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The dynamic nature of party identification during a presidential campaign

Allsop, Dee Thad, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1988
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UMI
THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
DURING A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Dee Thad Allsop, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1988

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful and indebted to many individuals and friends who directed, advised, and supported me throughout the research and writing of this dissertation. I am particularly lucky to have three of the most respected members of the Political Science faculty serve on my advisory committee. No dissertation is without challenges and difficulties. However, Dr John Kessel's direction and insight served as a rudder to help the dissertation sail true to course, keep off the rocks, and find safe harbor. Without question, the prompt and thorough reviews of Dr. Kessel, Dr. Herbert Weisberg, and Dr. Aage Clausen kept the momentum behind completing this dissertation.

The Ohio State Polimetrics Laboratory provided considerable analytical, financial and moral support throughout my graduate program and dissertation research. Many thanks go to Kristi Andersen, Aage Clausen, Jim Ludwig, Nora Groves, and all my friends at Polimetrics.

The research for this dissertation is based on data collected and made available by The Wirthlin Group, formerly known as
Decision/Making/Information. Many thanks go to The Wirthlin Group for the investment they have made in supporting this dissertation research.

To my children, who jealously despise the word "dissertation" because of the many times it took me out of their lives, I promise not to use the "D"-word again. Well, at least not until they start college and begin thinking about their futures.

I dedicate this work to my wife Charmaine because she has dedicated so much of her time, energy, and emotional strength to support this effort. I must admit that this dissertation in itself is not much compensation for all that she has given. However, the times we have shared in the nine years of our marriage—both good and bad—have made us stronger and better people.
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Overview

Party identification is recognized as one of the pre-eminent concepts in the study of voting behavior. Its significance is primarily due to the fact that it is the single best indicator of how an individual will vote. In addition, party identification is traditionally recognized as a long-term force which acts to stabilize election outcomes against electoral swings caused by popular candidates and salient issues of the day. Perceived as a stable long-term force, party identification provides a useful point of reference from which to gauge short-term fluctuations in electoral behavior and partisanship.

More recently, however, the traditional conceptualization of party identification has undergone serious challenges. Perhaps one of the more serious challenges questions the stability of party identification. Mounting evidence suggests that "the conceptualization of party identification primarily as a long-term force unresponsive to current political stimuli is in need of
If party identification is sensitive to political events in the short-term, then it cannot be used as freely as a baseline for gauging short-term fluctuations. Similarly, it raises serious questions as to how much of a stabilizing force it provides in the electorate.

The revision of the traditional conceptualization of party identification has already begun. Reconceptualization of party identification is a topic of much discussion in political science.

This Ph.D. dissertation reviews research which has examined the stability of party identification and raises several interesting questions regarding short-term fluctuations in party identification that remain to be treated in the literature. The dissertation details and then carries out a research design which examines daily fluctuations in party identification over the course of an election year. This differs dramatically from previous studies which have examined the stability of party identification across several election years. The research in this Ph.D. dissertation makes a major contribution in helping to further revise our conceptualization of party identification as

---

a dynamic element of American electoral behavior during the election year.

Review of the Literature

The single most dramatic factor of 1984 was movement in party identification... Let me take one state, Alabama. Among white voters in December 1983, 53 percent said they were Democrats and 24 percent said they were Republicans. That is a Democratic advantage of 29 points. By election day, among white voters in Alabama, 29 percent said they were Democratic and 41 percent said they were Republican, a 12-point Republican advantage, or a net shift of 41 points. --Peter Hart

As a political scientist who has a love affair with the concept of party identification, I thought of something as you were citing your Alabama data. Those data obviously say something important about party fortunes, but they also say something about the concept of party identification if you get that kind of movement. Have we simply transformed party identification so that it is no longer a deep underlying commitment, but a more casual, easily changeable reaction to current events? --Evert Carll Ladd

Party identification has only recently been reconceptualized as a dynamic element in American voting behavior. To understand the significance of this revision it is necessary to trace the intellectual roots and development of this concept.

---

Party Identification: The Traditional Conceptualization

Party identification is the anchor in the attitudinal approach to voting behavior. It was first developed and used in *The Voter Decides*[^3] and then more fully elaborated in *The American Voter*.[^4] An explanation of its role within the attitudinal approach is best described in *The American Voter*. In that book, the authors describe a "funnel of causality."[^5] In the analogy, the converging shape of the funnel represents the analytical process of eliminating and isolating the key causes that ultimately determine a simple dependent behavior which is symbolically represented by the narrowest end of the funnel. At the widest end of the funnel enter all causes (direct and indirect) which figure in the determination of the dependent variable. The axis of the funnel represents a time dimension.

According to the metaphor, if a cross-section of the funnel (perpendicular to the axis) were taken, it would reveal a set of causes or explanatory variables and would permit exact prediction of the dependent behavior. The closer the cross-section is to the

[^5]: Ibid., pp. 24-37.
narrow end of the funnel, the smaller the number of explanatory variables that can account for the behavior. Accordingly, the researcher designs a strategy to take a cross-section at a point just prior to the dependent behavior. This "proximal mode of explanation . . . assumes that whatever effect distant events may have on current political behavior, this effect must be present and measurable in some form just prior to the dependent event."\(^6\) Applied to an explanation of vote behavior, they suggest that the appropriate strategy would be to "measure the individual's party identification at the current time, on the assumption that this is a perfect distillation of all events in the individual's life history that have borne upon the way in which he relates himself to a political party."\(^7\) In other words, party identification was conceived as somewhat of a summary of all of an individual's political socialization experiences and constitutes the primary force behind vote choice.

Campbell asserted that this approach was superior to the sociological approach used previously by the authors of *Voting*.\(^8\)

---

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 34.

\(^7\)Ibid., p. 34.

causes in the funnel that were more removed (in time and substance) from the behavior they intended to explain. Consequently, sociological variables are not as strong predictors of vote behavior.

Within the attitudinal approach party identification is most commonly conceptualized as a psychological attachment or affective orientation of an individual to a political party. This conceptualization is an application of reference group theory which recognizes the "attracting or repelling quality of the group as the generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship." Accordingly, "the political party serves as the group toward which the individual may develop an identification, positive or negative, of some degree of intensity."  

Specifically, this identification is measured with a two-part question in which respondents classify themselves as Republican, Democrat, or Independent. The second part of the question asks how strong of a partisan they perceive themselves to be. If they claim to be Independent in the first part of the question, then they are asked which party they lean toward.  

---

9The American Voter, p. 121.
10Ibid., p. 122.
According to reference group theory, an individual's affective orientation to political parties (party identification) serves as a powerful reference point from which the individual can evaluate issues and candidates that he has little information about. In some cases, an individual's feelings are based solely on how his principal reference group identifies with an issue or candidate.

Following its initial development by Campbell, party identification rapidly became an integral part of nearly every study of electoral behavior. Research demonstrated that party identification when compared to other political attitudes was quite stable. Even amidst large fluctuations in voting outcomes, party identification at the aggregate level remained

---

11 The exact text of the two part question is a follows:

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?

(If respondent answers Democrat or Republican, then they are asked:) Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or not very strong Republican/Democrat?

(If the respondent answered that he was an independent, a member of an other party or had no preference, then he is asked:) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

stable. From 1952 to 1964, for example, the percent of the population identifying with either of the parties did not change by more than two percentage points.\textsuperscript{13} As the authors of the \textit{American Voter} concluded, "Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. Theses loyalties establish a basic division of electoral strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes place. And they are an important factor in assuring the stability of the party system itself."\textsuperscript{14}

Because it is often misunderstood, it should be pointed out that Converse was essentially making two important theoretical points (with regard to party identification) in \textit{The American Voter}: 1) party identification was more stable on the individual level than other attitudes, and 2) aggregate level stability in party identification over a ten year period produced a consistent division of electoral strength that contributed to the stability of the party system.


For various reasons, over the years these two points have become grossly oversimplified by political scientists in the literature. Most literature reflects the belief that Converse (and the coauthors of *The American Voter*) was claiming that party identification was absolutely stable. On the contrary, Converse merely intended to point out the relative stability of party identification at the individual level when compared with other variables. He did not intend to suggest that individual level party affiliation is unchanging and therefore the source of partisan equilibrium observed at the aggregate level. In a 1966 letter to John Kessel, Converse clarifies the point,

Naturally, we never intended to say that nobody ever changes, and any exclamations over stability are entirely relative. The Tau-b for the full party identification measure over a four-year period in the panel was .68. How stable this is, of course, depends on one's expectations and other information cast in comparable form.... What is most impressive, perhaps, is that there are no other measures of political attitudes of any type which are even within rough shooting distance of this degree of stability. 15

---

Despite Converse's understanding of the "relative" stability of party identification, most political scientists concluded from the early research that party identification was a "standing decision" unchanging over time.

Regardless of whether party identification was seen as stable or just "relatively" stable, most scholars agree that party loyalties contribute to the stability of the political system itself. An analysis conducted by Stokes and Iverson convincingly demonstrated the presence of equilibrium forces and measured the actual degree of stability in the political system.\textsuperscript{16} They point out the impressive fact that neither political party has won more than 65% of the presidential vote in more than 100 years. Further, their analysis indicates that the probability of that occurring due to chance is a very slim 3 times out of 100. In other words, the odds are very high that equilibrium forces operate to keep the parties in some kind of competitive balance.

Recognizing its role in maintaining aggregate level stability, party identification was used as the core of the "normal vote" measurement later developed by Converse.\textsuperscript{17} Based on

fairly consistent distributions at the aggregate level of partisan identification over time, turnout rates, and defection rates, the normal vote provided a means of identifying the expected division of the two party vote in any particular election. Fluctuations from the expected or "normal" vote thus constituted a means of measuring the effect of short term forces caused by candidates, salient issues, or specific events that were significant in a particular election.

Even though high levels of aggregate stability were observed in the electorate throughout the 1950s and 1960s, some individual level changes were observed. These were initially dismissed as idiosyncratic events associated with personal changes in an individual's social situation usually brought on by a new job, a marriage, or a move to a new community or neighborhood.\textsuperscript{18}

Eventually, utilizing evidence from panel studies, Butler and Stokes demonstrated that there were other forces underlying change in party identification. In a study of political behavior in Britain they found, "a measurable element of voters varied in

\textsuperscript{17}Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote", in Angus Campbell, et al. Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1966), chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{18}Campbell, et al., op cit., p. 150.
both their party identification and party choice. The great majority, though not all, of them suggested that it would therefore be wrong to present party identification in America as completely steadfast in the face of changing electoral preferences. ¹⁹

Subsequent studies began to examine correlates of change in party identification. More than one author has pointed out that change in identification varies directly with the level of political involvement—individuals with low levels of political involvement or political interest are more likely to change party identification. ²⁰ These same shifting voters, according to Converse's "floating voter hypothesis", were responsible for the "ebbs and flows of the American electoral system." ²¹ Alternatively, examining the same data, Dreyer found that "the only change that occurred over this period was (due to) random chance." ²² In other words, for a small group of voters, their


²¹Campbell, Elections and the Political Order p. 137.

preferred party can best be predicted according to random choice. Further, contrary to their earlier research, Dobson and St. Angelo reanalyzed the 1956-60 panel and found that switchers were actually from higher level involvement categories and that a model of random choice was inappropriate. In fact they found strong evidence which indicated that many changes were intentional or "purposive."

Party Identification: The Rational Choice Conceptualization

The discovery of a "purposive" element in party identification change was somewhat at odds with the traditional conceptualization. Yet it was entirely consistent with a separate theoretical approach to vote behavior that had been operating on the periphery for several years.

The then emerging emphasis on rational choice was due somewhat to the discovery of a "purposive" element in party identification. Shively, also points out that the unexpected decline in party identification that began in the 1960s also forced the reconsideration of the traditional conceptualization of the party identification measurement and a search for alternative approaches.

One of the earliest and most influential articulations of rational choice theory was outlined by Anthony Downs. A Downsian rational choice interpretation would suggest that party identification was strictly a function of the correspondence between a party and a voter's positions on the issues. According to the theory a voter rationally chooses to identify or vote for the party that best represents his own policy preferences. As such, partisan stability is a function of stable party positions rather than voter loyalty to the parties.

In the rational choice approach, party identification was seen as a dynamically integrated variable in electoral behavior. It was responsive in a dramatic way to short-term forces such as issues and candidate evaluations. This was a sharp contrast to the traditional role attributed to party identification. In the social-psychological approach, party identification was the product of early socialization and was not believed to be easily subject to later change. It remained constant and withstood short-term cross-pressures. It was considered an independent

---

24 Shively, op. cit. p. 221.

variable in models of voting behavior.

Strictly interpreted, a pure Downsian interpretation would suggest that party choice (party identification) was equivalent to vote choice. For example, many European studies conclude that party identification is a complete function of how a voter intends to vote. However, there is more than just a trivial definitional distinction between party identification and vote choice in the United States. Given the stability of identification amidst large fluctuations in vote, this clearly appears to have never been the case.

Another illustration of this difference is found in research by Howell that demonstrates individual party identification changing only after the individual has voted for a party other than the one with which he identifies. Shively also pointed out that the magnitude of the change in party identification from election to election is always about fifty percent less than the magnitude of the vote change. Thus, it seems that a pure rational choice approach is not supported.

---


The shortcomings in the traditional approach and the rational choice approach led to reformulations of the models of voting behavior. To different degrees, these reformulations incorporated the idea that party affiliation is an endogenous variable influenced by past and current political forces. It has direct and indirect influence on current political behavior. They also recognize that party identification is not based purely on a rational calculation of current party positions. In addition, some of these new models incorporate a more realistic dynamic aspect into their formal structure.

Recent Models of Party Choice

The most recent models of party choice appear in the work by Jackson,29 Fiorina,30 Markus and Converse,31 Page and Jones,32 and


32 Benjamin Page and Calvin Jones, "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote," APSR 73 (1979): 16 (Footnote continued)
Franklin and Jackson. Jackson's is the earliest of the five. His model reflects his belief that an individual's position on the issues are a function of social and demographic variables and impact directly on candidate evaluations and indirectly on party identification. Based on an empirical test of the model he concluded, "The most important influences are the effects of people's issue positions on their evaluations of the parties and the influence of these evaluations on party identifications and on voting decisions." The model suggests that the issues in each election are the basis of a new distribution of party affiliation in the electorate. To the degree that individual and party positions remain stable, there is a continuity in partisanship.

Within Fiorina's retrospective voting model, party identification consists of a running balance sheet between the two parties that takes into account all past experiences with parties. The performance of the party of the incumbent is postulated to be the dominant factor affecting evaluations of past experiences with the parties. Consequently, party identification is not conceived to be increasingly strengthened with increased political

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32 (continued)
1071-89.


34 Jackson, op. cit., p. 161.
experience or greater length of exposure or association with a party. On the contrary, party identification is responsive to short-term fluctuation in incumbent performance in handling domestic, economic, and foreign issues.

The Markus and Converse model is also retrospective. It is similar to the Jackson model, however, in that it attributes a larger role to social-demographic variables in determining issue positions and party affiliation. More importantly, their model is best distinguished because of the dominant role ascribed to party identification. In the Markus and Converse model party identification is positioned as the principal determinant of candidate evaluations and the vote. Not surprisingly, the estimation of their model finds party identification as the most significant factor in determining electoral choice. They conclude that party identification is "very durable" and only subject to change after a series of votes contrary to an individual's identification. This supports Howell's finding that party identification changes only after voters actually vote contrary to their identifications.35

The Page and Jones model is similar to the Jackson model with the exception of the fact that it recognizes reciprocal links

35Howell, op. cit.
between all three of the principal variables: issues, party identification, and candidate evaluations. Estimation of their model reveals that issues (comparative policy distances between voters and candidates) are the strongest factor affecting intended voters. In addition, they found that issues have a considerable influence on current party identification. Contrary to Markus and Converse, they found that party identification is less influential in determining the vote and more sensitive to short-term forces.

Most recently, Franklin and Jackson re-examined elements of the Jackson, Markus and Converse, and Fiorina models with data from a larger number of presidential elections. Their results support Jackson findings, "the forces with the greatest impacts in present party identification are the evaluation of the parties positions relative to the preferences of the voter during the current campaign."

They found little evidence to support the Markus and Converse finding or the finding by Howell that party identification change is linked with past voting, "We conclude that the voting decision by itself and not as a surrogate for other forces, exerts little if any effect on subsequent identifications. We expect the forces that influence the vote and that might indirectly influence identification by this method have already done so." 

36 Franklin and Jackson, op cit., p. 965.
The Franklin and Jackson piece is significant for another reason. It examines the nature of the relationship between age and partisanship. They find fairly strong evidence to suggest that partisan experiences, which increase with age, act to stabilize party identification. The older a person is, the greater number of past partisan experiences they have and the less susceptible they are to short-term forces.  

Recent work by Jennings and Markus advances the Franklin and Jackson research on age and partisanship one step further. Utilizing panel data from 1965, 1973, and 1982 they also conclude that the intensity and stability of partisanship increase with age. Their research reveals a sharp distinction between older and younger age groups: "As a group, members of the younger cohort have stabilized at a level of partisan loyalty notably below that of their parents." Jennings and Markus correctly recognize that

37 Ibid., pp. 965-66.


39 M. Kent Jennings and Gregory Markus, "Partisan (Footnote continued)
declining partisan loyalty and increasing independence undoubtedly has led to more volatility in the electorate as the process of generational replacement continues.

Besides these models of party choice there are other theoretical explanations for partisan change. For example, Carmines and Stimson offer an organic theory of issue evolution which among other things accounts for changes in the party balance. According to their theory of issue evolution,

occasionally issues rise from partisan obscurity and become so contentious, so partisan and so long lasting that they come to define the party system in which they arise...[R]ealignments are precipitated by the emergence of new issues about which the electorate has intense feelings that cut across, rather than reinforce, the existing line of cleavage between the parties.

A "critical moment" occurs when the mass public rapidly becomes polarized through partisan conversion and electoral mobilization along newly defined issue positions. These "critical moments" occur somewhat frequently, and are relatively

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39 (continued)

Orientations over the Long Haul: Results from the Three-Wave Political Socialization Panel Study. APSR 78 (1984): 1016.


41 Ibid., p. 901-2.
short-lived, fading away without consequence. Occasionally, however, "these critical moments become the signal event for a less dramatic, but more substantial secular redefinition of the issue basis of political life." The short-term changes in the party balance become crystalized and sustained by the normal process of population replacement.

While this theory does not attempt to provide reasons for recent partisan changes, it provides a framework to explain the changes.

The research of these scholars provides more than just a better understanding of the dynamics of party identification. Their conclusions have important implications for our understanding of the larger questions of partisan realignment and democratic theory. Perhaps Franklin and Jackson summarize the significance of the dynamic nature of partisanship best:

The most significant implication of our analysis is that party identification is not the fixed, exogenous force organizing other political behavior that we thought at one time. Party identifications are subject to change as individual preferences change, assuming fixed party positions, or as a consequence of shifts in the party position, if individual preferences are stable, or both. Identifications are more than the result of a set of early socializing experiences, possibly reinforced by a person's accumulated evaluations from previous elections and are dependent upon the events and the actions of political leaders during these elections and during subsequent terms in
office. . . [W]e argue that contrary to the view that party fortunes are largely dependent upon slow demographic changes or dramatic crises, the continual actions, decision, and performance of party leaders affect partisan strength and provide the basis for competitive party strategies.

Voters are not fools. They reward and punish political parties according to the ability of the parties to anticipate and meet their expectations for political leadership and articulate their vision for the future.

Direction of Future Party Identification Research

Our understanding of the role of party identification in electoral behavior evolved considerably since the early 1950's--from a "deep underlying commitment" which "assures the stability of the party system itself," to a "more casual, easily changeable reaction to current events" and the "actions of political leaders during elections." It remains now for us to take seriously the most recent conceptualization of party identification as a dynamic element in election campaigns and explore the degree to which "the continuous actions, decisions, and performance of party leaders affect partisan strength."

\[42\text{Op cit., Franklin and Jackson, pp. 968, 967-968. (emphasis added)}\]
In some respects the reconceptualization of party identification has advanced faster than evidence can be marshalled into to support it. Previous research has been limited because of inadequate sample designs. As political scientists we simply cannot talk definitively about short-term fluctuations in partisanship when we have observations that are spread too far apart in time to detect short-term fluctuations. Quite simply, with respect to partisanship and party affiliation, our theories may reflect the methodological idiosyncracies of the National Election Studies research design rather than the existing realities. Consequently, future research must provide definitive evidence of meaningful (non-random) fluctuations in party identification over the short-term.

Future research in this area must also begin the search for the evidence and reasons which account for any fluctuation in party affiliation. Previous research has not been able to link specific events with observed short-term changes in party identification. What actions, decisions, or events, can explain changes? Methodologically, how can the linkages be demonstrated? These constitute serious questions which must be addressed by future research.
Statement of Purpose and Research Objectives

The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that party identification is a dynamic element of American electoral behavior which responds to the continuous actions, decisions, and performance of party leaders. In order to establish this thesis I focus on the electoral activity of the 1984 presidential campaign. Three separate research objectives are pursued and collectively make a solid argument for the thesis:

1. Demonstrate that the fluctuations in party identification over the 1984 presidential campaign are not random;
2. Demonstrate a logical correspondence between campaign events and changes in party identification;
3. Demonstrate that voter subgroups vary in their responses to campaign events. Changes in party identification vary from group to group depending largely on the degree to which they are rooted in their traditional partisan attachment.

These three research objectives can shed considerable light on the dynamic nature of party identification and how it is manifested in relation to specific events and demographic
Significance of the Dissertation Research

This dissertation makes two major contributions to party identification research. The first contribution is non-theoretical but nevertheless critical to party identification research. For the first time, reliable daily observations of party identification are traced and analyzed in order to provide a definitive assessment of the degree to which party identification fluctuates, if at all, in the extreme short-run, i.e., during the course of a single campaign.

At a more theoretical level, the dissertation begins to explore the dynamic nature of party identification during a presidential campaign. In this regard, I develop the central thesis of the dissertation which rests on a tripod of evidence. First, party identification is a dynamic, rationally based attachment to the political parties rather than a static, attitudinal predisposition. Second, during the course of a election campaign party identification responds in predictable ways to real world events. A combination of macro and micro level effects influence public levels of affiliation with the parties over the course of the campaign. The final component of the
thesis recognizes the varied composition of the electorate. Different subgroups of the population respond differently to the events of a campaign. Some groups demonstrate a considerably greater degree of change in party identification over the period of the campaign.

It is now a well established fact that party identification responds to short-term political forces. Research reviewed above sheds some light on the degree to which party identification responds to short-term forces. It is important to recognize that in the context of these studies, the "short-term" usually refers to the period of time from one election to the next. In a few cases, change in party identification is examined in pre-post election interviews.\(^{43}\)\(^{44}\) In 1980 the NES Panel Study for the first time provided four time points with which to analyze change in party identification.\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\)For example, see Dreyer, op. cit.

\(^{44}\)It is interesting to note that in several of the earlier NES Pre/Post studies party identification was asked only in the pre-election interview. This is most likely due to the fact that party identification, like other demographic variables, was not expected to change during the course of the campaign.

Given the traditional conceptualization of party identification as an unchanging political force, it is not too surprising that no one ever sought to determine the degree to which identification changes at shorter intervals of time. However, now that revisionist research has made it clear that party identification is a dynamic element that is subject to short-term forces over the entire campaign, it becomes important to drastically alter the normal interval between observations. It now makes good sense to make more frequent observations of party identification in order to obtain a more accurate picture of the degree to which it fluctuates over the period of the campaign.

The research outlined in this proposal differs radically from previous research on change in party identification in that it dramatically reduces the interval for observing change to a single day. In the perspective of recent findings indicating the dynamic nature of party identification vis à vis other electoral forces, daily measurement is essential rather than excessive.

Previously, it would have been considered just as absurd to monitor party identification daily and expect to find change as it would be to monitor social status or some other demographic measurement. However, the revised conceptualization of party identification makes it imperative to shorten the interval of observation. In fact, it is interesting to speculate that the
reason for uncovering minimal changes in partisanship during an election year may merely be a function of the fact that it has been measured so rarely. Daily measurement makes it possible to begin to answer the question of whether party identification is no longer a deep underlying commitment, but a more casual, easily changeable reaction to current events. Further, the comments made by professional observers of the political pulse of U.S. make us believe that there is a very strong chance that the proposed research will find large and significant changes in party identification over the period of the 1984 campaign.

Daily measurements, with large sample sizes, significantly modify the scope of the investigation for sources of change in party identification. Daily measurements make it possible to determine the degree to which party identification distributions respond to daily political and electoral events. Similarly, it becomes possible to match fluctuations in party identification to other key electoral and political events in a campaign that are periodic, seasonal, or some other function of time. In fact, using daily measurements as building blocks, the researcher can aggregate days into meaningful periods that represent unique time periods of the campaign. What impact do the primaries have on partisanship? Do political conventions affect political affiliations?
Finally, much of our understanding of electoral politics is based on our knowledge of the voting behavior of major demographic subgroups: blacks, hispanics, Catholics, blue collar workers, college graduates, etc. All of these groups have demonstrated very different patterns of support for the parties over the years.

The research outlined in this dissertation contributes to our understanding of subgroup differences by identifying variation among the principal subgroups in the degree to which their partisan distributions fluctuate and the circumstances under which fluctuation or stability is likely to occur. If party identification is indeed a more dynamic element of American voting behavior as the thesis suggests, then we would expect to find varying levels of partisan sensitivity among these groups of voters based on their distinct political backgrounds.
There is a strong relationship between the kinds of questions that research can address and the data that are available. Indeed, research designs are essentially an explicit set of instructions as to how available data can be collected, manipulated and analyzed in order to answer the research questions raised. Accordingly, the following sections provide an overview of the research design and how each section contributes to the achievement of stated research objectives.

First, there is a description of the principal source of data that make this research feasible. Second, all key variables are operationally defined. Third, the chapter outlines additional data and information requirements. Fourth, the chapter presents a brief overview of the quantitative methods and techniques that are used.¹

¹It is not the intention of this chapter to give a complete explanation of the methods and techniques. As the quantitative methods are applied, they are explained in greater detail.
Finally, at various stages the chapter discusses related methodological concerns of causal interpretation, aggregate level analyses, and regression analysis—all of which are involved in the dissertation research.

Level of Analysis

The analysis largely consists of comparisons of day-to-day national cross-sections. Cases in each national cross-section are aggregated into a single daily data point. Each data point is a sample estimate of actual population parameters. The daily data points comprise a summary score of the level of party identification (the mean level of party identification) score for all voters or for a subgroup of voters and are calculated for every day of the campaign from June 1 to November 5, 1984.

A few cautionary words about aggregate level data analysis are merited. Foremost, it must be remembered that aggregate data cannot be used to explain relationships that might exist between individual level variables. It has been clearly demonstrated that aggregate level findings can be very misleading if generalized to the individual level.² Aggregate level changes in party

²For example, see Jeanne E. Moorman, "Aggregation Bias: An Empirical Demonstration," in Aggregate Data: Analysis and Interpretation Borgatta and Jackson (eds.) (Beverly Hills, CA.: (Footnote continued)
identification cannot be assumed to hold at the individual level. More than likely, there is a considerably greater amount of gross change taking place at the individual level that is impossible to discern with an investigation of net change at the aggregate level.

It is important to recognize that the aggregate data proposed in this dissertation does not suffer from one of the more common problems in aggregate data analysis. Usually researchers have to use aggregate level data because the information they seek is not available at the individual level. Furthermore, the measured indicators used in aggregate data analysis are only rough approximations of the unmeasured variables that they are intended to represent. For example, a historical voting study of the impact of religion on the vote might use the number of churches as the measure of the strength of a particular religion in a county and compare that with the votes cast for various political parties in the county. In this research, the aggregation variables are exactly the same as the individual level variables they represent.

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Individual level analyses could be performed within any one cross-section. However, as previously mentioned, in order to examine change, cross-sections must be compared across time.

The correct design for studying individual level change over time is the panel, wherein the attitudes and preferences of the same people are monitored over time. For example, utilizing this approach in the 1960 pre-post panel, Dreyer found, that some degree of partisan drift was registered by over 40 percent of these respondents. . . nearly half of the pre-election independents changed to a strong or weak partisan identification and over two-thirds of the pre-election weak Democrats and weak Republicans became more strongly identified partisans. Altogether these step changes—from independent to partisan and from weak partisan to strong—accounted for nearly two-thirds of all the changes that occurred. Dramatic as these currents of change are, they produced a net increase of less than one percent in the lead strong and moderate Democratic partisans enjoyed over their Republican counterparts.

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4 Dreyer, op. cit., p. 717.
The proposed research attempts to examine daily fluctuations in party identification during the campaign. Even if party identification could be monitored daily in a national panel, there would be very serious questions about the degree to which the same questions repeated each day to the same respondents were actually reinforcing existing predispositions and reducing the likelihood of individual change. More practically, given respondent mortality rates and other difficulties with panel methodology, it is easily recognized that daily or even weekly panels would be impossible to conduct on a large and representative scale.

**Obtaining Daily Observations of Party Identification**

The other classic approach for measuring change is to use a large number of independent cross-section samples spread out across a period of time. This design has not generally been employed in election studies. However, Kessel noticed that the Survey Research Center took separate surveys in January, May, and October of 1964 and included the party identification question series in each.\(^5\) Kessel found greater volatility in the overall party identification distribution across these surveys than

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expected. The January and October surveys indicated that the usual three-to-two Democratic advantage over Republicans in the SRC surveys of 1952-1962 had become a two-to-one advantage. To quote Kessel's explanation:

This is substantial change noted since the Survey Research Center began charting party identification. Why should such a change emerge in January and October, 1964, but not in May? As noted in an earlier chapter of Kessel's book, the measurement of party identification is in some degree responsive to short-term forces. Therefore, it seems logical to infer that certain short-term forces were applied to the voters' attitudes at those particular times. In view of the timing of the surveys, a plausible explanation is that the system of attitudes reacted to the shock of the Kennedy assassination by bending in the Democratic direction, had begun to recover its normal contours in late spring, and then was hit with the second shock of the Goldwater campaign.

Fortunately, in 1984, two continuous monitoring studies were conducted that permit an examination of change in partisanship across the campaign: the continuous monitoring of the University of Michigan's 1984 National Election Study and daily tracking conducted by Decision/Making/Information on behalf of the Reagan-Bush Presidential Campaign.

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6Ibid.
In other research Allsop and Weisberg compared the two continuous monitoring studies. In both studies they found evidence to demonstrate that aggregate levels of party identification changed across the 1984 election year. However, the large sampling variation in the NES data conceal trends that stand out in the D/M/I data. Moreover, the lack of measurement precision in the NES data leads to an overestimation of the Republican movement in party identification over the last five months of the general campaign. Accordingly, the bulk of the research for this thesis relies on the data from D/M/I's 1984 Reagan-Bush tracking.

D/M/I Reagan-Bush Tracking Study

During 1984, Decision/Making/Information (D/M/I) conducted all the polling for the Reagan Presidential campaign. After the election year was over they merged all of their nation-wide cross-sections into a single data set. Variables that were not asked in every cross-section were not included in the data set. Usually, a national cross-section of 1500 cases was done each

Dee Allsop and Herbert Weisberg, "Measuring Change in Party Identification in an Election Campaign", AJPS (forthcoming).
month. In addition, beginning on June 1, daily tracking began. Each day a national sample of approximately 250 interviews was completed. Beginning on October 5 (one month before election day), daily samples of 500 were completed, with the exception of October 6, 8, 9, 20, and 22 when 1000 interviews were conducted. From October 31 until election day, 1000 interviews were done each day. All together a total of over 66,600 interviews were conducted. Compared to the 75 interviews per week for 47 weeks completed by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan (for a total of about 3525 interviews)—in and of itself a remarkable undertaking—this represents a truly unsurpassed source of information for monitoring political variables over time.

Given that the guiding research question seeks to trace and understand daily fluctuations in party identification, only the tracking data is used in this research and the monthly cross-sections have been removed from the data. From this massive data set, party identification and all demographic variables were made available to the Ph.D. candidate for research.
Variable Measurement and Operationalization

Party Identification

Party identification is traditionally measured in a two part question which first assesses the preferred party and, second, the strength of affiliation with that party. D/M/I uses the traditional question wording:

"Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?"

If the respondent answers "Republican" or "Democrat he/she is then asked, "would you call yourself a strong (Democrat / Republican) or a not-so-strong (Democrat / Republican)?"

If the respondent had initially answered "Independent", then the follow-up would be "do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or to the Democratic party?"

8For comparative purposes, the NES uses "or what" in place of "or something else" and "not very strong" instead of "not-so-strong". The differences in question wording are so minor that for all practical purposes, the observations from both studies can be directly compared.
The two part question produces a seven point scale of partisanship:

1) strong Republicans,
2) not-so-strong Republicans,
3) independents who lean toward Republicans,
4) hard independents,
5) independents who lean toward Democrats,
6) not-so-strong Democrats, and
7) strong Democrats.

The reexamination of party identification that began in the late 1960s has focused primarily on the stability of party identification over time and the measurement of party identification. There is a considerable disagreement on the measurement of party identification even though it has been measured with the traditional seven point scale for over 30 years.

The two principal points of disagreement focus on the ordinality and dimensionality of the seven point scale. The ordinality problem has been discussed by Petrocik and Wolfinger and his colleagues. At the center of the problem is an

9 Shively, op. cit., identifies these two areas as the principal directions in party identification research.


"intransitivity" that occurs between weak partisans and independent leaners. Contrary to what one would expect in a unidimensional scale, the leaners in many ways behave more partisan than the weak identifiers. This presents some difficulty when attempting to collapse the scale or when attempting to make a summary score for a group of respondents.

To overcome the transitivity problem the seven point scale is commonly collapsed into five categories--putting the partisan leaners with the "not-so-strong" partisans. Leaners are included with "not-so-strong" partisans based on Brody's research that suggests that they are more partisan than weak identifiers.\(^\text{12}\) and the fact that they behave more partisan than weak identifiers.\(^\text{13}\)

The mean of the five point identification scores for all cases is then calculated and used as a single summary score of the

\(^{11}\)A Petrocik, op cit.; and Keith, et al. op cit.
daily level of partisanship. This measurement scheme is used extensively throughout the dissertation.

Demographic Variables

A primary component of the thesis is to compare the different demographic subgroups in order to determine which experience greatest change and under what circumstances. The daily tracking conducted by D/M/I obtained the usual demographic variables: age, race, sex, occupation, income education, religion, union membership and region.

Question wording and, where appropriate, method of construction for some of the demographic variables are included in Appendix A.

Responsiveness of Party Identification to Events

The second objective of the proposed research is to determine what events and circumstances coincide with changes in the distribution of partisan loyalties. The purpose of this research objective is to place the time series in a context that reflects the actual chronology of events and circumstances that accompanied changes in party identification during the campaign. The
assumption, of course, is that these events had an impact on the way people identified with the political parties. A strict causal relationship, however, between events and changing identification is almost impossible to establish. Causal explanation requires that there be a clear concomitant variation between two variables; a logical temporal sequence between the variables; and the elimination of other possible causal effects that might explain the observed relationship between the two variables.

This part of the analysis serves to identify points in the time series where there is concomitant variation and a logical temporal relationship between events and periods of change or stability in party identification. Only in a very limited sense will it be able to eliminate other possible causal effects that might explain the relationship between events and fluctuations in party identification.

Nevertheless, being able to demonstrate covariation between events and change in party identification occurring in a logical sequence provides the predicate of a persuasive causal argument. While not conclusive, it requires future research to bear the burden of disproof.
Event Identification and Documentation

In order to link events with changes in party identification, the research requires a thorough examination of the events occurring in the 1984 presidential campaign. Identifying and reporting events is an explicit function of the news media. What is required is a means of sorting through all of the reported news to find just those events that might have some political impact.

In order to reduce the effort required to identify and monitor all news events, just one media source was monitored. Television, newspapers, and magazines are the three principal sources of news. News magazines provide a weekly summary of events rather than day-to-day. Further, according to the 1984 NES study only 18 percent of all people eighteen or older even read a weekly news magazine. On this basis, magazines were eliminated from consideration.

There is good reason to believe that the national TV audience is more representative of the general population than the newspaper readership audience. According to the SRC data, there are fewer people who never watch TV (14.4 percent) than there are that never read a newspaper (23.1 percent). Moreover, nearly 46 percent of the people say that they watch national network news "every day." Finally, about 50 percent of all people say they
paid a "great deal" or "quite a bit" of attention to news about the presidential campaign on TV, compared to 28 percent in newspapers.

On the other hand, there is evidence which suggests that newspapers have more of an impact on level of information people have on the campaign. For example, Kessel demonstrates that the more often people use newspapers as a source of information on national politics and campaigns, the more likely it is that they have a higher level of information on the campaign. There is no such relationship between television viewing and level of information. Increased viewing of television seems to have no impact on the amount of information a person has regarding the election. So, while more people claim television to be the most important source of information on the presidential campaign, actual information gain is more closely related to newspaper reading.

In choosing whether to monitor events from TV or newspaper, perhaps the most persuasive difference is that the documentation of television network news is more readily available, concise, and complete. Documentation of daily newspapers is done in separate

indices for each newspaper. Further, because newspaper indices must cover such large amounts of information, the information that is needed is divided and spread out over several key words in the index, making topic searches much more difficult. Given the advantage of a single television news index over the several newspaper indices and recognizing that the analysis requires a good and thorough source for identifying day-to-day events and not necessarily one that conveys the greatest amount of information, national network news broadcasts will be used to identify significant events.

The Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts provides a complete summary of daily network news broadcasts for ABC, CBS, and NBC. A sample page (see Appendix B) reveals that the Television News Index and Abstracts identifies each news story, the specific segments that go into the story, the correspondents reporting the story, the length of the story, the city from which the story originates, people interviewed in the story, and a short abstract of the content of the story. This is more than enough information needed to identify significant political events.

A review of significant campaign events included an examination of all TV news stories on all three major networks that occurred between June 1 and November 6, 1984. A fairly liberal inclusion criteria was established so that the list of campaign events would tend to be exhaustive and less likely of overlooking some important event.

To be included in the list of campaign events only two criteria had to be met. In general, it is assumed that in order for an event to have an impact on political attitudes or partisan identification then it would have to:

- be reported on at least two of the three networks, and
- be politically relevant.

The first criterion is self explanatory. The second criterion admittedly is a subjective judgment. In application, however, because of the objective to be inclusive rather than exclusive, virtually anything with political implications qualified for inclusion. For example, monthly unemployment and economic reports are included as campaign events. Aside from economic reports, usual domestic or foreign affairs news which mentioned a political candidate directly or indirectly or made reference to policies of the Reagan White House are considered politically significant and included in the event monitoring.
The format of *Television News Index and Abstracts* greatly facilitates a thorough yet brief review of significant political events. One of the most useful bits of information provided in the index is a indication of the amount of time dedicated to covering a news story. Given the limited amount of time available each night and the magnitude of information and news that can be covered, it is assumed that the length of time devoted to a story is a rough indication of the relative importance of a news story. Accordingly, the length of time devoted to each news story was recorded in the event monitoring.

Appendix C contains copies of the actual coding sheets utilized in carrying out the event monitoring and the information recorded. For each event a short description of the event is recorded along with the date of its occurrence. The length of time devoted to coverage of the news story by each network is also recorded.

In some cases it was not possible to determine how much time was devoted to a particular event. For example, the abstract might describe a general story about the presidential campaign which talks about events from both the Reagan campaign and the Mondale campaign. In such cases the amount of time dedicated to the whole story would be divided evenly between the two (or more)
events. In most cases, however, this simply was not a problem. Returning to the example, typically each network had a correspondent following each candidate and filing separate news stories making it possible to keep an accurate tally of the time devoted to each news story.

The initial objective of the event analysis was to provide a systematic sorting of all news reports to identify those that might impact partisan affiliations. The next step in the event monitoring included a graphical chronology of news events and their importance in a way which facilitated over-time comparisons with measurements of partisan affiliation.

Appendix D illustrates the two-dimensional graphical representation of news stories over the five month period under examination. The horizontal axis represents a time dimension beginning at June 1 and ending at November 5. The vertical axis represents the relative importance of a news story (as measured in the total number of minutes dedicated to covering the news story on all three networks).

A total of 104 news stories over the five month period were included in the analysis. Most news stories continued over a period of two to five days. Some, like the party conventions or Geraldine Ferraro’s financial problems continued for a couple of
weeks.

This method of event monitoring makes it easy to track out any particular news story to determine how important it was compared to other news events occurring at the same time and other news stories occurring earlier or later in the campaign. It is possible to identify particular events which dominate all others occurring at the same time. Most importantly, it provides a format which makes it possible to compare campaign events at a particular point in time or over a period of time with coinciding measurements of partisan affiliation.

The day to day monitoring of campaign and news events and their importance combined with Decision/Making/Information's continuous monitoring study provide a sound empirical basis for analyzing the relationship between campaign events and changes in party identification.
CHAPTER III
Searching for Election Year Fluctuations in Party Identification

The Electoral Context of the 1984 Presidential Campaign

There are usually a large number of interpretations of the meaning of any election outcome--1984 was no different. Some viewed the electoral landslide as a broad endorsement of Reagan policies. Others thought that the Reagan victory was merely a "videogenic triumph" over a candidate who wasn't good on television. Still others suggested that the outcome was merely a reflection of a swell in political conservatism that was sweeping the country. While each of these factors may have contributed in some way to the final outcome, there is very little support for any of these extreme interpretations. It is widely recognized, however, that in 1984 the people were feeling better about themselves and their country. Perhaps more than any other factor, this might explain the Reagan victory.

Throughout the election year a majority of the population felt the country was headed in the right direction. By election day
over 60 percent felt that way.1 In particular, voters were pleased with the state of the economy. By election day 57 percent felt that they were better off financially than they were four years ago.2 Just before election day Public Opinion's Gross National Spirit Index reached its highest point since it was first measured in 1981.3

Actual economic data illustrate what people were feeling so much better about. Interest rates had declined substantially since 1980. Inflation was down around 4 percent rather than the double digit levels it had reached in 1979 and 1980. Unemployment was about the same as it was in 1980, but it was moving in a downward direction from the highs it had reached in 1982. As Paul Light and Celinda Lake point out, the fact that unemployment was declining was more important that the actual level of unemployment, "no matter what the unemployment rate, when it is rising, it scares both the unemployed and those who fear they may be next; when it is falling, its effect is confined to the unemployed themselves."4 People could feel personally the

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2Ibid., p. 36.
3The Gross National Spirit Index is based on a set of six questions which measure satisfaction with various conditions in the country and the prospects for future improvement.
importance and impact of declining interest rates, inflation, and unemployment.

The outlook was not entirely rosy to be sure. The international trade deficit and the budget deficit were clearly the biggest economic problems faced (or perhaps contributed to) by the Reagan administration during the election year. While the long-range impacts of uncorrected trade and budget deficits far exceed the short-term benefits of declining interest rates, inflation, and unemployment, they never became voting issues. Even if some voters could conceptually understand the complexities of these two issues, they could not feel their impact on their lives.

The principal beneficiary of this upbeat mood was the incumbent president, Ronald Reagan. His approval ratings increased fairly steadily from a low of 52 percent in May to a peak of 61 percent at election time. Indeed Ronald Reagan was not just a beneficiary of a positive mood that was sweeping the country; many people believed that he was personally responsible for the good times they were enjoying and felt that he had done

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well enough to deserve reelection. In June 1984, a 54-38 majority felt that Reagan had earned four more years based on how well he had performed.6

On the basis of this kind of evidence, it is generally conceded that the 1984 election outcome was a favorable assessment of the country's condition after four years under a Reagan administration. Whether Reagan was fully responsible for the favorable conditions prevailing in the country in 1984 is not nearly as important as the fact that he was president at the time and the perception by many was that he was partially responsible for the good times.

Election Year Effects: The Trend of Change in Party Identification During the 1984 Presidential Campaign

As mentioned before, within Fiorina's retrospective voting model, party identification consists of a running balance sheet that takes into account all past experiences with the parties. Of all the macro level factors that affect evaluations of past experiences with the parties, the performance of the party of the incumbent president is the dominant. Consequently, party

identification is responsive to the incumbent's performance in handling economic, domestic, and foreign issues.

As pointed out above, in 1984 Reagan's performance in handling these affairs was clearly perceived in favorable terms. Based on a favorable economy and a positive evaluation of Reagan's performance as president, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of both of these macro level forces on party identification would favor the party of the incumbent--the Republicans.

In one sense the November 1984 election day is a judgment day or reconciliation day for the voters--a day on which they must express an explicit preference. As the judgment day approaches and voters have to make their decisions, events of their political socialization, the past several years, past months, weeks even days all are factored into their decision. If party identification is partially based on retrospective evaluations of the parties, then the country could use the election year to update its partisanship to conform to its evaluation of the presidential term just ending. Accordingly, we might expect that these evaluations would have their greatest impact in the months just prior to election day as voters were forced to make a conscious accounting of the partisan balance sheet they had been keeping over the last four years.
Assessing Election Year Effects on Party Identification in the 1984 Presidential Campaign

Figure 1 plots the daily measurements of party identification over the general election period. Over the course of the 1984 general election campaign (June 1 to November 6) the average party identification level was 3.04 on a scale of 1 (strong Republican) to 5 (strong Democrat). At its lowest point, party identification fell to 2.79, and on two separate occasions it reached a high of 3.28. Before discussing this movement in party identification any further, we need to find out how much change must occur in order to be statistically significant.

Sampling Error and Measurement Error

Undoubtedly, there exists noise in the data caused by measurement error and/or sampling error. To what extent are the observed changes in party identification due to sampling error and measurement error? Let's first consider the possibility of measurement error.

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The 1 to 5 vertical scale of party identification is abbreviated in all figures throughout the thesis to highlight the variation in day to day measurement of partisanship. This makes it easier to distinguish partisan ebbs and flows. It also makes it easier to identify potential noise in the data.
Figure 1: Daily Measurements of Party Identification: June 1 to November 5
Measurement error can be the result of a biased measure or an unreliable measure. For the purpose of estimating the significance of the difference between two means, a biased measure is irrelevant. A biased estimator does not affect relative comparisons between two different sample estimates.

In order to understand how much of the observed daily score is due to measurement error produced by an unreliable measure, consider the following. Each daily score of party identification is actually the mean score of 250 cases. Measurement error for each day is the sum of all errors in measurement for each of the 250 cases. If we assume the measure is unbiased, then it would produce errors in both directions—some people would be more Republican than the measure indicated and others would be less Republican than indicated. The same would follow for the Democrats. We would expect no pattern to the errors, such that they would tend to cancel each other out. In other words, the sum of all measurement errors for all 250 cases on any given day would be expected to be near zero with a mean close to zero. Consequently, the impact of measurement error on each daily sample estimate of party identification is not too substantial.
Sampling error cannot be disposed of so neatly. One way of estimating the effect of sampling error on the daily mean of party identification is to calculate the probability that two different sample means from different days could be produced by chance.  

For a national sample of 250 there must be a .23 unit change in the mean of party identification from one time point to another in order to be considered statistically significant. When the sample size increases to 1000 observations, the required amount of change reduces to .12 units on the 1 to 5 party identification scale.

Not surprisingly, only a very small proportion of the day to day changes exceed these parameters. In fact, only five of the 158 day to day changes (3%) are statistically significant at the

\[ t = \frac{X_1 - X_2}{\sqrt{\frac{N_1 S_1^2 + N_2 S_2^2}{N_1 + N_2 - 2}} \sqrt{\frac{N_1 + N_2}{N_1 N_2}}} \]

The formula can be rewritten in order to estimate the magnitude of change which would be required to be considered significant at the 95% confidence level by setting \( t = 1.96 \) and solving for \( X_1 - X_2 \):

\[ X_1 - X_2 = 1.96 \sqrt{\frac{N_1 S_1^2 + N_2 S_2^2}{N_1 + N_2 - 2}} \sqrt{\frac{N_1 + N_2}{N_1 N_2}} \]

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8 This is done by calculating a t test for the difference between two means:
.05 level--about what we might expect by chance alone. This does not, however, negate nor diminish the importance of the fact that a very large number of differences between observations removed in time by a few days or weeks are statistically significant.

**Significant Movement in Party Identification**

While there is undoubtedly some random noise, there appears to be a very considerable amount of movement in the data that cannot be attributed to sampling error or random chance. At the extreme, when we compare the high watermark with the low watermark, there is a difference of .49 units. While the range of .49 units of change may seem like a small amount on a five-point scale, it is more than double the change required to be statistically significant. Moreover, it is 12% of the maximal change, and in this particular case it actually represents a net change of 17 percent of all voters moving from an Independent or Democratic partisan identification to a Republican identification (Based on the actual difference in the percentage of respondents identifying with the parties on these particular days--34 percent identifying themselves as strong, weak or leaning Republican changing to 51 percent).

Accordingly, nearly one-fifth of the voting age population shifted their partisan allegiance between these two time points.
It must also be remembered that this shift represents only the aggregate change which does not convey all the individual level changes that merely cancel each other out.

Regressing the daily measurements of party identification over time provides an estimation of the extent to which change in partisanship over the course of the election period was linear. The regression analysis also helps overcome the frailties of the data in measuring the actual amount of day-to-day change over the campaign. For example, the survey estimates for any day of the campaign obviously contain some unknown amount of sampling error, so a comparison of the first day of interviews in June with the last day before the election as a measure of change during the period could be thrown off badly by the sampling error associated with the two observations used for the comparison. However, the regression analysis uses all the data points to generate one estimate of change.

Figure 2 again displays daily measurements of party identification over time. The angled line represents the linear regression of party identification over the five month period. The regression line clearly demonstrates that the overall trend in party identification over the period of the general election was toward the Republican party.
No. of days = 158
Intercept = 3.12
Slope = -.001
\( \Delta Y = -0.1577 \) Total
Residual SS = 1.02398

\[ R^2 = .2424 \]
\[ F = 49.9 \]
Significance of F = .0000
Sum of Squares (SS) = 1.35167

\( \Delta Y \) = Change in predicted value of Y from the beginning of the period (June 1) to the end (November 5).

The sum of squares are reported with each figure and are referred to in an analysis later in the thesis.

Figure 2: Regression Line of Party Identification During the General Election
In linear regression the slope of a regression line represents the amount of change that occurs in $Y$ that is associated with a one unit change in $X$. Since a one unit change in $X$ is equal to one day, in this case the slope is a measure of the daily amount of change in party identification over the general election.

According to the regression solution, the slope is $-.001$. In general terms this means that for each day during the general election campaign, a net total of .1 percent of the voting age population would have had to have made a one unit pro-Republican change on the party identification scale to make a slope of $-.001$. Note that this is a different kind of change than that discussed on page 60.

Another method of analyzing the regression solutions is to use the regression equation to estimate the magnitude of change from the beginning to the end of the period. The $Y$-intercept of the regression equation is conceptually equivalent to the starting level of party identification for the general election (June 1). At the beginning of the period, the level of party identification was 3.12. After about 160 days the mean level of party identification was 2.96—a net change of .16 on the party identification scale.
In terms of partisan advantage, this magnitude of change is comparable to a 7.5 percentage point Democratic advantage at the beginning of the period to a 2.1 point Republican advantage at the end of the period. This represents a net increase of nearly 10 percent of the electorate identifying themselves with the Republican party.

The regression estimation of change in party identification over the five month campaign is highly significant statistically. This evidence clearly supports the expectation that with a favorable economy and positive evaluations of Reagan's performance, changes in party identification during the general election campaign favored the Republican party.

The dependent variable here is the Republican lead. Consequently, this is a third measure of change, different from that discussed on either page 60 or page 63. The conversion from mean party identification scores to the difference in the proportions of the electorate identifying with each party is based on a separate regression analysis. The day's observed difference between the proportion identifying with the Republican and the proportion identifying with the Democratic party was regressed on the mean party identification score for each of the 158 days of D/M/I polling. The resulting regression equation was used to estimate the Republican lead for a given mean partisanship score:

\[
\text{Republican Lead} = 201.46 - 66.9 \times \text{Mean Partisanship}
\]

This linear equation accounts for 93 percent of the variance in the mean party identification scores, so using the equation to convert to a difference in proportions identifying with each party seems reasonable. I shall continue this usage in the next several pages.
Campaign Effects: Accounting for Short-term Fluctuations in Party Identification During the 1984 Presidential Campaign

The regression line demonstrates a clear linear trend in party identification over the five month period in the expected Republican direction. However, the plot of the time series in Figure 2 clearly suggests that the movement in party identification was not completely linear.

During an election campaign it is likely that there will be ebbs and flows in the momentum that builds behind either party's nominee. Usually a series of events will generate either favorable or unfavorable exposure of the candidate and his party. When party identification is conceived as a "running balance sheet" it is reasonable to expect that these events would have some impact on the running score of which party is favored over the other. A series of positive experiences with one party are likely to sway the balance to more strongly favor that party. At the aggregate level this would be manifested in terms of having shifts in the daily mean level of identification that are more favorable to the party.
It is important to point out that this application of the retrospective calculus to party choice is significantly different from anything that has ever been considered previously. It is different simply because of the time frame of the present application. Never before have analysts been able to measure shifting preferences in party identification which result from a series of events within a single campaign.

Retrospective voting or decision making usually implies that voters make decisions based on broad assessments of an incumbent's past performance or record, or on the general state of the economy or country compared to what it use to be a few years ago. The analysis conducted in the above section is entirely consistent with this use of retrospective decision making. As you recall, we expected to find that any aggregate changes in party identification over the election would favor the incumbent due to positive feelings about the state of the economy and country and the perception that Reagan was at least partially responsible. We call these "election year effects". This hypothesis was clearly a formalized expectation that favorable retrospective judgments of the performance of the President and the GOP would be reflected in a stronger affiliation with the Republican party at the aggregate level.
In this section of the research the retrospective calculus of a "running balance" is postulated to operate during the campaign—responding to specific events or campaign periods as the campaign progresses. We call these "campaign effects". As new experiences during a campaign are added to the balance it is postulated that they will affect the net partisan balance. If they do have some kind of effect on the partisan balance, then there should be some trace of it in measures of partisan identification. According to this perspective, the total amount of change that occurs over the five month campaign is actually the sum of short-term and long-term influences. More simply, the party identification level at the end of the election is a function of the cumulative effects of the election year (long-term) and the effects of the campaign (short-term).\textsuperscript{10}

Defining the Campaign Periods

Perhaps one of the easiest ways to examine how or if party identification ebbs and flows in response to events of a campaign is to identify unique periods of the campaign which might reasonably exert differential effects on party identification. It

\textsuperscript{10}The formulation of party identification as a function of election year effects and campaign effects will become clearer as the analysis proceeds. Particularly in light of the analysis on pages 121-136.
is not uncommon to divide a long period of time into shorter periods for the purpose of analysis. Each shorter period is usually based on some common organizing theme or event that makes it different from the other periods. Consequently, it is assumed that the time points within each period are more similar to each other than to time points in other periods.

The Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts and the New York Times Index were used to monitor the occurrence of daily campaign events and help make decisions as to when one campaign period ended and another began. As mentioned earlier, the Television News Index and Abstract was particularly helpful because it provided a quick and easy method of measuring the degree to which a campaign event or issue dominated network news coverage of other events or issues. Television News Index and Abstracts records the amount of time in minutes and seconds devoted to each news story. This served as a surrogate indicator of the degree to which an event dominated others and when it was superceded by another event. The New York Times Index provided additional substantive information on the issues and events taking place during the campaign.

See Appendix C for the documentation of news stories over the election period.
In many cases a series of events clearly dominated the coverage of the campaigns for a period of several days. Eventually, the event or events would fade in importance. Sometimes they would be superceded by a newer and more commanding event. Consequently, the decision as to when one period ends and another begins is sometimes arbitrary while at other times it is fairly clear cut.

Over the last five months of the general election campaign there were a great variety of events which impacted the respective campaigns in greatly different ways. Based on an analysis of the *Television News Index and Abstracts* the last five months of the campaign are divided into eight campaign periods which capture the essence of the different episodes of the campaign:

---The Last Primaries
---Preconvention Democratic Nomination Politics
---Ferraro and the Democratic Convention
---Between Convention Jousting
---Republican Convention
---Traditional Campaign Period
---Debate I and Aftermath
---Debate II and the Final Campaign
The campaign periods and corresponding dates are illustrated in Figure 3.

In the following section each campaign period is described and the rationale for starting and ending dates is discussed. After the events and issues involved in each campaign period are described, their possible impact on party identification will be discussed. Based on that discussion, specific expectations, or hypotheses, will be postulated for later testing.
Figure 3: Chronology of the Eight Electoral Periods
The Last Primaries (June 1 to June 14):

This campaign period is dominated by preparations and reactions to the last day of primaries on June 5. Major primaries on this day included California and New Jersey. Because the stakes were so high, a considerable amount of media coverage was dedicated to the last head-on-head Democratic primaries. Victories by Hart in both California and New Jersey would greatly increase his chances of claiming the Democratic nomination. Likewise, a Mondale victory in California and New Jersey would be enough to provide Mondale with the required number of delegates to assure his nomination. As it turned out, Mondale won New Jersey and lost California.

Over the next several days the meaning of the "split decision" was the primary topic of political discussion. Mondale claimed that with the New Jersey delegates he had enough other committed delegates to win on a first ballot at the convention. Nevertheless, Hart continued to claim that he still had a shot at the nomination.

Conceptually, this period ends at the point when it becomes clear that Mondale is going to be the Democratic party nominee. While some people clearly realized this as soon as they learned Mondale had won in New Jersey, this was not so for the mass
public. In fact, a decision as to exactly what day this was finally realized is somewhat arbitrary because there probably is no single day on which it occurred. For the sake of analysis June 14 was chosen as the final day in this period. On Wednesday the 14th, George McGovern publically endorsed Walter Mondale. Given that McGovern and Hart were personal friends (they were senators together for a number of years, and more importantly Hart had managed McGovern's 1972 campaign), McGovern's public endorsement of Mondale can be considered as merely the realization that Mondale would be the party's nominee. Reacting to McGovern's endorsement, even Hart said that it was understandable and that it was time for Democrats to close ranks.

While the period was clearly dominated by the Democrats, the unofficial Reagan reelection machinery was in full operation. The White House had scheduled a European Tour and an Economic Summit which coincided with the Democratic primaries. On a couple of days, coverage of Reagan's trip to Ireland and the Economic summit even eclipsed coverage of the primaries. Moreover, the D-Day fortieth anniversary was receiving a considerable amount of media attention and evoking strong emotions of patriotism and national pride—central themes of the Reagan campaign. The D-Day coverage reached a climactic ending on the day after the New Jersey and California primaries when Reagan attended a special ceremony honoring those who died at Normandy. At the ceremony Reagan made
an emotional reading of a letter written by the daughter of one of the men who died on D-Day.

The preponderance of media coverage and attention during this period, however, focused on the Democrats and their primaries. Accordingly, any movement in party identification during this campaign period is expected to strongly favor the Democrats.

Preconvention Democratic Nomination Politics (June 15 to July 11)

This campaign period has no dominating events or issues: it is merely sandwiched between two other distinct periods. During the period most of the media coverage went to Democrats. The only event that received notable attention involved Jessie Jackson's trip to Cuba to see Fidel Castro. There was media attention given to Mondale's vice presidential selection efforts, but it received uneven rather than consistent or concentrated coverage—largely due to the fact that it was drawn out over such a long period of time. There were, however, no events that really commanded public attention on the part of the Democrat or Republican candidates. In fact, the only coverage dedicated to Reagan involved discussion of future arms talks with the Soviets and a few Reagan campaign cameo appearances, including the starting of the Daytona 500 on the Fourth of July. The ending of the period is best defined by the
events which dominate the next period.

With the lack of any commanding events to focus attention on either of the candidates or parties it is unlikely that there would be any significant movement in party identification favoring either of the parties. However, since most of the coverage was nevertheless dedicated to the Democrats it is likely that their party may have benefited marginally during this period.

Ferraro and the Democratic Convention (July 12 to July 26)

This period is identified because of two major events which generated massive amounts of Democratic coverage. On July 12, Walter Mondale announced "An Exciting Choice"--the selection of Geraldine Ferraro as his vice presidential running mate. The immediate media coverage was massive and favorable. In addition, the Democratic Party Convention began just a few days later.

National political conventions provide each of the parties with a large national audience. All the national networks provide large amounts of prime time coverage of the convention proceedings. It is clearly an opportunity for the parties to put on their best faces. While every convention has its problems, and while network coverage demonstrates preference for covering points of controversy or contention at the convention, it is nevertheless
a great opportunity for both parties to improve their standing with the public. Conventional wisdom suggests "...a party always prospers if its convention goes peaceably".12

One significant controversy during this period involved Mondale's decision to appoint Bert Lance to replace Charles Mannatt as the head of the Democratic National Committee. The decision was politically misconceived. It was intended to appease Southern Democrats who might react adversely to a Northern woman being added to the ticket. It failed to recognized the ill feelings of dismissing Manatt on the eve of the National Democratic Party Convention which was taking place in his own state. More importantly, the political baggage of a banking scandal which forced Lance's resignation from the Carter White House still lingered. While damage control was reasonably prompt, it nevertheless took away attention which would have otherwise been dedicated to more positive coverage of the Ferraro nomination or the convention itself.

Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the Ferraro nomination and the convention brought Mondale closer to Reagan in the polls than he would ever be throughout the rest of the campaign. A Newsweek poll conducted by the Gallup Organization even showed

12 Goldman and Fuller, p. 49.
Mondale leading Reagan by 48 percent to 46 percent. The President's own polling showed that Reagan still led by a margin of about 8-9 points—down from a 15 point lead prior to the convention.

The selection of Ferraro and the Democratic Convention were probably two of the brightest moments of the entire five month period for the Democrats. It is expected that the occurrence of these two events should have a very strong pro-Democratic effect on the aggregate level of party identification.

Between Convention Jousting (July 27 to Aug 16)

After the Democratic convention and prior to the Republican convention there was a moderate level of exchange between the two campaigns. The beginning of the period is marked by Mondale's return from a week long fishing trip in Minnesota. The Mondale/Ferraro team began pressing key issues—Reagan's environmental record, a "secret" White House plan to raise taxes after the election, and the "appalling" and "obscene" Federal budget deficit.

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13Newsweek, July 24, 1984.
14D/M/I poll cited in Goldman and Fuller, p. 249.
Throughout the period Reagan did not actively campaign. For several days he vacationed at his California ranch. Nevertheless, he made radio speeches and issued statements through campaign and White House personnel that refuted charges of a 'secret' tax plan and vowed to veto any income tax increases. Yet, on the tax issue he avoided painting himself into a corner by stating that raising taxes would be his absolute last resort to deal with the deficit—contrasted with Mondale who at the convention proposed it as a first resort. 

With two exceptions the exchange during this period could be likened to the opening rounds of boxing match during which the two presidential campaigns were just probing and feeling each other out.

During the period more and more attention was focused on Geraldine Ferraro's finances. The Mondale campaign initially tried to portray Ferraro as a woman with a humble background—immigrant daughter and a mother who had to work as a seamstress. That image, however, just didn't fit her blue blood lifestyle.

To complicate matters, past FEC investigations into the financial transactions of Geraldine Ferraro and her husband John Zaccaro raised old questions for a new national audience. To complicate matters, while not legally required, Ferraro promised 

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15 Goldman and Fuller, p. 253.
to serve "public interest" with full financial disclosure of her husband's finances. As pressure increased, she reaffirmed the pledge and moved up the proposed release date. Then, just five days later, after meeting with her husband, she announced that he would not release his returns because of the adverse effects it would have on his business interests. This unleashed, for the first time, open attacks by Republicans on the popular women vice presidential candidate. Strategically it was a "genderless issue" that could be used to discredit Ferraro without fear of a backlash of sympathy for her.16

During the period, Ferraro was not the only one who had some explaining to do. In an off-the-air voice check for his weekly radio address Reagan quipped, "My fellow Americans, I am pleased to tell you today that I've signed legislation that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes."17 Outside the radio studio the recorded comment was not quite as humorous. In Wirthlin's private polling, Reagan's margin over Mondale again fell, and the percent of the electorate who thought that Reagan might get the country into an unnecessary war increased 15 to 18 percentage points.18

16NYT Aug 14, I 1:2.
17Goldman and Fuller, p. 261.
18Ibid., p. 261.
Throughout the period, however, much of America's attention was diverted away from politics altogether. Americans were caught up in the spirit of the 1984 Summer Olympics. The Olympics stoked the fires of patriotism and national pride. Twice Reagan got into the action and spirit of the Olympics—opening the games on July 28 and meeting with the medalists at a White House reception on August 14.

During this period there was only a moderate level of campaign activity on both sides. The amount of coverage of their campaign activities was fairly equal with perhaps a slight edge for the Democrats. It is likely, however, that Ferraro's financial problems detracted from pro-Mondale or pro-Democratic messages and images. Even though Reagan's bombing remark was widely condemned, it was not his first gaffe. It was not about to alter opinions about him which had been formulated over a period of many years. For Ferraro, who was new to the national audience, the financial problems weighed heavily in many people's minds who were still in the process of formulating their opinions about her. The combined effect of these events would likely favor the Republicans. Accordingly, any changes in party identification during this campaign period should favor the Republicans.
The Republican Convention (Aug 17 to September 2)

On August 17 the final draft of the Republican Party Platform was officially adopted just as Dallas, Texas, was being inundated with delegates for the Republican party convention. The entire seventeen day period was largely dominated by the happenings at the Republican Convention. While the convention itself was uneventful—no outstanding floor fights over the platform or delegate rules—it nevertheless put the Republicans, on their best behavior, into the homes of Americans night after night for a period of a week. The strong religious and fundamentalist flavor of the delegates and the anti-Reagan protests outside the convention hall were about the only sources of unfavorable coverage from the convention. The only other topics of controversy seemed to be who was going to get the nomination in 1988 and whether or not the networks should show an 18 minute film designed by the Republican National Committee to introduce Reagan at the convention.

For the Democrats this was a bleak period. Controversy over Ferraro's finances had heightened with new revelations about loan improprieties by John Zaccaro in his real estate business. The most damaging effect of the entire financial controversy was the fact that it made it virtually impossible for Mondale to carry on any coordinated campaign strategy against Reagan when all the
attention was focused on the Republican convention in Dallas and the unresolved problems of his running mate. The only consolation for the Mondale campaign was that the financial controversy ended with a brilliant performance by Ferraro in a two hour press conference answering all questions on her finances. Nevertheless, her performance could not remove the scars and the opportunity costs the controversy had left on the campaign.

Just as the Democratic convention is expected to have had pro-Democratic effects on party identification, the Republican Convention is expected to generate a pro-Republican change in party identification. The only difference is that during this period the Republicans lacked an additional pro-Republican event comparable to the selection of Ferraro which might generate an even more favorable pro-Republican change. Consequently, it is expected that change of party identification during the Republican convention period will favor the Republicans but not as much as change during the Democratic convention favored the Democrats.

Traditional Campaign Period (September 3 to October 6)

Labor Day is traditionally seen as the official campaign kickoff date for the presidential campaign. Accordingly, it is the starting date for the sixth analytic period. Reagan attended well-orchestrated rallies with large crowds in sunny California.
The Democratic advance team planned to piggy-back a Mondale/Ferraro march through the streets of New York just ahead of the already scheduled New York City Labor Day Parade. As it turned out, they marched down the parade route long before the spectators had gathered. To top it off, it rained on Mondale's parade. On national television it conveyed an image of a struggling campaign, even though a midday rally in Merrill, Wisconsin, (which didn't make the news) was very crowded and enthusiastic.

During the period, Mondale mounted several successive attacks on the President and his policies: the line between politics and religion, deficit reduction, arms control, and US-Soviet relations. In addition, three significant events took place. On September 28 Reagan met with Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko. The meeting coincided with Gromyko's annual visit to the U.N. and was largely intended to brunt criticism that Soviet-American relations had sadly deteriorated during the Reagan administration and that Reagan was the only President in fifteen years not to meet personally to talk with Soviet foreign leaders. At the same time several news stories had reported that Soviet leader Chernenko was seriously ill, making it possible to claim that the deaths and ill health of Reagan's Soviet counterparts had precluded the possibility of serious talks. Gromyko also conceded to a meeting with Walter Mondale a few days before meeting with
Reagan. These meetings highlighted foreign affairs issues but did not really give either candidate an edge on the issue.

On September 20 a suicide car-bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, killing several people. The action spurred charges that Reagan had been lax on security arrangements at the embassy compound. Even with Reagan's somewhat flip remarks after the bombing, little could be done by Mondale to make a major campaign issue out of the event.

It is not really clear what effect events during this campaign period may have had on party identification. On some issues such as deficit reduction, US and USSR relations, and the security arrangements at the Beirut Embassy, Mondale was successfully able to take the offensive and force Reagan to respond. On deficit reduction and US and USSR relations, Reagan's ultimate response effectively deflected Mondale's offensive thrusts. Consequently, it is difficult to say what effect Mondale's offensive thrusts or Reagan's defensive responses might have had on voter's perceptions of the two candidates or their parties during this period.
Debate I (October 7 to October 20)

On October 7 the first of two televised presidential debates was held in Louisville, Kentucky. The President's performance during the debate lacked the up-beat optimism and humor characteristic of Reagan. More importantly, the President stumbled and seemed confused at points during the debate. In the post mortem of the days that followed, it was concluded that Mondale won the debate, not so much because of anything he had done, but simply because Reagan had done a poor job in the debate. After the debate people wondered openly whether or not Reagan was too old to competently handle the complexity of the office of President. Reagan's lead in his own tracking polls showed that he had dropped a from a 19 point lead the day before the debate to a 12 point lead three days after. In Pat Caddell's polling the debate outcome seemed to cause a tremendous surge in party identification—from an even split to a 46 percent to 28 percent Democratic advantage. The debate generated a glimmer of new hope for the Mondale campaign and put the Reagan campaign onto the defensive.

19 Ibid., p. 322.
20 Ibid.
On October 12 vice-presidential candidates George Bush and Geraldine Ferraro debated. While their debate was sometimes a bit heated, neither candidate made any glaring mistakes. Both sides claimed victory after the debate although it was generally conceded that the outcome was not clear-cut and that it would have little effect in the presidential race.

During the last week of this period both men began preparations for the rematch set for October 21 in Kansas City, Missouri. For Mondale, his preparations included more briefings and rehearsals at his personal residence. For Reagan, his preparation began with a whistle-stop tour through Ohio where Reagan resurrected many of the lines from his old speeches and vigorously attacked Mondale. An effort was made to "let Reagan be Reagan." Moreover, the number of practice debates was reduced from five to two to avoid overtraining and drilling the President as was done prior to Debate I.

The first debate between Reagan and Mondale and the vice-presidential debate greatly improved the political images of Mondale and Ferraro, but their impact on the campaign was not big enough to turn the election around to their favor. A Los Angeles Times poll conducted five days after the vice-presidential debate revealed that the Democrats failed to garner any new voters based on the debates. An NBC News poll two days later indicated the
same thing.22

Based on Reagan's poor performance during the first debate and the questions it raised about Reagan's age and abilities, it is expected that any changes in party identification during this campaign period will favor the Democratic party.

**Debate II and the Final Campaign (October 21 to November 5)**

The second debate essentially doused any hopes for a Mondale comeback that had been raised by Reagan's unsteady performance in Debate I. According to Mondale's own campaign officials, he would have to score a knockout in order to emerge from the debates with a real chance of defeating Ronald Reagan.23 Stu Spencer, a Reagan strategist and friend commented, "The only thing the voters wanted out of the debate was to be reassured that Reagan was not too old to be President. All that had been required of him was that he stay on his feet for ninety minutes."24 Reagan did more than that—at one time causing even Mondale to laugh at his one-liner response to whether or not age should be an issue in the campaign.

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23 Goldman and Fuller, p. 332
24 Ibid., p. 341.
Tracking polls the day after the debate reaffirmed the prognosis. In Mondale tracking, Reagan's lead changed from 11 points the night of the debate to 20 points one day later. Wirthlin's tracking had the exact same results. It was the largest one-day shift in the entire campaign.\textsuperscript{25} Throughout the rest of the campaign the Mondale group struggled to find an effective campaign strategy. At first he continued to attack the President as "the most detached, the most remote, the most uninformed president in modern history."\textsuperscript{26} A few days later he began to talk more about the issues. Finally, he settled into a more idealistic and personal narrative of his vision of America. While this approach played better before audiences and rallies, it really made little difference in the lead Reagan held.

In the last few weeks of the campaign Reagan addressed fewer and fewer personal attacks and rebuttals at Mondale and made more and more "positive, optimistic, uplifting, patriotic, future-oriented themes."

During this campaign period there were no major events or surprises. Primarily, both sides were returning to their

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., pp. 343, 344.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p. 346.
fundamentals, articulating their basic values and personal vision of what America should be. At the same time they were preparing for the inevitability of a Reagan victory on November 5.

By demonstrating that he was "alive, well, and mentally competent," Reagan effectively erased the results of the first debate and reassured both his weak and strong supporters. Any changes in party identification should reflect the strong pro-Republican reaction to the second debate which continued into the final campaign days.

Assessing Change in Party Identification During the Campaign Periods

The following sections outline the changes in party identification that occurred during each of the campaign periods. A linear regression analysis was conducted on the daily measurements of party identification in each campaign period. The analysis is similar to that conducted above for the entire period. In each section, the results will be discussed and then compared to expectations based on the events taking place during the campaign period.
The plot of daily measurements of party identification during the Last Primaries period and the line representing the regression of partisan identification over time are illustrated in Figure 4. The regression line reveals that the changes in party identification during this period favored the Democrats. The slope of .0054 indicates that just over .5 percent of the aggregate voting age population made a one unit pro-Democratic change on the party identification scale each day. According to this trend, party identification changed from 3.05 at the beginning of the period to 3.12 at the end of the period for a net change of .07 on the five-point party identification scale. This is comparable to a net shift of approximately five percent of the population changing from Republican to Democratic affiliation. This evidence supports the expectation that movement in party identification during the Last Primaries would favor the Democrats.

27 Based on the measure of change outlined in footnote 9 on page 64.
CHANGE IN PARTY ID DURING FINAL PRIMARIES:

LINEAR REGRESSION

ID5PT 3.3 H 3.5 - 3.0 a.9 - 1 1 i  i iiiiiiaaaaaaaaaa33333

No. of days = 14 = .083
Intercept = 3.05 F = 1.08
Slope = .00538 Significance of F = .3125
ΔY = .0753

Figure 4: Change in Party Identification During the Last Primaries
Preconvention Democratic Nomination Politics

Figure 5 shows the plot of daily measurements of party identification and the trend line for change in party identification over the Preconvention period. During this period the slope was slightly greater than -.0006. According to this figure less than .06 percent of the voters made even a one unit change in their level of partisan attachment. Over the twenty-seven day period there was a net movement in party identification of less than -.016 units on the five-point scale—the smallest amount of change of any of the eight periods. What little movement that did occur over the period was in the Republican direction and not the Democratic direction as expected. It is probably more significant to note that these findings support the expectation that there would be a lack of any significant movement in party identification in either direction.
Figure 5: Change in Party Identification During the Preconvention Period
Ferraro and the Democratic Convention

As expected, change in party identification during this period favored the Democratic party. As shown in Figure 6 there was a strong pro-Democratic trend to the movement in party identification after the Ferraro nomination and during the Democratic convention. The .0059 slope is the strongest pro-Democratic movement of all the periods. In fact, the magnitude of the slope is larger than any of the pro-Republican periods. Over this two week period there was a net change of nearly .09 units on the five point scale. This represents a considerable amount of change over such a short period of time -- a net increase of six percent more of the electorate claiming Democratic affiliation by the end of the period.
CHANGE IN PARTY ID: DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION

LINEAR REGRESSION

DATA FROM D/M/J TRACKING

No. of days = 15
Intercept = 3.03
Slope = .00590
ΔY = .0885

R² = .0582
F = .804
Significance of F = .3860

Figure 6: Change in Party Identification During Ferraro and the Democratic Convention Period
Between Convention Jousting

During this three week period there was considerable movement in party identification which favored the Republicans. As demonstrated in Figure 7, there was a net change of -.117 on the party identification scale over the period. There was a larger pro-Republican daily and net change during this period than any other, including the Republican Convention period. Approximately 7.7% of the population changed from Democrat to Republican over the period, effectively cancelling out gains from the previous periods. The pro-Republican direction of change confirms the expectation that change in identification during this period would favor the Republicans.
No. of days = 21  $R^2 = .1589$
Intercept = 3.11  $F = 3.59$
Slope = -.00557  Significance of $F = .073$
$\Delta Y = -.1170$

Figure 7: Change in Party Identification During the Between the Convention Jousting Period
The Republican Convention

During this period it was expected that changes in party identification would favor the Republicans. As demonstrated in Figure 8, changes in party identification did favor the Republicans. A slope of -.0038 indicates that about .4 percent of the voters made a one unit pro-Republican change each day during the period. There was a pro-Republican net change of .064 units on the five point scale. This represents a net increase of about 4.3% more people identifying with the Republican party by the end of the period. It is worth noting that net change and daily change during the Republican Convention period were less than the previous period.
Figure 8: Change in Party Identification During the Republican Convention Period
Traditional Campaign

Based on the events occurring during this period it was not clear what might occur to party identification. According to Figure 9, it appears that there was slight movement towards the Democrats. During this month-long period there was a net pro-Democratic change of .036 units. Of the three periods which experienced pro-Democratic changes in party identification, this period demonstrated the least amount of net change. This is not too surprising given that there were no outstanding Democratic oriented events such as the primaries or the convention.
Figure 9: Change in Party Identification During the Traditional Campaign Period

No. of days = 34  \[ R^2 = 0.0153 \]
Intercept = 2.97  \[ F = 0.4980 \]
Slope = 0.00105  \[ \text{Significance of } F = 0.4855 \]
\( \Delta Y = 0.0357 \)
Debate I

Movement in party identification during this period presents perhaps the greatest anomaly in the data. It was expected that Reagan's poor debate performance would bode well for the Democrats. Surprisingly, change in party identification during this period slightly favored the Republicans. Apparently, the pro-Democratic trend through the Traditional Campaign period had peaked out by the time of the debates. During this period there was a net pro-Republican change of .028 units on the party identification scale (See Figure 10). While the amount of change is fairly small compared to other periods, it is still somewhat unexpected that it would be in the Republican direction.
Figure 10: Change in Party Identification During the Debate I Period
Debate II and the Final Campaign

As expected, after Reagan's reassuring performance in the second debate, changes in party identification favored the Republicans. Figure 11 illustrates that there was a daily one unit change in party identification by .46 percent of the voters resulting in a net pro-Republican change of .07 units. This is the second largest daily and net change in party identification which favored the Republicans--larger that the changes which occurred during the Republican Convention period but not quite as large as the changes occurring during the Preconvention period. Approximately 5% of the population changed from Democratic affiliation to Republican affiliation during these last few days of the campaign.
Figure 11: Change in Party Identification During Debate II and the Final Campaign Period

No. of days = 16  
Intercept = 3.01  
Slope = -.00456  
$\Delta Y = -.0730$  

$R^2 = .1745$  
$F = 2.96$  
Significance of $F = .107$
Validating the Regression Solutions for the Campaign Periods

The regression analysis of movement in party identification during each of the campaign periods suffers from two serious limitations. First, each period has an average length of twenty days. Some periods last for just two weeks while others last for over a month. Second, sampling error produces a considerable amount of noise in the data which obscures any trends which may be present.

In nearly every period there are not enough cases for the regression solution to reach a high level of statistical significance.28 In only two of the eight periods is the relationship between time and change in party identification strong enough to be statistically significant at the .10 level (Between Convention Jousting and Debate II). Any conclusions based solely on these regression solutions would be weakened and less compelling. We could place more confidence in the regression solutions if we knew that despite the small number of cases they

28Typically, when the number of cases drops below 25 in regression, estimates of the amount of variance explained are overestimated. An adjusted $R^2$ values provides a more accurate estimate. Adjusted $R^2$ values for the eight electoral periods are reported in Appendix E. As demonstrated in Appendix E, the smaller number of cases invariably reduces the amount of variance explained although not enough to alter the basic conclusions of this research.
rely on that they nevertheless accurately depict the basic movement of party identification during that period. Fortunately, another quantitative research approach provides that confidence.

**Curvilinear Spline Analysis**

Curvilinear regression techniques involve trying to fit curves with one or more bends to a plot of data. Usually the researcher can choose whether to fit a fairly low-level curve with just one or two bends to summarize the most important trends in a time series or a higher-level curve with many more bends to show more completely the ebbs and flows of the time series. A spline procedure is used here for the curvilinear analysis.29

A spline is a mechanical device formerly used by draftsmen and architects to draw a smooth curve that passed through or near points on a graph. The device was actually a thin rod fashioned out of some kind of flexible material to which weights could be attached to alter the shape of the rod. The draftsmen would move the weights along the rod in such a way that its curvature would pass through or near the points on the graph.30

---


A mathematical spline is similar to the mechanical spline in that it describes a function which passes through or near all the points on the graph. Mathematical splines are part of modern numerical analysis in which they are used to develop data fitting approximations. Polynomial regression is traditionally a much more common application of approximation theory largely because of their mathematical simplicity. More recently, spline functions are recognized as being more flexible in adapting to a plot of points over a large number of intervals.\textsuperscript{31} Polynomials do a good job of approximating functions over a small number of intervals. When there are a larger number of intervals, a large order polynomial regression is often required. Unfortunately, larger order polynomial regression are known to produce "severe oscillations" that do not reflect the actual data.\textsuperscript{32}

Spline functions are actually a series of piecewise low level cubic polynomial functions "knotted" together at each interval in such a way that each piece must agree at the connection with the previous piece in slope and curvature.\textsuperscript{33} In this sense they are an application of polynomial functions under optimal conditions --

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{33}Stephen M. Pizer, \textit{To Compute Numerically}. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983).
low degree polynomials applied over a small number of intervals.

More generally, the spline procedure is useful for fitting a smooth line to noisy data. This is particularly useful in this situation where we need some method to smooth out the effects of sampling error. In the approach used here, the smoothness of the curve can be varied to highlight the main trends over a time series or to call attention to short term trends in the data. At one extreme the spline is the same as the linear regression solution in Figure 2. At the other extreme, the spline would pass through every point. The spline used in this thesis is far from either extreme but set as a level of smoothness that favors a greater sensitivity to the day to day observations rather than the linear trend over the entire five month period.

The spline procedure provides a means to verify the movement within each of the campaign periods as characterized by the regression analysis because it uses cases across all periods and ignores any pre-defined time periods. To the degree that the peaks and valleys of the spline solution coincide with theoretically derived campaign periods, the greater degree of confidence we can have in using the regression solutions to describe and summarize movement within each of the periods and rely on those solutions to test the specific research hypotheses developed in the news event monitoring.
Most importantly, the spline analysis provides a clearer look at how the movement in party identification changed from period to period. Do the eight distinct campaign periods really coincide with changes in the direction of movement in party identification? Is there an ebb and flow to the level of party affiliation which matches the tug of war for momentum in the opposing presidential campaigns?

Figure 12 plots the regression solutions for all eight campaign periods on to the entire time series, demonstrating what it would look like if the regression lines for each time segment were knotted or joined together. Figure 13 plots the spline solution for the same series of data. The spline clearly reveals the essence of movement during each of the eight periods and provides a depiction of the cumulative changes in party identification that occurred during the campaign after much of the noise from sampling variation is removed.

Figure 14 compares the knotted regressions with the spline to demonstrate how well the regressions during each of the periods convey the direction of movement in that period.
Figure 12: Regression Analysis for Eight Campaign Periods
Figure 13: Spline Analysis for Eight Campaign Periods
Figure 14: Comparison of Spline and Regression Analysis Solutions

DATA FROM D/M/T/ TRACKING
Overall the match is very good. The correspondence between the spline solution and the regression solutions is quite high. In six of the eight periods the lines are virtually on top of each other. In the Democratic Convention period, however, the regression line clearly has a steeper slope than the spline, indicating that the regression line may be overly influenced by the small number of cases (13 days) during the period. That portion of the spline, however, encompasses more days before and after the period and consequently does not indicate such a strong pro-Democratic movement during the period. During the Traditional Campaign period just the opposite occurs. The spline suggests that there was stronger pro-Democratic upswing at the end of the period than the regression analysis would indicate. Beyond these two discrepancies the spline provides a fairly sound validation of the regression solutions for each of the periods.

The validation and caveats gained from the spline analysis provides a quantitative handle for describing change in each of the campaign periods that will be further utilized in a later section in trying to unravel the impact of election year effects from the effects of the campaign periods.
Analysis of Movement in Party Identification During the Campaign Periods

Table 1 reviews the expectations for party identification movement in each of the periods. These expectations are based on the event monitoring and subjective analysis of the events reported earlier in this chapter. The table also reports the findings necessary to test each of the expectations and then lists the conclusions.

In all but one of the campaign periods there was movement in party identification which corresponded to what might be expected given the nature of the events taking place. It is not surprising to find fairly strong pro-Democratic movement during the Democratic Convention or the Last Primaries. It is not unexpected to find that the Traditional Campaign and Preconvention periods did not strongly favor either of the parties. Neither is it surprising to find pro-Republican movement Between Conventions, during the Republican Convention and after Debate II.

It is surprising, however, to find that movement in party identification between the conventions so strongly favored the Republicans. Similarly, it is surprising to find that movement in party identification after Debate I slightly favored the Republicans. While six of the eight periods experienced exactly
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Periods</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Slope*</th>
<th>Net Change in ID (ΔY)</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last Primaries</td>
<td>Strong pro-Democratic movement</td>
<td>.00538</td>
<td>.0753</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(positive slope and a large net change in level of party ID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconvention</td>
<td>a. Slight movement</td>
<td>-.00059</td>
<td>-.0159</td>
<td>a. Slight movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nomination</td>
<td>b. Marginal pro-Democratic movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>(positive slope)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Direction of movement not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferraro and</td>
<td>Very strong pro-Democratic movement</td>
<td>.0059</td>
<td>.0885</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>(positive slope and a large net change in level of party ID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Convention</td>
<td>Moderate pro-Republican</td>
<td>-.00557</td>
<td>-.117**</td>
<td>Direction of movement supported. Magnitude of movement larger than expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jousting</td>
<td>(negative slope with small net change in level of party ID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>a. Strong pro-Republican</td>
<td>-.00327</td>
<td>-.0641</td>
<td>a. Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention</td>
<td>(negative slope with large change in level of party ID)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Less than Democratic Convention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Periods</td>
<td>Expectations</td>
<td>Slope*</td>
<td>Net Change in ID (ΔY)</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Campaign Period</td>
<td>Inconclusive (slope near zero and little change in level of party ID)</td>
<td>.00105</td>
<td>.0357</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate I</td>
<td>Moderate pro-Democratic movement (positive slope and moderate change in level of party ID)</td>
<td>- .0020</td>
<td>- .028</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate II</td>
<td>Strong pro-Republican movement (negative slope and large change in level of party ID)</td>
<td>- .00456</td>
<td>- .073**</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Positive slopes signify pro-Democratic shifts
**Significant at .10 level (If not asterisked (**), then it is not statistically significant)
the type of changes expected, these two did not.

One explanation for not finding a pro-Democratic movement after the first debate may have something to do with the fact that there was a prevailing feeling among voters that they wanted to see what would happen in the second debate before changing their attachment with the parties. Accordingly, they were waiting to find out if the performance was a fluke or if Reagan really was losing his grasp on the complexity of the issues and the office. This would explain the NBC News and Los Angeles Times polls which showed more positive image scores for Mondale and Ferraro after the debate but no increase in their percent of the vote.

Given that we would expect change in vote intention to precede or at least coincide with a change in partisanship, the NBC and Los Angeles Times findings make not finding a Democratic surge less surprising. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. D/M/I's own data show a seven point drop in Reagan vote intention after Debate I and do not support the NBC and Los Angeles Times findings. Moreover Democratic polling showed a tremendous surge in Democratic affiliation -- from an even split to a 46% to 28% Democratic advantage. However, without knowing the point in time the "even split" was observed in the Democratic polling, it is impossible to assess the degree to which the debate alone was responsible for the Democratic surge. The D/M/I tracking
indicates that there was a Democratic surge taking place throughout the Traditional Campaign period. Consequently, Caddell may have overestimated the impact of the debate on partisanship because he did not or could not appreciate the gains already made by Mondale during the Traditional Campaign period.

There are two possible explanations for finding a stronger than expected pro-Republican movement in party identification between the conventions. First of all, it is possible that the controversy raised by Ferraro's financial problems caused even more voters to move toward the Republicans than anticipated. Secondly, it is likely that the coverage of the Summer Olympic Games generated strong feelings of national spirit and well being which reaffirmed the basic message of Reagan's campaign—"America is back" and moving in the right direction. Consequently, the Olympics may have had a stronger pro-Republican effect than anticipated.

The most amazing finding revealed in the spline analysis in Figure 14 and perhaps one of the best pieces of evidence to support the thesis is the degree to which the theoretically defined campaign periods coincide with empirically observed changes in the direction of movement in party identification. Visual inspection of Figure 14 confirms that the ebbs and flows in partisan affiliation begin and end at the same points in time that
define the campaign periods. While this does not demonstrate an irrefutable causal relationship between events and change in partisanship, it clearly establishes two of the three necessary elements of the causal argument: a concomitant variation between the two variables and a logical temporal sequence between them. To refute the causal implication, the burden now lies in finding other possible causal effects that might explain the relationship between the campaign periods and observed changes in party affiliation.

**Dynamic Interaction of Campaign Effects and Election Year Effects**

At the beginning of the period party identification was slightly more Democratic than Republican, approximately 3.12 on the 1 to 5 party identification scale. By election day it had dropped .16 points to favor Republicans at a level of 2.96. Up to this point the analysis has sought to explain this change from two different perspectives. According to the first, election year effects such as a favorable economy and a positive performance by the incumbent president were responsible for consistent and steady pro-Republican movement in party identification over the five month period. According to the second, the change in party identification was the cumulative effect of specific campaign periods during which momentum would build or wane for a candidate or a party. More than likely, changes in party identification
that occurred over the five month period are due to a combination of the two forces. Campaign effects dynamically interact with election year effects to alter the level of party identification. If so, then it is important to attempt to isolate these effects from each other in order to understand how much they contributed to the changes that occurred.

Isolating the Impact of Election year Effects and Campaign Effects

Through a series of statistical operations and controls involving regression, it is possible to estimate the impact of these effects. Ultimately, however, it is not possible to isolate and identify the impact of election year and campaign effects. The analysis provided here, merely provides a conservative estimate of campaign effects.

First, it is assumed that the primary force operating prior and throughout the five month period is the election year effect, analytically represented by the regression of party identification over time. Theoretically, this effect represents the impact of a favorable economy and a positive performance by the incumbent Republican president.

During the election, campaign effects are added to election year effects to impact party identification. The dynamic
interaction of the two effects is responsible for observed changes in party identification. Stated differently, the additive impacts of election year and campaign effects are used to explain the changes observed in party identification over the five month period.

Multiple linear regression is used to explain change in a dependent variable as a function of linear relationships with two or more independent variables. In this case there are two independent variables: election year effects and campaign effects.

In multiple regression the dependent variable is regressed on two or more independent variables in either a stepwise or hierarchical regression. In stepwise regression the order in which independent variables are used to explain variation in the dependent variable is statistically determined—at each step, the independent variable which explains the greatest amount of remaining variance is the next variable entered. In hierarchical regression the researcher determines the order of entry based on theoretical grounds.

For two reasons, hierarchical regression is appropriate in this research problem and election year effects are first entered into the regression. First, it is assumed that election year
effects are present before the campaign begins and continue to induce change in partisanship throughout the campaign. Second, the thrust of the thesis is to demonstrate the sensitivity of party identification to campaign events. By allowing election year effects first access to the variance it makes it more difficult for campaign effects to be observed.

Election year influences are steady and continuous, producing a unidirectional change in party identification. Sometimes a series of campaign events will induce unidirectional change in party identification which parallels the election year influences. If such occurred, the method of analysis utilized here would mistakenly attribute campaign-induced changes to election year influences.

---

The following example provided by Herb Weisberg serves to demonstrate the ultimate intractability of distinguishing election year effects and campaign events. It also illustrates how campaign effects can be mistaken for election year effects, and consequently, why this method is clearly a very conservative estimate of campaign effects.

**EXAMPLE:** Candidates occasionally say things that are taken out of context, such as something which is taken to insult blacks and loses some of their support, something which is taken to insult Jews and loses some of their support, something which is taken to insult Baptists and loses some of their support, and something which is taken to insult farmers and loses some of their support. Say these four misstatements occur at regular intervals during the campaign. For purposes of simplification, say that these are the only factors all year that affect party identification—no other election year or campaign effects. If (Footnote continued)
It should be noted and stressed, however, that the converse is not possible. Anything attributed to campaign effects by this method of analysis could not possibly be caused by election year forces. Consequently, this method is prone to overestimate election year effects by an indeterminable amount and underestimate campaign forces. Whatever effects are revealed, therefore are the most conservative estimates of the real impact of campaign effects.

Typically, a multiple regression model is estimated in a single statistical operation in one of the statistical packages such as SAS or SPSS. In this research problem, this is not possible. While election year effects on party identification can be represented in a single linear relationship, campaign effects on party identification can only be represented with eight different linear relationships—one for each period (See Figure 12). In other words, the campaign effects variable is not linear over the entire period—just within the eight campaign periods. In a sense the campaign effects variable is actually composed of eight additive effects—one for each electoral period.

34(continued) the Republican candidate makes statements 1 and 3 and the Democrat makes statements 2 and 4, you would correctly find no election year effects but only 4 campaign effects; if the same candidate makes all four statements, you would mistakenly find election year effects but no campaign effects.
Nevertheless, analytically we need to isolate the combined ability of all the periods to account for observed changes in party identification in order to compare campaign effects with election year effects. In this regard the regression solutions for each of the periods prove invaluable.

This problem can be resolved by decomposing the multiple regression into its component steps. In the first step of the multiple regression party identification over the entire five months is regressed on time according to the following equation:

\[ Y = a + b X \]

- \( Y \) = party identification
- \( a \) = y intercept
- \( b \) = slope
- \( X \) = day of the general election campaign

When the equation is statistically estimated it yields these results:
At this point a short digression into the statistical mechanics of regression is necessary to demonstrate an easy yet reliable means to estimate the total amount of variance explained by the combined effects of the eight campaign periods.

$R^2$ indicates the proportion of variation in party identification explained by the passage of time. In bivariate regression it is the square of the correlation coefficient between the independent variable and the dependent variable. In multiple regression it can also be calculated as the square of the correlation coefficient between the predicted value of the dependent variable and the observed value. Moreover, in multiple regression it can also be calculated in terms of the residual sum of squares and the total sum of squares according to the following equation:
(3) \[ R^2 = 1 - \frac{\text{Residual Sum of Squares}}{\text{Total Sum of Squares}} \]

The total sum of squares is equivalent to the total amount of variation in party identification that needs to be explained. It is the sum of all the squared deviations of observed Y values from the mean of Y:

(4) \[ \sigma (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2 \]

It is different from variance, which divides the variation by the number of observations to determine the average squared deviation from the mean:

(5) \[ \frac{\sigma (Y_i - \bar{Y})^2}{N} \]

The residual sum of squares is the sum of the squared deviations of observed Y values from predicted Y values:

(6) \[ \sigma (Y_i - \hat{Y})^2 \]

Residual sum of squares is a measure of what is left unexplained after the regression of Y on X. Residual sum of squares divided by total sum of squares is the proportion of unexplained variation. The proportion of variation explained
varies between 1 and 0. At 0, no variation in Y is explained by X. At 1, all variation in Y can be explained by X. Therefore, the proportion of unexplained variation subtracted from one is equal to the proportion of explained variation, or $R^2$.

This final method of estimating $R^2$ is most useful because it provides a simplified method of aggregating, over all the periods, the linear effects observed within each individual period -- the final result being measured in terms of $R^2$. \(^{35}\)

According to this formulation, $R^2$ in the first step of the multiple regression is determined by the following calculations:

---

\(^{35}\) Piecewise linear regression is another way to estimate the relationship between two variables when sharp breaks in the relationship (change in slope) occur at different points in time. As explained in Pindyck and Rubinfield (Econometric Models and Economic Forecasts (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976) pp. 126-7.), piecewise linear regression is special case of the more general spline functions, but fitting only linear pieces of a regression line. Piecewise regression makes it possible to use a single regression equation to estimate several line segments pieced together. While estimated as a single equation with a summary $R$ value it is fully equivalent to the separate line segments that make it up. One of the requirements of piecewise regression, however, is that there be no discontinuities at the break points between the separate pieces. As illustrated in Figure 12 several discontinuities fall on the break points. The method followed in the dissertation on the other hand provides an alternative which does not require continuity at the break points and can be calculated relatively easily with the same degree of reliability and usefulness.
Residual sum of squares = 1.02398
Total sum of squares = 1.35167

\[
\frac{2}{1.02398} = R = 1 - \frac{1.02398}{1.35167} = .2424
\]

The total sum of squares is the total variation in party identification (measured as the sum of all squared deviations of observed party identification values from the mean of party identification) that need to be explained. In the first step of the multiple regression, .2424 of this variation is explained. (Not surprisingly, this is exactly the same as generated by the output from SPSS).

The second step of the multiple regression is performed through a series of operations. First, all election year effects are removed from the data. The regression residuals from the first step of the multiple regression statistically represent what is left after the election year effects are removed. Accordingly, a data set of the residuals is used in the second step of the multiple regression. Next, the residual observations are segmented into their eight respective periods. For each period, party identification is regressed on time. Eight regression solutions are produced.
Table 2: Change in Party Identification in the Campaign Periods: Controlling for the Yearly Trend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Periods</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>Res. SS</th>
<th>ΔYa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late Primaries</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.0064</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.0731</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconvention</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.1302</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demo Convention</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.0069</td>
<td>.0780</td>
<td>.1572</td>
<td>.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Convent</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-.0046</td>
<td>.1129</td>
<td>.1265</td>
<td>-.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repub Convention</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-.0028</td>
<td>.0412</td>
<td>.0731</td>
<td>-.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Campaign</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.0021</td>
<td>.0558</td>
<td>.2331</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate I</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-.0010</td>
<td>.0077</td>
<td>.0309</td>
<td>-.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate II</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-.0036</td>
<td>.1142</td>
<td>.0334</td>
<td>-.057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of residual sum of squares = .8575

(a) ΔY is calculated as the product of (b) X (number of days in period).
Each solution provides information regarding the total and residual sum of squares for that period (See Table 2). The sum of these eight residual sum of squares is the residual sum of squares for the entire five month period. It represents the variation in party identification left unexplained by election year effects and campaign effects. Estimating $R^2$ with this figure yields:

\[
R^2 = 1 - \frac{.8575}{1.35167} = .3656
\]

(8)

Election year effects alone account for nearly one fourth of the variation in party identification. Campaign effects account for an additional thirteen percent of the variation in party identification. Combined, election year effects and campaign effects account for over one third of all the variation in party identification.

It is reasonable to expect that the residual sum of squares should be reduced when the five month period is broken into eight periods and a regression analysis conducted. An objection might be made that because the approach itself guarantees a reduction of the sum of squares and an increase in the proportion of variance explained, that the relative importance of the periods in explaining change is just an artifact. Admittedly, the regression analysis, by design, will always reduce the residual sum of
squares in much the same what that the second variable in multiple regression will always explain some additional variance in the dependent variable.

It should be remembered that the regression approach is not used simply to improve the regression results. The eight periods represent substantively different and meaningful episodes of the campaign. Each period is dominated by an event of series of events which distinguish it from the other periods and produces changes in party identification that are generally consistent with theoretically based expectations. Moreover, the change represents a sizeable 50% improvement in the amount of variation accounted for over the entire campaign—all this despite the fact that this method of analysis, as explained earlier, provides a conservative estimate of the true impact of campaign events.

The impact that campaign effects have after controlling for election year effects is particularly meaningful. Events taking place during these periods represent politically meaningful events. The impact of these periods is rather highly consistent and predictable based on the substance of events making up the period. Moreover, the magnitude of the impact of these periods on party identification and the contribution of campaign effects in explaining variation in party identification over the five month period provide very convincing evidence that party identification
readily responds to the events which take place over the election.

Reanalysis of Campaign Effects after Controlling for Election Year Effects

Since it has been demonstrated that it is possible to remove election year effects, it would be worthwhile to examine what difference this operation might have on individual campaign periods. For example, aside from the pro-Republican election year trend, what was the impact of the Democratic Primaries or the Traditional Campaign period. Even more interesting, what might have been the fate of the campaign if people considered only the events of the campaign and not the general trend of pro-Republican movement brought on by a favorable economy and a positive evaluation of the incumbent president?

The information in Table 3 compares the slopes and net change in party identification that occurred for each of the periods before and after election year effects are controlled.

One would naturally expect that after removing a pro-Republican trend, that subsequent change in pro-Democratic periods would appear even stronger and that change in pro-Republican periods would appear weaker. This is exactly what is revealed in the table. The Democratic Convention, Last
Primaries, and Traditional Campaign periods show stronger pro-Democratic movement after removing the election year trend. The Between Convention, Republican Convention, and Debate I, and Debate II periods all show less pro-Republican movement.

In the Preconvention period the direction of movement actually changes from pro-Republican to pro-Democratic. It was initially hypothesized that due to a slight Democratic advantage in media attention during this period that changes in party identification would favor the Democrats. After controlling for election year effects this expectation is supported.
Table 3: Comparison of Campaign Effects after Controlling for Election Year Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Periods</th>
<th>Without Control for Election Year Effects</th>
<th>With Control for Election Year Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>ΔY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last Primaries</td>
<td>.0054</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconvention</td>
<td>-.0006</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demo Convention</td>
<td>.0059</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Convent</td>
<td>-.0056</td>
<td>-.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repub Convent</td>
<td>-.0038</td>
<td>-.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trad Campaign</td>
<td>.0010</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate I</td>
<td>-.0020</td>
<td>-.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate II</td>
<td>-.0046</td>
<td>-.073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \sum \Delta Y = -.098 \quad \sum \Delta Y = +.059 \]

(a) \( Y \) is calculated as the product of \((b) X \) (number of days in period).
It is interesting to point out that during five periods the combined effects of campaign and election year brought about changes which favored the Republican and the three periods which favored the Democrats. The net change ($\Delta Y$) favored the Republicans. After removing the effects of the election year, the periods favoring the parties split evenly at four. However, the net change in party identification favored the Democrats. It seems that the campaign events which occurred over the five month period, particularly the Primaries, the Preconvention, the Democratic Convention, and the Traditional Campaign period, on the whole worked to the Democrats advantage. Unfortunately for the Democrats, these effects were not strong enough to offset the effects of a strong economy and a favorable performance by the incumbent.

Summary

During the last five months of the 1984 presidential campaign, party identification was not static. Nor were the observed

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36 Pages 121-124 of this chapter pointed out that the estimate of campaign effects used in this analysis provides a very conservative estimate of campaign effects, which implicitly carries with it an overestimate of the election year trend which in 1984 was pro-Republican. Removing the effects of overestimated Republican election year effects undoubtedly contributes to a larger pro-Democratic estimate of campaign effects.
movements random. On the contrary party identification moved in a very predictable manner given the events of the campaign. Throughout the last five months there was a solid tide of movement toward the Republican party--largely due to the strong performance of the economy and a popular Republican incumbent. By the time election day rolled around, about one out of every ten adults had changed their political affiliation from Democratic to Republican.

In addition to a Republican election year trend, party identification also dramatically responded to the political ebbs and flows of the campaign. During the last primaries and into the Democratic convention partisan change favored the Democratic party. After the Democratic convention and up through the Republican convention, partisanship began to shift back toward the Republican party. After the second debate and up to election day party identification continued to move toward the Republican party.

Finally, we played a little game of "what if" by removing election year effects to see what would have been the effect of just campaign events on party identification without the impact of a favorable economy and a popular president. In 1984, campaign events decidedly worked to the Democratic party's advantage. Without a strong economy and a popular president, the outcome of the 1984 elections would have been quite different.
Chapter IV

Subgroup Variation in Party Identification Fluctuations

Importance of Subgroup Analysis

This chapter examines fluctuations in party identification during the five month period of the general election for most of the major voting groups. In Chapter III I demonstrated that fluctuations in party identification over the 1984 presidential campaign directly correspond to the events of that campaign. Moreover, recognizing campaign events dramatically improves our ability to explain the direction and magnitude of campaign fluctuations in party identification. The analysis here provides a test to assess whether subgroups respond uniformly or whether they vary in their reaction to political events. In a sense this is another demonstration of the general thesis.

Voter subgroups have been examined as distinct elements of the American electorate, each having a unique historical voting history and recognizable pattern of support for the parties. Demonstrating that voter subgroups vary in their reaction to
political events provides strong evidence supporting the thesis that "party identification is a dynamic element of American electoral behavior which responds to the continuous actions, decisions, and performance of party leaders." If party identification is indeed a dynamic element of American voting behavior, then we would expect to find varying levels of sensitivity or fluidity in partisanship among these distinct groups of people. Based on their own historical background and strength of association or affinity to the parties, each group would naturally react somewhat differently to the specific actions and events of a political campaign.

Using the national data for the total sample as a base of comparison, the analysis assesses the degree of similarity with which subgroups respond to campaign events. The comparison is divided into three separate sections:

1) comparing subgroup changes in party identification over the general election campaign;

2) comparing subgroup changes during each of the campaign periods;

3) comparing the relative impacts of campaign effects versus election year effects in the subgroups.
Research reported in Chapter III demonstrated that a favorable economy and the positive performance of Ronald Reagan largely accounted for a trend of pro-Republican movement in party identification over the 5 month presidential campaign. The first section of analysis in this chapter will measure this election year trend as it appeared within each of the subgroups. This section tests the expectation that among the various subgroups there exist varying amounts of net movement in party identification over the five month period.

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that there are significant ebbs and flows in the level of party identification in the electorate over the course of the campaign. Evidence suggested that a series of positive experiences with one party were likely to increase the level of party identification with that party. In some cases, negative experiences with a party were likely to increase the level of identification with the other party. The second section of analysis in this chapter provides a comparison of the degree to which subgroups demonstrate a responsiveness to the periods within a campaign.

There are two distinct patterns of subgroup variation that could account for the aggregate level changes detailed in the previous chapter. According to one explanation, aggregate level
fluctuations in party identification may be the result of uniform reactions by all subgroups to the political events and issues of the campaign. If such an explanation were true, then it would be reasonable to expect uniform movements in party identification across subgroups during each of the campaign periods.

According to another explanation, aggregate level fluctuations in party identification are the sum of the diverse fluctuations of all the subgroups. Each subgroup is affected differently by the events taking place during the campaign and responds differently. Some groups may be more solidly attached to a party and less likely to be influenced by events which portray the opposing party in a positive light. These groups may respond more strongly to events favoring the party they already lean toward.

Some subgroups may not be leaning either way, and simply become more firmly set in their neutral relationship with the parties. It is unlikely that such subgroups would be much influenced by events at all. Other groups may not be firmly attached to either party, or their attachment to their traditional party may have deteriorated. These groups might be expected to fluctuate more dramatically as the sequence of events favors first one party then the other. The basic point remains the same: the various groups react differently to events that take place over
the campaign.

This latter perspective coincides with views of campaign strategists who target segments or groups in the population. If all voters were equally receptive and responsive to campaign messages, issues, candidates, and images, then campaigns would operate radically different than they do now. Targeting and packaging are two of the largest functions of modern political campaigns--getting the right message delivered by the right person in the right place to the right group of people at the appropriate time.

The third section of this chapter examines the relative contribution of campaign effects and election year effects on party identification in each of the groups. This portion of the research examines each group to determine whether or not fluctuations in party identification over the five month period are best explained by election year effects or campaign effects.

The analysis proceeds under the simple assumption that groups which are more strongly rooted in a traditional affiliation will be less influenced by day-to-day events and more influenced by long term effects. Groups which hold weakened party attachments will likely be more strongly influenced by events taking place in each of the periods. Groups which are shifting their allegiance
with a major party are likely to be marginal supporters of that party in the first place and are teetering between which party they will support. In such a condition, new political experiences taking place during the campaign can more readily tip the retrospective "running balance" back and forth, favoring first one party then the other.

These three analytical sections represent the three ways of examining partisan movement outlined in Chapter 3. Collectively they provide a comprehensive review of the similarities and differences in partisan movement that exist among the various demographic subgroups.

The Electoral Groups

A total of 32 groups are examined in this chapter. The demographic groups represent several different ways of categorizing people and are not intended to be mutually exclusive. Many of the groups represent major elements of either the Republican or Democratic party coalitions.

The analysis in this chapter focuses primarily on the amount of partisan change occurring in each of the subgroups. Consequently, most of the discussion will center on those groups which demonstrate the greatest amounts of change or levels of
change which vary significantly from the average.

For the purpose of explication, however, it is also very important to understand the political leaning of each of the groups and assess the degree to which partisan affiliation or intensity are related to the amount of change in party identification.

Figure 15 illustrates the mean level of party identification for each of the groups at the beginning of the June 1 to November 5 time series and provides a useful gauge of traditional party support for each of the subgroups. The information is based on a national cross-sectional sample of 1500 adults on June 1-3, 1984.

Figure 15 also serves to list the 32 groups which will be examined in this chapter. Basically, the groups are typical subcategories of common demographic variables: age, race, sex, occupation, income, education, religion, union membership, and region.
Figure 15: Mean Party Identification Scores for Significant Subgroups (January 15, 1984)
In this section we examine the net change in party identification occurring in each subgroup over the entire five month campaign period. The information in Table 4 outlines the slope and net change ($\Delta Y$) in party identification for all of the groups. The significance level of the regression equations is also included as an indicator of the degree of confidence that can be placed in the regression solutions.
Table 4: Subgroup Changes in Party Identification  
(June 1 to November 5, 1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>ΔY</th>
<th>Signif of F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>-.167</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>-.142</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24 years</td>
<td>-.264</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44 Years</td>
<td>-.179</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64 years</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 + years</td>
<td>-.205</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than High School</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduate</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>-.212</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>-.106</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post graduate</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $10,000</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$20,000</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000-$30,000</td>
<td>-.152</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000-$40,000</td>
<td>-.084</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,000 +</td>
<td>-.376</td>
<td>.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>+.024</td>
<td>.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>-.280</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-.163</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.196</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Member</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-.160</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>+.065</td>
<td>.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>+.068</td>
<td>.643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Λ Y</td>
<td>Signif of F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>-.180</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>-.150</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-.161</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>-.204</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5: Election Year Effects on Subgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Below Average Pro-Republican Movement (2% - 7% increase in GOP Affiliation)</th>
<th>Average Pro-Republican Movement (8%-12% increase in GOP Affiliation)</th>
<th>Above Average Pro-Republican Movement (13%-18% increase in GOP Affiliation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than High School College Graduates Post Graduates Catholics 45-65 year olds</td>
<td>TOTAL SAMPLE Men Women White 25-44 year olds High School Graduates Retired workers South Midwest Baptists Protestants $10,000-$20,000 $20,000-$30,000</td>
<td>Some College White collar Unemployed West 18-24 year olds 65 years or older</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NO EFFECT (no statistical relationship of change in party identification over time):

| Professionals Union members Hispanics $30,000-$40,000 | Blue collar Blacks Under $10,000 $40,000 or more |
From this information several points can be made. The low level of statistical significance (significance of $F > .10$) for those groups in the "no effect" category indicates that time, as a variable, cannot account for the linear change in party identification over the 158 day period for the following groups: blacks, hispanics, professionals, blue collar workers, union members, and people with incomes less than $10,000 or above $30,000. With the exception of professionals and people with an income above $30,000, these demographic groups represent key elements of the traditional Democratic coalition.

It is perhaps more accurate to note that these demographic groups represent the more intense partisan subgroups. As seen in Figure 15, with the exception of professionals, all of the groups are found at the extreme ends of the party identification scale. Along this line, note from Figure 15 that college graduates and people with less than a high school level education are the only two highly partisan groups not included in the "no effect" category. As indicated in Table 5, both college graduates and people with less than a high school level education changed party identification considerably less than the rest of the electorate.
The assumption that highly partisan groups would be influenced more by long term effects rather than campaign effects is not supported. Based on an analysis of election year effects alone, the evidence clearly suggests that election year effects generally have the least impact on the most politically partisan subgroups.

The low level of significance for these groups does not necessarily mean that party identification did not vary over time. In some cases that interpretation may be accurate. However, it is also possible that the low significance level simply indicates the inadequacy of a linear relationship between time and party identification. In other words, even though election year effects had no measurable impact on these subgroups, it does not rule out the possibility that some of these groups may have had significant patterns of movement in the eight campaign periods which may cancel each other out when combined over the five month campaign. This possibility will be explored a bit later in the chapter.

The largest pro-Republican changes occur among the youngest and the oldest voters, white collar workers, the unemployed, the West, and people with some college education. With the exception of the oldest voters and the unemployed, these subgroups all previously leaned slightly more Republican than other subgroups. Consequently, the change they experienced over the five month
campaign represents an increase in the strength of their support for the Republican party. Apparently, the five month campaign acted to strengthen an existing Republican voter base.

The unemployed typically lean toward the Democratic party. By June 1984, however, a plurality of the unemployed identified with the Republican party. The large pro-Republican change during the campaign constitutes a significant deterioration which might be due to their lack of confidence in the Democratic party's ability to handle the economy in the future or a positive reaction to the Republican party for improvement occurring in the economy during a Republican presidency. Either way the change is likely tied to economic performance rather than any enduring change of feelings toward the parties.

Young voters have traditionally favored the Democratic party. However, more recently young voters increasingly identify with the Republican party.\(^1\) As revealed in Figure 15, at the beginning of 1984 most 18-24 year olds had already begun identifying with the Republicans. The large change taking place during the actual campaign further emphasizes their shift in political loyalty.

---

This section of the analysis supports the idea that the subgroups responded differently to election year effects. Two general patterns appear. First, it seems that the most politically partisan subgroups from either party are least affected by long term election year effects.

Second, election year effects seem to have further strengthened key elements of the existing Republican voter base: college graduates, white collar workers, the West, and younger voters all experienced larger than average increases in Republican affiliation. In general, the unemployed as well as many elements of the Republican coalition seem to have been most strongly affected by the favorable performance of Ronald Reagan and the strong economy. Traditional Democratic voter groups either demonstrated less movement toward the Republican party or showed no linear movement in party identification over the five month period.

Subgroup Responsiveness to Campaign Effects

In order to test for variation in subgroup responsiveness to campaign events, each group was analyzed individually utilizing the regression analysis outlined in the previous chapter to provide an estimate of the direction and level of daily movement in party identification during each campaign period.2
In many of the periods there were very few data points, making it difficult to achieve a regression solution with statistical significance. Nevertheless, many groups did have strong and clear patterns which did achieve high levels of significance. Figures 16-23 outline the results of this analysis. A bar graph for each campaign period contains a bar indicating the amount of change in party identification for the entire electorate and separate bars for all subgroups which varied significantly from the national trend.

The total change in party identification is the level of daily change (slope or b) times the number of days in the period. The significance level of the solution, based on a calculation of F, is also provided. Groups which are reported in the table are only those which achieved a significance level of at least .20 and differed from the aggregate level of change in that period by approximately ± .05 on the party identification scale.

---

Since it is not apparent in the tables itworth pointing out (if for no other reason than to justify my long hours grinding these regressions out and analyzing them) that over 340 separate regression equations had to be estimated to conduct this analysis.
Table 6 summarizes the information in Figures 16-23 into a single table indicating the frequency of subgroup deviations from the national trend for each campaign period.
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID: The Last Primaries

Figure 16: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Last Primaries
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID:
Preconvention Period

Figure 17: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Preconvention
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID:
Democratic Convention Period

-0.85
-0.53
-0.46
-0.36
-0.33
-0.32
-0.31
-0.25
-0.19
-0.17

Unemployed
Professional
Baptist
South
Blacks
$40,000 or more
Less than High School
Blue Collar
Women
25-44 year olds

Democratic/Republican Shift in Party ID (ΔY)

* 0.05 < p < 0.10
** 0.10 < p < 0.20

Figure 18: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Democratic Convention
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID:
Between Convention Jousting

Figure 19: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Between Conventions
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID: Republican Convention Period

Figure 20: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Republican Convention
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID: Traditional Campaign Period

Figure 21: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Traditional Campaign
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID: Debate I Period

Democratic/Republican Shift in Party ID (ΔY)

* .05 < p < .10
** .10 ≤ p ≤ .20

Figure 22: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Debate I
SIGNIFICANT SUBGROUP CHANGES IN PARTY ID:
Debate II Period

Figure 23: Significant Subgroup Changes in Party Identification: Debate II
Table 6: Frequency of Subgroup Deviations from the National Trends in the Campaign Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Period</th>
<th>National Trend: Party most benefited by changes in ID</th>
<th>Number of subgroup deviations exceeding national trend</th>
<th>Number of subgroup deviations which run counter to national trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last Primaries</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconvention</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Convention</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Convents</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep Convention</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradit Campaign</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate I</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate II</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several general observations can be made about the variation in subgroup responsiveness within the eight campaign periods. As an aside, it is interesting to compare the number of groups for each period that deviate from the national trend (See Table 6). In four of the eight periods there were six or less groups which responded significantly differently from the rest of the subgroups. In the other four periods there were twice as many deviating subgroups. For whatever it is worth, it seems that the first two periods (Last Primaries and Preconvention) and the last two periods (Debate I and Debate II) exerted a more uniform impact across all the subgroups than the other periods. Conversely, the Democratic Convention, Between Convention, Republican Conventions and Traditional Campaign periods stimulated more intense reactions from some of the subgroups.

More substantively, according to the information in Table 6, in four of the eight periods, all significant deviations from the national trends were in the same direction. During the Last Primaries, and the Democratic Convention periods there were no groups that moved significantly less pro-Democratic than the electorate as a whole. There were, however, several groups which had a pro-Democratic change which was significantly greater. In the Between Conventions and Debate II periods just the opposite condition existed. No groups experienced any significant pro-Democratic changes in party identification while several had
pro-Republican changes significantly larger than the rest of the electorate.

As an even more general observation of the same phenomena, most of the deviations from the national trend were fairly lopsided—favoring one party or the other. Moreover, the lopsidedness always favored the party that benefited most from the changes in party identification during that period. For example, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Democratic Convention period witnessed the greatest pro-Democratic change in party identification of any of the eight periods. In the subgroup analysis, the only groups which significantly deviated from this aggregate trend were groups of people who changed even more strongly toward the Democrats; there no subgroups which changed significantly less than the national trend. Similar results in the Last Primaries, Between Convention, Republican Convention, Traditional Campaign, Debate I, and Debate II periods all support these findings.

The Preconvention period is the only period which bucks the pattern: subgroup deviations favor neither party. This is more than likely due to the fact that the events in the period itself did not really favor either of the parties. If you recall, based on the news event monitoring it was thought unlikely that there would be any significant movement in party identification favoring
either of the parties. Since the events themselves produced a wash in party competition, it is not surprising to come up lacking a clear pattern of subgroup reactions to the events.

Further insights into the impacts of the campaign periods are possible based on an analysis of the specific groups which deviated from the national trend (See Table 7). For example, during the Democratic Convention period ten subgroups exceeded the national level of pro-Democratic change. Eight of these subgroups are traditionally considered to favor the Democratic party: women (more recently considered to favor Democrats), blacks, 25-44 year olds, some high school or less, the South, blue collar workers, the unemployed, and baptists. One anomaly, people with incomes above $40,000 were also favorably impressed with the Democrats at their convention.

A similar situation occurred during the Traditional Campaign period. During this period traditional Democrats such as baptists, retired workers, southerners, post graduates, and people with some high school or less all responded more favorably to the Democrats than the rest of the country. Evidently, the Democratic Convention and the Traditional Campaign periods effectively rekindled and reawakened these elements of the Democratic coalition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Last Pre-Democratic</th>
<th>Democratic Convention</th>
<th>Between Conventions</th>
<th>Republican Convention</th>
<th>Traditional Campaign</th>
<th>Debate I</th>
<th>Debate II</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post Graduates</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>$40,000 or more</strong></td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Pre-</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Between</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Convention</td>
<td>Convention</td>
<td>Conventions</td>
<td>Convention</td>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Debate I</td>
<td>Debate II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>White</td>
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<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
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<td>North</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>West</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D = Subgroup moved more strongly toward the Democrats than the rest of the population
R = Subgroup moved more strongly toward the Republicans than the rest of the population.
During the Between Convention and Republican Convention periods a considerably different pattern emerged. Given what occurred in the Democratic Convention and Traditional Campaign period (a strengthening of tradition Democratic subgroups), one might expect to find that traditional elements of the Republican coalition such as professionals, white collar workers, high income groups, protestants, etc., might constitute the groups which responded most favorably to the pro-Republican events that dominated these periods. On the contrary, a large portion of the subgroups demonstrating the greatest pro-Republican movement are the same ones typically considered to be elements of the Democratic coalition. For example, according to Figure 20, during the Republican Convention the four groups demonstrating the greatest amount of pro-Republican change are blacks, union members, the South, and blue collar workers. The amount of change occurring in blacks is truly phenomenal, especially given the historical stability of black support for the Democratic party.

During the Republican Convention there was a net increase in Republican affiliation of about 4% in the total electorate.\(^3\) According to Figure 20, a total of seven groups moved even more based on the measure of change outlined in footnote 9 on page 64.
dramatically toward the Republican party. On the other hand, low income households and the unemployed actually bucked the national trend and shifted strongly toward the Democratic party. It is not a likely coincidence that the two groups that could be helped the most by increased federal social spending stiffened in their resistance to the Republican party at convention time—the very time when the party enjoys an open pulpit to preach the virtues of less social spending.

It is interesting to point out the subgroups which most frequently deviated from the national norm. According to information in Table 7, the unemployed, blue collar workers, southerners, and high school graduates all exceeded the national norm in half of the periods. Blacks, and some high school or less exceeded the national norm in three of the periods. All these groups are traditionally more Democratic than Republican, yet more often than not, these groups exceeded all others in the degree of pro-Republican movement. This is not to say, however, that these groups became more Republican over the entire campaign. Rather, these groups were simply more responsive to Republican appeals and campaign events in general.

The analysis initially proceeded under the simple assumption that strong Democratic or Republican support groups would be less influenced by day-to-day events than by long-term election year
effects. The analysis of election year effects clearly demonstrates that this could not be since the most partisan subgroups demonstrated the least amount of responsiveness to election year effects. Now we add the finding that some of the strongest Democratic support groups happen to be the most responsive to campaign effects.

Another explanation might account for why these particular groups demonstrated more volatility. Most of these groups were targeted in 1984 by each of the parties. As a minority party nominee, Republican presidential candidates must rely on large numbers of Democrats to vote Republican. In recent presidential elections, these groups (blue collar workers, southerners, and people with lower levels of education) constitute many of those that a Republican candidate needs to win. Precisely because these groups have contributed to past Republican victories at the presidential level, they are targets of both Democratic and Republican campaign activity. Moreover, because they are the targets of campaign activity, they are also likely to be most responsive to campaign events.

Quite clearly, the strength of political support among the subgroups is not related to volatility in party affiliation during the campaign. Strong Democratic support groups (i.e., blacks, blue collar workers, and people without a high school diploma),
moderate Democratic support groups (high school graduates, and southerners) as well as weak Democratic support groups (unemployed) all exhibited a high degree of responsiveness to campaign effects in 1984. Campaign events do not just affect those subgroups in the political middle. Why then, do campaign strategists target campaign events, media and messages at the swing voters? Quite simply, the political payoff for influencing party identification occurs only when a person changes from one party to another and not from just softening up strong partisans. A successful campaign must win support of the swing voters. Moreover, a presidential campaign attempts to affect vote choice rather than partisan affiliation.

One common denominator among all the subgroups that showed the greatest partisan volatility in 1984 is the Democratic party affiliation. This begs an important question. To what extent are these findings limited to just the specific circumstances of the 1984 campaign? For example, election year effects in 1964 would be much different than 1984. In a year when election year effects strongly favor the Democrats we might expect to find more volatility among Republican support groups.
Dynamic Interaction of Campaign Effects and Election Year Effects in the Subgroups

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that the changes in party identification that occurred over the general election campaign were due to a combination of election year effects and campaign effects. It was suggested that the favorable economy and a positive performance by Reagan dynamically interacted with the events of the campaign to impact party identification. This same dynamic interaction of campaign and election year effects is believed to operate within each of the subgroups. It is also expected that the relative importance of campaign effects versus election year effects will vary from group to group.

In the first analytic section of this chapter we examined election year effects among the subgroups. In the second section we compared campaign effects among the subgroups. In this section we complete the subgroup analysis and examine the relative impact of election year effects versus campaign effects to identify those groups most strongly influenced by campaign effects and those most strongly influenced by election year effects.

This analysis is subtly different than the first and second sections because it focuses on the relative ability of election year effects and campaign effects to account for change in party
identification rather than absolute magnitude of change. The results of the sections, however, are all logically and analytically linked. For example, groups consistently showing large amounts of change in several campaign periods will likely show up in this analysis as being more responsive to campaign effects than election year effects.

Here it doesn't matter how much change occurred, but rather what best accounts for the change—election year effects or campaign effects?

The regression and sum of squares analysis performed on aggregate level party identification in the previous chapter is repeated here for each subgroup. Table 8 lists the amount of variance explained by the election year trend and the total variance explained after campaign effects are used to explain the remaining variance. The change in $R^2$ is also provided as an indicator of the added importance of campaign effects in explaining subgroup fluctuations in party identification.
Table 8: Subgroup Variation Accounted for by Election Year Effects and Campaign Effects: Sum of Squares Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Election Year $R^2$</th>
<th>Election Year and Period $R^2$</th>
<th>$R^2$ Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-44</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some H.S. or less</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Graduate</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 or less</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000-$20,000</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
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<td>$20,000-$30,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$40,000+</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not significant at .10 level
Table 8: Subgroup Variation Accounted for by Election Year Effects and Campaign Effects: Sum of Squares Analysis (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Election Year $R^2$</th>
<th>Election Year and Period $R^2$</th>
<th>$R^2$ Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>.00*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar</td>
<td>.00*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Members</td>
<td>.00*</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.00*</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<td>.28</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not significant at .10 level
It is important to note that the high level of variance explained at the national level analysis for both election year effects and campaign effects is not evident in the analysis of the subgroups. It should be recalled that when all the groups were aggregated in the national level analysis of Chapter III, nearly one fourth of the variance was explained by election year effects alone, and the variance explained increased to .36 after campaign effects were added to the analysis. What might account for the high level of variance explained at the national but lacking at the subgroup level?

Among the subgroups, neither election year effects nor campaign effects do as good a job accounting for movement in party identification. Here we must recognize that we are pushing the data to its limits. When we look at such small groups of cases (in terms of the number of cases used to generate daily means of party identification), we are likely to encounter larger levels of sample error. In the regression analysis this shows up in the error term as unexplained variation. Nevertheless, there are a few insights we can gain from this analysis.

The regression analysis in Table 8 reveals that the amount of variance in party identification explained by a linear relationship with election year effects exceeded .10 in only eight out of the thirty-nine subgroups. After campaign effects
were introduced into the analysis, the amount of variance explained exceeded .10 in twenty-six of the subgroups. In thirty-one of the groups the amount of variance explained more than doubled when campaign effects were added to the analysis. Given the conservative method of measurement (a hierarchical regression that forces campaign effects to enter after election year effects), the obvious conclusion is that campaign effects in general make a very significant contribution to explaining fluctuation in party identification.

According to the results reported in Table 8, subgroups election year effects dominate over campaign effects in accounting for the changes in party identification among five groups: whites, men, 25-44 year olds, white collar workers and protestants.

According to the amount of $R^2$ change, campaign effects had the most dramatic impact on the South, unemployed, high school graduates, Baptists, and blacks. For example, Figures 24 to 26 dramatically illustrate the impact of campaign effects on party identification in the South.

Figure 24 shows the election year party identification trend for the South. Just eight percent of the variance is explained by election year effects. Figure 25 shows the regression analysis
within each period for the same group. The total amount of variance explained with both election year and campaign effects jumps to .28. Finally, the spline superimposed on the regressions within periods in Figure 25 clearly demonstrates the accuracy of the regression analysis. The figures demonstrate very clearly the distinct impacts of each of the periods. In particular, note how well all of the bends in the spline coincide with the breaks between periods. Campaign events similarly influenced the unemployed, high school graduates, baptists, and blacks.
Figure 24: Party Identification Movement During the General Election in the South
Figure 25: Knotted Regression for all Electoral Periods in the South
This provides dramatic evidence of the impact of campaign effects on party identification. The results here support the findings in Chapter III. This should not be too surprising since it was pointed out earlier that these same groups, with the exception of baptists, were the subgroups which most frequently exceeded the national tide of movement in the campaign periods. Consequently, it is reasonably to expect that a substantial amount of additional variance should be explained by the campaign periods.

Summary

The analysis of subgroup variations in party identification fluctuations yields some important findings. Most important to this thesis is the fact that campaign events dramatically influence the level of party identification in political subgroups. Evidence clearly demonstrates a marked improvement in our ability to account for subgroup changes in party identification when campaign events are used as an explanatory variable.

The analysis also produced some unexpected findings. The research proceeded under the assumption that the weaker partisans of the political middle would be most susceptible to the partisan
appeals of the two political parties during the campaign. Stronger partisans, if influenceable at all, were believed to be more likely to respond to the more gradual and pervasive election year effects. This was not the case.

Strength of partisanship is not an indicator of responsiveness to campaign events. Strong, moderate, and weak Democrats all showed great amounts of partisan volatility over the campaign. Moreover, the strongest partisans of both parties were the least likely to be influenced by long-term election year effects.

At a minimum, we can conclude that political subgroups vary in their responsiveness to election year and campaign effects. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the overall impact of campaign effects varies in the subgroups according to which party is in power. When election year effects strongly favor the Republicans as they did in 1984, then campaign effects will exert a strong influence on Democratic support groups. Likewise, when election year effects strongly favor Democrats, as they did in 1964, then we might expect campaign events to exert a strong influence on Republican support groups.

Based on the findings reported in this chapter, the campaign events of 1984 elicited a fairly uniform directional reaction from
all the subgroups. For example, during the Democratic Convention period nearly all groups moved slightly closer to the Democratic party in terms of political affiliation. During the Republican Convention most groups moved closer to the GOP.

The uniformity of the reaction, however, is limited to the direction of movement but not the magnitude of that movement. This is an important point of the analysis. With few exceptions, there is a uniform direction of response exhibited by the subgroups to the different campaign periods. While the direction of response is uniform, some groups are more strongly affected by the events of a given period and change more during the period. In particular, several groups traditionally part of the Democratic coalition seemed to be most affected by the back and forth swings of momentum between parties in the 1984 general election.

This finding clarifies the idea that aggregate level fluctuations in party identification are the simple result of uniform reactions among all subgroups to events of a campaign. On the contrary, aggregate level peaks and valleys in the level of party identification are the result of two phenomena: a uniform, directional movement exhibited by nearly all subgroups, and varying magnitudes of reaction punctuated by the more extreme reactions of a few voter groups.
Chapter V

Party Identification: A Dynamic Element of American Politics

Recent Changes in the Partisan Balance

Throughout most of 1986 a roughly equal number of people identified with the Republican and Democratic parties (See Figure 26). This new-found parity between the parties came about as a result of the 1984 elections. While there was some movement in party identification during 1986, the Democrats generally held just a slim three to five percentage point edge on the Republicans. To a party that has been down fifteen to twenty-five points below the Democrats for most of the last several decades, parity was paradise.
PARTY IDENTIFICATION

With Lean

Republican

Independent

Democrat

Source: DMI Polls

Figure 26: Party Identification Since 1984
Between October 17 and November 17, 1986, something happened to radically upset the partisan balance which had existed for two years. Just prior to the 1986 midterm elections the partisan balance stood at 40% Republican and 43% Democratic. By November 17 the partisan balance had dramatically shifted toward the Democrats--38% Republican and 47% Democrat. Over the next nine months, D/M/I measured party identification in over 40 national cross-section studies and the results continued to reflect a Democratic advantage of eight to ten percentage points.

The loss of the Republican controlled Senate and the Iran/Contras arms scandal changed the existing partisan balance. The inability of the Reagan administration to recover from these two blows resulted in a nine month crystallization of partisanship at the ten point gap. After extensive congressional hearings that stopped short of implicating the President in anything more serious than misjudgment or poor management style, the public lost interest in the scandal. Eventually partisanship drifted back to pre-scandal levels.

This recent shifting in party identification is just another example which vividly illustrates the fact that party identification is a vital and dynamic element of American electoral politics. This dissertation contributes to better understanding the correct role of party identification in
A Brief Review

This dissertation has sought to provide definitive evidence of the sensitivity of party affiliations to campaign events. Electoral theory in this area has progressed faster than research can generate evidence to support it. Moreover, existing research designs have simply been inadequate to examine whether or not partisanship fluctuates in response to campaign events.

The research in this thesis is premised on previous work by Franklin and Jackson which recognizes that party identification is undeniably rooted in both past and present political forces of socialization. Yet they also recognize that party identification is not just the static end result of the socialization process. On the contrary, party identification is a responsive and dynamic phenomenon which can stray far from its roots.¹

Stated most simply, the thesis asserts that the size and strength of party affiliation is directly affected by the continuous actions and performance of party leaders as well as the

events of a political campaign. Evidence to support the thesis comes from three separate research areas:

- the demonstration that change in party identification over the campaign is not random;
- the demonstration that change in party identification corresponds in understandable and predictable ways to campaign events;
- the demonstration that voter subgroups vary in meaningful ways in their reaction to campaign events and that some groups more than others are responsible for the swings in party identification occurring during the campaign.

**Non-Random Change in Party Identification**

The first and simplist evidence to support the thesis lies in the fact that over the course of the 1984 campaign, aggregate level measurements of party identification were not static. The amount of movement in party identification from one time point to another far exceeded what might be expected from sampling error.
Furthermore, fluctuations in party identification over the campaign were not random. On the contrary, over the course of the campaign there was a trend of change in party identification toward the Republican party. The magnitude of the change was both statistically and substantively significant. Over the course of the five month general election campaign, approximately 10% of the American population changed from claiming an affiliation with the Democratic party to Republican party. Moreover, the direction of the change corresponds to the hypothesized direction of change given a strong economy and a popular incumbent president.

Election Year and Campaign Effects

The dynamic nature of party identification is most clearly demonstrated by evidence which links changes in party identification to real world events. Two specific types of effects -- election year effects and campaign effects -- are identified and evidence demonstrates that they both exert a considerable amount of influence on the fluctuation of party identification over an election year.

Election year effects include general impressions that are not tied directly to any specific event. In a sense they are a collection of favorable or unfavorable impressions based on
retrospective evaluations of the performance of the parties and their leaders. It is hypothesized that for the most part these feelings simply percolate inside voters until at some point in time they are forced to make an accounting of the running balance sheet of positive and negative experiences with the political parties. Election year offers a natural time for most voters to review and update, if necessary, their partisanship. According to this framework, largely adopted from Fiorina's retrospective voting model, election year effects such as a favorable economy and positive evaluations of the performance of President Reagan should increase the size and strength of Republican affiliation during an election year.²

Campaign effects include reactions to specific events or episodes of a campaign like the conventions or the debates. Typically the momentum in a campaign will swing back and forth from one candidate to the other. During a period when things are going well for a candidate or events focus positive attention on him or his party and momentum swings his way, it is likely that any changes in party identification will also favor his party.

Intuitively, we know that political campaigns are dynamic -- each side in a campaign constantly acting and reacting to the opponent. Logically, we might expect that political gains and losses in momentum cancel each other out over the course of a campaign. Up to this point, however, we have only been able to measure the net amount of change and never the gross amount of change. Now, with daily observations of party identification it is possible to monitor the day-to-day fluctuations in party identification and measure the gross amount of change.

Research presented in Chapter III demonstrated that both election year and campaign effects help account for observed changes in party identification during the 1984 presidential campaign. About one-fourth of the day-to-day variation in the aggregate level of party identification is accounted for by election year effects alone. Curvilinear spline analysis clearly demonstrates that the pattern of movement in party identification was anything but linear over the five month period. Taking into account both the linear changes in party identification which I attribute to election year effects and the non-linear changes induced by campaign events, over one-third of the variation in party identification movement can be accounted for.
More important than the amount of variance explained, however, is the fact that party identification responds to election year and campaign effects in predictable ways. As expected, election year forces such as the strong economy and favorable retrospective evaluations of President Reagan brought about an increase in Republican party identification over the last five months of the campaign.

In addition, campaign events exerted a sizeable and predictable impact on the electorate during the different episodes of the campaign. A considerable amount of fluctuation occurred as party identification responded to the ebb and flow of political momentum behind each of the campaigns. In fact, the gross amount of change (the sum of the absolute amounts of change occurring during each electoral period or the distance from each peak to the next valley) is more than three times the amount of net change (the amount of change over the campaign considered as a whole or the difference between beginning point and ending point).

Again, the significant fact is not the amount of change occurring during the electoral periods, but the predictability of that change given the events that took place. In seven out the eight periods the observed changes in party identification supported research expectations. The events of the 1984 presidential campaign clearly mattered—affecting the way people
felt about the parties enough to change the partisan balance back and forth.

As an interesting exercise, I explored what would have happened to party identification if its fate rested solely on the events of the campaign. After removing election year effects, it appears that the Late Democratic Primaries, the Democratic Convention, and the Traditional Campaign periods all brought about increased levels of Democratic affiliation. The Between Convention Jousting, Republican Convention, and Debate II periods benefited the Republican party. The Pre-convention and Debate I periods did not significantly help either party. Considered by themselves, the net impact of campaign events worked to the Democrats' advantage.

The event analysis in conjunction with the statistical analysis of movement during the electoral periods provides considerable insight to the dynamics of the campaign, i.e., the success and failure of campaign strategies, the devastating impact of a scandal, and the positive impact of political conventions.

For example, during the Democratic Convention approximately six percent of the population changed from a Republican party affiliation to a Democratic party affiliation. In the weeks between conventions when Ferraro's financial problems
became big news, the Democrats lost all the ground they had gained from their convention—and then some. During the Republican convention they lost even more partisan support. By the time the convention was over, more than twelve percent of the population had changed their affiliation from the Democratic party to the Republican party. Fortunately, the Democrats fared better during the traditional campaign period immediately after the Republican convention. By mid-October, the Democratic party had regained a slim partisanship advantage over the Republicans. After the second presidential debate, however, the partisan balance shifted to favor the Republican party.

**Varying Degrees of Subgroup Sensitivity to Election Year and Campaign Effects**

Additional evidence of the dynamic nature of party identification comes from the analysis of changes in party identification among voter subgroups. Here we assumed that if party identification really was a dynamic element of electoral behavior, then among the different voter subgroups we would find varying levels of sensitivity in party identification to the actions and events of the 1984 general election campaign.

3Based on the measure of change outlined in footnote 9 on page 64.
Depending on their existing level of commitment or affiliation with the parties, some groups would be swayed more than others by the events of a campaign.

Indeed, the research in Chapter IV reveals a wide range of variation in the patterns of change in party identification among the different voter subgroups. Some groups responded strongly to the election year effects of a strong economy and a popular incumbent president. For others, election year effects had no impact whatsoever. On the other hand, several groups demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity to the different episodes of the campaign, waivering back and forth in their support between the two parties.

Research proceeded under the assumption that strength of partisanship would be the best indicator of whether or not a group would be most responsive to election year effects or campaign effects. Strong party support groups were believed to be least susceptible to the short-term momentum swings of campaign events. If they were going to change at all, they would be most likely to change in response to the steady long term forces of the election year. Weak partisans, on the other hand, were expected to get more involved with the campaigns—each new campaign event tipping the "running balance" a different direction. This was not the case.
Political affiliation, not partisan intensity, is the best indicator of whether or not a political subgroup will respond to long acting election year forces or the more immediate campaign forces. In 1984, traditional elements of the Republican coalitions seemed to be most affected by election year forces and traditional elements of the Democratic coalition were most affected by campaign events.

In 1984, key Democratic support groups at all intensities of political strength waivered back and forth in support for their party. Blacks, baptists, unemployed, blue collar workers, people without a high school degree, high school graduates, and southerners reacted dramatically to the events of the campaign. Their support was easily reinforced during the Democratic convention and just as easily lost during the Republican convention.

Among Republican groups such as white collar workers, people with some college education, the West, and 18-24 year olds, election year effects steadily worked over the last five months of the campaign to strengthen their Republican affiliation. Campaign effects did not appreciably affect the level of their partisan support one way or the other.
Implications of the Research

The research reported in this thesis provides some meaningful insights to our understanding of party identification.

"What" we see and the conclusions we draw depend on "how" we observe. More frequent observations of party identification open up a whole new realm of possibilities for learning and understanding the role of party identification in American politics.

Given what has been uncovered here, what are the implications of the findings on the way political scientists currently view party identification? Moreover, what are some of the implications of this research on our understanding of the political parties, the party system, and political stability?

For about fifteen years one of the hottest topics in American political voting behavior has been realignment. It is not surprising that realignment is such a popular topic to political scientists today. Realignments do not occur very often in American politics. Formerly, political realignments had to be studied and discussed in an historical context. For some of us, this is our Halley's comet. Like a space scientist we are right in the middle of the comet's tail armed with our most advanced
research tools not knowing exactly what it is that we are looking for or if we will recognize it when we see it—academic high drama at its best.

The next few pages will discuss the implications of this research with regard to these three areas.

What a Difference A Day Makes

Earlier I stated that there is a strong relationship between the kinds of questions that research can address and the data that are available. Until recently the data available have been inadequate to answer questions regarding the sensitivity of party identification over the short run. Only frequent monitoring of party identification is sure to catch any short-term responsiveness to events of a campaign. In this sense it is not too surprising that early research found partisanship to be so stable. Much of the movement that may have been occurring was not picked up due to infrequent measurement of party identification.

In the few cases when party identification was measured more frequently, it demonstrated a responsiveness to short term events. For example, in 1964 the Survey Research Center conducted national cross-section studies in January, May, and October. In January and October the Democratic party held a two-to-one edge over the
Republican party—well above the usual three-to-two advantage measured in May. As related earlier, Kessel explains that,

the system of attitudes reacted to the shock of the Kennedy assassination by bending in the Democratic direction, had begun to recover its normal contours in late spring, and then was hit with the second shock of the Goldwater campaign.3

While the explanation is plausible it begs an important question: what would have been the interpretation if any one of the cross-sections had not been conducted? If there was no May cross-section, we probably would have concluded that the shock of the Kennedy assassination caused a shift in the partisan balance that remained throughout the election year. If there was no January study, we would have never known about the Kennedy effect and would have concluded that the party balance remained stable through May of 1964 and then changed sometime before October as a reaction to the Goldwater campaign. In either case we would have made erroneous conclusions about what happened to party identification in 1964.

The D/M/I continuous monitoring of the 1984 general election campaign made it possible for the first time to observe daily fluctuations in party identification. What a difference an interval of one day makes! We don't have to wonder how much change was missed by the standard pre and post election surveys. Daily monitoring with

large sample sizes enable us to talk definitively about the short term sensitivity of party identification to campaign events and the decisions and performance of party leaders.

For example, in 1984 the standard pre and post election study would have revealed a net swing of approximately 10% of the population changing from Democratic affiliation in June to Republican in November. It would have missed the fact that there was a considerable amount of ebb and flow occurring throughout the campaign. In fact, in the concentrated period of a single month after the Democratic convention and during the Republican convention there was more change than the amount of net change over the entire five month period.

This is not to suggest that all future National Election Studies should implement a research design that calls for daily interviewing with large sample sizes. The costs would simply be too prohibitive and the money could be better spent. It does suggest, however, that our theories and understanding of party identification have been incomplete and inaccurate due to inadequate research designs. Quite simply, the data were not appropriate for the questions.

**Responsible Parties and Political Stability**

Most importantly, the thesis took seriously Franklin and Jackson's reconceptualization of party identification as a dynamic element in
election campaigns and demonstrated that it responds in predictable ways to the actions, decisions, and performance of presidential candidates. For many Americans, what the parties do and who they nominate as their candidates makes a big difference. Party fortunes are not dependent upon demographic changes or dramatic crises. The financial improprieties of Geraldine Ferraro and her husband John Zaccaro cost the Democratic party. President Reagan's success in handling the national economy, deserved or not, clearly benefited the Republican party. Political conventions appear to give each of the parties a significant boost in party identification.

The research in this thesis sheds light on some related observations on party identification. For example, research by Markus and Converse as well as Howell suggested that party identification was subject to change only after a series of votes contrary to identification. Given the amount of change observed during the course of a single campaign results here clearly indicate that vote change is not a necessary precursor to party identification change.

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There are clearly a large number of people who remain unmoved in their party loyalty throughout a campaign. Many of these people are either not involved or concerned enough to let campaign issues or events have an effect on their habitual party affiliation. Others are so deeply rooted in support for one of the parties that their party loyalty transcends the impact of any current political events. Still others, as discovered in this thesis, are tempted by the perceived political success and popularity of the party in power. In 1984, strong, moderate, and weak Democrats wooed by the Republicans waivered back and forth in their strength of support for the Democrats much like we might have expected Republicans to respond to the Democrats in 1964.

The thesis makes a forceful argument that party identification is more fluid than many political scientists have previously recognized. Frequent monitoring reveals that aggregate levels of party identification move back and forth between the parties. What does this say about the stability of the American political system? We never had this problem when we only measured party identification a couple of times each election year. Maybe we can maintain stability in the political system by outlawing frequent monitoring of political affiliation. Ridiculous? Of course. Nevertheless, it underscores the reality that a more powerful microscope does not change what is there, it just brings it into better focus.
There are many things that contribute to the stability of the United States' democratic system. To a large degree, what the authors of *The American Voter* said nearly 20 years ago still holds:

*Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections than the lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of electoral strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes place. And they are an important factor in assuring the stability of the party system itself.*

No doubt, basic political loyalties contribute to the stability of the party system. For many political scientists, however, this pronouncement became an end in itself. The fact that the distribution of party identification remained virtually unchanged from 1950 to 1960 sustained the belief.

Unchanging party identification, however, may just be a consequence of some other equilibrium process rather than a cause of stability in the party system. Moreover, research by Stokes and Iversen demonstrates the great likelihood that some

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equilibrium force has prevented one the parties from ever gaining more than 65% of the presidential vote in over 100 years. What might induce stability into the party system if it isn't party loyalty or party identification? One answer which holds a lot of promise is the competitive party organizations. Just as two competing corporations reach an equilibrium in terms of market share, the two parties are generally in a state of balance. As long as each party can keep its clientele happy, they stay in balance.

Equilibrium does not mean, however, that the two parties are inactive. On the contrary, they continually try new strategies to improve their relative standing. To fail to do so would give the opposing party the edge. If that edge is allowed to go unchecked, it becomes more and more difficult to recover. However, in periods of normal politics competing parties effectively counter each other's strategies tit for tat, creating a condition of equilibrium and political stability.

This line of explanation dovetails nicely with Carmines and Stimson's organic theory of issue evolution. According to

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Carmines and Stimson, "Alternative issues, or alternative definitions of the same issue, may be seen as competing for a portion of that space—a competition that is highly selective and often unpredictable." 7 Occasionally one party will substantially improve its public standing through favorable strategic positioning on a salient and contentious issue. At this "critical moment" the opposing party must respond or risk losing popular support. Typically the party responds by offering new policy stands which match the opposition close enough to effectively eliminate perceptual differences between the parties on the issue. In such cases, the issue loses electoral relevance very quickly.

The findings from this research support the view that the stability of our political system is largely due to an equilibrium achieved through the keen competitiveness of the two political parties. The fact that the process has been so stable is a testament to the effectiveness of the parties and their leaders to counter the appeals and strategy of the opposition.

Perhaps more than anything, these findings are most indicative of the good health of our democratic system. The dissertation demonstrates that there exists a considerable degree

of responsiveness among the general public to what the candidates and parties do and say. It sends a clear signal to the parties (probably reconfirming what they already know) that to a very large degree their actions affect their destiny. More meaningful and thoughtful party appeals, better handling of issues, better constituency service, and stronger candidates can make a substantial difference between being a minority party, a party at parity, or a majority party. Regardless of the motivation, these ends are exactly what Americans hope for most from their government and elected officials.

Partisan Realignment

Since the 1972 election, scholars have been looking for signs of electoral realignment. While four of the last five elections have been won by Republicans, it was not until the 1984 election that political realignment was seriously considered as a possible reality.

According to realignment theories, the minority party can win an election without realignment occurring. This is called a deviating election. It is called a deviating election because voters' preference for president deviates from their personal preference or affiliation with the parties. Often times these types of voters are split ticket voters. What is important to
realize, though, is that these people maintained their affiliation with the same party even though they voted for the presidential candidate of the other party.

In 1984, however, people were changing their feeling about the parties as evidenced in the fluctuations in party identification over the election year and the overall pro-Republican increase in party identification. By election day several polls showed that the Republicans had reached parity with the Democrats in terms of party identification in the nation. D/M/I polling throughout shows that that parity continued throughout 1985 and 1986 (see Figure 19).

In this sense the 1984 election of Ronald Reagan cannot be considered in the same category as other deviating elections. Many voters actually changed their affiliation from Democrat to Republican and voted accordingly. Neither can the 1984 election be truly considered as a realigning election. Despite a massive victory at the presidential level, the Republicans still failed to improve their minority status in the House or increase their slight advantage in the Senate.

These kinds of inconsistencies illustrate the inadequacy of this typology to accommodate the realities of today's political environment. They also underscore the difficulty political
scientists have in coming to some kind of agreement about whether or not there was, is, or will be a realignment.

If what we are experiencing is a realignment era, which I believe it is, it is different than any previously experienced. Absent any dramatic crisis or "critical election", the realignment question can be argued from virtually any angle because proof lies in the future.

In reviewing the New Deal realignment, Campbell notes that the nationwide shift toward the Democratic Party was not accomplished in a single election. It took several years of Roosevelt and the New Deal to finally win the confidence of the American people. Along the way, policy failures or administration scandals may have derailed the realignment and prevented the partisan balance from crystalizing with the Democrats as the majority party. Regardless, Campbell stresses the point that the New Deal realignment did not occur in a single election but rather an electoral era.

Rather than attempt to classify the 1984 election as a "realigning" or "deviating" election, it is more useful to examine

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the election's effect on significant groups of voters. Campbell points out that during a realigning era there are movements in both directions among important groups of the electorate as they try to "find their new positions in the party conflict." Carmines and Stimson's organic theory of issue evolution similarly suggests that "realignments are precipitated by the emergence of new issues.. that cut across rather than reinforce the existing line of cleavage between the parties." They suggest that this process alters the coalitional structure of the parties and sometimes can lead to a full-scale realignment. Both lines of thought agree that evidence of realignment lies in the changing patterns of subgroup support.

In the final analysis, a party's success is gauged by the success of its appeal to targeted groups of voters. Campaign strategy is designed to build a coalition of support groups which is larger than any other. Over the last 40 years, Republicans and Democrats have had traditional groups from which they draw their support and build their coalitions. A closer look at the movement in party identification among these key groups provides valuable insight into the dynamics of realignment and the evolving composition of the two political parties.

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9 Ibid., p. 75.
Research in Chapter IV revealed very different patterns of movement in party identification among Republican and Democratic coalition groups. Several of the traditional Democratic subgroups were significantly influenced by campaign events while Republican subgroups were more affected by election year forces. The affiliation of traditional Republican support groups was strengthened over the five month campaign. The unemployed, blue collar workers, southerners, high school graduates, some high school, blacks, and Baptists all had the tendency to waiver back and forth between the parties.

The fact that these traditionally Democratic groups demonstrated a higher degree of responsiveness to the Republican party suggests a weakening in their traditional support for the Democratic party. It does not necessarily mean, however, that they have realigned with the Republican party. More than anything, it suggests that their support for the Democratic party has softened, a necessary but not sufficient precondition for conversion and realignment.

There is no evidence in the daily tracking of party identification to indicate that 1984 was the long-awaited "realigning" election. Political analysts or party leaders who argue over whether this was a realigning election miss the point.
The evidence clearly indicates that the conditions during the 1984 campaign worked toward the Republican party's advantage—key Republican coalitions were strengthened and key Democratic coalition members waived. In short, from 1984 through 1986 the competitive edge lay with the Republican party.
APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT
43. In politics today, do you consider yourself to be (ROTATE) ... liberal ... or ... conservative?

(WAIT FOR RESPONSE:) Would you say you are very (liberal/conservative) or just somewhat so?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VERY CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMEWHAT CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE (DO NOT READ)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMEWHAT LIBERAL</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERY LIBERAL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And now I have a few questions for statistical purposes.

44. What is your age, please?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 - 20</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 24</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 - 69</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 AND OLDER</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45. What is the last year of school you have completed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL (1-11)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (12)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOME COLLEGE (13-15)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLEGE GRADUATE (16)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSTGRADUATE (17 AND OVER)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46. What is your marital status?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MARRIED</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINGLE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPARATED/DIVORCED</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFUSED (DO NOT READ)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47. Are you yourself a U.S. military veteran?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

48. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?

(IF REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT, ASK:) Would you call yourself a strong (Republican/Democrat) or a not-so-strong (Republican/Democrat)?

(IF INDEPENDENT/OTHER/NO PREFERENCE, ASK:) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or the Democratic party?
49. Are you presently employed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong> (ASK Qs. 50 AND 51)</th>
<th><strong>NO</strong> (ASK Q.52)</th>
<th><strong>REFUSED</strong> (SKIP TO Q.53)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**IF "YES, EMPLOYED" IN Q.49, ASK:**

50. And what is your occupation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHITE COLLAR</th>
<th>BLUE COLLAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Technical (01)</td>
<td>Craftsmen/Foremen (05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager/Official/Business Owner (02)</td>
<td>Operatives (06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Owner/Manager (03)</td>
<td>Service Worker/Laborer (07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical/Sales (04)</td>
<td>Farm Labor (08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51. Are you employed by the federal, state or city government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>YES</strong></th>
<th><strong>NO</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**IF "NO" IN Q.49, ASK:**

52. And are you retired, unemployed, employed, a student, a housewife (ASK HOUSEWIFE ONLY OF WOMEN), or what?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RETIRED</th>
<th>UNEMPLOYED</th>
<th>STUDENT</th>
<th>HOUSEWIFE</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>REFUSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

53. What is your religious preference? (DO NOT READ CHOICES; IF "PROTESTANT," ASK:) What denomination?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHRISTIAN</th>
<th>NON-CHRISTIAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal (01)</td>
<td>Jewish (09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian (02)</td>
<td>Other Non-Christian (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist (03)</td>
<td>Agnostic/Atheist (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran (04)</td>
<td>None (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist (05)</td>
<td>Other Christian (08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentecostal/Other Fundamentalist (06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic (07)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian (08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54. Which of the following categories includes your total annual family income? Stop me when I get to the right one. (READ CATEGORIES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNDER $5,000</th>
<th>$ 5,000 - $10,000</th>
<th>$10,000 - $15,000</th>
<th>$15,000 - $20,000</th>
<th>$20,000 - $30,000</th>
<th>$30,000 - $40,000</th>
<th>$40,000 OR MORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
57. Are you, or is anyone in your household, a member of a labor union?

YES..................................................1
NO..................................................2

58. What is your main racial or ethnic origin? (READ WHOLE LIST SLOWLY BEFORE ACCEPTING ANSWER, THEN ACCEPT ONE RESPONSE ONLY.)

ENGLISH...........................................01
IRISH.............................................02
GERMAN...........................................03
FRENCH............................................04
ITALIAN..........................................05
SCANDINAVIAN.................................06
EASTERN EUROPEAN............................07
BLACK AMERICAN..............................08
AMERICAN INDIAN............................09
CENTRAL/SOUTH/LATIN AMERICAN...........10
ORIENTAL/ASIAN..............................11
OTHER (SPECIFY:)

69. Sex (IF IT IS NOT OBVIOUS TO YOU WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS A MALE OR FEMALE, PLEASE CONFIRM THE GENDER.)

MALE............................................1
FEMALE.........................................2

70. Post Code: Respondent Location COUNTY

71. Post Code: Respondent State STATE
APPENDIX B

SAMPLE PAGE OF TELEVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS
HOW TO USE THE INDEX AND ABSTRACTS

Symbols:

(A) indicates ABC telecasts originating in Washington, DC.
(C) indicates CBS telecasts originating in Washington, DC.
(N) indicates NBC telecasts originating in Washington, DC.

(S) indicates material originating in the studio.

(Place name) indicates on-site reporting.

[ ] indicates an interview or material presented by someone other than the reporter.

NAMES IN CAPITALS indicate persons who speak, other than the reporter.

Reporters' names appear to the right of material narrated. Initials in this position refer to the anchors, identified by full name at the beginning of each program.
2 2 0

Tuesday January 8, 1985

5:30:00 ENTH. & PREVIEW PETER JENKINGS (Geneva, Switzerland)

5:30:20 US-USER RELS. / ARMS TALKS


(Geneva, Switzerland) Final negotiations reviewed; film shown. [GROMYKO - jokes during photo session.] [US OFFICIAL - notes talks cont.] [GROMYKO - bids press farewell.] [SHULTZ - announces outcome of talks.] Agreement by both for further arms control talks noted.

(S) [SHULTZ - discusses implications of agreement for new negotiations, gen. success of talks.]

(S) Upcoming items.

5:35:50 (COMMERCIAL: Whirlpool Corp.)

5:37:00 US-USER RELS. / ARMS TALKS

(S) Secrecy surrounding US-USER arms talks noted.

(Geneva, Switzerland) Physical conditions & atmosphere of dipl. mtgs. such as that between Geo. Shultz & Andrei Gromyko examined; no US presidents Gromyko's translator has dealt with mentioned.

(S) Secr. spn.'s interpretation of talks quoted.

(DC) Results of ABC poll of Am. public opinion of Shultz-Gromyko talks outlined on screen, discussed. [PEOPLE - support negotiations; debate Pres. Reagan's Star Wars proposal.] Pres. Reagan's job approval ratings for for. affairs compared to those immediately following US invasion of Granada.

(S) Henry Kissinger quote recalled. Commentary concerns Gromyko's alleged reaction to Shultz's stance on Reagan's Star Wars plan, US space weapons plan in gen., issue of US commitment to arms reduction considered.

5:42:20 UPCOMING ITEMS (S)

5:42:40 (COMMERCIAL: Wheaties; Bufferin; Am. Floral Marketing Cncl.)

5:44:10 REGAN & BAKER / JOB SWITCH

(S) Rpt. introd.


5:46:30 STK. MET. RPT. (S)

5:46:40 S. AFRICA / KENNEDY VISIT

(S) Rpt. introd.

*****
APPENDIX C

EVENT MONITORING CODING SHEETS
The following pages are copies of some of the original event monitoring coding sheets.
### Television News Monitoring

#### Code Sheet Page: 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Time (H:MM)</th>
<th>Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Mondale/Fierro</td>
<td>11:50</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Impact incumbency since Debate I</td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Economic, Family Farmers/Tax Incr</td>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>ABC Rep. Foreign</td>
<td>5:00</td>
<td>CBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>AT Smith Banquet/Al Smith Speech</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>NBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Use of RR Memo Letter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Reagan/Bush</td>
<td>1:50</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Company bicker, both cemented in polls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Youth Vote</td>
<td>2:10</td>
<td>CBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>AT Smith Banquet/Reagan Speech, ABC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Reagan memo 1/2/CIA Memo 1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>US/USSR Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>2nd Presidential Debate</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>ABC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Efforts of USSR in Europe - Age, theater, leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Date of Debate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Grenada Invasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Q's RR action there</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Reagan's as remark</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>CBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Report that more were killed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>W.H. Ceremony</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>3:00</td>
<td>CBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Prime minister</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Personal spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>GNP, Trade Deficit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Age Factor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>F's heath issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Chernenko Interview w/ Wash Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

- The table represents the monitoring of television news programs focusing on various political and diplomatic events, along with specific details such as dates, times, and networks broadcasting the events.
- The codes indicate different categories of news topics, with corresponding time slots and networks.
- The format is designed to track and analyze the coverage and timing of significant news events.

#### Example:

- **51 Mondale/Fierro**: This code indicates a news program discussing the political standing of Mondale/Fierro, scheduled for 11:50 on ABC.
- **25 Reagan/Bush**: This code refers to a news program about the Reagan/Bush debate, scheduled for 1:50 on ABC.
- **87 Grenada Invasion**: This code indicates news coverage of the Grenada invasion, with segments scheduled for different times on various networks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>ABC</th>
<th>CBS</th>
<th>NBC</th>
<th>MOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Marine Bombing/Embassy</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Follow-up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1yr. Anniversary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Committee Findings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>CIA Plane Crash (see also) in El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>U.S. Salvador Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Major Govt. assault for Aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>CIA manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Arrival of MiGs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>GM Layoffs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Terror against U.S. interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Shultz and admin define terrorist Policy - confusion apparent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Cost over runs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Navy wishes competitive bids</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

EVENT TRACKING
The following pages are copies of the original event tracking charts used in the event analysis.
APPENDIX E

ADJUSTED $r^2$ VALUES FOR ELECTORAL PERIODS
**ADJUSTED $R^2$ VALUES FOR ELECTORAL PERIODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Periods</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Adjusted $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late Primaries</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preconvention</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demo Convention</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between Convention</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Convent</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Campaign</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate I</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate II</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After considering the adjusted $R^2$ values, the Between Convention period and Debate II period continue to be the only two periods in which an appreciable amount of variance is explained.
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Pizer, Stephen M. *To Compute Numerically.* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983).


Prenter, P. M. *Spline and Variational Methods* (New York: John Wiley @ Sons, 1975).


