2) The financial resources and needs of the parents;

(3) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed;
(4) The physical and emotional condition of the child;
(5) The child's educational needs and opportunities which would have been afforded had the marriage continued.

The Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee (1987) provided the courts with broad discretion in deviating from the guidelines to avoid inequities to the child(ren) or to one of the parents. However, the courts are required to provide findings of fact to substantiate any deviations from the guidelines. The current guidelines would enable the court system to improve the equity and uniformity of awards, but do not affect enforcement of support orders.

3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study will examine the effects of background characteristics of judges and attorneys, legal processes (decisions) and characteristics of parents on child support awards in Franklin County, Ohio. Judges and attorneys attitudes toward and experiences with adoption of the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines will also be examined.

Models of child support receipt and amount will be estimated to determine the set of judges' and attorneys' background characteristics, legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics most important in influencing receipt and amount of child support.
The findings of this study could prove useful in providing legal personnel performance feedback and guidance in the design of continuing education programs. These findings could help improve handling of domestic relations cases—particularly, those involving child support. Such modification(s) could have a significant impact on the financial well-being of female headed single parent households.

The study does not compare frequency or amount of child support before and after the adoption of the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines, but it provides a picture at one point in time. Greatest contribution is the addition of detailed information on attorneys and their perceptions of judges. While others have included judge as an explanatory variable, none have included judicial performance.

The first chapter has presented an introduction to the study and established the purpose of the study. The 1987 Ohio child support guidelines were described. The second chapter will present a review of literature.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The review of literature begins with a discussion of theoretical models of divorce proceedings. Empirical studies of need, ability to pay, and legal system are discussed and an assessment of the empirical studies is presented. Judicial performance and methods of judicial evaluations are reviewed. Hypotheses of the study are proposed.

1. THEORETICAL MODELS OF DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

There are many uncertainties involved in legal divorce settlements. In an attempt to reduce uncertainties, many divorcing couples engage in what Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) called 'private ordering'. Private ordering is a process—subject to constraints imposed by the legal system—by which divorcing couples attempt to create their own legally enforceable commitments by engaging in bargaining negotiations outside the courtroom. In fact, Eekelaar (1988) suggests that in determining what financial provisions after divorce should achieve, there is a need for bargaining or assessment of the appropriate redistribution
to reflect contributions and needs of the parties. Harmann, McKenry, and Weber (1979) add that in order for couples to arrive at a successful settlement, there has to be motivation to establish an equitable settlement agreement. Concurring, Turner (1970) reports that empirical research on bargaining in social interactions has been concerned with equity.

The major assumption underlying all discussions of equity has been that people assess their contributions and outcomes in a relationship to evaluate the 'fairness' of social ties (Keith and Schaefer, 1987). The concept of 'fairness' is based on one of two principles, proportionality or egalitarianism. The principle of proportionality states a 'fair' relationship is one in which individual outcomes match inputs, whereas, the principle of egalitarianism states that a 'fair' relationship is one in which outcomes are distributed equally regardless of inputs (Rasinki, 1987).

In a study of 'fairness' judgements, Rasinki (1987) used survey questions to determine how subjects judged 'fairness'. Three items each were used to measure equity, equality, need, and economic individualism. The subjects were asked to rate each of three items on its consistency with equity, equality, need, and economic independence. In their first analysis, a factor analysis technique was used
to measure a two factor model: Factor 1, representing the value of proportionality and Factor 2, representing the value of egalitarianism. For the first factor representing proportionality, they found subjects to express sentiments toward rewarding individual contribution to society and withholding benefits to individuals who do not contribute. For the second factor representing egalitarianism, they found subjects to express a sentiment of equal access to basic services, equal treatment of all members of society, and the redistribution of wealth.

In the second analysis divergent and convergent validity were tested. The items passed the validity tests. In the test of convergent validity, Rasinki (1987) found proportionality and egalitarianism to form meaningful patterns of relationships with other values. Instrumental values such as ambition, capability, independence, and responsibility were found to be highly correlated with the principle of proportionality. Instrumental values such as broad-minded, forgiving, helpful, and loving were found to be highly correlated with the principal of egalitarianism.

A study by Larwood, Levine, Shaw, and Hurwitz (1979) found similar results. A sample of management students was assigned to work separately on two tasks, a skill task and a chance task. After completion of the tasks, participants were to distribute rewards based on either: 1) $2.00
between both people or 2) each person could be allocated up to $1.00.

Allocations were classified as follows: 1) self/other reward allocations of exactly $1.00 were defined as objective equality; 2) self/other allocations in which one party received no reward were defined as a winner take all exchange, and 3) all cases in which both participants were paid unequal, nonzero amounts were classified as objective equity.

Chi-square tests revealed individuals who had used objective equity relationships to allocate the rewards were found to select ability, effort, time and score as inputs with a significantly higher frequency. Cooperation, effort and time were found to have had a higher than average probability of being circled by objective equality users. These authors reported that those making an objective equality decision based their allocation on their knowledge of performance-relevant inputs. Those making an objective equality decision were found to be considering inputs, but referencing inputs which only indirectly were related to performance.

Lane and Meese (1971) defined an equitable relationship as (2.1):

\[
\frac{\text{Inputs of party } p}{\text{Inputs of party } o} = \frac{\text{Outcome of party } p}{\text{Outcome of party } o}
\]
Where:

Inputs=Assets/liabilities and/or qualities which are perceived to be a person's contribution to a relationship

Outcome=Rewards or punishments

In the context of a divorce when bargaining over a child support award, divorcing couples may perceive 'equitability and fairness' in terms of whether the couples' perceived need for a child support award are in compliance with the couples' perceived ability to supply such an award. Consequently, in a divorce bargaining relationship involving a child support award, equation (2.1) can be more realistically expressed as:

\[
\text{Party p's DCS} = f (\text{Ip}, \text{Io}) \ldots (2.2)
\]

\[
\text{Party o's CSS} = f (\text{Io}, \text{Ip}) \ldots (2.3)
\]

Where:

DCS=party's p's demand for child support

CSS=party o's supply of child support

Ip=needs of party p

Io=ability of party o

Proportionality (Rasinki, 1987) mirrors mandates of the Ohio General Assembly (1986, 1987-88) which require legal personnel to consider relevant contributions or inputs to a marital relationship such as earning abilities, financial resources and needs, assets and liabilities of the parties
when distributing assets at the end of a marriage. For these reasons 'fairness' based upon the principle of proportionality is more suitable for a study of divorce in Ohio.

Although divorcing couples engage in 'private ordering', such ordering is constrained by the legal system. The legal system affects when a divorce may occur, how a divorce must be procured, and what the consequences of divorce will be (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979). Added to these constraints, MacCauley and Walster (1977) say that the nature of the legal system rules, the cost of using the system, and the limited power granted to experts produce a less than ideal bargaining system. Therefore, after divorcing couples have bargained over their perceived needs and abilities, their perception of the probability of a favorable outcome may be based on other relevant inputs. Lending support to this argument, MacCauley and Walster (1979) draw an analogy between business and social bargaining, arguing that input constraints such as skill and human capital are not the only relevant inputs. Rather, characteristics of the legal system and process might also be relevant.

Since 'private ordering' is contingent upon constraints imposed by the legal system, equations (2.2) and (2.3) may be combined and rewritten as:
CSA = f (Io, Ip, S)…..(2.4)

Where:
CSA=child support award
Io=ability of party o
Ip=needs of party p
S=legal system characteristics

Theoretical models of divorce have viewed it as a bargaining process in which outcome for individual is a function of inputs to the marriage and characteristics of the legal system. However, empirical studies of child support have modelled it as a function of either demographic characteristics or legal system characteristics, not both. In the case of child support application of the principles of proportionality to the outcome/inputs relationship translates into a discussion of need and division of responsibility to pay in accordance with relative ability to pay. This relationship has received more attention in empirical studies and is discussed first. The influence of the legal system on child support has received less attention in empirical studies and discussed last. Each of these sets of studies may be further classified into those which measure child support simply as received, not received and those which measure it by dollars received.
2. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF NEED AND ABILITY TO PAY

Most studies of need and ability to pay (Robins and Dickinson, 1984; Robins and Dickinson, 1985; Beller and Graham, 1985; and Beller and Graham, 1986) have relied upon the 1979 and 1982 March/April Match Files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The 1979 and 1982 April CPS contained supplemental comprehensive survey information on child support. Socio-demographic characteristics such as race, number of children, age of children, age of parents, marital status, employment status, and education, have been used as measures of need and ability to pay.

A. Receipt of Child Support

Robins and Dickinson (1985) estimated a multinomial logit function for the probability of being awarded child support. They found black mothers, mothers with children under age six, mothers with a longer length of time since marital dissolution, and mothers who have married more than once to have a significantly lower probability of being awarded child support. Better educated mothers, divorced mothers, and mothers with more years married had a significantly higher probability of being awarded child support. Older mothers and employed mothers had a higher probability of receiving child support, although the effects of these characteristics were insignificant.
Beller and Graham (1986) also estimated a logistic function for the probability of being awarded child support. Most of their findings were in agreement with Robins and Dickinson (1985). However, they found age at divorce to have a positive effect on the probability of being awarded child support for blacks only. Mothers with more years of education, large number of children and older children also had significant positive effects on the probability of receiving child support. Although the effect was not significant, value of property settlement had a positive effect on the probability of receiving child support. Mothers who were nonwhites, college graduates, had not reached a settlement, had more years since divorce, and who were recently separated had significant negative effects on the probability of receiving child support. Age at divorce, value of property settlement not known, remarried mothers, and number of marriages that ended in divorce had negative effects on the probability of receiving child support, although the effects of these characteristics were not significant.

A study by Sorenson and MacDonald (1983) used a different data set, the 1977 Aide to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Survey. The 1977 AFDC Survey was compiled from case histories written by social workers on child support award status for a national sample of AFDC recipients.
The drawback of the 1977 AFDC Survey is that it focused on a special sub-set of the population which may be eligible for child support. This sub-set may not be representative of the total population eligible for child support. Using an ordinary least squares regression technique, Sorenson and MacDonald's results were consistent with those of Robins and Dickinson (1985) and Beller and Graham (1986). However, for this sample being a college graduate was positive, but insignificantly, related to receiving child support. Age of youngest child and number of children were positively related to receiving child support. Separated mothers, never married mothers, black mothers, other non-whites, education not known, and location of absent father not known were significant and negatively related to receiving child support. Although the effect was not significant, mothers with less than 12 years of schooling were negatively related to receiving child support.

B. Award Amounts

Robins and Dickinson (1984) estimated a linear model of the determinants of amount of child support income received. The 1979 March/April Match Files of the CPS were their data source. However, the equation was estimated over the sample of 1,056 mothers receiving child support. They found black mothers received significantly less than white mothers. Award amounts also decreased, though insig-
nificantly, as years since marital dissolution increased. Better educated mothers, mothers with large numbers of children, older mothers, and mothers with other children had higher incomes. Divorced mothers, separated mothers, mothers married longer, and mothers married more than once also received higher amounts, although the coefficients were insignificant. Fathers yearly income significantly increased award amounts.

Beller and Graham (1986) improved over Robins and Dickinson (1984) by estimating a nonlinear model of the determinants of amount received. The March/April Match Files of the CPS were also used as their data source. Their findings were consistent with Robins and Dickinson's (1984). However, they found mothers who had remarried received less child support. In addition, they found the value of property at divorce was positively related to the amount.

Sorenson and MacDonald (1983) studied the determinants of the amount of child support per child. Using the 1977 AFDC Survey, they estimated a linear model. They found legally separated mothers and the location of the absent father not known increased the amount per child. Mothers with more than 12 years of education received less per child. Black mothers, mothers with young children, and mothers with large numbers of children received significantly less per child.
3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

Although socio-demographic characteristics are important sources of variation in receipt of child support awards, they are not the sole determinants. Cassetty (1978) and Berstein (1982) argued that the legal system has an effect on the establishment of child support awards. Information from court cases has been used to study the impact of the legal system on child support awards. Divorce or dissolution; whether plaintiff or defendant; number of pages; grounds for decree; divorce contested; attorney present; month of decree; and presiding judge, have been used as characteristics of the legal system.

A. Receipt of Child Support

Recognizing the effects of the legal system, Stafford, Jackson and Burgess (1987) analyzed the effect of characteristics of the legal process in Ohio on receipt of child support awards. A random sample of 914 cases from two rural and one urban county was used in their analysis. For their sample, legal obligations had been established but information on most demographic characteristics was not available. Using ordinary least squares regression, they found attorney representing the woman, number of pages in record, dissolution versus divorce, and woman instead of man granted divorce to significantly increase the probability of receipt of child support. Length of marriage and
rural county significantly reduced the probability of receipt of child support awards.

B. Award Amount

White and Stone (1976) studied the impact of the legal system on setting the amount of child support. The purpose of their study was to ascertain whether or not the legal profession and individual judges used any noticeable principles in granting and setting child support. A random sample of 452 court cases from the Orange County Courthouse, Orange County, Florida, was analyzed. The explanatory variables used in their study were those determined by statutes. Using a multiple regression technique, these authors found considerable variation among judges in which variables significantly affected the amount setting of child support. These authors concluded that although there was little or no consistency among judges in selecting or emphasizing variables to be used in setting child support award amounts, these judges did have a high individual degree of predictability in their choice of variables. Only two of the judges' coefficient of determination were found to be below .887 with the lowest being .64.

Yee (1979) also was concerned with causes of variation in amount of child support awarded. Her sample consisted of a random sample of 287 court cases from the District Court in Denver, Colorado. She analyzed six variables:
income, judge, private attorney, district attorney, fixed living expense, and month of year in which the support order was entered, which were thought to cause variation in the amount of child support awards. Considerable variation in the amount of child support awards was found to exist with fathers' income.

Car payments and house payments were used as proxies to represent fixed living expenses. When looking at car payments alone, the average monthly bill was $136.97. The average support order for the same father was only $113.59 per month.

When looking at the month of the year, support orders were lower during November and December than during other months.

Whether or not an attorney was present also explained variation in amount. The average support order for a respondent with an attorney was $116.09 per month, while the average for a respondent not represented by an attorney was $132.56 per month.

When cases were classified by the judge who decreed the support order, tremendous variation was found in the percentage of income required for child support. Less variation among orders was found when orders were contested in court. The average of orders made after a hearing was found to be significantly lower than that of the full range of orders approved by the same judges.
4. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

Empirical analyses of the influence of judges on child support awards have been limited to examinations of temporary versus permanent status of judge, specialized versus general nature of judicial responsibilities, and a particular judge's case load (intra judge reliability). However, articles on judicature provide guidance on relevant features of judicial performance and how to measure them.

McKay (1980-81) believed that the public was entitled to the following qualities its judges:

1. Independence; not responsive to partisan or private interests
2. Neutrality; not involve personal beliefs and values in judicial matters
3. Competence; a strong legal education and awareness of new developments in the law
4. Prompt and reasoned answers; provide definite answers within a reasonable time frame
5. Decisions in accord with known rules; actions in accord with established precedents

The American Bar Association rules of judicial conduct propose that judges possess the following qualities:

1. Honesty; upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary
2. Integrity; avoiding impropriety
3. Impartial; performing duties faithfully and without
prejudice

4. Industrious; engaging in activities to improve the law

5. Self-restraint; regulating extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties

6. Political responsibilities; refraining from political activity inappropriate to the judicial office (cited in Judicature, 1985).

Concern over 'judicial quality' has led to an increase in judicial evaluations (State Court Journal, 1984). Indeed, Farthing-Capowich and McBride (1987) report that twenty percent of state courts across the country conduct judicial evaluation programs. Judicial evaluations are used for the purposes of evaluating performance of judges and providing the public with information (Sterling, Stott and Weller, 1981) to be used in judicial voting (Griffin and Murdock, 1985) and merit selection and retention of judicial personnel (Sterling, Stott and Weller, 1981). In a study to determine what a sample of Colorado judges thought of performance evaluations, Sterling, Stott and Weller (1981) reported that nearly half of these judges did not perceive any effects from judicial evaluations on their judicial independence. Domestic relations judges in Franklin County, Ohio, also did not perceive any effects from judicial
evaluation on their judicial independence. Domestic relations judges in Franklin County, Ohio in interviews with the researcher expressed: 1) evaluations are needed, 2) evaluations are a good source of feedback, and 3) evaluations are trusting.

A. Bar Association Polls

Bar associations have had the responsibility for conducting and reporting judicial evaluations (Flanders, 1978; Griffin and Murdock, 1985). Griffin and Murdock (1985) suggest that since attorneys are both knowledgeable about the judicial process and active participants in the process they are in a good position to inform the public about judicial performance. However, there seem to be some disagreement among judges over such polls. Sterling, Stott and Weller (1981) found Colorado judges to have only a moderate amount (3.976 on a 5 point scale) of confidence in the reliability of reports from bar associations. Domestic relations judges in Franklin County, Ohio reported confidence in reports from bar associations. In interviews with the researcher, Domestic relations judges in Franklin County, Ohio expressed the belief that: 1) bar association do a pretty good job, 2) questionnaires explore important areas, 3) surveys which protect identity are trustworthy, and 4) bar polls are measures of legal performance.
Bar polls are not without their criticism. Bar polls have been criticized on the grounds that they have a low response rate, are time consuming, it's difficult to respond to questions, and respondent self selection introduces bias (Flanders, 1978).

The Columbus, Ohio Bar Association (1988) conducted a judicial performance poll of domestic relations judges who were eligible for reelection to the domestic relations bench. Members of the Columbus, Ohio Bar Association were asked to rate nine attributes of judges on a scale of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). Of the three Franklin County, Ohio domestic relations judges, only two were eligible to be evaluated. The results from this poll indicated an acceptable to generally strong domestic relations bench in Franklin County, Ohio (Table 2).
Table 2

Columbus, Ohio Bar Association's Evaluation of Eligible Domestic Relations Judges in Franklin County, Ohio, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Solove</th>
<th>Twyford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectivity</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtesy</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal knowledge</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing and quality of opinions</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case management</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtroom management</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement negotiations</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall rating</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Interviews

Flanders (1978) suggests that the best method of judicial evaluation is to interview lawyers. A sample of Colorado judges' placed high confidence (4.402 on a 5 point scale) in the reliability of an evaluation committee composed of lawyers (Sterling, Stott and Weller, 1981). Interviews conducted by the researcher with domestic relations judges in Franklin County, Ohio revealed their confidence in an evaluation team of lawyers. These judges expressed: 1) an evaluation team of lawyers are in a good position to evaluate, 2) an evaluation team of lawyers are
knowledgeable of our legal ability and temperament, and 3) it is interesting to put an evaluation team of lawyers together.

5. ASSESSMENT OF PREVIOUS WORK

Although considerable research effort has been directed toward analyzing the uncertainty surrounding child support, most of the variation remains unexplained. The studies have used the appropriate, state-of-the-art statistical techniques. Their chief problem has been specification error. The major specification error has been the omission of important variables due to data sets used in the analysis.

A number of empirical studies (Robins and Dickinson, 1984; Robins and Dickinson, 1985; Beller and Graham, 1985; Beller and Graham, 1986) have used the 1979 and 1982 March/April Match Files of the CPS in looking at determinants of award and amount of child support. The 1979 and 1982 March/April Match Files of the CPS contained supplemental comprehensive survey information—socio-demographics on child support.

The advantage of these April supplements is that they provide information on a large representative sample of the potential child support population. However, results from these April supplements must be examined with caution.
Robins (1987) criticized these April supplements for failing to target the relevant child support population by including children of any age and possible grandchildren. Other criticisms are that these April supplements lack critical information on the absent father's income, establishment of legal obligations, and omit mothers less than 18 years of age.

A few empirical studies (Stafford, Jackson and Burgess, 1987; Yee, 1979; White and Stone, 1976) have used information from court records to study characteristics of the legal system. Characteristics used were: 1) those determined by legislative statutes, or 2) those related to legal procedures and available in court records. While these studies clearly established the influence of the legal system on child support awards, they have only touched the surface.

These studies analyzed attorneys only by their presence or absence and public versus private status. Since attorneys are integral part of the legal process, essential information such as their ability, attitude toward the legal issue being debated (e.g. child support), and their guiding ideology, need to be studied.

These studies analyzed judges only by name and temporary versus permanent status on bench. Since judges are a part of all divorce cases and approve all settlements, essential
information such as their ability, temperament, integrity, and handling of cases, need to be studied.

6. HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY

Based upon previous studies of need, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Age of children, assets acquired by custodian, liabilities acquired by custodian, employment of custodian, earned income of custodian, other income of custodian, custodian receive welfare, and age of custodian will have a significant effect on receipt and amount of child support.

Based upon previous studies of ability to pay, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 2: Assets acquired by noncustodian, liabilities acquired by noncustodian, employment of noncustodian, earned income of noncustodian, other income of noncustodian, and age of noncustodian will have a significant effect on receipt and amount of child support.

Based upon previous studies of need and ability to pay, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 3: Number of children, number of children receiving support, both parents' liabilities, both parents' assets, length of marriage, homeownership, and amount of property settlement will have a significant effect on receipt and amount of child support.
Based upon previous studies of the legal system, the following hypothesis is proposed:

Hypothesis 4: Whether an attorney handled the case, attorney's type of practice, attorney's experience, attorney's age, attorney's income, attorney's ideology, attorney's attitude toward child support guidelines, whether divorce or dissolution sought, whether plaintiff or defendant, contentiousness of proceeding, grounds for decree, divorce contested, month of decree, judge's experience, judge's age, judge's judicial temperament, judge's judicial integrity, judge's court management, and judge's legal ability will have a significant effect on receipt and amount of child support.

The second chapter presented a discussion of theoretical models of divorce process. Empirical studies of need, ability to pay, and legal system were discussed. An assessment of the empirical studies was presented. Judicial performance and methods of judicial evaluations were discussed. Hypotheses of the study were proposed. The third chapter will present a discussion of the methodology used in this study.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

In this chapter the objectives of the study are stated. The data sets are introduced. The method of sample selection and description of the samples are presented. Methods and techniques used to analyze the data are discussed.

1. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study were to:

A. construct performance scores for judges in Franklin County, Ohio Court of Domestic Relations.

B. provide information on Central Ohio attorneys' attitude toward and experiences with the Ohio 1987 child support guidelines.

C. analyze the relationship between attorneys' characteristics and their judicial scoring.

D. construct and test an empirical model to predict the probability of receipt of child support.

E. construct and test an empirical model to predict amount of child support.

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2. SAMPLES

The data analyzed in this study are from three sources. Divorce case data are from an on-going project focusing on patterns of property and asset dispositions in Ohio divorce cases, 1975-1988. Attorney perceptions were obtained via mail questionnaires; and attitudes of judges were provided through personal interviews.

Information was obtained from the official court records of divorce cases in Franklin County, Ohio in 1987-88. Court records contain information on name(s) and age(s) of children; age of parents; income and employment status; name(s) of attorney(s); name of presiding judge; date of marriage, date of filing and decree; all documents filed in the case such as motions, the separation agreement, and decree. The decree specifies income (child support and alimony) and asset (disposition of residence and cash settlement) awards to both parties.

Two hundred and thirty-five October 1987-March 1988 cases in Franklin County, Ohio Court of Domestic Relations were randomly selected. Randomization was accomplished through the use of a random digit table. Within the random sample of cases, this analysis was limited to only cases involving mothers with minor children.

Questionnaires were mailed to a random sample of 350 Central Ohio attorneys drawn from cases in Franklin County
Court of Domestic Relations during 1987-88. One hundred and forty-seven surveys were returned in usable form.

Survey questionnaires provided information on: 1) attorneys' ratings of Franklin County, Ohio domestic relations judges with respect to judges' judicial temperament, judicial integrity, courtroom management, and legal ability; 2) attorneys' attitude and experiences with the Ohio 1987 child support guidelines; 3) attorneys' perception of judges' use of the Ohio 1987 child support guidelines; 4) attorneys' legal practice; and 5) specific information on attorneys.

Personal interviews with domestic relations judges in Franklin County, Ohio were conducted. Interviews provided information on: 1) background and 2) attitudes toward judicial evaluations.

A. Description of Domestic Relations Cases

i. Socio-Economics

Tables 3-4 contain descriptive statistics on socio-economic variables from the 235 cases involving a minor child. As reported in Tables 3 and 4, fathers were slightly older than mothers (32.4 compared to 30.5). Fathers tended to be in the 30-39 age category, while mothers were mostly in the 18-29 age category.
Most custodial parents had 1 to 2 children, with a mean of 1.6. The mean age for these children was 7.9. Only 1 child was usually awarded support, with a mean of 1.3. The mean amount of support paid was 52.00 dollars per week. The father was the payer of support in the majority (83.0 percent) of cases.

The majority of fathers (83.8 percent) was employed, with a mean income of 22,938 dollars per year (the median income, $20,000 was close to the Bureau of the Census (1988) national median income level of $22,967 for divorced men). The majority of these fathers (88.1 percent) did not have other income sources. Of the few fathers that had other income, the mean yearly amount was only 925 dollars. The source of this other income was usually unemployment benefits.

The majority of mothers also was employed (77.9 percent), with a mean income of 14,983 dollars per year (the median income for these mothers was $14,157, slightly below the Bureau of the Census (1988) national median income level of $15,933 for divorced women). The majority of these mothers (79.6 percent) did not have other income sources. Of the few mothers that had other income, the mean yearly amount was 765 dollars. The source of this other income was usually welfare benefits.
Fathers had a higher mean number of assets (2.2) than mothers (2.1). Mothers has a higher mean number of debts (3.3) than fathers (3.2).
Table 3
Demographic Characteristics of Divorcing Couples with Minor Children in Franklin County, Ohio, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Sd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of mother</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>6.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of father</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>6.842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of child 1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of child 2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of child 3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of child 4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of child 5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of children receiving support</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly dollars of support</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>36.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband earned income</td>
<td>22938.0</td>
<td>12823.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband amount of other income</td>
<td>925.2</td>
<td>1412.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife earned income</td>
<td>14983.0</td>
<td>7208.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife amount of other income</td>
<td>765.6</td>
<td>2113.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife assets</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband assets</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both assets</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife debts</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband debts</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both debts</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Demographic Characteristics of Divorcing Couples with Minor Children in Franklin County, Ohio, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payer of Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband other income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband source of other income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second job</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife other income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife source of other income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premarriage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second job</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ii. Legal Characteristics of Cases

Table 5 contains descriptive statistics on all legal system variables from the 235 cases with at least one minor child. As reported in Table 5, most of this sample sought a divorce (65.5 percent) rather than a dissolution. The divorce was usually granted to the wife (53.2 percent). In the majority of cases the wife was the plaintiff (51.5 percent) and had an attorney present (53.2 percent). The husband was defendant in most of the cases (51.5 percent) and had an attorney present (62.6 percent). In over half the cases (51.1 percent) an attorney was present for both parties. Neglect (46.8 percent) and one year separation (26.4 percent) were the two most frequent grounds cited for divorce. Neither the husband nor wife was likely to contest the divorce, 4.7 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife role</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Husband role</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitioner</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divorce granted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife represented by attorney</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Husband represented by attorney</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>62.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Both represented by attorney</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neglect</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One year separation</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wife contest divorce</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Husband contest divorce</th>
<th>197</th>
<th>83.8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### iii. Selected Characteristics of Judges

Characteristics of domestic relations judges were obtained from interviews. As reported in Table 6, two of the judges were middle age and had recently been appointed to the domestic relations bench (Lias and Solove). Two of the judges were older and had served a number of years on the domestic relations bench (Twyford and Rose). Among these judges, only one had prior judgeship experience before being appointed to the domestic relations bench (Solove). Two of the judges had prior experience as a referee judge before being appointed to the domestic relations bench (Lias and Twyford).

### Table 6

**Selected Characteristics of Judges Handling Cases in Franklin County Court of Domestic Relations, 1987-88**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Lias</th>
<th>Solove</th>
<th>Twyford</th>
<th>Rose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year elect bench</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior judgeship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referee judge</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Description of Attorney Sample

i. Personal Information

The typical respondent to the survey of attorneys may be described by their modal characteristics. As described by the modal responses in Table 7, the typical respondent was a 35 year old male graduate of Capital University Law School who passed the bar exam in 1982. He earned $26,000 to $50,000 last year. He had not been a judicial candidate and his political ideology was either middle of the road or somewhat liberal.

The typical respondent could also be described by the medians. As portrayed in Table 7, half the sample was male, 38, passed the bar exam in 1976 and graduated from one of the two law schools in Franklin County. He earned $51,000 to $75,000 last year. He had not been a judicial candidate and described his political philosophy as middle of the road.
Table 7

Characteristics of Attorneys Handling Cases in Franklin County Court of Domestic Relations, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law school attendance</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OSU</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Columbus</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Ohio</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year attorney passed bar</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940-49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-59</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-69</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-79</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980--</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney interested in judgeship</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney candidate for judgeship</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type judgeship attorney candidate</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic relations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common pleas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney political ideology</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly conservative</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat conservative</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle of the road</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat liberal</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly liberal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60--</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>99,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>63,000</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii. Legal Practice

The typical attorney's legal practice could be described by modal characteristics. As shown by the modal responses in Table 8, the typical respondent had a private practice and spent 76 to 99 percent of his time with civil cases. He had been assigned to each domestic relations judge 0 to 9 times. The domestic relations judges intervened in directing clients settlements 1 to 25 percent of the time. He felt the judges' interventions was fair.

The typical attorney's legal practice could also be described by the medians. As depicted in Table 8, half the sample was in private practice and spent 76 to 99 percent of his time with civil cases. The domestic relations judges intervened in his cases 26 to 49 percent of the time. The attorney felt the intervention was fair.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of practice</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal corporation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time attorney assigned to Lias</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time attorney assigned to Solove</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time attorney assigned to Twyford</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
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<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time attorney assigned to Rose</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50--</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney type practice</th>
<th>Civil only</th>
<th>Civil and criminal</th>
<th>Civil and corporate</th>
<th>Criminal only</th>
<th>Corporate only</th>
<th>All of the above</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time civil case</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-25%</th>
<th>26-49%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>51-75%</th>
<th>76-99%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time spent criminal case</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-25%</th>
<th>26-49%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>51-75%</th>
<th>76-99%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time spent corporate case</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-25%</th>
<th>26-49%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>51-75%</th>
<th>76-99%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judge intervention to direct settlement</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-25%</th>
<th>26-49%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>51-75%</th>
<th>76-99%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>10.9</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iii. Attitude Toward 1987 Child Support Guidelines

The typical attorney's attitude towards the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines could be described by modal or median characteristics. In this instance both statistics reveal the same picture. As described in Table 9, the typical attorney favored passage of the guidelines and believed the judge followed the guidelines 76 to 99 percent of the time. He requested deviation from the guidelines 1 to 25 percent of the time. The judge complied with his request 1 to 25 percent of the time. He believed guidelines increased child support awards for his clients.
Table 9

Domestic Relations Attorneys' Attitudes Toward Child Support Guidelines, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attorney favored passage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly favored</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Favored</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly opposed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-49%</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>76-99%</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney request deviation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1-25%</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-75%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76-99%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge comply with attorney request</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>26-49%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-75%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>76-99%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guidelines increase awards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. STATISTICAL METHODS

To achieve objectives A, B and C, a survey questionnaire (Appendix B) was developed by the researcher (see Appendix A for the preamble to the questionnaire). The questionnaire was based upon frameworks proposed by Griffin and Murdock, 1985; Farthing-Capowich and McBride, 1987; Koebel, 1983; and Sterling, Stott and Weller, 1981. Criteria used to measure the judges' judicial temperament, judicial integrity, courtroom management, and legal ability were based upon recommendations by McKay, 1980-81; The Columbus, Ohio, Bar Association, 1988; Cook, 1984; Griffin and Murdock, 1985; Farthing-Capowich and McBride, 1987; and Koebel, 1983.

The survey questionnaire (Appendix B) was pretested by a group of Central Ohio attorneys, professors from the Ohio State University and personnel of Columbus Monthly Magazine to establish readability and content validity. The participants were asked to make comments concerning either clarity or ambiguity of the survey questionnaire. Survey questionnaire items were revised as indicated.

To achieve objective B, measures of central tendency were used to assess attorneys' attitude toward and experiences with the Ohio 1987 child support guidelines. Measures of central tendency were also used to assess the attorneys' perception of judges use of the Ohio 1987 child support guidelines.
To achieve objective C, Fisher's Least Significant Difference and a MANOVA test procedure were used to assess the attorneys' judicial scoring. Ordinary least squares were used to analyze attorneys' characteristics and their judicial scoring.

To achieve objective D, a probit model was used to determine the probability or receipt of child support awards. The major advantage of the probit model over the linear model lies in the assumption that the probit model's probability function is cumulative normal. That is, disturbance terms have a mean of zero and unit variance. Under the assumption that disturbance terms are normally distributed with the same mean and variance, it then becomes possible to estimate unbiased, consistent parameters of a discrete dependent variable (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977).

The determinants of receipt of child support awards as defined in equation (5.1) were estimated using the probit procedure in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (1983). The coefficients of the model were estimated by maximum likelihood methods. Other than noted as an efficient estimator (Finney, 1971), maximum likelihood is most appropriate for the data set at hand. Maximum likelihood can be applied where the explanatory variables are truly categorical or where continuous and categorical explanatory
variables are mixed. Most important, Maximum Likelihood answers the question "What underlying parameters would be most likely to have produced the observed data?" (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977). Asymptotic standard errors of the coefficients can be obtained from the inverse of the matrix of second derivatives of the likelihood function (Deegan and White, 1976).

Marginal effects were used to estimate the effects of the variables on receipt of a child support award. While theory can be constructed on statistical constructs such as standardized coefficients, policy must be based on 'real' world effects. The data sets used in this study yielded numerous explanatory variables which were thought to effect receipt of child support. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, a two stage process was used to test the hypotheses about the relationship of receipt of child support to one of the explanatory variables. In the first stage, stepwise discriminant and probit analyses were used to reduce the set of explanatory variables. In the stepwise discriminant analysis an F-ratio was used to test the relationship of receipt of child support to one of the explanatory variables. In the probit analysis the likelihood method was used to test the relationship of receipt of child support to one of the explanatory variables. In the second stage, a probit anal-
ysis was used to analyze the reduced child support award model (equation 5.1). The likelihood method was used to test the relationship of receipt of child support to one of the explanatory variables.

For overall testing of equation (5.1), a goodness of fit test between actual and predicted information was undertaken (Finney, 1971) with r-square being the criterion for judgement (Maddala, 1983). The r-square is a multiple correlation coefficient between actual and predicted values.

To achieve objective E, an ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression procedure was used to estimate amount of child support. The purpose of multiple regression is to estimate the independent effect of each variable on the amount of child support when all the other variables in the equation are held constant. The goal of multiple regression is to use information in the explanatory variable to predict changes in amount of child support. Predictors of child support as defined in equation (5.2) were estimated using the OLS multiple regression procedure in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (1983). The method of least squares chooses the regression prediction line that minimizes the sum of squared errors (Ott, 1984). Under the stringent assumption of no measurement error, OLS estimators are: 1) unbiased estimators, 2) consistent estimators, and 3) efficient estimators (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1983).
The unstandardized regression coefficient was used to describe effects of the variables. The unstandardized regression coefficient reflects the change in the mean response of child support amount per unit change in the explanatory variable when all other explanatory variables are held constant. The data sets used in this study yielded numerous explanatory variables which were thought to effect award amounts. To eliminate the problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, a two stage process was used to test the hypotheses about the relationship of award amount to one of the explanatory variables.

In the first stage, an OLS multiple regression procedure was used to reduce the set of explanatory variables. An F-ratio was used to test whether there was a relationship between award amount and one of the explanatory variables. In the second stage, an OLS multiple regression procedure was used to test the reduced child support amount model (equation 5.2). An F-ratio was also used to test whether there was a relationship between award amount and one of the explanatory variables.

The coefficient of multiple determination (r-square) was used to test the overall fit of equation (5.2). R-square explains the proportionate reduction of total variation in award amounts associated with the use of the set of determinants in the equation (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1983).
4. VARIABLE SELECTION CRITERIA

A. Child Support Award Model

A stepwise discriminant analysis and a probit analysis were used to assess the impact of judges' and attorneys' background characteristics, legal processes, and parents' characteristics on child support awards. The stepwise discriminant analysis was used as a criterion for selection of variables used in the child support award model presented in chapter 2. The stepwise discriminant analysis was used to identify the best linear combination of variables for discriminating between recipients and nonrecipients of child support awards (Maddala, 1983).

Variables were entered into the discriminant analysis based on their ability to discriminate using Rao's V as the criterion. Rao's V is a measurement of the overall distance between two groups. As such, variables that produced the largest increase in Rao's V were included in the analysis.

The standardized discriminant coefficient was used to assess the importance of the various discriminants. The larger the coefficient, the more important the discriminant. Under the assumption of normality, an F-ratio test was used to test the significance of the standardized coefficient (Maddala, 1983). In the absence of detailed empirical research which could serve as a guide, the signifi-
cance cutoff point was set at the .20 level or higher for background characteristics of judges and attorneys. For legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics the significance cutoff point was set at the .10 level or higher.

In the second step a reduced set of variables was used in a probit analysis. The second probit analysis was run on variables which were significant in either the discriminant analysis or initial probit analysis. To be entered into the final child support award equation, significant discriminant variables which were used in the probit analysis on the reduced set of variables had to remain significant. The significance cutoff point was set at the .20 level or higher for background characteristics of judges and attorneys. For legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics the significance cutoff point was set at the .10 level or higher. See Appendix C for the coding of the variables.

B. Child Support Amount Model

A multiple regression technique was used to assess the impact of judges' and attorneys' background characteristics, legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics on child support award amounts. A multiple regression is used for the purposes of: 1) description, 2) control, and 3) prediction (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1983).
Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1983) argued that only a limited number of independent or predictor variables should be included in a regression model. Selecting a limited number of variables posed the problem of choosing a set of independent variables which was 'good' for the purposes of the analysis. Consequently, only those variables which were found significant in analyses of the three sets of characteristics (i.e., background, legal processes, and parents' characteristics) were included in the child support amount equation. The significance cutoff point was set at the .20 level or higher for background characteristics of judges and attorneys. For legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics the significance cutoff point was set at the .10 level or higher. See Appendix C for the coding of the variables.

Third chapter presented the objectives of the study. Data sets were introduced, and samples described. Methods and techniques of data analysis were discussed. The fourth chapter will present a discussion of the measurement of judicial performance.
CHAPTER IV
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

In this chapter there will be a discussion of the judicial performance scores used to analyze the influence of judges on child support awards. Attorneys were asked to score judges on four performance attributes: 1) judicial temperament, 2) judicial integrity, 3) courtroom management, and 4) legal ability. The most parsimonious measurement of performance will be discussed. An assessment of the attorneys' scoring is presented.

1. DESCRIPTION OF JUDGES' SCORES

Attorneys scored judges on four performance attributes: 1) judicial temperament, 2) judicial integrity, 3) courtroom management, and 4) legal ability. Judicial temperament measured the judges' attitude toward their assigned cases. Judicial integrity measured the judges' sincerity toward their assigned cases. Courtroom management measured the judges' handling of their assigned cases. Legal ability measured the judges' knowledge of the law. In this section the performance scores of judges in Franklin County
Court of Domestic Relations are described. The best measure of performance for use in analyzing child support awards is selected.

A. Temperament Scores

As reported in Table 14, the attorneys' overall assessment of the judges' judicial temperament was slightly good (5.45). As described in Table 10, the attentive attribute received the highest mean score (5.70). The patient attribute received the lowest mean score (5.10). The modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 3.000. The range in the modal score was greater than the range in the average score. One judge scored lower than other judges on every attribute.

The mean score for the courteous attribute was 5.65. Mean scores ranged from 6.354 to 4.374. Modal responses ranged from 7.000 to 5.000.

The objective attribute mean score was 5.45. Mean scores ranged from 5.925 to 4.605. Modal responses ranged from 6.000 to 4.000.

The mean score for the concerned attribute was 5.38. Mean scores ranged from 6.102 to 4.129. Modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 4.000.

The attentive attribute received the highest overall mean score (5.70). The highest mean score received by any judge was 6.306. The lowest mean score was 4.680. The modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 5.000.
The patient attribute received the lowest overall mean score (5.10). The highest score received by any judge was 5.939. The lowest score was 3.469. Modal responses ranged from 7.000 to 3.000.

Table 10

Temperament Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lias</th>
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<th>Twyford</th>
<th>Rose</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<td>6.211</td>
<td>5.65</td>
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<td>5.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
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<td>5.871</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.211</td>
<td>1.706</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.129</td>
<td>5.837</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.090</td>
<td>1.757</td>
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<td>5.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attentive Mean</td>
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<td>4.680</td>
<td>6.014</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.704</td>
<td>1.007</td>
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<td>7.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient Mean</td>
<td>5.333</td>
<td>5.673</td>
<td>3.469</td>
<td>5.939</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
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<td>1.799</td>
<td>1.106</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.000</td>
<td>3.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Integrity Scores

As depicted in Table 14, the attorneys' overall assessment of the judges' judicial integrity was slightly good (5.36). As reported in Table 11, the fair attribute received the highest mean score (5.63). The unbiased attribute received the lowest mean score (4.74). The modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 4.000. The range in the modal score was greater than the range in the average score. With the exception of the unbiased attribute, there was differentiation in the attorneys' scoring. One judge consistently scored lower than other judges.

The fair attribute received the highest overall mean score (5.63). The highest mean score received by any judge was 6.082. The lowest mean score received was 4.980. The highest modal response was 7.000. The lowest modal response was 4.000.

The mean score for the impartial attribute was 5.51. Mean scores ranged from 5.932 to 4.946. Modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 4.000.

The unbias attribute received the lowest overall mean score (4.74). The highest mean score received by any judge was 5.034. The lowest mean score received by any judge was 4.313. The modal scores were consistent at 4.000.

The diligent attribute mean score was 5.55. Mean scores ranged from 6.224 to 4.435. Modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 5.000.
The mean score for the industrious attribute was 5.41. Mean scores ranged from 6.320 to 3.973. Modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 5.000.

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrity Scores</th>
<th>Lias</th>
<th>Solove</th>
<th>Twyford</th>
<th>Rose</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fair</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.469</td>
<td>6.082</td>
<td>4.980</td>
<td>6.014</td>
<td>5.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>1.376</td>
<td>1.150</td>
<td>1.777</td>
<td>1.129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impartial</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>5.878</td>
<td>4.946</td>
<td>5.932</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
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<td>Std dev</td>
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<td>1.782</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unbiased</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.633</td>
<td>5.034</td>
<td>4.313</td>
<td>5.007</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>1.419</td>
<td>1.505</td>
<td>1.695</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diligent</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.653</td>
<td>6.224</td>
<td>4.435</td>
<td>5.925</td>
<td>5.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
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<td>1.744</td>
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<td>Mode</td>
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<td>7.000</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industrious</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.565</td>
<td>6.320</td>
<td>3.973</td>
<td>5.789</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>1.314</td>
<td>.921</td>
<td>1.861</td>
<td>1.195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
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<td>7.000</td>
<td>5.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Courtroom Management Scores

As described in Table 14, the attorneys' overall assessment of the judges' courtroom management was slightly good (5.30). As reported in Table 12, the efficiency attribute received the highest mean score (5.49). The willing to work beyond normal hours attribute received the lowest mean score (4.78). The modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 3.000. The range in the modal score was greater than the range in the average score. On every attribute one judge scored lower than other judges.

The mean score for the prompt with motions attribute was 5.39. Mean scores ranged from 5.605 to 5.184. Modal scores ranged from 6.000 to 4.000.

The convene court promptly attribute received a mean score of 5.43. Mean scores ranged from 5.789 to 5.007. Modal scores ranged from 6.000 to 4.000.

The efficient use of time attribute received the highest overall mean score (5.49). The highest mean score received by any judge was 5.701. The lowest score received by any judge was 5.299. Modal scores ranged from 6.000 to 4.000.

The willing to work beyond normal business hours attribute received the lowest overall mean score (4.78). The highest mean score received was 5.449. The lowest mean score was 3.653. Modal scores were consistent at 4.000.
The mean score for the available during normal business hours attribute was 5.42. Mean scores ranged from a high of 6.068 to a low of 4.442. The highest modal score was 7.000. The lowest modal score was 3.000.

Table 12

Courtroom Management Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lias</th>
<th>Solove</th>
<th>Twyford</th>
<th>Rose</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prompt with motions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.184</td>
<td>5.599</td>
<td>5.197</td>
<td>5.605</td>
<td>5.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>1.266</td>
<td>1.343</td>
<td>1.417</td>
<td>1.076</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>6.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Convene court promptly

|          |      |        |         |      |       |
| Mean     | 5.367| 5.571  | 5.007   | 5.789| 5.43  |
| Std dev  | 1.360| 1.329  | 1.653   | 1.118|       |
| Mode     | 4.000| 6.000  | 6.000   | 6.000|       |

Efficient

|          |      |        |         |      |       |
| Mean     | 5.354| 5.633  | 5.299   | 5.701| 5.49  |
| Std dev  | 1.323| 1.325  | 1.537   | 1.050|       |
| Mode     | 4.000| 6.000  | 6.000   | 6.000|       |

Work beyond hours

|          |      |        |         |      |       |
| Mean     | 4.905| 5.449  | 3.653   | 5.116| 4.78  |
| Std dev  | 1.321| 1.415  | 1.683   | 1.263|       |
| Mode     | 4.000| 4.000  | 4.000   | 4.000|       |

Available during hours

|          |      |        |         |      |       |
| Mean     | 5.469| 6.068  | 4.442   | 5.728| 5.42  |
| Std dev  | 1.294| 1.058  | 1.938   | 1.150|       |
| Mode     | 4.000| 7.000  | 3.000   | 6.000|       |
D. Legal Ability Scores

As described in Table 14, the attorneys' overall evaluation of the judges' legal ability was slightly good (5.67). As depicted in Table 13, the understand issues attribute received the highest mean score (5.97). The administrative ability attribute received the lowest mean score (5.33). Modal scores ranged from a high of 7.000 to a low of 4.000. On all attributes one judge scored lower than the other judges.

The administrative ability attribute received the lowest overall mean score (5.33). The highest mean score received by any judge was 5.660. The lowest mean score received by any judge was 4.952. Modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 4.000.

The ability to make decisions attribute received a score of 5.95. Mean scores ranged from 6.265 to 5.599. Modal scores ran from a high of 7.000 to a low of 6.000.

The understand issues attribute received the highest overall mean score (5.97). The highest mean score received was 6.374. The lowest mean score received was 5.605. Modal scores were consistent at 7.000.

The mean score received for the quality of reason attribute was 5.42. Mean scores ranged from 5.939 to 4.667. Modal scores ranged from 7.000 to 4.000. The keep abreast with current legal developments attribute received a mean
score of 5.70. Mean scores ran from a high of 6.211 to a low of 5.184. Modal scores ran from a high of 7.000 to a low of 4.000.

Table 13

**Legal Ability Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lias</th>
<th>Solove</th>
<th>Twyford</th>
<th>Rose</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Administrative ability</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.619</td>
<td>6.211</td>
<td>5.184</td>
<td>5.810</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>1.305</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>1.504</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td>4.000</td>
<td>7.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E. Overall Assessment

As summarized in Table 14, the attorneys' overall assessment of the judges' performance was slightly good (5.44). The attorneys' assessment of the judges' legal ability received the highest overall mean score (5.67). The attorneys' assessment of the judges' courtroom management received the lowest overall score (5.30). Evidently, these attorneys put more emphasis on the judges' actual judicial knowledge than on the judges' handling of paper work. The judges' legal ability is an inferred attribute, and, is an attribute which often determines judicial decision making outcomes. The mean performance characteristics scores are in range with the total overall performance mean score.

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Performance Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Temperament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courtroom Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Mean Score</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. THE MOST PARSIMONIOUS MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE

A MANOVA test procedure was used to assess the attorneys' mean scoring of the judges' performance characteristics. The MANOVA indicated that each characteristic was significant at the .001 level or higher. As described in Table 15, the attorneys scored the judges' performances differently. Fisher's Least Significant Difference (FLSD), the smallest difference that would be statistically significant, indicated there was some similarity among the attorneys in scoring Judges Solove and Rose. Judges Solove and Rose consistently received higher mean scores on every characteristic. Judges Solove and Rose differed from Judges Twyford and Lias. And, Judge Twyford differed from Judge Lias.

Use of an overall performance score would have captured variability among the judges; however, the judges' performance characteristics were found not to be homogeneous (Table 15). The judges' mean scores differed among characteristics. Although Fisher's Least Difference test showed some similarity among the attorneys in scoring some of the characteristics, the differences among scores were greater than the similarities. Consequently, using an aggregate mean score as the measure of judges' performance would have masked variability in performance which could affect child support awards.
Table 15

Differences in Mean Scores by Performance Characteristics and Judge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lias</th>
<th>Solove</th>
<th>Twyford</th>
<th>Rose</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>FLSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temp</td>
<td>27.687</td>
<td>30.361</td>
<td>21.209</td>
<td>29.871</td>
<td>105.65</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integ</td>
<td>26.626</td>
<td>29.537</td>
<td>22.646</td>
<td>28.667</td>
<td>58.32</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage</td>
<td>26.279</td>
<td>28.320</td>
<td>23.599</td>
<td>27.939</td>
<td>42.62</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abilit</td>
<td>27.531</td>
<td>30.395</td>
<td>26.299</td>
<td>29.408</td>
<td>25.86</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>54.09</td>
<td>18.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLSD</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. ATTORNEY CHARACTERISTICS AND SCORES

A. Attorney Characteristics and Overall Total Score

An Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) technique was used to determine whether characteristics of attorneys had an effect on their scoring of the judges. As described in Table 16, attorney characteristics only affected their scoring of Judge Lias. The Judge Lias variable was significant at the .10 level. The more the attorneys were exposed to Judge Lias, the more the attorneys liked her. Judge Lias is a recent appointee to the domestic relations bench. With the exception of Judge Lias, attorney characteristics had little effect on their overall scoring of the judges. Ten percent of the variance was explained.
## Table 16

The Effects of Attorney Characteristics on Total Performance Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney Characteristics</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Twyford</td>
<td>-0.457632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.000019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge candidate</td>
<td>-0.083787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspire to be judge</td>
<td>4.804343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>11.221220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-0.487101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.523270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law school</td>
<td>2.168352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-15.124596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>0.583168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lias</td>
<td>1.392813*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 Continued

Year passed bar  .281447
                 (.50)
Solove       -.148981
              (-.25)
Rose        .783402
            (1.14)
R-square = .10
* = significant at the .10 level

B. Attorney Characteristics and Lias Score

As showed by the OLS regression in Table 17, characteristics of attorneys had little effect on their scoring of Judge Lias. Only seven percent of the variance was explained. Older attorneys had a positive effect on Judge Lias' score. The attorney's age variable was significant at the .05 level.
Table 17

The Effects of Attorney Characteristics on Lias Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney Characteristics</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year passed bar</td>
<td>.059508 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.269978 (.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspire to be judge</td>
<td>1.937173 (1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law school</td>
<td>.715955 (.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>6.295390 (1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge candidate</td>
<td>3.064188 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-3.052925 (-.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.308992* (2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>.658903 (.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.000004 (.55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square = .07
* = significant at .05
C. Attorney Characteristics and Solove Score

The OLS regression in Table 18 showed little relationship between attorney characteristics and Judge Solove's score. Only seven percent of variance was explained. The coefficients indicated that the more recently the attorneys passed the bar examination the higher they rated Judge Solove. Attorneys who had not been judicial candidates scored Solove six points lower than ones who had been a candidate. The exam variable and judge candidate variable were significant at the .10 level or higher.
Table 18
The Effects of Attorney Characteristics on Solove Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney Characteristics</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year passed bar</td>
<td>.298593* (1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>-.545723 (-.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspire to be judge</td>
<td>1.194224 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law school</td>
<td>-.627975 (-.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>-.781226 (-.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge candidate</td>
<td>-9.059747* (-1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>2.415389 (.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.029910 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>.131010 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.000005 (.65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square = .07
* = significant at the .10 level or higher
D. Attorney Characteristics and Twyford Score

As depicted by the OLS regression in Table 19, there was little relationship between attorney characteristics and Judge Twyford's score. Six percent of the variance was explained. The regression coefficients showed female attorneys scored Judge Twyford lower than male attorneys. The gender variable was significant at the .05 level.
Table 19

The Effects of Attorney Characteristics on Twyford Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney Characteristics</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year passed bar</td>
<td>.065605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.036164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspire to be judge</td>
<td>.935498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law school</td>
<td>.673596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>3.119819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge candidate</td>
<td>1.935927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-11.173866*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.221259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>-1.127285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.000005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.62)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square = .06

* = significant at the .05 level
E. Attorney Characteristics and Rose Score

The OLS regression in Table 20 revealed little relationship between attorney characteristics and scores for Judge Rose. Five percent of the variance was explained. Higher income attorneys scored Judge Rose favorably. The income variable was significant at the .05 level.
Table 20

The Effects of Attorney Characteristics on Rose Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attorney Characteristics</th>
<th>Regression Coefficients (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year passed bar</td>
<td>-.131665 (-.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.078524 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspire to be judge</td>
<td>.014309 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law school</td>
<td>.505675 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>2.415651 (.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge candidate</td>
<td>.047511 (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.675316 (-.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.047916 (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>-.663808 (-.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.000011* (2.13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square = .05
* = significant at the .05 level
CHAPTER V
CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS

This chapter begins with the construction of the child support award model. Preliminary findings from the three characteristics groups—judges' and attorneys' background characteristics, legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics—are discussed first. The child support award model is then presented and estimated. Afterwards, construction of the child support amount model is described. Preliminary findings from the three characteristics groups—judges' and attorneys' background characteristics, legal processes and parents' characteristics—are discussed. The child support amount model is then presented and estimated.

1. MODEL BUILDING: CHILD SUPPORT AWARD

At the first stage in variable reduction or model building the criteria for continued use in the second stage were inclusion in the final step of a stepwise discriminant function analysis and significance at the: 1) .20 level or higher for judges' and attorneys' background characteris-
tics and 2) .10 level or higher for legal processes and parents' characteristics in a probit analysis. At the second stage the criterion for continued use in the final model was significance at the .10 level or higher in a probit analysis run on all variables which passed the criteria in the first stage.

A. Judges' and Attorneys' Background Characteristics

Two background characteristics, attorney's gender and attorney employed in a legal corporation emerged as best discriminators between child support recipients and nonrecipients (Table 21). These variables were significant at the .20 level or higher. Knowledge of these two background characteristics enabled us to classify 76 percent of awards correctly. Four background characteristics, attorney's age, favored passage of guidelines, attorney employed in a private practice, and attorney's experience, were significant at the .20 level or higher in the probit model (Table 21). Once the impact of these six background characteristics variables was taken into account, attorney in all type of practice, judge's age, attorney's ideology, attorney's income, judge's experience, attorney employed as public defender, attorney employed in a corporate practice, judge's temper, judge's legal ability, judge's courtroom management, and judge's integrity, were rejected at stage one. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had
no affect on receipt of a child support award could not be rejected at the .20 level or higher.

Table 21

Stepwise Discriminant and Initial Probit Analysis of the Effects of Judges' and Attorneys' Characteristics on Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Characteristics</th>
<th>N=92 Discriminant Coefficient</th>
<th>N=92 Probit Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All type of practice</td>
<td>0.87423*</td>
<td>1.66044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>-0.56873*</td>
<td>-0.49577*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private practice</td>
<td>0.90727*</td>
<td>0.14571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's age</td>
<td>-.05693</td>
<td>-0.04260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney ideology</td>
<td>-0.56873*</td>
<td>2.64184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney gender</td>
<td>1.05693</td>
<td>-0.12264*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney income</td>
<td>0.49577*</td>
<td>0.04260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal corporation practice</td>
<td>-0.56873*</td>
<td>-0.04260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public defender practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation practice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's temper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's legal ability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's courtroom manage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canonical R-square = .19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent classified correct = 76%
* = significant at the .20 level or higher

As reported in Table 22 attorney's age, attorney's experience and attorney employed in a private practice, remained significant in the probit analysis on the reduced set of variables. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award was rejected at the .10 level or higher. Attorney female,
favored passage of guidelines, and attorney employed in a legal corporation were rejected for inclusion in the final model. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award could not be rejected at the .10 level or higher. Attorneys who were in a private practice had a large positive effect on the receipt of a child support award. Although the effect was small, experienced attorneys also had a positive effect on receipt of a child support award. Older attorneys had a small negative effect on receipt of a child support award.

Table 22

*Intermediate Probit Analysis of the Effects of Judges' and Attorneys' Characteristics on Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Characteristics</th>
<th>Probit Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attorney gender</td>
<td>-.41886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private practice</td>
<td>.61456*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favored passage of guidelines</td>
<td>-.19778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal corporation practice</td>
<td>2.52933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney's age</td>
<td>-.09100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney experience</td>
<td>.11938*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* = significant at the .10 level or higher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Legal Processes (decisions)

Six legal processes (decisions) emerged as best discriminators between child support recipients and nonrecipients (Table 23). They were number of pages filed, woman had attorney, husband contested divorce, divorce (as type of
action), one year separation, and neglect. These variables were significant at the .01 level. Knowledge of these six legal processes (decisions) characteristics enabled us to classify 71 percent of the awards correctly. Four legal processes (decisions) were significant in the probit model (Table 23). They were neglect, one year separation, number of pages filed, and husband contested divorce. These variables were significant at the .05 level. Once the impact of these six legal processes (decisions) characteristics was taken into account, man had attorney, wife contested divorce, wife was plaintiff, husband was plaintiff, month of decree, and custody were rejected at stage one. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award could not be rejected at the .10 level or higher.
Table 23

Stepwise Discriminant and Initial Probit Analysis of the Effects of Legal Processes on Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Processes</th>
<th>N=235 Discriminant Coefficient</th>
<th>N=235 Probit Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman had attorney</td>
<td>0.47150*</td>
<td>.43831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man had attorney</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.30031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>-1.11193*</td>
<td>-4.35785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect</td>
<td>1.01313*</td>
<td>1.43030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year separation</td>
<td>0.78420*</td>
<td>1.40360*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of pages filed</td>
<td>0.49128*</td>
<td>.01316*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband contest divorce</td>
<td>0.40768*</td>
<td>1.28257*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife contest divorce</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.48762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife was plaintiff</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.60435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband was plaintiff</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.99966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month of decree</td>
<td></td>
<td>.00103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custody</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canoncal R-square = .30
Percent classified correctly = 71%
* = significant at the .05 level or higher

As presented in Table 24 the six variables number of pages filed, woman had attorney, divorce, husband contest divorce, one year separation, and neglect remained significant in the probit analysis on the reduced set of variables. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award was rejected at the .10 level or higher. Husband contested divorce, one year separation, and neglect had large positive effects on the receipt of a child support award. Although the effect was small, woman had attorney and number of pages filed had a positive effect on the receipt of a child support award.
Divorce had a large negative effect on the receipt of a child support award.

Table 24

Intermediate Probit Analysis of the Effects of Legal Processes on Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Characteristics</th>
<th>Probit Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of pages filed</td>
<td>0.00996*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman had attorney</td>
<td>0.46766*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>-1.71693*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband contest divorce</td>
<td>1.15252*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year separation</td>
<td>1.50442*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect</td>
<td>1.48961*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the .10 level or higher

C. Parents' Characteristics

Five parents' characteristics emerged as best discriminators between child support recipients and nonrecipients (Table 25). They were homeownership, noncustodial assets, noncustodial employment, custodial employment, and both parents' assets. These variables were significant at the .01 level. Knowledge of these five parents' characteristics provided classification of 85 percent of the awards correctly. Three parents' characteristics, homeownership, noncustodial employment and both parents' assets, were significant in the probit model (Table 25). These variables were significant at the .10 level or higher. Once the impact of these five parents' characteristics was taken
into account, welfare, age of child(ren), length of marriage, noncustodial liabilities, custodial age, both parents' liabilities, amount of property settlement, and number of children, were rejected at stage one. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award could not be rejected at the .10 level or higher.
Table 25

Stepwise Discriminant and Initial Probit Analysis of Parents' Characteristics on Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parents' Characteristics</th>
<th>Discriminant Coefficients</th>
<th>Probit Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=220</td>
<td>N=220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>.45772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>-0.55298*</td>
<td>-.67337*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of children</td>
<td></td>
<td>.00208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial employed</td>
<td>0.83849*</td>
<td>1.28287*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial assets</td>
<td>0.16125*</td>
<td>1.14968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial liabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>.00346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial age</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial employed</td>
<td>0.20738</td>
<td>.53041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial assets</td>
<td></td>
<td>.07646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial liabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>.01638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial age</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both Assets</td>
<td>0.26859*</td>
<td>.65487*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both liabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>.14597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of property sett</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children</td>
<td></td>
<td>.13852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canoncal R-square = .47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent classified correct = 85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the .10 level or higher

As reported in Table 26, homeownership, noncustodial employment and both parents' assets remained significant in the probit analysis on the reduced set of variables. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award was rejected at the .10 level or higher. Custodial assets and employment were rejected for inclusion in the final model. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on receipt of a child support award could not be rejected at the .10 lev-
el or higher. Noncustodial employment and both parents' assets had large positive effects on the receipt of a child support award. Custodial employment had a small positive effect on receipt of a child support award. Homeownership had a large negative effect on the receipt of a child support award.

Table 26
Intermediate Probit Analysis of the Effects of Parents' Characteristics on Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Characteristics</th>
<th>Probit Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>-.59941*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial assets</td>
<td>.05618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial employment</td>
<td>1.41325*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial employment</td>
<td>.37144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both assets</td>
<td>.67463*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the .10 level or higher

D. The Empirical Child Support Award Model

Assuming the theoretical models specified in chapter 2 are a true representation of divorcing couples' divorce action, the custodial parents' demand for a child support award and the noncustodial parents' ability to supply a child support award are seen as functions of needs of the custodial (2.2), ability of noncustodian to pay (2.3), and legal system characteristics (2.4). To achieve objective D, the following child support award model was estimated:

\[ CS_{\text{award}} = f(I_p, I_o, S) \ldots (5.1) \]
Where:

\[ \text{Ip} = \text{Needs of custodian} \]
\[ \text{Io} = \text{Ability of noncustodian to pay} \]
Noncustodian employment
\[ \frac{\text{Ip}}{\text{Io}} = \text{Needs and Ability} \]
Homeownership
Both parents' assets
\[ S = \text{Legal System Characteristics} \]
Attorney with a private practice
Attorney's age
Attorney's experience
Number of pages filed
Woman had attorney
Divorce
Husband contest divorce
One year separation
Neglect

E. Child Support Award Model Estimation

Results of equation (5.1) estimating receipt of child support are reported in Table 27. Only variables significantly affecting the probability of receipt of a child support award at the .10 level or higher are discussed. The statistical hypothesis of no effect for attorney's age, attorney's experience, women represented by an attorney, homeownership, noncustodial employment, and number of pages...
filed was rejected at the .10 level or higher. Attorney's age had a small negative effect on receipt of a child support award. Woman represented by an attorney and homeownership had large negative effects on receipt of a child support award. Noncustodial employment had a large positive effect on receipt of a child support award. Number of pages filed and attorney's experience had small positive effects on receipt of a child support award. The statistical hypothesis of no effect for divorce, husband contested divorce, one year separation, neglect, and both parents' assets could not be rejected at the .10 level or higher.
Table 27
Probit Analysis of Factors Affecting Receipt of Child Support Awards, 1987-88

N=92
Probit
Coefficients
(Standard Errors)

Factors
Attorney's age              \(-.17397^*\)
                            \((-1.72)\)
Private practice           \(.39481\)
                            \((.53)\)
Attorney experience        \(.22690^*\)
                            \((1.90)\)
Number of pages filed       \(.06027^*\)
                            \((1.61)\)
Woman had attorney         \(-1.90199^*\)
                            \((-1.80)\)
Divorce                    \(-2.62755\)
                            \((-1.44)\)
Husband contest divorce    \(2.48091\)
                            \((1.18)\)
One year separation        \(2.57989\)
                            \((.44)\)
Neglect                    \(2.58851\)
                            \((.43)\)
Homeownership              \(-1.60802^*\)
                            \((-1.83)\)
Table 27 Continued

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial employment</td>
<td>1.53515*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both assets</td>
<td>2.52617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the .10 level or higher
Pearson Goodness of Fit Chi Square = 18.291
Degrees of Freedom = 79
P-value= 1.000

The positive effect for attorney's experience may be an indication that knowledge of the system, ability to bargain, ability to persuade, and ability to present effective legal arguments increases with experience. If so, the positive effect for experience indicates there is a payoff for skill acquisition.

Although attorneys have the ability to win child support awards for their clients, women who were represented by an attorney did not fare as well as others. These attorneys had a relatively large negative effect on receipt of a child support award. This finding is not consistent with results in preliminary stages (refer to Tables 24 and 25), nor with previous empirical research (Stafford, Jackson and Burgess, 1987).

Preliminary results (Tables 24 and 25) of this study and Stafford, Jackson and Burgess (1987) found women who were represented by an attorney were more likely to receive child support awards. These contradictory results could be
due to model specification error. Table 28 includes additional information on attorneys such as age and experience. For example, woman represented by an attorney was negatively correlated with attorney experience (-.30). Thus, women were likely to be represented by less experienced attorneys.

On the other hand, the older the attorney the lower the probability of receiving a child support award. Perhaps, it is possible that the age variable was capturing some of the effects from the attorneys' ideological beliefs and attitude toward child support and the child support system. Attorney's age is associated with political ideology and beliefs about child support and the child support system. While attorneys who were self-evaluated as conservative or middle of the road were distributed evenly across the age span, liberals were not distributed evenly across the age span. Seventy-seven percent of the self-rated liberals were 40 years old or younger. Further, younger attorneys (.74) were more heavily in favor of passage of the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines than older attorneys (.68).

Number of pages filed has been interpreted as being an indicator of contentiousness or willingness to fight for a child support award (Stafford, Jackson and Burgess, 1987). Number of pages had a small positive effect on receipt of a child support award. The greater the willingness to fight
for a child support award, the higher the probability of receiving an award.

Noncustodial employment could be viewed as an indication of ability to pay. Noncustodial employment had a large positive effect on receipt of a child support award. The Ohio General Assembly's House Bill Number 358, Section 3105.18 (1986) and Senate Bill Number 42, Section 3109.05 (1987-88) states that ability to pay must be considered in a support order. Legal personnel are adhering to this mandate of the Ohio General Assembly.

Homeownership could be viewed as an economic asset. Consequently, homeownership has the potential to be used as a bargaining tool. Homeownership had a large negative effect on the receipt of a child support award. Although the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines forbid making trade-offs, legal personnel may be trading equity in homeownership for a child support award.

An alternative explanation is that noncustodial homeowners who are wealthier than nonowners, used their wealth to purchase the skills and abilities needed to convince a judge that extenuating circumstances warrant not awarding child support.
2. MODEL BUILDING: CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT

An OLS multiple regression technique was used to reduce the set of variables for entry in the final child support amount model. Only variables which were significant in preliminary analyses were included in the final child support amount model.

A. Judges' and Attorneys' Background Characteristics

One background characteristic, judge's integrity, emerged significant in the background characteristics model (Table 28). The statistical hypothesis that judge's integrity had no affect on award amount was rejected at the .20 level. Attorney employed in a legal corporation, attorney's income, attorney's age, judge's age, attorney in all type of practice, attorney's gender, favored passage of guidelines, attorney's experience, attorney's ideology, attorney employed in a private practice, and judge's experience, were rejected in the preliminary analysis. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on award amount could not be rejected at the .20 level or higher. Judge's integrity had a large negative effect on award amounts. Judge's integrity was included in the child support amount model presented in chapter 2. Overall, the background characteristics model was moderately strong; twelve percent of variance was explained.
Table 28  
The Effects of Background Characteristics on Child Support Amount, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Characteristics</th>
<th>OLS Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judge's integrity</td>
<td>-2.465981*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal corporation practice</td>
<td>-22.137229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney's income</td>
<td>.000012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney's age</td>
<td>-.055511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's age</td>
<td>-.632755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All type practice</td>
<td>4.992878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney's gender</td>
<td>10.341226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passage of guidelines</td>
<td>-5.877248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney experience</td>
<td>.758431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney ideology</td>
<td>.300720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private practice</td>
<td>3.662887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge experience</td>
<td>-.125104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square = .12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the .20 level or higher

B. Legal Processes (decisions)

The six legal processes (decisions) divorce (as type of action), one year separation, woman had attorney, number of pages filed, husband acted as plaintiff, and wife acted as plaintiff, emerged as significant in the legal processes (decisions) regression (Table 29). The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on award amount was rejected at the .05 level or higher. Custody, wife contested divorce, man had attorney, month of decree, husband contested divorce, and neglect, were rejected in the preliminary analysis. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on award amount could not be
rejected at the .10 level or higher. A one year separation, woman had attorney, husband acted in plaintiff role, wife acted in plaintiff role, had large positive effects on award amounts. Although the effect was small, number of pages filed also had a positive effect on award amounts. Divorce action had a large negative effect on award amounts. These six legal processes (decisions) were included in the child support amount model presented in chapter 2. Overall, the legal processes (decisions) model was moderately strong; sixteen percent of the variance was explained.

Table 29

The Effects of Legal Processes on Child Support Amounts, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Processes</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Custody</td>
<td>11.513047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorce</td>
<td>-84.247785*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year separation</td>
<td>13.729883*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife contest divorce</td>
<td>-5.277153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man had attorney</td>
<td>2.064418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman had attorney</td>
<td>15.540397*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month of decree</td>
<td>.878426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband contest divorce</td>
<td>6.053611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of pages filed</td>
<td>.287250*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband was plaintiff</td>
<td>67.970066*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect</td>
<td>3.283050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife was plaintiff</td>
<td>64.724290*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square = .16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* = significant at the .05 level or higher
C. Parents' Characteristics

The eight parental characteristics—welfare, custodial income, both parents' liabilities, noncustodial income, custodial other income, number of children receiving support, custodial age, and age of child(ren)—emerged as significant in the parents' characteristics regression (Table 30). The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on award amounts was rejected at the .10 level or higher. Noncustodial liabilities, noncustodial other income, amount of property settlement, both parents' assets, custodial liabilities, noncustodial age, homeownership, length of marriage, custodial assets, and custodial income, were rejected in the preliminary analysis. The statistical hypothesis that these variables had no affect on award amount could not be rejected at the .10 level or higher. Both parents' liabilities, number of children receiving support, welfare, and custodial age had large positive effects on award amounts. Although the effects were small, noncustodial income, custodial other income, and age of child(ren) also had positive effects on award amounts. These eight parents' characteristics were included in the child support amount model presented in chapter 2. Overall, the parents' characteristics model was strong; fifty-three percent of variance was explained.
Table 30
The Effects of Parents' Characteristics on Child Support Amounts, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parents' characteristics</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of children</td>
<td>.239509*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial liabilities</td>
<td>-.246394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both parents' liabilities</td>
<td>2.866642*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial other income</td>
<td>.000013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of property sett</td>
<td>-.000024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both parents' assets</td>
<td>2.321942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial liabilities</td>
<td>-.548332</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial age</td>
<td>-.566014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>-3.242402</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>11.323389*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of marriage</td>
<td>-.303045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial assets</td>
<td>.618251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial income</td>
<td>.001379*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial assets</td>
<td>1.934508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial other income</td>
<td>.006689*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial income</td>
<td>.000042*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial age</td>
<td>.824944*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. children receive support</td>
<td>6.233832*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-square = .53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at the .10 level or higher

D. The Empirical Child Support Amount Model

The setting of child support amounts can be seen as a function of needs of the custodial parent (2.2), and ability of noncustodian to pay (2.3), and legal system characteristics (2.4). To achieve objective E, the following child support amount model was estimated:

\[ CS_{amount} = f(Io, Ip, S) \ldots (5.2) \]

Where:

\[ Io = \text{Needs of Custodian} \]

Custodial other income
Custodial income
Welfare
Custodial age

Ip = Ability of Noncustodian to Pay
Noncustodial income

Io/IP = Needs and Ability
Age of child(ren)
Both parents' liabilities
Number of children receiving support

S = Legal System Characteristics
Judge's integrity
Divorce
One year separation
Woman had attorney
Number of pages filed
Husband was plaintiff
Wife was plaintiff

E. Child Support Amount Model Estimation

Results of equation (5.2) estimating amount of child support are reported in Table 31. Only variables significant at the .10 level or higher are discussed. The discussion focuses on variables which significantly affect child support award amounts. The statistical hypothesis of no effect for both parents' liabilities, noncustodial income, age of child(ren), custodial other income, one year separa-
tion, judge's integrity, and number of children receiving support was rejected at the .10 level or higher. Both parents' liabilities, one year separation and number of children receiving support had large positive effects on award amounts. Custodial other income, age of child(ren), and noncustodial income had small positive effects on award amounts. Judge's integrity had a large negative effect on award amounts. The statistical hypothesis of no effect for woman had attorney, divorce (as in action), husband acted in plaintiff role, number of pages filed, wife acted in plaintiff role, welfare, custodial age, and custodial income could not be rejected at the .10 level or higher.
Table 31
Factors Affecting Child Support Award Amounts, 1987-88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>OLS Unstandardized Coefficients (Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Custodial income</td>
<td>0.000032 (1.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>9.984379 (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of child(ren)</td>
<td>0.242329* (6.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband was plaintiff</td>
<td>19.555749 (.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both parents' liabilities</td>
<td>3.113133* (2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncustodial income</td>
<td>0.001329* (8.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial other income</td>
<td>0.006435* (3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One year separation</td>
<td>7.571147* (1.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman had attorney</td>
<td>7.762209 (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge's integrity</td>
<td>-0.745016* (-1.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 31 Continued

Custodial age  
0.190997
(1.40)

Divorce  
-26.941127
(-.95)

Number of pages filed  
0.081307
(1.45)

Number of children receiving supp  
6.692427*
(2.45)

Wife was plaintiff  
24.130469
(.86)

R-square = .53
* = significant at the .10 level or higher

The judge's integrity could be viewed as an indicator of fairness, impartiality, unbiasedness, diligence, and industriousness. These indicators had a large negative effect on award amounts. The judge's integrity was negatively correlated with award amounts (-.05). This result could be due to the legislated mandate that judges follow federal mandated child support guidelines in setting award amounts. If judges follow child support guidelines, indicators of the judges' integrity are not important. The majority of Central Ohio attorneys in this study reported these judges to be following the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines 76-99 percent of the time. Rarely did these judges comply with attorneys' request to deviate from the guidelines (see Table 8).
Alternatively, judges with higher integrity scores maybe following the guidelines while judges with lower integrity scores may deviate (on the high side) from the guidelines.

While past empirical research (Stafford, Jackson and Burgess, 1987) on award amounts focused on total number of children, the present study looked at number of children receiving support and award amounts. Stafford, Jackson and Burgess (1987) found total number of children to be negatively related to award amounts. As total number of children increased award amounts decreased. The present study found number of children receiving support to be positively related to award amounts (.02). Evidently, once legal personnel made a decision as to how many children would actually receive a child support award, children's need was considered more important than ability to pay when setting award amounts.

Both parents' liabilities could be an indication of ability to pay. Wealth is needed to obtain credit. Wealth and credit (liabilities) are positively correlated. Consequently, as the number of liabilities increases the ability to pay also increases. Both parents' liabilities had a large positive effect on award amounts.

Noncustodial parents' income could be interpreted as being an indicator of ability to pay: the higher the noncustodial parent's income, the greater the ability to pay
child support. Although the effect was small, noncustodial parents' income had a positive effect on award amounts. This finding is consistent with Robins and Dickinson, 1984.

Custodial parents' other income could be interpreted as being an indication of need. Other income of custodial parents in this sample is likely to come from sources such as welfare benefits. Custodial parents' other income is probably so low that even an increase in the income would not make much difference. Custodial parents' other income had a small positive effect on award amounts.

A one year separation has fault implications. If a one year separation was cited as ground for divorce, the couple was selecting the least faulty grounds for divorce. In this circumstance the noncustodial parent may be more agreeable to a higher child support award, either because of greater attachment to the child or less anger with spouse.

Age of children had a small positive effect on award amounts. Older children require more economic resources than younger children; the older the child, the more income needed for support.

Also, noncustodial parents may be more attached to older children and so more willing to pay child support.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. SUMMARY

Unpredictable child support has become a national concern. To improve predictability in the child support system, states were mandated to adopt state-specific guidelines for child support awards by October 1, 1987. The present study examined the effects of judges' and attorneys' background characteristics, legal processes (decisions), and parents' characteristics on child support awards in Franklin County, Ohio. This study also looked at attorney attitudes towards and experiences with adoption of the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines.

This study was based upon a theory of bargaining for an equitable outcome. The concept of equity was found to be based upon two principles, proportionality or egalitarianism. The principle of proportionality was found to mirror mandates of the Ohio General Assembly (1986, 1987-88). The principle of proportionality required legal personnel to consider relevant contributions to a marital relationship when determining rewards or outcomes.
Two-hundred and thirty-five October 1987-March 1988 court cases in Franklin County, Ohio Court of Domestic Relations were selected. A survey questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 350 Central Ohio attorneys who represented parties in the 1987-88 sampled cases. One-hundred and forty-seven surveys were returned in usable form.

Franklin County domestic relations judges were scored by Central Ohio attorneys on four performance characteristics--judicial integrity, judicial temperament, courtroom management, and legal ability. The attorneys' overall assessment of the judges' performance was slightly good (5.44 on a 7.00 scale). Although individual mean performance scores were found to be in range with the overall mean performance score, the means were scored differently. Consequently, individual mean scores were used as a statistical measurement of judicial performance.

Over half of the attorneys favored passage of the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines and believed the judge complied with the guidelines most of the time. Deviation from the guidelines was rarely requested. The request for deviation was seldom granted. Over half of the attorneys believed the guidelines increased child support awards for their clients.

Another objective of the study was to estimate a model for the probability of receipt of a child support award.
Criteria of significance were applied to stepwise discriminant analysis and probit analysis for variable selection in the child support award model. The variable selection process involved two stages. At the first stage in variable reduction the criteria for continued use in the second stage were inclusion in the final step of a stepwise discriminant function analysis and significance at the .10 level or higher in a probit analysis. At the second stage the criterion for continued use in the final model was significance at the .10 level or higher in a probit analysis run on all variables which passed the criteria in the first stage.

Of the background characteristics attorney's age, attorney employed in a private practice, and attorney's experience were included in the final receipt model. Six legal processes (decisions) characteristics--woman had attorney, divorce, neglect, one year separation, number of pages filed, and husband contest divorce--were included in the final receipt model. Three parents' characteristics--homeownership, noncustodial employment and both parents' assets--were included in the final receipt model. Attorney's age, woman had attorney and homeownership significantly reduced the probability of receiving a child support award. Attorney experience and noncustodial employment significantly increased the probability of receiving a child support award.
Significance of variables in preliminary OLS multiple regressions was the criterion for inclusion of variables used in the final child support amount model. Only significant variables from the three characteristics groups—judges' and attorneys' background, legal processes (decisions) and parents' characteristics—were included in the final child support amount model.

One background characteristic, judge's integrity, was included in the final amount model. Six legal processes (decisions)—divorce, one year separation, woman had attorney, number of pages filed, husband acted in plaintiff role, and wife acted in plaintiff role—were included in the final amount model. Eight parents' characteristics—both parents' liabilities, noncustodial income, custodial other income, number of children receiving support, welfare, custodial income, custodial age, and age of child(ren)—were included in the final amount model. Judge's integrity significantly reduced award amounts. Both parents' liabilities, noncustodial income, custodial other income, one year separation, custodial age, number of children receiving support, and age of child(ren) significantly increased award amounts.
2. CONCLUSION

In concluding, this author suggests that detailed empirical research be conducted on the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines. While the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee (1987) proposed that the 1987 Ohio child support guidelines (guidelines) would enable the court system to provide predictable and fair child support awards, findings in this study did not support such a proposition. This study found Central Ohio attorneys to be reluctant to win child support awards for their clients. Consequently, child support awards are not as predictable as they could be. Perhaps, this reticence is due to attorneys' perception that the guidelines are producing higher award amounts than before the guidelines. Over 97 percent of the attorneys in this study reported that the guidelines have increased their clients' award amounts. Some of the attorneys wrote additional comments on the questionnaires and voiced verbal comments to the effect that: 1) award amounts are too high, 2) the high award amounts have led clients to file bankruptcy, and 3) the guidelines are in need of revision.

Perhaps, using the present income figure—annual gross—in determining award amounts is a major contributor to the increase in award amounts. Parents' adjusted gross income may be a more realistic income figure to use in determining award amounts. The adjusted gross income figure makes
allowances for taxes. Consequently, child support award amounts would be based on a lower income figure. The lower income figure might lead to lower award amounts. Although there would be less income for child support, the lower child support obligation could allow parents to balance their debt structure. The balanced debt structure could help ensure that debt obligations (e.g., child support and other debts) could be met. The balanced debt structure could 1) help alleviate the bankruptcy problem and 2) help alleviate the problem of unpaid child support obligations.

Judicial integrity was negatively related to amount of child support. This result could be explained by one or two reasons: 1) the federal mandate that judges follow child support guidelines or 2) the judges' reluctance to deviate from the child support guidelines.

This author suggests that future research on child support examine the following questions:

1. Which income figure—gross versus adjusted gross—should be used to determine award amounts?
2. Have child support guidelines affected parents' debt structure?
3. Are attitudinal or structural factors affecting the relationship between judges' integrity and child support?
Appendix A

PREAMBLE TO SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

March 1, 1989

Dear Central Ohio Attorney:

The department of Family Resource Management at the Ohio State University needs your help in assessing the results of the Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee's child support guidelines. We also would like you to evaluate the judges in Franklin County Court of Domestic Relations. Your name was randomly selected from divorce records in Franklin County. The accuracy and completeness of the results depend on your participation. All responses will be completely confidential; neither your name nor address will be used in any way. Only your responses will be coded and only aggregate results will be reported.

Attached is a brief questionnaire. Please score each judge on a seven point scale from 1 point (worst possible score) to 7 points (best possible score) for each of four characteristics: Judicial temperament, Judicial integrity, Courtroom management, and Legal ability. Your additional comments on individual judges or the operation of the Court of Domestic Relations in general will be appreciated on the reversed side of the questionnaire.

Response takes only a few minutes. For your convenience we have enclosed a stamped self-addressed envelope. Please return the questionnaire by March 31, 1989. Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,

Walter Lee Ellis

Study Director

encl: Domestic Relations Questionnaire
Appendix B
ATTORNEY SURVEY

Instructions

1. With which types of practice are you associated? Please circle the appropriate answer.

   A. Private practice
   B. Legal corporation
   C. Partnership
   D. Public defender's office
   E. Other

2. In the spaces provided below please indicate how many times in the last two years each of the judges has been assigned to one of your cases.

   Judge Lias ______
   Judge Solove ______
   Judge Twyford ______
   Judge Rose ______

3. If you have not been assigned to one of these judges during the past two years, please skip part one of the attached questionnaire and proceed to part two on page 2. Otherwise, proceed to part one on the next page.
The quality of our judges is very important. We would like to know how you as an attorney would evaluate judges in the Franklin County Court of Domestic Relations. Use a seven point scale to assess the judges' temperament, integrity, court management, and legal ability.

Ratings

VERY GOOD = 7 points                VERY BAD = 1 point
QUITE GOOD = 6 points               QUITE BAD = 2 points
SLIGHTLY GOOD = 5 points            SLIGHTLY BAD = 3 points
NO OPINION = 4 points

A. Judicial Temperament

1. Courteous  __ __ __ __
2. Objective  __ __ __ __
3. Concerned  __ __ __ __
4. Attentive  __ __ __ __
5. Patient   __ __ __ __
B. Judicial Integrity

6. Fair
7. Impartial
8. Unbiased
9. Diligent
10. Industrial

C. Court Management

11. Prompt with motions
12. Convene court promptly
13. Efficient use of time
14. Work beyond normal hours
15. Available during normal hours

D. Legal Ability

16. Administrative ability
17. Ability to make decisions
18. Understands issues presented
19. Quality of reasoning
20. Abreast legal developments

Please turn to next page
Child support has become an important issue. We would like to know what your experience has been with the 1987 child support guidelines? For questions #21-25, CIRCLE the most appropriate response.

21. Did you favor passage of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee's child support guidelines on October 1, 1987?
   A. Strongly favor
   B. Favored
   C. No opinion
   D. Opposed
   E. Strongly opposed

22. In what percentage of your cases involving minor children has the judge followed the child support guidelines?
   A. 0
   B. 1-25%
   C. 26-49%
   D. 50%
   E. 76-99%
   G. 100%
23. In what percentage of cases involving minor children did you present evidence for deviation from the child support guidelines?
A. 0
B. 1-25%
C. 26-49%
D. 50%
E. 51-75%
F. 76-99%
G. 100%

24. What percentage of time has the judge complied with your request to deviate from the child support guidelines?
A. 0
B. 1-25%
C. 25-49%
D. 50%
E. 51-75%
F. 76-99%
G. 100%

25. Has passage of the child support guidelines increased the amount of child support awarded in your cases?
A. Yes
B. No

Please turn to next page
Part 3

Now, we would like to know about you and your legal practice. For questions #26-31, CIRCLE the most appropriate response.

26. Would you classify yourself as a
   A. Civil lawyer
   B. Criminal lawyer
   C. Corporate lawyer
   D. Other ____________

27. What percentage of your practice is taken up with civil cases?
   A. 0
   B. 1-25%
   C. 26-49%
   D. 50%
   E. 51-75%
   F. 76-99%
   G. 100%

28. What percentage of your cases is taken up with criminal cases?
   A. 0
   B. 1-25%
   C. 26-49%
   D. 50%
   E. 51-75%
29. What percentage of your practice is taken up with corporate cases?
   A. 0
   B. 1-25%
   C. 26-49%
   D. 50%
   E. 51-75%
   F. 76-99%
   G. 100%

30. In what percentage of your divorce cases has the judge intervened to direct an agreement by the divorcing couple?
   A. 0
   B. 1-25%
   C. 26-49%
   D. 50%
   E. 51-75%
   F. 76-99%
   G. 100%
31. Would you say the judge's intervention resulted in a fair settlement?
   A. Yes
   B. No

Please turn to next page
Part 4

We would now like to know some personal information about you. For questions #32-40, CIRCLE the most appropriate response.

32. What law school did you attend?  
  
33. In what year did you pass the bar exam?  
  
34. Have you ever been interested in a judgeship?  
   A. Yes  
   B. No  

35. Have you ever been a candidate for a judgeship?  
   A. Yes  
   B. No  

36. If you answered YES to question #35, for what type of judgeship were you a candidate?  
   A. Domestic relations judgeship  
   B. Criminal judgeship  
   C. Juvenile judgeship  
   D. Common Plea judgeship  
   E. Other
37. Do you think of yourself as
A. Strongly liberal
B. Somewhat liberal
C. Middle of the road
D. Somewhat conservative
E. Strongly conservative

38. Gender
A. Male
B. Female

39. Age

40. In which of the following ranges did your personal gross income for 1988 fall?
A. 0--25,000
B. 26,000--50,000
C. 51,000--75,000
D. 76,000--100,000
E. over 100,000

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Please return in the enclosed envelop.
Appendix C
CODING OF VARIABLES

Dependent Variables
Receipt of Child Support 1=Award
0=Not awarded
Amount of Child Support $/wk/per child

Independent Variables
Needs of the Mother/Ability of Absent Father
Number of children Continuous
Age of children Continuous
Custodial assets Continuous
Custodial liabilities Continuous
Noncustodial assets Continuous
Noncustodial liabilities Continuous
Both assets Continuous
Both liabilities Continuous
Welfare 1=Yes
0=No
Custodial age Continuous
Noncustodial age Continuous
Age of children Continuous
Employment 1=Yes
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<td>0=No</td>
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<td>Amount of other income</td>
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<td>Amount of property sett</td>
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<td>Both rep by attorney</td>
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<td>Defendant</td>
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<td>0=No</td>
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<td>Neglect</td>
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<td>0=No</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Type</td>
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<td>Judge's legal ability</td>
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<td>Judge's experience</td>
<td>(88-Year admit to bench)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judge's age</td>
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<td>(88-Year passed bar)</td>
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Appendix D

SPSSX PROGRAM FOR ATTORNEY DATA SET

The following is a listing of the SPSSX statements which define the attorney data set.

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// REGION=2048K,TIME=6
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// EXEC SPSSX
//DATA1 DD DSN=TS4133.ATRNYDATJISP-SHR
//SYSIN DD *
DATA LIST FILE=DATA1 RECORDS=2 /1
  County 1  Caseid 2-9  Practice 10  Lias 11-12  Solove 13-14
  Twyford 15-16  Rose 17-18  La1 19  La2 20  La3 21  La4 22
  La5 23  Lb6 24  Lb7 25  Lb8 26  Lb9 27  Lb10 28  Lc11 29
  Lc12 30  Lc13 31  Lc14 32  Lc15 33  Ld16 34  Ld17 35  Ld18 36
  Ld19 37  Ld20 38  Sa1 39  Sa2 40  Sa3 41  Sa4 42  Sa5 43
  Sb6 44  Sb7 45  Sb8 46  Sb9 47  Sb10 48  Sc11 49  Sc12 50
  Sc13 51  Sc14 52  Sc15 53  Sc16 54  Sc17 55  Sc18 56  Sc19 57
  Sc20 58  Ta1 59  Ta2 60  Ta3 61  Ta4 62  Ta5 63  Ta6 64
  Tb7 65  Tb8 66  Tb9 67  Tb10 68  Tb11 69  Tb12 70  Tb13 71
  Tc14 72  Tc15 73  Td16 74  Td17 75  Td18 76  Td19 77  Td20 78
  Tb/2  Ra1 2  Ra2 3  Ra3 4  Ra4 5  Ra5 6  Rab 7  Rab8 8  Rab9 9  Rab10 10
  Rb10 11  Rb11 12  Rb12 13  Rb13 14  Rb14 15  Rb15 16  Rb16 17
  Rb17 18  Rb18 19  Rb19 20  Rb20 21  Passage 22  Judgefol 23-25
  Presevid 26-28  Judcompl 29-31  Guideinc 32  Typeprac 33-34
  Civil 35-37  Criminal 38-40  Corporat 41-43  Interfai 44-46
  Interfai 47  School 48  Exam 49-50  Likejudg 51  Judgcand 52
  Typecand 53  Politics 54  Gender 55  Age 56-57  Income 58-63
Variable Labels
  County 'County'
  Caseid 'Attorney case id'
  Practice 'Attorney type of practice'
  Lias 'Attorney assigned to Lias'
  Solove 'Attorney assigned to Solove'
  Twyford 'Attorney assigned to Twyford'
  Rose 'Attorney assigned to Rose'
  La1 'Lias courteous'
  La2 'Lias objective'
  La3 'Lias concerned'
  La4 'Lias attentive'
  La5 'Lias patient'
Lb6 'Lias fair'
Lb7 'Lias impartial'
Lb8 'Lias biased'
Lb9 'Lias diligent'
Lb10 'Lias industrious'
Lc11 'Lias prompt with motions'
Lc12 'Lias convenes court promptly'
Lc13 'Lias efficient'
Lc14 'Lias willing to work'
Lc15 'Lias available'
Ld16 'Lias administrative ability'
Ld17 'Lias ability to make decisions'
Ld18 'Lias understands issues'
Ld19 'Lias quality of reason'
Ld20 'Lias keeps abreast of issues'
Sa1 'Solove courteous'
Sa2 'Solove objective'
Sa3 'Solove concerned'
Sa4 'Solove attentive'
Sa5 'Solove patient'
Sb6 'Solove fair'
Sb7 'Solove impartial'
Sb8 'Solove biased'
Sb9 'Solove diligent'
Sb10 'Solove industrious'
Sc11 'Solove prompt with motions'
Sc12 'Solove convenes court promptly'
Sc13 'Solove efficient'
Sc14 'Solove willing to work'
Sc15 'Solove available'
Sd16 'Solove administrative ability'
Sd17 'Solove ability to make decisions'
Sd18 'Solove understands issues'
Sd19 'Solove quality of reason'
Sd20 'Solove keeps abreast of issues'
Ta1 'Twyford courteous'
Ta2 'Twyford objective'
Ta3 'Twyford concerned'
Ta4 'Twyford attentive'
Ta5 'Twyford patient'
Tb6 'Twyford fair'
Tb7 'Twyford impartial'
Tb8 'Twyford biased'
Tb9 'Twyford diligent'
Tb10 'Twyford industrious'
Tc11 'Twyford prompt with motions'
Tc12 'Twyford convenes court promptly'
Tc13 'Twyford efficient'
Tc14 'Twyford willing to work'
Tc15 'Twyford available'
Td16 'Twyford administrative ability'
Td17 'Twyford ability to make decisions'
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Value labels:

- **County:**
  - 1 'Franklin'

- **Practice:**
  - 0 'Private'
    - 1 'Legal corporation'
    - 2 'Partnership'
    - 3 'Public defender'
    - 4 'Other'

- **Passage:**
  - 5 'Strongly favored'
4 'Favored'
3 'No opinion'
2 'Opposed'
1 'Strongly opposed'/
Guideinc 1 'Yes'
0 'No'/
Typeprac 10 'Civil only'
20 'Criminal only'
30 'Corporate only'
12 'Civil and Criminal'
23 'Criminal and Corporate'
13 'Civil and Corporate'
50 'Government'/
40 'All'/
Interfai 1 'Yes'
0 'No' /
School 1 'OSU'
2 'Capital'
3 'Outside Columbus'
4 'Outside Ohio'/
Likejudg 1 'Yes'
0 'No'/
Judgcand 1 'Yes'
0 'No'/
Typecand 1 'Domestic relations'
2 'Criminal'
3 'Juvenile'
4 'Common pleas'
5 'Other'/
Politics 5 'Strongly liberal'
4 'Somewhat liberal'
3 'Middle of the road'
2 'Somewhat conservative'
1 'Strongly conservative'/
Gender 0 'Male'
1 'Female'/
Compute TotalLa=$(La1+La2+La3+La4+La5)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalLb=$(Lb6+Lb7+Lb8+Lb9+Lb10)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalLc=$(Lc11+Lc12+Lc13+Lc14+Lc15)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalLd=$(Ld16+Ld17+Ld18+Ld19+Ld20)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalL=$(TotalLa+TotalLb+TotalLc+TotalLd)$
Compute TotalSa=$(Sa1+Sa2+Sa3+Sa4+Sa5)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalSb=$(Sb6+Sb7+Sb8+Sb9+Sb10)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalSc=$(Sc11+Sc12+Sc13+Sc14+Sc15)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalSd=$(Sd16+Sd17+Sd18+Sd19+Sd20)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalS=$(TotalSa+TotalSb+TotalSc+TotalSd)$
Compute TotalTa=$(Ta1+Ta2+Ta3+Ta4+Ta5)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalTb=$(Tb6+Tb7+Tb8+Tb9+Tb10)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalTc=$(Tc11+Tc12+Tc13+Tc14+Tc15)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalTd=$(Td16+Td17+Td18+Td19+Td20)$$\nonumber$
Compute TotalT=$(TotalTa+TotalTb+TotalTc+TotalTd)$
Compute TotalRa=$(Ra1+Ra2+Ra3+Ra4+Ra5)$
Compute TotalRb=(Rb6+Rb7+Rb8+Rb9+Rb10)
Compute TotalRc=(Rc11+Rc12+Rc13+Rc14+Rc15)
Compute TotalRd=(Rd16+Rd17+Rd18+Rd19+Rd20)
Compute TotalR=(TotalRa+TotalRb+TotalRc+TotalRd)

Variable labels

TotalLa 'Lias judicial temperament'
TotalLb 'Lias judicial integrity'
TotalLc 'Lias court management'
TotalLd 'Lias legal ability'
TotalL 'Lias total score'
TotalSa 'Solove judicial temperament'
TotalSb 'Solove judicial integrity'
TotalSc 'Solove court management'
TotalSd 'Solove legal ability'
TotalS 'Solove total score'
TotalT a 'Twyford judicial temperament'
TotalTb 'Twyford judicial integrity'
TotalTc 'Twyford court management'
TotalTd 'Twyford legal ability'
TotalT 'Twyford total score'
TotalRa 'Rose judicial temperament'
TotalRb 'Rose judicial integrity'
TotalRc 'Rose court management'
TotalRd 'Rose legal ability'
TotalR 'Rose total score'

COMPUTE LASCORE=(TOTALLD+TOTALSD+TOTALTD+TOTALRD)
COMPUTE JTSCORE=(TOTALLA+TOTALSA+TOTALTA+TOTALRA)
COMPUTE JISCORE=(TOTALLB+TOTALSB+TOTALTB+TOTALRB)
COMPUTE CMSORE=(TOTALLC+TOTALSC+TOTALTC+TOTALRC)
COMPUTE PERFORM=(LASCORE+JTSCORE+JISCORE+CMSORE)

VARIABLE LABEL

LASCORE 'LEGAL ABILITY SCORE'
JTSCORE 'JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT SCORE'
JISCORE 'JUDICIAL INTEGRITY SCORE'
CMSORE 'COURTROOM MANAGEMENT SCORE'
PERFORM 'PERFORMANCE SCORE'

DO IF (PRACTICE=0)
COMPUTE PRIVATE=1
ELSE
COMPUTE PRIVATE=0
END IF
DO IF (PRACTICE=1)
COMPUTE LEGACORP=1
ELSE
COMPUTE LEGACORP=0
END IF
DO IF (PRACTICE=2)
COMPUTE PARTSHIP=1
ELSE
COMPUTE PARTSHIP=0
END IF
DO IF (PRACTICE=3)
COMPUTE PUBDEFEN=1
ELSE
COMPUTE PUBDEFEN=0
END IF
VARIABLE LABELS
PRIVATE 'ATTORNEY PRIVATE PRACTICE'
LEGACORP 'ATTORNEY LEGAL CORPORATION'
PUBDEFEN 'ATTORNEY PUBLIC DEFENDER'
DO IF (TYPEPRAC=10)
COMPUTE CIVONLY=1
ELSE
COMPUTE CIVONLY=0
END IF
DO IF (TYPEPRAC=20)
COMPUTE CRIMONLY=1
ELSE
COMPUTE CRIMONLY=0
END IF
DO IF (TYPEPRAC=30)
COMPUTE CORPONLY=1
ELSE
COMPUTE CORPONLY=0
END IF
DO IF (TYPEPRAC=40)
COMPUTE ALLTYPE=1
ELSE
COMPUTE ALLTYPE=0
END IF
VARIABLE LABELS
CIVONLY 'ATRNY INVOLVED WITH CIVIL CASES'
CRIMONLY 'ATRNY INVOLVED WITH CRIMINAL CASES'
CORPONLY 'ATRNY INVOLVED WITH CORPORATION CASES'
ALLTYPE 'ATRNY INVOLVED WITH ALL TYPE CASES'
RECODE PASSAGE (5,4=0) (1,2=1)
VARIABLE LABELS
PASSAGE 'ATTORNEY FAVORED PASSAGE OF GUIDELINES'
VALUE LABELS
PASSAGE 1 'DID NOT FAVOR'
0 'FAVORED'
RECODE SCHOOL (1=0) (2=1)
VARIABLE LABELS
SCHOOL 'LAW SCHOOL ATTORNEY ATTENDED'
VALUE LABELS
SCHOOL 1 'CAPITAL'
0 'OSU'
RECODE POLITICS (5,4=0) (2,1=1)
VARIABLE LABELS
POLITICS 'ATTORNEYS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY'
VALUE LABELS
POLITICS 0 'LIBERAL'
1 'CONSERVATIVE'
COMPUTE ATRNYEXP=((88-EXAM))
VARIABLE LABELS
  ATRNYEXP 'ATTORNEYS YEARS OF EXPERIENCE'
SORT CASES BY CASEID
SAVE OUTFILE-TEMP1
Appendix E

SPSSX PROGRAM FOR THE DIVORCE SETTLEMENT DATA SET

The following is a listing of the SPSSX statements which define the divorce settlement data set.

// JOB,
// REGION=2048K,TIME=6
//*JOBPARM LINES=35000,DISKIO=20000
// EXEC SPSSX
//DATA DD DSN=TS4133.JDIVOR87.DISP=SHR
//SYSIN DD *

DATA LIST FILE=DATA RECORDS=9 /I
County 1 CaseID 2-9 Judge 10-11 Wiferole 12 wiferep 13
wifename 14 Husbro 15 Husrep 16 Divto 17 DecreeM 18-19
DecreeD 20-21 DecreeY 22-23 SepfileM 24-25 SepfileD 26-27
SepfileY 28-29 DivfileM 30-31 DivfileD 32-33 DivfileY 34-35
MarriagM 36-37 MarriagD 38-39 MarriagY 40-41 Action 42
Neglect 43 Cruelty 44 Oneyrsep 45 Othrspos 46 Adultry 47
Impotent 48 Fraud 49 Drunk 50 Absence 51 Prison 52 Wifsupmo 53-54
Winfomo 55-56 Wifaward 57-58 Wifcontu 59-60 Wifrestr 61-62
Wicontu 63 Hussupmo 64-65 Husinfmo 66-67 Husaward 68-69
HUSCONTU 70-71 HUSRESTR 72-73 HUSCONTST 74
/2 Girtunum 2 Boynum 3 Huscust 4-5 Wifcust 6-7 Jontcust 8-9
Othrcust 10-11 Hustax 12-13 Wiftax 14-15 Othtax 16-17
CSTaxtat 18 Supsource 19 Childsup 20 Suppayr 21 Supdols 22-24
Numspp 25-26 Medins 27 Whomedin 28 Lifeins 29 Wholif 30
Medexp 31 Whomedex 32 Edex 33 Whedex 34 Supmethd 35 Supterm 36
Amting 37 Supurpos 38 Vis 39 Alimony 40 Alpayor 41
Aliamt 42-45 Term 46-48 Alqual 49 Alqual2 50 Homeown 51
Homedisp 52 Homer 53 Resleng 54-55 Resqual 56 Homexp 57
HOUOGOOD 58 PROPTY1 59-60 PROPTY2 61 PROPTVA1 62-67
Propty2 68-69 Propow2 70 Propva2 71-76
/3 Propty3 1-2 Propow3 3 Propva3 4-9 Propty4 10-11 Propow4 12
Propv4 13-18 Propty5 19-20 Propow5 21 Propva5 22-27 Propoy6 28-29
Propow6 30 Propva6 31-36 Propty7 37-38 Propow7 39 Propva7 40-45
Propty8 46-47 Propow8 48 Propva8 49-54 Propty9 55-56 Propow9 57
Propva9 58-63 Propty10 64-65 Propow10 66 Propva10 67-72
/4 Propty11 1-2 Propow11 3 Propva11 4-9 Propty12 10-11
PROPTV12 12 PROPTY12 13-18 PROPTY13 19-20 PROPTV13 21
Propva13 22-27 Propty14 28-29 Propow14 30 Propva14 31-36
PROPTY15 37-38 PROPTY15 39 PROPTVA15 40-45 PROPTY16 46-47
Propow16 48 Propva16 49-54 Propty17 55-56 Propow17 57

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DO IF (ACTION=0)
COMPUTE DIVORCE=1
ELSE
COMPUTE DIVORCE=0
END IF

VARIABLE LABELS
DIVORCE 'DIVORCE GRANTED'

DO IF (ACTION=1)
COMPUTE DISSOLUT=1
ELSE
COMPUTE DISSOLUT=0
END IF

VARIABLE LABELS
DISSOLUT 'DISSOLUTION GRANTED'

COMPUTE MASSET1=0
COMPUTE FASSET1=0
COMPUTE BASSET1=0
IF (PROPOW1=0) FASSET1=1
IF (PROPOW1=1) MASSET1=1
IF (PROPOW1=2) BASSET1=1

VARIABLE LABELS
MASET1 'MOTHER ASSET'
FASET1 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET1 'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASET2=0
COMPUTE FASET2=0
COMPUTE BASSET2=0
IF (PROPOW2=0) FASET2=1
IF (PROPOW2=1) MASET2=1
IF (PROPOW2=2) BASSET2=1

VARIABLE LABELS
  MASET2 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASET2 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET2 'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASET3=0
COMPUTE FASET3=0
COMPUTE BASSET3=0
IF (PROPOW3=0) FASET3=1
IF (PROPOW3=1) MASET3=1
IF (PROPOW3=2) BASSET3=1

VARIABLE LABELS
  MASET3 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASET3 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET3 'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASET4=0
COMPUTE FASET4=0
COMPUTE BASSET4=0
IF (PROPOW4=0) FASET4=1
IF (PROPOW4=1) MASET4=1
IF (PROPOW4=2) BASSET4=1

VARIABLE LABELS
  MASET4 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASET4 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET4 'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASET5=0
COMPUTE FASET5=0
COMPUTE BASSET5=0
IF (PROPOW5=0) FASET5=1
IF (PROPOW5=1) MASET5=1
IF (PROPOW5=2) BASSET5=1

VARIABLE LABELS
  MASET5 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASET5 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET5 'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASET6=0
COMPUTE FASET6=0
COMPUTE BASSET6=0
IF (PROPOW6=0) FASET6=1
IF (PROPOW6=1) MASET6=1
IF (PROPOW6=2) BASSET6=1

VARIABLE LABELS
  MASET6 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASET6 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET6
COMPUTE MASSET7=0
COMPUTE FASSET7=0
COMPUTE BASSET7=0
IF (PROPOW7=0) FASSET7=1
IF (PROPOW7=1) MASSET7=1
IF (PROPOW7=2) BASSET7=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET7 'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET7 'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET7 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET8=0
COMPUTE FASSET8=0
COMPUTE BASSET8=0
IF (PROPOW8=0) FASSET8=1
IF (PROPOW8=1) MASSET8=1
IF (PROPOW8=2) BASSET8=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET8 'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET8 'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET8 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET9=0
COMPUTE FASSET9=0
COMPUTE BASSET9=0
IF (PROPOW9=0) FASSET9=1
IF (PROPOW9=1) MASSET9=1
IF (PROPOW9=2) BASSET9=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET9 'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET9 'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET9 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET10=0
COMPUTE FASSET10=0
COMPUTE BASSET10=0
IF (PROPOW10=0) FASSET10=1
IF (PROPOW10=1) MASSET10=1
IF (PROPOW10=2) BASSET10=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET10 'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET10 'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET10 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET11=0
COMPUTE FASSET11=0
COMPUTE BASSET11=0
IF (PROPOW11=0) FASSET11=1
IF (PROPOW11=1) MASSET11=1
IF (PROPOW11=2) BASSET11=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET11 'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET11 'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET11 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET12=0

'MOTHER ASSET'
'FATHER ASSET'
'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE FASSET12=0
COMPUTE BASSET12=0
IF (PROPOW12=0) FASSET12=1
IF (PROPOW12=1) MASSET12=1
IF (PROPOW12=2) BASSET12=1
VARIABLE LABELS
MASET12 'MOTHER ASSET'
FASSET12 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET12 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET13=0
COMPUTE FASSET13=0
COMPUTE BASSET13=0
IF (PROPOW13=0) FASSET13=1
IF (PROPOW13=1) MASSET13=1
IF (PROPOW13=2) BASSET13=1
VARIABLE LABELS
MASSET13 'MOTHER ASSET'
FASSET13 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET13 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET14=0
COMPUTE FASSET14=0
COMPUTE BASSET14=0
IF (PROPOW14=0) FASSET14=1
IF (PROPOW14=1) MASSET14=1
IF (PROPOW14=2) BASSET14=1
VARIABLE LABELS
MASSET14 'MOTHER ASSET'
FASSET14 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET14 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET15=0
COMPUTE FASSET15=0
COMPUTE BASSET15=0
IF (PROPOW15=0) FASSET15=1
IF (PROPOW15=1) MASSET15=1
IF (PROPOW15=2) BASSET15=1
VARIABLE LABELS
MASSET15 'MOTHER ASSET'
FASSET15 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET15 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET16=0
COMPUTE FASSET16=0
COMPUTE BASSET16=0
IF (PROPOW16=0) FASSET16=1
IF (PROPOW16=1) MASSET16=1
IF (PROPOW16=2) BASSET16=1
VARIABLE LABELS
MASSET16 'MOTHER ASSET'
FASSET16 'FATHER ASSET'
BASSET16 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET17=0
COMPUTE FASSET17=0
COMPUTE BASSET17=0
IF (PROPOW17=0) FASSET17=1
IF (PROPOW17=1) MASSET17=1
IF (PROPOW17=2) BASSET17=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET17  'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET17  'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET17  'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASSET18=0
COMPUTE FASSET18=0
COMPUTE BASSET18=0
IF (PROPOW18=0) FASSET18=1
IF (PROPOW18=1) MASSET18=1
IF (PROPOW18=2) BASSET18=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET18  'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET18  'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET18  'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASSET19=0
COMPUTE FASSET19=0
COMPUTE BASSET19=0
IF (PROPOW19=0) FASSET19=1
IF (PROPOW19=1) MASSET19=1
IF (PROPOW19=2) BASSET19=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET19  'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET19  'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET19  'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASSET20=0
COMPUTE FASSET20=0
COMPUTE BASSET20=0
IF (PROPOW20=0) FASSET20=1
IF (PROPOW20=1) MASSET20=1
IF (PROPOW20=2) BASSET20=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET20  'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET20  'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET20  'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASSET21=0
COMPUTE FASSET21=0
COMPUTE BASSET21=0
IF (PROPOW21=0) FASSET21=1
IF (PROPOW21=1) MASSET21=1
IF (PROPOW21=2) BASSET21=1
VARIABLE LABELS
   MASSET21  'MOTHER ASSET'
   FASSET21  'FATHER ASSET'
   BASSET21  'BOTH ASSET'

COMPUTE MASSET22=0
COMPUTE FASSET22=0
COMPUTE BASSET22=0
IF (PROPOW22=0) FASSET22=1
IF (PROPOW22=1) MASSET22=1
IF (PROPOW22=2) BASSET22=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MASSET22 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASSET22 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET22 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET23=0
COMPUTE FASSET23=0
COMPUTE BASSET23=0
IF (PROPOW23=0) FASSET23=1
IF (PROPOW23=1) MASSET23=1
IF (PROPOW23=2) BASSET23=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MASSET23 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASSET23 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET23 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MASSET24=0
COMPUTE FASSET24=0
COMPUTE BASSET24=0
IF (PROPOW24=0) FASSET24=1
IF (PROPOW24=1) MASSET24=1
IF (PROPOW24=2) BASSET24=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MASSET24 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FASSET24 'FATHER ASSET'
  BASSET24 'BOTH ASSET'
COMPUTE MOTASSET=(MASSET1+MASSET2+MASSET3+MASSET4+MASSET5+MASSET6+
  MASSET7+MASSET8+MASSET9+MASSET10+MASSET11+MASSET12+MASSET13+
  MASSET14+MASSET15+MASSET16+MASSET17+MASSET18+MASSET19+MASSET20+
  MASSET21+MASSET22+MASSET23+MASSET24)
COMPUTE FATASSET=(FASSET1+FASSET2+FASSET3+FASSET4+FASSET5+FASSET6+
  FASSET7+FASSET8+FASSET9+FASSET10+FASSET11+FASSET12+FASSET13+
  FASSET14+FASSET15+FASSET16+FASSET17+FASSET18+FASSET19+FASSET20+
  FASSET21+FASSET22+FASSET23+FASSET24)
COMPUTE BOTASSET=(BASSET1+BASSET2+BASSET3+BASSET4+BASSET5+BASSET6+
  BASSET7+BASSET8+BASSET9+BASSET10+BASSET11+BASSET12+BASSET13+
  BASSET14+BASSET15+BASSET16+BASSET17+BASSET18+BASSET19+BASSET20+
  BASSET21+BASSET22+BASSET23+BASSET24)
COMPUTE TOTASSET=(MOTASSET+FATASSET+BOTASSET)
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTASSET 'MOTHER ASSET'
  FATASSET 'FATHER ASSET'
  BOTASSET 'BOTH ASSET'
  TOTASSET 'TOTAL ASSET'
COMPUTE MOTLIA1=0
COMPUTE FATLIA1=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA1=0
IF (DETPAY1=0) FATLIA1=1
IF (DETPAY1=1) MOTLIA1=1
IF (DETPAY1=2) BOTLIA1=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA1 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
  FATLIA1 'FATHER LIABILITY'
BOTLIA1
COMPUTE MOTLIA2=0
COMPUTE FATLIA2=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA2=0
IF (DETPAY2=0) FATLIA2=1
IF (DETPAY2=1) MOTLIA2=1
IF (DETPAY2=2) BOTLIA2=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA2
  FATLIA2
  BOTLIA2

COMPUTE MOTLIA3=0
COMPUTE FATLIA3=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA3=0
IF (DETPAY3=0) FATLIA3=1
IF (DETPAY3=1) MOTLIA3=1
IF (DETPAY3=2) BOTLIA3=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA3
  FATLIA3
  BOTLIA3

COMPUTE MOTLIA4=0
COMPUTE FATLIA4=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA4=0
IF (DETPAY4=0) FATLIA4=1
IF (DETPAY4=1) MOTLIA4=1
IF (DETPAY4=2) BOTLIA4=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA4
  FATLIA4
  BOTLIA4

COMPUTE MOTLIA5=0
COMPUTE FATLIA5=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA5=0
IF (DETPAY5=0) FATLIA5=1
IF (DETPAY5=1) MOTLIA5=1
IF (DETPAY5=2) BOTLIA5=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA5
  FATLIA5
  BOTLIA5

COMPUTE MOTLIA6=0
COMPUTE FATLIA6=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA6=0
IF (DETPAY6=0) FATLIA6=1
IF (DETPAY6=1) MOTLIA6=1
IF (DETPAY6=2) BOTLIA6=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA6
  FATLIA6
  BOTLIA6

COMPUTE MOTLIA7=0
COMPUTE MOTLIA7=0
COMPUTE FATLIA7=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA7=0
IF (DETPAY7=0) FATLIA7=1
IF (DETPAY7=1) MOTLIA7=1
IF (DETPAY7=2) BOTLIA7=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA7
  FATLIA7
  BOTLIA7

'BOTH LIABILITY'
'MOTHER LIABILITY'
'FATHER LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'
'BOTH LIABILITY'

COMPUTE FATLIA7=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA7=0
IF (DETPAY7=0) FATLIA7=1
IF (DETPAY7=1) MOTLIA7=1
IF (DETPAY7=2) BOTLIA7=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA7 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
  FATLIA7 'FATHER LIABILITY'
  BOTLIA7 'BOTH LIABILITY'
COMPUTE MOTLIA8=0
COMPUTE FATLIA8=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA8=0
IF (DETPAY8=0) FATLIA8=1
IF (DETPAY8=1) MOTLIA8=1
IF (DETPAY8=2) BOTLIA8=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA8 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
  FATLIA8 'FATHER LIABILITY'
  BOTLIA8 'BOTH LIABILITY'
COMPUTE MOTLIA9=0
COMPUTE FATLIA9=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA9=0
IF (DETPAY9=0) FATLIA9=1
IF (DETPAY9=1) MOTLIA9=1
IF (DETPAY9=2) BOTLIA9=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA9 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
  FATLIA9 'FATHER LIABILITY'
  BOTLIA9 'BOTH LIABILITY'
COMPUTE MOTLIA10=0
COMPUTE FATLIA10=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA10=0
IF (DETPAY10=0) FATLIA10=1
IF (DETPAY10=1) MOTLIA10=1
IF (DETPAY10=2) BOTLIA10=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA10 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
  FATLIA10 'FATHER LIABILITY'
  BOTLIA10 'BOTH LIABILITY'
COMPUTE MOTLIA11=0
COMPUTE FATLIA11=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA11=0
IF (DETPAY11=0) FATLIA11=1
IF (DETPAY11=1) MOTLIA11=1
IF (DETPAY11=2) BOTLIA11=1
VARIABLE LABELS
  MOTLIA11 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
  FATLIA11 'FATHER LIABILITY'
  BOTLIA11 'BOTH LIABILITY'
COMPUTE MOTLIA12=0
COMPUTE FATLIA12=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA12=0
IF (DETPAY12=0) FATLIA12=1
IF (DETPAY12=1) MOTLIA12=1
IF (DETPAY12=2) BOTLIA12=1

VARIABLE LABELS
    MOTLIA12 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
    FATLIA12 'FATHER LIABILITY'
    BOTLIA12 'BOTH LIABILITY'

COMPUTE MOTLIA13=0
COMPUTE FATLIA13=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA13=0
IF (DETPAY13=0) FATLIA13=1
IF (DETPAY13=1) MOTLIA13=1
IF (DETPAY13=2) BOTLIA13=1

VARIABLE LABELS
    MOTLIA13 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
    FATLIA13 'FATHER LIABILITY'
    BOTLIA13 'BOTH LIABILITY'

COMPUTE MOTLIA14=0
COMPUTE FATLIA14=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA14=0
IF (DETPAY14=0) FATLIA14=1
IF (DETPAY14=1) MOTLIA14=1
IF (DETPAY14=2) BOTLIA14=1

VARIABLE LABELS
    MOTLIA14 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
    FATLIA14 'FATHER LIABILITY'
    BOTLIA14 'BOTH LIABILITY'

COMPUTE MOTLIA15=0
COMPUTE FATLIA15=0
COMPUTE BOTLIA15=0
IF (DETPAY15=0) FATLIA15=1
IF (DETPAY15=1) MOTLIA15=1
IF (DETPAY15=2) BOTLIA15=1

VARIABLE LABELS
    MOTLIA15 'MOTHER LIABILITY'
    FATLIA15 'FATHER LIABILITY'
    BOTLIA15 'BOTH LIABILITY'

COMPUTE MOTLIA=(MOTLIA1+MOTLIA2+MOTLIA3+MOTLIA4+MOTLIA5+MOTLIA6+
    MOTLIA7+MOTLIA8+MOTLIA9+MOTLIA10+MOTLIA11+MOTLIA12+MOTLIA13+
    MOTLIA14+MOTLIA15)
COMPUTE FATLIA=(FATLIA1+FATLIA2+FATLIA3+FATLIA4+FATLIA5+FATLIA6+
    FATLIA7+FATLIA8+FATLIA9+FATLIA10+FATLIA11+FATLIA12+FATLIA13+
    FATLIA14+FATLIA15)
COMPUTE BOTLIA=(BOTLIA1+BOTLIA2+BOTLIA3+BOTLIA4+BOTLIA5+BOTLIA6+
    BOTLIA7+BOTLIA8+BOTLIA9+BOTLIA10+BOTLIA11+BOTLIA12+BOTLIA13+
    BOTLIA14+BOTLIA15)
COMPUTE TOTLIA=(MOTLIA+FATLIA+BOTLIA)
COMPUTE TOTCHILD=(GIRLNUM+BOYNUM)

VARIABLE LABELS
    TOTCHILD 'NUMBER OF CHILDREN'
    MOTLIA 'MOTHER LIABILITIES'
    FATLIA 'FATHER LIABILITIES'
BOTLIA 'BOTH LIABILITIES'
TOTLIA 'TOTAL LIABILITIES'
COMPUTE LENGTHM=(DECREETY-MARRIAGY)

VARIABLE LABELS
LENGTHM 'LENGTH OF MARRIAGE'
RECODE DECREEY (37,71,78,80,81,83=SYSMIS)
RECODE LENGTHM (88,-30,-4,87=SYSMIS)
RECODE CASHDOL (90000000=SYSMIS)
COMPUTE CHILD1=89-YRBIRT1
COMPUTE CHILD2=89-YRBIRT2
COMPUTE CHILD3=89-YRBIRT3
COMPUTE CHILD4=89-YRBIRT4
COMPUTE CHILD5=89-YRBIRT5

VARIABLE LABELS
CHILD1 'AGE OF CHILD 1'
CHILD2 'AGE OF CHILD 2'
CHILD3 'AGE OF CHILD 3'
CHILD4 'AGE OF CHILD 4'
CHILD5 'AGE OF CHILD 5'
RECODE CASHDOL (220000,9000000=SYSMIS)
RECODE CHILD1 (19,20,42,58=SYSMIS)
RECODE CHILD2 (19,49=SYSMIS)
MISSING VALUES COUNTY (2,3,4)
DO IF (WIFEREP EQ 1 AND HUSREP EQ 1)
  COMPUTE BOTHREP=1
ELSE IF (WIFEREP=0)
  COMPUTE BOTHREP=0
ELSE IF (HUSREP=0)
  COMPUTE BOTHREP=0
END IF

VARIABLE LABELS
BOTHREP 'BOTH HAVE AN ATTORNEY'

COMPUTE VALASSET=(PROPVA1+PROPVA2+PROPVA3+PROPVA4+PROPVA5+
  PROPVA6+PROPVA7+PROPVA8+PROPVA9+PROPVA10+PROPVA11+PROPVA12+
  PROPVA13+PROPVA14+PROPVA15+PROPVA16+PROPVA17+PROPVA18+
  PROPVA19+PROPVA20+PROPVA21+PROPVA22+PROPVA23+PROPVA24)
COMPUTE BALUA=(DETBAL1+DETBAL2+DETBAL3+DETBAL4+DETBAL5+DETBAL6+
  DETBAL7+DETBAL8+DETBAL9+DETBAL10+DETBAL11+DETBAL12+DETBAL13+
  DETBAL14+DETBAL15)

VARIABLE LABELS
VALASSET 'VALUE OF ASSETS'
BALUA 'BALANCE OF LIABILITIES'

DO IF (JUDGE=24)
  COMPUTE SOLOVE=1
ELSE
  COMPUTE SOLOVE=0
END IF
DO IF (JUDGE=2)
  COMPUTE TWYFORD=1
ELSE
  COMPUTE TWYFORD=0
END IF
DO IF (JUDGE=3)
COMPUTE ROSE=1
ELSE
COMPUTE ROSE=0
END IF
VARIABLE LABELS
SOLVE 'JUDGE SOLOVE PRESIDE'
TWYFORD 'JUDGE TWYFORD PRESIDE'
ROSE 'JUDGE ROSE PRESIDE'

COMPUTE TEMPER=0
IF (JUDGE=24) TEMPER=30
IF (JUDGE=2) TEMPER=21
IF (JUDGE=3) TEMPER=29
VARIABLE LABELS
TEMPER 'JUDGE TEMPER'

COMPUTE INTEGRIT=0
IF (JUDGE=24) INTEGRIT=29
IF (JUDGE=2) INTEGRIT=22
IF (JUDGE=3) INTEGRIT=28
VARIABLE LABELS
INTEGRIT 'JUDGE INTEGRITY'

COMPUTE COURTMAN=0
IF (JUDGE=24) COURTMAN=28
IF (JUDGE=2) COURTMAN=23
IF (JUDGE=3) COURTMAN=27
VARIABLE LABELS
COURTMAN 'JUDGE COURTROOM MANAGEMENT'

COMPUTE LEGABIL=0
IF (JUDGE=24) LEGABIL=30
IF (JUDGE=2) LEGABIL=26
IF (JUDGE=3) LEGABIL=29
VARIABLE LABELS
LEGABIL 'JUDGE LEGAL ABILITY'

COMPUTE TOTSCORE=0
IF (JUDGE=24) TOTSCORE=118
IF (JUDGE=2) TOTSCORE=93
IF (JUDGE=3) TOTSCORE=115
VARIABLE LABELS
TOTSCORE 'JUDGE TOTAL SCORE'

COMPUTE JUDGEAGE=0
IF (JUDGE=24) JUDGEAGE=44
IF (JUDGE=2) JUDGEAGE=61
IF (JUDGE=3) JUDGEAGE=61
VARIABLE LABELS
JUDGEAGE 'JUDGE AGE'

COMPUTE JUDYEAR=0
IF (JUDGE=24) JUDYEAR=87
IF (JUDGE=2) JUDYEAR=76
IF (JUDGE=3) JUDYEAR=70
VARIABLE LABELS
JUDYEAR 'YR JUD ADMIT DOM REL BENCH'

COMPUTE JUDGEXP=(88-JUDYEAR)
VARIABLE LABELS
JUDGEXP 'JUD YRS OF EXPERIENCE'
DO IF (WIFEROLE=1)
  COMPUTE WIFPLAIN=1
ELSE
  COMPUTE WIFPLAIN=0
END IF
VARIABLE LABELS
  WIFPLAIN 'WIFE WAS PLAINTIFF'
DO IF (HUSBROLE=1)
  COMPUTE HUSPLAIN=1
ELSE
  COMPUTE HUSPLAIN=0
END IF
VARIABLE LABELS
  HUSPLAIN 'HUSBAND WAS THE PLAINTIFF'
DO IF (WSOROTIN=2)
  COMPUTE WELFARE=1
ELSE
  COMPUTE WELFARE=0
END IF
VARIABLE LABELS
  WELFARE 'MOTHER ON WELFARE'
COMPUTE ONECASE=1
COMPUTE CUSTODY=0
IF (WIFCUST GT 0) CUSTODY=1
IF (JONTCUST GT 0) CUSTODY=1
IF (OTHRCUST GT 0) CUSTODY=1
VARIABLE LABEL
  CUSTODY 'CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD'
COMPUTE NCUSINC=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) NCUSINC=HUEARNIC
IF (CUSTODY=0) NCUSINC=WIEARNIN
VARIABLE LABELS
  NCUSINC 'NONCUSTODIAL INCOME'
COMPUTE NCUSEMP=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) NCUSEMP=HUSEMPLO
IF (CUSTODY=0) NCUSEMP=WIFEMPLO
VARIABLE LABELS
  NCUSEMP 'NONCUSTODIAL EMPLOYED'
COMPUTE NCUSOINC=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) NCUSOINC=HAMOTHIN
IF (CUSTODY=0) NCUSOINC=WAMOTHIN
VARIABLE LABEL
  NCUSOINC 'NONCUSTODIAL OTHER INCOME'
COMPUTE NCUSASET=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) NCUSASET=FATASET
IF (CUSTODY=0) NCUSASET=MOTASET
VARIABLE LABEL
  NCUSASET 'NONCUSTODIAL ASSETS'
COMPUTE NCUSLIA=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) NCUSLIA=FATLIA
IF (CUSTODY=0) NCUSLIA=MOTLIA
VARIABLE LABEL
NCUSLIA 'NONCUSTODIAL LIABILITIES'
COMPUTE NCUSAGE=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) NCUSAGE=FATHAGE
IF (CUSTODY=0) NCUSAGE=mothage
VARIABLE LABEL
NCUSAGE 'NONCUSTODIAL AGE'
COMPUTE CUSTEMP=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) CUSTEMP=WIFEMPLO
IF (CUSTODY=0) CUSTEMP=HUSEMPLO
VARIABLE LABEL
CUSTEMP 'CUSTODIAL EMPLOYED'
COMPUTE CUSINC=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) CUSINC=WIEARNIN
IF (CUSTODY=0) CUSINC=HUEARNIC
VARIABLE LABEL
CUSINC 'CUSTODIAL INCOME'
COMPUTE CUSOINC=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) CUSOINC=WAMOTHIN
IF (CUSTODY=0) CUSOINC=HAMOTHIN
VARIABLE LABEL
CUSOINC 'CUSTODIAL OTHER INCOME'
COMPUTE CUSTASET=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) CUSTASET=MOTASSET
IF (CUSTODY=0) CUSTASET=FATASSET
VARIABLE LABEL
CUSTASET 'CUSTODIAL ASSETS'
COMPUTE CUSTLIA=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) CUSTLIA=MOTLIA
IF (CUSTODY=0) CUSTLIA=FATLIA
VARIABLE LABEL
CUSTLIA 'CUSTODIAL LIABILITIES'
COMPUTE CUSTAGE=0
IF (CUSTODY=1) CUSTAGE=mothage
IF (CUSTODY=0) CUSTAGE=FATHAGE
VARIABLE LABEL
CUSTAGE 'CUSTODIAL AGE'
COMPUTE MONTH=0
IF (DECREEM=10) MONTH=1
IF (DECREEM=11) MONTH=2
IF (DECREEM=12) MONTH=3
IF (DECREEM=01) MONTH=4
IF (DECREEM=02) MONTH=5
IF (DECREEM=03) MONTH=6
VARIABLE LABEL
MONTH 'MONTH OF DECREE'
COMPUTE AGECHILD=CHILD1+CHILD2+CHILD3+CHILD4+CHILD5
VARIABLE LABEL
AGECHILD 'AGE OF CHILDREN'
SORT CASES BY CASEID
MATCH FILES FILE=TEMP1/FILE=* BY CASEID/MAP
SELECT IF TOTCHILD GT 0 AND CHILDSUP NE 9 AND COUNTY = 1
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