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The Ohio State University, 1989

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THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS' ROLES AS PROJECTED IN NIGERIA'S
GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPEECHES, 1960-1987

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Akintunde Akintayo Akioye, B. A., M. A.,

***

The Ohio State University

1989

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my parents, Isaac and Lydia Akioye, my brother-in-law, Deoye, and sister, Tokunbo, and my brothers, Kayode and Akindele.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My special gratitude goes to my adviser, Dr. Robert Monaghan, my former adviser, Dr. James Golden, Dr. Elgabri, and Dr. Joe Pilotta who have all in one way or another been fountains of ideas, inspiration and motivation during my four years here at Ohio State. My gratitude also goes to all my other professors.

I am also appreciative of the friendship of the wonderful people in the Department of Communication, and to the Department itself for giving me the opportunity and financial support. My choice of Ohio State has been one of my better decisions.

Thanks.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter does the following: it discusses the background of the study; it states the problem, including the major research questions; it describes the significance of the study and its rationale; and finally, it identifies some major theses of the study.

Background of Study

Development continues to be one of the most intensively probed subjects in the world today. Clinton (1977) said:

it is not exaggerating to say that the subject of development is merely the way in which modern (rational, secular and objective) intellectuals prefer to handle the troublesome but persistent question familiar in antiquity as: What is the good society? (p. 111).

This brings up a more fundamental question about human needs because needs must be adequately identified before any agreement is possible on what kind of society is good for humans (p. 111). The needs of humans are different from their wants. While human wants tend to be infinite, basic human needs tend to be less so; in fact, needs are more vital to an individual's or society's development process.

Development in human society as a many-sided process includes an individual level which implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and well-being (Rodney, 1974, p. 3). This level is closely linked to a broader
societal level which is exemplified by a nation or a continent. Several questions one might ask include: (a) What constitutes the development process in a particular society, or which are its major aspects? (b) Which are the most appropriate pathways to achieving development, and what are some of the major obstacles? (c) Have the policymakers elicited the ideas, and subsequently, the participation of the population in this process of change? These same questions apply to the African development process which is the focus of this study.

The concept, "African development," presupposes and implies a collective African purpose and goal, even though Africa, as a continent, consists of over 50 different sovereign nations which were creations of the European colonial powers. Rotberg (1966, p. 39) said Africans, antagonized by the realities of colonial rule, while educated in, and aware of the realities of the European national image, eventually asserted themselves with a patriotic fervor that made real the possibility of national self-determination. Also, Africans possessed common grievances and shared the hope of common libertarian aspirations (p. 40). He concluded that he saw African nationalism in historical terms, and that "it has qualities reminiscent of the older nationalisms of Europe, Arabia, and Asia, despite the number of putative peoples and distinctive languages that exist within each territorial boundary" (p. 46). In essence, African development might refer to a collective consciousness of the people of a continent, whose people are trying to lessen the negative impact of colonialism.
But, according to Chinweizu (1987):

a quarter of a century after Africa's political independence from European colonial powers, the colonial mentality still lies like a fog on the African consciousness. It befuddles African perception, confuses African thinking, messes up African feelings and disorganizes African action. As a result, African efforts at nation-building and development have yielded little (p. vii).

He added that most Third World countries were now well into the third decade of their post-colonial development effort, but they had little to show for it, in spite of the campaign for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and regardless of whether they had followed the capitalist or socialist paths (p.14). He acknowledged that in industrialized countries like the USA, the USSR, and Japan, the fundamental transformation from feudal or agrarian capitalist society into an industrial nation-state which was either capitalist or socialist was demonstrably accomplished in about 30 years (p. 15). However, one should note that the international conditions the industrialized countries faced at a comparable stage of their development were quite different from those which African nations faced.

Currently, Africa's development problems include its heavy indebtedness to international financial institutions, and a persistent inability by many of the countries to feed their people, thus necessitating the importation of food. Coupled with these are ecological problems of drought and desert encroachment, also, political instability, endemic mismanagement and corruption by the leadership of many of the countries. The result has too often been a loss of faith in the African political and socio-economic process by
the governed; subsequently, instead of being participants in the process— they are alienated. These problems have been given much exposure in African and international media; they have also been high on the agenda of most African countries, and that of local and international organizations as well. Finally, these problems are foci of study and intellectual discussion, both in the countries of Africa, and in those outside the continent.

In his own contribution to this intellectual discussion, Chinweizu said a primary challenge for Africa was the restoration of the African cultural personality in a version consistent with an industrial economy (p. 6). Also, the renaissance of African civilization in an industrial mode implied a far-reaching renovation of African cultures. He stated that renovation called for "selectivity guided by the new objectives" (p. 7)-- [new objectives of development]. Every cultural item for use in renovating African civilization had to be critically appraised to see if it met the specifications demanded by the new objectives; elements from African tradition, no less than elements from non-African traditions have to be thus appraised (p. 7).

Such calls as this for the revitalization of Africanist thought underscore the importance of ideas in a society's development. Moreover, they serve a crucial communication purpose by enabling people to exchange ideas and to critically evaluate them-- important steps in Africa's development quest. A society's body of ideas or thought, as a storehouse of ideas, is a vital ingredient in its development process. Ekechi (1987) cited Hughes (1961, p. 3) who
said the history of ideas was concerned with "the whole range of human expression as revealed in speech, practice, and tradition."

When applied to the African context, the history of ideas meant

the patterns of African thought and emotions, especially as these are manifested in their institutions (e.g. religion, law, social and political structure), value systems, norms, as well as popular culture. In essence, we are concerned with an array of ideas that reflect the totality of African culture (Ekechi, p. 64).

Ekechi cautioned that there was a tendency to delimit the history of ideas to the study of the ideas of the educated people in the society, but this should not be the case because

the growing emphasis on the common man and woman in the new history coupled with the present intellectual ferment in Africa, which seeks to orient social economic and scholarly endeavors towards the common folk, compels us to focus genuine attention on the masses (pp. 64, 66).

He added:

But given that the ideas and emotions of the masses, the majority of the population are not expressed in writing, but in oral and artistic forms, the question arises as to how we should study the patterns of thought of these non-literate members of the society (p. 66).

This last statement raises genuine concerns which need to be addressed. A concern is whether the contribution of the population, in form of ideas, is going to be incorporated into the development process. This is crucial because it is easier for people to go along with a development plan that has their input than one that does not. This study however primarily analyzes the ideas of those who have expressed their ideas in writing or in speeches. They are usually considered to be the intellectuals in the African society, and also usually belong to the middle class in these countries. But, all this
does not necessarily mean that their communication on issues has a monopoly on all the sound ideas emerging from Africa.

Also concerning ideas, in The Afrocentric Idea (1987), Asante highlighted the dominant influence of Eurocentric thought, and discussed the emergence of a distinctively Africanist thought. He said he was fascinated with the manner in which most of his colleagues had written theory and engaged in the social sciences, particularly relating to African people. They had often assumed that their "objectivity," a kind of collective subjectivity of European culture, should be the measure by which the world marches (p. 3). He criticized two major schools of Eurocentric thought: the positivist and critical schools.

Asante explained that the critical theorists might not seek to manipulate the external world in the way of the positivists, but their notions of enlightenment through reflection on the subtle pressures of society tended to be individualistic. He said reflection was a uniquely private affair, and for that reason, it must be asked whether or not there was anything in the critical theory that related to an Afrocentric ideology (p. 5). In the sense that Afrocentricity proposed a cultural reconstruction that incorporated the African perspective as part of an entire human transformation, critical theory suggested a pathway (p. 5). According to Asante, Afrocentricity literally meant placing African ideals at the center of any analysis that involved African culture and behavior (p. 6). The term Afrology, coined in "Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change," denoted the Afrocentric study of African concepts, issues,
and behaviors; it included research on African themes in the African continent, the Americas, and the West Indies (p. 16).

The study of the African development process delves into the political, economic, and social fabric of African society. In this context, Africanist thought refers to the collection of perspectives, ideas, and theories which offer insight into interpreting and understanding that fabric, and consequently, the development process. The perspectives are derived from the experiences of the African environment, in conjunction with useful foreign traditions which are borrowed and adapted to African conditions.

Mnguni (1987, p. 113) stated:

The development of a specifically African Political Thought in a sense of a theory seeking to articulate the movement of the political and economic structures in their full complexity, is a product of the convergence of various factors and influences: historically, the movement had arrived in which African intellectuals and African peoples forged a unity in order to oppose capitalism, colonialism and imperialism through various national liberation struggles; ideologically, a system of thought or practices was necessary in order to theorize the nature of opposition and resistance, hence the importance of pan-Africanism, African nationalism, African socialism etc; sociologically, in many African countries, there was a profound fracturing in the social structure whether between the urban and country spheres, or between Africans and the white settlers or between the peasantry and the emerging working-class, or between the Third World countries and imperial European countries.

One feature of development is that it is often depicted either implicitly or explicitly as a teleological process. From much of the discussion of the subject, there seems to be an implication of a purposive movement in a society from simpler ways of living
towards increasingly complex stages, that is, greater need for the maximization of the society's human and non-human (physical) resources, so that the people may have better lives. This maximization is a challenge for all societies, in particular, for those who draw up development policies and plans.

There are influences which either help or hinder the movement towards a more developed state. In the case of African development, these influences can broadly be divided into two: the internal and the external. The internal influences and forces are those acting from within the African countries and continent which help or hinder development. They include the human and non-human resources. The human-related resources might include skills, knowledge, manpower, the guiding ideology, the quality of leadership, and the motivation of the population, among others. The non-human resources include the continent's natural endowment in terms of natural and financial resources. The two kinds of internal influences complement each other in the sense that it requires some skill on the part of the human element to plan how to utilize these non-human elements to the benefit of all concerned. Simultaneously, external influences represent those influences and forces which have come from, and continue to come from outside the African continent. These include colonialism, and its relatively recent derivative-- neocolonialism. Others are international organization, human-related influences such as ideologies; they also include the skills, knowledge, and development ideas of so-called experts; finally there are resources like financial loans, grants and assistance, among others.
This study investigates the nature of the roles of one of these external influences— the United Nations— in African development. More specifically, the research seeks to find out what was the nature of the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the roles the UN has played in African development. Since its inception in 1945, the UN has been under constant scrutiny. Individuals and countries alike have made and continue to make their perceptions of the activities of the organization known. According to Nicholas (1975, p. 175):

the UN is never, so to say merely, what it is in itself; it is also what member-states think it is. Its full understanding requires an awareness of the attitudes of at least some of the states toward the organization they have combined to create and maintain.

Mazrui (1964, p. 501) said:

What should concern us to begin with is that which has already happened or is continuing to happen— the role of the UN in the momentous mid-twentieth century phenomenon of global decolonization.

He also stated that the Charter of the UN had an ideology of decolonization. However, a quarter of a century later, it appears that the UN's decolonization role perceived by Mazrui has now changed somewhat to how to remove the effects of neo-colonialism. Historically, Nigeria shared similar colonial-rule experiences with most African countries and the consequent struggle to do away with such foreign rule.¹ However, this is only one side of what Clinton

¹ Wallerstein (1971, p. 9) said they almost all came to independence approximately at the same time, the modal year being 1960. Virtually all these states passed through a similar scenario of political development. They were colonized in the late 19th century...The nationalist movement arose in the years after the Second World War. He concluded that "as long as the state machinery remains fragile, and the state's revenue so uncertain, there would
called "a multidimensional phenomenon" (p. 112). He suggested the need for a concept of development defined in the broadest sense, that is, "as composite of economic, social, and political development plus an additional dimension-- the ecological one" (p. 112). All these dimensions still feature prominently in Africa's quest for development. For instance, economic independence and consequently, economic development, still elude the continent. According to World Bank figures, the total amount of debt owed by sub-Saharan African nations in 1987 was $150 billion (Helmore, June 17, 1988, p. 9). Among other things, this study focuses on the composite of political, economic, social and ecological dimensions of African development, and how these dimensions are manifested in the speeches of Nigeria's delegates.

The General Assembly debates offer a forum for all member-countries to communicate their views about issues of concern to a world audience. This forum has been described as a "talking shop with all the potentialities and disabilities that that implies" (Nicholas, p. 107). Nicholas added:

the smaller states in particular still prize, and rightly so, the opportunity given to them to appear before the rest of the world, and show their wounds, their medals and personalities. The Great Powers after all have no lack of opportunities for making their voice heard, but for many of the members, the general debate... is a rare moment for seizing the spotlight and putting across a point of view that might otherwise be ignored (p. 112).

be chronic gap between promise and reality, and hence, chronic instability" (p. 33).
Apart from being a forum for communicating views, the debates also bring up a more fundamental issue of power relations in the organization in particular, and the world in general. The concept, "rhetorical condition," is applicable in describing the relations among nations at the UN. Asante defined rhetorical condition as the structure and power pattern assumed or imposed during a rhetorical situation by society (p. 22). At the UN, there are rhetorical situations in which the structure and power pattern have been imposed by the historical conditions surrounding the organization's creation. The UN was created at a time when almost all of the countries of Africa were under colonial rule; therefore Africa had minimum direct input and participation in its deliberations. Asymmetrical power relations in favor of the developed and colonial countries had been a main feature in the organization since its inception. Decades of colonialism meant power relations had been created and maintained in such a way that the colonizing powers have a firm control on much of the world's power structures—political and military, economic, social, and cultural.

Asante asked: "How are we to understand discourse in this society given the rhetorical condition?" (p. 24). Daudi (cited in Asante, 1987) contended that discourse was the object of a struggle for power. Daudi claimed that a social environment had been created where one, for instance, gave orders, and the other was expected to obey. This often occurred in social situations where political and economic power resided in one class or race, and powerlessness in another class and race (Asante, p. 24). This description applies to the
relationship between the developed countries and the developing ones such as those of Africa.

Nigeria, a developing African country, joined the United Nations organization in 1960. At the time of this study, the country had participated in about 28 annual General Assembly debates. The speeches given at these meetings were the object of analysis. The Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the process of African development, and the UN's roles in the process should give some insights into the country's overall world view and ideology as they relate to development. Theoretically, this brings up some contradiction. The Nigerian delegates might be professing what can be described as an Africanist or Afrocentric ideology in their perceptions of how to enhance the African development process. But if the delegates ascribe some major responsibilities for the UN as well, there seems to be an inherent contradiction here.

This contradiction also highlights the potential for a divergence of world views between Nigeria and the UN. One is Africanist; the other is Eurocentric, and it has been the globally dominant one so far. An Africanist ideology is primarily anchored in an affirmation of African self-reliance, and an affirmation of Africa's primary interests in the pathway to development. But the UN which is a product of a Eurocentric society and experience, is likely to advocate and disseminate development ideas of a Eurocentric nature, that is, those ideas which emphasize the application of essentially the same development techniques used by the Western countries. Furthermore, as these countries are also the UN's major source of
funding, this might further imply that the UN's development activities would be Eurocentric in import. In the final analysis, a crucial issue is what this inherent divergence in world views and dominance of Eurocentric thought would imply for the chances of African countries to revitalize a uniquely Africanist perspective and ideology in enhancing their development. There are several definitions of ideology. One is Adorno's definition (cited in Stryker, 1971) that it is an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values--a way of thinking about humans and society. Althusser (cited in Rotberg, 1966) said ideology is "an internally consistent body of thought (which can take the form of images, myths, ideas or concepts), characterized by its historical function within a given society."

Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

The problem is to discover the nature of the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the major aspects of the African development process, and the nature of the UN's roles in fostering that process. Furthermore, these perceptions are to be studied as part of the delegates' contribution to Africanist thought. In essence, they are critically examined in the context of some major perceptions of Africanist thinkers.

The five major research questions include:

1. What were the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the major aspects of the African development process?

2. What were the major patterns observed in these perceptions
of the African development process? What are some implications?

3. What were the major perceptions of the roles of the UN in African development?

4. What were the major patterns observed in these perceptions of the UN's roles? What are some major implications?

5. How can one critically appraise the major perceptions within the context of the major perceptions of some Africanist thinkers?

Significance of the Study

The United Nations is truly an international organization because it brings together the delegates of over 160 countries. Indirectly, this means almost all the world's over 5 billion people are represented. The speeches delivered at the General Assembly enable every nation to share with other nations, its respective ideas and world views on crucial issues like development. The sharing of ideas among nations is significant for the enhancement of international communication, especially in a world in which those relations are too frequently marked by frictions, wars, disagreements, and distrust among nations. The content of the discourse generated by the nations at the Assembly represents a significant communication artifact worthy of study. Such a study is even more significant as it seeks to critically analyze and rationally explain some of the perceptions in the speeches.
However, there is ongoing debate about the role and relevance of the organization under whose auspices these speeches are delivered. Some observers have the view that the UN is likely to pass into disuse except possibly in dealing with matters of minor importance outside the interests of the major powers (Goodrich, 1974, pp. 1-2). Others feel it will play a modest role in dealing with problems of a non-political nature, many of which have come to assume critical proportions as a result of the technologic developments and growing interdependence (p. 2). Finally, those who see the UN as performing an increasingly important role in the achievement of common purposes set forth in the Charter, though disappointed by its inadequacies, see the future in terms of a more effective organization and greater willingness on the part of governments to make use of it (p. 2).

Within the last year or so, there appeared to have been more acknowledgement of the stature of the UN in world affairs. Even the United States which for several years refused to honor its financial obligations to the organization because of what it perceived as the UN's less-than-satisfactory financial accountability, has expressed willingness to pay its dues. The Washington Post (July 20, 1988, p. A14) commented:

The United Nations is moving into a period where its forums, processes, corridors-- its offices and its officials-- are being put to American use on a scale never seen before. Major conflicts involving Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan, southern Africa, and Indochina are in various stages of seemingly promising treatment with the help of the UN. Alert to this development, the new Soviet leadership has abandoned its past recalcitrance and moved to take advantage of the newly-seen possibilities.
Two and a half decades earlier, Mazrui (1964) had expressed the view that the UN Charter effectively replaced the Atlantic Charter as the ultimate documentary confirmation of the legitimacy of African aspirations. By 1955, the UN had become a liberating factor in practice as well as in principle. He said "it was involved in this process in two paradoxical capacities-- in the capacity of a collective "imperialist" with "trusteeship" responsibilities of its "own" and in the capacity of the grand critic of imperialism at large" (p. 504).

The genesis and evolution of organizations reflect a level of human development which is an attempt to cope with the complexities of societies brought about by sharp increases in populations, and human relationships; consequently, there are complexities in those relationships, locally and internationally, and there are increased human demands on the environment. Goodrich said such organizations as the UN were important, and claimed that as long as the state retained its primacy as a form of social organization, international organization in some form would be necessary for dealing with matters of common concern that cannot be satisfactorily handled by individual state action (p. 2). Rothwell corroborated the idea when he said:

The very existence of international organization... has injected a new force into the world community and has altered the configurations of world politics. The organizations have been able to exert influence because... they have served as institutions through which contending political forces can be brought continuously face to face in a regularized manner (1949, pp. 612, 615).
Assuming that the claims made here are valid, a study of an international organization constitutes a significant research exercise. In the case of the UN's roles in Africa, it might be significant to find out what new force the organization has injected into the African community, and how it has altered the configurations of African politics and especially from the viewpoint of an African nation.

All human beings, including the delegates of various nations, have perceptions of what happens around them, and their ability to rationally explain and communicate or share those perceptions with others is what makes human beings unique. An examination of such perceptions as a distinct body of thought projected in Nigeria's General Assembly speeches is significant because it is an attempt to understand some of the issues the country considers as important, and what it wants the world to know about them. The speeches constitute some of a developing country's communication geared towards particular audiences (like the world's powers), and towards a general world audience (international public opinion), as well. Such an examination is all the more crucial at this time because many developing countries find themselves at the crossroads in their quest for development. Plagued by a multitude of problems like adverse ecological conditions, food shortages, low commodity prices, huge foreign debts, mismanagement by public officials, and internal instability among others, they are forced to rethink and re-evaluate their goals of national development and how best to achieve them. It is also a time of much pessimism, uncertainty in the future, and a general mistrust of the economically powerful developed nations and
international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially in their policies towards African nations.

This study is intended to contribute to development and communication theories by highlighting some of Nigeria's conceptualizations of development matters, in an attempt to achieve an agreement of minds with other nations. It is believed that attempting to understand another nation's perceptions of issues, and the underlying reasons for these, might maximize the potential of effective communication at the UN. The study also critically compares Nigeria's perceptions with some of the major ideas of some Africanist thinkers. The Africanist perspective includes the pertinent ideas on African politics, economics, sociology, and history drawn from the writings of thinkers such as Fanon, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Chinweizu, Cabral, and Obasanjo. The significance is that the study should help highlight the common trends and differences in their ideas; this collection of ideas offers a context for critically analyzing the speeches, and this should contribute, in some way, to the ongoing debate and discussion on revitalizing Africanist thought.

Rationale of the Study

The study focuses on speeches delivered by Nigerian delegates at the General Assembly sessions because General Assembly speeches are an important communication tool. They enable the nations to share their respective world views with other nations. All nations are represented at the Assembly, unlike the Security Council which is comprised of the big powers and a few elected members
from the developing world. But even the great powers turn to the plenary body not only because they want to escape the "veto," but also because they find the Assembly a useful channel for winning and maintaining the collaboration of the middle and small powers that are not all regularly represented in the Security Council (Haviland, 1978, p. 169). Also, the great powers have realized that the Assembly debates are a powerful psychological force throughout the world often reported more completely than those of the Council (p. 169).

The analysis began with the 1960 speech because it was Nigeria's very first speech to the UN General Assembly. It also marked the beginning of the decade in which the majority of the developing nations of Africa joined the UN. Nigeria got its political independence from Britain in 1960 and joined the UN the same year. 1960 was also the beginning of the First UN Development Decade.

Some Major Theses of the Study

1. The delegates' enunciation, on one hand, of an Africanist or Afro-centric world view in matters pertaining to African development, and their enunciation on the other hand, of a significant role for the UN seems to be inherently inconsistent and hence, problematic. The assumption in this study is that the concepts, Africanism or Afrocentricity, capture the essence of the continental consciousness about African development, shared by the over 50 different countries and thousands of ethnic groups on the continent. The continent can only be characterized as developed when the
majority of the countries, and not only a handful, show the characteristics of development. Development becomes a common goal, and it should serve as a centripetal force for Africans. But on closer examination, while the UN could be a significant participant in African development, it might have an implication of perhaps pulling African countries away from establishing an Africanist-based approach to development.

2. The Nigerian delegates' perceptions about the African development process should depict a rhetorical condition in which the African leadership is caught between ineffectiveness at home, and lack of influence abroad. It is no secret that African countries have minimal political, economic, and social influence especially, in African development matters. Moreover, much of the power in international affairs rests outside the African continent in the political, economic, and social institutions of the developed nations. Because of this, much of Nigeria's discourse could be characterized as a rhetoric of protest which called for change and redress in the relations between the developed and developing countries.

3. Nigeria's overall perceptions of African development, and of the roles of the UN, as projected in its UN speeches, perhaps constitute only one version of the whole story of African development. It could be expected that Nigeria's delegates would be subjective in their perceptions of some of the major issues that concern Africa. This is because Nigeria has its own particular attitudes and history which might influence some of the perceptions projected in the speeches.
Source Material for Analysis

The primary source material to be analyzed consists of the speeches delivered by Nigerian delegates to the General Assembly Sessions between 1960 and 1987. The transcripts of the speeches were obtained directly from the Nigerian UN Mission in New York, and from the UN Records of the Plenary meetings.

The other source consists of secondary material. This includes the scholarly articles which deal in some way with the UN and Africa relationship. These are taken from journals such as International Organization, Journal of Modern African Studies, World Affairs, Journal of International Affairs, Presence Africaine, and Political Studies. They are also taken from monographs which focus on issues related to the United Nations, Nigeria, Africa, and African Development.

Chapter II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter defines the major concepts utilized in the study. These concepts include: perceptions, images, roles, international organization, and the United Nations system. There is a description of some major development paradigms, a summary of some of the literature pertinent to the issue of the UN's role in African development, and finally, there is a summary of the major ideas of some Africanist thinkers on issues crucial to Africa.

Perceptions, Images, and Roles

There is a close connection between perceptions, images, and roles. Perceptions are ideas formed by human beings from what their senses have taken in. They are the individual's understanding of what goes on around him or her. Nimmo acknowledged the closeness between perceptions and images in his definition of the image. He defined it as

a subjective representation of something previously perceived. It is an interpreted sensation, or in other words, a meaningful impression, appearance, semblance, or similar mental representation of our perceptions (1974, pp. 5-6).

In The Image (1956) Boulding discussed the image-role relationship. He said: "We are not only located in time and space and in personal relationships, but also in the world of nature, in the world of how
things operate" (p. 5). One is located in a world of subtle intimations and emotions, all of which he referred to as the "Image of the World." (p. 5). One can assume that each country's respective UN delegates also have particular images of the world, which they make known in their speeches. Boulding said the image could be our knowledge of the world. Messages could produce a change in the image and this is the "phenomenon of reorganization of the image" (8).

Boulding added: "a society consists not only of individual persons; it consists of organizations" (p. 57). An organization is a structure of roles tied together by lines of communication (p. 57). Furthermore, the image of roles was the significant thing, and not the image of the whole organization. The role of an organization was the particular responsibility it had in relation to a particular task. But it was possible to have multiple roles associated with that task.

Boulding explained that the image was involved in economic life (pp. 82-89). Economic life dealt with matters of wealth and its distribution. It included the ability to know economic alternatives, the ability to value-order, and the ability to choose the best alternative (pp. 82-89). The image was also involved in the political process. This dealt with matters associated with power. Organizations might have the power of a role. The social organization maintained its role structure amidst a flow of constantly changing individual persons occupying these roles. Organizations exhibit division of labor, specialization of roles and a hierarchical structure of communication (p. 27).
International Organization

Ogley (1969, p. 601) said international organization might be defined as "the attempt by two or more states to settle in an organized way some issue or category of issues, which would otherwise be settled in an informal, decentralized or even chaotic way." International organization then referred to a process, and that process might take many forms: discussing an issue before a political audience; legal judgment by a panel of arbitrators; financing some enterprise; fighting a military campaign; observing and patrolling a frontier; doing research on a specific problem (p. 601).

Ogley listed five criteria in his definition of international organization. These were composition; representation; jurisdiction; decision-making; and execution (p. 603). Composition meant membership, that is, the states which comprised an organization. Representation referred to the manner in which this is done—either commitment to a particular form or to allow member states to be represented as they wish. Jurisdiction was the subjects that were considered as falling within its competence. Decision-making was the process which a given form of words come to have the status of a resolution of an organ, that is, the voting system. Execution referred to the staff and money at the disposal of an organization or the commitment which members might have given on which they can rely for execution of decisions. These same factors apply to the UN.
The United Nations System: The Charter and the Agencies

The Charter of the UN suggests that the organization has a role to play in development. The Charter is Appendix B in Coyle (1969). The sections that have the most relevance for development are as follows:

The general opening statement said that the nations involved in the drafting of the Charter, agreed to preservation of peace, affirmed human worth, dignity, and equality; uphold justice and international law; and promotion of social progress and better life. In order to achieve these ends, the nations agreed to peaceful co-existence, unite to maintain peace using the proper means, and to use international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

Article 1 stated the purposes of the organizations, summarized as follows:

1. maintaining international peace and security.
2. developing friendly, respectful, equal relations, and self-determination for all peoples.
3. achieving international co-operation in solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems.
4. serving as harmonizing center for actions of all nations in these ends.

As an international organization, the UN is divided into special components or organs to facilitate its achieving these ends and purposes. The General Assembly is essentially a communication clearing-house where all member-nations are represented, and
where they can discuss any matter within the scope of peace and security; Article 13 stated that the Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

1. promoting cooperation in the fields of politics and international law.

2. promoting cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without the distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

The Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the area of International Economic and Social Cooperation, Chapter IX, Article 55 stated that the creation of conditions of stability and well-being was necessary for the peaceful and friendly relations among nations. Therefore the UN shall promote:

1. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic progress and development.

2. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems, and international cultural and educational cooperation.

3. universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion

Article 57 stated that various specialized agencies established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide responsibilities as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, health, and related fields shall be brought into relationships with the UN. Even though the names of these agencies were not specified in the Charter, a description is as follows:
The UN includes specialized agencies and numerous commissions and programs comprising what is the UN family (Coyle, p. xi). The UN work at the grassroots is carried out by several agencies that deal with the basic problems facing human beings—hunger, disease and poverty. Hunger is the special problem of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The World Health Organization (WHO) is a specialized agency which advises member-countries on public health and the control of disease (p. 24). The International Labor Organization (ILO) works to promote social justice for workers around the world (p. 26). The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), though not supported by the UN budget but by voluntary contributions from governments and individuals and sale of the widely used UNICEF Christmas cards works with children in the developing world. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) helps governments plan expanded educational programs, budget the necessary funds, and set up the required training and research institutions (p. 37). A principal aim of the agency is to develop understanding and goodwill among widely differing nations and peoples (p. 40).

The UN also has agencies helping with production, one of which is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which promotes international investment. It is also known as the World Bank (p. 44). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established with the special purpose of encouraging the growth of private enterprises in the developing world (p. 48). The International Development Association is another affiliate of the World Bank,
established in 1960 to make "soft" loans for necessary public works and services that will not earn a direct income like the projects that the Bank finances, and yet will have a fair chance of repayment over the course of time (pp. 48-49). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a system of cash reserves that the member-nations can draw upon to meet temporary deficits in their international trade (p. 49). The establishment of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was to have a conference where the question of tariffs and other trade barriers could be discussed.

In the area of technical services, there are several UN specialized agencies devoted to providing international technical services. These are the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Universal Postal Union (UPU), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).

Having specific development agenda is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which is a combination of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance which is supposed to help in economic progress for the developing nations of the world (p. 63) and the Special Fund-- designed to fill in the gaps between the programs of other agencies in the developing countries, particularly the gaps in knowledge of what resources are available, and in the number of trained technicians to undertake the countries' development (p. 64). The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) provides research into the resources and training of technicians to work them (p. 66). The UNIDO program
coordinates various sources of capital for industries in the developing nations (p. 66). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) offers a forum for discussions on trade and development. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) was and is still the only development agency in which the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) participates as a bloc (Feldman, 19 April 1989, p. 7). The director of the agency, Idriss Jazairy was quoted as saying "IFAD is one-third self-sufficient, and by the end of the next decade should be 70 percent so" (p. 7).

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) was formed in 1966 by combining several UN training courses for government officials from newly-independent countries on such matters as development financing and the transfer of technology (Coyle, p. 66). Finally, there are four United Nations regional economic commissions. They cover Europe (ECE), Latin America (ECLA), Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and Africa (ECA). The ECA was established in 1958 to aid in coordinating the economic and social development of the African nations and territories (p. 75).

The UN organ which is closely connected to economic and social matters that have been described above is the Economic and Social Council. Article 62 stated its functions which included the initiation of studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters, and may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. It may draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with
respect to matters falling within its competence. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the UN, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

The International Trusteeship System is the UN's administration of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. Its objectives are

1. to further international peace and security
2. to promote political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories and their progressive development towards self-government or
3. to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. . .
4. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the UN and their nationals. . .

The functions of The Trusteeship Council are

1. to consider reports submitted by the administering authority
2. to accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority.
3. to provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
4. to take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Finally, the International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the UN, and the Secretariat handles administrative matters through the Secretary-General and Staff.

Development Paradigms

Development is multi-faceted and value-laden and can be defined as:
the process of change which has as its goal the improvement in the quality of life of all or the majority of the people without doing violence to the natural and cultural environment in which they exist and which seeks to involve the generality of the people as closely as possible in this enterprise, making them masters of their own destiny (Dissanayake, 1981, p. 217).

There is a communication component in development. The concept, "communication" could be used to represent all the ideas various people—intellectuals and non-intellectuals alike—express about the subject of development. This study focuses primarily on this conceptualization of development communication. But another reference to communication is as a component and facilitator of the development process. Dissanayake said this was generic, and could cover the various forms like interpersonal, group, and mass communication processes.

Paradigms and approaches of development, including the communication component were discussed by Tehranian (1979), Dissanayake (1981), and Servaes (1986). Only an abbreviated description is offered here.

According to Dissanayake, Approach I had been the dominant approach; it stressed the need for rapid economic growth by means of industrialization (p. 2). It laid emphasis on heavy industries, capital intensive technologies, and urbanization, and the development of a society was to be measured by Gross National Product (pp. 2, 3). He cited Rostow (1960) who emphasized the economic aspect of development. Dissanayake said some of the communication scholars whose works could be classified under this
approach included: Schramm (1964), Lerner (1958) and Lerner and Schramm (1967), and Pye (1963).

Servaes (1986) offered a scheme in which he described the above approach as the Modernization and Growth Paradigm. He said its communication component could be seen under four aspects:

(a) Two-step flow of information whereby the population comprised of active and passive members or opinion leaders and opinion followers. According to Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), the receiver reacts to the stimuli of the sender (p. 2).

(b) Diffusion of innovations. Rogers (1962) mainly conceived of a process of adoption and diffusion of ideas essentially by interpersonal means. (p. 3).

(c) Individual and Attitude Changes. Lerner (1958) examined the concept of empathy. Schramm (1964), among others, affirmed that the media of communication effected social change and development.

(d) There was the idea of introducing and applying new techniques to solve most development problems by Innis (1951), and McLuhan (1962).

Under Approach II, Dissanayake said there was attention to income distribution—labour intensive technology, decentralized planning—endogenous as well as exogenous factors of development. The communication strategy seemed to be to make use of both cosmopolitan and the indigenous media of communication to effect a two-way communication process between policymakers and the public.
Under Approach III, Dissanayake said there was a focus on the interdependence of the developed and developing nations. For example, Nordenstreng and Schiller referred to the emphasis on global structure whereby it was in precisely the international sociopolitic-economic system that decided the course of development within the sphere of each nation. He said the scholars represented included: Frank (1969), Amin (1974), Wallerstein (1974), Barratt (1974), Kaufmann (1975), and Petras (1978). The role of communication was to educate the majority of the people living in the less-developed countries into a new awareness of their plight.

This approach is also known as the Dependency Paradigm. Servaes differentiated between the culturalist and political economy schools. He said the first interpreted culture, communication and ideology idealistically and autonomously and was represented by Read (1976), Tunstall (1977), and Varis (Varis and Nordenstreng, 1973). The second school consisted of materialists who were more concerned with the economic and political base in which culture and communication occurred. Some of the scholars represented were Hamelink (1978), Mattelart (1976), and Schiller (1969).

Finally, Approach IV emphasized the idea of "Self-reliance." According to Dissanayake, it meant the reliance on the natural and human resources available to a country, and the ability to define development problems, set goals, devise strategies and make decisions independently, and in accordance with one's own social and cultural ethos.
Servaes called this "Another or Multidimensional Development." He said the central idea here was that there was no "universal development model; development is an integral, multidimensional and dialectical process that can differ from country to country" (p. 211). He perceived six essential criteria for "another" development. These were (a) basic needs (b) endogeny (c) self-reliance (d) ecology (e) participative democracy, and (f) structural change.

He described self-reliance as the opposite of dependency, and as a sovereign and autocentric strategy for development on the basis of a country's own capabilities and needs (p. 214). Furthermore, self-reliance was "the condition for collaboration on the basis of equality, which may be striven for on the local, the national, the regional, and the international level" (p. 214).

**Summary of Literature on the UN's Connection with African Development**

Since its inception in 1945, the UN has been a major player in international affairs. But its involvement in the affairs of the African continent assumed more importance especially concerning the issue of colonialism on the continent and the problems it brought for Africans.

This literature summary follows the emergence of Africa in international relations, from the 1960s, the period in which many African nations became members of the UN, through the 1970s to the 1980s, when the problems of development facing Africa continue to be as formidable as ever.
Mazrui (1964), focused on the UN and some political attitudes of Africans. He said a bundle of complexes, aspirations, fears, and values were involved in African nationalism and in its aftermath. All these affected how Africans viewed events in the world and how they reacted to those events. Reflecting the spirit of the times, he said the concern should be on that which had already happened or was continuing to happen, the role of the UN in the momentous mid-20th century phenomenon of global decolonization. According to him, the new UN Charter effectively replaced the Atlantic Charter as the ultimate documentary confirmation of the legitimacy of African aspirations (p. 504). In fact, the Charter did become a kind of documentary confirmation of the legitimacy of African aspirations (p. 504). The actual framers of the Charter in 1945 first declared their determination to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and then to only secondly, to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small" (p. 508). He believed that judging by their policies, attitudes and stands, the new states of Africa would have reversed the order of affirmation.

Finally, on the UN and Africa's future, he said that the UN which was so important as a means of giving the African a sense of stature since Africa was weak and divided-- was so constituted that it tended to lure some Africans away from the pan-Africanist goal. Sovereign nations would give up their sovereignty only if there were
compelling needs which only such renunciation would meet. These needs might range from military insecurity to economic problems.

In "Colonialism, Political Development and the UN" (1965), Emerson among other things, examined the change in the UN in terms of its overall numerical strength and that of African nations. At the end of 1945, there were 4 African members; in 1965, Africa had 35 members out of a total UN membership of 114 (pp. 484-5). Emerson said prior to 1960, there was a lesser role for the UN in the massive sweep of decolonization, but its role grew bolder after, and in fact, the UN helped create an atmosphere conducive to the overthrow of colonialism (p. 490).

During Congo's independence the UN was not consulted until there was an outbreak of trouble. Also, the UN had minimum impact in the situation whereby Nigeria got its independence from the British as a single state and member of the UN, while the French broke down two pre-existing federations of French West and Equatorial Africa into 12 component parts, to which were added the trust territories of Togo, Cameroon, and Madagascar. In essence,

the smaller heirs of French colonial empire in sub-Saharan Africa emerged as fifteen states, many of them with little hope of vitality or strength, and endowed with fifteen votes to overwhelm the single vote of their Nigerian colleague (p. 494).

Emerson concluded that the two major spheres that seemed likely to challenge the ability of the UN to manage them were the discovery and implementation of acceptable solutions for the countries of southern Africa and the advancement of political, economic and social development (p. 500). The greatest contribution
the UN could make was in the broad and vital area of development (p. 501).

Ewing, a UN Staff-member, discussed self-reliance in Africa. He faulted African countries for establishing development plans largely drawn up by foreign experts with limited participation by local personnel, thereby making limited impact on development (1968). He made the following suggestions:

1. The planning department ought to be directly attached to the head of the government because of the rivalries between different government ministries.

2. There should be promotion of private saving, including promotion of cooperative banks, unit trusts and life insurance organization.

3. There was need to concentrate on less spectacular forms of development, such as feeder roads, to bring agricultural products from the villages.

4. Agriculture had to focus on the domestic market instead of the dependence on imported food.

5. Even though the United Nations Development Program commanded only a fraction of resources channelled through bilateral program, yet, it could play a strategic role in development, and this was true of the Special Fund sector of the UNDP which promoted training projects, natural resources surveys, and pre-investment studies in industry, agriculture, and physical infrastructure.

Barber (1975) examined the committee on decolonization, also known as the Committee of Twenty-four. He said the "principle" of
self-determination had developed into an assumed "right" accepted as such at least by the anti-colonial mentality (p. 146). The committee had done a lot to advance such a change which commenced before its establishment in 1961. He noted the inconsistency in the use of the concept, self-determination. It seemed aggravating to the Westerner, but taken for granted by the African, for example, it is "applicable for purposes of independence from the Westerner's empire but not for the use of those dissatisfied with the resultant state" (p. 146). The case of Biafra which wanted to secede from Nigeria, a former British colony, exemplified this situation. The UN Secretary-General was prevented from interfering, and the UN never considered the question.

Gunter (1974) discussed the long and checkered history of the doctrine of self-determination. The term encompassed non-intervention, democracy, economic independence, human and minority rights, and cultural and educational guarantees. Judging by what happened at the UN, self-determination had become a right to be exercised by the peoples as a whole, who inhabited a given colonial entity. And once these peoples had availed themselves of this right, and had become independent, the principle had little further relevance for them. In 1974, the Legal Counsel of the UN said U Thant, the Secretary-General, believed in the principle as defined by the UN, but recognized that on occasion, events might discard of the principle (p. 154). The December 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), which came one day after the Assembly, had virtually equated self-determination for colonial
entities with complete independence in the Anti-Colonial Declaration. It was the recognition that self-determination might also result in "free association" or "integration" with another state (p. 157).

The right of self-determination was exercised when people concerned were fully aware of the significance of what they were being asked to decide. The process should be a democratic one. There was a bias for plebiscites, rather than indirect methods such as legislative approval. Also, the presence of UN observers when the act of self-determination occurred, was also considered to be important.

Gunter (1979) continued with the topic of self-determination. He said there was confusion in the UN between self-determination and territorial integrity. According to him, the two doctrines defined the right of colonies to become independent within their already established colonial boundaries (p. 204). If a colony wished to exercise its right of self-determination, by splitting into several states or joining a neighbouring state, it could do so, only by the democratic vote of all its people, and never as a result of all the pressures or claims of the neighbouring states (p. 204). But in several instances around the world, these definitions and norms they sanctioned had been confused and challenged by events. For example in Western Sahara, despite affirmations of self-determination, both Morocco and Mauritania laid claim to the territory. Algeria, the Western Sahara's third neighbour backed the accepted norm of self-determination. The role of the UN General Assembly was a worsening of the situation. It adopted two contradictory resolutions: 3458A (XXX) and 3458B (XXX) on December 10 1975. The first affirmed the
"inalienable right of the people of Spanish Sahara to self-determination" while the second took note of the tripartite agreement concluded at Madrid" and in effect, gave de facto acceptance to Morocco's and Mauritania's claims of territorial integrity (p. 206).

He asked why the UN had not taken a firmer stand in defense of its beleaguered norms of self-determination and territorial integrity. He attributed one of the major reasons to the voting power of the Third World majority (p. 213). Another reason was the military power the norm-breakers had (p. 213). Finally, the sensitivities of sovereign states and the need to achieve a consensus in an organization composed of sovereign states, even if at the lowest common denominator of simply listing both conflicting claims without pronouncing upon their legitimacy, also helped to explain the inaction of the UN (p. 214).

In "The Impact of the UN upon Africa," Gareau (1978), defined impact as "the capacity to change or merely to sustain the behavior or attitudes of African elites or publics" (p. 565). He examined the impact exerted not merely by the institution in New York, but also by some 25 other Specialized Agencies and Programs. The UN had been convincingly portrayed as an international actor and his intention in the article was to demonstrate that it was not a "toothless, spineless, indigent who prattles fluently in six languages" (p. 566).

The UN's impact was examined using a typology of the methods by which outputs were produced. The first was Information-- the
facts and opinions in oral, written or other forms generated by national delegates. The second was Conference Diplomacy including interactions of official delegates and members of the Secretariat at the various headquarters of the UN family (p. 567). The fact that by 1966, the organization was sponsoring 7,120 meetings attested to its services to African states (p. 567). Gareau cited Alger's study which tested the thesis that attitudes were transformed and became more internationalist by the proceedings of the UN. This was done by interviewing 25 delegates before and after the 14th General Assembly session, and he found that their attitudes had changed.

The third method by which outputs were produced was Standards--this included the rules of command of the organization. The standards of the system of Trusteeship usually took the form of recommendations of the General Assembly. This system left its mark by encouraging indigenous leadership to former colonies; South Africa, and Namibia were the "spoilers as far as decolonization was concerned" (p. 571). The standards of the World Bank Group were efficacious because compliance with them was usually tied to the leverage which flowed from the power to grant or to withhold loans (p. 571). In fiscal year 1977, the two most important components--the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Development Agency made 68 loan commitments to 38 countries of East and West Africa with an emphasis on projects designed to promote agricultural development, at a total value of $964 million.
There were instances in which standards seemed to have sustained or altered African behaviors and attitudes. An instance was the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Assembly Resolution had been incorporated into the constitution of at least 17 African states (p. 572). The impact of standards was that they were targets to be reached sometime in the future (p. 572). Another standard was connected to conflict resolution. Haas, Butterworth, and Nye (1972), (cited by Gareau), had given the UN some credit for helping to ameliorate all the African conflicts that came before it, giving highest marks for six, including French Togo, the British Cameroon and the Congo (now Zaire).

The fourth type of output was Field Administration. This referred to the activities of the organization performed away from the headquarters (573). The Congo problem made the organization issue orders intended to lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But there were development activities away from headquarters as well. The administrators of the UN Development Program had found it necessary to post some 94 Resident Representatives and their staff in the field. The conclusion was that on the negative side the organization had marginal results regarding the situation in South Africa and Namibia.

Nicol's examination of Africa and the USA in the UN revealed that the US had a creditable record in the pursuit of two cardinal goals of African countries-- the promotion of economic and social development and the strengthening of the continent's political unity and autonomy (1978, p. 366). He considered the relationship of the
two regions by looking at the evolution of policies concerning the issues of colonialism and racial domination through different phases of US foreign policy particularly as reflected in the UN (p. 366). With the emergence of the Congo crisis in 1960, Africa became for the first time a priority in the foreign policy of the US (p. 367). The Kennedy administration endorsed the need for immediate steps towards independence by voting in November 1961 to establish what became later known as the Committee of Twenty-four on Decolonization, to review the implementation of the Declaration of Decolonization (p. 367). Some of the political problems over the years had been South Africa and Namibia, which were still in the grip of apartheid, but the Portuguese colonies, and Zimbabwe had attained their political independence.

But there were economic considerations as well. Nicol said:

The Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the General Assembly, as well as the formation of a Committee of the Whole in December 1977 for a Special Session in 1980 on a New International Economic Order, were merely the tips of the icebergs floating in a troubled economic sea of contention between the developed and developing countries (p. 390).

The US was undeniably tied to the economic fortunes of Africa because it contributed materially to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, as well as other specialized agencies which were under the UN umbrella (p. 390).

In "The UN Confounds African Development," Gruhn (1978, p. 547) said the commitment of the UN to the problems of the least developed nations would seem to be unquestionable after the UN Development Program earmarked two-thirds of the around $2,500
million aid program for 1977 to 1981 for these countries. But despite
the budget, she believed the services rendered to the Least
Developed Countries (LDC) were unlikely to improve markedly,
unless some understanding was gained as to why the same factors
had also produced their inability to maximize the resources of the UN
as it now operated (p. 548). She listed four myths the UN had
generated concerning its role and capacity to foster development in
the Third World.

The first myth was that increased reliance on, and improvement
of UN Country Programming and the UNDP Resident Representative
would reduce inter-agency overlap, competition, and confusion for
the LDC. This was not so; instead,

it is unreasonable to assume that even an experienced and
effective Resident Representative can be expected to rationalize
the whole UN system, and at the country level, to generate
effective participation on the part of the LDC (p. 550).

The second myth was that the UN system operated at the will of
member-governments and development aid came in response to a
member-governments's request. The actual situation was that most
studies, projects, and programs under the UN banner were initiated
somewhere within the UN and were then "sold" to the African
governments in question (p. 550).

The third myth was that the UN system produced many valuable
specialized studies and statistical compilations which were widely
disseminated and which gave least developed African governments
the access to vital information. However, the reality was that some
UN statistics were valuable to African governments and many other
types of desired information were available only to governments which had the manpower and the knowledge to know where to go, and if they possessed the tenacity to wind themselves through the UN maze.

Lastly, there was the myth that the UN system provided African countries with the access to the world's largest and most technically competent pool of development experts. In reality, this was not entirely the case. For example, expertise in a technical field might have been lost due to the bureaucratic nature of UN work. Also, there was a need to be familiar with particular local circumstances and conditions of a country, and finally, the duration for consulting and advising might not be appropriate to the circumstances of local conditions.

Meltzer (1978, p. 993) focused on the restructuring of the UN and discussed the "different clusters of member-state interests and their deliberations within the special UN committee on institutional reform." He also assessed the basic types of institutional reforms proposed within the restructuring deliberations, evaluating their possible impacts and implications for the UN system's functioning in the context of North-South relations. He said the heightened attempts at restructuring was a reflection of the increased dissatisfaction of most member-states with their participation in international economic relations and with the inadequacy of UN bodies in addressing problems of economic development and relations between industrialized nations and developing countries (p. 994).
A feature of the UN's organization and political evolution had been the tremendous growth of economic and social development activities undertaken within the UN system, following the expansion of membership from the developing world (p. 994). By the 1970s, four out of every five dollars spent each year within the UN system, totalling over $2.6 billion in 1977, were devoted to such economic activities (p. 995). Another feature was that the UN had become the locus of far-flung debates, negotiations, and policy proposals regarding the conduct and future of international economic relations (p. 995). In December 1974, a resolution was passed to set up a panel whose goal among others was to make the UN "a more effective instrument for the establishment of a new more rational and just international economic order" (p. 997). The group's report was issued in May 1975. The proposals for reform involved two basic areas: (a) the manner in which the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should conduct their deliberative and policy-making efforts (b) the ways in which the organization and operation of UN programs should be structured to achieve effective implementation of goals.

Meltzer concluded that key provisions within proposed restructuring guidelines included,

strengthened roles for the General Assembly and (ECOSOC) as central forums for the discussion and negotiation of international and economic and social issues; improvements in the system-wide planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation of UN programs and actions; greater interagency coordination at the intergovernmental and inter-secretariat levels; increased efficiency and consolidation of UN operational activities; reorganization of the UN secretariat (p. 1017).
Krishnamurti (1980) also discussed the restructuring of the UN system. He limited himself to three aspects of restructuring raised by Meltzer (1978). These were (a) the role of the General Assembly in international economic cooperation and development within the UN system (b) the creation of the post of Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, and (c) the restructuring exercise and UNCTAD.

For the first, he said:

in order to create a constructive framework for the negotiations and to provide the necessary political impetus, it is essential to recognize a stronger role for the General Assembly at the international level. This role would be more than a reviewing and overseeing role. Instead it would give the Assembly influence, even if indirect, on decision-making processes in other forums, especially in those where developing nations have only a very small voice at present (p. 634).

And for the second aspect, he said:

While the supremacy of the General Assembly and its directives cannot and will not be challenged at least within the UN (i.e. excluding the specialized agencies), the leadership role of any particular UN organ such as UNCTAD, or the Committee on the Whole, or even a charter body such as ECOSOC is less likely to be determined by the formal powers of the Director-General at the center, than by the political dynamics of the situation and the respective substantive contributions and negotiating successes of the organ concerned (p. 637).

Finally, he said:

The UNCTAD has emerged stronger as the result, because the resolution reaffirmed and strengthened UNCTAD's principal and major role in the UN; gave further support to measures to endow it with a greater level of resources as well as flexibility in deploying them; took a number of concrete actions to promote streamlining of UNCTAD activities, and set up intergovernmental committee of limited duration to consider further necessary
measures for the rationalization of UNCTAD's machinery (p. 639).

Along similar lines, McLaren (1980) focused on the UN and its "quixotic" quest for coordination. He said from a variety of sources, some of the problems of coordination included:

a decentralization of socio-economic concerns in independent functional specialized agencies; overlapping mandates and jurisdictions among these agencies; independent sources for each agency of both regular budget and development fund resources; the inability or lack of desire within the member-governments to coordinate their approaches toward the UN system as a whole; the impossibility of comparing plans, programs and budgets of all the agencies due both to time constraints and to the meaninglessness of interagency comparisons; the lack of a center within the UN system for establishing priorities; the proliferation of committees, commissions, programs and funds within the UN system itself, and the resulting distribution of UN offices around the world, together with the spread of agency offices; the mission-mentality of agency officials, and their member-government delegates, which causes them to stress allegiance to their particular agency and its functional concerns above all else (pp. 141-142).

The ECOSOC was supposed to coordinate the various bodies but one found only a vacuum at that point in the system (p. 142). According to McLaren, the specialized agencies could, and did make authoritative decisions concerning development irrespective of what ECOSOC wants (p.143). He cited Judge (1978) who said "the UN development system is not a system at all-- it is a network." And until the General Assembly and ECOSOC were prepared to recognize this fact, their attempts to coordinate the "system" were doomed (p. 143). He believed there was a dearth of creative thinking within the UN system, and coordination should be examined as a concept (p. 145).
McLaren, citing Luard (1977), said three distinct and possible purposes for coordination were (a) Rationalization— the process of attempting to remove the duplication of activities between or among units (b) Standardization— referred to the process needed to coordinate such procedural matters as personnel conditions and financial practices (c) Priorization— referred to the process of examining program requirements and determining which ones should be allocated what resources, and when they should be allocated.

He concluded that at the end of World War II, there was a role for the General Assembly and ECOSOC in socio-economic development as most of the specialized agencies were in their infancy. 30 years later, the agencies had matured and were in control of their own affairs; it was now time for ECOSOC and the General Assembly to retire at least from the coordination role.

Obaseki (1981) focused on the role of international organization in resolving conflicts in Africa. He said the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) were two international organizations which might exercise an acceptable mediation role. But the UN's role was limited because certain practical and procedural problems restricted its area of maneuver and its status to act as international legislator (p. 209). The composition of the UN and the weight accorded to the votes of certain members in the organization's Security Council, which had primary responsibility for the "maintenance of international peace and security" was placed (Article 24 UN Charter),
were in fact major factors preventing regions from according it that legitimization (p. 209).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which dealt with the connection between the UN, Security Council and regional arrangements in respect of international peace and security, was a tacit recognition of the practical limitation of the UN's effectiveness in this area (pp. 209-210). Obaseki said the basis of international organization's existence determined, or was synonymous with their role through which the major responsibilities for managing the political affairs of the group were exercised (pp. 213-214). The facilitation of cooperation by an organization was a very important source of its legitimacy. Some of the limitations of the UN's mediating role included the veto, the lack of funds for peace-keeping operations, as well as such constitutional provisions encouraging states to settle their disputes themselves and restraining, at least temporarily, possibilities to intervene (p. 214).

**Major Africanist Ideas Relating to African Development**

Mutiso and Rohio (1975, p. xi) said a majority of modern African thinkers grounded their thought at the socio-cultural (sociological) level. Both authors considered African political thought to be socially grounded because it reflected "interactional situations such as those between the colonizers and the colonized, between tribesmen and non-tribesmen, between powerholders and non-powerholders etc." (p. xi). They declared that the most prominent phenomenon in modern African politics had been nationalism whether one viewed
nationalism as a social movement or as a mode of political thought (p. xi). They organized nationalism under eight categories; a summary is as follows with some of the representative thinkers, many of whom fall under more than one category (pp. xi-xiv)²:

1. **Cultural Nationalism.** All modern African political thought started with cultural nationalism. While Europeans justified their colonization of Africa with the argument that theirs was a superior culture, or that Africans had no culture, it became necessary for the colonized to assert themselves as people with a culture and who were proud of it. Some of the representative thinkers are Senghor and Cesaire (Senegal); both expounded the concept of "negritude." Negritude is "the whole complex of civilized values—cultural, economic, social, and political—which characterize the black peoples, or more precisely, the Negro-African world" (Senghor, 1961, p. 83). He added:

> today our negritude no longer expresses itself as opposition to European values, but as a complement to them. Henceforth, its militants will be concerned, as I have often said, not to be assimilated but to assimilate. They will use European values to arouse the slumbering values of Negritude. . . (p. 83).

2. **Plaintive Nationalism.** Its essence was a request for assimilation into the colonizer's society in the colonies. This was

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² This categorization is problematic. One major problem is that since many of the Africanist thinkers fall under more than one category, it makes the categories rather porous. But an explanation could be that since this is a categorization of ideas, then it is possible for Africanists to express political ideas which could be classified into more than one category. Another problem is the labels given to Categories 4 and 6. They seem to be confusing. Instead, labels like: Nationalism against Race and Colonial Imperialism, and Nationalism against Neo-Colonialism seem more appropriate. Category 8 could even be Non-Aligned Nationalism.
exemplified by the nature and demands of the cultural associations and religious associations of the inter-war years. Awolowo and Azikiwe (Nigeria) during the inter-war period pleaded for African political participation and the expansion of economic and educational opportunities for the African colonial elite. Kenyatta (Kenya) was also considered to be under this grouping.

3. Radical Nationalism. The African political thinker, convinced that he was still living in a racial and colonial-imperialistic world, had to reassess his strategy and tactics for dealing with the colonial situation. This necessitated a radical change in his ideas; he demanded the end of colonialism and imperialism and declared that Africa must be for Africans. Some thinkers represented here are Fanon (Algeria), Nkrumah (Ghana), and Toure (Guinea).

4. Race and Colonial Imperialism. Essentially, this kind of nationalism was a reaction when the politics of plaintive nationalism had not succeeded. The demand was for racial equality between the colonizer who believed in white superiority, and the colonized. Some of the thinkers represented here are Nyerere (Tanzania), Fanon, Toure, and Awolowo.

5. Pan-African Nationalism. African political thinkers perceived race and colonial-imperialism as common problems requiring a coordinated strategy on a continent-wide scale. This meant the emergence of pan-African nationalism. Some pan-Africanists who are commonly referred to as "radicals" wanted a politically-united free Africa. Nkrumah represents this group. Others commonly referred to as "functionalists," wanted a free Africa which would be functionally
united. Nyerere is one. A third group, the "regionalists," wanted a piecemeal approach to African political unity. Kaunda of Zambia is an example.

6. Neo-Colonialism. Soon after independence in many African countries, it dawned upon African political thinkers that "independence was merely juridical" (p. xiii). This form of nationalism realized the negative impact of neo-colonialism on African countries. Nkrumah was quoted as saying the countries were client-states with political independence minus economic independence. They also lacked cultural independence. Some of the representative thinkers are Nkrumah, Oginga Odinga (Kenya).

7. Ideological and Integral Nationalism. Political thinking became complicated by the failure of the original pan-African thought movement, the efforts of the neo-colonialists to keep Africa balkanized, and the need for African leaders to maintain themselves in power. This led to the need for ideological and integral nationalism. The political thought dealt with concepts like African socialism and the one-party state. Some of the representative thinkers are Kaunda, Toure, Nasser (Egypt), and Senghor.

8. African Non-Alignment. This related to African strategy for extra-African relations and the way to approach the cold-war international situation. Some of the thinkers are Kenyatta, Nkrumah, and Nyerere.

In order to put the findings of this study into some kind of Africanist perspective and context, a summary of major ideas from
the writings of some Africanist thinkers, is provided. Among the Africanist thinkers are four former African heads of states, who having held leadership roles, have had first-hand experience as policymakers in the task of overseeing their country's development. These leaders were Nigeria's Obasanjo, Tanzania's Nyerere, Ghana's Nkrumah, and Guinea Bissau's Cabral. This summary of ideas which by no means exhaust all there is to know about Africa, introduces some crucial ideas relating to African development. Also, the summary offers a framework for a comparative analysis of the perceptions about African development and the roles of the UN, as projected in the speeches of the Nigerian delegates.

Frantz Fanon's seminal work, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), explored the theme of colonialism. He said decolonization was quite simply the "replacing of a certain "species" of men by another "species" of men" (p. 35). One could also stress the rise of a new nation, the setting up of a new state, its diplomatic relations, and its economic and political trends (p. 35). Decolonization would occur only after a decisive struggle between two protagonists. For it to occur, all means including violence had to be used. Decolonization unified the people by the radical decision to remove from among them, their heterogeneity, and it unified them on a national, sometimes racial basis (p. 46). Violence was a cleaning force at the level of individuals (p. 94).

Concerning the role of intellectuals in the colonial process, the native intellectuals accepted the cogency of ideas implanted in their
minds by the colonialist bourgeoisie; they accepted the supremacy of Western qualities and ideas (p. 46). One such idea pertained to "individualism," but on the contrary, Fanon said the native intellectual would discover the substance of village assemblies, the cohesion of people's committees, the spirit of self-criticism, which he called, an African institution (pp. 47-48). Decolonization also brought up "know-all, smart, wily intellectuals" who were referred to as spoilt children of yesterday's colonialism, and of today's governments, and who "organized" the loot of whatever national government existed (p. 48).

He said the importance of truth was that among the people, it was the property of the national cause, and it hastened the break-up of the colonialist regime (p. 50). The uprising of the emergent nation and the break-down of colonialist structures were the result of one of two causes: either of a violent struggle of the people in their own right, or of the action on the part of surrounding colonized peoples which acted as a brake on the colonial regime in question (p. 70). Violence was not only informative; it was also operative (p. 70). Fanon said authorities took spectacular measures such as arresting local leaders, but this only served to reinforce the aggressiveness of the people, and the situation could only deteriorate and worsen (pp. 71, 73).

Violence used in specific ways at the moment of the struggle for freedom did not magically disappear after the granting of independence. This was due to the cutthroat competition between capitalism and socialism. The local people realized they were living in
an atmosphere of international stress (p. 76). In recently liberated countries, the atmosphere of violence continued to dominate national life. The statesmen of underdeveloped countries indefinitely kept up "the tone of aggressiveness and exasperation in their speeches which in the normal way ought to have disappeared" (p. 77). A new tone dominated the international diplomacy at the UN General Assembly in September 1960. The representatives of the colonial countries tended to be aggressive and violent. Fanon added:

The radicalism of the African spokesmen brought the abscess to a head and showed up the inadmissible nature of the veto, and of the dialogue between the great powers, and above all, the tiny role reserved for the Third World (pp. 77-78).

During the colonial period, people were called upon to fight against oppression; after national liberation they were called upon to fight against poverty, illiteracy, and underdevelopment (pp. 93-94). In a comparison of development between European nations and the Third World nations, Fanon added that it was incorrect for the latter to say that they wanted to prove to themselves and to the world that they were capable of the achievements of the former. This was because of the differences in conditions between the periods of development in the two areas. National independence and the growth of national feeling in underdeveloped regions took on totally new aspects. In these regions, there was no infrastructure, and there was poverty and hunger (p. 96). Ironically, on the other hand, Europe's opulence was scandalous because the well-being of Europe was built with the sweat and dead bodies of people from the underdeveloped regions (p. 96).
Fanon said the call for independence was met with two kinds of reactions. First, capital and technicians were withdrawn from the young state, in other words, economic pressure was applied. On the other hand, countries that did not agree to go through this ordeal accepted the conditions of the former guardian power, and they became economically dependent.

Nkrumah emphasized African unity in *Africa Must Unite* (1970) and in *Neo-Colonialism* (1966). In the latter, he advocated the economic unity of Africa. He said: "Every African State has some contribution to make to the economic whole" (p. 29). In the process of obtaining economic unity, there was bound to be much hard bargaining between the various states (p. 28). For economic unity to be effective, it must be accompanied by political unity (p. 30).

He said decolonization was a word much and unctuously used by imperialist spokesmen to describe the transfer of political control from colonialist to African sovereignty. Colonialism had achieved a new guise. It had become neo-colonialism, the last stage of imperialism (p. 31). Its final bid for existence as monopoly-capitalism or imperialism was the last stage of capitalism. In his examination of the mechanisms of neo-colonialism, he said the methods of neo-colonialists were subtle and varied. They operated not only in the economic field, but also in the political, religious, ideological, and cultural spheres (p. 239).

On the economic front, a strong factor favoring Western monopolies and acting against the developing world was
international capital's control of the world market as well as of the prices of commodities bought and sold there (p. 241). Another technique was the use of high interest rates, and there was what had come to be known as "multilateral aid" through international organizations: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association.

Cabral, the former leader of the liberation movement in Guinea Bissau (Portuguese Guinea) in Revolution in Guinea (1969), said:

to free themselves from foreign domination is not the only desire of our [African] peoples. They have learned by experience under colonial oppression that the exploitation of man by man is the biggest obstacle in the way of development and progress of a people beyond national liberation. They are determined to take an active part in the building of a new Africa, truly independent and progressive, founded on work and justice in which the creative power of the people has been stifled for centuries will find its truest and most constructive expression (p. 13).

While the imperialists, colonialists, and fascist-racists were the enemies of Africa, they could not have succeeded without African traitors, such as traditional chiefs and bandits as in the time of slavery, and of the wars of colonial conquest-- gendarmes, various agents, and mercenary soldiers during the golden age of colonialism, self-styled heads of states and ministers in the present time of neocolonialism. African revolution meant,

the transformation of our present life in the direction of progress. The prerequisite for this is the elimination of foreign economic domination on which every other type is dependent. Our vigilance means the rigorous selection of friends, a constant watch and struggle against enemies (both internal and external)
and the neutralization or elimination of all factors opposing progress (p. 16).

Cabral commented that the UN despite the resolution favorable to the struggle of Guinea Bissau's liberation movement, the organization had shown itself to be incapable of resolving the disputes between colonized people and colonial powers (p. 19). He said the movement was fighting so that

our peoples may never be more exploited by imperialists—not only by Europeans, not only by people with white skin because we do not confuse exploitation or exploiters with the color of men's skins; we do not want any exploitation in our countries, not even by black people (p. 80).

He also advocated African unity in favor of African people, but unity as a means, not an end (p. 80). He expressed an Africanist philosophy in the following statement:

In Africa, we are for an African policy which seeks to defend first and foremost the interests of the African people of each country, but also for a policy which does not, at any time forget the interests of the world, of all humanity (p. 81).

He added: "there is not and cannot be national liberation without the use of liberating violence by the nationalist forces, to answer the criminal violence of the agents of imperialism" (p. 107).

Furthermore, a form of struggle which was fundamental was that of a country's struggle against its own weakness (p. 91). Any national or social revolution that was not based on the knowledge of the reality that the struggle was the expression of the internal contradictions in the economic, social, culturalist (and therefore historical) reality of every country (pp. 91-92).

From this work, it was possible to differentiate between Cabral's perceptions of political, economic, and social/cultural aspects of
development using the experience of the Portuguese colony of Guinea Bissau. The political aspect revealed armed liberation struggle in an attempt to exercise a fundamental political choice. There were maneuvers by the Portuguese colonialists aimed at demobilizing patriots and deceiving African and world opinion by promulgating false administrative "reforms" and hinting at so-called internal autonomy (p. 118). The economic situation depicted the system of colonialist exploitation. Economic activities had been paralyzed in the government-controlled areas, attention was given to economic development, with regard to increasing the production of crops. There was the attempt to develop artisan work and small industries. Finally, the social and cultural situation was exemplified by such social conditions as thousands of people flooding toward the main towns, creating serious food shortages and hunger and crime problems. He mentioned provision of social services like the building of schools, hospitals and dispensaries.

In Freedom and Development: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1968-1973. Nyerere said African unity did not preclude differences of philosophies and organizations in the different independent nations (p. 13). Differences must be accommodated within a growing unity, and movement towards unity in Africa does not mean hostility to Europe or Asia or America (pp. 13, 14). African unity must be worked for; it is an important aspect of policy in every single African state (pp. 15-16).
There must be a government which could speak for Africa to the outside world, and there must be one representative body which could coordinate and facilitate the economic development of Africa as a whole in such a manner as to ensure the well-being of every part of the continent; this meant one currency, one tariff system and so on, as well as other institutions to promote economic growth (p. 16). In fact "until Africa is one economic unit, it will remain the plaything of the great powers of the world" (p. 17).

On the role of the intellectual in the society, he said if real development was to take place, the people had to be involved (p. 25). Educated people could give a lead-- and should do so; they had to identify themselves with the uneducated. The acceptance of equality regardless of education was essential. As for political parties, their job was much more difficult now than it was when they were struggling for independence (p. 33).

In the speech "Freedom and Development" (1968), freedom was characterized in three ways. Firstly, there was national freedom which was the ability of the citizens to determine their future. This could be seen as political freedom. Secondly, there was freedom from hunger, disease, and poverty. While the first two were part of social progress, the third was primarily economic. Lastly, there was personal freedom for the individual; this was his or her right to live in dignity and equality with all others, his or her right to freedom of speech, freedom to participate in the making of decisions which affect his or her life (p. 58). Development brought freedom provided it was development of the people. But people could not be developed;
they could only develop themselves (p. 60). A proposal of development contributed to the development of people provided three conditions were fulfilled. These were (a) If the people understood their own needs, (b) If the people understood how these needs could be met, and (c) If they had the freedom to carry out their own decisions and to carry them into effect (pp. 60-61).

A similar theme of freedom could be found in the speech "Stability and Change in Africa" (1969). According to Nyerere, national freedom existed on paper only; a great change in economic well-being was necessary to meet the requirements of national freedom (p. 110). Essential economic change would not, and could not take place in isolation; it depended upon, and it brought social and political change (p. 111). Stability in the society was also essential for freedom. Without political stability, African countries would remain the plaything of others. Stability was also essential for economic development. But to secure political change, he supported a peaceful means rather than one of violence.

On non-alignment, he said it was not and had never been a matter of neutrality-- of treading a delicate tightrope between contending forces. Non-alignment was or certainly ought to be a policy of involvement in world affairs (p. 161). It was the assertion of the right of the small and militarily-weaker nations to determine their own policies in their own interests (p. 161). Non-alignment may be applied to economic matters and

we shall never be free while our economic weakness, and our economic aspirations, force us to our knees as supplicants or as scavengers of the world's wealth. Separately, that is, and will
remain our position. We shall beg or wheedle our way towards a little development here, a little development there— all on the terms determined by others (p. 171).

Amin (1970) in "Development and Structural Change: The African Experience, 1950-1970" examined Partners in Development (Pearson Report). He said, ironically, the report said the concept of "development" embraced more than mere growth, but the authors, the Commission on International Development did not do anything other than argue exclusively in terms of growth (p. 203).

He concluded that Africa's experience over the two decades demonstrated that,

(a) outward-looking growth is not development because the latter demands structural changes, and can only be inward-looking and self-initiated; (b) that outward-looking growth is of necessity unequal, chaotic and regularly blocked, and that it is too slow to avoid the continuous widening of the gap between the rich and poor nations and is incapable of avoiding misfirings of attempts to get off the ground; (c) that the structural framework of agrarian capitalism in the contemporary Third World singularly limits the potential of the "Green Revolution"; (d) that the development of the Third World is only possible within the framework of socialist systems organized over large self-sufficient regions; (e) that contrary to the Pearson Report's point of departure, development should be regarded as the continuation of the political struggle for independence; (f) that by beginning with a set of common prejudices, (the bromide of the world market), the Pearson Commissioners prevented themselves from seeing the alternative to the policy they advocated— inward-looking development over large regions (p. 223).

Shaw and Ojo (1981, p. 2), said Africa had "always been a factor in international relations: a place for "discovery", a source of slaves, a
market of exports, a store of raw materials, and territory over which to fight." Independence gave it some lost status, and permitted it to play a more effective and extensive international role (p. 2). As an actor, Africa was attempting to reassert its own interests through national and collective foreign policies. It had used the UN system, for instance, both before and after independence to advance political and economic decolonization (p. 3). As a collectivity, Africa was most concerned with development, and with participation (p. 4). Having been both underdeveloped and excluded during the colonial period, it was anxious to enhance its development prospects and its political influence. It had attempted to do this particularly through the UN system, via the non-alignment movement, and within the debate of a New International Economic Order (p. 4).

Shaw and Ojo said:

the African international system is increasingly complex, not only because of the emergence of its component countries as actors as well as factors, but also because of the involvement of sub-national, trans-national, and inter-national forces (p. 5).

Before the particular problems of the 1980s were apparent, it was clear that Africa's mid-term future would probably be a troubled one, because given its unpromising inheritance at independence, its first twenty years had been characterized by considerable disappointment (p. 6). They cited Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, the Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (1977), who said:

if we are to reverse the past and present trends of low development, and accelerate the rates of socio-economic advancement, we will need to install first, at the national level, a new economic order based on the principles of self-reliance and self sustainment... (and second) regionally, there is an urgent
need for concentrating on achieving and increasing measure of collective self-reliance among African States (pp. 7-8).

In *Africa in Perspective* (1987) Obasanjo, the Nigerian Head of State between 1976 to 1979, delved into some of the myths and realities in African politics and governance. One myth was the well-known one in which Africa was portrayed as a dark continent of wildlife plagued by drought, famine, disease, incessant coups, civil wars, social disorder and corruption.

One of the realities was that with decolonization, most of the former colonies remained substantially within the influence of the former colonial powers (p. 4). The ideological dichotomizing between capitalism and alternative socialism had opened the way for heightened East-West rivalry in Africa making the task of consolidation and cooperation within Africa more difficult (p. 4). In many African countries, the people had acquired the consumption patterns and tastes of industrial and developed economies without acquiring the attendant production techniques and skills (p. 5). They seemed to believe in development based on consumption rather than production (p. 5).

According to Obasanjo, one of the legacies of colonial rule was cultural disorientation that resulted in distorted behavior in African political processes—corruption and inefficiency linked with the involvement of foreign businessmen. Another legacy was the practice of having an institutionalized opposition, a concept he considered not only alien, but profoundly incongruent with much of
African political culture and practice in which government functioned by consensus (p. 8).

Obasanjo said the convergence of myth and reality in today's Africa was that African leaders, civilian and military alike had only been able to partially fulfill expectations that people inside and outside the continent had after independence (p. 9). Emerging and promising African leaders must have a forum providing exposure and interaction to enable them seek solutions to joint problems with other leaders. The issues of development, peace and security, sustaining the world economy, and improving the environment were universal, interrelated, and global and could not be solved by uncoordinated action in Africa or elsewhere (p. 15).

According to him:

Africans will need to dispense with the myths they hold dear, not least because in doing so, they will start a process that in itself will dispel the surviving myths about them in the Western world. It is the Africans who need urgently to shed their blunders about the essential challenges of economic, social, and political development. . . . They must seriously organize and mobilize their societies for a more profound and sustained development process, predicated on the conviction that they cannot have development without sacrifice. They must inculcate in all their citizens the conviction that development means hard work, sweat, forbearance and discipline. They must reach down into the base of their cultural fountain and bring up new sustenance from age-old values, norms and ideals so that they can address the challenges posed by a largely unsympathetic world leaving them behind (p. 19).

In the Chapter titled "Debt, Disarmament and Development," Obasanjo examined the economic aspect of Africa's situation. He said that the debt problem was not created by the actions of the debtor-
nations alone. They were goaded by commercial banks, which had surplus deposits of petrodollars to recycle and the creditor-nations, which supported the banks (p. 22). Debt-servicing must be kept to an amount that allowed for reasonable growth and development. The unabated arms race between the superpowers and their allies combined with conflicts among developing nations to drain the resources urgently needed for development (p. 26).

He believed the greatest handicap for African leaders in formulating development policy at the time of independence was their lack of adequate experience in economic matters. He warned that greater intrusion of superpower rivalry could trigger a "rescue package" resulting in repartition into shared spheres of influence. And to avoid such a catastrophe, Africans needed to concentrate their efforts on agriculture as the bedrock for economic development (p. 32). Development aid had not been as successful as anticipated. In any case, aid never involved all partners as equals in designing and implementing projects, nor in maintaining and evaluating them (p. 35).

Chinweizu (1987, p. 22) said the conventional term, economic development was an ambiguous misnomer. It was used for two quite dissimilar processes: indigence in consumerism and creation of industrial culture which were cultural processes, rather than being only an economic process. He said what was happening in the Third World was actually maldevelopment. It was the development of consumerism without the prior development of the industrial culture.
which could produce consumer goods (p. 23). Examples of developed
countries showed that development proceeded from a self-reliant
understanding of their nation's history and circumstances, and
interpreted for local practice whatever general economic and political
theories the leadership of the nation chose to be guided by (p. 23).

He emphasized the importance of leadership in the development
process. It required a leadership class which was clearsightedly
dedicated to the transformation of its society, also a leadership that
was willing and had the confidence to face the challenge of that social
adventure. In contrast, leaders of maldevelopment usually mistook it
for development or were unwilling to face the challenges and risks of
development. They demanded the fruits of development but insisted
on avoiding its costs in social and personal discipline, deferred
consumption investment, talent, effort, and dislocation and
abandonment of some old ways and cherished values (pp. 23-24).

Chinweizu continued that contrary to popular belief, the
paramount desire of Third World elites was not development but the
perpetuation of their rule with minimum disruption to their
enjoyment of its perquisites (p. 25). However, to legitimize their rule
in the minds of populations, hungry for material prosperity, these
elites had found it necessary to proclaim development as the
principal enterprise of the state (p. 25). Thus for a while, all it
required was to secure funds to pay for sufficient imports to satisfy
the population's hunger for consumer goods (p. 25). He said many of
the regimes in the developing world called for a New International
Economic Order when they were unable to keep imports flowing due
to economic crises, and due to the subsequent stringent demands made by the IMF (p. 26).

Chinweizu said any Third World country that wished to develop should recognize these tasks as among those it needed to face:

1. It must sufficiently disengage from the Western economic system in order to avoid being further plundered of resources it would need for its own development.

2. It would help, through South-South cooperation, to build a Third World economic system.

3. It must not only uncompromisingly abandon consumerist maldevelopment, but uncompromisingly embark upon the social adventure of creating a national industrial culture.

He called for new directions in economic thought, and made the following claims:

1. economic development was part of socio-cultural evolution.

2. there should be constant test of appropriateness of recommendations from the North.

3. there was need to understand the various economies of the world and their historical evolution.

4. there should be a fresh conceptualization of development in accordance with a country's endowments, aims and opportunities.

This should be done building upon the groundwork already laid by such theorists as Gandhi, Mao, and Nyerere.

Martin (1982) inquired into the "major causes of the continued state of underdevelopment and dependency of Africa in spite of its
enormous wealth and tremendous economic potential" (p. 221). He said the ideology of Eurafrica which was based on complementarity and interdependence was a convenient justification for colonialism. But it was nothing but the rationalization of the neo-classical theory of international development. He believed that Africa's best hope for development lay in continental economic and political integration (p. 221).

The justification of the Eurafrica ideology did not wane when the European powers divested of their colonies, instead the process of neo-colonialism which was the survival of the colonial system began, in spite of the formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries, and these countries became the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by economic, social, military, and technical means (p. 223). One of the main consequences was to enable the former métropoles to dominate the newly independent nations militarily, economically, and culturally.

Martin said there were alternatives to the ideology of Eurafrica. First, there should be cooperation with other developed countries and some socialist countries. Second, it was in Africa's interest to develop preferential economic links with the rest of the Third World (p. 235). This implied not only the creation of horizontal economic cooperation—namely, South-South, not North-South—in trade industrialization, and investment, but also the severance of various existing links between developed and developing countries (p. 235). Last, there was African regional and continental integration. He said this was the only path likely to lead to Africa's independent
development; Africa must start looking inwards as advocated by Nkrumah (p. 237).

Crowder (1987) used Nigeria as a case-study of Africa's independence experience. He said the experience had "unhappily not been atypical, but rather the norm for the majority of African nations" (p. 8). There were many more parallels to be found between the colonial state and the independent state than were usually conceded. There was the history of violence which was conceived and maintained in the colonial state. There were also the characteristics of poverty, misgovernment, the destruction of the pillars of law, and finally the destruction of economic life.

Discussing some African achievements, Crowder cited the case of Tanzania where in 1961, 80 percent of the adult population were illiterate, but by 1986, about 85 percent could read and write. But with such achievements came accumulation of debts, and this was worsened by the squandering of resources and corruption (p. 22). He noted that the debts of African countries were built upon a genuine attempt to make for the sad development record of the colonial governments, and incidentally, some of the spectacular failures in African development were part of development plans concocted largely in the métropole to buttress the colonial state (p. 22). There was also the fact that the financial strains experienced by the post-independence governments had been due to the sometimes overzealous concern to improve the inadequate communications systems left by the colonial powers and to build the foundations of
an industrial infrastructure that would make them less dependent on supplies from the First World (p. 22).
Table 1. A Framework of African Political Thought by Mutiso and Rohio, adapted and used to categorize Africanist Thinkers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Idea</th>
<th>Some Representative Thinkers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CULTURAL NATIONALISM</td>
<td>Senghor (&quot;Negritude&quot;), Cesaire, Chinweizu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAINITIVE NATIONALISM</td>
<td>Awolowo, Azikiwe, Kenyatta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADICAL NATIONALISM</td>
<td>Fanon, Nkrumah, Toure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE AND COLONIAL-IMPERIALISM</td>
<td>Fanon, Nyerere, Awolowo, Toure, Chinweizu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN-AFRICAN NATIONALISM</td>
<td>Radical-- Nkrumah, Functionalist-- Nyerere, Regionalist-- Kaunda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO-COLONIALISM</td>
<td>Nkrumah, Nyerere, Chinweizu (elitism/class) Obasanjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEOLOGICAL AND INTEGRAL NATIONALISM</td>
<td>One-party state -- Nasser, African Socialism -- Nyerere, Senghor, Kaunda, Toure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICAN NON-ALIGNMENT</td>
<td>Nyerere, Nkrumah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. A Model of Nigeria's Perceptions (Communication of African Development Ideas), and Interactions between the UN System and Countries.
Content Analysis

Budd, Thorp, and Donohew (1967, p. 2) said content analysis was a "systematic technique for analyzing message content and message handling— it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt communication behavior of selected communicators." Kerlinger (1973, p. 525) called it a method of observation in which instead of observing people's behavior directly, or asking them to respond to scales, or interviewing them, the investigator takes the communications that people have produced, and asks questions of the communications. Content analysis can be taken out of the purely analytic class and put into the same class as interviews, scales, and other methods of observation (p. 526). It is the same as previous observational activities: observing and measuring variables. Content analysis has also been used to determine the relative emphasis or frequency of various communication phenomena: propaganda, trends, styles, changes in content and readability (p. 526).

Content analysis as an appropriate method for this study had a practicality over face-to-face interview, for example, because the study was not so much concerned with perceptions of Nigeria's individual delegates as it was with the fact that their perceptions could be taken as representative of the overall perceptions of the
government and people of Nigeria. Besides, content-analyzing the speeches allowed for scrutiny of details which some of the Nigerian delegates might not recollect if they had been interviewed face-to-face, due to time lapse.

Research Question Formulation

Budd et al. (cited Adams, 1964, p. 1) who said a content analysis project like any other research venture, "depends upon a happy blend of researchable questions, materials to analyze, and a method." He added that the degree of satisfaction in the finished product depended on how closely all three elements matched ideal standards. This study has researchable questions, materials to analyze, and a method.

First, the broad researchable question was:

What were the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the process of African development, and of the UN's roles in the process?

But to systematically investigate this broad question, it was subdivided into five operational questions. They are as follows:

1. What were the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the major aspects of the African development process?

2. What were the major patterns observed in these perceptions of the African development process? What are some implications?

3. What were the major perceptions of the roles of the UN in African development?

4. What were the major patterns observed in these perceptions of the UN's roles? What are some major implications?
5. How can one critically appraise the major perceptions within the context of the major perceptions of some Africanist thinkers?

The study also explored some of the assessments or reactions of the delegates to some of the roles they perceived.

The materials for analysis were the speeches delivered by the Nigerian delegates at the UN General Assembly between 1960 and 1987. The method used in the study was content analysis.

**Sampling**

All the speeches delivered by Nigeria's representatives to the UN General Assembly since Nigeria joined the organization in 1960 to the speech given in 1987, were used as the population of the analysis.

The problem associated with sampling such as getting adequate representation was drastically lessened since the whole population of the speeches was analyzed. This researcher took into account the UN procedure that one speech per year was given by each member-nation at the annual General Assembly meetings. At the rate of one speech per year, Nigeria which joined the UN in 1960, delivered a total of 28 General Assembly speeches between 1960 and 1987.

**Units of Examination and Categories**

Perception was examined. It was defined as an understanding people have about a particular event going on around them. The process of African development is an event. Nigerians have some
understanding and ideas about the process and about the roles of the UN in fostering that process.

Perception is a broad label, but it was operationalized in this study by subdividing it into the following meanings:

1. Perceptions of the process of African development.
2. Perceptions of the roles of the UN in African development.
3. Perceptions of approval or disapproval of the roles of the UN.

The first two fall under Nominal scale, and the third falls under Ordinal scale. In order to systematically investigate the perceptions of African development, three categories were formed and labelled. The three categories were:

1. Perceptions of the economic aspect of African development.
2. Perceptions of the political aspect of African development.

Similarly, the perceptions of the UN's roles were categorized as follows:

1. Perceptions of the UN's economic role.
2. Perceptions of the UN's political role.
3. Perceptions of the UN's social role.

The coding unit or the smallest segment of content recorded in this analysis was the assertion. An assertion is a single thought unit or idea unit that conveys a single item of information extracted from a segment of content (Budd et al., p. 34). An assertion could be a sentence, a part of a sentence, or even a single word (p. 34).

Assertions help an analyst form categories. Categories differentiate and describe the content being investigated (p. 39).
They are not mere labels but compartments explicitly defined into which material is grouped for analysis. In this study, the interest was first on the content characteristics, for example, perception of political development, perception of political role and so on. In other words, this is a description of content in terms of African development themes perceived by Nigerian representatives at the UN General Assembly. But, indicators are also used in content analysis to point out a characteristic that is not, itself measurable (pp. 42-43). Indicators are used frequently with theme categories.

To analyze the assessments of the roles perceived, the ordinal scale was applicable. Budd et al. cited Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool (1952) who said direction in content analysis referred to the "attitude expressed toward any symbol by its user." Budd et al. said:

Expressions of attitude are usually categorized by the analyst as favorable or unfavorable with different writers using different labels for these categories: pro-con, positive-negative, friendly-hostile, indulgence-deprivation, approval-disapproval, optimistic-pessimistic, relief-discomfort, consonance-dissonance, affirmative-negative, to mention a few. Generally, all these pairs include a third category—neutral. . . (p. 50).

This study did not quantify direction according to degree or intensity; it only described whether the direction was positive or negative.

**Determining Trends/Patterns**

A trend refers to the increase or decrease of the frequency of given symbols (or content) over a period of time (p. 60). Trends are found only after the recording of the material has been completed.
The expectation in this study is that there will be a clear indication as to which aspects of African development, which particular themes, and which UN roles were projected more frequently than others in particular years. However, it is also possible in content analysis not to observe any significant increase or decrease in frequency. The study must then try to offer some probable explanations for the presence of these observations.

**Reliability and Validity**

The reliability of the study is that other researchers, using the same analytic techniques on the same speeches, should arrive at fairly similar results. This is the stability of the method used. For example, from the category descriptions and coding instructions, other researchers should be able to adequately recognize what characteristics constituted political development in Africa as separate from economic, and social development. They should be able to do the same for UN roles as well. It also means a consistency in the terms and concepts used throughout the study. Within an Africanist framework, references to the work of Africanist thinkers should help to maintain some consistency.

The validity of the study refers to whether the method used produced the desired information. In other words, it is whether the content analysis method revealed a reasonably accurate depiction of Nigeria's perceptions of the African development process, and of the roles of the UN in engendering that process. Validity also includes
careful and logical explanation of findings. It means there is a strong explanation for having certain observations (trends).

**Descriptions of Categories**

The descriptions of categories were developed from a synthesis of the ideas of theorists and which have relevance for the African situation. The perceptions of the Nigerian delegates were then matched with these descriptions for categorization purposes.

**Political Category**

A number of authors assert that politics relates to power. Boulding said politics essentially dealt with the subject of power among human beings and among nations. Also on the concept power, Chinweizu said the power of the African elites should be curbed.

But the political thought of many Africanists referred to Africa's quest for political independence from colonial rule. There was also the question of non-interference by developed countries in the affairs of independent governments in Africa. This is the political aspect of neo-colonialism.

Shaw and Ojo saw political development as the assertion of Africa's own interests through national and collective foreign policies.

Some Africanists such as Nyerere also perceived political development as a demonstration of the philosophy of non-alignment.

Nkrumah, Nyerere, Martin among others, saw politics in Africa as striving towards unity and political integration of African states.

Fanon, Cabral believed that armed liberation or freedom struggle by forceful and violent means was inevitable. Nyerere believed in
peaceful means of political change. Politics also meant the attainment of political stability after independence.

Other Africanists depicted kinds of political systems suitable for African countries. Senghor, and Amin (Senegal), Toure (Guinea), Awolowo (Nigeria), and Nyerere (Tanzania) believed in some form of African socialism. Others like Neto (Angola), Cabral, Machel (Mozambique) were for African marxism. Houphouet-Boigny (Cote d'Ivoire), Obasanjo (Nigeria) leaned towards some form of African capitalism or mixed economy.

**Economic Category**

Boulding said economics dealt with those issues related to wealth and its distribution; it also dealt with the choice of economic alternatives. This is true for Africa as well.

Chinweizu, Shaw, and Ojo among others, referred to Africa's quest for a New International Economic Order, and the assertion of the continent's interests through economic decolonization.

Obasanjo mentioned the removal of acquired consumption patterns and tastes of industrial economies which had hitherto been unmatched by necessary production techniques and skills. He also wanted an alleviation of Africa's debt problem through reduction of debt-servicing. He believed that African leaders needed to have more experience before they could adequately deal with economic matters. There should be more concentration on agriculture as the bedrock of Africa's economic development.
Chinweizu wanted African disengagement from the Western economic system, the building of a Third World economic system, and the removal of consumerist maldevelopment. He believed the call for a NIEO by Africans was essentially an attempt by African elites to continue to enjoy the perquisites of the economy, which was essentially the enjoyment of imported consumer goods. There was a perception of economic class-struggle in the African society.

Nyerere saw Africa's economical problem as freedom from poverty.

Nkrumah and Nyerere wanted more economic cooperation, unity, and integration of African states.

Social/Cultural Category

In Cabral's depiction of social development issues in Africa, he listed the following: (a) Reducing rural-urban migration with people flooding into cities and creating food shortages and hunger, and crime. (b) Education-related matters such as building of schools. (c) Health-related matters such as building hospitals.

Obasanjo mentioned the removal of cultural disorientation that gave rise to distorted behavior—corruption and inefficiency. Social issues also dealt with the following: (a) peace and security, (b) the improvement of the environment. (c) the inculcation of the conviction of sacrifice, hard work, sweat, forebearance, and discipline in African citizens.

Nyerere saw social issues as dealing with equality within African nations regardless of level of education, personal freedom for the
individual, the right to dignity and equality, freedom of speech, freedom to participate in decision-making.

Thinkers like Senghor and Cesaire applied the concept of "negritude." This depicts the cultural pride of the African—the pride in the image of the black person—in the face of racial discrimination as practiced in the world in general, and South Africa in particular.

Findings of Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted to get a first-hand knowledge of the content that was being observed and analyzed. It provided a groundwork for the study. First, the study demonstrated that the study was feasible; as a piece of the whole study, it enabled the researcher test the utility of the major categories to be used in analysis of the content of the speeches. It brought out some of the likely coding problems, and adjustments were made accordingly in parts of the research design to accommodate these problems. It also enabled the researcher to have a foretaste of a piece of the overall study.

The speeches analyzed in the pilot study were the first five speeches in chronological order from 1960 to 1964. The first step of analysis was identifying the aspects to be studied. The aspects were: the perceptions of the major components of African development, the perceptions of the major roles of the UN in African development, and the perception of approval or disapproval or assessment of those roles.
The coding unit or the unit segment of content used for analysis and explanation of perception of the components of African development was the "assertion." The study tried to find the content characteristics of African development perceived by Nigerian representatives. The researcher catalogued the major perceptions and depictions of African development in the Nigerian delegates' speeches, depending on their match with the categories described above. Similarly, the roles of the UN were catalogued using the same category descriptions. For example, the UN's political roles were determined if they fitted adequately with the political category description. The same was done for the economic and social roles.

**Perceptions of the African Development Process**

In the 1960 speech, Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of the newly independent Nigeria, spoke about the country's hope to work with other African nations "for the progress of Africa and to assist in bringing all African countries to a state of responsible independence."

On the Congolese situation, he stated: "Africa must not be allowed to become a battleground in the ideological struggle." Furthermore, he perceived that political independence was totally inadequate if it was not accompanied by stability and economic security. He added that the developed countries could help the African countries not by spreading ideological propaganda in whatever form it may be disguised, but by genuinely helping them with goodwill, to develop their resources, and to educate their human potential up to the standards which are necessary for proper development.
In this statement, there are assertions of political development-- the absence of political interference in form of ideologies from developed countries; economic development-- developing the continent's resources; and social development-- educating the human material.

On matters devoted to African affairs in the 1961 speech, the delegate affirmed the bond between Nigeria and the rest of Africa. He said if Nigeria had a stable government and viable economy, then it was the country's duty to seek the "complete total liquidation of all forms of imperialism and colonialism off the face of Africa." This was the determination to have political independence for all African states. He perceived that the "bulk of the areas that are dominated in the world today are to be found on the African continent." Nigeria wanted the type of independence that will be real; not an independence that will be secure today and lost tomorrow; not the type of independence that will be an attraction for political marauders or hawkers of ideological conflicts; independence that will be peculiarly African, independence with peace and tranquility, independence that will last.

The delegate added that African countries wanted peaceful development in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. African countries would not like to use their resources and dissipate the things they required for their economic, social and cultural development, in wars of destruction and annihilation.

The Congolese situation was the main problem facing Africa. The delegate said Nigeria did not support the destruction of the Republic by intrigues on the part of the people who were more interested in economic wealth and their investments, than in the well-being of the
people of Africa and the Congo. This revealed that development comprised more than the economic aspect. There was also the social aspect—the well-being of the people. A political dimension was introduced when the delegate said Africa insisted on full and effective participation in all aspects of the organization of the body. This dimension was the reference to power relationships between the developed and the developing countries within the UN which was asymmetrical in favor of the former. He said for some reason known to the "great Powers," Mauritania had been prevented from joining the UN. He implored the big powers not to abuse their veto by preventing small states like Mauritania from joining the organization.

In the 1962 speech, the political aspect of African development seemed to dominate the discussion of African affairs. The delegate mentioned the interdependence of African countries. An Africanist outlook to African development was projected in the assertions that the development of Nigeria was the development of Africa, and Katanga (the mineral-rich region of Congo) was the heart of Africa. It was an outlook of interdependence of African countries and responsibility of one African country for another. Referring to the political issues affecting Africa intimately, he affirmed Nigeria's total commitment to the complete abolition of all forms of colonialism, imperialism, and domination of peoples on the African continent or anywhere else. He also mentioned the issue of Africa's under-representation in the essential organs of the UN.

The focus of the 1963 speech was also primarily on the political aspect of African development. The delegate perceived that the
problem of decolonizing Africa had become a collective matter, and it must be solved collectively. There would be peace only when there were no more areas for exploitation and conquest, and ideological experimentation. The delegate referred again to Africa's minimal influence within the UN organs.

But there was also a projection of the social aspect of development because Nigeria was said to favor a peaceful and orderly development of Africa. The delegate called on the South African government to emulate what was happening in the US—there, the government was trying to eradicate racial discrimination. This social aspect also involved the eradication of racial discrimination.

In 1964, Africa's political climate dominated the part of the delegate's speech that was devoted to African affairs. He perceived that

the peoples of Africa are steadily capturing their right to determine their destiny and to govern themselves, and little Portugal cannot stop them.

Also, thirty-five African nations will be bound to use all forces at their disposal for the rescue of their brothers from an illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia.

The solution was a "free and collective expression of the people's will on the basis of equality." Furthermore, the delegate said:

... liberation of territories should mean liberation of territories which are dependent, not liberation of territories which have already been liberated from foreign imperialism.
Perceptions of the UN's Roles, and Assessments of Roles.

The roles of the UN as perceived by the delegates were divided along the same lines as the aspects of African development. In the 1960 speech, for example, there was substantial focus given to colonial matters. For the then-troubled territory of Congo, the Nigerian Prime Minister projected the following social and political roles of the UN (kind of role in parentheses):

1. help and advice in rebuilding the Congo rather than turn to any individual power (social)
2. thorough investigation of the root causes of troubles which have arisen there (political)
3. appointment of a fact-finding group to look into the circumstances which caused the crisis (political)
4. cooperation with some properly authorized leaders, and working with them only (social)
5. assistance and advice by the UN on an agency basis without infringement on the sovereignty of the government (social)

Continuing with the perception of the organization's roles and functions, the delegate included: firmly supporting the central government in maintaining law and order—social; keeping the machinery of the government moving—political; entrusting African nations with responsibility, and giving them full backing—social. There are also the functions of providing technical assistance (technical knowledge), and finally, the provision of perhaps the only effective machinery for inducing world peace—social. The purpose of the organization was to
enable the different countries to work together in a friendly atmosphere to procure the peace and progress of mankind, and this cooperation is meant to link all the member-nations no matter what sort of government each individual country enjoys within its own boundaries.

Nigeria and African nations were also said to have social roles to play, such as helping to find places in secondary and technical schools for the Congolese, and helping professional training in community development, co-operatives, agricultural-extension work, and sending short-term advisory missions to survey the requirements of the Congo.

However, there was the perception that the UN should not have too much power in the Congo. The delegate said it "should not take the role of an administering power."

The perception of roles for African nations, and the powers (United States and the Soviet Union), as well as other countries continued. For example, the delegate said Nigeria hoped to work with other African states for the progress of Africa which could be a combination of political, economic and social. But the assertion that Nigeria would assist in bringing all African territories to a state of responsible independence was referring to Nigeria's political role.

The only economic role perceived for the UN, was the provision of necessary experts to inquire and advise in revenue allocation.

In his assessments of the roles and functions of the organization, the delegate used indicators or words that revealed the direction of the country's attitudes—negative or positive. He said he warmly applauded the immediate response of the UN to the Congolese disaster. He repeated the positive assessment in the statement that
the speed with which troops were sent to maintain law and order was most commendable. But the positive attitude was modified with the statement that the mere sending of armed forces is not enough. He said he was not criticizing any of the UN staff then serving in the Congo, and affirmed that the country indeed believed in the UN as providing the only effective machinery for inducing world peace.

In the 1961 speech, the delegate mentioned a political role when he referred to the Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) which was passed at the last session, and which called for the abolition of colonies throughout the world. He added: "this session should put a stamp of character, a stamp of finality, on further imperialism on the African continent."

A social role was projected in the request that the Assembly should take up the issue of racial discrimination especially as it was being practised in South Africa and other states. There was an implicit demand that the UN should respond to the call that Africa should have full and effective participation in all aspects of the organization. For example, it was suggested that one of the UN's Under-Secretaries should be African.

There were no assessment of roles, but Nigeria's attitude to the organization in the speech was that anything that weakened it was inimical to the best interests of the smaller nations of the world. Some of the major African problems facing the organization were said to be Angola, the Congo, Mozambique, South-West Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda Ruanda-Burundi, Basutoland, Swaziland, the small Spanish territories, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania. These
were political problems, and according to the delegate, if the UN was to have some success in this political role, there must be an African in the Secretariat to represent the legitimate interests, and to portray the yearnings of the people of Africa in the way they would like the problems of their continent solved—not viewing African problems with "an alien eye." The major problem Africa had was the Congo, though no clear role of the UN was defined; similarly, there was no assessment of role. The delegate repeated that Nigeria supported the organization wholeheartedly, and would be opposed to anything likely to weaken it.

In 1962, the speech turned to some "political issues affecting Africa intimately." These included: "the complete abolition of all forms of colonialism, imperialism, and domination of the peoples of the African continent or anywhere else." The colonies were Kenya, South Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and South Africa. In the case of Kenya, no overt role of the UN was mentioned; instead, the United Kingdom and the Kenyan leaders were said to be responsible for Kenya's independence; Portugal was responsible for Angola's independence. South Africa was called upon to hand over South-West Africa to the UN, so that the territory might be developed in the interests of the people concerned. The delegate said he would not talk about South Africa in detail because it was being discussed in another body.

Lastly, on the Congo, a joint role was perceived, which was that of African states in cooperation with the UN and the Secretariat and the Congolese people themselves. At the same time, all the outside
parties could not be "fairy godmothers" and the Congolese must be allowed to "take up responsibility for their future and direct their own destiny."

Another political issue was the "question of African representation in the essential organs of the UN." The delegate said Africa did not have fair representation in any of the organs of the UN, therefore the question of the enlargement of these organs was very urgent. He called for the reconstitution of the various bodies so as to give African countries representation commensurate with their number, and the contribution they were expected to make under the obligations they had assumed under the Charter. The role for the UN could be described as one of in-house political reorganization.

Some of the positive general assessments of the UN were found in the assertions (indicators underlined): that "the delegation, the Government, and people of Nigeria have great faith in the organization." The delegate also said: we have to show our appreciation for the effort that is being made to settle disputes under the aegis of the UN; we have great confidence that the UN can do great things if it has wholehearted support; and finally, Nigeria had infinite faith that with good sense and mutual understanding, the organization could continue for many more years to serve humanity.

In the 1963 address, the delegate saw a social role for one of the organs of the UN-- the International Court. The role was the adjudication of the case brought against South Africa by two African states-- Ethiopia and Liberia. A political role of the UN was to give the states of Africa the support it had given them in the past in order
to decolonize the continent. The references were to the Portuguese colonies—Angola and Mozambique, and South Africa. In seeking to share political power within the organization, there was the call again for more representation by African members in the various organs of the UN. Of special concern was the Security Council where Africa had no seats.

In its assessments of the roles of the UN, Nigeria was simultaneously referring to the organization's social role. There was a positive perception that the UN was

one of the finest institutions that have been created by modern man to bring various states together, and to rally international opinion, in order that the world at large might have a center once a year for exchanging thoughts and for knowing how the various sections of the world are thinking.

Another positive assessment of a social role was that the organization served a useful purpose if only to enable people let off steam. On the issue of Congolese independence, Nigeria perceived that the UN had done excellent work, and by helping the Congolese people, the UN had helped Africa. Then the delegate said his delegation would always be grateful to the organization.

The assessment of the UN on the issue of African representation was not as positive. The delegate asked:

does this organization want thirty-two African states just to be vocal Members with no right to be able to express their views on any particular matter in the important organs of the UN? Are we only going to continue to be veranda boys?

In the 1964 speech, all three kinds of roles were perceived without special focus on any. The social role of the UN was depicted in the reference to the organization as: "the most reliable instrument
for the preservation of peace and understanding." The economic role was tied to the just-concluded UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It was in the 1964 speech that the first call for a new international economic order was made. The delegate said:

It is already apparent that a new international order is in the making in economic relations among nations, and we are looking forward to the Trade and Development Board to translate this new order into concrete terms and realities.

The delegate expressed the hope that the Trade and Development Board would help eliminate the existing imbalance in levels of development in the world because it had become clear that a grave threat to peace was the division of the world into the "haves" and "have-nots"-- the so-called North-South division.

Finally, the political role of the UN was recognized in the assertion that the whole organization lent itself to the problem of the Congo. This assessment was positive because the organization was perceived to have been successful, but this was later modified. The delegate added that the UN withdrew from the country earlier than it should have.
CHAPTER IV


This chapter describes the rest of the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the process of African development, and their perceptions of the UN's roles in engendering the process. It is a description solely from the perspective of the delegates; in addition, the researcher interpreted the speeches to discover the aspects of African development, the kinds of UN's roles, and assessments, using the categories described in Chapter III.

Perceptions of African Development: 1965-1969

In 1965, South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) was perceived to be the major political problem confronting Africa. The delegate said there was "continued denial of all political rights to the four million Africans by a government composed of a white minority of about a quarter of a million." He said another problem was in Angola, Mozambique, and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, where Africans were engaged in "genuine wars of liberation."

In the 1966 speech, the delegate stated that political development meant more than a quest for, and an attainment of political independence from the colonial powers. He acknowledged that transition to independence and the development of democratic
institutions had always been accompanied by stresses and strains. Three aspects of African development were implied in the assertion: "The road to national unity, political stability, and economic well-being is harder and could be longer still." These were (a) "national unity"-- social, (b) "political stability"-- political, and (c) "economic well-being"-- economic.

In 1967, economic self-reliance was perceived to be in the best interests of developing countries. The delegate said:

we of the developing countries are not anxious to continue being eternal recipients of foreign aid, since we know by experience that in many cases, the aid given is more than offset by the unfavourable terms of trade, since we are anxious to be on our own feet economically. . .

In 1968, the delegate continued on the same theme of African economic independence and self-reliance. He called for an international economic system in which the developing countries would not suffer unfavorable terms of trade, and one in which they would be able to stand on their own two feet economically.

There was a perception of external interference in Nigeria's affairs, particularly, the support and financial assistance given to the break-away faction of Biafra. The delegate depicted this as "undermining Nigeria's political authority and independence."

In 1969, Nigeria's delegate, speaking on the same issue of external political interference, said there had been "unwarranted assaults on the sovereignty of Nigeria", and that "external subversion has been directed against the political independence of my country." He added:
to translate humanitarian considerations into political concepts, to convert them into an acceptance or recognition of a rebel regime which threatened the very existence of a member-state of the organization is a blatant and crude violation of all standards of civilized international conduct and practice.

The reference to decolonization included the assertion that South Africa continued its criminal usurpation of the sacred rights of the Namibian people, and Ian Smith of Rhodesia had recently placed the crowning piece on "the dangerous edifice of racial tyranny." Portugal maintained its "grotesque colonial doctrine which claimed that Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique etc are mere entities in the Lusitanian Empire." The delegate surmised that the consequence for Africa was that "independent Africa now stands in danger of the disruptive efforts which the regimes of racial supremacy are actively promoting in that continent."

Alluding to the social side of development in Nigeria, the delegate said: "The cause of one integral Nigeria will triumph despite a painful spell in the nation's history; national conciliation will follow this bitter experience of civil conflict."

1970-1974

In 1970, the delegate devoted more attention to the economic aspect of African development than to the political and social aspects. He said: "the task of development is not one of appealing to the charity of affluent nations or securing token reforms of trade and aid policies"; rather, it is "a fight for economic independence and cooperation on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual
advantage." The prevailing situation was that "new nations are generally dependent on the former colonial powers in economic matters as the latter refuse to loosen their economic stranglehold over the former."

Referring to what could be interpreted as a political matter, the delegate said stability was a "revolutionary struggle which will demand probably more sacrifice than we had to make in order to regain our political independence." The delegate said Western powers which "persist in political, economic, and military collusion especially with South Africa are sowing the seeds of strife in Africa against themselves."

The perception of what could be considered as social development was

conflicts and tensions abound in Africa, particularly in those areas still under colonial and racist occupation. Africans in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe... are still denied the fundamental rights of humanity and deprived of justice as well as a full and decent life.

In the 1971 speech, the economic situation in Africa was the main focus. The problem of Africa's economic development was attributed to the advanced countries. The delegate said: "the reluctance of some advanced countries to contribute to the development of the less-advanced areas of the world should be overcome." This was made more specific in the statement:

we recognize the continued need for a flow of technical expertise and equipment, and in some cases, of capital, from the industrialized countries to the less advantageously-placed areas of the world, to enable the latter to prepare their economies towards a desirable level of development.
He continued that today, the financial measures taken by a few advanced and powerful countries with highly developed economies have caused uncertainties which will have a serious effect on the development processes of the countries whose economies are not so well advanced.

As for the economic policies of trade and development, the delegate believed any solution of the world's economic and political problems must involve the developing countries, especially in the preparation or examination of the means designed to achieve such solutions.

A perception of political development was that the "intransigence of the colonial or white minority governments still continue unchecked and unabated." South Africa still illegally and defiantly occupied a territory to which it had no legitimate or legal action.

The social development of Africa referred to the continued colonial exploitation and undisguised oppression of the African people. Also, Africa was one part of the world where the glaring examples of historical inequities and racial injustice remain unresolved and are pursued with impunity by those who perpetrate them.

In the 1972 speech, the social effects of colonialism continued to be projected. The delegate said:

the question of colonialism affects Africa more than any other part of the world and the continued existence of colonialism in Africa is the infraction of our dignity as Africans.

He acknowledged that the provision of material assistance by the Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries was a demonstration of the
support for human dignity. Assistance had also been provided by the non-aligned states, and the socialist countries.

Another perception of a social aspect of development was that the South African government had extended the policy of apartheid more harshly to every aspect of national life. Black people were dehumanized in the country, and apartheid was exported to Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the territories of Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, the delegate said what Africa could not condone was giving those who organized the worst forms of terror an opportunity to condemn as terrorists, the victims of their inhumanity.

Alluding to the attitude of developed countries to economic matters crucial to African development, he said there was reluctance and apathy on their part towards the economic strategy set out in the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 developing countries at Lima on November 7 1971. The delegate believed that the situation called for closer cooperation and deeper consultations among the developing countries to determine what their economic and trade relations with the developed countries should be. There was also an expression of Nigeria's commitment to the promotion of regional economic units in Africa which would provide much needed cooperation for the rapid development of the continent, rather than having the countries append themselves to units created basically for the development of Europe.

The delegate depicted colonialism as a threat to national security and sovereignty. In other words, this could be interpreted to mean an obstacle to Africa's political development. He said the peoples of
the territories of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Namibia were denied the opportunity to exercise their rights for independence and self-determination. The delegate said:

In securing those rights, and in pursuance of the ideals enshrined in the Charter, it has become necessary for some persons and organizations to adopt violent methods where all avenues of peaceful settlement have been barred.

Another problem which could be considered political was the lack of democratic principles in the organization. The delegate sought readjustment of the composition of the principal organ concerned with peace and security, the Security Council. This was in recognition and accommodation of ever-changing world attitudes. He said there was need for some modest increase in the overall membership of the Security Council to provide fairer representation of the various geographical regions of the organization.

There was a continued discussion of political power within the organization in the 1973 speech. The Nigerian delegate said there should be an urgent review of the decision-making processes in the UN system, especially concerning the use of the veto in the Security Council. For example, the veto had been frequently used to block meaningful initiatives in matters relating to fundamental human rights, freedom, and human dignity, particularly, in Africa. This could be interpreted to mean the power of the veto was an obstacle to Africa's social development. In the social area as well, it was mentioned that the problem of colonialism, racism, and apartheid constituted an unbearable affront to human dignity in the areas where they existed. And in political terms, they represented a great
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African states and to international peace and security.

The delegate mentioned that countries were breaking the economic sanctions placed on the illegal regime in Salisbury. He said they were those who preferred to sell a few goods to such an illegal clique, or to buy such commodities as the racists wished to sell.

Speaking also as the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, the Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, said since the OAU was formed in 1963, the promise of economic independence had not been encouraging. This was reflected in the fact that the gap between African countries and the developed countries continued to grow wider. In response to such a situation, African countries had proclaimed their determination to achieve economic independence and development of the continent through the effective mobilization of Africa's own human and material resources.

According to him,

what we want and demand is the opportunity for our own people to be afforded a chance to acquire those skills and those elements of technology without which no decent and progressive economic system can be structured and maintained in the modern world.

He continued:

we have learned that we cannot expect help, at least not of the order that would make significant contribution to our own needs of development. . . but the older more technologically-advanced countries can still do much to redeem the pledge they made to humanity and to this organization by not putting impediments in our way by making less selfish and lopsided marketing arrangements for our own produce, and by facilitating our determination to utilize such resources as we have in the
interest of our own peoples.

In 1974, the economic considerations of development were very prominent, especially in relation to a country's natural resources and protection of its economic interests. According to the delegate, in order to safeguard every country's natural resources, each state was entitled to exercise effective control over those resources and their exploitation. There should also be a regulation and supervision of activities of transnational corporations (TNCs), by taking measures in the interest of national economies of the countries where the TNCs operate. He mentioned that the Assembly also declared itself in favor of a just and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, and manufactured goods exported by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured goods, capital goods and imported equipment with the aim of bringing about sustained improvement in the unsatisfactory terms of trade and expansion of world economy. The above statements were part of the Assembly Resolution adopted in May 1974 as the basis for the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Oil was a main focus of the speech. It was Nigeria's primary commodity and foreign exchange earner. The argument of the delegate against singling out oil (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) as the villain of the world economy was that just as oil prices had increased seven-fold, so had the prices of "wheat, automobiles, cement, every type of machinery and every piece of electronic equipment." The delegate continued that the highly
industrialized countries were not prepared to make any sacrifice in the high standards of living of their peoples in order to promote the development of the developing countries and ensure adequate flow of resources to these countries.

As a contribution to development, oil-producing countries in spite of their development needs were responding to international appeals for multilateral assistance for the non oil-producing developing countries.

In terms of political changes in Africa, the delegate acknowledged the declaration of independence and subsequent admission of Guinea Bissau into the UN, and the installation of "a government of nationalists in Mozambique."

1975-1979

In the 1975 speech, the delegate saw a need for "developing countries themselves to cooperate more effectively in improving their economic conditions." He repeated what the previous year's delegate said about producers of oil in the developing world positively assisting other developing countries who were in a slightly less advantageous position.

As for Africa's achieving more political influence, the delegate spoke of working for a more democratic structure within the UN which would better fulfill the aspirations of all members of the organization. The problems of colonialism persisted, but the persistent struggle of liberation movements had made Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, sovereign
states. However in Zimbabwe, Ian Smith the minority Prime Minister had once again shown his determination to "wreck all chances of a peaceful transfer of power." South Africa had also persisted in its "diabolical policy of balkanizing Namibia through the creation of bantustans."

In the 1976 speech, the delegate said the present international economic relationship did not meet the ideals of economic security and responsiveness to the realities of international order based on realistic cooperation in a world divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots." Self-reliance must therefore necessarily be emphasized in addition to close cooperation. Specifically, he listed specific examples of Nigeria's economic contribution to African development which reflected African cooperation.

The delegate referred to apartheid as abuse of power, and he listed the four conditions that the world community had laid down for the process of self-determination in Namibia. These were (a) unconditional withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, (b) the release of all political prisoners, (c) the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Namibia, and (d) negotiation between the Vorster regime and SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization), the "authentic representatives of the Namibian people."

In the area of social development, apartheid in South Africa was depicted as a veritable crime against humanity, and as degradation of human values. A threat to the continent's social development was
France's cooperation with South Africa in nuclear technology. The delegate said it constituted a nuclear blackmail of Africa.

In 1977, most of the focus was on the political aspect of African development. The political issues included equitable representation in the UN. The delegate called for a review of relevant provisions of the Charter which would lead to equitable representation on the present-day realities. But he added that Africa's struggles went far beyond the cause of equitable representation within the UN's organs. In Zimbabwe, the minority regime rebellion against the colonizing power had lasted for twelve years. This was due mainly to the open support of the illegal regime by their fellow racists of South Africa and clandestine support or tacit sabotage by those who profess democracy at home but prefer to espouse the cause of fascism in Africa.

Finally, an obstacle to political development in the continent was said to be the superpower tussle for areas of political and military influence in Africa, which had tended to deny the people the right and ability to settle purely internal African problems in the African way.

In the area of social development, six million indigenous people continued to be denied their basic human rights in defiance of the Charter of the organization. Also, the delegate expressed the hope that Africa would remain a nuclear-free zone.

In 1978, there was relatively equal coverage given to the three aspects of African development. The political aspect included the problem in Zimbabwe in which the "rebel regime" established a so-called multi-racial transitional administration in preparation for
majority rule." The delegate faulted the arrangement which sought to hand power to black surrogates of minority rule. He said it was doomed to fail. The solution must include, the Patriotic Front, which had "borne the brunt of the struggle for majority rule." He suggested that an all-party conference could provide the best forum for resolving the outstanding differences so as to pave the way for genuine democratic rule. Finally, he affirmed that the acts of aggression against independent African states had increased.

The perception of the economic aspect of development included an affirmation that developing countries needed more than commitments. They wanted a fundamental change in the situation of international economic relations, and effective participation in the decision-making process. The delegate said mere palliatives along the traditional lines of donor and recipient were not only peripheral to the structural economic problems of developing countries, but they also inhibited their self-reliance and sustained growth. Ironically, military research and development in nuclear-weapon states continued to consume vast human and financial resources, locking up funds which otherwise would have been used for development.

The images of the obstacles to social development included a reference to the continued brutal killing of defenceless Zimbabweans. The delegate said in South Africa, the situation was a constant reminder of the indignity and inhumanity to which the black man had been subjected.
1979 marked the return of Nigeria to democratic rule after thirteen years of military rule. This was reflected in the special focus given to issues of political development, especially the affirmation of a democratic-style government as opposed to an authoritarian one. The delegate defined independence as "nothing but the government of the people by themselves." He commended the Nigerian Armed Forces for marching back to the barracks of their own volition to "perform their traditional role of defending the fatherland against external aggression." And he condemned the recent interferences by some European countries, notably France, in the internal affairs of some African countries. The delegate then went on to discuss leadership. According to him, leadership in any state was as good as the people of that state wanted it to be. Only leadership which the people supported would endure. He added that the era of self-appointed kingmakers for Africa was gone. The dependence of political institutions on foreigners from whatever continent was both an anathema and betrayal of Africa's "freedom and liberty." To show that the influence of colonialism was still strong, he said:

former colonial masters not only left behind timebombs in the form of latent instability and insurrection, but nurturing their nostalgias and myths of indispensability, they carefully planned their return for insidious political domination and economic exploitation.

Referring to the Zimbabwean situation, Nigeria's delegate hoped that the London talks would restore power and sovereignty to the Zimbabwean peoples on a basis which would justify international acceptance and recognition.
In economic-related matters, the delegate stated that the goal of developing countries was the restructuring of international economic relations in a way that would narrow the ever-widening gap between the developed and developing countries through trade and aid, and increased netflows of resources. The struggle to eliminate the inequities of the existing international economic system and to establish the NIEO was an integral part of the struggle for the elimination of colonialism, foreign exploitation and all forms of subjugation and interference in the internal affairs of states. Specifically, one of the contradictions and distortions in the world economic system included the annual unproductive expenditure of $400 billion on armaments which far exceeded the total net flow of resources to developing countries as a whole from all sources, which stood at $63.93 billion in 1977. Another was the fact that the least developed countries of the world had a total external debt of $10 billion, and as a result, they had to mortgage 15 percent of their export earnings in 1977 for debt payments.

As a way to help their own development, 49 African countries, with the approval of the UN had launched a Transport and Communications Decade in Africa which they hoped would enable them to integrate their economies and provide a viable basis for accelerated progress. In the delegate's words, this was to cost $8 billion, but the powers who did not hesitate to budget $400 billion for destructive purposes were wary of supporting and making pledges for such a constructive scheme.
The delegate focused also on leadership in Africa. His message for African leaders was that those who parodied themselves after "foreign models," and who degraded themselves by exploiting their people through insensitivity, corruption or callous brutality would be swept away by their own people into the dustbin of history just as their colonial masters were driven out of Africa in ignominy and revulsion.

There was the belief in the existence of an organic link between disarmament and development, hence the support for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, and if that failed, the creation of nuclear-free zones, particularly in Africa.

1980-1987

In the 1980 speech, the delegate focused mainly on Africa's economic plans. He said Africa was placing "new emphasis on its economic development after decades when our over-riding preoccupation was to secure the independence of all our territories and peoples." The Monrovia Strategy for the economic development of Africa reflected the realism that "in our interdependent world, we welcome constructive cooperation and partnership from the rest of the international community." The delegate said the crisis in the world economy was wreaking havoc in Africa, and the very existence of some of the nations was being critically threatened by adverse economic forces and disasters.

He continued that in spite of Africa's economic wealth and resources, the continent remained the least developed. This was
inconsistent with the continent's political independence. He affirmed that there was a resolve to make progress. Also, Africa must refuse to subsidize the economies of the rich countries by continuing to sell its raw materials and labor cheaply, in return for the exhorbitantly priced manufactured goods from the industrialized countries.

Among the political perceptions was a reference to South Africa's "provocations and the dilatory tactics of her allies in the West-bloc with regard to self-determination and majority rule for Namibia." Also, the delegate called for some institutional or structural reform to democratize the UN's decision-making process, and supported an expansion of the membership of the organization.

A perception classified under Africa's social development was that half a millenium of colonial rule by European powers had not succeeded in destroying "our self-image as Africans." Another was the fact that African states had fought one another across borders. They fought not to colonize anyone but to defend their perceived patrimony, that is, to safeguard their territorial integrity. Despite the reason given by the delegate, the fact still remained that war was not in Africa's development interests.

In 1981, the political problem of Namibia was mentioned. The delegate said the struggle for the genuine independence of Namibia under a democratically elected SWAPO-led government would never be abandoned. But most strenuous efforts were being made in the West to link withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and the progress towards Namibia's independence. He saw no link between the two, and repudiated the claims of extra-continental powers to
dictate to any African country who their friends should be. He suggested that South Africa had to pull its troops from Angola, from other Front-Line States, cooperate internationally for Namibia's independence, and replace the apartheid system with genuine majority rule.

As for the perception of economic development, the delegate said the "uncaring stand of the rich industrialized North obliged us to suspen
d delerations concerning the New International Development Strategy and Global Negotiations". But meanwhile the artificially maintained high interest rates showed that "those with economic power were not ready to democratize it." At the same time, the industrialized North had managed "using the unwary to induce an artificial glut in the world supply of crude oil." He suggested that any global negotiation must be founded

   on compromise and barter, and justice and equity. A scheme which envisages for the South the role of junior partner in a position of permanent economic subservience to the North contains in it, the seeds of its own destruction.

   In 1982, there was a perception that Africa's efforts to solve the political problems in Western Sahara and the Horn of Africa continued to be undermined by the intervention by the big powers. South Africa continued to occupy Namibia in defiance of the unanimous decision of the Assembly. But the independence of Namibia should not be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from

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3 This was a reference to the countries who took the full brunt of South Africa's nefarious activities. These were Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.
Angola. The delegate believed that the people of Namibia were entitled to freedom under the leadership of SWAPO.

In his perception of economic development, the delegate said the world economic depression was proof that the economies of the world were interdependent. The symptoms of depression included:

- massive unemployment, incredibly high levels of global inflation,
- high debt-servicing ratio for many developing countries, sharp falls in commodity prices and unstable exchange rates.

He declared that agriculture had all but collapsed in many parts of Africa due in part to drought, and to the unreasonably low commodity prices, and high cost of agricultural machinery. There had also been the reluctance on the part of developed countries to embrace the NIEO; declines in the flow of official assistance, and a clearly expressed preference for bilateralism over multilateralism which had seriously undermined the integrity of the multilateral institutions of the UN.

Africa's social development was linked to peace. The delegate said "we attach importance to peace and stability, without which our efforts to develop our countries will continue to be frustrated." This social aspect of development was also linked to human happiness. He said the people of Namibia were entitled to the pursuit of happiness. Finally, Africa was also committed to the eradication of racism in South Africa.

In 1983, the political aspect of the process of African Development included the delegate's recognition of the "inherent right of the 20 million blacks to participate fully and equally with
whites in South Africa's political processes." He faulted the Western
powers' "constructive engagement" policy with South Africa,
describing it as "deeply offensive and repugnant to Africa." He
warned that,

those permanent members of the Security Council who continue
to prevent the Council from discharging its full responsibility... have left the people of South Africa and Namibia with no other
choice than to seek redress through armed struggle.

There was also the "increasingly dangerous interventionist policy
being pursued in Africa by some external powers in the Western
Sahara, Horn of Africa and Chad." The delegate, in reference to power
relationships on the African continent, said Africa must not be
turned into an arena for proxy-wars by the superpowers.

But the economic aspect of African development was a main
focus in the part of the speech devoted to African affairs. This aspect
included the recognition that the blacks of South Africa had to
participate fully and equally with whites in the economic processes
of the country. The delegate however acknowledged the increased
cooperation between South Africa and the West, for example, the
United States government's approval of the request by seven U.S.
corporations to provide technical and maintenance services to a
nuclear power installation in racist South Africa.

There was also a concern about the ever-widening economic gap
between developed and developing countries. The delegate said this
underscored the structural imbalance in the global economy, and the
burden of adjustment over the current crisis had fallen
disproportionately on the developing countries. He made a reference
to the "grim economic picture in most of the developing countries."
This grim picture included: high foreign debts, continued erosion of
their terms of trade, unacceptably high level of inflation, sharp
increases in cost of capital and international credit, and deep
recession in the economies of developing countries resulting in
further decline in 1982 in their per-capita Gross Domestic Product.

The delegate continued that at a time of global improvement of
food supply, acute shortages persisted in Africa with serious
consequences not only in terms of increasing famine and hunger, but
they also inhibited development because of the increasing amount
spent on importing food. Owing to overdependence on the export of
one or two commodities, the continuing decline and uncertainty in
commodity prices had taken their heaviest toll on African countries.
He suggested that one of the major pre-requisites of economic
recovery in Africa was "ensuring a substantial flow of external
finance to the region."

There was a perception of growing reliance by the developed
countries on bilateral rather than multilateral approach to the
resolution of the crisis confronting the world economy, and
particularly the economic problems of the developing countries. The
delegate said there could be more progress made in the restructuring
of international economic relations through

better appreciation by the developed countries of the reality of
interdependence, and the fact that developing countries have
become a significant partner in the international economy.
However, according to him, the trickle-down from the so-called recovery in certain developed nations was not the panacea; it required global and integrated solution.

The perception of the social aspect of development included a reference to South Africa's practice of racial discrimination, and the fact that discrimination had been institutionalized, enshrined in law, and made all-pervasive. The delegate said South Africa had been widely condemned, but it still had private support from the Western countries. South Africa had consistently sought to undermine the peace, security and stability of the region by the incessant and unprovoked aggression against its neighbors. He again referred to this aggression against the Front-Line states.

In the 1984 speech, the prominence given to the economic aspect of African development continued. According to the delegate, the emergency aspect of Africa's economic crisis emanated mainly from the devastating impact of drought. Drought exacerbated the already inadequate food situation of the region. Also because of the high dependence of external sources for almost all critical and essential input for development activities, the African economy has been the principal victim of the global recession, export earnings had tumbled with collapse of commodity prices, there was stagnation and decline in official development assistance (ODA).

Furthermore, escalating debt and debt-servicing, and unprecedented high interest rates had meant financial disaster for African countries.

There was a recognition by African countries that the primary responsibility for the development of their economies rested on
them, and they had to look inwards for that development. But the recovery in other regions did not necessarily produce positive impetus nor act as catalyst to economic development in developing countries because of the fundamental barriers to their participation in international economic activities. The delegate said for genuine world economic recovery, there must be willingness on the part of all members of the international community to redress those structural imbalances that contributed to, and condemned African and other developing countries to a life of poverty and economic underdevelopment. He called for the active participation of all countries, and condemned the tendency for developed countries to resort to protectionism; instead, he felt there should be multilateralism.

A perception of political development in South Africa was projected in what the delegate called the "orchestrated attempt to hoodwink the world about a non-existing democratisation process in South Africa." He said it was strange democracy which enshrined in its constitution the exclusion of 23 million blacks, 73 percent of the population, from the electoral process. There were also references to South Africa's pressure on Lesotho for a defence pact between the two countries, and South Africa's strengthening of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), the consequence of which was to increase the pressure on the government of Mozambique.

The social aspect of African development was characterized by the fact that the inhuman system of apartheid which was at the heart of the South African problem continued to thrive and develop
roots partly through the maneuvers of the apartheid regime, but also through the support of certain members of the organization.

In 1985, the perception of economic development included reference to the economic aspect of apartheid. The delegate said the economic system in South Africa was based on deprivation of blacks and the exploitation of their labor.

He said the adverse impact of the unilateral decisions and actions by the powerful actors in the global economy on the developing countries were: high interest rates; volatile exchange rates, protectionism, and little sympathy for the external debts of developing countries. He reiterated that global problems demanded global solutions, and this Fortieth anniversary of the UN was an appropriate time for the renewal and rededication to a multilateral spirit. Some of the solutions suggested included: honest North-South dialogue; the need to allay unfounded fears of each other's intentions; flexibility in positions coupled with political will was inevitable to permit the restructuring of the world economy in a mutually advantageous manner as called for in the NIEO; re-examination of International financial institutions so that they could be purveyors of prosperity rather than economic and political ruin; realization of the burden of debt by international creditors; generosity of the human spirit in providing a great amount of food aid and allied needs and relief assistance, but very little efforts had been directed towards the longer-term and structural problems of the African economy. The delegate repeated the call for long-term action, and also mentioned the principle of responsibility. He said:
African countries accept that the primary responsibility for dealing with the critical economic situation, and for relaunching the development process in the continent lies with them.

On the political aspect of development, Namibia was seen as a "classic case of colonialism," and that it should not become a victim of ideological rivalry of the superpowers. South African presence in the territory was perceived to be an illegal occupation by a latter-day imperialist power.

The social aspect of African development was linked to the apartheid situation in South Africa. The delegate said: "by a series of oppressive laws, and naked practice of state terrorism, successive regimes in South Africa have violated every conceivable law of human decency." He continued that the Pretoria clique was a veritable menace to the neighboring states—disturbing the peace and security of the South African region. The clique was in violation of the territorial integrity of Angola, and its response to mass revolt was to introduce more draconian laws.

In the 1986 speech, the delegate, continuing the focus on the economic aspect of African development, reminded his international audience that the Charter of the UN devoted two chapters to the question of International Economic and Social Cooperation. He said the gap between the developed and developing countries and persistence of the unjust and inequitable international economic system constituted major impediments to the development process of most of the member-states. According to him,

industrialized countries have refused to address the problem of structural imbalance and inequalities that characterize the
international economic and trading system. We have to consider the problem of structural imbalance and inequalities with a view to formulating concrete and effective solutions to the questions of huge external debt of developing countries, the problems of debt servicing, high interest rates, inflation, declining commodity prices, stiff conditionalities of the IMF, protectionist measures and unfair trade terms continually imposed by developed countries.

The delegate claimed further that commodity trade was currently the primary source of foreign exchange earnings for a majority of developing countries, and specific measures to control trade on commodities to the advantage of the developed market-economy countries were embarked upon without sympathy or consideration for the repercussions on the current balance of payments of developing countries. The high hopes of the developing countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) had floundered owing to a deep-rooted reluctance on the part of the developed countries to engage in a honest and meaningful North-South dialogue. He stressed the need for fundamental structural readjustment in the international economic system which would promote a rapid and sustained world economic growth and development. But he added: "we do not lose sight of the need for developing countries themselves to cooperate effectively in improving their economic conditions."

There were three aspects of African development in the delegate's perception of the situation in South Africa. The three aspects were the political, the economic, and the social. He said South Africa had declared a state of emergency, with a total clampdown on news reports. Despite this, workers had initiated strike actions, and
an ever-growing number of school children working independently had periodically boycotted classes to show their revulsion against political powerlessness, economic deprivation, inferior education and dehumanizing segregation laws imposed on them by the racist regime. This situation in South Africa was one part of the liberation struggle in Africa. The other part was in Namibia. The political nature of the problem was that "the racist Pretoria regime persists with its illegal occupation of the territory by ruthlessly suppressing the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence."

In depicting the social aspect of African development, the delegate said South Africa continued to pursue policies of mindless oppression and intimidation of the blacks who were subjected to persistent and systematic violation of their fundamental human rights. He declared that apartheid meant violence and terror for the struggling people of South Africa. The regime was still undeterred in its implementation of policies which were repressive and offensive to the laws of natural justice. Apartheid was a crime against humanity, the dignity and conscience of mankind, and continued to pose a threat to international peace and justice.

Finally, in the 1987 speech, there was the perception that economic prospects for developing countries in general, and Africa in particular, continued to remain very bleak. Despite the painstaking efforts of most of the developing countries at attaining some appreciable levels of structural adjustment, they continued to be plagued by debt problems, unsurmountable debt-servicing, falling
commodity prices, unjustified protectionism in some developed countries against developing countries' commodities and high interest rates. In Geneva, the international community agreed that while developing countries needed to restructure their economies, there was the corresponding obligation on the developed countries to increase resource flows to Third World nations. He declared that South-South cooperation was not and could not be a substitute for international economic cooperation development.

The political aspect of development was depicted in the perception that in South Africa, there was no freedom to express different opinions in the media. The belief in the armed struggle in South Africa and Namibia was predicated on the necessity to wrest from an unjust order those basic freedoms that many nations had always fought for in Europe and America. The delegate called on the racists to talk to the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress with a view to bringing an end to the violence they started.

The social aspect of African development focused on peace. The delegate said there was a link between peace and development; the African continent which had most of the world's least developed countries was unfortunately plagued by intractable conflicts. Many of these were traceable to the nefarious activities of the racist minority regime in apartheid South Africa. He listed some of the effects of the policies of the apartheid regime. These included setting families apart, and destroying humble places of abode of the impoverished African population. The regime had set Soweto ablaze; it brutalized
teenage Africans through torture and imprisonment; finally, it dehumanized the indigenous population.

Moving from the inhuman situation in South Africa, the delegate said the situation existing between Chad and Libya was unfortunate and highly regrettable. But he did not explain what the situation was.4

In this speech, another social aspect of development was the state of the environment. The delegate said environmental problems were often of global character and it was unhelpful to ascribe lack of environmental protection to developing countries, when in fact they were marginal to the causes of environmental problems.


In 1965, there was perception of a political role in the colonial territory of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The delegate hoped that the General Assembly would come up with a resolution that in unilaterally declaring independence, Ian Smith was not only defying the British government, but all the members of the UN.

An economic role was projected in the recognition of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's organizing the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals of other states.

4 Libya was known to have invaded the northern part of Chad.
There was another role which was not so much tied to the organization as a body, but to the various members of the UN. Speaking figuratively, the delegate urged members to take a positive action to put out a flame which would engulf Africa and the rest of the world— he was referring to the situation in South Africa.

The delegate was positive in his assessment of the UN's adoption of resolution 1995 (XIX). The assessment also brought out an acknowledgement of an economic role for the UN. He also welcomed the initiative of the Secretary-General in providing additional staff for the Center for Industrial Development in the 1966 budget estimate.

A negative reaction by the delegate to the UN's activities, was that it was "a matter of regret that the Secretary-General's report to the 39th session of the Economic and Social Council had to indicate that objectives have not been met." Another was that the activities of the UN in the field of Industrial Development had "fallen below the level generally desired by members of the Assembly."

Some roles were implicit in the assessments of the organization in 1966; this was the 21st anniversary of the UN's creation. The following is a list of its shortcomings, and the roles implied in parentheses:

1. Its failure to remove the last strongholds of colonialism and racial domination from the continent of Africa and elsewhere in the world (political);

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5 This resolution established the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as an organ of the UN.
2. Its degeneration from an Organization for the maintenance of peace and security into an organization for the maintenance of cease-fires; it had yet to establish an effective system for peace-keeping (social).

3. Its incapacity to deal with the glaring cases of international misbehaviour by countries concerned; Ian Smith's regime continued in Rhodesia, and South Africa not only bluntly pursued its policy of apartheid, but refused to carry out international obligations in South-West Africa (political).

4. Its failure to solve the problem of increasing poverty and want suffered by the greater part of humanity in a world which was by and large increasingly getting richer (economic).

5. Its failure to persuade the world to follow a policy of a gradual subordination of narrow national interests and prestige to the larger interests of humanity as a whole (political).

6. The International Court was discredited; the Court's decision on South West Africa was "a lamentable development" (social).

7. The discussion on disarmament was at a standstill (social).

8. The avowed determination to help the developing countries to overcome their development problems had yet to be matched, for example, despite the useful work of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), some countries like France, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there was still no agreement on international prices stabilization scheme for cocoa (economic).
In 1967, a social role was projected in the call on South Africa to "stop this nefarious violation of international law, and resolution of the competent organs of the UN."

The delegate had a negative assessment of the situation in South Africa. He described it as "getting worse because of the half-hearted nature of the handling of African decolonization issues by the UN."

Moreover, the delegate perceived the record of the UN in the economic field to be "without doubt more impressive than its political record." This record was achieved by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UNCTAD.

In 1968, the political role or responsibility of the organization was linked mainly to the "state of international affairs." The economic roles of some UN organs were described as follows:

the work of the UNCTAD, and the role which the body can play for bringing about a more equitable international economic order.

Also, the Nigerian government was interested in the work of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The delegate said not only should a blueprint of a world industrialized-development strategy be prepared; its content must be implemented in practical terms.

In his assessment of the organization, the delegate said:

compared with its other achievements, the record of the UN in the economic and social fields seems impressive though still short of expectation.

He also said:

the organization has the institutional arrangements and
establishments necessary to give impetus to the development of the underdeveloped world. . . but they lack the tools and political will, and support on the part of the industrialized countries to enable them perform their tasks as stated in Chapter IX of the Charter which are to promote economic and social progress and development.

Just as in the 1967 speech, there was a negative assessment, and simultaneously a recognition of the organization's social role when the delegate said:

as the UN becomes half-hearted in the handling of African decolonization, the millions of oppressed people in South Africa seem progressively condemned to permanent white minority domination and subjugation.

The called the Second session of UNCTAD "a disappointment" because of reluctance of the industrialized countries to disavow the existing imperial patterns of trade. But on a positive note, he welcomed the interest the Secretary-General had focused on the program of the work of UNIDO. He also added that the UN Development Program had been doing commendable work within its limited resources.

In 1969, the delegate projected a social role in the assertion that the UN should relate the proposed disarmament decade to the Second UN Development Decade.

In his assessment of the UN since the historic declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, the delegate said the UN had established an impressive record in the process of decolonization. But significant as the past achievement had been, there were increasing signs of a half-hearted handling of the remaining problems of decolonization, particularly South Africa. In
the face of disruptive influences which regimes of racial supremacy were actively promoting, the UN appeared "impotent."

A further negative reaction to the role of the UN in African development, was the perception that "we approach the end of the First Development Decade with the goals and targets prescribed for the period far outside the reach of the developing countries."

Also, the delegate said that "inspite of the strict and mandatory injunctions enshrined in its charter, the UN appears to accept double standards in its operations."

1970-1974

In 1970, an economic role of the UN was projected in the delegate's call for the establishment of a UN fund with which to support the liberation movements in Africa. He added that the UN should wake up to its responsibilities and create the proposed fund.

Another economic role perceived was that during the Second Development Decade, the UN would squarely face the realities of the present unjust world economic system, and thereby seek a viable solution to it. In addition, there were perceptions of economic and social roles, respectively, in the following assertion:

the capacity of the UN to facilitate global economic and social progress should be reinforced in a concrete manner.

There was recognition of one of the roles of the UN in the positive assessment: "the recent reported agreement under the aegis of the UN Conference on Trade and Development to liberalize trade
between developing and developed economies is a step in the right direction."

In 1971, the major political role perceived was specifically for the General Assembly. The delegate said that the major task of the 26th Session of the General Assembly would be to devise ways and means of re-establishing without further delay UN authority in the Territory (Namibia).

The UN's peace-keeping role was recognized. In fact, the delegate was positive in the assessment of this role. He said he believed in the "usefulness of the peace-keeping role." However, he did not react positively to what the UN achieved during First Development Decade. He said the decade did not satisfy the expectations of many member-states.

In 1972, the UN's social role was projected. The delegate mentioned that the UN must look closely into areas in which new initiatives could be taken in the efforts to combat apartheid.

However, he lamented the fact that the Territories of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and Namibia were denied the opportunity to exercise their rights to independence and self-determination. The delegate saw this denial as "an indelible blot on the record of the UN."

In the economic field, he said the hope for bridging the economic gap between the developed and developing nations which inspired the International Development Strategy for the Second UN Development Decade had not been fulfilled. The Third Session of UNCTAD had the "bottom knocked out of its strategy."
In 1973, there was a perception of the political role of the UN in the assertion that,

We in Africa strongly believe that the UN and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council have a duty and responsibility to use all the means at their disposal to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia.

As for the organization's social roles, he said:

The UN can and does bring to bear the moral weight of world opinion on many a controversial issue. That explains its great value to the smaller nations and to the dispossessed and downtrodden peoples of the world.

Also, there was positive recognition of a social role in the statement:

... invaluable services rendered by the Organization and its specialized agencies in the vital areas of health, literacy campaigns, child welfare, and the championship of progressive labor legislation on a world-wide basis.

There was an acknowledgement of positive political and social roles in the assertion:

The UN continues to play a key and vital role in providing physical stability and preventing a deterioration of unhappy and unstable political and social conditions.

Finally, the delegate commented that many Africans would not accept such a doleful assessment of the UN. He said they were well aware of its shortcoming and failings. These were in some measure, a reflection of the world which produced and now operated the organization.

In 1974, a political role of the UN was linked to the support it gave to Africa and the national liberation movements for the final liquidation of Portuguese imperialism in Africa.
Economically, its role included organizing the Sixth Special Session which acknowledged the role of transnational corporations in the fashioning of a New International Economic Order. A problem for oil-producing nations, for example, was that for every dollar which the producer country earned, the international companies earned between $7 and $10. The delegate then asked: "Is this not a problem which requires international cooperation within the UN system for its solution?"

In his assessment, he described the UN's support for Africa as "indispensable." But this was followed by negative assessments. He asked:

for how long will the UN watch the horrors of brutalities by South Africa on Namibia's indigenous population?

He also asked:

for how long will the UN shy away from the firm measures that are needed to assert UN authority over Namibia?

He however added that despite its weaknesses, the UN was one of man's greatest creations. It offered the world a unique forum for sustaining peace and progress, an acknowledgement of a social role.

1975-1979

In 1975, the political roles perceived were

1. That the UN should give maximum support and encouragement to the nationalist movement of Zimbabwe.

2. That the UN should have a political will to solve the Namibian problem.
The economic roles and their assessments were

1. That the UN provided an ideal forum for working out the mutually beneficial partnership implicit in the New World Economic Order.

2. That the UN had to reaffirm its arms embargo on South Africa and to demand the end of economic collaboration with South Africa.

The social role that was positively assessed was that the UN provided an indispensable stage for the preservation of international peace and security.

Some roles and positive assessments of the UN between the 25th and 30th Anniversaries as projected in this speech were

1. That the organization had proved its awareness of its responsibilities to all its members.

2. That it had gone beyond pious statements delivered with great solemnity in the historic hall and then quickly forgotten.

3. That it had adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and had proclaimed a New International Economic Order.

4. That it had held the World Population Conference, World Food Conference, Third Session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the General Conference of the United Nations International Development Organization (UNIDO). Also, the delegate said the Seventh Special Session of the UN, by its positive achievement, had demonstrated the truth in the age-old saying that where there was a will, there was a way.

In 1976, a political role was that it was the responsibility of the UN to ensure that an independent Namibia under the leadership of
the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) would take its place in the community of nations.

As for the organization's social role, the delegate reiterated the purpose of the organization— the promotion of human well-being, the dignity of man and a well-ordered international society in order to ensure the survival of the human race.

In his negative assessment of another social role, the delegate said it had been apparent that the UN which Africa looked up to for the eradication of the evils that plagued South Africa was being increasingly rendered powerless to discharge its obligations.

He positively assessed another political role of the UN, and later modified it. He said: "Having played a commendable role in the process of decolonization, the UN cannot now be a mere bystander when the last push against the last bastion of imperialism and racism in Africa is in progress."

He recognized that among the factors that had led to the more positive situation in Zimbabwe was the continued pressure by the UN for the maintenance of mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime there.

In 1977, the delegate assessed a social role by affirming the laudable role the UN had played in the past and continued to play so that even in South Africa, the basic right of man to freedom might be quickly restored.

He also mentioned the admirable role of the UN in raising the living standards of those millions of people in the underdeveloped world.
There was positive assessment of the UN's political role in the assertion:

we are greatly encouraged by the enthusiasm which the Secretary-General has shown in his efforts to reassert UN control over the Territory.  

But there was a reference to the roles played by parties other than the UN. The delegate said the Anglo-American proposals deserved to be given a chance. He also recognized the constructive role played by the Front-Line states through peaceful negotiations in the search for a solution in Zimbabwe.

In 1978, the economic role pertained to the UN's negotiations of the New International Economic Order. Also it was perceived that the Security Council should impose at least some sanctions on new loans and investments in South Africa.

The social roles included:

1. Conducting a session on peace-keeping and decolonization and attempting to achieve a new world without war.

2. Convening a conference to arouse the conscience of mankind against racism and racial discrimination.

3. Convening a conference to mobilize the capacities of developing countries for collective self-reliance.

4. The UN must be in the vanguard of efforts towards general and complete disarmament.

In 1979, the recognition of the UN's social role was that it should not put itself in a position of appearing to condone an illegal and

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6 The Territory was Namibia.
illegitimate act of piracy by a state\textsuperscript{7} which has forfeited the goodwill and respect of the international community.

The economic role perceived was that the UN should undertake a study of how much the attitude of some Western states was determined by their dependence on the strategic minerals and commodities of South Africa.

The assessment of the UN's role in apartheid South Africa was negative. The delegate said the UN was defied by a minority racist regime in a country which had no claims to be a world power. Also, the UN could not enforce its unanimous decisions, in accordance with the provision of its Charter.

In the case of Namibia, he said the UN now seemed to have allowed itself to be bullied into inaction. There had been too much bending over backwards to accommodate the so-called Government of South Africa that was in illegal occupation of Namibia.

Assessing the Fifth Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Manila, the delegate said, instead of addressing the main issues facing the economy of the international community, the session concentrated on matters of secondary importance and wasted precious time in trying to sow division and discord in the ranks of the developing countries.

\textsuperscript{7} South Africa.
1980-1987

In 1980, a political role was projected in the recognition that the declaration of the UN generated the impetus that led to Zimbabwe's independence. Also, it was two years since the Security Council endorsed the Western Five's proposals for Namibia's transition to independence.

The delegate said the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) should be deployed without undue delay to carry out its mandate to supervise a free and fair election in Namibia.

As for the organization's economic role, he urged that the "August Assembly launch a Decade of reparation and restitution for Africa as a master-plan for the economic recovery of Africa." There should also be a restructuring of the world economic system to conform with the dictates of the NIEO. Finally, the International Conference on Sanctions should impose sanctions on South Africa, particularly oil sanctions.

The social role was that the UN should return to its central role of being an effective instrument for harmonizing different views; reconciling competing interests, and initiating such collective action as would give sustenance to human aspirations for peace and plenty, and in justice and liberty. He recognized that it was 14 years now since the International Court of Justice handed down the decision that South Africa had neither the legal nor moral right to maintain its administration in Namibia.

The praise given to the organization was that since 1960, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution containing the
Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, it had never relented in its effort to support the legitimate struggle of peoples in colonial bondage to regain their freedom and their liberty.

In 1981, the first political role perceived for the UN was for it to stop the international drift, caused by an escalating confrontation between the two superpowers. Then there was the call on the UN for the early implementation of the Namibia Plan as provided for in Resolution 435 (1978) without amendment, modification or amplification.

Simultaneously, there was a recognition of an economic role in the statement which also projected the first political role. It was for the UN to arrest the drift in world affairs, caused by the big gap between the economically deprived South and a protectionist-oriented industrialized North.

The social role was that the UN should redouble its efforts to bring some sanity to the arms race despite the failure of the second review conference the previous year.

In 1982, the delegate said that the UN (Resolution 2145 XXI) had terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia. In spite of Resolution 435 (1978), sponsored by the Contact group, adopted by the General Assembly, effective pressure could not be brought to bear on South Africa to withdraw from Namibia.

An economic role was projected in the statement that the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Ministerial Meeting, and Sixth session of UNCTAD could contribute immensely to the
reactivation of international trade and improved trading prospects for developing countries.

There was also a recognition of the contribution of international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group, to the development of developing countries, though there were many areas requiring response. The very stiff conditions of International Monetary Fund lending was said to be resented by developing countries.

Also, donor countries needed "not only to step up official assistance to the poorer nations, but also to ensure that an increasing proportion of that assistance flows through the development organizations of the UN."

There was a perception that the establishment of long-term arrangements of the UN financing system for science and technology for development acquired special significance.

The assessment of the IMF was that its solutions left many developing countries worse-off than before.

In 1983, a political role was for the UN to invoke the provisions of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter because of the persistent refusal by the racist regime of South Africa to withdraw from Namibia.

Nigeria's positive assessment of the UN was demonstrated as follows: The delegate said on the situation in Namibia, the Nigerian government would like to express its deep appreciation and gratitude to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to bring about the independence of the Territory.
The negative comments were the following: what emerged out of the conference of the Sixth UNCTAD session was

a rehash of the results of previous sessions, and a few additional but half-hearted measures which did not amount to any serious package of urgent remedial and long-term measures that had been sought.

He also said the Resolution 34/138 on global negotiations on international economic cooperation for development adopted four years before had not been matched by any positive action.

In 1984, the delegate acknowledged the UN's political role. He said the international community should play a decisive role in the liquidation of apartheid. The Security Council concluded that the application of Article 6 of the Charter was the answer but the resolution was vetoed by three permanent members. He stated that Namibia was a classic case of decolonization which fell squarely within the purview of the UN. The UN must take positive action to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and bring about the immediate and unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

Referring to an economic role, the delegate acknowledged the important role of the International Monetary Fund in helping members cope with their balance of payment problem.

He also called on the Assembly to live up to its Charter and embark on a course that would permit early launching of genuine negotiations to accelerate the attainment of the New International Economic Order.
A joint social role of Nigeria and the UN was recognized when the delegate said that Nigeria and the Special Committee on Apartheid sponsored a Seminar on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime. The Seminar concluded that the institution and the operation of apartheid made the South African government nothing but a colonial regime. He said the General Assembly would have to take appropriate action.

The IMF was criticized for being a bad creditor which prescribed the same economic remedies to all its borrowers, irrespective of their peculiar problems.

In the 1985 speech, there was a reference to the General Assembly 1966 Resolution 2145 (XI) which terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia and assumed responsibility over the area, and subsequent resolutions and decisions and the landmark adoption of the Security Council's 1978 Resolution 435 (1978) which embodied a plan for the independence of Namibia. Because of all these, the delegate felt that South Africa must be compelled to cooperate with the UN in implementing Resolution 435.

The economic role perceived for the Security Council included meeting and imposing mandatory economic sanctions on South Africa in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Charter.

Another role was that all permanent members of the Security Council should support sanctions in the discharge of the onerous responsibility bestowed on them by the Charter. He also believed that all the members of the UN should give total support for sanctions.
According to him, the role of the UN in providing a universal forum for economic problems facing the international community was continuously "disrupted, bypassed and even ignored." An economic role prescribed was that the UN should adopt a Declaration on the critical economic situation in Africa.

He showed his approval of a UN resolution by saying: "we welcome the positive tone of Resolution 1985/80 on the critical economic situation in Africa."

In 1986, the UN's economic role was linked to its organizing a Special Session of the General Assembly on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa. The delegate supported the session because according to him, it succeeded in deepening the global awareness of the dimensions of the current economic crisis in Africa. He called upon the President of the Assembly to address an urgent appeal to the President of the United States to endorse the Congressional action on sanctions against South Africa.

The social role was expressed in the statement that the UN had an important role to play in keeping up the pressure to bring the arms race to a halt.

Finally, in 1987, a recognition of the political role was that the UN Council for Namibia must be strengthened to enable it effectively administer the territory until the plan envisaged under Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) had been fully implemented.

The economic roles perceived were the following: First, that the organization must remain committed to such ventures as African Economic Recovery and Development. The delegate recalled the May
1986 Special Session of the UN Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990. He also mentioned the conference sponsored by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Abuja, Nigeria, and which was devoted exclusively to the challenge of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development in Africa. It recommended the following:

1. A comprehensive approach to support Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Africa.

2. Disbursing funds for spare parts and material needed to increase utilization of existing capacity in industry, agriculture, and public infrastructure.

3. Efforts should be made to reduce the debt-service burden of African countries.

A positive assessment was the reference to laudable ventures as exemplified in Resolution S-13/2 adopted at the 13th Special Session of the General Assembly, to assist African Economic Recovery and Development.

The delegate however perceived a failure by the UN so far, to resolve the issue of Namibia's independence. This was intricately intertwined with all the reasons which rendered impossible the early resolution of the whole South Africa problem.

He expressed happiness that the Assembly deferred the inscription in its agenda of the matter to give more time for further consultation.
However, another assessment was negative. It was that the recently concluded conference on the relationship between disarmament and development failed to achieve its main objective.
CHAPTER V

MAJOR FINDINGS IN THE NIGERIAN DELEGATES' PERCEPTIONS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT, AND OF THE UN'S ROLES

The study found some major patterns in the Nigerian delegates' perceptions. These patterns can be classified under three broad headings:

1. Patterns projected in the perceptions of the political, economic, and social aspects of the African development process.
2. Patterns projected in the perceptions of the political, economic, and social roles of the UN.
3. Major observations in the comparison between the perceptions of the delegates and the perceptions of some major Africanist thinkers.

Patterns in the Perceptions of the Political Aspect of African Development.

It was found that in the perceptions of the process of political development in Africa, there were two dominant themes:

1. Political freedom or independence from colonial and foreign rule.

This refers to the decolonization process in Africa, and there is depiction of the political manifestations. This theme also relates to the issues of political stability, the establishment and development of democratic institutions within African countries, and finally, it also
deals with non-interference and non-intervention by outside powers in Africa's internal affairs.

2. *Africa's influence within the UN system.*

This relates to African representation and participation in the UN's organs.

The most dominant perception the Nigerian delegates had about the process of political development in Africa could be characterized as: the political independence of the respective countries from colonial or minority rule, and the decolonization of the continent. Beginning from the 1960 speech, Nigeria's Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa who was the newly independent country's delegate to the General Assembly, expressed the desire of African countries for "responsible independence." He added: "We in Nigeria have been fortunate in achieving independence without bloodshed or bitterness."

African political independence from colonial rule was characterized in the following ways:

In 1961— "the complete and total liquidation of all forms of imperialism and colonialism off the face of Africa."

In 1962— "the abolition of all forms of colonialism, imperialism, and domination of peoples on the African continent" and "decolonization."

In 1963— "capturing the right to determine their destiny."

In 1964, the delegate said Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), was the major problem confronting Africa because of the "continued denial of all political rights to the four million Africans by a
government composed of a white minority of about a quarter of a million."

The depiction of colonial rule continued, and it was characterized in the 1967 speech as "perpetuation of white racist-minority rule" in South Africa and South Rhodesia.

In the 1969 speech, the delegate mentioned "the usurpation by South Africa of the sacred rights of the Namibian people."

But there were sub-themes of political development; one was The political climate within the African countries. It depicted the political state of most African countries after they had gained political independence. This included the development and maintenance of political institutions, and the stability of the political order in these countries. The ability to maintain a stable political order has been a persistent problem for many African countries. Securing political independence was perhaps a solution of only half of the continent's political problems; the other half later had to do with how to enfranchise or enable the majority of the people to participate and contribute to the process and practice of politics. In Nigeria's 1966 speech, the delegate acknowledged the challenge. He said:

The road to independence is usually long, and hard, but the road to national unity, political stability, and economic well-being is harder still and could be much longer. Its negotiation calls for the highest skill, sound judgment, and above all, statesmanship.

The previous year, 1965, Nigeria's post-independence problem of political instability which had continued to deteriorate, reached a
climax. The first elections since independence were marked by allegations of fraud and malpractices between political parties, and violence ensued, mixed with ethnic rancor. All this culminated in a January 15, 1966 military coup in which the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa was killed. Ironically, the blood which in his 1960 UN speech, he said Nigeria did not shed while achieving political independence from British rule, was now shed as the country struggled to achieve post-independence political stability. In July of 1966, there was another military putsch of the seven-month old government of General Aguiyi Ironsi, who replaced Balewa as head of the government. By this time, ethnic discord had clearly began to manifest itself. And this was to lead to Nigeria's civil war between 1967 and 1970, bringing in its wake, harsh political, economic and social consequences for the country.

In connection with the political stability sub-theme, a perception in Nigeria's 1970 speech was that stability was a revolutionary struggle which would demand more sacrifice than Africans had to make in order to gain their political independence. This could be interpreted to refer to the continent's political development process. During the military interregnum in Nigeria between 1966 and 1979, the speeches were however silent on what direction the sacrifice was supposed to take, in terms of building and nurturing a stable political system. Instead, the speeches essentially focused and made suggestions on how to achieve political independence in South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and other colonies in Africa.
But in 1979, when Nigeria had its first democratic elections in 13 years, and there was a subsequent return to civilian rule, Nigeria's speech at the General Assembly was radically different in its perception of political development. The delegate espoused what Nigeria's new civilian government believed should be the political direction of post-independent Africa. This direction was that of establishing democratic processes and offering efficient and high-quality leadership. He affirmed that the era of "self-appointed kingmakers" in Africa was gone. In other words, an era should begin, in which the people became more active participants in the political process by freely expressing their choice of leaders. On the other hand, the era in which politically, only a minority of people participated, must come to an end.

In the 1981 speech, this issue of achieving political stability through upholding democratic principles was also pursued. Then, the Nigerian delegate perceived political development as the "non-abandonment of the struggle for genuine independence of Namibia under a democratically elected SWAPO-led government." He also perceived stability in terms of replacing the apartheid system with genuine democratic majority rule. In 1983, the political aspect of African development could be interpreted to mean the inherent right of the 20 million blacks to participate fully and equally with whites in South Africa's political process.

In 1984, when a military government had taken over power again from the civilian government in Nigeria, the delegate's speech mentioned the "orchestrated attempt to hoodwink the world about a
non-existent democratization process in South Africa." He said it was strange democracy which enshrined in its constitution the exclusion from the electoral process, of 23 million blacks who constituted 73 percent of the population. This statement seemed to be inconsistent with the kind of government Nigeria itself had, which clearly was not a democratically elected government.

Another sub-theme of political independence and freedom was The non-interference or non-intervention of the big powers and developed countries, in general, in the internal affairs of Africa. In the 1960 speech, Nigeria's delegate deplored the ideological interference in Africa. This implicitly referred to the struggle between capitalist (US) and socialist (USSR) ideologies for the minds of Africans who were then under colonial rule, or were about to attain political independence. The delegate said: "Africa must not be allowed to become a political battleground in the ideological struggle." He continued that the developed countries could help the African countries not by spreading ideological propaganda in whatever form it might be disguised. In the 1961 speech, the delegate said until there were no areas for ideological experimentation there would be no peace. In 1985, Namibia was depicted as a classic case of colonialism which should not become a victim of ideological rivalry of the superpowers.

According to Young (1982, p. 254),

until the 1950s, Africa was an inconsequential diplomatic field for both the Soviet Union and the United States. The approach of
independence—and crises such as the Congo affair—extended
the terrain of the cold war to Africa, and both powers defined
more activist African policies.

The focus on political interference was not limited to ideology.
There was also a focus on interference which took the form of giving
physical support to factions within some African countries, and
which was supposed to lead to their assertion of self-determination
and independence from the central government. Nigeria was an
example.

In the 1968 speech, the delegate said there was interference
from outside the country because support was given to the Biafran
rebellion in Nigeria.

In 1969, interference was described in the following terms: "the
unwarranted assaults on the sovereignty of Nigeria," and "external
subversion has been directed against the political independence of
my country."

Other examples of physical political interference were found in
the 1978 speech which stated that the acts of aggression against
African states surrounding Zimbabwe by the rebel regime there, had
increased. In 1981, the delegate said South Africa's troops should be
pulled from Angola and other Front-Line states; in 1982, the efforts
to solve the political problems in Western Sahara and the Horn of
Africa continued to be undermined by the intervention of the big
powers. In 1983, the delegate's words were that the increasingly
dangerous policy being pursued in Africa by some external powers in
the Western Sahara, the Horn of Africa, and Chad.
The second major political theme that was continually mentioned in the speeches was Africa's influence within the UN and its organs.

In the 1961, 1962, and 1963 speeches, the delegates perceived that Africa was underrepresented in the essential organs of the UN. In 1972, the delegate in referring to the same theme called for the democratization of the organization and a readjustment of the composition of the Security Council, the principal organ concerned with peace and security. He wanted a modest increase in its overall membership to provide fairer representation of the various geographical regions of the organization. In 1973, the delegate called for an urgent review of the decision-making processes in the UN system, especially concerning the use of veto to block meaningful initiatives in matters relating to fundamental human rights, freedom and human dignity in Africa. In 1975, the delegate called on the international community to work for a more democratic set-up within the organization; in 1977, the call was for "equitable distribution," and in 1980, the delegate called for institutional or structural reform to democratize the UN's decision-making process, and for the expansion of the membership of the organization.

All these political themes and sub-themes relating to Africa's political development could be interpreted to stand for some of the political tenets of an Africanist principle. These political tenets would include:

1. The establishment of administrations or governments on the African continent based on majority-rule principle.
2. The quest by Africans to build and maintain their own political institutions and culture without interference from the outside.

3. The empowerment of African countries, such that they would have more representation, participation, and influence proportional to their number, in international organizations such as the United Nations.

From the discussion of these political themes, it seemed clear that so far, politically, Africa remained in the periphery of international relations. It was a weaker participant in the international politics, and its political development had been dependent upon the influence and interests of the more powerful developed countries. These outside powers brought such political obstacles as colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid in South Africa, ideological and physical interference, and the asymmetrical power structure within the UN. But, the Nigerian delegates did not seem to place much emphasis on affirming the political integration of the countries of the continent. In fact, their espousal of political unity and cooperation of African countries were not as prominent in latter years as they were between 1960 and 1965. Moreover, the perceptions of such political cooperation were less pronounced than the perceptions of economic cooperation between African countries.
Patterns in the Perceptions of the Economic Aspect of African Development.

It was found that in the perceptions of the economic aspect of African development, there was an emphasis on two interrelated themes:

1. The international economic conditions and their adverse impact on African countries.

   This could be perceived in the context of the economic relationship between the industrialized North, and disadvantaged South. The result has been the frequent calls for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). This theme refers to the dynamics of the international economic system and Africa's place in it.

2. African economic self-reliance, and economic cooperation between developing countries, or South-South cooperation.

   This refers to the dynamics within the African economic system in particular, and the developing countries, in general.

   The first theme was projected in the 1960 speech when the delegate called on the developed nations to help Africa develop its resources. A similar idea was expressed in 1961 in the assertion that the problem of Africa's economic development could be placed on the advanced countries.

   In 1971, the assertion was that "the reluctance of some advanced countries to contribute to the development of less-advanced areas should be overcome."
In 1972, the delegate said there was continued need for flow of technical expertise and equipment; he referred to the reluctance and apathy on the part of advanced countries toward taking the basic step in the strategy as set out in the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 developing countries at Lima, Peru.

The following year, 1973, the call was for the more technically advanced countries to redeem the pledge they made to humanity and to the organization by not putting impediments in our way by making less selfish and lopsided marketing arrangements for our produce. . .

The following are the rest of the perceptions relating to this first theme: In 1978, the delegate acknowledged the need for a fundamental change in the situation of international economic relations; in 1979-- the restructuring of international economic relations; 1981-- the uncaring stand of rich industrialized countries of the North led to suspensions on deliberations concerning New International Economic Order; 1982-- reluctance of developed countries to embrace NIEO; 1983-- there was concern for the ever-widening gap between developed and developing nations, and one major prerequisite of economic recovery in Africa was ensuring a substantial flow of external finance to the region. In 1984 and 1986, there were expressions of the need to redress structural imbalances. In 1986, there was the added perception of the reluctance of the developed countries for a North-South dialogue in respect of NIEO.

Also, under the broad theme of international economic conditions and their impact on Africa, the delegates advocated and
emphasized *The spirit of interdependence between nations, and equality between them.*

In 1970 the delegate said the task of development was a fight for economic independence and cooperation on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual advantage;

1971-- that any solution of world economic problems must involve the developing nations intimately in preparing and examining the means designed to achieve those solutions;

1974-- the recognition of the principle of interdependence in economic relations;

1976-- interdependence between developed and developing nations;

1980-- that African countries were realistic to know that in this interdependent world, they welcomed constructive cooperation and partnership from the international community; the refusal to subsidize the economies of the rich by continuing to sell raw materials and labor from the developing countries cheaply, in return for the expensive finished goods imported from the developed countries.

In 1983, the delegate said any global negotiation must be founded on compromise and barter, justice and equity. And any scheme which envisaged for the South, the role of junior partner in a position of permanent economic subservience to the North contained in it, the seeds of its own destruction. The developed countries should have better appreciation of the reality of interdependence
and the fact that developing countries have become a significant partner in the international economy.

Another major theme was Economic self-reliance, and cooperation among African countries. Under this theme, there were calls for South-South dialogue and cooperation. This theme acknowledged the responsibility of African and developing countries for shaping their own economies.

In 1967, this theme was depicted as: "we of the developing countries are not anxious to continue to be eternal recipients of foreign aid, . . . we are anxious to be on our own feet economically."

In 1968, there was a similar assertion about economic self-reliance. This was that economically, the countries wanted to stand on their own two feet.

In 1970, the delegate said the task of development was not one of appealing to the charity of affluent nations or securing token reforms of trade and aid policies.

The following are the rest of the assertions of the same theme:

1972-- the situation called for a closer cooperation and deeper consultations among the developing countries to determine what their economic and trade relations with the developed countries should be; there should be a commitment to the promotion of economic units in Africa which would provide much needed cooperation for the rapid development of the continent, rather than these countries appending themselves to the units created basically for the development of Europe.
In 1973 there was a report on the ten-year life span of the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The delegate said its promise of economic independence for Africa had not been encouraging.

In 1975, the delegate suggested that the developing nations themselves had to cooperate more effectively in improving their economic conditions;

In 1976, the delegate said the theme "self-reliance," must be emphasised.

The 1984 speech recognized that responsibility for the development of the developing countries' economies rested on them, and African countries had to look inwards.

In 1985, the delegate said: "African countries accept the fact that the primary responsibility for dealing with the critical economic situation and for relaunching the development process lies with them."

In 1986, the assertion was "We do not lose sight of the need for developing countries themselves to cooperate effectively in improving their economic conditions."

However, in 1987, the delegate said South-South cooperation was not and could not be a substitute for international economic cooperation for development. This appeared to be a major shift from the assertion of self-reliance and cooperation of developing countries, to the assertion about the responsibility of the whole international system for Africa's economic development.
Patterns in the Perceptions of the Social Aspect of African Development.

It was found that in the perceptions of the social aspect of African development, there were two major themes:

1. **The inhuman conditions associated with racial discrimination in South Africa, and other colonial territories.**

   This theme includes the enunciation of the need for improvement in human justice, fundamental human rights and dignity on the African continent. It also refers to improving the image of the African and the black race. It means securing the happiness and well-being of the African people.

2. **Peaceful conditions in Africa.**

   This theme includes creating conditions devoid of wars, human massacres, tension and conflicts among people. It calls for peaceful co-existence among African nations, and the creation of a nuclear-free Africa.

The delegates called for the eradication of the inhuman effects of apartheid and colonialism in almost all the speeches. This call started in the 1964 speech in which South Africa was told to eradicate its policy of racial discrimination. The following year, 1965, the delegate mentioned the case of the citizens of Angola, Mozambique, South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and other parts of Africa which remained unhappy enclaves of colonialism, and the citizens of South Africa, which had a policy that carried with it one of the worst forms of repression and denial of fundamental human rights based on racism.
In 1968, the perception was that "neo-colonialist circles" pretended to show humanitarian feelings for the break-away faction of Biafra in Nigeria, but they did not readily express similar feelings with respect to 16 million Africans of South Africa who were being racially oppressed and suppressed, nor did they empathize with the dead and suffering in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Southern Rhodesia, and Namibia.

In 1970, the perception was that Africans in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe were still denied the fundamental rights of humanity, and deprived of justice as well as a full and decent life.

1971-- Africa was "one part of the world where the glaring examples of historical inequities and racial injustice remain unresolved, and are pursued with impunity by those who perpetrate them."

1972-- the statement was made that "... the continued existence of colonialism in Africa is an infraction of our dignity as Africans"; also, black people were dehumanized in South Africa.

1973-- the problem of colonialism, racism and apartheid constituted an unbearable affront on human dignity in the areas where those evils existed; Africans desired racial harmony on conditions of mutual respect and fundamental human rights for all inhabitants of the continent.

1976-- apartheid in South Africa was a veritable crime against humanity; it was a degradation of human values.
1977-- there was a denial of basic human rights to six million indigenous people in Zimbabwe.

1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987-- these years also revealed references to apartheid and its social effects. These included: (a) the brutal killing of defenceless Zimbabweans; (b) attempt to destroy the self-image of Africans; (c) the unhappiness of the Namibian people; (d) apartheid was legalized in South Africa. Furthermore, there were perceptions that apartheid was an inhuman system; it was an oppression and intimidation of people, and violation of their human rights; it destroyed family bond, and finally, it brutalized African teenagers through torture and imprisonment.

The second major social theme that was dominant in the speeches was how peaceful conditions could prevail in Africa. The vision seemed to be also the establishment of a continent where there were no wars or conflicts among African countries. It means Africans would not be used in proxy-wars by the big powers.

But the first theme of eradication of the inhuman aspects of apartheid and colonialism is also related to the second theme of creating peaceful conditions. For example, there was a perception by the delegates that apartheid and colonialism posed a grave danger to peace and security in Africa. Peace in Africa also meant the denuclearization of the continent. The characterizations of the problems of maintaining peaceful conditions in Africa were as follows:
1969-- Nigeria was going through a civil war which divided the country, and there were moves at national conciliation in order to maintain an integral Nigeria.

1970 -- there were conflicts and tensions in Africa especially in those areas still under colonial and racist occupation.

1975-- Angola was involved in what was described as "fratricidal war."

1976-- the delegate referred to France's cooperation with South Africa in nuclear technology as nuclear blackmail.

1977-- there was a call for a nuclear-free Africa.

1979-- the delegate expressed the belief in the link between disarmament and development, and therefore supported the elimination of all nuclear weapons. If that failed, there should be the creation of nuclear-free zones, particularly in Africa.

1980-- African countries have tragically fought one another across borders.

1982-- the importance of peace and stability without which the efforts to develop the countries of Africa would continue to be frustrated.

1983-- the undermining of peace, security and stability of the region.

1985-- the Pretoria clique disturbed the peace and security of the surrounding region.

1986-- apartheid was a threat to international peace and security.
1987-- the delegate repeated again the link between peace and development, and said that Africa was plagued by intractable conflicts.

Discussion of Findings

In the speeches between 1960 and 1969, the Nigerian delegates focused more on the political aspect of development than on the economic and social aspects. A likely reason was that this was the decade when most of the countries of Africa attained political independence from the colonial powers. From the speeches, it is safe to claim that the delegates showed an abhorrence for the significant political power the developed countries exerted in Africa. They were concerned about the inability of African countries to establish control over their own affairs, in the face of the overwhelming political, economic and social power of the colonial and industrialized countries. These same speeches reflected the uncompromising terms with which Nigeria wanted Africa to free itself from foreign rule. There was also an expression of concern that Africa was simply an ideological battleground for capitalist countries of the West-bloc and socialist countries of the East-bloc. It was a place to experiment on who could exert more power, and which ideology would prevail; there was no concern for the African people. This form of meddling and interference in Africa was particularly responsible for the problems in Congo (now Zaire), and in Nigeria, both of which went through periods of political turmoil and instability. The results in both were civil conflicts.
The internal situation in these two countries underscored the importance of political stability in Africa. While many of the countries eventually attained their political independence, they had the added burden of trying to secure stable political conditions. Stable conditions implied a situation in which there is a free, fair, and regular means by which the population in African countries could participate in the political system. In other words, when the people have an input in the system, there is the potential for the system to grow and become an integral part of the political culture. Usually, the non-involvement of the citizens makes the political situations in many African countries rather tenuous. Genuinely democratic conditions, which translate into a more enduring political system, do not exist in many African countries. And the result is that authoritarian rule prevails in the continent, even though it is not a lasting alternative to a participatory form of governance. It is not a lasting alternative because the people seemingly continue to be denied political choice, and the means to exercise that choice, a process which began under colonial rule.

But, this last statement itself seems inherently flawed because in reality, it is not for any government no matter how intimidating its apparatus of state and suppression are, to give power to the people. It is for the people to use their power, if they realize they have it. An appropriate analogy is a statement made several years ago by Wole Soyinka, Nigeria's Nobel Laureate, who said a tiger does not pronounce its "tigritude"; it pounces.
Between 1960 and 1969, the references to economic development in Africa were made in such a way that they did not offer details of economic problems, since much of the focus of African countries seemed first— to achieve political independence. But it was clear that economic development was equally important. In fact, this point was made in Nigeria's very first speech in 1960. Then, the delegate said political independence was inadequate if it was not accompanied by stability and economic security. By 1967 and 1968, there was more specificity in Nigeria's perceptions of Africa's economic problems. The delegate depicted the problem as "unfavorable terms of trade." But 1974 was the year when the elaborate details of what Nigeria perceived as the unfavorable international economic conditions was first given. Oil, Nigeria's principal commodity was the resource used to bring out these details. The Nigerian delegate acknowledged the extensive economic power of the transnational companies (TNCs) in developing countries like Nigeria. He also mentioned the unjust and inequitable relationship between the prices of raw material, primary commodities and manufactured goods exported by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured goods, capital goods and imported equipment.

He argued that oil was being treated as villain by the developed countries, when in actual fact, while oil prices had increased sevenfold, so had the prices of "wheat automobiles, cement, every type of machinery and every type of electronic equipment."
The 1970 to 1979 period revealed the regular calls for a restructuring in the international economic environment; in particular, the calls were for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). But in the 1980s, as the economic problems persisted and actually worsened for most African countries, the descriptive analyses of these problems became more detailed. The speeches now regularly referred to problems of massive unemployment, high levels of global inflation, high debt-financing ratio, low commodity prices, lack of financial assistance from developed countries, unstable exchange rates, and the uncaring attitude of rich nations to the plight of the developing countries.

Remarkably however, much of the blame for Africa's economic predicament was placed on external conditions, while there seemed to be little or no blame on the internal conditions, that is, the conditions within African countries. The speeches did not reveal much about how many African countries, Nigeria, in particular, engaged in economic policies which were detrimental to them. In the 1970s, Nigeria, with its high oil revenues, developed a penchant for financial profligacy; it embarked on white-elephant projects which had little economic benefit for the people. Moreover, it developed the habit of importing goods it could do without from abroad, something that practically reduced indigenous industrial initiative, and food production. But, the speeches only went so far as to reiterate that Africans bore the responsibilities for their economies. This attribution of blame on external factors contradicted the assumption
of responsibility and self-reliance projected frequently in the speeches.

From the major findings of the perceptions of the aspects of the African development process, it is possible to ask which of the development paradigms or approaches discussed previously (see Chapter II) had been the most emphasized. The three major paradigms summarized were (a) Modernization and Growth (b) Dependency, and (c) Self-Reliance.

It appeared that the espousal of the principle of self-reliance was an integral part of the speeches of the Nigerian delegates. Beginning with the first speech delivered at the Assembly in 1960, there was an expression of African economic self-reliance. The delegate said African nations wanted a situation whereby they could be able to stand on their own two feet. But the affirmation of self-reliance is itself a disavowal of the dependency which has continued to be a part of the political, economic, and social relationships between the African countries and the developed ones. In fact, Clapham (1986) claimed:

Dependency theories despite their broadly Latin American origins, seem much more directly relevant to Africa than 'classic' Marxism: there are after all, a few parts of the world more obviously dependent than black Africa on the western capitalist states. They are also ideologically appealing, in that they enable the problems of the continent to be completely ascribed to an external source (p. 649).

However, in the 1962 speech, the delegate projected what was clearly a modernization approach to African development. The delegate said:
We must scale the centuries. Africa wishes to achieve in ten years what others who had more time at their disposal achieved in one hundred years. We cannot afford to waste time. The advances in technology and science cannot wait for us. We must move with great rapidity in order to catch up with the world.

Fanon had expressed opposition to the idea of African countries utilizing the European model of development. He said:

Yet it is true that we need a model, and that we want blueprints and examples. For many among us, the European model is the most inspiring. . . (p. 312). Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and brains in a new direction (p. 313). . . No, we do not want to catch up with anyone. What we want is go forward all the time, night and day, in the company of Man, in the company of all men. . . So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies which draw their inspiration from her (pp.314-315).

But apart from the expression of the urgency for Africa to modernize, the speeches of the Nigerian delegates seemed to mainly emphasize an Africanist principle which in this study implied some degree of political, economic, and social self-reliance of African countries within limits of acknowledged need for outside help (especially economically). However, events have shown that the actions of African countries so far are different from what Nigeria's delegates professed. Self-reliance continues to exist only in theory, and not in practice. As the Nigerian delegates continued to emphasize the subject year after year, the implication was that there had been little practical success in this direction.

It is possible to draw from the speeches, some characteristics of an Africanist ideology of development. Politically, it would imply political freedom and self-rule in Africa; furthermore it would also
mean the political participation and empowerment of the masses in the various countries. It also relates to the issue of political legitimacy of the governments in Africa. Political Africanism also meant that Africa would be empowered, and thus become a major player in international affairs; it is the development of a political relationship between Africans and the big powers based on equality.

Economically, an Africanist ideology would imply Africa's economic self-reliance; it would mean Africa's economy is not at the mercy and control of the industrialized countries, in terms of debts, fluctuating commodity prices, and exchange rates. It means the cultivation of the principle of interdependence, and not dependency, in the economic relationship between African countries and the industrialized countries.

Socially, an Africanist ideology would imply that African countries adhere to the principle of human dignity and worth. It means the removal of discrimination on account of race or color. It also means the co-existence between African countries and other countries, both in the continent and outside the continent. Finally, it means that Africans have to place human happiness and well-being at the center of what they do.

Patterns in the Perceptions of the UN's Roles in African Development

The perceptions of the roles of the UN are the perceptions of the organization's responsibilities and functions. The classifications of the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of roles corresponded with the
classifications of the aspects of African development made earlier. The role perceptions were (a) Perceptions of political roles (b) Perceptions of economic roles, and (c) Perceptions of social roles. Each of the three types of role perceptions could be further subdivided as follows:

1. Perception of Implementary Role.

These were the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the UN's role which were primarily tied to the actual implementation of plans related to African development. These perceptions entailed the UN executing pertinent resolutions and decisions, and/or enforcing the decisions made sometimes after votes have been cast at meetings. It also means carrying out recommendations of studies and reports. Under this subdivision, the UN was also perceived as the sole party involved in a perceived development role; it had sole responsibility. It is how well the UN implements its policies that enables the observer make fairly accurate assessments about its effectiveness.

2. Perception of Administrational Role.

These were the perceptions of the UN's responsibility in administering the various parts of the UN system so that they could keep running smoothly. These included the perceptions of the UN's rule-making and resolution-making. The tasks here include the casting of votes at the General Assembly; the establishment of committees; the organization of seminars and conferences. It also involved the writing of reports; the invoking of articles and chapters of the Charter; and the use of the veto as the permanent members of
the Security Council are able to do. In essence, these were roles that were associated with the maintenance of the organization.


Finally, there were perceptions of roles which were not reserved for the UN alone. These perceptions could be related to implementation or administration tasks. The underlying principle here was that some particular roles which enhanced the development process involved the cooperation of other parties such as member-countries, governments, organizations, individuals, and their policies or actions.

Patterns in the Perceptions of the UN's Political Roles

It was found that the perceptions of the UN's political roles were mainly tied to the subject: How to enhance the decolonization of Africa. The perceptions were of the UN's responsibilities in facilitating the political independence of colonial territories in Africa. Under this subject, it was possible to see that the delegates focused more on the implementary aspect of the UN's political role. The description of the perceptions of this subtype are the following:

In Nigeria's 1960 speech, the delegate said the UN should not be an administering power in the Congo. This seemed to be an attempt to reduce the UN's political role. But the main subtype of political roles perceived was that of implementation. The delegate said the following about the UN: (a) it should "investigate the root causes of the troubles which have arisen there"; (b) the UN should appoint a fact-finding commission to look into the circumstances which caused
the crisis; and (c) the UN should work together with the authorized leaders, those duly chosen by the people.

The perceptions of the implementary role subtype were characterized in the rest of the speeches as follows:

1961— that the session should put a stamp of character, a stamp of finality on further imperialism on the African continent.

1963— (a) that if the organization continued to give the states of Africa the support it has given them in the past, the question of decolonization would be solved as quickly as possible; and (b) that the organization had done excellent work in the Congo, and by helping the Congolese people, the UN had helped Africa.

1964— the perceptions of the implementary role were projected in: (a) The UN could not continue to tolerate the challenge of Portugal— its continued intransigence in refusing to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and with Chapter XI of the UN Charter; (b) The whole organization bent itself to the problem of the Congo but it withdrew earlier than it should have.

1966— the delegate implored the UN to remove the last strongholds of colonialism and racial domination from Africa and elsewhere in the world; there was the added assertion that the UN was only half-hearted in carrying out this role. This was repeated in 1968 and 1969.

1969— (a) ten years since the historic declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, the perception was that the UN had established an impressive record in the process of
decolonization; (b) another role was enforcing the strict and mandatory injunctions enshrined in the Charter.

1971-- the task of the 26th Session was for the General Assembly to look for ways to establish UN authority in Namibia.

1972-- the UN should not deny opportunity of independence to colonial territories.

1973-- that the UN and the permanent members of the Security Council should use all the means at their disposal to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia.

1974-- (a) the UN should not shy away from measures that were needed to assert UN authority in Namibia; (b) it should give support to Africa and the liberation movements; this is repeated in 1975. In the same year, there was a call on the organization to have the political will to solve the Namibian problem.

1976-- it should ensure that the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) would take its place in the community of nations; the organization cannot be a bystander.

1977-- the Secretary-General's effort to reassert UN control over the Territory.

1979-- the organization should act more firmly; it should implement unanimous decisions.

1980-- the UN Transitional Assistance Group should be deployed without delay to carry out its mandate to supervise a free and fair election in Namibia.

1981-- the organization should implement Resolution 435;

1982-- it should apply more pressure on South Africa;

Politically, the perceptions of the UN's administerial roles were less frequent than the perceptions of implementary roles. These perceptions essentially recognized the UN's resolution-making functions. They are as follows:

1961-- there was reference to the UN Resolution 1514 (XV).

1965-- there was the hope that the General Assembly would come up with a Resolution that said Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence in South Rhodesia defied the members of the UN.

1980-- there was the recognition that the resolution of the UN passed in 1960 helped South Rhodesia's independence, and there was the recognition of the Security Council's endorsement of the Western Five's proposals for Namibia.

1982 and 1985-- references to UN Resolution 2145 (XXI) which had terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia.

1983-- the delegate invoked Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

1984-- the delegate disapproved of the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council.

Patterns in the Perceptions of the UN's Economic Roles

It was also found here that the delegates mainly perceived the roles of the implementary kind. These were tied essentially to the UN's responsibility for: The improvement of international economic conditions, for the benefit of the economies of African and developing countries.
Next in prominence were the perceptions of administerial or maintenance role, and lastly, came the perceptions of general role. The various characterizations of the implementary role were as follows:

1964— (a) there was the hope that the Trade and Development Board would translate the new order into concrete terms and realities; (b) that it would help eliminate the imbalance in the levels of development.

1966— the UN's important role in solving the problem of increasing poverty and want; the specific organs mentioned were the Food and Agricultural Organization which had done helpful work, and UNCTAD which renewed its drive on the international cocoa price agreement.

1967— the UNDP and UNCTAD had an impressive record; there was a recognition of the UNCTAD's role in bringing about a more equitable international economic order.

1968— UNIDO should prepare and implement the blueprint of a world industrialized development strategy; the UN seemed to have a more impressive record in the economic field; UNDP had been doing commendable work within its limited resources.

1970— (a) the establishment of a UN Fund with which to support the liberation movements of Africa; the UN should wake up to its responsibility and create the proposed Fund; (b) during the Second Development Decade, the UN would face the realities of the present unjust economic system squarely, and seek a solution to it; and (c) the recent reported agreement under the aegis of UNCTAD to
liberalize trade between developed and developing economies was a step in the right direction.

1975-- the UN had to reaffirm its arms embargo on South Africa and to demand the end of economic collaboration with South Africa.

1976-- the UN pressure for the maintenance of mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime was one of the factors that led to the situation in Namibia.

1978-- the Security Council should impose at least some sanctions on new loans to, and investments in South Africa, and therefore impose full and mandatory sanctions.

1980-- (a) the General Assembly should launch a decade of reparation and restitution for Africa as a master plan for the economic recovery of Africa; (b) the UN should restructure the world economic system to conform with the dictates of the NIEO; (c) the International Conference on Sanctions should impose sanctions (oil) against South Africa.

1981-- the UN should arrest the drift of the world caused by the gap between the economically deprived South and a protectionist-oriented North.

1982-- (a) the international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group have contributed to the development of developing countries but there are many areas requiring response; (b) IMF solutions left developing nations worse-off than before because of the stiff conditionality of loans; (c) establishment of long-term arrangements of the UN financing system for science and technology.
1983-- no positive action has matched Resolution 34/138 on global negotiations on international economic cooperation for development adopted four years before.

1984-- (a) the IMF played an important role in helping members cope with their balance of payment problem; (b) the Assembly should live up to its Charter and embark on a course that will permit early launching of genuine negotiations so as to accelerate the attainment of NIEO; (c) the IMF is a bad creditor which prescribes the same remedies for all its borrowers irrespective of their problems.

1985-- the Security Council should meet and impose economic sanctions on South Africa in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Charter; all permanent members should support sanctions; all UN members should support sanctions.

The administrational role subtype was also fairly elaborated in the speeches, though not as often as the implemenitary role subtype. The function of conducting negotiations among members, organizing conferences, sessions, and conventions seemed to comprise much of the administrational role. Such functions were projected in 1965, 1968, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1986, and 1987. There was a recognition of the resolution-making role of the UN in the speeches of 1985 and 1987.

Some of the examples of the general role were the following: 1966-- that the UN's determination to help the developing countries overcome their development problems required "very hard work on
the part of us all." Other years in which this kind of role were mentioned were 1968, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1980, 1982, and 1985.

**Patterns in the Perceptions of Social Roles**

Under the delegates' perceptions of the social role of the UN, the perceptions of the implementary role dominated the speeches. These were mainly connected to:

1. **Responsibility for facilitating peaceful conditions in Africa and the world.**

1961-- the UN was seen as providing the only effective machinery for inducing world peace. The other years in which the peacemaking role was recognized were: 1964, 1966, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1981, and 1986.

But the perception of the implementary role was also important in:

2. **The elimination of the social problems of apartheid and colonialism.**


To show that the UN's provision of social services was not high on the agenda of Nigeria's delegates, the role was recognized only in 1973. The delegate referred to the UN's, and its agencies' role in rendering services in the vital areas of health, literacy campaigns, child welfare, and championship of progressive labor legislation on a world-wide basis.
The administerial role was essentially perceived to mean the organizing of conferences and providing a forum where nations could meet. This was essentially a communicative role in the sense that the delegates perceived the UN as working to bring countries together for the sake of better understanding.

In 1963, the roles were to bring various states together; to rally international opinion in order that the world at large might have a center once a year for exchanging thoughts and for knowing how the various sections of the world are thinking; finally, it also enabled people let off steam.

In 1969, the role was to propose a disarmament decade related to the Second UN Development Decade.

In 1970, there was a perception that the capacity of the UN to facilitate social progress should be reinforced in a concrete manner.

In 1973, it was to bear the moral weight of world opinion on many a controversial issue.

In 1978, the perception of administerial role was essentially linked to the organizing of sessions and conferences. First, the UN conducted a session on peacekeeping and decolonization and attempting to create a new world without war. Secondly, it convened a conference to arouse the conscience of mankind against racism and racial discrimination. Lastly, it convened a conference to mobilize the capacities of developing countries for collective self-reliance.

The general role was demonstrated in the 1962 perception that the UN could do great things if it had wholehearted support.
In 1965, members of the UN were urged to take positive action to put out the flame which will engulf Africa and the rest of the world.

In 1978, the delegate recognized the role of the international community in isolating South Africa in all areas of international endeavor, in treating it as culprit, not as a partner in any negotiation aimed at resolving the problem, and in stepping up assistance to the liberation movements in South Africa.

In 1984, there was an acknowledgement of the general role of Nigeria and the Special Committee on Apartheid in sponsoring a seminar in which it was agreed that the institution and the operation of apartheid made the South African government a colonial regime. In the same year, the international community was depicted as having a responsibility in the liquidation of apartheid-- also a general role.

In the 28 speeches analyzed, these are the frequencies of role perceptions:

In the task of improving international economic conditions, there were 30 assertions or perceptions of the UN's implementary role, 24 perceptions of the UN's administerial role, and 11 of the general role.

In the task of facilitating the decolonization of Africa, there were 27 perceptions of implementary role, 7 perceptions of the administerial role, and 6 perceptions of the general role.

In the social area, specifically, helping to secure peace in Africa, there were 11 perceptions of the implementary role, 3 perceptions of the administerial role and no perception of the general role.
Also in the social area, specifically, the eradication of the inhuman apartheid conditions, there were 12 perceptions of the implementary role, 1 perception of the administerial role and 6 of the general role.

Table 2. The Nigerian Delegates' Perceptions of the UN's Role Subtypes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Development THEMES</th>
<th>Implementary Role</th>
<th>Administerial Role</th>
<th>General Role</th>
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<tr>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving International Economic Conditions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing Peaceful Conditions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removing Inhuman Apartheid Conditions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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Discussion of Findings and Implications

A critical look at the findings on the UN's roles in African development reveal the following:

From the above findings, it is possible to say that the UN and its agencies were perceived to have a significant share in the task of fostering African development. The predominance of the perceptions which emphasize the aspect of implementation in the UN's roles reinforces this view. The implication is that the delegates strongly wanted the UN to be active and successful in this task.

But with this acknowledgment of the UN's significant role in the task of African development comes the question which is what does this mean for the revitalization of an Africanist approach or principle of development enumerated earlier (Chapter I). One cannot overlook the fact that the UN itself is a creation of a Eurocentric culture and environment. Groom (1978) said:

... there is very little to be found in the (Western) literature on the notion of organization per se as applied to world society (p. 14). ... International institutions, as we are considering them, developed out of a Euro-centric world society, and are to be found in greatest abundance within the Western developed world (p. 17).

Mazrui (1964) had expressed a similar idea. He said the societal framework on which the UN Charter was based was that of the West European. In fact at the UN's creation in 1945, there were only three independent African members.

The UN's role in African development underscores the complexities and contradictions involved in the issue of forging an
Africanist pathway towards development amidst an overwhelming Eurocentric influence in African affairs, and African countries' lack of will to follow ideas with appropriate action. This is one of the major challenges that African countries continue to face. Nigeria's speeches on one hand, revealed some affirmation of African cooperation and self-reliance, especially in the economic sphere. This is an inwards looking approach to development which could be described as Africanist or Afrocentric in intent. But on the other hand, there seems to be an unmistakable acknowledgment of the impact of the UN in African affairs. Theoretically, the contradiction here is that should the UN successfully implement most of the perceived roles, there is likely to be a weakening of the motivation to revitalize an Africanist approach to development.

One might ask if it really matters whether Africa develops by a Eurocentric or by an Afrocentric pathway, just as long as development is achieved. But it matters, and this is exactly the point of re-examining Africa's development strategies. For more than three decades, Africa seems to have essentially applied a Eurocentric approach to development, but it is no nearer being developed than it was then. It seems to be caught in a vicious cycle.

The reality is that there are serious political, economic, and social problems facing Africa, and these problems seem to be getting worse, rather than better. The major political role perceived for the UN was the facilitation of independence and removal of colonial rule. Now that Namibia, the last colonial territory has now tentatively attained its independence from South Africa, it would seem that the UN's
political responsibility is over, since the speeches implied that there was little or no political role for the UN once a colony had been granted its independence.

After independence, Africans were now supposed to work to develop and maintain stable political systems and conditions in their respective countries. This in fact, is supposed to be an opportunity to fashion a uniquely Africanist pathway towards political development. The major responsibilities were now for Africans—leaders and masses—to assure such conditions. As projected in the speeches, the delegates perceived a link between political stability and the participation of the majority of the people in the political process. Moreover, it was realized that leadership had to be of high caliber as well. This goal of political stability is probably a universal ideal since every society is normally seeking the optimal political conditions. However, Africa has still not found a regular way to assure such conditions.

In the economic area, the major role of the UN was perceived to be improving the international economic conditions so that African nations would have a better opportunity to develop. The perceptions of economic roles were the most frequently projected out of the three kinds of roles—political, economic, and social. Again, the implication for an Africanist approach to development is that it has minimum chances of flourishing in Africa now and in the future if the deference for UN’s contribution to development continues, as projected in the speeches. In their speeches, the delegates revealed their awareness that the industrialized countries of the West were
virtually in control of much of the global economic power. Consequently, these are also the countries which are the main sources of funding for the UN and its economic agencies, and in essence, it seems they are the ones who in the final analysis, leave the boldest economic imprint on the way the UN implements its economic roles. The delegates in fact emphasized that the trend had been for the developed nations to move away from the multilateral approach whereby the multilateral agencies were used, in favor of the bilateral approach-- one in which every African country makes its own separate financial arrangements with a particular developed country.

But in theory, while the Nigerian delegates professed what was essentially an Africanist approach to development, the actual situation is that most African countries, along the way having advertently or inadvertently acquired a huge liability in form of financial debts, have little room for its implementation. Ezeani (1988, p. 24) said freedom and democracy which Western nations preach and which Africans cherish cannot grow in an atmosphere of debt, famine, and poverty. He said Western nations imposed very harsh conditionalities before giving African countries more loans or allowing them to reschedule their oversized debt payments (p. 24). And rather than devise some global solutions which will accomodate the African debt burden, they preferred to deal case-by-case with the African debtor-nations.

The debt problem is inherently inimical to a self-reliant and independent African economy. In the area of economic development,
just as in the political field, the more the number of roles perceived for the UN, and Western countries for that matter, the less the chances African countries have to take control of their economies. Their main task has been how to truly establish control, something that has hitherto been elusive.

Underscoring the debt problem, and its dependency implications, Africa Economic Digest, citing a February 24 1988 Report on Financing Africa's Economic Recovery, said: "Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding Nigeria, needs additional resources of at least $5,000 million a year to meet minimal growth targets and make debt servicing more manageable" (AED, February 26 1988:2). The report further said that

Africa's external financial position has deteriorated by around $7,600 million over the past six years. Nearly $3,000 million of this is attributable to terms of trade losses, a further $2,600 million results from reduced financial flows, including direct investment, and more than $2,000 million is attributable to increased interest payments. In compensation, official grants have increased by only $1,000 million a year. Aid flows which totalled $11,500 in 1986, were up on 1985, but down in real terms... These factors have created a payments crunch, as well as widespread import strangulation that further threatens an already precarious development process (p. 2).

One of the UN's organs, the International Monetary Fund, was described as a net taker of funds from Africa-- to a tune of nearly $900 million-- in 1986 and 1987. The Fund and the World Bank now account for more than a quarter of sub-Saharan Africa's medium-term public debt (pp. 2-3). The Report recommended a series of debt relief measures for commercial and official debt. These include:
1. Debt cancellation: Essentially, this should be confined to debtors showing no prospect of regaining creditworthiness.

2. Conversion of loans to grants: It was suggested that this should be extended to "existing ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) claims on all low-income, debt-distressed countries in Africa" (p. 3).

3. Paris Club debt: It was recommended that there should be more radical relief, including concessionary interest rates.

4. Commercial debt: Commercial banks should be willing, on a case-by-case basis, to take special debt relief measures. It was found that in the current economic climate, the scope for debt/equity swaps was narrow, but it was recommended that where there was a steep discount on the secondary market, countries could use aid funds to buy back their debt, as Bolivia had done.

5. Menu approach: The report endorsed "menu" approach to Third World debt and development problems. This approach is essentially that there is no single measure that can bring adequate relief.

However, the criticism of policies sponsored by the IMF, the World Bank, and creditors continue. Helmore (June 17, 1988) reported that African leaders had recently denounced the devastating impact of "structural adjustment programs" which in many countries had resulted in cuts in spending for social needs, higher consumer prices and increased unemployment (p. 9). He also said that some experts like Kellinger of the Development Gap, a
Washington "third world policy organization," believed that a more sweeping change than mere debt relief was needed (p. 10). Kellinger was quoted as saying the debt crisis could never be solved until its root causes-- misguided development, capital flight, corruption, overemphasis on agricultural exports, and excessive military spending-- were addressed (p. 10). Also, there must be "accountability on the part of aid institutions which made loans based on a model that made no sense for Africa" (p. 10). They should fund a "more self-reliant form of development" (p. 10).

It is now generally agreed by African economic and social affairs experts that recovery would take longer than expected (Press, September 12 1988, p. 7). Press quoted Norway's UN ambassador, Tom Vraalsen, one of the leaders during the two-week review of the first two years of the UN's five-year Africa recovery plan, who said: "we are definitely talking about a decade" (p. 10). But there does not seem be an agreement on how to solve Africa's problems, at least judging by the communication coming from the UN and its agencies within the past few months. For example, Barber Conable, president of the World Bank which with the bank's affiliates made some $20 billion in development-loan commitments in 1988, was quoted as saying "Debt is not the central issue" for developing countries (Francis, March 16 1989). Instead, he believed the bank's greatest goal was

- alleviating poverty: 90 million poor people in Latin America where debt impedes economic growth; 280 million "absolute poor" in Africa, where the need is for more schools, roads, and other infrastructure; and 600 million in Asia where debt is not a
serious problem (p. 9).

It appears that the World Bank and other UN agencies continue to see development as basically a problem of economic growth and eradication of poverty, the same characteristics of the less-than-successful Eurocentric-oriented Modernization and Growth paradigm they have used since the end of World War II. The only difference between then and now is that at present, the World Bank and its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have a substantial role to play in the United States strategy for dealing with the $1.2 trillion in developing-country debts owed to the commercial banks and governments of industrial nations. With such a large debt, debt cannot but be a central issue for African countries. It seems the World Bank continues to be much preoccupied with growth of Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product in the developing world--it still does not adequately emphasize the situation where citizens in many of these countries, for example, could at least attempt to feed themselves.

But the myth that the Eurocentric approach to development is best for Africa continues to be strong because many African countries themselves seem to feel they cannot achieve development without the intervention of the World Bank and other UN agencies. The reality is that World Bank officials would have little to do, and the World Bank's relevance for Africa would severely be in question if Africa should finally successfully implement the self-reliance principle emphasized in the Nigerian delegates' speeches. The World Bank was essentially created to help in rebuilding war-damaged
Europe, but now that Europe is developed, the Bank is no longer a factor there. It has shifted its focus to where it is a factor-- the Third World. Meanwhile, it is expected that the multilateral institutions of the UN will inject money into debtor-countries with what are called adjustment loans. These are not tied to any development project, but are mainly used to help cover international-payments deficits in return for domestic reforms in the debtor-countries (p. 9).

But there seems to a disagreement among the UN's agencies themselves about which are the most reliable criteria for assessing Africa's development. Battiata (April 15 1989) reported that the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) at its meeting in April 1989 charged that a decade of free-market economic reforms imposed by the World Bank and IMF had failed to reverse Africa's economic decline and forced unacceptable cuts in spending on social programs (p. A15).

A World Bank report in March 1989 had presented evidence that its reform programs were working. The bank study compared countries that had implemented so-called structural adjustment programs (SAP) with those who had not. It found that the governments that met SAP conditions: paying fair market prices to farmers, devaluing inflated currencies and trimming bloated bureaucracies, enjoyed higher growth rates. But the ECA called the bank's assessment inaccurate and cynical in the extreme; it said the bank had manipulated statistics in an attempt to prove that its reforms were working (p. A15). The ECA called for increased aid to Africa and a modification of what it said were Western economic
reforms. It even unveiled a 56-page "African Alternative," which Battiata said was likely to be as controversial as the reform policy it was supposed to replace. But both the ECA and the bank agreed that structural adjustment would require both strong national leadership and years of extensive economic aid from the outside (p. A15).

This discussion about the UN's agencies and their roles in African development shows the immense problem that arises when most of development policies and reforms come from outside Africa. There usually is a difference in the perception of development. When an agency like the World Bank says its reforms are working, African countries perceive things differently, especially since they are the ones who experience the adverse effects of economic reforms. A conclusion one might draw from all this is that inevitably, institutions from a Eurocentric origins might not be the best judge of what is best for Africa. There is a divergence of cultural experience, which, in other words, means ideas of Eurocentric experience are not often best suited for conditions that prevail in Africa.

One can safely claim that the quest for Africa to develop underscores the struggle between a more dominant Eurocentric approach or ideology and a currently fledgling Africanist approach or ideology. While a new ideology usually comes into being as a reaction to a current dominant ideology which seems to be unable to cope with new conditions, the new ideology cannot afford to have too many major internal weaknesses and inconsistencies, or it would never develop. The new ideology is supposed to correct the weaknesses of the old ideology. This has been a major problem with
professing a so-called Africanist ideology by majority of Africans. Africanist ideology has not been able to successfully put Africa on a path towards genuine development. Moreover, there is a big gap between theory and practice. For example, many of those who profess it, especially the African leaders themselves, have very seldomly acted in accordance with the ideas they profess.

An Africanist pathway towards development, anchored in African self-reliance, should be self-examining and self-critical even when some of these criticisms are less than flattering to the African society. This is part of its evolution. Fanon remarked that self-criticism was an important African institution. However, in Nigeria's speeches to the UN, one could hardly find criticism of the ways African countries have handled the task of development. In the 1970s when most of the atrocities were committed on thousands of Ugandans by Idi Amin, the speeches of Nigeria's delegates did not bother to refer to the matter. But on the other hand, the delegates were quick to point out the massacres in the then colonial territory of Zimbabwe and in the South African region. The implication one can draw from this is that it might be more tolerable for blacks to perpetrate atrocities on fellow blacks, but it was not acceptable if the perpetrator were white. Another instance was the concern which Nigerian delegates had for majority rule in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia, but at the same time Nigeria itself had nothing that resembled majority or democratic rule in 19 out of 28 years of independence. Any affirmation of Africanism should mean the application of the same criteria in assessing human behavior.
A conclusion that could be drawn from all this is that an Africanist mode of development, should not degenerate into an all-theory-and-no-action exercise. Otherwise, it would be an exercise in futility. Putting Africanist ideas into action should be an integral part of the Africanist pathway to development. The speeches implied that implementation of policies was a task that Nigeria's delegates considered crucial, at least judging by the emphasis they seemed to place on the implementation part of the UN's roles. Hence the role of implementation should probably start with African countries themselves.

Analysis of the Perceptions of Nigerian Delegates in the Context of the Perceptions of Some Major Africanist Thinkers.

In political terms, it was clear that decolonization and attainment of political freedom by African countries was an important part of the perceptions of Nigeria's delegates. Their speeches revealed that both processes did not come easily; rather they involved some struggle. While Fanon (1963) described decolonization as the replacement of one species of man by another species of men, he similarly acknowledged the difficulty it entailed. He said it was a decisive struggle between two "protagonists," and for it to occur, all means including violence had to be used. Similarly, Nkrumah said he knew of no case where self-government had been handed to a colonial and oppressed people on a silver platter. The dynamic had to come from the people themselves (1970, p. 18). It was clear from Nigeria's speeches that the two "protagonists"
referred to by Fanon, were on one hand the African people, and on the other hand, the colonial powers. These were the British, the Portuguese, the French, and Afrikaner South Africans.

A basic advantage of the struggle for independence was that at the beginning, it was mainly a centripetal force. Fanon said it unified the people on a national or racial basis by the radical decision to remove their heterogeneity. However this assertion about unity did not adequately depict the post-independence situation in Africa. After independence, it was difficult to sustain the unity in many countries. The attainment of independence was not an end in itself but a means to the attainment of greater ends. Ohaegbulam (1977, p. 1) said the attainment of the political kingdom had been given the topmost priority because without independence, none of the plans for economic and social development could be put into effect. But no sooner had the struggle for

political autonomy been won than the nationalist sentiment largely responsible for the enormous energies and discipline required for the establishment of political organizations which made the attainment of political independence possible, began to wane and dissipate. In its place, began to emerge centrifugal forces that tended and still tend to complicate the gigantic task of nation-building, and to nullify the many promises and expectations of independence (p. 2)

The Congo situation (1960-1964 speeches), and the Nigerian civil strife (1966-1969 speeches), revealed some of the centrifugal forces that obstructed nation-building in Africa. In Nigeria, apart from external interference, ethnic rivalry brought problems.
The importance of solving these problems during the post-independence years was highlighted by Nyerere (1968). He said stability in the African society was essentially freedom, and without it, African countries would remain the plaything of others (p. 111). He however advocated a peaceful means of change rather than a non-peaceful means (p. 115). But in 1979, the Tanzanian army was used to forcefully drive the Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin, from power. The perception of Nigerian delegates over the years on the best method of political change seemed to be that as a last resort, forceful means would have to be used, especially in the cases of Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Fanon on the other hand, saw the violent means of change as necessary. He said violence used at the moment of the struggle for freedom did not magically disappear after the country has been granted its independence because of the ideological competition between capitalism and socialism, and the realization by the colonized people that they were living in the period of international stress (pp. 75-76). He added that in recently liberated countries, the atmosphere of violence continued to dominate national life (p. 76). This is true of many African countries today.

Fanon saw what he called a new tone in international diplomacy and the result was that the representatives of African countries tended to be aggressive and violent (p. 77). It was clear to such countries that while they might have attained official independence, they were in fact unequal partners and lacked influence in international politics. Nigeria's delegates regularly called for
restructuring and reorganization in the UN system. Nigeria was especially critical of the use of veto power by the permanent members of the Security Council to block the decisions of the majority of the members in matters relating to colonialism and apartheid. One case was in 1962 when the permanent members blocked the admission of Mauritania into the organization despite the fact that it had been granted its independence by France. Fanon said:

The radicalism of the African spokesmen... showed up the inadmissible nature of the veto, and of the dialogue between the great powers, and above all, the tiny role reserved for the Third World (pp. 77-78).

To correct the situation and empower Africa, it has been suggested that political integration of African countries was a solution. Nyerere said: "There must be a government which could speak for Africa to the outside world..." (p. 16). Nkrumah, a major proponent of pan-Africanism said: "Seek ye first the political kingdom" (1970, p. 50). And in terms of African unity, sound political direction was necessary. He said:

We therefore need a common political basis for the integration of our policies in economic planning, defence and diplomatic relations. That basis for political action need not infringe on the essential sovereignty of the separate African States (p. 218).

Nigeria's delegates did not advocate political integration. But they expressed unity, cooperation and interconnectedness of African countries in matters that affected the continent. In 1961, there was a perception that anything that affected Africa affected Nigeria, and the fact that there were still some colonies under foreign rule meant that Africa was not entirely free.
One important factor in Africa's political development but which was not given too much prominence was the quality of leadership in Africa. Evidently, this could not be separated from other processes of political development like the development of political institutions which would assure political participation of the people. The problems of political instability that had plagued the continent cannot but be traced back to the kinds of leadership in many of the countries of the continent. In 1966, Nigeria's delegate saw the road to political stability as hard and long, and that this road called for the highest skill, sound judgement and above all, statemanship. A similar idea was expressed in the 1979 speech about the importance of leadership in Africa. The delegate said leadership in any state was as good as the people wanted it to be, and any leadership that was supported by the people would endure. He said Africa's era of self-appointed kingmakers was gone. This was a call for participation by the majority of the people in the choice of their leaders.

According to Nyerere, the individual should have freedom of speech, and freedom to participate in the making of decisions which affect his or her life. Development brought freedom provided it was development of the people. In fact, it was only the people who could develop themselves (1973. This was a recognition of the power of the people and of their responsibility for shaping their own future, an often ignored idea in Africa where many of the leaders have the notion that power rests absolutely and permanently in their hands. Ohaegbulam said:

The frustration and political alienation of the impoverished
masses thus turned bitter, and often unbearable, when it was recalled that their imaginations and expectations for the good life had been stimulated and inflated by the promises made by the nationalist leaders during the struggle for independence. . . It seemed that colonial oppression and inequality had become replaced by post-colonial oppression and inequality at the hands of an entrenched oligarchy and its cronies (p. 3).

One of the major economic themes in the speeches was the state of international economic relations and Africa's place in it. The delegates called on the industrial countries to help rectify the structural imbalances in economic power. The speeches, among other things, called for favorable terms of trade, lower interest rates, and a more sympathetic attitude on the part of the developed nations. Fanon said Europe's opulence was scandalous because its well-being was built from the sweat and dead bodies of people from the underdeveloped regions. Rodney (1972) also said one of the common means by which one nation exploited another and one that was relevant to Africa's external relations was exploitation through trade (p. 22). He said:

African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist economies; they are integrated in a manner that is unfavorable to Africa and insures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist countries. Indeed, structural dependence is one of the characteristics of underdevelopment (p. 25).

Rodney provided some historical background of the beginning of the dependency condition. He said throughout the 17th, 18th, and for most of the 19th century, the exploitation of Africa's labor continued to be a source for the accumulation of capital to be reinvested in Western Europe (p. 84). Africa's being drawn into the orbit of
Western Europe speeded up the latter's technological development. Colonial Africa fell within that part of the international capitalist economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the metropolitan sector (p. 149). Colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate the profits to the so-called mother country (p. 149). In the mining sector, the complex of Southern African mining concerns operated not just in South Africa itself but also in South West Africa (Namibia), Angola, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Congo (pp. 152-3). The Congo was consistently a source of immense wealth to Europe (p. 153). But there were also significant mining operations outside the Southern African region during the colonial period.

In the agricultural field, the differences between the prices of African exports of raw materials and their importation of manufactured goods constituted a form of unequal exchange (p. 160). Throughout the colonial period, it got worse, and economists refer to the process as one of deteriorating terms of trade. In banking and finance, it was on the issuing of currency that "the colonial government did the most manipulations to insure that Africa's wealth was stashed away in the coffers of the metropolitan state" (p. 171).

This brief economic history provides a context in which one might explain the persistent call by Nigeria's delegates to the General Assembly for a restructuring of economic relations between the developed and developing nations. A similar historical background
was provided in Nkrumah's *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (1966). He provided a post-independence economic background of Africa in relation to the colonial powers. He believed that a new wave of predatory invasion of former colonies operated behind the international character of the agencies employed: financial and industrial consortia, assistance organizations, financial bodies and so on (p. 50). He said:

These latest methods of holding back the real development of the new countries are also the paraphernalia of neo-colonialism, superficially professing aid and guidance, subterraneously benefitting the interested donors and their countries in old and new ways (p. 50).

Nigeria's 1967 speech had similarly stated that "in many cases, the aid given is more than offset by unfavorable terms of trade. . .."

But while Nigeria's speeches seemed to reflect the call for more assistance and aid in the 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985 speeches, Nkrumah served a warning about the dangers of such assistance. He said neo-colonialism was the sum-total of these modern attempts to perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about freedom (p. 239). The other aspects and techniques of neo-colonialism included international capital's control of the world market as well as the prices of commodities bought and sold there (p. 241). There was also the use of high interest rates and the use of the neo-colonialist trap which is known as "multilateral aid" through international organizations like the IMF, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and International Development Association (p. 242). Nkrumah added that these agencies had a habit of forcing would-be
borrowers to submit to various offensive conditions, an idea which Nigeria's delegates mentioned regularly in the 1980s.

Nigeria's speeches did not mention how the heavy debts by African countries were incurred. But Obasanjo believed the debts were not of their own making alone. He said these countries were goaded by commercial banks which had surplus deposits of petrodollars to recycle and the creditor-nations who supported the banks (1987, p. 22). He acknowledged that development aid had not been as successful as anticipated, since aid never involved all partners as equals in designing and implementing projects, nor in maintaining and evaluating them (p. 35).

The perceptions of international economic conditions discussed above revealed the common ground between Nigeria's delegates and the Africanist thinkers. Their depictions of Africa's economic history and development was marked by pessimism and warning for African countries. The only problem was that Africa did not seem to heed some of its own warnings. As the self-reliance paradigm of development, and the perceptions in the speeches would seem to show, Africa would have to truly dedicate itself to a principle of self-reliance. It also means African cooperation or some form of South-South cooperation. A discussion of this reorganization in the internal dynamics of Africa would seem to be appropriate.

So far, it is clear that Nigeria's perceptions and the perceptions of most of the Africanist thinkers on Africa's economic problems attribute such problems to external conditions, or to forces outside the African continent. On the other hand there was nothing to show
the audience of Nigeria's speeches what were some of the factors that had contributed to the economic decline in many African countries. It cannot be denied that there has been a mismanagement of funds, the execution of wrongheaded policies, like the building of prestigious and lavish projects which had little or no value to the common people in the rural countryside. Also, most often, the basic human needs like portable water were usually concentrated in the urban areas or ignored in favor of money-draining projects. There has also been very little accountability on the part of the leadership, and collusion with foreign businessmen in siphoning funds into personal accounts in Western banks. The importance of high-caliber leadership and governance cannot be overemphasized. Chinweizu, referring to one of the major mistakes made in development, said there was development of consumerism without the prior development of the industrial culture which could produce consumer goods (p. 23).

Chinweizu said development proceeded from a self-reliant understanding of a nation's history and circumstances, and interpreting for local practice whatever general economic and political theories the leadership of a nation chose to be guided by (p. 23). This suggests the need for some rethinking on the part of the leadership of African countries on what is a truly self-reliant, openminded, and critically-minded Africanist approach to development. Many African leaders either do not learn from historical trends or have decided they would rather ignore them since they are usually preoccupied with how to consolidate their
power and stay in office. The result is that the development of their countries is mostly left unattended.

Another problem in the African society that Chinweizu perceived was class domination. He said the elites in many developing countries were a major obstacle to the self-reliance principle. They wanted to enjoy perquisites in form of imported consumer goods. When there were not enough funds to afford such luxuries, they clamored for a New International Economic Order, and for better terms from international financial institutions like the IMF.

Similarly, Williams (1976) in his description of class relations within the neo-colonial political economy of Nigeria said:

Professionals, bureaucrats and merchants used state power to establish themselves as a bourgeoisie. . . (p. 32). The ambiguous position of the bourgeoisie within the neo-colonial political economy is expressed in its ideological ambiguity. Its nationalism is the outcome of its wish to appropriate resources back from the foreigner; its commitment to foreign investment is the outcome of its concrete dependence on the neo-colonial political economy (pp. 33-34). The Nigerian bourgeoisie do have an ideology in the sense of a theoretical legitimization of the status quo. It is expressed in the concept of 'development' which is 'that which we are all in favor of' and given statistical respectability in figures measuring the growth of commodity production. . . The ideology of 'national development' presents the bourgeoisie's image of itself as providing national leadership in the public interest with its contradictions abolished and its immediate material interests preserved (p. 34).

It should be noted that the delegates to the UN from African countries are often drawn from the elite or bourgeoisie class in those countries. Also, they are the people who would want to keep the
status quo with minimum disruption from adverse international economic conditions.

More critical for the members of the ruling class in Africa is the fact as the economic conditions get worse, the less secure is their grip on power. And this highlights the interwoven nature of economic and political power in Africa, just as in almost all societies. The perceptions of the Nigerian delegates revealed Nigeria's ideas not only from what was said, but also what was left out. It seems the rhetorical strategy employed by the delegates was to try and focus the audience's attention on external causes for the development plight at home. Nigerian delegates are also indirectly speaking to the Nigerian audience even when such speeches are made at international gatherings such as the UN because the contents of the speeches are reported back home.

The delegates' speeches also revealed a characteristic of inconsistency or contradiction. On one hand, they called for self-reliance and cooperation between African nations, but at the same time, they were calling for more financial assistance and better aid terms, for African countries. Obasanjo, Nkrumah, and Nyerere all suggested that there was always conditionality attached to any aid. Nkrumah and Nyerere called for integration of resources under a common African entity. Nkrumah (1970) advocated such economic entity with the strongest of convictions. He said:

Our conference and meetings, which while obviously useful must remain ineffective unless supported by joint action. The African economy has shown little improvement since the establishment of the Economic Commission for Africa in 1958 (p. 167).
This highlights a gap between expectation of a role of this UN organ, and actual effective implementation, something that Nigeria's delegates seemed to have emphasized throughout their speeches. The speeches showed that there were a lot of expectations on the UN's ability to help in African development, hence there were more perceptions of the UN's role of implementation than any other role subtype. But the reality is that the effectiveness of the UN is contingent upon the actions of the industrial countries who control the world's economy.

The economic integration of Africa advocated by Nyerere and Nkrumah was an attempt to rectify the asymmetrical relations between the developed North and developing South. Nkrumah said:

Each of us alone cannot hope to secure the highest benefits of modern technology, which demands vast capital investment and can only justify its economics in serving an extensive population (p. 168). . . The key to the significant industrialization of the continent lies in the union of African states, planning its development centrally and scientifically through a pattern of economic integration (p. 170). . . The planned industrialization must be geared to the social objective of the highest upliftment of those acquisitive tendencies which lead to sectional rifts within the society (p. 171).

Another feature of an Africanist approach to development which is related to self-reliance was for Africans to look inwards. Nkrumah said: "let us begin to look inwards into the African continent for all aspects of its development." Amin (1970) also said: "outward-looking growth is not development because the latter demands structural changes, and can only be inward-looking and self-initiated." Nyerere has a similar view as well. Chinweizu said there should be a fresh
conceptualization of development in accordance with a country's endowments, aims and opportunities (1987). It would help through South-South cooperation to build a Third World economic system, an idea shared by Martin (1982). However, Nigeria's 1987 speech revealed the idea that such South-South alliance was not the solution. This assertion seems to suggest that the idea about cooperation among African countries and other developing countries which the delegates had espoused in previous years was wrong.

Economically, Nigeria shares most perceptions about the process of African development with the Africanist thinkers mentioned here. As for the UN's roles in African development, the Nigerian delegates perceived a substantial role for the UN. Specifically, it is a role of adequately implementing the organization's development policies. However, since these thinkers were not specifically addressing a UN audience per se, they focused more on the roles of the African countries themselves, and the roles of the industrialized countries in correcting the imbalances.

The theme of racial discrimination and injustice as it occurred in South Africa and other colonial territories was a major focus of the perceptions of social development in Africa. Among the perceptions are the inhuman treatment of blacks in South Africa or the denial of the fundamental human rights, and the human indignity that colonialism subjects Africans to (1972 speech). There was also the brutal killing of defenceless Africans as in Zimbabwe (1978 speech); there was the recognition that racial discrimination in South Africa had been institutionalized, legalized, and made all-pervasive with the
support from Western countries (1983 and 1984 speeches). Nkrumah said:

The social effects of colonialism are more insidious than the political and economic. This is because they go deep into the minds of the people, and therefore take longer to eradicate. The Europeans relegated us to the position of inferiors in every aspect of our everyday life (1970, p. 32).

He referred specifically to racial situations in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Rodney explained the situation in South Africa as one in which the Boers retained the political power to institutionalize white racism (p. 191). Through investment and trade, capitalists of other nationalities agreed to strengthen, and did strengthen the racist/fascist social relations of South Africa (p. 191).

Apart from the social conditions of apartheid, peaceful conditions are integral to African development. The relations among ethnic groupings in different African countries is an integral part of peaceful in Africa. The state of ethnic relations is responsible for problems of conflict and tension, and this has been known to break out into civil wars in some of these countries. Rodney said: African states were sometimes based entirely on part of the members of a given ethnic group or more usually an amalgamation of members of different ethnic communities (p. 228). Nigeria exemplified one of the situations in which such ethnic relations became strained and this led to a civil war between 1967 and 1969. The large states of 19th century Africa were multi-ethnic and their expansion was continually making anything like tribal loyalty a thing of the past by substituting in its place national and class ties (p. 228). However this substitution was
a lengthy historical process (p. 228). Rodney continued that colonialism blocked the further evolution of national solidarity because it destroyed the particular Asian or African states which were the principal agents for achieving the liquidation of fragmented loyalties (p. 228). Also, because ethnic and regional loyalties which went under the name "tribalism" could not be effectively resolved by the colonial state, they tended to fester and grow in unhealthy forms (p. 228). In fact, the colonial powers sometimes saw the value of stimulating the internal tribal jealousies so as to keep the colonized from dealing with their principal contradiction with the European overlords; that is the classic technique of divide and rule. Belgium used this technique in the Congo, and the British did the same in Nigeria.

The promotion of peace as a crucial ingredient of the social development process also deals with the denuclearization of Africa. This topic was not discussed by the Africanist thinkers. Nevertheless, peace was an important part of their perceptions. Nkrumah said: "World peace today needs Africa's total independence, it needs African unity, as positive contributions to and elimination of the elements engaged in creating conditions for war" (1970, p. 202). He continued that imperialism was the fundamental cause of war (p. 202); and world peace was not possible without the complete liquidation of colonialism and the total liberation of peoples everywhere (p. 203). He said wherever there was the possibility of conflict arising out of discriminations and the refusal of human rights, the peace of the world was threatened (p. 202).
This analysis has tried to lay a contextual framework for critically examining Nigeria's perceptions at the UN General Assembly. There is a general agreement between Nigerian delegates and the thinkers on some of the important steps Africa has to take to develop. But one cannot help asking, despite this much agreement and seemingly adequate analysis of the African situation, why is Africa still floundering on its way to development. There are no easy answers, but it brings up the basic issue which is the crucial issue of having sound ideas in the first place, and having the will to implement them. As of the present, there is still a big gap between theory and practice in African development.

Having discussed the various development ideas of Africanist thinkers, it behoves them and other development policymakers to bring certain frames of mind or attitudes to the task. The descriptions of the sets of attitudes are borrowed and adapted from Kelly (1963), Monaghan (1983, 1985, 1988, 1986 to 19898). These attitudes include:

1. The attitude of permeability as opposed to impermeability. This entails an openmindedness by the African development policymakers in acknowledging the existence of alternative development policies. It is openmindedness with a critical eye; only the useful ideas from elsewhere are borrowed for African use.

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8 Between 1986 and now, I had the opportunity of taking classes with Professor Monaghan. Also, I worked with him as an associate, and from time to time, we had useful discussions, and frank comments flowing both ways, on communication issues.
2. The attitude of interdependence as opposed to division. This takes into consideration the involvement and participation of the African population in the development process. It enhances national and continental social interaction. It is the acknowledgement of the "other" in the development process, and there is the realization of the interdependence between the African leadership and the population, between the African countries and the developed ones, and between all peoples and their environment. The opposite is a division based on superior-inferior relations.

3. The attitude of flexibility as opposed to rigid determinism and control. This is the realization that development is not a dogmatic exercise as many of the African leaders and Western experts are wont to do. This involves being socially responsive to, and aware of the problems of development. It is not a process of asserting and generalizing one set of development theories which worked in one instance to all instances. It involves appreciation of the special experience of development from the other's perspective.

4. The attitude of continually striving for the optimum as opposed to the terminal. African policymakers should never be complacent in the seemingly hopeless situation they are in. They should not put all the blame on nature of the international order. They should actively strive to make the best possible situation for the maximum number of people. This means purposeful action has to match the ideas and theories professed on how to enhance African development.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Summary

This study has tried to examine the nature of the perceptions of the African development process, and consequently, the perceptions of the UN's roles as projected in the speeches of Nigeria's UN General Assembly delegates. The quest for development has been the major preoccupation of many African countries. The process of development can be examined in several ways. These include an examination of Africanist ideas, theories, their implementations, and the contribution of international organizations to the process. It is correct to claim that Africans must have a reliable body of knowledge to work with in their quest for development. This study has added to those voices which said that it is necessary to have a body of knowledge that is Africanist in order to have a genuinely African development. The study also argued that the speeches of the Nigerian delegates at the UN portrayed a rhetorical situation whereby Africa is caught in a vicious cycle of ineffectiveness in speeding up the development process at home, and lack of leverage abroad in international relations. Another major argument was that Nigeria's speeches also revealed a fundamental problem of subjectivity which is exemplified by the omission in the speeches of certain controversial issues. At the same time there are
inconsistencies in the speeches between some of the claims made and the reality in Nigeria and other African countries.

Clearly, Africa's development problems started with the advent of colonialism on the continent when it was carved out into spheres of influence by the colonial powers. The effect was that the continent, politically, economically, and socially was systematically rendered "voice-less" and "power-less" in the international scheme of things. But when the African countries attained independence, the general feeling of African nationalists was that Africa would finally be on its way towards development. Unfortunately, this has not been the case; the countries have yet not found a viable pathway or solution to development.

It has been suggested that Africa would be better served if it employed an Afrocentric or Africanist approach to development instead of the less-than-successful Eurocentric approach it has used for some three decades now. The speeches of the Nigerian delegates were thus analyzed to see what ideas they offered about the subject of African development, what the UN could contribute to it, and how do these African development ideas fit within the general call for a revitalization of Africanist thought.

The study had five major research questions. These were:

1. What were the Nigerian delegates' perceptions of the African development process?

2. What were the major patterns observed in these perceptions of the African development process? What are some implications?
3. What were the major perceptions of the roles of the UN in African development?

4. Which were the major patterns observed in these perceptions of the UN's roles? What are some implications?

5. How can one critically appraise the major perceptions within the context of the major perceptions of some Africanist thinkers?

The speeches of the Nigerian delegates to the General Assembly between 1960 and 1987 were content-analyzed. The unit of analysis was the assertion. An assertion is a single thought unit or idea unit that conveys an item of information extracted from a segment of content. Categories were developed from the synthesis of ideas of Africanist thinkers. These categories were: (a) Political (b) Economic and (c) Social. These had Africanist descriptions and interpretations. They were taken from the ideas of some Africanist thinkers.

The major aspects of the African development process perceived were likewise (a) Political (b) Economic and (c) Social. Under the political aspect, the two major themes emphasized were:

1. The political independence of African countries.

This could also be characterized as Decolonization. The sub-themes here were (a) Political stability. This was also perceived as participation of the majority of the population in the political process. Issues related to political stability were mentioned intermittently in the 1960s, and given prominence in the 1979 speech when Nigeria had returned to civilian rule after a thirteen-year military rule. In the 1980s, the subject of stability was also associated with the situation in South Africa and Namibia. (b) Non-interference in
African affairs. It was associated with big power interference in the political affairs of African countries. Two of such countries that had external interference in their affairs were the Congo (Zaire) in the early 1960s, and Nigeria in the late 1960s.

2. African political influence within the UN system.

Considering that the majority of African countries only joined the organization in the 1960s, there was a persistent call on the UN to reorganize because the big powers had the most influence in the UN system. One particular tool they used to their advantage was their veto power within the Security Council.

The perceptions of the economic aspect of African development were mainly tied to two main themes. These were:

1. Conditions of the international economic environment and their impact on African countries.

This was also characterized as the structure of international economic relations. Under this same theme, the delegates called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). There was the repeated assertion that the rich industrialized countries of the North were uncaring in their attitude to the South—Asian, and developing countries. Other economic problems faced by the latter included: high interest rates, low commodity prices paid by the developed countries and the high cost of manufactured goods these same countries sold to African and developing countries, monetary debt problems and high cost of debt-servicing. There was a call for the upholding of the principle of multilateralism instead of bilateralism because the
delegates believed that developed nations should have a better appreciation of the reality of interdependence of nations.


This theme was also characterized as the call for African cooperation, especially with the formation of regional economic units. There were assertions in the speeches that African countries accepted responsibility for dealing with the critical economic situation in Africa and for relaunching the development process. The study found that references to economic problems were not explained with any details in the 1960s, but from the mid-1970s onwards until 1987, these references offered more detailed analyses of the overall world economic situation. The speeches catalogued Africa's economic problems.

The perceptions of the social aspect of African development were categorized under two broad themes. These were:

1. Inhuman conditions associated with racial discrimination, and their impact on African countries.

The inhuman conditions were condemned throughout the speeches. These were depicted as: denial of fundamental human rights; the infraction of the dignity of Africans; and dehumanization of blacks in South Africa and other colonies.

2. Peace in Africa.

Under the theme, there was a perception that the continent should become a place where conflicts were eliminated. This theme also accounted for the internal situations in African nations where there were ethnic discord and civil conflict. At the same time,
conflicts in which individual countries were used as proxies of the superpowers were unacceptable. Peaceful conditions were also contingent upon the denuclearization of the continent.

As for the perceptions of the roles of the UN in African development, these were closely tied to the aspects of the process delineated earlier. Roles were those responsibilities or functions the UN had in connection to the conditions of African development enumerated above. For example, the UN was perceived to have a role in bringing about the decolonization of the African continent.

Just as there were three aspects of the African development process, there were three kinds of role perceptions. These were Political, Economic and Social. But it was found that these role perceptions could be further subdivided into the following:

1. Implementary— this was a role perceived to involve the implementation or execution of policies. Some of these policies were usually made during meetings, seminars, and studies sponsored by the organization. This role was essentially perceived to involve the UN alone.

2. Administerial— this was a role which was perceived to involve the laying of the groundwork for the implementary role. Among the responsibilities were the making of resolutions, organizing of conferences and seminars, and formation of committees.

3. General— this was the perception of the general role of the UN and other parties in the carrying out of a development task,
which might be any of the two above. This was not solely the UN's role.

The implementary subtype was the most dominant role perceived in each of the three types of roles. Under the UN's political role, there were 24 perceptions or assertions which involved the UN having the sole responsibility for: Helping the African nations secure their independence. Under the economic type of role, there were over 30 Implementative roles perceived and this was mainly tied to: Improvement in the adverse impact of international economic conditions on Africa. Finally, under the social type of role, the implementative sub-types were associated with these two themes: (a) Alleviating the inhuman conditions associated with racial discrimination in Africa, and (b) Facilitating peaceful conditions in Africa. There were 12 of the first, and 11 of the second.

There was apparently no particular pattern in the assessments of the roles of the UN. For example, in the 1968 speech, the delegate said the record of the UN in the 1960s in the economic and social fields was better than its record in the political field. He added however that the UN's record in the 1960s did not satisfy the expectation of many member-states. This is indicative of what was consistently found in the delegates' assessments of the UN. Often in the same speech, they assessed a UN role positively and followed that with a negative assessment.

In light of the roles of the UN projected in the speeches, it was not difficult to see that with its political, economic, and social problems, African countries were in a weak position when it came to
their international relationship with the more developed industrialized countries of the North. This image of the continent's lack of influence and power especially in matters crucial to its development destiny was frequently projected in the speeches. The dominant political power of the colonial countries were acknowledged in the 1960s when many of the African countries were setting out on the road to self-rule. When the 1980s came, this power had now changed primarily into the economic kind. It is within such a context that the role and relevance of the UN were critically appraised. The crucial questions to ask are whether the UN could improve the unsatisfactory situation, and what did a member-nation perceive as the major things the organization could do to help.

The general conclusion is that there was overwhelming evidence that the Nigerian delegates saw the UN as a significant participant in the African development process. It must be asked here then what implication this would have in the enunciation and development of an Africanist principle of development. The Africanist or Afrocentric principle affirms the primacy of African interests in the development of the continent. It also incorporates African self-reliance and cooperation as one of its tenets. It is an attempt to reduce the influence of a Eurocentric tradition (theory and practice) in Africa. But ironically, the UN itself is a product of the same Eurocentric tradition, and most of its policies and actions cannot but be Eurocentric. Moreover, much of the organization's funding comes from the Western developed nations, the bastions of Eurocentricity. One wonders whether such an organization could truly contribute to
the empowerment of Africa, politically, economically, and socially, and to help improve the less-than-satisfactory ties it has with the developed nations. But the general conclusion of this research is that, in the short-term, the UN's contribution is going to be only a stop-gap-- giving aid here and there; in the long-term, it is not likely to solve Africa's development problems.

Africanist thinkers have analyzed this situation and it seems that they essentially have the view that Africa itself would have to do much more to control its own destiny. Some have suggested political and economic integration as a possible way out. Theoretically, this seems to be a sound idea, however in practice, it has been an almost impossible task. One reason is that there are the important ingredients of leadership and the people's participation in the political process, which hitherto in Africa have left a lot to be desired. If historical events so far are anything to go by, the African masses have minimal comfort in the way much of the leadership in African countries has misruled and mismanaged the respective countries. As a sign of the future, the current state of affairs does not give cause for much optimism. The question is then who is going to save the African masses from their leaders. The answer is clear; only Africans themselves can. However, while it might take longer yet to set Africa straight on the path to a truly Africanist-based development, it might be worth the wait. In essence, Africa should not be too dependent on the UN and the industrialized countries for its development.
An applicable message which Africans and the leaders might do well as to remember is:

Development brings freedom provided it is development of people. But people cannot be developed: they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build a man's house, an outsider cannot give the man pride and self-confidence in himself as a human being. Those things a man has to create himself by his own actions. He develops himself by what he does; he develops himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his own knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation—as an equal—in the life of the community he lives in (Nyerere, 1973, p. 60).

Implications of the Study

The study has tried to contribute to knowledge in the sense that it critically examined the process of development—an issue which is crucial in human affairs. In particular, it examined the various problems in Africa's march towards development. In the analysis of Nigeria's communication to the world, it was clear that while Africans started out on an unequal footing with the industrialized nations, Africans perhaps needed to do more to help their own cause. A basic argument in the study was that Africa should not be too dependent on such organizations as the UN and its agencies for its development. The study tried to highlight the fundamental contradiction between Nigeria's espousal on one hand of an Africanist ideology, or world view in its perceptions about development, and on the other hand, its affirmation of a major role for the UN. In the process of analyzing the speeches of the Nigerian delegates, the study also prominently focused on the crucial issue of international power relations.
associated with the political, economic and social development of Africa.

This study also tried to contribute to knowledge in the sense that it elaborated on some of the ideas which can be characterized as Africanist or Afrocentric body of thought. It is with the aim of providing a worthy alternative to the dominant Eurocentric tradition. This underscores the necessity of using an indigenous theoretical framework for analyzing the process of development in Africa. At the same time, it also criticized the shortcomings of African leadership and its disappointing performance, considering the fact that there does not seem to be a dearth of ideas on how to develop the continent.

Limitations of Study and Recommendations for Further Study

A limitation of the findings of this study might be that one should not readily generalize and conclude that they are representative of the perceptions of all the African countries. Even though there would probably be much in terms of shared ideas, it should not be forgotten that these speeches included one African country's subjectivities, prejudices, and attitudes in interpreting an issue crucial to the continent. In other words, no two countries would see things exactly the same way.

Also, these speeches should not be taken as the sum total of what Nigeria perceived to be the African development process over a period of 27 years. The forum of the General Assembly should be
taken as only one of the forums of international communication available to Nigeria in sharing its perceptions with the world.

As for the direction future study might take, one is to try and understand the perceptions of other African countries. From these, one could have a relatively more accurate attempt at answering a broader question of what were the perceptions of African countries at the UN on African development.

Another direction might be to do a comparative analysis between countries of different continents, degrees of development and ideologies. This analysis could be used to determine the different perceptions on particular significant issues. Countries could be chosen from any of the continents--Africa, North and South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia.

Finally, a direction a future study might take is to seek to identify the basic international communication principles that Nigeria has explicitly and implicitly projected in the speeches. These are the general statements which a researcher could scientifically draw from the speeches to enable people determine what Nigeria perceived as the requirements of better understanding among countries. This could be repeated for the speeches of a number of countries and the overall findings might prove significant for the study of principles of international communication in general.
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