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Superpower intervention in sub-Saharan Africa: A framework for analyzing third world conflicts. (Volumes I and II)

Lombardi, Mark Owen, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1989

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SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS
Volume I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Ohio State University

by

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The Ohio State University
1989

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For Elizabeth, Jonathan, Allison and Rachel,
May they know the peace of their own special context.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My appreciation goes out to a number of people who have crossed my path in the past six years. Most notably is Dr. James Harf whose intellect, guidance and friendship helped place this research and my life within its own unique context. Also, to Dr. Richard Herrmann who ignited my professional fires giving me focus and a commitment to perfection. Thanks go out to Dr. Charles Hermann and Dr. Phil Stewart for their driving intellects and support.

I also wish to thank those friends who endured my madness and gave unconditional support in return including Patti, Peg, Joan, Steve, Brenda, Scott, Val, Connie, Earl, Steve & Annie. Further, I wish to acknowledge a very special friend whose example of warmth, dignity and quiet commitment inspired my efforts at every disheartened moment: Mark Denham.

Finally, I wish to thank Betty, Martin and Paul who instilled in me an unyielding respect for and obsession with education that I have never regretted.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A year ago a cartoon appeared in the Washington Post that depicted U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the world in terms of a massive "chessboard" with Reagan and Gorbachev exchanging pawns and calculating global strategy. The "pawns" represented states of the world seemingly pliant to superpower desires and policies and relatively impotent in terms of response. This view is widely accepted among laypersons and students who usually begin any analysis of the international system with a discussion of the East-West rivalry and its main "battlegrounds," i.e. nuclear weapons, economics, ideology, the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America.

This conception of U.S.-Soviet relations generally, and within the Third World in particular is a somewhat misguided perception given the events of the last three decades. U.S.-Soviet foreign policy over that time is replete with examples of those supposedly "passive pawns" striking back and causing substantial policy defeats for both superpowers. Egypt, Somalia and Afghanistan are just a few examples of such losses for the Soviet Union and one need only look to Iran, Vietnam, and Nicaragua to see concrete cases of policy failure and local popular "victories" over U.S. involvement. In fact, the dependent relationship that is implicit with a "chessboard" view of the globe is in reality often reversed with Third World states adeptly
playing the superpowers off against one another to their own tactical benefit.

Why then does this image continue to be so prevalent not only in the media and public at large but also among certain elements of the scholarly and policy-making communities? How has it been perpetuated? What have been its effects on scholarship and how have the fields of comparative foreign policy and international relations dealt with them? Underlying these very general substantive questions is the assumption that local conditions in Third World states or what is termed in this study local context plays a vital role in superpower foreign policy behavior in terms of its scope, depth, success or failure. Although this may on the surface appear to be a prima facie point in terms of logic, the sub-field known as superpower foreign policy in the Third World, of which this dissertation is primarily concerned, has been slow to accept this assumption and incorporate it into research.¹ A great deal of scholarship has been less than explicit about the effects of local context on superpower foreign policy behavior and consequently, scholars have fashioned studies that don't delineate those effects from other important factors.

¹This sub-field of literature is primarily those research efforts that concentrate on U.S. and/or Soviet foreign policy in regions of the Third World, whether they be in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia or Africa. Some of the more prolific scholars whose primary research interests lie in this area include William Zartman, David Albright, Colin Legum, Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Donald Zagoria and Larry Napper. By their listing here, this is not to imply that each of these authors has contributed to the problems with the literature to be discussed in chapter two. Rather, they represent a cross-section of the sub-field and a point of reference for the reader.
This dissertation will attempt to analyze this issue through the explicit examination of a type of superpower behavior—intervention as it interacts with local context. The examination of the interaction of these two factors will be carried out within the foreign policy event known as Third World Conflict in the specific region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the central question that this study will address is:

What effect does local context have on the success and failure of superpower intervention in Third World conflicts?

This research will utilize the structured-focused comparison case study method popularized by Alexander George in his work on deterrence. The cases that will be employed to explore the interaction of local context and superpower intervention include the following:

1. The Angolan Civil War 1975-1976
2. The Shaba II Invasion 1978
3. The Ogaden Desert War 1977-1978
4. The Rhodesia-Zimbabwe Civil War 1976-1979

It is now important to state what this study will focus on and what will be outside its scope.

SCOPE

First, the specific behavior that this study is concerned with is superpower intervention. Briefly, this study is not going to focus upon the decision to intervene, why that decision was taken or what the

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particular decision-making units within each superpower were thinking when it was made. The specific behavior of intervention will be taken from the point of its initiation as defined by this study (to be spelled out later) and then tracked in terms of its level of intensity and interaction with local context to examine differences in outcome (success and failure). This means that cases of non-intervention are not applicable in this study since we are concerned with charting the interaction between intervention and local context and not how that context effects the decision to intervene. Although the issue of how the decision-making process works and the nature of the decision itself are interesting ones, their exploration is clearly outside the scope of this study. As Snyder points out in his analysis of the sub-field of Soviet foreign policy:

...the most useful kind of knowledge about Soviet foreign policy may be how it behaves in certain kinds of situations and how it responds to the policies of other states. To develop and test generalizations of this kind, we may not always need to agonize over "what Khrushchev must have been thinking." Rather, we should devote more effort to comparing and contrasting patterns of behavior across cases(Snyder 84-85: 99).

Second, this study is concerned with the interaction of intervention and local context within a discreet form of foreign policy event, namely Third World conflict. Obviously, implicit within this concept are a host of biases brought to bear by authors who view conflict in the Third World in many forms through divergent perceptual frames. For example, many scholars often perceive conflict in the Third World as endemic and incorporating many degrees from economic conflict over scarce resources to political conflict usually in the
form of election violence to military conflict between factions fighting for control of the regime itself. Often, authors use the term conflict to denote a wide range of events with little effort at definition and delineation. This study will attempt to identify certain demarcation points within the concept of conflict and develop a more focused and consequently more useful definition.

For the purposes of this study, conflict will be viewed as that extreme form of behavior in which two or more states or factions within a state carry out military operations against one another aimed at changing the existing political authority structure or insulating it against change. Thus, the spectrum of "conflictual" activity is constrained in this study to focus on only those most extreme forms. Cases like Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and the ongoing conflict between the Contras and the government of Nicaragua are examples of Third World conflicts (although not ones to be specifically examined in this research). This will be explicated in depth in chapter three.

Third, this study will not argue that global level factors such as superpower motivation and capability are not important in relation to local context. On the contrary, this study's primary aim is to display that the importance of studying local context is a necessary corollary to the examination of more global level factors like superpower capability and not a surrogate for such study. As Donald Rothchild pointed out in his critique of the Bender et al volume on U.S. policy in African crises, the need to merge the "globalist" and "regionalist" perspectives into systematic analysis concerned with theoretical behavior is vital in order to understand the interplay of these
levels. This is precisely what this study endeavors to accomplish with the primary purpose being the integration of these levels into more accurate explanations of outcome.

THE RATIONALE FOR EXAMINING "CONFLICT," SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND "INTERVENTION"

The first question that any scholar must be prepared to answer is "why study what you are studying?" Beyond a series of ambiguous responses centered on self-interest and policy impact, there should be several concrete analytical reasons for wanting to examine certain behaviors under specific conditions. This dissertation will be grounded in the literature of international relations and superpower foreign policy and it is principally from those two bodies of literature that the answer to this question arises. This section will focus on addressing the question of "why" as it pertains to the type of behavior (intervention), the type of foreign policy event (conflict in the Third World) and the specific region of focus (Sub-Saharan Africa).

Why Third World Conflicts?

First, recent study in the area of conflict and war has focused on the changing nature of this phenomenon in the post-war era. Total war on the scale of World War II appears to be giving way to more limited conflicts. In fact, many scholars no longer believe that direct-total

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3 See American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, no. 1, March 1987, pp. 317-318. The terms "globalist" and "regionalist" refer to common conceptions of U.S. foreign policy outlook usually with respect to Africa, yet they can and do include views of the third world in general. A more precise definition of each will follow in the discussion in chapter two.
conflict between the superpowers is likely and thus limited conflict becomes the operative concept for examining superpower competition. Consequently, the concept of limited war has emerged to address the occurrence of conflict in various Third World areas that although devastating for the local participants is not globally threatening on any scale comparable with direct superpower confrontation. Studies on the increasing militarization and number of conflicts in the world indicate that in the aggregate and by region, conflict is increasing in the Third World and becoming a more pervasive phenomenon globally.

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5As Osgood points out in his article "The Post-War Strategy of Limited War: Before, During and After Vietnam," in Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, by Lawrence Martin, 1979, the concept of limited war as it has been applied in the West in the post-war era is "limited" from the standpoint of the superpowers but not necessarily for the participants themselves. This study is concerned with that dimension of conflict at the local/regional level that is "total" for the indigenous participants yet "limited" in superpower policy terms.

The justifiable concern regarding this development is omnipresent in scholarship and among policy-makers who are fearful of the consequences of protracted wars in the Middle East, Southern Africa or Central America. The vast resources invested in military and economic aid indicate an increased importance attached to these areas as primary "battlegrounds" for East-West conflict. The consequences of this globalization of local conflict will be explored later, yet it is important to note here that the recognition of the increasing degree of conflict in the Third World makes it a form of foreign policy event worthy of study on its own merits, separate from conflict or limited wars in general.

A second and interrelated reason but one that bears separate mention is the increasing importance of third world nationalism in its many forms. Nationalism as a foreign policy concept has always been a significant element in the analysis of state activity since the pre World War II era. Virtually no one would challenge the importance that nationalism has played in events like the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Italy, Japan, and Germany, the victory of the Soviets over the Germans in the "Great Patriotic War", and the movement of non-aligned nations with calls for the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Although, nationalism appears on the wane in various western societies, it is still a potent force in the Third World where regime legitimacy often rests on the perceptions of regional and international independence.

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from both east and west. One need only study the legitimacy accorded various Third World leaders because of their primary role in the fight for national independence to see evidence of this (Nyerere in Tanzania, Kaunda in Zambia, Nassar in Egypt, Quaddafi in Libya, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and the list goes on).

Nationalism has taken many forms in the Third World, from the Arab Socialism of Nassar to the African Socialism of Nkrumah and Nyerere to the Non-Aligned movement under the leadership of India and Yugoslavia to the Islamic fundamentalism of the 1980's in Iran and beyond. It is very possible that increasing nationalism amidst increasing levels of political and social upheaval will cause higher levels of conflict within the Third World. Thus, as nationalism is combined with the already monumental problems facing the Third World, the incidence of conflict will likely increase making this foreign policy event even more salient for study.

As alluded to earlier, a third reason for studying third world conflict is its distinctness from other chronic forms of instability. Third world area studies are replete with analyses that focus on the enormous problems facing those states and societies.¹ These problems

range from debt, chronic malnutrition, illiteracy, infant mortality and brain drain to political instability, militarization of politics, ethnic infighting and resource scarcity. All of these issues, it can be argued, help to cause conflict within the Third World in general and thus broaden the spectrum of "conflict" as a foreign policy event. Any study could easily find itself mired in the endless sorting out of these factors thus broadening the concept to unmanageable levels. In order to address this problem, this study will focus on "Third World conflict" with the purpose of sharpening the concept to include only those aspects at the most "severe" end of the spectrum. This too will be fleshed out in detail in chapter three.

Why Sub-Saharan Africa?

The framework proposed in this research design will be confined geographically to cases within the Sub-Saharan African region. Aside from the author's own substantive interest in this area, there are several reasons for this. First, one of the problems in the current foreign policy literature and in the specific sub-field in question is that work focusing on Africa is sadly lacking. Much of the scholarly and policy-making communities in Washington and to some extent in Paris, London, Bonn, Beijing and Moscow focus upon East-West relations, the Middle East, the Pacific region or other areas more contiguous with superpower influence and interest. Africa, when placed against these other regions, has been comparatively ignored. This is evidenced by the literally handful of scholars in the United States whose primary


A second reason is that Africa is outside any implicit "sphere of influence" notion either between the superpowers themselves or within the scholarly community that studies them. Unlike regions where superpower intervention has historical precedent and is tacitly "accepted" by other states (Eastern Europe-USSR and Latin America-USA), Africa generally and Sub-Saharan Africa specifically has been "untouched" in a foreign policy sense by the superpowers prior to 1960. This creates a unique set of operating conditions for superpower intervention that require further elaboration.

Recent literature on superpower foreign policy in the Third World has focused upon a dual dynamic of relative unrestrained competition coupled with a cooperative threshold. This refers to the coalescing of two seemingly contradictory trends. The first is that due to the


10 Prior to this time, U.S. policy had been to quietly encourage European governments to decolonize while keeping their distance from potential conflicts that arose as a result. The exceptions were Ethiopia, Liberia and later Zaire where U.S. commercial interests were greatest. In the case of the USSR, activity prior to 1956 was non-existent and in the early Khrushchev period relegated to diplomatic support for "national liberation movements." The only exceptions were Egypt and Algeria.

lack of a recognized "sphere of influence" idea for either superpower in certain regions like Africa and the Middle East, competition on one level is unrestrained by factors like vital security interests, historical presence and similar rationales. The language and justifications used for involvement are different in these regions as compared with areas that could be termed spheres of influence like Central America or Eastern Europe. However, this competitive dimension carries with it a discernible firebreak. Since survival issues for both superpowers are not salient to warrant direct confrontation, a threshold exists between competition and the incentive for cooperation or at least the lessening of tensions. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the Arab-Israeli conflicts where U.S. and Soviet officials have shown a remarkable capacity for dialogue and agreement in the face of intense crises among their respective allies (Breslauer 83: 70-98). Thus, we have a competitive/cooperative threshold in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa that create unique foreign policy situations warranting analysis that delineates between these regions and so-called spheres of influence.

A final reason for focusing upon Sub-Saharan Africa lies in its distinctness as an area of study. The literature both in international

12"Survival issues" refers to areas or concerns defined by the superpowers as vital and non-negotiable. This would include in the Soviet case the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine for fellow communist states. In the U.S. case this would include the inherent security interests with regards to the Caribbean and passage through the Panama Canal. Basically, we are talking about areas and issues that each superpower has self-defined as so important that direct conflict to protect those interests is a distinct possibility. This usually means issues of perceived self-defense and security whether that be for themselves or close allies.
relations generally and within foreign policy specifically has been consumed with the need for theories, pre-theories and frameworks that provide us with generalizable conclusions across a variety of cases. This goal is a sound one, yet it carries pitfalls. Central among them is that as the level of generalization increases, the degree of context-richness and case specific knowledge decreases. Attempting to generalize over the entire Third World carries several problems already alluded to, including the fact that certain regions have different characteristics in relation to superpower foreign policy. By keeping the study focused on a specific, yet nonetheless vast geographical area like Sub-Saharan Africa, we can hopefully serve the need for generalization without increasing the level of abstraction to the point of making substantive conclusions superficial.

Why Intervention?

Perhaps the most nebulous concept with which to deal with in this study is the phenomenon of intervention. "Intervention," generically defined for the moment, is so pervasive in the present international system that one could argue it is virtually constant with no discernible end point. This is due to the increasing interdependent world system with the complex web of interrelationships that result. Yet, recognizing the frightening definition potential of intervention does not help us in identifying its traits and weighing its effects. It does however graphically display why it is important to accurately define and study.
Intervention as a concept needs to be separated from other forms of "involvement" in the international system if this study is to produce fruitful results. For this research, intervention is best viewed as one form of involvement along a continuum with varying levels or degrees. As scholars, we can visualize a continuum of involvement between states ranging from basic diplomatic activity, trade, and cultural exchanges to economic aid, the presence of personnel for education training and similar activity to military aid, the presence of foreign forces, the use of bases and the actual invasion of a particular state by another.

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The concern of this study is with the far right portion of the spectrum marked by the brackets. These represent the most extreme forms of intervention.

FIGURE 1
CONTINUUM OF INTERVENTION

Obviously, each of these activities is different in form, intensity and affect with respect to the relationship between the particular states involved. To group basic diplomatic activity with

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military aid broadens the meaning of intervention to such a level of abstraction that its usage becomes problematic. Consequently, a key reason for examining intervention as a form of behavior is to aid in distinguishing it from less extreme forms of involvement.

A second reason relates to the discussion regarding the increasing importance of Third World conflicts and the issues that promote them. If, as has been argued, the major scenes of conflict are shifting from "northern" to "southern" theatres and superpower competition in these conflicts is increasing, then the overall concern with the policy implications of intervention becomes even more vital for the superpowers. The increasing militarization of the Third World coupled with an increased amount of conflict means greater chances for superpower intervention and hence heightened levels of competition. This makes intervention from a superpower foreign policy perspective vitally important to study.

Thirdly, from a Third World perspective, the same situation applies. Local actors in Third World conflict situations often find themselves seeking outside support to turn the tide of competition between themselves and their adversaries.\textsuperscript{14} With the increased militarization and the corresponding increase in ties between supplier and recipient states that this implies, the need for understanding and managing the superpower factor for Third World actors becomes even more

imperative.\textsuperscript{15} In fact, it is of more relative saliency for these actors than for the superpowers themselves and thus should be a primary area of focus.

The fourth and perhaps most important reason for utilizing intervention in this study centers around the importance of superpower-centric factors like motivation and commitment within Third World conflicts. As we have established in attempting to set the scope of this research effort, the concern is not with the decision to intervene by the superpowers but the effects that local context has on the success and failure of that intervention. This, however, means that the degree of superpower commitment to the intervention is somewhat muted by ignoring the decision process and the intricacies of goal structure. There are many difficulties in trying to measure both motivation and behavior as they relate to local context, not the least of which lies in not being able to hold one variable constant while examining the other. Intervention, as it will be operationalized later, attempts to, in part, tap superpower commitment by theorizing that the level of intervention measures in a limited manner the degree of superpower commitment to the faction in question. Thus, we can roughly estimate superpower commitment in the particular case by observing behavior rather than making vague inferences regarding motivation.

\textsuperscript{15}For an excellent discussion of the increasing militarization of the world and the Third World in particular and the implications this has for increased ties between supplier and recipient states, see Andrew J. Pierre (82), Foltz and Bienen (85), and John H. Maurer & Richard H. Porth, \textit{Military Intervention in the Third World}, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984.
This is not to argue that charting levels of intervention tells us everything about goals and commitment, but it can arguably allow us to speculate as to degree of commitment and thus make useful comparisons across cases where the interaction of differing levels of intervention with local context produces divergent outcomes. Consequently, rather than being concerned with both cases of intervention and non-intervention as some scholars would argue is necessary, this research will examine cases of varying levels of intervention that hopefully will provide an accurate and inclusive categorization of the behavior. From this perspective, intervention becomes a useful concept in the narrow sense of making conclusions about behavior and also in the broader context of inferring commitment regarding that behavior.

This brief enunciation of the "why's" of this dissertation provides us with the general contours of what will be examined, yet the specific organization of this study still requires explication.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

Chapter two will ground this study in the relevant bodies of literature which attempt to address these same problems and questions. Generally, this includes portions of comparative foreign policy, international relations theory and superpower foreign policy, and more specifically, the sub-field of Superpower foreign policy in the Third World. The central premise of this discussion will be that elements (power, balance of power, will, and "globalism") of the general fields mentioned above have created assumptions and biases that have adversely skewed scholarship in the specific sub-field such that analyses are
superpower-centric with little or no regard for local and regional factors. The exploration of this phenomenon will focus on the relationship between these general theoretical concepts proposed by the fields in question and how they have affected research on superpower foreign policy in the Third World.

Chapter three will first, present the operationalization of each of the key concepts already introduced, intervention, local context, conflict and outcome and integrate them within an analytical framework. Second, the outline of the research design will be displayed with an in depth explication of the focused comparison case method and how it will utilized. Finally, the criteria for case selection will be presented to show how each of the four cases mentioned above were chosen.

It should be noted here that the examination of these cases within the aforementioned framework entails comparisons within as well across cases to explicate the relationship between intervention, local context and outcome. Conclusions regarding each case are best seen in relation to the entire comparison analysis. Thus, each case should not be used individually as "proof" of the explanatory power of one factor (superpower intervention) over another (local context).

Chapters four-seven will be the case analyses in rough chronological order beginning with the Angolan Civil War and ending with the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict. Chapter eight will draw together the information obtained from the application of the framework into a series of conclusions regarding the initial research question, the prospects for intervention and local context as concepts and the utility of the framework as a whole.
The task outlined is a difficult one given the unique needs of constructing a generalizable framework coupled with the necessity for in-depth case analysis. The initial step must be one that places this effort within an analytical context to display how this work will extend itself beyond previous research. A critical evaluation of the literature thus becomes the next step in the process.
CHAPTER II
POWER, BALANCE OF POWER, WILL AND THE STUDY OF
SUPERPOWER FOREIGN POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

INTRODUCTION

The brief research agenda presented in chapter one flows from a series of observations and concerns regarding the evolution of the literature on superpower foreign policy in the Third World. These concerns stem largely from the influence that certain dominant assumptions within international relations theory and foreign policy have over scholars who examine superpower behavior. Essentially, the central thesis in this chapter is that while realism and some of its key aspects (power, motivation, balance of power and fungibility) have come under rightful scrutiny in the discipline over the past decade, many of realism's assumptions are taken as accepted "facts" in the sub-field in question, creating several problems that subsequent research has been slow to address.

In this discussion, we will explore efforts within the sub-field that have addressed in part the problems of realism and thus point the way toward positive research. From this theoretical critique, a research design and series of comparative case studies will follow centered around the research question:
Prior to this discussion linking general international relations theory to superpower foreign policy, one caveat should be made explicit. The linkages that will be examined are more environmental than causal. That is, the specific problems relating to international relations theory that will be discussed are responsible for creating an environment within which certain problems become more pronounced in specific sub-fields of study. When one dominant theory or paradigm permeates a discipline, regional studies flowing from this view tend to rest on the assumptions of that paradigm, often carrying with them adverse consequences for substantive analysis. This is not necessarily a conscious recognition on the part of the researcher, but more the implicit adoption of assumptions as "givens." The sub-field of superpower foreign policy and its relationship to international relations theory is not immune to this phenomenon.

Organizationally, the first section of this chapter will focus on a critical evaluation of two of the central tenants (power & balance of power) of realism and demonstrate how these elements have been adopted by the sub-field to that literatures' detriment. Arising from this discussion, we will then place this dissertation within efforts made by scholars, such as Alexander George, Richard Cottam, Larry Napper, and Arthur Jay Klinghoffer to illustrate a more complex and balanced approach to the study of superpower foreign policy in the Third World.
The fields of international relations and comparative foreign policy, and more specifically, the sub-field of superpower foreign policy in the Third World, draw much of their key assumptions, propositions, and theoretical underpinnings from international relations theory and most notably the realist paradigm. Realism has been and some argue still is the de-facto dominant paradigm in the discipline, and its basic precepts form the foundation for research in a variety of sub-fields often without significant critical questioning. The precise history and interpretation of the tenants of realism require no in-depth elaboration here, yet it is important to note that the entrenchment of this paradigm carries adverse consequences for foreign policy analysis that any inclusive study must recognize and endeavor to address.

It is the contention of this study that two interrelated elements of the realist paradigm have been accepted and inculcated by the above mentioned sub-field. As a consequence, explanations of superpower foreign policy behavior in Third World conflicts are generally superpower-centric, relegating local context factors to secondary or tertiary status. These two tenants are the traditional definition and usage of the concept power, and the preoccupation with balance of power theory in foreign policy analysis. This section will explore the concepts of power and balance of power within realist thought and display how their drawbacks have paved the way for spurious conclusions in the sub-field of superpower foreign policy.
A Critique of Power

Realism as a paradigm has dominated the discourse within international relations and among policy-makers for the past forty years. Its central precepts and assumptions are well documented in the work of philosophers and scholars from Tacitus and Thucydides to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hegel to Morgenthau, Aron, Kissinger, Waltz, Gilpin, Frompkin, and Ferris.¹ In his landmark work, Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau sets out the central tenants of realism as a paradigm within international relations and foreign policy study (Morgenthau 85: 3-17). Morgenthau argues that realism rests on six principles:

1) Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
2) Statesmen think in terms of interest defined as power.
3) National interest is the objective law of politics, but that interest is complex with a minimalist definition focusing upon national survival.
4) Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states.
5) The moral aspirations of a particular nation are not congruent with the moral laws that govern the universe.
6) Politics is autonomous from other spheres like economics.

What is important for this discussion is the introduction and definition of power as the central concept of realism and the raison d'etre for states and their foreign policies.

Morgenthau defines power as an amalgamation of independent and objectively identifiable elements or attributes. These include geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military power and population along with a set of more enigmatic elements such as national character, morale, quality of leadership and will (Morgenthau 85: 117-169). In his discussion, Morgenthau is at once vague with respect to the interplay of these attributes and the scholar's ability to measure them, and also clear as to their inherent saliency in conceptualizing power (Ibid., 85: 151-169). For Morgenthau, these differing types of "attributes" are interconnected parts of the greater whole termed power. He argued that power is a relational concept with meaning only in terms of its relationship to both external (environmental) and internal (state capability) factors including other states. Certain elements cannot be singled out and then redefined as "power" without a recognition of the distortion that this creates. Yet, many scholars have chosen to focus, not on the relational dimension of power, but only on those objectively measurable elements, internal to the state or actor in question such as capability. This severely warps the overall concept that Morgenthau was trying to grapple with.

Scholars such as Waltz, Gilpin, Ferris, Choucri and North have advanced this more traditional conception of power as largely those
aspects that can be objectively identified and measured. For these authors, a state’s power is often equivalent to those elements of the Morgenthau/realist definition such as military capability, population, and industrial capacity, that are measurable and indeed relatively constant. Ferris illustrated this focus by paying homage to the complexity of power while relying upon that which is empirically measurable in defining the parameters of the concept (Ferris 73: 1-8). For him, the importance of a focus on objective military capability was partially within his notion of how power works, but also in his bias for parsimony. This fostered a fusion of power with objective capability into a concept that de-emphasized important elements like character, will and leadership along with those aspects external to the state including terrain or local context.

In the midst of the behavioral revolution, the redefinition of power as that which is empirically identifiable (largely capability) became a central tenant of the realist paradigm ignoring some of the initial caveats enunciated by Morgenthau. This was due in part to the inherent difficulties and indeed implausibility of accurately measuring some of the more "fuzzy" elements such as motivations and will. As Morgenthau himself pointed out:

To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of the statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most elusive of psychological data, distorted as they are frequently beyond recognition by the interest and emotions of the actor and observer alike (Morgenthau 85: 5-6).

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Consequently, if an analyst wished to determine the "power" of several states, he or she need and should only be concerned with measuring their respective capabilities since these were more easily measured and presented less conceptual problems. These capabilities usually included indicators such as GNP, military strength, population, geographical location and the possession of nuclear weapons. For many realists, these "objective" capabilities became virtually synonymous with power.³

Partially in response to this capability/power synthesis, there has been the movement in international relations to visualize power in terms of causation. Work by Dahl, Nagel, Simon and others argues that power is best seen in terms of the relationship between two actors, with actor A's desire to make actor B do something and A's subsequent success or failure in that regard as reflective of the causal dependency of power.⁴

This more relational view of power guided or evaluated by causation has however created some logical inconsistencies. Foremost among them is the problem with attempting to empirically measure power as capability and then judge its impact in actual cases based on the yardstick of causality. As Baldwin points out, power analysis from


this perspective is frequently off target in its predictions, creating what is called "the paradox of unrealized power". Or as other analysts have correctly pointed out in their analyses of specific cases, larger (more capable) states often fail in their bid to subjugate smaller (less capable) states in a host of foreign policy encounters, or for the purposes of this study, superpowers often fail in their bid to successfully intervene in Third World conflicts. Thus, viewing power in terms of causation becomes misleading if one is not inclusive in the consideration of the factors that make up its internal dimensions (internal to the initiating state).

Several criticisms of this definition of power have emerged to redress this problem and inject realism with a more complex and accurate view of power originally theorized by Morgenthau. In his work on power measurement, Sjostedt has referred to the static visualization of \[ \text{power} = \text{capability} \] as an "unconditional comparison of power". Sjostedt argues that by defining power in such a way that its measure is equally applicable across a wide variety of cases and time, one cannot help but ignore aspects like motivation as well as the

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relational dimension of power (Sjostedt 79: 37-54). For Sjostedt, this fact should refer us to measures of power that include both objective and subjective elements within a situational context no matter how difficult it may be to measure these factors.

Robert Keohane points out that to measure power as largely capability satisfies concerns for parsimony, yet is empirically unjustifiable. The notion of [power = capability] simply is not accurately correlated with the reality of causation. That is, capability does not translate into the successful usage of power. This is an empirical reality that many in the field have come to accept. Yet, certain polemical assumptions contained within the concept of power have been introduced to support the traditional view. The most important is the use of "will."

Power and "Will" in Foreign Policy Study

In response to these problems and criticisms, realists both in international relations generally and within the sub-field of superpower foreign policy specifically have clung to the [power = capability] notion by addressing the above anomaly through the re-introduction of motivation (will) into the analysis. For example, Adam Ulam in his work on Soviet foreign policy assumes that by virtue of superior superpower capability, i.e. power (military/economic), the

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U.S. and the Soviet Union should be able to dictate the outcome of Third World conflicts in Vietnam, Angola and the Middle East. Yet, when the superpowers are unsuccessful, Ulam argues that it is due to a lack of political skill or will to succeed (Ulam 83: 100-144). This is what Baldwin refers to as the "conversion process explanation" (Baldwin 79: 168-170). As Keohane points out:

> The conversion-process explanation is a classic auxiliary hypothesis, since it is designed to protect the assumption that power resources are homogeneous and fungible (Keohane 84: 523).

This introduction of will as an explanatory factor is inherently post-hoc and non-falsifiable in that rather than questioning the basic assumptions underlying the [power = capability] thesis, the analyst (in this case Ulam) retreats to the position that capability would have been enough if properly applied. Within the sub-field this has become the common explanation given for U.S. foreign policy "failures" in Vietnam, Angola and Nicaragua.11

One could argue that will is the key determinant of the outcome of a particular case, but there is no way to prove or disprove it. When analysts argue that the use of Cuban forces by the Soviet Union in Angola or Ethiopia is a result of American failure to show resolve against such actions, the scholarly implication is clear; there is no


way to disprove it. Although a lack of political skill or will may be a significant factor in the failure of an intervention; it should not be used as a post-hoc justification of the [power = capability] assumption while down-playing other explanatory factors such as a lack of capability or the importance of the local context.

Motivation, inherent in the notion of will, is an important explanatory variable, yet recognizing this strikes at the heart of the power as capability notion. As discussed above, the appeal of power measured in capability terms was its parsimony and potential for generalization. This was argued since motivation presented such difficult measurement problems. However, as several scholars have suggested, it is the realist paradigm and its use in the specific sub-field in question that brings motivation (in the form of will) back into the analysis without questioning its basic assumptions or allowing analysts an opportunity at adequately measuring its impact (Keohane 82, Ashley 84 and Herrmann 87). Motivation is utilized simply to redress the empirical inconsistencies between power measurement, causality and

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14 See discussions by each author on motivation in foreign policy study.
actual outcome. Consequently, we are left with the assumption, \[\text{power} = \text{capability} + \text{will}\] without any clear measure of will or any discussion of other salient variables including local context.

A central assumption of this study is that power should not be viewed as a static, objective measure of capability nor as the fusion of capability and will arrived at in a post-hoc manner. Rather, power must be recognized as a relational concept, encompassing a variety of elements including capability and motivational factors like will within a situational context. Implicitly, this means that research must deal with explicating and delineating a state's internal dimensions including capability and motivational elements from those external factors, principally local context, that have impact. That is, we must build upon the recognition of "separateness" in the research of George (71), Russett (63) and Cottam (67) whose work in this area has displayed positive results in illustrating the demarcation between measuring power and evaluating its utility.\(^\text{15}\)

With this recognition of the importance of will as an explanatory variable, certain caveats must be explicitly stated prior to any research. First, will is almost impossible to measure accurately within the context of superpower foreign policy in the Third World. The reason for this is that our universe of cases includes no example of maximum exertion on the part of a superpower. Consequently, any estimation of will becomes speculative at best.

\(^{15}\)See George, Hall & Simon (71), Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence" \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution}, (June, 1963) and Richard Cottam (67) and also \textit{Foreign Policy Motivation: A General theory and Case Study}, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1977.
Second, standard measures of power for Third World cases defy equally standard measures of motivations (will) since the normal spectrum or continuum of exertion is confined by the nature of the case, or as Sprout calls it, "the policy-contingent framework" (Baldwin 79: 162-164). All Third World cases are not defined in survival terms for the superpowers, which means that our estimation of will must be sensitive to the limitations of existing conditions and not tied abstractly to an ideal notion of power (Baldwin 79: 161-165).

Third, one cannot simply rely on will as the final determinant of success or failure without actually being able to estimate its importance and weigh it against alternative explanatory factors. Some work already cited has been promising here but the problems of variable control and accepted measurement standards still remain. If these caveats are not explicitly recognized and addressed within research, then the amplification of one variable (will) and the down-playing of another (local context) becomes the result. As Baldwin pointed out:

> Among students of international politics there is a tendency to exaggerate the fungibility of power resources often to the point of ignoring scope and domain; but there is hardly any example of international power analysis that exaggerates the importance of contextual variables, i.e. the policy-contingency framework. (Baldwin 79: 168)

Balance of Power Theory and The Study of Superpower Foreign Policy

A related element of the realist paradigm that has adverse effects on the sub-field in question is the push for systemic theory or system-wide analysis. Embedded within the realist, and most recently neo-realist or structuralist literature is the drive for a holistic
explanation of international relations and all its relevant aspects including foreign policy. For realists like Aron, Kaplan and Rosecrance and so-called "neo-realists" like Waltz, Gilpin and Krasner, systems theory satisfies this desire because of its parsimony, testability and inclusiveness. Within this general approach, there has been a focus on various systems and sub-systems with a pre-occupation on balance of power both as a theory and as a system. It is this principal dimension of systems theory that is of primary concern for this research.

Many scholars have addressed balance of power and theories of polarity with significant yet inconclusive results. Disagreements have emerged regarding the definition, nature, utility and function of balance of power systems. However, the common thread running through all of this literature is a focus upon a sub-set of actors within the system, exclusively those dominant actors or states. It is precisely

16 See Gilpin (81), Waltz(79), and Krasner(85). For a critique of these works see Keohane (84).


18 Hans Morgenthau argued that balance of power was an illusionary outgrowth of competition for superior power among states who possessed non-quantifiable, ambiguous measures of actual power status (see Morgenthau 85: 207-217). Kaplan saw balance of power as an ideal type of system governed by a series of variables and their alignment among the dominant actors within the system (Kaplan (68)). Others like Deutsch & Singer and Waltz have differed over the nature of balance of power and its relationship to the incidence of conflict (Deutsch & Singer (64) and Waltz (59)).
this perspective that has brought negative consequences for the study of superpower foreign policy in the Third World.

According to Kenneth Waltz, a systems approach with a focus on balance of power is uninterested in anything below the system level with the exception of relative state capabilities. These capability measures are derived from the "objective" attributes discussed above and are static and relatively constant over time. As Keohane points out in reference to Waltz's use of systems theory:

To develop a systemic analysis, abstraction is necessary and one has to avoid being distracted by the vagaries of domestic politics and other variables at the level of the acting unit (Keohane 84: 509).

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, balance of power theory need only be concerned with "key states" within that system. As Waltz point out, the structure of the system is..."defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the major ones" (Waltz 79: 93). Similarly, another systems theorist, George Modelski viewed the study of regional sub-systems as an enterprise primarily concerned with Great Power influence and competition. For Modelski, the characteristics of a sub-system flow not from the attributes of the local actors but more from the presence and relationship they have to great power involvement. This advocacy of analysis that ignores "minor" states and focuses attention on only those actors that supposedly dominate the

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system (great or superpowers) fosters the phenomenon of "superpower ethnocentrism." 2

This problem is further exacerbated in studies of balance of power and its relationship to conflict. For example, Waltz's studies of bipolarity and conflict not surprisingly conclude that a tight bipolar system with two dominant superpowers capable of moderating "lesser states" in their behavior is the most desirable system for reducing conflict (Waltz 67). This naturally forces us to focus on those states uppermost in the hierarchy of actors. Although Rosecrance rejects Waltz's contention regarding tight bipolarity, he nonetheless advocates a superpower/power block domination with primary focus on the interplay of capabilities between the two dominant blocks thus overlooking more critical levels beneath the global arena (Rosecrance 63).

These authors represent a cadre of theorists who rely on a reduced scope of analysis in terms of the numbers of actors considered and the levels at which they interact. Their conclusions regarding polarity and balance of power politics help to invigorate an environment already well-schooled in global level, systems analysis, yet lacking in the consideration of local context and its relevant factors. As part of any analysis of superpower foreign policy, this is good, but as the

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2 Superpower ethnocentrism is a term devised for this study that refers to the almost exclusive focus on superpower actions, decisions, capabilities and motivations to explain foreign policy events around the globe. It is most prevalent in studies dealing with superpower foreign policy in select regions and how that policy manifests itself within the specific events taking place, i.e. conflict, civil war, revolution, etc. It is also pervasive in most studies that attempt to gauge outcome in relation to superpower intervention.
primary focus and indeed the starting and finishing point of study, it is a distortion, insensitive to the complexities of foreign policy.

Balance of Power and "Superpower Ethnocentrism"

Many authors in the sub-field have fallen prey to the assumptions embedded within much of balance of power theory. Most of these assumptions shift the focus of foreign policy research to constrained levels of analysis. For example, Uri Ra'anan organized his study of Soviet "allies" in the Third World and U.S. policy response through a perceptual "chessboard" of pawn for pawn, global strategy versus global strategy (Ra’anan 86: 1-17). According to Ra’anan and his associates, Soviet foreign policy is global in outlook and strategy, and must be examined at that level without allowing for the vagaries of specific cases to obscure the big picture. Thus, U.S. policy response to Soviet actions in Angola for example must first center upon what signals of resolve we will send to the Soviets and what pressure we can bring to bear on Cuba (Ra’anan 86: 87-125). Little or no consideration is taken of the internal situation save how it affects the global U.S.-Soviet competition. This focus on the global level for explanations regarding Third World events can be traced to certain assumptions within the balance of power literature.

In another example of this perspective, Alvin Rubinstein argues that increased Soviet intervention in the 1970’s was the result of three primary factors:

1) Increased Soviet power projection capability.
2) Soviet perception of U.S. inability or unwillingness to compete in the Third World.
3) Increased opportunity through political instability in Third World regions (Rubinstein in Maurer and Porth 84: 22).

For Rubinstein, two of these factors relate to power/capability calculations coupled with arguments regarding U.S. will. What emerges within analyses of specific cases or regions is that (1) and (2) are amplified in their saliency and (3) is treated as a secondary or tertiary determinant. Consequently, according to this outlook, in order to understand U.S.-Soviet policy in Africa, one must concentrate the analysis along the Washington-Moscow axis for primary causality and internal, indigenous events become secondary and in some cases superfluous.

Agreeably, determining the effects of local events on the global superpower relationship is an important issue. Yet often in these scholar's zest for conclusions regarding those effects, they simplify or fail to capture the nuances of activity below the bilateral, global level. Solutions to complex foreign policy issues in the Third World are given as bilateral policy recommendations: "go to the source" and "put pressure on Moscow." Without the most basic intellectual recognition of the need for multi-level analysis, the research in the sub-field cannot move past these more traditional notions of 19th century balance of power politics.

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22 For an examination of the positions and context behind these quotes-one attributed to Alexander Haig(81) and the other to Richard Nixon(70), see Seymour M. Hersch, The Pursuit of Power, Summitt books, New York, 1983 and William LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment? The United States, Nicaragua, and the Search for Peace in Central America," in International Security, Fall 86.
Balance of Power and the Implications for Strategy

As important as the de-emphasis on local context and multiple levels has become, an even more sweeping and prevalent issue has emerged since the mid-1970's. Significant work has been done that recognizes the importance of local context factors as part of the overall notion of superpower opportunity. Scholars like Bialer, Breslauer, Schulman, Menon, Valkenier, and Halliday have buttressed this more intellectually balanced perspective through their analyses of U.S.-Soviet policy in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Yet, even these scholars have a tendency to slip back into the bilateral perspective, particularly in their conclusions regarding U.S. policy recommendations.

For example, Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe in their exhaustive study of Soviet behavior in Third world conflicts present a clear and thorough historical picture of Soviet policy paying careful attention to the local and regional levels of analysis. Yet, in their section on policy responses and strategy, they rely upon bilateral, military-centric policies for the U.S. directed at the Soviet Union in order to "foreclose Soviet opportunities" (Hosmer & Wolfe 83: 179).

"Opportunity" has been given many meanings in the sub-field and little agreement exists as to how it is best conceptualized. Most scholars see opportunity in relation to superpower capability and policy. That is, a superpower has opportunity when it is able to create events conducive to expansion of influence or manipulate such events as they occur. Often, the local dimension of opportunity is underplayed.

This presents an intellectual contradiction that must be addressed. While Hosmer and Wolfe document and argue that local context factors are vital in explaining Soviet and U.S. opportunities and their success and failure, they still elevate their conclusions to a level designed not to address local factors but thwart global policy. If one is to argue that a series of variables significantly outside the reach of a particular state accounts to a large degree for the conditions under which that state must operate, then to recommend policy action that subsequently ignores those variables is counterintuitive.

Concurrently, these studies show an almost reflex-like reliance upon generic strategy to address unique and often complex events. For example, many of the lessons and conclusions that academics and policy-makers drew from the Vietnam experience focused on the importance of economic underdevelopment, institutional instability, and a lack of political socialization as prime explanations of instability—i.e., opportunities for local communists and by inference, the Soviet Union. Consequently, the strategy that emerged centered on economic aid, political education and the fostering of stability along with a

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25 See the literature on deterrence, strategy and its drawbacks including Jervis, Lebow and Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence*, Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, and Herrmann, "Perceptions of the Third World and Soviet-American Relations: Psychological Images and the Challenge for Strategy," (86). These and other authors make the argument that analysis of superpower foreign policy relies on strategy developed in an experiential vacuum. That is certain assumptions regarding superpower behavior are taken as givens and a strategy for addressing foreign policy is derived based on those assumptions. This is the case with deterrence strategy and also entire concept of will as it pertains to U.S.-Soviet competition.
policy of military aid to maintain internal and external security. This approach however is pre-planned, "standard operating procedure" strategy that assumes all Third World states exhibit similar mega-trends and follow similar political and social patterns of development. This strategy has been manifested most recently in the Kissinger Report on Central America and also in administration arguments regarding the maintenance of ties with the South African regime-constructive engagement.26

What is vital to any analysis of superpower foreign policy in Third World conflicts is that this strategy often ignores a key element of the local context that accounts in part for the adverse outcome of superpower policy in a host of examples (United States: El Salvador, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Iran; U.S.S.R.: Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia, Mali). This element is nationalism and the saliency that it has for local populations who desire self-determination separate from either superpower assistance or opposition. For many Third World states, foreign support and high profile kinds of aid stifle the concerns of nationalism for the population and consequently the legitimacy of the regime accepting that support. It is viewed in many cases as a recurring form of colonialism (neo-colonialism) with the "master" shifting from European to American or Russian.

The sub-field literature is filled with analyses that grapple with the problem of a lack of context recognition, yet ignore the implications in terms of strategy. Thus, they fail to draw accurate

lessons from the Vietnams, Irans and Afghanistas. Although the problem of level recognition is being rectified in terms of substantive analysis, it still remains within the conclusions of these analyses and consequently, hinders the sub-fields progress. Both problems are symptomatic of the systems theory/balance of power theory approach and the environment of globalism that it fosters.

THE STUDY OF SUPERPOWER FOREIGN POLICY: PATHS OF PROGRESS

This study in attempting to address the aforementioned shortcomings is grounded in research both within the sub-field and in other related areas of study. This includes studies in the area of Superpower foreign policy generally (Breslauer (83), George (83), Zartman (83), Johnson (85), Nation & Kauppi (83, 85), Donaldson (80)). It also encompasses work in the specific area of Sub-Saharan Africa and superpower involvement there (Bienen (82), Klinghoffer (80), Napper (80), Legum (79), Halliday (81), MacFarlane (84), Carter & O'Meara (82), Legvold (72)). Additionally, this research hopes to build upon more general theoretical and methodological work in foreign policy analysis (George & Smoke (74), George, et.al. (71), Gamson & Modigliani (71), Cottam (67, 77), Herrmann (84, 87), Jonsson (84), Keal (83), Isaphani (84), Snyder (85)).

The following section is an exploration of a cross section of this literature; its strengths, how it has addressed the issues discussed above and how it can be supplemented and enhanced. From this discussion, the research design of this dissertation can be placed in
its proper scope and its potential for contribution can be adequately explicated.

Superpower Foreign Policy and the Recognition of Local Context

A recognition of the myriad of levels with which superpower foreign policy must interact has come slowly but nonetheless emerged in the past decade. Consider for example, Robert H. Johnson who articulates the need for multi-level analysis by examining the ways in which U.S. policy-makers have conceived of threat in Third World conflicts, always in terms of Soviet involvement. He outlines six views of threat in the American policy-making community and examines their basic precepts, displaying the inadequacies in dealing with Third World conflicts in general.

In the "geostrategic" view, the U.S. places the target Third World state or region in a broader global conception, as in an East-West battle over mineral resources. In this conception, Soviet capabilities are associated with the ability to dictate outcome often beyond their (Soviet) power to do so. This clearly ignores the importance of local context (Johnson 85: 33-39). This is related to another of Johnson's conceptions, identified as the "historical departure" view. This sees Soviet actions as part of a significant shift from past behavior, becoming more "adventuresome" and less conservative (Johnson 85: 48-52). He argues that within this view the implicit assumption is that Third World states are pliable and relatively defenseless against such

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intervention. Thus, according to a synthesis of these views, it was a new policy of aggressive Soviet expansion that led to the interventions in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan and not as Johnson later argues, a set of separate responses to unique, local events (Johnson 85: 48-49).

Johnson’s analysis displays graphically how the problems outlined in the initial critique of the literature are personified in the scholarly conclusions regarding particular cases. His contention that the local and regional levels must be included addresses the concerns embedded within the phenomenon of "superpower ethnocentrism" discussed above. This explicit recognition of the importance of local context is necessary before a more accurate and complex analysis can be woven into the sub-field literature.

A second example of this shift in focus is displayed in an article by Henry Bienen, who echoes the reasoning behind Johnson’s analysis by stating:

Whatever the degree of independence that a particular African regime may have, if we focus only on Soviet motivations and neglect African realities, both in foreign policy realms and in domestic political spheres, we will not be able to understand either Soviet policies or their impact in Africa.28

Bienen’s explicit recognition of certain "realities" that serve to shape, enhance, or thwart superpower foreign policy brings us closer to an identifiable set of factors that can be delineated and examined across cases.

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A third research effort within this trend is the work by Craig R. Nation & Mark V. Kauppi. In their two general surveys of Soviet foreign policy in Africa and the Middle East, the contributing authors attempt to identify and emphasize the local and regional dynamics of Third World conflicts, how they effect Soviet policy, and concurrently dictate U.S. response. At the outset of their study on Soviet policy in Africa, Nation and Kauppi state their assumptions regarding such studies of superpower foreign policy in distinct regions by pointing out:

"The most important forces conditioning the role of outside powers in the continent remain those indigenous to the continent itself."²⁹

Although this may appear to be a statement of obvious fact, prior research in this area reveals that a focus on the local and regional levels is often bypassed in favor of the globalist perspective. Thus, the clear and explicit statement of the above assumption is vital to the restructuring of the intellectual debate on superpower foreign policy and its permanently operating factors. Without this initial recognition of fact, analytical frameworks to study superpower behavior are virtually impossible to construct. Yet, as mentioned above, this recognition still falls short of the necessary "conditions" that are required for cumulative research. This is also illustrated clearly in the work of Nation and Kauppi.

The aforementioned authors tease us with their conclusions regarding context importance and even provide a loose classification

scheme of context affect in the Middle East. They still fail to explicitly delineate local, regional and global levels into a framework that refers our study to a more complex set of questions. They also fail to focus the discussion on a more logically consistent vision of strategy based on those findings. The authors simply present the various local context factors that they see as important without any organizing framework.

Thus, we are left with two primary goals. The first centers on a way of systematically organizing and exploring these local context factors or "realities" in some analytical framework. The second is what proper methodological focus to take in order to maintain context "richness" while still being able to make substantive generalizations.

Frameworks and the Study of Superpower Foreign Policy

The utilization of an analytical framework has been applied to the Sub-Saharan African region in the exhaustive work of Arthur Jay Klinghoffer on Soviet policy in Angola. In this study, Klinghoffer begins with the explicit recognition of the saliency of local and regional levels and attempts to develop and "test" a set of alternative hypotheses concerning Soviet motivations and behavior within a pre-

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framework. Klinghoffer uses two prominent motivational assumptions about Soviet intentions (loosely referred to as expansionist and defensive) and examines the Angolan case in increments, constructing hypotheses and filtering evidence through each of these views.32

Although his conclusions regarding plausible Soviet motives are case specific, the method and approach are illustrative of efforts that can be expanded into more generalizable areas. Klinghoffer's effort serves a two-sided purpose. First, it displays substantively what multi-level analysis within a deductive frame can illustrate that earlier descriptive research could not. Second and perhaps more importantly, Klinghoffer shows how motivational assumptions about an actor's behavior can shape how evidence is examined, inculcated and processed by scholars and statesmen alike. As pointed out earlier in the critique of power and will, the difficulty in accurately measuring a motivational element like will leaves the discipline open to a series of assumptions and random rules of evidence inclusion that ultimately results in non-systematic analysis. Klinghoffer's illumination of this phenomenon serves the additional purpose of displaying the polemical implications of leaving calculations of actor motives hostage to author biases.

A second work that goes a step further by utilizing a deductive pre-framework is Larry Napper's article on superpower intervention in Angola and Rhodesia. This work addresses both of the issues (an

32This study takes each level or aspect of the conflict and constructs hypotheses reflecting the expansionist and defensive views of Soviet motives and then examines the evidence through these views. For an example of this see pp. 16-29 in reference to Soviet role in the internal dynamics of the respective movements.
analytical framework and comparative case methodology) mentioned above, and develops what can be termed a pre-framework for analyzing superpower foreign policy in the Third World. Napper distills from a comparative case study of two conflicts a set local and regional terrain variables that appear salient in explaining two divergent outcomes (success and failure) for superpower intervention.\textsuperscript{33} From these two cases, Napper identifies five terrain variables which he argues substantiates his thesis that...

\textit{...the history of recent U.S.-Soviet crises in the third world suggests that conditions and variables beyond the effective control of superpower policy-makers have set important parameters for U.S.-Soviet conflict (Napper 83: 155).}

These variables provide a pre-framework that is able to guide analysis not only for the Angolan and Rhodesia cases but for other cases in the region as well.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, Napper’s use of the comparative case study method further enhances his pre-framework by shifting the descriptive focus from the global level to include the local and regional levels as well.


\textsuperscript{34}the following is the list of the five terrain variables as outlined by Napper:

1) effectiveness of African regional organizations.
2) nature of the de-colonialization process.
3) local military situation.
4) role of South Africa.
5) Sino-Soviet competition.
Both of these authors have drawn the sub-field closer to addressing the first goal of adopting a way of organizing and explicating the various levels into some type of deductive framework that guides our analysis of cases. Napper's effort is the best example of this frame-building enterprise and as such leaves this study with a series of local and regional variables which can be incorporated into a more inclusive and generalizable framework. Further, Napper's study utilizes a methodology well-suited to the answering of the specific problems that the sub-field faces: the focused comparison case study method.

The methodology of focused comparison case study is best articulated in the work of Alexander George.\textsuperscript{35} Briefly, the structured focused comparison method allows the researcher to construct a set of hypotheses within a framework that focuses case analyses and channels conclusions into "theoretically relevant general variables" (George in Lauren 79: 48-52). As George points out:

> With this method, the investigator is able, of course, to uncover similarities among cases that suggest possible generalizations; but he is also able to investigate the differences among cases in a systematic manner (George 79: 50-51).

The analyst is thus able to construct, based on substantive and theoretical work, a set of variables and hypotheses that focus the case research and provide a multi-level frame within which all salient factors can be considered. Napper's set of terrain variables and their

\textsuperscript{35}For an explanation of the method itself see Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy. For an application of the method see George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 1974.
usage in the two cases provide a picture of how such a framework can be constructed, applied and adapted.

**Concept Identification and Superpower Foreign Policy**

In the more general area of foreign policy, the writings of Richard Cottam provide the sub-field, and this study in particular, with a set of parameters and assumptions regarding the specific behavior of superpower intervention and its interaction with local context (Cottam 67 & 77). In Cottam's work on "competitive interference," he explores U.S. policy options in an era of Cold War/limited engagement conflicts. This is accomplished by examining the concepts of interference (and implicitly intervention) and tolerance in foreign policy and placing them within a framework for studying specific cases (Cottam 67: 1-150). Cottam's contributions to the sub-field include his conceptualization of levels or types of interference and how these interact with tolerance for both initiating (superpower) as well as target states. Here, Cottam correctly illustrates the element of interference in foreign policy as a pervasive phenomenon in the international system and one that must be viewed not along standard dichotomies of interference/non-interference but as a continuum with varying levels and degrees. This approach to the concept of interference will be utilized in this studies operationalization of both conflict and intervention in the research design to follow.

Another contribution of Cottam's centers on his discussion of power as an relational concept that is dependent not only on a state's
"measure" of power potential with other salient factors but also on the "strategic interaction" of that power (Cottam 67: 78-116). The concept of "strategic interaction" refers to an understanding of power that is contingent upon the interaction of both objective and subjective elements within a defined context. Implicit here is the notion that the context is fluid and that no one power measurement is constant. This serves to bolster earlier arguments regarding power, its relative fungibility and relational dependency (Morgenthau 85, Baldwin 79 and Keohane, 84). Finally, Cottam's linkage of strategy with the conclusions derived from an application of the framework reinforces the need for logical policy recommendations based on multi-level analyses.

Each of these authors cited have served to address the theoretical, substantive and methodological issues outlined in the first section of this chapter with varying degrees of success. The more general philosophy of science concerns regarding cumulative knowledge building can only be addressed through the satisfaction of these problems. Thus, future research efforts within the sub-field should maintain the interactive and deductive nature of the work cited.

CONCLUSION

The sub-field of superpower foreign policy in the Third World is both an affected spectator and contributing participant to the growth or stagnation of theory-building in international relations. Due to its policy-charged nature, the sub-field seems to amplify those aspects of the literature that are detrimental (the operationalization and definition of power, the globalist environment of balance of power
theory and the adverse implications for strategy) while remaining mired in polemical battles over post-hoc arguments concerning will. The recognition of these problems is well documented and not taxing on one's logical impulses. Yet, scholarly efforts at transcending these issues and focusing on what George terms "pre-theory building" are still lacking in the sub-field as a whole. The primary question then becomes, how can the positive developments of Bienen, Napper, Klinghoffer, George and Cottam be enhanced, opening up a series of research efforts that can be pursued?

The research design that will follow in chapter three will make use of these authors' analytical spadework and attempt to satisfy the following concerns. First, it will provide us with an explicit conceptualization and operationalization of those elements of superpower behavior—commitment, capability and intervention that relate to foreign policy outcome. Second, it will delineate this global level of analysis from local and regional levels operationalizing those local context factors into variables that can be observed and weighted in relation to outcome. Third, it will utilize the structured focused comparison method to build upon the work of George and Napper and illustrate a framework that can provide valuable conclusions for scholars and policy-makers alike based on generalizable variables. Finally, it will make policy conclusions with implications for strategy that are context-sensitive and non-generic.

Without a constant reminder of both the strengths and weaknesses of past efforts, no research will move past the polemics of argumentation and into the realm of knowledge cumulation and theory-
building. Understanding how the sub-field of superpower foreign policy in the Third World developed the problems of the present is the first step in achieving progress. The next step is incorporating this understanding into actual research.
CHAPTER III
THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF INTERVENTION, LOCAL CONTEXT, CONFLICT AND OUTCOME WITHIN AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION

Any dissertation must ground itself within a body(s) of literature in order to adequately explain its potential contributions. Yet, a logical extension of this process is the presentation of a research design that not only builds upon that literature but illuminates the critical aspects of the discussion in order to move into the area of application. Chapter one presented a brief rationale for the dissertation and outlined the key elements of the research effort. Chapter two provided the theoretical underpinnings of this study and discussed why this research is important within the relevant literature. The following chapter will specifically define and operationalize the key concepts, present the research design and methodology to be employed, and outline the criteria for case selection. This process will bring together the salient aspects of chapters one and two into a cohesive framework that will lead us into the realm of practical application.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

This section will clearly and systematically define the concepts that are germane to the research design. These include intervention, local context, conflict, and outcome (success and failure). Each of
these concepts will be operationalized according to their application within the framework. Following which, we will describe how these newly defined concepts will be incorporated into a cohesive research design.

Definition and Operationalization of Conflict

As discussed in chapter one and substantiated by a variety of scholars in various fields, we can identify political/military conflict between competing actors for years whether at the intra or interstate levels. However, this recognition serves no useful analytical purpose unless the broad concept of "conflict" can be whittled down to a more manageable form. Within the notion of conflict, we can identify certain events or "stages of events" that escalate the conflict into different plateaus of competition distinct from previous and less intense levels. Generally, this represents the development of a largely political conflict into a military-dominated one with the mobilization of military forces, combat confrontations, and with this behavior, a concerted push to change the existing political authority structure or insulate it against change (i.e. expand territorial control, control the capital or disputed area, or eradicate other political entities as viable groups).

The rationale for reformulating this concept stems from the conception of Third World conflict in terms of stages of development.¹

¹The notion of conflict in the Third World being delineated into stages or levels of intensity is not new. Most studies in attempting to examine cases in depth implicitly acknowledge stages of conflict whether the demarcations are characterized by actor involvement, military force used, or number of casualties. Some general work that
Depending upon the issue involved, (usually involving control of the regime itself or issues centered on self-determination) the following stages are identified in all emerging conflicts.

**CONFLICT STAGE 1:** usually entails acts of civil disobedience against the established government centered on issues of political/economic or social concern. **Example:** the passive resistance campaigns of Ghandi in India, King in the USA or the early non-violent movement of the ANC in South Africa.

**CONFLICT STAGE 2:** the organization of groups with discernible structures and agendas in opposition to the government and usually working outside the "legal" means of expression. That is not taking part in elections.

**CONFLICT STAGE 3:** the organization of multiple groups in opposition to the government and the expansion of dissatisfaction as measured through the proliferation of such groups. This is usually evidenced by increasing disaffection for the regime by previously legal opposition and their movement into civil disobedience. **Example:** The continued expansion of opposition groups in Chile, South Korea, and South Africa.

**CONFLICT STAGE 4:** the commitment of groups in opposition to the dominant political authority to violent action against that authority with the subsequent militarization of the groups in question. **Example:** the adoption of violence by the ANC in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre.

**CONFLICT STAGE 5:** the active pursuit of outside support and aid by the opposition groups now committed to violent action to achieve their goals. **Example:** the moves by the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in the 1961-1974 period in Angola.

CONFLICT STAGE 6: military hostilities between the government or dominant faction and opposition groups, usually on a small scale with limited military effect. Example: The periodic skirmishes between liberation groups and the Portuguese authority in Angola and Mozambique from 1960-1974 and the ongoing Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.

CONFLICT STAGE 7: factional skirmishes between groups competing for control of the political authority structure or the intensification of the fighting between groups and the dominant political authority. Example, the recent intensification of the Tamil insurgency against the Sri Lankan government.

CONFLICT STAGE 8: military action by one group against another or the regime with the aim of changing the existing political authority structure or reducing the target group or groups capability. This means full-scale hostilities with the significant (in terms of the scale of the conflict) commitment of military force and an apparent drive for a military solution to the conflict. This usually means an escalation to the point of civil war with political solutions placed on hold. Example: The Chadian military attacks against rebel positions in 1986 and subsequent defeat of Libyan forces in 1987. The military campaign launched by the El Salvadoran guerrillas against the government in 1983.

The primary conflict stage that this study will focus on is conflict stage 8. This represents the most extreme form of Third World conflict in that sufficient militarization and polarization has taken place to potentially create the most damaging type of conflict for local as well as non-local participants.

Not all cases of instability or "conflict" within the Third World follow each of these stages in a sequential order, nor are all of these stages ever reached in each instance. In some cases civil disobedience is effective and achieves the desired political result with no need for movement beyond it. In other cases escalation from stage 1 or 2 to stage 6 or 7 takes place within a relatively short period, often "skipping" over stages in between. One example of the adoption of conflict stage 7 almost at the outset of a conflict is the case of Peru.
where the Shining Path have launched an ambitious guerrilla war against the government without the discernible presence of previous "conflict stages."

This classification of conflict into stages is aimed at trimming the concept to a more analytically manageable level without losing its core characteristics in the process. The way in which a conflict will be identified in this research is best explained through an actual illustration.

If we take the case of the Angolan civil war, it is clear that elements of all eight of these stages are present throughout the period of nationalist efforts at independence (1955-1976). Yet, conflict stage 8 with the corresponding military escalation between factions, the concerted push to take control of the capital (Luanda) and the political authority structure, and the enormous increase in actual battlefield attacks does not take place until approximately March 1975.

Consequently, point 'C' represents the beginning of the "conflict" for the purposes of this study.

FIGURE 2
CONFLICT INITIATION

In this case, up until March 1975, the rivalry between the various factions in Angola and the Portuguese government had been relegated to skirmishes of little effect, sabotage and political jockeying abroad to gain support in whatever future regime might emerge. Once a timetable was set for Portuguese withdrawal and the subsequent coalition
agreement (Alvor) between the factions was abrogated, the conflict, its scope and the numbers of participants quickly escalated into and beyond stage 8 status. This illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of conflict in the Third World and the need to make substantive demarcations that capture this.

This division of "conflict" into stages and the decision to focus on conflict stage 8 is not intended to ignore prior events that helped to escalate the conflict to the present level. These important background factors will be utilized to set the stage for the temporal period of study. However, this study's focus is still on superpower intervention within explicitly defined parameters and, as such, will be concerned with superpower behavior prior to the actual initiation of the conflict only in terms of its relationship to the local context.²

Definition and Operationalization of Intervention

The type of behavior to be explored in this research effort is intervention. Intervention as an analytical concept has been debated by a number of scholars over the past two decades with mixed results and limited consensus.³ What many past efforts seem to have in common

²Prior superpower involvement and policy with respect to the conflict serves the interests of this framework in terms of its effect on the conflict period itself. This "historical" information allows us to chart prior behavior as it impacts on the local context at the initiation point of the conflict. Thus, intervention becomes meaningful for our study only after the conflict has begun. Prior to this time, intervention serves to inform our understanding of the local context.

³There is an abundance of work here that illustrates the concern with intervention as a foreign policy behavior and the disagreement over exactly what it is and what does it entail. Examples of this debate include James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," Journal
is a limited conception of the proper scope of the behavior. Too many scholars have interpreted intervention as a pervasive and inclusive phenomenon. As has already been established, the concepts of intervention and interdependence have become central to the emerging literature on international and transnational relations. Yet, recognizing this calls into question the utility of the concept if it is to be so broadly conceived as to include all inter-state contact. Thus, not unlike conflict, we must find a way to make substantive and logical delineations between types of intervention behavior. This means that the concept of "intervention" must be viewed as separate from the more general behavior termed involvement. Consequently, intervention must be defined and operationalized with this reduced scope in mind.

In terms of its definition, diplomatic and political involvement between states on the order of trade negotiations and cultural exchanges represent a form of behavior best characterized as involvement and one separate from intervention (See chapter one pp. 3-5). These activities are omnipresent in the world system today and


The literature here is pervasive including studies focusing on interrelationships at the local, regional and state as well as supra-state levels. For a few seminal works on the subject, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics, Roseau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalism of World Affairs, Galtung, The True Worlds, Haas, Beyond the Nation-State.
thus present no useful analytical inclusion that concerns this study. Further, the multitude of activities at this level do not, in most cases, represent behavior during recognized crisis periods where conflict is present or fundamental interests are at stake. Thus, to equate trade negotiations with military intervention during a conflict dilutes the concept of intervention beyond any analytically useful degree.

Consequently, intervention is defined in this study as a shift in behavior by one state directed at another state or actor in a specified target area aimed at changing the existing political authority structure or insulating it against change. It is limited in time and scope and this shift is temporally identifiable. Although it is believed that intervention is limited in its duration, it does not rule out the possibility of such behavior going on for years within the context of a particular Third World conflict.

It is important that we carefully explore the various aspects and implications of this definition of intervention. First, a central element is the goal of changing the existing political authority structure or insulating it against change. As has already been established, the concern here is with conflict situations and, as such, the viability of a particular regime or political faction is at stake. Consequently, intervention is explicitly aimed at the support of a certain faction or regime in order to further its goals, whether they be maintenance or change. This is distinguished from attempts by the superpowers to influence a particular policy or regime position with
incentives and disincentives. This study's definition of the behavior in question is concerned only with the former.

Second, intervention obviously occurs outside the boundaries of the superpower and can be directed at a regime, in support of a regime or in the absence of established political authority, in support of a faction attempting to gain such authority. It is not, as other authors would argue, only applicable in inter-state (governmental) relations.

Third, scholars have argued that intervention is by nature negative in that it represents only uni-lateral action by a state usually without the consent of the local target actor or actors. Frequently, arguments are made both in scholarly and policy circles that being "invited in" makes intervention moot and that after this invitation, the behavior ceases to be intervention. The question of invitation is an important one but only within the context of examining the opportunities for intervention and not in delineating between intervention and other forms of behavior. It is argued that an "invitation" can tell us something about the fertility of the local context in terms of superpower intervention, but it still does not change the nature of the behavior. Thus, whether local forces seek superpower intervention or not is irrelevant in terms of defining the behavior itself.

Intervention can best be analyzed in terms of levels, each representing a higher degree of superpower intervention. The following

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5 For a good discussion of this see David Baldwin, "Foreign Aid, Interference and Influence," World Politics, XXI No. 3 April 1969, pp. 425-447.
The operationalization of intervention is based around three "firebreaks" or cut-off points that aid us in visualizing these levels.

The first distinction relates to the active combat involvement by the superpower or proxy (ally). The following three sub-levels make up the general level of high degree of intervention.

**HIGH 1:** The direct use of force in a conflict in support of a local group or faction. This can include ground forces, air defense personnel, combat commanders, etc. **EXAMPLE:** The use of Soviet personnel in the air defense of Egypt in the 1969–War of Attrition. The use of American forces in the invasion of Grenada, 1983.

**HIGH 2:** The use of force by ally or proxy in support of the local faction with superpower aid and acquiescence. **EXAMPLE:** Soviet aid to Egypt in their intervention in the Yemeni Civil War of 1962–1970.

**HIGH 3:** The allocation of military aid and the training of combatants by superpower personnel within the territorial boundaries of the conflict in question. This represents superpower personnel in a non-combat yet direct role in the conflict itself. **EXAMPLE:** U.S. training of El Salvadoran forces in their civil war with leftist guerrillas 1981–87. Soviet support personnel training and aiding Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam Conflict 1965–75.

The key distinction in this category is the active nature of superpower intervention within the territorial confines of the conflict itself, whether in a combat role or in direct support of one. This denotes a clearly active and "high" risk venture on the part of the superpowers. Any conflict situation that would prompt direct intervention by superpower personnel with the corresponding risks to life and prestige as well potential for further intervention, represents the highest degree of intervention short of a formal declaration of war.

The second distinction represents efforts made by a superpower outside of a direct combat role, either in terms of participation or
training locally, along with the covert use of force or threat of force.

**MODERATE 1:** The use of coercion to reduce or eliminate a target state or groups capabilities and thus hinder its chances for gaining control of the political authority structure. This includes activities such as political assassinations, sabotage of economic and political infrastructure, etc. This usually means covert activities carried out by agents of the superpower in concert with local forces. **EXAMPLE:** U.S. destabilization and coup instigation against Allende in Chile 1973. Soviet support for coup attempt by communist party in the Sudan 1971.

**MODERATE 2:** The threat of the use of force by a superpower aimed at directly affecting the outcome of a conflict for a particular group or faction. This includes largely public threats of retaliation for action, the movement of military force into the region of the conflict such that it is within striking distance for possible intervention, etc. **EXAMPLE:** U.S. nuclear alert put in place in response to Soviet moves during the 1973 Middle East War. Soviet airlift of two divisions to within striking distance of the Middle East conflict in 1973.

Both of these sub-levels represent intervention by the superpowers of a less direct nature than the high category. Superpower behavior in this category is not of a direct combat nature, but it does include impact oriented behavior in terms of the covert use of force or threat of force. Thus, there is no direct superpower presence within the conflict itself save "covert" intervention designed to have impact without notification of presence.6

The third and final distinction or sub-level represents those efforts made by a superpower outside the territorial confines of the

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The term covert has lost much of its original meaning in this age of media exposure, leaks and public versus private policy. Many times a covert operation is one that simply is discovered rather than announced by the regime itself. In this study, covert simply refers to those actions designed to support a faction and affect an outcome that is not publically acknowledged by the superpower in question.
conflict and usually involving more indirect methods. Indirect refers to action that is supportive rather than participatory.

**LOW 1: The covert and overt funding and training (outside the territorial confines of the conflict) of factions committed to political authority change or insulation against change.** This sub-level represents efforts made largely for military use within the confines of the conflict. This includes training guerrillas on a superpower’s or contiguous territory the granting of military aid and its delivery to forces within the conflict, etc. **EXAMPLE:** U.S. support for the rebels in Afghanistan. Soviet aid for the Polisario in their war in the Western Sahara with Morocco.

This sub-level represents the base level for interventionary behavior and as such will be the starting point for our analysis of intervention as it is tracked through the cases of conflict. It is recognized that in some cases, superpower presence in terms of levels of intervention will have been present prior to the actual initiation of the conflict. This is important only in terms of mapping the historical contours of the case itself and not in terms of charting the intervention through the relevant period of the conflict. Our focus on intervention begins after the initiation of conflict (stage 8 status) and thus, any substantive conclusions made as to its effects are confined to the post-conflict period.

A second point that requires explication is that these sub-levels are delineated based on the behavior of the superpowers. It is possible that interventionary behavior at moderate level 2 may have a greater impact on the conflict than intervention at high 2, yet this is not germane in defining and operationalizing intervention itself. The impact is salient only in explaining outcome in concert with local context. The identification of intervention is concerned only with
superpower behavior and not with its effects. Effects imply relationship and as such, the sub-levels have no meaning within the cases until combined with an analysis of their interaction with local context. It is at this point that their impact will be analyzed.

Definition and Operationalization of Local Context

Perhaps the most important yet most difficult enterprise within this research effort is the definition and operationalization of local context. As inclusive and potentially debilitating as intervention and conflict can be (in terms of their scope), local context carries many more analytical pitfalls that must be traversed. Local context is conceived in order to address the concerns stated in chapters one and two regarding level inclusion and depth of analysis. In general, it is designed to estimate the relative "penetrability" or opportunity of the local conflict to successful superpower intervention.

The notion of opportunity has been used extensively in the sub-field to reflect superpower notions of foreign policy affect and involvement. It is almost always conceived of in terms of superpower

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perceptions and capabilities with respect to local situations. As in other efforts, most scholars down-play the "local" aspect of this term and tend to focus on the superpower-centric factors that determine opportunity. The use of local context in this study attempts to re-shape the focus and restructure opportunity into something locally determined and dependent. It is the contention of this research that local and regional level factors determine an "objective measure" of opportunity that can be identified and roughly calculated for the purpose of juxtaposing it with intervention. This so-called objective opportunity is derived from an examination of certain key local and regional variables and their alignment in relation to the conflict itself.

These variables are derived through an examination of the relevant literature in the sub-field and the drawing together of several efforts in this area. Each of the local context variables taps, in part, this concept of opportunity and creates a general sense of the prospects for successful superpower intervention. Again, this does not refer to the decision to intervene but rather to the period after intervention occurs. It is possible that an argument could be made that these factors as they are conceived in this study do have an impact on the actual decision process depending largely on perceptions of

1982.

The principle research efforts here that provide the theoretical base of local context from which a more comprehensive list could be formed include Larry Napper, "The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet in Angola and Rhodesia: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention," in George (83), Richard Cottam (67), George & Smoke (71), Bender, Coleman & Sklar (85) and, Nation and Kauppi (83).
opportunity, but this is an area for later speculation and not the principal focus of this effort.  

There are six local context variables each containing a set of indicators posed as questions to estimate the degree of opportunity. These variables are:

1) The Local Military Balance  
2) Local Factionalism  
3) The Role of the State of Influence  
4) The Role of Regional States  
5) The Role of Regional Organizations  
6) The Level of Tolerance for Intervention

These variables roughly estimate the degree of opportunity for the local conflict. For example, if the role of regional states in a particular conflict is one of a highly partisan nature, in which sides have been taken and supplies provided increasing the rivalry to a regional stature, then we can theorize that opportunities for successful superpower intervention increase, since conduits of support exist in the presence of involved regional states. Conversely, if these states are cohesive in a policy toward the conflict and are able to enforce that among the contiguous states such that each will abide by the prescripts of that policy, then the opportunity for successful intervention decreases since regional support may be lacking or indeed


10 Each of these with their indicators are illustrated in Appendix A.
counter-productive. This will be fleshed out in greater detail in the research design to follow.

Once a conflict has been defined and established an examination of these variables and their alignment will provide us with an estimate of the potential for successful intervention which can be updated temporally through the case itself. Thus, local context acts as the independent variable in this study.

Definition and Operationalization of Outcome

Success and failure like intervention are fluid concepts with a high degree of relatively in the real world of foreign policy. In fact, if we were to rely on policy-maker's definitions of these concepts for our study, we would find few superpower "failures" and many more "successes." In objective terms, one need only examine the history of superpower-Third World policy to see a myriad of failures ranging from Egypt, Iran and Ethiopia to Ghana, Mali and Nicaragua. Coupled with this is the extremely tenuous nature of these set-backs since superpowers often re-establish ties with states previously considered enemies.11 Because of this, success and failure must not only be expanded to include varying degrees and levels but also studied over time to capture their changing nature.

In addition, success and failure carry with them a series of value judgments that often present us with constant qualifiers regarding our evaluations of superpower behavior. Some argue that success and

11Examples include the continued warming of relations between the USSR and Egypt and the USA and China.
failure are not measurable within the context of any foreign policy event since often the fruits of such behavior are not apparent for years and in some instances generations. This however is intellectually unsuitable for our research. Foreign policy scholarship has established the truly short-term, nature of a states foreign policy behavior such that some "objective" measure of success or failure is often discernible within limited time intervals. Thus, we can argue that success (and by definition failure) is a desired, short-term goal of the superpowers and can be identified and defined within our research design.

Consequently, success and failure are operationalized in the following manner, containing five salient variables. These variables provide us with five classifications of outcome that can be charted throughout and beyond the lives of the cases in question. The five variables are:

1) The military position of the faction in question vis-a-vis other rivals in the conflict
2) The territorial control of the faction in question
3) The degree of international recognition of the faction in question
4) The form of political control over territory that the faction utilizes
5) The degree of superpower opposition to their political and military position

Five categories of success and failure are derived from these variables such that each case can be categorized for the relevant superpower(s). These categories are:
A) Success
B) Limited Success
C) Stalemate
D) Limited Failure
E) Failure

Each of these categories is derived from the alignment of the variables outlined above. For example, success is achieved when the faction in question achieves control of the political authority structure, receives international recognition and is in the dominant military position vis-a-vis other factions. At present, superpower intervention against its authority is minimal at best and it exercises effective territorial control over most major areas along with exercising effective political control either through co-optation, neglect or appeals to nationalism. A complete outlining of each of these is contained in Appendix B.

These four concepts represent the core theoretical base of this research effort. Each one, operationalized in the above form, creates the general framework within which the initial research question can be answered. Estimating the effects of local context on the outcome of superpower intervention requires that the scope of these concepts be focused in order to make generalizations possible without being saddled by endless caveats. This has been the primary goal of the above section.

The concepts of intervention, local context, outcome and conflict reflect the interacting elements of a greater substantive and theoretical issue. This is to what degree can the "regionalist" and

12 Each of these are defined based on the answers to the questions in the five variables. These are defined in depth in Appendix C.
"globalist" perspectives be separated, identified and then fused together into a coherent analysis of intervention in conflict situations?  

The fruits of this effort at delineation and definition are still awaiting discovery. Only through a clear research design and methodology that can incorporate these levels and allow for context rich analysis can these "fruits" be explicated. This is the next task at hand.

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The concepts outlined above reflect the theoretical underpinnings of this research effort. Explicating them provides us with a sense of what will be explored and why. Yet, without a clear enunciation of how these factors fit together, they are merely subjective concepts without any analytical meaning. The next task becomes one of integrating these

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13 The terms regionalist and globalist will utilized throughout this study. They are best conceptualized in the work of Bender, Coleman and Sklar, African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1985. In this study, the authors juxtapose two conflicting conceptions of U.S. policy in Africa. The globalist view, sees U.S. policy in Africa as a calculation of interests vis-a-vis the Soviets, acting within the "larger" considerations of access to strategic materials, denial of military bases, etc. The regionalist view sees U.S. policy more in tune with local and regional African issues like black majority rule, economic independence for the SADCC states and so forth.

These scholars and many others (Sinner (86), Jackson (82), Lemarchand (81), Msabaha & Shaw (87), Feinberg (83)) see superpower foreign policy as largely globalist, down-playing or ignoring local and regional factors that act as vital components of the success and failure of those policies. They argue that a more regionalist perspective on the part of policy-makers and scholars alike will best serve analyses of superpower foreign policy in Africa and throughout the third world.
concepts within a framework that satisfies the needs of systematic research without sacrificing their unique nature.

This section will first articulate the specific methodology of the dissertation displaying how the concepts defined above will be examined in order to chart patterns across cases. The methodology to be employed is the structured focused comparison case method and its application will be illustrated in depth. Second, a detailed description of the research design will follow displaying how the cases will be analyzed. Finally, the criteria for case selection will be presented and evaluated.

The Method of Structured Focused Comparison

In chapter one, the method of structured focused comparison was briefly introduced as the preferred method for the research concerns of this study. This method, best explicated in the work of Alexander George, centers on the utilization of case analyses within a deductive framework of hypotheses and questions generated from a set of generalizable and theoretically relevant variables. The overall purpose behind this method is to "test" alternative propositions to further the process of theory building. As George himself points out in reference to this methodology:

Theory attempts to absorb the "lessons" of a variety of historical cases within a single comprehensive analytical framework; it is the

14 The term "test" does not refer to statistical testing in order to prove or disprove alternative hypotheses. Rather, in this analysis, we are attempting to juxtapose alternative views of local context and its effects on superpower intervention in order to illustrate plausible arguments for their relative success or failure.
task of theory to identify the many conditions and variables that affect historical outcomes and to sort out the causal patterns associated with different historical outcomes. (George in Lauren 79: 44)

In this sense the structured focused comparison method is but a general label denoting a series of differing approaches to case analysis, each utilizing differing elements or approaches to case study. The primary "sub-method" that this study will employ is known as the "disciplined-configurative" method. Basically, this approach centers around four basic elements or "rules."

First, the researcher recognizes the necessity for specific knowledge that only detailed case research can provide, yet concomitantly he also sees the difficulties in generalizations from such analyses. Thus, it becomes necessary to examine cases through an "analytical/inductive" framework that focuses the research into generalizable factors or variables that are utilized to examine a specific class of behavior.

Second, an inductive element is introduced in that the researcher is intellectually aware not only of the behavior to be studied but of its general patterns across cases and of the salient factors that are

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15 These "sub-methods" discussed by Eckstein and George range from the heuristic to plausibility to crucial case study. These are discussed in depth in the literature cited. What is important to note here is that each "sub-method" satisfies certain specific concerns of various researchers and does not simply represent increasing or decreasing analytical power. Overall, all research that utilizes case studies in a more than historical/descriptive manner utilizes parts of all of these "sub-methods" and this research effort is no exception.

important. Consequently, variables are pre-selected based in part on prior theoretical work and also on pre-case work to examine assumptions and hypotheses.¹⁷

Third, the hypotheses and assumptions regarding the interplay of these variables and their effects are stated up front prior to the research so they can be evaluated against the weight of evidence.

Finally, the framework is amenable to adaptation based on the introduction of new material and knowledge from the subsequent case analyses. This final aspect also brings in elements of the "heuristic" case study method as it has been used in research cited earlier, particularly in the work of Napper (Napper 83).

George in his discussion and usage of this methodology introduces two additional criteria for the researcher. The first is the researcher must clearly define the type of behavior to be examined whether it is deterrence, conflict or in this case intervention. A second point is cases must be analyzed "selectively." That is the framework and salient variables guide or channel the analysis of the case rather than having the historical description of events focus the study (George 79: 50). This means rather than following a mere chronology of events, the case study(s) is examined through the framework focusing on those factors pre-selected as germane to the research question(s) being asked. Both of these caveats are important elements of the research design to follow.

¹⁷For a discussion of this deductive/inductive dynamic see George "Case Studies and theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison" in Lauren, Diplomacy, New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, pp. 43-53.
The Framework

The method discussed above will be applied to the concepts outlined in the first section in the following manner. Each case will be analyzed through a timeline approach centered on the concepts already outlined and defined: intervention, conflict, local context and outcome. First, each case will have a brief historical background on the development of the key actors and issues. Second, the initiation of the conflict will be identified using the operationalization of conflict outlined above. This 'C' point represents that event when the situation reaches conflict stage 8 status and those factors contained within that stage become dominant. This signals the beginning of our examination of the case through the variables of intervention and local context.

The next step entails an estimation of the local context and its relative "penetration" potential for successful superpower intervention. This entails an examination of the six intervention variables and the analysis of their indicators which are posed as questions.18 As demonstrated, each local context variable has a series of salient indicators posed as dichotomous questions that aggregated can give us a rough estimation of the role, or lack of, of a particular aspect of the local context (i.e. local factionalism, the role of regional states, the level of tolerance for intervention, etc.). These "scores" for the variables are dichotomized into [+/-] with '+' representing higher potential for successful intervention and

18See Appendix I.
'-' representing lower potential for successful intervention. This step will give us a series of six "scores" corresponding to each local context variable and allow us to chart an aggregate "score" for the local context in general. The following illustration of a hypothetical case will further clarify this step.

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE A</th>
<th>LOCAL CONTEXT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT POINT 1</td>
<td>+ + + + + +</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The (+ or -) values derived for each variable and the overall score reflect the positive or negative impact on successful superpower intervention. Hence, the overall potential for successful intervention in CASE A is high (+). Once this step is complete, an analysis of the interaction of local context with superpower intervention begins with the first step being the identification of the intervention points of one or both superpowers (I). This too is done using the earlier operationalization of intervention and the identification of its respective levels as they shift. Once this intervention point has been charted, each case will be examined at prescribed intervals (for ex. 3 months, t1...t2...t3...etc) with updated readings of the level of intervention, the local context (any shifts from the initial reading) and the outcome status.

The actual intervals that will be utilized in each case will differ for two reasons. First, the individual time frames for each
case range from 3 weeks to 4-5 years. Some cases, like Angola, lend themselves to division in 3 month increments while others do not. Due to the specific analytical needs of each case, no prescribed and generalizable time intervals will be used. Second, the specific intervals are not germane to our overall comparison of cases since we are more concerned with comparisons across variable configuration and affect rather than time. For an illustration of this see Appendix D.

What emerges is an in depth examination of the case (conflict) with prescribed readings of the level of intervention, the local context and its malleability for successful intervention and the outcome status of that intervention. The outcome will be analyzed both in the initial period following the conflict and also in a post-script over an extended period of time (@ 3-5 years) to determine subsequent shifts in the success or failure of the intervention.

The key question that will be answered through the application of this research design is:

What effect does local context have on the success and failure of superpower intervention in Third World conflicts?

By charting out the levels of intervention, local context and outcome across a series of cases, it is believed that we can answer this question under specific conditions and with an aim towards general conclusions across a wide variety of instances.

Case Selection

It is important that the selection of cases for examination satisfy the analytical needs of the framework and the substantive
concerns regarding generalizable information. Without an examination of "like" cases, focusing on the same class of behavior, we lead the discipline into conclusions that are case specific and behavior ignorant. Thus, the choice of cases must reflect the criteria set forth in our construction of the framework in addition to moving us toward answering the initial research question.

This means that since the framework is designed to provide results that are comparable across cases as well as important conclusions within each, it is necessary that this selection reflect differing dimensions of the specific behavior that we are examining, namely intervention. Specifically, this means that only by examining instances of both U.S. and Soviet intervention can we best illustrate the explanatory power of the framework. Consequently, the selection of cases will reflect three differing intervention "patterns".¹⁹

The following criteria for case selection are first: the examination of cases of superpower intervention as defined in the operationalization of that concept. This does not entail all acts of involvement across the full diplomatic spectrum, but rather is only concerned with interventionary behavior of a specific form.²⁰ Also, as mentioned earlier, we are concerned in this study with the effects of local context on intervention once that intervention has taken place. We are not examining the decision to intervene and as such, cases with

¹⁹These are: cases of Soviet intervention, U.S. intervention and cases of varying levels of both.

²⁰See discussion of the definition and conceptualization of intervention in this chapter pp. 58-64.
no intervention by either superpower are not applicable in this study.

Second, we are looking at cases of conflict in the Third World of a particular nature and type. As has already been specified, conflict can be used inclusively to denote all forms of activities from political unrest to labor strikes to assassinations. We are concerned with only one specific level or degree of conflict in this study and as such will confine our cases to this form.\(^{21}\)

Third, the substantive area of interest for this study is Sub-Saharan Africa for a variety of reasons already stated.\(^{22}\) In this study, Sub-Saharan Africa refers to that area south of and including the Sahel countries of Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. It excludes the North African states of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. This distinction made frequently in many studies of the region reflects the more homogeneous nature of the North African and Maghreb states with other states of the Middle East. This does not suggest that these states do not play an important role in African affairs. Rather, the geographic demarcation is used as an analytical tool for our study.

Fourth, this study is concerned with intervention during a period of political, military and international "parity" between the

\(^{21}\)See the discussion and operationalization of conflict in this chapter pp. 54-58.

\(^{22}\)A discussion of these reasons can be found in chapter one, pp. 9-11. Perhaps the most important centers on the need for studies within the sub-field that can provide us with frameworks and conclusions that are generalizable across cases and regions without diluting the distinctness of these third areas to the point of abstraction. One of the key points of contention with the prior literature has been its ignorance of these areas in their drive for "globalistic" conclusions. A region specific focus diminishes the adverse effects of this approach.
superpowers. Hence the operative time frame of cases is within the
decade of the 1970's. By utilizing "parity" as a key delineating
concept, this study is not referring as much to the nuclear balance as
the international/political relationship between Moscow and Washington.
The examination of intervention cannot be clouded with caveats
regarding established spheres of influence, a lack of military
projection capability or a clear asymmetrical relationship between
potential intervenors. Consequently, the period from roughly 1970 to
the present acts as a filter for some of these caveats that would be
operative if the focus were on a different region or during an earlier
period. This will become clear as the cases are examined.

This leaves us with a universe of cases since the period of
African independence that include the following:

The Angolan Civil War 1975-76
The Ogaden Desert War 1977-79
The Shaba II Invasion 1978
The Rhodesia-Zimbabwe Civil War 1976-1979

Each of these meets the above criteria and necessitates our examination
within the confines of this study.

It is important to explain the reasoning behind the exclusion of
certain cases that arguably could be included. First, the initial case
could be the Congolese Civil War of 1960-64 in which American-Belgian
intervention was prominent in the outcome of the conflict. However,
one of the substantive concerns of this study is superpower
intervention within an environment of global parity. The period of the
early 60's saw little tangible evidence of U.S.-Soviet "Global"
competition in Sub-Saharan Africa. That is, the Soviet Union had
little if any power projection capability into the region and as such
was more of a diplomatic player than one capable of intervening to affect the outcome. Although, in a period of 5-7 years, the Soviets were able to expand that capability to become a major player across virtually the entire continent, their role at this time was more of diplomatic supporter rather than full-fledged competitor.

Also, the period 1968-1972 saw the ushering in of a supposed "parity" between the superpowers, if not in reality certainly acknowledged by both parties diplomatically. This made competition in Third World areas in general more of a "even" game rather than a one sided contest.

Two other cases are also conspicuously absent from the above list. The first is Mozambique and the second is Biafra. Initially, one would think that the battle for Mozambique independence would satisfy our criteria but upon closer examination, we find that no "conflict" (at least in terms of stage eight status) existed during the relinquishing of power by the Portuguese to FRELIMO. This was largely due to the inviability of all other nationalist groups operating within Mozambique. No conflict ensued over independence due to the omnipotence of FRELIMO as the only legitimate liberation movement and, as such, no superpower intervention is present. Limited Soviet aid to FRELIMO was present yet this was largely a function of quasi-

ideological compatibility and it was not increased in any appreciable way to affect an outcome that was already moot.

The case of Biafra is more complex. Soviet intervention is high by most standards and the conflict surely meets the criteria set forth in the above operationalization. The reason it is excluded is that this study is secondarily concerned with superpower intervention during the period of Detente and superpower parity as discussed above. The Biafran case occurred during the pre-detente period and would introduce significant caveats to any subsequent conclusions regarding superpower intervention patterns in general. This study does however, recognize the explanatory importance of the Biafran case within a similar study of intervention that has a greater temporally scope. This will be left for future study.

This leaves us with the cases outlined above save the current crises going on in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia today. These are separate cases that beg examination, and it is hoped that the findings from the application of this framework will shed light on the future study of those conflicts.

CONCLUSION

The task of this chapter has been to integrate the concerns and criticisms of the earlier discussions and fuse them into a research design that addresses those problems and charts the path toward solving them. The case analyses that will follow reflect the true "test" of this design and the concerns that lie behind it.
The interplay of intervention and local context will provide insights into the why's of success and failure. However, it is not expected that proof will be provided that either factor is dominant. It is expected that legitimate arguments will be made that support a more context rich explanation of superpower intervention and the elements that influence its success or failure. Further, the author expects to systematically identify those key variables that appear most important when examining local context and its interaction with superpower intervention. This will serve to inform the policy community as to aspects of African realities that bear particular consideration. It is hoped that the comparative case analyses that follow will satisfy each of these expectations and extend beyond them.
CHAPTER IV
THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR 1975-76

INTRODUCTION

The case to be explored in this chapter is the Angolan Civil War of 1975-1976. This case meets all of the criteria set forth in chapter three in that it is a civil conflict of stage eight status with definite intervention by at least one (and in this case both) superpower(s) along with a number of extra-regional states as well. This conflict has been well documented and thoroughly explored by a number of scholars, such that we will not engage in an in depth historical account here. In this study, we will first briefly


It is important at this point to recognize the unique nature of these and other sources drawn upon in this case study. A wealth of material that would greatly clarify the information utilized in this study is currently unavailable. Most of this includes governmental documents of those parties concerned as well actual eye witness accounts that are as yet, unsubstantiated. Many analysts in this area have relied on the initial exploratory work done by the authors mentioned above and this study is no exception. However, certain conclusions derived from an analysis of events in this case must be recognized as largely inferential, based on the development of evidence from a variety of sources. These inferences will be identified throughout the progression of the case analysis.
present the historical background of the case leading up to the
initiation of the conflict and the beginning of superpower
intervention. Second, we will identify the conflict point tracking it
through the respective superpower interventions and subsequent outcome.
This will be followed by a post-script on the outcome status, 3-5 years
after its "formal end."

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The roots of the Angolan conflict can be traced to the first
arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century and their subsequent
subjugation and colonization of the resident peoples during the
succeeding 500 years. The history of their conquest and rule is brutal
and savage even by European standards with Portuguese slave traders
alone "exporting" an estimated six million local inhabitants to North
and South America during this period. The central aspect of this
colonial period that bears notation is the brutality of rule that the
various local ethnic groups suffered under the Portuguese and the
resulting militancy in their desire for independence.

The approach pursued by the Portuguese government with respect to
organizing civil society in Angola was termed Lusotropicalism (Katsikas
82: 55). This policy was ostensibly equated with egalitarianism, non-
racism and enlightened relations between black and white. In reality,

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2These figures are of course estimates. Of the 6 million, 3
million are estimated to have died in route. For a discussion of the
Portuguese rule in Africa see Ronald Chilcote, Portuguese Africa,
Cambridge, 1969, Bender (78) and Marcum (78).
it created a stratified Angolan society with Portuguese whites occupying the top, mesticos (mixed bloods) and assimilados (assimilated blacks) occupying the middle tier and rural Africans (clearly the vast majority) making up the lower underprivileged class. As anti-colonialism began to take institutional form, several Angolan nationalist groups coalesced around these cleavages planting the seeds for inter-group conflict and strife. Three such movements emerged amidst the period of intense nationalism and Pan-Africanism (1955-1965) around these traditional divisions.

The first to emerge in 1958 was the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) under the leadership of Manuel Barros Necaca. Later in 1961 upon Necaca's death, control of the movement was transferred to Holden Roberto where it remained until 1978. This movement was largely uni-ethnic and rural, with roots in the Bakongo people of Northern Angola and Western Zaire. The FNLA's announced "platform" for change centered on Angolan political independence and vague pledges to both "African Socialism" and market Capitalism. Despite its ethnic make-up and vague ideology, the FNLA during the period 1961-1975 received the lion's share of foreign support, both diplomatic and material, from such sources as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), China, North Korea, Tunisia, Morocco, the Ivory

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3 "African Socialism" has a definitive meaning in the African lexicon. It refers to a brand of ideology grounded in the principles of European socialism but adapted to the traditions and culture of the respective African regions where it is implemented. The best examples include Toure's Guinea, Nyerere's Tanzania and Mugabe's Zimbabwe. Its' record of success is somewhat sketchy.
Coast, Zaire, India, Rumania, Western Europe and the United States (Klinghoffer 80: 14).

The second significant nationalist movement in Angola was the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) first under the leadership of Mario de Andrade and later Dr. Agostinho Neto. This movement was based largely in the urban areas particularly around Luanda and was "non-ethnic" in that its membership was diverse across a number of groups (Katsikas 82: 63). Principal among these were the assimilados and mesticos which made up the middle strata of Angolan society, along with the Mbundu.  The MPLA's platform for change was clearly leftist in orientation centering on a combination of African Socialism and Marxism-Leninism that was heavily influenced by the ideologies of both Nkrumah of Ghana and Nyerere of Tanzania. The bulk of MPLA aid came "socialist" states, mainly the Soviet Union, Cuba, Portuguese leftists, and other African socialists (Hosmer & Wolfe 83: 81).

The third movement was carved out of the FNLA in 1966 by its then foreign minister Jonas Savimbi. His movement, the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), was based largely in southern and eastern Angola among the Ovimbundu people who make up 31% of the Angolan population, the largest single ethnic group (Klinghoffer 80: 11-14). Savimbi's tactics were guerrilla in style and he eschewed most

4 These groups had a great deal more exposure to Portuguese society, its culture, thinkers and education. Indeed most of the MPLA's leadership was educated in Portugal and maintained strong ties with Portuguese leftists both among civilians and the military. See Marcum for a more detailed account of this, Vol II. pp. 9-61.
foreign contact, relative to the other movements, during the period 1966-1974. His orientation was clearly the most radical of the three with a mixture of Maoist and Third World revolutionary ideologies. His principle foreign base of support came from Nasser's Egypt, China, Zambia and later the United States and South Africa (Marcum 78: 228-232).

All three of these movements led Angola's drive for independence in the 1960's, feeling that they alone personified Angolan national interests. Yet, each operated from a base of support which was ethnically and racially distinct while being largely isolated from one another. As Suzanne Katsikas points out:

> These three liberation movements reflected the disunity and divisiveness within the Angolan situation: the deep suspicion between African and mesticos, the distrust between the rural uneducated peasant and the urban educated elite, and the traditional hostility between regions and tribes. (Katsikas 82: 61)

Thus, the development of organized opposition to Portuguese rule followed a pattern of ethnic and racial divisions already present and perpetuated in Angolan society by centuries of Portuguese rule. This would prove salient in the development of civil conflict in the year leading up to independence.

The 1966-1974 period saw a good deal of political and military conflict between and among these three groups. Correspondingly, vacillation and varying levels of commitment from abroad marked the policies of outside actors, particularly African states and the Soviet

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5 See Marcum 78: 165-167 & 193-197 for a discussion of these ties and also see UNITA Bulletin, no. 1, 1974, p. 7 for Savimbi's own words regarding philosophy and tactics.
While UNITA remained fairly cohesive under the strong leadership of Savimbi, the MPLA and to a lesser extent the FNLA exhibited internal strife and factionalism.

The MPLA went through several leadership crises from 1966-1974. First, two factions led by de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz broke with Neto in 1963 and began operating independently in order to rest control of the MPLA and eclipse the movement all together. Their efforts proved unsuccessful. In addition, an ethnic faction in northeastern Angola under the leadership of Daniel Chipenda broke with the MPLA in 1974 and subsequently sided with the FNLA in 1975 (Katsikas 82: 69-71). These rivalries for power within the MPLA weakened its military posture and made foreign support problematic, placing it in a weaker military position vis-a-vis the FNLA by 1974.

Several states initiated, then suspended and later reinstated aid programs to one of the three groups including the Soviet Union, the United States, and several African states (Zambia, Tanzania and the Ivory Coast).

This was due to the relatively volatile nature of the leadership of each group. As an example, the MPLA hierarchy was constantly at odds over policy and leadership and Neto consistently had to fight for control over the political structure.


In this case, both China and the Spinola regime in Portugal openly sided with the Chipenda faction and other states like Zambia and the Congo wavered in their support for Neto. In addition, the Soviet Union was less than sanguine about Neto's chances to remain in control and actually cut off support to the MPLA during strategic periods of these leadership crises.

The respective force levels of each movement in part reflected the degrees of foreign support each could muster. The group recognized as the strongest and most viable militarily was the FNLA with a force estimated between 15,000 and 20,000, and with training and support facilities in neighboring Zaire. In addition, 120 Chinese were present in Zaire from 1974 aiding FNLA forces. The MPLA was weaker militarily with a force numbering near 8,000, and aid coming from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Although estimates are difficult, UNITA had approximately 1-2,000 guerrilla fighters with little significant support prior to 1968. It should be noted here that the multiplicity of aid donors to these three movements and particularly the FNLA and MPLA does not constitute a massive influx of arms or personnel, nor the presence of high quality weaponry. The vast majority of weapons shipped to these three movements were usually obsolete rifles of Korean war vintage and usually included no heavy armor or aircraft, at least until the post-Alvor period.

Given the Portuguese position of no independence and no negotiation, the situation of sporadic guerrilla fighting may have gone


These figures are estimates based on data obtained from a variety of sources including CIA and Portuguese government estimates of relative movement strength. The CIA figures relied heavily on the Policia Internacional de Defesa de Estado (PIDE), Portuguese secret police since they were the group most familiar with Angolan resistance at the time.

In addition, it was reported that China shipped some 400 tons of equipment to Zaire in late 1974. The final destination of this material was the FNLA. See Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, *Hearings on Angola*, 94th Congress, January 29, February 3,4,6, 1976, pp. 126-130.
on for years if not for the military coup in Portugal on April 25, 1974 in which the Caetano regime was overthrown and a "leftist" regime(MFA) was established. The MFA was initially committed to the decolonization of overseas possessions and this changed the political situation in Angola overnight(Ibid., 78: 241-244). The policy of the Spinola regime was to divest itself of the financial and political burden of its African colonies and with United Nations (UN) and OAU assistance discussions were held between the leaders of the liberation movements and Portuguese officials from August through December 1974.

This new "African policy" was met with opposition in Portugal as right wing military and civilian elements in both Portugal and Angola opposed it and in some cases attempted counter-coups against the regime. Yet, despite frequent regime change, vacillation, and political infighting the policy of decolonialization was initiated and the momentum for Portuguese withdrawal became insurmountable.

Once decolonization became an inevitable conclusion, domestic forces within Angola and regional states began to move more rapidly to assert themselves and gain an advantageous position in Angolan affairs. The FNLA expanded its contacts with foreign forces, particularly China and through Zaire, the United States. John Stockwell relates that during the August-January, 74-75 period, the U.S., through the CIA,

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12 For a detailed explanation of this policy see speeches by both Salazar and Caetano in Marcum, Appendix I 78: 284-302.

13 See Marcum pp. 243-261 for a discussion of the various jockeying of Portuguese factions with respect to the MFA's Angolan policy and internal Portuguese politics. Also, see Bender 67: 234-237 for a brief synopsis of the shifting policy climate in Portugal.
expanded relations with Roberto, providing aid and pledging support with Zaire acting as a conduit (Stockwell 78: 70-137). As for the MPLA, their contacts were expanded particularly within Portugal as leftists there were able to more openly support the MPLA's movement for independence. UNITA remained relatively isolated except for expanding covert contacts between Savimbi and both the U.S. and South Africa (Ibid., 78: 154-156).

During this scramble for position by both internal and external forces, diplomatic efforts were being carried out through the UN and particularly the OAU under the leadership of President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. Summits were held between the leaders of the three groups (Roberto, Savimbi, and Neto) under Kenyatta's mediation and on January 5, 1975, the three agreed to act as one voice in the negotiations with Portuguese authorities for a transition to independence.¹⁴ Having accomplished this, the three movements met with Portuguese officials and hammered out the Alvor Agreement on January 15, 1975. This agreement provided for the following:

1) The three movements were the sole representatives of the Angolan people.
2) A provisional government would be created made up of all three movements that would together with the Portuguese oversee the transition to independence.
3) A National army of Angola would be created out of the forces of the three movements (8,000 each) along with a Portuguese force of 24,000 that would be stationed in Angola until at least February 28, 1976.
4) Cabinda is part of Angola and should remain so.

5) Elections for a legislature would be held by the provisional government for the transition to independence.
6) Independence would be given on November 11, 1975.\textsuperscript{15}

The Alvor accord took effect in January, 1975 and officials representing the three movements served in a provisional government. However, its life was short-lived. Due to mistrust, a lack of a forceful Portuguese role, and outside "meddling," the agreement was abandoned and conflict broke out between the three groups within two months of its signing. The ensuing conflict would eventually settle the question of who would rule Angola. It is at this point that we begin our case analysis utilizing the framework presented in chapter three. A graphic representation of the framework appears below.

1. Each case will have a time line constructed around the concepts outlined. For Angola, this will be the following:

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c|c|c}
Conflict point & May 75 & Nov 75 \\
(March 23,1975) & ; & ; \\
(-------------)--C----------I1/2--------T1------T2------T3------T4---
& Interv. for & ; \\
historical backgr. & USA & USSR & Aug 75 & Jan 76
(1961-1975)
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

2. Point 'C' represents the identification of the beginning of the conflict. At this point, the local context is examined and estimated for the case.

3. 'I1/2' represents the point of US and Soviet intervention. In this case it is roughly at the same time, but this may not be true for other cases as has already been seen-Biafra.

\textsuperscript{15}For a complete text of the agreement see ACR, Legum 74-75: C221-C226.
4. The case is then examined in at three month intervals (T1-T4) from the point of the conflict, examining the level of intervention and its interaction with local context.

5. At point T4, the outcome is then examined with a corresponding postscript 3-5 years after the original outcome.

6. The only aspect that varies across cases is the time increments for each case. This is due to the wide variation across cases in terms of duration and the need to make each analysis manageable within the constraints of the framework.

FIGURE 3
SCHEMATIC OF THE ANGOLAN CASE

THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR: THE INITIATION OF CONFLICT

The design of this study requires that we now identify the point in time when the situation in Angola becomes a conflict of stage eight status, thus signaling the beginning of our comparative case analysis. Briefly, a conflict of stage eight status is when:

- military action by one group against another or
- the regime takes place with the aim of changing the existing political authority structure or
- reducing the target group or groups capability...This usually means an escalation to the point of civil war with political solutions placed on hold. (See chapter three p. 3)

This point is identified as March 23, 1975 when a large contingent of FNLA forces attacked MPLA positions in Caxito and Luanda killing 51 recruits in the former and carrying on a 3 day battle in the later instance (ACR, Legum 75-76: B424). Prior to this time, no direct conflict had occurred between the respective groups save skirmishes of a few soldiers in isolated areas. This also marked the first instance of one group, through military action, violating the Alvor agreement and initiating hostilities. It is at this point that a largely political conflict became a military one with no diplomatic efforts
proving successful in stopping the fighting until the post-independence period.

From this "conflict point" the case will be examined in (4) three month increments (March-May/June-August/September-November/December-February).\textsuperscript{16} In the first period, we will develop an accurate picture of the local context by "filtering" the case through its specific dimensions (i.e. variables). Once we have an estimation of the susceptibility of the local context to successful intervention, we will then explore the case, identifying and examining the intervention patterns of both superpowers within the progression of events. Following this, we will examine the outcome of each superpower's intervention after the conflict has ceased. In addition, a more long-term estimation of outcome in a post-script (3-5 years after the termination of the conflict) will be undertaken to determine any shifts in the success or failure of the intervention(s). This will be followed by an analysis of the interaction of local context and superpower intervention to explore the plausible arguments for superpower success and failure.

THE LOCAL CONTEXT

There are six variables that make up the concept of local context. They are:

1. The Local Military Balance
2. Local Factionalism

\textsuperscript{16} As discussed in Chapter three p. 22, these increments are utilized according to the analytical needs of this particular case and are not absolute across all the cases in this study. I refer you to the discussion cited above.
Each variable contains a number of "indicators" posed as questions that when combined can give us a rough estimate of the prospects for successful intervention [+ or -]. The case will be filtered through each variable at the point of the initiation of the conflict. The compilation of these six scores will provide an overall (+ or -) score for the local context. The final mapping of this case is found in Appendix E.

1. The Local Military Balance

This variable attempts to ascertain the relative stability or fluidity of the local military balance. The rationale is that the more fluid and unstable the military balance, the more susceptible it is to change and affect from outside intervention.

A. Is the military balance tenuous and subject to dramatic changes with relatively small increments of aid, or is it stalemated and relatively stable?

Estimates of the military force levels of the three groups indicated a fluid battlefield situation. Even generous estimates for this period by both U.S. Defense department and Portuguese officials put FNLA forces at or near 20,000, MPLA forces at 8,000, and UNITA troop strength at 2-3,000. These numbers are comparatively small for

17See Appendix A for a listing of these variables with their indicators.

the vast territory involved which means that these groups were largely isolated from one another. Combining this with the lack of sophisticated equipment and in some cases virtually no air or reconnaissance capability, and you have a military balance that with the introduction of only a few weapons (like advanced rifles, artillery or helicopters) could be significantly altered.\footnote{For a good synopsis of the tenuous battlefield situation and its propensity for sudden shifts, see Valenta 80: 99-116.}

For example, the sizeable numerical advantage enjoyed by the FNLA was translated into early battlefield success but with the introduction in May of only some 100 Cuban advisors and weapons, the MPLA began to stem the FNLA advance and by June were driving back a numerically superior force.\footnote{For a discussion of this shift with a modest infusion of weapons, see Larry C. Napper, "The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia: Some Implications for Crisis Prevention," in George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry, Westview Press, Boulder, 1983, pp. 160-161.}

A further point illustrating the fragility of this balance is made by John Stockwell when he writes that the proposed introduction of a CIA aircraft code named Puff The Magic Dragon equipped with six machine guns could have "won the war" for the FNLA or UNITA during the initial period\cite{Stockwell 78: 79}. This clearly substantiates the tenuous nature of the military balance and the potential for its rapid shift given outside involvement.

**B. Does one side or the other appear capable of or close to military victory or is a protracted war of attrition the projected result?**
Given the tenuous battlefield situation and the constrained timetable for independence, it was assumed that each group, and particularly the FNLA, was capable of securing power and emerging victorious. The Portuguese themselves had already, in principle, relinquished the policy of continued rule and thus independence simply became a matter of time and position rather than a protracted struggle against an entrenched colonial power. Indeed, the power vacuum resulting from the Portuguese withdrawal and subsequent fragmentation of its government coupled with the fluid battlefield situation provided a multitude of opportunities for each group to take command and thus a stalemate appeared unlikely.

21 This appears likely given the potential number of scenarios that could have taken place. For example, many experts assumed that given free and open elections, UNITA and Savimbi would achieve a plurality and perhaps a majority of votes making his group "victorious." Militarily, it was widely assumed that given no outside interference, the FNLA would win the battle and emerge dominant in any new government. And in the case of the MPLA, it was also argued that they were the best prepared politically, and as such would emerge as the dominant force given equal representation among the three. This was based largely on the effectiveness of the MPLA in mobilizing support and organizing its party structure within Luanda and surrounding urban areas. For a discussion of these scenarios see Marcum 78: 141-181 and Legum 78: 17-33.

22 For discussions of the effects of Portuguese policy on the conflict see Napper 83: 169-172 and Klinghoffer 80: 31-42.

23 This point is perhaps best substantiated if one compares the Angolan situation with the Namibian, or South African situation today. As long as the entrenched power holds on to the notion of continued rule and is able to support that position militarily and, in a minimal fashion, politically, then the prospects for a protracted struggle are likely. The "light at the end of the tunnel, independence" made this or any such conflict a question of time and action, thus changing the nature of the struggle significantly. Recent literature on the struggle in South Africa illustrates this, See Ibrahim S. R. Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa, Westview Press, Gower, England, 1986 and Carol B. Thompson, Challenge
C. Does the terrain lend itself to decisive and rapid shifts in the battle or is it more suited for a long guerrilla type struggle?

The enormous size of Angola (roughly twice the size of Texas) and the relatively small military forces of the three movements made the potential for a long guerrilla struggle appear likely. A key reason for this is that there are a multitude of areas from which to launch and sustain a guerrilla fight and this is witnessed by the ability of the three groups to remain viable throughout the fifteen years prior to independence and the continued viability of UNITA today. Yet, this reality is a double-edged sword when considering the Angolan case.

Since the control of Luanda and the surrounding provinces of Cuanza Norte, Cuanza Sul and Malante were considered vital in establishing legitimacy at the time of independence, the field of battle was restricted to efforts by both the FNLA and later UNITA to control that area held tenuously throughout this period by the MPLA. As Valenta points out in reference to the tenuous nature of the conflict and its principal objective:

...the faction that succeeded in mustering "sufficient support" to win the battle of Luanda before the deadline (Nov. 11, 1975) would emerge the victor in the power struggle or would at least gain a major and perhaps insurmountable advantage over its competitors.(Valenta 80: 106)

Consequently, in the period of March-July alone, the FNLA expanded control from the northern Bakongo region into Luanda itself and was by Imperialism: The Frontline States and the Liberation of Zimbabwe, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985.

24 For a discussion of the importance of the Luanda area to any group claiming legitimacy at independence, see Klinghoffer 80: 9-28, Marcum 78: 259-275.
later forced out by MPLA forces all within a three month span (Marcum 78: 259-262). This lends itself to the conclusion that the territorial situation (coupled with the political realities of Luanda) was ripe for rapid shifts in balance over relatively short periods of time.

D. Is the base of support for the respective groups ethnically or territorial based and are the respective positions of the factions historically rooted or more fluid and interchangeable?

This question was partially addressed in the historical background of the case. The development of the three movements reflected almost completely the ethnic and regional divisions long established within Angola. FNLA and UNITA support was centered around single ethnic groups (Bakongo and Ovimbundu) and, as such, found little legitimacy among middle or upper class forces within Angola. The MPLA on the other hand was almost entirely based and supported within the capital of Luanda and surrounding areas. Although it was more diverse in membership in terms of ethnic groups, its more intellectual and urban make-up detached it from the majority of the population in the rural countryside. As Marcum points out in reference to statements made by Neto and Roberto regarding each movements respective membership:

Although each movement sought to transcend its origins, managed to attract some representation from other ethno-linguistic communities, and presented itself as genuinely multiethnic, each received much of its support from a primary ethnic segment, and each perceived its rival as

\[25\] Words of the participants themselves substantiate this as each considered the other not viable based on their "restricted" and "illegitimate" bases of support. See ACR, Legum: 74-75: C53-C55, C57-C58 and 75-76: C88-C89, C93 for statements by Roberto, Neto and Savimbi on this point. Also, see Marcum pp. 14-20 and particularly notes 49, 50 and 51.
being exclusively and antagonistically ethnocentric (Marcum 78: 48).

These factors lead one to the conclusion that the local military balance was highly tenuous and fluid and as such created a high degree of opportunity (+) for successful intervention by either superpower if and when they intervened.

2. Local Factionalism

This variable attempts to tap the relative presence of factionalism within the polity. During this period its dimensions are much the same as that of the local military balance.

A. Are divisions between groups historically deep and ethnically based?

The clear answer to this is yes. In fact traditional rivalry between Bakongo, Ovimbundu and Mbundi peoples can be traced back to before the arrival of the Portuguese (Kwitny 84: 134-137). Add to this the presence of two groups (mesticos and assimilados) created as a result of Portuguese policy, who occupied advantageous positions vis-à-vis other indigenous ethnic groups, and you have the makings of extreme inter-ethnic conflict.\(^2\) The enmity between the rival forces during this period and the disdain that particularly the FNLA and MPLA showed for the Alvor agreement further illustrates this.

B. Are those divisions ideologically based?

An added dimension to the ethnic divisions already present was that each group had seemingly different political programs for the

\(^2\) See Bender 67: 3-54 for a discussion of Lusotropicalism and the effects of these artificially created divisions.
future of Angola. Although both the FNLA and UNITA and to a lesser extent the MPLA were purposefully vague in their pronounced ideologies, there still existed wide gaps in philosophy. For example, the MPLA platform called for "scientific socialism" along with a mixed economy. It made references to the creation of a one-party state, the adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles, and professed a foreign policy of clear non-alignment (Marcum 78: 196-205).

UNITA and Savimbi advocated a Maoist approach to development and a clear anti-white, pro-black nationalist character stating on several occasions "No progressive action is possible with men who serve American interests...the notorious agents of imperialism" (Kwitney 83: 136). Savimbi's primary education was received in trips abroad to China, North Korea, Egypt and Vietnam. Although no precise program for governing was ever enunciated, UNITA was clearly by verbal behavior the most radical of the three.

The FNLA on the other hand was presumably pro-western despite extensive support from China, Rumania and Tanzania. Mobutu's influence over Roberto was read as a signal that he embraced western values,

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27 For a complete history and analysis of Savimbi as a political force within Africa see Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi A Key to Africa, Mainstream Publishing, Great Britain, 1986, pp. 55-102.

28 This was clearly the case during this initial period. As the battle scene shifted against Savimbi and he sought aid from the west, his ideology shifted to where today, he is a professed "Western Democrat" who believes in such notions as freedom of religion, press, and capitalism. It is left to the reader to determine which is truth. Only one element seems certain, UNITA is a uniquely personalized organization that is held together by Savimbi himself. Without him, it is unclear that the movement or its "philosophy" would survive.
including market capitalism and free trade. Like Savimbi, Roberto never made available a policy platform but it is clear that he was not a Marxist and disdained both Neto and Savimbi’s philosophies. This establishes the ideological diversity of the three groups and further adds to the difficulties in bringing them together.

C. Are the nationalist groups cohesive or splintered in a situation of decolonization?

The signing of the Alvor agreement seemed to bring the three groups together into a cohesive nationalist movement with one voice and presumably one short-term goal, independence. Yet, the rapidity with which this agreement was shattered and the traditional/ideological hostilities of the three groups indicates the hollowness of this "solidarity". Unlike the case of Mozambique where the nationalist movement was centered on only one viable entity, FRELIMO, Angola enjoyed no such unity. This further diminished the opportunity for a peaceful transition and heightened the chances for successful intervention.

The variable local factionalism and its dimensions played into the hands of perspective superpowers seeking to shape the outcome of the

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29 This was the position of most analysts and government officials at the time. See Marcum 78: 185-191 and Stockwell 78: 118-137.

30 Due to Roberto’s close ties to Mobutu and clear preference for a high life style, it is safe to assume that he would have reached accommodations with western investors making Angola much like Zaire is today, a pro-western state with a mixed economy run by the state in tandem foreign corporations.

31 Incidentally, this is not only recognized by western scholars as a fault of Angola and an asset of Mozambique but also by Soviet writers as well. See Napper (79), Klinghoffer (80), and Dmitry Volsky "Behind the Conflict in Angola," New Times, September 1975.
Angolan civil war. Like the local military balance, its configurations increased the prospects for successful intervention (+).

3. The Role of the State of Influence

In this case the state is Portugal. This variable attempts to tap the relative presence of the "dominant" state in the conflict and show how that role fits within the contours of the local context.\(^2\)

\textbf{A. Does the former colonial power or dominant state have a strong involvement in that target state or a high stake in the outcome of the conflict?}

During the period leading up to and following the Alvor agreement, the Portuguese government had a high stake in the solution to the question of their colonial possessions.\(^3\) Factionalism within the Portuguese government (MFA) centered on the speed with which independence would come and the form it would take, but with the exception of some lingering rightist movements, the accepted goal was independence (Klinghoffer 80: 31-34). Yet, the Portuguese polity was highly fragmented around who would rule the future Angolan government. Many on the left (particularly the Portuguese Communist Party and the Socialists) continued and expanded their ties with the MPLA and saw

\(^2\)In most cases the term "state of influence" refers to that state or states which for whatever reason, possesses a relatively high degree of impact and influence over the state in question. In the African context, this is best conceptualized as the former colonial power and its relative influence. For the Ivory Coast, this would be France, for Nigeria, it would be Britain and so forth.

\(^3\)In fact, many have argued that it was the neo-colonial attitude of the Caetano regime that was the key factor in the downfall of that government and the emergence of the MFA. See Marcum 78: chapter 6 and Appendix I. Also see Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Hearings 76: 126-130.
Neto as the viable alternative. Conversely, rightist military officers both within Portugal and Angola vented their frustration on the MFA by siding with the FNLA and later UNITA in an effort to maintain some kind of influence in an independent Angola. This factionalism served to make a coherent, unified and high profile Portuguese policy toward Angolan independence very unlikely.

For example, the Spinola regime (April-September 1974) at first advocated a confederation of Portugal with her formal colonial possessions, then pushed for a referendum on independence and finally advocated outright independence without any locally supervised voting (Klinghoffer 80: 32-33). This illustrates the shifting political forces and positions within Portugal that made a coherent policy toward Angola impossible.

A further illustration of this was in the post-Alvor period when subsequent Portuguese regimes wavered on what future they would have within Angola. The first provisional high commissioner for Angola, Antonio Alba Rosa Coutinho, was a pro-MPLA sympathizer who promoted Neto's interests within the MFA. He was later removed after the Alvor accord by the more moderate Antonio da Silva Cardoso. However Cardozo was later removed by a subsequent government, once more in favor of a more pro-MPLA figure, Ernesto Ferreira do Macedo (Ibid., 80: 32-34). A consequence of these shifts in authority was that the enunciated

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34 Many junior officers and leftist whites in Angola began openly supporting the MPLA since it had a mostly western educated elite and urban make-up along with its leftist proclivities. Many former Portuguese landowners, rightist officers and elements of the PIDE (Portuguese secret police) began aiding and training FNLA forces. See Marcum 78: 243-245 and see Kwitny pp. 134-151.
Portuguese position on the maintenance of troops within Angola (under the Alvor agreement they were to remain until February 28, 1976) shifted with each change in commissioner. Subsequent Portuguese regimes wavered until a new high commissioner (Leonel Cardozo) under the recently installed Pinheiro regime unilaterally announced that all Portuguese troops would leave by November 11, 1975. This effectively meant Portuguese abrogation of the Alvor agreement (Ibid., 80: 33).

One conclusion that can be derived from the factionalism and non-coherence of policy is that the only true certainty for the parties involved was that independence would come to Angola by November 11, 1975 and that Portugal would make little effort to affect the outcome of the contest. Its own political and ideological turmoil served to open the Angolan conflict to a multitude of influences and forces that the Portuguese had neither the desire or power to effectively control.

B. Does the state favor one group over the other in the conflict?

If one were to separate out all of the groups within Portugal at the time of the Alvor agreement and then match up their preferences for particular factions within Angola, the resulting information would be overwhelming. The fall of the Caetano regime and the subsequent MFA commitment to democratization opened up the political process to a multitude of groups ranging from communists on the left to fascists on the right. Each group had its own views on the future of Portugal’s
colonial possessions (including Angola) and the role that Portugal should play in that policy.\textsuperscript{35}

Central to addressing the above question is the omnipresent fact that factionalism and divisions within Portugal made a coherent policy of advocacy for one group impossible. Portuguese sympathies wavered as successive governments moved from the right to the left, yet throughout, no clear policy was followed until well after independence had been achieved and the MPLA had emerged victorious.

C. Is the state capable of affecting the outcome of the conflict or has it abdicated any role?

In the case of Portugal, the state clearly had the military capability to affect the outcome whether it would have been to prolong the conflict, insulate groups from one another or side with one group against the others. The Portuguese had an estimated 24,000 troops within Angola, more than the combined forces of the three movements and certainly better equipped.\textsuperscript{36} Yet, the army, like the political scene in Lisbon, was polarized with factions supporting and aiding differing groups within Angola. In fact, separate military units acted to aid various movements with their own weapons and expertise (Ibid., 80: 34-35).

\textsuperscript{35} Several reports regarding the views of these respective groups have since surfaced. One view, prevalent among right-wing officers and former supporters of Salazar advocated the use of Angola and Mozambique as bases for Portuguese rightists against any future Lisbon government and in alliance with "like-minded" forces in the region, presumably South Africa and Rhodesia. Another view held by the communist party advocated a transfer of power to the MPLA and the exchange of information between the two to facilitate the communists' emerging triumvirate in Portugal.

\textsuperscript{36} These troops were in Angola under the Alvor accord and were designed to provide for a smooth transfer as well as buffer between rival forces.
37). As a result of the inertia of the government(s) at home, the prospects of coordinated military action abroad became non-existent.

Overall, the role of the state (Portugal) of influence was minimal at best and certainly conducive (+) to successful intervention by a number of states. The true revolutionary nature of Portuguese society following the MFA coup made decisive action to mediate a settlement or dictate an outcome impossible and successive Portuguese administrations settled for the least common denominator in Angola, independence and withdrawal. This served to create a power vacuum that the superpowers could move to fill, perhaps successfully.

4. The Role of Regional States

This variable focuses on the presence, degree of involvement and propensity for interference of regional states germane to the conflict itself. In the case of Angola, we are speaking predominantly of states contiguous with Angola: Zambia, Namibia/South Africa, Zaire, and the Congo.

A. Is there a history of intervention in the states' affairs by any of the region?

In the case of Angola, regional interference in the Portuguese administration had been minimal until the period of general African independence when local states began to aid diplomatically and materially the movements within Angola. The first key regional actor was Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko. The Zairians, particularly after 1963, began to heavily supply FNLA forces with material aid and
later troop support. During the period leading up to the conflict, Zaire acted as the chief conduit for foreign aid coming to the FNLA including acting as the home base for 120 Chinese advisors sent to train FNLA forces (ACR, Legum 74-75: B530). In addition, Zaire acted in concert with U.S./CIA officials to channel aid to the FNLA, allocating some $300,000 in covert aid in January, 1975 and then channeling some additional aid (originally earmarked for Zaire) to Roberto in the March-June period (Stockwell 78: 53-55 & 263-266). It is important to note that the value of U.S. aid in this case is still open to debate. Several within the government and outside have argued that the actual value of U.S. aid to the FNLA/UNITA was undervalued in order to preserve the "integrity" of the covert operation. In fact, this was the finding of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, 1976. The actual value of American aid throughout the conflict may have been more than twice the reported figures.

Although on a much smaller scale, several other regional states acted within the confines of the Angolan situation prior to the conflict. These included the Peoples Republic of the Congo under the successive governments of Presidents Youlou and Ngouabi. Both of these leaders engaged in an on again off again romance with the MPLA, providing them with a base of operations, training of troops, and

37 In fact Mobutu sent in Zairian troops in 1972 to put down an internal rebellion against Roberto by some officers at the FNLA base at Kinkuzu, Zaire. See N.Y.Times, March 20, 1972. In addition, for an inventory of the weapons sent by Zaire to the FNLA during this period, see Stockwell 78: 267-268.

logistical support for the transfer of arms to Neto (Marcum 78: 141-142 
& 249-253). Also, South Africa acted along the Angolan border in part 
to chase SWAPO forces from their bases in the area and later (1975- 
present) to support UNITA forces based along the border. In addition, 
Zambia and Tanzania, during the period 1965-1975, acted in support of 
the FNLA and later in the case of Zambia-UNITA to affect the outcome of 
the Angolan conflict.39

B. Do the regional states have the capacity to intervene 
militarily?

Clearly, both Zaire and South Africa exhibited the ability to 
project force into Angola in significant numbers. Zaire, having done 
so during the period 1972-1975 and South Africa, possessing the largest 
and most powerful military in Southern Africa, had both the 
transportation and air support facilities to project itself well beyond 
its own borders.40 In the case of Zambia and the Congo, the military 
option, save a safe haven for troops and minimal training was a non- 
existent one.

C. Are there political, ethnic or ideological affinities for 
one faction or another on the part of regional states?

This point has already been established through an examination of 
the prior role of regional states in Angola. In the case of Zaire,

39 For a discussion of Zambia’s role in aiding UNITA, see Mario 
Azevedo, "Zambia, Zaire and the Angolan Crisis Reconsidered," Journal 

40 This is evidenced by virtually continuous South African 
incursions across not only the Angolan borders but also into 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. A South African force estimated at 
well over 50,000 is stationed in Namibia with air and reconnaissance 
capability making it the most potent force in the area. Most military 
strategists agree that the SADF has the military capability to dominate 
and overthrow most of the governments from Kinshasa to Dar es Salaam.
strong ethnic ties between native Bakongo peoples across their common border along with strong personal ties between Roberto and Mobutu served to bring Zaire into the conflict. Added to this was the clear anti-communist stance of the two leaders making an alliance between them a logical outgrowth. In the case of the Congo, strong political/ideological affinities between the "Marxist" government in Brazzaville and the MPLA served to fuse these forces together in an alliance and in fact, Brazzaville acted as the principal base of operations for the MPLA from 1970-1975.41

Zambia, under the leadership of President Kaunda, also had ties drawing it into the Angolan situation that were partially political but more importantly, economic.42 In Angola stretching from the interior of Southern Africa (Zaire and Zambia) to the Angolan port of Lobito is the Benguela railway. This railway is one of the few in Southern Africa that does not utilize South Africa as a de-embarkation point and, as such, is highly important to the landlocked states of Zaire and Zambia for the export of copper and other key minerals.43 The territory through which the Benguela operates is largely Ovimbundu and is controlled by UNITA. Because of this, Zambia found itself in support of UNITA during the initial period of Savimbi's movement up

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until the first period of the conflict in 1975. This served to bring another nation more actively into the fray.

D. Do the regional states have strong ties to a supra-regional actor(s) who has a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and consequently would be willing to aid in an intervention?

The dynamic of regional state-global actor "alliance" existed for many of the regional states in this case, but three bear particular notation. First, Zaire had developed strong political and economic ties not only with the United States but also with the Peoples Republic of China. In the case of China, Zaire was Mobutu's second largest recipient of military aid in Africa during the 1967-1976 period. In addition, Zaire welcomed several hundred Chinese technicians and military personnel as well as dispatching officers for training in the PRC (Ibid., 83: 107). In economic terms, Zaire was the fifth largest recipient of Chinese aid=$100 million in the 1961-1977 period (Smaldone 80: 120-121). Also, Mobutu had begun a diplomatic offensive designed to portray Zaire as a truly non-aligned state equally positioned

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44 Support from Kaunda was tenuous however since UNITA threats against the Benguela railway and several sabotage attacks in the late 60's periodically strained relations between Kaunda and Savimbi. See Stockwell 78: 140 & 164).


between east and west and as such China seemed a natural counter-weight to his ties with the U.S.\textsuperscript{47}

From a U.S. perspective, the history of strong ties with the Mobutu regime go back to the Congolese Civil War of 1960-65 and the U.S. role in eliminating Lumumba and installing Mobutu. Political, economic and military relations between the U.S. and Mobutu have always been substantial coupled with tremendous American corporate economic interest in Zaire.\textsuperscript{48} Together these served to create a "political/economic binding" between Mobutu and the U.S. that served both parties interests in conterminous conflicts such as Angola.\textsuperscript{49} As John Stockwell points out, it was necessary from a U.S. perspective to keep Mobutu "in the camp" and thus they were willing to support the FNLA in Angola in order to remain in good favor with him

\textsuperscript{47}See Crawford Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis," in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1978. Also, see Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1985, pp. 47-77 & 367-390.


\textsuperscript{49}This point is further substantiated in depth in chapter 5: The Shaba II Conflict. I refer you to that discussion for additional information.
42-45). Also, as Dr. Stephen R. Weissman pointed out in his testimony before the Senate Sub-committee Hearings on Angola in 1976:

American policies in Zaire and Angola are tied together by more than a faulty intellectual framework and a recurring interventionist program. Secretary Kissinger's aides and other high officials have told Leslie Gelb of The New York Times that:
A major reason for American involvement in Angola was to maintain good relations with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, the man on whom Secretary of State Kissinger is banking to oppose Moscow's interests in Africa and to further Washington's interests in various international forums. (See Hearings 76:109).

Now whether one sees these ties as promoting leverage for the supra-regional power (U.S. or China), or whether it gives added leverage to the local state (Zaire) is immaterial. The key is that Zaire acted as a conduit for Chinese and U.S. access into Angola and the FNLA, and to a lesser extent UNITA.

The second state is South Africa. Although, more delicate and certainly less straight forward, ties between the U.S. and the South African government were extensive in the economic, political and military spheres. To the extent that South African and U.S. policy

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50 There is an emerging literature on this topic with the increased incidence of superpower "clients" that have accumulated a great deal of assistance and are still able to maintain policy independence in the face of "benefactor" opposition. In the field of arms trade and influence, see Andrew S. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, pp. 14-20. In the more general area of superpower-client relations, see Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984, pp. 44-78.

51 See the National Security Study Memorandum 39, contained within Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, pp. 75-182. Also, see Lemarchand, 83, particularly chapters 3, 6, 7, 8 & 12. Also, for a detailed account of the
aims were coterminous (usually entailing anti-communism) South Africa could act as a conduit for U.S. intervention and apparently did.\textsuperscript{52}

The third key state here is the Peoples Republic of the Congo (PRC). The Congolese government under President Ngouabi was Marxist in character and program and it had extensive military relations with both the USSR and Cuba.\textsuperscript{53} This coupled with the Congolese ties to the MPLA provided a secure beachhead for Soviet and Cuban relations with the MPLA within the region itself.

In sum, the role of regional states in this case was conducive to successful superpower intervention (+). Several conduits of access existed for both superpowers (U.S.-Zaire, South Africa and the USSR-Congo) that provided avenues for exploitation. Coupled with this was the historically established presence of each of these regional states in the Angolan civil war, making their participation "commonplace" once the conflict accelerated.

5. The Role of Regional Organizations

In the case of Angola, the principle regional organization that had "jurisdiction" over the conflict was the Organization of African

\textsuperscript{52}The extent of these links between U.S. and South African policy are not fully known but many have charged that they were extensive. See Stockwell 78: 187-190, The Washington Post, February 4, 1976 and the testimony of Edward Mulcahy, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Angola Hearings, 1976, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{53}Witness the extent of Soviet-Congolese relations during the Angolan crisis itself, including a state visit by President Ngouabi to Moscow in April 1975. Reported in PRAVDA, F.B.I.S., Vol III, No 64, pp. H1-H5.
unity (OAU) under the leadership of first Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and later Idi Amin of Uganda. This variable focuses on the strength or weakness of the organization and how that role affected superpower intervention.

A. Are the regional organizations cohesive on a policy toward the conflict?

The OAU and its African Liberation Committee had long endorsed the concept of Angolan independence and Portuguese withdrawal and welcomed the policies of the MFA in Lisbon. However, given the factionalism of the nationalist groups in Angola and the different bases of support each had within the OAU itself, a common front was difficult to achieve. The final position of the OAU in negotiations with the three groups from August 1974 through March 1975 centered on four basic tenants:

1. The need for a government of National Unity.
2. The legitimacy of all three groups to be a part of that government (MPLA, FNLA & UNITA).
3. A call for non-intervention by outside powers.
4. The unity of Cabinda with Angola. (Legum 78: 28)

This was embodied in the position of Jomo Kenyatta, OAU chairman, and in the Alvor agreement of January 1975 cited earlier. Consequently, we can determine that the relevant regional organization did have a coherent policy toward the conflict, at least on the surface. However, when combined with the other indicators, we see a different picture emerge.

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54 For a discussion of the different factions that have emerged on this and other issues within the OAU, see Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity in 1978: The Challenge of Foreign Intervention," in ACR, Legum 78-79: A25-A39.
B. Are the regional organizations able to enforce this policy position on its member states?

Clearly, the answer to this is no. Despite active calls for non-intervention and a national unity government, virtually all the regional states worked to thwart the Alvor agreement that symbolized OAU mediation. The U.S. through the CIA almost immediately authorized assistance to the FNLA in order to strengthen its hand against the MPLA. The FNLA, with Zairian aid, broke the Alvor agreement two months after its signing and moved to control the government outright. Both the Congolese and South Africans acted to aid their respective clients while verbally supporting the Alvor accord, and Cuban forces acted unilaterally in April via the Congo to shore up MPLA forces (Marcum 78: 257-281).

Consequently, despite a united position publicly on the part of the OAU, the organization could not enforce their policy on those salient member states whose cooperation was necessary in order for it to succeed. Thus, the role of the regional organizations was weak and this created a greater potential for successful intervention (+).

55 In the period January-August 1975, the OAU chairmanship was transferred to Idi Amin of Uganda. Inter-OAU rivalry over Amin's role, and the legitimacy of the three groups amplified the already visible schisms within the OAU over who represented Angola, what approach to take and what foreign role if any should be tolerated. Amin himself openly sided with Mobutu and the FNLA/UNITA in his handling of the mediation efforts between the three groups. See Colin Legum & Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa, Africana Publishing Company, New York, 1976, pp. 28-35 for a discussion of this infighting and also Klinghoffer 80: 61-71.
6. The Level of Tolerance for Intervention

This variable attempts to estimate the degree to which local participants are "willing" to request and utilize foreign intervention in the conflict.

A. Is there historical precedence for superpower intervention?

In the specific case of Angola, one can argue that prior superpower involvement in its internal affairs was limited at best. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a long history of limited support for various factions in the conflict. The U.S., as early as 1961, aided the FNLA and provided it with material and diplomatic support, yet this was severely limited by the saliency of Portugal to U.S. foreign policy and security interests (Angola Hearings Kissinger testimony 76: 3-55). The Soviet Union also had long established ties with the MPLA going back to the early 60's and by some estimates supplied up to 80% of MPLA arms (Marcum 78: 229).

Despite these apparent "bonds," one would be remiss in arguing that there was a sustained historical precedence for superpower intervention. In fact, Soviet ability to intervene in Angola's affairs was severely limited by her own logistical inadequacies well into the 1960's. And even when Soviet power projection capability increased and potential bases were available in Guinea and the Congo, Soviet aid to the MPLA actually decreased and temporarily ended in 1974 (Legum 76: 17-20). For the U.S., aid and involvement was always tempered by the relationship that Portugal had to NATO and more important U.S. security interests in the Middle East (Angola Hearings, Kissinger testimony, 76:14-23). As a result, historical patterns of U.S. intervention were
negligible. Consequently, this indicator shows little or no historical precedence for superpower intervention.

B. Are there ideological affinities and political ties between faction(s) in the conflict and the superpower?

This appears to be true for both the MPLA and FNLA while UNITA showed little affinity for either superpower during this period. As established above, the MPLA was a leftist, "Marxist" oriented organization with strong ties to other like groups in Africa and also Cuba.\textsuperscript{56} In repeated references to the MPLA made by Soviet analysts, the movement is always described as "progressive," "revolutionary democrat," "anti-imperialist," and "anti-colonialist."\textsuperscript{57} The subsequent development of the MPLA into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard

\textsuperscript{56} It is well known that Neto and Castro were good friends and developed close ties through the years of the Angolan conflict until Neto's death in 1980. In fact, it is only Castro who gives unwavering support to the MPLA and Neto in particular during the entire period of struggle 1961-1976 despite efforts to assassinate and overthrow him by several groups within the MPLA. The same cannot be said of the Soviet Union. During the abortive Alves coup in 1977, it was Cuba that diplomatically and militarily acted on Neto's behalf while the Soviets sat on the sidelines and refrained from condemning Alves until it was clear that Neto would be victorious. See F.B.I.S., May 21-30, 1977, Vol. III Nos. 100-108. For a discussion of this episode and the Soviet role within it, see Klinghoffer 80: 127-131 and Katsikas 80: 111-113.

\textsuperscript{57} This in the Soviet lexicon is one step below the creation of a vanguard party and the transition to scientific socialism and true Marxism-Leninism. The Dergue in Ethiopia, Sid Barre's movement in Somalia and the ruling party in Tanzania all have earned this distinction at one time or another. See several excerpts from articles in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, particularly Tass report August 18, 1975 in Vol XXVII No. 33 and Izvestia July 24, 1975 in Vol XXVII No. 30. Also, see Victor Sidenko, "Independent Africa's Choice," New Times, August 1975 and "Angola: People Against Reaction," New Times, October 1975.
party further emphasizes the ideological affinity between the Soviet Union and MPLA.  

In the case of Roberto and the FNLA, the ideological binds are also strong. The FNLA throughout its history continually voiced its anti-communist, if not pro-western stance which made alliance with the U.S. likely (Legum 76: 9-12). The primary reason for this was the strong bonds between Mobutu and Roberto which essentially fused Zairian and FNLA interests making U.S. support for Roberto tied to the U.S.-Zaire relationship. This made an alliance between the FNLA and U.S. more probable in any protracted struggle.

C. Do the local factions seek superpower support actively?

On the surface, this is clearly the case. But, it must be qualified to include only certain levels of intervention. The MPLA, FNLA and to a lesser extent UNITA all sought outside diplomatic and material support throughout the colonial struggle. Roberto spent a great deal of time soliciting aid throughout Europe, China and the U.S. during the 60's and 70's (Marcum 78: 221-240). Neto and other MPLA officials made countless trips to Cuba, the Soviet Union and Western Europe in search of aid, and there is substantial evidence to suggest that Neto actively sought the introduction of Cuban and Soviet forces


59 This did not preclude strains in U.S.-Zairian relations however. In fact during July, 1975, Mobutu (incensed over some unidentified aspect of U.S. policy) accused the U.S. of plotting against his life and attempting to overthrow him. Apparently, the dispute was papered over quickly, perhaps with more American aid to Roberto and Zaire, but this is speculation.
during the initial period of conflict (Klinghoffer 80: 114-120). UNITA as well made several overtures for aid to China, Egypt and later the U.S. through diplomatic efforts and as we have seen, shifts in stated policy positions (Somerville 86: 122-130).

Active efforts on the part of all three groups to gain assistance from the superpowers was present. Yet, it must be stated that while assistance was solicited and intervention requested, the three respective groups did not actively seek a massive superpower presence in order to impose a solution. On the contrary, this was precisely what all three leaders were fearful of. Superpower intervention of that scale could de-legitimize the movement(s) that it was supporting and thus destroy any momentum for governing.

Once again, the pattern of political legitimacy and its important effect on a conflict became salient. In the African context, legitimacy with regional states and the OAU is vital in order to ensure political/economic acceptance within the community of states. The kind of superpower intervention discussed above would serve to thwart legitimacy in the Angolan case. Consequently, relatively low levels of intervention were actively sought at least in the initial stage of the conflict (March 75).

D. Do any groups or states within the conflict have agreements regarding intervention with any superpower?

The answer to this is no. None of the groups had any type of formal relations with either superpower making mutual assistance agreements or the like not salient in this instance.

In terms of tolerance for intervention, the local movements in general exhibited a high tolerance for outside and particularly
superpower intervention. Yet, this tolerance had definite and prescribed limits. This made the potential for successful superpower intervention in terms of this variable relatively strong (+).

Through this examination of the local context, we can roughly estimate the degree of "opportunity" for successful superpower intervention for the period leading up to and including March 1975. The combined alignment of variables indicate a very HIGH (+) level of opportunity for the superpowers in Angola with virtually no local context factors acting as obstacles to that intervention. See Appendix E for a full illustration of the local context in this case.®®

This represents the highest possible "score," yet this does not alone guarantee successful superpower intervention. The interaction of superpower behavior with the independently operating factors of local context must be explored in order to accurately determine the outcome. This is where the true nature of local context can be teased out of the case and critically analyzed.

THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT

We now begin the analysis of the case in (4) three month increments. In keeping with the methodology employed, the analysis will focus on superpower intervention, its relative levels, its interaction with the local context and the resulting outcome (success or failure) of that intervention. The case itself will be explicated within the

®®In the analysis of the case itself, certain local context factors shift during the course of the conflict to diminish the potential for successful U.S. intervention and enhance Soviet chances. These are also illustrated in Appendix E. The discussion of their interaction and affect will follow.
discussion of these factors and their shifts over time. Once again we are reminded that the primary aim of the framework is to juxtapose superpower intervention with the local context in order to better explain outcome and ultimately address the initial research question.

March-May 1975

Once the conflict began, MPLA forces responded with counter-attacks on the FNLA throughout March and April. The FNLA possessing the more powerful of the two forces maintained the dominant military position both within the northern provinces of Zaire and Uige and increasingly around Luanda. Fighting between the two groups in this period was intense and estimated casualties in Luanda were in upwards of 20,000 (Legum 76: 13). During this initial period, UNITA attempted to remain neutral and separate itself from the fighting. Savimbi capitalized on FNLA-MPLA hostilities by portraying himself as the moderate force in Angola travelling abroad to illicit support based on UNITA's non-violence (Marcum 78: 260 & Legum 76: 12-13).

The first evidence of superpower intervention occurred almost simultaneously for both in the first few weeks of the conflict (March 23-April 15). In January, the U.S. National Security Council 40

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61 The vast majority of these were civilians with actual armed combatant casualties at or near 200.

62 A primary reason for UNITA inaction may have been more practically driven. UNITA forces were ill equipped and very small in comparison to FNLA/UNITA forces and as such could not have mounted any sort of military campaign that would have effected the initial fighting that broke out in March and April.

63 I refer the reader to the detailed operationalization of intervention appearing in chapter three/pp. 5-11.
committee appropriated $300,000 for the FNLA and this arrived in March and April in the form of light weaponry. This U.S. intervention is clearly at the LOW 1 level since it entails the overt funding of a faction without an actual physical presence in the conflict.

The point of intervention for the Soviet Union also occurs at this time with the shipment of weaponry to the MPLA (after March 25) through Brazzaville Congo, including mortars and artillery. This intervention level was also LOW 1 for the same reasons cited above. It is important to note that superpower intervention during this stage was publicly condemned by the Angolan transitional government and other regional actors but no concerted action was taken by any of the local participants to mitigate this behavior. For example, regional states that publicly voiced support for the Alvor accord, privately acted to undermine its goals (Zaire, Congo, South Africa, Zambia). This further illustrates the "fertile" nature of the local context in terms of superpower intervention.

In late April and early May, fighting between the two factions escalated with the FNLA carrying out attacks against MPLA and even

64See N.Y. Times, December 19, 1975 and the discussion of this meeting and its effects from Stockwell 78: 42-56.

65The estimated worth of Soviet shipments was approximately 10 million during March-April and it was ferried by Soviet and Yugoslavian ships as well as over land from the Congo(Marcum 78: 259).

UNITA forces within Luanda. At this point, the intervention levels for both superpowers escalated beyond the LOW 1 status as the MPLA position weakened and the FNLA sensed a knock-out blow.

At some undetermined point in May, a Zairian force numbering 1,200 crossed the Angolan frontier and joined with 2,500 FNLA troops in a drive against the MPLA (Katsikas 82: 78 & Bender 81: 80). This move was coterminous with increased U.S. contacts with FNLA forces in Zaire, thus representing a significant escalation of the level of US intervention into HIGH 2 status. This level entails the use of force by an ally or proxy in support of a local faction with superpower aid and acquiescence. It is unknown if an actual decision was made within Washington regarding the specifics of the Zairian intervention, but U.S. behavior clearly supported it with increased aid to the FNLA during this period, increased contacts through Kinshasa and the administration's public focus not on Zairian interference but on Soviet/Cuban machinations.


68Many, including Bender, Lemarchand and Weissman, have argued that U.S. ties to Zaire made the intervention of Zairian forces a de facto U.S. intervention and as such was interpreted as a U.S. escalation by both the Soviets and the Cubans as well as local Africans. See Lemarchand (83) and the corresponding chapters by both Bender and Weissman. In addition, for the "Soviet perspective" which seems to support this see F.B.I.S., April 2, 1975 from TASS report of International Affairs Magazine article.

See Stockwell 78: pp. 86-117 & 203-212 for an account of the increasing CIA activity in the Kinshasa station in relation to contacts and support both for Mobutu and the FNLA as well. See Hearings Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs-Angola, Jan. 28- Feb. 6 for a detailed account by Sec'y of State Kissinger on the American concern over Soviet/Cuban action in this period.
During this period of increased FNLA and Zairian intervention, the MPLA called for Soviet and Cuban aid to offset their disadvantageous position. Some 230 Cuban advisors arrived in June and established training facilities for the MPLA in and around Luanda (Katsikas 82: 78). In addition, the Soviets increased aid to the MPLA supplying some 50 tons of equipment estimated at $10-15 million (Bender 81: 80-81). The Cuban forces did not take up battlefield positions and, as such, represented an escalation on the part of the Soviet Union to HIGH 3 status level. This represents the training of local forces by either the superpower or ally within the territorial confines of the conflict.

By the end of May and the first "period" of the conflict, the MPLA had stabilized its position against the FNLA although it was still weaker militarily. Also by this time, UNITA had been drawn more into the battle because of its presence in Luanda, yet remained relatively aloof from any direct fighting or formal alliance with either the MPLA or FNLA.

Both superpowers had acted forcefully in concert with allies to escalate their roles in the conflict in order to effect the outcome for

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69 It was reported that Neto initially sought Soviet presence but was rebuffed in his trip to Moscow. *N.Y. Times*, January 12, 1976.

70 Although, it was becoming increasingly clear that Savimbi was moving closer to the FNLA than the MPLA. By this time he had already begun initial contacts with U.S. and South Africa officials (Stockwell 78: 151-156).
their respective local factions. This served to raise their respective intervention levels considerably in the space of three months.\textsuperscript{71}

**June-August 1975**

By early June, the MPLA had solidified its position and had begun counter attacks against both the FNLA and UNITA, and in the latter instance, pushing Savimbi more toward a formal alliance with the FNLA.\textsuperscript{72} Amidst increasing violence and the prospects of escalation by UNITA, the OAU attempted to reestablish the framework of Alvor by convening a conference in Nakuru, Kenya under the direction of Jomo Kenyatta. The subsequent Nakuru agreement signed by the three leaders on June 21, 1975 provided for a restoration of the basic principles of the Alvor agreement along with the restoration of a transitional government, independence, and the creation of a national army.\textsuperscript{73}

This represented the last real effort by the OAU to mediate the dispute. Within three weeks, July 9, large scale hostilities had broken out between FNLA and MPLA forces with the latter forcibly removing the former from Luanda (N.Y. Times, July 19, 1975). The environment within which this agreement collapsed is worth noting.

\textsuperscript{71} One note is important to mention. In charting these intervention patterns and identifying temporally "who acted first," this study is not attempting to attach blame either implicitly or explicitly. Blame in terms of this research is a non-issue. What is vital is the accurate mapping of intervention patterns in concert with local context to determine outcome. It is left to the reader to make the normative judgement of which superpower is "responsible."

\textsuperscript{72} See The Washington Post, August 8, 1975 and Hodges 76: 51 for a discussion of the growing alliance between UNITA and the FNLA.

\textsuperscript{73} For a complete text of the agreement see Hodges 76: 69-75.
Soviet and Cuban action during June and July included the continued shipment of personnel and arms (aid and Cuban advisors) through Brazzaville which totaled $35 million for the entire March-July period (Bender 80: 80).\(^7^4\) In the U.S., Kissinger convened another meeting of the 40 committee (July 17) and subsequently authorized the shipment of $14 million worth of aid to the FNLA and for the first time, to UNITA, along with the replacement of Zambian and Zairian weapons that had been given to Savimbi and Roberto respectively (Ibid., 80: 86).\(^7^5\) Additionally, Zairian troop strength within Angola was increased in this period and Mobutu's forces massed along the Cabindan frontier to threaten MPLA control in that area. China also contributed to this atmosphere by releasing weapons previously held up by Zaire to the FNLA.\(^7^6\)

Overall, regional and superpower actions ran counter to the tenants of the Nakuru agreement and its call for non-intervention and, as such, scuttled the pact before it had a chance to be implemented. OAU efforts were thwarted by a combination of local/regional state concerns and superpower foreign policy that acted in concert with those

\(^7^4\)It should be noted that actual Soviet personnel presence during this time was limited at best. There are no confirmed reports of Soviet military officials taking any direct part in the conflict or in actual fighting positions. Undoubtedly however, there were Soviet personnel periodically traveling to and from Luanda to assess the situation but their military role is open to conjecture.

\(^7^5\)The actual value of this equipment shipped to Zambia and Zaire is unknown but was most likely less than $60 million.

\(^7^6\)For a discussion of this Chinese role and its impact, see Katsikas 80:82-83.
interests. This displays the continued "penetrability" (+) of the local context.

A further illustration of this was the OAU meeting in July under its new chairman, Idi Amin of Uganda. In this meeting, the OAU almost exclusively focused on the worsening Angolan situation. They set up a committee of inquiry and called for the non-interference of superpowers with the proposal for an OAU peacekeeping force to be dispatched to Angola (ACR, Legum 75-76: C16-C17). However, the OAU was deeply split over the issue and regional intervention was already well entrenched. Additionally, Amin had openly sided with Mobutu in the Zairian intervention undermining his already weak position as either a mediator or positive regional force. Consequently, OAU efforts proved futile and as Marcum points out:

> Failure to act decisively (by the OAU) could only encourage extra-African powers (superpowers) to expand their intervention. (Marcum 78: 252)

By the end of July and the early part of August, both superpowers had maintained the intervention levels they had established previously. The U.S. continued to support with arms and assistance, Zairian intervention in support of the FNLA and had considerably escalated their support for UNITA as well. In late July, U.S. intervention within HIGH 2 status was expanded somewhat by FNLA moves to illicit the support of another regional actor in the conflict, South Africa.

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77 Gerald Bender correctly makes the observation that the 40 committee meeting on July 17, 1975 effectively increased U.S. support for the FNLA and UNITA by 100% and thus increased U.S. intervention within its already established HIGH 2 status (Bender 80: 86).
In July, Daniel Chipenda, an MPLA official who had defected to the FNLA with some 3,000 troops in April 1975, met with the Chief of the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) in Namibia to discuss South Africa support for the FNLA (Legum 78: 14). Additionally, the FNLA and UNITA had undertaken talks aimed at creating a united front against the MPLA (Ibid., 78: 14-15). Both of these moves immediately precipitated the South African Defense Force (SADF) incursion into Angola on August 9, 1975 which was ostensibly designed to secure the Cunene river and dam facilities from sabotage (Bender 80: 87). In addition, in late August, the South Africans, at the FNLA and UNITA’s urging, set up two training bases for each faction, one at Calombo and another at Mapupa, both in southern Angola (Marcum 78: 269). The result was a significant escalation of regional intervention, if not in terms of changing the military situation certainly in terms of serving notice to the MPLA that forces were coalescing against them.

In the Soviet case, aid to the MPLA increased during this period but not at alarming levels. Soviet shipments continued throughout August along with the arrival of an additional 100 Cuban advisors bringing the total to roughly 300 by September 1 (Bender 80: 87-91).


79 Stockwell has argued that U.S. contacts with the SADF and BOSS were extensive and that the SADF did not surprise the administration with its moves into Angola. Even if this is not true, local and regional actors would have been hard pressed to believe that an SADF intervention into Angola was not done without U.S. acquiescence and approval. Consequently, it is plausible to argue that this fact made the SADF invasion part and parcel of U.S. intervention.
The intervention level remained at a **HIGH 3** status throughout this period. Despite, these increased efforts by the U.S. and her regional allies, the MPLA enjoyed a more advantageous position vis-a-vis its adversaries by mid-August. MPLA forces had driven the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda and had established control over 12 of 16 provinces, due largely to its political organization ability and not its military prowess (Katsikas 82: 80). Support from the Soviet Union and Cuba was continuing and regional organizations were split over the conflict, thus making the MPLA more viable while it still continued to hold the key territorial position, Luanda.

A salient consequence of the MPLA's enhanced position was the increased polarization of the three movements that had already begun in April. MPLA forces stepped up actions against UNITA forces in southern Angola, including driving Savimbi from the key cities of Lobito, Benguela and Mocamedes (Hodges 76: 53). This served to formally split the three Angolan factions into two groups, FNLA/UNITA vs. MPLA. Savimbi codified this division by declaring war on the MPLA on August 21, 1975 and later, the FNLA and UNITA formally bonded themselves together against the MPLA both in political and military terms.

**September-November 1975**

By September 1, the battle lines had been clearly drawn and neither regional actors nor the superpowers appeared interested in mediating a settlement. Contributing to this, OAU action was ineffective and largely sidestepped once Amin assumed the Chairmanship.
Thus, all the factors discussed in the mapping of local context still appeared salient and, as such, the local context was still ripe (+) for successful intervention and manipulation.

On September 3, the first signs of increasing Cuban intervention appeared with a report of Cuban vessels heading for Angola with hundreds of soldiers on board (Katsikas 80: 81). They subsequently arrived in late September. By October 15, the number of Cuban advisors had risen from 300 to 1,500 escalating their role and also heightening Soviet intervention into a HIGH 2 status (Ibid 80: 81).®© In addition, Soviet aid continued, increasing that country's total bill for the March–October period to $80 million.®¹

During this period, the truly tenuous nature of the battlefield situation was clearly illustrated. The MPLA's position shifted from a dominant position to near defeat and back to a dominant position all within a span of three months.®² From mid-September through early October, the FNLA and UNITA moved militarily against the MPLA in both the northern and the southern theatres. These attacks were carried out

®©It is still a major point of contention as to when Cuban advisors took part in battlefield operations. Reports indicate that Cuban forces did not take part in actual direct fighting until after the South African invasion of October 23. But, most analysts believe their role in Angola must have included advising the MPLA during the course of battle situations and as such elevates this intervention into HIGH 2 status.

®¹See N.Y. Times, March 10, 1976 & The Washington Post, January 6, 1976. Again, as discussed above, the value of U.S. aid during this same period had been reported by the administration as approximately $32 million but this does not take into account other western sources of aid, the possible undervaluing of the weapons provided or the replacement equipment furnished Zaire and Zambia.

®²This is illustrated in several accounts of the battle situation, most notably by Valenta 83: 105-114. Also, see Bender 83: 86-96.
with the increasing aid of Zaire and South Africa. In the north, Zaire increased her role in Angola by adding 120 additional troops to its "intervention" force bringing the total up to 1,400-1,500 by October 1 (Marcum 78: 269). In the south, South African advisors (18) moved up from their training base in Calombo into Silva Porto and actually took part in a UNITA operation against MPLA positions in Novo Lisbo in early October (Marcum 78: 269).83

Coincidentally, China almost simultaneously began a general pull out from Zaire and halted aid to the FNLA. This decision was based largely on Chinese estimates of FNLA fighting ability and also on the undesirable situation of being a de facto ally of South Africa.84 In September, China announced it would cease arms shipments to the FNLA and by late October had pulled out its advisors from Zaire and essentially left the conflict altogether (Marcum 78: 265).

Concurrently, both superpowers were continuing their respective interventions through increased aid and the participation of regional allies in the conflict. In the U.S. case, Zairian and FNLA forces

83 Also, according to later reports, South African intervention was "paid for" by Savimbi with aid in routing out SWAPO guerrillas, see The Washington Post, April 26, 1976.

84 Speculation ran high among U.S. officials as to why the Chinese chose to pull out when they did. In the Senate Hearings of late January and early February, 1976, this question was repeatedly asked of administration officials as well as experts on the area. The consensus appears to be a combination of the two factors cited above. China saw no diplomatic value in being a de facto ally of South Africa and also apparently saw little encouraging signs among FNLA forces that they could actually win. This is instructive for U.S. policy for it was the Chinese who had worked most closely with Roberto and were in the best position to evaluate his ability and that of his men. This point is collaborated by Stockwell in his meetings with Roberto, See Stockwell 78: 118-137.
began a major offensive (October 15) against the MPLA, with the clear aim of taking Luanda by November 11, independence day. By late October, Zairian troop levels within Angola went from 1,500 to 3,500 and these forces spearheaded FNLA advances in the north.

In the South, a key turning point occurred when the SADF in tandem with UNITA, Portuguese mercenaries and FNLA forces began "Operation Zulu" on or about October 23. South African forces numbering 5,000 and equipped with tanks, air support and heavy artillery routed MPLA forces from the key cities of San Da Bandiera, Mocamedes, Benguela, Lobito and Novo Redondo. The result was that within several days UNITA and her "allies" were within 200 miles of Luanda and threatening MPLA positions in the eastern region. Likewise in the north by November 1, FNLA and Zairian forces had advanced on Luanda getting within 12 miles of the city. By this time, MPLA control had shrunk from 12/16 provinces in September to 4/16 by November 4.

The degree of U.S. complicity in these offensives is difficult to determine, yet indications are that in the case of Zaire, U.S. officials were certainly aware of prior Zairian intervention and through CIA offices encouraged it, underwriting most of the aid that Mobutu provided to the FNLA. As was pointed out later by Kissinger himself, part of the reason for our

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85 Roberto had pledged that he would be in Luanda to declare independence by November 11 and staked much of his reputation on that.
involvement stemmed from support for Mobutu’s policy in the region which included support for Roberto.\(^{86}\)

In the case of South Africa, the picture is less clear. Reports indicate that the U.S. made known to the Vorster regime that South African policy was coterminous with American interests and, as such, intervention by the SADF was quietly welcomed by the administration and subtlety justified when juxtaposed with Cuban/Soviet involvement.\(^{87}\)

According to John Barratt in his account of the South African view of the Angolan situation:

> Whether there was actual encouragement from any source in the U.S. administration is not known....the indications are that there was no positive discouragement, and that in fact South African presence suited American policy, as the only means of preventing the collapse of the anti-MPLA alliance in Angola...\(^{88}\)

In addition, it is well documented that the CIA had extensive contacts with their counterparts in BOSS and reports indicate that they were in close association immediately prior to the South African invasion.\(^{88}\)

All of this illustrates regional state action in support of U.S. policy as an integral part of the U.S. intervention dimension


\(^{88}\)This relationship during the crucial period leading up to Operation Zulu is documented by John Stockwell 78: 185-190. In fact, the sharing of intelligence and war material (covertly of course) by the two indicates a degree of prior complicity in the invasion so far denied by American officials. Thus far, the degree of complicity has only been substantiated by Stockwell himself and this leaves any conclusions in this area open to criticism. The necessary documentation to support this view is still yet to be released.
and thus increased an already HIGH 2 status for the Ford Administration.

The MPLA response to this new and dire situation was to call for Cuban and Soviet aid to stave off total defeat. Although, the decision may have been made as early as October 20, on November 4, Neto formally called for Cuban assistance and a battalion was airlifted in with plans for the dispatch of additional combat forces (Katsikas 82: 82). This was part of the larger joint Soviet-Cuban move code-named "Operation Carlotta." In this effort, Soviet Antonov-22 transports flew in Cuban troops, artillery, and weapons directly to Luanda. In addition, T54 and T34 tanks arrived manned by Cubans for deployment in the South. This renewed escalation further heightened Soviet intervention within HIGH 2 and served to escalate hostilities as well.

On November 11, the date given in the Alvor agreement for Angolan independence, two rival "governments" were formed. The MPLA, in control of Luanda and the surrounding areas, declared itself the Peoples Republic of Angola (PRA) and was immediately recognized by the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Vietnam and a host of other communist and "leftist" states in the Third World (Marcum 78: 272). Simultaneously, the FNLA/UNITA alliance announced the formation of the Social Democratic Republic of Angola (SDRA) in the city of Huambo (Legum 78: 15). Despite each sides protestations of support and victory, the MPLA/PRA was in danger of suffering a massive defeat.

89 See The Washington Post, January 16, 1976 for a post-mortem on this operation. Also, see Marcum 78: 273-274 for a discussion of its impact.
By November 16, Luanda was threatened on three sides by the combined forces of the FNLA/SADF/UNITA and Zaire with only the province of Luanda being securely in MPLA hands. It was at this point that Cuban combat forces began to be deployed by the thousands on both fronts and Soviet weaponry, particularly Jet fighters and 122mm "katyusha" rockets, turned the tide of the conflict(The Washington Post, February 19, 1976).

In the north, MPLA forces with Cuban officers and 122mm rockets literally stopped the FNLA/Zairian advance and forced a massive retreat(Stockwell 78: 214-215). In the south, SADF and UNITA forces encountered stiff Cuban resistance as they increasingly took on the bulk of the MPLA/Cuban forces. The Cuban expeditionary force initially suffered several defeats at the hands of the South Africans, but resistance stiffened and superior firepower won out preventing an outright "South African victory." Cuban troop levels expanded dramatically during the latter half of November with some 3,000 combat troops in action by November 30, and many more on the way(Legum 78: 21).

The political result of this escalation by all parties was a reversal of sympathies and legitimacy worldwide. Initially seen as weak and not well supported, the MPLA began to receive diplomatic and material support from influential African and Third World states. On

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90 In fact the rapidity with which the forces of Roberto and Mobutu crumbled under the weight of one cleverly used piece of hardware further underscored the tenuous battlefield situation. FNLA forces appeared on the verge of victory yet, the use of these "katyusha" rockets so frightened and intimidated the overly confident forces of Roberto that they merely fled.
November 27th, the Nigerian government recognized the FRA and sent $20 million in aid (N.Y. Times January 4, 1976). OAU factions began to coalesce around an anti-South African and consequently anti-SDRA position. Some of the more influential states among them were Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal. A direct result of this was that Soviet intervention was legitimized during this period and U.S. moves were castigated.

Thus, the September-November period was key for the superpowers for several reasons. First, it saw the elimination of any regional efforts at mediation due largely to superpower disdain for these efforts and OAU factionalism. Second, this period saw the further escalation of the conflict to make it a truly regional war with allies of both sides significantly increasing their roles in order to force a solution. Third, it saw the solidification of both superpower interventions into a HIGH 2 status which served notice that both sides were thoroughly committed (at least for the immediate future) to their respective allies. Finally, it forced a showdown between the rival factions where the relative weaknesses and strengths of each could be

91 Part of the OAU inability to mediate the situation stemmed from a real split over legitimacy of the respective factions. During the conflict several factions coalesced around the three movements. Zaire, Tanzania, the Ivory Coast and others supported the FNLA until the SADF invasion while the more radical states of Congo, Mozambique, Guinea, and Somalia supported the MPLA. A third faction, principally Zambia and Ghana, began to increasingly side with Savimbi amidst his diplomatic offensive of the spring of 1975. Finally, there existed the influential group of states still pledged to the framework of Alvor and Nakuru, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon and Kenya. Overall, at least until the post-independence period, the OAU was as factionalized as the Angola terrain.
exposed, and this process of discovery occurred quickly and decisively in the December 1975-February 1976 period.

December 75-February 76

Once the MPLA had forced a halt to the joint FNLA/Zairian advance, they began to launch counter attacks in December that effectively routed the FNLA and forced Zaire to retreat across the border. The situation in the south, however, remained tenuous with UNITA/SADF forces still within striking distance of Luanda, and holding their own against newly introduced Cuban forces. The deployment of Cuban combat troops continued in Angola throughout the December-February period, with some 7-9,000 arriving by mid-December (Bender 78: 94). In addition, once independence had been declared and legitimacy accorded, the USSR began bringing in military advisors (400) and tacticians who oversaw battlefield operations, particularly in the south.

During this period of MPLA-Cuban counter-attacks, international condemnation of U.S./SADF intervention became strongly influential on regional actors, supra-regional states and on domestic forces within the U.S. First, African states joined Nigeria and Tanzania in their disdain of Savimbi's "selling out" to Pretoria and in their increasing acceptance (in context) of Soviet/Cuban intervention. The split

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92 Known as "the Battle of Death Road," the Zairian/FNLA forces were completely shaken and eliminated as a viable fighting force, if not physically certainly emotionally (ACR, Legum 75-76: B432). Also, see discussion by Marcum 78: 274-275 and Stockwell 78: 214-218 of this battle and its effects.

93 It is interesting to trace the Nigerian position on this question. Nigeria, a largely pro-western state, at first openly led the charge against Soviet intervention up until the South African
within the OAU that had been present throughout the period of the conflict began to crumble under the weight of a growing anti-South African consensus. Thus, despite Zairian intransigence until 1976, most African states began to accept the battlefield reality and worked to diplomatcally support the PRA. As Legum points out in reference to the effects of South African intervention:

It (S.A. intervention) led to greater shipments of arms from Russia and more combat troops from Cuba,...It provided a more credible justification (in African eyes) for the Soviet/Cuban role. It caused a number of African countries (led by Nigeria and Ghana) to abandon their earlier support for UNITA,...And it helped to discredit the anti-MPLA Angolan movements suspected of colluding with 'Africa's arch-enemy'. (Legum 78: 38)

Second, in the U.S., congressional forces moved to cut off U.S. "covert" aid to the Angolan factions and stifle American intervention.94 This movement led largely by Senator Dick Clark of Iowa (a noted "senate specialist" on Africa) finally coalesced around the Tunney amendment to the Defense appropriations bill of December 19, 1975 which prohibited further U.S. covert aid to the factions in invasion. Once this occurred, Nigeria began to reverse itself until it openly recognized the PRA and in fact accepted Soviet intervention as a necessary bulwark against "Pretorian expansionism." See Klinghoffer 78: 68-71.

94The actual story of American/CIA aid to Angola broke in the fall and had risen as a major issue for the Ford Administration in the wake of the fall of South Vietnam and the revelations about CIA activities under the Church Committee hearings. At this time, the Ford administration found itself under attack from both left-wing and right-wing elements. On the left, criticism of a resurrection of American "adventurism" of the kind that led to Vietnam fueled opposition while on the right, disdain came as a result of Ford's "weakness" in the face of Soviet expansionism and the fall of Vietnam.
Angola. The amendment passed in the Senate by a vote of 54-22 and publicly, the U.S. administration role began to shift from intervention to interested spectator.

Third, the U.S. (monetary support) pull-out from the conflict weakened the already tenuous interventions of her allies, South Africa and Zaire. Mobutu's troops were already in flight and by January were out of Angola together. From the South African viewpoint, extraction was less desirable and more problematic. Through November-December, SADF force levels within Angola had been increasing to about 2-3,000 regular troops and by December 15 had already engaged and defeated Cuban forces in several battles. In addition, Savimbi remained in direct contact with the South African government, meeting personally in Pretoria with Vorster on December 20 to request greater involvement (Legum 78: 38). However, once the U.S. decided that extraction was mandated, the Vorster regime felt "betrayed." Added to this was the intense international pressure to withdraw further alienating South Africa within the region. In that December meeting, Vorster informed Savimbi that an SADF pull out was imminent and by January, South African troops were being pulled back to the Namibian border.

By January 15, certain realities were present in Angola. First, while U.S. intervention had begun to drop from a HIGH 2 status to negligible levels, the Soviet Union continued to upgrade its intervention considerably within that same status. Cuban troops

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95 See a discussion of this in Legum 78: 35-41 and Bender 81: 96-104. Also, see Barratt, 76: 152-157.
continued to arrive and by this time, numbered 12,000 (Bender 78: 94).
Soviet aid for the period October-January amounted to $220 million
bringing the grand total for March-January to $300 million (Marcum 78:
278-279). This aid included weaponry more sophisticated than anything
provided to the FNLA or UNITA, with the possible exception of some SADF
material. Also, with military victory close at hand, Cuban troops
began to take an even more active role in both the combat and
administration functions of the country.

Second, the regional actors began to accept the reality of the FRA
and with a few exceptions moved to admit her into the OAU (Legum 78: 30-
31, Klinghoffer 80: 68-71) On February 11, 1976 this reality was
codified and the FRA was admitted into the OAU.

Third, UNITA and the FNLA lost all credibility within and outside
the country with the exception of their ethnic bases of support. In
Roberto's case, this too proved tenuous and he eventually retreated to
Zaire and later Europe. For Savimbi, his close ties and utility to
South African policy made his departure less likely and he retreated
into the bush of southern Angolan to continue the fight with SADF
assistance. This marked the formal end to the Angolan conflict begun
in March, 1975.

INTERVENTION OUTCOME: EVALUATION

The next task entails evaluating the outcome of the conflict
within a period of one year after its termination, roughly between late
February 1976 and February 1977. This is done by utilizing the
operationalization of outcome explained in chapter three. Briefly, this concept includes five key factors:

1. The military position of the faction in question vis-a-vis rivals in the conflict.
2. The territorial control of the faction in question.
3. The degree of international recognition of the faction.
4. The form of political control over territory that the faction employs.
5. The degree of superpower opposition to the faction's position.⁹⁶

The first factor is the military position of the MPLA during the period February, 1976-1977. By February 15, 1976, the MPLA had fully routed the FNLA from most of the northern provinces and had eliminated UNITA's operations in all but the southern 1/3 of Angola. By most objective accounts, the conflict, begun in March, 1975 was over. With some 15,000-20,000 Cuban troops, the FRA was able to effectively govern most of the country and also eliminate a large percentage of the attacks on the key urban centers. In terms of the dominant military position vis-a-vis other factions, the MPLA clearly was in a position of supremacy. This dominant position increased over the corresponding year with the virtual elimination of the FNLA as a viable entity and with the initial disorganization of UNITA in the south.⁹⁷

The second factor is the territorial control of the faction or group. By this time, the MPLA claimed control over 13/16 provinces and

⁹⁶See Chapter three and Appendices B & C for a detailed explanation of the operationalization of outcome.

⁹⁷In subsequent years, the destruction of UNITA was not completed and with South African aid, Savimbi was able to regroup over a period of two years to once again become an effective fighting force within Angola (mostly in the southern 2/3 of the country).
with Savimbi's forces retreating deep into southern Angola, could claim control over all the major urban areas from Mocamedes in the south to Cabinda in the north. Although much of the countryside and remote areas were beyond the reach of not only the MPLA but also UNITA and FNLA during the war, their territorial integrity was largely guaranteed by MPLA/Cuban forces.  

Third, by early to mid 1976, the MPLA was accorded representation in the OAU and was accepted internationally by the UN and by most other western states, with the exception of the United States (Klinghoffer 80: 64-65). Clearly, with the disintegration of the FNLA and the growing South African alliance with UNITA, there existed no "politically viable" entity with which to deal in Angola except the PRA. Recognition became a moot point particularly for the MPLA's former adversaries, Zaire and Zambia who both found it necessary to deal with Neto by late 1977-78.  

Interestingly enough, this appears to be a situation that continues to today. Recent reports out of Angola indicate that neither the government nor UNITA is able to effectively patrol or govern much of the remote countryside since its size coupled with population sparseness is so prohibitive. See William Claiborne, "In Angola, It's Getting Harder to Tell the good Guys from the Bad," Washington Post Weekly, October 26, 1987.  

Zaire began this process first with a meeting between Neto and Mobutu in which both leaders pledged non-interference in the other's affairs in the wake of the Shaba II episode. See Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation-American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan, Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1985, pp. 516-517. In fact, even by 1977-78, South Africa began to make overtures to the Neto regime for talks aimed at eliminating Angola as a base for SWAPO guerrillas. These talks were hardly productive but indicated the de facto recognition of the PRA by even its most vehement enemies. These talks under different leaders and with differing conditions continue to today.
Fourth, the type of political control that the MPLA exercised was not ideal in terms of eliciting long-term support and displayed varying levels of effectiveness. The nationalistic euphoria of Angolan independence soon subsided under the weight of enormous destruction, death and flight by Portuguese settlers, taking with them expertise and money.\textsuperscript{100} In the urban centers, MPLA control was strong and could be considered symbolic in that these areas were traditionally MPLA strongholds and early popular attitudes were firmly behind the PRA against the SADF/UNITA/U.S. alliance. This meant that the form of political control in these areas was not prohibitive on the regime.

However, in the countryside and particularly in Bakongo and Ovimbundu areas, utilitarian and coercive methods were the norm.\textsuperscript{101} In areas of traditional UNITA/FNLA support the Mesticos, Assimilados and Cubans of the urban areas were considered invaders and their policies became difficult to enforce without police and military action, usually carried out by the Cubans.\textsuperscript{102} Consequently, the type of political control that the PRA exercised over the entire country was at best minimally successful.

Finally, the degree of U.S. opposition to the PRA was considerable in that recognition and the corresponding aid was not forthcoming. Yet, several factors acted to mute this opposition in 1976-77. First, 

\textsuperscript{100}For a discussion of this and its effects on the economy, see Somerville 86: 131-147.

\textsuperscript{101}Again, for an explanation of these terms as they are used within the concept of political control, see Chapter three and its discussion of outcome.

\textsuperscript{102}See Somerville 86: 152-170 and Katsikas 82: 84-90.
the U.S. was largely alone in its "tilting at windmill" strategy. Most states accepted the reality of the PRA as evidenced by the OAU and UN policies of recognition. Even those states most vehemently opposed to an MPLA government saw fit to accommodate in part the new regime. China, Zaire, and Zambia.

Second, the U.S. did not help their anti-PRA cause by openly stating that their opposition was to Soviet and Cuban aid and not an MPLA government per se. In fact, Kissinger testified before Senate Hearings in early 1976 that U.S. officials saw little difference between the factions and that an MPLA victory was amenable to the U.S. provided it was achieved in the proper manner. This served to intensify the criticism of the U.S.'s Africa policy under Nixon-Ford which emphasized strategic considerations and ignored local concerns and issues.

Third, the economic isolation that may have hurt the PRA in this initial period did not materialize, either from western states or from private investment concerns. Major oil companies (Gulf and later Chevron) dealt with the PRA even prior to independence for drilling

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103 See Garthoff 85: 516-518, and Legum 78: 30-32.

104 See Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress January 29-February 6, 1976, pp. 32 & 38.

rights in the oil-rich Cabindan province providing the new government with immediate sources of revenue.\textsuperscript{106}

Fourth, the perception, largely correct, that the PRA was a black majority state being strangled by the South Africans added to her legitimacy in the eyes of most of the world and made support for her victory a litmus test for many state’s anti-apartheid policy. Even regimes that viewed the MPLA as ideologically or politically undesirable to their long-term interests (Nigeria, Tanzania) immediately changed gears when presented with the prospects of a South African occupation and dictation of terms to Luanda.\textsuperscript{107} Thus, it became clear that despite considerable diplomatic opposition on the part of the U.S., the PRA initially was able to weather the storm and mute its adverse effects.

The following represents a graphic illustration of the alignment of factors providing a rough approximation of the outcome for both superpowers.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106}See Somerville, 86: 134-136, Katsikas 81: 98-100, and Hodges 78: 59. In fact, even current administration efforts at diminishing oil company dealings with the PRA have proved unsuccessful.


\textsuperscript{108}Each variable cannot always be classified as a separate success or failure throughout every case. The overall measure of a success or failure is usually ascertained through a combination of the interaction
TABLE 2

OUTCOME: Soviet Union/MPLA

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OVERALL = SUCCESS

TABLE 3

OUTCOME: United States/FNLA-UNITA

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OVERALL = FAILURE

The fact that in this case, a Soviet failure corresponded with a U.S. success does not mean to imply that outcome is a zero-sum game. In fact, this study rejects the notion of zero-sum as any accurate starting point in evaluating outcome. There are many cases where all aspects of outcome can be achieved by both superpowers within the same context of the five factors since it is possible that one or two factors could by themselves determine a success or failure. For example, a regime could fail in maintaining territorial control over areas of the country or face significant superpower opposition but be very successful in gaining international recognition and support for itself and in the form of political control it utilizes. Thus, it could be judged a success. The key is the interaction of these factors within the context of the case and not the simple adding up of factors in a positive or negative score.
conflict due to the relationship of local context to intervention. Only within the globalist conception does the concept of zero-sum dominate.

Overall, in this initial period we can classify the MPLA victory as a success for Soviet intervention and a failure for the United States. The MPLA had achieved control over the political authority structure by February 1976. It had received most international recognition save a few states, and was in the dominant military position although not fully in control of all territory. The level of political control varied according to region and ethnic group but, substantial support was present and any large scale antipathy was suppressed with the exception of UNITA. Also, the prospects for continued U.S. intervention were minimal in this period due to Congressional and public opposition and the failed policy of U.S. allies in the region who largely withdrew their forces and accepted the fait accompli of an MPLA victory.

OUTCOME: POSTSCRIPT

This section details briefly, the outcome status some 3-5 years after the initial analysis (in this case roughly 1979-1984). This is designed to identify certain patterns developing after the conflict has ended which may provide insight into the strength or fragility of
superpower intervention and its relative success or failure. The same operationalization of outcome applies in this period as well.

The military position of the PRA by 1979-80 had not improved since independence. The PRA was still dependent upon some 19,000 Cuban troops whose functions ranged from military support and internal security to actual governing in some remote areas (Katsikas 81: 85-86 and Somerville 86: 166-169). UNITA regrouped during this period and with substantial South Africa assistance reestablished itself in the Southern 1/3 of Angola, waging a partially effective guerrilla war severing key rail and communication links including the Benguela railway (Somerville 86: 126-130). SADF invasions during this period and actual occupation of territory (Cunene province) along the border served to further weaken the PRA control over the region. In addition, the FLEC renewed their operations with SADF assistance in Cabinda and some northern provinces. This not only weakened PRA political control but also hindered the economic re-organization of the country.

109 This refers in part to the discussions in chapters two and three regarding the nature of superpower foreign policy in the Third World and the estimates of its success or failure. It is recognized that success and failure are tenuous phenomena in superpower foreign policy and must be treated both in short-term and longer term projections. This serves not only our estimate of superpower intervention and its outcome but also how local context intercedes to effect that intervention past the life of the actual conflict in question.

110 In fact, one South African officer/mercenary was captured by PRA forces in Cabinda while taking part in a sabotage operation with the FLEC.
through the sabotage of key installations and the forced migration of refugees, now numbering some 200,000.\(^{111}\)

The amount of territory controlled by the PRA was reduced. The PRA could claim effective control over most of the urban areas that it held at independence, but the rural provinces of Cunene, Namibe, Huila Cuando Cubango, Bie and Huambo were largely under the influence of UNITA and the South Africans (Somerville 86: 125-127). This effectively made 1/3 of the country ungovernable by 1980.

In 1981, the SADF launched an invasion code-named "Operation Protea" (much like Israeli invasions of Lebanon) that effectively eliminated PRA influence along the Namibian border as far as 200 miles north (Ibid., 86: 125). Also by 1984, UNITA expanded its involvement into all of the provinces south and west of Luanda including Mexico, Luanda Sul, Luanda Norte, Cuanza Sul, Cuanza Norte and Malanje (Ibid., 86: 126). Overall, the PRA was still in control of the key areas of the country including Cabinda and Luanda but its territorial position was much less viable than in 1976-77.\(^{112}\)

The form of political control in Angola deteriorated along with the territorial and military positions. With the continued reliance upon Cuban and East bloc assistance at many managerial levels of society, and with the corresponding infiltration from without and within, the MPLA increasingly relied on coercive methods in order to


\(^{112}\)In fact, many analysts argue that without the continued presence of Cuban forces the MPLA government would fall (Bender 78). However, this does not de facto translate into a pre-eminent position for UNITA.
maintain political control. The extent of these methods used by the PRA is unclear as reports are contradictory and unconfirmed, but there appears to be a direct and positive relationship between SADF/UNITA operations and PRA political crackdowns against the population.

The level of international support that the PRA was able to muster in the face of prolonged South African/UNITA/U.S. intransigence was perhaps the one factor that was actually enhanced during this period. The PRA under Neto and particularly under dos Santos was able to engineer several diplomatic moves aimed at increasing and diversifying Angola's ties with both east and west. Despite strong ties to the Eastern bloc, particularly Cuba, the PRA has expanded its relationship with Portugal, Western Europe and a host of other non-socialist states. For example, Angola is a party to the Lome Convention and thus eligible for EEC aid; it has expanded trade with Brazil and Scandinavian countries, and by 1986, the PRA did 70% of its trade with the west (Somerville 86: 147-151).

Regionally, relations with Zaire and Zambia have been expanded and adapted to emphasize cooperation rather than the enmity prevalent


114Some have argued that this was done at Soviet insistence due to both their lack of available funds and a hesitancy to fully support Angola. This is still a matter for speculation.

115See Katsikas 81: 107-110 for a brief synopsis of this. For a more detailed examination, see Somerville 86: 131-151.
During the independence period.\footnote{116} After the Shaba II conflict in 1978, Neto and Mobutu signed an agreement respecting each country's sovereignty and in 1979 Neto made a state visit to Zaire reaffirming this principle\cite{Legum 78-79: B500}.\footnote{117} In the case of Zambia, Kaunda's rejection of Savimbi and encouragement of Angolan membership in SADCC solidified the rapprochement between those two states.

Finally, in the area of superpower (in this case U.S.) opposition, the Angolan government has felt the brunt of the Reagan administration's "anti-communist" policies. As part of the Reagan doctrine, U.S. military and diplomatic support for UNITA (ostensibly as part of an overall settlement of the Namibian question) has hurt Angolan development and further heightened the political/economic difficulties cited earlier.\footnote{118} As a result, the FRA has had to turn to

\footnote{116}The initiator here is hard to determine and relations between Angola and Zaire & Zambia have gone through periodic strains, yet the growing absorption of Angola into mainstream status is continuing regionally and internationally. Evidence of this can be seen in the incorporation of Angola into the Organization of Frontline States, and its membership in the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

\footnote{117}This agreement called for Neto and Mobutu to refrain from supporting respective insurgent groups that operate within each other's territory. For Mobutu, this meant withdrawing sanctuary and support to the remnants of the FNLA and FLEC separatists. For Neto, this meant disarming FNLC/Katangan forces operating to rest Shaba province from Kinshasa's control. Thus far, the agreement has been moderately successful.

\footnote{118}The Reagan administration position on this is best summed up by Peter Duignan in Elliot Skinner ed. \textit{Beyond Constructive Engagement}, Paragon House Publishers, New York, 1986, when he outlined four basic objectives:

1. Peaceful shift away from Apartheid.
2. Maintain access to strategic minerals.
3. Assure strategic security around Cape.
4. Thwart Soviet/Cuban policy.

These entail linking Namibian independence to Cuban withdrawal and as
other donors, especially the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc for military assistance. Figures are difficult to obtain but estimates are that the Soviets provided some $20-30 million in economic aid during the 1976-1982 period with "pledges" of $2 billion for 1982-1990 (Somerville 86: 147-151). Military aid is considerably higher, with aid levels in the 1976-1978 period alone totaling over $650 million and projected figures for 1976-1986 totaling between $1-3 billion (Arlinghaus 83: 41). What these figures show is that the economic assistance necessary to develop Angola's vast resources has not been forthcoming for a variety of reasons. Principle among them is the Soviet desire not to bankroll "another Cuba," along with the PRA's genuine desire to diversify its sources of aid.

Additionally, the South African military support for UNITA has effectively sabotaged those potentially viable areas (except Cabinda) for economic development such that the country is atrophying both economically and politically. When this fact is combined with the such allies The U.S. with South Africa's policy of support for UNITA.

Evidence on the actual value of arms shipments between any two states is difficult to obtain and this case is no exception. Reports of Soviet military aid to Angola range from figures as low as $400 million to as a high $1.2 billion for any calendar year.

This has been reported not only in the case of Angola but also in Nicaragua, Mozambique and Ethiopia. The Soviets appear economically unable to provide the massive assistance necessary to offset the horrendous conditions facing each of these states. For a discussion of this from the regional perspective see Wilfred Burchett, Southern Africa Stands Up, Urizen Books, New York, 1978, Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution, Verso Editions, London, 1983 and Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire, London, 1984.

Current U.S. covert aid requests call for $15 million per year to UNITA. This aid includes Stinger missiles which have been used very effectively by the Afghan rebels against the Soviets and Afghan
Portuguese exodus and its devastating effects on the economy, the economic capital and infrastructure necessary to develop Angola is severely hampered if not strangled. This serves to place inordinate pressures on the dos Santos government forcing it into talks with South Africa on the question of Cuban troop involvement and support for SWAPO and the ANC.122

Based on the events of the last eight years, we can update and amend our original estimation of Soviet and U.S. outcome. For the Soviet Union, the intervention in a longer perspective is a limited success based on some of the factors mentioned above. Principally, these include the fact that the PRA requires massive aid and continued foreign involvement to survive as a viable regime. Coupled with this, is the increasingly tenuous territorial position it enjoys vis-a-vis UNITA/South Africa along with heightened coercive methods and superpower (U.S.) opposition.

Conversely, for the U.S., the Angolan intervention has proved to be a more limited failure. UNITA remains a militarily viable force and one that will not disintegrate in the near future despite universal international condemnation of Savimbi and little or no chance of his actually attaining power. The PRA's increasing willingness to talk and deal with her adversaries (the Reagan administration and South Africa but not UNITA) appears as "proof" that the failure trumpeted by critics


of the Ford-Kissinger handling of the Angolan conflict has evolved into a less than catastrophic situation in the ensuing 5-10 years.

TABLE 4

OUTCOME: Soviet Union/MPLA

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OUTCOME=LIMITED SUCCESS

TABLE 5

OUTCOME: United States/FNLA-UNITA

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OUTCOME=LIMITED FAILURE

ANALYSIS

This analysis of the Angolan conflict illustrates several key points with regard to the interplay of local context and superpower intervention. These points form the skeleton of an explanatory argument that addresses the principle question:

Why were the Soviets successful (and why did the U.S. fail) in their respective interventions in Angola?
In addressing this question, it is important to first substantiate the centrality of local context as a key explanatory variable and second to juxtapose it with superpower intervention to explain outcome. These are the two primary tasks of this section.

The Local Context

In attempting to address the above question, the central starting point is that the local context was clearly susceptible (+) to penetration and successful intervention throughout the duration of the conflict. Local actors (MPLA/FNLA/UNITA) along with regional states and organizations acted to enhance (although perhaps not by design) superpower intervention rather than thwart it. Arguably, without this positive (+) environment for successful intervention, the superpowers would not have been able to capitalize on the local conditions to any significant degree. In fact, the following analysis will argue that it was principally the configuration of the local context that dictated the outcome of the respective superpower interventions.

Evidence for this view can be seen by examining salient portions of the above case study. By focusing on two key variables, regional state role and regional organization role, this is clearly illustrated.

First, without regional states as "staging areas" for superpower intervention, penetration into the local conflict would have been difficult if not impossible. From the U.S. perspective, without Zaire and South Africa acting as regional allies of U.S. policy, it is doubtful the Ford administration could have projected any significant force (overt or covert) into Angola, particularly once U.S.
intervention came under the scrutiny of the Congress and public.\textsuperscript{123} The account of John Stockwell, since corroborated by other participants in the process, indicates that the Zairian and the South African connections were \textit{vital} not only in implementing policy and shuttling aid, but also in terms of motivating that policy.\textsuperscript{124} Without the positive (+) impact of regional state "openness" to superpower policy, the degree of U.S. intervention would have been well below the HIGH \textsuperscript{2} status that it achieved.

This also applies to the Soviets and their reliance on the Congo and Guinea, particularly in terms of supply and overflight rights in Conkary and Brazzaville.\textsuperscript{125} Additionally, the role of Cuba can not be excluded. The Soviets were reluctant to deploy any of their own personnel prior to the declaration of independence making the congruence of Cuban and Soviet policy a key corollary of Soviet intervention. Although not a regional ally in the strict definition, Cuba's role in bolstering the MPLA and in keeping it militarily solvent during the November-December period is important in this context.

\textsuperscript{123}Without these states as staging areas and without the manpower provided by each, U.S. intervention would have taken the form of American troop involvement or at best, European involvement provided by American logistics. At this time, this option was impossible for American policy-makers. See Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 94th congress, January 29-February 3,4,6, 1976. Hearings on Angola, pp. 6-50.


Had either the Soviets or the U.S. not had the support of regional states, their ability to affect the events in Angola would have been quite limited. Since each local faction relied heavily on contiguous allies for assistance and as conduits of access for international actors, the conflict itself could have been cauterized at the regional level had those states acted against superpower wishes and supported the transitional government created under the Alvor agreement.

Although, it is hard to imagine a consensus among the regional states involved (Zaire, Congo, Zambia, South Africa), several unilateral actions by each could have changed the complexion of the conflict. For example, tangible support for Alvor by Mobutu would have prevented U.S. funds from reaching the FNLA and thus emboldening it to attack. Further, had the FNLA been prevented from launching its offensive, the increased role of Cuba and the Soviet Union would not have been justified either regionally or internationally and thus, the transitional government may have survived. In fact, evidence suggests that the Soviets welcomed the Alvor accord since it seemed to secure an MPLA role in a peaceful transition to independence that may not have been guaranteed in a military transition. Also, without the threat

126 Of course, this supposes that Mobutu’s policy would also be shifted from forcing an FNLA imposed solution to increase his own power in the region to mediating in favor of FNLA acceptance of Alvor. All the reports regarding the FNLA and Roberto indicate that he was entirely reliant on Mobutu and as such, could have been pressured to participate within the transitional government. See "The Portuguese Coup and Zaire’s Southern African Policy," Crawford Young, in in Seiler, ed., Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980.

of military defeat, Savimbi may have restrained his desire for support from South Africa, securing his legitimate position within the independence fight and effectively eliminating South Africa's role, both as a regional intervenor and as an ally of U.S. intervention.

A second element of this argument is the role of regional organization(s) and in this case the OAU. Briefly, U.S. and Soviet penetration of the conflict was directly dependent upon the inability of the OAU to mediate and enforce a solution. Superpower disregard of the Alvor and Nakuru accords could only be carried out within a regional atmosphere of discord over the implementation and enforcement of these agreements. OAU impotence in this matter was widespread throughout the chairmanships of Kenyatta and Amin, and was directly linked to a lack of regional state support. Had all of the relevant regional states (Zaire, the Congo, Zambia and South Africa) observed and supported the OAU by closing their borders to infiltration and support, the superpowers would have been hard pressed to intercede at the levels which they did and not risk both international condemnation and policy "defeat." 

August support the Alvor and Nakuru efforts. For example, see Victor Sidenko, "The Nakuru Agreement," New Times, June, 26, 1975, p. 16.

This position has been stated and restated by a number of analysts and participants with respect to Angola and other conflicts within the region. Some analysts that deal explicitly with this element in the southern African context are Napper(80), Young & Turner(85) and Nation & Kauppi(84).

For a good synopsis of Zairian policy during this period which publicly supported the OAU and privately undermined its efforts, see Young and Turner, The Rise and Fall of the Zairian State, 1985, pp. 363-395. For an overall summary of the OAU and its problems, see Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity," in ACR, Legum 1975-76: A67-A68.
This is further illustrated by the subsequent emergence of an OAU consensus by late December, early January 1976. Once regional and international recognition and support coalesced around the PRA and against the UNITA/SADF/USA alliance, American policy suffered greatly and subsequent Soviet intervention was legitimized.130

Thus, the implication of the regional organization role for superpower intervention is clear. Unless such an organization can enunciate and effectively implement a strategy designed to minimize intervention, the avenues of access for the superpowers become open inviting successful exploitation. In analyses cited earlier that have addressed this phenomenon, regional organizations have, on occasion, been able to effectively mute even concerted superpower effort at intervention and exploitation.131 This will also be witnessed within subsequent case analyses.

The Interaction of Local Context and Superpower Intervention

Since the nature of the local context has been thoroughly established, it becomes important to fuse that reality with superpower behavior in order to refer us to our initial argument concerning outcome. The "globalist" versus "regionalist" conceptions implicit within a focus on local context and superpower intervention,


131The case that will be explored in this study that illustrates this point is Rhodesia-Zimbabwe where the role of the Frontline States as an arm of the OAU was decisive in determining the extent and impact of intervention and in the overall outcome. See Chapter 7.
erroneously indicate that somehow each can be delineated and analyzed within an "explanatory vacuum." Of course, this would recreate some of the same problems that this study initially attempted to address. The temporary delineation of the two within this framework has served to outline the contours and traits of each within the respective cases. Thus, any plausible argument with respect to outcome must now attempt to fuse the two together, discuss their interrelationship, their relative impact and how they merge to explain outcome.

It is at this "nexus" where the configurations of the local context meet superpower policy behavior that the most accurate understanding of outcome can emerge. Thus, this interrelationship will now be explored once again addressing the question of why the Soviets were successful and the U.S. was unsuccessful. The central argument will be that the local context is primarily responsible for this outcome.

First, it appears that the general alignment of local context variables in Angola served Soviet intervention best over time. This contention centers principally on the realization that regional and international actors were more favorably aligned to Soviet policy, particularly in the latter and more critical stages of the conflict, October 75-February 76.

This was due in large part to the introduction of the South African "dimension" into Angola. Once an African state's support for

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132 For an introduction of these terms within the African context, see Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and Richard L. Sklar, Africa Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 284-339.
the SDRA became a de facto alliance with South Africa, a regional (OAU) and international (UN) consensus in favor of the FRA and against the PDRA was forged. As Cervenka and Legum point out:

SA's heavy involvement on the side of two of the Angola liberation movements had not only stirred African hostility to Pretoria but had caused at least half of the OAU members to question whether the FNLA and UNITA any longer had the right to be regarded as true national movements entitled to a place in an Angolan National Unity Government. Even those African states which opposed the MPLA's heavy reliance on the Russians and Cubans and who were willing to see U.S. arms go quietly to the 'anti-communist' forces were enraged that the SA army would be operating hundreds of miles inside Angola (Cervenka and Legum, ACR, Legum 75-76, p. A72.

Antipathy for the apartheid regime is reason enough here, but in addition, South Africa's invasion raised the specter of the creation of a "buffer zone" between white ruled Rhodesia/South Africa/Namibia and the rest of Africa that was intolerable to the OAU and its member states no matter what their ideological orientation (Cervenka & Legum 78: A25-A38).

In much the same manner as "anti-Israelism" is the litmus test for Arab leaders whatever their ideological orientation, so too is apartheid for African regimes. This lesson was not lost on the Soviets as they acted in accordance with this view and presented it as verbal justification for their actions. Consequently, Soviet

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133 For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see Lamb 87: 77-107.

134 See F.B.I.S., Vol. III, no. 64-74 for a cross section of this argument as presented in the Soviet press and in broadcasts to Africa.
military intervention became de facto legitimate since it in fact countered South African involvement.

Without regional and international support, the MPLA would have been hard pressed to establish any political or diplomatic legitimacy whatever the military outcome. Influential states like Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal and Zambia were already predisposed against the MPLA (Legum 78: 32-41). Thus, assuming Savimbi had stayed the "Africanist" course and rejected South Africa support, the states in question would have been motivated to help him and perhaps the FNLA as well in their quest for legitimacy within an independent coalition government.

The Soviets and Cubans may have still achieved their military victory despite this, but the result would have been a significant loss of credibility with southern African liberation movements and with the OAU. Coupled with this, they would have been saddled with an "illegitimate" regime surrounded by hostile forces, i.e. another Afghanistan. In fact, given UNITA's strong internal base and possible regional (Zambia, Zaire, Tanzania, OFLS, Nigeria?) support, a form of "balkanization" may have occurred in Angola, further alienating the

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135 Such a turn would have been disastrous for Soviet influence given the growing conflicts in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa which in the larger context of southern African liberation were more important. The Soviets had invested a great deal in gaining favor with the liberation movements in the region, particularly SWAPO, ANC and ZAPU/ZANU. A heavy hand in Angola would have deeply stymied that policy and also have legitimized Chinese influence as a counter to the Soviets and alternative to the U.S. Clearly, South Africa shifted this equation. Whether the Soviets consciously timed their escalation of intervention is unclear, but it certainly shifted perceptions of their actions among key actors capable of mitigating an MPLA "political/diplomatic" if not military victory. See Legum, 78: 22-25 for a discussion of this in Angola.
MPLA and her benefactors from the rest of Africa. How long the Soviets and Cubans would have been willing to sustain this result is unclear.  

A second example of this interrelationship lies in the differing strengths and weaknesses of the local factions within the conflict. The actual MPLA victory has been portrayed in the western press and among certain scholars as an example of the Soviet/Cuban imposition of a regime through "expansionist" military force. However, by examining the case and explicating the interrelationship between local factionalism, the local military balance and superpower behavior, we see a more complex picture emerge.

The shifting tides of victory and defeat that mark the conflict have already displayed the tenuous military balance that was present. Yet, on several occasions (April, July, October-November), the MPLA appeared on the verge of defeat, while only in late December did it suddenly become apparent that the FNLA/UNITA alliance would be

Interestingly enough, the scenario of a divided Angola has emerged today, yet the Soviets are able to sustain the PRA largely on the basis that the PRA is legitimate and supported by virtually all the states except the U.S. This political support softens the blow of the MPLA’s military weakness and reliance and serves to keep Soviet/Cuban intervention legitimate in the face of South African aggression. Witness the recent SADF actions and international response, September-December 1987, New York Times, December 4, 7, 1987.

eclipsed. What kept the MPLA viable and prevented the PDRA from attaining a victory most argued was likely?

As discussed, certain scholars have argued that it was an "unprecedented" Soviet/Cuban intervention that essentially reshaped the local military situation and achieved the MPLA her victory. Yet, it appears that Soviet/Cuban assistance was largely limited to reciprocal increases vis-a-vis U.S. intervention during the March-November period. For example, after the Zairians enter the battle (@April) and actually engage MPLA forces, Cuban advisors arrive but only in small increments and they are not involved in the battle. It appears that only after the South Africans launch Operation Zulu, do Cuban forces assume a battlefield posture. Also, some have argued that in terms of the value of the material, the Soviets never exceeded the assistance (@$300 million) provided by the west to the FNLA/UNITA until the December-February period. These points are not designed to assign blame to either superpower, but rather to address a somewhat

138See previous discussion of this, pp. 122-139.

139See Katsikas 82: 78-79. Many (Lemarchand, Bender, LeoGrande) have argued that Zairian troop involvement may have preceded the actual date of the conflict (March 23, 1975) particularly in Cabinda and also northern Angola, but this is impossible to accurately substantiate.

140See Bender 81: 90-94 for a discussion of this response. This conclusion regarding "who acted first?" is a difficult one with respect to its effect on the conflict. Perhaps all that can be said with 100% certainty is that both sides aided a spiraling cycle of intervention and counter-intervention that contributed to the outcome.

141See Bender, in Lemarchand, American Policy in Southern Africa, pp. 86-87. In fact, as discussed above, the actual value of U.S. aid to the FNLA/UNITA may have been as high as $100 million by August and not $32 million as originally reported.
spurious argument regarding escalation and focus our analysis on more plausible area of explanation.

Arguably, the answer to the above question lies more accurately within the relative abilities of three factions in terms of military power, territorial occupation and organizational ability as seen through the progression of the conflict. Essentially, it was largely a combination of MPLA organizational ability, FNLA incompetence, and UNITA rejection of the "Africanist" path that forged an environment conducive to a successful military outcome for the MPLA and hence the Soviet Union.

In the case of the FNLA, despite a secure Zairian base, advanced Chinese training, the lion's share of assistance and weapons and the largest numerical military force, Roberto could not translate these advantages into either a military or political victory. Given FNLA superiority, many expected Roberto to be firmly entrenched as president by independence, including U.S. officials (Stockwell 78: 40-56). In reality, overall FNLA performance was poor. Roberto had little political organization despite 15 years of existence; he had poorly trained officers in his military, inadequate methods of support among the population and large scale corruption among his associates.\footnote{This was not only the opinion of Stockwell in his travels and meetings with Roberto but also among state department officials. This subsequently emerged in the Hearings on Angola in early 1976. See Senate Hearings on Angola, January-February 1976.}

If the U.S. had upgraded its assistance to military training in Zaire and had equipped the FNLA with more sophisticated weapons, the result would still have been the same. The FNLA by CIA, Chinese and
objective accounts were incapable of translating superior numbers or equipment into victory. Consequently, the argument can be made that no matter what U.S. assistance was forthcoming, the FNLA would have been hard pressed to emerge victorious. This was due not to overwhelming Soviet/Cuban intervention (which did not materialize until after November 1), but an incompetent ally on the ground.

Without a viable force to absorb increased aid, the U.S. or another extra-regional actor would have had to take an active, combat role. This would have come under the rubric of "neo-colonialist intervention" alongside South Africa, de-legitimizing the intervention and the movement(s) (FNLA-UNITA) that it supported. Consequently, the internal inadequacies (both political and military) of the FNLA served to dilute U.S. intervention irrespective of Soviet actions. This begins to call into question the "globalist" thesis regarding the success or failure of intervention.

If examining the MPLA and UNITA, similar developments appear to coalesce. The MPLA was militarily weak and factionalized, yet, several factors acted to mitigate against these deficiencies and provide them with the capacity to succeed on the ground. First, the MPLA controlled the key strategic area for independence, Luanda (See pp. 12-14). Second, the organizational ability of the MPLA in the areas that it controlled was impressive by local standards. They were able to mobilize the population, recruit soldiers, and implement their

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143 See speech by Senator John Tunney, "The Meaning of Detente," February 5, 1976, Delivered at American University. In it he raises this point with reference to Angola and the debate that raged over U.S. involvement in the previous year.
political programs.\textsuperscript{144} Third, the MPLA called upon a more multi-ethnic group of leaders who were well trained in political organization, unlike their FNLA/UNITA counterparts. Consequently, it appeared that the MPLA was better equipped politically to handle the onslaught of national independence provided it could militarily survive the transition. Thus, backing the MPLA proved a more viable course in the long-term for the Soviets.\textsuperscript{145}

Since political organization and occupation of Luanda were the MPLA's strengths, a military solution would play into the hands of her enemies while a diplomatic/political one would insure some kind of MPLA role. Thus, the Soviets had little interest in forcing a military solution and the evidence suggests they did not until the MPLA first, appeared on the verge of defeat and second, was in a "political position" (post-independence) to accept the aid without adverse credibility problems. As mentioned earlier, Soviet aid to the MPLA prior to the conflict was minimal (non-existent for a significant period, 74-March 75); her support for Alvor seemed genuine and Soviet aid during the March-November period was in keeping with the pace of

\textsuperscript{144}This is substantiated by independent and U.S. officials both before and after the conflict. For a discussion of the initial period of independence for the PRA see Somerville 86: 45-70 and John Marcum, "Angola: Perilous Transition to Independence," in Carter and O'Meara, eds., \textit{Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis}, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, pp. 175-198.

\textsuperscript{145}Obviously, the Soviet calculations regarding Neto's staying power were cautious and subject to shifts of enthusiasm. This is evidenced by the cut off of aid and flirtation with the Chipenda faction in 1974 and in the non-committal position on the Alves coup attempt of 1977. Yet, overall, the MPLA political "machine" was more sophisticated and better equipped to govern a large multi-ethnic state than either of its rivals.
Western aid to the FNLA/UNITA. Had the Soviets acted unilaterally to escalate the conflict prior to South Africa's invasion, they would have lost legitimacy for themselves and their allies. Also, once the Soviets/Cubans acted to preserve the MPLA and thwart South African/Zairian invasions, the military weaknesses of the FNLA were exposed and the result was a rout.

The case of UNITA further builds upon this argument. Basically, Savimbi's position in the conflict made victory unlikely and defeat equally elusive. UNITA did not possess the military power to unilaterally decide the outcome. Yet, its position was secure enough within the south and southeast to stave off total defeat or disintegration. Vital to this was the organizational and charismatic ability of Savimbi (Bridgland 87: 80-89, 163-244). His hold on the area, the Ovimbundu people and his troops was and is immense and as such was secure from defeat, yet incapable of victory without significant outside assistance (South Africa). In fact, politically, the MPLA had the most to fear from Savimbi since he would likely win a free election and at least be a key figure in a popularly elected government. Savimbi's acceptance of Pretoria's assistance however, de-legitimized his position and further strengthened the MPLA. Thus, survival for UNITA became a "Catch-22" situation. Without South

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146 See "The Soviet Union's Year in Africa," David L. Morison in ACR, Legum 1975-76: A103-A110. Also, see Bender in Lemarchand (81).

147 This was the position of most inside and outside the country in their analysis of the political situation after the Alvor accord was signed. For a discussion of this see Katsikas(82) and Legum(76).
African aid, it would be relegated to a militarily weak entity within Angola and with it, UNITA would be a political pariah.

Thus, both movements in the SDRA, due to their own internal deficiencies, unilaterally acted to neutralize their own strengths and in so doing enhance the weak position of the MPLA. Over the course of nine months, the FNLA and UNITA made critical military errors, diplomatically isolated themselves and diminished their own advantageous military positions within the countryside. This served to elevate the MPLA into preeminence prior to the decisive military outcome.

Had the Soviets and Cubans not forcefully intervened at the levels they did, a PDRA military victory may have been achieved, but it would have been pyrrhic in nature. By November 11, and the period of intense crisis for the MPLA, regional and international actors were already castigating Pretoria's actions and pledging support for any policy that would remove their role and diminish their influence. Thus, an SDRA government would have been hard pressed, due to their lack of legitimacy, poor organizational ability and uni-ethnic bases of support, to translate a battlefield victory into a political one. The MPLA's success thus was a fait accompli created as much by SDRA incompetence and misjudgment than Soviet/Cuban arms. Arguably, the latter served only to make it official.

CONCLUSION

These conclusions regarding the configuration of certain local context variables make a substantial argument for its salience in
explaining outcome. What is central to this argument is the fact that while these variables in general made the potential for successful intervention more likely, certain factors coalesced to enhance one superpower's success (Soviet Union), and thwart the others (U.S.). Despite U.S. intervention at a HIGH 2 level from roughly April/May through November, the Ford administration could not achieve victory for its local allies or success for its policy. The local actors that it chose to support were immersed in conditions beyond American control that made their (and U.S. policy) success increasingly remote. Additionally, Soviet intervention at the HIGH 2 stage only maintained the MPLA's viability until local and regional factors served to provide positive opportunities for success. These factors were largely centered on the inadequacies of the FNLA/UNITA coalition and the destabilizing impact of South Africa.

Overall, this case illustrates a highly fertile environment for superpower intervention coupled with an outcome best understood through a primary focus on local context. Although clearly, it was not only the local context, but how those factors interacted with superpower behavior that created the resulting outcome. Based on that, it is plausible to suggest that once superpower policy flies against the prevailing local context, the chances of success become minimal at best, no matter what the degree of respective superpower commitment. In Angola despite, a significant intervention on the part of the U.S. through South Africa and Zaire, respective political and military realities for the FNLA and UNITA stifled that effort and provided avenues for Soviet/Cuban access and subsequent MPLA victory. The
Brezhnev regime owed its success not to "Cuban gendarmes" of Soviet policy or a lack of will in Washington, as much as to the local conditions that "prepared" the Angolan terrain for victory.
CHAPTER V
THE SHABA II (ZAIRE) CONFLICT 1978

INTRODUCTION

This case is commonly referred to as the "Shaba II" invasion of 1978. Shaba denotes the province or region of Zaire, formally called Katanga, that has periodically been the center of secessionist violence since Zaire's independence in 1960. This separatism has erupted into three major conflicts: the Congolese Civil War of 1960-65, Shaba I in March 1977 and Shaba II in May 1978.¹ The first two conflicts will be discussed only in terms of their relative impact on the Shaba II episode.

Prior to examining this case, it is important to reiterate briefly, why Shaba II was chosen and not the two previous instances of conflict in this country. First, the original civil war in 1960-1965 took place at a time of different global and regional configurations.² Essentially, this period was not a time of "equitable" Soviet-American

¹In many studies, Zaire is often referred to as Congo-Kinchasa and the Peoples Republic of the Congo referred to as Congo-Brazzaville. Note that the name "Congo" refers to the state of Zaire prior to and during the first years of independence. The new, Africanized name is Zaire. The use of the "Congo" when discussing the historical background of the conflict should not be confused with the Peoples Republic of the Congo. Also, the term Shaba refers to that region of southern Zaire formally called Katanga.

²I refer the reader to the discussion of the importance of the global "balance" between the superpowers when examining U.S.-Soviet policy in Third World conflicts. See chapter three pp. 23-26.
competition in Africa given the logistical inadequacies in Soviet military projection capability and the unique nature of the decolonization process at that time. Since this study is concerned with superpower intervention in an era of relative nuclear and political parity, any potential cases in the pre-1970 period would introduce too many caveats that would debilitate the comparative power of the framework. ³

Second, the case of Shaba I encapsulates many characteristics of conflict in Africa, and in the Third World in general, that are the focus of this study. ⁴ However, like many "minor" conflicts in Africa, the intensity level in terms of superpower intervention is negligible or totally non-existent. There is no tangible evidence of Soviet intervention at any stage of the conflict and U.S. intervention is limited to shipments of non-lethal aid to the Zairian government. Also, the U.S. role in the French, Belgian and Moroccan interventions in this conflict was negligible at best. As we will see, the Shaba II conflict was very different. Consequently, Shaba I would have little or no explanatory value in terms of understanding superpower intervention within the parameters of this framework.

³ There are not many cases of conflict in this period (1957-1965) that are being overlooked. In fact, the Congolese conflict and the Biafran Civil War represent the only cases of significant and "measurable" superpower intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa within the limits set by this framework. Evidence of this is found in the exhaustive work of Robert Lyle Butterworth, Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-1974, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1976.

⁴ Some of these include irredentism, ethnicity as a motivating factor and the division of factions along governmental-non-governmental lines.
Conversely, Shaba II offers a case of Third World conflict in which there is "significant" intervention by one (U.S.) superpower and none by the other (U.S.S.R.). This allows us to examine unilateral intervention on the part of a superpower (the U.S.) in a Third World conflict. We then are able to compare differing patterns of intervention to add richness to our understanding of that concept and to the explanatory power of the framework.

The first section of this chapter will provide a brief historical review of the Shaba II case. Subsequent sections will examine the local context, the patterns of intervention, how they is played out in the case itself and the resulting outcome both from a short and long term perspective.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A limited review of the key events leading up this conflict cannot possibly do justice to the political landscape of Zaire from its pre-independence period through the 1970's. The multitude of actors, events and political developments is voluminous and would sidetrack this study from its principle focus—Shaba II.⁵ Instead, after a brief geographical introduction, we will focus on two events with particular salience for the Shaba region: the initial Katangan (Shaba) secessionist movement in 1960 and within that conflict, the role of

outside actors in Zaire throughout the period, and the events of Shaba I to provide the historical context from which our study can begin.

**Geographic Landscape**

Shaba province is an area in the south-southeastern portion of Zaire, bordering Tanzania to the east, Zambia to the south and Angola to the west. Formally called Katanga, this region is populated by a variety of peoples with the dominant ethnic groups being Lunda, Baluba, Yeke, Tshokwe and Sanga. The region contains several important "urban" areas including Kolwezi, Lubumbashi, Malemba, Kamina and Mutshatsha.⁶

Central to this study is Shaba's vast economic wealth and subsequent salience to the entire Zairian economy. This region accounts for virtually all of Zairian export earnings and thus forms the "lifes-blood" of the national economy.⁷ Key minerals found in this area include cobalt, copper, tin, zinc, oil, and diamonds as well as gold and other precious metals. For example, Shaba is responsible for 70% of the world's cobalt production outside the communist

⁶ The term "urban" does not refer to large centers of population like Kinshasa, Lagos or Cairo. Rather, these "cities" in Shaba serve as key transportation and economic centers for the mining and other economic activities which are carried out in the countryside. Thus, they became salient for control of the region and its economic wealth. Also, these cities are the key regional centers of non-Zairian, European populations, mostly French, Belgian, German and Americans.

block (Crawford 78: 180-181). Cobalt is vital in the production of armaments both conventional and nuclear and 90% of Zairian cobalt is mined in and around the key urban center of Kolwezi (N.Y. Times, May 27, 1978). In addition, Shaba contains 6% of the world’s copper reserves making Zaire the 5th largest exporter of that commodity along with being the world’s largest producer of industrial diamonds.® Below is a listing of some of these major minerals and Zaire’s continental and world share in their production:®

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Rank(Africa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COBALT:</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World prod/year (metric tons) = 33,432</td>
<td>Zaire’s prod/year = 15,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLD:</td>
<td>Fourth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World prod/year = 1,191,419</td>
<td>Zaire’s prod/year = 972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIN:</td>
<td>Third</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World prod/year = 204,700</td>
<td>Zaire’s prod/year = 2,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIAMONDS:</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World prod/year = 41,449</td>
<td>Zaire’s prod/year = 10,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPPER ORE:</td>
<td>Second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World prod/year = 8,223</td>
<td>Zaire’s prod/year = 503*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All figures 1984

The amount of western investment in capital terms is difficult to determine but estimates run from $1.5 to over $5 billion and


climbing. This is largely from Belgian, French, U.S., British, West German and South African sources. For example, Belgian investment at the time of independence was in upwards of $700 million with well over 70% directed in the Shaba region. U.S. direct investment is between $200 and $600 million and likewise centered in this area. In fact, many have argued that it is this enormous economic dimension that has made Zaire a prime testing ground for Western (and principally U.S.) containment policy in Africa in the 60's and 70's. Whatever the motivation, Shaba and the regime in Kinshasa that controls it, are vitally important both regionally and globally within the international economic system. Thus, unlike other potential trouble spots in

10 This makes Zaire second to South Africa in the continent in terms of foreign economic investment. The concentrated nature of this investment, massive amounts in a few minerals within Shaba, further illustrates the skewed importance of the Shaba region not only to the Zairian government but also to western investment in Africa as a whole.


12 In terms of cobalt, a mineral vital to the production of jet aircraft and other high tech military equipment, the U.S. imports 98% of its cobalt needs from Zaire. See Hull: 79: 224-225. For a more general examination of U.S. economic reliance on Zaire and the region at large, see "African Minerals and American Foreign Policy," Sandy Feustel in Africa Report, September-October, 1978, pp. 12-17.


various Third World areas, many supra-regional states have a vested interest in the largely local developments within the Shaba province.

Independence, Secession and Intervention (1960-1965)

The political dimensions that contributed to the turmoil of independence, civil war and military takeover by Mobutu are vast and complex within the ethnic-ideological dimensions of the Congolese landscape. It is important that we sort some of them out here.

Upon Congolese independence in 1960, an adequate government and economic infrastructure (except in Shaba), educated professionals, high literacy and other societal "necessities" that would spell a smooth transfer of power were nonexistent or prohibitive in the Congo. An alliance of church, government and multi-national business interests had essentially concentrated on the economic exploitation and extraction of primary resources doing little to forge a national consciousness, promote self-governing or develop an educated class capable of administering such a vast area. This Belgian colonial policy was known as the Patronic Triangle. It appeared that upon


independence the Congo (Zaire) would be balkanized or locked in a perpetual cycle of civil war like Chad or the Sudan.\(^\text{17}\)

In fact, the later scenario of separatist conflict did emerge during the first 4-5 years of Congolese independence (1960-1965). Various political movements centered largely on ethnic identifications emerged and vied for power. As Young and Turner point out:

Above all, First Republic politics at all levels were saturated with ethnicity. While it was generally not the sole or even major factor in particular events, ethnicity was nearly always present in the perceptions of the actors and in the understandings of the spectators as well. (Young and Turner: 85: 41).

Some key points of contention for respective political factions were the future nature of the Congolese government, its degree of authority over the respective provinces, the degree of local autonomy each ethnic group would have, the relationship that the Congo would have to the West in general and Belgium in particular and the distribution of resources in the country.

A multitude of movements emerged that reflected various views on these and other issues. They were largely divided over the central issue of greater central government control (unitarism) or more local autonomy (federalism).\(^\text{18}\) The first was the Mouvement National

\(^{17}\)Both Chad and the Sudan, like other states in Africa, have found it impossible to forge any sustained political development in the midst of periodic civil wars between diverse ethnic and religious factions. In Chad, the wars have been largely ethnically based while in the Sudan, religion has been the central point of contention between the muslim north and the christian south. At this writing, there appears no end in sight.

\(^{18}\)The unitary-federal split personified in Lumumba and Kasavubu became the key demarcation between a united Congo under an African Socialist banner a la Ghana and a loosely tied confederation of
Congolais (MNC) under Patrice Lumumba. This "political party" voiced the most intensely "nationalistic" tone of all the factions. Lumumba had been a disciple of Nkrumah of Ghana and saw the need for a united Congo which would forge a national consciousness and thwart ethnic separatism. Its membership was multi-ethnic and its policies were vaguely African socialist with outside aid coming from Ghana, the Soviet Union and other eastern block states (Ibid., pp. 25-30).

The second movement was the Association pour la Sauvegarde de la Culture et des Interests des Bakonga (Abako) which was formed in 1950 and led by Joseph Kasavubu. This group was dominated by the Bakongo people of the western Congo and was organized around the need to promote Bakongo interests within any independent Congolese state. Its policies were more "moderate" and pro-western in economic, political and ideological terms with its primary concern being autonomy for the Bakongo region and sub-division of the Congo into autonomous provinces.

In Shaba, two groups vied for dominance. The first was under the leadership of Jason Sendwe known as the Baluba Association of Katanga separate ethnic areas with de facto autonomy of action. Thus, these two leaders and their movements personified the demarcations between national-ethnic, moderate-radical, west-east and so forth. See Young and Turner 85: pp. 40-41.


20 Interestingly, this was the same ethnic group that produced Holden Roberto of Angola. Roberto was Bakongo but born on the other side of the border. Kasavubu like Roberto, harbored dreams of uniting Bakongo peoples in Angola and Zaire into one nation.

(BALUBAKAT). This group had the support of the Baluba of northern Shaba and was partially dominated by Belgian business and church interests within the area. The second was the Confederation of Trade Associations of Katanga (CONKARAT) under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe. This group was based among the Lunda, Yeke and Tshokwe of Shaba (Katanga) and it too was financed and supported by Belgian commercial interests deeply entrenched in the region. Principal among these was the Union Minière du Haut. Tshombe advocated an open, free market philosophy vis-a-vis the west, and Belgium in particular, along with political separation from the Congo (Colvin 68: 19-34). As such, his movement was supported heavily by those international commercial interests that would benefit most from his policies.

These represent the dominant political/ethnic movements of Congolese independence politics. Their "platforms" of governance were vague and non-committal. Their organizations were largely confined to a minority of elite leaders in urban areas—Leopoldville (Kinshasa) and ethnic strongholds. Their approaches to independence and national development were usually region specific, with the exception of the MNC and Lumumba.

Upon independence, Lumumba emerged as the dominant force for Congolese national development, advocating a "unitary" system, strong central government, Congolese control over their own resources and a

22See Kanza 79: 122-140.

23See Colvin, 68: 11-23. Also, a variety of literature on Belgian colonial policy and the post-independence period will consistently mention the influence of the Union Minière de Haut in the political affairs of Zaire.
policy of non-alignment. His movement was very popular among the urbanized youth exposed to the "African nationalist" generation who had achieved political awakening under Nkrumah of Ghana, Toure of Guinea and Nyerere of Tanzania. Yet, Lumumba's rule sent warning signals to the various ethnically-centered movements and the international (western) commercial interests that supported them.\textsuperscript{24}

The machinations, negotiations, infighting and violence that characterized the transition to independence followed a path of factionalism, political infighting, miscalculation, murder, regional and international intervention and subsequent civil war.\textsuperscript{25} Despite the myriad of groups and interests within the Congo, the salient issue became the fight over Katangan separatism and the corresponding rivalry between Lumumba and Tshombe.

On independence day, June 30, 1960, Lumumba emerged as the Prime Minister and Kasavubu as the President of the new Congolese republic but they were immediately saddled with mutual mistrust, differing policy goals and multiple efforts at separatism. The composition of the government attempted to draw together members of various regional movements but it contained few mechanisms for adjudicating disputes or fostering compromise, and it lacked a blueprint for governing (Kanza 79):


Consequently, divisions emerged during the transition to independence over domestic and foreign policies ranging from the future relationship with Belgium to the role of local and regional administrators.

Meanwhile, local areas had been given much latitude under the new constitution and local ethnic groups were moving rapidly to thwart Lumumba's policies of national cohesion and unitary control. The strongest and most effective was the CONKARAT movement of Katanga (Shaba) under Tshombe. Tshombe worked closely with Europeans living within Katanga who represented business and church interests. This concurrence of policy goals was formalized when his movement merged with the Union Katanganaise (Ibid., 79: 122-136). This was a group of European settlers who wanted to create an autonomous Katanga, allied with Belgium and organized economically much like South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese (African) colonies of Angola and Mozambique (Ibid., 79: 131-136). This effectively severed ties between Tshombe and Sendwe of the BALUBAKAT.

While CONKARAT worked to increase Katangan-Belgium ties and effectively sever ties with the remainder of the Congo, Sendwe attempted to deal with Lumumba and was subsequently appointed regional commissioner for Katanga. This effectively subordinated Tshombe and his movement to secondary status serving to divide the Katangans against themselves and heighten Tshombe's separatist aims.

Working in close concert with Belgian officials, Tshombe pressured Lumumba and his government for concessions and proposals to give him more authority over Katanga and weaken already tenuous ties between the
central government and the provinces. Lumumba, of course, acted against any efforts to diminish his authority and thus further alienated Tshombe. Had Lumumba gained the support of other regional groups or government bureaucracies, like the military, or presidency he may have been able to thwart Tshombe. But as Lumumba was being challenged by separatism from without, he was also being undermined from within by Kasavubu, the military, and Belgian supported officials within the cabinet.26

First, Congolese troops revolted on July 5, 1960 at several bases around the country calling for the removal of all Belgian officers and the reorganization—"Africanization" of the army (Kanza 79: 184-195). Lumumba siding with the rebellious soldiers by dismissing all Belgian officers and restructuring the national army into the National Congolese Army (ANC) (Jackson 82: 26-28).27 However, separate revolts among diverse ethnic elements of the ANC continued.

Second, anti-Lumumba elements within the government called for western intervention to pacify those rebellious factions of the ANC and restore order. Appeals by various government officials went out to the United States, Belgium and the United Nations all without Lumumba’s

26 These officials were largely led by Kasavubu himself along with Joseph Iléo, President of the Congolese Senate, Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko and of course, Moïse Tshombe.

27 One of the native Congolese officers promoted during this restructuring and given the position of Army Chief of Staff was Col. Joseph Mobutu, an officer with ties to the American intelligence community.
On July 10, the Belgians unilaterally intervened in Katanga (with passive U.S. support) by airlifting in 2,000 troops into Kitonia and Kamina (Nzongola-Ntalaja 85: 226-227). Their justification was the protection of over 100,000 European ex-patriots (with 30,000 Belgians among them) from "marauding" Congolese soldiers. What resulted was the declaration of an independent Katanga by Moise Tshombe on July 11, 1960. In his independence speech, Tshombe outlined clearly the ideological and political position of the new "Katangan state:"

We realize that what our present Congolese government wants is nothing more nor less than the breaking up of the whole organization of the army and the administration, in order to set up a reign of terror to get rid of our Belgian assistants.

In this way it is hoping to replace the disbanded leadership as soon as possible with leaders it seems already to have chosen from among natives of communist-tending countries.

...However, since we recognize the vital need for economic collaboration with Belgium, the Katangan government-to whom Belgium has just granted the help of its own troops in order to protect human life-begs Belgium to join us in close economic community (Kanza 79: 199).

Faced with the breakup of the Congolese state and Belgian intervention, Lumumba called on the Soviet Union for aid and personnel on July 12, 1960 (Jackson 82: 29). This served only to reinforce images

28See Jackson 82: 25-30. Also, at first, Lumumba did not want UN involvement in the crisis, but when it appeared that Belgium and perhaps he U.S. would pre-empt his actions and intervene, he eventually sided with Kasavubu and called on UN assistance.

29In reality, it was the Congolese who needed protection from the Belgians. In Matadi, the Belgians massacred 1,000 civilians during a battle with elements of the ANC. See Jackson 82: p. 30.
of Lumumba as a communist and galvanize the west (U.S. and Belgium largely) to act against him.

What ultimately resulted in a series of actions and counter-actions was the intervention of U.N. forces in support of western interests, the destabilization of the ANC through the co-optation of its leadership (including Mobutu) by the CIA, the funding of anti-Lumumba elements by the United States throughout the country, and the disintegration of the Lumumba government ending with his kidnapping and assassination in 1961.\(^3\)

In terms of the Katangan revolt, once Lumumba and his supporters (Gizenga and others) had been purged from the central government by Mobutu, the UN and western interests acted against the secession and it was finally quelled in 1963(Jackson 82: 37). Ironically, Tshombe was later resurrected to lead a "unity" government against supporters of Lumumba attempting to regain control in 1964-65. This pro-Lumumbist group known as the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL) received outside support from China, Egypt, and Ghana among others, however with U.S. and Belgian military assistance it was crushed and disbanded(Nzongola-Ntalaja 85: 230-233).

By 1965, the Congolese situation had stabilized, yet Tshombe had become a political liability as Prime Minister since he was pictured as a puppet of western interests and too pro-Katangan. Consequently, the military under the command of Joseph Mobutu, with U.S. support, acted

\(^3\)For a discussion of these events and the conflict over goals between Lumumba and the United Nations, see Nzongola-Ntalaja 85: 226-233, Kanza 79: 204-259. Also, for an examination of the extensive role played by the U.S. and the CIA in this conflict, see Kalb (82).
against him establishing the 2nd Republic of the Congo, renaming it Zaire in 1971. Mobutu adopted much of Lumumba’s rhetoric resurrecting him as a national hero in order to legitimize his own position and forge a national consensus within Zaire.\textsuperscript{31}

There are several factors arising out of this conflict that are salient for our analysis of the Shaba II episode. First, U.S., West European and to a limited degree Soviet intervention in Zaire has historical precedence from the beginnings of independence. Second, that intervention is largely centered around political and economic issues in Katanga/Shaba; who controls its resources and how amenable are they to western interests. Third, the Tshombe followers who would later form the core of the FNLC have been historically pro-west and anti-communist yet open to chameleon like shifts in their policy stance and actions. Tshombe who began as the rebel champion of Katangan separatism became Prime Minister advocating national unity. His movement went from a regional to a national and later to an exiled force within Angola. These shifts and the perception of opportunism that they created would haunt the FNLC in its attempts to acquire national and international legitimacy in subsequent crises.

Shaba I

The episode known as Shaba I was the first real challenge to the Mobutu regime from Tshombe’s followers since the early 1960’s (1967). The new movement purporting to represent "Katangan" interests was the

\textsuperscript{31}For a discussion of this policy of resurrecting Lumumba and using him to support the legitimacy of the 2nd republic, see Young and Turner 85: 54-60.
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLC), created in 1968 by a former Lundan police commissioner, Nathaniel Mbumba. This group had taken part in Portuguese operations against MPLA/FNLA forces in Angola until 1974 and after the Portuguese coup had assisted the MPLA's fight for independence. This military role in Angola afforded the FNLC armaments and Cuban training, making them a credible force within the confines of the Angolan conflict.

Whether this emboldened the FNLC to act or whether they were simply cast out from Angola by President Neto is unclear. Nonetheless, on or about March 8, an FNLC force numbering some 1,500 entered Shaba province from Angola and occupied the towns of Dilolo, Kasaji and Mutshatsha (Legum 76-77: B527). The Katangan troops met little Zairian resistance and were clearly supported by the native population. Reports as to exactly what was happening in the area were difficult to obtain. There were small engagements between rebel and

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34 Reports are very sketchy on this point. Two positions seem plausible. First, prior to Shaba I, Zaire had stepped up support for Cabindan (FLEC) and FNLA forces operating in the north of Angola. Neto was aware of this and warned about "reprisals" against Mobutu. Also, in a speech on February 25, 1977, Neto outlined a plan he uncovered code-named Operation Cobra that supposedly called for the invasion of Angola by the FNLA/FLEC and Zairian forces led by French and American mercenary officers. The plan was of course denied but it perhaps was the fuel Neto needed to instigate rebellion against Mobutu as a quid pro quo. Second, it is possible that the FNLC forces, having outlived their usefulness were ordered home by their Angolan hosts and decided to use the opportunity to act. Evidence for both views are found in ACR, Legum 1977-78: B591-B594, 1976-77: B526-B528, B445-B446.
government forces but little fighting during the first month of the campaign as the FNLC appeared unclear as to what its objectives were and the FAZ seemed to have little stomach for direct conflict. FNLC forces apparently had no coherent battle plan or organized fighting force. They interacted with the local population but never effectively mounted a coordinated drive either against the FAZ or Kinshasa. Mobutu's response was largely rhetorical raising the specter of a Soviet/Cuban/Angolan inspired invasion and calling for the aid of all western states.35

The importance of the Mobutu regime and the maintenance of economic stability in Shaba for Zaire's western benefactors was reinforced by the influx of support for Mobutu in early April. On April 7, Morocco offered the assistance of some 1,500 troops airlifted in by 11 French transports accompanied by an unspecified number of advisors (Legum: 76-77, B57). Further offers of support came from Egyptian, Chinese and Belgian officials. The United States under the Carter administration was lukewarm to high profile, military assistance. This was in keeping with the new approach of the Carter-Young African policy which attached increasing importance to human rights and a more balanced approach between leftist and rightist

35 See interview with Zairian Ambassador to the United Nations, Umba Di Lutete, in Africa Report, July-August, 1977, pp. 10-13. In this interview Lutete enunciates the Kinshasa position that the invasion was a Soviet and Cuban inspired move.
Thus, American support amounted to the shipment of $15 million in "non-lethal" aid.

After the introduction of Moroccan forces, the FNLC was routed from its previous positions retreating into the bush and eventually back across the border. There were few engagements, little causalities, except for civilians, and much speculation as to who was behind the invasion.

Mobutu adeptly argued that it was a Soviet/Cuban pincer movement from their new "base" in Angola which was designed to "communize" Southern Africa. The evidence on this is purely circumstantial but it nonetheless played to Western and Chinese fears of increasing Soviet influence and thus orchestrated the desired response. For several reasons, this made Shaba I vitally important in understanding the climate for the events of Shaba II.

First, Shaba I solidified the precedent of western intervention to protect the Mobutu regime from destabilization. Second, the multinational character of that intervention further established the importance of the Mobutu regime to western interests and the future pattern of support that Mobutu could rely upon. Third, the communist specter raised by Mobutu helped to fuel growing western concerns of Soviet/Cuban "adventurism" bringing conservative pressure on the Carter administration for more forceful action in the future. This would weigh heavily on the Carter response to Shaba II. Finally, the

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impotence of the OAU in the face of considerable multi-lateral western intervention and the apparent acquiescence after the fact also established a precedent for further action under like circumstances. This was not lost on moderate African states, fearful of Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia and predisposed to French and American assistance should their regimes be threatened.

SHABA II: THE INITIATION OF CONFLICT

The Shaba II conflict is of relatively short duration when compared with other cases in this study. The actual duration of discernible hostilities is approximately, one month. Despite the abbreviated time frame, this case meets the minimum requirements of a conflict of stage eight status, (See chapter three pp. 3-5)

It is important to point out that in comparison to the other cases it may appear that this conflict is not as salient in a regional/geopolitical sense as say Angola, or the Ogaden. In fact, if one were to rank the Shaba II conflict in terms of international involvement, or international impact, one might surmise that Shaba II has minimal importance in the study of superpower foreign policy.

In abstract terms this argument may be persuasive. However, the operationalization of conflict within this study is designed to facilitate the systematic identification of conflict within each case such that the relative intensity of the conflict is not the issue. Rather, the threat that the conflict poses to the specific authority or regime in question and the corresponding levels of superpower intervention are the only dimensions that should be considered. From
this perspective, the events of Shaba II were as dire and threatening to the Mobutu regime as the Somali invasion of the Ogaden was to the Ethiopian Dergue. Thus, the concept of conflict becomes one that is generalizable across cases and not subject to shifting perceptions of "relative importance."

The conflict point for this case is May 14, 1978. It is on this date that a force known as the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) numbering between 2,000-5,000 entered Shaba province from base camps in Angola and attacked government forces in the strategic mining town of Kolwezi as well as surrounding areas (N.Y.Times, May 15, 1978). The rebel force led by General Nathaniel Mbumba consisted of former Katangan rebels who had fled the region during the period of civil war (1960-65) and local dissidents who were subjected to persecution by the Mobutu regime (Legum 77-78: B589-594).

From this point, the conflict lasted roughly four weeks, with several initial battles between FNLC and government/interventionary forces. The case will be examined within this time span, with an initial mapping of the local context, followed by an examination of the conflict itself and an evaluation of the outcome.

THE LOCAL CONTEXT

Having identified the initiation point of the conflict, it is now necessary to map out the contours of the local context. The six variables utilized are listed in Appendix A for reference.
1. The Local Military Balance

There are four indicators posed as questions that combined will provide an estimation of the fluidity of the military situation at the time of this conflict.

A. Is the military balance tenuous and subject to dramatic changes with relatively small increments of aid, or is it stalemated and relatively stable?

The rebel forces were small and relatively under equipped. Their organization resembled that of a commando operation more than a military invasion. There were no tanks, air support or sophisticated hardware that would provide the rebels with a reasonable chance of military success. Their aim was apparently to frighten foreign workers into withdrawal, occupy the economic nerve centers of the region, and incite popular revolt against the Mobutu regime. Their tactics appeared unorthodox from a military perspective in that a march on Kinshasa or the direct engagement of FAZ troops were apparently avoided.

Coupled with this unorthodox FNLC strategy was the ineptitude of the Zairian armed forces (FAZ) who were unable to detect the invasion, thwart its advance or sufficiently organize themselves to counterattack. In fact, the FAZ became a key enemy of the local population when it did intervene, taking the opportunity to loot and


Since the force levels of the respective groups in the area were relatively small, a modest infusion of properly trained and equipped forces could shift the balance either in favor of Mobutu's army or the FNLC. In fact, the events of Shaba I illustrate this tenuous battle field nature. With the introduction of some 1-2,000 foreign forces (mostly Moroccan with French and Belgian support) the rebels were easily routed and control of the region was restored to the government.

Conversely, had the Angolans or Cubans chosen to intervene with the force at their disposal, they most definitely would have been able to render the FAZ impotent (if it wasn't already) and quite possibly could have defeated any sizable foreign force lifted in, although this is open to conjecture. Thus, from both perspectives, relatively

39 This is evidenced by Mobutu's almost immediate call for assistance from outside sources. Given the prior track record of the FAZ, it was clear that reestablishing control over Shaba would be problematic if not for "sophisticated" western military aid and presence. This assistance usually meant the simple introduction of well disciplined troops. In both Shaba I and II, this intervention changed the situation from a rebel success to defeat in a manner of days.


41 Cuban forces in Angola at this time numbered anywhere from 12,000-19,000 and were well equipped for offensive action. Whether they were well positioned in territorial relation to the Shaba conflict is unclear, yet there potential as an intervening force was certainly greater than any other regional capability at that time. The fact that they didn't move may indeed impact on actual Cuban participation in this conflict. This will be discussed at length later.
minor infusions of aid or personnel could have significantly altered
the battle field situation and quite possibly the outcome.

B. Does one side or the other appear capable of or close to
military victory or is a protracted war of attrition the
projected result?

In this case, several factors mitigated a protracted guerrilla
type struggle within the Shaba province and pointed to a more limited
engagement. First, the apparent goal structure of the FNLC was
somewhat limited in that they were attempting to take control of the
Shaba economy, force skilled foreign workers out-decreasing foreign
confidence in Mobutu, and thus incite country-wide revolt and hopefully
overthrow of the regime (N.Y. Times, May 26, 1978). This meant that
their forces were not equipped for a long struggle from the bush of
Shaba but rather a limited engagement designed to provide the catalyst
for a chain reaction revolt.42

Second, although the FAZ were ill equipped to handle the invasion,
the saliency of the region for the national and international economy
made a guerrilla struggle with the corresponding loss of revenues,
production, etc., impossible to withstand either from a Kinshasa or a
western (Belgium, French, U.S.) perspective. The vast wealth of the
region made its security a multi-national issue, thus it was simply a
matter of time before the force of several western powers was brought

42 This appears to be substantiated by FNLC communiques from
Brussels and other locals in which they called on all groups to
overthrow the Mobutu regime, hoping that other separatist movements
like the FRP led by Laurent Kabila and the MARC led by Monguia Mbenge
would join the rebellion. See Young, "Zaire: The Unending Crisis,"
Foreign Affairs, Fall 1978.
to bear on the FNLC who had neither the military or political infrastructure to withstand such counterattacks.

Thus, intervention appeared likely to succeed based on the short-term goal of securing the region and Mobutu from overthrow. How this would effect the longer-term issues of stability in Shaba and Zaire in general was still questionable.

C. Does the terrain lend itself to decisive and rapid shifts in the battle or is it more suited for a long guerrilla type struggle?

Clearly, the terrain, its distance from the central authority of the government, its proximity to "hostile" border sanctuaries and the disdain that the local ethnic groups (especially Lunda) had for the government made the prospects for a long guerrilla type struggle highly likely. Yet, the centrality of the economic nerve-center of Shaba, principally Kolwezi, restricted the battle to an urban-based fight for control of the city and the surrounding industrial area. Since, the FNLC had a battle plan which was not designed for direct confrontation or even consistent hit-and-run attacks, the guerrilla struggle that one might anticipate never materialized. Coupled with this, the terrain could sustain a guerrilla type army bent on sabotage and disruption.

\[13\] In fact, one may argue that this is precisely what has gone on in Zaire since independence. Despite the absence of sustained guerrilla activity, the FLNC and its separatist goals received much support within Shaba indicating a fertile terrain for civil conflict and revolt. If one takes this fact along with the official western desire to paint Mobutu as the only unifying force, the image becomes one of a state constantly facing civil conflict and revolt, adeptly shielding it from international exposure. For reports of this receptivity on the part of local people to the FNLC and what they represent, see ACR, Legum 78-79: B575-B576.
but the targets are few, centrally located, and theoretically easier to protect.

Further, the Mobutu regime had been capable of effective "pacification" policies within regions of the country that appeared reluctant to obey Kinshasa's orders. Reports of civilian massacres, forced government exodus to Zambia and Angola and massive relocation had created enough fear among the local population that passive support for the rebels was possible, but active support appeared unlikely (Young and Turner 85: 254-275). This diminished the prospects for a protracted struggle in the countryside.

D. Is the base of support for the respective groups ethnically or territorial based and are the respective positions of the factions historically rooted or more fluid and interchangeable?

In the case of both the government forces and the FNLC, the answer is clearly in the former set of responses. However, the configuration of support for both overlapped within the Shaba region itself. In the case of the FNLC, support was obviously ethnic and territorial in origin. The FNLC were remnants of the followers of Moise Tshombe and had fought for years in a rejection of Kinchasan authority and in favor of separatism for Katangans. Thus, theirs was a local movement as the Kasai, Bakongo, Bangala and others had their own ethnic movements.

The term "Katangan" is much like the use of the term Biafran by Nigerians. There is arguably no ethnic group called Katangans but rather the term denotes the old provincial name for the region which those ethnic groups in the area took as a rallying cry for their struggle. As pointed out earlier, the Lunda and Baluba were the dominant ethnic groups within Shaba and it is principally the Lunda that make up the forces of the FNLC.

For a discussion of this movement and its roots, see Colvin (68) and Kanza, 79: 131-348.
In this way, it was a localized conflict with national implications but little popular national support.

For the government, although Mobutu is from an ethnic group in the north, his regime's legitimacy is clearly linked to the economy of Shaba. The saliency of the region both nationally and internationally has already been well established and western aid for Mobutu centers not on his human rights record or strength as a progressive leader, but rather on his ability to secure a relatively stable environment from which the vast wealth of Shaba can be extracted and exported. These also appear to be primary motivations for French and Belgian support as well.

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45This is substantiated in repeated contacts with Mobutu by successive Democratic and Republican administrations from Nixon through Reagan. First, it is explicitly stated in the "Tar-baby" memorandum, NSSM 39 and later reiterated during both Shaba crises in the Carter administration. For example, see Department of State Bulletin, May, 1979, "Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Zaire," by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, pp. 42-43, "Mobutu's Battle for Survival," Africa, no. 91, March 1979, pp. 48-57, and Young and Turner, 85: 363-395.

Additionally, it is important to mention that although the economic vitality of Shaba is central to the Mobutu mystique, equally, his geo-political position as a bulwark against communism and supporter of moderation within Africa also heavily influences western and particularly U.S. calculations. This will also be discussed later. See Crawford Young, "The Zairian Crisis and American Foreign Policy," and Nzongola-Ntalaja, "United States Policy Toward Zaire," in Bender et.al., 1985 and and Courtland Cox, "Western Strategy in Southern Africa," in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, eds., South End Press, Boston, 1978.

This makes each group's basis of support two unique dimensions of the same region. For the FNLC it is the localized ethnic issue of Shaba, for the government it is the economic resources and western investment contained within the area. This serves to heighten the urgency of the conflict for both local participants and regional/global spectators.

Overall, these indicators show that the local military balance was highly tenuous and susceptible (+) to successful superpower intervention if and when they decided to intervene.

2. Local Factionalism

The specific aspects of this variable conform largely to the inter-ethnic rivalries already established in our examination of Zairian history.

A. Are divisions between groups historically or ethically based?

Clearly, the answer to this is yes. The nature of Zairian politics from its independence to the present has been one of inter-ethnic competition and attempts by successive governments to forge a "national" consciousness against the backdrop of a highly fractionalized ethno-political environment. This is perhaps best personified in Shaba. Mobutu, having adopted the nationalist programs of Lumumba, has worked consistently to inhibit regional identification in favor of a greater Zairian nationalism. This has served to further alienate ethnic groups who still possess aspirations of autonomy. In much the same fashion as Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, and most of Africa,
Zaire has fallen prey to the multi-national character of its boundaries.

B. Are these divisions ideologically based?

On this point the evidence is less clear. The FNLC had developed a reputation (much like Savimbi in Angola) of changing their stripes to accommodate potential supporters (Hull 77: 5-8 & Young and Turner 85: 249-258). During the initial civil war period, the FNLC was clearly "pro-western," sponsored by Belgian interests and in agreement with multi-national corporate designs for the region (Kanza 79: 152-203). After being driven from Zaire into Angola in 1965-67, the FNLC began a tenuous alliance with Portuguese colonialists in their war against independence movements further solidifying their more conservative stature. Once independence in Angola appeared likely, the FNLC sided with the MPLA in their independence fight and carried out operations against FNLA/UNITA forces. This ostensibly shifted the FNLC "ideology" to a more leftist course.

However, it appears likely that the FNLC has utilized supporters to its own benefit and continues to adhere to a loose ideology similar to that of its original founder, Tshombe. This being, autonomy or independence for Shaba and strong ties with western economic interests on favorable terms for Katangans.47

47Logically, it would be less than realistic to find a group connected to Shaba that did not at least grudgingly recognize the importance of western investment and technology to the growth of the economy. Presumably, even "radical leftists" succeeding Mobutu would have to find some modus vivendi with western economic interests or suffer great economic upheaval and perhaps internal collapse. Thus, any FNLC program would be hard pressed to deviate from earlier positions.
This is not too far removed from the "ideological" perspective of Mobutu, at least in practice. Although he is constantly speaking in third world nationalist and socialist tones, he adheres in practice to the principles of an open economy to investment, IMF and other international institutions while publicly advocating "nationalization" measures. Thus, ideology seems to be a secondary if not tertiary factor in the factionalism between the government and the local insurgents-FNLC. Each utilize it in rhetoric while displaying more common agreement in actual practice.

C. Are the nationalist group(s) cohesive or splintered in a situation of decolonialization?

This question does not apply in this case since we are looking at an entrenched government fighting an insurgency movement. The cohesiveness of the FNLC as a group is difficult to determine since little is known about its membership or organization. Several factors are present however that provide some insight into its nature. First, its (FNLC) lack of an enunciated program or ideology indicates a concurrent lack of political organization. In fact, there is no apparent leadership structure or corresponding "government in exile" that can be identified. Second, since it is regionally and ethnically unique, its support country wide is minimal at best. Although several other separatist movements share the FNLC's disdain for Mobutu, they

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48 Two excellent examples of this duality in Zairian policy are Thomas Callaghy, "Absolutism and Apartheid: Relations Between Zaire and South Africa," 1983 and Young and Turner 85: 367-376.
are hardly allies, politically or militarily. This makes the FNLC and other such movements nationally impotent.

Thus, there is a significant degree of local factionalism within the Zairian polity, but the division is hardly "equal" either in terms of support, strength or appeal. Mobutu apparently remains the significant nationalist voice while the other groups coalesce around ethnic and regional cleavages. This indicates a high (+) degree of factionalism tempered with a largely unequal distribution of power within the polity.

3. The Role of the State of Influence

In this case, that "state" is difficult to identify. For Zaire, it is best to roughly estimate the role of several states with significant impact on the Mobutu regime. These include Belgium, the U.S. and France.

A. Does the former colonial power or dominant state have a strong involvement in that target state or a high stake in the outcome of the conflict?

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Some of these include the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP) operating in Kivu province, the Democratic Force for the Liberation of the Congo led by Anthony Gizenga and the Action Movement for the Resurrection of the Congo (MARC). All told, there are some 32 groups claiming opposition to Mobutu and the ruling MPR. To date, none have mounted any form of cohesive anti-Mobutu policies and periodically each have been co-opted into the MPR by Mobutu's divide and rule policy.

Again, in this variable, the state of influence usually is the former colonial power. In the case of Zaire, this is Belgium. However, by 1977-78, Belgian influence had significantly waned and was being replaced by French and U.S. interests both politically and economically. This makes identifying one state of influence problematic and hence, we will explore all three.
In the case of all three, the answer is yes. For Belgium, an extensive economic investment in the Zairian economy has been present since the 19th century giving them a high stake in the stability of the regime or at least, in a government that would ensure the continued flow of resources from Shaba. However, relations between Zaire and Belgium were tense due to the influential role Belgian authorities played in promoting Katangan separatism in the 1960's and the suspicion of a continuing role in the Shaba I affair. In addition, Mobutu's policy of "Zairianization" in the early 1970's had disenfranchised some Belgian business interests further straining relations between Kinshasa and Brussels (Africa Report, July-August 1977, Hull, pp. 4-9) When this deterioration of Belgian-Zairian relations is juxtaposed with the emerging French role, an even more dynamic picture is presented.

With the advent of the 5th Republic and particularly the Giscard regime, Africa took on primary saliency in French foreign policy priorities. Zaire was principle among these. Zaire is the largest Francophone state in Africa and has received increasing amounts of French military aid. In addition, French foreign investment in

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Zaire topped the $1.2 billion mark in 1984 (Zartman 84: 44). By 1970, Belgium accounted for 24% of Zairian imports, with the U.S./Canada holding 18% and France 10%. By 1975, the French share had risen to 14%, U.S./Canada to 20% with a corresponding drop for Belgium to 17%. Coupled with this is the proven track record of the French in the Shaba I crisis, giving them increased influence with Mobutu vis-a-vis the Belgians. As stated by Kenneth L. Adelman in reference to this French-Belgian competition for influence in Zaire and the effects of Shaba I:

France snubbed the never-to-popular Belgium; became the hour's hero of moderate African states; and opened vast financial territory in the potentially wealthy Zaire—all in one flamboyant swoop. (Africa Report, Jan/Feb. 1978, p. 8.)

In the case of the U.S., the vast economic stake (particularly in strategic minerals-cobalt) provides a surface reason for motivated interest, however, other more political factors appear equally important. At the time of Shaba I, the Carter administration was not entirely persuaded that Mobutu represented a key pillar of American African policy. As alluded to, U.S. Africa policy had shifted from cold war calculations and the "status-quoism" of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years to a more balanced and some would argue more

1983, pp. 129-149.

54 See Hull, 79: 226. In fact, as Hull points out, "By 1976, France had become Zaire's second most important importer after Belgium." This trend has continued through the Mitterand regime.

progressive approach to issues like black majority rule and human rights.\footnote{56}

However, with the events in Angola and concurrent (with the initial Shaba I crisis) Soviet-Cuban air-lift and intervention into Ethiopia in 1977-78, the administration policy shifted dramatically in tone and substance.\footnote{57} This served to make Mobutu a test case for U.S. "resolve" in the face of "Soviet expansionism" in Africa. Consequently, the Carter administration saw a high stake in the defeat of the FNLC and the maintenance of Mobutu within their own global calculations. As Crawford Young points out with respect to U.S. foreign policy at this time:

\begin{quote}
American policy came full circle in a remarkably telescoped time frame. Shaba I had been an opportunity for a carefully limited and measured response, with minimal rhetorical accoutrement and some distancing from the Zairian regime...Between Shaba I and Shaba II occurred the massive Soviet-Cuban Ethiopian airlift operation and the steady erosion of presidential credibility at home and abroad; the White House
\end{quote}


\footnote{57}During this period, the beginnings of the "Carter metamorphosis" is apparent with the re-emergence of cold war rhetoric, strident anti-communism and corresponding calls for less Congressional restrictions on Presidential latitude. By 1979-80 (Afghanistan and Iran), this transformation is complete. The voices of previously held views (Vance and Young) are gone by this time and Brzezinski reigns over the administrations foreign policy.

was acutely conscious of its image of weakness and ineptitude. (Young 78: 181-182).

Thus, the stake of all three of these "states of influence" was relatively strong with the French and U.S. having more immediate and substantial considerations than the Belgians at least from a political standpoint. 58

B. Does the state(s) favor one group over the other in this conflict?

Clearly, all three states for varying reasons cited above had an "affinity" for Mobutu and consequently his regime. Mobutu represented stability in economic terms for French and Belgian concerns. He represented a bulwark against communism in Africa as well as a moderately influential voice in Third World forums. And, perhaps most importantly, Mobutu was and still is the only viable (at least according to these governments) alternative to chaos and the potential radicalization of Zairian politics. 59

C. Is the state(s) capable of affecting the outcome of the conflict or has it abdicated any role?

Clearly as demonstrated by the Shaba I crisis, all three states have the capability to militarily intervene in the region. France has

58 For an examination of the tremendous economic influence that these states exercised over the decision-making of the Mobutu regime, see Kenneth Maxwell, "A New Scramble for Africa," in From Cold War to Coexistence, 1980, pp. 523-527.

59 Several scholars dispute this somewhat dichotomous view of the Zairian polity. Communism has taken little root within Zaire over two decades of harsh authoritarian rule and experts agree that it is unclear that a post-Mobutu government would be any less pro-western in its outlook or policy. In fact, as stipulated above, the FNLC by most accounts would be as if not more amenable to western interests than Mobutu if it controlled Shaba. See Young 78, Bender, Coleman & Sklar 85, and Helen Kitchen, U.S. Interests in Africa, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983.
the most logistically sound position with troops stationed in surrounding states principally Gabon, Ivory Coast, Central African Empire and Senegal (Arlinghaus 83: 125-149). In fact, France is second to Cuba in terms of the number of foreign troops in Africa, numbering some 12,000 (Ibid., 83: 135-136).

Belgian capability is less extensive but still within reach as Shaba I indicates. However, as evidenced, Belgium must rely on foreign airlift capability, namely the United States. The U.S. certainly possessed the capability with the use of "friendly" states as refueling and staging areas. Yet, they may not have been necessary with American in-flight refueling capacity. As evidenced during the crisis, the 82nd airborne was placed on alert status but never used (New York Times, May 17, 1978).

Overall, the role of the state(s) of influence was great. For economic, political and more globalistic reasons, each had a high stake in the conflict and in securing the Mobutu regime from overthrow. Although, this apparent congruity of purpose did not mitigate conflict over the policy (particularly between Belgium and France), it did provide a multi-lateral framework for decisive action in Africa.

What this meant for superpower intervention is that with a stronger role for the state(s) of influence, the overall prospects for superpower intervention decrease (-). However, since the U.S. was one of those states of influence, the susceptibility of the conflict to

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60 In the case of Zaire, "friendly" states would most probably refer to those states most sympathetic to French intervention in support of a sovereign government. Thus, the U.S. could count on states like the Ivory Coast, Senegal or Gabon, however, with American power projection capability within Europe, this would not be vital.
successful U.S. intervention greatly increased while the potential for successful Soviet intervention remains low. Again, this factor illustrates the differing patterns within each variable that emerge through the case analysis.

4. The Role of Regional States

This variable focuses on the degree and propensity for involvement of regional states germane to the conflict. In the case of Shaba, we are primarily concerned with Angola and the Francophone states (as a block) of Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic (CAR).61

A. Is there a history of intervention in the states affairs by any of the regional states?

For the aforementioned states, historical patterns of intervention were relatively non-existent with the exception of Angola. The newly independent Angolan government had been forged despite the interventionist, anti-MPLA stance of the Mobutu regime with its support for the FNLA, UNITA and FLEC (See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of Zairian policy in this case). This initiated contentious relations between Kinshasa and Luanda from independence-1975 through 1978. As already mentioned, Angola (as a colony and later as an independent state) acted as the sanctuary for FNLC forces after their forced

61The reason for focusing on Angola and the Francophone states is self-evident. In the case of Angola, the traditional negative ties stemming from Zairian interference in the Angolan civil war and subsequent enmity between the governments is reason enough. In the case of the Francophone states, most were key allies of Mobutu and shared his outlook on African affairs and the Cuban-Soviet "threat" that was emerging. Other African states were central only within larger international forums such as the United Nations and the OAU.
retreat from Shaba in the early 1960's. This provided the PRA with a ready made "instrument" with which to reciprocate Zairian intervention into Angolan affairs.62

However, the evidence is not persuasive that intervention patterns through the FNLC were established by the Neto regime. Although, the Katangans were armed, and by Cuba's own admission, trained by them, reports indicate that they were not "sent" into Zaire in either Shaba I or II. Rather, they may have acted alone in contradiction to Angolan policy.63 Despite this difficulty in ascertaining Angola's interventionist history in Zaire, clearly, the argument could be made of prior complicity.64

B. Do the regional states have the capacity to intervene militarily?

Again, with the exception of Angola, none of the regional states in question could intervene without the direct assistance of a supra-

62 Many have argued that this is exactly how Neto used the FNLC. According to some analysts, Neto would periodically unleash the Katangans in retaliation for attacks by FNLA and UNITA forces. There is no tangible evidence to support this however. See Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR AND Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power*, Advanced International Studies Institute, Miami, 1980, pp. 51-65 and Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 1985, pp. 622-630.

63 See *Young Africa*, June 10, 1977. In this interview, the leader of the FNLC, Nathaniel Mbumba argues that they invaded Shaba in 1977 because they were told by the Angolan government to disarm and disband. Thus, it is possible that the Angolan government was against the invasion. This has also been corroborated by other reports from Angola. See ACR, Legum 1978-79 pp. B573-B574.

64 Whether or not the Angolans advocated a FNLC invasion in either Shaba I or II, Mobutu certainly believed that they did and thus, in this context, the perception became more important than the reality. For Mobutu, Angola had an established pattern of interference in Zairian affairs, as Zaire had in Angola, and this fact amplified the Angolan role in the conflict.
regional power. Angola, theoretically could have intervened since it had the troops at its disposal, however, its was directly involved in securing the southern 1/3 from UNITA attacks and thus, its more vital commitments would have made intervention unlikely. In tandem with Angolan interests, Cuba certainly had the capability with over 19,000 troops stationed in Angola at this time. However, they too were committed to the pacification of UNITA and thus intervention (had they desired it) was also unlikely unless accompanied by an expansion of their presence in Angola.

C. Are there political, ethnic or ideological affinities for one faction or another on the part of regional states?

In the case of the Francophone states, clearly the ideological affinity was strong for Mobutu. Houphret-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Bongo (Gabon), Senghor (Senegal), and to a lesser extent Bokassa (CAE) all shared Mobutu's affinity for western aid and investment with a particular emphasis on France. In addition, all of these states represented that block of the OAU best characterized as "Moderate-Conservative" with definite "anti-Soviet/Cuban positions." This made them natural allies of Mobutu once he charged Cuban-Soviet complicity in the invasion. Although, one would not classify these leaders styles or policies as totally compatible, certainly their agreement on issues like western investment, anti-communism and pro-French policy made them allies in the specific crises of Shaba's I and

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II.

Coupled with this, is the non-interventionist, status-quo nature of the OAU charter, upheld in several cases including the Nigeria Civil War and Ogaden Desert War. As the OAU charter stipulated in reference to the "mystically drawn" national boundaries of the African states, these borders are nonviolable and not subject to change. Thus, Mobutu's crisis of separatism like Gowon's, Menghistu's and Neto's was one that all African leaders could identify with and support despite their personal or political animosities.\textsuperscript{66}

In the case of Angola and her affinity for the FNLC, the evidence suggests that while the PRA attempted through years of association to transform the FNLC into a more Marxist, radical organization, they were unsuccessful\textsuperscript{(ACR, Legum 78-79: B498-B500)}. The FNLC remained relatively true to the Tshombe program of parochial separatism and western investment in Shaba, thus making whatever relationship that existed between the two, a marriage of political convenience rather than ideological affinity. Perhaps this accounts for the lack of Angolan/Cuban/Soviet support they received once they entered Shaba itself.

D. Do the regional states have strong ties to a supra-regional actor(s) who have a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and consequently would be willing to aid an intervention?

\textsuperscript{66}In fact, this element of the African political experience seems to be one of two unifying principles within the OAU, the other being anti-apartheid sentiment. Logically, if separatism is supported or allowed to gain legitimacy within one state, virtually all African states become hostage to this explosive brand of nationalism. Thus, each has a national interest in the principles of non-interference and maintenance of borders embodied in the OAU.
Clearly the Francophone states with their political ties and military reliance on France personified strong bonds with a supra-regional state. All of the aforementioned regimes were and are tied economically, politically, militarily and even socially to the French metropole. For example, economically of the $8 billion (in FF @1980) of French aid to the world, $3.8 Billion goes to the 23 countries of Francophone Africa (ACR, Legum 79-80: 158). France also monopolizes key business interests controlling 72% of the agribusiness interests in Gabon, 82.4% of the textile business in Senegal, and 100% of the petrochemical business of the CAE, 73.5% in Senegal and 60% in Gabon. In the Ivory Coast, French nationals dominate the management sector of the economy, numbering some 50,000 (Zartman & Delgado 84: 13).

In the military sphere, all of these regional states are totally dependent on France for military aid, personnel and protection. Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and the CAE have mutual defense agreements with Paris facilitating French intervention in these states (Moose 85: 62). French military personnel are permanently stationed in Gabon, the CAE and Senegal. Also, these regimes (particularly the CAE and Gabon) depend upon French forces as a loyal "Praetorian guard" against their own militaries and the potential for overthrow.

In Angola, the evidence of strong ties between the PRA and the Soviet Union and Cuba are also pervasive. In October, 1976, Angola signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and

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67 For a brief discussion of these figures and their impact on French policy see Jouve 85: 308-317.

the MPLA was upgraded to "socialist orientation" status as a political party(Somerville: 86: 174). In terms of trade, the Soviets increased their imports to Angola from $34.4 million in 1976 to $449.1 million in 1977, putting Angola third behind Egypt and Algeria in Soviet exports to Africa(ACR, Legum 79-80: C131). By the Shaba II conflict, Soviet military personnel in Angola numbered over 3,000 by 1978(Ibid., C133). Coupled with this are the extensive Cuban-Angolan ties personified by the presence of over 37,000 Cuban military and technical personnel in Angola(Ibid., C133).

However, this evidence may seem somewhat misleading in terms of the strength of Soviet-Angolan relations particularly during the Shaba II conflict (1978). In May, 1977, a "leftist" faction within the MPLA led by Nito Alves attempted to assassinate Neto and seize power(See chapter 4).69 The Alves coup was thwarted largely with the aid of Cuban forces loyal to Neto, however Soviet complicity in the coup was suspected since they were recalcitrant in condemning Alves until the situation was settled and Neto emerged victorious.70 In fact, reports circulated that the Cubans and Soviets were at odds over this event and Soviet-Angolan relations cooled as a result.

69This "leftist" faction was so classified due to their more pro-Soviet inclinations vis-a-vis the "moderate," pro-Cuban Netoist elements. Whether this was the central point of contention is unclear. One principle difference that was present between the factions was their approach to the issue of race. Apparently the Alves faction advocated a black nationalist, anti-white/mestico posture in government pitting them against the more multi-racial groups that supported Neto.

Consequently, it may be that in the Shaba II crisis, access for Soviet intervention through Angola may not have been as readily available as presumed. Yet, whether this actually impacted any Soviet decision not to intervene is impossible to prove.

None of the regional states mentioned had the sort of bonds with the U.S. that would have provided ready access for their intervention. The only caveat to this is the secondary access that could be provided the U.S. by France through her African allies mentioned above. U.S. planes and troops presumably could have been granted access, refueling and transport through Abidjan, Bangui or Dakar had the need arisen, yet it did not. Thus, the ties to the U.S. were not as apparent but nonetheless potentially available through France.

In sum, the regional states alone did not have established avenues of access into Zaire and the Shaba region, but through their affinities for Mobutu and the supra-regional ties that existed with France and the U.S., access for intervention was present. This is true for the French and the U.S. (as long as their policy aims were congruent) and less so in the case of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the role of regional states was conducive (+) to superpower intervention.

5. The Role of Regional Organizations

In Shaba II, as in all cases in Africa, this variable entails examining the OAU and its position with respect to the conflict. At this time, the OAU was under the chairmanship of President Bongo of Gabon.
A. Are the regional organization(s) cohesive on a policy toward the conflict?

In the initial debate surrounding Shaba II and the ensuing intervention, the OAU was highly fractionalized. Once the initial charge of Soviet/Cuban collusion in the Shaba II conflict was made by the Kinshasan government, a "radical-conservative" or pro-east, pro-west schism within the OAU developed. So called radicals like Angola, Mozambique, Congo, Benin, Ethiopia and Madagascar referred to the Shaba conflict as an internal uprising and condemned French and all western intervention as neocolonialism (ACR, Legum 78-79: A32-A33). Conservatives like Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Somalia* condemned Soviet/Cuban intervention and called for the right of all states to request western aid in thwarting external invasions (Ibid., A34-A35). They sided with Zaire in calling Shaba II a case of foreign intervention.

What is central to this difference in classification is that within the OAU charter, foreign intervention and the promotion of separatist sentiment are illegitimate in the eyes of all African states. As already discussed, the common denominator for all African states is the inviolability of African borders and the need to thwart separatism and irredentism. Consequently, if the Shaba conflict is seen as a foreign intervention designed to promote the balkanization of Zaire, then those states in support of such an act are in violation of

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71(*) Somalia by this time had undergone a transformation of her foreign policy outlook in the wake of the expulsion of Soviet personnel from Berbera and the subsequent Ogaden War. Barre now followed a largely pro-U.S. line, voting with the more moderate and conservative forces within the OAU.
basic OAU principles and are likely to be ostracized by the community. If the conflict is purely internal, with no external involvement on the side of separatism, then the OAU traditionally has steered clear and allowed individual states to pursue their own policy interests.\(^{72}\)

In the Shaba case, this split over the character of the conflict and thus the nature of western intervention remained until an influential block of states including Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya and Guinea were able to forge a loose consensus on two resolutions.\(^{73}\) Both refused to take a firm stand either pro-west or pro-east. However, what is significant is that each reserved the "inalienable right of ever state to take any measures it deems necessary to safeguard its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and protect its security" while rejecting the notion of an Inter-African military force outside of OAU control (ACR, Legum 78-79: C16).\(^{74}\) This reaffirmed the basic OAU policy of not intervening in internal conflicts unless external intervention is evident.

\(^{72}\) Evidence for this can be seen in the hands off policy of the OAU in conflicts such as Biafra, Chad, and Mozambique. Yet, when external invasion or foreign destabilization are apparent, the OAU usually rallies to the side of the sovereign state no matter what its political ideology may be. This is witnessed in OAU policy in the Ogaden Desert War and Angola.

\(^{73}\) The first was On an Inter-African Military Force of Intervention, CM/Res 635(XXXI) and the second was titled On Military Interventions in Africa and on Measures to be Taken Against Neo-Colonialist Manoeuvres and Interventions in Africa, CM/res 641(XXXI). The texts of both are contained in ACR, Legum 78-79: C16 & C19-C20.

\(^{74}\) See "Foreign Troops in Africa," by President Julius Nyerere in Africa Report, July-August, 1978, pp. 10-13. In this piece, Nyerere perfectly illustrates the schizophrenic position of many African states. While against western intervention in principle and more supportive of the reasons for Soviet/Cuban intervention (anti-South African), he still reaffirmed the right of Mobutu to call for such assistance and thus, establishes the foundation of OAU policy; a legitimate government has the right to provide for its own self-defense against external invasion and irredentism.
principle of the maintenance of established borders and the rejection of separatism and irredentism while condemning outside intervention in general—either from the east or west.\footnote{See "OAU Summit Talks Foreign Intervention Issue," \textit{Africa Report}, September-October, 1978, p. 25. At this meeting of the OAU, the member states agreed that "every state had the right to call in help from any country."} Thus, the door was left open for outside intervention if requested by sovereign states and if it was deemed legitimate within the context of the conflict (anti-apartheid in Angola, maintenance of established boundaries in Zaire). As Nyererre pointed out at the conference:

> We regret, even while we recognize its occasional necessity, that an African government should ask for military assistance from a non-African country when it is faced with an external threat to its national integrity\footnote{See "OAU Summit Talks Foreign Intervention Issue," \textit{Africa Report}, September-October, 1978, p. 25. At this meeting of the OAU, the member states agreed that "every state had the right to call in help from any country."}.

And as Gen. Obasanjo of Nigeria reiterated with regard to eastern and western block intervention:

> To the Soviets and their friends, I should like to say that having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the liberation struggle and the consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome...To the western powers I say they should not act in such a way that we are not led to believe they have different concepts of independence and sovereignty for Africa and for Europe\footnote{See "OAU Summit Talks Foreign Intervention Issue," \textit{Africa Report}, September-October, 1978, p. 25. At this meeting of the OAU, the member states agreed that "every state had the right to call in help from any country."}.

Consequently, after extensive debate, a cohesive policy did emerge with respect to the Shaba conflict, yet it reflected a minimalist course. Zaire could call upon outside intervention to quell an external invasion and subsequent efforts at separatism, yet that intervention should be carefully limited within the parameters of OAU policy. Also, any unilateral effort at a permanent interventionary
force within Africa should be rejected. In this sense, we can argue that the OAU established a cohesive policy that most states, in principle, found acceptable.

B. Is the regional organization(s) able to enforce this policy with its member states?

The simple answer here is no. This is due to several factors. First, the time frame of the conflict was short enough that the OAU or its designated representatives could not intervene diplomatically as they did in Zimbabwe. Second, the relevant regional states who had the most immediate access were not those states in the Nigerian-Tanzanian block. Rather, the Francophone states and Angola both were on opposite sides of the conflict seeing an external invasion and internal political strife respectively. Third, both groups of regional states had relatively strong ties to supra-regional actors (France, U.S. and USSR) capable of intervening. This served to polarize the salient regional states who would have to be neutralized if intervention from any source was to be thwarted. This of course did not occur.

The paralysis of the OAU with respect to regional states and the ambiguity in its policy in the first weeks of the conflict left the door open for regional state-superpower intervention that directly effected the outcome. The OAU proved incapable of impacting on that result. As President Senghor of Senegal stated in reference to the OAU’s condemnation of intervention:

Why should Africa be solely preoccupied with the 10,000 French troops in the continent and not with 50,000 Cubans (ACR, Legum 78-79: A32)?

This statement displayed the fractionalization over the conflict, the need to be balanced in an appraisal of intervention and hints at the
reasons why certain regional states were motivated to assist western intervention and ignore OAU policy.

Consequently, the role of the regional organization was weak in terms of its ability to thwart or minimize intervention. This presented the superpowers in general with a wider avenue of access (+) for successful intervention. However, as in other variables, these "avenues" were not equally allocated for both the U.S. and the USSR due to a compilation of factors and events. These will be discussed in depth in the analysis of the case.

6. The Level of Tolerance for Intervention

This variable attempts to tap the degree to which local actors are motivated to seek and accept intervention.

A. Is there historical precedence for superpower intervention?

For the Mobutu regime and Zaire in general, the precedent for superpower intervention was well established. As discussed above, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union intervened to varying degrees in the struggle for Congolese independence 1960-1965. The United States was more heavily involved throughout the initial crisis particular with those factions that ultimately prevailed—Mobutu. After the death of Lumumba and the ascendency of Mobutu, Soviet influence within Kinshasa waned. Yet, through the victory of the MPLA and its apparent alliance with the FNLC, the potential for Soviet involvement in Zaire, albeit indirect, still remained.

With respect to the Shaba I conflict, clearly the U.S. maintained a close relationship with Mobutu, although no appreciable intervention
for the U.S. took place during this period. Still, historical patterns of U.S. intervention were present prompting Mobutu to directly call for such action and subsequently condemn the U.S. for not intervening. This indicates a strong environment for possible U.S. intervention in support of the ruling government.

This conflict does not display any pattern of Soviet intervention, but the tenuous links between the PRA-FNLC-Cubans and summarily the Soviets provide for the argument of at least prior knowledge or at worst, complicity. Whether these linkages were real or imagined matters little. Overall, the perceptions of local, regional and global actors appears to have been that Zaire was not isolated from Soviet intervention either historically or in the current conflict. Thus, the prospects of such an occurrence became less than surprising.

B. Are there strong ideological affinities and political ties between the faction(s) in the conflict and the superpower(s)?

In the case of Mobutu and the U.S., there were strong ideological and political bonds that had survived several crises and disagreements. Successive U.S. administrations saw Mobutu as a "western bastion" against communism, a potentially strong economic power which shared free market ideals and a "regional influential" that would implement U.S. policy designs with local forces. Although there was

76 See the historical background discussion in this chapter for a brief illustration of precedents for U.S. intervention in Zaire, pp. 6-18.

77 The term "regional influential" refers to the Nixon doctrine of arming and investing economically and politically in certain strategic pro-western regimes around the globe who would essentially act as U.S. proxies in those areas. These states included Brazil, Iran, Israel, South Africa, Zaire, and Indonesia.
questioning and disenchantment at times with Mobutu's performance, many believed he was the viable leadership of Zaire and the only one who could insure a pro-western tilt (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 85: 233-235).

These political and ideological ties did not shift despite changing policy styles on the part of Mobutu. In the early 70's Mobutu embarked on an ambitious diplomatic and political campaign to assert Zaire as a leader of Third World non-alignment (Young & Turner 85: 367-378). These policies included increasingly harsh rhetoric against west and east block policy, the embracing of the PRC as a counter to western influence and the move to nationalize western interests and jobs through "Zairianization" (Ibid., 85: 326-361 & 367-371). All of this proved largely cosmetic, while Mobutu privately maintained close ties to the U.S. and other western allies including South Africa (Callaghy, 83: 373-385).

For the Soviet Union, there were few ideological allies within the Zairian polity. For all of Mobutu's failings, communism as an alternative force gained little appeal in Zaire thus, Soviet intervention could not be justified in the service of an ideological or political ally. In the specific case of the FNLC, ideology or political affinity is clearly lacking. As substantiated above, the FNLC as a political movement had always been myopically centered on the issue of separatism and ideologically, it had been capitalistic throughout its existence. Thus, whatever affinity existed between

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*See discussion of this movement in the historical background section of this chapter, pp. 180-191.*
the FNLC and the Soviets, it would have to be of political expediency with respect to a common antagonist-Mobutu.

C. Do the local factions seek superpower support actively?

This indicator also shows a marked contrast between the two factions involved in this conflict. For Mobutu, intervention and support from the U.S. as well as France, Belgium, Morocco and a host of other states was called for and solicited almost immediately. Mobutu's first announcement regarding the invasion charged the Soviets, Cubans, Libyans and Algerians with complicity and called on pro-western states to militarily intervene on his behalf (New York Times, May 15, 1978, pp. 1:A8). Prior experience in the Shaba I conflict no doubt contributed to this early call as well as the lack of a reliable military within Zaire to deal with the threat.

For the FNLC, the situation was more politically complex. As a non-state actor without political legitimacy operating across state borders, they could not legally call for intervention and expect to gain any support regionally or internationally. This kind of action would have been in direct violation of the OAU charter (see discussion pp. 37 & 42-43) and certainly would have given the Soviets, Angolans and Cubans cause for reluctance. Thus, the FNLC position, and by default the position of their supporters, would have to be that the conflict was an internal rebellion, without outside aid or interference. In fact, this was the FNLC's position and that of Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union.79 This made public or private FNLC

calls for intervention politically counter-productive and unlikely to be heeded by the prospective interveners (Soviets, Cubans, etc.). If solicitations were made through private channels, they probably would have been ignored for the political reasons cited above. This will be explored in depth in our analysis.

D. Do any groups or states within the conflict have agreements regarding intervention with any superpower?

In the case of both the FNLC and Zaire, the answer is no. For Angola, as an influential regional state in this conflict, an agreement with the Soviet Union did provide for mutual assistance (and intervention) if attacked by another state (Somerville 86: 174-176). This could have come into force had the Zairian army engaged in hot pursuit attacks in Angola against FNLC bases. However, given the incompetence of the FAZ this outcome was highly unlikely.

In terms of tolerance for intervention, the Shaba II conflict was highly susceptible to superpower intervention (+). The configuration of this variable indicates a greater susceptibility for the U.S. than the Soviets given the proclivities of the local actors involved and the historical patterns already established. See Appendix G for a full representation of the local context.

This elucidation of the local context has provided a rough measure of the potential for successful superpower intervention in the Shaba II conflict. Overall, the local context was highly susceptible (+) to successful intervention, yet the configurations of these variables rendered distinctly different avenues of access for the U.S. as opposed to the Soviet Union.
This illustrates a growing pattern within the concept of local context as it is operationalized within each case. Although objectively calculated for both superpowers, indicators within each variable tend to coalesce in favor of either U.S. or Soviet intervention in most cases. That is, the local context of any given conflict may be conducive to superpower intervention (+) in general, but within that overall measure there appear to be differing "degrees" of opportunity for each depending upon the alignment of the indicators. Alone, each of these indicators may not dictate a successful outcome, but combined, they allow us to see nuances of local context development that alert us to potential superpower success or failure.

In Shaba II, the local context initially sets the parameters for successful superpower intervention but only within some carefully focused conditions that facilitated U.S. intervention and served to inhibit the Soviet Union. This point will be elaborated upon in the analysis section of this chapter. For now, it is important to reiterate that this reinforces the initial argument of this thesis that the success of superpower intervention may be based largely on locally determined factors and not simply on superpower commitment and will.

THE SHABA II CONFLICT

The actual duration of the Shaba II conflict is short in comparison to other cases examined in this study. For this reason, the analysis of the conflict will be divided into two, 2-week periods. The first includes the initial FNLC invasion and subsequent U.S./Belgian & French interventions and "mop-up" operations (May 14-May 25) and the
second begins with the "Africanization phase" of the conflict and the corresponding international debate over U.S./European, Cuban/Soviet intervention (May 26-June 14).

May 14-25, 1978

After the initial reports of the FNLC invasion on May 14, Zairian President Mobutu immediately accused the Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola, Algeria and other "left-wing" regimes with complicity in the action. The result was a corresponding series of denials and vociferous Zairian calls for U.S., French, Belgian, Chinese and Moroccan assistance (N.Y. Times, May 15, 1978). Kinshasa's diplomatic "reporting" of the conflict followed the pattern of Shaba I with a series of detailed yet unsubstantiated charges leveled against Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union. Soon after the invasion, the Zairian news agency (AZAP) claimed that the FNLC incursion was part of larger plan codenamed "Operation Dove" (N.Y. Times, May 15, 1978). According to AZAP, Cuba, Algeria, Angola and by association the Soviet Union orchestrated the action which included Cuban/Algerian training of the FNLC, Soviet planning and Angolan material support. These claims of communist intrigue were also made in 1977 as well, yet questions still remain as to their authenticity.


81These claims of Soviet, Cuban and Angolan complicity in the invasion have never been substantiated beyond a reasonable doubt. It is safe to assume that each had some type of foreknowledge of the attack, yet it still is open to conjecture as to what they did to encourage or discourage the FNLC. It is clear however, that Neto was interested in ridding his country of this "mercenary" force one way or
With respect to the conflict itself, this latest Shaba episode did differ from Shaba I in terms of the initial effectiveness of the FNLC under Mbunda. In Shaba I the rebel forces and FAZ were both disorganized and inept with no apparent battle plan and little success in terms of capturing territory. Shaba II was clearly different. Within two days, the FNLC had engaged and defeated token FAZ resistance, capturing the strategic mining center of Kolwezi (N.Y. Times, May 16, 1978). This event intensified concerns within western capitals about the solvency of the Zairian regime and added genuineness to Mobutu's claims of a communist conspiracy. Consequently, Zairian requests for support were heeded, particularly by the U.S., French, Belgians and later the Chinese.

On May 17, the United States placed the 82nd airborne unit in North Carolina on alert status for possible use in Shaba (N.Y. Times, May 17, 1978). This constituted the initial intervention by the U.S. at MODERATE 2 status. That is the threat of the use of force within the confines of the conflict. Administration officials argued that these forces would be used only to evacuate American and other civilians in the area and not in a combat capacity.\(^{82}\)

\(^{82}\)As discussed above, the FNLC was fairly incoherent in strategy and tactics in Shaba I and as a result never entered Kolwezi or posed too grave a threat. The swiftness of their attacks and initial success in Shaba II only one year hence raised suspicions that they must have had help. In fact, there were unconfirmed Zairian reports of "Spanish-speaking" officers accompanying FNLC forces in Shaba.

\(^{83}\)It was reported by several news agencies and later reiterated in analyses of the conflict that western intervention was prompted by humanitarian concerns over reported massacres of Europeans by FNLC
This action was immediately followed on the 19th and 20th by an escalation of U.S. intervention into a HIGH 2 status. Approximately 18 C-141 transports were dispatched to Zaire carrying part of a Belgian/French "rescue force" numbering @2,500. In addition, the U.S. provided additional material, spare parts and supplies under previously existing military aid packages (N.Y. Times, May 20, 1978).

The reasons for such a strong and forceful response on the part of the administration are important to discuss given Carter's relative lack of support for Mobutu in Shaba I. In 1977 President Carter played down the importance of the Mobutu regime to the west, refused to dispatch forces or assist in the sending of French or Moroccan troops and essentially rejected Mobutu's claims of a communist aggression against his country. What then accounted for the shift in the Carter position?

Several scholars have pointed to first, the greater geo-strategic calculations going on in the administration in 1978 and second, the

forces (U.S. News & World Report June 5, 1978 p. 41 & N.Y. Times, May 17, 1978 pp A1/A8, May 27, 1978, A4). This appears somewhat self-serving and inaccurate. First, reported massacres and looting were as much a product of FAZ actions as FNLC. Second, the threat to European lives was probably exaggerated to make the intervention more palatable to the international community and respective constituencies. Third, as in the Congolese crisis of 1960-64, actual casualties among Africans in the area were far greater than Europeans but significantly under reported.


growing preeminence of the Brzezhinski faction within foreign affairs as central to this shift. The common thesis put forth was that "massive" Soviet/Cuban involvement in Angola (1975-76) and Ethiopia (1977-78) and a growing communist presence within Southern Africa (Rhodesia & Mozambique) spun Carter's African policy off the Young/Vance axis onto Brzezhinski. Evidence for this view was found in the contradictory statements made by Young and Brzezhinski on African policy and the U.S.-Soviet relationship in general during and after the Shaba II conflict. The first signs of this emerge with Young at first down-playing Cuba's role in Africa, then disagreeing with Carter over his concern for undue Congressional restrictions followed by a complete reversal of views. Brzezhinski for his part framed the Shaba II crisis within the global relationship between the superpowers even intimating that arms control was threatened and a new Sino-American alliance might be in the offering as a response (N.Y.Times, May 29, 1978).

Faced with seemingly patterned behavior on the part of the Cubans and Soviets in a series of unrelated theatres and domestic calls for a


forceful response, Carter reacted in traditional containment terms. He rhetorically placed the Mobutu regime within the umbrella of friendly governments vital to western interests and called on united western action against the threat. He even attracted (although not by design) the favorable support of then South Africa Prime Minister John Vorster who applauded Carter's change of heart (N.Y. Times, June 1, 1978). Consequently, it can be argued that U.S. intervention in Shaba II was as much a response to geo-strategic perceptions and concerns as to the actual events on the ground.

This thesis illustrates the strong "globalist" tendency within American foreign policy even within the so-called "enlightened" Carter administration.

Nonetheless, within 48 hours of the initial reports of fighting, some 1,000 French Foreign Legionaries and 1,500 Belgian troops engaged the FNLC and routed them from Kolwezi and the surrounding areas (N.Y. Times, May 19, 1978). During the subsequent 4 days of

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88 See N.Y. Times, May 23-25, 1978 for comments by Carter, Young and Brzezinski that discuss Cuban-Soviet involvement, undue restrictions on Presidential decisions with respect to aid and hopes of reestablishing a relationship with UNITA. All of this coming from an administration that had argued for a new look with respect to Africa.

89 What is interesting to note for general foreign policy analysis is that most scholars have pointed to Afghanistan as the watershed of the Carter shift from a more human rights-oriented approach to traditional containment policy. It is apparent that this shift took place at least one year earlier within the dynamic of a changing African landscape effected by the introduction of Cuban forces in civil conflicts. As Brzezinski himself stated, detente died in the sands of the Ogaden.

action, French and Belgian forces carried out mop-up operations against
token FNLC resistance while also evacuating most of the estimated 2,500

Once Belgian and French troops arrived on the scene, obvious rifts
were reported between the two forces and their respective governments.
Belgium charged that French intervention was of a military, partisan
nature designed to prop up Mobutu and increase French influence, while
the Belgian operation was purely "a humanitarian one." In fact,
Belgian castigation of the French effort was compatible with Soviet
claims that French intervention was designed simply to secure important
economic interests and concessions from the Mobutu regime. This
served to exacerbate western concerns over supporting a corrupt Mobutu
regime weighed against the potential loss of economic investment in the
region should he fall.

The Soviet Union as well as her allies in the region, Angola and
Cuba remained removed from the actual conflict taking a non-

91 Belgian disdain for Mobutu, his mis-handling of the economy and
his brutal method of rule all contributed to this anti-Kinshasa
attitude in Brussels. The fact that France was willing to fill the
vacuum created by the rift between Belgium and Zaire served to put them
in disfavor with the former colonial state.

This is played out in press reports and government statements
between Belgium and France beginning with the first reports in May 21,
1978. See N.Y. Times, May 21-24, 1978 also see Goldsborough, Foreign
Policy, 78-79, Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, The Lessons
of Recent Wars in the Third World: Comparative Dimensions, Volume II,
Coker, NATO, Warsaw Pact and Africa, The Macmillian Press Ltd., London,
1985, pp. 122-129.

H1-H3 and May 19, pp. H1.
interventionary posture.\textsuperscript{93} Soviet denials were immediate and like those of the Shaba I crisis, careful to paint the conflict as an "internal crisis" brought on by a "western policy of collective neocolonialism."\textsuperscript{94} The Soviet government attempted through its statements to de-legitimize any form of western intervention on behalf of Mobutu in the eyes of the OAU. This would obviously become a central issue for African states with respect to this or any other regional conflict with international dimensions.

Cuban and Angolan denials of involvement were equally strident. In the case of Cuba, Castro called Lyle F. Lane, the chief American diplomat in Havana to explicitly outline Cuban non-involvement in the Shaba crisis (\textit{N.Y. Times}, May 19, 1978). American State Department officials tacitly backed Castro's claim of "non-involvement" by stating that "there was no evidence of Cuban troops in Zaire," but they left open the door for charges of Cuban collusion in the planning of the invasion (\textit{N.Y. Times}, May 19, 1978).

The Angolan regime also denied involvement and even went so far as to claim that they had tried to warn the U.S. government of the invasion prior to its occurrence (\textit{ACR, Legum} 78-79, B499). However, Angolan and Cuban foreknowledge of FNLC intentions is hard to ignore,\textsuperscript{93,94}

\textsuperscript{93}In answer to potential criticisms, it is impossible to conclusively determine that the FNLC invasion constituted a de facto Soviet/Cuban intervention into Zaire. As the evidence suggests, no clear role for either state can be substantiated. Therefore, despite some arguments to the contrary, this study does not classify the Shaba II crisis as a Soviet/Cuban intervention but rather as a case of non-intervention.

if only by logical inference. The Neto regime had begun a rapprochement with Mobutu in 1977. The key issue was Zairian support for FLEC (Cubindan separatists), FNLA and UNITA forces still operating within Angola. Yet, attacks by the above groups with apparent Kinchasan acquiescence angered the Angolan regime and relations deteriorated. It is plausible to assume that the "unleashing" of the FNLC was part of a retribution effort on the part of Neto for perceived Zairian bad faith. 95

Also, it could be argued that the FNLC was actually expelled from Angola as a precondition for improved relations between the two states. 96 This later scenario is based in part on Kinchasan-Luandan commonality of interest with respect to centrality of the Benguela railway (Ibid., 78-79, B498-B500). As long as rebel forces (FNLA, UNITA) operated in Angola, the railway was threatened thus potentially closing off Zairian exports and reducing Angolan revenue that could be accrued from their shipment. Consequently, both states had a mutual interest in cooperating to keep this vital economic link open.

Prior knowledge of the FNLC invasion is also borne out in information on the "Lane cable" which included an admission by Castro that he knew of the invasion days before its initiation but could do little to stop it (N.Y. Times, June 11, 1978). Whatever their actual part, the subsequent disagreements within the Carter administration

95 See Hull (77) and also ACR, Legum 78-79: B498-B500 for discussions of the Angolan claim that Zaire was helping plan a joint western invasion of Angola code named "Operation Cobra."

96 This was argued by Mbunda himself in interviews in Brussels after the expulsion of the FNLC from Shaba. See ACR, Legum 78-79: B573 for allusions to this by Neto himself.
over the exact nature of the Cuban role and the interpretation of the Lane cable are testimony to the uncertainty surrounding these charges.97

May 26-June 14

Once Kolwezi was secured by French and Belgian forces, approximately 100 Moroccan troops were airlifted in by the U.S. to help Zairian soldiers restore order. These troops became part of a larger process of "Africanizing" the intervention. During an emergency meeting of Francophone states in Paris on May 25, the Belgium Prime Minister Leo Tindermans proposed an all African peacekeeping force to patrol the Shaba region replacing Belgian and French troops. This proposal was positively received by the so-called "moderate" African states (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon & Morocco) but spurned by other OAU members.98

Despite a lack of significant hostilities in Shaba, U.S. intervention remained at a HIGH 2 level as U.S. C-141 transports were used to ferry out French soldiers and airlift in approximately 2,500

97These disagreements like others in the Carter administration were played out in the press where it became apparent that two distinct factions were emerging on all foreign policy issues. These obviously centered around the more regionalist view of Andrew Young and Cyrus Vance and the more globalist conception of Zbigniew Brzezinski.

98These states represented that block within the OAU largely considered pro-western and particularly tied to the French. The inter-African force was not warmly received by the OAU at large and particularly among those states with a more anti-western agenda, i.e. Tanzania, Mozambique, Congo, Angola, Algeria, Libya and Guinea. A discussion of these factions within the OAU is found in ACR, Cervanka & Legum (78-79). See note #66, p. 36.
African troops (*N.Y. Times* June 3, 1978). This inter-African force was made up of Moroccans, Gabonese, Ivorians, Senagalese and Togolese troops.

Continued U.S. intervention was coupled with a major diplomatic campaign by the Carter administration following three interrelated objectives. First, the White House was determined to link the Cubans and by definition the Soviets to the invasion by proving "communist complicity." U.S./CIA intelligence data was provided from agents within the region that claimed Cuban forces were involved in the training and planning of the invasion. This evidence was refuted not only by the Soviets, Cubans and Angolans (see above), but also by members of Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee openly challenged the President with respect to his interpretation of the intelligence data (*Ibid.*, May 27, 1988).

Although the full details of the data have not been released, administration officials have claimed that their information showed prior training and equipping of the FNLC and thus, the Cubans and Angolans must have known and encouraged the invasion. Critics of this argue that although these activities may have taken place 1-2 years prior to the Shaba conflict, this does not mean that the invasion itself was either planned or condoned by Luanda, Havana or Moscow. In fact, this was Castro's position in the Lane cable.

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99 For an examination of the debate over the interpretation of this data see *N.Y. Times*, May 27, June 4, 5, & 9. The actual intelligence information is unavailable at this time.

Second, the Carter administration had from the outset of the Shaba II crisis linked U.S. response to the conflict with congressional restrictions on Presidential policy in general. Coterminal with the outbreak of Shaba II, the White House immediately began lobbying for a repeal of the Clark amendment which prohibited aid to UNITA in Angola and a removal of other restrictions on Presidential actions with respect to U.S. policy in Africa (presumably in response to Soviet-Cuban "adventurism"). These restrictions included amendments within the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 which required the President to report to Congress any requests for aid to Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia or Zaire and to justify those requests as being in the direct foreign policy interests of the U.S. (Ibid., May 26, 1978). The rationale given by President Carter focused on the need to enhance his ability to respond to "Soviet and Cuban intrusion" in Africa especially since 1976 (Ibid., May 26, 1978).

Thirdly, the administration, in concert with its efforts in Zaire, began questioning the utility of detente amidst seeming "Soviet violations of the code of conduct." National Security advisor Brzezinski argued that Soviet conduct in Africa was overstepping the bounds of competitiveness recognized by the superpowers and thus

101 See corresponding N.Y. Times articles (May 21-28, 1978) which document the development of this debate in Washington and the increasing effort at repealing the reforms of the Watergate era with respect to foreign policy.

102 This too was played out in the press during the conflict. See N.Y. Times, May 29, 1978 and remarks made by National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski.
endangered other aspects of the relationship including arms control (Ibid., May 31, 1978). This further illustrated the globalist conception of the Shaba II conflict as the crisis was framed within the arguably more important dynamic of U.S.-Soviet relations.

This diplomatic offensive by Washington became a central issue at an emergency NATO meeting (May 31-June 1) focusing on the Atlantic Alliance's response to Soviet/Cuban initiatives in Africa. A split developed over the nature of the Western response to Shaba and the concern about fractionalizing African states over the issue. France, the U.S. and Belgium argued strongly for a military response by other African states (albeit for different reasons) while British and West German officials down-played this option and warned against the perception of neo-colonialism that military intervention could engender.\(^\text{103}\) In fact, in response to American pronouncements on Africa British Prime Minister Callaghan rather flippantly argued that:

> There seem to be a number of Christopher Colombuses setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time. It's been there a long time (N.Y. Times, June 3, 1978).

As this debate progressed in Western Europe and the U.S., African troops were being put in place in Shaba to insure economic and political stability. The OAU remained split over the "legality" and desirability of western or inter-African intervention and failed to

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\(^{103}\) See reports in the N.Y. Times May 31-June 2 regarding this split and the contending positions. Also, see Coker 85: 126-129 for a discussion of the inter-NATO politics regarding the proper response to Shaba II.
address the issue until after the Shaba II conflict had ended.\textsuperscript{104} When the OAU did address the issue it reaffirmed the least common denominator within the OAU’s charter that of a regime’s right of self-determination and defense while advocating non-interference.\textsuperscript{105} Hence, in effect, the OAU legitimized Mobutu’s right of self-defense and his calls for foreign intervention.

In addition to western intervention, China and Saudi Arabia involved themselves on Mobutu’s behalf. Chinese foreign Minister Huang Hua traveled to Zaire on June 2-7 meeting with Mobutu, touring the Shaba area and declaring that Shaba II represented "an important part of Soviet policy in seeking world domination"\textit{(N.Y.Times, June 8, 1978)}. China subsequently pledged renewed military aid and training of Zairian forces. Saudi Arabia also pledged U.S. made weapons to the Inter-African Defense Force being put in place\textit{(Ibid., June 1, 1978)}.

By June 14, the last French and Belgian troops had left and an Inter-African force was in place. Any remaining FNLC forces had either fled across the border into Angola or had simply faded into the local population discarding uniforms and weaponry in the process. American intervention had ceased while the diplomatic battle over Soviet/Cuban

\textsuperscript{104}The corresponding split took on an expected dynamic with Francophone states and Commonwealth states largely supportive and Pro-Soviet states(Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Algeria, Libya) against with two notable exceptions: Tanzania and Liberia. Both states voiced resentment of western intervention and the inter-African force and called for their removal from Africa as a whole. See \textit{N.Y.Times}, June 8, 1978 and also see \textit{ACR}, Cervanka and Legum 78-79: A25-A37.

\textsuperscript{105}These are embodied in the 31st Session of the OAU Council of Ministers Meeting in Khartoum, July 7-18, 1978 in the resolutions cited earlier. The texts are found in the \textit{ACR}, Legum 78-79: C16 & C19.
involvement raged on between the administration and a skeptical Congress.

INTERVENTION OUTCOME: EVALUATION

The first factor in evaluating the outcome of the conflict is the military position of the faction in question vis-a-vis its rivals. These factions, of course, include the Kinchasan regime and the FNLC.

By June 15, Mobutu had won a complete military victory over the rebels. The FNLC was routed from Shaba province and completely disbanded as a fighting force. However, that military victory was achieved by western forces in spite of the actions of the FAZ. Reports of widespread desertions among FAZ officers and disunity in the ranks led Mobutu to a harsh reorganization of the military and necessitated the introduction of foreign forces to protect the regime from further attack.¹⁰⁶

The territorial control exercised by Kinshasa was also completely restored at least on the surface. Kolwezi and the surrounding areas were recaptured and placed under strict military rule (ACR, Legum 78-79: B573-580). Mass deportations took place in the area and the border region with Angola was virtually cleared of civilians. However, like the military position, the underlying currents of anti-government feelings ran strong and continued foreign presence along with harsh government tactics were necessary to maintain a semblance of control.

and order.\textsuperscript{107} The Pan-African force that replaced French-Belgian troops was not removed until June 30, 1979 indicating continued concern over the security of Shaba and the reliability of FAZ forces.\textsuperscript{108} This does not change the fact that the government was in an advantageous position but it does inform us as to the character of that victory.

Internationally, the Mobutu regime achieved mixed results. On one level it clearly did not gain from the affair since it appeared weak and incapable of internal defense. Shaba II fully illustrated the tenuous hold Mobutu had over his country and the potential for internal collapse should local groups unite against him.\textsuperscript{109} However, Mobutu was able to illicit significant multi-lateral support for his position both politically and militarily vis-a-vis his enemies (the FNLC, Angola, and the larger Eastern bloc states). Also, despite its problems, Zaire did not suffer from any loss of international legitimacy and the moderate African support for its position strengthened Mobutu within the continent particularly after his disastrous adventure in Angola.


\textsuperscript{108}See \textit{Africa Report}, March-April, 1979, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{109}In fact, former Zairian Foreign Minister Karl-I-Bond argues that "Without the western countries intervention in Zaire, Mr. Mobutu's regime would not have survived the armed uprisings that took place during the events known as Shaba I, in 1977, and Shaba II, in 1978."
The subsequent rapprochement between Mobutu and Neto in 1978-79 further solidified his regime within the region. The degree of political control utilized by the Mobutu regime can best be described as coercive. Internal persecution of officials and civilians was commonplace and Shaba II did nothing to change this. Responding to allied pressure, Mobutu was able to orchestrate internal and external diplomatic initiatives that on the surface appeared to lessen his oppressive form of rule. Internally, Mobutu brought in significant dissident factions under the umbrella of the MPR thus solidifying his dominance while neutralizing important opposition. This has been a common maneuver on his part since taking over. Yet, these moves did not change the essential direction and nature of Mobutu's rule while Shaba was ruled as a foreign land under military occupation.

The final factor in the calculation of outcome centers on superpower opposition to the Mobutu regime. In this case we are referring to the Soviet Union and its policy toward Kinshasa after the period of conflict had ended. Essentially, the Soviets accepted the outcome of the battle. Diplomatic relations were continued and in fact overtures by Mobutu were received warmly in the Kremlin (ACR, Legum 79-80: B450-B451). Added to this was the rapprochement between Neto and

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110 See ACR, Legum 78-79: B577-B579 for a complete accounting of this rapprochement culminating in the official visit of President Neto to Kinshasa August 19-21, 1978.

111 See Young, 78: 171-183.

112 Ibid., pp. 177-183 and Young & Turner 85: 165-178.
Mobutu formalizing relations between the two states and neutralizing sources of enmity between the two governments (sanctuary for foreign forces) (Ibid., 78-79: B578-B579). Any efforts at destabilization by the Soviet Union were not present in the aftermath of the conflict.

Overall, the U.S. intervention in the Shaba II conflict was clearly a success. The Mobutu regime was saved, it was able to eliminate a source of opposition to its regime, reestablish control over a vital area of the country and illicit international support for its actions. Further, superpower opposition was non-existent and the main source of external combat—Angola was diplomatically neutralized. The configuration of the outcome is represented below.

TABLE 7

OUTCOME: U.S./ZAIREE

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OVERALL: SUCCESS

It should be noted in reference to the configuration of outcome that the pattern of indicators across the spectrum (success-failure) of possible results is often like that of Shaba II shown above. That is several indicators showing success and one or more indicating failure. Since these estimations are not concrete measures, there is no systematic way of measuring the relative potency of each indicator. We can however "gauge" the outcome by examining these factors within the context of the case. Thus, in Shaba II, despite the failure of the Mobutu regime to maintain what would be considered stable political control, the overall compilation of factors indicates a success for U.S. intervention.
OUTCOME: POSTSCRIPT

This section attempts to evaluate the outcome of the intervention in a longer term perspective, approximately 3-5 years after the conflict has ended. In this way, we can better evaluate the longer term effects of intervention and what salient factors might influence outcome from a long range perspective.

In terms of both the military and territorial position of the Mobutu regime, Shaba remains firmly in government control. The FNLC has undertaken little or no action in the region and has had limited access to Angolan territory. The Shaba region has returned to pre-conflict status and foreign troops including the inter-African force have been removed.

In the area of international recognition, Mobutu remains the legitimate leader of Zaire. With the arrival of the Reagan administration in 1980, Zaire and Mobutu's excesses were played down in the press in return for his dutiful anti-communist stance. In addition, recent reports indicate that Mobutu has allowed UNITA forces to use Zairian territory as a conduit for American material sent in 1987 after the rescinding of the Clark amendment prohibiting such aid.\(^\text{114}\) Thus, in the western world, Mobutu remains a needed ally.

Within Africa, his status remains somewhat weak. His ties to the Apartheid regime continue to alienate him from the Front-Line states as

is evidenced by repeated refusals by the SADC for Zairian membership. In addition, his support for the Moroccan regime in its conflict with the Polisario has further placed him within the minority in the OAU. However, these events do not translate into pariah status, and his legitimacy as the only viable government of Zaire remains.

The method of political control that Mobutu exercises continues to be repressive and violent especially in areas of past revolts like the Shaba province. The period 1980-present has been one of continual political oppression, reorganization, purges and internal exile of opponents. Mobutu has maintained firm control of the Shaba region but at the expense of military occupation and coercive political control.

Finally, Soviet opposition to the Mobutu regime and efforts at destabilization have been minimal. Both states have gone through periods of cooling and warming relations and with the corresponding rapprochement between Angola and Zaire, a key obstacle to better Soviet-Zairian relations has been removed.

Overall, the outcome of U.S. intervention in the expanded time frame of 3-5 years remained a success with the only blemishes being the repressive rule of Mobutu and the weakness of indigenous forces (FAZ)

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in controlling territory. The following represents the mapping of this extended outcome:

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**FACTORS**

1. Military Position
2. Territorial position
3. International Recognition
4. Political Control
5. Superpower Opposition

**OVERALL: SUCCESS**

**ANALYSIS**

As in all of the cases in this study, it is important that we explicate the configurations of the local context and explore its interaction with superpower intervention in order to explain outcome. This involves first the artificial delineation of the local context from superpower behavior. And second, the fusion of that reality with superpower interventionary behavior. Once the major points of each have been established, we can explore potential explanations for the reasons behind success and failure.

In the Shaba II case, the focus is on U.S. intervention and the nexus between that behavior and local context. Thus, the central question is:
Why was the U.S. successful in its intervention in the Shaba II conflict?

Soviet non-intervention will be addressed within a discussion of the potential reasons why they did not intervene.

The Local Context Variable

Through an investigation of the set of factors which make up local context, it is apparent that the Shaba II conflict was in general highly susceptible (+) to superpower intervention. The local military balance was highly tenuous and malleable to outside manipulation. Regional states had a vested interest in the outcome as well as established links with the faction(s) involved and thus promoted non-African (U.S., France, Belgium) intervention. In addition, the tolerance for intervention was extremely high given a long history of foreign involvement in Zairian affairs and the clear propensity of both local factions (particularly Mobutu) to solicit outside assistance.

Concomitantly, the internal patterns of these local context variables coalesced to favor the intervention potential of one superpower (U.S.) and significantly diminish the others (U.S.S.R.). This is borne out in an examination of several of these variables, particularly Local Factionalism, The Role of Regional Organizations, The Role of Regional States and The Role of the State of Influence.

When we examine the interaction between local factionalism and the role of regional states, an important formation emerges that contributes to the character of superpower intervention (U.S. intervention/Soviet non-intervention) in Shaba II. As pointed out, the
FNLC as a "viable political entity" represented a unique set of regional-ethnic aspirations within the province of Shaba.\textsuperscript{117} Conversely, the Zairian government was recognized as the "legal" representative of the Zairian people. Since the Kinchasan regime is a black nationalist government and not colonial in nature, its legitimacy as the ruling authority becomes unquestioned within the established rules of the OAU charter.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, in the African context, Shaba II translates into a legitimate and recognized government being challenged by an irredentist force bent on the balkanization of Zaire and the redrawing of its boundaries. What this means for our analysis of the Shaba II conflict is clear.

First, most African states (with the exception of South Africa) would find it politically disadvantageous to publicly support a regionally based irredentist movement with the goal of self-determination.\textsuperscript{119} This would set a dangerous precedent of reshaping

\textsuperscript{117}This refers to the history of the FNLC as an ethnocentric movement concerned with the irredentist position of "liberating" the Shaba province from Kinchasan control.

\textsuperscript{118}This directly refers to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Article 3 which stipulates that no country may interfere in the affairs of another African state. This by definition affords Zaire and any other state the right to defend itself against internal or external attack with any and all means including foreign assistance. See Olajide Aluko, "African Response to External Intervention in Africa since Angola," African Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 319, April 1981, pp. 160-175 and U.O. Umozurike, "The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter," African Affairs, Vol. 78, 1979, pp. 197-209.

\textsuperscript{119}Although this phenomenon has been present in many circumstances: Somalia and its interference in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, Ivorian and Tanzania support for Biafra, the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda and South African support for UNITA and Renamo; it has largely been militarily, politically and diplomatically unsuccessful. Since all African states have significant ethnic minorities within their borders that could be "activated" with proper
Africa's borders insuring the fragmentation of the continent and chronic intra-state conflict. As the OAU charter specifies and as virtually all African states have supported in other such conflicts (Biafra, Ethiopia-Somalia, Polisario), the "colonial" borders must be maintained and ethnic concerns must be satisfied within those territorial boundaries.\textsuperscript{120}

Second, despite the character of the Mobutu regime, regional support for the maintenance of Zaire's territorial integrity would be unquestionably accepted. This means that any support Mobutu would gain from other African states no matter how diverse is de facto legitimate given this position. This gave anti-intervention arguments less weight within the OAU and similar world forums particularly with the precedents of Biafra and Angola.\textsuperscript{121}

Third, despite the ideological and political vagaries of most issues, certain positions are de facto legitimate or illegitimate within the African context. As in the case of Angola, despite widespread (Nigerian, Tanzanian, Senegalese to name a few) disdain for Soviet/Cuban intervention and the ascension of the MPLA, the anti-South external support and material, the precedent of destabilizing another regime is dangerous. Witness the present Sudanese-Ethiopian conflict with each supplying the other's irredentist movements with arms and material that prolong both conflicts and weaken both regimes.


\textsuperscript{121}Although calls for non-intervention were strong in the OAU, the "legal" position of the Mobutu regime in calling for aid found its way into the OAU statements on Shaba II and subsequently watered down any anti-intervention sentiment. See the resolutions cited in note 72, p. 41.
African character of the intervention and the corresponding alliance between UNITA/FNLA and South Africa, made Soviet/Cuban intervention legitimate within Africa and beyond.\textsuperscript{122} We see a similar pattern in the case of Biafra.\textsuperscript{123} Thus, any supra-regional state (i.e. superpower) that openly supported the FNLC in its attack on Shaba would fall prey to charges of anti-OAU/African behavior placing influential African states (Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal) against its policies.

All of these configurations within the interplay between local factionalism and the role of regional organizations made the likelihood of successful intervention much stronger for the U.S. given its preference for Mobutu. Conversely, the U.S.S.R. and its apparent preference for the FNLC made any potential intervention on their part illegitimate and increased the likelihood of failure.

Two other variables further illustrate this. They are the role of the state(s) of influence and the role of regional states. In the case of Shaba II, the configuration of the state of influence variable uniquely served U.S. intervention.

Although Belgium was the dominant colonial power, its influence with Mobutu was waning through the seventies. Replacing that position of preeminence were first the United States and later France (see discussion pp. 29-34). Both states, for reasons already cited, had

\textsuperscript{122}See chapter four for a discussion of the centrality of this legitimacy for Soviet intervention within Angola. Also, see "South African Liberation: Touchstone of African Solidarity," Annette M. Seegers, chapter 11

\textsuperscript{123}For a discussion of this phenomenon as it was played out in the Biafran case, see Suzanne Cronje, Chapter 13, "Africa: A Respect for Boundaries," The World and Nigeria, Sidgwick and Jackson Publishers, London, 1972, pp. 281-319.
established extensive economic and political ties to the Mobutu government.\textsuperscript{124} These served to bolster their position in Zaire particularly during potential conflict situations. Shaba I illustrated this role in the case of France and although American aid was minimal in that conflict, historic ties with Mobutu maintained an equally pre-eminent position for Washington.

Thus, since the dominant state(s) of influence were the U.S., France and Belgium, all with coterminous interests (the protection of the economic security of Shaba and the maintenance of Mobutu); they found mutual support in their multi-lateral intervention. The internal dynamics of this variable served to increase the probability of successful U.S. intervention.

This dynamic is further buttressed in an examination of the role of regional states. In this case, the so called "moderate" African states shared several common policy concerns with respect to the Shaba conflict specifically and irredentist conflict in the region in general.\textsuperscript{125} These included three salient positions. First, they all shared a deep concern for the "lessons" of Angola and the precedent that massive Cuban/Soviet involvement would bring to other conflicts in

\textsuperscript{124}See Young and Turner 85: 394 for an analysis of the differing patterns of influence foreign states had with the Mobutu regime and the consistently "high intimacy" pattern enjoyed by the United States.

\textsuperscript{125}As was discussed above, these moderate African states include the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, Senegal, Central African Republic(CAR), Chad, Morocco, Egypt, Togo, and on certain issues Kenya, Liberia, Botswana and Somalia(only after the failed Ogaden War and Barre's realignment). The are all relatively pro-western in their orientation to regional and international issues and many are dependent upon western military and economic aid, particularly the Francophone states.
the region. Second, they shared an affinity with Mobutu in terms of political, international and regional policy views. Finally, many of these states were in close military alliance with France, some even possessing French troops available for duty should they be needed.126

This core block of moderate African states, militarily and economically allied with France, committed to thwarting "Cuban-Soviet adventurism," and clearly anti-irredentist in their policy acted to enhance French and by definition U.S. and Belgian intervention. Thus, although regional states were not cohesive on a policy toward the conflict, a significant block did agree on interventionary support for one faction-Mobutu. As a consequence, western intervention was enhanced considerably. This accentuates the internal dimensions of this variable as it served one superpower's interests over another.

The local context of the Shaba II conflict illustrates the nuances of local/regional conditions and how these may impact superpower intervention. As in the Angolan case, the general pattern of the local context was susceptible (+) to successful superpower intervention. However, the specific traits of each variable were aligned to serve one superpower and not the other. Unlike Angola, the roles in Shaba II were reversed.

126 These included 1,500 French troops in Senegal, 2,000 in Chad, 500 in the Ivory Coast and 500 in Gabon. Also, precedence for French intervention with African regional support was present in Shaba I(77) and Mauritania(77).
The Interaction of Local Context and Superpower Intervention

After firmly establishing the nature of the local context, it now is incumbent upon this study to merge that reality with the behavior of the superpowers. In this way, we can explore potential explanations for their success and failure.\textsuperscript{127}

At the local level, several factors coalesced to favor U.S. intervention and diminish the likelihood of any Soviet counter moves. First, the multi-lateral nature of the U.S. intervention and subsequent support that it had within the Francophone community did much to enhance U.S. success. The availability and willingness of French, Belgian and later African troops took the onus off American personnel and afforded the U.S. the advantage of having a HIGH \textit{2} intervention without American forces being at risk.

Had the Carter administration been alone in its support for Mobutu, it is doubtful that Washington could have applied the necessary force logistically or maintained a political consensus for intervention. This was especially true given their lukewarm response to Shaba I just one year earlier. Despite the coterminous events in the Ogaden and the concern it caused in Washington, public debate over whether Cuba had complicity in Shaba II illustrated the difficulty in selling to the Congress and the American people unilateral action in

\textsuperscript{127}A note here about success and failure. In the case of Shaba II, a U.S. success does not automatically mean a Soviet failure. Since the Soviets did not intervene in the conflict success or failure as measured in this framework can not be attributed to them. If one wishes to argue that certain positive or negative consequences arose out of Mobutu's and the U.S.'s success in Shaba II for the Soviet Union there is evidence to support this. Yet, without a tangible Soviet policy behavior, i.e. intervention, to explore and chart, success and failure as this study envisions it can not be concretely argued.
Zaire. Thus, without any clear Soviet/Cuban intervention, an argument of counter-intervention like that in Angola would have been hard to justify.

Second, the lack of a commitment to long-term fighting by Mbunda's forces made any pro-Mobutu intervention likely to succeed with minimal effort. The reasons for the FNLC's ineptitude in this area are open to conjecture but two plausible arguments exist. First and most obviously, the FNLC were poorly organized and equipped with limited military or political savvy. There is probably a degree of accuracy here given the evidence obtained by French and Belgian military officers on the scene. The sheer speed with which they dissolved into the bush when confronted with limited French and Belgian forces displays their lack of military capability. The second and equally plausible argument is that FNLC forces were forced out of Angola by the Neto government and thus were not prepared for a long, guerrilla struggle in the bush. This would explain the lack of Cuban, Soviet and Angolan support for the invasion and the subsequent disarmament of their forces once they returned to Angola.\textsuperscript{128} Whichever is true, countries supporting Mobutu (despite his inept army) had a far greater chance of success than those allied with the FNLC.

A third factor that helps explain the forceful response by the U.S. in the wake of a minimalist approach to Shaba I is the greater "globalist" environment prevalent in Washington. As alluded to earlier, American concern for increasing Soviet/Cuban penetration of African regions led the Carter Administration to a renewal of cold war

rhetoric and policy. The Angolan episode coupled with the events in the Ogaden in 1977-78 heightened conservative criticism of the Carter/Young African policy and created internal pressures for a more forceful, anti-communist stance in the continent. This movement led by Brzezinski found a test case in the Shaba II conflict.

Unlike Shaba I, immediate charges of Cuban/Soviet duplicity were made and threats against aspects of the Soviet-U.S. relationship were leveled (i.e. arms control). Also, human rights as a policy priority was sacrificed on the altar of anti-communist loyalty which Mobutu had shown for over a decade. All of this illustrated a new environment for U.S. policy with respect to Africa that informs our understanding of U.S. motivations in Shaba II. These shifts in outlook do not automatically spell success however. Yet, when combined with the reality of the local context they provide us with a comprehensive picture of why U.S. intervention was successful. The increasingly globalist administration in Washington found a locally advantageous way of demonstrating American backbone against Soviet "intervention" in Africa, even if it wasn't present in this specific conflict.

In the case of the Soviet Union and her Angolan and Cuban allies, much speculation has taken place regarding their complicity. Clearly, the above states all had varying levels of animosity toward the Mobutu regime and the significant western presence there. Angola and Zaire had been in de facto conflict since the signing of the Alvor agreement in January 1975. Both had indigenous forces at their disposal who could and did act to destabilize the others rule (Angola-FNLC, Zaire-FNLA, FLEC, UNITA). Yet, evidence linking these countries and the actual
decision to intervene in Shaba II does not exist. Angola, Cuba and tangentially the Soviet Union are responsible for arming and training the FNLC over a period of two years, yet the lack of support, materially and diplomatically that Mbunda's forces received from all three seems to indicate a serious lack of enthusiasm for their effort. Even administration charges against Cuban complicity could only substantiate Cuban training of FNLC forces. There were no links to the actual planning of the invasion.\textsuperscript{129}

The possible reasons for the Soviet decision not to intervene are numerous. First, it is possible that the Soviets were not politically predisposed toward the FNLC or that they simply failed to see any advantage in intervening. Historically, Soviet support for the FNLC had been minimal by most standards. During both Shaba I & II, Soviet propaganda took its shots against Mobutu and called for non-intervention but never did it endorse the FNLC action or its "political platform."\textsuperscript{130} The shadowy ideological nature of the FNLC made it unlikely that Moscow would invest political and material capital on a group incapable of mounting an effective military program.

Second, the Soviets may have simply been caught off guard by the action given the disaster of Shaba I and the estrangement between Luanda and Moscow since the aborted Alves coup of 1977. Castro himself

\textsuperscript{129}See \textit{N.Y.Times} May 31 and June 1, 1978 for reports of Cuban complicity and subsequent denials.

intimated in the Lane cable that Cuba found out about the invasion only three days prior to the event. It is possible that the Soviets were never informed. Also, relations were tense between Moscow and Luanda due to Soviet fence-sitting during the Alves coup crisis. Had Angola been aware of FNLC plans they might not have made them known to the Soviets. Nonetheless, a lack of foreknowledge by the Soviets is plausible given certain circumstances.

Third, the local variables explicated in this study may have played a key role. Soviet lack of public and private support for the FNLC might have reflected Moscow’s "correct read" of the local context. Central to this thesis is the legitimacy argument made with respect to the OAU. In mid-1978, the Soviets had achieved a political/military success in Angola and in the Horn. Both conflicts displayed the importance of regional support for local forces fighting for legitimacy; in Angola, it became an anti-South African intervention, in Ethiopia, it was an anti-irredentist intervention against Somalia. Both cases illustrate the centrality of the basic precepts of the OAU charter and the legitimacy accorded states that support those principles.

Conversely, Shaba II clearly would have placed the Soviets on the side of irredentism and against the OAU. Much of the political success they enjoyed in Angola and Ethiopia would have been sacrificed for a militarily weak, ideologically "impure" force fighting for succession. African states would have found it difficult to condone such intervention given their own positions and the overriding principles of the OAU charter. Soviet reasons for not intervening may have come
from a calculation of the potential for success based on their understanding of this crucial local reality.

CONCLUSION

This case builds upon our knowledge base from chapter four to further enhance the notion of local context and its role in superpower intervention. In Shaba II, the U.S. intervened at a HIGH 2 level and was successful by most measures while the Soviet Union sat on the sidelines. The local context variables in this case clearly show differences in configuration that while creating an overall environment for intervention, made U.S. action much more likely to succeed.

Central to this emerging pattern is the confluence of several variables (local factionalism, role of regional states, role of regional organizations) that combined to give one superpower (U.S.) greater legitimacy for their intervention within the African arena. Apparently, as factions align themselves within conflict situations certain groups obtain or lose legitimacy both within the local area and across the region. As the superpowers act to support one or another faction they too are susceptible to the labels attached to these factions and thus suffer or gain based on the position of their local ally. Shaba II illustrates this graphically.

Despite Mobutu's disaster in Angola and his relative unpopularity in the continent, his legitimate position as the leader of Zaire afforded him widespread African support against threats to balkanize his country. This grudgingly included receiving intervention from U.S. and West European allies as well as regional states. Conversely, the
irredentist aims of the FNLC politically crippled their effort prior to any military action. States that would openly support such action would fall prey to charges of anti-OAU behavior and be susceptible to counterdestabilization in the future.

In the case of Shaba II, U.S. intervention became de facto legitimate. When this element is combined with other local context variables already charted, the potential for a U.S. success becomes overwhelming. Further cases will flesh out this phenomenon and hopefully give us a better understanding of its parameters within Africa.
CHAPTER VI
THE OGADEN DESERT WAR (ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA)
1977-78

INTRODUCTION

The Ogaden Desert War of 1977-78 provides this study with a case of unilateral intervention by one superpower, the Soviet Union, and non-intervention by the other (U.S.). This configuration displays the reverse pattern found in the Shaba II conflict and thus adds to our general understanding of superpower intervention. Also, it is the first case of de facto inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. This adds a further dimension to our analysis of intervention and the impact of local context.

This case will follow the same framework as in Chapters 4 & 5. We will first briefly explore important elements of historical background. Second, the initiation point of the conflict will be identified followed by a detailed charting of the local context. This will be followed by an exploration of the case in prescribed intervals charting local context shifts and the patterns of superpower intervention. Finally, an examination of the outcome both from a short and long term perspective will be undertaken followed by an in depth analysis of the case.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The historical dynamics of this conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia reach far back into antiquity with traditional inter-ethnic animosities emerging between two modern "leftist" regimes. The myriad details of this history will not be explored here, however a brief synopsis of the reoccurring nature of conflict on the Horn is germane to our analysis.¹

The Ogaden region of the Horn of Africa is a sparsely populated desert area occupying the land mass between the ancient borders of the Ethiopian kingdom and the present Somali frontier. It is made up of three Ethiopian provinces; Hararghe, Bale and Sidamo along with portions of the Arussi district. This area is roughly 1/5 of the present Ethiopian state and its inhabitants are almost exclusively Somali. The Ogaden is largely rural with traditional Somali clan leaders ruling the countryside and Ethiopian government officials and the military controlling the "urban" centers.² These include the key strategic cities of Jijiga, Harar, Diredawa, and Goba. In addition,


²As in most cases of conflict in Africa, these "urban" areas do not refer to large concentrations of people but rather strategic localities within a particular territory. In this case, these cities (with the exception of Diredawa) resembled forts used by the government as centers for troops and commerce.
this region contains the only rail-line connecting the port of Djibouti with Addis Ababa.³

Inter-ethnic rivalry extends deep into the histories of both peoples. The modern genesis of this conflict is rooted in the annexation of the Ogaden by Emperor Menelik II in the late 19th century and the codification of that fact by successive Italian, British and American governments in support of Ethiopia's claims.⁴ In the 1940's after the defeat of Italy, Britain proposed a "Greater Somalia" containing the present day state of Somalia along with ethnic Somalis in Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and of course the Ogaden. Rejecting this plan outright, Emperor Haile Selassie began an open courtship with the U.S. hoping to offset British influence and give Ethiopia hegemony over the region. This tactic was successful and U.S. support for Ethiopian claims to Eritrea and the Ogaden stifled plans for a "Greater Somalia."⁵ This obviously did not appeal to the

³This rail-line transports approximately 60% of all Ethiopian imports and exports and with the increasing military activity of the Eritreans along the Red Sea, this route held great significance for the Ethiopian government. See N.Y.Times, July 19, 1977.


emerging Somali leadership and it became a nationalist rallying cry for successive Somali governments after 1960.6

Selassie's Ethiopia continued a close military and economic relationship with the West, particularly the U.S., accumulating $279 million in military aid between 1953-77, training over 3,500 Ethiopian military officers in the U.S. and acquiring a wealth of economic assistance.(Selassie 85: 170). In exchange, the U.S. built and manned the Kagnew communications facility in north central Ethiopia along with having privileged access to Ethiopian ports and air bases at Assab, Massawa and the Dahlak islands.7

In the face of a close Washington-Addis Ababa relationship and two failed wars against the Ethiopian military (1961 & 1964), Somalia explored extra-regional avenues of support, particularly the Soviet Union.8 In 1964-65, an arms package was negotiated with the Soviets

6This was personified in the phrase "Greater Somalia" and the five pointed star on the national flag denoting those areas making up "Greater Somalia"(Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden).

7The Kagnew facility was one of the key listening posts for the U.S. monitoring activities throughout the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, East and Central Africa. Its importance waned in the mid-70's however due to more advanced methods of monitoring activity and U.S. facilities in Iran and Diego Garcia.

8Ethiopia and Somalia engaged in border skirmishes and intense fighting during the years mentioned and in both cases the Ethiopians with superior numbers, training and weapons soundly defeated the small and weakly armed Somali forces. At some point in the mid-60's, the Somali regime surmised that the modernization and expansion of the military with outside assistance was the only way to compete with Ethiopia. It is clear in retrospect and to many observers at the time that military aid to Somalia meant increasing the potential for conflict with its neighbors. The intense nationalism binding the Somali people and government was the single issue that no leader could afford to show weakness or compromise. Thus, military hardware bound for Somalia from whatever source would undoubtedly be deployed toward
providing Mogadiscio with approximately $30 million in aid.® This agreement began a period (1964-1969) of modest expansion of Soviet-Somali ties until a 1969 military coup overthrew Prime Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and installed General Mohammed Siad Barre. From this point on, Somalia embraced the Soviet Union and "Scientific Socialism," beginning a set of modernization policies, creating a single political party (Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party-SSRP) and further expanding its armed forces.10

From 1970 to 1977 the Somali armed forces grew from 12,000 to 30,000, 1,000 Soviet advisors were dispatched, 2,400 Somali officers were trained in Moscow and an arms package was signed in 1972 providing between $300 million and $1 billion in aid.11 In addition, Somali granted the Soviets full basing rights at the port of Berbera and the satisfaction of those nationalist goals.


11See Ottaway 84: 173. Also, see Tom J. Farer, "Dilemmas on the Horn," Africa Report, March-April, 1977, pp. 2-6. The reason for the large discrepancy in estimates is that as with many countries (i.e. Angola, Mozambique), the Soviets have promised more aid than has been actually delivered. Researchers believe that the Soviets signed agreements for approximately $1 billion in hardware but delivered far less.

This development served to polarize the Horn into two distinct camps. Ethiopia, traditional and pro-western, supplied by the U.S. and allied with Kenya, and Somalia aided by the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany and South Yemen (PDRY) and increasingly "allied" with the Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{12}

The catalytic event of the pre-conflict period was the Ethiopian revolution of September 12, 1974. Following a year of military setbacks in Eritrea and increasing radicalization of the intelligentsia, a small body of officers frustrated with the imperial regime formed the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces (Dergue) and staged the overthrow of Selassie.\textsuperscript{13} The Dergue was composed of approximately 120 officers with General Aman Michael Andom as Chairman and Major Atnafu Abate and Major Mengistu Haile Mariam as Vice

\textsuperscript{12}The role of Kenya is interesting to note. Like the Israeli support for Ethiopia, Kenya has always viewed the Somalis as the prime threat due to Barre's territorial claims in the Northern Frontier District and thus, has always fostered good relations with Ethiopia despite the character of the regime. Consequently, today pro-west Kenya has an ally in pro-east Ethiopia due to their common enemy.

The dynamic of Somali-Arab ties is also interesting to trace. These Arab states began to take an active interest in Horn politics particularly after Somalia's shift to the Soviet Union. The Saudis in particular were fearful of the growing Soviet influence in the Horn and thus attempted to use Somalia's Islamic and Arab ties to pull Barre away out of the Soviet orbit. Thus, as Somalia grew closer to the Soviets from 1970-77, conservative Arabs increased contacts with Barre in order to thwart that exact development. This would become of vital importance in the developments of the Horn conflict and in Barre's calculations in the summer and fall of 1977.

\textsuperscript{13}Little is known about the internal development and workings of the Dergue. This internal revolt caught the west off guard especially its growing left wing nature. See Katsikas 84: 128-131.
Chairmen (Ibid., 84: 130). This coup was largely supported by the Ethiopian population and cautiously followed by separatist ethnic groups hoping for a more accommodating policy with respect to their concerns.  

The new regime vacillated in its policy stance and programs, advocating a more radical leftist approach yet charting few concrete policy options. Relations with the U.S. both military and economic were maintained while efforts to suppress Eritrean, Tigrean and Somali irredentist claims continued at an ineffectual level. Most of the Dergue's attention was directed at internal issues with the political jockeying for position among differing factions dominating the agenda.

The first point of contention within the Dergue appears to have been its policy toward Eritrea. Chairman Gen. Aman Andon, a native Eritrean, advocated a more conciliatory stance toward Eritrean secessionism. This was opposed by Vice Chairmen Mengistu and Atnafu and probably prompted the internal coup d'etat of November, 1974. In this revolt, Chairman Aman and 60 other officers were executed.

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14 The support that the Dergue enjoyed was largely out of frustration with the old regime and the desire for any form of change. As Dergue policy took shape over the corresponding two years, that support began to disintegrate under the weight of repression, violence and resettlement.

These groups were numerous on the Ethiopian political landscape. Most prominent were the Eritreans, represented by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigreans led by the Tigre Liberation Front (TLF) and Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Somalis of the Ogaden led by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and Abo Somali Liberation Front (ASLF).


Three leaders emerged from the purge as dominant; Lt. Gen. Banti, Mengistu and Atnafu.

The direction of the Dergue from this point on was increasingly leftist beginning with the declaration of Policy Guidelines on Ethiopian Socialism issued on December 20, 1974.\footnote{See Schwab 85: 24 and \textit{ACR}, Legum 74-75: B186-B187 for a synopsis of this statement.} In this policy statement, the Dergue exposed a socialist vision for Ethiopia proclaiming the elimination of feudalism in the countryside, the redistribution of land, the securing of labor union rights and the nationalization of key economic sectors; manufacturing, gas, electricity, communications and natural resources.\footnote{Ibid., 85: 24-25.} The central thrust of this rhetoric was clearly Marxist-Leninist. As Peter Schwab states in reference to this period:

December 1974 was thus a watershed period for Ethiopia. It marked the official introduction of socialist policies, and represented the beginning of the institutionalization of the revolution. Classical Marxist theory was circumvented and replaced by a policy more in line with Leninism. The military Dergue substituted itself for the vanguard party and began to push Ethiopia towards socialism within a Leninist framework.\footnote{Ibid., 86: 25.}

What is important for our analysis is that this move to the political left gained momentum within Ethiopia despite both right wing
and left-wing opposition. On the left, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) became the lightning rod for anti-government activity despite its pro-Marxist character. In a series of strikes, protests and assassinations the EPRP attacked Dergue policies even while the military moved increasingly toward a socialist orientation.\(^\text{18}\)

On the right wing, the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) led by Tigrean governor Ras Mengesha Seyyoum mobilized support among pro-western professionals and the intelligentsia as well as ethnic groups committed to a western style civilian regime. Their efforts were limited to action in the countryside as the real battle for power remained within the Dergue.

During the period 1975-1977, the Dergue continued its socialist thrust, reorganizing internal society and militarizing its ethnic policy. The results were modestly successful politically and disastrous with respect to irredentism. The Dergue was initially successful in achieving widespread support for its policies of modernization, redistribution and self-governing at local levels.\(^\text{19}\)

Despite the increasing levels of repression, thousands of years of monarchical feudalism created fertile ground for social transformation.

\(^{18}\)This was due largely to the EPRP belief that the military was basically a fascist entity and that true internal revolution and class awakening could not be led by a military coup but rather by mass revolt. Their position although ideologically "pure" in the abstract proved fallacious due to the increasing Marxist character of the Dergue coupled with their monopolization of force and willingness to use it. See Schwab 85: 22-44, Lee 77: 7-11, Halliday & Molyneux, 81: 74-145 and David A. Korn, Ethiopia, the United States and the Soviet Union, Croon Helm, London, 1986, pp. 2-20.

\(^{19}\)See Halliday & Molyneux 81: 96-112 and Schwab 85: 87-92.
However, the continuing "imperialist" policies with respect to Eritrean, Tigrean and Somali irredentism increased the level of violence and taxed an already disorganized and demoralized military. The result was a weakening of the central government in Addis Ababa and the increasing momentum of ethnic separatist groups particularly the ELF/EPLF and WSLF.²⁰

In its relations with the U.S., the growing radicalism of the Dergue did not initially shift Washington policy. Throughout 1975-76, Washington continued arms sales amounting to $17 million and pledged an additional $200 million to modernize Ethiopia's forces over a three year period(Africa Report: March-April 77: 11).²¹ However, this was not enough to satisfy the growing needs of the Ethiopian military. In December, 1976 Mengistu traveled to Moscow and signed an arms agreement with the USSR calling for $100 million in weaponry.²²

²⁰This period saw renewed activity by all groups with the Eritreans scoring some amazing successes. The Eritreans had been fighting Ethiopian rule for over 20 years with their attacks largely confined to hit and run. However, with the decaying Ethiopian military, the EPLF in particular was able to mount large scale military operations against major urban centers and control virtually all of Eritrea. For an interesting discussion of the Eritrean movements and their effectiveness, see Gerard Chailand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," in Foreign Policy, Spring, 1978, pp. 126-129; Halliday and Molyneux 81: 182-192 and A.C.R., Legum, 76-77: B189-B194, B196-B201.

²¹It has been speculated that Kissinger expressed grave doubts about the nature of the new Ethiopian regime to Mengistu and others and warned against further leftist swings even while U.S. aid continued to flow.

addition, Addis Ababa sought military aid from Turkey, Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam and Libya.  

Once the Carter administration took over in 1977, relations deteriorated rapidly. The new Carter human rights policy came down hard on the Dergue and the widening separatist war against Addis Ababa did nothing to dissuade Washington. On February 3, 1977, the final major internal coup took place ousting both President Banti and Vice Chairman Atnafu (the former being killed) and leaving Mengistu in a preeminent position. With this coup d'etat and apparent desire of Mengistu to embrace totally the Soviet model, Carter announced on February 25 that Ethiopia along with Uruguay and Argentina would be singled out for human rights abuses and military aid would be reduced accordingly (N.Y. Times, February 26, 1977).

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23 See Keller 85: 183-185. He points out that the arms deal with Libya included provisions for the cessation of Libyan backing of the Eritrean rebels.

This brings up an important point. Up until the 1974 revolution, the Eritreans rebels were largely supplied by the Eastern bloc, particularly the Soviet Union and Cuba. Once the balance of forces shifted and the Dergue sought aid from the Soviets, support for Eritrea and Tigre dried up except for their Arab benefactors, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Iraq. It is possible that the Dergue originally sought Soviet bloc aid as a strategic move to eliminate important external support for the Eritreans and thus weaken the rebel position. This is also substantiated by the Dergue's continued effort to maintain its relationship with Washington right to the last even while it sought Soviet aid. If the Dergue's move to Moscow was purely ideological then maintaining its ties to Washington was superfluous, unless undercutting Eritrea was the reason?.

24 N.Y. Times, February 4 & 12, 1977 and Korn 86: 25. Apparently, Mengistu was losing power to Banti and Atnafu and called an emergency meeting of the Dergue. At that meeting, Banti and several of his associates on the Dergue were killed and Mengistu emerged victorious. He later became Head of State, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Defense and Security Council and Commander of the Armed Forces.
It is at this point (March-July 1977) that events began to accelerate toward conflict. After a decade of Soviet military buildup and three years of Ethiopian internal strife, the Barre regime decided to increase pressure on Mengistu and press its demands for the Ogaden. The WSLF with Somali aid attacked border towns along the Ogaden frontier and Ethiopian troops retreated into garrisons along a defensive line from Jijiga in the north east to Goba in the south central Ogaden. It is important to note that these attacks were skirmishes without direct Somali military involvement and thus do not denote the beginning of the conflict.

The Soviets apparently sensed the increasing boldness of Somali policy and made a concerted diplomatic effort to head off Ethiopian-Somali conflict. In March, Fidel Castro and Nickolai Podgorny made extensive trips throughout Southern and East Africa, with Castro holding a secret conference in Aden, PDRY with Mengistu and Barre. At this conference, Castro proposed an "Anti-Imperialist Federation" between Ethiopia, Somalia, the PDRY, an autonomous Ogaden and autonomous Eritrea. However, Barre refused to discuss the issue until the Ogaden was granted independence first. Podgorny later

25 See ACR, Legum 77-78: B373-B376.


28 This conference was a bold Soviet/Cuban effort at conciliation with Somalia as the terms presented would indicate. Actually, the proposal was more detrimental to the Ethiopians than Somalis given the
engaged in diplomatic talks with both Barre and Mengistu but he too was rebuffed.29

Once these efforts were exhausted, Ethiopian-Soviet ties accelerated into a positive relationship. Coincidentally, Somalia upped its support for the WSLF with the U.S. and conservative Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan) communicating their desire to fill the increasing gulf in the Somali-Soviet relations.30

On April 19, Washington announced it was cutting the staff of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in half. The Ethiopians reciprocated on April 24, ordering the American base at Kagnew closed and the entire MAAG staff expelled (N.Y.Times, April 24, 1977). This was followed by series of actions and reactions through May resulting in a significant reduction in diplomatic staffs and the virtual severing of relations. This was all carried out while Mengistu openly courted Moscow and traveled there on May 6, to sign a series of agreements for expanded aid.31

proposed relinquishing of Eritrea and the Ogaden. Perhaps this "Brest-Litovsk" strategy may have worked had Mengistu been more confidant of Soviet assurances and Barre less confidant of military success. See Legum & Lee, 79: 142-145.


31 For a discussion of this meeting see N.Y.Times, May 7, 1977 and Washington Post, March 5, 1978. This aid agreement included approximately $500 in million assistance. Also, on or about May 7, Cuban advisors and technicians began to arrive in Ethiopia training military and civilian personnel. Although, speculation is that they had been there since February. See N.Y.Times, May 26, 1977.
Throughout the two months preceding the outbreak of conflict, the U.S. and her Arab allies openly stated that they were willing to support Somalia, providing "defensive" weapons and other aid packages.\textsuperscript{32} This apparently weighed heavily on Somalia's decision-making since their involvement in the Ogaden appeared to escalate from this point. The Soviet Union however continued to attempt to maintain its position in Somalia with unscheduled visits and promises of continued aid.\textsuperscript{33}

In the month (June-July) preceding the conflict, the situation in Ethiopia both politically and militarily turned against Mengistu. The EPRP was successful in launching assassination squads against Dergue members and supporters wreaking havoc within the capital while ELF/EPLF

\textsuperscript{32}See Katsikas 82: 152-156 and Selassie 85: 172-173.

\textsuperscript{33}This is evidenced by Moscow's refusal to condemn or mention WSLF actions in the Ogaden while severely criticizing outside interference by Sudan and others in the Eritrean conflict. See \textit{N.Y.\textbf{Times}}, May 5, 1977.

There have been two schools of thought on which state (Somalia or the Soviet Union) precipitated the break in relations. One contention is that Somalia, emboldened by the deteriorating Ethiopian internal situation and the promises of aid from the west adopted a belligerent attitude almost daring the Soviets to choose between the two. The other view states that the Soviets by their eagerness to supply Ethiopia with arms and willingness to dispatch Cuban advisors and the like forced Barre's hand both privately and publicly with their support for Ethiopia. For examples of each of these views, see Richard B. Remnek, "Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa: The Decision to Intervene." in Robert H. Donaldson ed., \textit{The Soviet Union in the Third World Successes and Failures}, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1981, pp. 132-141 and Colin Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa." in Stephen S. Kaplan, ed., \textit{Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument}, The Brookings Institute, Washington, 1981, pp. 615-619.
forces scored successes throughout Eritrea. Also, right wing groups like the EDU were successful in soliciting outside support (Sudan) and mounted attacks against government forces in Gondar. By mid-July and the initiation of the conflict, it appeared that the Dergue would be reduced to a garrison state occupying only Addis Ababa and the surrounding highlands.

Several trends can be distilled out of this synopsis that will inform our understanding of the conflict that followed. First, the Ethiopian internal situation, the revolution, radicalization of the Dergue and subsequent disorganization of the military are crucial in understanding the boldness of the WSLF and Barre’s regime. As the internal rivalry within the Dergue became increasingly violent (particularly after November 1974), Somalia began to see a window of opportunity in pressing its demands on the Ogaden. WSLF activity increased greatly in 1975 and Somalia showed increasing intransigence toward all mediation efforts (Soviet/Cuban & OAU). Apparently, they felt that they were in the most advantageous position and saw no need for compromise.

Second, the migration of the Ethiopian regime into the Soviet camp was not inevitable. Despite the radicalization of the Dergue and the

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36 Speculation about this is present throughout the literature. It is the consensus of scholars that Barre saw the 1977 period as the most advantageous time to settle the Ogaden issue militarily since Addis Ababa was in such a weakened political position. For discussions of this, see Legum & Lee 79: 68-95 and Korn 86: 34-44.
emergence of Mengistu, Ethiopia was still heavily dependent on the U.S. for material aid both economic and military. It was largely the Carter administration's new perspective that hastened the deterioration of relations in early 1976 and accelerated the pro-Soviet trend. This is clearly evidenced in the stunning Ethiopian criticism of the Soviets in September, 1977 and initiation to the U.S. to return with military and economic aid (David 79: 79).

Third, even at the height of Somalia's close relationship with the Soviet Union, pro-western states were courting Barre and providing promises of aid if he distanced himself from Moscow. This played a

37 For an excellent discussion of this development through U.S. foreign policy eyes, see David 79: 72-79, Keller 85: 184-190 and Korn 86: 23-85.

38 This does not mean to place the entire blame for Ethiopian-U.S. estrangement on the Carter administration. Clearly, the Ethiopian internal situation did much to create an environment of distrust and caution. However, despite Ethiopian efforts at procuring aid from Moscow, a strong case can be made that limited levels of U.S. aid in the face of a worsening battlefield situation prompted the turn to Moscow. Evidence for this view is provided in the comparative military aid data between Somalia and Ethiopia for the 1970-1977 period. For an analysis of this aspect see Henze (83), Keller 85: 189 and Clapham, 81: 210.

vital role in Barre's decision to break with the Soviet Union completely in November 1977. 40

Finally, the Soviet Union fresh from their success in Angola appeared willing to gamble on the increasingly leftist rhetoric coming out of Addis Ababa despite the worsening military/political situation and tenuous hold of the Dergue. Mengistu was the driving force for increased Soviet-Ethiopian ties but his political position was fragile and as several assassination attempts testify; he could easily have been removed from the scene. This makes Soviet policy in pursuing contacts even more dangerous and risky. Yet, once the U.S.-Ethiopia rift materialized, Moscow moved swiftly and with elan. 41 Overall, the events leading up to the Ogaden conflict provide a rich set of trends that help to understand the events that followed.

THE OGADEN DESERT WAR: THE INITIATION OF CONFLICT

Identifying the initiation of conflict for the Ogaden case is more problematic than in other cases in this study. Irredentist violence and hit and run attacks between the WSLF and the Ethiopian military had been occurring on and off since 1975. Somali government complicity

40 An example of this was the intense courting of Barre in the preceding two months prior to the initiation of conflict. During the month of June, the Carter administration publicly and privately gave assurances to Barre that the U.S. was willing to sell "defensive" weapons to Somalia as well as agree to support Somali backing of the WSLF. Also, in July during a Barre visit to Saudi Arabia, assurances were given on aid and support with Soviet expulsion as a necessary precondition. For some excellent discussions of this see Katsikas 82: 149-155 and Legum 77-78: B382-B384.

41 This is evidenced in the immediate agreements on arms and aid and the coordination with Cuba on the dispatch of advisors and technicians.
during this period was suspected but never concretely proven given the remoteness of the region and ability of Somali nationals to blend into WSLF ranks.

We can however, identify a point when the WSLF with direct Somali participation, began a coordinated attack against Ethiopian positions in the Ogaden with the specific goal of capturing strategic cities in the region as a prelude to annexation. It is this point that the conflict enters stage eight status, signaling the beginning of a direct Ethiopian-Somali military confrontation.

This date is on or about July 15, 1977. It is at this point that the WSLF with Somali military participation began a conventional military offensive against Ethiopian positions in the Eastern and Southern Ogaden. The main targets were the rail-line connecting

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It is important to point out that in reference to the WSLF, their independence from the Somali government was and is a point of conjecture. While operating as a separate political entity, the WSLF leadership clearly coordinated its actions, policies and tactics with the Somali high command. To argue that they were completely independent from Somali would be fallacious. Yet, the Ethiopian position that they were a paper creation of the Somali regime is equally misleading. WSLF soldiers represented Somali clans within the Ogaden region with a tradition of opposition to Ethiopia in agreement with, yet separate from clans occupying Somalia proper. They are treated as a separate political entity in this study with the implicit realization that their policies and actions are coterminous with the interests of the Mogadiscio regime.

Reports from Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia place the date anywhere between June 16 and July 23. Western reports indicate that the major offensive began on or about the date listed.

This offensive was launched from WSLF positions inside the Ogaden that had been captured or abandoned in the preceding two years. Apparently, Somali forces that participated entered these areas and linked up with WSLF forces. See N.Y. Times, July 19 & 22, 1977, Christopher Clapham, "The Soviet Experiences in the Horn of Africa," in Feuchtwanger & Nailor, The Soviet Union and the Third World, St. Martins Press, New York, 1981, pp. 213-214 and A.C.R., Legum 77-78:
Djibouti and Addis Ababa intersecting in Diredawa along with the cities of Jijiga and Harar. From mid-July on, the irredentist violence that had plagued the Horn for decades took on the dimensions of a full-scale inter-state conflict.

From this point, we must now chart the local context and explore the development of the conflict through to its conclusion. The time frame involved is approximately July 15, 1977 to March 9, 1978. This allows us to examine the conflict in four, 2-month periods (July-September/ September-November/ November-January/ January-March).

THE LOCAL CONTEXT

The variables that make up local context have been illustrated in the previous two chapters and require no further elaboration here. For reference, they are outlined in Appendix A.

1. The Local Military Balance

A. Is the military balance tenuous and subject to dramatic changes with relatively small increments of aid, or is it stalemates and relatively stable?

At the initiation of conflict, the military balance was highly fluid due to certain prevalent conditions. First, the Ethiopian military although potentially formidable was in disarray. Three years

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Under stable political conditions for both regimes (1960-1974), Ethiopia possessed a vast superiority in resources, manpower and defensible terrain giving them a sizeable advantage. This fact made for an asymmetrical and static balance of military force. The conditions described below display a shift from this situation to a more tenuous balance present at the time of the Ogaden conflict.
of purges, battlefield defeats and internal politicization had left it weak and disorganized. The leadership was fractionalized and had been steadily stripped of experienced senior commanders. The military had further "suffered" under inadequate and diminishing supplies from its principle benefactor, the U.S.\(^6\) The unprecedented gains in 1975-76 by the Eritreans and Tigreans in the north and Somalis in south attested to the reduced capacity of the Ethiopian armed forces.\(^7\)

Second and concurrently, the WSLF and the Somali military had been the recipients of a massive (by African standards) Soviet military buildup. In eight years, the Somali army had more than doubled in size, it had acquired sophisticated fighter aircraft and artillery and it possessed an excellent knowledge of the Ogaden terrain.\(^8\) These factors served to accentuate Ethiopian weaknesses and create a battlefield situation more amenable to Somali goals, at least in the short term.

As the two states approached rough parity, the potential for Somali advances increased, however, the window of opportunity for success was finite. Ethiopia's inherent advantages alluded to above created a limited time frame for Somali opportunity. Theoretically,


\(^{47}\)Most analysts agree that the Eritrean struggle took on a new dimension after the Dergue took power when the EPLF and ELF both made substantial gains in heretofore untouched areas, the urban centers of the province. To a lesser extent the same can be said for the Tigreans and Somalis. See Farer 77: 2-6, ACR, 76-77, Legum: B186-B201 and Korn 86: 10-21.

once Ethiopia could rectify its internal situation and gain sufficient material support, its natural military dominance would take hold. Thus, Somali/WSLF strategy centered on a quick knock-out blow before that eventual resurgence.49

Consequently, an infusion of weapons and assistance to either side could significantly change the course of the conflict. This was witnessed in the initial swiftness of the Somali advance and equally rapid retreat once Soviet and Cuban resupply was underway. The level of aid needed to change this situation was greater than in either the Angolan or Shaba case, but nonetheless, the battlefield was fluid and subject to quick and decisive changes.

B. Does one side or the other appear capable or close to military victory or is a protracted war of attrition the expected result?

The battlefield realities of the Horn from 1960-1976 consisted of sporadic WSLF guerrilla warfare, Ethiopian reprisals, seasonal retreats and limited engagements. This pattern suggests that the prospects of military victory for either side seemed remote. This is also true in the case of Eritrea. However, once the Somali military leadership committed itself to the conflict and began to wage a conventional war against strategically designated areas, the nature of the conflict changed dramatically.50

49 This strategic perspective on the part of Barre and his advisors is discussed in a number of analyses of the Ogaden conflict. Two of the best discussions are Colin Legum and Bill Lee, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa, International Dimensions of the Somalia-Ethiopian Conflict," in ACR, Legum 77-78: A36-A40 and David, 79: 72-80.

50 This clearly reinforces this study's claim regarding the transformation of the conflict from Stage 7 to Stage 8 status. Factional skirmishes and limited engagements designed to thwart one
As discussed above, military victory from the Somali perspective became the only option and it was one that suffered under increasing time constraints. For the Ethiopians, the loss of the Ogaden would have insured the balkanization of the country and most probably regime collapse. Consequently, a protracted struggle was unacceptable to the Dergue. This then provided both sides with incentives to press their respective advantages and force a unilateral and asymmetrical outcome to the conflict.

C. Does the terrain lend itself to decisive and rapid shifts in the battle or is it more suited to a long guerrilla type struggle?

Again the same dynamic exists. While the WSLF was content to harass Ethiopian forces and wage a limited guerrilla struggle, the terrain served this tactic. However, once the decision was made to militarily seize the Ogaden, the battle centered on control of three-four key urban areas; Jijiga, Harar, Diredawa and Goba. Consequently, those elements of the terrain: remoteness, a dearth of adequate transportation routes, an indigenous population supportive of the guerrillas and areas for guerrilla bases secure from attack were neutralized by the goals and tactics of the Somali military. The battle developed into a conventional one for strategic areas, easily
This provided a terrain conducive to decisive and rapid shifts in fortunes.

D. Is the base of support for the respective groups ethnically or territorially based/are the respective positions of the factions historically rooted or more fluid and easily changeable?

As we have already substantiated, the political base for both "factions" (the Somalis and the Ethiopian government) was ethnically, politically and historically deeply rooted. The main point of contention was territorial and not political in the strict sense. The depth of feeling in both camps for their own position made their demands not easily reconcilable.

For the Somalis, the regaining of the Ogaden was a national priority. In fact, loyalty and legitimacy in the military government was measured in the nationalist zeal one possessed for the goal of

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These areas are mentioned in the historical background section of the case. They include a few relatively sparsely populated urban centers strategic in their salience to both the Ethiopian regime in Addis Ababa and the Somalis in establishing territorial legitimacy for in the Ogaden.

This brings up an important point regarding the salience of terrain in third world conflicts. Often, western studies of limited conflicts emphasize the critical nature of terrain for forces fighting superior numbers and equipment. Analyses regarding the Vietnam, Afghan and Polisario wars have focused on the indigenous populations' use and knowledge of terrain as central to an understanding of their success. However, terrain alone does not explain this result. As the Ethiopian, Shaba and Angola campaigns illustrate, terrain can be altered, enhanced or neutralized by the tactics of the respective forces operating within it. As the WSLF and Somalia military changed their strategy to a direct conventional attack on Ethiopian positions in certain urban areas, the focus and nature of the conflict fundamentally changed. Aspects of terrain that would be an asset to a guerrilla force now became a liability to an invading army. Consequently, terrain as an operating factor is fluid.
recovering the "stolen" lands.\(^2\) A negotiated settlement that did not amount to a capitulation to Somali demands was unacceptable.\(^3\) This strengthened the policy aims of the government and decreased the possibility for compromise.

In the case of the Ethiopian Dergue, an equally vehement and militant policy stance in favor of Ethiopian sovereignty dominated. The initial purges of September-November 1974 centered on nationalist policy with Eritrea and hard-liners or "imperialists" won out.\(^4\) Therefore, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement between the two appeared remote.

The local military balance variable displays some similar characteristics to other formations in previous cases. The balance itself was fluid and subject to dramatic change. The military confrontation centered on specific targets as definitive points for victory and as such diminished the likelihood of a protracted guerrilla war. Also, it was unlikely that the goals of both regimes with such strong ethnic-nationalist bases of support would be negotiated away at the bargaining table without settlement on the battle field. Consequently, we can say that the local military balance was conducive (+) to successful superpower intervention.


\(^3\)This is evidenced by repeated efforts at mediation by the Soviets, Cubans and OAU along with requests by western supporters that Barre drop his demands. All were rebuffed by Mogadischio.

2. Local Factionalism

This variable attempts to tap the degree of polarization in the conflict among the various factions and how that impacts superpower opportunities.

A. Are divisions between groups historically deep and ethnically based?

Obviously, the answer to this is obviously yes. As we have discussed, Somali-Ethiopian rivalry reaches deep into ancient history beginning with the first arrival of ethnic Somalis from the Arabian peninsula. With Somali political independence in 1960, this animosity gained renewed vigor and found political and military expression in the increasing rivalry between divergent regimes.

B. Are those divisions ideologically based?

This indicator is interesting to probe and somewhat misleading. On the surface, both the Ethiopian Dergue and the Somali military professed an adherence to "scientific socialism," Marxist-Leninist principles and an overall plan for socialist development.

In Somalia's case, Barre had followed a quasi-socialist path, yet had deviated in many important respects. First, the political party (SSRP) formed to act as the agent of revolution was little more than a front for military domination.\textsuperscript{55} Second, standard policies associated with "true" Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements like societal transformation in areas like religion, land distribution and the like were not followed. Traditional Somali clans under strong Arab economic influence still retained dominant control within Somalia.

In the case of Ethiopia, despite significant obstacles created by entrenched interests, the Dergue demonstrated a greater willingness to follow a more "pure" Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Mengistu instituted reforms in agriculture that shook the foundations of traditional Ethiopian society and broke practices over 1000 years old.\textsuperscript{56} Although, a vanguard party was not created by the time of the Ogaden war events suggested that the Ethiopian Dergue was indeed bent on revolutionary change and not simply minor reforms. Castro on several occasions praised Ethiopian efforts at socialism when he implicitly alluded to the distinctions between Somalia and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{57}

Therefore, although the ideological differences appear nonexistent on the surface, closer examination indicates a strong dichotomy of viewpoint between the Barre and Mengistu regimes.

C. Are the respective groups fractionalized or cohesive in leadership and policy?

In the case of Somalia and the WSLF no significant divisions are apparent. Both the Somali military under Barre and the WSLF under Secretary General Abdullahi Hassan Mahmoud were united in the policy of "reunification" of the Ogaden with Somalia. There is also no evidence of a conflict over strategy or tactics.

In the Ethiopian case, the situation is quite different. While factionalism had been diminished through the purges leading up to February, 1977, militant left and right wing elements still exerted

\textsuperscript{56}For a discussion of Ethiopian policy and its effects on the peasantry, see Halliday & Molyneux 81: 99-118, 156-169, and Schwab 85: 24-38, 73-82.

\textsuperscript{57}See Legum & Lee 79: 142-145 for a review of these statements.
pressures on the Dergue both from within and outside the government. The EPRP and MEISON operated from the left to de-stabilize Dergue policies and attack its leadership. Evidence suggests that these groups had allies within the Ethiopian military if not within the Dergue itself. On the right the EDU acted against Dergue policies but received little internal military support. Both were representative of the political factions fighting within Ethiopia for control over the direction of the revolution. All of this "internal" factionalism obviously did not include the ethnically-centered threats to the regime (Eritrea, tigre, Oromo and of course Somali).

The fractionalized nature of the Ethiopian polity made access for a number of outside actors increasingly possible. This is evidenced in Sudanese support for the EDU and early Yemeni support for the EPRP.

Overall, local factionalism was conducive (+) to superpower intervention. Somali-Ethiopian enmity was deep and substantial while divisions within Ethiopia and the continuing ideological fluidity of the Dergue opened opportunities for traditional enemies—the Soviet Union, Cuban, the PDRY to exert influence.

3. The Role of the State of Influence

This variable attempts to tap the role that the "traditionally"...
dominant state or states played in the conflict. In the case of Ethiopia-Somalia, the traditional colonial powers (Britain and to a lesser extent Italy) had little or no role by the time of the conflict. Therefore, other states with dominant influence must be identified. Coincidentally, these are the respective superpowers. In the case of Ethiopia—the U.S. and Somalia—the U.S.S.R.

It should be noted that during the period 1974-1977, these alignments become increasingly fluid and tenuous. By July, 1977 and the initiation of conflict, the U.S. lost much of its influence in Ethiopia while the U.S.S.R. occupied a relatively strong position vis-a-vis both regimes. This requires us to examine both U.S. relations with Ethiopia and Soviet relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia.

A. Does the former colonial power or dominant state have a strong involvement in the state or a high stake in the outcome of the conflict?

Long standing American influence in Ethiopia has already been established. Since the post-war era, the Selassie regime had adopted a pro-western stance on regional and international issues and provided the U.S. with military bases in exchange for economic and military aid. This influence also placed successive U.S. administrations in Selassie's corner with respect to "internal" conflicts over Eritrea (1958) and the Ogaden (1960, 1964). However, with the coup of 1974 and subsequent revolution to follow, the U.S. position became more problematic and less reliable.

Again, this variable is unique to the African landscape and attempts to examine the colonial impact on Africa of dominant states and cultures, i.e. Britain, France and Portugal or states of influence that emerged in the post-colonial era.
In the first six months of 1977, U.S. influence in Ethiopia declined precipitously while Washington's "stakes" in the region remained high. From January-April 1977, the Carter administration suffered set-backs in Addis Ababa partially as a result of indigenous events outside its control and in part due to its strong anti-Mengistu posture.

The new administration in Washington made the Dergue a model of its human rights policy, cutting off aid at a time Ethiopia felt the most threatened from both within and without. This further exacerbated the deterioration of relations and initiated a cycle of charges, counter-charges, expulsions and rebuttals that served to eradicate any real leverage the U.S. had in Ethiopia. This was codified by the expulsion of American officials in April and the major arms agreement signed between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union in early May.61

With the loss of a position of influence in Ethiopia, the U.S. explored contacts with Somalia but despite calls for improved relations, military aid and pledges of assistance, no corresponding gain of influence was achieved in Mogadiscio to offset the loss in Addis Ababa.62 Thus, by July, 1977, the U.S. had substantial interest in Horn events and an ongoing dialogue with Somalia but little in the way of direct influence with either state.

The case of the Soviet Union is quite unlike that of the U.S. As already discussed, Moscow had extensive ties to the Somali regime of Siad Barre. Soviet military and technical assistance even predates

61 N.Y. Times, April 24, 25, May 7 & 8 and discussion pp. 272-273.
Barre's assumption of power. During the 1969-1977 period, the Soviet Union poured weaponry and personnel into Somalia making it one of the most effective fighting forces in Africa. In addition, Barre espoused Marxism-Leninism and although recalcitrant on adopting the Soviet model in total, internally and internationally projected itself as one of the Soviet Union's closet allies. In exchange, Moscow received basing rights at the key port of Berbera as well as access for refueling and other military activities.

This influence remained stable through 1976 but showed signs of cracking in the six months leading up to the Ogaden conflict (Jan.-July 1977). Despite the presence of 5-6,000 Soviet and East bloc advisors, Somalia stepped up aid to the WSLF while the Soviets increased ties to Ethiopia. Repeated Soviet-Cuban efforts at restraining Barre's actions in the Ogaden went unheeded. Also, Mengistu's trips to Moscow in

63 See the discussion of Soviet aid to Somalia, its origins and rational in the historical background section pp. 3-5.

64 As alluded to in the historical background section of this study, the Soviet Union acted as the sole supplier of a massive military buildup by African standards. Somalia went from an ill-equipped, small (less than 8,000) and unorganized internal "police force" to a modernized, well trained fighting force of more than 30,000 men in less than 10 years. By African standards, their military was in the upper echelon of fighting forces and this is evidenced in their performance in the Ogaden war. See Legum & Lee 79: 75-77, 87 for an inventory of this buildup.

65 Barre adopted much of the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric but little revolutionary substance. Whatever differences the Barre regime had in terms of internal Marxist-Leninist development with Moscow, it made up for with international support for Soviet policy positions.

66 I refer the reader to the discussion of Castro and Podgorny's trips to the region in February-March 1977 designed to stave off conflict. In each case, proposals for settling Ethiopian-Somali differences were apparently rebuffed by Barre.

I say apparently because our only evidence that it was Barre that
December and April resulting in increased arms packages served to strain relations from the Somali perspective. However, even by the beginning of conflict in July, Soviet influence in Somalia remained in tact. Soviet personnel appeared deeply entrenched, Berbera remained a Soviet port and Somalia was undeniably reliant on Soviet aid for any short-term military action (at least 1 year).

In the case of Soviet influence in Ethiopia, the central dynamic of Horn politics comes into play. From September 1974 and the first internal purge within the Dergue, Ethiopia was moving toward a more leftist, pro-Soviet posture. The culmination of this trend came in Mengistu's assumption of full power in February 1977. With this development and the subsequent cuts in American aid, the Soviets gained influence with the regime almost geometrically. In less than six months, three aid agreements were signed, Soviet and Cuban technicians scuttled proposals for peace is from the Cubans and Soviets themselves. However, when we logically examine the Castro proposal for example it seems more loosely pro-Somali than pro-Ethiopian. Limited autonomy for both Eritrea and the Ogaden were certainly not part of Mengistu's internal policy and any sort of detachment of these regions from Addis Ababa would increase the possibilities of subversion, realignment and possible annexation. In the long term this would serve Somali policy. It is possible that at the least both sides were cool to the Castro plan and that all the blame can be attributed to Barre.

As most military/political analysts are aware, once a state becomes reliant on another for its military hardware, training and tactics, switching to another patron is problematic. Military weapons must be changed, new training must take place and often entire strategies are overhauled. Whatever enmity existed between Somalia and the U.S.S.R. over the Ogaden issue, Barre could not lightly cast out the Soviets without severe consequences for his military objectives in the conflict. Thus, relations continued well into the actual conflict after the Soviets had shown their preference for Ethiopia.
were dispatched, communist party relations were charted and Mengistu made three trips to Moscow and one to Havana.  

All of this served to give the Soviets a position of influence in two states at the outbreak of conflict and obviously a high stake in the outcome.

B. Does the state favor one group over the other in the conflict?

Clearly, the U.S. by July 1977 was against the Ethiopian regime in policy and ideology. However, despite contacts and hints of support for Barre, they never embraced the Somali cause in the Ogaden and maintained a non-interventionary posture throughout most of the conflict.

As early as April, 1977, reports were circulating that the U.S. would support any action against the Ethiopian regime carried out by Somali forces. Pledges of aid were publicly and privately voiced, yet always with a caveat regarding actual Somali military participation. The Carter administration, conscious of African regional (OAU) policy with respect to the inviolability of international borders distanced itself from the Somali cause as the conflict mounted throughout July, August & September. By the outbreak of conflict and beyond, the U.S. assumed a neutral posture,

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See citations in notes # 22, 33 & 35.

See LeoGrande 80: 37 and Katsikas 82: 154-155 for unconfirmed reports on this. Both discuss Somali charges of this "go-ahead" from the west which was subsequently denied by the U.S. and other states.

Some good analyses of this dynamic and how it affected U.S. policy on the Horn can be found in Keller 85: 186-188, David 79: 76-85 and Lewis 85: 108-112.
condemning any Somali action against OAU policy while castigating Ethiopia for embracing Cuban and Soviet personnel and aid.

In the case of the Soviet Union, again the issue is more problematic. Given the unique position of influence enjoyed by Moscow in both states (From March-September 1977), favoritism is more difficult to gauge. Clearly, during the early part of the year, Soviet officials believed that some kind of modus vivendi could be reached, accommodating both Barre and Mengistu while enhancing Soviet influence throughout the Horn. The repeated personnel appeals made by Castro and Soviet leaders alluded to above testify to this desire.

The reality of Somali aims and increasing Ethiopian "radicalism" seems to have forced the Soviet hand in choosing sides and in this respect, the favorite was clearly Ethiopia. By June, Soviet military aid arrived in amounts exceeding $500 million along with 50-100 Cuban advisors who trained the Ethiopians in their new weaponry. Also, Soviet deliveries to Somalia were held up and joint Somali

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71 This may seem foolish in retrospect given the animosities between the parties. However, it is in principle similar to the position of the U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. Successive administrations since Nixon have attempted to gain favor with moderate and conservative Arab states as well as Israel in order to broker peace and close out Soviet influence. Soviet policy in the Horn resembles this same approach at least during the first 6-9 months of 1977.

72 In this context "radicalization" refers to an increasing pro-Soviet tone in the Dergue on international and domestic policy that was impossible for Moscow to ignore and difficult to resist. Ethiopia appeared to represent one of the few instances of indigenous military revolt in the Third World taking on an apparently Marxist-Leninist character. At least ideologically, the Soviet Union would have been hard pressed to reject such an opportunity.

military and Soviet exercises were cancelled or postponed (Ibid., July 19, 1977).

C. Is (Are) the state(s) capable of affecting the outcome of the conflict or has it abdicated any role?

In the case of both states, the answer to this question is yes. The U.S. with regional allies (Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia) committed to Somalia had the logistical and military capability to intervene with either material or manpower. The role that the U.S. government choose for itself was one of limited support for Somalia's defense but no direct involvement in the Ogaden War. This "abdication" of role left a vacuum in Somali military support after the Soviet presence was removed.

For the Brezhnev regime, logistical and military capability along with regional allies (PDRY, Libya and Cuba) were present to effect the outcome. It is in the area of desired role where Moscow differed from Washington. The Soviets from the moment that Mengistu expressed interest in improved relations pursued the "Ethiopian option" as a positive opportunity for influence in the region even at the expense of its position in Somalia. As conflict in the Ogaden was initiated, Soviet policy clearly supported Addis Ababa along OAU guidelines and within prescribed limits.\textsuperscript{74}

Overall, the "state of influence" variable displays a great deal of fluidity that would normally make a dominant role for any state

\textsuperscript{74} These limits include the holding back of aid and material to the Somalis once it became clear that they were involved directly in the Ogaden and the limiting of Soviet support for Ethiopia until it became apparent that Barre had "crossed the Rubicon" and expelled Soviet advisors and influence from his country.
problematic. However, with both superpowers occupying this role at varying times for both Ethiopia and Somalia, the configuration changes dramatically. Additionally, during the crucial period (2-3 months) leading up to the conflict, the U.S.S.R. assumed the dominant state of influence position for both states. This displays a strong role of the state of influence with a considerable advantage afforded to the Soviet Union. This makes the configuration for this variable (−) within the context of this framework.

Normally, a strong role in this variable would translate into reduced (−) opportunity for the superpowers. However, as seen in Shaba II, the unique presence of the Soviet Union as the state of influence for both states makes this reduced opportunity applicable only to the U.S. This will examined in greater depth in the analysis of the case.

The Role of Regional States

This variable attempts to tap the relative salience of regional states to the conflict. There are several regional states in the Ogaden case that require examination. They include those states territorially coterminous to the Horn: Sudan, Kenya and the PDRY, and a group of Middle Eastern states more territorially removed from the conflict: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya and secondarily Iraq, Iran and Syria.

A. Is there a history of intervention in the states affairs?

The historical precedent for intervention in both Ethiopia and Somalia is present for many of the states identified. First, both the Sudan and Kenya had definite interests in Horn events with Sudanese
concerns focusing on northern Ethiopia and Kenyan policy focusing on the South-western Ogaden and Somali designs on that territory.

Since 1970, the Sudanese government of Jaffar Numeri had vacillated on its policy toward Ethiopia. Originally, Numeri was aligned with radical Arab policy a la Nassar and consequently acted to de-stabilize the Selassie regime by funneling aid to Eritrean nationalist groups. This policy was reciprocated by the Emperor with Ethiopia aiding a southern Sudanese Christian movement bent on separatism from the authority of Khartoum and the establishment of an "African/Sudanese" state. This mutual destabilization was momentarily halted after Numeri negotiated a settlement with Ethiopia known as the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. This agreement coincided with a more pro-western posture on the part of Numeri. However, with the ascension of the Dergue in 1974 and its corresponding mistrust of "pro-western" Sudan, destabilization from both sides resumed at increasing levels.


The halting of aid for the Eritreans came after an aborted communist coup in 1971 against Numeri. Soon after, Numeri began a rapprochement with the west which precipitated a warming of relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa.

For Kenya, the dynamic of intervention took on a different form. Kenya identified the principle threat to its security as Somali aims on the Northern Frontier District. Rivalry over this area of northern Kenya has deep historical roots, in fact, it was partially out of Kenyan protest that Britain scrapped its plan for a "Greater Somalia" after the War.\(^7^8\) Thus, Kenya had always been leery of Barre's designs aligning itself with both the Selassie and Mengistu regimes despite their ideological differences.

The second group of states with historical intervention patterns are the conservative Arab bloc of states—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and to a lesser extent Iran. Historical intervention for these states was more recent and less direct but still germane to the conflict.\(^7^9\) Beginning in 1973-74, these states had lobbied Barre to bring his policies and regime into the "Arab fold." This was solidified in 1974 with Somalia's entrance into the Arab league, the first non-Arab state to achieve this honor. Their rationale appears to be two fold. First, these states saw Somalia as a potential ally in the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly from a strategic perspective. Second, Saudi Arabia, the prime architect of this policy, had become increasingly concerned about growing Soviet influence to the south in both the PDRY and Somalia. Both states represented the most entrenched Soviet allies

\(^7^8\)See discussion in the historical background section, pp. 1-3.

\(^7^9\)By "conservative Arab" the author refers to those states whose primary aims in the region included the goal of thwarting Soviet influence and thus aligned themselves with U.S. policy. Iran, although not an Arab state, engaged in a similar policy with these other actors while under the Shah's rule. Obviously, not too long after the Ogaden conflict, Iran ceased to be an actor in the region.
and along with growing cooperation with Libya represented a potential base of anti-Saudi activity.

In the case of the PDRY and Libya, both states had been involved in the affairs of Ethiopia and Sudan. Libya along with other Arab states had worked in support of Eritrean interests against the Selassie regime. Given Libya's political views and Gaddafi's growing radicalization, the ascension of Mengistu neutralized Libyan support for Eritrea replacing it with aid to Addis Ababa. The same pattern holds for the Marxist government of the PDRY. By the outbreak of conflict in July 1977, the government in Aden was closely allied with the Ethiopian Dergue.80

B. Do the regional states have the capacity to intervene militarily?

For the first group of states who were territorially coterminous to the Horn conflict, the answer is yes. The Sudan, Kenya and to a lesser extent PDRY were theoretically able to apply force in the region, however their ability to influence the conflict with that force was limited. Both states possessed relatively small militaries that did not have the capability of rapid movement and deployment.

Other states like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran had the capacity for intervention but not at decisive levels. Only through a coordinated effort with extra-regional, i.e. superpower assistance could these states have mounted a decisive and effective intervention. As a consequence their activity was relegated to aiding factions within the conflict itself.

80 See ACR, Legum 76-77: B207-B212.
C. Are there political, ethnic or ideological affinities for one faction over another on the part of the regional states?

Clearly, definite proclivities on the part of all the regional states existed. As suggested, both Kenya and the Sudan had strong interests in both pro-Ethiopian and pro-Somalian positions respectively. In the case of Kenya, this had little to do with ideology or ethnicity and more to do with the perception of threat Somalia posed to its territory.

In the case of the Sudan, ethnicity was a key factor. The Arab character of the Numeri regime and its traditional support for Eritrean forces naturally pitted it against the Christian Ethiopians. As discussed above, there were periodic lulls in this mutual destabilization, yet these lulls do not correspond to any ideological shifts on the part of either state. The dominant pattern over the 1958-1977 period was mutual support for respective irredentist movements. Hence, ethnicity played the central role while ideology was secondary.

As other regional states more physically removed from the conflict are considered, the importance of ethnicity and politics is accentuated. For the Arab states mentioned, ethnicity and politics were crucial. Somalia's Islamic roots are obviously one factor in Arab support for Barre, but also political considerations were vital to

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As alluded to above, the early Numeri regime (1969-1971) was clearly Nassarist in internal and foreign policy. This obviously promoted anti-western sentiments in general. As Numeri shifted to a more pro-western position, after the failed leftist coup in 1971 and certainly after the Soviet expulsion from Egypt, his policy with respect to Ethiopia did not change. Ideological differences may have provided the rhetoric but clearly, ethnicity and traditional rivalry was at the heart of both states policies.
Saudi Arabia (the driving force behind Arab support for Somalia). The Horn's strategic location, often emphasized by western analysts as crucial to the U.S. and Europe is pivotal in Saudi calculations. The region, including the PDRY, is part of a vital Saudi flank in economic and political terms. With both sides of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea under Soviet influence, Saudi Arabia would be out flanked politically, economically and militarily.

Only in the case of the PDRY does ideology appear central. The regime in Aden through successive leaders maintained its essential Marxist philosophy and close alliance with the Soviet Union and Cuba. It is in fact the only true Marxist regime in all the Arab world. As such its ideological views were more compatible with Mengistu's than with any other leadership in the region including Somalia.

Thus, there are pronounced affinities on the part of regional states polarizing forces along ethnic, political and ideological lines.

D. Do the regional states have strong ties to a supra-regional actor(s) who has a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and consequently would be willing to aid an intervention?

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82 For discussions of the importance of the Gulf area to Saudi and western security and the important role that this "southern flank" plays see Mamoun Kurdi "Perspectives on Arabian Gulf Security," in Kauppi & Nation The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980's, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1984.

Clearly, the answer is yes. In all cases, the aforementioned states had strong ties with extra-regional states (superpowers) whose interests in the Horn were strong.

For Kenya, the Sudan and the PDRY, varying degrees of support from extra-regional actors existed. The Kenyatta government in Nairobi had perhaps the deepest and most pronounced ties with western states. Trade, foreign policy and domestic economic policy placed Kenya in that group of African states most closely allied with U.S. interests. However, the antagonistic position of Kenya vis-a-vis Somalia neutralized their potential as a conduit for U.S./pro-Somali intervention. This certainly acted to inhibit U.S. policy options in the region.84

In the case of the Sudanese government, Numeri had been moving steadily toward a pro-western stance on regional and international issues since 1971. By 1977, Sudan had become a close ally of Cairo in both the areas of Egyptian-Israeli policy and "conservative-radical" Arab rivalry. As events in the Horn accelerated and Ethiopia sought East bloc aid, Sudanese policy mirrored Egyptian, Saudi and of course U.S. actions in support of Somalia. Since the Sudan provided the best base territorially for superpower intervention this alignment was

84 The importance of Kenya in U.S., British and western calculations in general in both the Horn and all of Africa cannot be overlooked. Kenya was an influential state in African affairs as well as staunch and apparently secure western ally. Kenyan enmity for Somalia and her policies could not be ignored for geo-strategic considerations in Horn. The importance of Kenya is emphasized in the analysis of American calculations in Legum 81: 608-610 and Legum & Lee 79: 4-5.
significant. However, this base was never fully exploited by pro-
Somali regional or supra-regional allies.

Conversely, the PDRY provided the Soviets with its closest ally in
the region along with a steady presence of Soviet, Cuban and East
German personnel that could be and were deployed in the conflict.85
The PDRY a source of strong ideological and territorial support for the
above mentioned supra-regional states.86

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya and other Arab states, strong ties
did exist for either the U.S. or the Soviet Union that could be used in
an intervention policy. Each of these states however, did not possess
sufficient forces to greatly effect the military conflict without
outside assistance.

In terms of the overall role of regional states, several factors
existed to enhance superpower intervention. First, regional state
alignments crossed over two distinct areas, Africa and the Middle East
creating divergent political considerations. This enhanced the
complexity of the inter-ethnic and inter-political differences that
existed along Christian-Moslem, Arab-non-Arab, radical-conservative,
and Marxist-non-Marxist lines.

85See Bissell 78: 87-106, Hosmer & Wolfe 83: 71-75 & 97-106, Page
85: 50-55, John F. Cooper & Daniel S. Papp, Communist Nations' Military
Joyce Starr eds., Challenges in the Middle East: Regional Dynamics and

86Despite an unstable and violent political history, the PDRY has
always shown a strong Marxist-pro-Soviet inclination. This has been a
great source of concern for conservative gulf states, particularly
Oman, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia who have all been targets of South
Yemeni destabilization. See note #83 and Page 85: 75-78 & 125-149.
Second, those states territorially germane to the conflict (Sudan, Kenya, PDRY and Saudi Arabia) had ardent, partisan positions vis-a-vis the combatants and were not likely to unite on a policy of non-interference. The same can be said for those influential regional states beyond the four mentioned.

Third, each of these states had pronounced ties to supra-regional states including the superpowers which increased access capability for both. In the case of the Soviet Union, this was enhanced to a much greater degree due to their expanded presence in both the PDRY and Ethiopia in the 6-8 months leading up to the conflict. The U.S. after its falling out in Addis Ababa had to be content with limited access through regional states more removed from the conflict.

In sum, the role of regional states acted to increase (+) the opportunity for successful superpower intervention.

5. The Role of Regional Organizations

This variable examines the role of regional organizations in the conflict. In this case the relevant organization is the OAU.

A. Are the regional organizations cohesive on a policy toward the conflict?

The OAU's policy with respect to the Ogaden conflict was clear and not subject to negotiation. WSLF actions inside the Ogaden were "acceptable" as long as they were not supported by outside powers with the goal of altering the status of Ethiopian sovereignty. Once

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87 The term "acceptable" does not mean that the OAU sanctions such internal rebellion. Rather, unstated OAU policy has been to ignore or down play internal irredentism provided it is not externally inspired and supported. In this way, it does not become directly involved in
Somalia or any state intervened in support of the WSLF, any counter-action or support that the Dergue could solicit would be legitimate and without criticism. In this sense OAU policy was cohesive and inviolable.

B. Are they able to enforce that policy with member states?

Enforcement was obviously more problematic. The OAU immediately acted to bring the two parties together under its auspices to negotiate a settlement to the conflict. OAU Chairman, President Omar Bongo of Gabon called Ethiopian and Somali representatives to Libreville for talks, however, his efforts along with mediation efforts by the Nigerians broke down quickly when Barre insisted that a delegation representing the WSLF be seated as well.

OAU impotence in forging a negotiated settlement should not be confused with an inability to directly effect the conflict however. The Somali invasion of the Ogaden represented a violation of the sacred principle of non-interference for the purpose of redrawing Africa's boundaries, a principle that was also of great importance in the Angolan and Shaba cases (See Chapters 4 & 5 for discussions of this phenomenon). Consequently, a policy of condemnation of Somalia and the myriad of internal conflicts in African states that are largely indigenous problems created by the omnipresent phenomenon of ethnic politics.


See N.Y. Times, August 5, 6 & 9, 1977 and Legum & Lee 79: A37-A38.
diplomatic support for the Ethiopian position was forged in near unanimous fashion.\textsuperscript{90}

This served to legitimize the Soviet-Cuban role and de-legitimize any overt or covert support for the Somalis. The Carter administration and conservative Arab states were thus faced with the unpopular prospect of violating OAU and African "principles of engagement" if they chose to intervene on Somalia's behalf. The political damage of such a policy to American interests in states like Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and across Africa would be significant. In addition, the adverse impact on the ongoing Rhodesian-Zimbabwe issue cannot be discounted. As Zdenek Cervanka stated:

\begin{quote}

The Somali-inspired 'liberation war' in the Ogaden found no support whatsoever in Black Africa...The clear implication of this OAU attitude is that any foreign help extended to those fighting secession and especially to those fighting the white minority regimes in Southern Africa is not regarded as interference (Cervenka 77-78: A63).
\end{quote}

The role of the regional organization (OAU) was not strong in terms of thwarting external intervention or halting the conflict. However, it was instrumental in muting potential U.S. intervention once the extent of Somali involvement became clear and well publicized.\textsuperscript{91}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{91}] It is important to point out that the impact of OAU policy in terms of influence cannot be absolutely measured. Depending upon the prior perceptions of the OAU, analysts do not agree on how influential the OAU position on the Ogaden actually was. It is argued in this study that considerations of legitimacy are very important in understanding both decisions regarding possible intervention and whether it is successful or not. The primary evidence to support this
Thus, that role can be classified as strong in the Ogaden conflict. This means that the adverse impact (−) on superpower intervention was great.

This further illuminates the nuances of this variable as it is illustrated within the cases. As seen in Shaba II and in the latter, critical stages of the Angolan conflict, regional organization role can weigh heavily on regional and international support and subsequent superpower behavior. Arguably, once the U.S. found itself with a choice of either intervening on the side of an African state (Somalia) fully castigated and ostracized for its actions or remain aloof within the current conditions of the conflict, it choose the latter. The saliency of the inviolability of borders in the African context and the ability of the OAU to mobilize support for this position cannot be overlooked.

6. The Level of Tolerance for Superpower Intervention

A. Is there historical precedence for superpower intervention?

During the previous conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1960's superpower intervention was negligible. To the extent that each was a participant in terms of supply and training for their "clients," intervention was present, however, the nature of these conflicts made any pronounced superpower involvement unnecessary. What existed prior to the Ogaden conflict were two somewhat extended patron-client

arises out of public and private statements by the participants outlining the importance OAU policy and its political impact throughout Africa.
relationships that furnished each superpower with a physical and political presence in the states in question. During 1977, these relationships began to shift rapidly with American influence diminishing and Soviet influence increasing.

B. Are there ideological affinities and ties between faction(s) in the conflict and the superpower?

In the Ethiopian case, this is certainly apparent. One cannot explain the sudden shift in alliances in the Horn and the precipitous growth of Soviet and Cuban influence in Addis Ababa without examining the ideological development of the Dergue from military reformers to a "Marxist-Leninist vanguard party." The depth of these ideological ties is illustrated in the extent to which the Soviets would sacrifice a long standing relationship with a self-professed socialist state like Somalia. This investment cultivated over a decade can not be easily dismissed when revolutionary forces apparently leftist in orientation emerge in Ethiopia. Apparently, the Soviet perception of ideological affinity with the Mengistu regime along with its strategic importance in the Horn outweighed the historical relationship with Barre.

In the case of the U.S., ideological ties in any strict interpretation are non-existent. By 1977, both Somalia and Ethiopia are hardly capitalist or democratic in outlook or policy and hence have no emotional ties to the U.S. The breadth of U.S. political ties to Somalia stemmed largely from a common enemy and a few shared friends.®

®These friends include the conservative Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sudan whose policies and motives were discussed in the examination of the role of regional states. The subsequent embracing of the west politically by Barre, that continues to varying degrees to today can not be termed an ideological shift but rather a political calculation born of strategic necessity.
These shared concerns provide the basis for diplomatic support but not military intervention.

C. Do the local factions seek superpower intervention actively or are there any agreements regarding intervention on the part of a superpower?

In this case as in several within Africa and the third world, the primary parties to the conflict actively sought intervention. First, the Ethiopian regime was in a precarious position vis-a-vis ethnic separatism both in the Ogaden, Eritrea and other portions of the state. Unprecedented military gains by Eritrean forces and WSLF guerrillas added to an already divided internal polity. Second, leftist and rightist attacks from the EPRP and EDU respectively added to the sense of urgency. Consequently, once Somali guerrillas and regulars made great advances in the Ogaden, the Dergue openly courted Soviet and other allied intervention.  

For Somalia, concern over Soviet aid to Ethiopia through the December 1976-June 1977 period persuaded Barre to openly inquire about western (primarily U.S.) military aid. Once the conflict began and his military bogged down Barre openly called for U.S. intervention citing massive Soviet/Cuban aid to Ethiopia and his own role in thwarting the "communist/colonialist" invasion. Clearly, the relative lack of historical precedence for intervention and the nebulous ideological ties, at least from the U.S. perspective were overshadowed

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93See N.Y. Times, August 12, 17 & 26.

by the blatant pandering for superpower assistance and intervention. The public nature of these calls shifted as the battlefield situation moved first against Ethiopia and later against Somalia. Overall, the ideological affinity between Addis Ababa and Moscow along with Ethiopia's more dire internal circumstances acted to enhance the level of tolerance for Soviet intervention. Thus, the level of tolerance was strong (+).

A representation of the local context is presented in Appendix I. This provides an overall "score" that tells us in general the susceptibility of the local conditions to successful superpower intervention.

This "+ measure" provides an overall estimation of the susceptibility of the local context to successful intervention. Yet, this is only part of the picture within this concept. Prior cases have informed this study that within the general mapping of local context certain factors usually act to enhance one superpower's action and inhibit another's. In the Angolan case, the role of regional states and organizations acted through the conflict to enhance the legitimacy of Soviet intervention and diminish U.S. intervention. In Shaba II, a combination of several variables coalesced to give greater potential for successful U.S. intervention and largely thwart any potential Soviet moves. The Ogaden Case follows this emerging pattern.

By July 1977, the role of the Soviet Union as the state of influence in both Ethiopia and Somalia provided them with unlimited regional potential to act. When this is factored in with Soviet preference for Ethiopia and a strong regional organization role against
Somali policy, Soviet intervention is markedly enhanced. Given the U.S. support for Somalia, the potential for successful U.S. intervention became diminished. The interplay of these variables will be explored in detail in the analysis to follow.

THE OGADEN DESERT WAR

The approximate period of the Ogaden conflict is July 15, 1977-March 9, 1978. This provides the opportunity to examine the conflict in four distinct periods. The first is July 15-September 15, 1977, as the Somalis scored several successes and placed the Ethiopians on the defensive. The second period (September 15-November 15, 1977) includes the Somali offensive on Harar along with the expulsion of Soviet forces from Somalia. The third period (November 15-January 15, 1978) is marked by the massive Soviet/Cuban airlift and final period (January 15-March 8, 1978) includes the deployment of Cuban troops and material, the Ethiopian counter-offensive and the final withdrawal of the Somalis.

July 15-September 15-1977

Sketchy and unconfirmed reports of Somali infiltration into the Ogaden had been present for about two months prior to the outbreak of conflict when on July 19, 1977 reports from Kenya confirmed direct attacks on Ethiopian forces along the Diredawa rail-line by WSLF forces (N.Y. Times July 19, 1977). Ethiopia charged Somali military complicity in the attack and the Barre regime denied any involvement.
At this time Ethiopian charges were impossible to independently verify. However, on the day that reports of widespread fighting began, the Soviets inexplicably initiated the removal of a significant portion of their 5,000 man advisory group from Somalia with no plans for replacement (Ibid., July 19, 1977). This move may have been coincidental or it may have been in anticipation of possible shifts in Soviet policy. In a similar situation, Soviet forces were removed en masse from Egypt just prior to the initiation of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. It is unlikely that such a movement would have taken place if Moscow did not anticipate some shift in policy as a result of the fighting.

On July 22, the Ethiopian government announced that they had captured officers of the Somali military deep inside the Ogaden outside of Harar (N.Y. Times, July 22, 1977). In addition, Addis Ababa charged American complicity by stating that U.S. made weapons were captured in the attacks. Somali and American officials denied the reports.

During these first 2-3 weeks, reports of external complicity, armed interventions and mutual successes flowed freely. Independent confirmation was difficult yet, one overriding aspect appeared clear. The nature of the Ogaden conflict undoubtedly shifted from a guerrilla war to a direct inter-state conflict between Ethiopia-Somalia. The scale of WSLF/Somali attacks, the weaponry used and the Ethiopian response are indicative of this escalation.

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During the next two-three weeks (July 21-August 10) reports circulated from both the Somali and Ethiopian sides of decisive victories, major gains of territory, equipment and personnel, and accusations of regional and superpower complicity.\textsuperscript{95} By early August, it was apparent that the evidence supported Somali claims of success.

On August 3, the WSLF announced that it captured the city of Dagahbur leaving just three cities (Harar, Jijiga and Diredawa) under Ethiopian control in the entire Ogaden (\textit{N.Y.Times}, August 3, 1977). Ethiopian recognition of the situation was witnessed in their public admittance of Somali control over most of the Ogaden and increasingly urgent calls for OAU mediation (\textit{Ibid.}, August 5 & 6).

At this time in the conflict, there is no evidence of American or Soviet intervention. U.S. officials called for a cessation of hostilities while publicly voicing interest in selling "defensive" weapons to Somalia.\textsuperscript{97} Also, during this period, Barre received repeated calls from Saudi Arabia to renounce his Soviet benefactors and embrace the west for aid and assistance, pledging $300 million as an inducement (\textit{Ibid.}, July 27, 1977). Despite the public discourse on potential western aid, no weapons were dispatched.


In the Soviet case, weapons shipments contracted for prior to the conflict arrived periodically up to the conflict, but only small shipments of material arrived during this initial two-three week period.  

By August 10, WSLF, Ethiopian, Somali and independent sources confirmed that the Somalis held approximately 90% of the Ogaden and were closing in on the cities of Diredawa, Jijiga and Harar (N.Y. Times, August 7, 9 & 10, 1977). Somalia also charged that "5-9,000 foreign troops" were on their way to Ethiopia to assist the government in the Ogaden (Ibid., August 10, 1977). The nationality of these troops was not identified and Addis Ababa denied that they existed.

This unsubstantiated claim again fueled speculation as to when the Soviets and Cubans did intervene. At the outset of the conflict Cuba had approximately 50-100 advisors in Ethiopia but no combat troops. The Soviets shipped limited military supplies in the first month (July 15-August 15) yet they had been contracted for prior to the conflict. Although it is impossible to determine the actual date, Soviet intervention does take place in the first month at the LOW 1 level. This entailed the supply of material and weapons to a faction (Ethiopia) involved in the conflict. Interestingly, this LOW 1 level of Soviet intervention is directed to both sides during this first month since Soviet arms shipments also are sent to Somalia. Given the growing tenuousness of the situation for Ethiopia and increasing boldness of Somali actions, this level of intervention seems shockingly limited. It is important to explore the possible reasons for this.

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Apparently, the scope of Somali attacks against Ethiopia caught the Soviets off guard. WSLF activity had been present for an extended period, however, many analysts did not think that the Somalis would violate OAU precepts and directly intervene to take the Ogaden, particularly since they were reliant on Soviet weapons and aid. Perhaps the Soviets shared this view. Also, increasing tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadisho throughout 1977 engendered direct mediation efforts by both the Soviets and Cubans. Although these were unsuccessful, discussions and meetings between the Soviets and allies and the Barre regime continued throughout this first month of the conflict. Thus, the prospects for settlement still remained. Soviet reluctance to directly castigate Somali policy until well into the conflict as well as their continued diplomatic efforts to mediate the dispute further indicated a belief that they could salvage influence in both states.

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99 Several analysts shared this view including Richard B. Remnek 80: 132-139. According to Remnek, the Soviets miscalculated Somali policy based largely on their perception that first, Somali reliance on Soviet aid would moderate their policy and second, Somali nationalism would not react violently to Soviet support for Ethiopia. In retrospect, both of these positions seem quite naive.

100 Mediation efforts by Soviet officials in visits to Somalia along with visits by the government of PDRY as late as August 30 indicate a belief that peace could be salvaged. See N.Y.Times, August 9 & 30, 1977, The Washington Post, September 27, 1977, Remnek 81: 136-139 and Legum & Lee 79: 5.

101 See N.Y.Times, July 30, 1977 for reports in the Soviet press displaying shock and cautioniness in taking any side in the conflict. Also, see N.Y.Times August 17, 18 & 19, 1977 and Washington Post, August 12, 1977. In these reports, the Soviets walked a fine line mildly blaming Somalia for the conflict in the Horn while continuing to ship light weaponry to Somalia along with signing an economic pact with the Barre regime.
This "fence-sitting" on the part of Moscow began to shift in late August and through September. Somali forces brought the key cities of Diredawa and Jijiga under attack while Ethiopia searched for outside aid. The Soviets in turn stepped up public attacks on the Somali action and voiced support for Ethiopia.\(^{102}\) This public posture still existed within an environment of material support for Somali, however, these ties were rapidly deteriorating.

On August 21, Somali stepped up public attacks on Soviet policy in the war apparently in response to anti-Somali Soviet pronouncements as well as Moscow's material support for Ethiopia.\(^{103}\) This deteriorating relationship was further exacerbated by Somali accusations of Soviet complicity in Ethiopia's policy in both Eritrea and the Ogaden. All of this took place within a worsening battle field situation for the Ethiopians on all fronts.

In a last attempt at reconciliation, Barre traveled to Moscow for direct talks with Soviet leaders in late August (\textit{N.Y. Times} August 30, 1977). The deepening rift between the two states was evidenced in that Brezhnev refused to meet with Barre and he was instead shuffled off to lower level officials.\(^{104}\) Nothing substantive came out of the talks and Barre returned to Somalia a day later with no change in policy.

This meeting seemed to accelerate the Soviet move toward Ethiopia and increase her intervention in the conflict. Two days later a major

\(^{102}\)\textit{N.Y. Times}, August 17 & 21, 1977. Also, see \textit{Pravda} July 30, 1977 and \textit{TASS} August 13, 1977 for examples of this more strident anti-Somali rhetoric.

\(^{103}\)See \textit{N.Y. Times}, August 21, 1977.

arms deal with Ethiopia was announced totaling in excess of $350 million (N.Y. Times, September 2, 1977). The weapons contracted for included 48 MiG 21's, 200 T-54 and T-55 Tanks and dozens of SAM-3 and SAM-7 missiles. In terms of Cuban intervention, beyond the 50-100 advisors, no increase in actual combat personnel appears during this initial period.

Overall, Soviet intervention remained at the LOW 1 level during these first two months. However, the increased Soviet aid to Ethiopia and diminished supplies to Somalia indicated a repositioning of the Soviets which readied them for an increase in intervention if events warranted. This took on greater saliency in mid September, when Mogadiscio announced a cessation of Soviet aid to Somalia (Ibid., September 9, 1977).

On September 15, at the end of the first period of the conflict, WSLF forces claimed over 90% of the Ogaden and were in the midst of a siege at Jijiga (Ibid., September 13, 1977). Somalia and Ethiopia had broken off diplomatic relations and a de facto state of war between the two existed. OAU mediation was unsuccessful due largely to Somali intransigence. Soviet intervention on the side of the Dergue increased coupled with a corresponding reduction in aid to Somalia. For their part, U.S. policy tacitly supported Somalia yet with no corresponding dispatch of aid (Ibid., September 2, 1977).¹⁰⁵

During this period, the U.S. reversed itself on military aid to Somalia based on evidence that the Barre regime was indeed involved in

¹⁰⁵ For discussions of the thinking behind this policy stance see David 79: 76-80 and Selassie 85: 172-174.
the fighting and that regional and international support for that position was unpopular. Since OAU mediation had been unsuccessful, an African consensus had formed to side with Ethiopia as the victim of separatist aggression. This obviously flew in the face of established principles of the OAU and any state supporting the redrawing of African boundaries would suffer great political disdain. The importance of this in U.S. calculations was not ignored as Legum & Lee point out:

Eager as the west might have been to counter Soviet influence in the Red Sea, it could not reconcile its wider interests with Somali irredentist ambitions: to endorse them would not only antagonize Kenya but also flout one of the fundamental OAU principles, thereby alienating African sensibilities. Even the West Germans, who owed Siad Barre a favor for his acquiescence to the 1977 commando hijack rescue raid at Mogadiscio, could not bring themselves to extend any meaningful aid to Somalia (ACR, Legum & Lee 77-78: A35/underline added).

September 15-November 15, 1977

In mid-September, the battlefield situation was perilous for the Ethiopians. The Somalia army of 20-25,000 along with 10,000 WSLF troops captured Jijiga and were poised to take Harar and Diredawa. Further complicating Mengistu's problems was the increasing


107 See N.Y. Times, September 18, 1977. Also, see "Rebels Threaten Ethiopia's Collapse," in Africa Report, November-December, 1977, pp. 23-24. As this article explains, if Harar and Diredawa fall to the Somalis, "the Ethiopia army would no longer have accessible front-line bases from which to launch an attempt to recapture the Ogaden."
effectiveness of the Eritreans in the north and growing internal revolt in the capital.\textsuperscript{108}

This grievous situation became even more intolerable in the face of seeming Soviet reluctance to intervene above the present level (LOW \textsuperscript{1}). In fact, Mengistu's concern over Soviet recalcitrance prompted him to publicly criticize Soviet "inaction" and call for renewed talks with Washington about the resumption of weapons shipments.\textsuperscript{109} This unprecedented move displayed first, the desperateness of the Ethiopia situation during this period and second, the limited Soviet intervention on behalf of Ethiopia well into the conflict (2-3 months).\textsuperscript{110} Most analysts agreed that the Soviets apparently still held out hope of reconciliation and continued influence in both Somali and Ethiopia and thus straddled the fence for an extended period.\textsuperscript{111}

This attempted rapprochement with the west was short-lived due to American policy of non-intervention in the conflict.\textsuperscript{112} In fact,


\textsuperscript{109}See N.Y.Times, September 16, 1977 and Washington Post, September 27, 1977. For a discussion of this interesting switch on the part of Mengistu, see David 79: 79.

\textsuperscript{110}The term "limited" refers not necessarily to Soviet perceptions of the scope of their aid but clearly Ethiopian evaluations.


\textsuperscript{112}See ACR, Legum 77-78: C88 for the text of the U.S. government statement on American policy in Horn conflict.

This move by Mengistu to openly court the U.S. may have been strategically designed to draw the Soviets out of their conservative posture and more openly side with Ethiopia. The talks held between Washington and Addis Ababa although substantive seemed abrupt and contrived given the almost immediate shift to a more pro-Soviet position by Mengistu only two days later.
proposals by pro-Somali states in the Middle East to funnel American arms to the Barre regime were rejected outright by Washington.\textsuperscript{113}

The importance of Carter's failure to heed Somali calls for intervention cannot be ignored. First, it is clear that political considerations regarding the unpopularity of the Somali position weighed heavily on policy-makers.\textsuperscript{114} This immediately calls into question the assumption that the superpowers do not consider the local context important in their calculations regarding intervention. Second, at a time of maximum Ethiopian vulnerability, the U.S. rejected arming Somalia and thwarted other motivated allies from supplying them as well. This indicates a commitment to the principles of the OAU charter beyond the globalistic considerations associated with the conflict. Finally, the decision to rebuke the Dergue in their efforts at reconciliation indicated a willingness to relinquish short-term interests in the Horn for long term political gain. The wisdom of this policy is still open to conjecture.\textsuperscript{115}

The events of late September and early October further heightened the sense of defeat in Ethiopia. Somalia, after capturing Jijiga, moved to control the Marda Pass leading to Harar and

\textsuperscript{113}See \textit{N.Y. Times}, September 16, 1977 and David 79: 79-81.

\textsuperscript{114}There appears to be a consensus on this among most analysts in the field. See Katsikas (82), Remnek (81), Legum (80) and Mayall (81).

\textsuperscript{115}Many analysts (David (79), Henze (83) and Katsikas (82)) argued that the Americans wasted a great opportunity in the Horn by following a non-interventionist path in the face of strong Soviet intervention. Others (Legum & Lee (79), Selassie (85) and Shaw & Ojo (82)) stated that the U.S. astutely read the contours of the conflict and followed the only course open to them—respect for OAU principles of non-interference, and thus gained in the long term.
Diredawa (N.Y. Times, September 19, 1977). This area is of extreme strategic importance for the remaining cities under Ethiopian control and indeed the entire Ogaden. The severity of the situation was personified in Ethiopian calls for a full mobilization up to the age of 60 and an all out peasant onslaught against the Somalis (Ibid., September 19, 20, 1977). Also, in an apparent shift from his earlier frustration, Mengistu openly praised Soviet support and intimated that a full cut-off of Soviet aid to Somalia was imminent (Ibid., September 19, 1977). The reasons for this rapid shift are unclear, however subsequent events indicate that Mengistu must have received assurances from Moscow of renewed Soviet intervention and support. Evidence of this is found in the arrival of MIG-21’s, T-55 tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers (APC’s) at the port of Assab on September 23 (Ibid., September 24, 1977).

Coupled with renewed Soviet vigor in their support of Ethiopia, all sides initiated increasingly strident rhetoric making the battle-liners and "alliances" more clearly pronounced. The WSLF Secretary General at a news conference in Mogadiscio announced that no cease fire would be acceptable to the Somalis until the Ogaden was conquered and annexed (Ibid., September 25, 1977). In addition, he included portions of Ethiopia heretofore not included within the Ogaden as territorial goals of the WSLF. These included areas as close as 75 miles to Addis Ababa. Apparently, the string of Somali victories intoxicated their leadership. For their part, the Soviets stepped up their criticism of Somalia with Brezhnev directly attacking Barre's actions in the Ogaden,
intimating that they were in direct violation of established OAU principles (Ibid., September 30, 1977).

During a three week period between September 20 and October 8, WSLF Somali forces had halted their assault in the Ogaden to regroup and resupply. The situation in Ethiopia still remained grave as reports circulated that adequate material and manpower for the defense of Harar and Diredawa were not available. This pause in the fighting was broken on or about October 10, when Somali forces began a two pronged push out of the Marda Pass toward Diredawa and Harar (N.Y. Times October 11, 1977). It is during this offensive that independent reports confirmed the presence of Cuba advisors and soldiers (20) at the front with Ethiopia forces. 116

Obviously, at some point during this critical juncture (October 10-November 1) as the Ethiopian position deteriorated and Somali forces continued their advance, Moscow made the decision to increase their intervention to a HIGH 3 status by introducing more weapons and Cuban troops. 117 Up until this point, Soviet intervention had been at roughly the LOW 1 level despite increasing amounts of aid. No direct role was evidenced and the 200 Cuban advisors were in place prior to the conflict's initiation. However, the effectiveness of Somali

116 Despite the fact that only a handful of Cuban advisors are confirmed in Ethiopia, their presence in the conflict as advisors and trainers indicates a level of intervention by the Soviets at the HIGH 3 stage. This includes the physical presence of superpower military personnel or proxies in the conflict in a training and advisory role. This fact coupled with increasing military aid arriving from both the Soviet Union and the PDRY indicate an escalation of Soviet intervention well beyond its original LOW 1 status.

117 The majority of Cuban forces (100) airlifted in during this period come from the PDRY.
strategy and precarious position of Mengistu must have forced Moscow's hand and pushed them even further into an alliance with Ethiopia. This pattern is evident with Cuba as well. On October 15, the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia-Col. Giorgis traveled to Cuba for talks on the conflict and the availability of Cuban aid. Although, no reports on the talks are available, Cuban involvement on the Ethiopian side increases after the visit.

In addition to Soviet/Cuban support, Ethiopia also found themselves the recipients of aid from the PDRY, Libya and Israel. As the only "true" Marxist state in the region and a close ally of the Soviets, the PDRY provided aid and personnel @3-500 soldiers to Ethiopia for service in the Ogaden. Libya for its part supplied Mengistu with @$425 million in economic and military aid during the 1976-1977 period consisting mostly of reduced rate oil supplies. Finally, the Israelis acted to supply the Ethiopians with spare parts and training from 1976 through the conflict(Legum 81: 619 & ACR, Legum 77-78: B227). Israeli support for Ethiopia had more to do with "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," axiom than any strong ties to the Dergue. This same pattern in Israeli policy emerged in their support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war.


119See Legum 81: 615, 617 & 621 and ACR, Legum 77-78: B251.

120This represented a major shift in Libyan policy since they were major suppliers to the Eritreans in the north and Somalis in the south during the early 70's. After Mengistu's assumption of power, Libya became one of the few Arab states to openly court the new regime. See Ibid., 81: 619 and ACR, Legum 77-78: B225-B227.
By November 1, a full scale Somali offensive was underway against Ethiopian positions in Harar and Diredawa. Reports indicated that Soviet equipment, including MiG’s, Tanks and rocket artillery were deployed in and around both cities under Cuban supervision (N.Y. Times, November 1, 1977). This further solidified the HIGH 3 status of Soviet intervention.

The first two weeks of November emerged as the crucial period in the conflict. The Somalis imitated an all out offensive against Harar with some 20,000 regular troops and 10,000 WSLF forces. Although with a clear superiority in material, the Somalis were hampered due to the "drying up" of spare parts from the Soviet cut off of aid (Lewis 85: 111). This severely handicapped Somali control of the air and proved decisive in the later stages. The Ethiopians defended with approximately 120,000 troops, most of which were poorly supplied recruits.

It is at this juncture that the Barre regime unilaterally abrogated their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union (N.Y. Times, November 14, 1977). They announced an expulsion of all Soviet personnel in seven days and prohibited Soviet use of the Somali naval facilities at Berbera and Kismyu. The expulsion was also extended to Cuban personnel and the diplomatic corps. Interestingly, at the point of the Soviet expulsion, there apparently was no corresponding supra-regional aid to supplant the loss of Soviet material in Somalia. Consequently, the potential reasons for Barre’s actions deserve explication.
The U.S. publicly had rejected intervention and acted to thwart allied (Egypt, Saudi Arabia & Iran) support for Somalia. In addition, other potential western donors were reluctant to aid Barre for reasons already discussed (see discussion pp. 52-53). Therefore why did Barre take this monumental step? Reports from the Somalis along with many analysts concur that the U.S. along with conservative Arab states in the Middle East misled Barre by pledging support for his actions, enticing him to renounce the Soviet Union. Yet, by November 13, it seemed clear that the U.S.-the only supplier capable of matching the loss of Soviet aid-was not going to send weapons to Somalia in any significant quantity. Consequently, the more plausible explanation for Barre's action appears to center on the Soviet Union.

Since December of 1977 the Soviets had moved steadily toward diplomatic support for the Ethiopian Dergue in all of its "internal" conflicts. From the outbreak of the conflict they had cautiously increased their aid to Mengistu while decreasing or halting new material to Somalia. Thus, the November 13 expulsion may simply have been Barre's formal recognition of objective reality—a Soviet alliance with Ethiopia in the Ogaden. Presumably, Barre held little hope for even limited Soviet support for his Ogaden policy and consequently gambled that by a public expulsion, he could mute western disdain for

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121 See Africa Report, November-December, 1977, Katsikas 82: 154-158, Selassie 85: 172-173, Legum & Lee 79: A37-A39, David 79: 76-80, Lewis 85: 109-113 and Legum 81: 617-620 for discussions of the calculations that led Barre to this decision. Most agree that Barre either was led to believe that the west would fill the military void left by the Soviets or he misread their signals on that aid. In either instance, the expulsion represented a major gamble given Somalia's military position and limited opportunity in terms of time.
the Ogaden campaign and achieve his knock out blow before Soviet supplies could save Ethiopia. He clearly failed on both calculations.

Whatever the rationale, this event codified the evolving realignment in the Horn and sealed the fate of Soviet policy with respect to Ethiopia. Almost to the day of this announcement, Soviet/Cuban material and personnel were abruptly dispatched to Ethiopia, quickly raising Soviet intervention into a **HIGH 2** status. Soviet weapons arrived at the port of Assab including emergency supplies of 48 MIG 21 and 12 MIG-23 fighters, 140 T-55 tanks and 12 M1 helicopters. Concurrently, State Department officials reported that Cuban personnel in Ethiopia were increased to @500 including combat personnel sent from Angola (N.Y.Times, November 15, 1977). The combat role for the Cubans was substantiated by the increasing use of T-55 Soviet tanks in the battle for Harar; a weapon that the Ethiopian army had not yet been trained to use.

Once this break was formalized, the Soviets initiated more strident rhetoric against Somalia. Verbal attacks against Barre proliferated in the Soviet press with the classification of Somalia as "reactionary" and "expansionist." In addition, the last remnant

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122 All of this represented advanced material that the Ethiopian military did not possess the training to master. This again begs the question of who operated the equipment as it was deployed—Cubans? Somali claims of Cuban intervention began almost at the onset of the conflict, yet no independent reports confirmed these charges. The exact introduction of Cuban troops in a battlefield situation is difficult to determine. However, by logical inference, we can surmise that Cuban forces were on the scene along with the increased Soviet aid due largely to the point made above: there were no indigenous military forces capable of operating the equipment being deployed except Cubans.

of a "moderate" position within the Dergue was eliminated as Lt. Col. Atnafu Abate was executed by Mengistu forces for "anti-revolutionary crimes" (Ibid., November 15, 1977).124

Even at the point of this formal realignment, Somalia remained in the dominant military position in the Ogaden in the face of increasing Ethiopian, Cuban and Soviet collusion. Yet, the "window of opportunity" for a Somali military victory was closing fast.125 Accordingly, the Somali's acted to capitalize on their advantage while they still possessed the capability.

November 15-January 15, 1978

Somalia initiated an all out assault for the city of Harar in late November with street fighting reported in the city itself (N.Y. Times, November 24, 1977). At this time, the Soviets began a major air and sea-lift to Ethiopia on an unprecedented scale in Soviet history. From November 2- January 30, the Soviets sent Ethiopia between $1-1.5 billion in military hardware along with 10,000-15,000 Cuban soldiers.126 The sheer amount of military equipment as compared to

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124 This move represents the complete solidification of Mengistu’s power and the elimination of any possibility for a balanced Ethiopian position vis-a-vis the west.

125 This seemed to be the prevailing opinion among western and Arab experts on the region. See N.Y. Times, November 24 & 26, 1977 and Africa Report November-December, 1977.

earlier supplies to Ethiopia and Somalia indicated the decisiveness of the move. The airlift included 550 T-54 & T-55 Tanks, 100/40 bl rocket launchers, 60 MIG-21 and 40 MIG-23 fighters and over 200,000 AK-47 rifles.\textsuperscript{127} Although, this material could not possibly be absorbed quickly by the Ethiopian army, it did provide sufficient reinforcements to hold the line against the Somalis at Harar until Cuban troops were deployed.

By mid December, fighting raged for control of Harar while the Soviets along with 1,000 Cuban troops were organizing the Ethiopians for a counter-offensive in the new year. The importance of this effort for the Soviets is illustrated by the presence of General V.I. Petrov, Deputy Commander and Chief of Soviet Ground Forces to oversee the battle.\textsuperscript{128} Weapons, personnel and battle-plans were absorbed by the Ethiopians throughout December and early January while door-to-door street fighting continued in Harar. Although the Somalis publicly claimed victory on several occasions, they could not fully control the city thus signaling the high water mark of their Ogaden campaign.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{footnotes}
\item The extent to which this caused concern and policy re-evaluation in Washington cannot be ignored. Brzezinski and Carter both argued that this event coupled with the Angolan and Shaba II episodes led directly to the breakdown of detente. Whether this view is accurate in the abstract is unclear. Yet, certainly the initiation of "linkage" as a foreign policy tool in U.S.-Soviet relations became a key point of contention in Washington after the Soviet airlift.

\item See Clapham 81: 213 for an inventory of these items.

\item According to reports, he arrives in early December, shortly after the Somali expulsion.

\end{footnotes}
January 15–March 8, 1978

The situation moved quickly and decisively against the Somalis in mid-January. The air-lift of forces into Ethiopia was nearly completed and sufficient material was present to launch a counter-offensive against Somali forces. The degree of coordination among Cuban-Soviet and Ethiopian personnel was unprecedented as all three leadership were involved in planning the attacks at the highest levels.\(^\text{130}\)

During this massive Soviet/Cuban buildup, the Carter Administration repeatedly issued warnings regarding Soviet intervention and the adverse consequences to U.S.-Soviet relations.\(^\text{131}\) However, this was the extent of American involvement at least until the latter stages of the conflict.\(^\text{132}\) In mid February, the U.S. privately gave

\(^{130}\) This was evidenced by the almost constant travels of Mengistu, Raul Castro and high ranking Soviet officials between Addis Ababa, Havana and Moscow. This was also witnessed in the presence of two high ranking Soviet Generals: Gen. Petrov mentioned above and also Gen. Barisov, former commander of the Soviet aid program to Somalia. In addition, Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov travels to Ethiopia in early January. See LeoGrande 80: 39-40 and Legum & Lee 79: 14-16.


\(^{132}\) Brzezinski claims in his memoirs that Sadat voiced a plan for the deployment of Egyptian troops in Somalia to thwart an Ethiopian/Cuban invasion and that Washington agreed in principle. Only after hesitation on Carter's part did Sadat subsequently decide not to follow through (See Brzezinski 83: 181). There is however, no evidence to substantiate this claim.

The one important element of American action in the Horn at this time is the public "threat" of retaliation against the Soviets should the Somali frontier be breached (See above notation). This could be loosely termed intervention at a **MODERATE 2** status; the threat of the use of force to effect the outcome of the conflict. However, since the threat was specifically aimed at the extension of the conflict into another "regional area" thus changing the nature of the present conflict, it is best left within the realm of U.S. policy and not intervention.
the nod for Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt to begin supplying Somali with some weapons, yet this aid had no effect on the outcome.\textsuperscript{133}

Washington's recalcitrance in aiding Somalia still revolved around the legitimacy gap regarding Somali involvement in the Ogaden. Although intervention in general was not welcomed in Africa without reservations, nonetheless, it was legitimate given the circumstances. Subsequent American statements mirrored Africa's general position on Soviet/Cuban intervention: do not overstay your invitation and do not violate the Somali frontier.\textsuperscript{134}

Throughout early February, Somalia maintained the siege of Harar but found its supplies and personnel virtually exhausted. The denial of American and western weapons shipments that would have had an effect on the conflict contributed to Mogadiscio's deteriorating situation. It at this late date, that Barre formally admitted that Somali forces were committed in the Ogaden to repel an "...invasion mounted by the allied Russian and Cuban forces."(\textit{ACR}, Legum 77-78: B377). The significance of this announcement was muted by the legitimacy already accorded Ethiopia against the de facto presence of Somali forces.

During the final month of the conflict Washington stepped up its attacks against Soviet/Cuban intervention by hinting that SALT II might


be jeopardized.\textsuperscript{135} Also, the U.S. warned that it would come to Somalia's aid if the frontier was breached. The Soviets for their part repeatedly assured Washington that it would not allow Ethiopian and Cuban forces to cross the border.\textsuperscript{136}

On or about February 10, 1978, the Ethiopians and Cubans began a major offensive under Soviet leadership which quickly relieved the Somali siege of Harar and began a decisive push across the Ogaden. On March 5, Jijiga fell and by March 10 Somalia announced the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden with Ethiopian and Cuban forces in hot pursuit.\textsuperscript{137}

\textbf{INTERVENTION OUTCOME: EVALUATION}

This study must now address the issue/question of outcome; was the intervention (in this case-Soviet) a success or failure? This is examined through the operationalization of outcome presented in chapter 3, pages 14-17 and Appendices II & III. The reader is referred to those sections for a review of the concept.

The time frame in this examination of outcome is for a period of one year after the termination of the conflict (March 1978-March 1979). A long-term evaluation of outcome will follow in a postscript.


\textsuperscript{137}\textit{N.Y.Times}, March 10, 1978 and ACM, Legum 77-78: B379.
The first element is the military position of the Ethiopian government at the termination of the conflict. By March-April, 1978, 16,000-20,000 Cuban soldiers were stationed on the front-lines in the Ogaden under direct Soviet command. The Dergue with this foreign force at their disposal along with $1-1.5 billion in arms and extensive Soviet/East Bloc training insured their military dominance vis-a-vis Somalia. This is witnessed by the speed of the collapse of Somali forces during the later stages of the conflict and the subsequent Somali refusal to re-enter the area. If we examine the extent of Somali losses, the scope of the military victory becomes clear:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Casualties:</th>
<th>8,000 (out of an armed force of 50,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft:</td>
<td>50% lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor:</td>
<td>35% lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees:</td>
<td>500,000 to Somalia from Ogaden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, dismay within the Somali military at the extent of the defeat prompted a coup attempt against Barre on April 9, 1978 that was brutally crushed.

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139 During the conflict, the Somali military gambled a substantial part of their armed forces built up over a decade on victory. In the course of this conflict, the Somalis suffered a substantial military defeat that would take them years to recover. Coupled with the shift in supply from the Soviets to the U.S. and West and the chances of renewed military activity in the region becomes even more bleak. Consequently, despite increased WSLF attacks and no doubt Somali aid, there is no evidence of Somali regulars entering the Ogaden after the conflict period ended.

140 *Africa Report*, March-April, 1978, p. 31. In this coup attempt, hundreds were executed included 80 junior and senior officers.
While the immediate Somali threat was neutralized, continued WSLF attacks, a deteriorating situation in Eritrea and the need for a substantial foreign presence put a damper on the Ethiopian victory. By early, 1979, the WSLF had resurrected itself as an effective guerrilla force and was tying down thousands of Ethiopian and Cuban troops. Yet, the primary objective of maintaining the region as a sovereign part of Ethiopia was satisfied.

The second factor is the territorial control of the Ethiopian government during the initial post-conflict period (March 1978-March 1979). By March 15, 1978, the Ethiopian government had reasserted its authority over all of the urban areas of the Ogaden previously lost to the Somalis. These included Harar, Jijiga, Degahabur, and Gobo along with a number of smaller towns (ACR, Legum 78-79: B219). During the next nine months, the Ogaden was routed of any large-scale resistance and the region returned to its pre-conflict status of sporadic guerrilla warfare. Despite this victory, WSLF forces continued their fight with Somali moral support yet, their success was limited to small hit-and-run attacks.

However, by November, 1978 WSLF attacks against Ethiopian forces increased and tensions mounted between Ethiopia and Somalia. Ethiopia again charged that Barre was engaged in an invasion of the Ogaden while Somalia counter-charged Ethiopia had attacked Somalia proper.\textsuperscript{141} Although, the WSLF was unable due to a lack of sophisticated material to mount a conventional invasion like that in July-March 77-78, they were able to effectively restrict Ethiopian control of the Ogaden to

urban areas. Consequently, according to independent observers they were able to recapture 80-90% of the rural areas of the Ogaden within a year of the end of the conflict. The Ethiopians with their Cuban allies still maintained the dominant military position in the Ogaden but logistics and supply prevented their pacifying the area.

A third factor necessary in evaluating outcome is the international recognition accorded the Mengistu regime and those intervening on its behalf. In this area, Ethiopia and her Soviet and Cuban benefactors enjoyed tacit international support for their actions. This was due entirely to the illegality of Somalia’s action in violation of sacred OAU precepts. African, European and Third World support for Ethiopia was clear although each voiced reservations about a prolonged Soviet/Cuban presence or the possibility of Ethiopian retaliation against Somalia. These fears were allayed when Ethiopian forces did not cross the border into Somalia as the Soviets had pledged.

The form of political control that Ethiopia exercised was less than successful. Given the anti-Ethiopian character of the region historically and the crushing defeat of WSLF/Somali forces, local opposition to the reassertion of Addis Ababa authority was strong.

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142 See ACR, Legum 78-79: B221-B222.


This created conditions for highly coercive methods of rule by Ethiopian and Cuban forces once they retook Somali positions. One tactic adopted by the Ethiopians was the resettlement of ethnic Somalis in secure areas (i.e. strategic hamlets) from which they could be controlled (Ibid., 79-80: B184). This proved disastrous. A result of these coercive methods of control was the migration of over 1 million refugees from the Ogaden into Djibouti and Somalia (Ibid., 79-80: B306). Consequently, the Ogaden became a "foreign land" under Ethiopian occupation with WSLF forces continuing guerrilla attacks with indigenous popular support.

The last element in this evaluation of outcome is the degree of superpower (U.S.) opposition to Ethiopia. U.S. opposition to the Dergue and its policies was softened by the international recognition that Mengistu enjoyed. The Carter administration acted to expand ties with the Somali regime through weapons sales and aid agreements yet always maintained implicit diplomatic support for Ethiopian claims in the Ogaden. In public statements, Washington made it clear that it objected to Soviet/Cuban intervention rather than the specific goal of maintaining Ethiopian integrity. This was evidenced in repeated warnings about any Ethiopian actions against Somalia, the continued

116 For a discussion of these measures and their adverse effects, see Lewis 85: 113 and ACR, Legum 79-80: B197-B200.


large scale presence there and the linkage of Soviet/Cuban activities to Detente.149

The following represents the alignment of factors that provides an approximation of the outcome for Soviet intervention. This applies only in the "short-term" with a recognition of possible shifts later on.

| TABLE 10 |
|*********|

| OUTCOME: Soviet Union/Ethiopia | S | LS | ST | LF | F |
| Classification | S | LS | ST | LF | F |
| Factors | | | | | |
| 1. Military Position * | | | | | |
| 2. Territorial Position * | | | | | |
| 3. International Recognition * | | | | | |
| 4. Political Control | | | | * | |
| 5. Superpower Opposition | | | | | *

OVERALL=SUCCESS

Soviet intervention in the Ogaden conflict is classified as a success. The configuration of factors indicates some mixed elements to this evaluation. First, the military and territorial position of the Ethiopians was completely reversed by the Soviet/Cuban intervention from defeat to victory. Coupled with the extensive regional (OAU) and international support for Ethiopia's position and the immediate outcome was clearly a victory.

The deteriorating territorial situation along with the coercive methods of control soiled this success in the corresponding 6-12 months. Soviet and Cuban presence was necessary to maintain the Ethiopian edge not only in the Ogaden but also in Eritrean and Tigre as

149See Brzezinski 83: 178-185 and Legum 81: 618-621.
well.\textsuperscript{150} The potential for U.S. opposition was diminished as well given the enunciated U.S. position of support for Ethiopian claims. Despite the growing American presence in Somalia, no subsequent administration supplied Somalia with the weapons needed to resurrect their invasion of the Ogaden.

OUTCOME: POSTSCRIPT

This section examines the outcome from a longer range perspective (3-5 years) in order to explore any shifts in outcome that would inform our understanding of intervention and its effects.

Ethiopia maintained the dominant military position within the Ogaden throughout this extended period (1979-1985). Soviet aid and east bloc training (GDR, PDRY and North Korea) of an expanded Ethiopian military reasserted and increased the traditional military superiority that Addis Ababa had always had over Somalia.\textsuperscript{151} The figures regarding Ethiopian military expansion and Soviet aid display this clearly:

\textsuperscript{150}It is important to note that although Cuban forces were instrumental in the Ogaden, they refused to take part in Soviet/Ethiopian offensives in Eritrea in late 1978-1979. This was due largely to their ideological affinity for the Eritreans and belief that they had legitimate claims to the territory unlike the Somalis. This proved to be a prominent point of contention not only in Havana-Addis Ababa relations but also between Havana and Moscow. This rift led to the subsequent unilateral withdrawal of Cuban forces in 1983.

\textsuperscript{151}For a discussion of the historical asymmetry between Ethiopia and Somalia see discussion pp. 18-20.
TABLE 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>44,570</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>306,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>@50 M-41</td>
<td>@600 T-54/55</td>
<td>@1,000 T54/55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Aircraft</td>
<td>@40 F-5</td>
<td>@100 MIG-21/23</td>
<td>@200 MIG-21/23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Aid</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>$2-4 Billion between 77-85.152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, Cuban forces numbering between 10-16,000 remained in Ethiopia until 1984, most of them stationed in the Ogaden. Apparently by 1984, the retrained and well equipped Ethiopian military was able to reassert the dominant role in the Ogaden and the bulk of Cuban forces were recalled.153 This further illustrated the superior military position that Ethiopia enjoyed.

The situation with respect to territory was different however. The resurgence of the WSLF in 1979 continued for much of this period. Although on a more limited scale, Somali rebels in the Ogaden were able to effectively control the rural area of the region encompassing approximately 80-90% of territory.154

During the mid-1980's the WSLF position was eroded through a two-pronged Ethiopian strategy. First, as discussed above, the Ethiopian regime instituted a brutal policy of resettlement and control of the local Somali population creating an enormous refugee burden for


153 See Korn 86: 93-96 for a discussion of the reduction of Cuban forces and potential reasons for their removal.

154 See note #143.
Somalia. Although this no doubt increased animosity for the Dergue among ethnic Somalis it also placed great pressures on the Barre regime and the WSLF to care for these displaced persons. Second, Ethiopia fostered the creation of an anti-Barre guerrilla force known as the Somali Salvation Front (SSF). This force operating from Ethiopian held areas of the Ogaden launched repeated attacks against Somali forces inside Somalia increasing pressure on the Barre regime. Consequently, although the Ethiopians held a more tenuous territorial position in the Ogaden, the situation did improve by 1985.

The third factor deals with the international recognition accorded the Ethiopians and their benefactors (Soviet Union & Cuba). This element changed little from the cessation of the conflict. Somalia's international position remained weak due to their continued desire to reclaim territory recognized as part of Ethiopia. The Mengistu regime's ruthless internal policies served to ostracize the regime in certain areas but not with respect to sovereignty over the Ogaden (Korn 86: 105-141 & Schwab 85: 65-70). As long as there remained Somali involvement in the region, Ethiopian actions to maintain control, including foreign intervention, were grudgingly accepted.

Another factor deals with the form of political control administered by the Ethiopians. In this area the Dergue continually

155 This is evidenced by the tremendous flood of refugees into Somali during the 1979-1985 period, over 1 million. Reports indicate that Somalia still does not receive enough outside aid to care for these refugees causing a great strain on the Somali economy. See ACR, Legum 79-80: B310-B312 and Anthony J. Hughes, "Policy Options in the Horn," Africa Report, May-June, 1981, pp. 4-11.

failed. Political opposition was squashed with limited efforts at reconciliation. Some reports stated that the Dergue did attempt to negotiate with WSLF leaders and the Somalis on points of contention under the premise that the Ogaden must remain within Ethiopia. However, the constancy of attacks and reprisals amidst calls for negotiation stifled any sincere efforts at settlement on both sides.

The final element deals with U.S. opposition to Ethiopia. During the later Crater years and the Reagan administration contacts with Somalia were substantially expanded yet at a cautious pace. First, American military aid was dispatched to Somalia totaling $40 million in 1979-1980. This was followed by $26 million to rebuild the Berbera base and an additional $85 million in economic aid between 1980-83 (Schwab 85: 99-100). Second, the American use of the Berbera base was negotiated and finalized in March 1980 (N.Y. Times, April 5, 1980). Third, other western states including France and Saudi Arabia followed suit with aid packages of their own (ACR, Legum 79-80: B313-B314). During the Reagan administration these ties were increased in the form of expanded military aid and joint Somali-U.S. maneuvers in Operation Red Star.

In tandem with this U.S.-Somali rapprochement was a further deterioration in U.S.-Ethiopian relations. Throughout the period, the U.S. and Ethiopia exchanged charges of threatening activity and

\[157\] Some reports stated that the Dergue did attempt to negotiate with WSLF leaders and the Somalis on points of contention under the premise that the Ogaden must remain within Ethiopia. However, the constancy of attacks and reprisals amidst calls for negotiation stifled any sincere efforts at settlement on both sides.

\[158\] For a discussion of the breakdown of aid flows to Somalia and the reluctance on the part of the U.S. see Korn 86: 74-77.
dangerous behavior. The U.S. warned Ethiopia regarding its arming of the SSF and reported air attacks inside Somali territory while the Ethiopians intimated that an attack against Somalia was possible should the U.S. re-arm Barre.\textsuperscript{159} Washington attempted to explore negotiations with Ethiopia on the issue of compensation for American holdings nationalized in 1975 yet, this became a point of contention that resulted in the U.S. terminating its entire assistance program to Ethiopia (Korn 86: 53-56). The expansion of Soviet presence in Ethiopia, the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in the fall of 1978 and the formal alliance between Libya, the PDRY and Ethiopia in 1981 further alienated Washington from Addis Ababa.

Despite the rapprochement with Somalia and disintegrating relations with Ethiopia, U.S. opposition to Ethiopia's position on the Ogaden was never at issue. The formal recognition of Ethiopian claims in the area along with the recalcitrance to overtly supply Somalia given Barre's track record served to stifle any direct U.S. efforts at destabilization in Ethiopia. This differed greatly from their experience in Angola.

The following represents a chart of the outcome status three-five years after the conflict's termination.

Overall, the Soviet intervention remained a success. The military dominance of Ethiopia was maintained to the point of not requiring Cuban troop presence. The territorial position was solidified despite continued WSLF activity and international recognition for Ethiopian claims remained strong. Although political control was harsh and detrimental to long term pacification, superpower opposition was confined to limited support for Somalia and a rejection of their claims in the Ogaden.

ANALYSIS

The Ogaden desert war provides this study with a case of unilateral Soviet intervention within an inter-state conflict. This illustrates a third pattern of intervention that can inform our overall understanding of the concept. The central question within this case study is:

Why were the Soviets successful in their intervention in the Ogaden Desert War?

Once again, as in previous cases, we will first examine the salient contours of the local context followed by a synthesis of that
reality with superpower intervention. From this approach, it is hoped that a set of plausible explanations can be discussed that ultimately address the above question.

The Local Context

The mapping of the local context in the Ogaden conflict displayed graphically the presence of a strong (+) susceptibility to successful superpower intervention. Most of the variables lined up to provide substantial opportunities for a multitude of supra-regional actors, with particular emphasis on the superpowers. What is also apparent is that the general contours of the local context served one superpower (USSR) and acted to thwart another (USA).

This trend explicated throughout this research has augmented our original conception of local context. As previous cases have illustrated, many of the variables that make up local context display unique traits that have afforded one superpower increased access over the other. The Ogaden conflict is consistent with that finding. While the overall "score" on any one variable or on a cluster of variables may be (+) or (−), certain configurations within these variables act to enhance or mitigate one or another superpower.

It is important to examine what variables within the local context of the Ogaden conflict illustrate this point. They are the Local Military Balance, the Role of Regional States, the Role of Regional Organizations and the Role of the State of Influence.

The local military balance in the Ogaden was highly fluid and susceptible to manipulation (+) due to some important features. First,
a combination of terrain and tactics created a highly fluid balance. The Ogaden desert provided the WSLF multiple opportunities from which to wage a harassing, hit-and-run type conflict. The area was vast and hostile, with many remote areas for basing coupled with an indigenous population predisposed to support the WSLF. While the WSLF maintained this strategy they were moderately successful.

Once the Somali military intervened and began a conventional offensive to conquer the Ogaden, the nature of the terrain changed dramatically. The "new" war was fought over specific urban areas easily identified and more adequately defended. This allowed the Ethiopians to confine their tactics to a defense of Harar, Diredawa and Jijiga, bestowing them the advantage of a greater concentration of personnel and supply. The Somalis on the other hand faced increasing problems of logistics, supply and personnel loss given the concentrated nature of the fighting. Thus, by Somali decision, those aspects of the terrain that facilitated initial WSLF success were neutralized.

A second element of the military balance centers on how these new tactics made the battlefield situation more easily malleable for supra-regional states, i.e. the superpowers. Since the battle now centered on control of three key urban areas, a protracted struggle was unlikely. Somalia had a limited "window of opportunity" for success based on their supplies and limited personnel strength while the

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166 Somali with the smaller of the armed forces could not afford a long protracted war due to the limited ability to absorb casualties. Their entire strategy relied on Blitzkrieg like tactics that achieved victory quickly rather than long sieges. This worked initially however, the further they moved into the Ogaden, the more these problems became exacerbated.
Ethiopians had to maintain control of Harar and Diredawa or lose any hope of keeping the Ogaden. Consequently, intervention on either side would prove quick and decisive and indeed it was. Once the Somali siege of Harar was halted, the Cubans and Ethiopians needed less than a month to rout Somali forces from the Ogaden. Conversely, had the U.S. along with regional allied support intervened en masse in October-November, Somalia would have overwhelmed Ethiopian positions at Harar and Diredawa before the deployment of Cuban troops and material and won the Ogaden.

A second local context variable that bears examination is the role of regional states. The regional states that were germane to the Ogaden conflict were clearly motivated and positioned to intervene (+). The most important of these included Kenya, the PDRY (Cuba), Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These states had a history of intervention in the Horn along with strong political, ethnic and ideological ties to one or the other faction. In addition, many had strong supra-regional ties to one or another superpower that presumably afforded both Moscow and Washington increased access if they chose to act. This established that regional states were important players in the conflict and through their actions played the role of encouraging superpower intervention.

Once again, within this general reality, certain factors emerged to enhance Soviet opportunities and decrease those of the U.S. Three states whose impact is most pronounced here are the PDRY, Cuba and Kenya.
The PDRY represented a rarity in the Arab world; a Marxist state. With the growing Marxist-Leninist character of the Dergue throughout 1975-77, the PDRY as a base for anti-Ethiopian, pro-Eritrean activity was neutralized. Instead, the regime in Aden reversed its previous policies and forged close ties with the Mengistu regime furnishing weapons, personnel and technicians even prior to the conflict. Instead, the regime in Aden reversed its previous policies and forged close ties with the Mengistu regime furnishing weapons, personnel and technicians even prior to the conflict.161 Instead, the regime in Aden reversed its previous policies and forged close ties with the Mengistu regime furnishing weapons, personnel and technicians even prior to the conflict.162

Coupled with the extensive Soviet, Cuban and GDR presence in Aden and its strategic location near the Horn, the PDRY was the ideal staging area for any potential Soviet intervention. In addition, given the PDRY's ideological proclivities, they assumed the role of "broker" between Somalia and Ethiopia through August 1977, acting as the haven for mediation talks between Mengistu, Barre and Castro in March, 1977.

The other dimension of the PDRY involves its use as a base for Cuban intervention. The importance of this role cannot be underplayed. Cuba as a supra-regional actor allied with Soviet interests was in a sense hostage to the capabilities of the Soviet military in terms of large-scale intervention. Thus, the significant Cuban presence in Aden prior to the conflict afforded them the capability of quick intervention in the Ogaden. This proximity also had positive implications for the airlift of substantial material into the conflict.

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161 The PDRY had acted as the conduit for Soviet and Cuban aid to Eritrean guerrillas since 1970. The primary avenue of access for conservative Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others) was the Sudan.

162 See pp. 297-299 & 317-318 for documentation on the role of the PDRY.
Although Cuban troops were airlifted from Angola as well, the bulk of the Soviet resupply passed through the vital air and sea installations of Aden.

The importance of the PDRY is further buttressed by the dearth of alternative staging areas among traditional Soviet allies in the area. Specifically, this refers to the "Middle Eastern consequences" of Soviet intervention. Traditional Soviet allies in the region: Iraq, Syria and Algeria all supported the Somalis as an Islamic state and member of the Arab league. Coupled with the loss of Soviet influence in both the Sudan (1971-77) and Egypt (1973), the importance of the PDRY became even more conspicuous.

The other important state that bears examination is Kenya. The Kenyatta government represented one of the most pro-western governments in Africa, possessing great influence on the continent and extensive ties to both Britain and the U.S. A logical extension of American

163 This is witnessed in the ability of the Soviets to deliver emergency material in large quantities at short notice during the early and middle stages of the conflict. See discussion pp. 47-61. The PDRY acted as the conduit for virtually this shipment.

164 Several analysts have argued that the Soviet move to Ethiopia was precisely designed to thwart the growing anti-Soviet Arab bloc pledging to make the Red Sea and "Arab Lake." Yet, if this is true, the Soviets certainly did nothing to sway these Middle Eastern states from their initial fears. As discussed, the Soviets sacrificed their Middle Eastern policy for ambiguous gains in the Horn, i.e. Ethiopia. The long-term benefits of this policy have still yet to be discovered.

165 Kenyan ties to both Britain and the U.S. as well the rest of Western Europe are extensive. The U.S. & Britain account for virtually of Kenya's defense needs including arms and training. Kenya is the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid on the continent-$69.6 million-FY1982 and the largest recipient of British aid. Also, Britain and the U.S. combined are by far the largest suppliers and purchasers of Kenyan products. See Arlinghaus 83: 180-188 & ACR, Legum 77-78: B280-B285.
concern regarding a leftist regime in Addis Ababa would be the threat it might pose to pro-western regimes in the region, i.e. Kenya. However, traditional east-west calculation did not influence regional Horn politics. Instead of acting as an ally of Somalia against Ethiopia, Kenya followed a long established policy of "alliance" with Ethiopia against the "expansionist" designs of Mogadiscio (ACR, Legum 77-78: B271-B274).

The Kenyan government moved swiftly as it condemned Somali intervention in the Ogaden and mobilized the OAU against Barre's aims. Also, Nairobi moved to thwart potential western intervention on Somalia's behalf by communicating their dismay over such action. As a Radio Nairobi report stated on November 7, 1977:

Somalia's sincerity with regard to peaceful coexistence with her neighbors is loathsome to say the least, and no number of tongue-wagging emissaries will convince Kenyans that Somalia has good intentions. Kenyans would like to tell Somalia that her emissaries are no longer welcome in Kenya as long as their list for parts of our territory remains un-renounced. Somalia's expansion is unacceptable; Somalia is an aggressor both in word and deed; she has invaded Ethiopia militarily and lays claim to large chunks of Kenyan territory; her expansionist adventures must not be allowed to succeed because they will set the continent and the world aflame.

According to most analysts, this impacted Carter Administration policy to a great degree during the initial three-four months of the conflict.166

A second dynamic regarding the role of regional states was the

166See note #114 and pp. 315-317.
important incendiary function that the Arab states of Egypt, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia played in the evolution of Somali policy.

The interventionist posture of regional states was no more illustrated than in the actions of these three states. All three shared a growing concern regarding the radicalization of Ethiopia and extension of Soviet influence in the Horn. These states actively intervened against this development through their support for the Eritreans and a policy designed to wean Somalia away from her benefactor—the Soviet Union. This policy, largely spearheaded by the Saudis, was initiated in 1974 with Somalia's admission into the Arab League, the extending of economic aid and the introduction of monetary inducements to reject the Soviet Union. As Legum pointed out in 1976:

The Saudis strongly oppose their [the Soviets] having military facilities in the Red Sea. There was confirmation in 1976 of reports that the Saudis were engaged in trying to 'buy off' the Somalis by offering them substantial economic and military help if, like North Yemen, they broke their ties with Moscow. The former U.S. Ambassador to Riyadh, James Akins, told a Senate committee that he had been asked by the Saudis to find out whether the U.S. would agree to supply arms to the Somalis if they broke with Moscow (Legum 76-77: B333).

167 Many analysts argue that Saudi policy was key here in slowly dragging Barre out of the Soviet orbit and also driving Carter's policy toward Somalia away from Ethiopia. See David 79: 75-77; Ottaway 84: 172-174, Selassie 85: 14-175 and Katsikas 82: 152-153. As Ottaway points out, the amount of economic aid from the Arab states to Somalia from 1974-1977 is unsubstantiated but estimates run from $140 million-$675 million. The higher figure if accurate is well above Soviet economic aid to Somalia for the same period.
This policy of dangling monetary inducements in exchange for shifts in Barre’s pro-Soviet posture remained throughout the conflict. As discussed above, the Saudis offered some $300 million in immediate aid in August 1977, if the Somalis broke relations with Moscow.

Had these states not acted to strongly support Somalia’s policies and thus influence their primary supra-regional ally—the U.S., Barre’s calculations regarding the Soviet expulsion and the entire Ogaden campaign may have been different. Arguably, without potential suppliers to fill the vacuum of Soviet withdrawal, Barre may not have taken such an irreversible step.

Clearly, the role of regional states was conducive (+) to general superpower intervention, yet the alignment of these states and their policies served the Soviet Union and hindered the U.S.

When we combine the role of regional states with the regional organization role, a starker image appears that vividly displays this within the concept of local context. Despite the interventionist stance of several regional states, the OAU (The dominant regional organization) articulated an intelligible and influential policy stance. The OAU ruled that Somali intervention into the Ogaden was illegitimate based on the fundamental precepts of the OAU charter. Consequently, support for Somali action was equally illegitimate while assistance for Ethiopia was acceptable under reasonable conditions. This immediately energized the prospects for successful Soviet intervention and diminished U.S. opportunities.

Given the respective affinities of each superpower, intervention for the Soviets required little political risk within Africa while
American intervention became potentially very costly. For the Americans, the tension between "Africanist" policy-makers like Vance and Young who understood the dangers of violating OAU principles and "Arabists" like Brzezinski who favored a more interventionist stance clearly illustrates the consequences involved. Ultimately, Carter decided against intervention based largely on the illegitimacy of Barre's position and the Kenyan influence. This is witnessed in the repeated reluctance to sell Somalia weapons, the restriction of allied material support and the public calls for Somalia to renounce its claims on the Ogaden as a precondition for aid.

Conversely, the Soviets slowly gravitated toward a position they occupied in Angola where intervention, although not generally supported, enjoyed diplomatic approval given the nature of the target—Somali irredentism. As long as Soviet and Cuban forces did not

169 The same cannot be said for the Middle East. While many researchers point to the Ogaden as an overwhelming Soviet success in geo-political terms, the reality is that while successful in terms of the conflict and predominant African conditions, the Soviets lost a great deal in the Arab world. Except for Libya and the PDRY, the Arab world along with Iran were united in their support for both the Somalis and Eritreans. The way in which the Soviets dealt not only with Somali but also the Eritreans greatly effected Soviet influence with allies such as Syria, Iraq and Algeria. When this is coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan @ 20 months later, the damage to Soviet-Arab relations becomes extensive. Several analysts have argued that the Soviets still have not recovered.

169 For discussions of this dichotomy of views and how it played itself out in Washington, see Katsikas (82), Mayall (81), Selassie (85) and Brzezinski (83).

170 As discussed in chapter 4, the Soviets gained regional and international legitimacy once their intervention on the side of the MPLA was a de facto anti-South African intervention. The OAU reversed itself and influential states like Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, prior critics of Soviet intervention applauded its design and effects.
press that advantage into Somalia, their presence was grudgingly accepted as legitimate. As stated by Cervenka & Legum in reference to the OAU Khartoum Summit of July 1978:

The Majority of OAU ministers felt that the Russians and Cubans were fighting on the side of the Ethiopians because the Addis Ababa regime had invited them to help repel the Somali invasion of their territory. They also regarded the wars in the Ogaden and Eritrea as struggles against secessionism, a point which Ethiopia exploited to the utmost (Legum & Cervenka 78-79: A30).

When combing the configurations of both of these variables, it is clear that local conditions acted to enhance Soviet intervention potential. Conversely, the U.S. found itself with significant obstacles to its conceivable intervention policy and decided not to traverse them.

The final variable configuration that solidified the "pro-Soviet" character of the local context is the role of the state of influence. The ascendancy of Mengistu in Ethiopia throughout 1976-1977 and the corresponding U.S.-Ethiopian break in May, 1977 presented the Soviets with a unique position vis-a-vis the participants in the conflict. Moscow occupied the role of the state of influence for both states from approximately May 1977 through November. By the outbreak of the conflict, Ethiopia was partially reliant on Soviet weapons shipments and aid due to the cut-off of American military supplies. Somalia was clearly tied to Soviet supplies although they were slowly evaporating in the wake of Moscow's tilt toward Ethiopia.

\[17^1\] In the interim period of restructuring the Ethiopian military toward Soviet weapons, spare parts from Israel were vital. See discussion of this pp. 57-58.
This central role in both states gave the Soviets tremendous opportunities for affect, mediation and influence throughout the Horn. This is evidenced in the multiple mediation efforts of Soviet officials and allies throughout 1977. It is also witnessed in Soviet "cautiousness" throughout the first three months of the conflict.

From the outbreak of the conflict through November, Moscow seemingly straddled the fence on support for either Ethiopia or Somalia. Despite a dire military situation for Addis Ababa, Soviet aid to Ethiopia was limited and their intervention status remained at LOW 1 for over two months. Concomitantly, they continued supplying Somalia (although in diminished quantities) well into the conflict while publicly expressing sympathy for Ethiopia. This is further witnessed by Barre's trip to Moscow on August 30, 1977 at a point when Ethiopia was in desperate straits. Additionally, Soviet intervention of a HIGH 2 status does not take place until the Somali expulsion indicating that they were willing to go to great lengths to keep alive the Castro proposal of an "anti-imperialist federation" straddling the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

These examples show the repeated Soviet effort at maintaining influence and bargaining power with both regimes as a state of influence. Unfortunately for the Soviets, other influences on Somalia acted to thwart this policy an force Moscow to chose sides. In retrospect, it may have seemed inevitable given the enmity between the two governments but policy-makers in Moscow must have believed in the potential for reconciliation given Soviet behavior in the July-November period.
The Interaction of Local Context and Superpower Intervention

The analysis of this case now requires a fusion of the local context with superpower intervention behavior. In this way we can address the initial question derived from this case study:

**Why were the Soviets successful in their intervention in the Ogaden Desert War?**

The first and perhaps most salient element of the local context that surfaces in the above analysis is the importance of *legitimacy*. As in other cases, this concept emerges within the role of regional organizations and their impact on the conflict.

Despite their inability to stop the fighting, OAU policy was definitive and influential. The intervention of Somalia in support of the WSLF was **illegitimate** within the African political landscape (Legum & Lee 79: xiii). This was an indispensable component of the OAU charter that was inviolable and non-negotiable. This meant that any state that intervened to support Somalia would suffer politically across the full spectrum of states in Africa (pro-western, neutral or pro-east). Conversely, aid solicited by Ethiopia was justified provided that assistance did not involve the violation of Somalia's borders. As Ottaway points out in reference to the U.S. dilemma of support for Barre:

...Somalia was bent on a policy of territorial expansion that did not receive the approval of any African country since it challenged the Organization of African Unity (OAU) principle that colonial borders should be respected (Ottaway 84:180).
This reality afforded Soviet intervention political legitimacy. Although the scope of that intervention was alarming, it could not be deemed inappropriate given Ethiopia's dire military condition. Once the Soviets had moved into the Ethiopian camp, after their expulsion from Somalia, virtually any level intervention would enjoy widespread continental support.172

Washington faced the opposite dilemma. The U.S., with a geo-strategic affinity for Somalia was confronted with the prospect of violating OAU precepts and sacrificing its African policy for Middle Eastern gains. As discussed above, it became clear that the Horn conflict bridged two distinct regions with differing sets of policy priorities. For Middle Eastern states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, the Ogaden conflict was part of continuing Islamic-Christian rivalry that had taken on communist-anti-communist dimensions with the growth of Soviet influence in Ethiopia. For the African community it was an irredentist conflict that had blossomed into an inter-state war with severe territorial precedents should Somalia win. Thus, U.S. support for Somalia would generate ancillary benefits in the Middle East while negative policy effects in Africa. Soviet support for Ethiopia would conversely solidify her position as a benefactor of legality in Africa while hurt her middle eastern position. Clearly,

172By "support" it is not meant to imply that African states welcomed such superpower intervention. Rather, in the context of diplomatically siding with either Ethiopia or Somalia, Somalia's anti-OAU actions made backing for Ethiopia the only possible course for African states.
this weighed heavily on the Carter administration and according to many analysts was the decisive factor in U.S. non-intervention.\footnote{3See Katsikas (82), Selassie (85), Legum (81), David (79) and Ottaway (84) for discussions of this within U.S. foreign policy circles. Brzezinski alludes to this when relaying the debate and indecision within the Carter administration over the proper response to Soviet intervention (Brzezinski 83: 179-189).  

\footnote{4Although leery of Soviet motives, the Organization of Front-Line States (OFLS) was highly responsive to Soviet offers of aid to the groups mentioned. Soviet support for these groups while not decisive was certainly recognized as necessary to the anti-colonial struggle and bought the Soviets and the Cubans great political gains in Africa. See Morison 77-78: A94-A95 and Legum & Lee 79: 139-141.}

If we place the Ogaden conflict into a larger regional/continental setting, we can see how detrimental other patterns of behavior may have been for the superpowers. The Soviets in their support for black nationalist movements in Zimbabwe (ZAPU), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Angola (MPLA), Namibia (SWAPO) and South Africa (ANC), had gained substantial political capital with influential members of the African community of states.\footnote{5'This is evidenced in Soviet pronouncements throughout the conflict arguing that support for Ethiopia was based solely on the illegitimacy of Somali's actions in the eyes of the OAU. Obviously, the Soviets did have other considerations, but they correctly saw the importance of this issue in Africa.} This is also true of Cuban policy in these areas. Further, the Soviets were fresh from a political/diplomatic success in Angola given the anti-South African perception of their intervention(See Chapter 4). Had they reversed themselves and ignored OAU principles in the Horn, they would have risked losing favor in the continent even among their "allies."\footnote{This would have proved}
disastrous given the escalating conflicts in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.\textsuperscript{176}

The U.S. faced an even more acute problem in this area. Political fall-out from the Nixon administration's support for Portuguese rule in Africa ("Tar-Baby Memorandum"), tacit support for Rhodesia and the catastrophic policy of aid to UNITA/FNLA and by definition South Africa had weakened the U.S. position on the continent even with traditional western allies, i.e. Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal.\textsuperscript{177} The Carter administration promised in 1976, a new look on Africa and delivered with a Presidential visit to Nigeria, renewed support for Black Nationalism in Zimbabwe and the OPLS and immediate proposals to establish relations with Angola.\textsuperscript{178} Support for Somalia would have scuttled these new efforts and jeopardized America's role both in the conflicts in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Due to the illegitimate nature of Somali intervention, the Soviets enjoyed greater freedom of action than the U.S. and correctly perceived the African benefits to a policy of support for Ethiopia and renunciation of Somalia. The U.S. perceived this as well and while

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{176}The period 1977-78 was a critical juncture in the Zimbabwean conflict with western efforts at negotiation gaining momentum and Soviet access being reduced to military supply only. See Chapter 7.
  
  
  \item \textsuperscript{178}As seen in the Shaba II case (May-June, 1978), this position on Angola shifted 180 degrees. Yet, during 1977, high level negotiations between Andrew Young and Agustino Neto were in progress to establish diplomatic ties and U.S. aid. This was reported to the author in discussions with Professor Donald Easum, former Ambassador to Nigeria and Bourkina Fasso.
\end{itemize}
publicly condemning Soviet/Cuban "intrigue," sided with Ethiopia by withholding weapons to Somalia from both the U.S. and regional allies.

A second element that requires elaboration is the impact of local factionalism on superpower behavior. The Ethiopia coup in 1974 and subsequent revolution through 1977 reshaped the politics of Horn. Prior to this period, the Horn was polarized politically and ideologically between Somalia/PDRY/Sudan with East Bloc aid and Ethiopia/Kenya with western benefactors. The takeover by the Dergue and succeeding evolution to Marxism-Leninism changed the entire political landscape of the Horn, presenting the superpowers with shifting alliances coupled with new opportunities.

As these opportunities took shape through 1976-77, it became clear that local states (i.e. Somalia, Ethiopia & Kenya) acted, not necessarily by design, to enhance Soviet opportunities and diminish the maneuvering room of the U.S. Moscow policy while cautious in the initial conflict period took advantage of the disadvantageous regional/international situation of Somalia to solidify a relationship with Ethiopia. While this may have been the aim of Soviet policy since 1975-76, it was a combination of radicalization inside the Dergue with growing Somali expansionism that laid the groundwork for a massive Soviet intervention with international support.

Conversely, the Ford and later Carter administrations were faced with the dilemma of a strong, pro-western ally quickly shifting into a revolutionary Marxist state. While the U.S. attempted to use its "supplier" leverage over Ethiopia, the character of the regime and the "new look" of the Carter foreign policy accelerated the demise in U.S.-
Ethiopian relations. When this aspect of the local context is fused with the impact of regional states on U.S. policy, this shift becomes even more clear.

Pro-western, Arab states had been gradually persuading Somali to distance herself from the Soviet Union. The spiraling disintegration of the new Ethiopian government obviously increased Barre’s attention to these enticements and emboldened his actions. While persuading Barre, the Saudis and Egyptians among others were also arguing to the new administration that a great opportunity to rest Somali from the Soviet camp was being lost by inaction.179 This seemed to reach Carter and his foreign policy people—Brzezinski who began to explore these possibilities during 1977.180

Consequently, the following sequential developments of U.S. policy in the Horn are apparent. First, the U.S. was presented with a traditional ally turning to Marxism, frustrated with American military aid and increasingly motivated to seek Soviet aid. Second and concomitantly, the U.S. was told by its allies in the region that given Soviet courtship of Ethiopia, a great opportunity for U.S. diplomacy lie in Somalia. Third, while publicly castigating Ethiopia and severing most relations, Washington expressed genuine interest in political/military ties with Somalia seemingly unaware of the increasing Somali intervention in the Ogaden.

Once this became clear, the U.S. had an "ally" that it could not

179See Katsikas 82: 153-156 and David 79: 76-78.

180See note #173.
legitimately support. The result was a political fait accompli for Soviet intervention with America tacitly accepting the outcome.

In retrospect, the only possible way for the U.S. to maintain favor with Ethiopia would have been massive American aid plan to a radical military Marxist state. The rationale for this in the U.S. would have been dubious and may not have fundamentally altered Ethiopia's evolution to Marxism-Leninism.

The final interrelationship that requires explication is the superpower reaction to regional state intervention. The importance of this has greatest impact in U.S. behavior. It has been established that the conservative Arab states had been involved in the shifting dimensions of Horn politics from the outset. Their extensive courtship of Barre was part of a concerted policy of diminishing Soviet influence in the region. The revolution in Ethiopia and the increasing radicalization of the Dergue further heightened Arab fears and 1975-77 saw a redoubled effort at wooing Somalia. This development in tandem with several other factors is vital in understanding U.S. behavior.

First, the Carter administration had singled out Ethiopia as one of its first test cases on human rights and the results for U.S.-Ethiopian relations were disastrous. This left the new administration with the "loss" of one of Americans few long-term African allies. Second, the beneficiary of the left-wing character of the Dergue was the Soviet Union. With influence in Somalia, the prospects of the Red Sea being truly "red" began to be discussed in Congress and among conservative forces around the globe. Third, this

181 See discussions pp. 270-274.
same conservative bloc of Arab states increasingly cajoled Carter and particularly Brzezinski into the notion of opportunities in Somalia.³⁸² Given Angola, the increasing leftist character of Zimbabwean nationalism and the Shaba I uprising, a "victory" in the "African Cold War" was welcomed.³⁸³

All of this led the new administration in April-August, 1977 to move toward Somalia in speech and action without an adequate analysis of the regional/continental dynamics of the Ogaden. By pledging "defensive" weapons and intimating support for Barre, the U.S. helped foster a Soviet intervention that was illegitimate affording Moscow the opportunity to lay claim to a "positive" role in support of OAU principles.³⁸⁴ The role of the Arab states in leading the U.S. in this region cannot be ignored.

CONCLUSION

This analysis displays a plausible and indeed persuasive argument in response to our initial question:

³⁸² Brzezinski 83: 178-190.

³⁸³ The term African Cold War simply refers to the imposition of the globalist perspective on the regional reality. This has been discussed extensively in previous cases as well as in the work of Bender, et. al., (85).

³⁸⁴ See discussion of this with appropriate citations in both the local context and conflict analysis sections. Undoubtedly, although there is no tangible evidence to support this, the Saudis and others were telling Barre that American aid would be forthcoming after a break with the Soviets. Whether he believed this or not is impossible to say.
Why were the Soviets successful in their intervention in the Ogaden Desert War?

The local context presented the Soviets with several positive and few negative consequences for intervening on Ethiopia's behalf. First, the Dergue and Mengistu's emergence in 1977 provided the Soviets with two ideological allies in the Horn and the role as state of influence for both participants. This afforded them the luxury of choice. Second, the regional states and OAU acted to enhance Soviet intervention best. This gave any action in support of Ethiopia legitimacy within the whole of Africa. Third, U.S. policy options were severely restricted thus allowing the Soviets the comfort of biding their time in the initial conflict period, attempting to mediate the conflict and salvage influence. Finally, regional states like the PDRY and Cuba afforded the Soviets quick and decisive military access one the decision to discard Somalia was made for them.

The added dimension of inter-state conflict in this case added new and more complex considerations to the analysis but did little to change the important impact of local context. Soviet and American policy in the Horn found itself in reaction to events and driven by regional concerns and dynamics that left little doubt as to short-term success and failure. The globalist conception best shown in the words of Brzezinski may be correct in illuminating the losses for the Soviets in the Middle East. Yet, the imposition of that view on the actual events of the conflict would have proved disastrous for the U.S. throughout Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.
SUPERPOWER FOREIGN POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS
Volume II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of Ohio State University

by

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1989

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INTRODUCTION

The Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict is the final case in this study. Like Angola, this case displays the dynamics of third world conflict within the process of de-colonization. Unlike the other cases however, the time frame of the conflict is fluid and somewhat amorphous. Specifically, this conflict is the only example in this study (and one of the few in the third world) of a long term guerilla war whose solution was forged politically not militarily. This fact coupled with other elements of the conflict make this case an important addition to this study's understanding of superpower intervention and local context.

As we will see, guerrilla warfare in the Rhodesian case exists sporadically from 1966-1979. The beginning of a stage eight conflict was approximately December, 1976. However, from this date till the Lancaster House Agreement in 1979, the intensity of the conflict varies greatly during periods of negotiation, consolidation and escalation. This makes the normal analysis of the case more problematic since, the scope of violence undergoes significant shifts during the identified conflict period.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The historical roots of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict are as deep and complex as any of the cases examined in this study. While any exhaustive analysis could trace the racial, economic and ethnic roots of the conflict to a period prior to European colonization, this section will focus on the salient developments from the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965 to the outbreak of conflict in 1976-77.

Geographic & Political Landscape

Rhodesia-Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in southern Africa bordered by Zambia to the north, Mozambique to the east, South Africa to the south and Botswana to the west. At the time of the UDI, it had 5.7 million people, 265,000 white (5%), 5.435 million black (95%). Among the black African population two main ethnic groups dominated: the Ndebele who made up 10% and the Shona who made up 80% of the population.

The name Rhodesia-Zimbabwe refers to Zimbabwe from the period of the UDI announcement of 1965 to formal independence in 1980. It is recognized that Rhodesia is a colonial term and thus has not validity for the vast majority of the Zimbabwean people.

population. In this society, white Rhodesians controlled a disproportionate share of the wealth and dominated the political structure. For example, 50% of the land was allocated to the whites (5%), the other 50% was divided among the blacks (95%). Wage differences were substantial with a per capita income for Blacks at $315/year and whites at $3,300. Further, white Rhodesians enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in all the world (1970-1979) with the highest ratio of cars and pools per person (Lake 76: 8).

In tandem with this asymmetrical economic balance in favor of the whites was a system of authoritarian control over the remaining 95% of the population. The state legally reserved the right of detention, censorship and resettlement of blacks into controlled areas. In addition, an entire system of Apartheid laws established separate facilities, laws and penalties for the races.

4 Often analysts refer to these two groups as the ethnic division in the country. However, there are several clans within the Shona ethnic group that account for much infighting during this period. These include the following: Karanga-25%, Zezuru-21%, Manyikas-11%, Ndaa-6%, Kerekore-5% and Kalangas-3%. These clans become vital in understanding the factionalism within ZANU during the conflict period. See Patrick O'Meara, "Zimbabwe: The Politics of Independence," in Carter & O'Meara eds., Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis 2nd edition, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, pp. 44-45.


6 These figures are for 1964 and maintain this same ratio black to white through the guerrilla struggle. See Julian Henriques, "The Struggles of the Zimbabweans: Conflicts Between the Nationalists and with the Rhodesian Regime," in African Affairs, Vol. 76 no. 305, October 1977, pp. 496-498.

Within this reality, the Rhodesian Front Party under the leadership of Ian Smith declared Rhodesian independence from Great Britain in 1965 (UDI). This unilateral act was not recognized by Britain or any other state including the U.S. and South Africa. The United Nations responded by imposing selective sanctions in 1966 and mandatory sanctions in 1968. Both of these were at least publicly supported by the U.S. and Britain.

In the ensuing 10 years, the Rhodesian Front's "unilateral" and repressive rule engendered a black nationalist response in the form of guerrilla warfare and destabilization. The genesis of this modern struggle can be traced to 1962-63 with the formation of ZAPU and ZANU followed by the first engagement with Rhodesian forces in the Battle of Sinora on April 26, 1966 (Thompson 86: 45).

The main black nationalist movements that emerged in the conflict occupied differing positions along an ideological/political spectrum. The two main groups that fought against the Rhodesian Front regime could be loosely termed "radical" nationalist. The first and longest

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8 The first set of sanctions dealt with selected economic goods and then mandatory sanctions were imposed. This extended into the military sphere as well. In both cases, the U.S. and Great Britain supported the action.

9 While the U.S. and Britain refused recognition of the Smith regime, government policies from 1969-1976 acted to relieve the economic, military and political isolation of the Salisbury regime. The best example of this was the U.S. States Senate passage of the Byrd Amendment in 1971 which allowed the U.S. to import strategic minerals including Chromium from Rhodesia based on the "anti-communist" character of the Smith regime. For a discussion of this see Lake 76: 123-157 and Michael T. Klare & Eric Prokosch, "Evading the Arms Embargo: How the U.S. Arms South Africa and Rhodesia," in U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa, South End Press, Boston, 1978, pp. 157-170.
exiting organization was the Zimbabwean African Peoples Union (ZAPU) with its military wing the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPRA). This organization was formed by Joshua Nkomo in 1962 out of the banned National Democratic Party (NDP). Its membership centered largely among the Ndebele ethnic group of western Zimbabwe. It operated from bases in Zambia with a guerrilla force of @1,000 (1969). It received aid from Zambia, the Soviet Union and increasingly Cuba and Angola (after 1975). ZAPU was loosely Afro-socialist with a political platform most resembling that of Zambia. In relation to its armed counterpart ZANU, it was believed to be more pragmatic and "moderate."

The second organization considered more "radical" than ZAPU was the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) with its military wing the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA). This group was forged by disaffected members of ZAPU in 1963 under Sithole's leadership and was dominated by the Shona ethnic group of Northern and eastern Zimbabwe. Originally headed by Sithole, the organization came under the leadership of Robert Mugabe and General Josiah Tongagara in 1975-76. Its main base of operations was in the Tete province of Mozambique and


11 The numbers of guerrillas at ZAPU command started out small and grew through the 70's to approximately 10-15,000.

12 The reason Tongagara is mentioned with Mugabe is that unlike ZAPU, ZANU's political and military wings were more separate and autonomous. Mugabe had the complete support of ZANLA under Tongagara's command, yet his importance as a key figure during portions of the struggle (1974-77) bears mentioning.
it received the lion's share of aid from Tanzania and China. 13 The espoused ideology of Mugabe and ZANU was certainly more Marxist in character and the relative secrecy of Mugabe led many to label ZANU the most radical and "dangerous" of the nationalist groups.

Those in the "moderate" sphere included the United African National Council (UANC) led by Bishop Muzorewa founded in 1974, The Zimbabwean United Peoples Organization (ZUPO) headed by Jerimiah Chirau, and Ndabaningi Sithole, the former leader of ZANU who was ousted in 1976. 14 These three represented that part of the black nationalist movement who had renounced violence as a means of change and were increasingly willing to negotiate and share power with the Smith regime. 15

The following represents a general conception of the nationalists groups on an ideological/political continuum.

13 Mozambique as a base of operations was not available to ZANU until the early 1970's (@1973) when FRELIMO was able to establish control over the Tete province adjoining the Zimbabwean border. See O'Meara 82: 44-45.

14 ZUPO was created in 1974 as a counter to ZAPO and ZANU and its main impetus came not from Chirau but from Smith and interested "British Conservatives." See Wilfred Burchette, Southern Africa Stands Up, Urizen Books, New York, 1978, pp. 237-238.

15 This was evidenced in the speeches and statements made by all three, particularly Sithole and Muzorewa throughout the conflict period. As the struggle intensified, these leaders moved closer to Smith in position in order to insure their power when independence came. For examples of this willingness to deal see Legum 75-76: A39-A57, Legum 76-77: A14-A16 and Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS), Sub-Saharan Africa, VIII, April 18, 1979, p. E8, April 19, 1979, p. E3, April 23, 1979, p. E5 and September 7, 1979, p. E8.
Throughout the 1966-1972 period, hit and run attacks and sabotage by the nationalists (ZANU & ZAPU) escalated while reprisals by the right (RFP-Smith) increased in intensity. The so-called moderate elements were caught between the two positions and while sympathizing with the guerrillas; they increasingly acted within the Rhodesian polity to cooperate with the Smith regime in finding a compromise solution (see note #15).

Most of the guerrilla leaders in both ZAPU and ZANU as well as some moderate leaders were "detained" in Rhodesia during this time. Along with inadequate numbers and material this muted much of the potential for guerrilla activity. Consequently, this initial period while violent does not constitute the beginning of a conflict of stage eight status.

Acceleration to Conflict

During the initial period of nationalist revolt (1966-1972), the guerrillas were small in number (01,000 combined ZANU/ZAPU), ill-

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16 Mugabe was imprisoned in Rhodesia for 10 years from 1964-1974 and during the early 70's some 20-30% of the guerrillas were in detention.
equipped and saddled with poor base locations. By 1972, reports indicated that their numbers had increased, their training and weapons had been up-graded and new bases of operations in Zambia and Mozambique were opened (Lake 76: 24-25). Much of this shift was the result of increased aid and training from outside sources along with greater recruitment within Rhodesia. The result was a more coordinated effort on the part of black nationalists that generated an equally expanded response by the Smith regime.

The Smith government introduced a set of Draconian measures in response to increased "terrorist" activity. The military, police budget was increased by 35% to $95 million and mandatory military service was augmented to 12 months (Lake 76: 24). In 1973, the border with Zambia was closed and the government instituted a policy of "Protected Villages," (PV) which rounded up some 300,000 black

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18 See Lake 76: 24-25, Nyoka 77: 47 and Gann 77: 10-11.


20 The term "terrorist" is used to describe all violent and in some cases non-violent action taken by nationalists fighting for freedom. It is also used quite extensively by the Apartheid regime in Pretoria to describe ANC and other actions in their country. It should be noted that the term should not be confused with its usage in other regions and contexts.
Zimbabweans into "forts" that were controlled and administered by government troops.\textsuperscript{21} Finally, the government stepped up its "hot pursuit" raids into neighboring states, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia.\textsuperscript{22} All of this served to increase the intensity of the guerilla war and also increase regional and international interest in the outcome.

Several regional and supra-regional states become increasingly involved during this period (1972-74). A brief explanation of their role and position in the conflict is necessary for the analysis to follow.

First, South Africa as a natural ally of Rhodesia was greatly alarmed by the escalating violence and inability of the government to blunt the unrest. In 1969, the South Africans stationed several hundred policemen in Rhodesia to assist Salisbury with internal security. After the mandatory arms embargo in 1966, South Africa acted as Rhodesia's main supplier of weapons including NATO arms and aircraft.

\textsuperscript{21}This policy was virtually identical to the "strategic hamlet" policy followed by the U.S. in Vietnam war. Villagers were issued passes and allowed out to work during the day and then re-admitted at night, Curfews were in place and dissent was crushed. The results were just as disastrous. Agricultural production in these areas decreased while guerrilla recruitment increased. For a discussion of this see Tony Hodges, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of the Rural Blacks," in Africa Report, September-October, 1977, pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{22}Mozambique at this time was still a Portuguese colony whose administration was allied with White Rhodesian policy. However, FRELIMO under Samora Machel operated with relative impunity in the remote regions of the country including the Tete and Vila Pery provinces bordering Rhodesia. It was ZANU guerrillas and their FRELIMO hosts that were the target of these raids. Once Mozambique became independent and FRELIMO emerged as the official government, ZANU forces based in Tete increased along with Rhodesian incursions.
as well as South African produced weaponry. Also, the economic dependency between Rhodesia and South Africa impacted Pretorian policy. With approximately 90% of Rhodesian exports passing through South Africa and 25-40,000 Rhodesian workers, mostly Black earning their living across the border, South Africa began extensive talks with the Smith government to fashion a strategy for ending the nationalist revolt.

By 1974, Pretoria's policy focused on moving Smith toward accommodation and majority rule. The key event that seemed to precipitate this was the Armed forces Coup in Portugal in 1974 and the potential radicalism in the emerging nationalists states of Angola and Mozambique. Legum's statement on Vorster's policy sums up South Africa's position from 1974 on:

Prime Minister John Vorster has made no secret of his view that the only policy for his northern neighbor was to accept the inevitability of majority rule and to achieve it quickly through a peaceful settlement....


Also, Vorster had introduced his policy of "detente" with black African states in the hopes of thwarted anti-Apartheid activity and policy among the states of southern Africa. One way to accomplish this was apparently to throw these states a sacrificial lamb-Rhodesia.

A second actor in this conflict that bears note is the Organization of Front-line States (OFLS) including Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and later Angola and Mozambique. The OFLS acting as a coordinated group of regional states until 1974 and then as an official body under OAU auspices, were heavily involved in negotiations with ZANU and ZAPU leadership, training guerrillas and providing channels for the shipment of weaponry from supra-regional states.\(^27\) As the conflict escalated during 1972-74, the OFLS increased its activity with respect to the above roles. It is during the subsequent years and during the actual conflict (1976-1979) that they emerge as the central actor.

A third central player in this period is Britain. As the former colonial power and the legally recognized authority in Rhodesia, Britain found itself negotiating between the Smith regime, the OFLS and black nationalists for some kind of settlement. While lukewarm to the prospects, increasing violence, upgraded Rhodesia on Britain's priority list.\(^28\)

The two other actors necessary to complete the international fabric of this conflict are the superpowers. For the Soviet Union, involvement during this time took the form of arming and training ZAPU forces in the Soviet Union and Zambia.\(^29\) The amount of weaponry was

\(^{27}\) For a discussion of the important role of the OFLS in the weapon allocation function see Napper 83: 164-176. Also, Thompson 86: 75-86.


\(^{29}\) For a discussion of the history of Soviet support for ZAPU and the increasing aid provided during this period see Somerville 84: 195-204 and Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of
relatively small due largely to the limited absorption capacity of the ZAPU. However, diplomatic support for the black nationalist cause and Nkomo in particular was vociferous and unyielding.\textsuperscript{30}

For the U.S., its African policy was more problematic and contradictory. While publicly calling for settlement and black majority rule, the private policy through the Nixon period was guided by the NSSM 39 or the so-called "Tar Baby" memorandum. This document written in 1969, advocated an accommodating policy with respect to South Africa and Rhodesia, skirting the arms embargo, continued dealing with Rhodesia economically and a general "globalist" conception of events in the area.\textsuperscript{31} This placed the U.S. in the background of efforts at a negotiated settlement until after 1974-75 and particularly after the Angolan debacle.

1974-1976: Negotiation and Conflict

1974 ushered in a new set of conditions and dynamics in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe case that further propelled the parties toward conflict. Several key events contributed to this acceleration. First, as alluded to above, the Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974 effectively altered the balance of power in southern Africa. With black majority rule sure to emerge in both states under governments unsympathetic to

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\textsuperscript{30}The Soviets ignored ZANU during this entire period and publicly pictured Nkomo as the voice of black nationalism. For examples see TASS July 2, 1976, Pravda February 25, 1976 and March 17, 1976.

\textsuperscript{31}See Lake 76: 123-157 for a discussion of this policy change and its implications.
the Smith regime (FRELIMO-Mozambique (1975)/MPLA-Angola (1976)), the political/military pressure on Rhodesian intensified.\footnote{See O’Meara 82: 35-36.}

Second, in October-November, 1974 the states of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana along with FRELIMO acted in tandem to negotiate with South African and Rhodesian officials on the issues of the release of Black nationalists imprisoned in Rhodesia and the prospects for long-term settlement.\footnote{33 The genesis of the OFLS on these issues apparently were secret talks between Kaunda and Vorster in which both expressed the desire for an end to minority rule in Rhodesia and a peaceful transition to majority rule. Vorster made this publicly known by stating that South Africa was interested in aiding a transition in Rhodesia. This supposedly marked the beginning of South African efforts at moderating Smith’s position on majority rule. See Thompson 86: 12-17, Legum 76-77: A24-A26 and David Martin & Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, Faber, Faber & Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, London, 1981, pp. 133-143.}

On November 8, 1974, they were able to obtain the release of several nationalist leaders and this marked the first formal act of what become known as the Organization of Front-line States (OFLS) (\textit{N.Y. Times}, November 9, 1974). In April, 1975, this organization was given full committee status within the OAU in the OAU Declaration of Dar es Salaam on Southern Africa.\footnote{34 For the full text of the resolution see ACR, Legum 75-76: C71-C75.} From this point on, the OFLS under Nyerere’s chairmanship orchestrated Africa’s policy toward the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict.

\footnote{33 The original policy position of the OFLS and the OAU on this conflict is embodied in the Lusaka Declaration of 1969 and the Mogadiscio Declaration of 1971. Each of these called for majority rule in southern Africa and while the Lusaka declaration left armed struggle as a last resort, the later statement pushed for violence as the only means of attaining that goal. See ACR, Legum 69-70: C41 and ACR, Legum 71-72.}
Third, the first official conference on the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe issue took place in August, 1975 at Victoria Falls on the Zambian-Rhodesian border. This conference, preceded by a cease-fire on the part of the guerrillas, was attended by Kaunda as the representative of the OFLS, Smith, Vorster and Muzorewa, Nkomo and Sithole representing the black nationalists. (Thompson 86: 26-28). The meeting was a failure due to Smith's intransigence on several issues and black nationalist factionalism which Smith exploited.35

The failure of this conference brought about an escalation of guerrilla activity culminating in the formation in November, 1975 of a joint military force, Zimbabwe Independence People's Army (ZIPA) (Legum 76-77: A20). This effort was designed to unite ZANU and ZAPU militarily and thus politically and provide a united front vis-a-vis Smith to offset his divide and rule strategy. The main impetus came from the OFLS, however, the unification was short-lived. While united in name, troops were trained and equipped separately with different leaders, tactics and bases of operations. The effect was largely cosmetic.

Overall, the impact on the struggle was escalatory. Weapon shipments to both groups were expanded by China and the Soviet Union

35See Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: How the Search for Peaceful Change Failed," in ACR, Africana Publishing, London, 1975-76, pp. A49-A52. One of the clear results of this conference was the acceleration of Sithole's deteriorating position within ZANU. By attending the conference, he further de-legitimized himself with leaders like Mugabe and Tongogara and this led to intensifying actions on the part of ZANU and eventually his ouster.
along with increased recruitment and training. In February, 1976, the OFLS met at Quelimane, Mozambique and announced that a peaceful settlement with Smith was unattainable and that armed struggle was the necessary course (ACR, Legum 75-76: B639). In March, the new FRELIMO government under Samora Machel closed its border with Rhodesia cutting off Rhodesia's only non-South African link to the sea. The escalation was further evidenced by the increasing number of Rhodesian casualties; from 1972-1975 there were 75 government troops killed, in 1976 alone that number was 176 (Hodges 77: 15). Despite this increased activity, the conflict had not yet reached stage eight status.

The fourth development in this period centered on renewed superpower involvement. The U.S. in the wake of intervention and civil war in Angola took a high profile position on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in the form of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in April, 1976. This flurry of activity brought a shift in U.S. policy on the conflict, renewed South

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37 Although not by design, this strengthened Mugabe's hand vis-a-vis Sithole and other moderates at a crucial time in the struggle. By rejecting negotiations, militants within both ZANU and ZAPU were legitimized in the conflict. Since many OFLS leaders (Nyerere, Kaunda) were luke-warm to Mugabe, this proved very central to his emerging leadership. For an excellent discussion of this dynamic within the OFLS see Thompson 86: 63-66.

38 Ibid., 75-76: B639.
African pressure on Smith and eventually led to a compromise on the issue of black majority rule from the Smith faction within the RFP.  

In a speech on April 27, 1976 in Lusaka Zambia, Kissinger repudiated the 'Tar-Baby' memorandum of 1969 and laid out a ten point program for U.S. policy in southern Africa. This policy was based on the Callaghan proposals of March 22, and further called for majority rule in two years, a maintenance of sanctions, repeal of the Byrd Amendment and a pledge of $12.5 million to aid Mozambique in its closing of the border.

This development and the negotiations that flowed out of it, greatly increased the pressure on Smith to deal. This was occurring at the same time the military situation was becoming more contentious.

39 For a discussion of these talks and the change in position by Smith, see Legum 76-77: A28-A40. This account offers the best data and analysis of the Kissinger shuttle and "secret" negotiations between Kissinger, Smith and Vorster. Since varying accounts of who exerted decisive pressure on Smith exist, it is difficult to pinpoint when he accepted the concept of majority rule in two years. Apparently, after the September 19-20 meetings in Pretoria, Smith decided that American and South African support for a stubborn Rhodesian policy would not be forthcoming. Hence, he decided to compromise and negotiate.

40 For a text of the speech see ACR, Legum 76-77: C159-C162.

Throughout the summer of 1976, Kissinger along with Vorster and the OFLS attempted to achieve a breakthrough toward a settlement. The Americans and South Africans apparently were more concerned with the growing conflict and its capacity to generate "communist influence" than the specific concerns of the nationalists. If it was possible, a transfer to moderates was definitely more preferable than either Nkomo or Mugabe. The OFLS for their part were attempting eliminate factionalism between ZANU and ZAPU and forge a united front.

In a meeting with Kissinger and Vorster on September 19, 1976 Smith agreed to the principle of majority rule in two years (N.Y. Times September 26, 1976). In addition, Kissinger outlined a five point plan for independence that met several of Smith's demands including an immediate cease-fire and the disarmament of guerrilla forces, the maintenance of white control over the police and military and a virtual white veto over constitutional development.42

In a meeting in Lusaka on September 26, the OFLS and nationalist leaders rejected the plan since it provided a framework for independence without adequate safeguards against continued white rule, no commitment to one man, one vote and limited guarantees of nationalist participation. In a joint statement on the Kissinger plan the OFLS stated:

The Presidents have carefully studied the proposals outlined by the illegal and racist regime which, if accepted, would be tantamount to legalizing the colonialist and racist structures of power...Now that the pressures of armed struggle have force the enemy to accept majority

42See Thompson 86: 30-31 for a discussion of these points and their impact.
rule as a condition for immediate independence, the five Presidents call upon the colonial authority, the British government, to convene at once a conference outside Zimbabwe with the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people (ACF, Logum 76-77: C159).

This served to accentuate the differences between the nationalists and the Smith regime along with re-invigorating the guerrilla struggle. Also, this call by the OFLS for British participation brought a reluctant London government to the forefront of the process and relegated future U.S. administrations (Carter) to a secondary role behind the British.

The Patriotic Front and the Geneva Conference

Having achieved a major public concession from Smith on majority rule, the OFLS sensed the possibility for a settlement provided certain conditions could be orchestrated. The first was unity for the nationalists to thwart Smith's last "trump card"-factionalism and the second was a strong British role to mitigate a U.S./South African globalist approach.

In the former, the factionalism that was rife both between ZANU and ZAPU and within ZANU had to be eliminated in order to present a united stand not only vis-a-vis Smith but the moderates (Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole) as well. This was accomplished first with the codification of Mugabe as the official and recognized leader of ZANU.43

43 This was opposed by Nyerere and Kaunda yet supported by the vast majority of ZANU fighters as well as Machel. The development of the entire leadership struggle within ZANU is far too complex to explore here. Yet, one of the salient consequences of Mugabe's rise was the perception among other participants and observers that ZANU now was the most "radical" and unpredictable of the nationalist groups. This no
Second, the nationalists at the insistence of the OFLS announced the formation of the Patriotic Front in Dar es Salaam on October 10, 1976 (N.Y. Times October 11, 1976).

In the later, the OFLS generated an immediate and positive response from the British who convened the Geneva conference on October 28, 1976. The participants included Smith, Mugabe and Nkomo, Muzorewa (UANC), Sithole and the OFLS chaired by Britain's UN Ambassador Ivor Richard. The conference was not accompanied by a cease-fire and guerrilla and government attacks intensified throughout November as the talks continued. The results were a stalemate over issues of transition, voting, independence date and security. Smith's position was unyielding: whites would not relinquish control over the police and security forces and would not commit to the concept of one man, one vote. This served to scuttle real progress and Smith spent most of the conference in Rhodesia.

What emerged on December 12, 1976 was the following. First, the Patriotic Front although divided became the solid leader in the nationalist struggle both with the OFLS, the British and other parties. The moderates, especially Muzorewa and Sithole, clearly showed their willingness to compromise with Smith and thus they further de-

doubt impacted on Smith's desire to seek an internal settlement and eventually de-legitimize moderates inside Rhodesia. All of this will be discussed in the analysis section. See Legum 76-77: A15-A18.

44 Casualties were the highest for any one month to date and Rhodesian military incursions into Mozambique inflicted great damage on FRELIMO's defenses prompting Machel to intimate that Cuban and Soviet aid might be necessary. See ACR, Legum 76-77: B299-B300.

legitimized themselves as long as the conflict continued. Third, the Smith regime still was not militarily persuaded of defeat and thus felt that it could procrastinate and continue a policy of divide and prevail. Finally, the nationalists came away more committed than even to the concept of armed struggle. This polarization was personified in the OFLS decision to recognize the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate representatives of Zimbabwean people (N.Y. Times, January 10, 1977).

All of this led to an eventual escalation of the conflict that moved it into a stage eight status. The identification of that point is the next task of this study.

THE RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE WAR: THE INITIATION OF CONFLICT

It is important to now identify that point at which the conflict reaches stage eight status. As alluded to above, this task is somewhat problematic in this case due to its unique nature. While the conflict intensified throughout the 70's (1972-1979), there were periodic lulls and stoppages of activity as well as extended periods of re-deployment which is customary in a guerrilla conflict. Also, the nature of the military balance (to be explored later) was such that the Patriotic Front had limited avenues of access into Rhodesia and were subject to small engagements to prevent a massive defeat.  

--Like South Africa today, much of ZANU and ZAPU actions involved small-scale infiltration, training and then hit and run attacks. Thus, while intense, the conflict does not exhibit the same large-scale conventional military status of either the Ogaden or Angola.
Nonetheless, the military actions of the guerrilla's did represent a concerted effort at changing the political authority structure and while small in scale, they were able to launch attacks in virtually every region of Rhodesia adversely impacting on the economic, political and social structure.

The point at which this conflict reaches this stage is after the failure of the Geneva conference (December-January). With the failure at Geneva, the further widening of the gap between moderates and the Patriotic Front and Smith's apparent intransigence on key issues, the war escalated into an all out bid for control. The exact date cannot be identified but both leaders in the Patriotic Front pledged renewed vigor in the armed struggle and this coincided with the release of several key military leaders from Zambia including Josiah Tongogara. A key indicator of this was the expansion of the theatre of war from northern and eastern Rhodesia throughout the entire country as ZANU forces infiltrated rural areas heretofore removed from the fighting.

It is at this point, January 15, 1977, that our analysis of the conflict begins. It is now incumbent on this study to examine the contours of the local context at this point of conflict initiation.

As we will see when we explore the conflict itself, negotiations between the OFLS, Britain, the U.S., South Africans and all other parties continued throughout this period (1977-1979). In addition, several proposals were put forth and negotiated however the Patriotic Front never relinquished its armed struggle during these talks. This is also unlike the previous cases yet it does not hinder our analysis.

ACR, Legum 76-77: B413.

See Legum 76-77: A6-A10 and ACR, Legum 76-77 B910-B911.
THE LOCAL CONTEXT

The following is an analysis of the contours of the local context in terms of its susceptibility to successful superpower intervention. The variables and indicators are outlined in Appendix A for reference.

1. The Local Military Balance

A. Is the military balance tenuous and subject to dramatic changes with relatively small increments of aid, or is it stalemate and relatively stable?

In January, 1977, the military forces of the respective factions were apportioned as follows. The Rhodesian military and police numbered approximately 16,000 active personnel with 35,000 reservists. These forces were geared for counter-insurgency tactics with moderate air force capability. In addition, 1,200-2,000 mercenaries mostly of Portuguese, British and American nationality served in the Rhodesian military. Further, the South African military augmented the Rhodesian forces by stationing between 2,000-10,000 (1969-1973) troops in strategic areas of the country including the Zambezi valley.

The nature of the struggle (guerrilla conflict and infiltration) meant a high degree of coordination between the army, policy and internal security forces and this translated into non-traditional

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51 See SIPRI 76: 109.
methods of fighting (Cohen 77: 488). Overall, the Rhodesians could field and equip @25,000 armed personnel at any one time.

For the Patriotic Front/ZIPA, the number of active guerrillas is hard to accurately gauge even after the fact. By January 1977, there were approximately 15,000 soldiers in ZIPA. Over 70% were ZANU troops and the remainder were ZAPU recruits. This number was up from @1-2,000 total in 1974 and showed the increased polarization and escalation of the conflict. These 15,000 troops included those being trained and those already activated. Of that number @2,500 (mostly ZANU) operated inside Rhodesia (Ibid., 77: 16). Virtually all ZIPA troops were trained in camps in the front-line states. ZANU forces were trained by Chinese, Tanzanian and Mozambiquan advisors at several camps including Itumbi, Mgagao and Chifombo in Tanzania and Mozambique. ZAPU forces were trained in Zambia and also Angola after 1976 (ACR, Legum 78-79: B994).

The struggle between the nationalists and the Smith regime changed with differing leadership and tactics. At the outset (1966-68), ZANU and ZAPU forces engaged Rhodesian forces in conventional fashion and suffered great defeats (SIPRI 76: 106-107). However, when this tactic proved disastrous, nationalist forces regrouped and began a more classic guerrilla style campaign engaging in hit and run attacks in

52 The actual number is almost impossible to verify. Gann places PF troops strength in 1974 at @5,000 while SIPRI statistics place it at 1-2,000.

border areas of Rhodesia seeking sanctuary in neighboring states. Thus, direct engagement with the Rhodesian military was avoided and the Salisbury government responded with border raids into Zambia and Mozambique.

By January 1977 and the initiation of the conflict, the scope of this activity had escalated. First, as pointed out, largely ZANU and some ZAPU forces expanded operations throughout the entire country. Second, ZANU changed its tactical position and concentrated on infiltrating larger numbers of troops who would occupy and politically administer rural areas as bases of operations, thus changing the fundamental nature of the conflict. Conversely, ZAPU maintained the same pattern as before.

This renewed activity did escalate the battles, casualties and rhetoric on both sides yet the fundamental balance remained in tact. Few analysts argued that Rhodesia was near collapse and military defeat for either side appeared unlikely in the near future.

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54 ZANU adapted to these new tactics more readily than ZAPU due to the Chinese-FRELIMO influence in ZANU also the differences in overall political strategy between the two leadership.

55 See O'Meara 82: 36-37 for a discussion of this escalation.

56 Speculation about this shift in tactics between the two main bodies of the PF centers on political/ideological differences. ZANU under Mugabe felt that popular support and rural mobilization a la China was necessary to build support for the post independence government. ZAPU under Nkomo concentrated more on international support and legitimacy among the various leadership and special interests feeling that eventual power transfer would take place at this level. This accounts in large part for the greater willingness of Nkomo to negotiate with Smith and the moderates despite a public stance of confrontation. It also is one of the main reasons why ZANU was able to garner so much post-independence support vis-a-vis its rivals.
B. Does one side or the other appear capable or close to military victory or is a protracted war of attrition the expected result?

In the government's case, a limited supply of manpower coupled with limited access to arms made their position relatively stable. That is no large scale infusion of weapons was likely to change the course of the conflict. The only possible force capable of reversing Rhodesia's fortunes was the SADF, however, from 1974 on, the Vorster policy of detente and advocacy of settlement precluded the participation of South Africa in the direct defense of Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{57}

With the guerrillas expanding operations in all areas of the country, counter-insurgency was the only course. The resulting military situation was one of pre-emptive strikes against guerrilla bases or counter-attacks against rebel positions. Little changed in terms of territory or control. Only casualties escalated.

For the PF, while operations were expanded and recruitment increased, a conventional military strategy was unlikely. First, PF forces were equipped and trained for guerrilla action only. Second, ZAPU forces were tied down by a lack of manpower and inadequate basing.\textsuperscript{58} Third, both sides were hampered by limited access to

\textsuperscript{57}SADF forces which numbered as many as 10,000 were gradually withdrawn to the border by 1976-77.

\textsuperscript{58}While the Rhodesian-Mozambique border provided many avenues of infiltration, the border with Zambia, through which ZAPU operated did not. The nature of the terrain afforded the government the luxury of more concentrated defense against infiltration, consequently, ZAPU operated at a disadvantage.
material since all had to come through OFLS hands, who controlled flow and access.59

Thus, the prospects for continued war, escalation and polarization were great while neither side neared victory. Given the manpower levels on both sides and limited military supplies, no decisive military action appeared likely. Although, eventually manpower and economic destruction would have forced the governments hand, the realistic time frame for this was certainly well into the 1980's.

C. Does the terrain lend itself to decisive and rapid shifts in the battle or is it more suited for a long guerrilla type struggle?

The clear answer to this is no. Perhaps, if the PF were forced to operate from inside Rhodesia alone they could be liquidated in a period of time, but with basing in surrounding states, they were insured continued survival. Mozambique and Zambia acted as shelters for PF forces and thus made their task easier. As discussed above, the remoteness of the terrain particularly in Mozambique gave ZANU's forces a measure of advantage.

D. Is the base of support for the respective groups ethnically or territorially based/are the respective positions of the factions historically rooted or more fluid and easily changeable?

Clearly, the initial base of support for both groups was racial. The government had the support of the white community, one that was highly cohesive and committed to continued rule.60 The PF had the


60See L.H. Gann, "Rhodesia and the Prophets," African Affairs, Vol. 71 no. 283, April, 1972, pp. 125-143 for a discussion of the cohesiveness of the white community.
support of a significant degree of the African population although at the time of the conflict it was difficult to determine how much. Moderates like Muzorewa and Sithole along with the PF claimed majority support among the African population. However, as the conflict escalated, expanded guerrilla activity and popular complicity in that action signaled strong black support.

This black-white division also had the added dynamic of inter-ethnic rivalry between Shona and Ndebele. ZANU leadership and support was drawn largely from the Shona ethnic group and its corresponding clans. ZAPU forces were equally rooted in the Ndebele strongholds. This intensified differences between the groups while also further deepening the rift between black African and white Rhodesian. The result was deep ethnic fissions in a society that cut across black and white and served to heighten the intensity of the struggle not only for the guerrillas but for civilians as well.  

Overall, the local military balance was fairly stable. The military forces of each side were unlikely to be defeated by the other and the terrain with adequate guerrilla sanctuary allowed a continued infiltration into Rhodesia, mitigating government hopes for a knock-out blow. With the depth of animosity between the PF and RFP, shifts in popular position and thus actor fortunes were also unlikely. This made the local military balance not conducive to successful superpower intervention.

\[61\] As Rhodesian efforts at thwarting the guerrillas increased with reprisals, detention, and Protected Villages, rebel recruitment increased and active popular support materialized.
2. Local Factionalism

A. Are divisions between groups historically deep and ethnically based?

The above evidence suggest that the answer is yes. After over 100 years of colonial rule and Apartheid like laws imposed by the white minority, black-white divisions were not likely to be papered over. Given the "colonial" nature of the Rhodesian regime and its illegal status, recognition of white supremacy was out of the question. This is evidenced in the failures of the Victoria Falls and Geneva conferences. In both cases, Smith's desire to maintain white control without true majority rule (one man-one vote) provided the nationalists with the impetus to escalate the struggle. These issues were not reconcilable based on "minority rights" terms.\(^2\)

B. Are those divisions ideologically based?

The answer here is more problematic given the differences in public and private perceptions of the respective leaders of the PF (Mugabe vs. Nkomo). For Smith and the RFP, ideology was clear and seemingly unyielding: capitalist oriented economy, a commitment to democratic procedures (for whites) and virulent anti-communism. Within this standard rendition of western oriented ideas was the fundamental ideological issue of racial separation. The RFP and Ian Smith were ideologically committed to Apartheid like rule in Rhodesia and this placed them at odds with both moderates and radicals within the nationalist movement.

The parties to the PF coalition, Mugabe and Nkomo, were more difficult to pin down. Nkomo and ZAPU espoused an ideological orientation most closely akin to the Afro-Socialism of Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (Legum 76-77: A19). Although Nkomo advocated a more statist role in the economy in terms of land reform and economic changes, he was on record against communism for Zimbabwe and most multi-national interests inside and outside Rhodesia supported his movement.63

Mugabe's position was more leftist. He advocated a socialist reformation in Zimbabwe along with eventual one-party rule. His rhetoric talked of confiscation and redistribution of land and wealth and this served to intensify white fears of a ZANU victory (Legum 76-77: A17-A18). His strategy during the guerrilla conflict most closely resembled Chinese tactics and consequently, observers saw his movement as an emerging manifestation of Afro-communism.64

It is apparent that there were stark divisions between the nationalists and the regime. They had both racial and political

63 See Burchette 78: 228-229 for a discussion of this. Clear evidence that business interests inside and outside Rhodesia supported Nkomo was the active role of Lornho and its CEO Roland Rowland in facilitating talks between Smith and Nkomo in 1977. See Thompson 86: 60-61.

64 Part of the reason for this view of Mugabe was his relative secrecy vis-a-vis Nkomo. While Nkomo traveled extensively, meeting with European, eastern bloc and Third World leaders alike, Mugabe remained in Mozambique with his forces. When he did grant interviews or make speeches, his rhetoric was more hostile than Nkomo's and thus, his reputation as a radical increased. In retrospect, we have seen that his rule has been marked by limited socialism and pragmatism despite a huge mandate. For a discussion of the Mugabe-ZANU philosophy within the African political landscape see Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild, Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy, Lynne Reiner publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, pp. 85-107, 199-224 and Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, pp. 22-98.
dimensions that further increased the void between the parties. Also, internal ideological differences in the PF also added to the factionalism present.

C. Are the respective groups fractionalized or cohesive in leadership and policy?

For the RFP and Smith, the only internal challenge came from the extreme right who advocated all out war and no compromise. Their impact was minimal since they were few in number and easily neutralized. In the case of the nationalists factionalism was strong, deep and violent and it occupied many planes within and among the various nationalist groups.

First, the most fractionalized movement was ZANU. Originally formed out of ZAPU in 1963, the movement had a succession of leadership crises from 1964 through 1976 and beyond. The most important centered on the direction of the struggle. Sithole, the founder of ZANU, moved to a more moderate stance by accepting Smith's demand for the renunciation of violence. This infuriated the young imprisoned leaders including Mugabe and Tongagara. They moved against Sithole throughout 1973-74 culminating in his ouster on November 1, 1974 (Martin & Johnson 81: 147-149).

During this period, violent conflict between factions of ZANU accounted for more guerrilla deaths than engagement with Rhodesian forces. The culmination of this violence was the assassination of

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65See Thompson 85: 46-52 for a discussion of this.

66The ouster was not officially recognized until 1976 when the OFLS put their stamp of approval on Mugabe's leadership.

67See ACR, Legum 75-76: B641-B643.
Herbert Chitepo in Lusaka (March 18, 1975). Chitepo was National Chairman of ZANU and one of those guerrilla leaders committed to armed struggle. His death engendered accusations from within and outside ZANU of complicity on the part of Mugabe and other ethnic factions within the movement. This also exacerbated tensions between Mugabe and those front-line presidents against his role in the struggle—Kaunda and later Neto.

ZAPU was not immune from internal factionalism however Nkomo’s leadership and stature overshadowed other potential rivals. The only significant challenge came from a splinter group of former Nkomo supporters who formed FROLIZI and attempted for a time in 1974-75 to gain equal status with ZANU and ZAPU but eventually faded into the background (Ibid., 75-76: B641). Additionally, the smaller and less militarily oriented ZAPU provided less opportunities for opposition coming from military commanders as in ZANU.

Finally, the existence of the moderate black elements (UANC-Muzorewa, Sithole & ZUPO-Chirau) within Rhodesian politics further heightened the level of factionalism. Their insistence on non-violence and accommodation with Smith hurt their popular standing yet gave the

68 It is widely believed that the Rhodesian security police orchestrated the assassination for the express purpose of sowing factionalism within the nationalist camp. By de-legitimating Mugabe, the hands of the moderates along with Nkomo would be strengthened. Thus, Chitepo’s death served Smith’s interests best.

69 For an excellent discussion of this affair and its impact on the nationalist movements and the front-line states, see Thompson 86: 47-50. This event was used by Nkomo, Kaunda, Sithole and Muzorewa to discredit ZANU radicals like Mugabe and de-legitimize their leadership in the struggle. For a time they were successful, yet for those soldiers in the field—ZANLA regulars, Mugabe and Tongagara gained in stature thus solidifying their position.
Smith regime and other parties alternative avenues of access into the potential settlement within Rhodesia.

Overall, the degree of local factionalism was very high (+) in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. Despite the existence of the PF, factional infighting and leadership rivalry could not be ignored. Whether this would prove decisive in affording the superpowers increased access still remained to be seen.

3. The Role of the State of Influence

This variable taps the impact of the state or states with dominant influence at the time of the conflict. In the African context, this variable can be likened to a measure of the importance of the "former colonial power," in this case Great Britain.

A. Does the former colonial power or dominant state have a strong involvement in the state or a high stake in the outcome of the conflict?

The British role in Rhodesian politics had always been strong particularly after the UDI in 1965. Britain led the fight internationally for sanctions both military and economic. However, successive London governments (1966-1974) had wavered in the importance attached to a truly independent Rhodesia and the role that Britain should play in the process.  

By 1975-76, Britain's interest intensified as the conflict deepened and the OFLS and British Commonwealth increased pressure on London to take an active role. Under the Callaghan government, London

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76The wavering coincided with conservative and labor administrations who saw the African situation very differently as one might imagine.
sent several emissaries to the region to work out conditions for a settlement and Nyerere and Nkomo were received at 10 Downing Street for talks on Rhodesia (Legum 75-76: B88-B89).

A second development was the public call by the OFLS and PF for British mediation in the wake of the Kissinger proposals of September 1976. The Geneva Conference which was a direct result of OFLS calls for British mediation was ultimately unsuccessful, however, it did solidify Britain's position as honest broker and "point-person" for further negotiations.

A third development at the initiation point of the conflict was the emergence of David Owen as Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. His policy stance clearly placed Britain in the forefront of the negotiations for a variety of reasons. As Legum points out:

Dr. Owen's policies towards Africa differed from those previously pursued in three respects. First, he was willing for Britain to accept the risk of becoming involved in the interim government of Rhodesia. Second, he accepted the need to begin to reduce Britain's financial involvement in South Africa. Third, Owen accepted the need for active co-operation with African leaders by visiting even the less friendly capitals on the continent—a notable change from past practice (Legum 77-78: A84).

Consequently, by the initiation point of the conflict, Britain had carved out a pivotal role in the negotiations for a settlement with the OFLS, Smith, South Africa and the PF. Also, this shift coincided with the arrival of the Carter administration and its more active African

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71 Legum 76-77: A39-A41.


policy under Andrew Young. This further accentuated Britain's role and "forced" future governments (Thatcher's conservative party-1979) into an activist policy as well.

B. Does the state(s) favor one group over the other in the conflict?

Overall, the answer is no. That is, successive British governments were pledged to majority rule in Rhodesia as decided by the Rhodesians themselves. While each government had their preferences, the overall goal remained in tandem with OFLS goals: legitimate majority rule.

Later, in 1979, this became more problematic as the Thatcher government talked about accepting the Muzorewa government and rejecting PF participation, yet this never fully materialized. We can however surmise that Britain surely favored more moderate black nationalists like Muzorewa or even Nkomo over Mugabe(Legum 76-77: A44-A45). This was evidenced in the proposals made by Ivor Richard at the Geneva conference(Ibid., 76-77: A47-A50).

C. Is it capable of affecting the outcome of the conflict or has it abdicated any role?

Britain's ability to militarily intervene was virtually non-existent. While some military force could have been applied it was politically and militarily not feasible. This option was never considered.

In political/diplomatic terms, the picture is very different. With the political abyss between the nationalists and the Smith regime widening, the necessity for a British role increased. The OFLS acting as the patrons of the PF and South Africa providing a similar function
for the Rhodesians both felt that British participation was the only bridge to a settlement. This related to one of the central points of contention in the negotiations to date: Should the new government be formed before or after independence?

The PF and OFLS argued that if a transition government was formed with significant white participation (i.e., Kissinger proposals), any subsequent reform and change would be doomed by "white veto." Obviously, the Smith regime wanted to maintain maximum power over the process. A British role was seen as a necessary compromise in which Britain would re-establish colonial administration for a period of time to oversee a new constitution, elections, and independence. Thus, a British role was crucial and the OFLS particularly pushed for that outcome.

Once that role was solidified in the Geneva conference, Britain's ability to affect the outcome with its participation and recognition became substantial.

Consequently, the role of the state of influence was strong in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict. This meant a potentially reduced opportunity (-) for successful intervention for the superpowers. Now, it can be argued that a strong role for Britain naturally meant a strong role for the U.S. This is certainly true in a political/diplomatic sense. But since military intervention of any kind was ruled out by Britain and U.S. policy largely mirrored her that approach, the prospects for successful intervention into the conflict did not increase for the U.S.
4. The Role of Regional States

This variable examines the important role that regional states play in the conflict. In this case, we are discussing several states, most notably, South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Botswana and Nigeria.

A. Is there a history of intervention in the states affairs?

If we examine the period from the UDI in Rhodesia to the initiation of conflict, several of these states have had prior interventionist policies. The first is South Africa. Up to 1974, Rhodesia was one of a constellation of allies (including Portuguese Angola, Mozambique and Namibia) for the Apartheid regime. Rhodesia represented a first line of defense against black nationalism as well as a test case for future South African issues.

More concretely, South Africa played a vital role in the military and political solvency of the Smith regime providing an economic lifeline, military aid and personnel. In 1974 that policy of support

\footnote{Some of the figures are important to note. By 1972, South Africa was Rhodesia's number one trading partner and 67% of all Rhodesian exports flowed through South African ports. By 1975 and the closure of the border with Mozambique that figured rose to 100%. Also, Multi-national investment in Rhodesia by South African companies accounted for over half of all business interest. Finally, the Rhodesian military was almost entirely dependent upon South Africa for military aid. For a discussion of this see C. Munhamu Botsio Utete, "Zimbabwe and South African Detente," in Seilor ed., Southern Africa After the Portuguese Coup, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980, pp. 63-65 and John Seilor, "South Africa's Regional Role," in Seilor 80: 107-111.}
changed to one of instigator of compromise as the Vorster government put pressure on Smith to accept the concept of majority rule.\footnote{This new policy was ushered in a policy speech made by Vorster in October of 1974 in which he argued that South Africa must find a way to deal with the states of Africa over issues of black nationalism. It become known as South Africa’s "detente" policy. See \textit{ACR}, Legum 75-76: B610 and Larry W. Bowman, Michael Bratton and Rukudzo Mudziva, "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependency, Destabilization and Liberation," in Callaghy, ed., \textit{South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence}, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1983, pp. 323-335.}

The second state is Zambia. As the primary seat of anti-Rhodesian activity, Zambia under Kaunda had engaged in intervention into Rhodesia since the formation of ZAPU.\footnote{See \textit{ACR}, Legum 75-76: B385-B387.} This brought armed intervention from the Rhodesian military on Zambian soil further increasing that role.

For Angola and Mozambique, their history of intervention came from Portugal’s alliance with Rhodesia and support for white rule. As nationalist movements sprouted up in the colonies, nationalists in both Angola and Mozambique found common cause with ZANU and ZAPU and thus established ties, trained soldiers and provided sanctuary.\footnote{See \textit{ACR}, Legum 76-77: B299-B300 & \textit{ACR}, Legum 77-78: B513-B514.} By 1977, Mozambique was the main base of operations for ZANU guerrillas and Mugabe’s closest ally among the OFLS and Angola was a main base of ZAPU operations and training.

Nigeria and Botswana did not have any significant history of intervention except diplomatic support for the struggle.

\section*{B. Do the regional states have the capacity to intervene militarily?}

Only those states with geographic proximity to the conflict, adequate military force and secure internal regimes had the capacity to
intervene. Only South Africa and Zambia meet all of those conditions.

The South African government clearly had the capacity to intervene. With the largest, best equipped and most advanced military force in the region, Pretoria could have insured the survival of the Smith regime for an extended period had they been willing to commit the necessary manpower. However, several factors mitigated that capacity.

First, the South Africans had just completed a disastrous and aborted invasion of Angola a suffering a military and political defeat. Second, Vorster was in the midst of an extended "detente" policy in Africa designed to gain favor with black nationalist states not alienate them. Thus Rhodesia fit into that strategy as a "sacrificial lamb" on the altar of recognition of South Africa's unique position on the continent. Third with Namibia increasing in importance, Pretoria did not have the resources or political capital to defend two vast areas simultaneously. They choose to cling to Namibia.

The other state with such capability was Zambia. Their intervention capacity was dictated largely by their geographic proximity and not by their military power. With a limited military force, Zambia could not hope to defeat the Rhodesian in a war but could, if inclined, guarantee the security of the border region for ZAPU guerrillas. However, this tactic was never adopted by Kaunda.

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76 For an examination of the enormous military dominance that South Africa has over the region, see Seilor (80) and Butts and Hughes (86).

77 For a discussion of this see Utete 80: 61-76 and Thompson 86: 13-15.
C. Are there political, ethnic or ideological affinities for one faction over another on the part of regional states?

All the regional states had their political "favorites" in the struggle based on a variety of reasons. Obviously, all the salient regional states except South Africa had ethnic affinities for the black nationalists, PF. Yet, each state contributed to the factionalism described above by favoring one group over another.

For Nkomo's ZAPU, Zambia and Angola became his biggest proponents. Kaunda had long supported Nkomo as the best hope for an independent Zimbabwe. Largely based on like ideology and approach, the two remained allies throughout the struggle. Kaunda did not trust Mugabe and worked against his ascension to the leadership of ZANU.\(^7\) In fact, Kaunda had several ZANU leaders detained over the Chitepo affair. Angola under Neto developed an affinity for Nkomo as well largely based on ZAPU's proximity to Angola and support for the MPLA during the struggle. This support was non-ideological however, and probably grew out of the Soviet affinity for ZAPU.

Tanzania and Mozambique both fluctuated in their support for ZANU. While Tanzania and Mozambique provided all of ZANU's training and basing, they both were apprehensive over the internecine fighting within the movement. Nyerere himself saw ZANU's infighting as an

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\(^7\) Whether the reasons for this were ideological or political is open to conjecture. Certainly, Mugabe's more militant attitude spelled a long and drawn out guerrilla struggle that would adversely effect the Zambian economy. Perhaps, he saw Mugabe as an impediment to Zambian policy interests alone. For a discussion of these relations and Zambia's perspective, see ACR, Legum 75-76: B385-B387 and ACR, Legum 76-77: B413. Also, see Douglas G. Anglin and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia's Foreign policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1979 and Utete 80: 68.
impediment to unity and hence strengthening Smith's hand. Machel was critical of the ideological direction of ZANU until Mugabe and his followers took over.

Nigeria and Botswana both showed little preference however, Nigeria did in the later stages promote secret talks between Smith and Nkomo that were aimed to find a solution that excluded ZANU (Thompson 86: 66). Thus, they clearly developed a greater affinity for Nkomo and ZAPU.

D. Do the regional states have strong ties to a supra-regional actor(s) who has a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict and consequently would be willing to aid an intervention?

Clearly, the answer here is a qualified yes. The Southern African states mentioned had differing patterns of relations with motivated supra-regional actors. First, Mozambique under FRELIMO had extensive ties to the Soviet union and the PRC. In 1977, Maputo signed a 25 year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow which provided large amounts of military aid and some personnel (ACR, Legum 76-77: B300). Also, China was Mozambique’s largest provider of aid in 1975-76. Second, Tanzania had extensive ties to the PRC and acted as the main conduit for Chinese supply and training of ZANU (Ibid, 76-77: B360-B361). In addition, Tanzania also possessed strong economic ties to Britain further enhancing London’s status as the state of influence.

Some reports indicated that the personnel included Cuban troops who were used extensively in the training and equipping of ZANU forces, although this has never been fully substantiated. See William Leo Grande, Cuba's policy in Africa, 1959-1980, Institute for international Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1980, pp. 50-53 and David E. Albright, "The Communist States and Southern Africa," in Carter & O’Meara, eds., International Politics in Southern Africa, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, pp. 4-10.
Third, both Zambia and Angola were large recipients of Soviet aid and material and thus acted as chief conduits for Moscow's aid to ZAPU.³⁰ Fourth, South Africa had strong ties to the west including the U.S. and Great Britain which provided them access to the Smith regime in Salisbury.

All of these supra-regional actors were highly interested in the outcome for a variety of reasons. For the U.S. and Great Britain, considerations of Soviet influence in Angola and Mozambique motivated them to find a peaceful solution amenable to western interests in Rhodesia. Also, the economic stake of Zimbabwe further heightened this interest.³¹ For the Soviets, Rhodesia represented another portion of extended struggle for black nationalist rule in southern Africa that Moscow had pledged to support and militarily intervened to protect in Angola.

Overall, the role of regional states was strong with deep ideological and political considerations at stake. Yet, despite their


high stake in the conflict and clear proclivities for different factions, all states shared a common approach. The OFLS and South Africa generally adhered to the common purpose of settlement rather than escalated civil war and thus acted in concert to mitigate supra-regional military intervention and internal escalation. Thus, their role was not conducive to successful superpower intervention.

5. The Role of Regional Organizations

This variable attempts to gauge the role of relevant regional organizations to the conflict. In this case as in all others that organization was the OAU. However, due to the unique dimensions of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, OAU responsibility fell to the Organization of Front-Line States (OFLS) which included Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola.

A) Are the regional organizations cohesive on a policy toward the conflict?

The OFLS, formed in 1974 and given full subcommittee status within the OAU in 1975, was charged with the prosecution of a peaceful settlement to the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict. Towards this end they were able to bypass traditional inertia and factionalism within the OAU and fashion a cohesive policy on the conflict. OFLS influence and dominance became apparent in the aftermath of the Kissinger proposals in 1976. As Cervenka points out:

The monopoly of the Front-line Presidents on determining policy in Rhodesia became even more pronounced when Dr. Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State entered the African scene in 1976. The OAU was 'kept informed' but otherwise entirely excluded from the negotiations which produced the Anglo-American plan for majority
When the talks on Rhodesia's constitutional future opened in Geneva on 26 October 1976, it was apparent that whatever agreement emerged from the conference, or even outside it, would have very little to do with the OAU (Cervenka 76-77: A73).

Despite differing alignments among the leaders with respect to the nationalist movements, the fundamental principles of the OFLS remained intact. First, majority rule was the goal without any de facto minority (white) control. This naturally placed the OFLS squarely behind ZANU and ZAPU and de-legitimized moderates like Muzorewa, Chirau and later Sithole who were willing to deal away one man, one vote for a share of power.

Second, armed struggle was a necessary corollary to negotiation. Without military pressure, the Smith regime and its benefactor—South Africa would not negotiate. Third, unity among the nationalists was vital no matter what the individual preferences of the leaders. Hence, despite high levels of suspicion and animosity, a recognition of unity forged the PF into one voice in the negotiations. This point cannot be overemphasized. As Thompson points out in reference to this:

> The political unity forged with the assistance of the Frontline was absolutely essential to the negotiated settlement...With the Patriotic Front united, the Frontline states could argue that the internal settlement excluded those who were doing the fighting (Thompson 86: 53).

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82 These contrasting preferences of the respective leaders within the OFLS are explored on pp. 36-39 and the corresponding notes.

83 This eventually became official OFLS policy on January 9, 1977 when the PF was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people. This was later codified at the OAU Conference in Libreville, July 2-5, 1977. In the process, Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau were ignored as nationalist forces. See Cervenka 76-77: A73-A74, Cervenka 77-78: A59 and ACR, Legum 77-78: C3.
Finally, a commitment to a peaceful transition without a protracted guerrilla struggle was vital to the political and economic fabric of the OFLS and hence, negotiation was always preferable.\textsuperscript{84}

Clearly, the OFLS was committed to a unified position on the conflict despite internal differences over strategy and preferences. This would prove immensely important in the conflict stage.

B. Are they able to enforce that policy with member states?

If we examine the entire term of the OFLS as a functioning body (1974-1979) with respect to the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict, their record on this point is somewhat mixed. Yet, in looking at OFLS policy from the outbreak of the conflict in 1977 through 1979, a different image appears.

Early on in the struggle (66-76), regional states within the OAU were a contributing factor to the factionalism that was rampant within the Zimbabwean nationalist movements. As discussed above, each state with the exception of Tanzania and Botswana had their definite favorites in the guerrilla struggle and subsequently took explicit and sometimes extreme action in support of those "clients". The most visible in this was Kaunda. It was unilateral Zambian policy that initiated secret talks between Vorster, Smith and Nkomo and also detained and jailed key ZANU leaders during crucial times of the struggle (1975-76).\textsuperscript{85} FRELIMO as well acted to offset Kaunda's

\textsuperscript{84}This is evidenced in their constant support for the Lusaka declaration of 1969 and willingness to engage in talks with Smith and Vorster in a multitude of forums—Victoria Falls, Geneva, Malta and finally Lancaster House.

\textsuperscript{85}See Anglin & Shaw (79), Martin & Johnson (81), ACR, Legum 75-76: B385-B387 and Thompson 86: 47-49.
influence over the process by supplying and shielding ZANU forces keeping them solvent even during violent inter-group conflict.  

This pattern continued until late 1976 and the Kissinger initiative. Until this time, nationalist factionalism coupled with OFLS complicity weakened the ZANU/ZAPU wing of the struggle and strengthened (at least in Smith's eyes) the role of the moderates. Since this was counter-productive to the stated goals of both the nationalists and the OFLS, an effort was orchestrated by Nyerere to forge a unified nationalist front with OFLS/OAU backing. This became the Patriotic Front in October 1976 which was codified by the OAU in January 1977.

Further, while internal factionalism may have been strong in the OFLS until 1977, external intervention was never enhanced. The OFLS maintained a strict policy of control over all military aid to the rebels from China, the Soviet Union and all other sources. This


87It is important to point out what has become clear through this analysis. Nyerere was the driving force for unity in the PF and the OFLS despite the rampant factionalism that existed. His ideological and political preferences were always subordinated to his adherence to the stated goals of majority rule and peaceful transition. For this reason he received grudging respect from all the parties including the U.S., British, South Africans and even Smith.

provided the OFLS with ultimate control over nationalist operations enabling them significant leverage in promoting negotiations at varying times. For different reasons, the same is also true with respect to South Africa's vis-a-vis Rhodesia.

In sum, the role of the OFLS was strong, united and vital to a solution during the entire conflict period. This served to diminish the potential (-) for successful superpower intervention.

6. The Level of Tolerance for Superpower Intervention

This variable attempts to tap the degree to which local participants invite superpower intervention or act to thwart it.

A. Is there historical precedence for superpower intervention?

For Rhodesia-Zimbabwe the answer is no. However, for the region in general, recent precedent did exist for Soviet intervention under the rationale of protecting a nationalist regime against "colonialist/racist aggression," i.e. South Africa. At the initiation point of the conflict, the Angolan Civil War had been over approximately one year. The legitimacy of the MPLA regime rested in part on the manner in which it gained power. The OAU and key African states viewed the conflict as a South African/UNITA/FNLA push for control that was defeated by a combined force of Cuban and MPLA troops with Soviet aid. This was de facto legitimate in the African context.

89See Chapter 4 for an examination of this phenomenon.
given the anti-South African nature of the intervention.\footnote{For a discussion of the South African dimension in African politics see Annette M Seegers, "South African Liberation: Touchstone of African Solidarity," 1986, pp. 185-198.} Hence, a precedent was established should South Africa unilaterally act to militarily save the Smith regime.\footnote{This is manifested in certain front-line states raising the specter of a Cuban-Soviet invasion during particularly dire periods in the conflict. The greatest culprit here was Mozambique who threatened Soviet/Cuban intervention as protection against Rhodesian border raids that were inflicting a heavy toll. Western analysts feared this scenario as well. See N.Y. Times, June 1 & 3, 1977.}

However, as discussed above, South African policy was clearly against this option in Rhodesia for many of the reasons that its operation failed in Angola. Also, The OFIS as a group were not pleased by the precedent of Soviet intervention in Angola and acted precisely to mitigate that same event occurring in Zimbabwe.

B. Are there ideological affinities and ties between factions in the conflict and a superpower?

In the case of the Soviet Union, there were definite predilections for one nationalist faction (ZAPU) over another (ZANU). The Soviet government and press continually emphasized the role of ZAPU in both the fighting and negotiating process and de-emphasized or failed to mention ZANU's role.\footnote{See the following as representative of the pro-ZAPU position in the Soviet Press: Izvestiia May 5, 1978, Pravda July 30, 1979 and December 19, 1979. Also, for a discussion of this, see Somerville 84: 199-203 and Rothenberg 80: 164-171.} Also, the Soviets were forthcoming with
substantial amounts of aid however, its effects were muted by OFLS and particularly Zambia's role as conduit.93

The reasons for these ties to Nkomo could hardly be termed ideological since it has been established that Nkomo was not a Marxist. In fact, ideologically, Mugabe was perhaps more closely attuned to Marxism-Leninism however his Chinese preferences stifled potential Moscow support. Why then did the Soviets throw all their patronage to Nkomo? The best answer lies in the well accepted proposition that Nkomo was the dominant figure in the nationalist camp who would eventually emerge from the struggle as Zimbabwe's leader.94 This view was shared by westerners as well since Nkomo was sufficiently nationalist to illicit popular support while being pragmatic enough to deal with Smith and the whites.

For the U.S., ideological affinity was much less of a factor. No one group, except perhaps Muzorewa and the moderates, represented America's political viewpoint. Consequently, U.S. affinity lay more with a legitimate and stable government of black nationalists from wherever they might arise. The U.S. preferred more moderate elements but with the advent of the Carter administration, they were willing to

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94Most scholars and statesmen shared this view of Nkomo. He was well-known, seen as rational and non-ideological and his international travels won him familiarity. All of this coupled with his solid position in the struggle made him the likely bet for pre-eminence once independence was achieved.
accept Nkomo and Mugabe if that would insure stable transfer and majority rule.\textsuperscript{95}

C. Do the local factions seek superpower intervention actively or are there any agreements regarding intervention on the part of a superpower?

Except for the aforementioned threats of Cuban intervention put forth by Mozambique, no nationalist group solicited superpower intervention. In fact the PF and the OFLS worked against that eventuality in the aftermath of the Angolan episode.

Overall, the tolerance for superpower intervention was very low. Historical precedence was minimal and despite political linkages for the Soviets, active superpower intervention was never sought and openly discouraged. This translates into a situation not conducive to successful superpower intervention. The final map of the local context for Rhodesia-Zimbabwe located in Appendix K.

The local context does not provide overall positive opportunity for successful superpower intervention. While local factionalism was very high as reflected in the intra and inter-movement fighting throughout the period, the remaining variables all coalesced to diminish potential superpower intervention. The most salient appear to be both the role of regional states and regional organizations.

\textsuperscript{95}This is personified in statements made by both Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador Young early on in the administration. See \textit{N.Y.Times}, September 29, 1977 for a report on Young's speech to the UN Security Council in which he outlines American policy on this. Also, see \textit{Legum} 76-77: A52 for a report on a statement made by Vance, February 10, 1977 in which he unequivocally places the U.S. behind majority rule with PF participation and ACR, \textit{Legum} 77-78: C21-C22 for the text of an interview with President Carter (December 1977) by Raph Uwechue, Editor and Chief of \textit{Africa}. 

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In both variables, it is obvious that regional actors fashioned policies that served a regional settlement rather than an escalating conflict and possible intervention. Regional states acted to channel arms flows to the respective groups and maintain a military stalemate while pressuring their respective clients to negotiate. The OFLS acting as the regional organization enhanced this by forging unity on a fractionalized nationalist movement, promoting negotiation with the Smith regime. South Africa, for its part, served a similar function with respect to Salisbury and thus complimented the OFLS.

THE RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE CONFLICT

With this measure of the local context, the next task entails the examination of the conflict and corresponding outcome. The time frame from the initiation point to the termination is approximately three years (1977-1979). Specifically, the conflict begins January 15, 1977 and ends with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement on December 21, 1979.

This extended time period includes a general escalation of the conflict however, due to battlefield realities, periodic lulls are present. This means that for the purposes of this study it is not necessary to track the conflict through each day or week but rather through the salient periods of negotiation and escalation. This translates into examining the conflict in three distinct periods covering the three years: first, January 15, 1977-December 31, 1977, second, January 1, 1978-December 31, 1978 and third, January 1, 1979-December 21, 1979.
January 15, 1977—December 31, 1977

The first phase of the conflict saw as great a flurry of diplomatic activity as actual military engagement. In the immediate aftermath of Geneva, Britain's UN Ambassador Ivor Richard put forth four options for a transition to independence that were designed to address the central point of contention: who will control the army and police (Legum 76-77: A46). These options included:

1) Direct British control of Defense and security during a transition government.
2) A National Security Council with equal representation between white and black along with a "bipartisan" chairman.
3) Head of the military and internal security to be split between a white and black representative.
4) One white, non-Rhodesian Front Minister to control both functions.

The response by the parties established a pattern that was replicated throughout the conflict. PF and OFLS response was cautious but not entirely negative, requesting first that these options be cataloged and placed within an overall proposal for evaluation (Ibid., 76-77: A46-A47). Smith's response was complete rejection based on his commitment to maintain white authority over the military and police. This set in motion a prolonged period of negotiation, proposal, increasing conflict and rejection by one or another of the parties.96

The polarization that intensified out of the failure of the Geneva conference and Richard's subsequent initiative was solidified by the......

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96 As we will see, each time a proposal was broached, one side or the other found significant problems. This increased the void between the PF and Smith and fueled Smith's efforts at accommodation with moderates inside Rhodesia.
The OAU Liberation Committee in Lusaka which endorsed the PF and OFLS in the struggle (N.Y. Times, February 4, 1977). This was followed by an escalation of violence between the PF, her regional benefactors and the Rhodesian government. Guerrilla attacks were stepped up as were incursions into Mozambique by Rhodesian forces.

During this early stage of the conflict, the actions of the superpowers assumed highly dissimilar patterns. First, the new Carter administration introduced a forward strategy for Africa investing a great deal of political and diplomatic capital in forging solutions to the Nambian and particularly Rhodesian issues. UN Ambassador Andrew Young visited London to confer with David Owen the new British point man on Rhodesia-Zimbabwe (Legum 77-78: A9). This first meeting helped launch an American policy centered on stressing negotiations and de-emphasizing the military option. There was never a hint, threat or application of U.S. force and thus the U.S. assumed a strict non-interventionary posture.


See pp. 32-34 in the local context section for a discussion of the important impact David Owen had on the settlement process.

As we have discussed at length, some would argue that diplomatic "intervention" is as important as military. In most cases that could be considered an axiom. Yet, this study is primarily concerned with
One of the most salient reasons for this was the position of the British government and most notably its new minister David Owen. Owen, like Carter, Young and Vance saw the Rhodesian situation as another potential Angola, if true nationalist concerns were not satisfied. That is, he realized that the PF had to be included in the process and that the OFLS and South Africa were vital in propelling a settlement forward.

Thus, the following factors coalesced for a cohesive non-interventionary U.S. policy. First, the OFLS and PF made it clear they wanted a dominant British role. Second, the British under Owen were willing to assume that task. Third, the new administration, unfettered by the previous Kissinger proposals and with a "new look" in Africa was in agreement with the British and OFLS position. Finally, both agreed on the need to stifle the military option and hence, the conflict.

Conversely, Soviet policy adopted a disparate course. As a military supplier to ZAPU, a long-time supporter of armed struggle and emerging ally to several of the front-line states (Angola and Mozambique), the Soviets increased their aid and training of the guerrillas (exclusively ZAPU) along with Angola and Mozambique.  

the interplay between local context and superpower intervention within a conflict. This presumes some sort of action designed to change the military situation on the ground. Consequently, while the U.S. role here is vitally important in understanding the eventual outcome, it is not intervention as defined in this study. This point will be fleshed out in greater detail in the analysis and in Chapter 8.

Although an actual date is difficult to identify, Soviet and later Cuban advisors in both Angola and Zambia were present in February-March of 1977 training ZAPU guerrillas in the use of Soviet supplied weaponry that included SAM-7's, 122 mm Rockets and AK-47 rifles.\(^{101}\)

This represented an intervention at LOW 1. That is the provision of training and military aid to a faction outside the territorial confines of the conflict. In addition, some training went on inside the Soviet Union as well. It is important to point out that throughout the conflict, Soviet intervention never rose above this LOW 1 level. The reasons for this will be explored in the analysis to follow.

During this period and the remainder of the conflict, three blocs of actors coalesced following three distinct yet intertwined courses of action. The first (Britain-U.S.) was the continuing Anglo-American talks designed to hammer out a settlement based in part on the initial Richard proposals. The second (OFLS-PF-Soviets) was the relationship between and among the OFLS, PF and her benefactors, particularly the Soviets. The third (Smith-Moderates-South Africa) was the ongoing internal machinations of Smith, moderate nationalists and South Africa to develop an alternative solution that solidified the white position in Rhodesia. This first phase vividly illustrated the dynamics of these three sets of actors and their behavior.

British-U.S. negotiations and meetings with the participants continued throughout the spring and summer of 1977. David Owen set the parameters of the task in June at the Commonwealth Conference in

London by arguing that if majority rule is not brought to Rhodesia through negotiation by 1978 then it will surely come through violence.\textsuperscript{102} Young traveled extensively throughout Africa in April after lengthy talks with Owen to outline elements of the Anglo-American plan.\textsuperscript{103} In each case, the response was mixed with primary concern being voiced over the transition and specifically the following set of core concerns: will Smith resign first, if so, when, will the internal security forces be disbanded, who will administer security in the interim, who will guarantee the agreement?

Concurrently, the PF and OFLS acted to increase the military pressure on Smith by escalating the war. At a meeting in Quelimane, Mozambique in April, the OFLS called for increased aid from the Soviet Union and Arab benefactors in order to serve that purpose\textit{(Africa Report, May-June, 1977, p. 21)}. In response, a 700 man force of the Rhodesian army invaded Mozambique in late May and held the town of Mapai in the Gaza province under the pretext of raiding guerrilla areas.\textsuperscript{104} This was the largest Rhodesian operation of the war and it motivated Mozambique and Zambia to mobilize their forces and threaten Rhodesia with outside intervention, i.e. Cuba and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{102}See \textit{ACR}, Legum 77-78: C67.

\textsuperscript{103}See Legum 77-78: A9 and Thompson 86: 33-34.


\textsuperscript{105}See \textit{ACR}, Legum 77-78 B1021-22 for a discussion of Kaunda's announcement that he had gained a military support accord with both Cuba and Somalia in the event that Rhodesian attacked Zambia. This further heightened the tensions between the parties and raised the specter of full internationalization.
In the midst of this, Smith manuevered internally for a way to maintain authority and still satisfy moderate nationalist concerns. Smith lifted a detention order against Sithole allowing him to return to Rhodesia and work with other moderates (ACR, Legum 77-78: B1021). To solidify his own position within the RFP and among whites, Smith announced in mid-July the dissolution of parliament and new elections on August 31 (N.Y. Times, July 19, 1977). Presumably, this was done to strengthen his hand in dealing with moderate black nationalists.

Smith's apparent turn inward was supported by the Vorster regime and this added another dimension to the polarization. While South Africa had consistently been a force of moderation on Smith, his moves toward unilateral, internal settlement with moderates was fully aided by Pretoria (ACR, Legum 77-78: B1022). Still another factor that facilitated Smith's "turn inward" was the OAU decision in Libreville-July 2-5 to formalize the PF as the legitimate nationalist movement rebuffing Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau (Ibid., 77-78: C3). As Legum pointed out in reference to this decision:

the OAU's rejection of the claims of recognition by Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU (renamed ANC-S) did create a new situation which was soon to change the course of events. It was only to be expected that once Africa turned its back on them they were no longer free to operate externally, their only alternative was to consolidate a power base for themselves inside

106 An interesting element of speculation here is that South Africa, ever mindful of the impact of a Rhodesian settlement on South Africa's situation, might have envisioned an internal settlement as a precedent for eventual South African change. Muzorewa and Sithole might have played the roles of Buthelezi and others in the future.
Rhodesia...The effect of the OAU decision was thus to drive Sithole and Muzorewa into the waiting arms of Smith, who lost no time in exploiting this opportunity (Legum 77-78: A9-A10).

Consequently, the three "blocs" outlined above, operating at cross-purposes propelled Rhodesia further into civil war.

This accelerated through 1977. For example, while the U.S. was lining up support for the Anglo-American initiative during Nyerere's visit to Washington in August, Smith and Defense Minister Botha were meeting in Salisbury to plan strategy (N.Y. Times, August 5, 1977). In Washington, Nyerere (as a representative of the OPLS) pledged support for a dual track approach of continued warfare and optimistic interest in the Anglo-American proposals. 107 This was evidenced by the increasing engagements between ZANU guerrillas and Rhodesian forces all along the Mozambiquean border (N.Y. Times, August 22, 1977). 108 Almost simultaneously, the Rhodesian elections were held on August 31st. The result solidified Smith's hold over the government as he won 83% of the

107 See discussions of the substance of Carter-Nyerere talks in N.Y. Times, August 6 & 8, 1977. While Nyerere sent positive signals to the U.S. no doubt reflecting the OPLS view, Nkomo in a meeting with Young sent opposite signals. In a meeting between the two on August 10 in Georgetown Guyana, Nkomo stated first, that a full American role in the process was not wanted and second, that negotiations with Smith were not warranted and thus the Anglo-American plan was not acceptable. See N.Y. Times, August 11, 1977.

108 It is interesting to note that a familiar pattern of guerrilla action continues throughout this period. ZANU forces engage in most of the warfare while a great percentage of ZAPU troops remain in base camps in Zambia and increasingly Angola. This is borne out by the fact that at this time, approximately 3,000 of the @15,000 ZANU forces were inside Rhodesia while only @500 of the @8,500 ZAPU troops were operating in the country (ACR, Legum 77-78: B1035). This further exacerbated tensions between the two movements of the PF.
popular (white) vote and a 2/3 majority in the Parliament (N.Y. Times, September 1, 1977).

The stage was now set for a formal review of the Anglo-American proposals followed by unilateral action by both sides. Young, Owen, the OFLS and PF met at Lusaka to formally discuss the Anglo-American proposals in their final form. The main points included the following:

1) Resignation of the Smith regime.
2) Assumption of authority by the British government.
3) Provision of a UN Peacekeeping force to monitor the transition.
4) Cease-fire on the date of Smith's resignation.
5) Police will be in charge of law and order under the command of a commissioner appointed by British representatives.
6) A National Assembly with 1/5 of the seats reserved for minorities for at least 8 years.
7) Protection of private property.
8) A $1.5 billion Development fund for rebuilding.
9) Discrimination outlawed.
10) One man, one vote system.109

The overall reaction of the parties was a qualified maybe. The PF and OFLS felt that several problems existed but that these provisions could form the basis for further negotiation. Smith, under South African pressure, did not reject them but clearly stated they were flawed and needed overhaul.110 By October, independent actions by the parties, especially Smith and Nkomo scuttled the plans.

The first event was military. In mid September, Rhodesia bombed refugee camps inside Mozambique at Chimoio and Tembwe killing over 1,000 people, mostly civilians. This resulted in a stiffening of

109 For a complete text of the provisions, see ACR, Legum 77-78: C69-C70.

resolve on the part of the PF and also alienated moderates who were willing agree to talks with Smith. These talks did take place however, Muzorewa did not attend and they were subsequently adjourned.

The second salient event was the secret meeting in Lusaka on a separate agreement between Smith, Nkomo and the moderates excluding Mugabe. These talks centered on an internal settlement that would transfer power to Nkomo peacefully, thus satisfying nationalist concerns while isolating Mugabe. The result was disastrous. It caused a further widening of the rift between ZANU and ZAPU and also helped to increase divisions within the OFLS between Kaunda and Nyerere & Machel. The impact was a fractionalization of the nationalists providing Smith the opportunity to forge the outlines of an internal settlement that would satisfy white concerns.

From October through December, Smith pursued this course while the PF attempted to regroup politically and the U.S. & British pursued their initiatives. First, Smith announced that the Anglo-American proposals were a failure and that an "internal settlement" was the only course (N.Y. Times, November 20, 1977). The first part of this (A-A

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111 See ACR, Legum 77-78: B1025, N.Y. Times, October 5, 1977 and Africa Report, November-December, 1977, pp. 45-46. Lonrho under CEO Rowland "Tiny" Rowlands is a large British based Multi-national corporation with extensive holdings in Rhodesia. Lonrho had always seen Nkomo as an acceptable black nationalist who would protect business interests and bring stability. Conversely, they feared Mugabe and ZANU "ideologues" and therefore worked to split the PF and bring Nkomo into a separate settlement with Smith and moderate nationalists.

112 The view that Mugabe could be excluded was based on some rather erroneously information on his support inside Rhodesia vis-a-vis his fellow nationalists. This is summed up by Smith who argued that in open elections, the moderates (Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau would gain 85% of the black vote, Nkomo-15% and Mugabe none. See The Guardian, September 7, 1977.
plans failure) was not earth shattering since both Nkomo and Mugabe had articulated that position earlier (ACR, Legum 77-78: B1026). However, the second part changed the nature of the conflict overnight. In a speech by Smith four days later, he announced a constitutional conference with moderate black leaders and the RFP's recognition of "majority rule based on adult suffrage."\(^{113}\)

This move by Smith codified the progressive polarization outlined at the beginning of this period. The moderates, Smith and South Africa were all committed to a unilateral, internal solution. On December 9, the conference was convened with Smith, Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole to work out such a solution (N.Y. Times, December 10, 1977). The British and Americans responded with renewed pressure to gain a settlement with OFLS, PF approval. Yet, they faced mounting opposition from pro-Smith forces at home. Finally, the OFLS and PF were forced to either continue their infighting and ultimately serve Smith's goals or renew their unity and step up the conflict. They chose the later.

January 1-December 31, 1978

The British attempted to re-gain the initiative when Lord Carver and General Chand met with Samora Machel in Mozambique to work out a timetable and agenda for talks between the OFLS, PF and the British (ACR, Legum 77-78: B1027). The principals (except Smith and the moderates) subsequently agreed to a conference in Malta on January 20, 1978, yet nothing substantive was achieved. Two factors contributed to

this. First, with Smith now committed to the internal settlement, no adequate leverage existed to force him into negotiations. The only recourse appeared to be increased guerrilla attacks. Second, the U.S. and British, despite their sincerity about an inclusive agreement, were under mounting conservative pressure to reject the PF and OFLS and accept the internal settlement.

While the Anglo-American initiatives arrived "still-born" at the doorstep of the PF, Smith hammered out the final elements of an internal settlement with black moderates (N.Y.Times, February 16, 1978). The main provisions of this agreement included: a 100 seat parliament, 28 seats guaranteed to the whites for at least 10 years, separate voter roles for white and black, the exclusion of the PF, limited land reform and the maintenance of ultimate executive authority in a series of commissions equally represented between white and black (Washington Post, February 16, 1978). \(^{114}\)

OFLS, PF and African response was immediate and united. The agreement was invalid and a sham designed to perpetuate white domination. In a joint communiqué the OFLS argued that:

> The present circumstances demand an intensification of the just armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The Front-Line states therefore reaffirm their total and unwavering support to the armed struggle being waged by the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the PF for the attainment of complete independence and the establishment of a

\(^{114}\) Overall, the specific provisions of this agreement provided sufficient white veto over all major decisions, white command of the military, police and foreign policy. See a complete text of the agreement in ACR, Legum 77-78: C73-C76 and for an extended discussion of its intricacies, see Thompson 86: 38-43.
The U.S. and British also rejected the agreement as a final solution but gave qualified support if the internal settlement lead to further negotiations (ACR, Legum 77-78: B1028). While publicly advocating intensified warfare, the OFLS renewed their efforts at promoting the Anglo-American plan. This translated into eliciting further concessions from the PF within those proposals. The response was internal bickering among the PF and outright rejection by Smith unless, as a pre-condition, the internal settlement was fully accepted.

These failures translated into expanded conflict. The first 3 months of 1978 saw heavy fighting and guerrilla attacks reaching into the suburbs of the capital (Ibid., 77-78: B1041 & N.Y.Times March 30, 1978). In addition, for the first time, Cuban advisors were reported inside Zambia training ZAPU guerrillas at several base camps (The Guardian, January 6, 1978). This corresponded with a significant increase in ZAPU military personnel and operations. However, this did not shift Soviet intervention beyond its LOW 1 status.

The internal settlement agreement was signed on March 3, 1978 and the Executive Council comprised of Muzorewa, Chirau, Sithole and Smith was sworn in on March 21.\textsuperscript{115} Theoretically, this council would run Rhodesia and prepare the country for elections and the transfer of power. The official target date was December 31, 1978.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1978, several dynamics operated both within and outside Rhodesia. First, Owen, Carver, Chand, 

\textsuperscript{115}The War Council designed to control the military and police was run by Smith alone.
Young and Vance continued their efforts to convene an all-parties conference that would include the new members of the Executive Council. In mid-April, they traveled throughout Africa to elicit support but hit several dead ends.\textsuperscript{116}

Second, Smith forged ahead with the internal settlement while increasing military action against the PF. In April, a raid was launched against ZAPU camps in Zambia (\textit{Africa Report}, May-June, 1978). Defense expenditures were increased 44\% in the new budget, conscription was extended to 38-50 year olds, and raids on Mozambique and Botswana were increased.\textsuperscript{117}

Third, the moderates on the EC (Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau) were at odds over government policy, dismissals of key allies within the government and the military's heavy hand in the war.\textsuperscript{118} Overall, it appeared that Owen's prophecy in 1977 was coming true: if independence wasn't achieved by 1978, an all out civil war would ensue.

Three concurrent events from August through October did little to change this course. First, it was leaked in September that Smith, Nkomo and Nigerian Commissioner of Foreign Affairs General Joseph Garba

\textsuperscript{116}These "dead-ends" grew mostly out of the belief on both sides that unilateral action would satisfy their goals rather than negotiation. This is witnessed in the rhetoric of Smith and the PF who argued for an internal settlement and escalated warfare respectively.

\textsuperscript{117}See \textit{ACR}, Legum 77-78: B1043-B1044 & \textit{ACR}, Legum 78-79: B1001-B1002. The result of this escalation was a massive increase in casualties. Between 1972-78, 12,039 people had been killed in the war. 29\% of those died in the first seven months of 1978.

\textsuperscript{118}See \textit{ACR}, Legum 78-79: B989-B991. It appeared from the infighting that despite appearances, the moderates were thwarted at real reform by the RFP and Smith both in the prosecution of the war, relations with South Africa and internal efforts at eliminating discrimination.
had met in Lusaka on August 14, 1978 (The Guardian, September 4, 1978). The meeting produced little except increased factionalism within the OFLS, and between Smith and his partners on the EC. Nyerere and Kaunda "had it out" over the meeting since Nyerere argued that no unilateral moves could solve the problem. Likewise, Sithole condemned Smith for the meeting and argued that the internal settlement would suffer because of it (N.Y. Times, September 1, 1978).

The second event involved military action. An Air Rhodesia aircraft was shot down by ZAPU forces and some 10 survivors were subsequently murdered (Ibid., September 5, 1978). The government charged the guerrillas with the crime and played it up for the world press. In response, Smith announced martial law in several districts (N.Y. Times, September 11, 1978). This event fueled western fears about the PF and increased sympathy for the internal settlement regime.

Third, conservative support for the internal settlement grew in both Britain and the U.S. pressuring both governments to focus on home politics in order to insure that their southern African policy was not pulled out from under them. On July 26, the U.S. Senate voted 48-42 to tack on an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill requiring the U.S. to repeal sanctions against Rhodesia (N.Y. Times, July 27, 1978). In

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119 This was part of a long-standing dispute over Zambia's "selfish" strategy with respect to helping Nkomo at Mugabe's expense. An additional example was Zambia's decision in October, 1978 to re-open its border with Rhodesia and allow economic traffic.

120 This opposition came from the conservative party in Britain under Thatcher and from a right-wing block of Senators (27) led by Jesse Helms.
October, Smith and other members of the EC were granted visa to come to the U.S. and they arrived on October 7 (Ibid., October 7, 1978). They gained favor with right wing elements and increased pressure on the Carter administration to accept the internal settlement. Consequently, the opportunity for full nationalist (PF) participation in a settlement was waning and the prospects for renewed conflict increased.

After Smith returned from the U.S., Rhodesia launched raids into Zambia at over 10 different camps killing an estimated 500 ZAPU guerrillas (ACR, Legum 78-79: B1003). The guerrillas retaliated by attacking targets inside Salisbury itself (N.Y. Times, November 12, 1978). This was the first time guerrillas were able to strike in the capital with impunity.

While the conflict spread, the EC made changes in the initial settlement plan in preparation for the elections. On October 10, 1978, all racial discrimination was outlawed. On October 29, the proposed elections were postponed until March 3, 1979 and later shifted to April 20. Also, new provisions were added to the plan which further enhanced white authority. A new rule was introduced that provided each party with 5 seats in the Parliament would get one cabinet post. Thus, with the whites insured 28 seats they were guaranteed 5-6 posts (Africa Report, January-February 1979).

By the end of the second period, Anglo-American efforts were stalled and conservative pressures in both countries were forcing  

121 The new government structure with no real executive authority in the hands of the Prime Minister meant that councils would ultimately run affairs. With the whites guaranteed 5-6 cabinet posts, this meant effective white veto in both the executive and legislative branches.
shifts in policy away from the OFLS and PF. The Soviets for their part stepped up supply to ZAPU with aid and personnel yet remained in low intervention posture due to OFLS-PF action.  

January 1-December 21, 1979

The last period of the conflict began with another escalation of violence by the government to insure minimal sabotage of the April elections. Raids were carried out in Mozambique, Zambia and for the first time Angola (ACR, Legum 78-79: B1004). Martial law was extended for the entire country except Salisbury and Bulawayo. Also, selective service for Blacks was initiated as part of the new constitution for country. Government attacks against the guerrillas including efforts at assassinating Nkomo himself were pursued throughout the summer. For their part, the guerrillas retaliated with attacks inside Salisbury including the airport and also the shooting down of another Air Rhodesia flight by ZAPU (ACR, Legum 79-80: B983). It appeared that polarization, conflict and eventual internationalization a la Angola would emerge from the trends begun in 1978 and continuing into 1979.

122 OFLS action included carefully channeling the flow of weapons to the PF and maintaining a low profile on personnel in front-line states training guerrillas. Although much of this activity was difficult to chart at the time, in retrospect, it is clear that the PF was not dependent on Chinese and Soviet bloc aid and material but on the OFLS dissemination of that assistance. For a discussion of this dynamic, see Ispahani (84), Napper (83) and Legum 78-79: A18-A21.


The elections scheduled for April 20 consumed Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau which afforded Smith the opportunity to prosecute the war to the fullest extent. The PF, frustrated by the lack of political progress, stepped up its verbal attacks against both the internal settlement and British/U.S. efforts. This served to fuel conservative sentiment in both Britain and the U.S. for recognition and rejection of the PF and OFLS. In Britain, a new conservative government pledged to re-evaluate the past Labor policy under David Owen. This was welcomed by Smith and especially the moderates including Muzorewa (Ibid., April 2, 1979, p. E4).

In the April 20th election, Muzorewa’s UANC party won 51 out of 100 seats in the Parliament and formed a coalition with Smith’s RFP and Sithole’s ZANU-S party. The turnout was in excess of 50% (estimates ranged between 51-63) and no widespread irregularities were reported yet, international recognition was not forthcoming and the conflict increased.

Muzorewa tried desperately to attain that recognition for the regime from the U.S. and Britain. In July, he traveled to both capitals for talks on the lifting of sanctions and recognition. His mission was a qualified failure. No recognition was offered and both

\[125\] See F.B.I.S., VIII, January 12, 1979, p. E5, January 16, pp. E6-E8, January 17, pp. E3-E4 and January 19, p. E2, for examples of both Mugabe and Nkomo speaking to the British and American role in the process. Both argued that Washington and London were tacitly aligned with Smith and the moderates and that armed struggle is no the only recourse.

\[126\] Sithole disputed the election and what followed was a three month process of arrest, detention, harassment and violence against his party by the government that finally forced him to accept the result and enter the coalition. See ACR, Legum 79-80: B964-B965.
Washington and Britain adopted a wait and see attitude on sanctions. In the case of Thatcher, her campaign rhetoric revealing a desire to accept the internal settlement softened as the August Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka approached.

The salient issues that drove Britain and the U.S. away from recognition at this critical juncture were the exclusion of the OFLS-PF and the fact that Rhodesian policy showed little external or internal change in the wake of the election. The Carter administration even in the wake of Shaba II, the Ogaden War and its growing "globalist" perspective, still listened to the OFLS on the formula for solution in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. As visits with Nyerere and Kaunda had emphasized, there will be no end to the conflict unless the PF is included in a settlement. Carter, Young and Vance believed that continued conflict just invited more Soviet/Cuban intervention, consequently, globalist concerns pushed them to continue to search for an inclusive solution. The same general analysis can be ascribed to the British.

Continued Rhodesian militarism and clear white control over that policy further added to Muzorewa's problems. While it was arguable

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127 In the U.S., the Senate had voted in June to lift sanctions immediately yet the House voted against. Eventually, they agreed to lift sanctions on November 14 unless the President deemed it unwarranted. See N.Y. Times, August 5, 1979.

that certain legal changes had taken place that allowed voting and privileges not afforded blacks before, the concept of one man, one vote was not adhered to nor was any shift in an aggressive military policy evident. In fact, the opposite was true.

A key turning point that re-energized Anglo-American initiatives and gave the OFLS-PF renewed hope for a settlement was the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka-August 2-9, 1979. The Thatcher government shelved their initial bias for Muzorewa and sided with the other members in tacitly rejecting the internal settlement. Instead, they called for an all-parties conference, new elections under British supervision and a cease-fire (ACR, Legum 79-80: B966). In the final communique from Lusaka on the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe issue, the Commonwealth stated:

b) ...that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
c) fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
d) recognized that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all the parties to the conflict;
g) acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
h) welcomed the British government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all parties would be invited (ACR, Legum 79-80: C27).

This forecasted the death knell for the Muzorewa government and the internal settlement. By placing full responsibility with the British government for an agreement, elections and ultimate legality, the internal moves of the moderates and Smith were totally de-
legitimized. This represented a resurrection of the Owen-Young position and new hope for the OFLS.

It is important to explore why the conservative British government underwent this metamorphosis. The single salient factor appears to be regional, African pressure from the OFLS and Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, the Obasanjo government used its economic leverage to send a clear signal to London regarding Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. In May, Nigeria denied all British firms the right to compete for contracts in Nigeria. This was followed by the nationalization of British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell holdings in Nigeria and the dumping of over $500 million British Pounds on the world market.129 Regionally, the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo and the OAU Meeting in Liberia both vociferously came out against the Muzorewa government, and for negotiations with the PF.130 These actions were taken at the private urging of Nyerere and Kaunda representing the OFLS and contributed to the accommodating British position.

The Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka gave new life to an inclusive agreement and engendered negative responses from Muzorewa and Smith (F.B.I.S., VIII, August 7, 1979, pp. E6-E7). The PF response to an all-parties conference was also not positive. Both Mugabe and Nkomo


130 See ACR, Legum 79-80: C4, OAU Resolution on Zimbabwe (Cm/Res, 719 (XXXIII).
expressed misgivings about a strong British role and on the nagging question of who would control the security apparatus. Nyerere and Kaunda on the other hand, welcomed the prospects (F.B.I.S., VIII August 8, 1979, pp. A2, E1-E5).

This illustrated a fundamental difference between the OFLS and PF that was apparent since 1976. Mugabe and Nkomo believed that through increasing military pressure, all their demands could be achieved without some of the elements of the Lusaka Communique: a strong British role, minority guarantees, etc. Conversely, the OFLS had always adhered to the plan that armed struggle was a necessary "sub-policy" to a negotiated settlement. As discussed above, the OFLS was united in wanting to avoid a repeat of the Angolan episode with superpower intervention as the central operating factor. Consequently, the OFLS persuaded the PF to take part in the all-parties conference.121

On September 10, 1979, the Lancaster House Conference was convened in London. The participants included Muzorewa, Sithole and Smith representing the Rhodesian government, the PF, representatives of the OFLS and the British delegation headed by Lord Carrington. One of the key stipulations of PF attendance was the continuation of the war, thus no cease fire was called.

The conference lasted over two months and various disagreements, deadlocks and compromises had to be worked out to insure success. In

121There is little evidence to suggest arm-twisting on the part of the OFLS but past trends indicated that from the initial reaction of the PF to their acceptance, some consultations with Front-Line leaders led to a re-evaluation. Differences in rhetoric partially illustrate this. See F.B.I.S., VIII, August 6, 1979, pp. E2-E3, August 8, p. A2, August 13, pp. E2-E3 and September 6, p. E4.
each case, the OFLS prodded the PF to remain at the table while the a combination of South African pressure and the dire military situation persuaded Smith and Muzorewa to remain. The various issues of contention included:

1) Whether to refine the existing constitution or scrap it and plan out a new transition?
2) What role would the security forces of each side have and how would they be organized and disarmed?
3) What degree of "veto" would the white minority have? None, Some?
4) What would be the role of an executive?
5) How much land reform and in what form would it take?
6) How much of a development fund would be provided?
7) Who would monitor the elections and cease-fire?

Each of these brought conflict and eventual compromise. The eventual agreement was not arrived at harmoniously.

On December 3, Lord Carrington issued several ultimatums to the participants, particular the PF to accept the proposal or be left out\footnote{Legum 79-80: A15-A17}. The central point concerned the coordination of the guerrillas into camps inside Rhodesia and the possibility of military disaster should the government act against them. While the PF was against this procedure, they eventually acceded to the ultimatum after assurances from Britain were given\footnote{Ibid., 79-80: A16}. 

The final agreement provided the following:

1) Universal suffrage: one man, one vote.
2) British control over Rhodesia under Lord Soames.
3) Commonwealth and British troops to monitor cease fire and elections,
4) Numerous base points for PF forces and the Rhodesian military were established for the transition/to be completed by January 4, 1980.
5) Land Reform with unused redistribution and adequate compensation for white owned land.
6) A Parliamentary system with 100 seats; 20 reserved for whites for 7 years, no veto power.
7) Elections for the whites would be February 14, 1980 and for the blacks, February 27-29, 1980.133

On December 12 Britain reassumed authority over Rhodesia and lifted sanctions with the U.S. following suit on December 16 (Africa Report, January-February, 1980). On December 17, the PF formally accepted the agreement and it was subsequently signed on December 21, 1979. The cease-fire took effect and actual fighting ended December 28, 1979. This marked the formal end of the conflict.

INTERVENTION OUTCOME: EVALUATION

The next task entails evaluating the outcome of Soviet intervention in this case. The immediate outcome is evaluated in a one year period from the termination of the conflict (December 21, 1979-December 31, 1980).

In comparison to the cases examined, it is clear that Soviet intervention was not a high profile, decisive element in the solution to this conflict. Rather than debilitating, this fact only accentuates the need to examine that behavior and its relationship to the outcome.

133See Legum 79-80: A14-A17. For the full document, constitution and cease-fire agreement, see ACR, Legum 79-80: C76-C90.
Consequently, an analysis of the outcome will provide this study with a basis on which to evaluate why Soviet intervention adopted this limited character.

The first factor is the military position of the faction in question vis-à-vis its rivals in the conflict. In this case we will focus on ZAPU and its military wing (ZIPRA) under Nkomo's leadership.\(^{134}\)

Through the Lancaster House Agreement and subsequent elections, ZAPU was confined militarily to designated base camps throughout Zimbabwe. In the process of retraining and assembling a new Zimbabwean army, ZAPU and ZANU forces were gradually disarmed and demobilized.\(^{135}\)

Since ZAPU forces were outnumbered by ZANU forces, their position in the new army was weak compared to their rivals. Also, there were

\(^{134}\)It is important here to state that Soviet analysts and policymakers argued that their support was for the PF in general and thus a victory for the PF including Mugabe was a victory for Soviet policy. While this may be true in rhetoric, it is not apparent in fact. This case has already established Soviet patronage of ZAPU to the exclusion of ZANU. It has also established deep divisions between Mugabe and the Soviet Union translating into a clear rivalry. This is accentuated by the large Chinese support given for Mugabe and the obvious Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region as a whole. For analyses of this dimension see Alan Hutchinson, *China's African Revolution*, Hutchinson & Co. Publishing Ltd., London, 1975, pp. 227-250, Mayall 85: 90-119, Michael A. Samuels, Chester A. Crocker, et al., *Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. Policy*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1979 and Olajide Aluko, *Africa and the Great Powers,* in Shaw & Ojo, eds., *Africa and the International Political System*, University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 15-40.

several violent skirmishes between ZANU and ZAPU forces during this period that had to be squelched by units of the former Rhodesian army. The losers in this were ZAPU.

The second factor was territorial control by ZAPU. As discussed above, the tactics utilized by ZAPU did not facilitate a strong presence in many areas of the country. While ZANU forces were infiltrated in higher numbers into rural Rhodesia to politically mobilize the population, ZAPU forces remained in their base camps in Zambia engaging in hit and run attacks across the border. This translated into limited influence for ZAPU during the transition, election and afterward.

In addition, the ethnic nature of Zimbabwean politics meant overwhelming support for the Shona dominated ZANU and limited support for the Ndebele controlled ZAPU. The clearest illustration of this was in the political defeat that Nkomo and his party suffered in the national elections:


137 See historical background section for a discussion of the differences in tactics and their impact.
TABLE 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>ZANU</th>
<th>ZAPU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>203,567(6)</td>
<td>37,888(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>146,665(6)</td>
<td>3,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>285,277(11)</td>
<td>6,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>209,092(8)</td>
<td>94,960(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
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<td>4,992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>508,813(14)</td>
<td>28,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
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<td>313,435(9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>11,787</td>
<td>148,745(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,668,992(57)</td>
<td>638,879(20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures show the limited territorial support that Nkomo enjoyed which placed him in a clear subordinate position of Mugabe. This situation degenerated in the first year and beyond.

The degree of international recognition afforded the PF was significant and it could be argued that prior to the election Nkomo had the bulk of that support. Yet, the international community at large was committed to the Lancaster House Agreement and thus whoever emerged as the government would benefit from that recognition. This was overwhelmingly Mugabe and the poor showing of Nkomo's party reduced his standing considerably.

The form of political control exercised was also a moot point for ZAPU given their limited support and subordinate position within the

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138 Seats in parentheses. See ACR, Legum 79-80: B977-B978. The remaining seats (3) went to the UANC under Muzorewa.

139 This was widely accepted by observers and analysts largely based on the clear preference that westerners and business interests had for Nkomo. However, it did not concur with the internal reality of Zimbabwe. First, ZANU forces had been operating throughout the countryside to politically mobilize the people long before the election. Second, the ethnic realities of Shona domination further solidified Nkomo's subordinate status. See Africa Report, March-April, 1980 for an examination western preference for Nkomo.
government. In the wake of their dominant victory, the Mugabe regime was able to establish widespread legitimacy with both black and white alike due to a series of extensive social programs coupled with pragmatism toward the white community. Mugabe's success translated into a further weakening of Nkomo's position.

The degree of superpower (U.S.) opposition was non-existent. Since the U.S. position had always been tacit acceptance of PF legitimacy and Lancaster satisfied that interest, the regime received significant U.S. assistance and diplomatic support. Unfortunately, due to the internal dynamics outlined above, Nkomo and ZAPU were not the main beneficiaries of that.

Overall, Soviet intervention in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict can be classified as a limited failure. While majority rule was established it was firmly in the hands of a faction not supported by the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviets had worked against Mugabe since the struggle began and Moscow-Harare relations were cool as a result. ZAPU was confined to a limited and increasingly weakened position as the year wore on.

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**TABLE 14**

**OUTCOME: USSR/RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>LS</th>
<th>ST</th>
<th>LF</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**FACTORS**

1) Military Position
2) Territorial Position
3) International Recognition
4) Political Control
5) Superpower Opposition

**OUTCOME: LIMITED FAILURE**

**INTERVENTION OUTCOME: POSTSCRIPT**

This section attempts to evaluate the intervention in a more expanded time frame, approximately 3-5 years after the termination of the conflict.

In terms of both the military and territorial position, ZAPU fared worse than during the transition. In the subsequent years, some ZAPU forces refused to be disarmed and engaged in violence against the regime from remote rural areas. They were treated as guerrillas and eventually crushed by the government. This caused further alienation between ZAPU and Nkomo and Prime Minister Mugabe that resulted in Nkomo’s eventual exile. This represented the low point (1982-86) for Nkomo and ZAPU where their influence in Zimbabwe was effectively neutralized.

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141 Reports of militant ZAPU factions operating in Ndebele areas began after the election and continued sporadically for several years. Although the violence was not organized or regime threatening it did de-legitimize Nkomo within the government and he was soon demoted from Home Affairs Minister in 1980 and then ousted from the government entirely.
This made the elements of international recognition and political control moot since these fell on a regime under ZANU not ZAPU authority. Subsequently, during this period, Soviet influence in Zimbabwe was limited while China, Britain, and states of the non-aligned movement enjoyed good relations with Mugabe.\textsuperscript{142}

In terms of superpower opposition, the rift between Nkomo and Mugabe along with other policies of Harare angered the new Reagan administration who subsequently cooled relations cutting back on aid. However, the differences were not severe and no benefit was accrued to Nkomo as a result. In sum, the intervention degenerated into a failure for the Soviets.

\textbf{TABLE 15}

\textbf{OUTCOME (POSTSCRIPT): USSR/RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{CLASSIFICATION} & \textbf{S} & \textbf{LS} & \textbf{ST} & \textbf{LF} \\
\hline
\textbf{FACTORS} &  &  &  &  \\
1) Military Position &  &  &  & \* \\
2) Territorial Position &  &  & \* &  \\
3) International Recognition &  &  &  & \* \\
4) Political Control &  &  & \* &  \\
5) Superpower Opposition &  &  &  & \* \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textbf{OVERALL: FAILURE}

\textsuperscript{142}The extent of these relations were largely economic and diplomatic not military. However, between 1980-1985, the large scale development fund promised by the Western powers did not materialize and this trained Mugabe's relations with west. Coupled with the situation in South Africa and Zimbabwe's high stake (economic as well as political/moral) in the outcome, Mugabe increasingly searched elsewhere for aid; this included the Soviet Union.
ANALYSIS

The outcome of this conflict generates many questions with respect to the local context and superpower intervention. In order to address these, it is important to extract the salient dimensions of the local context and fuse their effects with Soviet intervention. The primary question that should be answered in this analysis is:

**Why was Soviet intervention a failure in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict?**

The Local Context

Unlike other cases in this study, the local context of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was unquestionably not conducive to either U.S. or Soviet intervention. The reasons for this are numerous, yet certain variables had a dominant impact on this reality.

The first is the local military balance. While in other cases, the military situation was tenuous and given to rapid shifts of fortune over short periods of time, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was somewhat stable. The government had a preponderance of firepower and well-trained forces that were well-schooled in counter-insurgency tactics. This did not insure victory, yet it did mean that as long as the economy and weapons supply held up, the government could be assured of maintaining a degree of moderate control.\(^{143}\)

\(^{143}\)The deteriorating situation of the economy led Smith and Muzorewa to Lancaster and the final agreement. Reports were that the strain of sanctions and diminished access routes (closing of the Mozambique border) placed great pressure on the government to compromise. Yet, militarily, the regime could have held out for an extended period of time and indefinitely if South African forces were extensively deployed.
For the PF, manpower strength, weapons supply and tactics were all rapidly improving through the conflict period. This is evidenced by the increased scope and depth of their attacks and growing size of their military establishments. However, their basing and overall strategy lent itself to a long, protracted struggle not a decisive victory. Except briefly in 1968, conventional tactics were never adopted and consequently, significant territorial acquisitions were not forthcoming. This was especially true of ZAPU due to their less active military tactics.

The nature of this balance meant first, the government could maintain control for an indefinite period provided the economy held out. Second, the rebels could not be defeated militarily since they were based in adjacent states, with multiple access routes and secure from elimination although not harassment. Third, the level of military assistance to both sides was modest and not escalatory. This is true in terms of the amount of weaponry and type.

The reality of this situation became even more detrimental to superpower intervention when combined with the role of regional states.

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145 Since there was an international arms embargo on Rhodesia, weapons that did get through were mostly second-hand and of light weaponry designed for counter-insurgency. More sophisticated firepower like tanks, advanced fighters or bombers were more difficult to get secretly and not in keeping with Rhodesian military strategy. Consequently, they were not procured. In the case of the PF, weaponry including amount and type were dependent on tactics and absorption capacity. Since ZANLA forces numbered between 10-15,000 with only 3,000 inside Rhodesia and ZIPRA force rations were considerably less: 8,000/500; the amount of weaponry was moot. The only escalation of hardware during the conflict period was the shipment of SAM-7's to ZAPU that they used to shoot down Rhodesian aircraft.
in the conflict. The key actors here include South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania.

South Africa represented the salient regional actor from the white Rhodesian perspective. The Rhodesian economy and military establishment was dependent on South Africa for its economic health and military status.\(^{146}\) It has already been substantiated that through the 1970's Rhodesia became almost exclusively dependent upon the Pretoria regime for its continued survival. If Pretoria opted to fully support Smith and insure white domination, they certainly had the military means to do so. However, Vorster's policy of detente, begun in 1974 and reaffirmed after the aborted invasion of Angola in 1976, focused on pressuring Rhodesian into reform and governmental change as a "sacrificial lamb" to African nationalists. Part of this was undoubtedly diplomatic and also based on a choice of resource allocation. With Namibia looming as a point of contention with Black Africa, Pretoria had to decide where to invest its military and political effort. They must have ascertained that Namibia was a more cost-effective enterprise than bankrolling the Smith regime.\(^{147}\)

This accommodationist role played by South Africa insured that Rhodesia would not achieve a military victory over the guerrillas and

\(^{146}\)See the following for discussion and figures showing the enormous extent of this dependency. Butts & Thomas (86), Grundy 82: 171-178 and Bowman, Bratton & Murapa 83: 323-354.

also placed Pretoria into a tacit alliance with other regional states (particularly Zambia) and the OFLS in terms of the overall need for a peaceful transition in Rhodesia.

The second state occupying center stage was Zambia. As a primary base of operations for ZAPU, Zambia played a role similar to South Africa. If necessary, Kaunda could have elicited massive Soviet/Cuban aid to forge a military push against the Smith regime yet, he did not. Military aid to ZAPU was channeled through the Zambian government and turned over to ZAPU in fairly modest increments. Further, Soviet/Cuban personnel was kept at minimal levels and in a low profile in the camps.

Coupled with this, Kaunda urged Nkomo to pursue negotiations with Smith and engaged in talks with both Smith and Pretoria since 1974. This pattern of stressing negotiation over a military solution further solidified the stable military balance and thwarted potential access that the Soviets had to Nkomo. As long as Zambia was the chief base (ZAPU) of operations and infiltration, Soviet/Cuban policy would have to ascribe to Zambian policy and not vice versa.

Tanzania and Mozambique as the other key states played the same role with respect to ZANU and Mugabe. While ZANU was more committed to the military solution and received more aid than ZAPU, Chinese

148 See Legum 78-79: A14-A17 for a discussion of this and its impact.

149 As discussed above, this had a debilitating effect on OFLS and PF unity since the talks were unilateral and designed to give Nkomo an edge in the battle for eventual control. The positive effect was to open channels of dialogue that remained open throughout the conflict. The primary reason for this was Kaunda.
assistance still was subject to Tanzanian and Mozambiquean policy and thus conformed to their interests. Like Kaunda, both leaders saw negotiation as the central viable option with military pressure aiding that process not replacing it. At critical junctures, both Machel and Nyerere helped moderate Mugabe, promote talks with Smith, the British, Americans and even South Africa and withhold military assistance to ZANU forces.

The role of these states had the effect of cauterizing the conflict and securing it from dramatic changes caused by outside intervention. In fact, if intervention was considered in Moscow it was stifled by the territorial strangle-hold these regional states had over Rhodesia itself and the participants.

The third variable that operates in synchronization with the regional states role was the role of regional organizations, in this case the OFLS. The OFLS as a group of states suffered episodes of intense factionalism regarding the PF and other actors, yet several key elements superceded these preferences and served to bind them into a cohesive organization with a common policy stance.

First, the OAU early on abdicated responsibility for Zimbabwe to the OFLS. This allowed the organization to work within itself and


151 This study has utilized the work of Carol Thompson on the vital role that the OFLS played in Zimbabwean independence. This is virtually the only exhaustive study on this organization and its central role in the conflict and I refer the reader to this volume for a full understanding of the depth of OFLS impact.
avoid the factionalism that exists in the OAU at large. Second, all the actors agreed that the massive supra-regional intervention in Angola and the Ogaden had to be avoided. Whether an anti-Soviet (Nyerere, Kaunda) or more pro-Soviet (Machel, Neto) perspective all leaders saw benefits in a peaceful transition and limited superpower participation. Despite differences in support, ideology and tactics among leaders like Nyerere, Kaunda and Machel, all supported negotiation over escalating conflict. Thus, they acted to inhibit their clients (ZAPU-ZANU) from seeking external escalation.

Third, they were committed to a strong British role in terms of establishing legality, recognition and unbiased supervision of a transition. This meant that rather than force a fait accompli on Smith, they were willing to support compromise through British offices to insure that a legitimate and popular government emerged. This goal supplanted whoever emerged victorious in post-independence elections.

This ties into the final variable, the role of the state of influence, Britain. In previous cases, we have seen that when a state of influence has a strong role in the conflict, this usually mitigates one or another superpower's intervention. In Angola, the lack of a Portuguese role served to created an "influence vacuum" for both superpowers. In Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, the reverse was true. Since the failure of the Kissinger initiative in 1976 and the initiation of the conflict, Britain occupied a decisive role in the conflict. Their commitment and policy goals were made explicit under David Owen: majority role with PF participation. This firmly established the only recognized legitimate path to follow in fashioning a settlement.
When Thatcher's government took over, a strong British stance seemed to be in jeopardy, yet the Lusaka conference and African regional pressure forced London to adhere to Owen's policy and forge ahead with the Lancaster House Conference. This had the following effects. First, the Carter administration who shared Britain's views for differing reasons were forced to play a complimentary role to London and not a dominating one. Consequently, globalist calculations that were becoming dominant in the administration through 1977-78 could not govern the structure of the agreement. Second, the OFLS and regional states had a supra-regional option (Britain) in terms of negotiation. Without this, their only recourse in terms of pressuring Smith and Muzorewa would have been military which translated into increased presence for the Soviets, Cubans and Chinese. Finally, a strong British role allayed some of the white Rhodesian and moderate black fears that a reasonable agreement could be reached. This also helped to maintain South African pressure on Smith since the "communist specter" could be reduced to manageable levels.

All of these factors coalesced to make the local context unreceptive to superpower intervention. This afforded regional and local actors the opportunity to police, prosecute and find a solution to the conflict with minimal intervention. It is logical to assume

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152 See Brzezinski 83: 141-143 for the globalist view of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.

153 The "communist specter" represents the common Apartheid, RFP, conservative viewpoint in relation to calls for political change and decolonization in Africa. After Angola and the Ogaden, this "reasoning" became even more in vogue to justify continued white minority rule. A strong British role neutralized much of this and made it less than believable.
that these factors and the resulting outcome served to make the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict far less bloody and de-stabilizing than it might have been.

The Interaction of Local Context and Superpower Intervention

It is now important to merge the reality of the local context with superpower intervention or rather the relative lack of it in this case. This section will explore Soviet intervention and the reasons for its limited nature and subsequent failure. It will also explore some plausible reasons for U.S. non-intervention.

Soviet intervention never rose above a LOW 1 status even during the height of the conflict in 1978-79. On the surface this appears odd given the following factors. First, the Soviets had several regional "allies" with strong links to the PF and adequate territory from which to launch an intervention. These included Zambia and after 1975, Angola and Mozambique. Second, the Soviets with their Cuban allies had significant military force in the area capable of being projected into the conflict. This included between 12-25,000 Cuban troops in Angola alone. Third, the Soviet Union was fresh from the regional "successes" of Angola and the Ogaden War in which they had supported legitimate (in the eyes of the OAU) liberation forces against anti-OAU actions by South Africa and Somalia respectively. Why then was their intervention limited and ultimately a failure?

One potential answer lies in the premise that the Soviets were not particularly interested in Zimbabwe and saw it as unimportant in relation to other arenas. This is clearly erroneous. Soviet policy in
Africa accorded southern Africa: Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa primary salience. Angola and Mozambique were sideshows by comparison. In geo-strategic terms, Zimbabwe was far more important than other regional states in terms of mineral wealth and strategic location vis-a-vis South Africa. Also, the group (ZAPU) that the Soviets backed was in the advantageous position for much of the conflict 1963-1978-79 by most accounts. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would rather take a risk on a Mengistu or Neto given their uncertain positions at similar stages in their conflict instead of Nkomo who was apparently assured of a dominant role in a post-independence Zimbabwe.

The answer lies more in the relationship of Soviet intervention to the local context. Specifically, the hypothesis that Soviet policy of long-standing support for ZAPU was moderated and diminished by regional state actors: Zambia and the OFLS in general. As we have established, the role of these actors was vital in military supply, training, tactics and basing. Without Kaunda, Nkomo would not have had access into Rhodesia at all. Without Zambian bases, his military operations would have been nonexistent or worse; dependent upon ZANLA forces and bases in Mozambique. Nkomo's primary benefactor was Lusaka not Moscow.

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154 Several analyses have made this case based on extensive research of Soviet activity. For a cross section, see Somerville (84), Mayall (85), Stevens (80), Hough (86), Rothenberg (80), Samuels & Crocker (79) and Daniel S. Papp, Soviet Policies Toward the Developing World During the 1980's, Air University Press, Alabama, 1986, pp. 279-310.

155 For a discussion of this dynamic, see Kahn 83: 69-106.
The equation for ZANU is more complex. With the ascension of Mugabe and Tonga­
gara, the militant wing of the party took over. Under FRELIMO's guidance that wing saw the Chinese example both militarily and politically as salient to their situation and sought out Peking's support. With Tanzania's preference for China and willingness to house PRC advisors, ZANU became unfertile ground for Soviet influence and intervention. On several occasions, Nyerere solicited Soviet aid for ZANU yet, it was always followed by the stipulation that Mugabe renounce Chinese aid which was untenable. Thus, the Soviets despite influence with Machel were closed out of the largest area of potential intervention through the most effective military force. Any large scale effort to bypass these states would have engendered severe anti-Soviet attitudes in the OAU and destroy the positive capital built up.

A final factor contributing to this explanation is the nature of the battle itself. Since Rhodesian did not lend itself to large scale internal guerrilla operations or bases, Soviet, Chinese or any other military intervention would have to go through regional states. Had the war been fought inside Rhodesia, Soviet material could have bypassed Zambia and Mozambique assuming Angola or perhaps the Congo was willing to comply. Consequently, the nature of the military balance and struggle contributed to limited Soviet intervention.

In the case of the U.S., non-intervention of a military nature was a vital component of Ford and Carter's policy and thus became a non-issue. Military support for the PF would have been politically deadly to any administration in the wake of Angola, Shaba and the Ogaden. Thus, not only was the diplomatic course the preferred method of
solving the conflict according to Vance and Young, but it was also politically astute.

CONCLUSION

This case adds another dimension to the mosaic of intervention that this study has attempted to scrutinize. With a local context unsympathetic to superpower intervention, that role (Soviet) was kept at a LOW 1 status and subsequently became secondary to the outcome. While, some might argue that ultimately the decision to increase or decrease intervention rested with Moscow, it is impossible to argue that the local context was not central in that calculation.

This case provides our study with several important ingredients that inform our understanding of superpower intervention and the factors that impact on it. First, a strong and cohesive regional organization role appears vital in limiting the scope of that intervention and subsequent conflict. Second, regional states that are committed to negotiation over conflict can also mitigate the effects of conflict both internally and from external sources. Third, the nature of the military balance and the terrain/tactics that govern the conflict dictate the use of weapons, the strategies employed and the impact (great or small) that outside intervention may have. Finally, these factors cannot be individually extracted and used to explain the Soviet failure in this case. Rather they must be seen in their relational context to each other and to superpower interventionary behavior.
INTRODUCTION

The case analyses presented in this study have provided a significant reservoir of knowledge from which to address the initial concerns and questions that motivated this effort. Before bringing that erudition to bear, it is important to first re-familiarize ourselves with the goals and assumptions of this research so that this information and the process by which it was obtained can be adequately evaluated.

The core research question of this study is:

What effect does the local context have on the success and failure of superpower intervention in third world conflicts?

Several assumptions form the foundation of the authors concern and analysis of this question. First, most studies of superpower foreign policy in the third world focus at the "globalist" level, de-emphasizing important local and regional determinants. Second, analyses of superpower success and failure are usually dominated by "superpower ethnocentrism." This means they are preoccupied with discussions of relative superpower capability and exertion of "will," rather than investigations of the interactive dynamic between superpower behavior and the "context" within which that behavior
operates. Third, the traditional definition of power so vital to the globalist view may be obsolete within the confluence of conditions in third world conflicts and thus must be refined into a situational/relational concept. Finally, the local context cannot be considered an empty canvass on which the superpower's paint their interventionary activity but rather a three dimensional environment which to a large extent impacts on the extent and outcome of that intervention.

This chapter will attempt to sort out the data compiled in this study and blend it into a cohesive answer to the above question. This task will include four main sections. First, we will provide a synthesis of the comparative case analyses focusing on those pivotal components of the local context and superpower intervention that interact to shape the parameters of the conflict. Second, we will merge the information derived from the framework (local context and intervention) with outcome (success and failure) to address the central research question. This will necessitate the exploration of a variety of plausible arguments regarding outcome coupled with the identification of salient factors that emerged through the case studies.

The third task will focus on an analysis of the configuration of the framework itself examining its relative strengths and weaknesses along with proposing possible modifications. Finally, we will explore what the results of this study portend for future analysis in this area as well as what "lessons" policy-makers can learn with respect to superpower foreign policy in the 90's.
THE LOCAL CONTEXT

This section will analyze what the comparative case studies have taught us with respect to these two concepts and their relationship to outcome. Towards that end, it is necessary to examine the constellation of factors that make up the local context within and across the cases.

This study's conception of the local context included six factors with indicators that provided a series of rough yes/no answers furnishing an overall "score" (+ or -) for the conflict. The following chart illustrates the collective fruits of these studies.

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*The following represent the codes for Table 16: Factors 1-6 correspond to the listing of local context factors in Appendix A, OS refers to the 'outcome score,' IO refers to the 'immediate outcome' of the intervention and PO denotes the 'postscript outcome.'

*Please note that in the Angolan case the differences in local context scores between the Soviets and US occur after the initiation of the conflict when South Africa intervenes in support of UNITA and the FNLA. Up until approximately September-October 1975, overall scores for both were (+) conducive to success, yet changes in factors 5 and 6 shifted the U.S. position (+ to -) during this period.
As Table 16 illustrates, the general trends of each variable across the cases showed no clear and distinct pattern relating the local context to intervention outcome. However, this does not indict the explanatory power of the concepts. Rather, it requires us to extensively examine the interaction of these factors within the general framework.

In the case of the local military balance and local factionalism (Factors 1 & 2), general patterns indicated their perpetual presence as facilitators of successful intervention. In each case except Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, the local military balance was conducive (+) to successful intervention while all of the cases exhibited like signs (+) in terms of local factionalism. This would seem to indicate that these factors had little impact on intervention outcome, since their presence is constant across failures and successes. Yet, this observation tells only part of the story.

Initially, what is clear from the alignment of these factors is that without their presence, intervention would have been unlikely. Logically, conflict of stage eight status can only be present in a politically polarized environment. This obviously translates into high degrees of local factionalism. Also, the presence of a fluid and easily maleable military balance in three of the four cases is also consistent with prevailing military conditions in third world
conflicts. These facts intuitively follow the general pattern of both factors.

Through deeper examination, it is apparent that the overall scores (+ or -) only capture one dimension of the configuration of these factors within and across the cases. For example in the Angolan case, while the overall local military balance for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was conducive for successful intervention, the nature of that balance shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. The reasons for this centered largely upon the advantageous position of the MPLA (controlling Luanda) vis-a-vis the military ineptitude of the FNLA and relative numerical weakness of UNITA. Thus, while the overall score for factor 1 leads us to the contention that its potential impact on outcome is minimal, its configuration within this case paints a more complex picture.

When combined with other examples this dynamic becomes more conspicuous. In Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, the local military balance was not conducive (-) to successful superpower intervention. Since the relative stability of the balance allowed regional actors to manage the flow of weapons and scope of the conflict Soviet intervention could be blunted (Limited Failure). Thus, while a fluid balance may appear on the surface, differing alignments of forces within each case can create uniquely differing conditions, arguably contributing to outcome.

3This has been discussed at length in each case. The character of most third world conflicts centers on two or more relatively small and underequipped forces fighting for strategic areas, i.e. capital, main urban areas of key transportation routes. The relative "weakness" of these forces makes the introduction of modest amounts of aid potentially decisive, thus enhancing the potential for success.
Factors three through five as illustrated in Table 16 further display this complexity. For example, the role of the state of influence (Factor 3) displays both positive (+) and negative (−) scores in relationship to outcome. This would also lead one to surmise that this factor has minimal impact on outcome. Yet, this conclusion must be tempered by the expression of this factor through the cases.

In Shaba II and the Ogaden, the role of the state(s) of influence were strong based in part on both superpowers occupying that role (U.S. and Soviet Union respectively). Thus, while the overall score was not conducive (−) to successful superpower intervention, it did facilitate that superpower who occupied the influential position. Thus, the (−) score in the context of these cases obviously contributes to successful superpower intervention.

For factors four and five, the same dynamic is detectable. While we would expect in instances of strong regional state role and regional organization role, a diminished likelihood of successful superpower intervention, we find a spread of success and failure across cases. For example, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe shows both of these factors as inhibitors of intervention with the resulting outcome (Limited Failure) expected. Yet, in the Ogaden a strong (+) regional organization role is present amidst a Soviet success. This forces us to look beyond the scores and examine the constellation of factors within the case itself.

In the Ogaden, the OAU was clear and forceful in its policy of support for Ethiopia. This fact was coterminous with Soviet

4 This is true in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe example but not present in the case of the Ogaden.
intervention. Thus, a strong regional organization role facilitated superpower intervention. The opposite was true in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe.

This further elucidates the dynamic of the framework as presented. While the overall scores provide a general picture of the local context, further examination and articulation is necessary to ferret out the interrelationship between the factors and outcome.

Factor six (Level of Tolerance for Intervention) also displays like traits with respect to outcome, yet the general pattern is far clearer. In both cases of failure, the level of tolerance for superpower intervention was diminished (Angola-US, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe-USSR). In both cases, this diminished level of tolerance was linked to regional state and organization policy against external intervention in support of certain local actors. By October-November, U.S. intervention in Angola was de-legitimized by the quasi-alliance with South Africa while Soviet intervention in R-Z was muted by a regional desire for preventing another Angola-internationalization. Overall, the links between the level of tolerance and outcome are more apparent than other factors. This will be explored in depth in the section to follow.

THE LOCAL CONTEXT, SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION AND OUTCOME

The initial fruits of the research as seen in Table 16 reflect a limited relationship between the local context and outcome. That is by examining the configurations of the local context it is problematic to argue that a direct relationship exists between the two. However, as each of the factors are explicated within the cases, an argument can be
made that several have substantial impact both on superpower intervention and subsequent outcome. The above discussions of factors three through six illustrated this.

In light of this effort, it is important to remind the reader that this study began with few illusions regarding the elucidation of causal links between these variables. Rather, it was explicitly stated that as globalists argue about commitment, will and their links to success and failure so too can regionalists adopt a similar set of plausible arguments with respect to the local context. The above data provide a persuasive and substantive basis on which to make those arguments.

The Lessons for Success and Failure

This research has established that by examining the local context and the interplay of its factors we can provide an explicit picture of the environment within which superpower intervention operates. This realization does not mean to suggest that the local context and intervention can be totally segregated. On the contrary, the two are inexorably linked in their relationship to outcome. It does mean that specific components of this interaction must be explicated so that superpower intervention can be placed within its proper scope.

The primary conclusion emanating from this interaction is that the superpowers were successful when their behavior was coterminous with the alignment (+ or -) of local context factors. While both superpowers have had the military capability to effect the conflict in
most cases, that impact is accentuated or diminished based on its synchronization with the local context.®

In Shaba II, U.S. intervention and subsequent success was dependent upon the role of regional states/allies and the level of tolerance for superpower intervention. If these factors had not been conducive to U.S. action, there would have been little if any access to Zaire let alone the Shaba region where the conflict was occurring. The U.S. would have been hard-pressed to attain a HIGH 2 intervention with only its own forces and without significant internal tolerance (requesting intervention) and regional support. Yet, since U.S. policy essentially dovetailed the intervention of these actors, it was enhanced.

This is also true in Angola. The original alignment of the local context was highly conducive (+) to successful intervention for both superpowers. Each superpower, aided by regional states and high degrees of local factionalism intervened at LOW 1 levels and increased that intervention throughout the spring and summer of 1975. As the conflict progressed certain dimensions within the local context arose that enhanced the potential for Soviet success and consequently diminished that of the U.S.. These centered chiefly on the changing role of regional states: South African invasion, and the response to

®I refer the reader to the initial discussion in this chapter regarding the alignment of factors (+ or -) and their "uniqueness" within each case. While some cases display certain factors with '−' signs amidst varying degrees of success, the specific contours of each illustrate a direct relationship between the operating factors and superpower success.
that by regional organizations: support for the MPLA and the local military balance.  

Common globalist arguments hold that massive Soviet/Cuban intervention turned an MPLA defeat into a victory. Thus, Soviet commitment was the deciding factor not the local context. However, while the military role of the Cubans was important in maintaining MPLA control over Luanda, FNLA political and military incompetence and UNITA military weakness did more to dictate the outcome. Zairian and South African intervention which preceded Soviet/Cuban intervention could not insure an anti-MPLA regime. What it did do was de-legitimize UNITA/FNLA and politically strengthen the MPLA. Thus, UNITA; strong politically, weak militarily, cut itself out of the conflict by accepting Pretorian aid while the FNLA neutralized its own military advantage through poor tactics and ineptitude.

Had the South Africans not intervened, African support for UNITA and the FNLA would have remained strong and legitimate. Any Soviet/Cuban intervention above its August levels (2-300 advisors) would have been politically deadly to Moscow and afforded FNLA/UNITA forces instant legitimacy.

Another example of this lies in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe case. While Soviet and allied personnel (Cubans) were present in ZAPU base camps training and arming ZIPRA forces and upgrading their weaponry

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6 I refer the reader to Table 16.

7 As discussed above, UNITA was recognized a viable political force in any peaceful settlement due to its large constituency among the Ovimbudu. In addition, Savimbi enjoyed support among key regional states including Nigeria, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya and for a time Tanzania.
throughout the 70's, their intervention level was kept at a LOW status throughout the conflict. This was a direct result of Zambian control over the flow of weapons, numbers of personnel and scope of the conflict. Zambian policy along with Tanzania and Mozambique limited the scope of the conflict and stabilized the local military balance such that no radical escalation could take place like in the Ogaden or Angola. Had Angola been the primary conduit, it is possible that ZAPU would have been more substantially armed and engaged in more direct conflict with the Rhodesian army perhaps scuttling efforts at negotiation. Yet, internal Angolan problems and a lack of territorial contiguosity made this option unwarranted.

Some analysts have argued that limited Soviet intervention in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was due to Soviet restraint rather than regional state action. Yet, this argument has some logical inconsistencies with respect to general Soviet foreign policy in the area. As discussed in chapter 7, Soviet leaders saw Zimbabwe as a key arena of nationalist/anti-colonialist conflict that was vital for the entire region: Namibia and eventually South Africa. They invested a great deal of money and diplomatic effort in support of Nkomo and ZAPU since 1963. Like Angola, this conflict also represented a key battleground for direct Sino-Soviet confrontation with Chinese support of ZANU. Further, the Soviets were enjoying qualified success in Africa since their interventions in both Angola and the Ogaden had widespread support due to the enormous legitimacy factor.

All of this indicated a strong Soviet stake in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict and a desire to influence that outcome. Evidence
suggests that Moscow repeatedly upgraded its weapon supply to ZAPU in order to keep pace with ZANU and prepare it for the eventual transition, yet they were frustrated by the Zambian, OFLS policy of total control over the flow and dissemination of weaponry to the PF.

This 'lack of will' argument runs counter to all the evidence regarding Soviet interest in Zimbabwe and southern Africa in general. Those who advance it are unaware that it is contradictory to their own ideas about Soviet adventurism in the 1970’s: Why would the Soviets have such limited intervention in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in the midst of their greatest third world "successes"-Angola, Ogaden?

Consequently, it is logical to argue that Soviet intervention efforts were considerable but thwarted at in their application by regional state and organization policy rather than simply a lack of will on the part of Moscow. This provides an unobstructed view of the gate-keeping role of regional states and organizations in superpower intervention.

A second conclusion originating from the analysis is the distinct interactive nature of the local context. In delineating six operating factors of local context, this study was able to separate elements of local/regional activity and roughly measure their status within a given conflict. What was clear is that no one factor stood alone in explanatory power. Each factor impacted upon the other to build conditions that were more or less ripe for successful intervention.

As discussed above, in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict, local factionalism was very high (+). Black nationalists were split between moderates and radicals and within each group significant divisions
prevented adequate coordination of strategy. The regional states were also fractionalized by differing affinities for ZANU or ZAPU as well divergent ties to supra-regional actors (China, Soviet Union, Britain). On the surface, the depth of local factionalism might lead one to surmise that the prospects for successful intervention would be great.

However, the influence of local factionalism must be understood in relation to the dimensions of other factors, specifically, the role of regional states and regional organizations. Despite the presence of near epidemic factionalism throughout the conflict period, salient regional states and the OFLS acted to mitigate its negative impact. Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, while possessing their own "favorites" remained united on several core points of strategy. First, the necessity for PF participation in the process. Second, the need for a strong British role in the transition. Third, the commitment to a negotiated settlement with armed struggle as a complimentary factor in that process. Fourth, the need to avoid large scale supra-regional (i.e. superpower) intervention.

Complimenting this was the role of South Africa. While capable of militarily insuring the Smith regime, Pretoria pursued a policy of accommodation and compromise with the OFLS through pressuring Smith to make concessions. This melded with OFLS policy to effectively cauterize the conflict and significantly channel and diminish superpower intervention.

Thus, while local factionalism was as high (+) as in Angola, or the Ogaden, regional factors acted to mute rather than enhance its
adverse effects. This illustrates the interactive proportions of the local context and the differing alignment patterns that can emerge.

A third conclusion that arises out of this interactive dynamic is that no one factor of the local context proved completely dominant. That is, there was no single factor that consistently dictated the relative susceptibility of the local context or the outcome. However, each case did suggest that regional level factors: the role of regional states and regional organizations seemed to act as key facilitators or inhibitors of access. Again, while this may not have been reflected in the raw scores across the cases (Table 16), it does emerge when the interaction of these factors is explicated.

For the superpowers, geographic proximity to most areas of Africa was impossible. Logistically, they depended upon regional bases, supra-regional allies or regional actors motivated to aid their intervention. Consequently, we would expect the role of regional states and organizations to be crucial in acting as conduits for Soviet or U.S. access. This means that in cases of success and failure the pattern of regional state role should vary (+ or −) accordingly.

The following comparative example will illustrate this. In the Ogaden Desert War, regional state role was in general conducive (+) to successful superpower intervention. The presence of several regional states including Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Egypt, the PDRY and Libya who were motivated to facilitate both U.S. and Soviet intervention contributed to this. Yet, the local and cross-regional dynamics of intervention for the U.S. made their potential intervention more problematic. Kenya as an influential, pro-western regional state
adopted a policy (pro-Ethiopia) not amenable to the U.S. position (pro-
Somalia) due to their own security concerns and the overriding issue of
legitimacy in the African context. This arguably impacted upon
American policy and served to mute their potential for intervention
vis-a-vis the Soviets.

When this is compared with U.S. intervention in the Shaba II case,
the differences that can emerge within the dynamic of each factor are
clear. Without motivated regional states and supra-regional allies
facilitating U.S. intervention, any action in direct support of Mobutu
would have been infeasible. The roles played by the Francophone states
(Senegal, Cameroon, CAE, Chad) and supra-regional actors (France,
Belgium, Morocco) were vital in affording the U.S. a positive (+)
environment for successful intervention. Without them, U.S.
intervention at a level above MODERATE 2 would have been an untenable
option. Since Mobutu's inept armed forces were incapable of re-
establishing control over Shaba, a strong military intervention by some
outside force was necessary. If that burden had fallen to the U.S.
alone, political and logistical considerations would have greatly
inhibited if not thwarted that option.

The gate-keeping function of regional level factors appears
salient to successful intervention. This point recognizes that
while the overall score (+) may be similar across cases of differing
outcome, the facilitating or inhibiting role of these factors is
illustrated in the actual regional alignment vis-a-vis the superpowers.

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8 The impact of legitimacy will be examined at length in this chapter.
That is while regional state role in Angola was conducive to successful superpower intervention in general, its contours dramatically shifted against U.S. policy in the later stages of the conflict. This captures the necessity of examining the interaction of each factor through the cases beyond the initial measurement of the local context.

Legitimacy and Outcome

The concept of legitimacy became omnipresent in each case acting to inhibit or facilitate superpower intervention which at times proved decisive. Apparently, when a faction or government had legitimacy within the African regional milieu, intervention (despite its abhorrent nature) was tolerated and in some cases supported. Through the case analyses certain "rules" operated within African politics that acted as bellwethers of legitimacy. These included:

1) Anti-Apartheid/anti-colonialism
2) The maintenance of established borders
3) The rejection of irredentism
4) The commitment to majority rule

In each case one or more of these "sacred rules" was introduced, usually within the role of regional organizations since the OAU acted as the guardian of these precepts of African political interaction. When superpower policy was coterminous with these de facto "rules of law," their actions were accorded legitimacy and in some cases outright support (Ogaden, Angola, Shaba II). When a superpower was politically predisposed against one of these, their potential or real intervention was castigated and inhibited.

Protestations of legitimacy and illegitimacy by the OAU may not always determine whether a superpower intervenes with military force in
a conflict. However, legitimacy as a regional concept impacts significantly on the behavior of local and regional actors who may or may not be pre-disposed to support superpower intervention. The case of Nigeria displays this impact in Africa.

Nigeria occupies a highly influential role in all African issues as both a broker and supporter of OAU precepts. While Nigeria is largely recognized as pro-western, its adherence to these precepts is unyielding and powerful. In Angola, Nigeria adopted an anti-MPLA/anti-Soviet intervention posture throughout the conflict, yet, once Pretoria invaded and Soviet/Cuban intervention took on an anti-South African dimension, Nigeria's diplomatic and material support for the MPLA was vocal and decisive. Obasanjo helped build an OAU consensus in support of the MPLA severely inhibiting American policy.

Another clear example of legitimacy and its relationship to regional state action is Nigeria's role in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict. Since true majority rule was being advocated only by the PF who had full OAU/OUFS support, Nigeria acted decisively to direct British policy towards an acceptance of the PF. During the crucial period of British government re-evaluation under Thatcher, April-August, 1979, Lagos utilized its substantial economic leverage in nationalizing BP, closing out British companies and dumping British currency to keep Britain committed to true majority rule. This rested largely on the African view of the legitimacy of the PF. Legitimacy as an operating element within the local context had definite impact on local and regional actors that directly affected superpower intervention opportunity.
Along with this obvious direct impact on regional states, it can also be argued that legitimacy had a decided impact on the limited or non-interventionary posture of the superpowers.

The examples of this phenomenon are numerous. In the Shaba II conflict, while the Soviets may have been predisposed to support the FNLC in its irredentist aims in Zaire, no intervention took place and Soviet statements emphasized the internal dimensions of the conflict. All African states, both supporters and detractors of Mobutu, recognized the enormous precedent of openly aiding an irredentist movement—FNLC. Like Biafra, such support either from within or outside Africa would subject the continent to a fire-storm of balkanization. Consequently, support for the FNLC meant anti-African intervention; a position that would spell political disaster in Africa as a whole.

These "African realities" were apparently not lost on the Soviets or her regional allies. Despite initial FNLC success against an inept military, intervention was not forthcoming nor apparently, was it ever considered. Conversely, western intervention although psychologically repugnant to Africa as a whole was legitimized by the OAU under the precept of a recognized government's right to call for aid.

Perhaps, the most illustrative example is the influence that Somalia's illegitimate invasion of the Ogaden had on the Carter administration. Even in the face of widespread allied (middle eastern) prodding by influential states (Egypt & Saudi Arabia) the U.S. rejected arming Barre and went so far as to inhibit other states from following that policy. Administration officials themselves stated that the illegitimacy of Somalia policy was the deciding factor in this non-
intervention. This not only emphasizes the legitimacy factor in superpower intervention but extends that impact into the actual decision to intervene. Concurrently, Ethiopia's position vis-a-vis Somalia's invasion gave her supporters (Soviet Union, Cuba, PDRY, etc...) legitimacy in intervening to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state.

While the decision to intervene is outside the scope of this study, one cannot ignore the effects of such a pervasive political phenomenon as legitimacy within the confines of these conflicts. It is clear that African regional legitimacy along the precepts outlined above impacts regional state and subsequent superpower interventionary behavior.

Terrain and Outcome

A final aspect of the local context arose in the examination of the local military balance and its effect on intervention. In three of the four cases (Angola, Shaba II & the Ogaden), the local military balance was fluid and easily changeable, allowing modest increases in weaponry to have a decisive effect. This contributed to a susceptible (+) environment for successful intervention. Yet, in these cases the terrain was remote, local populations were supportive of one or another faction and infrastructure did not facilitate the rapid movement of military force. The terrain promised long protracted guerrilla struggles with little hope for resolution. In general, this would usually mean a static balance that would generally inhibit (-) successful intervention.
What is interesting here is that in the Angolan, Ogaden and Shaba cases, the tactics of the factions essentially changed the nature of the terrain making it fluid and easily manipulated, increasing the opportunity for successful superpower intervention. This was done through their respective military tactics.

In the Ogaden, the WSLF and their Somali benefactors prosecuted a guerrilla war for years in the remote desert region. With popular support, limited infrastructure and remote bases of operations they were able to effectively harass Ethiopian rule and control most of the rural areas. However, once WSLF/Somali tactics changed to militarily seize the urban areas of the Ogaden and annex the territory, the terrain became a key facilitator of a fluid military balance that was susceptible to successful intervention.

First, the shift in tactics escalated the conflict into stage eight status. Second, the targets became three or four key urban areas and not control over rural populations. Third, Somali strategy was predicated on a quick knockout blow against a militarily dominant enemy. This introduced military supply and time constraints that turned the conflict into a limited war easily shifted by outside intervention.

In Shaba II, despite the remoteness of the region, FNLC strategy was focused on control of the central mining center of Kolwezi. Rebel control meant economic chaos, European flight and perhaps regime collapse. Consequently, intervention was not needed to pacify a local population or root out entrenched guerrillas but rather clear Kolwezi of FNLC forces. FNLC tactics took a terrain conducive to a long
guerrilla-type struggle and made it a conventional battle. This made intervention "attractive" from a supra-regional perspective since it could be quick and relatively painless. Pacification of an extended area was not required. This made the local military balance fluid and highly susceptible (+) to successful intervention.

Consequently, in Sub-Saharan African conflicts, the local military balance can be a key facilitator or inhibitor of intervention based not only on the balance of forces but the tactics adopted by the respective factions. Apparently, terrain is as fluid or static as the tactics of the participants will allow.

Comparative Case Analysis: Conclusions

Overall, the link between the local context, superpower intervention and outcome centers on the following propositions. These represent a compilation of the findings of this framework as well as potential hypotheses to explore in future research.

First, the level of superpower intervention is important as it interacts with the local context both in general terms (+ or -) and in terms of the specific alignment of factors. Only by examining the interrelationship between and among the factors, can an understanding of each superpower's opportunity be identified and gauged.

Second, inferences that can be made regarding superpower commitment and will based solely on the level of intervention are spurious. Interventionary behavior is determined by its interaction with the local context. That is, one cannot identify intervention at LOW 1 or MODERATE 2 levels and assume limited commitment without
considering how and whether that behavior compliments or is in contradiction to the local context.

Third, superpower intervention that adapts itself to the specific contours of the local context has the best chance of success. Intervention that ignores those factors will probably fail.

Fourth, the local context provides a relatively objective measure of opportunity for intervention that is not subject to the vagaries of perception. This refers to the tendency of globalist scholars to identify opportunity in terms of superpower-centric factors; when they act there is opportunity, when they do not, there is none. Thus, opportunity becomes an arrangement of local events and conditions not a perspective in either Washington or Moscow.

Fifth, in presenting evidence that argues the local context can thwart concerted superpower intervention, this study indicts the common conception of power and its universal applicability. Regional level factors within the local context apparently operate as a gatekeeper enhancing or diminishing capability as it is applied.

Based on this data, the initial answer to our research question must be that the local context has an effect on the success and failure of superpower intervention in third world conflicts that is definitive and arguably determinant. Further, that effect is dictated by the specific contours of the local context as it interacts with superpower interventionary behavior.
EVALUATION: FRAMEWORK

It is now important to examine the framework itself to outline its strengths and weaknesses and suggest ways to enhance its explanatory capacity. This is best accomplished by examining three of the major components: local context, intervention and outcome.

The Local Context

The conception and operationalization of the local context captured a wealth of local/regional information and relationships that clearly were influential in addressing the research question. Each factor encompassed a variety of ingredients that provided a rich picture of the conflict's environment. A few modifications could be introduced to further bolster this portion of the framework.

First, as discussed, several factors throughout the various cases emerged as more important in their relative impact on outcome. The problem arose in adequately capturing the specific dimensions of these as they played themselves out in the cases. It thus becomes necessary not only to provide a rough (+ or -) measure for each factor but to delineate between differing alignments of factors so that each specific dynamic can be captured. This might involve expanding the dichotomous measure into some form of scale or perhaps creating a more intricate series of measures. Also, it may be possible to statistically measure these factors and their relative impact using factor analysis techniques. In this way, we might be able to more accurately gauge to what degree and under what conditions, certain factors are more or less potent in their explanatory power.
Second, the concept of legitimacy emerged as dominant and pervasive in understanding superpower opportunity. While it usually played itself out in the role of regional organizations and states, perhaps a separate variable could be constructed that more explicitly captures this concept and its interaction with other local context factors. One way to do this would be a series of questions tapping local, regional and supra-regional actor views on the conflict, what faction or factions are worthy of support and how important is it that those factions emerge successful.

Third, each "read" of the local context should be done separately for each superpower in addition to an overall score. In this way, we would have a sharper image of the divergent alignment of the local context within each conflict.

Fourth, as the number of cases are increased and the geographic scope extends beyond Africa other variables may have to be introduced. For example, since the role of the state of influence may be somewhat idiosyncratic in the African context, a revision of this factor might be necessary.

Finally, another means of strengthening this framework would be to expand the scope to include the impact of local context on the decision to intervene. Although, this question was clearly outside the scope of this study, certain cases (Ogaden, Angola) indicated that leadership evaluation of certain local context factors clearly impacted on the decision to intervene or escalate an intervention already in progress. This would require a means of examining and roughly measuring
superpower perceptions of the local context and how that impacted on their subsequent decision(s).

Intervention

This study attempted to grapple with a concept envisioned as pervasive by many analysts. In the process it was necessary to whittle it down to a manageable and meaningful level.

It was clear from each case, that some form of superpower involvement preceded the conflict and thus gave the superpowers a degree of access prior to actual intervention. While some may argue that this is a form of intervention that should be examined, this research shows that superpower involvement prior to the conflict illustrates the interactive dynamic between the local context and that intervention. That is, prior involvement should be conceived as a component of the local context rather than superpower intervention. Thus, its importance lies first in how prior involvement affects the local context before the initiation of conflict and then how combined with other factors (i.e. level of tolerance) it impacts intervention.

Overall, the concept of superpower intervention should be expanded to include non-military activity as well. One of the problems in this study, particularly in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe case was classifying U.S. behavior as non-interventionary despite a substantial amount of diplomatic "intervention" on the part of Washington. Such non-military intervention may indeed have as much if not more impact on a conflict's outcome as military action. While this does not adversely effect our conclusions regarding the importance of the local context, it does
generate interest in revitalizing the operationalization of intervention.

Outcome

The operationalization of success and failure was primarily dictated by local events in the conflict. That is, it was assumed that in a conflict situation, intervention success would be measured by the relative success of the faction(s) one was supporting. While in some cases this was clear, this conception de-emphasized a potentially more complex goal structure for the superpowers.

It is possible that the goal of superpower intervention may not be measurable in the "absolute" success or failure of local forces. The goals of Washington or Moscow in certain third world interventions may be to prolong a conflict and promote stalemate rather than military victory. Although, this was not present in any of the cases explored here, it certainly has precedence in other third world conflicts: Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq or the current Angolan civil war.

Superpower goals also may be designed to impact in other areas. For example, given the nature and pervasiveness of the globalist perspective, actions in Africa may have ultimate designs in the Middle East. Thus, while this study's conception of outcome meets our initial assumptions and accurately portrays the conditions that emerged in each case; it is important that a more intricate estimation of superpower goal structure be integrated into the operationalization of success and failure. This should however be tempered by the realization that
superpower self-definition of outcome is highly spurious and should be resisted.

Framework

This framework falls within that portion of the literature concerned with systematically cataloguing superpower foreign policy and its impact. It builds upon the work of scholars such as Napper, Cottam and George in explicating the contours of third world "political terrain." While certain aspects require modification the overall thrust remains an innovative one.

By attempting to analytically separate and identify the factors that make up the local context, we amplify the complexity of superpower foreign policy adding to an overall understanding of its effects. As alluded to above, the direction of this study can then be fused with analyses of superpower decision-making to develop an inclusive picture of foreign policy behavior in general.

Thus, this framework represents part of a more comprehensive process that would integrate the local context and superpower intervention with decision-making components such as image and perception. The results of which would address some of the common inconsistencies in present analysis discussed at length in chapter two. These include estimations of superpower-centric factors: commitment, will and power, as well as the issue of adapting strategy to the realities of a conflict. This would finally inform analysts and policy-makers why similar strategies in seemingly analogous conflicts often produce divergent outcomes.
THEORETICAL AND POLICY CONTRIBUTIONS

The need to produce results that inform scholarship as well as policy-makers is one of the fundamental concerns of this research. This study began with certain assumptions and concerns regarding both arenas and found that the fruits of this study can expand our knowledge base in both.

In the area of theoretical contributions, several salient concepts in the international relations and foreign policy disciplines were explored, critiqued and re-conceptualized in this study. These included power, commitment, opportunity, intervention, conflict, outcome and local context. The primary goal was to refocus the debate away from superpower-centric determinants thus broadening our conception of superpower foreign policy and the elements that impact its success and failure. One result of this process was the refashioning of the above concepts away from more traditional ways of considering them. This did not involve the discovery of unique definitions but rather entailed the shifting of focus from the globalist to the regionalist perspective.

The best examples of this are seen in the analysis of power and opportunity. The relational dynamic of power had been well established by scholars prior to the work in this study. The basic fact that capability and its operating elements does not translate into applied power and subsequently successful outcome has been empirically established both in this and other previous work.
What this research has done is expand this contention into that realm of power analysis that rests on motivational type factors like commitment and will. While empirically impossible to falsify, the simple contention that outcome can be measured by the degree of superpower effort must be considered unacceptable. The operationalization and subsequent analysis of outcome in this study displays graphically the relational dynamic between local, regional and supra-regional factors leading to outcome.

Opportunity as another theoretical notion was also re-introduced and re-fashioned through this research. Whereas prior work in superpower foreign policy has always seen opportunity as a function of superpower perceptions and decision-making, this study presented a different conception centered on the environment within which behavior must interact. That is in its most objective form, opportunity is best measured separately from elements indigenous to the foreign policy actor. Thus, opportunity becomes the relative susceptibility of the local context to intervention. Whether the superpowers perceive that opportunity, read it correctly and act to enhance or diminish their potential for success becomes secondary to the actual "measure."

Consequently, opportunity becomes something indigenously determined.

When applying the results of this research to actual policy, it is not enough to simply argue that policy-makers need to be more sensitive and knowledgeable about those arenas in the third world where conflict erupts. This must be regarded as an axiom not an option. Rather, it is more vital that the results of this framework speak to superpower self-interest from a local context perspective. As this framework has
attempted to merge local context and intervention into an understanding of outcome, policy-makers must be instructed to do the same before committing their states to intervention. A discussion of the emerging conflict in South Africa from a U.S. foreign policy perspective will provide an illustration.

In the African context certain local and regional realities included within the general concept of local context exist. About this there can be no argument. These include the commitment to majority rule in South Africa, the legitimacy of the ANC and other like-minded anti-Apartheid groups and the de-legitimacy of accommodation that settles for anything less than one man, one vote. Like in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe example, there is a de-emphasis on ideology among the African participants: Black South Africans, Front-Line states and the OAU and an over emphasis by the whites: Afrikaners.

Since the military option is active, although thus far limited, U.S. policy should build upon the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe example. Anything that forges cohesiveness and unity among nationalists and the front-line states, limits potential intervention. Thus, U.S. policy should be centered not on South Africa, but on the front-line states and a variety of black nationalist groups including the ANC.

This does not mean armed intervention. That too would be unwanted in the region. It means U.S. assistance in an economic de-coupling from South Africa for the regional states and Washington as well. It also means concerted diplomatic pressure guided by OFLS policy goals. This would have the effect of cauterizing the South African situation
and limiting the conflict to an internal/regional one with limited supra-regional i.e. Soviet intervention.

Consequently, while the globalist perspective is abhorrent to the fundamental assumptions of the framework and this study, examining a conflict from the "local" perspective can provide options for success vis-à-vis a global adversary, in this case the Soviet Union. The fruits of this framework hopefully have provided knowledge to splinter that viewpoint with respect to Africa.

CONCLUSION

The final conclusion is that it is impossible for the Great Powers to be successful in their strategic designs unless their policies are also successful from a regional point of view. Both the United States and the Soviet Union apparently hoped that the regional problems could be ignored; the evidence shows clearly that this was a major fallacy (Ottaway 84:190).

This quote captures the core thrust of this framework and the conclusions derived from the comparative case studies. It functions not only as a description of the fruits of this research but a prescription for analysts and policy-makers alike.

No single event or leader will probably ever eliminate the "globalist" tendency in U.S.-Soviet policy in the third world. It may indeed be a fundamental element of superpower status. What must suffice is a tempering of that tendency with the realization that a globalist strategy, conceived and implemented in that intellectual prison will more often than not fail because it is divorced from the reality within which it must interact: the local context. If success and failure are to be measured by the superpowers themselves, then
their first task must be a logical assessment of their own goals in tandem with an accurate appraisal of the environment within which they wish to act.

The chessboard conception that dominates U.S.-Soviet relations and academic analyses of that relationship must be replaced by a different "game"; a game that envisions a complex and textured political, social and economic terrain in the third world providing a set of opportunities and pitfalls for any and all supra-regional actors who chose to intervene. Only then, will policy-makers and those who analyze them fully grasp the fragility of superpower policy and the imbroglio that is the third world.
APPENDIX A

LOCAL CONTEXT:

(1) THE LOCAL MILITARY BALANCE:
   A) Is the military balance tenuous and subject to dramatic changes
      with relatively small increments of aid, or is it stalemated and
      relatively stable?
   B) Does one side or the other appear capable of or close to
      military victory or is a protracted war of attrition the expected
      result?
   C) Does the terrain lend itself to decisive and rapid shifts in
      the battle or is it more suited for a long guerrilla type
      struggle?
   D) Is the base of support for the respective groups ethnically or
      territorially based/are the respective positions of the factions
      historically rooted or more fluid and easily changeable?

(2) LOCAL FRACTIONALISM:
   A) Are divisions between groups historically deep and ethnically
      based?
   B) Are those divisions ideologically based?
   C) Are the respective groups fractionalized or cohesive in
      leadership and policy?

(3) THE ROLE OF THE STATE OF INFLUENCE:
   A) Does the former colonial power or dominant state have a strong
      involvement in the state or a high stake in the outcome of the
      conflict?
   B) Does the state favor one group over the other in the conflict?
   C) Is it capable of affecting the outcome of the conflict or has
      it abdicated any role?

(4) THE ROLE OF REGIONAL STATES:
   A) Is there a history of intervention in the states affairs?
   B) Do the regional states have the capacity to intervene
      militarily?
   C) Are there political, ethnic or ideological affinities for one
      faction over another on the part of regional states?
   D) Do the regional states have strong ties to a supra-regional
      actor(s) who has a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict
      and consequently would be willing to aid an intervention?

(5) THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:
   A) Are the regional organizations cohesive on a policy toward the
      conflict?
   B) Are they able to enforce that policy with member states?
(6) THE LEVEL OF TOLERANCE FOR SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION:
   A) Is there historical precedence for superpower intervention?
   B) Are there ideological affinities and ties between faction(s) in
      the conflict and a superpower?
   C) Do the local factions seek superpower intervention actively or
      are there any agreements regarding intervention on the part of a
      superpower?
APPENDIX B

The concept of outcome (success and failure) is operationalized through the interaction of the five variables outlined on page 27. The first three are self-explanatory in how they are measured. The variable Political control of territory builds from the work in comparative politics by Etzioni and others with regard to methods of rule and the varying levels of legitimacy accorded with each. Briefly, there are four "levels" of political control. These are:

1. The use of coercion to control the population
2. The use of utilitarian methods (co-optation)
3. The use of habitual methods (neglect)
4. the use of symbolic methods largely centering on nationalism

Each represents a distinct level or degree of political control ranging from "worst(1) to best(4)." In this study we will theorize that it is more effective and consequently more indicative of support that a faction or regime utilize level 3 or 4 rather than levels 1 or 2 and thus would be more "successful."

The final variable The competitive superpower dimension refers to the degree of adverse superpower intervention against a faction that has assumed pre-eminence after the life of the conflict. This variable is concerned the degree of superpower recognition or opposition to the faction that prevails and how that inhibits governing and consolidation.

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From the five variables outlined in appendix II, five categories of success and failure are constructed in a classification scheme. Each of these is developed through the alignment of the five variables defined above.

**SUCCESS:** The faction in question achieves political control of the political authority structure (PAS), international recognition and achieves the predominant military position. The faction exercises political control at level 3 or 4 and superpower intervention against its authority is minimal at best.

**LIMITED SUCCESS:** International recognition and a positive military position vis-a-vis other factions yet the group requires outside support to maintain the current position. It exhibits moderate territorial control yet relies on more coercive forms of political control usually at levels 1 or 2. Superpower intervention against its authority is present in low to moderate forms and thus facilitates internal resistance to the regime.

**STALEMATE:** Conflict continues with little or no significant shift in territorial or political positions of the various factions. International recognition is not forthcoming and a military stalemate is evident. Superpower intervention may be present but not yet significant enough to shift the status-quo.

**LIMITED FAILURE:** Weak military position and a tenuous political control over whatever territory the faction occupies. There is little or no international recognition and clear superpower support for the adversary(s) who’s relative position is more advantageous.

**FAILURE:** Militarily defeated, withdrawn or disbanded. There is no effective superpower support and no international recognition. In terms of territory, the faction has little of a secure base from which to operate and usually must flee the country itself. Political control becomes almost a non-issue.
APPENDIX D

Diagram of a Case Study: Angola

Hist. Background {t1-t2/3 months}
[I--------]-C------I1-----I2----t1--t2----t3----t4
1958-1975 March 75
Mar-Apr 75 [Mar-May] [June-Aug]
[Sep-Nov]

1. Each case will be explored beginning with a brief examination of the historical background of the case.

2. The "C" conflict point is identified. In this case, it is March 23, 1975.

3. Following this, the respective "I" (1 & 2) Intervention points for both superpowers are charted. In Angola, these occur for both in roughly the same period, late March, early April.

4. Then the case is examined at three month intervals. In the case above there are four such intervals, the three shown and also Dec.-Feb 76.

5. Following this, a post-script is done on the outcome, 3-5 years after the conflict has ended.

6. At each point beginning with "C" and including at each interval, the local context is charted using the variables already identified. This will give us an overall estimation [+ or -] of the prospects for successful intervention based on local context.

7. At each interval point and at the end of the conflict, the outcome status will be charted using the operationalization of outcome outlined earlier. For the Angolan case, this will done in February 1976 and also in a post-script.
APPENDIX E

ANGOLA: Local Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(+ or -)</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Local Military Balance</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Factionalism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Role of State of Influence</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Role of Regional States</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Role of Regional Organizations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Level of Tolerance for Intervention</td>
<td>±</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The score for the Soviet union represents the highest degree of opportunity for the superpowers in terms of successful intervention. Whether this is the highest relative to other cases is not discernible at present.

*Please be reminded that while the scores differ for the U.S. overall, the shift does not take place until well into the conflict itself. This shift impacts U.S. intervention during the critical escalatory stage and thus has significant impact. This accounts for the (−) score overall.
APPENDIX F

Case: Overall "map" of the Angolan Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Context</th>
<th>Superpower Int.</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Postscript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA I USSR</td>
<td>USA I USSR</td>
<td>US S US</td>
<td>USA I USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Angola: - I + High 2 I High 2 F I S LF I LS

I

I

I

I

This map shows that the local context was susceptible to successful superpower intervention, that the intervention was at a high 2 level for both superpowers, that the outcome was a failure for the U.S. and a success for the Soviets, and that in a more extended time frame, a limited failure for the U.S. and limited success for the U.S.S.R.
APPENDIX G

2SHABA II: Local Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(+ or –)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Local Military Balance</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Factionalism</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Role of State of Influence</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Role of Regional States</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Role of Regional Organizations</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Level of Tolerance for Intervention</td>
<td>+**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This overall pattern (+) is the same as the Angolan case on the surface. As explicated in the discussion above, the alignment of these indicators provided one superpower with a high degree of access to the conflict while stymieing the opportunities of the other.
APPENDIX H

Case: Overall "map" of the Shaba II Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Context</th>
<th>Superpower Int.</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Postscript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shaba II</td>
<td>+ High 2</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA I USSR</td>
<td>S I I</td>
<td>I I I I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This map is a synopsis of the findings of this case as seen by the framework. The local context was susceptible to successful superpower intervention overall with a definite bias in favor of U.S. action and against Soviet intervention potential. U.S. intervention was at a High 2 state due to the active American participation in a proxy intervention on the side of the Mobutu regime. Overall, the outcome both in the short and long term was a success based on the maintenance of the present regime.
APPENDIX I

OGADEN CONFLICT: Local Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(+ or -)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Local Military Balance</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Factionalism</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Role of the State of Influence</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Role of Regional States</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Role of Regional Organizations</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Level of Tolerance for Intervention</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX J

Case: Overall "map" of the Ogaden Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Context</th>
<th>Superpower Int.</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Postscript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA I USSR</td>
<td>US I SU</td>
<td>USA I USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden Conflict:</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>----- I High 2</td>
<td>-- I S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This map shows that the local context was susceptible to successful superpower intervention, that Soviet intervention was at a HIGH 2 level and the outcome was a success.
## APPENDIX K

**RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE: Local Context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(+ or -)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Local Military Balance</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local Factionalism</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Role of State of Influence</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Role of Regional States</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Role of Regional Organizations</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tolerance for Superpower Interv.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The overall pattern (-) precluded both superpowers from successful intervention. Unlike other cases we have examined, this score was applicable to both and afforded neither superpower greater access than the other.*
APPENDIX L

Case: Overall "Map" of the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Context</th>
<th>Superpower Int.</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Postscript</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA I USSR I</td>
<td>I I I</td>
<td>I LF I F</td>
<td>I I I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This map is a synopsis of the findings of this case as explored by the framework. The local context was not susceptible to successful superpower intervention and in fact acted to thwart that behavior. Soviet intervention never reached above the LOW 1 status and the outcome was far less than successful for Moscow.
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