THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY IN THE RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

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The Ohio State University, 1987

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THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT:
A CASE STUDY IN THE
RHETORIC OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Mark Reed Stoner, B.S., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1987

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Adviser
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To My Wife, Daria, and my Children, Ian and Heather Whose
Encouragement, Love and Support
Made This Project Possible
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The student uprising at the Berkeley campus of the University of California known as the Free Speech Movement did not develop in a vacuum, but was the result of a complex interaction of political, social and moral issues salient at the time. Of course, student protest on campus is not new to the American college system. Lipset noted that "[f]or half century after the Revolution, students recurrently engaged in protests, some of them quite violent in character, directed against the universities for various deficiencies" (Lipset 127-8). Most of the disturbances, although focused on student concerns, were over bad food, accommodations, or "compulsory commons." But not all of the disturbances were of such a mundane nature. The spirit of the Revolution was still very much alive and was particularly expressed in clashes between the Christian and secular interests that were vying for power at the societal level and found a crucible on the campuses as the students'
liberalism confronted the more generally conservative elements of the institutions in the faculties, administrations, and boards of trustees.

The pre-Civil War years, according to Lipset, saw a decidedly political turn in the issues dealt with on campus and has generally remained that way. What was unique about the events at Berkeley was the recognition of students as a class of individuals (Lipset 191; Horowitz and Freidland 13) and a focus on student rights and concerns whereas student activism prior to 1964 was generally related to the larger civil rights struggle. The Berkeley revolt became the "prototype event of the student movement" (Lipset xix; Heirich 1) of the 1960s and 1970s.

Phillips described the period 1960-64 as a time when students were focusing on political and racial civil rights issues. For example, students demonstrated in San Francisco against hearings held by the House Un-American Activities Committee (122-5) which was clearly a political event. At the same time, the civil rights movement for blacks was beginning and with it the "impetus and initiative for the student protest movement as a whole was inspired by the sit-in demonstrations in the South" (Phillips 126). The effect of these events was to provide a training ground for the students who would eventually
lead the Berkeley protest. (Phillips 126; Savio qtd. in Draper 1965, 5-6). Phillips suggested three outcomes of these events: a political awakening among students, the politicization of many previously neutral students, and practice in the techniques of nonviolent protest (124-5).

This historical and tactical melding of student protest may, in part, explain the convoluted nature of the issues identified as central to the Free Speech Movement. Certainly, the issue of freedom of speech was salient; it was not just that freedom of speech had been abridged, but that it had been truncated by an institution whose supposed mission was the development of thinkers while its ultimate action was the production of workers for industry—an factory (Cleaveland qtd. in Lipset and Wolin 8-9; Savio qtd. in Fincher 100; Weinberg, audio tape Michigan State). As the movement proceeded and students were arrested, issues such as the legal jurisdiction of the university, the rights of graduate assistants to strike and the right to collect funds on campus for political causes were introduced. The situation became increasingly complex, ultimately involving the governor, legislature, Regents, hundreds of police and prominent citizens before the uprising ended (Lipset and Wolin xi-xii).
In sum, one effect of the Berkeley uprising "was [the] focusing of greater attention upon problems of American higher education . . . the size and impersonality of some universities; the lack of communication sometimes existent within the academic community . . . problems of student political activity on campus; the problem of academic freedom and what it means for students and faculty; the problems of free speech on campus" (Phillips 148). A second effect was that students learned that they could organize and protest and, ultimately, they had significant power to affect the universities they attended (148); i.e. they had created a social movement.

Background

This study examines the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement from September 14, 1964 to April 26, 1965. The dates are, in one sense, arbitrary, but they relate to significant events of the movement that are clear benchmarks. September 14 is the date on which the administration notified all student organizations that advocacy and recruitment would no longer be permitted on the "Telegraph-Bancroft Strip." It was this memorandum, known as the Towle Letter that sparked the campus events. One must remember that the letter was embedded in a
context of civil rights advocacy (Brown 1980, 4). April 26 marks the withdrawal of Mario Savio as leader of the Free Speech Movement. The evidence indicates that this was a significant event, for Savio was not just an ideologue, but was a symbol of the movement for many. With Savio's disappearance, the movement quickly lost whatever focus remained at that time and the FSM fragmented along various lines of issues and personal commitments of students to lesser leaders of the movement (Heirich 375-6; Time 7 May 1965).

In February, 1965, John Boler, then Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Berkeley, placed the uprising in a context of social change by arguing that the university is an integral part of American society. He wrote, "The issues now facing the Berkeley campus--and other American universities--concern the internal structure of the university community and the relevance of politics to the campus. But both these issues must be situated within the context, realistically understood, of the movement of contemporary society" (604). If, in fact, the universities of this country are integrally related to the society at large, it would follow that significant changes in the universities would mean significant changes in society in general.
Writing in March, 1965, Calvin Trillin noted that even at that early date, significant changes within the university were recognizable. He noted, "there is so little disagreement left about the basic changes made in university policy during the controversy that President Kerr . . . has lately acknowledged in several speeches that the rules in effect before this fall . . . were of 'doubtful legality'" (54-55). Real evidence of the changes existed in the form of recruitment tables and advocacy continuing on the Bancroft-Telegraph strip, and on the campus proper in front of the Student Union building, tables were set up and political rallies were held on the steps of the Administration Building (Trillin 55).

A leading spokeswoman of the Free Speech Movement from its beginning was Bettina Aptheker. (Heirich 162). Aptheker's interpretation of the movement's purposes is significant for understanding the nature and purpose of the movement's rhetoric. According to Aptheker, the conditions that spawned the movement were general "distress, disaffection, disillusion of the students and professors" due to "the fact that the imperialist social order is in general and acute crisis. Society is moribund" (158). Suggesting that such conditions are "antithetical to life" (158) and that the
university represented "a civilization gone mad" (159), Aptheker concluded, "A university in the midst of such madness must shed any illusion of social neutrality; it must become an instrument for progressive social change . . . (159). Clearly, Aptheker saw the need for the university, as a social entity, to become involved in making significant social changes; to intervene in the then present flow of events to prevent the furtherance of racial discrimination or repression of political discourse.

The Free Speech Movement was an event of significant size directly involving thousands of people and, indirectly, the entire nation. The movement was more than just human beings in motion, but was a human symbolic event that had meaning for those who made contact with it. As a meaningful event, it affected how students, faculty and those outside of higher education understood themselves, higher education, and society at large. The central activity of the movement was rhetorical--the production and consumption of messages, both verbal and nonverbal, "to intensify an adherence to values, to create a disposition to act, and finally to bring people to act" (Perelman qtd. in Golden et al. 12).
The evidence seems to indicate that students intended to do more than persuade an audience, or argue a case, but sought to make significant change in the society at large; their efforts in the civil rights movement were directed to social change, and their struggle against the university was intended to reshape the nature of higher education; i.e., the ultimate goal of student protest was to intervene in present social processes and reshape them according to a new vision of individual freedom and expression. It is consideration of the complex situation as a rhetorical event that is the subject of this study.

**Statement of the Problem and Research Questions**

The Free Speech Movement was an event of extreme complexity and scope. The principal actors in the crisis attempted to interpret and reinterpret the symbolic activities of both sides in an attempt to create a social reality that would make sense of the environment and events faced by people on the Berkeley campus and observers of the events. Since that time, the actions of the FSM have been mimicked by others in numerous circumstances across the country. Although the campuses of this country are now quiet, it is important that the rhetorical strategies and responses of student leaders,
administrators and public officials be understood so as to allow better understanding of such confrontations in the future. Also, the dynamics of the social movement are not necessarily confined to the campus; an understanding of the Berkeley uprising may provide insight to other large-scale movements that may develop here or abroad in the future.

The questions for this study are designed to probe the nature of the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement as an effort to intervene in the evolution of the social structure of American society. More specifically, the questions lead to an examination of the strategic and tactical choices made by movement rhetors to accomplish their goals. The following general research question is proposed:

1) What potential did the rhetoric of the Free Speech movement have to influence its audiences in what ways?

Related questions are:

2) How and to what degree did the historical, political and ideological environment of the movement affect the development of the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement?

3) What rhetorical strategies and tactics were used by the FSM to direct audience attention to student needs as defined by movement leaders?

4) What role did rhetoric play in regard to the use of power in relation to the protestors and the establishment seeking to maintain order?
5) On the basis of this analysis, what theoretical claims can be drawn about the rhetoric of social movements attempting to intervene in social processes?

The questions are necessary for the central purpose of rhetorical criticism is to understand and assess the effectiveness of the rhetoric (Andrews 6). These questions necessitate analysis, interpretation and evaluation of the rhetoric of the movement to establish the "limits of the possible" and the extent to which the FSM leadership "recognized the limits and operated within them" (7).

Method and Procedures

Method

The data for this investigation exist as copy and audio tapes. The copy consists of a collection of primary sources; reproductions of fliers, position papers, advertisements, published articles, press releases and memoranda, primarily from the FSM Steering Committee, but also including material from the UC administration and its representatives. The collection of some 826 pages of material is uninterpreted and unedited microfilm reproductions published by the Independent Socialist Press and compiled by Hal Draper, a participant in the Berkeley events (Draper 1968). Further, some tape from the G.
Robert Vincent Voice Library, Michigan State University has been used. Also, a lengthy body of uncataloged actualities have been discovered in the archives of the Pacifica Foundation recorded during the uprising by reporters from radio station KPFA. Arrangements were made for me to travel to Los Angeles to audition the tapes. The existence of the tapes allowed verification of transcriptions in sources such as Heirich's *The Spiral of Conflict: Berkeley, 1964*. The tapes also will provide an invaluable addition of paralinguistic evidence and audience responses to speeches that added a dimension to the analysis of FSM leaders' rhetoric not possible with only copy as data.

Numerous methods could be employed for analyzing the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement. Bormann's fantasy theme approach (1972), Burke's dramatistic theory (1969), and Fisher's narrative paradigm (1984) all provide possible frameworks for analysis of the Free Speech Movement. However, each of these has limitations that inhibit one in answering the questions posed above: Bormann's approach focuses on content of interactions allowing for understanding and coping with events, but it does not provide any notion of intervention whether one wants to understand how an intervention occurred, or one wants to act as a consultant for potential
interventionists; Bormann's model does not account for "progressive developments in the 'growth' and 'death' of rhetorical visions . . . " (Brown 1980, 6). Burke's dramatistic theory would provide a means to deal with the movement, but Burke's critical method does not draw sufficient attention to strategic and tactical moves that must be accounted for to explain the cyclical nature of the events at Berkeley. Finally, Fisher's narrative paradigm may be applied, but the focus of Fisher's model is on the logical functioning of storytelling as argument and directs attention away from audience actions in reconstructing and interpreting the stories. Also, it assumes a universal narrative logic that is yet only speculative (Stoner, 1986). A fourth model, Brown's social intervention model, provides a means of combining many features of the approaches above with a descriptive and interpretive scheme that allows one to place the rhetoric of the movement into a larger social context.

The seminal article relative to the social intervention perspective of this study is Bormann's "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," written in 1972. Bormann showed how the concept of fantasizing, developed by Bales and elaborated in Bormann's work on small groups, could be applied "to speaker-audience fantasizing and to the dream
merchants of the mass media" (396). Specifically addressing movements, Bormann wrote, "A rhetorical movement contains small group fantasy chains, public fantasy events, and a rhetorical vision in a complex and reciprocal set of relationships" (399). Bormann felt the fantasy theme/rhetorical vision theory had the capacity to "account for the development, evolution, and decay of dramas that catch up groups of people and change their behavior" (399). Such is the general concern of Brown's work and the focus of this study. Bormann went on in this article, too, to posit a method of analysis very similar to that described earlier in the methodology of the social intervention model (Bormann 401-2) and advocated by Croft (1956), Brock and Scott (1981), Cathcart (1981) and Andrews (1983). The rhetorical vision model has been tested further by Bormann, "The Eagleton Affair: A Fantasy Theme Analysis" (1973), Bormann et al., "Political Cartoons and Salient Rhetorical Fantasies: An Empirical Analysis of the '76 Presidential Campaign" (1978), and Hensley's "Rhetorical Vision and the Persuasion of a Historical Movement: The Disciples of Christ in Nineteenth Century American Culture" (1975).

Brown's work in social intervention theory has grown from the ground prepared by Bormann. As Brown stated in "Toward a Complementary Version of Rhetorical
Theory," (1980) his purpose was not to supplant, but to augment Bormann's work. Brown, in his 1978 article, "Ideology as Communication Process" noted the specific gaps in rhetorical vision theory that he hoped to close: the lack of prior rhetorical vision theory to "consider the principles by which world views wax and wane" (133); the lack of an accounting for "(1) the success or failure of ideology in meeting intrapersonal growth and survival needs and (2) the compatibility or lack of it in the negotiation of interpersonal roles relevant to ideology" (133-4). Inasmuch as ideology serves as a mechanism by which people make sense of their experience, and rhetorical vision seems to serve the same purposes as fantasies and rhetorical visions such as providing meaning, expressing feelings, and sanctioning behavior (Bormann 1975, 232-7) Brown's focus on ideology seems to be quite appropriate. Wander (1983) has supported the necessary criticism of ideology. As Toch has noted, "By and large, the most important appeals of a social movement are contained in its ideology" (Phillips 19).

Brown has continued to expand his analysis since 1978 with the publication of "Attention and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention" (1982) and "Power and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention" (1986a). Both essays serve to expand upon the original descriptions of the interpretive
and interpersonal sub-cycles. Further elaboration has been done by Brown in unpublished essays, "Toward a Complementary View of Rhetorical Vision Theory" (1980) and "Need and the Rhetoric of Social Intervention" (1986b).

It appears that some analysts of the Free Speech Movement were surprised by the continuing escalation of student demands in December after the faculty had supported them almost entirely and had backed total amnesty for movement participants (Lipset xix). Others perceived a cyclical pattern to the events (Heirich). Since the clear cyclical nature of the movement has been recognized and since the Free Speech Movement has been recognized as an event that impacted our country at the societal level, acting as a social intervention, use of the Brown model seems appropriate. Brown's work has greatly influenced the methodological approach of this study.

Procedure

Use of the social intervention model requires first a clear description of the events to be analyzed. A description is necessary to provide the reader with a macroscopic view of the movement so that the symbolic reality of movement participants can be understood by the critic, and to allow a perspective from which to view the
rhetorical strategies of movement leaders. What is lost in the process is fine detail regarding the participants' actions; a "less satisfactory description of constitutive themes in the vision" (Brown 1980, 4). However, what is gained is an understanding of the "dynamics-in-the-large" which allows one to "synthesize relations among communication events and their context" (8).

The social intervention model views the social movement as a system with at least three sub-systems: one being a system of intrapersonal needs of the actors in the movement; one being a system of power grounded in interpersonal relations between actors, and the third being a system of attention-switching in which certain rhetorical strategies are used by movement leaders to shape the symbolic realities of their audiences (Brown 1978). In order to make sense of social intervention rhetoric, all three sub-systems require investigation.

In analyzing the need sub-system, one finds that beyond the basic need actors have to make sense of their world, further needs can be created or made more salient through the rhetoric of movement leaders. Needs can only be met by those capable of doing so, and it is toward those roles that actors direct their attention; that is, actors look for a needs meeting response that will help them reduce the anomalies between what actors are
experiencing and what their rhetorical vision posits their lives should be like. Generally, those who can meet actors' needs are outside the movement. Analysis of the needs sub-system or cycle is accomplished by examining the rhetoric of a movement to uncover what needs the movement leaders are naming and to which they are directing their audiences' attention. Over time, as intrapersonal needs are made salient by movement leaders and advocated with those capable of meeting those needs, one may discover that something of a vicious circle emerges. If advocacy of a need increases, but there is no response by those with the power to meet the need, further advocacy will most likely result and greater recalcitrance by those in power may be exhibited. Brown calls this a "deviance-amplifying" trend (1978, 134) that could lead to significant changes in social relations and organizational structures if unreversed. By understanding the need sub-system as a rhetorical creation, the ideological nature of the communication process becomes clearer for the process of advocacy and response is a continuous one [sometimes appearing to be a circle, other times appearing to be a spiral, but always continuous] engaged in by social actors to make sense of and give meaning to their symbolic worlds (Brown 1978). In sum, analysis of the need sub-system allows the critic to describe the needs
that have become salient to actors, the rhetoric employed
to generate a needs meeting response from those capable of
doing so, and describe any (potentially) deviance
amplifying trends.

To answer the second research question, the
critic must analyze the rhetorical means by which movement
leaders were able to generate and sustain the movement by
directing audience attention to the needs defined by
movement leaders. The rhetorical act that the critic is
most interested in at this point is the means by which
rhetors "presence" one interpretation of reality over
another. Perelman has described this as "the displaying
of certain elements on which the speaker wishes to center
attention in order that they may occupy the foreground of
the hearer's consciousness" (qtd. in Foss et al. 115).
Similarly, Brown described the attention-shift as
resulting from "language-using . . . to feature or
de-emphasize some aspects of phenomena rather than others"
(1980, 27). Specifically, the task of the critic when
analyzing the attention-switch is to uncover in the
rhetoric of the movement "at least two patterns or
interpretive 'templates' (Brown 1982, 18), whereby "each
pattern itself be capable of rendering the situation
coherent" (18) and that "movement from one to another . . .
be necessary before a switch will have occurred" (18).
Accomplishment of this analytical task is important because the success or failure of movement rhetors in directing audience attention has much to do with whether a vicious circle of advocacy will develop or a trend reversing vision will develop from movement rhetoric. Such an analysis of the attention-switch sub-system is important to an accounting of the success or failure of any movement.

To complete the analysis using the social intervention model and answer the fourth research question, the critic must attempt to uncover how movement participants use communication to create power to accomplish their goals, as well as how power is used to communicate (Brown 1986). According to Brown, power can be understood to be the "conceived share that each group or role has in maintaining an overall balance between social continuity and change--thus keeping viable any rhetorical vision" (1980, 22). This conception of power is consistent with the systemic perspective which underlies the rhetoric of social intervention. It is the task of the critic to clarify in what ways advocates, their audiences, and those who can meet the needs of advocates are interdependent; to make clear who can choose what future for whom (Brown 1986a, 184-5). To accomplish
this task, the critic must examine the rhetoric of the movement to pin-point when, where, and by what means people ascribe power to each other.

In sum, this dissertation employs the method of analysis developed by Brown in his work on the rhetoric of social intervention and tested in works by Anderson, Corley, Lopez, Snyder, and Opt. The method combines concepts from Bormann and Burke with Brown's concepts of attention-switching and deviance amplifying or deviance compensating trends in the rhetoric of vision managers. Such an approach is especially suited for this analysis because it focuses attention on large-scale rhetorical strategies and events and accommodates an analysis of a movement as large and complex as the Free Speech Movement.

The work by Lopez lends support to this assertion for his dissertation examined the rhetoric of national policy-making in Brazil over a three year period. Opt's study examined the languaging strategies of authors in the field of artificial intelligence as they have attempted to name the activities in the field as successes or failures and thus intervene in the development of the discipline. Snyder's historical study of the Stone-Campbell Movement employs the social intervention model to explain the formation and persistence of the movement over a ten year period. And whereas Corley's work was a wide-ranging
treatment of ideologizing by a single writer and Anderson's focused on the attention-switch as employed by a single author, both studies provide insight into the flexibility and applicability of the model in a context other than a social movement. This analysis will provide further testing of the social intervention model and will provide some insight into the communication efforts of Free Speech Movement leaders, members, observers and antagonists as they attempted to modify or preserve the social system in which they found themselves in 1964.

Review of the Pertinent Literature

In approaching this study, three areas of relevant literature need to be examined. First, a survey of the area of social movements is necessary. Such an analysis provides a theoretical basis for the study of the Free Speech Movement. Second, the Berkeley uprising generated a great deal of literature about student movements, although a surprisingly small amount that could be considered scholarly study of the Berkeley events themselves. This survey provides material for reconstruction of events, data for analysis, and some
sociological perspectives that assist in making sense of the events at Berkeley. Finally, the issue of free speech as it related to the Berkeley events is examined.

Social Movements

In 1952, Leland Griffin published "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements." Griffin suggested therein a move by critics beyond figure studies to a larger and more varied set of topics: period studies, regional studies, and movement studies. The article focused on questions Griffin felt were pertinent to movement studies such as: How does one isolate a movement? What criteria should be used to judge a movement? and How does one report/criticize a movement? Griffin followed this with further analyses of social movements; first with "The Rhetorical Structure of the 'New Left' Movement: Part I" (1964). Griffin's dramatistic approach herein and elsewhere in his work ("A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements" 1969), is relevant to the social intervention model which has adapted the Burkeian concept of "identification" (Brown 1982). The cyclical nature of a social movement predicted by the social intervention model is also clear in Griffin's discussion of the "silence of the pious" becoming the "brooding silence of the impious" which eventually leads to further revolution.
Other studies relative to the development of social movement theory and focus on student protest are Andrews' "Confrontation at Columbia: A Case Study in Coercive Rhetoric" (1969), Scott and Smith's study, "The Rhetoric of Confrontation" (1969), and Simons' "Requirements, Problems and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social Movements" (1970). Andrews' article is relevant because it raises the question of what the limits of persuasive rhetoric are, a question central to any rhetorical analysis of protest rhetoric. Given the variety of activities at Berkeley and the constant escalation of tensions, one might ask if there is a point where student or administrative actions were no longer rhetorical and therefore outside the scope of this study. This question is also relevant to a study attempting to test the ability of the social intervention model to separate rhetorical from coercive interventions. Scott and Smith's dramatistic approach focuses attention on the Burkean concepts of identification, the rite of the kill, and the act of confrontation as symbolic (7). Cathcart explores further the nature of confrontation as an act giving form to the rhetorical situation. Such a generic understanding of movement rhetoric is also compatible with Brown's suggestion that the organismic social intervention model "may encompass and interrelate current critical work
on genres and movements" (1980, 40). Simons' study provides a framework by which one can analyze the specific rhetorical choices made by movement leaders (vision managers). Further work by Simons and Mechling develops the role of movement leaders as ideologues for movement members (424-5).

Finally, Stewart, Smith and Denton's text, Persuasion and Social Movements, provides a synthetic approach to social movement rhetoric, accommodating the confrontational approach of Cathcart and the sociological approach of Simons in their definition and treatment of social movements. This text is helpful in providing an overview of present approaches to social movements beyond dramatism such as functionalism and developmentalism; such an overview aids in contextualizing and understanding social intervention theory as another tool for understanding and criticizing the rhetoric of social movements.

The Berkeley Conflict

The single most influential book relative to the Berkeley uprising itself is Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University. Kerr's historical account of the development of the modern American university and his vision of its function provided the focal point of the students'
rhetoric. The metaphor of the university as factory, the central image of FSM rhetoric throughout the movement, was provided by Kerr (Stoner 1984). Numerous writers from a variety of political positions responded to the Berkeley events: Harold Taylor responded to Kerr's arguments in "The Academic Industry: A Discussion of Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University" (1964); Richard Abrams, "The Student Rebellion at Berkeley--An Interpretation" (1965) and John Boler, "Behind the Protests at Berkeley" (1965) provided accounts of events. Most writing about the Berkeley revolt was done by sociologists, many of whom were on the Berkeley campus during the demonstrations. Lipset and Wolin (1965), Heirich (1970), and Horowitz and Friedland provide the most complete social scientific analyses of the movement. Draper (1968) provides an invaluable collection of primary documents for analysis. Phillips, treating the Free Speech Movement as only one of many, nevertheless contributes both theoretical and bibliographic insight.

Freedom of Speech

As a theoretical construct, freedom of speech is treated extensively by Franklin Haiman in his book Speech and Law in a Free Society (1981). Although Haiman does not treat the Berkeley movement, or student rhetoric
directly in this work, it is nevertheless an important text by providing a detailed and wide ranging analysis of the concept of freedom of speech in the United States. Works written closer to the Berkeley events are Halg Bosmajian's *The Principles of Free Speech* (1971) and the *Free Speech Yearbooks* (cf. Tedford 1970). Sidney Hook's essay "Academic Freedom and the Rights of Students" (Miller and Gilmore 1965) is helpful because he makes clear the conceptual connection of student assumptions about academic freedom as they relate to freedom of speech. Bettina Aptheker's book, *The Academic Rebellion in the United States* (1972) contains a particularly relevant chapter entitled, "Problems of Academic Freedom."

As a principal in the leadership of the Free Speech Movement Steering Committee during the uprising itself, Aptheker's understanding of the relationship of academic freedom to freedom of speech helps the critic better understand the rhetorical vision of vision managers and their understanding of what student needs were at that time. Nathan Glazer's essay "What Happened at Berkeley" in *Remembering the Answers: Essays on the American Student Rebellion* provides further understanding of the free speech/academic freedom issue from the perspective of one who was a participant observer in the Berkeley rebellion. Probably the most complete and social
scientific treatment of the student perceptions of their freedoms was prepared by Williamson and Cowan entitled, *The American Student's Freedom of Expression: A Research Appraisal* (1966). They treat "freedom" as a concept that can be understood in at least three ways within the student movement: "freedom within the curriculum, social freedom for the individual, and freedom for students to organize themselves in various ways to express their views" (9). The third understanding of freedom is most salient to this dissertation. Williamson and Gowan attempt to "determine how much academic freedom (as defined above) students enjoy . . . and "hope to identify some of the difficulties in enacting desirable forms of freedom" (10) from quantitative data.

**Organization of the Study**

The remainder of this study is organized around the research questions generated in this introductory chapter. Chapter Two presents an historical account of the events at Berkeley from September 1964 to April 1965 to provide a framework and context for application of the rhetoric of social intervention model. Chapter Three will present the basic structure of the social intervention model relying primarily on Brown's article, "Ideology as
Chapter Four will investigate the concept of attention and the rhetorical strategies predicted by the social intervention model and apply the theory to the events at Berkeley. Chapter Five will examine the notion of power created by rhetoric as well as power as medium for communication. Starting from the description of the events of the movement, the model will be applied to uncover the power shares owned by the principal actors in the uprising; the rhetorical strategies employed by power holders to create and enhance power will be examined. Finally, Chapter Six will attempt to answer the primary research question posed for this dissertation: What potential did the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement have to influence its audiences in what ways? Also, the chapter will assess the theoretical yield of the social intervention model as an analytical tool in the study of social movements.
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Chapter 2
The Free Speech Movement, 1964-65

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present a clear description of the activities and events of the Free Speech Movement from September, 1964 to April 1965. As stated in chapter one, this description does not present every event of the movement; rather, it is intended to present the "dynamics-in-the-large" so that the critic may "synthesize relations among communication events and their context" (Brown 1980, 7-8). It is important that the strategic rhetorical decisions and behaviors of both the Free Speech and counter-movement leaders be visible. Only a view of the rhetoric that allows the critic to see the contours of the movement, unencumbered by minituae, will make clear the relationships of events and context and the strategic workings of the movement. Description and analysis are necessary to answer the primary research question and the related questions of how and to what degree the historical, political, and ideological environment of the movement affected the development of the rhetoric of the movement.
Description of the Free Speech Movement

Conditions of Conflict

The Berkeley area had been experiencing a high level of political activity for some time prior to the beginning of the Free Speech Movement. (Glazer 73). During the spring and summer of 1964, the civil rights movement had great support in the form of demonstrations, recruitment activities, and advocacy both on and off campus. (Warshaw 8-13; Draper 1965, 22-26). One particular area of the campus, at the corner of Telegraph and Bancroft Avenues, was a staging area for such activities. (Heirich 91). The physical characteristics of the area were such that this became the focal point for the original confrontation that became the Free Speech Movement.

The Bancroft-Telegraph area was a 26-foot wide walkway that led to the campus proper at the end of which stood two pillars which appeared to form the actual entrance to the university property. This alcove, just off the sidewalk, provided an area of high pedestrian traffic, so it was here that groups across the political spectrum set up tables to pass out literature, recruit members, collect money for various causes and give
speeches. As a result of these activities, the area was highly congested and littered by discarded leaflets. The walkway had been assumed to be the property of the City of Berkeley because it appeared to form the campus boundary (Draper 1965, 27), and new construction during previous years, had confused jurisdiction over the area. A question of jurisdiction raised by a reporter for the Oakland Tribune (which had lately been picketed by Cal students for alleged discriminatory hiring practices) brought to the attention of university officials the fact that the Bancroft strip was, in fact, university property.

It seemed clear to the administration that the solution to the problems of congestion and litter (and the students felt in response to pressure from William Knowland, publisher of the Tribune) was to enforce the university's existing policy prohibiting such activities on its property since students were in technical violation of Rule 17 (Heirich 68-70).[1]

Initial Confrontation

In early September, a letter was sent from Dean Katherine Towle to all student groups and political organizations informing them that the Telegraph-Bancroft area was off-limits for the type of political activity that had been occurring there. Due to a quirk in the
geography of the location, the regulation effectively prohibited all activity in that area. The fact was that the university owned the alcove and half of the sidewalk adjacent to it—the line of demarcation being a series of plaques imbedded in the sidewalk. In one quick action, and without warning (Heirich 97), the university attempted to revoke an area that had a long-standing tradition of political advocacy. The university saw this simply as a legitimate exercise of authority in line with its traditional position of political neutrality.

The students construed the action in a different manner. Due to the salience of the civil rights movement and the momentum it was generating in the university area, the students saw the move as an effort by the establishment to squash civil rights activity. As a result, a coalition of student political organizations, spanning the political spectrum from Cal Students for Goldwater to the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), was formed to combat what its members saw as a violation of constitutional rights (Warshaw 25); thus, as the students recognized their complementarity on the issue, the United Front was formed on September 17, just three days after the Towle letter was issued.[2] With such an expansive composition, the coalition provided a formidable foe for the administration in that the student body was
essentially united as a single entity in its reaction to
the administration's actions—at least for the early part
of the struggle.

Discussions with Dean Towle on Thursday,
September 17 produced no significant changes in the rule,
nor did further discussions with the administration
through September 21, the first day of classes for the
Fall semester. Although numerous new versions of the rule
were proposed by the administration, allowing
"informative" material to be distributed, but without
advocacy of partisan positions, fund-raising, or
recruitment (Draper 1965, 30; Miller and Gilmore,
xxiv-xxv), no changes were made that the students saw as
acceptable. In the eyes of the students, no meaningful
administrative response was forthcoming. At a meeting on
September 20, the United Front agreed to engage in civil
disobedience by manning tables and offering advocative
material in the restricted area (Draper 1965, 32). All
agreed to the strategy and pledged solidarity, although
the conservative groups would not set up tables themselves
(Draper; Heirich 107). The students were acting as if the
administration had not intervened in the exercise of
political advocacy of students (Heirich 113).
During the next weeks, the students adopted a civil-rights model and style of advocacy. For example, at 9:00 P.M. Wednesday, September 23, the students began a Free Speech Vigil at the administration building "with nearly 300 members of various organizations taking part. Participants read, talked, or sang. The theme song of SNCC, 'We Shall Overcome,' was a popular choice, and new verses were added: 'We Shall All Speak Out' and 'We Shall Advocate'" (Heirich 114). During the vigil, a group decided to march to University House to picket a reported meeting between President Clark Kerr and the Regents. (Draper 1965, 32-33). By the time the marchers arrived, the meeting had broken up and the Regents were not contacted.

Escalation Begins

On September 28, Chancellor Edward Strong announced that "advocacy" would be permitted on the Bancroft strip of a candidate or a proposition on the ballot (Draper 1965, 30). And further, according to Draper, the chancellor announced that "discussion of the matter was over: 'no further changes are envisioned. The matter is closed'" (30). With that, "the United Front opened the throttle a little more," reported Draper (33). "'Advocative' tables were set up at Sather Gate itself,
since the new rules were supposed to be campus wide now" (33). The placing of tables at Sather Gate was an act of defiance by the students since the gate (at one time the entrance to the campus) was now at least one block inside the 1964 campus boundaries. At this point, the United Front had received "no personal reply" from the Regents regarding the United Front's requests for renegotiation of the rules for political activity (Heirich 115). Heirich continued, "In fact, the only administrative responses that week were ones challenging the group's definition of the situation . . . . At this point the United Front decided it was time to increase the pressure and to force a clarification of the situation" (116). Clearly, the students were looking to the administration for a response that would allow some change in or resolution of the situation. As it stood, the more the students tried to get the administration's attention to negotiate, the more the administration stood on its action as the only possible resolution to the situation. As one of the leaders of the students summarized:

We'd tried everything else we could think of. We'd talked to the administration--we'd been good little boys and girls and gone to talk to the administration four or five times--we'd picketed, we'd held a rally, we got this fantastic petition out during the rally; there was totally no response so the next step--look, these civil rights people, they know civil rights action and they also know that you escalate--put on your pressure a
little bit more and a little bit more . . . .
So, we thought we'd put on a little more pressure (Heirich 120).

The students set up their tables again on Wednesday, September 30, at the Sather Gate. Members of the Dean's staff went to the area to ask the students to leave since their actions were in violation of university rules. Five of the students had been singled out because they were sitting directly behind some of the tables and ordered to report to the Dean's office at 3:00. At 3:00, 300 students appeared at Sproul Hall to be disciplined (Warshaw 29) [3]. These students, led by Mario Savio, Art Goldberg and Sandor Fuchs, demanded that all cases be heard if any were to be heard (Lipset and Wolin 108). The administration did not agree to the demand and, instead, added Savio's, Goldberg's and Fuchs's names to the list with the original five (Draper 1965, 34; Warshaw 29). At that time the students voted to sit-in and spent most of the night in Sproul Hall. When the university suspended Savio and the other seven indefinitely, the students left the building to plan further action. Discussion between students and administration proved fruitless, for each group was construing the other's actions in a different light. The administration perceived the situation as a crisis of authority whereas the students perceived it as a crisis of legitimacy.
Crisis at the Car

The Sproul Hall sit-in ended at approximately 2:40 A.M. so students could prepare for a demonstration there later that day. Around noon, October 1, being angry over the lack of response from the administration and the suspension of the eight students, the students continued their escalation of pressure by setting up tables on Sproul Plaza under the windows of the dean's office. Once the tables were up and manned, the Dean's office called the campus police and requested they remove the demonstrators. Deans Murhpy and Van Houten, along with the police, approached the largest and most active of the tables, that of Campus CORE, and asked the most vocal of the students to identify himself (Draper 1965, 39). Upon his refusal, Jack Weinberg was arrested and taken to a waiting squad car. The disturbance drew the crowd's attention and demonstrators began to jam in around the car. Mario Savio spoke up saying, "We're staying right here until this guy is released. We will let the police car through only if he is first released from arrest" (Heirich 149). After Weinberg was put into the car, people began sitting down on all sides, stranded the police car in the center of the crowd where it remained captive for some 32 hours (Draper 1965, 41; Warshaw 32). Throughout the confrontations of the previous two weeks, students had been growing increasingly
aware of their complementary roles in changing the university's position on advocacy specifically and the university structure in general. As figures such as Savio, Weinberg, Goldberg, Fuchs and others emerged as leaders of the FSM, students began to identify with those central figures. The FSM leaders seemed to recognize this early and focused much of their rhetoric on developing a feeling of unity among the students. This strategy would play an important role in regenerating unity later in a deeply divided student body.

The police car became a podium for an extended rally. Mario Savio was the first to climb on top of the car to speak. The speech he delivered, although short, had three major foci that were continuing themes during the crisis—the complementarity of those who had been suspended with all those desiring freedom of speech; the right to advocate freely political views on campus; and the determined escalation of the confrontation planned by students until their needs were met (Heirich 156-8).

The immediate response of the administration came from Chancellor Strong who "insisted that no rules had been changed—that, in fact, their 'clarification' on Monday, September 28, if anything, had made them more liberal" (Heirich 161). The students further escalated the confrontation at the police car by staging a "pack-in" at
Sproul Hall which was designed to close off all entrance ways and corridors, and thus hold captive all staff in the building. It was at this point that the faculty made its first attempt at intervention. While John Leggett of the Sociology Department attempted to mediate,

the students inside Sproul Hall waited for word that the faculty had been able to talk with members of the chancellor's staff, administrators waited for word that the students had left Sproul Hall. Thus each side was inadvertently provided with "tangible evidence" of the "intractable bad faith" of its opponents (Heirich 164).

Ultimately, the faculty representatives were unsuccessful in their quest for a solution. News of the unsuccessful efforts was relayed to the students who voluntarily withdrew from the building around 9:00 P.M. During this time, students continued to hold the police car immobile.

October 2nd dawned with the car containing Jack Weinberg still on Sproul Plaza. Demonstrations continued on that site throughout the day. The administration made a decision to make a show of force and recruited police help from Oakland, Alameda County, Berkeley and California Highway Patrol. According to Lipset and Wolin, the police began "marching on campus, taking up positions at the north and south ends of Sproul Hall and on Barrows Lane, behind the administration building. Some 500 officers, including over 100 motorcycle police, were on hand by 5:30 P.M., some
armed with long riot sticks" (117).[6] At that hour, negotiations were in progress between the student leaders and President Kerr in a desperate attempt to avoid a confrontation between police and students. At 7:20 an agreement was announced containing the following points: 1) students would desist the protest against university regulations, 2) Weinberg would be booked, but the University would not press charges, 3) the suspended students would remain suspended with the cases to be reviewed by the Student Conduct Committee of the Academic Senate within a week, and 4) the University was willing to deed the Bancroft-Telegraph property to Berkeley or the ASUC (Lipset and Wolin 117-8). Savio climbed onto the car and read the agreement to the crowd and concluded, "Let us agree by acclamation to accept this document. I ask you to rise quietly and with dignity and go home" (118). According to Heirich, "The crisis of authority had been temporarily resolved. But the crisis of legitimacy had not" (186).

The Free Speech Movement Created

During the next two days, the Free Speech Movement was formed out of the United Front by creation of an executive committee representing a variety of political views as well as a twelve-member steering committee (Miller and Gilmore xxvi). Also, with the involvement of the
faculty during the police car action, a tripartite committee called the Study Committee on Campus Political Activity, composed of students, faculty and administration was formed by Chancellor Strong to investigate the issue of political activity on campus (Lipset and Wolin 122).

On October 5th, a rally was held at Sproul Hall to voice support for the Friday agreement. Art Goldberg is reported to have commented to the crowd: "We ask only the right to say what we feel when we feel like it. We'll continue to fight for this freedom, and we won't quit until we've won" (Lipset and Wolin 121). The demonstrations and distrust of each side continued throughout the next weeks. For example, President Kerr and other administrators, after the defusing of the police car situation, had blamed the events on communistic, non-student agitators (Lipset and Wolin 119; Draper 1965, 58-61); the students were upset with the fact that Chancellor Strong had appointed the Study Committee personnel without negotiation with the students. Heirich noted that although the pact of October 2 had averted a dangerous confrontation, it had "left both sides with a deep distrust of their opposition" (217). Throughout the next week constant misinterpretations of intent of each side by the other led to charges and countercharges of bad faith bargaining and further escalation of tensions. For example, it became clear on the
5th that no "Student Conduct Committee of the Academic Senate" existed even though the administration had used the committee as a bargaining chip in the October 2nd agreement (Lipset and Wolin 122); on the 13th FSM leaders requested a one hour meeting with the Regents "promising 'mass demonstrations' if they were not given 'some clear indication . . . that the administration is not playing'" (129). To complicate matters, the FSM had obtained typewritten, but unsigned letters allegedly written by Clark Kerr and Thomas Cunningham, UC's general counsel, addressed to the Regents recommending harsher policies on political activity and the prosecution of violators. These letters, assumed by the FSM to be legitimate, solidified their view of the administration as treacherous. "Given the context," wrote Heirich, "it would be difficult for student advocates of moral pressure campaigns not to assume that what really was at issue was the right to pursue unpopular civil rights actions whose legal status was not clear" (225). Clearly the students believed there was an administrative plot designed to destroy them and the October 2 agreement as they understood it (250).[8] In Draper's opinion, the administration had purposely misconstrued the terms of the October 2 agreement (1965, 66-7).
Of course, when looking for a conspiracy, the "facts" attended to support one's theory. From the university's perspective,

There was 'ample evidence' of a Marxist conspiracy . . . . As the university had modified its position in September (regarding Rule 19), the student demands had shifted. Within a few hours after the police car had been captured, the daughter of one of America's leading communists [Bettina Aptheker] was acting as a major spokesman for the demonstrators. Moreover, she was serving as a negotiator for the FSM and was on its Steering Committee. And the students were accelerating their pressure as the negotiating committee seemed to be nearing agreement (Heirich 236).

So, with increased pressure in the form of daily FSM speeches and fliers and apparent disregard for what the administration understood the October 2nd agreement to mean, the administration decided to bring charges against Mario Savio, Art Goldberg and Brian Turner, spokesmen for the movement. This action, however, would not actually occur until after the Thanksgiving break.

The Movement Declines

Throughout the crisis period, from early September through October, the FSM enjoyed wide support from the student body. But, at the beginning of November, the students began to be uncomfortable with FSM rhetoric and tactics and by November 8, support had dropped to 22% (Heirich 241). Negotiations between administration and FSM
leaders had again broken down over the issue of whether or not the student off-campus political actions were to be construed as the exercise of civil rights or university rule violations. On November 9, in an apparent effort to rejuvenate the movement (the FSM had observed a self-imposed moratorium on political action since October 2), a large rally was organized by the FSM after circulating a flier explaining why the tables were again being manned:

Why we have begun to advocate again . . . .
[The administration] demands the privilege to usurp the perogatives of the courts, to pre-judge whether an act of advocacy is illegal, and to punish 'offenders' before they have been found legally guilty. It demands this privilege as a tool to repress student social and political activity when outside pressures become great enough. At present it seems most responsive to pressures asking that it crush the Civil Rights movement. In the future this tool may be used against any student activity causing outside pressure to be directed at the Administration (Draper 1968, 347).

In response to the perceived recalcitrance of the administration ("All week it's been nothing but 'no,' from every bureaucrat in every issue." Draper 1968, 276) the FSM decided to begin massive rule violations again in spite of some dissension in the FSM Steering Committee regarding the timing of the rule-breaking (Heirich 244). "Using loudspeakers from the steps of Sproul Hall during the noon hour, supplemented by an occasional newsletter and mimeographed hand-outs at the entrance to the campus, FSM
members had created maximum exposure to their claims among the student body" (244). Tables were set up and manned and the Graduate Co-ordinating Committee announced its solidarity with the FSM, threatening a strike of teaching assistants if the administration attempted to arrest the students (Lipset and Wolin 143). Even though over 700 students participated in the rally [9], it was a considerable decline in numbers in comparison to previous actions. The response of the university was that since the FSM had "abrogated the agreement of October 2" the Committee on Campus Political Activity was disbanded (Lipset and Wolin 143) and Chancellor Strong warned that "Students and organizations participating will be held responsible for their actions" (Warshaw 52). With the FSM calling the disbanding of the CCPA the "destruction of one more line of communication between the students and the administration", Savio added, "By its continuing acts of political oppression, the University Administration has abrogated the Pact . . . . The students shall not cease in the responsible exercise of their rights" (Lipset and Wolin 144). Seventy-five students manned the tables and gave their names to the dean's staff for rule violation. Over the next few days a list of over 710 names [10] including graduate students was sent to Dean Towle admitting guilt and requesting citations for rule violations. On November 10th
graduate student protestors set up tables at Sproul Hall and openly collected money in defiance of the prohibition, but the administration took no official notice of their activities. This continued for the next few days. The then dissolved Committee on Campus Political Activity made a final statement or report on the 12th of November, and recommended "substantial liberalization of university rules regarding on-campus mounting of legal off-campus political and social action" (Lipset and Wolin 146). The six faculty members of the committee were essentially advocating the allowance of on-campus mounting of off-campus political action.

The Students Re-Unified

The next day, the Academic Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Suspensions released its recommendations that Art Goldberg and Mario Savio suffer suspensions from September 30 to November 16 and the other five students originally charged with them in October were to be reinstated and their recorded suspensions be changed to "censure" (147). According to Heirich, "Thereafter, the approval of the goals and tactics of the FSM shot upward . . . . [W]hile the administration was canceling the Study Committee on Campus Political Activity and beginning disciplinary action against those who manned the tables, approval rose to 28%. And in
the week that followed the release of the report by the Ad Hoc Committee on suspension, 47% of the students expressed unreserved approval of the demonstrators' goals and tactics" (250). With the successful reunification of student support for the movement, the FSM continued its actions of setting up tables in defiance of university regulations through November 20, the date of the next Regents meeting. Further, in preparation for the meeting, the FSM "issued an open letter to the Regents requesting permission for FSM leaders to appear before the Board" (Lipset and Wolin 152) to present its platform. The reason for the request was because the FSM felt that the neither the faculty or the ASUC fully understood the issues. Mike Rossman stated, "The language of the [ASUC] Senate proposal and of the Faculty report which they have amended is too obscure and open to interpretation . . . . This proposal does not provide for many of the major needs of the students which have been expressed by the FSM" (153).

On November 20th, the Regents repudiated the FSM and stated full support for administration policies. In fact, at this meeting, President Kerr suggested stronger penalties for the original eight students charged than had been suggested by the Ad Hoc Committee on Suspensions. The Regents also passed a recommendation that students be allowed to mount from the campus lawful off-campus political
activity. This apparent liberalization, however, was seen by the FSM as a severe constraint on political activity for who could determine prior to an action what was lawful; they saw such a regulation as severely curtailing student involvement as well as removing the traditional efforts of change agents to let the courts decide what the limits of the law are in test cases. As it stood, students were in danger of a double punishment: immediate punishment by the university when charged with unlawful acts and punishment by the courts should they be ultimately convicted of unlawful actions by the courts (Pacifica BB5578.29). At a rally immediately after the announcement of the Regents' actions, Art Goldberg noted, "... the administration would determine the connection between the speech, on-campus, and that unlawful action off-campus. In a court of law, this would be a very difficult thing to prove. On the other hand, ... the administration could define the relationship of the advocacy and the action as they damn well pleased ... The administration brings the indictment, judges it, and also interprets what's meant by a fair hearing" (Pacifica BB5578.26). Immediately after Goldberg spoke, Savio pointed out the hard line of the administration: "On the last page of the Daily Cal today, the Chancellor said, concerning this policy, 'It cannot change, and it will not change'; its right in there!" (Pacifica BB5578.26). In
response, the FSM attempted an ill-planned sit-in at Sproul Hall on the 23rd that was poorly attended and fraught with bickering among the FSM Steering Committee (Pacifica BB5578.26). The Committee voted 6-5 to leave the building at 5:00 P.M. and avoid any further escalation at that time. It seemed as the students left for Thanksgiving break that the Free Speech Movement was again on the wane. In fact, some of the primary leaders of the FSM were so discouraged and worn out at that point that they talked of ending the movement (Draper 1965, 93). Little did the leadership realize that inadvertent help from the administration would be forthcoming to energize the movement beyond any previous levels.

The "Final Atrocity"

During the short vacation, the university prepared cases against Brian Turner, Jackie and Art Goldberg and Mario Savio, and on November 28 charged them with the organization of the demonstrations on October 1 and 2, the entrapment of the police car, threats to police officers, assault, and other disruptive actions. The punishment was to be expulsion. The immediate response by the FSM stated: "The administration sees the free speech protest as a simple problem of disobedience and refuses to recognize the legitimacy of student needs . . . . Its action violates the
spirit of the Heyman Committee report [the committee on suspensions] and can only be seen as an attempt to provoke another October 2. We demand that these new charges be dropped" (Lipset and Wolin 160). The administration responded that the Heyman Committee's recommendations were relative only to violations prior to September 30 (prior to the police car incident) and that these new charges against Savio, the Goldbergs and Turner would stand. The students were concerned about this further show of strength by the university. As Mike Rossman had asked immediately after the November 20 Regents meeting: "They have disregarded the recommendations of the Heyman committee and in addition intend to institute disciplinary proceedings against how many more of us? Seventy more who were cited? The two hundred graduates whose names were sent in? The eight hundred who signed the list? How many?" (Heirich 255). Having labeled the administration's action as "arbitrary" (Draper 1968, 394), the FSM response was: "THE CHANCELLOR HAS TAKEN HIS DIRECT ACTION. WE MUST NOW TAKE OURS . . . . WE MUST PROTECT OUR LEADERS, OUR ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE STUDENTS AND TA'S . . . PROTEST UNFAIR POLICIES. THE NEEDS OF THE STUDENTS MUST BE MET . . . . EXCEPT TO THREATEN AND HARM US, THE MACHINE OF THE ADMINISTRAT*ION (sic) IGNORES US. WE WILL STOP THE MACHINE" (396).
One of the student leaders, Bettina Aptheker, commented that the notices of expulsion "were just what we were waiting for--the final atrocity . . . . I was sick and tired of hanky-pankying around with their negotiations . . . (Heirich 266). Apparently, many other students felt the same way for the new offensive by the administration generated wide-spread support of the FSM and mobilized students for action. On November 30, the Graduate Coordinating Council announced plans for a strike of TA's on Friday December 4 if the new charges were not dropped. Rumors spread across campus that not only were individual students being singled out for retribution by the administration, but some of the organizations comprising the FSM such as SNCC, CORE, YSA, Women for Peace, and the W.E.B. DuBois Club were targeted as well (Draper 1968, 394). No response to these rumors was forthcoming from the administration. An ultimatum was issued by the FSM on December 1 giving the university twenty-four hours to withdraw the charges; the deadline came and went. Therefore, on December 2, the major confrontation of the Free Speech Movement began, rocking the University of California for four straight days.
The Students Strike

At noon on December 2, a large rally was held in front of Sproul Hall drawing a crowd of some 5,000 students. One of the early speakers was Marty Roysher, an articulate spokesman for the FSM, who gave a history of the events to date emphasizing the lack of responsiveness of the administration and the Regents to the needs of the students as the students understood them. Mario Savio also spoke, making extensive use of the factory metaphor, urging the closing down of the university. He said, in part:

There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart that you can't take part; you can't even passively take part and you've got to put your bodies on the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machines will be prevented from working at all! (Pacifica BB5578.28)

Noting that the more who participate the safer and more effective the demonstration, Savio announced that, "We are going, once again, to march up to the second floor of Sproul Hall and we're going to conduct our lives for a while on the second floor of Sproul Hall . . . . We'll do something that hasn't occurred at this university in a good long time--we're going to have real classes up there . . . . We're going to learn about freedom up there and we'll learn by doing!" (Pacifica BB5578.28). With that, some 1000-1500
protestors began to pack into the halls and stairways of Sproul Hall. The students were obviously prepared for they had arranged topics for the "freedom school," movies for entertainment and food to be brought in to sustain the students through a long seige. At approximately 3:00 A.M., December 3, Chancellor Strong announced that the university could no longer tolerate the situation and students would be arrested and removed if they did not leave voluntarily. At 3:45, 635 police from a variety of jurisdictions, who had been ordered by the governor to clear the building, began doing just that. It took much of the day to finally arrest, remove and book all the sitters. During the early morning hours, students in Sproul Hall set up loudspeakers and described to those waiting outside what was happening inside. The action instigated an attempt by police to arrest the students using the loudspeakers, and to commandeer the microphone which only reinforced the image of heavy-handed repression. Between what observers heard and saw, the actions of the police gave a clear impression that the university intended to enforce its regulations by force.

Clark Kerr issued a statement in the afternoon of December 3 which stated, according to Lipset and Wolin, "When patience and tolerance and reasonableness and decency have
been tried, yet democratic processes continue to be forsaken by the FSM in favor of anarchy, then the process of law enforcement takes over" (168).

The Faculty Moves

The sit-in and the actions of the police polarized the campus; the FSM, although seeing wide popular support for a strike, was thinning its ranks as the ASUC and the Young Republicans withdrew from the organization. Yet the faculty remained, to a great degree, undeclared. Except for a few who were vocally for or against the FSM, most were still neutral to this point. At 1:00 P.M., December 3, the faculty held an unofficial emergency meeting, chaired by Prof. Nathan Glazer of the Sociology Department, to discuss the response of the faculty to the student strike; over 800 faculty attended the meeting. According to Draper, the meeting was held because the administration had not been willing to talk with faculty or students or press about the strike. "Apparently, the only section of the university community that could commune with the administration at this point was the Police Department" (Draper 1965, 111). Glazer opened the meeting with a statement that the meeting was unofficial and that it was not called to endorse either side (Pacifica BB5578.38). The debate began with Prof. Robert Scalapino voicing reservations about the student strike and
announced a meeting later in the day of all department chairs "to establish a working committee to provide leadership in the crisis" (Heirich 281). Next Leo Lowenthal, vice-chairman of the Sociology Department, suggested that the faculty temporarily suspend classes so they could devote full attention to finding a solution to the crisis, adding that the suggestion was by no means an approval of the strike. Finally, Henry May, of the History Department, stated:

I had previously supported the administration's enforcement of law and order on campus. I was for strict enforcement of present regulations. However, this past Monday, action was taken retroactively against students involved in a dispute some time ago under regulations which have since been abandoned and after a series of negotiations which seemed ... to imply that this kind of action would not be taken ... . It seems to me that this retroactive action at this time was, to put it mildly, extremely unwise, and I would go further and say it was calculated to produce about the results that it has (Applause) (Pacifica BB5578.38).

May went on to propose a resolution to unify the campus and "end the series of provocations and reprisals that has ended in disaster." May's proposal was: "1. That the new and liberalized rules for campus political action be declared in effect and enforced, pending their improvement. 2. That all pending campus action against students for acts occurring before the present date be dropped. 3. That a committee selected by and responsible to the Academic Senate
be established, to which students may appeal decisions of the Administration regarding penalties for offenses arising from political action, and that decisions of this committee be final" (Pacifica BB5578.38). Considerable debate followed May's resolution. At one point in the debate, according to Heirich, Prof. Franz Schurmann said, "The faculty are largely to blame: in a sense we have become a factory, dependent upon a bureaucracy for leadership. I support the resolution as a symbolic act by which faculty begins to take leadership to provide moral guidance" (283). The passage of May's resolution was invaluable for the legitimization of the student strike. Heirich summarized the faculty action as follows:

The faculty had, for practical purposes, deposed the chancellor. They had decided to provide their own administrative leadership in the form of the Council of Departmental Chairmen. Thus the mass arrest of several hundred students brought results more extreme than the FSM planners could have hoped. Not only did it spawn a strike that paralyzed the campus (as they had intended); it also led to a faculty "mutiny" that repudiated the campus administration and created a temporary faculty organization to act in place of the administration in these matters (284).

With the support of the faculty, a strike that had begun "from a flat-footed standing start" that morning had by afternoon been at least 60 per cent effective (Draper 1968, 112).
The next day, Friday December 4, the original date set by the graduate students for their strike, saw expanded effects of the strike. An FSM flier crowed about the faculty's approval of May's resolution, stating, in part, "The call for a general student strike brought the activities of the University to a halt. Faculty, T.A.'s and students respected picket lines. Entire departments have urged that classes be suspended pending a solution of the present problems" (Draper 1968, 404). By this time, the infrastructure of the FSM was in full operation with the establishment of a "strike central" to coordinate student and faculty efforts to keep the university hamstrung. [11] Polarization of the campus continued as students, faculty, and alumni began to more clearly state their positions. According to Lipset and Wolin, approximately 5,000 students packed Sproul plaza and the balconies of the adjacent dining commons for a noon rally to hear strike leaders and some faculty condemn the administration, governor, the Regents and the police (169). On the other hand, Charles Powell, ASUC President, issued a statement that, "The campus community would support proper channels . . . but sit-ins, strikes, and arbiting bodies are not going to bridge the gap which divides this campus . . . and [they] make the FSM continual demonstrations and tactics completely invalid and unwanted" (170). Heirich estimated that 10,500 students
supported the strike, while 3,500 actively opposed it and 8,100 ignored it (287). The most important event of the day, however, was the announced formation of a Council of Department Chairmen.

The trends described above continued over the weekend; the FSM continued to develop its organization of the strike and planned its next moves; interested organizations published their positions on the strike; a counter-FSM organization called the University Students for Law and Order (USLO) emerged; and the Council of Department Chairmen, chaired by Robert Scalapino, recognizing their position as de facto administration, spent a great deal of time trying to find a solution to the crisis. On Sunday, Kerr announced that he would address the students at a special meeting on Monday, December 7 at the outdoor amphitheater to make a proposal "'to inaugurate a new era of freedom under law' which had been unanimously approved by 73 department chairmen yesterday" (Lipset and Wolin 173). The committee suggested that classes be cancelled on Monday morning to prepare for and attend the meeting and the afternoon was to be used to talk with students about the agreement. The ASUC planned a rally in the Student Union Plaza to support Kerr's proposal and the FSM planned a rally at adjacent Sproul Plaza to counter it. Savio stated in taped interviews made after the Greek Theater meeting that
he asked Prof. Scalapino for permission to announce the FSM rally scheduled for noon, but was denied permission to be on the stage (Pacifica BB5578.53; BB5578.56). Tensions were extremely high over the weekend as it appeared that a denouement to the drama would be forthcoming, but the denial of the microphone to the FSM raised tensions even further. According to Heirich, a graduate student stated in a meeting in the Sociology Department on Monday morning, "... if no one from the FSM is up there, all hell's going to break loose at 11:30" (292).

Crisis at Greek Theater

An estimated 16,000 students were gathered at the Greek Theater to hear President Kerr's address. On stage with Kerr were Scalapino and the Council of Department Chairmen. Savio had expressed his concern that this attempt to convince the students that the administration and the Committee of Departmental Chairmen represented the faculty position might succeed. He stated, "They're going to attempt to pre-empt the academic senate [which was to meet the next day, Tuesday, December 8], and I hope they don't succeed" (Pacifica BB5578.58).

The tapes indicate that as Kerr, Scalapino and the chairmen took the stage, they got a warm round of applause, generally, although the reporter notes a clear division in
the group; as the FSM contingent tried to sing "We Shall Overcome", they were shouted down. President Kerr then announced the proposal from the Chairmen that he had accepted. The five points were: 1. The university will maintain lawful government and the free pursuit of educational activities will be maintained; 2. the university would abide by the new, liberalized rules for political action pending a report from the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom; 3. the Chairmen believed the demonstrations of December 2 and 3 were unwarranted; 4. the university will accept the Court's judgement on the 800 arrested in Sproul Hall, but the university will invoke disciplinary actions for actions henceforth; and 5. all classes were to resume (Lipset and Wolin 176-7). The speech seems to have been received with a strong round of applause. Kerr then quickly adjourned the meeting.

Mario Savio had moved to the edge of the stage near the end of Kerr's speech and upon the adjournment moved quickly to the microphone. Just as he reached the microphone, he was grabbed by campus police, pulled to the stage floor, dragged backstage and locked in a room there. Those who tried to help Savio were knocked away by the police. The crowd was stunned by the incident and did not leave the area. Someone shouted, "There's going to be a riot if he isn't left out immediately!" (Pacifica BB5578.58)
Out front, the crowd in general, began chanting "We want Mario!" President Kerr and Robert Scalapino conferred and decided on letting Savio speak to the crowd. Kerr told the backstage observers, "I just talked to Bob Scalapino. Bob is going out there now to say that this was completely unexpected, but that under the circumstances he [Savio] has been released and Scalapino is going to introduce him. I hope you will remember our fairness in this" (BB5578.58). During the time backstage, a student went to the microphone, as it was unattended and stated, "You've just seen a good example of free speech on UC campus. Did you see the police come and grab him when he came up to the podium? That's how they want free speech on the campus. I'm just sorry Mario can't be here--"(the microphone was shut off at this point) (Pacifica BB5578.56). This was the point where the crowd began chanting, "We want Mario!" with Bettina Aptheker leading the cheers from the stage. Savio returned to the stage and stated simply, "Please leave here. Clear this disastrous scene, and get down to discussing the issues" (Heirich 297; Lipset and Wolin 178).

The scene was truly disastrous for the administration, but rejuvenating for the FSM. The administration appeared to be touchy, heavy-handed, and unable to handle dissent. Clark Kerr was upset by the situation and recognized its ramifications as he commented,
"Whether we have a new start seems somewhat doubtful" (Lipset and Wolin 178). Nearly 10,000 students jammed Sproul Plaza after the Greek Theater episode and "rejected, by acclamation, the proposals announced by President Kerr less than an hour earlier" (178). During that demonstration, Jack Weinberg spoke, referring to an FSM leaflet distributed that day. Weinberg stated:

The faculty has tried repeatedly to lift its voice as an independent body and that's what we want also; we want the faculty, the proud faculty of the University of California to lift its voice as a powerful and independent body and the reason why the body of faculty chairmen was convened one day before the Academic Senate meeting when they were prepared to lift their voice was to undercut them . . . . They fear the faculty united . . . . As a sign, as a symbol with which we present our case to the Academic Senate, at mid-night tonight we will, at least temporarily, cease our strike and we will wait and see if they can emerge as an independent force (Pacifica BB5578.55).

The student protestors had been expecting much more from Kerr's presentation than what they got. In fact, the plan delivered was more stringent than was first apparent (Draper 1965, 121). At this point, the issues were, for many, confused and clouded; the FSM argued that the issues have not changed throughout the entire movement, but the USLO argued that FSM demands have "ceased to have any clarity or focus." [12]
The Faculty Speaks

Although many of the faculty were divided on the issues, some clearly siding with the administration, and some siding with the FSM, the faculty, as a body, was still perceived as a powerful and generally objective force. Almost a thousand members of the Academic Senate (composed of regular instructors, professors, deans and directors) gathered on Tuesday, December 8 to discuss what action should be taken to reopen the university. Outside, several thousand students gathered to listen to the proceedings broadcast by loudspeakers (Heirich 301). The first speaker was Professor Joseph Garbarino, Chairman of the Academic Freedom Committee of the Academic Senate, who made the following proposal:

1. There shall be no university disciplinary measures against members or organizations of the university community for activities prior to December 8 connected with the current controversy over political speech and activity.

2. That the time, place and manner of conducting political activity on the campus shall be subject to reasonable regulation to prevent interference with the normal functions of the university. That the regulations now in effect for this purpose shall remain in effect provisionally pending a future report of the Committee on Academic Freedom concerning the minimal regulations necessary.

3. That the content of speech or advocacy... should not be restricted by the university. Off-campus advocacy or organization of such activities shall be subject only to such limitations as may be imposed under section 2.
4. That future disciplinary measures in the area of political activity shall be determined by a committee appointed by and responsible to the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate.

5. That the Division urge the adoption of the following—of the foregoing—policies, and call on all members of the university community to join with the faculty in its efforts to restore the university to its normal functions (Heirich 302).

Debate followed the reading of the resolution. The issues were essentially the same as those raised by the students throughout the semester: the issue of complete freedom of political advocacy and action versus the protection of the rights of those who will be interrupted or denied their education due to disruptions caused by unfettered advocacy. More heated debate focused on an amendment offered by Professor Feuer to paragraph three: "that the content of speech or advocacy on this campus, provided that it is directed to no immediate act of force or violence, should not be restricted by the university" (Heirich 304). The Feuer amendment was soundly defeated, 737-284 (Lipset and Wolin 181). Ultimately, the Garbarino resolution was put to a vote without amendment, passing, 824 aye, 115 nay. Great cheers were heard by those inside the building as the results of the vote were broadcast to the crowd outside the auditorium. As the faculty left Wheeler Hall, the students outside cheered and applauded, and formed an honor guard lining the sides of the entrance until every
faculty member had emerged (Heirich 315). The action taken by the faculty was of paramount importance for it legitimated the demands of the FSM and took from the administration the important function of student discipline.

Soon after the vote, an FSM flier appeared with the title, "Happiness is an Academic Senate Meeting." The flier expressed gratitude to the faculty for its action. It continued, "For months the FSM has fought to bring the issues to public discussion and to rouse the faculty to take action. Our efforts have finally succeeded, and our protest has been vindicated" (Draper 1968, 454). And not only had the faculty upheld the FSM, but during the ASUC elections that day, all seven Slate candidates were elected to the ASUC Senate, further validating the FSM. It appeared for the moment that the crisis was ended, that the students had been heard and their needs met via the faculty action.

The Administration Reacts

It became clear in the following weeks that the administration, including the Regents, was not about to give up its power so easily. On December 9, Governor Brown released a statement stating that he would in no way contravene the charges against the 800 arrested in the December 2-3 Sproul Hall occupation. On December 14, Dean Towle cancelled a request to use Wheeler Hall for a benefit
concert for the 800 arrested students on the grounds that it violated the rules restricting collection of funds to Sather Gate and Telegraph-Bancroft. An appearance by James Baldwin was cancelled for the same reason: collection of funds on campus, except in those two areas was prohibited. The FSM did not react at this time because it did not want to jeopardize the faculty's attempt at a final settlement; they did not want to accept the blame if negotiations fell through (Lipset and Wolin 189). During this time, faculty representatives, and the administration, as well as the Regents were meeting to decide on future policy. As the days wore on, the atmosphere began to be recharged for the news was increasingly negative regarding the attitude of Governor Brown and the Regents. On December 18, the Regents met in Los Angeles and soundly rejected the Academic Senate's resolution of December 8. They stated, in part, "The Regents reconfirm that ultimate authority for student discipline within the University is constitutionally vested in the Regents, and is a matter not subject to negotiation. Implementation of disciplinary policies will continue to be delegated, as provided in the by-laws and standing orders of the Regents, to the President and Chancellors, who will seek advice of the appropriate faculty committees in individual cases" (Lipset and Wolin 194; Heirich 319). Edward Carter, Chairman of the Board of Regents, "stressed that the Board
was standing firm on its resolution on Nov. 20, which provided that students could plan lawful off-campus political or social action, with the Regents retaining the right to regulate such activities on-campus" (Lipset and Wolin 195). The faculty committee meeting with the Regents fully accepted the Regents' resolution, stating that, in the minds of the faculty committee members "It is now clear that the advocacy of ideas and acts, which is constitutionally protected off the campus, will be protected on the campus" (195) since the Regents had also promised in their resolution to "undertake a comprehensive review" of the policies regarding political action and pledged to not restrict advocacy "beyond the purview of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution" (194).

This was significant, for according to Heirich, this was the first public acknowledgement by the administration of the most crucial issue of the entire uprising (321). Nevertheless, the FSM leaders were very upset with the Regents' decision to reject the Academic Senate's resolution calling it "a repudiation of the policy we've been fighting for" (Lipset and Wolin 196). With that, the students left campus for the Christmas break.
Denouement

During that time, both camps were reorganized. The FSM developed further its organizational infrastructure, becoming more institutionalized and directed toward reestablishment of normal academic pursuits; in fact, the FSM announced that the Steering Committee was disbanding until such time it might be needed. The administration made significant personnel changes. Chancellor Strong was given an indefinite leave of absence and Martin Meyerson was appointed Acting Chancellor. Meyerson was seen by students as a sympathetic listener from his work on the early Study Committee for Campus Political Activity.

Heirich articulately summarized the conclusion of the movement in 1964:

The revolution, it appeared had been completed. The chief campus officer had been removed; the Academic Senate had defended the legal position of the student demonstrators; student government would represent the voice of the student protesters; the Regents had bound themselves to uphold the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; the new political action rules were favorable to the concerns of the student demonstrators; and the new chief administrative officer of the campus was sympathetic to the concerns of the students. Moreover, both the students and the faculty . . . had indicated that they expected to be directly involved in decisions concerning future policy on the campus . . . . The energies that had been devoted to the campus struggle were redirected to issues in the surrounding community and nation. As the semester ended, it seemed to be an amazing
victory for the small band of civil rights activists who had taken on the university administration (322).

With the return of the students to classes in early January, they indeed found a more supportive environment; Acting Chancellor Meyerson had eased some restrictions on campus political activity and made the steps of Sproul Hall available for student advocacy, going so far as to provide a sound system for speakers to use. The FSM, as an organization was now defunct, but the student body had learned a great deal about organization and communication both within and between interest groups. The Graduate Coordinating Committee remained in action for the purpose of developing a highly sophisticated infrastructure providing tutors to undergraduates who had fallen behind in their studies. They also organized discussion groups to get faculty and students together to talk about issues beyond course material. A Student Advisory Committee which was set up in mid-November to act as a liaison with the Student Affairs Committee (faculty) was institutionalized. At a January 5 meeting of the Graduate Coordinating Committee, Steve Weismann, a former FSM leader, urged students to take advantage of Meyerson's promise of "new channels" of communication open to the students (Pacifica BB5578.63). There is clearly an atmosphere of completion and relief in
the meeting; students were elated at being heard by the administration and did not want further action to be necessary. That, unfortunately, was not to be the case.

A Short Round Two

In early March, 1965, the campus experienced a second cycle of events. The cast of characters was somewhat different, but the major differences were the salience of the issues and the size of the movement.

By the spring of 1965, the honeymoon between the vindicated students and the reorganized administration was ending. The new cycle of events was triggered when a drugged-out non-student showed up on the steps of the Student Union at Bancroft and Telegraph bearing a sign with the single word, "fuck" written on it. He was promptly arrested by campus police. The next day, a few students showed up on Sproul steps to defend the right of this person to so express himself, and having used the word themselves were arrested, one of whom was Art Goldberg, a past member of the FSM Steering Committee. According to Draper, the student and faculty response to the episode was "cold" and one noon rally attracted not a single audience member (Draper 1965, 143). The crisis was precipitated by an interesting turn of events.
On March 9, Clark Kerr and Martin Meyerson announced their resignations at a news conference apparently because they felt they were getting extreme pressure from the Regents to expel the students who had been involved in the fledgling "Filthy Speech Movement." The next day, the FSM and Graduate Coordinating Committee issued a joint statement distancing itself from the students, which, with the announced resignation of Kerr, placed the FSM on the horns of a dilemma: "it had to choose between turning its back on all the rights which should be enjoyed even by students who were wrong; or else, by standing up for the legitimate rights of the same students whose irresponsibility it had criticized, facilitatng [sic] the aim of its enemies in smearing it with the 'obscenity' issue. The FSM chose integrity and the latter course" (Draper 1965, 146). The university dealt severely with the students who had been involved and suspended them; and expelled Art Goldberg for creating and selling Spider magazine on campus after it had been banned for obscenity. The FSM leadership was confused for the issues here did not carry the same impact as the civil rights issues of the fall. The Steering Committee was composed of less experienced replacements who were clearly divided on how to proceed. On April 26, Mario Savio announced his withdrawal from the FSM and promptly disappeared. With that, a new
organization called the Free Student Union was announced to replace the FSM, but the political activity for the year was, at that point, ended.
Endnotes

1. Draper reported, "The ban on the activities was based on Art. 9, Sec. 9 of the State Constitution which reads: 'The University shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and the administration of its affairs . . . '" (1965, 29).

2. According to Warshaw, the United Front was composed of the following organizations: Young Republicans, University Society of Individualists, Cal Students for Goldwater, California College Republicans, Particle Berkeley (student magazine), Young Democrats, Student Civil Liberties Union, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Slate (campus political party), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), W.E.B. DuBois Club, Young Socialist Alliance, Young People's Socialist League (YPSL), Independent Socialist Club (ISC), Women for Peace, Committee for Independent Political Action, May 2nd Committee, and Students for Fair Housing (25).
3. The numbers vary depending on the source. Draper reports that 500 students showed up and 400 signed a petition admitting their guilt of manning the tables illegally (Draper 1965, 34). Heirich reports that 415 names had been on the petition and he cites the *Daily Californian*’s estimate of 500 students entering Sproul Hall (Heirich 124).

4. Heirich provides a lengthy description of the verbal interaction between Weinberg and the student audience prior to his arrest as well as Savio’s rhetoric on top of the police car as he addressed the students. This description (143-161) includes testimonies of participants who make clear their increased identification with the movement as a result of the rhetoric of the student leaders at the tables and, later, on top of the car.

5. At one point early in the police car episode, ASUC president Charles Powell, speaking from the top of the car, asked the demonstrators for the power to go to the deans and ask for Weinberg’s freedom. The crowd asked about the other eight suspended students. "Powell replied, 'This one is the immediate problem; all right?' There were shouts of 'No!' Weinberg leaned out of the car window and cried, 'I'm not the immediate problem; we're all together" (Draper 1965, 42; Heirich 159).
6. Draper prefers a higher figure: "The San Francisco Examiner (Hearst) reporters made a physical head count and they reported almost 1,000--965 to be exact" (54).

7. Goldberg said essentially the same thing on October 8 in a telephone interview with a reporter from KFRC (San Francisco). When asked if the deeding of the Bancroft-Telegraph strip to the ASUC would end the confrontation, Goldberg stated, "No . . . The majority of the students feel we should have the right to advocate anywhere on campus (or at the seven or eight traditional areas where you can set up)--we feel we have the right to advocate social causes of any sort, of any kind, at any time as long as we do not block traffic or interfere with classes in any manner. So we will continue to advocate and do everything possible to assure we have total freedom not only at Bancroft-Telegraph, but throughout the entire campus" (Pacifica BB5578.17).

8. For example, in the November 2 issue of the FSM Newsletter, having reviewed the previous weeks' events, it was concluded, "It is more than evident that the administration has its own plans, its own goals, its own means; and these plans, these goals, these means have nothing whatsoever to do with what the two committees
[Strong's committee regarding the eight suspensions, and Kerr's Committee on Campus Political Activity] decide" (Draper 1968, 273).

9. Lipset and Wolin claim, "Approximately 200 students participated in the rally, while an additional 400 watched from the fringes" (143).

10. Warshaw reported that, "All told, 832 names were on the final list: 75 who were cited, 220 graduate students and Teaching Assistants, and 607 undergraduates and additional graduates who volunteered" (55).

11. During the December 3rd occupation of Sproul Hall, KPFA reporter Burton White narrated from a second story window, "Down below me, on the patio, one of the FSM students is standing with a walkie-talkie; an example of the remarkable degree of organization to which the students have planned this demonstration" (Pacifica BB5578.43). Such coordination had a symbolic aspect in that, "Seeing the remarkable amount of organized activity going on around them and its clearly sizable expense, some members of the student government became convinced they were the victims of a tightly organized, externally financed and directed, Communist plot" (Heirich 285).
12. On December 7, the FSM published a lengthy narrative interpreting the recent actions of the administration and the Council of Department Chairmen. The piece concluded, "The issues have not changed since the start of the semester. They are threefold: 1) Administrative policies must not affect the content of speech or tend to impose prior restraints on speech; 2) Administrative regulations must impose no unnecessary restrictions upon the forms of speech; 3) The students should have a voice in the enactment and interpretation of the regulations affecting them" (Draper 1968, 423). The USLO, although not a large organization, certainly represented some of the opposing or neutral students. In an interview with Robert Dussault, a USLO organizer, he stated, "The issues almost by point have been given to them [FSM]. Except on one point that they, unless the courts decide otherwise, are not at this time allowed to organize on campus, advocate support, and go off-campus and commit an illegal act; illegal in the eyes of the civil authorities. This administration cannot and will not submit to this last point" (Pacifica BB5578.51).

Clearly, the issues were interpreted to be very different depending on the camp one was in. The polarization of the campus was such that few could see clearly what response to the strike was appropriate. The faculty, although involved, appeared to many to be the most independent of the players
and it was to the faculty the task fell of stopping the vicious cycle of provocation and escalation that had developed.
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Chapter 3
The Rhetoric of Social Intervention: A Description

Introduction
It is the purpose of this chapter to define and explain the basic concepts of the rhetoric of social intervention and the relationships of these concepts/variables over time. Such a discussion is essential for the reader to understand the vocabulary of the rhetoric of social intervention which names the complex role relationships of movement participants.

Three Interrelated Subsystems in the Process of Ideologizing

As stated in Chapter One, the social intervention model views the social movement as three simultaneously functioning sub-systems: the system of intrapersonal needs of the actors in the movement, a system of power grounded in the interpersonal relations between actors, and a system of attention-switching wherein certain rhetorical strategies are used by movement leaders to shape the symbolic realities of their audiences. In order to be able to talk about the
events at Berkeley in terms of the rhetoric of social intervention, it is necessary to describe all three systems. However, the analysis of the revolution at Berkeley will focus on the attention-switch and power sub-systems since, to this point, Brown has published articles expanding the theory on these two systems.

It is obviously the case that the Free Speech Movement grew out of and was sustained by the communication process. During the events of the movement, students, administrators, politicians and other interested parties expressed their visions of what the campus community should be like; that is, each party expressed its set of values at the moment, its ideology,[1] and attempted to negotiate the implementation of that ideology with the other. Such interaction necessitates the simultaneous creation and communication of ideology (Brown 1978, 123). Miller, in describing the development of "collective argumentations," suggests a similar process of ideological development via communication, and the description matches well the events of the Free Speech Movement; Miller wrote, "Usually people begin to argue without knowing yet what their basic collective beliefs will turn out to be . . . . Moreover, what belongs to the domain of the collectively valid may change as the discussion goes on: it may shrink or expand. These
processes are anything but arbitrary" (Miller 132-3). It seems then that the ideology, or collective beliefs of any collectivity is in process, but at any particular moment, can be counted on to provide an interpretation of a rhetor's symbolic reality.[2] This was happening throughout the Free Speech Movement, more or less, as students, faced with a sudden challenge to their taken-for-granted right to advocate, had to make sense of the situation. They did that via ideology which is a function of the communication process.

According to Brown, it must be recognized that this process is constituted by three sub-processes. First, the abstract nature of symbol-making requires that human beings interpret symbols in the process of making sense of the world. Second, individuals construct interpersonal relationships via the assumption and ascription of role, status, and hierarchy through rhetoric, which is the "locus of ideology" (Brown 1978, 126). Third, the constructions developed flourish as long as they make sense of the world as experienced; they decline and disappear or are reconfigured when they fail to make sense of experience (124). In other words, the rhetorical vision of any person or group functions as long as its explanation of experience makes sense and does not have too many gaps between what is supposed to be the case
and what is experienced. If gaps are recognized, further explanations are offered until the entire construct becomes too complicated, too turned in upon itself (the result of the vicious cycle wherein repair of the vision requires further repair), and must be replaced by a more elegant explanation. [3]

Intrapersonal Role Development

The process of abstraction by symbol-making is an intrapersonal activity that must be accomplished before one can become "relational" (127). The naming of the world allows experience for the individual to become "repeatable" and categories of repeatable behaviors can then be constructed and shared which ultimately allows ideologizing. This process involves the apprehension of similarities and differences between experiences. According to Corley, "Mature membership in a language community, such as a world-view communication system, implies the possibility of this ongoing and sophisticated process of forming and testing the adequacy of asserted relationships between categories and experience" (45). Not only does naming allow the categorization of reality, but it also allows one to say what is not the category; to show that the "lines" and "shades" created by the word do not represent the "details" of the object named, just as an abstract painting does not represent the details of the
subject. It is these categories and "gaps" in the descriptions of the world that allow varieties of complex interpretations of experience by individuals. It is also these gaps that, when recognized within a community, become anomalies which are problematic if unexplained. Corley noted, "The shared conception of an anomaly in a world view arises when someone asserts that an accepted categorization of reality is 'inadequate,' i.e., that the expectancies created by a name are violated by experience" (45). Given the nature of symbols to draw attention to parts of the named reality, the task of any vision manager or ideologue, when anomalies are recognized, is to recategorize, or reinterpret an old name so it makes sense within the ideology (Corley 45-6).

Criticism of movement rhetoric from this level would lead the critic to focus attention on the choices of terms used by actors to name and rename acts, agents, agencies, scenes and purposes in an attempt to maintain the ideology of the groups or individuals involved in dialogue.

**Interpersonal Role Development**

The act of naming the world to or for another necessitates interpersonal relationships based on symbolic interaction. The self is meaningful only in relation to others (as we categorize and construe ourselves), and
individuals use symbols to "ascribe reciprocal, complementary and comprehensive social relations to members of a community" (Brown 1978, 128). What ties two parties together is the fact that for these relationships to function, they must be mutual; "a 'place' must be negotiated among ideological adherents made consubstantial by acting together as if under some superordinate symbol system" (128). Communication provides the vehicle by which individuals make their "needs", "purposes", and "relations" known to others (129). When needs are expressed and responded to in socially shared ways, people are said to behave "as though the world makes sense" (129). Too, these needs and responses, along with their attributed motives, allow hierarchical relationships to be established among individuals, further ordering the world. Individuals can establish reciprocal and complementary relationships as well as ascribe competitive and cooperative motives (130) for each other. Brown argues, "As one carries out actions attributable to a specialized status in a comprehensively graded set of social 'relationships,' one is behaving in the eyes of 'others' as though an ideology were making sense of the world to one" (130). In essence, one is following the rules that have been mutually negotiated and one's behavior makes sense to others. However, when one fails to follow the
rules, or behavior does not meet the criteria of performance, one's behavior is problematic and it is explained or redefined or "corrected" through the communication process of ideology.

In sum, the rhetorical vision of any group allows it to make comprehensive sense of the world it faces. Criticism generated from a view from the interpersonal sub-system would focus attention on power accruing to advocates and audiences as they dialogue. The hierarchical categories and statuses taken for granted by the actors provides a structure for sense-making by all involved in any rhetorical community. To borrow Brown's example of the scientific community, roles of innovator, ratifying practitioner, and textbook writer obtain "based on their skill in performing roles best exemplifying the ideological nature of science as 'empirically verifiable truth'" (131). He goes on to make clear that

the power to create ideologies is shared among all the parties utilizing symbols to mediate mutual "needs," "motives," "beliefs," and "identities." The figure one might call an "ideologue" in any conceptual system . . . must share power with others in interpersonal roles as part of a communication-system view of ideology-making (131-2).

The task of the critic is to make clear the interpersonal roles imbedded in the rhetoric and assess the use of power available to each party. From that analysis, some accounting can be made for the maintenance or decay of an
ideology; the success or failure of a movement. Given that purpose, it is essential to understand what conditions or events are associated with the waxing or waning of any particular ideology. It is that question that is next addressed.

Continuity and Discontinuity in Ideologies

According to Brown, "[I]deologies flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles that otherwise exacerbate gaps in human beings' construed worlds. Ideologies decline when the communication system fails so to compensate" (1978, 133). As people seek to make comprehensive sense of the world to each other (to fit the bits and pieces together into a whole) they must rely on language. However, as stated earlier, the abstract nature of symbols focuses attention on certain aspects of experience while at the same time directing attention away from other aspects. Gaps in ideologies appear when "an out-group or an innovator will recategorize experience and call attention to a heretofore unconceived, and therefore worrisome, gap in doctrine" (134). Interestingly, to deal with gaps, a community will redirect attention by shifting levels of interpretation or changing metaphors and so on.

If a group is successful in redirecting attention and reconfiguring the ideology so the gaps are
no longer problematic using a strategy of masking or featuring certain characteristics of the questionable construct, this is said to be system-regulating (134). If no attempt is made to recast the problematic gap, or if the tactic is merely to reassert the present construct more forcefully, loudly or vociferously, a vicious cycle can obtain that is "deviance-amplifying" (134). "In such deviance-amplifying states," Brown noted, "all omissions, inconsistencies, and contradictions in ideology are apparently magnified to its followers" (135) and the system eventually flies apart. If, however, some kind of compensatory interpretation is forthcoming (e.g. a "loose construction" of a law or rule rather than a traditional "strict construction"), system-breaking trends can be reversed and the ideology remains essentially intact (Brown 1982, 26).

Criticism from the perspective of the attention-switch would necessarily focus on the rhetorical strategies used to facilitate or inhibit system balancing construal of reality. Since the system has a teleological nature, the process of intervention is not reconstruction of the system, but "nudging" of the system in one way or another; it is to facilitate or inhibit the natural systemic outcomes of deviance amplification or deviance compensation.
This system perspective leads ultimately to viewing the rhetoric of social intervention as composed of three inter-related sub-systems. An analysis of the systems individually and collectively is now appropriate with special attention given to the power and attention-switching sub-systems.

Need, power and attention-switching sub-systems

As mentioned above, these three sub-systems are interdependent and can be understood as intrapersonal roles wherein "growth and survival" needs are made coherent for each person as they construe their world. What is a salient need at the moment has much to do with context;[4] that is, for a starving lower class, agitation for equitable food distribution may be important; for a disenfranchised race, advocacy of democratic rights of participation; or, as Brown suggested by way of example, for scientists, "solving variations in scientific problems constitutes the growth and survival need" (1978, 135). For members of the FSM, the need was to say what they wanted, when they wanted, where they wanted. The interdependence of the need system and the power system becomes apparent at this point because a response from an audience with the power to validate the need must be forthcoming; without a response, further advocacy will occur until the deviance-amplifying system flies apart.
The attention that the advocate pays to the audience Brown calls "open-channel behavior" (135). The audience that can validate or not validate an advocate's need has a power share over the future actions to be chosen by the advocate (Brown 1986, 185). As Brown noted, "Without evaluative inputs from other parties to the communication system, such a cycle among needs, advocacy, and gatekeeping theoretically is deviance-amplifying and will tend toward dissolution of the sub-system . . ." (1978, 135).

What seems to be happening, then, in the intrapersonal or need system is as the need is realized and advocated, the advocate looks to those who can meet the need. If no input is forthcoming, the advocate will be expected to increase advocacy and increase attention to the powerful audience (Figure 1). This cycle would be expected to continue increasing the pressures on itself until the system destroyed itself. In other words, if perceived growth and survival needs are not met and sufficient gaps in the ideology are comprehended by an advocative community, ultimately the ideology of the advocates will be called into question (Brown 1978, 136). In sum, the key to maintenance of the needs sub-system is input from the environment (context).
Figure 1

Deviance Amplifying Needs Sub-Cycle
The power sub-cycle consists of interpersonal roles that are generally defined by membership in needs advocating or needs meeting groups. Needs meeting groups have power to resolve symbolic gaps in the rhetorical vision of the group which perceives its needs as not being met to the degree that its vision would suggest. That is, advocates experience a gap between what is experienced and what is supposed to be experienced. As gaps are seen in the ideology, needs become salient for they are clearly not being met which necessitates a deviance-compensating response from those who can meet the need. For example, in the recent uprising among Korean students, their need of a voice in the government was not responded to by those who had the power to provide opportunity to be heard: the government itself. As a result, the students increased their advocacy and paid close attention to governmental responses which were for some time only to deny the need. Further escalation of protest occurred and, as a result, the government agreed to talk with student leaders. The level of student activity decreased significantly as students waited to find out if their needs, in fact, were met. If a response would be forthcoming from the government (power share) that provides for the need of the students to be heard in government, the model would predict a lessening of advocacy, a lessening of
open-channel behavior, and validation of the democratic ideology (Figure 2). Note, however, that if the "democratic" notion were taken to its ultimate end, the system would implode; as the autonomy of each citizen would grow the organization of the social system would change in significant ways such that, eventually, the needs of some segment of the population who rely on social institutions (the elderly possibly) would not be met and advocacy would begin for more social programs. Such a system-balancing event would be "good" in the scheme of the rhetoric of social intervention for it provides for the evolution of the social organism and the ultimate preservation of the system. From this it is clear that the attention-switching cycle is important for the meeting of needs and the preservation of the power sub-system.

The attention-switch proceeds from the artifact of symbolizing discussed above wherein naming simultaneously features and masks parts of referents. Specifically, attention-switching depends on anomaly masking or anomaly featuring depending on where in the cycle one attempts to intervene. In the example of the Korean students, the effort of the government has been anomaly-masking for "attention to anomalies increases when
Figure 2

Deviance Compensating Response From Power Cycle
the promise of comprehensive fit [of the rhetorical vision] decreases" (Brown 1978, 138). Thus, it is possible that by switching attention of students from, for example, the need to be heard to the need to be protected by a strong federal government from nearby enemies, "deadly gaps in the fit" between the ideology of the students and the world of experience would be compensated and the system preserved.

A Complementary Version of Rhetorical Vision Theory

So far, what has been sketched out have been the broad strokes of the process of rhetorical vision maintenance and decay as described by Brown. What seems to be most evident is that the process exhibits an "organic" teleology that allows an interventionist to facilitate or inhibit the process. This "organismic" model suggests "(1) that rhetorical visions arise and flourish in communication systems that are not vicious circles; they die when embodied in systems which fail periodically to reverse tendencies toward vicious circles; (2) that interventional strategy is keyed to promoting/retarding the system's capability for periodically reversing trends toward vicious circles; and (3) that fantasy themes are invented/accepted in conjunction with their participants' shift of attention necessary to avoid vicious circles" (Brown 1980, 17). The
The overall system is composed of three interrelated sub-systems: a "needs" or intrapersonal system, a "power" or interpersonal system, and an attention-switching system. However, these systems cannot be understood apart from the specific roles played out by people within the system. A task of the next section is to clarify how these systems proceed as people attempt to act as "mediators of each other's goals" (17). What is necessary is a clarification of the roles of vision actors, power shares and the "church," and vision managers.

**Vision Actors**

All human beings are participants in some rhetorical visioning/ideology-making community. For purposes of this analysis, however, the naming of specific roles is necessary to draw attention to specific behaviors exhibited by a specific sub-group in any culture, society or institution. In terms of the model, the vision actors are those people who are an identifiable sub-group of a larger society. The members of the Free Speech Movement, for example, shared a rhetorical vision that was different from those of the administration. Even though administrators themselves participated in a rhetorical vision, the description of their role will be as power brokers, not vision actors. As the terminology is used
hereafter, vision actors and vision managers will apply to the social movement participants rather than to those of the "establishment."

In terms of the sub-cycles described above, vision actors participate in a rhetorical vision and internalize that vision and the values or "needs" of that community. As long as the vision makes sufficient sense of everyday experience without too many gaps, the needs of vision actors are not salient for they are regularly being met. However, as vision actors find their needs to be challenged or unmet, those needs become salient, and actors begin advocating needs to those outside of the rhetorical vision community that can meet the need, paying close attention to the response from the others in a position to meet the need. As described above, the process will either become a crisis for vision actors as the vision fails to account for experience and it dies, or a needs meeting response from the powerful others who validate the expectancies created by the vision and reduce the "misfit" or anomaly raised by the event keeps the vision intact. It must be understood that periodic reversals in trends are essential for the rhetorical vision to remain for without the reversals, the system will either explode from continually increased advocacy of needs based on a misfitting rhetorical vision, or decay
from a lack of attention. **Vision actors**, then, are members of a community whose world-view is directive of their activities—they are engaged in the process of making sense of their everyday experience via an articulated or assumed ideological construct.

**Power Shares and the "Church"**

According to Brown,

the "power" sub-system maintains a rhetorical vision . . . by alternating between continuity and discontinuity. At this level of analysis, power-shares of "groups" may be profitably transposed to "roles" while schematizing the overall societal act of future-choosing in ways which alternately stress trends of social continuity and change (Brown 1980, 23).

During a period of discontinuity, such as the uprising at Berkeley or the recent riots in Korea, the state increasingly asserts its physical power and violence with the increased disorder created by the rhetorical-vision community (23). In the midst of the trauma, there is increased activity of the "church" which "consists of those taking the role of value-arbiters in the rhetorical vision" (23). As this writer understands the "church," it consists of those who have some interest in the rhetorical vision community, but are not identified with it per se. They are "interested parties" who desire to mediate the conflict between the vision actors and the powerful others for the purpose of restoring continuity. For example, in the case of the FSM, the faculty acted as
the "church" for they were relevant, interested others who understood the vision of the movement and the constraints of the administration. With the involvement of the "church" follows a necessary realignment of power-shares among powerful others, the state, the church, and vision managers and a concomitant "decrease of disorder, a decrease in 'State' activity, a decrease of value-changing in the 'Church,' a decrease in legitimizing by 'government,' along with a 'return'--to an increase in disorder under conditions of an attention-switch . . . (23).

In sum, power is divided among the parties involved in the conflict and accrues to each party to the degree that each can affect the options for future action by others. Vision actors and managers can develop power by strategies of rhetoric and action that control what powerful others may do in the future and visa versa. Not only that, but interested others, the church, can affect the balance of power by intervening as the "conscience" of the society (through strength of moral purpose) and realign the power shares. Within the Free Speech Movement this realignment can be clearly seen as the faculty entered the controversy in December. With the intervention of the faculty, the predicted decreases in
disorder occurred with a related increase in dis-order under conditions of an attention-switch in February as the "Filthy Speech Movement."

**Vision Managers**

The vision-manager role is, as are all parts of the model, relative to the power cycle. Specifically, vision-managers cannot effect changes in the rhetorical vision, that is, they cannot facilitate the "chaining out" of a new vision, without some power share "relatable to the waxing and waning of specific fantasy themes" (Brown 1980, 24). Essentially, vision-managers must recognize their dependence on "popularizers, organizers and mobilizers" (24) in order to accomplish the feat of increasing in-group empathy and attention to the group's ideology. The activity of the ideologue is to create new fantasy themes which in turn results in more overt in-group enactment of the themes followed by the passing of the themes to larger publics and even out-groups (24). Necessarily, as these new themes are promoted, invention of new themes slackens. "With a decrease in invention," Brown wrote, "there is a falling-off of improvisation on, enactment of, and confronting with new themes" (24) and, without an attention-shift by a vision manager at some
later date, a system-decaying cycle of less fantasy theme invention, less in-group empathy, less enactment and less connection with larger publics occurs.

As this writer understands the role of the vision manager, it is to re-invigorate a naturally decaying rhetorical vision by creating new fantasy themes upon which the group may improvise which increases in-group solidarity and appeals for recruits to larger publics. For example, as the FSM vision managers began creating new themes at the outset of the movement, and again in November as the movement appeared to be waning, they increasingly improvised new themes (specifically, new interpretations of administrative actions) which chained out through the student body adding substantially to the FSM membership and adding power to the FSM as future choosers. It appears from the data that the original "new" themes of September began to "fall-off" as the semester wore on since new themes were not being developed because of the attention being paid to the promotion of the university-as-factory metaphor. It was necessary to reinvigorate the movement via new themes which were unwittingly provided by the administration when it decided to punish selected, key FSM leaders harshly. The
activities of Mario Savio, in particular, as a vision-manager, closely resemble the description of the role of vision-manager provided by Brown.

**Strategies of Intervention**

Ultimately, understanding of the interdependent sub-cycles and roles of the rhetoric of social intervention lead to the practical concern of how one, in fact, might intervene in the development in socially constructed realities. Given the three sub-processes as described above, the following general interventional strategies surface:

1. facilitating/inhibiting openness to interpersonal cues among participants in a rhetorical vision called "open-channel behavior";  
2. the possibility of facilitating/inhibiting the complementarity of roles within whatever hierarchy is legitimized by the rhetorical vision; and  
3. the possibility of facilitating/inhibiting systems-balancing attention-shifts in vision behavior (Brown qtd. in Corley 75).

The strategies can be implemented with the invention of tactics that will accomplish strategic goals, and the tactics will change from movement to movement although the strategic choices will remain the same. Given Brown's description above, at least four patterns of intervention obtain:

1) If an interventionist invented rhetorical tactics that facilitated open-channel behavior (and assuming a needs meeting response was forthcoming), the
result would be system balancing for the outcome would be a lessening of advocacy by vision actors. One could go at the problem from the opposite end and facilitate needs meeting responses from the powerful others, and the system would be balanced.

2) If open-channel behavior or needs meeting response was inhibited by an interventionist, the system would reach a crisis point, and, if unreversed, the rhetorical vision would decay.

3) If roles within the system are portrayed as competitive (inhibiting complementarity), the result would be increased in-group solidarity and increased conflict with out-groups. Such activity, according to Brown has the outcome of reminding the "out-group" of its dependence on the vision actors (1980, 25). For example, as the FSM struck the university and stopped its functioning for four days, it became clear to the administration that the administration had nothing to govern without the support of the students.

4) As with every such trend in rhetorical visioning, it must be periodically reversed. Roles in the system must, at some point, be portrayed as complementary in order to maintain the system as a whole. During the Free Speech Movement, such an attempt was made by the University Students for Law and Order (USLO) who made
clear their complementary relationship with the administration and its goals and advocated that position in direct opposition to the FSM. The data seem to indicate that ultimately complementary roles were emphasized after the strike was settled in order to re-balance the system and continue the task of education.

It is important to note here Brown's insight regarding such interventions as noted in three and four above. Borrowing concepts from Boulding, Brown makes clear that within these interdependent roles, three specific rhetorical/tactical stances can be adopted: an "exchange" system can be emphasized. Within such a system, role complementarity is clear as one does something for another so each is satisfied just as an economic transaction illustrates. This was clearly the case at Berkeley when all roles were conducting "business as usual." Second, a "threat" system can be created wherein vision actors make clear to powerful others their interdependence by making clear that if the powerful other did not provide for the needs of the vision actors, the powerful other would be somehow punished. This was the case when the students threatened to strike the university if their needs for advocacy were not met. Finally, an integrative system can be created rhetorically in which complementary roles cooperate simply on the basis of who
they are. Such was the case at the end of the Free Speech Movement in which students and administration attempted to cooperate in order to rehabilitate the university.

Brown articulately summarized the complementary/competitive strategies as follows:

[T]he tension between cooperation and competition is part-and-parcel with power shares as just defined. When roles are seen as complementary, a consequence is the social stability that comes from an agreed-upon hierarchy. When roles are seen as being competitive, a consequence is the social flux that follows from a challenged hierarchy. Whether power shares are seen as being complementary or not is therefore always associated with what type of intervention which can be thought of as a strategy for strategies: the promotion or inhibition of an attention-switch by participants in a rhetorical vision . . . (1980, 26).

The attention-switch is basic to all persuasive discourse for as individuals mutually construe their symbolic worlds, the naming of parts of reality (which is done with all words more or less) directs attention to or away from certain dimensions of the thing being named. As Brown suggested, the attention-switch is the strategy for strategies since all symbol using requires choosing among symbols in the encoding process and the choosing is, at minimum, between two alternatives. According to Brown, "an attention-switch requires that (1) at least two patterns or interpretive 'templates' always be potentially involved in our sizing up a situation; (2) each pattern
itself must be capable of rendering the situation coherent; and (3) movement from one to another—with a consequent reconstituting of the situation—be necessary before a 'switch' will have occurred" (Brown 1982, 18). In essence, the attention-switch is an over-arching interpretation of social reality that may be achieved by a rhetorically astute vision-manager.

As can be seen, the attention-switch is ultimately related to the intrapersonal (needs) sub-system and interpersonal (power) sub-system; their meaning for any group is controlled by the portions of the group's existence to which its attention is focused. The attention-switch is grounded primarily on such questions as in-group/out-group identification, competition/cooperation of roles and acceptance or rejection of present hierarchy. Brown provided the example of turn-of-the-century black rhetoric that attempted to mask anomalies between experience (denial of equality) and ideology (the promise of success through hard work) and featured a version of black identity that was individual rather than collective, sanctioned competition between blacks for success and promoted cooperation with the white hierarchy (Brown 1982, 20). According to Brown, vision-managers such as W.E.B. DuBois served to direct attention to the gaps between experience
and rhetorical vision and provided a trend reversing interpretation of the then present black situation as slavery rather than opportunity (20-22). Similarly, leaders of the Free Speech Movement provided for vision-actors an alternative interpretation of the university stressing the complementary interests of students while stressing competitive relations with the administration and rejecting the hierarchy as it then existed.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to make clear the process of rhetorical vision creation and maintenance as abstracted by Brown as the rhetoric of social intervention. The interrelated subsystems of intrapersonal roles, interpersonal roles, and attention-switching that comprise the creation and maintenance of rhetorical visions were described. First, the intrapersonal subsystem was seen as "naming" parts of reality that allows persons to organize social relationships, and allows the apprehension of "repeatable" events. This activity is basic to the creation of shared interpretations of reality. Second, the related subsystem of interpersonal roles was shown to be concerned with the establishment of complementary or competitive roles that aide in the construction of social reality. Hierarchical
relations provide the loci of power among social actors who employ rhetoric to mediate mutual needs, motives, beliefs and identities. Finally, the attention-switch was shown to be central to system-balancing by directing attention away from anomalies within any group's ideology. Since the rhetorical visioning process is posited to have a teleological nature, rhetorical interventions are seen as "nudging" a system to a rebalanced or deviance-amplifying state rather than recreating the system.

Further, the specific concepts of vision-actors, power shares, the church, and vision-managers were discussed. Vision-actors were defined as members of a community whose actions are influenced and directed by their shared world-view. Power shares were seen as the degree to which one group can affect the future options of another. Power was not described as a fixed amount of force, but a fluid condition that can be created by use of appropriate rhetorical strategies. The church, as a variable, was defined as interested parties who take on the role of value-arbiters in a troubled rhetorical vision system. Last, vision-managers were described as those who attempt to re-invigorate a naturally decaying rhetorical
vision by providing new fantasy themes upon which the rhetorical vision community may improvise increasing in-group solidarity.

Given the three abstracted, interdependent sub-systems, and the above concepts/variables, the strategies of intervention were described as facilitating or inhibiting open-channel behavior among vision-actors, facilitating, or inhibiting perceptions of complementarity between roles in the existing hierarchy, and facilitating or inhibiting system-balancing attention-shifts in vision behavior. These strategies are actualized by tactics growing out of "economies" of integration, exchange or threat established between the roles within the relational hierarchy described by any rhetorical vision.

The remainder of this study relies heavily on this chapter as conceptual framework. In the next chapter, Free Speech rhetoric will be treated in terms of attention-switch and will show that the FSM was engaged primarily in promoting an alternate rhetorical vision that served to interpret the university as factory, featuring anomalies between educational ideology and education experience.
1. Brown defines ideology as "any symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate 'name' human beings can comprehensively order their experience and subsume their specific activities" (Brown 1978, 124). It can be seen from the description of the movement that this is exactly what the leaders of the students, and administration were doing. Each side claimed its actions to be right in the 'name' of constitutional rights, or reason, or law and order, for example.

2. This notion of continuity between the static and processual in rhetorical events (e.g. scientific research, ideology, or argumentation) is clarified by Brown in "The Holographic View of Argument." In essence, we carve up a continuous and interpenetrated reality (as represented by the holograph metaphor) in order to make sense of it to ourselves and each other. Just as the grounds for the FSM arguments were historically connected to a myriad of events and ideas, and just as the administration's were so constituted, it behooved the participants to talk as if rules and rights under discussion were static because it provides clarity and ease of resolution. Arguers, for centuries, have employed conventional categories of
argument for the very reason that the ideas being discussed (and the procession of discussion) are so messy and unclear. As Perelman is reported to have stated, "The domain of rhetoric is that of confused ideas" (Perelman qtd. in Brown 1987, 90).

3. Brown uses Kuhn's description of the structure of scientific revolutions as a case in point. Brown wrote, "The connection, then, between vicious circles and symbolic or ideological gaps is this: In such circumstances members of an ideological community act as if hiatuses in a world view would invalidate it . . . . To put the matter of vicious circles differently, some systems-thinkers refer to deviance-amplifying and deviance-compensating cycles. Any system is deviance-amplifying when its trends are not periodically reversed" (Brown 1978, 134).

4. As mentioned in Chapter One, one significant value of Brown's model of the rhetoric of social intervention is the overt connection made between rhetorical event and its context. This is an important notion for understanding the interpretations of need ascribed by various groups in a community. As Bailey noted, "We find meaning not by perceiving the item of behavior . . . but by perceiving
also the context in which it occurs. These combinations of item and context are, of course, given to us by our culture" (Bailey 40).

5. After the first two weeks of protest, the government agreed to talk with the leaders of the present movement. To what degree the government response actually met the perceived needs of the protesters remains to be seen. (Cf. The New York Times 23 June 1987: 1,4; The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) 24 June 1987: A-13; Time 29 June 1987: 20-26).
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Chapter 4
Attention-switching and the Free Speech Movement

Introduction

It is necessary to turn to an analysis of the attention-switch in the Free Speech Movement for, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the attention-switch is basic to persuasive discourse as individuals mutually construe their symbolic worlds, naming parts of reality in the process and thus directing attention to or from dimensions of the thing(s) being named. In essence, the attention-switch is an interpretive act in that rhetors make choices among symbols in the encoding process. The attention-switch, according to Brown, is a "strategy for strategies" (1980, 26) relying on two basic moves: anomaly-masking and anomaly-featuring (Brown 1982, 22).

The process of attention-switching can be further understood as an interaction of two communication processes: the first is that of naming, often via metaphors, and the second is the interaction of text and context in interpreting those names. These two processes are intimately related and are related to the organismic...
model of the rhetoric of social intervention. According to Brown, the genius of the model is its focus on the "integrated relations between event and context" (1980, 6)—the point that also unites the processes of naming and interpreting. The next discussions will briefly examine those two processes before moving to analysis of FSM rhetoric as social intervention.

Renaming the University as Factory

According to Lakoff and Johnson, "The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another . . . will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept . . ., a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor" (10). By the same token, such focusing can point out inconsistencies in metaphors as they aid in construing reality. That is, in terms of the rhetoric of social intervention, metaphors serve to feature or mask gaps in one or another ideology. In fact, the basic metaphorical nature of naming has built within it the gaps that serve to allow manipulation of language and cause any ideology to require constant repair or reconfiguration. "It is important to see that the metaphorical structuring involved here is partial, not
total," Lakoff and Johnson wrote. "If it were total, one concept would actually be the other, not merely be understood in terms of the other . . . . Thus, part of a metaphorical concept does not and cannot fit" (12-13). So, it appears that the process of naming (metaphor) implies the act of choosing which Brown identified as central to use of the attention-switch as a strategy for social intervention (1982, 17).

Although a number of metaphors were developed throughout the Free Speech Movement, the central metaphor of the movement was the university as factory (Stoner 1984). This may have developed in response to two currents of ideas salient on the Berkeley campus in the Fall of 1964. First, in 1963, Clark Kerr had published his analysis of American higher education, The Uses of the University, and had cited a growing identity between American industry and the larger institutions of higher learning. The increasing size of the University of California and the increasing alienation felt by students were, by Autumn 1964, converging and raising tensions on campus. The second current, as noted in Chapter Two, was the civil-rights movement. In reflecting upon the situation, Mario Savio wrote:

The university set about denying students access to those facilities and rights on campus which had made possible student involvement in the civil-rights movement in
the previous years. Yet very rapidly the concern of the movement shifted from Mississippi to much closer to home; we soon began doing an awful lot of talking and thinking about the limitations of the university, the "Multiversity," the "knowledge industry"—these metaphors became ever more a part of the rhetoric of the movement" (Draper 1965, 5-6).

In fact, the factory metaphors gained increasing usage, eventually subsuming both the civil rights and free speech themes for the most part.

As early as the summer of 1964, prior to the uprising, the factory metaphor was salient among campus activists. At the beginning of each quarter, a "supplement" to the University catalog was published by SLATE (a "left wing" student political party which later provided strong support for the FSM) which evaluated the performances of individual instructors. In the SLATE publication a "Letter to the Undergraduates" appeared which focused attention on the machine-like nature of the university and developed a number of related images throughout. The author, Brad Cleaveland, wrote:

THE MULTIVERSITY IS NOT AN EDUCATIONAL CENTER, BUT A HIGHLY EFFICIENT INDUSTRY. IT PRODUCES BOMBS, OTHER WAR MACHINES, A FEW TOKEN "PEACEFUL" MACHINES, AND ENORMOUS NUMBERS OF SAFE, HIGHLY SKILLED, AND RESPECTABLE AUTOMATONS TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT (Lipset and Wolin 75).
After a lengthy discussion of who comprised the board of regents and of what their investment portfolios consisted, Cleaveland concluded:

In these men, you find substantial ownership and control of the vital raw materials and service industries of the West . . . . As corporate men of power, the Regents are getting precisely what they most desire--enormous numbers of highly skilled graduates to fill the corporate structure and keep it running smoothly (81).

This analogy was further developed at the beginning of the uprising. During the first sit-in at Sproul Hall, September 30th, Mario Savio spoke to the demonstrators saying,

The most crucial problems facing the United States today are the problem of automation and the problem of racial injustice . . . students and faculty are respectively raw material and employees . . . . The conception of Clark Kerr . . . is that the university is part and parcel of this particular stage in the history of American society; it is a factory that turns out a certain product needed by industry or government (Draper 1965, 180).

The factory metaphor was apparently salient to all the FSM leaders early in the movement. Just prior to Jack Weinberg's arrest on October 1, while waiting for the police to arrive with the patrol car, Weinberg delivered a brief speech to the crowd outlining the resemblance of the university to the factory. Weinberg stated in part:

I want to tell you about this knowledge factory. It seems that certain products are not coming out to standard specifications . . . and I feel the university is trying to purge
these products so they can once again produce for the industry exactly what they specify. This is a knowledge factory, if you read Clark Kerr's book, these are his precise words . . . (Pacifica BB5578.01).

The same imagery continued to be used by the FSM throughout the movement into the crisis period in December. Savio stated on December 2nd, "This factory does unjust things and we'll have to cause the wheels to grind to a halt . . . . If we don't get our constitutional rights, we won't let the machine operate" (San Francisco Chronicle 1). The next day Savio stated, "The administration is a factory. The faculty is the workforce and we students are the raw material. But we will not be made into a product . . . . We are human beings" (San Francisco Chronicle 1).

In an FSM Newsletter, dated December 10, 1964, the analogy again was employed:

. . . we are human beings and so cannot forever be treated as raw materials--to be processed. Clark Kerr has declared, in his writings and by his conduct, that a university must be like any other factory--a place where workers who handle raw material are themselves handled like raw material by the administrators above them" (Draper 1968, 283).

This sampling of FSM rhetoric indicates a clear use of and development of the university as factory metaphor over the course of the movement. Given the pervasiveness of the use of the factory metaphor, and given the nature of metaphorical expression to focus
attention on one aspect of a referent by renaming the referent, it appears that a significant rhetorical strategy of the FSM was to feature anomalies between the ideology of the university as a place of free intellectual inquiry and the experience of the university as a rule-bound "shop." However, understanding of the effectiveness of the process of renaming cannot be fully developed without consideration of the interaction of text and context.

Text, Context, and Interpretation

In words that seem to echo Brown's notions of ideologizing via communication process and system balancing via attention-switch, Branham and Pearce concluded that interpretation of any rhetorical event must be understood within a reflexive relationship between text and context. Just as Brown made clear the propensity for people to "ascribe complex interpretive relationships to the world" (1978), Branham and Pearce described a similar process when they wrote:

. . . contexts tend to be relatively stable, because people and societies work to construct and enforce a re-creation of shared experiences. This re-creation produces perceptions of permanence and choice in the social order based on an unchallenged consonance between rhetorical motives and ordinary experience (19).
It seems to this writer that what is being described above is essentially the same process of rhetorical visioning that Brown argues is based on the "unique growth and survival requirement of the human being: to construe a world of connected entities" (1978, 128). Brown went on, in his discussion of the intrapersonal cycle, to state that "because human symbolic transformation abstracts and reifies categories of experience, human creatures can infer and ascribe or impute 'needs/motives' to others based upon whatever behavioral symptoms they can observe and categorize" (128). It appears then that interpretation of self and others is related to some stable set of categories or context; i.e. an ideology.

Also, in the schema presented by Brown and Branham and Pearce, the necessity of "fit" between one's interpretive scheme and experience is emphasized. Brown noted that, "Because . . . ideologies are associated with the human seeking of a comprehensive explanation of the 'world,' hiatuses are regarded as anathema among adherents of a world view" (1978, 134). It seems to be the case that any community holding a particular world view must interpret events such that the "gaps" in the ideology are minimized or explained away. This is central to the survival of any world view. Similarly, Branham and Pearce wrote:
The processes by which texts "fit" and re-create existing contexts are of social importance and critical interest. However, less attention has been given to those equally important and interesting situations in which the relationship between text and context is "breached." We are particularly intrigued by those texts which change the context in which they occur to one in which they might "fit." This process may be termed "contextual reconstruction." (19).

Brown, too, is intrigued by the "'Gaps' in symbolizing [that] are endemic to the abstraction of concepts" (1978, 134) and vicious circles that may grow out of maladaptive responses to 'gaps' in or challenges to a world view.

Apart from the similarities between the two models, the specific question that this discussion needs to address is how the Branham and Pearce model furthers Brown's notion of attention-switch. It will be shown that whereas Brown cites the importance of and effects of attention-switching in the maintenance of a world view by affecting interpretation of data, Branham and Pearce illuminate slightly the process of interpretation and provide support for Brown's contention that attention-switches rebalance a troubled rhetorical vision.

Branham and Pearce note that, "In any specific instance, 'text' and 'context' are constituted by the work of an interpretive community . . . . Further, the locus of interpretation . . . is the interpretive community, not any individual authority . . . [and] the 'context' of any
given text is the perception of it by various interpretive communities, not the features of the historical situation in which it occurs" (20). All that is to say the process of interpretation is a reflexive one wherein "context" and "text" are determined, not by any absolute or historical reality, but by the particular audience consuming a message and the "interpretive assumptions which happen to be in force" (Branham and Pearce 21). Quoting John W. Lannamann, Branham and Pearce concluded that one may "understand 'context' as 'a transparent vantage point around which a person orients his or her meaning structure.' This vantage point moves among the dancing elements in an interpretive community's 'world,' showing particular acts and events first as text, then as context, and so on" (21). The outcome of such interpretive action is essentially that of system-balancing as Brown described it (1980, 17) to achieve a "stable structure" (Branham and Pearce 22).

Such stable structures, called "charmed loops," reflect and perpetuate "established parameters of what makes sense as well as when, where, and how such senses may be made . . . . When entwined with institutions and systems of authority, contexts may be enforced by interpersonal rules, the power of the state, or a tyranny
of taste" (23). Also, according to Branham and Pearce, any message can be interpreted from at least two vantage points. For example,

A radical's message may be seen as "unrealistic," "disloyal," or "threatening"; his/her acts may be considered "bad," "criminal," or "crazy." From a radical's perspective, even the opportunities provided by social and intellectual systems for the orderly expression of discontent are ensnaring traps that assimilate revolutionary intentions into channels which reify existing contexts. If expressed within a sanctioned forum--the debating hall or the ballot box--the work of the radical can be assimilated into the system (23).

This description corresponds to the interpretive positions of vision managers and powerful others described in Chapter Three. However, this perspective suggests that, at times, contextual reconstruction (attention-shift) is demanded by the situation for some rhetors. That is, while Brown's model seems to imply that rhetors always have a choice as to what they direct attention (choosing one of alternative strategies), Branham and Pearce suggest that within some contexts, no choice is available; rhetors must focus on particular "texts" to avoid the demise of their rhetorical vision. For radicals or revolutionaries, to act as if the context defined by the establishment makes sense is to legitimate
it; the only possible recourse for the revolutionary vision-manager is to transform the context to create a different interpretive scheme.

Herein seems to lie some further explanation for the attention-switch that Brown described. As Branham and Pearce noted, the contextual reconstruction version of interpretation "provides a way of interpreting text and context in specific situations without succumbing to the temptation to impose an ultimately 'orderly' system on the continuing process of social interpretations" (21). This does justice to the rhetoric of social intervention which cannot accept "an ultimately 'orderly' system" and which assumes a "dance" of elements featuring first text then context. In another passage specifically related to revolutionary thought, Branham and Pearce argued,

Revolutionaries in any field of human thought or endeavor may find paradoxical the acceptance of textual constraints imposed by the logic of conventional order. To follow the dictates and reinforce the authority of a situation that one regards as illegitimate or inimical to one's purpose is self-defeating or worse (22).

It would appear that there is a driving force behind an attention-switch that may or may not be consciously apprehended by a vision-manager or vision-actors; that to interpret a text according to the logic of an out-group would be to violate the explanatory power of the rhetorical vision of the in-group. What must occur is a
re-focusing of text and context by those managing a challenged rhetorical vision; an attention-switch that avoids sanctioning the conventional order, yet provides an appropriate logic for sense-making within one's rhetorical vision.

So far, it has been argued that the attention-switch can be understood as an interaction of the processes of naming and contextual reconstruction. The intent by rhetors may be to facilitate or inhibit system-balancing attention-switches. However, it has been argued that in some circumstances, particularly those situations where revolutionaries are attempting to restructure the social system, the choices of attempting or not attempting an attention-switch are limited or eliminated; that is, the attention-switch must occur if the challenged rhetorical vision is to remain intact. The process of attention-switching, as described above, was well summarized by Branham and Pearce when they wrote, "Naming what is otherwise implicit permits and provokes a metacommunicative leap of thought, and is a common feature of texts that anticipate conflict with the contexts in which they will be understood or evaluated. More sophisticated forms of self-referential texts not only provoke, but also guide the direction of contextual change" (30); i.e., an attention switch.
Given this understanding of the attention-switch, it is now necessary to turn to an analysis of FSM rhetoric as social intervention.

Attention-switching as Social Intervention

One must keep in mind the centrality of ideology to the development (Bowers and Ochs 2) and maintenance of any rhetorical vision (Brown 1978) for it is this process of comprehensively explaining the context in which people find themselves that is the central concern of most talk. One must also keep in mind the related task performed by rhetoric of meeting perceived needs as described by one's ideology as well as the power that accrues from one's ability to meet the needs of others. The attention-switch is what provides the regulatory mechanism by which the social order can adapt and evolve as contexts and texts interact to create new symbolic realities.

The focus of the following discussion will be on the efforts of students and administration to direct attention to meet their rhetorical goals, but the concepts of need and power will necessarily be discussed due to the organic nature of the model.
An Ideology of Social Justice and the Need to Act

As described in Chapter Two, the context in which the students operated was one of increasing concern for civil-rights and personal freedom. The rhetorical vision of the students chained out through the student body through channels of advocacy such as the Bancroft-Telegraph strip as well as increasingly radical speakers who were being invited to speak on campus due to Clark Kerr's efforts to increase freedom of speech by liberalization of rules regarding political advocacy, although the rules continued to prohibit the use of university property as a staging area for off-campus political and social action (Elsea 122-123). With the revocation of the Bancroft-Telegraph strip, a clear interpretive problem developed: the administration construed the action as a legitimate exercise of authority whereas the students construed the action as illegitimate. Given the context of openness, and the ideology of social justice then salient, students felt their need to act to achieve social justice was being blocked by the administration. With that a vicious circle developed: the more students' needs were blocked, the more they advocated those needs and the more they looked to the administration for an acceptable response. However, the administration
was recalcitrant and non-responsive; the students grew increasingly concerned about their need to act, increased advocacy and continued open-channel behavior toward the administration. What was needed, according to the rhetoric of social intervention model (Figure 2) was a response from the administration that interpreted the context in a way that made clear that student needs were not being blocked by administrative actions. Instead, what happened was the administration engaged in a "rhetoric of avoidance" (Elsea 117) and failed to interpret their texts in an advantageous way within the then salient context. As a result, student vision-managers were quick to step into the vacuum and create a new context, the university as factory, that served to make sense of the gaps between the ideology of academic freedom and the experience of control. It was from this interpretation that the Free Speech Movement proceeded.

An Ideology of Social Order and a Need for Control

Elsea's dissertation makes clear that Clark Kerr, as vision-manager of the established order, failed to understand the new exigencies that he faced in September, 1964 (Elsea 139). The conservative position [1] that Kerr represented highly valued the rule of law (131; 133; 148; 149). It was from that rhetorical vision
that Kerr was interpreting the events on the Berkeley campus. Prior to the uprising in 1964, Kerr had been very concerned with audiences outside the university community who had vested interests or some kind of power over the future of the university: alumni, regents, legislators, and the voting public of southern California (131). Apparently, President Kerr had been persuasive in his interpretation of what the university meant to the citizens of the state for they were supportive of a bond issue needed to expand the University system. Within the conservative vision, Kerr was apparently able to understand audience expectations and meet rhetorical constraints, but in regard to the students' vision, he was faced with a new interpretation that did not respond to the traditional rhetorical strategies that had served him so well to that time (133). The students had changed the context and Kerr was unable to reconstruct that context to make his texts comprehensible.

According to this writer's understanding of Elsea's conclusions, since Kerr was unable to use his traditional rhetorical strategies, he essentially opted to say nothing much of the time, or repeated his commitment to the rule of law within an ideology of social order (Elsea 134). This approach exacerbated the vicious circle described above and failed to create a system-balancing
attention-switch. The result was the students were able to take the forefront in interpreting university actions and texts within their rhetorical vision which served to re-create the context of the university. This was clearly the case as the evidence cited in Chapter Two indicated that, except for some decline in early November, the student movement consistently added membership until some 10,000 students identified with the FSM at the rally immediately after the Greek Theater incident on December 7, 1964. It was after that incident that the administration (with the faculty leading the way) capitulated to the students' interpretation of the situation and began to deal with issues that heretofore were not "sensible" within the rule-of-law ideology (Elsea 150). It would seem that the administration's failure to act to interpret student needs via an anomaly-masking attention-switch led to a system-break (strike) and ultimately required all involved to reconfigure their ideologies to make sense of the new interpersonal roles brought about by the success of the strike and the intervention of the faculty.

In sum, it appears that Clark Kerr was unable to adapt to the new and unique rhetorical problems with which he was confronted. It also appears that the students were sensitive to the need to refocus texts and context in a
way that avoided sanctioning the conventional order, yet provided an appropriate logic for their ideology and maintained their challenged rhetorical vision. It is to an analysis of the students' strategies, tactics and maneuvers that this study now turns.

**Strategies, Tactics, and Maneuvers of the FSM**

Brown argued that the attention-switch is effected by the formal moves of strategy, tactic and maneuver (1982, 22). The strategies for "reconstructing human experience" are "conceived-anomaly-masking and -anomaly-featuring" (22). Tactics are less abstract and may be actualized by

(1) changing back and forth among conceptions of epistemology—for example from "intuitive," to "doctrinal," to "pragmatic," as Arnold has hypothesized; (2) passing not only from one epistemology to another but also among variant modes of axiology and ontology; (3) going from one level of metaphor to another, including alternation of appearance-reality, as Bormann has shown, along with other means of rendering rhetorical visions "immune to corroboration"; and (4) moving between strict and loose construction of any portion of a lifeworld considered as a "set of sovereign wishes" (22).

Maneuvers serve to actualize tactics through traditional rhetorical devices such as "turning the tables"(22). All three levels must be understood to be operating simultaneously for as a strategy is chosen, it is actualized by tactics and implemented by maneuvers.
For the student members of the Free Speech Movement, confronted with the ideology of the conventional order--the rule of law--the only response that made sense within their ideology of social justice was one that drew attention to the disparity between the freedom the rule of law was supposed to provide and the actual experience of decreased freedom as indicated by the withdrawal of the Bancroft-Telegraph strip and prohibition of collection of funds on campus for social and political causes. The context provided by the university essentially demanded that the students immediately adopt a strategy of anomaly-featuring which is exactly what they did; to do otherwise would be to legitimate the present system.

For example, the first FSM Newsletter of October 12, 1964, in a question-and-answer column, contained the following:

WHY DIDN'T YOU GO THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS INSTEAD OF PRACTICING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE?
What are the "normal" channels for redressing grievances here? No one pretends that this university is a democracy . . . . We are most directly affected by university regulations but we have no guaranteed rights of redress (Draper 1968, 264).

Clearly, the students felt that the conventional order, while promising freedom and protection of rights as a result of the rule of law, provided no such outcome in actual experience. In the same publication, the students published their interpretation of the October 2nd
agreement that ended the capture of the police car. The prefatory paragraphs read, in part, "[T]he administration has begun to interpret this agreement arbitrarily and to violate both its letter and spirit . . . . Below each point is an explanation of its meaning, as agreed upon during the negotiations, and a summary of the way the administration is keeping its part of the bargain" (Draper 1968, 263). The students took the offensive in creating an attention-switch by interpreting the texts within the context of the situation as proving the inconsistency between the ideology of the establishment and the experience of the students.

Even more to the point was Hal Draper's analysis of the situation in the second FSM Newsletter dated October 20, 1964 wherein he specifically called into question the legitimacy of the "law and order" ideology of the administration.[2] After a brief review of the events that intiated the confrontation, Draper began his argument that the law and order ideology was not providing the same benefits for students that it was for the administration. Students were prohibited from collecting money and mounting off-campus action in the name of the university while people such as Dr. Edward Teller were allowed to advocate a particular position on nuclear arms as a representative of the university.[3] Draper argued simply
that all laws should apply equally to all citizens: "... if any part of the University community should be enjoined from embroiling the name of the University in off-campus political issues, it should be the faculty and administration, not the students. For it is the former that are popularly regarded as responsible figures of the University, not the students" (Draper 1968, 271). Draper concluded his essay, "Law and Order should be observed. (In fact, observed very closely.) But it is the responsibility of the Law-Makers to make such laws as can be obeyed not only by men's bodies but also by their consciences" (217). The point seems to be clear that the students' experience was significantly different from those in power and the gaps between the ideology of Law and Order and experience were highlighted by FSM rhetoric.

The tactics of the FSM were generally based on focusing specific attention on the complementarity of students within the context of the law and order ideology (as they all suffered equally no matter what their position on the political spectrum was) and the morality of the students' concerns over against the immorality of the administration.

The emphasis on complementarity of those who are not in power was not a new tactic. It had been used often in the civil-rights movement prior to the Free Speech
Movement and, since many of the FSM leaders were civil-rights veterans, the action seemed to come naturally. The United Front was created only three days after the Towle letter was received by student organizations; as the eight students manning the tables in front of Sproul Hall were arrested, other students took their places; approximately 400 other students signed a petition admitting guilt for the same offense and demanded the same penalties as the eight. Although the action was emphatic, the notion still needed to be articulated for those new to civil-rights advocacy. A flier dated October 1, 1964 asked students to rally at Sproul Hall to protest the "arbitrary suspensions" because, "If we allow the administration to pick us off one by one in this manner we have lost the fight for free speech at the University of California . . . . Only by solidarity and by positive action can we maintain our basic freedoms!" (Draper 1968, 293). The same day another flier, entitled "It's YOUR Fight, Too!", appeared and stated, in part: "THESE EIGHT HAVE PUT THEIR EDUCATION ON THE LINE IN DEFENSE OF OUR RIGHTS. DON'T LET THEM STAND ALONE. The radical, liberal, and conservative campus groups are united in protest against the administration action" (294). On October 2nd, a flier entitled, "Our Support is Growing!", reported that 3,000 students had attended the rally on October 1st and
listed at the bottom thirteen of nineteen organizations which would comprise the FSM. Beyond that, the FSM drew attention to the complementarity of the protesters with students from other colleges and universities and the national civil-rights movement (Draper 1968, 305).

As was noted in Chapter Two, the movement seemed to be on the decline in late October and early November as the negotiations with the administration continued to drag on without substantive progress. Apparently, the FSM recognized that it had failed to continue to emphasize complementarity and began again. The FSM issued an "FSM Progress Report" on October 28th which read, in part:

We continue to meet in growing frustration and with deepening doubt as to the value of the proceedings. The leadership of the FSM has been remiss in not maintaining constant close contact with the student body. We acknowledge the error by issuing this bulletin--the first in a series of "progress" reports. We admit like-wise, our error in allowing the administration to entrap us in a widening and deepening morass of red tape, committees and ad hoc negotiations . . . we learn fast and will not repeat past mistakes (Draper 1968, 327).

The FSM did stay in closer contact with its constituents, but the action that most promoted perceived complementarity among students was the administration's decision to suspend Savio and Goldberg. The action fit the students' interpretation of an arbitrary exercise of law to keep order within the context that then existed.
It also made clear that the administration could not be trusted to treat students fairly—and that was understood to mean any student. The FSM's response in a flier dated November 30, 1964 contained the following interpretation of the administration's action:

The Administration's concept of justice is, at best, arbitrary.

Clearly, Savio and Goldberg are meant to serve as an object lesson. Such disciplinary action, taken against a few students who helped lead a responsible demonstration protesting arbitrary infringements of freedom is an insult to the 5000 students at Berkeley who were concerned enough with their freedoms to march in public to regain them. It is of vital importance to every student to be protected from this kind of arbitrary action, which is meant to cripple our fight for our freedoms (Draper 1968, 394).

Throughout the movement, the ontology of the FSM was based on a reality that stressed the needs of the group more so than that of the individual. But, this collectivity-stressing tactic was not the only one employed.

Quoting "A Task Force Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence", Phillips draws attention to the moral concerns of student protest: "'students who participated in these activities saw them primarily as moral responses to specific issues, yet some began to perceive general political implications'" (112). Horowitz, in his chapter entitled, "The Ideology of the Student Rebellion," treats
the moral roots of the student movement at some length. His analysis is consistent with what was observed in the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement as students decried the factory-like nature of the "multiversity":

Radical politics turned romantic implies the restoration of "moral politics"--the involvement of all in social activity politically defined. The cure for "apathy" and "fragmentation" lies in a revival of those conditions that restore political decision making to all levels, preventing it from constituting the special preserve of a professional class . . . . Thus "civic man" . . confronts "political man," the creature of individualist morality committed to action to shape a common good, a broad democracy, for the collectivity (Horowitz and Friedland 105-106).

For the students, the corruption of the system, pictured in the factory metaphor wherein students were dehumanized by the system, the recreation of an essentially moral order was paramount. This concern was central to the entire Free Speech Movement. For example, in the first FSM Newsletter (October 12, 1964), in response to a question asking if it would be acceptable for Southern racists to use the tactics of the civil-rights movement, a student wrote, "We believe we are different from Southern racists because we feel we are morally justified and they are not. At some point you must make a moral rather than a technical decision" (Draper 1968, 264).
In response to the use of large numbers of police on numerous occasions to maintain law and order on campus, the FSM stated:

It is clear that there has been only one threat of force: Clark Kerr's threat to break up a peaceful demonstration with more than 500 helmeted, club-carrying policemen. The students have exerted only moral force. By refusing to participate in injustice . . . they showed that they had real strength, strength of conviction (Draper 1968, 275).

The entire context was understood by the students to be immoral and their "texts" were an attempt to recreate the context and consequently focus attention on a new order of social justice as opposed to law and order. The tactic of moral emphasis was summarized by Mario Savio after the initial confrontations of the Free Speech Movement were ended:

I am not a political person. My involvement in the Free Speech Movement is religious and moral . . . I don't know what made me get up and give that first speech. I only know I had to. . . . America may be the most poverty-stricken country in the world. Not materially. But intellectually it is bankrupt. And morally it's poverty-stricken. . . . [As an intellectual] You question the mores and morals and institutions of society seriously; you take serious questions seriously. This creates a feeling of mutuality, of real community (Life 100).

For Savio and other students, the vision of the multiversity as described by Clark Kerr, and as experienced at Berkeley was unacceptable; for them, it led to a severing of morality and politics, as well as a
severing of thought and action. It was imperative for the students that attention be drawn to the immorality of the system as they saw it in order to effect positive change. The overall strategy of anomaly-featuring, with the tactics of redefining the ontology and axiology of the student milieu were ultimately implemented through a variety of rhetorical maneuvers.

Maneuvers are limited only by the inventional skill of the rhetor, and, of course, the constraints of the rhetorical situation. Brown noted that one maneuver available to the interventionist is that of "turning the tables" (1982, 26). This maneuver was central to FSM rhetoric, facilitating the tactics of switching frame of reference in the areas of ontology and axiology and the overall strategy of featuring anomalies between the context of law and order and the experience of repression.

Draper used the maneuver as the central device in his argument both at the police car and in the FSM Newsletter (Draper 1968, 272) wherein he attempted to show that the Administration was guilty of advocacy of political positions in the name of the University.

The FSM often employed a maneuver common to legal reasoning through the presentation of evidence and appeal to precedent (Draper 1968, 270; 279; 331-336). This was an appropriate maneuver because, as Reike and
Sillars stated, "... the focus of legal evidence is on bringing to the attention of the jury those people and objects associated with the source of the controversy" (225). It was the intent of FSM vision managers to use evidence to recreate the context for its various audiences in a way that made sense within their rhetorical vision. Interestingly, Reike and Sillars concluded that evidence need not reconstruct a past event for an audience so it is as if the "jury" was present, but rather, evidence can be used "to reveal as nearly as possible an acceptable image of the event" (225). Such an understanding of the forensic act of presenting evidence is clearly consistent with Brown's notion of attention-switch and Branham and Pearce's concept of contextual reconstruction. In both of these conceptions of rhetoric, even forensic rhetoric, the measure of the value of the rhetoric is its ability to make sense of text and context through an "acceptable image of the event" which serves to maintain the rhetorical vision of the group.

A third maneuver extensively employed by the FSM was the use of narrative as argument. All the FSM Newsletters (Draper 1968, 263-287) as well as other fliers (293; 327-328; 337; 405; 422-423; 469-472) and speeches (Pacifica BB5578.30; BB5578.38) contain renditions of past actions. This maneuver seemed to be effective because it
exhibited a consistent plot that, over time, provided a logic (one thing because of another, not one thing after another) of interpretation for the students (Ricoeur 41, 56). The narrative provided an organizational scheme for events that was recognizable and probable rather than episodic (Stoner 1986, 3-4). Also, the narrative as maneuver allowed the FSM to implement the tactic of emphasizing a moral order. Fisher concluded his essay on the narrative paradigm with the idea that moral truths find their expression in good stories and stories are good that express moral truths (Fisher 17). And morality, i.e., the justice of the social order, was the ideological engine driving the Free Speech Movement.

The maneuver of advocating by way of narrative is amenable to an analysis based on the rhetoric of social intervention because narrative arguments tend to evolve and may continue to make sense within an organismic system. Also, narrative argument exhibits a teleological character that fits well with the claims made by Brown (1982, 26) that rhetorical interventions are limited to "nudging" a system to facilitate or inhibit its entelechy. Finally, narrative argument is an excellent vehicle for the expression of moral truths.
Other maneuvers were used by the FSM from time to time: refutation (Draper 1986, 265), paradox (280, 287, 289), and labeling (290, 305), as well as combinations of maneuvers. As mentioned above, the number of maneuvers available to a rhetor is limited only by inventional skill and situational constraints. Although numerous maneuvers were employed by the FSM, the most significant and most common were "turning the tables," forensic reasoning, and narrative.

Conclusion

The attention-switch has been described herein as a strategy of strategies within the rhetoric of social intervention. It was argued that an attention-switch is a result of interaction of naming and reconstruction of context. It was shown that the Free Speech Movement made extensive use of those processes via metaphor in an effort to effect an attention-switch that featured gaps between the promised freedom of the established order and the everyday experience of the students. The strategy was implemented by such tactics as featuring the complementarity of student needs and the moral imperative of their demands. Those, in turn, were actualized by the common rhetorical maneuvers described above.
Once one becomes aware of the attention-switch, it becomes clear that the attention-switch is intimately related to the power a rhetor may wield. Clearly, the ability of vision-managers to redirect audience attention and, consequently, its interpretation of text and context impacts on the interpretation of the organization or hierarchy of the social order. One has great power if one can redirect attention and thus reconfigure how others construe reality. However, attention-switching and power are not synonymous. In order to understand the differences between the two and their relationships within the rhetoric of social intervention, it is necessary to turn to an analysis of the interpersonal roles of the Free Speech Movement.
Endnotes

1. The terms "liberal" and "conservative" mean essentially the same thing to the radical mind. Stewart, Smith and Denton suggest that, "'Liberalism' is generally satisfied with the existing order and believes that this way of life can be improved 'substantially without betraying its ideals or wrecking its institutions'. 'Conservativism,' like Liberalism, is satisfied with the existing order and sees change as necessary and inevitable" (18). Both positions then represent a commitment to the present ideology that emphasizes the rule of law and social order. However, "'Radicalism' is dissatisfied with the existing order, committed to a blue-print for thoroughgoing change, and thus willing to initiate reform . . . " (18). Savio stated in an interview in February, 1965, "As for ideology, the Free Speech Movement has always had an ideology of its own. Call it essentially anti-liberal. By that I mean it is anti a certain style of politics prevalent in the United States: politics by compromise--which succeeds if you don't state any issues (Life 100). Given that, Clark Kerr
represented the status quo, and as both a "conservative" and a "liberal" was an obvious target for anyone who was dissatisfied with the present system.

2. Although Hal Draper was not in the forefront of campus demonstrations, he served as an ideologue for the FSM. Draper's critique of Clark Kerr, *The Mind of Clark Kerr*, served as a guidebook of sorts for the student leaders of the Free Speech Movement. Draper acted essentially as advisor for the organization and his opinions were highly respected by the student leaders such as Mario Savio, and Jack Weinberg.

3. Draper used this same argument during a speech at the captured police car, October 1, 1964 (Pacifica BB5578.02).
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Chapter 5
Power and the Free Speech Movement

Introduction

In the organismic model, the rhetoric of social intervention, the power cycle can be understood to consist of interpersonal roles that are generally defined by membership in needs advocating or needs meeting groups. Needs meeting groups have power to resolve symbolic gaps in the rhetorical vision of a group which perceives its needs as not being met to the degree that its vision of the world would suggest. This is not to say, though, that groups advocating their needs, and looking to some powerful others for a needs meeting response, are powerless. Power is an artifact of the hierarchical relationships created by human beings in an effort to construe their worlds—to make sense of the reality they face. The complementary nature of the power cycle is implied in Andrew King's description of relational power:

We live in a world of rank. We speak of better and worse, higher and lower, more important and less important. We constantly evaluate others. We permit, even encourage, them to evaluate us. A listener makes a judgement of the worth and potency of a speaker. Speakers craft their messages based
on estimates of the significance and status of audience members. Similarly, groups attempt to change the public's perception of their worth through strategic communication (7).

It is within the complex relationship between a group's attempt to reshape "the public's perception of their worth" and the strategic use of communication that power becomes visible (Brown 1986, 198). And it is "When one group questions hitherto accepted allocations of power, the event encourages others to do the same, making it seem that revolution is upon us" (Becker 2). Thus, as vision managers begin to advocate their group's needs with an audience, an audience that has power because it can meet the needs advocated, new relational structures are demanded for the necessary assent to the present hierarchy is no longer forthcoming and a struggle ensues. As Becker noted, "... the matters at issue involve fundamental status realignments that those in power will not willingly contemplate, changes they can prevent under the existing rules of the game" (6). However, if the context is reconstructed by the rhetoric of vision-mangers, a new "game" (constitutive and regulative rules) is created.

Just as the attention-switch was understood within the rhetoric of social intervention as the "strategy for strategies", Brown suggests that the power cycle can be abstracted as "relationships for relationships" (1986, 193). Given a relational conception
of power (as opposed to a causal one), it is the purpose of this chapter to define power within the rhetoric of social intervention model, to examine the interdependent interpersonal roles that can be abstracted from the power cycle, and finally to describe and evaluate the strategies, tactics and maneuvers of the university and the FSM as each group sought to make truth, as they knew it, effective.

Power Defined

Brown's conception of power directs attention away from the mechanical conception of power as force that overcomes resistance, or the traditional rhetorical conception of achieving desired end-states via persuasion. Rather, according to Brown,

power conceived as communication medium, by serving both the evolutionary and systems-view of the social world, becomes a process not of causing but of selecting, on extra-discursive bases, from among potentialities for behavior . . . a code of generalized symbols which guides the transmission of selections (1986, 182).

Such a conception remains consistent with the organismic, evolutionary model Brown has developed, accommodates the rhythmic system-balancing nature of attention-switching and implies the agreement of interdependent roles to some set of governing rules by which hierarchical social
relationships are developed and interpreted. This agreed upon set of governing rules constitutes a **power code**; 
"that aspect of culture by which taken-for-granted rules set boundaries for acceptance and rejection among contending choices" (182).

Code may be understood to be an abstract set "of generalized meanings and in its sense of being binding (without being causal) on behavior, as in the phrase "Code of the West" (188).[1] Also, code is generally invisible to those who are employing it. That is, those who live by the "Code of the West" or "The Code of Silence", or any other code are unaware of its functioning until some discontinuity, some challenge, brings it to mind or makes it visible. Such is the case with the power code as those who employ the power code do not see it until some intervention makes clear the hierarchical interdependence of social roles and it becomes clear that there exists an "'asymmetrical ordering of preferences' between power holder and power subject, and it also provides sanctions as alternatives to be avoided by acceptance of these asymmetrical preferences" (Brown 1986, 182). Employment of the power code acts as a **medium** of communication by providing an interpretation of relationship between power holder and power subject (each of whom can shift roles) (182). Such was the case in the Free Speech Movement as
the university employed the power code to communicate a hierarchical relationship between the university and the students with the issuing of the Towle letter in September. The discontinuity made power salient to the students and it also made clear "sanctions to be avoided" by the students.

This shiftable set of social relationships and sanctions defined by the power code implies an economy of trade; not of commodities, but of "goods" and "bads." Brown, using ideas borrowed from Boulding (Ecodynamics), synthesized these ideas by suggesting that the rewards and punishments outlined in the power code ultimately can be understood as "future choosing." "The power of an individual decision maker . . . is the amount of change in the state of the universe he can accomplish by choosing one future rather than another" (Boulding qtd. in Brown 1986, 184). Herein lies the interdependency of social roles and the abstract power code that serves to establish hierarchy and the choices that can be made by power holders and power subjects--both share some "responsibility" (184) in making present the future for any group; this understanding belays any notions of power as causal, but responds to a conception of power as intervention due to the presence of "interacting influences" (185).
In sum, Brown focuses attention on power as a medium of communication by clarifying how power is created via mutual ascription of social roles and the concomitant requirement of cooperation in any future choosing resulting in an understanding of power as intervention, not causation. With those ideas in mind, Brown defined power as "relational and hierarchical communication that effects choices among competing policy or action alternatives" (187). Given this definition of power, it is now necessary to turn to a description of the system of interdependent interpersonal roles that constitute the "power cycle" in the rhetoric of social intervention, and extend the discussion of power begun in Chapter Three.

Power Cycle

King's discussion of power focused attention on the power of the audience as he wrote, "The power of the great speaker is an illusion. The audience is many. The speaker is one. The speaker is weak. The audience is strong" (21). Brown made clear the power of the speaker to recreate context and meaning for audiences by effecting a gestalt switch (1982). But, for Brown, it is not "one or the other," but "both and"; vision-managers and the "government" may create power through the strategies, tactics and maneuvers of the power code. Just as the
oscillation between anomaly-masking and anomaly-featuring served to maintain rhetorical vision, so too, the movement between interpretations of competition and complementarity of power shares serves a system-balancing function.

Although the national news media reported the events at Berkeley across the country, the media were not significant players in this particular case. The evidence indicates that the groups involved in the "progressive developments" of the Free Speech Movement were the roles of vision-managers and actors, the "State," the "Church," and the "Government." To use Brown's terms, "Here . . . is an economy of power distribution (constitutive rules) which at the same time is a taken-for-granted cultural scenario for [social justice], as determined by complementary expectations (regulative rules) (Brown 1986, 188). The logic of the power code is described by Brown as follows:

The greater the disorder created in a community, the greater the exercise of the "State's" assertion of its monopoly on violence; in the midst of such social trauma, the greater is the reassessment of conscience within the "Church" that consists of those taking the role of social arbiters in the community; at the same time, such realignment of privilege or power in the community is legitimized in law and/or its interpretation and/or its execution by the "Government," all of which (to the extent it is seen by all parties as being an appropriate reallocation of power among shareholders) is associated with a decrease of relationship-modifying in
the "Church," a decrease in legitimizing of changes by the "Government," along with a return under such low-change conditions to another increase in disorder--and so on around the cycle (188).

This cycle can be clearly seen in the "progressive developments" of the Free Speech Movement.

With the issuance of the Towle letter in September, it was clear to the students that the university was exercising power by "transmitting choices" through an "'asymmetrical ordering of preferences'" to the students regarding their future alternatives by providing "sanctions as alternatives to be avoided by acceptance of these asymmetrical preferences" (Brown 1986, 182).

Interpreting the action as a truncation of their civil-rights, students immediately began advocating their needs with the "government", the university, in an effort to reallocate power shares. With the lack of result from negotiation, the students began to emphasize their complementarity with each other and their competitive role relative to the university; such was the birth of the United Front, later the Free Speech Movement. Throughout the last two weeks of September, the students continued to exhibit open-channel behavior, looking for a suitable response from the university. When no needs meeting response was forthcoming, the students began increasing social disorder, acting as if the university had issued no
directive. To do so was to employ the power code by denying the university its goals of quietude and cooperation (law and order) from students.

True to the power code, the university sought to assert its power through the "State's monopoly on violence" and called in 500 policemen to end the confrontation at the police car and later at Sproul Hall. The message to the students, through power as a communication medium, was that the university would stop at nothing to achieve its goals. The message further established the validity of the interpretations of student complementarity and student/university competition. The system continued in this vicious circle of more disorder, more State violence, more Government legitimation of its position leading to more disorder throughout October and November. Even as students began to tire, to lose sight of their complementarity in the system, the university, through its suspensions of Savio and Goldberg, reasserted its message of power and competitiveness, and reunited the student body.

With the constantly escalating situation, the faculty as "Church" began to call for some kind of response from the university to prevent the destruction of the university. Since the administration was unwilling to talk with students, and student demands were increasingly
vociferous, it became clear that some new interpretation of the situation was necessary. Although the faculty was somewhat divided (the Council of Department Chairmen proposed a solution more suitable to the administration while the faculty proposed a solution more amenable to the students), the informal action of the faculty on December 3, 1964 served to reinterpret power shares, to "take leadership to provide moral guidance" (Heirich 283). Thus, the faculty had taken on the role of "value arbiters in the rhetorical vision" (Brown 1980, 23).

Faculty support for the students invited a new interpretation of all power shares involved: university ("Government"), students, "State," and "Church." However, the university refused to legitimize any new interpretation and continued to ignore student proposals. As a result, the students and some faculty struck the university further increasing social disorder. At the Greek Theater meeting of December 7, Clark Kerr presented his solution to the problems facing the university as a whole, and had generated some support, but with the police response to Savio's attempt to speak, the message was loud and clear to the students that nothing had changed and the university still ruled by force. (Ironically, Kerr had just proclaimed in his speech "a new era of freedom under law" (Heirich 430)).
The students seemed to understand that a realignment of power rested not with student actions, for increased disorder had only increased the State's use of violence, but rather with the faculty. As reported in Chapter Two, Jack Weinberg stated at the massive rally after the Greek Theater meeting:

The faculty has tried repeatedly to lift its voice as an independent body and that's what we want also; we want the faculty, the proud faculty of the University of California to lift its voice as a powerful and independent body . . . . They fear the faculty united . . . As a sign, as a symbol with which we present our case to the Academic Senate, . . . we will . . . cease our strike and we will wait and see if they can emerge as an independent force (Pacifica BB5578.55).

The faculty met officially on December 8, 1964 and after much debate passed a resolution legitimizing student demands which required a significant reallocation of power shares. Even then, the university attempted to assert power by responding with stand-pat statements that it was "standing firm" on the Regents' resolution of November 20th, but did concede that they would not attempt to regulate political action "beyond the purview of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."

The final concession was sufficient to begin "Government" legitimation of a new order. Further evidence of such legitimation was in the appointment of Martin Meyerson as "Acting Chancellor" until Chancellor
Strong could be relieved of his duties in a face-saving manner. As reported earlier, Meyerson eased restrictions on campus political activity, and even provided the steps of Sproul Hall and a public address system for student use. The students took seriously Meyerson's promise of new channels of communication and were elated by the fact they were now being heard by the administration. Meyerson's work provided the final realignments necessary for a system-balancing response from powerful others to vision-managers and actors. With that came a new set of complementary expectations among the power shares for future-choosing and new set of alternatives for behavior.

As the power code would predict, with the realignment of power-shares, there was a "decrease in disorder, a decrease in the 'State's' assertion of monopoly on force, a decrease in value-modifying in the 'Church,' and a decrease of legitimized change in the 'Government,' along with a later return to increased disorder, as another trend reversal" (Brown 1986, 190).

The "later return to increased disorder" occurred in March, 1965, during the "Filthy Speech Movement." With the appearance on campus of the person wearing a sign with a single obscene word on it, the FSM was presented with a dilemma: to forego the effort for free speech expended the previous semester and say nothing
about his arrest, or defend irresponsible users of the freedom to speak. The first reaction of the students was to try to distance themselves from the activities of the Filthy Speakers (or "Wordmongers" as Draper called them). However, the reaction of Clark Kerr and Martin Meyerson was most shocking because they announced their resignations on March 9th. Draper's analysis was:

Kerr's resignation was a power-play designed to restore the dominant role of the presidency among the countervailing pressures of faculty, students, Regents, community, and state legislature. One thing is certain: this is what it did substantially accomplish; and any claim that the result was merely accidental represents a gross underestimation of Kerr's ability in the one field on which he prides himself as a skilled professional performer with few peers in the country (1965, 144).

Draper's interpretation was that Kerr was attempting to employ the power code to consolidate power in the office of the Presidency and reorganize the relationships between roles by making clear to others how much they needed him. The faculty did call for withdrawal of the resignations (144). According to Draper, the message to the students was: "Would you be happier if Frank Murphy, or Richard Nixon, or (gulp) Max Rafferty came in as president?" (144-145). Draper's conclusion was a surprisingly adroit analysis of the power code: "After the faculty, students, Regents, and public had united in coaxing him back to the presidency, who would be in a good position to object as
he step-by-step restored the ante-bellum campus, and cautiously weeded out the 'troublemakers'? It couldn't miss" (145). And this time, Kerr did not miss.

Everyone realized what the possibilities were should Clark Kerr resign—a truly conservative administration could very well be installed by the Regents that could overturn the gains made only a few months before. Kerr remained as President and Meyerson as Chancellor. In April, following hearings for four students who faced obscenity charges, Meyerson announced that three were to be suspended, and Art Goldberg was to be expelled. This was a crisis for the FSM as an organization, but it could never muster sufficient energy and consensus to battle the administration. The Steering Committee was composed of almost entirely new and untried personnel who were confused by the issues. "All plans for student resistance for that semester came effectively to an end, and the student activists' thoughts turned to longer-range preparation for a more drawn-out battle with an administration which might try to take further steps to turn the clock back" (Draper 1965, 148).

True to the power code, a reversal of the trend of student control was being effected by Clark Kerr's use of power as communication medium. However, as Draper made clear, and as history has shown, the struggle for power at
Berkeley continued to oscillate between students and administration (Newsweek 64-65). "Relationships for relationships" continued to be negotiated creating the spiral of continuity/discontinuity; of complementary and competitive roles; playing "a fundamental part in evolutionary choicemaking" (Brown 1986, 183). Given this description of the power cycle, it is now appropriate to examine strategies, tactics and maneuvers employed by administration and students in an effort to resolve anomalies in their respective ideologies.

Strategies, Tactics and Maneuvers of Power Code

According to Brown, the power code has "to do with the creation, maintenance, or demise of human interdependency during future choosing. Strategies of power intervention number only two: the facilitating of cooperative interdependence and the facilitating of competitive interdependence to produce the mixed relationships necessary to make possible the periodic challenge to and affirmation of the power code's hierarchy" (1986, 193-194).

The tactics used to actualize strategies "are three in number, all of which are negotiated as trade of one sort or another in what Boulding calls the 'social organizers' of integry, exchange, and threat" (194).[2]
The integrative system is based on individuals' identification with a group or organization; an image of identity (Boulding 190). This also implies disintegration (the leaving of a group) and negative identities (knowing what one does not want to identify with) of which the "radical identity is very frequently of this type" (191). Power arises from the "places" created through identification. The naming of roles is important to any social organization for it provides benchmarks of status and hierarchy; i.e., who gives orders to whom. Also, it must be understood that legitimacy of roles must be ascribed by those within the hierarchy for it to remain intact. "No continuing organization is possible indeed without substantial grants of legitimacy from lower to the upper roles in the hierarchy" (197). The source of motive for legitimizing, according to Boulding, is some payoff (the meeting of some need), generally, although this culture tends to ascribe legitimacy to some things for what they are (young, new, antique), or who they are (persuasive, mysterious) (206-207). Legitimation is necessary, too, for exchange and threat tactics to work (Brown 1986, 194).

The tactic of exchange is at points difficult to separate from integration, for as was stated above, legitimacy of integrity is often based on some payoff.
Whereas the integrative system focused on hierarchy, status or class, exchange implies reciprocity. The motive for exchange is the perception that the parties engaged will both be better off as a result of the exchange (Boulding 165). Exchange begins with an invitation rather than a statement of relationship or challenge. "You do something that I want and I will do something that you want" (163). This also separates tactics of exchange from integration because in exchange there is a focus on separation, division of labor, or specialization.

Finally, the tactic of threat is related to the previous two because a threat system must be legitimated by those in relationship and requires perception of significant differences by social actors. That is, if two people see each other as of the same category, with equal amounts of power, it will be difficult for one to threaten the other; it is only when one is perceived as being sufficiently different that threats may be used. According to Boulding, many long-term organizations are created in this way, and all legal systems involve threat relationships (142). However, perceptions of differences and capability to carry out a threat may change over time, possibly leading to a counter-threat. Threat is interventional because it leads to "four types of reaction or alternative futures"—submission, defiance,
counterthreat, or flight (141-142). These are inherent in the threat system and use of threat invokes the power code nudging the system toward increased perceptions of complementarity or competition.

Finally, as was the case with the attention-switch, maneuvers are invented by rhetors to implement tactics. Maneuvers are grounded in the communication activities of rhetors and can often be named as common rhetorical devices.

The Strategies, Tactics, and Maneuvers of the Administration

In 1963, Clark Kerr wrote, "The president in the multiversity is leader, educator, creator, initiator, wielder of power, pump; he is also officeholder, caretaker, inheritor, consensus-seeker, persuader, bottleneck. But he is mostly a mediator" (36). But according to the evidence in this study and Elsea's (118), Clark Kerr failed to practice a doctrine of mediation.

Given Kerr's words, one would expect him to promote a strategy of cooperation. He stated, "The strategical mediator draws attention to the total milieu from which the conflict arises, such as the role of the disputants in the environment, the stability of their society, and their ideological compatibility" (qtd. in
Elsea (121). From words such as "ideological compatibility," one would expect an emphasis on cooperation actualized by a tactic of integration. However, Kerr's lack of response to student requests to discuss the restrictions on political activity, along with other administrators involved in the Free Speech controversy, served to promote perceptions of competition between students and the institution. Elsea noted that, "With the advent of the Free Speech Movement . . . the student participants did not play by the administration's regulations . . . Kerr chose not to mediate their differences by either tactical mediation or personal reduction of the sources of discontent" (122).

The ideology of Law and Order was salient to the university administration which was sensitive to external pressures from taxpayers, alumni, legislators, parents and the media. According to Elsea, Kerr's primary concern was these public audiences and only secondarily did he attend to students and faculty (131). Apparently, his concern was reduction of the discontent of these audiences rather than the student audience which served to create a vicious circle within the power cycle which can be inferred from Elsea's analysis:

The slow organizational procedures of his administration could not "keep pace with the continual shift in focus of the controversy," so it adopted tactics of postponement and some
harassment of the student leaders. The frustration of the impatient students increased, the disorders continued and tensions mounted (140).

The result was that gaps in the ideology of the established order were made more obvious which made it more difficult for the administration to reduce the sources of the students' discontent without appearing to back down. Whereas a moderate response to student demands would have begun a shift toward interpretations of complementarity actualized by tactics of integration and exchange, the hard-liners of the administration continued to emphasize competition actualized by the tactic of threat.

As a tactic for the established order, threat worked poorly, but served the students well. As noted earlier, threat cannot work unless the threat system is legitimated by those it is supposed to control. The students, however, did not attend to the threats of the "Government"; instead, they acted as if threat was not given when, for example, they set up tables in Sproul Plaza after the ban, and 400 students claimed responsibility for doing so and asked to be punished. The threats the students responded to were threats from the "State" to exercise its monopoly on violence which served to show the "true" repressive nature of the university to all who observed. For the students, the tactic of threat
by the university served as an eloquent statement of repression and worked on their behalf to further undermine the legitimacy of the administration's power (King 52; Brown 1986, 198).[3]

Although President Kerr relied consistently on a strategy of competition and tactic of threat, he employed a number of maneuvers to actualize his strategic and tactical decisions. One maneuver used by Kerr was to "cry anarchy." With regard to the use of large numbers of armed police to control demonstrators called in by the Governor, Draper suggested that a president of a large university would normally be "honorbound to resign in protest . . . . Kerr, on the contrary, publicly supported the action which he privately opposed, and echoed Brown's cry of 'Anarchy!'" (Draper 1965, 103; Draper 1968, 432).

King noted the outcome of such a maneuver: "To cry anarchy is to do more than to brand the activities of the challengers as merely criminal and sinister, as destroyers of society, they strike at everyone. They are downright devilish" (58). Using the label of "Castro-Maoist" to name the FSM leadership, Kerr managed only to anger his student audience. For example, political independent, Dustin Miller wrote in the FSM Newsletter:
I would like to bring up a statement by President Kerr. "Forty-nine percent of the hard core group (of demonstrators) are followers of the Castro-Mao line," Clark Kerr has said. There were, Mr. Kerr, some ten to twenty political groups involved in the entire protest [at the police car], groups ranging from Goldwaterites to young Socialists. And I, a political independent, in support of an idea, in support of the protest, in support of myself and my rights, stood on top of that car and lent avid support to the movement.

At best Mr. Kerr's statement was wrong and at worst it smacks of the tactics of "red-baiters," tyrants, and people whose only motivation is fear (Draper 1968, 265).

Such a vituperative reaction was not uncommon among the students who resented the stereotype and the fear appeal. It continued to focus attention on competitive roles and widened the use of threat tactic to the public as well as the student body. The protestors became "devils" which maintained a deviance-amplifying cycle of provocation and retribution (Elsea 136). According to Elsea, once both sides shifted to mutual provocation and power moves, Kerr's position weakened considerably (151-152). Heirich explained the impact of administration (and later FSM) conspiracy theories on communication:

Once simple explanations in terms of conspiracy were accepted by both sides, each began to plan its strategies in power terms: If no act by an opponent can be taken to mean what he says it does, all acts become threatening or devious. Thus conspiracy theories have tremendous power to change the "meaning" of all future acts by an opponent, and to make resolution of differences on their merits extremely difficult (341).
In essence, Kerr's maneuver of "crying anarchy" served to lessen his ability to choose future alternatives for the students and diminished his own power. Without the ability to credibly employ the power code, the administration's position was severely weakened.

A second, related maneuver common to conflict management and debate was reduction of the problem. For example, after the sit-in at Sproul Hall (September 30-October 1) and the capture of the police car (October 1-2), the chairman of the University Board of Regents stated:

Law and order have been re-established on the Berkeley campus of the University of California. That this was accomplished without violence is a tribute to President Clark Kerr and his administrative staff. All applicable University rules remain unchanged; the non-student arrested has been booked by the police; the eight suspended students are still on suspension, and the regular procedures for review of student conduct and grievances are functioning . . . . It is regrettable that a relatively small number of students, together with certain off-campus agitators should have precipitated so unfortunate an incident (Lipset and Wolin 118-119).

It is clear that Carter was minimizing the effects of the demonstration as well as the number and kind of participants. The language stresses the control the university had and continues to have, as if brushing off a troublesome fly; and the language suggests that only a few students were involved with most of the blame directed at
"off-campus agitators." Kerr issued essentially the same message that day. A week later, speaking before the San Diego Chamber of Commerce, Kerr stated the troubles of October 1 and 2 were, "one episode—-a single campus, a small minority of students, a short period of time" (Lipset and Wolin 126). Throughout the movement, appeals were not only made by administrators, but other interested parties asked the "great majority" to resist the efforts of a few radicals: the California Alumni Council, "We urge the great majority of students, faculty and citizens of California who have an ingrained respect for law and order to speak up in its defense and support the administration's maintenance of traditional democratic principles and processes" (171); Charles Powell, ASUC President, stated on December 5th, "The FSM, a minority group, is imposing needless suffering on the majority of the students . . . . We condemn the leadership and tactics of the Free Speech Movement which can in no way claim to represent the great majority of students at the University of California . . . ." (171). On December 16, State Senator Hugh Burns, chairman of the State Senate Subcommittee on Un-American Activities described the FSM as "a group of malcontents, silly kids, and addle-headed teachers, egged on by Communist stooges" (191).
The effort to minimize the importance and effects of the Free Speech Movement was long-term, and wide-spread. The effect of such a maneuver may have convinced those distant from the events on campus, but on campus, where one could observe 10,000 students rallying in support of the FSM, the power of the maneuver was lost. As a maneuver to invoke the power code claiming the power of the hierarchy, minimization gradually became ineffective. As time wore on, and as reports of the number of incidents and large numbers of students involved accumulated, it became clear to most observers that what was happening at Berkeley was somehow significant and not to be minimized. In the long run, the maneuver of minimization served to diminish the credibility of the administration, not the FSM.

In sum, the Berkeley administration in general, and Clark Kerr in particular, employed a strategy of featuring competitive roles among power shares, actualized by tactics of threat and maneuvers of crying anarchy and minimization of the problem. It appears from the analysis that the university would have been more able to intervene in events had President Kerr earlier adopted a strategy of featuring complementary roles via tactics of integration and exchange. If that would have occurred, the deviance-amplifying cycle of increased disorder, increased
State violence and increased Government legitimation of its own status would have been avoided. However, the competitive relationship continued into the spring semester. Elsea noted that the students' "threat of continued conflict left the administration with only two very untolerable [sic] alternatives . . . : acceptance of mass violations or enforcement of mass discipline. [Kerr] excluded from his remarks a third option, the possibility of mediation, which might have settled the conflict shortly after it began" (151).

The Strategies, Tactics and Maneuvers of the FSM

The nature of the struggle for the students necessitated the simultaneous use of strategies of competition and complementarity. Whereas the students needed to emphasize complementarity among themselves which led to perceptions of competition with the administration, the administration, initially, was faced with an easier task.[5] The students had to develop and maintain perceptions of complementarity between student groups across the political spectrum in order to create an organization of sufficient size to invoke the power code. King argued that, "Power results from the unification of mass and is achieved through the mobilization of
The power of a particular group is a product of the size of its resources and its potential for unity" (39).

At the outset of the semester, students attempted to employ the power code via tactics of exchange, primarily. The day after the Towle letter was issued, making the Bancroft-Telegraph strip off-limits, students went to Dean Towle to negotiate some mutually agreeable set of rules that would allow continued use of the area (Lipset and Wolin 102-103). On September 21, the day the ban was to begin, students again approached Dean Towle who modified the rules to allow the distribution of informative, but not advocative material. She remained steadfast in the prohibition of recruitment of members and collection of funds to aid off-campus political activity. This was unacceptable to the students who began to invoke threat tactics, while continuing to negotiate. The exchange system implies reciprocity and is powerful to the degree that it promises a payoff for both parties. As the students attempted to negotiate, it became clear that the administration was not amenable to the leveling of status that comes with exchange, nor did the university apparently see any need for exchange; the students' offer had no payoff for the university except lessened griping about the loss of the "Hyde Park" area. Unfortunately for
the university, it misunderstood the invitation for exchange, "You do something that I want (allow advocacy) and I will do something you want (behave)." It appears from the evidence that the feeling of the university was supposed to behave and therefore there was no real exchange to be made. It quickly became clear to the students that the university was not willing to discuss mutual goals (integrity), nor was it willing to negotiate (exchange), leaving only threat as a power tactic. Threat necessitated student solidarity (which had already been recognized by student political leaders) and the organization of a sufficiently large and mobilized group to carry out the threat. The United Front was immediately formed, with the more formal organization of the Free Speech Movement about two weeks later. Thus, students set about creating power by simultaneously creating perceptions of complementarity between groups and competition between students and the administration and invoking the power code as communication medium by threatening violations of university regulations.

In order to actualize the strategy of competition with the university via threat tactic, the students engaged in two particular maneuvers: pathetic appeals (Bailey 22-26) and cries of official betrayal (King 62-63).
As shown above, the nature of the bureaucratic multiversity essentially closed off student attempts to employ integrative or exchange tactics. Bailey explained, "formal organizations (bureaucracies) . . . develop highly sophisticated rules for competitive interaction. These are rules that tell you how to make your definition of the situation prevail" (22). Applied to the FSM as it dealt with the University of California, it appears that the university's use of threat to invoke the power code was consistent with its nature as a bureaucracy. The students faced an organization that could understand only competitive interpretations of roles and that bureaucracy insisted upon a competitive context. Bailey went on to explain that such structuring is necessitated by ideology: "[Rules for competitive interaction] are part of culture . . . lying in the covert sector" (22; cf. Brown 1978). Persuasion in this culture is accomplished in two fashions,

The first is the Platonic way, the use of reason. This method is possible when the persuader can find some value that the other person accepts, and that can serve as the premise from which to lead an argument. The persuader then works from the accepted value, showing logically that other values can be derived from it and coming eventually to a definition of the situation which, he hopes, will lead to the appropriate action. Alternatively, the persuader may proceed by demonstrating that certain forms of action stand in the way of achieving some desirable goal. Such reasoning implicitly uses the
The two forms of reasoning described above, the seeking of common values, and "opportunity cost" correspond to the power tactics of integration and exchange. It has been shown that the students and administration were unable to find any common ground from which to begin negotiations, nor were they able to create an economy of exchange. It appears then that reason was not a means of persuasion that would meet the constraints of the rhetorical situation that the students faced.

The second means of persuasion Bailey identified is the use of passion. "Reason," he wrote, "has no power to move: without passion, one remains inert, unmoved oneself and unable to move others" (24). This has long been apprehended among rhetorical theorists from Aristotle to the present. The use of passion then invokes the power code as communication medium; it, in effect, asserts "relational and hierarchical communication that effects choices among competing policy or action alternatives."

Within the power cycle, the university failed to provide a needs meeting response to the open-channel behavior of the students. Without that response, the students naturally increased advocacy. As Boulding stated regarding protest, "When nobody is listening to us and we feel we have
something to say, then comes the urge to shout" (qtd. in Bowers and Ochs 6). Given the above, the students' use of passion seems to be an appropriate maneuver to invoke the power code.

After the initial attempts at reasoning with the administration and after repeatedly being denied a response by the administration, the students began to escalate. As one protester said, "... there was totally no response so the next step—look, these civil rights people, they know ... that you escalate—put on your pressure a little bit more and a little bit more ..." (Heirich 120). The students began with the tables being set up on Sproul Plaza, escalated more with the sit-in at Sproul, more with the capture of the car, and ultimately struck the university. Tape recordings of the demonstrations reveal in the voices agitated and often angry paralinguistics; the voice of the crowd is often loud, powerful and unified. There is energy in the voices and a sense of moral purpose; a sense that change is imperative. Photographs reveal great physical movement and energy (as the tapes confirm) by the students (Warshaw). The protesters appear intent upon their purpose, and often physically acting out their messages. The speeches and writings of the students employ emotional language and imagery. In short, once it became clear to
the students that reason as a maneuver was fruitless, they made full use of passion as a maneuver to invoke the power code.

A complementary maneuver employed by the students was to cry official betrayal. Such a maneuver is consistent with the strategic moves of the students of featuring perceptions of competition with the administration and complementarity between themselves. The maneuver begins with an assumption of complementarity that is shown to have been violated. It may be that a traitor is found in the midst of the group, or it may be that mutually dependent groups find that one or the other has attempted to double-cross the other to take power. The latter case is applicable to the FSM. As King wrote, "When things go wrong for a group . . . it can be a dangerous time for people on the periphery. The group must reaffirm its integrity, expiate its guilt, and return to its mythical purity" (63). The FSM regularly engaged in this maneuver as it portrayed the administration as bargaining in bad faith or engaging in treachery. For example, the first FSM Newsletter (October 12, 1964) contained an article entitled, "THE AGREEMENT What it says . . . How it stands now," wherein the students made clear that the administration has "begun to interpret this agreement arbitrarily and to violate both its letter and
its spirit" (Draper 1968, 263). An insert in the same publication announcing a rally that day stated, ". . . the Administration has acted in remarkably bad faith by insisting that it has the unilateral right to make all decisions on interpretation and implementation of the pact and by refusing to meet with the FSM to discuss and reach mutual consensus on how to carry through the pact" (267). The students were drawing attention to the university's violation of the code in that it acted as if students and administration were complementary by negotiating a pact, then reverting to competitive stance in an effort to employ the code as medium by stressing power through status and hierarchy. Such rhetoric hopes to empower the students by undermining the legitimacy of the administration. "The placing of blame is a genteel form of the ancient sacrifice. Resentment must be 'diverted' outside the group . . . " (63).

Another example of crying betrayal is the lengthy argument developed by Draper that the administration was trying to double-cross the students by its rulings. He argued that the administration's ruling "illegalizes [sic] the student groups' way of 'mounting' political action, without interfering in the least with that type of campus-mounted political action for which we have used Dr. Teller as an example" (Draper 1968, 271).
Draper's maneuver was to show that the university was attempting to implement a double-standard; such actions are illegitimate and immoral and those who recognize such actions are empowered because they are insightful and moral.

As a final example, the FSM published a flier responding to the Regents' action of the previous Friday that stipulated that only "lawful" political activity may be mounted on campus. This raised the issue of double-jeopardy. The flier stated, in part, "The purpose of the policy is to provide a tool for the further suppression of student political activity; it is not to protect students" (389). The implicit point is that normal complementary relations between students and administration assume rule-making to be in the interest of those who assent to the hierarchy, but the administration has betrayed that assent and attempted to subjugate students rather than support them. True to the power code, the legitimacy of the hierarchical roles are dependent on the assent of the governed which requires a complementary response of care for the governed. The administration was portrayed by student vision-managers as breaking that tacit agreement; with that, a new set of relationships was created that empowered students to choose future actions for themselves and the university.
Conclusion

Power has been abstracted herein as "relationships for relationships" whereby a rule-governed code of power communicates perceptions of complementarity or competition between power shares. It was argued that within the rhetoric of social intervention, power is relational and shiftable rather than causal and fixed.

It was shown in this chapter that power can be abstracted as a set of interdependent roles that alternately feature complementary or competitive goals to maintain the system. Within the Free Speech Movement, the roles of Vision Actors, the State, the Church and the Government were identified. Applied to the events of the Free Speech Movement shifting power shares were uncovered so that as students increased disorder, the State increased its use of its monopoly on violence, the Church increased its revision of values and the Government increased its legitimizing of its position until the Government engaged in a system-balancing redistribution of power-shares by assenting to the Church's validation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments as being applicable to the students at Berkeley. That assent led to a temporary restructuring of power shares which were again questioned during the period of the "Filthy Speech Movement" in the spring semester.
The interventional strategies, tactics, and maneuvers of the administration and the students were analyzed. It was found that the administration employed a strategy of featuring competitive roles by refusing to provide a response to student advocacy of their perceived needs. The conclusion of the analysis was that an early response of mediation or negotiation may have rebalanced the system and lessened student advocacy. The administration employed the tactic of threat rather than tactics of integration or exchange. The evidence seems to indicate the tactic was not useful because it served to legitimize student claims of repression. Finally, the maneuvers of crying anarchy and reduction of the problem were identified as being used by the administration. The former served to create a deviance amplifying system of suspicion that made negotiations impossible; the latter undermined the ethos of the administration because the problem was, in fact, quite significant.

The analysis of student rhetoric indicated that students simultaneously used strategies of complementarity and competition. The first developed student power by mobilizing a significant organization while the second matched the administrative strategy. The evidence seems to indicate that such a mixed strategy worked well by providing unified student organization while resisting
administrative attempts to intimidate students to capitulate to administrative fiat. Attempts by students to employ exchange tactics were shown to be inappropriate because of the lack of reciprocity between the roles of administration and students. However, it appears that the use of threat, actualized by maneuvers of passion and cries of official betrayal were useful in meeting student goals. The use of passion was shown to be appropriate in the competitive context created by bureaucracies and the cry of betrayal worked to show the illegitimacy of relational hierarchy with the administration at the top. As applied to the data, it appears that the power code as employed by the students within the power cycle served to meet student needs by effecting, at least temporarily, new relational structures.

The interaction of the power-cycle and the attention-switching cycle can be seen from this case study. The rhetorical reconstruction of context by use of messages, at least in part communicated by the power code, allowed students to intervene in the on-going process of rhetorical vision creation and maintenance.
Endnotes

1. Bailey discussed the notion of code at length, and some of his ideas are relevant to understanding Brown's conception of code. Bailey wrote,

   . . . I have used it to mean a set of regulations, like a code of law, or a housing code, or a code of honor . . . . All three senses share, in different degrees the ideas of restriction. Law codes apply to particular categories of person and not to others. A code of honor sets a boundary around a class . . . or around those belonging to an institution (184).

   Codes, then, define boundaries for concepts and thus impact upon what can be considered within a category; i.e., it limits choices.

2. King developed a surprisingly similar set of categories, although he calls them "images" or "metaphors of society": the Integrationist Image, the Conflict Image, and the Negotiator Image (4) which he argues are necessary to any account of the relationship between power and communication.

3. If, as King and others suggest, power resides in the legitimacy granted by subordinates, then the efforts of the Berkeley administration to limit student advocacy were doomed from the start. First, as was noted by Savio, the
students felt the university's action was immoral. But the university never attempted to argue that point. King wrote, "In a modern democratic state, elites must frame an argument for power. They must provide reasons for their acts, using language that the community will find convincing, moral and reasonable . . ." (52). Second, given the shiftable power shares described by Brown, it seems to be the case that "Even a relatively powerless group represents a potential for future influence" (King 51). The university administration did not seem to realize the power the students could generate as a "well-disciplined minority." King concluded, "Thus, an elite must do more than look to its own organization; it must avoid clear-cut issues around which a majority can organize. It may have to accommodate some of its positions. Occasionally, it may assimilate leaders or potential leaders of the underclass" (52). The administration clearly failed to avoid clear issues. Although the issues became increasingly difficult to sort out with the increased size and complexity of the disturbances, the students continued to publish their concise statements of their interpretations of the issues to the end of the uprising (cf. Draper 1968, 423). The university never was able to compromise in a fashion that was perceived by students as significant. In fact, with
actions such as the suspensions of Savio and Goldberg in November, it became clear to everyone, including the faculty that the university was intending to press its program more forcefully (Pacifica BB5578.38). Finally, the university never managed to build a leadership bridge. Its harassment of the FSM leadership lead only to perceptions of competition. Charles Powell, ASUC President, attempted to negotiate as a student leader without specific ties to the FSM, but Kerr or Strong never cultivated Powell as an intermediary.

4. Apparently, Dr. Kerr repeated his accusations (Elsea 134-135) for the next issue of the FSM Newsletter, dated October 20, 1964, contained another complaint about Kerr's labeling protestors as communists:

   The only sad note [in the negotiations] came in a statement from Mr. Kerr. On Thursday night, after this agreement had been reached, Mr. Kerr continued his red-baiting. He claimed that 40% of the FSM were non-students, many of whom were communists or communist sympathizers (Draper 1968, 269).

5. The administration (including the Regents) was the initial power holder in the confrontation, and interested parties (such as taxpayers, parents, alumni, and legislators) were just that--interested parties who did not have a direct influence on events. Thus, the
administration could pay attention to the choices of strategy, tactics and maneuvers to employ with the protestors. Although the administration was required to attend to interested parties as an audience, the crucial audience was the students who were exhibiting open-channel behavior.
WORKS CITED


Chapter 6
Summary, Conclusions, and Evaluation

Introduction

It is the intent of this chapter, first of all, to review the central ideas of the rhetoric of social intervention model as it was understood within this case study. Such a review is necessary to provide a context for a pointed summary of the answers provided to the research questions which is the second purpose of the chapter. The final purpose is to examine some strengths and weaknesses of the rhetoric of social intervention model that have been made visible by the case study.

Ideology, Attention-switching and Power: A Summary

In his attempts to come to grips with the processes of social change and continuity, Brown has sought to move beyond analysis of the function of ideology to an understanding "Of what is ideology, itself, a function" (Brown 123). His conclusion is that an ideology is the product of communication process which can be understood as the interdependent systems of intrapersonal...
roles (needs), interpersonal roles (power), and the interpretive system of attention-switching. As process, these interdependent and simultaneously operating systems provide a means by which people construe their realities, create social structures, and maintain sense-making rhetorical visions, giving meaning and predictability to everyday experience. Through mutual ascription of roles, people in a rhetorical vision community can understand events via shared interpretations of reality; they can understand their own meaning and worth via establishment of competitive and cooperative roles, and employ power to meet needs of others or as communication medium in the self-reflexive process of ideologizing.

Brown attempts to account for the ways people talk with each other by beginning with an analysis of symbol-using among human beings to get at a beginning point; something like Habermas' "necessary structure of our world" (Foss et al. 237). The act of naming (each other, objects, events--all categories) provides that beginning point for as people name their needs, they also name needs-meeters and direct attention to both. In short, Brown's model of social intervention begins with the nature of human symbol-making and -using and abstracts the inherent systems and roles that naturally grow out of ideologizing as communication process. Brown's conclusion
is that ideologizing/rhetorical visioning is an organismic, evolutionary process that exhibits a teleological character. In other words, many of the communication activities of a rhetorical vision community are designed to explain events, and/or to explain gaps in the explanations; and the process is systemic proceeding along predictable paths, bound by the rules of the process to employ specific strategies and tactics in improvising on fantasy themes created by community members. In sum, ideology is "any symbolic construction of the world in whose superordinate 'name' human beings can comprehensively order their experience and subsume their specific activities" (Brown 124).

Any systemic notion of rhetorical visions must account for their wax and wane. Inasmuch as rhetorical visions are to be "comprehensive," gaps in their explanation of the world are to be avoided; the challenges of out-group recategorization must be met, too, which may lead to vicious circles that, unreversed, will destroy the ideology. The attention-switch is the strategy for strategies of rhetorical intervention. A result of the interaction of naming and contextual reconstruction, the attention-switch serves a system-balancing function by which the social order can adapt and evolve, preserving a community's vision and accounting for their periodic wax
and wane. The attention-switch may be implemented by employing strategies of featuring or masking anomalies and such tactics as changing epistemological, ontological and axiological stances.

Power as code is made effective by reinterpreting the relationship between power holder and power subject and asserting more responsibility for future choices of both. By reconstituting the rules of the game (e.g. withdrawing legitimation of the power holder's position in the relational hierarchy), a discontinuity is created in the social system and makes visible the interdependence of the roles of power holder and subject. Thus, power may be employed as communication medium to reconfigure the hierarchical relationships between members of a community. By strategically emphasizing complementarity or competition and employing integration, exchange or threat tactics, vision-managers may effect a needs meeting response from power holders to reconfigure the relational structures within the community.

Given that student rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement was an attempt to negotiate some needs meeting response from the administration, given what seems to be a generally accepted motive of social change by students, and given the use of rhetoric as a power medium, analysis of this "prototype event of the student movement" by use
of the rhetoric of social intervention model seems appropriate. It is the purpose of the next section to summarize the answers to the research questions posed in Chapter One.

Research Questions and Conclusions

In order to most clearly answer the central question of the study, "What potential did the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement have to influence its audiences in what ways?" it is necessary to first summarize the answers to the secondary questions of the study as organized in Chapter One.

The first of the subordinate questions asked how and to what degree the historical, political and ideological environment at the time affected the development of the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement.

Becker's analysis of the organizational structure of American colleges and universities posited that prior to the development of the multiversity concept, "Every campus has found its natural balance point--the point at which everyone has enough of what he wants that he doesn't feel, at the moment, like doing what he thinks is necessary to get more" (3). That may have been the general case with the colleges and universities of the 1950s, but with the rapid growth of some major
universities, and with the salience of the civil-rights movement, the context began to change and the "natural balance points" were no longer evident. Becker noted:

The increase in numbers, the separation of the faculty from the campus community, the increasingly disorganized or, better, unorganized state of the student body, have made things worse for students . . . . They no longer win here and lose there. In fact, they find it hard to find out where the fight is, as everyone explains how "it is out of our hands" and "nothing can be done about it" (7-8).

The increasing complexity of the university as an organization served to increase the power of the university by creating an asymmetrical hierarchical relationship moving students further and further down the organizational status structure. Student power to "get enough of what he wants" was being eroded by the size of the institution. The Free Speech Movement "represented the first coherent student challenge to the entire authority system of the university" (Horowitz and Friedland 48). In terms of the rhetoric of social intervention, students who were not getting a needs meeting response from those in power invented rhetorical strategies, tactics and maneuvers to intervene in the development of the multiversity ideology eloquently outlined by Clark Kerr.
But the students were concerned with more than the institution's size, they were concerned about the related problem of academic freedom; to live and learn apart from the agenda of some outside agencies. The students were concerned the objective described by Kerr, to make the multiversity a servant of the military-industrial complex, would bring about the loss of institutional autonomy and the loss of the independent search for truth. What constitutes "academic freedom" is a debatable question. One may take the argument advanced by Sidney Hook that it is a privilege of the faculty who have proved their academic credentials, not a right for all such as the freedom of speech. Or one may adhere to Aptheker's contention that such a conception leads to a politically conservative mindset that seeks only to maintain the status quo (Aptheker 178). One contribution of the Free Speech Movement was to make the debate public; to cause people within and without the university to reconsider the direction in which the multiversity was moving. The academic freedom debate drew attention to a trend of increasing identity between the creators and users of knowledge and the dangerous pressures that obtain when profit and power can be accumulated through control of knowledge.
Finally, the students were concerned with the issue of freedom of speech as their organization's name made clear. Again, there has been debate as to the nature of freedom of speech on campus. Some people such as Clark Kerr and Nathan Glazer argued that freedom of speech existed on the Berkeley campus before the FSM and was actually diminished by the students' actions (Glazer 275-276). Others argued that the restrictions placed on speech by the university constituted prior censorship and that sanctions by the university against students who participated in unlawful acts amounted to double-jeopardy and an intrusion by the university into the responsibility of the courts (Draper 1965, 243-246). A contribution of the Free Speech Movement was to focus and intensify that debate for it is only through reevaluation of policy under changing conditions that a responsible public policy regarding free speech can be discovered.

Just as the environmental conditions had an impact on the development of the Free Speech Movement, the impact of the Free Speech Movement on university life was enormous. As the "prototype event of the student movements" (Lipset xix), the Free Speech Movement began a decade of unprecedented student political and social action in this country (Horowitz and Friedland 46-50). Specifically, the Free Speech Movement began a period of
change in student rhetorical strategies and tactics (Hammond). No longer were the students the apolitical, career-oriented students of the 1950s, but were energized by a new ideology that was intent upon reshaping the social fabric of what they perceived to be an immoral and unjust society full of bigotry and self-interest. As noted in Chapter One, the Free Speech Movement was not the first student uprising, but it was unique in its melding of campus and community issues, and in its catalytic influence on other campuses; students were determined to make significant changes on their campuses and began to explore new rhetorical strategies of agitation and confrontation.

The next research question asked the more specific question of what rhetorical strategies and tactics were employed by movement leaders to direct attention to student needs as defined by vision-managers.

It has been shown in this study that the students construed their world through an ideology of social justice which named the established order as unfair and arbitrary. Within that ideology, the salient need was the freedom to act, to advocate, and to participate in political demonstrations for the purpose of securing equality for all and exercising what were understood to be democratic rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Expression of the ideology of social justice created a competitive relationship with the administration by featuring anomalies between the ideology of law and order as beneficial and the everyday experience of law and order as unjust. Utilizing tactics of featuring student complementarity (ontology) and the moral ascendancy of the ideology of social justice (axiology) the students interpreted the context in a way that their texts were most sensible to students and required a revised interpretation on the part of the administration.

The third subordinate question probed rhetoric's role in empowering the protestors to make changes in the university, and the establishment to maintain order.

A conclusion of this study is that the Free Speech Movement employed rhetoric as power code by reinterpreting the relationship between power holder (administration) and power subject (students) and asserting more responsibility for their future choices and those of the university. By reconstituting the rules of the game (withdrawing legitimation of the administration's rules through civil disobedience) the students created a discontinuity in the social system and made visible the interdependence of the roles of power holder and subject. Thus, power was employed as communication medium to reconfigure the hierarchical relationships within the
university. By emphasizing complementarity between students and employing threat tactics with the administration, the students were able to effect a needs meeting response from the university that, at least temporarily, reconfigured the relational structures within the university and allowed the students to engage in the kinds of advocacy and action demanded by the ideology of social justice.

With regard to the use of power by the administration, it was shown that the rhetoric of the administration, particularly that of Clark Kerr, failed to adjust to the changing context of the situation. President Kerr, faced with a context that did not permit the use of his stock strategies, opted not to respond to student rhetoric allowing vision-managers to interpret the university hierarchy as illegitimate for the student audience, thus diminishing the power of the institution.

Having examined the historical, political and ideological environment of the FSM, and having examined the rhetorical strategies and tactics within the sub-processes of attention-switching and power, we are now ready to answer the overall research question posed in Chapter One of this dissertation: What potential did the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement have to influence its audiences in what ways?
In discussing the critical analysis of rhetorical potential, Andrews wrote,

Great oratory often grows out of a series of events that either precipitate a crisis which calls for immediate action or delineates a serious problem which demands a solution. Whatever the circumstances, a rhetorical message is a purposive message; its aim is to get a response from an audience (7).

The oratory of the Free Speech Movement grew out of a series of events that both precipitated a crisis and demanded immediate action. The messages were purposive and aimed at at least two specific and immediate audiences: students and administration at Berkeley. In light of Andrew's statement, the rhetorical potential of student rhetoric must be assessed in regard to the context, purpose, audience and effect of the discourse.

In terms of the rhetoric of social intervention, the context of the FSM was one in which anomalies were clearly evident between the rhetorical vision promulgated by the administration and the perceived everyday experience of the students. Both in the larger society and the in campus community, it appeared to the students that salient needs of those lower on the social hierarchy were not being met. The ideology of law and order appeared to be providing quite well for those with access to power, the rich, the educated, the politically astute; but those without such means were being ignored, at best,
and, more likely, exploited. The students seemed to sense that unless the trend of increasing centralization of power was reversed, the vision of the students of a just society would go unrealized. The moral necessity to speak out was clearly developed by the context as perceived by students and the texts of the administration as it attempted to revoke a resource students relied upon to effect change (the Bancroft-Telegraph strip and the ability to collect money and recruit members) and as it attempted to persuade students that such action was justified. For the students, the action was sensible within a definition of the university as a factory, as an exploitive regime that was intent upon solidifying the position of "management" to facilitate its extraction of products from the factory.

If the students had opted to accept the terms of the Towle letter and the administration's explanation, they would have had to violate the vision of their community of a just world for they would have immediately legitimized the present order; in fact, they would have become responsible for the lessened opportunity to advocate on campus and would have been responsible for the lessened ability of the poor in the Bay Area to mount pressure on those in power to meet the growth and survival needs of the poor. For the students, then, the response
of calling for action to reverse or modify the administration's decision was absolutely necessary to avoid culpability for "selling-out" the poor and minorities and to avoid creating anomalies in their own rhetorical vision. As was argued in Chapter Four, in any specific case, "'text' and 'context' are constituted by the work of an interpretive community" and the "'context' of any text is the perception of it by various interpretive communities, not the features of the historical situation in which it occurs." Inasmuch as the students were faced with the task of interpreting the actions of the administration, to do anything other than attempt to effect an attention-switch would have been the death of the vision of social justice. Had the students allowed Charles Powell, for instance, to represent their cause rather than Mario Savio, it is most likely that the events of the Free Speech Movement would not have occurred for Powell appeared to interpret context in the same manner as the administration. The outcome would have been further legitimation of administrative power, and some diminishment of democracy on the Berkeley campus.

Andrews noted, "A speaker's purposes are not always apparent or easy to determine" (7). Even so, some assessment of rhetorical purpose can be made. Actually, within a movement with the scope of the Free Speech
Movement, multiple purposes may be identified. In terms of the rhetoric of social intervention, one may abstract, at minimum, the dual purposes of maintenance of rhetorical vision and employment of power code.

The centrality of a rhetorical vision to the life of a community has been argued by Bormann (1972) and Brown (1978). According to Brown, a basic growth and survival need of any person or community is to make sense of the world in which they live and interact (125-126). As mentioned above, the students of the Free Speech Movement possessed a value system that preferred social justice to social order. That value system, or ideology, carried with it certain expectations regarding social relationships, obligations, responsibilities and parameters of action. As Brown suggested, such an interpretive framework will "flourish when the communication system compensates for vicious circles, and they decline when it fails to do so" (124). The vicious circle created by the withdrawal of the Bancroft-Telegraph necessitated for many students a reinterpretation of context to keep their ideology from declining. It was essential that student vision-managers interpret the actions of the administration as competitive in order to solidify the relationships of the student community creating a body that could reallocate power among the
actors in the drama. This was accomplished through appeals for unity, the use of the collective "we," and the constant rehearsal of student interests. The outcome was an agreement by the administration not to restrict advocacy "beyond the purview of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution." Since the students reduced advocacy with the administrative concession, and since the student leaders of the FSM did not press for further concessions during the "Filthy Speech Movement," it appears that the motive for FSM rhetoric had been the preservation of the ideology of social justice and not self-aggrandizement or communist agitation as many accused the student leaders of seeking. Such a purpose must be hailed as positive by all who hold the First Amendment to be central to the democratic process.

The second purpose of student rhetoric appears to have been to employ the power code both as communication medium and communication outcome. The outcomes of such use of power were to make clear to the administration the message that the students' interpretation of the context was legitimate and workable, as well as to reshape the hierarchical relationships between students and administration. In talking about power as communication medium, Scott and Smith wrote,
We have talked of the rhetoric of confrontation, not merely confrontation, because this action, as diverse as its manifestations may be, is inherently symbolic. The act carries a message. It dissolves the lines between marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, acts of physical violence, and aggressive discourse. In this way it informs us of the essential nature of discourse itself as human action (7).

The message of the students as they put their bodies in front of the police car or in the offices of Sproul Hall was that they could make a difference; they could deny the purposes of the tainted institution they wished to modify.

What they were doing was rhetorical to the degree that it was symbolic. The actions of the students were legitimate rhetorical forms that were consistent with the tactical use of passion and interventional rather than coercive. This is the case inasmuch as the students used their actions to provoke responses from the power holders who were free to choose other steps to meet their goals. The actions served to make clear the interdependent roles of students, faculty and administration; and the highlighting of those roles was more immediate for the administration via confrontational rhetoric than had been the case prior to its use. Student use of power as communication medium was effective since a different future was chosen by the students than was mandated by the administration.
In terms of the rhetoric of social intervention, the primary audience for FSM rhetoric was the administration for it was this audience that possessed the power to meet the needs being advocated by vision-managers. The students were also an important audience the attention of which needed to be directed to the complementarity of its various parts, but within the social intervention model, a secondary audience. However, the bulk of student rhetoric was directed at the student body with the apparent assumption that the administration would "overhear" what was being said. The students did attempt to negotiate with the administration from the issuance of the Towle letter on, but after two weeks of talking with no success, the students became frustrated and turned their primary attention to the student body, and engaged in confrontational rhetoric with the administration. The tables set up on Sproul Plaza at the end of September were clear messages to the students and administration alike. However, the content of the fliers, and speeches on the plaza were directed toward the chaining out of the rhetorical vision of the radical student leaders of the SSM and were not intended to be dialogical with the administration. This shift in attention created increased identification among students, but led to a vicious circle of provocation and retribution.
between students and administration that most likely prolonged the confrontation. It seems to this writer that the students too quickly abandoned hope in talking with the administration and forced Clark Kerr, an able, expert, and experienced negotiator into a communication system with which he was unfamiliar; a situation wherein his proven strategies of negotiation were not applicable and he was unable to improvise new ones to meet the new context created by the students. Since the administration was the key in the system to meeting student needs, it appears that the student leaders made a serious mistake by turning from the administration as primary audience so quickly. The need for increasing perceptions of complementarity among students was there, but the United Front had emerged within three days of the Towle letter and had remained intact for two weeks with little effort from the students. There is reason to believe that the United Front would have remained united had the student leaders continued to negotiate with the administration.

A third audience that was central to the student movement was the faculty. The evidence indicates that although some were involved in the FSM, and others actively opposed it, most of the faculty were observers of the events until the escalation became so great that they took the role of "church", as value arbiters, in an effort
to reduce tensions. From analysis of the power cycle in Chapter Five, it is clear that the faculty, as "church," created significant power by providing for student needs. However, the students had not attended to the faculty as a specific and important audience until it became clear that the faculty intended to involve itself in the events of the movement. Had the students wooed the faculty earlier in the semester, it is likely that a resolution to the conflict could have been found earlier and avoided the dangerous confrontations with police.

The effect of student rhetoric was that it accomplished its aim of reformulation of the rules of advocacy on the Berkeley campus to allow student involvement in off-campus issues without fear of reprisal from the university and increased freedom to advocate, recruit, and collect money on campus. However, ultimate effect cannot be the final standard of analysis. It was argued above that the students correctly understood the need to respond to the Towle letter to avoid the demise of their ideology. If they wanted to avoid responsibility for lessened freedom to advocate, they had to attempt a reformulation of the rules. Given the context, they were correct in their response. Also, if they were to preserve their rhetorical vision, and exert power within the social system they found themselves, they were correct in
forcefully advocating their position. However, as just discussed, it appears that the students abandoned their primary audience too early and, once the vicious circle developed, failed to turn to the faculty as arbiters soon enough. Given these conditions, one may conclude that the rhetorical potential of the Free Speech Movement was not fully met for the power of the rhetoric was diminished by improper focus on students as primary audience.

**Evaluation of the Model**

In 1972, Bormann suggested that the study of rhetorical vision "can interrelate important features of communication and rhetorical theory" (396). Six years later, Brown suggested that his complementary theorizing about ideology as communication process "can point toward a central, and therefore unifying, concern for the communication field" (123). At present, the field of communication is divided into two camps: rhetorical theory and communication theory, wherein rhetorical theories are primarily style specific descriptions or prescriptions for discourse and communication theories are variable analytic studies of rule-governed human communication behavior. Neither body of theory is predictive in the same way that theories in the natural sciences are predictive, but communication theories attempt to "establish correlations
among behavior and may be supporting the presence of a pattern which is tied to tendencies, to norms, or to rules rather than laws of nature . . . " (Bormann 1980, 148).

If a general theory of communication is to ever be developed some theoretical bridge must be developed to allow the unification of the bodies of rhetorical and communication theory. It appears that the belief of Bormann and Brown is that the beginnings of such a bridge exist in rhetorical vision theory. In fact, the rhetoric of social intervention model seems to exhibit some characteristics of both and, with elaboration, may provide such a bridge.

The model provides a descriptive mechanism by which the rhetoric of any person or group may be described, analyzed and evaluated, as this case study has shown. Beyond those traditional critical tasks though, the social intervention model provides a heuristic that would allow a critic or consultant to predict, within certain parameters, what rhetorical events will occur in the future of a movement. More specifically, as a consultant observes a social movement through the lenses of the model, a prediction could be made regarding the possible strategies, and tactics that may be used by movement leaders. Evidence of this was provided in the brief discussion of the recent Korean student uprising.
The model was able to predict what events to expect once certain conditions obtained. And as time progressed, increasingly certain predictions could be made about student behavior. Further research and case studies may establish patterns of strategies and tactics and uncover increasing numbers of rhetorical maneuvers associated with specific tactics. Although the model does not provide the kind of predictive power of a natural science theory, nor even that of many communication theories, it has made a first step toward providing a rhetorical theory that is heuristic and a first step toward the goal of unifying the communication field.

A second significant contribution of the model is the conception of power as a rhetorical concept wherein power is communicated rhetorically as well as employed as communication medium. This expands the complexity of rhetorical theory which allows more sophisticated explanations of rhetorical events. In particular, the notion of power as Brown conceives it moves a critic past the typical dichotomy of speaker and audience to include, in complex relationship, other significant contextual roles as the "State" and the "Church" which use or interpret power as message. This increased complexity should allow a critic to describe, analyze and interpret rhetorical events with greater precision and validity.
The rhetorical intervention model, with power as a fluid concept, allows a critic to take a variety of "cuts across the grain" of any attempt at social intervention. What results is a shifting description of interrelated activities by social actors (speaker/power subject and audience/power holder as well as State and Church) rather than a static set of categories that require distortion of the analysis in order to fit the events. The increased versimilatude of the model, I feel, is a profitable contribution to rhetorical theory.

In the course of this case study, two "blindspots" of the model were noticed. The first is an artifact of the model's focus on the rhetorical efforts of vision-managers. The second seems to grow out of an assumption within the model that variables that can be named within the process are necessarily significant factors in the process of social intervention.

The description of the Free Speech Movement focused attention on the rhetoric of student vision-managers and cast the administration as audience as per the model. However, it became clear as the historical accounts were analyzed, and as the data indicated, the administration did engage in simultaneous, countervailing rhetorical efforts. This occurred early in the movement (September and early October), and the rhetoric was
directed at student leaders, vision-actors, and the rest of the student body. As the FSM was advocating a view of the university as factory, the administration was advocating traditional learning roles (hierarchy). As the FSM advocated its needs, the administration argued that the needs were more than met. The model fails to take these simultaneous rhetorical efforts into account. One must ask what the effects of countervailing messages are on an audience or audiences. Do the messages counteract each other in the listeners' minds or does one confirm the verity of the other, or does one modify the effect or effects of another? If so, in what way or ways? Further elaboration of the model, especially as it relates to attention-switching, needs to draw attention to the rhetorical efforts of power-holders directed toward power-subjects and other roles as audiences. And the interactive influences of those efforts needs to be explained.

Second, the model, as described by Brown to this point, does not account for the involvement of particular interpersonal roles while not influencing the attention-switch cycle. For example, within this case study, the faculty as "Church" was, in fact, involved to some degree throughout the events of the Free Speech Movement. However, the model directs attention to
specific roles only as they can be identified as effective. This leads to a distortion of the events as described for the critic's attention is directed away from a crucial player or group of players whose actions may be quite significant although not immediately apprehended. On the converse, the model seems to indicate an effect when a role becomes identifiable and included in the description of whatever cycle is presently under scrutiny. It would be useful to modify future descriptions of the interpersonal roles to include attention to all identifiable roles, and attention to their effects as roles as well as their effects as rhetors and power brokers within the entire time period under analysis. Such a modification may aid evaluation of rhetorical effects of vision-managers.

In conclusion, this case study has examined the rhetoric of the Free Speech Movement as an attempt to intervene in the on-going social relationships developed within the university community and surrounding community through verbal and nonverbal interaction. Using the rhetoric of social intervention model, the countervailing rhetorical efforts of students and administration were examined. It was concluded that the students partially achieved the potential effects of the rhetorical situation by redirecting attention of students and administration as
audiences to the needs of students as described within the context of an ideology of social justice. It was shown, too, that the students employed power as message and communication outcome to effect a reorganization of the relational hierarchy within the university, during the time bounded by this analysis, which preserved and facilitated free speech on the Berkeley campus of the University of California.
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