INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
McINTOSH, Claude Truman, 1934-
FRENCH DIPLOMACY DURING THE WAR OF DEVOLUTION,
1667-68, THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1668, AND THE
TREATY OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, 1668.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1973
History, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

(C) Copyright by
Claude Truman McIntosh
1973

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the inspiration and very special effort and aid given my by Dr. John C. Rule. Also, I thank my faithful typist.

But above all, my special thanks to my wife, who supported me most when I needed it. Therefore, to you, Glenda, I dedicate this dissertation.
VITA

January 8, 1934 . . . Born - Houston, Texas
1959. . . . . . . B.A., Texas Christian University, Ft. Worth, Texas
1965. . . . . . . M.A., Texas Christian University, Ft. Worth, Texas
1965-1968 . . . . Teaching Assistant, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1968-1971 . . . . Instructor, The University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, Texas
1971- . . . . . . Assistant Professor, The University of Northern Iowa, Cedar Falls, Iowa
1973. . . . . . . Ph.D., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Early Modern Europe

Studies in Tudor-Stuart England. Professor Clayton Roberts

Studies in the Renaissance - Reformation. Professor Harold Grimm
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA.</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The Diplomatic Preparations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-67.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The War of Devolution</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Triple Alliance</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and Results</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY.</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation, as originally conceived, was to present a study of the diplomatic tactics of the French diplomatic corps prior to and during the War of Devolution May, 1667 to February, 1668, the Triple Alliance January, 1668, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle June, 1668. However, when more extensive research revealed the fact that few historians have even mentioned the War of Devolution 1667-68, in their historical studies, the original purpose of the dissertation was altered. While there are few scholarly works devoted to the War of Devolution, several studies have been written about the Triple Alliance and its effects upon Europe. Yet, there is an abundance of primary source material about all three events. Therefore, the intent and direction of this study was changed in order that the scope of this dissertation, through investigation of the primary materials, could provide a here-to-fore unpublished intensive study of the French diplomacy surrounding the War of Devolution, Triple Alliance, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Research of the primary and secondary sources, including unpublished correspondence of Charles II of England and
his sister, Henrietta, provided the opportunity for this dissertation to offer new substantive evidence for interpreting Louis XIV's motives and decisions in 1668, that prompted him to delay until later any further territorial expansion into adjacent European territories.

The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to provide an intensive study of the French diplomatic activity during the War of Devolution, 1667-68, the Triple Alliance, 1668, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668, by relating the development of pertinent events that occurred between the conclusion of negotiations of the Peace of the Pyrenees, 1659 and the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668. A further purpose of this dissertation is to write about the War of Devolution, Triple Alliance, and Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle as one topic in a chronological sequence since there is not a study written inclusively about these three events. In addition, this study stresses the important effects upon French diplomacy and alliances resulting from the interaction of the Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Dutch alliances, the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-67, and the War of Devolution, 1667-68. The effects of these events upon French diplomacy were critical because of the single-purposed goal of France throughout this period, the successful occupation of the Spanish
Netherlands (Low Countries). Finally, this dissertation attempts to further substantiate the historical interpretation that Louis XIV, king of France, did not want to jeopardize his recently won victories of the War of Devolution by a continuation of French aggrandizement. It is the conclusion of this dissertation that Louis XIV was prompted to delay any further territorial expansion by the league of the Triple Alliance, 1668 (England, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and Sweden). However, the letters of Henrietta to Charles, relaying Louis' thoughts, motives, and decisions seem to also verify the interpretation that Louis XIV had faith in his diplomatic corps and in his own diplomatic abilities to accomplish his goals for further expansion of France's northeastern borders.

The first chapter of this dissertation introduces the reader to the French diplomatic negotiations which proceeded the Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659. One of the major provisions of the Treaty of the Pyrenees was the arrangement of the marriage in 1659 of Louis XIV to Maria Theresa, Spanish Infanta. Before the Spanish government would approve the marriage, Maria Theresa had to renounce all claims to the Spanish inheritance. The "renunciation clause" was the pivotal point around which the French di-
diplomacy functioned throughout the next nine years.

Until the Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-67 French diplomacy was irresolute. Perhaps, instead, the diplomatic corps under the direction of Hugues de Lionne, was seeking direction, testing alliances, and ascertaining friends and enemies. Alliances were formed and relationships were strengthened, especially those diplomatic relations with England, the United Provinces, Spain, and Portugal. France was half-heartedly drawn into the Anglo-Dutch War because of a defensive alliance with the United Provinces. Even before the outbreak of the war, French diplomats and ambassadors had attempted to negotiate peace between England and the United Provinces. Participating in the war as little as possible, Louis and his diplomats continued their efforts to bring England and the United Provinces to peace terms.

In the meantime, Louis XIV and Francois-Michel Le Tellier, the marquis de Louvois, planned an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands. Under the guise of training and equipping his armies to aid the Dutch in their war with England, Louis prepared his troops. As the English and Dutch fought to a standstill, Louis decided, in the spring of 1667, that the time was propitious and sent his troops across the borders between France and the Spanish Nether-
lands. Louis explained that his actions were justified since his armies were only occupying certain provinces in the Spanish Netherlands that rightfully belonged to his wife because the Spanish, who had not paid the dowry, had not fulfilled their part of the marriage contract.

Fearing further advances by Louis' armies, England and the United Provinces agreed to peace terms in July, 1667 and began laying the groundwork for the league of the Triple Alliance which eventually included Sweden. After having successfully occupied the Spanish Netherlands by the end of the summer 1667, and having signed a secret agreement to partition the Spanish kingdom and territories with the Emperor Leopold I, upon the death of Carlos II, king of Spain, Louis agreed to negotiate peace with Spain, rather than face a confrontation with the three allies of the Triple Alliance - England, the United Provinces, and Sweden. Therefore, the diplomatic goal of Louis, Lionne, and the French diplomatic corps was obtained. After nine years of activity, France occupied certain fortresses, fortified towns and villages, and provinces in the Spanish Netherlands.

There is no modern history of the War of Devolution. Because of my own investigation of the events of the War of Devolution, Triple Alliance, and Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, I believe that the three events should be historically written as one topic in a chronological sequence. Although the many scholarly general histories such as Philippe Sagnac and A. de Saint-Léger's *Louis XIV 1661-1715*, Edmond Preclin and V.-L. Tapié's *Le XVIIe siècle*, Roland Mousnier's *Les XVIe et XVIIe siècles: le progrès de la civilisation européenne et le déclin de l'Orient (1492-1715)*, The Ascendancy of France 1648-88 (ed. F. C. Carsten), and Ernest Lavisse's *Histoire de la France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution*, vols. VII¹ and VII², and even the more recent generalized works such as Pierre Goubert's *Louis XIV et vingt millions de Français*, Robert Mandrou's *La France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, Hubert Méthivier's *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, Georges Mongrédièn et al., *La France au temps de Louis XIV* and G. R. R. Treasure's *Seventeenth Century France*, include some information about these three events, the accounting is sketchy and lacking in details. In fact, most of the previously mentioned histories tend to describe only immediate incidents leading into the period of 1667-68, while emphasizing elsewhere the idea of Louis XIV's long-range goal of the Spanish Succession. Thus, the importance of nine years of French diplomacy directed toward the eventual occupation of the Spanish Netherlands
is slighted or ignored by these historians. Differing with these historians, I believe that Louis XIV's successful campaign in 1667 and the territory granted France by the terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were a direct result of the many diplomatic steps that began with the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. One of the more important provisions of the Treaty of the Pyrenees was the contract which arranged for the marriage between Louis XIV and Maria Theresa, Infanta of Spain, and included the "renouncement clause" whereby Maria Theresa gave up rights to the Spanish Inheritance, that is, the throne, lands, money.

While historians like François Mignet and Arsène Legrelle devoted many volumes to the Spanish Succession, their treatment of French diplomatic relations with other European countries has proven insufficient, especially regarding the War of Devolution. Because I have tried to emphasize those events that specifically culminated in the War of Devolution, no single history of European or French diplomacy, proved sufficient. C.-G. Picavet's diplomatic history briefly covered the subject and was too concerned with protocol. Gaston Zeller's Les Temps Modernes (Vol. II), by writing a history that includes too long a period, was not inclusive enough.
Although modern scholarship has dealt with the time period I was concerned with in this dissertation, the historians interested in this period have written specialized studies and therefore, have not approached my particular subject and area of study with the intensiveness that I desired in my dissertation. For example, Feith Feiling, in his *British Foreign Policy*, has written a good monographic study of English diplomacy in the years between 1660-1672. However, the book was never intended to present a serious study of French diplomacy, relating it, instead, only as French diplomacy effected English policy. Similarly, Charles H. Wilson and his study of the Anglo-Dutch wars, does not deal with the French diplomacy until France was brought into the wars. Herbert Rowen in his book on Pomponne, while giving an excellent sketch of the War of Devolution, was mainly concerned with Pomponne's ministry after the Triple Alliance was formed. And Pieter Geyl, who wrote about Dutch history during this period in several books, was concerned about France mainly in relation to overall Dutch history. Each of these historians, then has written specific studies, usually mentioning with brevity the War of Devolution, Triple Alliance, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle as events narrowly related to their specialized studies.
With the exception of Rowen, because of his work on Pomponne and the Triple Alliance, only Geyl in his _Orange and Stuart 1641-72_ has written a history that included a comprehensive study of the time period, 1659-1668. And even in this book, Geyl included the involvement of the French as it pertained to the Dutch and English governments.

Therefore, I have taken the various secondary sources and, wherever possible, compared these sources with the primary sources at my disposal for accuracy, adding further evidence from these primary sources when possible or necessary. The primary sources used in this dissertation included memoirs, letters, instructions, memorandums, pamphlets, tresties, and government documents, many of them located in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Archives Nationales, and Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and in the Public Records Office in London.

Although my interpretation of Louis XIV's motives for postponing further acts of aggression in 1668 are not radically different from the major historians who have tried to answer the question of whether Louis XIV was really halted by the league of the Triple Alliance, I do feel that the correspondence conveying the personal thoughts of Louis as he wrote to Charles II through
Charles' sister, Henrietta, does add credence to my interpretation.
The highly successful French military victories in 1667 over Spanish troops garrisoned in the Spanish Netherlands\(^1\) and the equally rewarding terms of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668, which terminated the hostilities between France and her antagonists, were made possible only after several years of careful preparations by the French diplomatic corps and Louis XIV, king of France. The first major contribution toward these French successes began in 1659 with the negotiation of the Treaty of the Pyrenees which ended twenty-one years of hostilities between Spain and France. This treaty, which was in part guaranteed by the marriage contract between Louis XIV and Maria Theresa, Infanta of Spain, was only one of the many diplomatic measures taken by the entire French diplomatic corps and Louis XIV, himself, as they worked throughout the first half of the 1660s to neutralize, divide, or coerce into lukewarm alliances, the various enemies of France.

\(\text{Although the quest for the Spanish succession always}\)

\(^1\)Also called the Low Countries, included the ten southern provinces located between France and the United Provinces of the Dutch Netherlands. The latter will hereafter be referred to as the United Provinces.
remained a major goal of Louis XIV, most French diplomatic activity during the years 1659 to 1665 was directed toward a policy of acquiring the Spanish Netherlands, using such methods as the cementing of offensive and defensive alliances, arranging marriages of state advantageous to France, and imposing economic sanctions against commercial rivals. The Spanish Succession refers to the period of time covering most of the second half of the seventeenth century (and the beginning of the eighteenth century) when

there was much speculation if there would be a successor to the Spanish throne. First, there was the question of who would succeed Philip IV (1621-1665), upon his death. This question was resolved when Philip's second marriage produced heir-apparent Carlos. However, the question of succession arose again when Carlos, a sickly child not expected to live, produced no heirs. Although Carlos II chose his successor in 1700, the issue of succession was not finally resolved until the termination of the Wars of Spanish Succession, 1702-1713. Also, by subsidizing foreign rulers and bribing foreign politicians, France enlisted support from men who attempted to manipulate their subjects and colleagues into supporting French foreign policies.

Always keeping French aspirations toward the Spanish succession in mind, another long-standing French foreign policy that Mazarin had inherited was the task of preventing further unions between Spain, Austria, and the Holy Roman Empire through inter-marriage of the house of Hapsburg. Thus, the French statesmen believed that if Louis XIV did not marry Maria Theresa, the Spanish government might offer her as wife to Leopold I of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor, thereby giving Leopold the chance to become the power behind Spain. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers: Venice, 1658-1662 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1935), X\XIII, 179. (Hereafter cited as Public Record Office). However, when Margaret Theresa, daughter of Maria of Austria, Philip IV's second wife, married Leopold I, the Holy Roman Emperor, the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs were again united through marriage. And although she renounced her claim to the Spanish throne, her
cepted overtures from Spain to end the war between the two countries by negotiating a peace treaty.  

Mazarin, an Italian who served as an administrative agent of the Pope, was first noticed by Cardinal Richelieu in 1631, at which time Richelieu asked Mazarin to serve in the French government. Mazarin attended state council meetings and was sent on diplomatic missions by Richelieu. After Richelieu died, Mazarin became chief adviser to Louis XIII and godfather to Louis' son, the future Louis XIV. Upon the death of Louis XIII in 1643, Mazarin continued as chief minister to Anne, Louis XIII's widow, sharing with her the responsibilities of regent for the young Louis XIV. Mazarin was responsible for the education of the young king, an education which included tutoring in several languages, arithmetic, and writing; learning to dance and to fight with implements of war; behaving as a gentleman; administering the government of France through council and ministers; that is learning the métier of a king - how to rule and act like a king. As first minister of France, Mazarin actually controlled the government of France until father's will naming her as heir-apparent if her brother, Carlos, died, further complicated the Spanish Succession.

The war with Spain had begun during the Thirty Years' War when, on May 19, 1643, Henri Jules, the prince of Bourbon, duke of Enghien, prince of Condé, as one of the commanders-in-chief of the French troops defeated the Spanish army at Rocroi.
March 1661, acting as an adviser to Louis and as a surrogate father. To enhance the chances for the success of the treaty and to keep alive the chance for inheritance of the Spanish Succession, Mazarin willingly agreed to one of his long hoped-for goals, the inclusion of a marriage contract between Louis and Maria Theresa. As early as 1656, Hugues de Lionne, an ambassador-on-mission to Spain to seek terms that would bring about peace, was instructed by Mazarin to "discreetly pursue the idea of a marriage be-

The proposal of marriage between the Spanish Infanta and Louis XIV was thus the fruition of an idea first suggested during the negotiations for the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Even then the merits of such a union offered opportunities for France. Mazarin had wanted the Spanish Netherlands to be all or a part of the dowry, Mazarin even forew saw the possibility of a greater inheritance, stating "the succession to the thrones of Spain, no matter what renunciation she [Maria Theresa] has to make." See letters of Mazarin to French ambassador Abel Servien, January 20, 1646 and to the Duc de Longueville, January 20 and February 9, 1646 in James Breck Perkins, France Under Mazarin with a Review of the Administration of Richelieu (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1872), II, 318-319 (hereafter cited as Perkins, France Under Mazarin) and Jules Mazarin, Lettres du cardinal Mazarin pendant son ministère, ed. Adolph Chérel (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1872), II, 39.

Lionne, the nephew of Abel Servien, one of Mazarin's ministers, was one of Mazarin's "faithful" counselors. Because Lionne was a man "sensitive to the nuance of diplomacy a skilled negotiator and a master of foreign languages," he was given missions of great responsibility, serving at the Congress of Münster in 1648, planning the framework for the League of the Rhine signed in 1658 and finally, because of the trust placed in him by Mazarin, as well as his anti-Spanish feelings, Lionne was chosen by Louis as his foreign minister, the third member of the Triade of 1661. See John C. Rule's, "Louis XIV, Roi-Bureaucrate," in Rule (ed.), Louis XIV, pp. 18 and 54.
tween Louis and the Infanta" in return for liberal conces-
sions. However, even though Philip IV had remarried, no
children had been born. And because Castilian law, unlike
French laws, allowed a woman to inherit the throne, Maria
Theresa was next in the line of succession and the Spanish
court at Madrid did not want to contend with the possibil-
ity of a French king contesting for the throne. Therefore,
at that time, Lionne's proposition was declined. But by
1658, the entire situation had changed. In 1657, Anna
Maria of Austria, Philip IV's second wife, gave birth to
Carlos, heir-apparent to the Spanish throne. Also, France
and England had concluded an alliance in March 1657, which
had brought English troops to the continent to aid the
French forces in the Spanish Netherlands. Successful vic-
tories had secured Dunkirk (given to the English for aid)
and the Battle of the Dunes in June, 1658. With the mili-
tary campaigns in a precarious situation for further war,

7 Arsène Legrelle, La diplomatie française et la
succession d'Espagne (Gand: Imprimerie F.-L. Dullé-Plus,
1888), I, 89 (hereafter cited as Legrelle, La diplomatie
française).

8 Philip A. Knachel, England and the Fronde: The
Impact of the English Civil War and Revolution on France
(Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), chapter
IX. cf. France, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Cor-
respondance Politique, France, Vol. 275 (hereafter cited as
A. A. E., Correspondance Politique . . .), letter of Mazarin
to the Queen of France on August 2, 1658, in which he ex-
pressed "hope that Turenne's victories would compel the
Spanish to sue for peace."
the Spanish began to make overtures about peace with hints that the marriage of the Infanta and Louis XIV would seal the peace. 9

Finally, after Mazarin announced an arranged meeting at Lyons between the Duke and Duchess of Savoy and their daughter, Princess Margaret, and Louis for the discussion of suitable arrangements for a marriage, and even, perhaps, to nudge the Spanish into action, the Court at Madrid sent Don Antonion Pimentel de Prado to Lyons. Pimentel even arrived at Lyons before Mazarin and the French court. But on November 24, 1658, discussions for a peace treaty and marriage began between Pimentel and Mazarin. 10 With more authority from instructions received from Madrid, 11 Pimentel followed Mazarin to Paris where the negotiations proceeded so well that a two month truce was arranged for on

9France, Archives Nationales, MS K. 1,616, nos. 7 and 8 (hereafter cited as A. N.).

10A. N., MS K. 1,619, nos. 6 and 7. See also A. A. E., Correspondance Politique, Espagne, Vol. 34. The details of Pimentel's mission to Lyons and the progress towards negotiations is recorded in detail in the cited works.

11Henri Lonchay (ed.), Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle (Bruxelles: Kiessling et cie, F. Imbrechts, 1935), IV, 624 (hereafter cited as Lonchay, Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne... XVIIe siècle). In a letter dated November 21, 1658, Philip IV asked Don Juan to "continue to press with urgency" all concerned parties about a proposed marriage between the Infanta and Louis, trying to bring about an armistice beginning on January 1, 1659. Negotiations actually commenced again in January, 1659.
May 8, 1659, and a preliminary treaty, halting hostilities, and arranging for a conference between the two chief ministers of the two countries, was signed on June 2, 1659, the Treaty of Paris. The treaty named the French conquests to be restored and retained by France and agreed only that the marriage should take place. A secret article was included that Louis XIV would renounce all obligations to support the king of Portugal, if the Spanish offers of a full amnesty and the restoration of a status quo before the revolution of 1640, were not accepted within ninety days by the Portuguese. The Portuguese refused the offer. 12

With many questions about future Franco-Spanish relations still unanswered, for example, whether Portugal should be included in the treaty and what terms should be included in the marriage contract, the two ministers, Mazarin and Don Louis de Haro of Spain met on the Isle of Pheasants. This small island was located in a stream in the foothills of the Pyrenees Mountains. The stream, at this point, divided France and Spain. A large commodious room was built on the island so that the boundary line separating the two countries divided the room into two equal halves. Thus, the two ministers could enter the room from opposite ends and with their staffs not feel any "loss

of face" as each group sat in their own country while negotiating.\(^{13}\)

The conferences between the two ministers and their staffs lasted for three months, commencing on August 13, 1659, and culminating on November 7, 1659, with the signing of the Peace of the Pyrenees by the two ministers, acting as representatives of their respective monarchs.\(^{14}\)

Although France gained land and European recognition as victor over Spain, the single most important item in the treaty which dealt specifically with the Spanish Succession was the marriage contract between Maria Theresa and Louis XIV.\(^{15}\)

Because Philip IV and the Spanish court at Madrid feared that the Spanish crown and lands might pass to Maria Theresa and then to Louis or to children of their marriage,

\(^{13}\)A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Espagne, Vol. 34, fols. 41 and 69. Letters from Mazarin to Le Tellier dated August 5 and August 10, 1659. Mazarin complained that so much time was wasted in having "even the tapestries the same...", that the negotiations could have been terminated while waiting for the building to be completed. For a complete accounting of the negotiations at the Isle of Pheasants, see all of the volume of A. A. E., Correspondance Politique, Espagne, Vol. 35 and France, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscript française, MSS 4,213, 4,214, and 7,156 (hereafter cited as B.N., Manuscript française, ...

\(^{14}\)Documents and correspondence relating to the provisions and terms of the Peace of the Pyrenees can be found in the A.N., MS K. 1,616, no. 3 and A.A.E., Documents et Mémoires, Espagne, vols. 277-9.

\(^{15}\)Letters from Don Louis de Haro to Philip IV discussing terms offered to Spain by France can be found in the A.N., MSS K. 1,618, no. 5 and K. 1,623, no. 12.
Mazarin had to accept an article in the marriage contract in which Maria Theresa agreed to give up all rights to the Spanish inheritance. Included in the terms for the marriage contract, was the important marriage clause, the *moyennant*, which required that Spain pay a dowry of 500,000 écus of gold to France within eighteen months. And, "in consideration of payment of this sum, the most serene Maria Theresa" would renounce her claims to the Spanish inheritance. In other words, the renunciation was not valid unless the dowry was paid. Lionne was the architect of this clause which was incorporated into the Act of Renunciation which was finally agreed upon and signed on June 2, 1660. But with a bankrupt Spanish treasury, neither Lionne nor Mazarin could envision any payment in the foreseeable future. Thus "it appeared that Lionne had goaded Philip IV's ministers into granting a lien on the Spanish inheritance." Louis had only to wait for the proper time.

---

16 A precedent for the renunciation had been set when Anne of Austria agreed to a formal renunciation of her rights to the Spanish inheritance as a condition of her marriage to Louis XIII in 1612.

17 A. A. E., Correspondance Politique, Espagne, Vol. 41, fol. 21.


in order to collect on the lien. The diplomacy of France during the 1660s was directed at keeping the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs from any stronger alliance than marriage, while at the same time, usually displaying very overt aggressive diplomacy towards the rest of Europe. Most of the diplomacy concerning the Hapsburgs dealt with reactions to the policies at Vienna and Madrid. Because of the very preponderance of France, the smaller European states tried to play gamesmanship neutrality, taking whatever position was necessary so as not to become embroiled in the affairs of the major powers. Towards England and the Dutch Netherlands, French diplomacy appears much more complex. Louis always believed he could buy English support through subsidies to Charles II and bribes to various members of the English Parliament. Instead, Charles "was a man passively hostile to the French but no fool; in need of French money and therefore willing to accommodate Louis. . .", but unwilling to incur the wrath of his anti-French Parliament and English populace.\(^\text{20}\) Regarding the United Provinces, Louis and his ministers failed to understand the Dutch people and their government, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Louis approached diplomacy in the same manner as war, a man who loved the craft of war and loved the craft of diplomacy. He spent many hours with his for-

\(^\text{20}\) Ibid., p. 59.
eign ministers, especially with Lionne, reading dispatches and memoranda, conferring with his advisers, then dictating the many instructions and letters. To Louis, gloire was a necessity and his decisions in diplomacy were effected by the search for gloire. And, since the French policies toward the frontiers were legacies from Richelieu and Mazarin, Louis pursued the attainment of those frontiers, especially along the northeastern boundaries of France. When the economic and diplomatic war failed, Louis could then resort to war, justified legally, if possible. So, Louis' offensive and defensive weapon, diplomacy, was brought into action, assigning diplomats to all areas of Europe. France's envoys energetically engaged in bringing about peace in northern Europe between Sweden, Poland, Brandenburg, and Denmark with the Treaties of Oliva and Copenhagen in 1660. In order to obtain France's guarantee of the treaties, the negotiating countries agreed to announce that it was only through the intervention of Louis XIV that peace had been possible.

21Ibid., pp. 56-60; cf. Hatton's article in the same book, "Louis XIV and His Fellow Monarchs."

The opportunity to reacquire Dunkirk from England was offered to Louis in 1662. Dunkirk was a territory lying on the Northwestern coast of France next to the border of the Spanish Netherlands and had been in English possession since the Battle of Dunes on June 4, 1658. Charles II, who had become king of England in 1660, had been unable to obtain further funds from the parsimonious Restoration Parliament and was desperately in need of money. Having been subsidized by the French government while living in France and having received several generous "gifts" of money from Louis since becoming king, Charles easily turned to his cousin, Louis.23 Charles instructed Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, chief minister to Charles, to negotiate with Godefroy Louis Comte d'Estrades, ambassador extraordinary to England, for the sale of Dunkirk to France for 4,500,000 livres.24 The treaty was signed on October 17 and Dunkirk was transferred to France officially on Novem-

23 Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, France, 1660-61 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), CXV, 202, an undated letter to Charles about the 3,000,000 livres that had been paid to him in the year 1660.

Also, to aid in the decisions for the treaty
D'Estrades had been instructed to aggravate the financial
plight of Charles "by any possible means." D'Estrades is
reported to have bribed creditors into pressuring Charles
for the money that he owed them. Apparently, D'Estrades
sold Charles several expensive paintings on credit and then
pressured him for the money.

In an attempt to further place Charles in debt to
the French king, Louis was instrumental in arranging
Charles' marriage to Catherine of Braganza, princess of
Portugal, daughter of John IV of Portugal. The marriage
contract provided that she bring a dowry and land to
Charles and in return Charles would aid Portugal. In
this marriage, as in the marriage arranged earlier between

25 Vast, Les grands traités...Louis XIV, I, 208-11.

26 B. N., Manuscripts françaises, Ms 10,260, fol. 55,
letter from Louis to D'Estrades, September 23, 1661.

27 George Payne Rainsford James, Lives of Cardinal
de Retz, Jean Baptiste Colbert, John De Witt, and the Mar­
quís de Louvois (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard,
1837), I, 170-2.

28 Louis XIV, Œuvres de Louis XIV, ed. by P. Grouv­
velle (Paris et Strasbourg: Treuttel et Wurtz, 1806), V,
138, letter of Louis to D'Estrades, ambassador of France to
London, September 16, 1661, in which Louis instructs D'Es­
trades about the provisions and terms of the marriage con­
tract. The marriage occurred on May 31, 1662. cf. Mignet,
Négociations relatives à la d'Espagne, I, part 1, 88-94.
Charles II's sister, Henrietta Anna, to Louis' brother, Philippe, Louis was attempting to secure stronger bonds between England and France. In all of these acts, Louis apparently intended to place Charles under further obligation to him, a position that Louis hoped would encourage Charles to use his persuasion to prevent the anti-French populace and Parliament from severing relations or opposing Louis' future plans.

With the French policy of maintaining internal and external strife against the Hapsburg dynasties in mind, Louis secretly supplied Portugal with money and military support so that she could continue to carry on her rebellion against Spain. So that it would not appear as if France were giving money to Portugal, an act which was in direct violation of the Treaty of the Pyrenees and which might also offend his father-in-law, the king of Spain, Louis sent money to Charles II, who in turn sent the money

29 Henrietta Anna, living in France, acted as an intermediary between Charles and Louis until her death. Secret correspondence between the two kings was sent through her by special couriers and friends.

30 Louis XIV, Œuvres, V, 148.

31 For a detailed, but very partial, account of diplomatic actions in Portugal at this time, see the reports of Sir Richard Fanshawe, English ambassador to Portugal as written in his collection Original Letters and Negotiations of His Excellency Sir Richard Fanshawe, the Earl of Sandwich, the Earl of Sunderland, and Sir William Godolphin... (London: J. Wilford, 1724), I, 73-214.
on to Portugal.\(^{32}\)

Louis justified his actions in sending money to Portugal, stating that he knew treaties are partially broken, but "that the interests of crowns are such that the princes who are charged with them are not always at liberty to bind themselves to their prejudice."\(^{33}\)

Therefore, publically at least, it appeared to all Europe as if England were providing financial support to assist Charles' father-in-law, the king of Portugal.\(^{34}\)

Louis also secretly provided financial assistance to Portugal through his ambassador in Lisbon, Henri de la Tour D'Auvergne, Viscount de Turenne. And French military advisers and troops were provided Portugal under the command

\(^{32}\)Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers: France, 1662-63 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933), CXVII, 321, is a copy of a memorial delivered to the French ambassador to London, Gaston Jean Baptiste Comminges, on January 19, 1663, concerning the defense of Portugal and the eight hundred thousand crowns given to Charles for the aid of Portugal.

\(^{33}\)Longnon, Mémoires de Louis XIV, I, 406-7. In a letter of October 25, 1661, to D'Estrades, Louis wrote that Henry the Great (Henry IV), had aided "the United Netherlands with men and money even though it was forbidden by the treaty of Vervins," and that he, Louis, was certainly going to follow any steps taken by his grandfather, Louis XIV, Œuvres, V, 46, and B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 10,260, fol. 55.

\(^{34}\)Portugal rebelled against Spain on December 1, 1640, electing John Braganza as John IV, king of Portugal. Hostilities with Spain and Portugal continued sporadically over the next twenty-eight years.
of Friedrich Hermann, Count von Schomberg. Apparently Louis was concerned about his image and did not want anyone to think that he had not kept his word in the signing of the Peace of the Pyrenees. In fact, Louis claimed that Spain had broken the Peace of the Pyrenees by invading Portugal, thus freeing Louis from his obligations to the treaty.

The first opportunity to interfere directly into the diplomatic affairs of the Spanish Netherlands came in 1662 with the arrival in Paris of a Dutch delegation for the

35 Historical Manuscripts Commission, The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote (Norwich, England: "Norfolk Chronicle" Co., Ltd., 1899), pp. 40-1, letter of Sir Richard Fanshawe to Clarendon, November 16, 1662 in which he wrote that a secretary of Mazarin had arrived from France and was lodged at Schomberg's house. The man was being called Monsieur de Corneton but was really "Charles Colbert du Terron." Colbert had brought an offer of an additional twenty thousand men and "other assistances" for the king of Portugal if the king did not conclude a peace with Castile. See also B.N., Nouvelles Acquisitions françaises MS 10,235, fol. 162 for copies of letters lent to Schomberg by Louvois.

36 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la d'Espagne, I, part 2, 108. While supporting the rebellion by the Portuguese, Louis also did not want the rebellion to be terminated. In a letter written to Turenne on August 15, 1663, Louis instructed Turenne to persuade the Spanish in any way possible that they should not compromise in their dealings with Portugal. See also B.N., Manuscripts francaises, MS 11,231, fol. 29, and for a copy of a memoir from Louis to Colbert dated August 17, 1663, instructing Colbert to send 43,000 livre to Turenne for a payment to Portugal see B.N., Manuscripts francaises, MS 7,065, fol. 174.

purpose of discussing the renewal of the Franco-Dutch alliance. Both countries felt that they could profit from the alliance but for different reasons. The Dutch were afraid that Charles II of England would interfere in the United Provinces, attempting to force upon the States General the reestablishment of the ruling rights of the Prince of Orange, Charles' nephew. Furthermore, the Dutch feared English renewal of anti-Dutch commercial activities which would probably result in another war. Another fear of the Dutch, centered on the recent enforcement taxes on foreign imports by Jean Baptiste Colbert, finance minister of France. When he came into power, Colbert supported the 50-sous-a-ton tax on foreign ships hoping that the tax "would overcome the advantages of the Dutch, who were able to build, man, and operate a ship much more cheaply than the French." In the summer of 1661, two Dutch ships sailed out of the harbor at Dieppe rather than pay the tax. To placate the Dutch, Colbert did change the ruling that provided that the Dutch should only pay the 50-sous once a

38 The first Franco-Dutch treaty of alliance and Marine was signed June 8, 1657.

39 The States-General was composed of delegates from a loose confederation of the seven northern provinces of the Netherlands and was established by the Union of Utrecht of 1579. The States-General, in 1653, had delivered administrative powers into the hands of John de Witt, the chief executive or grand pensionary, thus excluding the Prince of Orange, William III, from the monarchy.
voyage, and not both on entering and leaving a port.  

The Dutch were also fearful of the newly-formed French East and West India Companies.

Finally, Dutch fears reached a climax when they learned of a French proposal to England in March 1661, in which the French offered to co-operate in challenging the United Provinces for their primacy on the seas and in commerce. Therefore, by negotiating a Franco-Dutch alliance, the Dutch hoped to detach France from England, gain an ally in case of hostilities with England, secure a revocation of the tariffs, and prevent the reestablishment of the House of Orange as a ruling family by William of Orange, the Orange party or Orangists, as they were called.

At this time, France had as much if not more to gain than the United Provinces by the renewal of the Franco-Dutch alliance. Louis, like De Witt, was very apprehensive about the possible rise of the Orangist party and the emergence of William Orange as Stadtholder and ruler of


41Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique, VI, part 3, 136 and B.N., Manuscripts françaises MSS 17,399, fols. 397-403 and MSS 17,401, fols. 3-14.

42The Stadtholder was military leader during the time of emergency of five of the seven northern Dutch
the United Provinces. Not only would William of Orange look to England but all indications pointed to a rebellion within the Provinces if the Orangists came to power.\(^43\) Secondly, the alliance would certainly move the United Provinces closer to France, lessening English influence.\(^44\) And thirdly, the alliance would isolate Spanish troops in the Spanish Netherlands, while at the same time, securing a commitment from the Dutch about French rights in the Spanish Netherlands.\(^45\)

With so much at stake for both countries, the envoys of France and the United Provinces signed the Treaty of Paris on April 22, 1662. The terms of the treaty provided provinces. The remaining two provinces were under the House of Nassau.

\(^43\)Jean De Witt, Lettres et négociations entre Mr. Jean de Witt, ed. G. Boreel et P. de Groot (Amsterdam: Janssens-Waesberge, 1725), III, 257 (hereafter cited as De Witt, Lettres et négociations).

\(^44\)At this time Louis felt that an Anglo-Dutch coalition against France would be threatening to France. Colbert elaborated upon this idea later when he asserted that any two of the three states, i.e., England, The United Provinces, and France, would normally be able to defeat the other power. See Jean Baptiste Colbert, Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert, ed. Pierre Clément (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1866), III, 208 (hereafter cited as Colbert, Lettres).

\(^45\)Spanish envoys had been trying to negotiate an alliance with the Dutch for the mutual protection of the Spanish Netherlands. See Mignet, Négociations relatives à la d'Espagne, I, part 2, 245-56. cf. D'Estrades, Lettres, . . ., d'Estrades, III, 277; Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne. . . XVIIe siècle, IV, 732-59, letters between Philip IV and his ambassador to Brussels, instructing him to stop Louis' influence with the Dutch.
for a defensive alliance between the two countries. If the United Provinces were attacked, France could supply the Dutch with a 12,000 man army or could elect to pay the Dutch 10,000 francs a month for every one thousand soldiers. And, if France were attacked, the Dutch could supply France with an army of 6,000 men or could elect to pay France 10,000 francs a month for every thousand soldiers. The treaty was for twenty-five years. But the provisions of the treaty would be tested within two years. 46

By 1662, the French diplomats were busy at their tasks, trying to arrange alliances and neutralize any countries on France's eastern borders that could interfere with Louis' future plans for the Spanish Netherlands.

Taking advantage of the rivalries of the cantons of Switzerland, French diplomats and money, negotiated the Franco-Swiss Treaty of 1663. 47 In exchange for French money this treaty ensured a passageway from Switzerland to France for the Swiss mercenaries fighting in the French armies. 48 In addition, by allying Switzerland to France, French diplomats had made Switzerland a negligible factor in any future alliances that might be formed to halt

46Vast, Les grands traités... Louis XIV, I, 143.

47Ibid., I, 158.

France's aggressiveness.

By 1663, Louis appears to have formulated his ideas about how to seize the Spanish Netherlands. D'Estrades, who had recently been appointed ambassador to the United Provinces, was questioned by De Witt about Louis' future plans for the Spanish Netherlands. D'Estrades admitted to De Witt that Louis regarded Maria Theresa's renunciation of her rights to the Spanish succession in the Treaty of the Pyrenees as invalid. In an attempt to get Dutch acceptance of Louis' interpretation of the renunciation of rights, De Witt was asked what plan for dismemberment of the Spanish Netherlands would be acceptable to the Dutch Republic. While any scheme for dividing up the Spanish Netherlands was repugnant to De Witt, after some hesitation

49 De Witt, Lettres et négociations, IV, 233. De Witt and the Dutch were very concerned about the future of the Spanish Netherlands, particularly Antwerp, which was viewed by the merchants of Amsterdam as a potential threat to their commerce and industry if France tried to re-vitalize Antwerp as a trading and commercial center.

50 D'Estrades, Lettres..., d'Estrades, III, 287-91. See also, Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne ..., XVIIe siècle, IV, 760-1. In a letter to Philip dated July 12, 1663, Caracena informs Philip that it is rumored that Louis XIV married Maria Theresa just to be able to claim Brabant by succession.

51 Lonchay, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne..., XVIIe siècle, IV, 763-7. In an exchange of letters between Philip and Caracena, Philip learns of the proposed plan of dismemberment of the Spanish Netherlands, rejects it outright, and instructs Caracena to begin fortifying the fortresses and villages in case of an attack by the French.
he proposed a tentative plan for the partitioning of the provinces. His proposal called for a frontier boundary that would run from Ostend to Maastricht, leaving Ypres, Courtrai, Audenarde, Alost, Brussels, and Louvain in French possession. However, this proposal was not acceptable to the other Dutch provinces and was rejected outright by them. De Witt submitted a second plan, proposing the establishment of a South Netherlands Republic which would be allied to the United Provinces, with the guarantee of the protection of France.  

While the conferences concerning the partitioning of the Spanish Netherlands dragged on, the French legal advisers to Louis found an old medieval law that was still on the law books of several of the provinces in the Spanish Netherlands - Brabant, Molines, Namur, and Hainault. The law, entitled Jus Devolutionis (law of devolution), had been used legally in the courts only a few times. Jus Devolutionis was a local custom in force in only those few provinces and dealt with the succession of titles and land. But particularly it referred to private property in which the succession went to the children of the first wife to the exclusion of the children of the first wife to the exclusion of the children.  

52 D'Estrades, Lettres, . . . d'Estrades, IV, 316-7.  

53 The jurist usually referred to in developing the legal argument is Louis Leblanc. He served as one of the personal secretaries of Louis XIV.
of the second wife whenever a man married more than once. For Louis and his ministers, who were always seeking a legal justification for their overt and aggressive acts, the law, Jus Devolutionis, was the answer to the legal problems involved in advancing the claims of Louis and his wife so the Spanish Netherlands.

Therefore, according to Louis' legal advisers, Maria Theresa, rather than her half-brother Carlos of Spain, would be entitled to some of the provinces in the Spanish Netherlands upon the death of their father, Philip IV. With his wife's legal rights supported by the law of Jus Devolutionis, a provincial law of Brabant, Louis could afford to wait for the opportunity to assert these rights. And knowing that his future plans for acquiring the Spanish Netherlands were legally "justified," Louis apparently decided that he no longer needed the opinions or consent of the Dutch towards his plans. Without further ado, Louis instructed D'Estrades to terminate the discussions with De Witt by allowing them to drift aimlessly and pointlessly. These instructions were given to D'Estrades even while De Witt and his advisers were still attempting to find some possible solution to the demands of Louis XIV.

54 Louis XIV, Œuvres, V, 204, letter of Louis to D'Estrades, October 28, 1664 and B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 7,065, fol. 260.
However, neither Louis nor De Witt had the time nor the opportunity to resolve the issues that separated them from any sort of compromise because of the mushrooming hostilities between England and the United Provinces which in 1664 finally broke out into open warfare between the two countries. Charles II had given New Netherlands to his brother, James, the Duke of York. In January 1664, the Duke of York had sent a military expedition to North America to claim the land for him. The expedition took possession of New Netherlands from the Dutch West India Company and renamed it after James, calling it New York. Between January and May, 1664, an English squadron had sailed along the southwestern coast of Africa, seizing Dutch slaving posts at Goree, Cape Coast Castle and the Gold Coast. After learning of these English attacks upon their colonies, the States-General in August, 1664, ordered Admiral De Ruyter to recapture the Guinea colonies.

With full-scale war eminent, De Witt sent Coenraad Van Beuningen as ambassador extraordinary to Paris in December 1664 to secure French military support in accordance with the provisions of the Franco-Dutch treaty of

But Louis' major concern was not his obligation to the Dutch as stipulated in the treaty, but instead, how to prevent this war from disrupting his future plans for seizing territory in the Spanish Netherlands. To gain more time in which he and his military staff could try and work out some viable solution to the predicament, Louis instructed D'Estrades "to offer hope to the Dutch," for French assistance in the immediate future. Furthermore, in order to help Louis determine just how much the Dutch were depending upon French aid, D'Estrades should find out if the Dutch government would accede to French occupation of the Spanish Netherlands or a portion thereof in return for French military aid. Surprised at this request,

56 John De Witt, Lettres et négociations entre Mr. Jean de Witt et Messieurs les plénipotentiaires des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas, ed. G. Boreel et P. de Groot (Amsterdam: Chez les Janssens-Weesberge, 1725), II, 384 (hereafter cited as De Witt, Lettres et négociations); Lonchay, Correspondance, IV, 307, Letter of Castel-Rodrigo to Philip IV explaining that the Dutch are very unhappy with France.

57 Charles II, king of Great Britain, The Letters, Speeches, and Declarations of King Charles II, ed. Sir Arthur Bryant (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1968), pp. 165-6 (hereafter cited as Charles II, Letters... King Charles II) letter to Henrietta, October 17, 1664, in which Charles proposed an Anglo-French treaty that stated that all he desired was "that the Dutch may not enjoy any privileges in France, which shall be denied to my subjects..." Therefore, if Louis entered into an agreement with the Dutch, he jeopardized relations with Charles.

58 D'Estrades, Lettres...d'Estrades, III, 234.
De Witt replied angrily to D'Estrades that "the point at issue is whether or not His Majesty is willing to implement the treaty of 1662, not whether Holland should sign a new treaty that would probably be honoured no more than the old." 59

With military assistance from their French ally questionable at this time, De Witt and the States-General had to reassess their strength and ability to single-handedly engage England in a full-scale war. 60 While the Dutch were pondering their next move, Louis was carefully but steadily preparing the groundwork to his plans that would allow France to occupy the Spanish Netherlands. However, before either side could act on the problem of the Spanish Netherlands, the eruption of the Anglo-Dutch War demanded immediate attention.


60 B.N., Manuscripts francaises MS 6,919, fol. 38, letter of D'Estrades to Lionne, November 8, 1664, in which D'Estrades asserted that De Witt was "under no illusions," England "was bound to win in the end."
Chapter II

The Anglo-Dutch War of 1665-1667 was not an unexpected event. Tensions between the English and Dutch had been building for over a half century. And since the restoration of Charles to the throne in 1660 the relations between the two countries had been severely strained. Although there were a number of reasons for the commencement of war between England and the United Provinces, the foremost cause was the long-existing commercial rivalry which had produced a series of armed engagements on land and at sea, in their colonies, foreign ports, and at home. While most of these clashes were isolated incidents, the bitterness that these acts invoked, added to the growing hostilities between the two countries. The most serious conflict growing out of the commercial rivalry was the First Dutch War, 1652-1654, often referred to as the Anglo-Dutch War 1652-1654. The English merchants, particularly the

1 Most historians have agreed with the historical interpretation that the Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-54 was grounded upon economic terms. It is a well-known fact that the Dutch responded angrily to the newly-enacted restrictions by England upon free trade in English colonies and to fishing rights off of the English and New Foundland coasts. But Pieter Geyl, the late Dutch historian, offers a different perspective in his Orange and Stuart 1641-72, trans. by Arnold Pomerans (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1969), pp. 86-9 and 190. Geyl believed the Dutch did use
London merchants, were jealous of the Dutch commercial prosperity, and were anxious and willing to see England wage another war against the United Provinces, hoping to reap another bountiful profit during the war and after the war, such as occurred after the first Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-1654. "No Endeavours were wanting in England to set the negotiations for a truce as a "lever to consolidate her commercial supremacy," but that the English motives were more ideological than economic. Furthermore, the Dutch were forced into refusing the English proposals because of the Stuart-Orange politico-family entanglement. In contrast to this first war, as Geyl explained, the causes of the second Anglo-Dutch war "were purely economic."


3Wilson, Power and Profit, pp. 145-51. Wilson refutes this idea, believing instead, that contrary to existing ideas, the years from 1664 to 1667 gave English merchants little reason to suppose that further wars against the Dutch offered a way out of their difficulties, much less a certain hope of expansion. See also Pepys, Diary, VI, 183-235, VII, 64-191; Edward Hyde Clarendon, Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon (Oxford: At the Clarendon printing-house, 1761), II, 373-435; Keith Felling, British Foreign Policy 1660-1672 (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1930), pp. 83-138.
both City and Country against the Hollanders, as Incroach-ers on the Commerce of the English Merchants.\(^4\)

Even though Charles II appeared hesitant about engaging in a costly war with the Dutch, he "was incessantly jealous of the Dutch fleet." And since the "navy and English sea-power were his real political passions," as Feil- ing notes, Charles could use the war as an excuse to increase the size of his fleet.\(^5\) Charles, like other Stuart kings before him, was in debt and always in need of additional money. Although the Restoration Parliament had voted him an annual payment, the account was in arrears and Charles was in debt.\(^6\) Therefore, Charles hoped, that by engaging in war with the commercial rival of England, he could coerce Parliament to grant him the large subsidies that he needed to financially operate the military and government.\(^7\) Charles was correct in his assumption. The normally parsimonious House of Commons voted \(£2,500,000\) to equip the fleet, what amounted to an enormous sum at

\(^4\)Pepys, Diary, VI, 212.

\(^5\)Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 25.

\(^6\)Public Record Office. Calendar of Treasury Annals: 1660-1664, CXII, 84. Charles had accumulated debts while living in exile on the continent.

\(^7\)Cobbett's Parliamentary History, VI, "Kings call for war," 297-302.
that time.  

Apparently, Charles also hoped that a successful war against the United-Provinces might force upon the States-General the re-establishment of the ruling rights of the Prince of Orange, the nephew of Charles II.  

Yet, Charles displayed an attitude of ambivalence about actually engaging in war. As late as September 1664, in a letter to his mother, Charles wrote that he was "almost the only man in [his] kingdom who doth not desire war." But many other English leaders did oppose the war and their efforts were directed towards the maintenance of peace. 


\[9\]Charles II had been left the guardianship of William upon the death of William's mother in 1660. D'Estrades sent a letter to Lionne claiming that many of the deputies of the States-General were willing to conclude a peace on English terms, even to elevating the Prince of Orange to his titular offices. D'Estrades, Lettres, d'Estrades, III, 214-5. According to Geyl, Orange and Stuart, p. 194, the public at large was pro-Orange. England was receiving reports of all debates on the orangist dissension in the States-General from Van Ruyven, a secret agent of England.  

peace.\textsuperscript{11} All attempts to keep peace were futile. Through the early months of 1664, the advocates of war against the Dutch urged the English government to retaliate. Demands for indemnities for English losses were pressed upon the Parliament. Thus, while Charles was being assured by Lord George Downing,\textsuperscript{12} the English ambassador at The Hague, that England should challenge the Dutch supremacy of the seas and their commercial dominance, because the Dutch would not go to war, the English government was allowed to drift closer to war.\textsuperscript{13} During the last half of 1664, the actions taken by England became more bellicose.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11}Earl of Clarendon, Lord Southampton, Arlington, William Coventry. See also Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic: 1663-1664, XXXVIII; Pepys, Diary, vols. V-VIII; Lee, Cabal; Barbour, Arlington; and Clarendon, Life, III-IV.

\textsuperscript{12}Downing, ambassador to The Hague in 1657-1658 and again from 1661 to 1665, was adament in his belief that the Dutch would not go to war, no matter how much the English badgered Dutch ships and shipping. He based this judgment upon the fact that the Dutch were still paying off war debts, were so divided amongst themselves, and were too worried about business loses in case of war. See Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, Holland: 1664-65, CLXXII, 375-490, letters from Downing to Clarendon and Charles II; also Clarendon, Life, III, 371, letters from Downing to Clarendon.

\textsuperscript{13}Charles II, Letters, p. 159. In a letter to Henrietta, June 2, 1664, Charles wrote, "I never saw so great an appetite to a war as is, in both this town and country, especially in Parliament, men, who, I am confident, would pawn their estates to maintain a war."

\textsuperscript{14}Cobbett's Parliamentary History, VI, 292. Resolution of both Houses of Parliament against the Dutch.
uary 1665, the English had taken over a hundred Dutch ships in what had now become a war of reprisals.\footnote{Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, Holland, CLXXII, 437.}

The more immediate causes of the war were the attack and seizures of each other's colonies in 1664 and early 1665. Deciding in January 1664 that the American colonial system needed reorganization, the English ministry granted a large tract of land to the Duke of York. An expedition was sent to the colonies under the leadership of Richard Nicolls, who took New Amsterdam in August 1664.\footnote{Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series: 1664, XXIII, 190-225.} At the same time, an armed expedition was attacking and securing the coast of Africa. The Dutch had blockaded the African coast between the years 1661-1664, and the English merchants wanted protection and revenge. Under the command of Robert Holmes, the English captured Cape Verde and Goree in January 1664, and controlled Africa's Gold Coast by May of that year.\footnote{Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series: 1664, XXIII, 213.}

In June 1664, after the post had remained vacant for two years, the Dutch sent an ambassador to London. Whatever the real intentions for finally filling the vacancy, to Charles it seemed to confirm the impression that
the Dutch did not want to fight, but instead wanted to negotiate. But, after hearing about Holmes' attacks in July, the States-General ordered Admiral De Ruyter to proceed to the African coast and recapture the Guinea posts. The news of his victories reached London in December 1664. The English responded with an attack upon the Dutch Smyrna fleet off Cadiz as it was sailing back home in January, 1665. The Dutch retaliated with orders to their commanders to attack any English ships in European waters.

England officially issued a declaration of war on March 4, 1665. Although most of the fighting was limited to naval engagements, land battles were fought in colonial possessions, along the English seacoast, and in the United Provinces.

Because of the terms of the offensive and defensive alliance between the United Provinces and France, 1662, De Witt and military leaders of the United Provinces

---

18 Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 132.

19 John De Witt, Lettres et négociations entre Mr. Jean De Witt, ed. by G. Boreel et P. de Groot (Amsterdam: Janssons-Waesberge, 1725), II, 383.

20 Barbour, Arlington, p. 98. The English government first learned of De Ruyter's sailing and destination in October when Arlington received a letter from Downing dated September 23, 1664.

counted on a rapid compliance by the French government in sending French ships to aid the Dutch navy and also French troops to support the Dutch troops in the war against the English.\(^2\) De Witt sent Coenrad Van Beuningen to Paris in December 1664 to replace the ambassador Johann Boreel. Because his son served the Prince of Orange, Boreel was suspected of being pro-Orange and thus pro-English.\(^3\) At this point, De Witt needed French aid and he could not take any chances with a man not really equal to the task.\(^4\) Replying to Van Beuningen's request for immediate assistance, Louis maintained that he "was not required to take part in the war for four months." Furthermore, since the French considered the Dutch as the aggressors in the contest, Louis was under no obligations to the treaty.\(^5\) And


\(^3\)Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, Venice: 1662-1666, XXXIV, 63.


\(^5\)Special instructions were sent to Lord Denzil Holles ambassador in Paris, urging him to convince Louis of the fact that the Dutch were the aggressors. Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, France: 1664-65, CXIX, 203-74, letters dated December 31, 1664 and February 11, 1665. See also A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 85, fol. 118. See also Charles II, Letters, p. 173, Letter to Madame, dated December 26, 1664, in which Charles sent her a paper which he declares will show that the Dutch "are the aggressors and the
since the quarrel "being for pretensions and rights out of Europe," France was offered still another reason to feel freed of their treaty obligations with the United Provinces "which expressly limits" the provisions to Europe.\(^{26}\)

However, Louis XIV vacillated for a number of reasons. For one thing, Louis XIV did not wish to antagonize the English, not only because of the family ties, but because of the hope of improving relations between England and France.\(^{27}\) Louis certainly had every reason to believe that England wanted to improve upon their tepid relations with France as evidenced in Charles' letters to Henrietta, i.e., "... and when the general treaty is concluded. ..." Charles wrote, "then we can conclude the real treaty which

breakers of the peace, and not we." And in a letter written to Madame on January 5, 1665, Charles claims that "by the Treaty," Louis "is only to defend them in case they be attacked," and since the Dutch are the attackers Louis is not obliged to help them, p. 174.


will display...that kindness and friendship which I have always desired there should be between the King, my brother, and myself." 28 And in another letter written October 3 to Henrietta, Charles stated that he was "very glad to see the King, my brother so ready to make a good friendship with me..." 29 Charles asked Louis to remain neutral in the contest and in return Louis could do whatever he wished in the Spanish Netherlands. 30 Louis and Lionne pursued the offer but Charles declined to discuss the matter any further. 31

But Charles continued his appeals for friendship with France. In January, he wrote to Madame that he was expecting to soon conclude the treaty of commerce between England and France and then the two states could "enter upon the strict alliance." Then Charles explains that "I prefer the friendship with France in the first place, in case I can have it," but in closing, threatens "I can


29 Ibid., p. 165.


make very considerable friendships elsewhere."  

That Louis had more important reasons for delaying his entrance into the war, becomes very evident. Fearing that if he joined with either belligerent, it would drive the other power into an alliance with Spain, Louis attempted to bring about peace between England and the United Provinces through his mediation. Although Louis displayed such apathy that it appeared he wished to remain neutral, he apparently was afraid of neutrality.


33 Lee, The Cabal, p. 85, not only agrees with this idea but adds that at the beginning of the Anglo-Dutch War, Louis believed that if he attacked Spain, she would join the non-ally of France. However, Lee asserts that, on the contrary, the Spanish attitude toward England hardened during the year of 1665 and the Spanish were relieved when France declared war on England. See Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 142; Geyl, Orange and Stuart, pp. 194-5; D'Estrades, Lettres, II, 491, Letter of D'Estrades to Louis, December 18, 1664; IV, 259, Letter of Louis to D'Estrades, December 19, 1664.


35 Moths Round the Flame (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936), p. 158. Geoffrey F. Hall believes that Henrietta "was mainly responsible for French neutrality when England went to war with Holland."
Lord Downing was so convinced of continued French neutrality that he wrote to Clarendon in January that England "could take whatever steps necessary to bring Holland to her knees" because the Dutch no longer believe that the French king will live up to his alliances. 36 His letter was reinforced by a letter in January from Van Ruyven, the English secret agent in The Hague, who claimed France "would not fulfill her obligations" to the Dutch. 37

By remaining neutral, Louis would be neglecting his pledges to the United Provinces, thereby inviting economic retaliation since the Dutch carried French goods. 38 Not only did the Dutch carry French commerce, they built many of the ships used by the French. 39 After England declared war, the Dutch refused to allow the French to pick up three ships of war (frigates) that had been purchased by the French at Amsterdam. 40 The Dutch reasoned that they

36 Clarendon, Life, II, 287.
40 Fanshawe, Letters, p. 188, in a letter to Lord Belayse at Tangier, May 5, 1665, Fanshawe wrote that "a very ill understanding" had occurred between France and
needed the ships for their own war with England and offered to pay a compensatory sum. Colbert obtained a decree from the **Conseil d'en haut** that would allow the French government to seize all ships belonging to the Dutch that were in French ports. To prevent Louis from using this incident as a further pretext for not sending them aid, the Dutch agreed to the French demands.

Louis also feared an English victory because it would assure England of naval supremacy. Also an English victory might reestablish the Prince of Orange in the United Provinces, allowing Charles to control their policies.

Holland because the Dutch were holding for their own service three "great frigates built in Holland for the French King." "How far this will be resented," continued Fanshawe, "more than already it is and what further influence it may have as to our affairs a little time will show."

---


43 De Beauval, Annales, II, 131.

44 Godefroi, Louis, comte d'Estrades, Correspondance authentique de Godefroi, Comte d'Estrades (Paris: E. Champion, 1924), III, 280-95, Letters of Louis to d'Estrades, December 19, 1664 and July 30, 1665. See also Pagès, Revue historique, p. 65.

45 J. Dumont, Corps universal diplomatique de droit des gens (Amsterdam: Chez F. Brunel, R. et G. Wetstein,
In a final bid for peace, Louis selected as ambassadors extraordinary to London, the Duke of Verneuil, who was a son of Henri IV, as well as uncle of both Louis and Charles, and the Duke of Courtin. Their mission, which became known as la célèbre ambassade, extraordinaire, lasted from April 15 until December 10, 1665. Two offers of peace were made by the special French embassy to the English government. The first offer in May 1665 was rejected outright. As Verneuil reported, "the insulting reply given to me," was that the English navy was more likely to "win peace than French diplomacy." After the English fleet defeated the Dutch at Lowestoft on June 12, 1665, in a battle where over two hundred ships were involved, the French government became even more concerned. Louis obtained further Dutch concessions and the French ambassadors made another offer of peace to England on August 5.


46 Henri IV, the first Bourbon king of France, 1589-1610.


48 A.A.E., Correspondence Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 85, fol. 193.

49 De Witt, Lettres, III, 104-56. See especially letter to Van Beuningen, in which the States-General
In the meantime, Louis received reports that the Baron of Wreden, envoy of the Bishop of Münster, had signed a treaty in London on June 13. According to the terms of the treaty with England, the Bishop of Münster was to attack the Dutch with an army of thirty-thousand men for which he would receive 500,000 rixdahlers in three installments. The Bishop of Münster and the United-Provinces had long contested each other's rights over land lying between them. In July and August Sir William Temple negotiated the arrangements for the payment of the money at the town of Coesvelt and the Bishop, who had been massing his troops on the Frisian border declared war against the Dutch in September and attacked the province of Overyssel. Even before the attack by the Bishop of

50 Bishop of Münster, Bernhard Christoph von Galen, had also visited the Emperor in October 1664 and had signed treaties of alliance with Brandenburg and Neuburg.


52 Geyl, Orange and Stuart, p. 202; Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, III, part 2, 422.

53 Arlington, Letters, I, 1-12. See also Mignet,
Münster, Louis had warned the English government and the Bishop that France would not "sit idly by" but would come to "the defense of Holland."^54

In what seemed like a deliberate attempt to provoke Louis, the English began capturing French merchant ships along the Atlantic coast. Colbert sent orders to the seacoast towns warning them that "English frigates take all the French vessels they meet, pretending then to be bound for Holland or Zeeland."^55 Louis could wait no longer, he informed The Hague and London that if England persisted in her refusal of peace terms, he would declare war on England.^56

Louis XIV's motives for delaying any French action in the war, however, appear to be much more complicated. For example, Herbert H. Rowen^57 believes that Louis antic-

54 B.N., Manuscript française, Ms 15,889, fol. 325, letters of Lionne to the Bishop of Münster July 10, 1665, and to Comminges July 9, 1665. Letter of Louis to D'Estrades July 17, 1665, informing D'Estrades that notices had been given to London and Münster.


ipated a stalemate, which would have given him time to strengthen his own fleet which included 110 ships, 3700 guns and 22,000 men\textsuperscript{58} and at the same time, would have weakened England and the United Provinces.\textsuperscript{59} Another reason for Louis XIV's delaying tactics before entering the war, while still attempting to re-establish peace, was Louis' apparent concern, similar to De Witt's, that if the English were victorious, the Orange faction would come into power in the state of Holland and gain control of all of the United Provinces.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, not only did Louis have to prevent one power from winning a complete


\textsuperscript{59} Letter, Louis to D'Estrades, August 21, 1665, A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Suède, Vol. 31, fol. 19. cf. Feiling, Policy, p. 149, writes that Louis, after his attempts at mediation, was ready "to leave the two sea powers engaged in a lingering war." Ogg, Charles II, p. 249, supporting this same view, states that "the Catholic Lion of the world was genuinely anxious that the heretic dogs, England and Holland, should weaken themselves by conflict." cf. Osmond Airy, who asserts that Louis XIV did not wish to engage France in the war because "he was afraid the war might spread." The English Restoration and Louis XIV (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895), p. 136. This book is very good for the presentation of relations between Charles II and Louis XIV, cf. John Oldmixon stated that the French "desired to see the English hereticks destroy the Dutch, that they might the more easily destroy the English afterwards." The History of England During the Reigns of the Royal House of Stuart (London: Printed for John Pemberton under the Royal Exchange, 1780), pp. 517-8.

\textsuperscript{60} Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, III, part 1, 414.
victory he had to also prevent a union of the two maritime powers, which would have presented "an insurmountable obstacle to the projects of France in the Low Countries."\(^6^1\)

Yet, Louis tenaciously continued to seek a peaceful settlement. His father-in-law, Philip IV of Spain died on September 17, 1665 and Carlos II, only four years old, had become king under a regency guided by his mother, Anna Maria. Apparently, Louis still felt that peace between the two belligerants was possible. Through Vernueil and Courtin peace terms were again offered to England in October, 1665.\(^6^2\) Although the terms included almost all possessions of land and reparations the English were asking from the Dutch, England issued a declaration of refusal on November 7, 1665.\(^6^3\)

Louis recalled his envoys from England. And with the Bishop of Münster having taken Overyssel and most of Groningen by the end of November, Louis, fearing not only


\(^{63}\) Foiling, Foreign Policy, 149.
a Dutch defeat and danger to his own alliance system, but
the end to his plans for the occupation of the Spanish
Netherlands, issued a declaration of war against England
on January 16, 1666. If the antagonists refused his of­
ers for mediation, then Louis decided to use French
entrance into the war as the long-awaited opportunity to
set into operation his plans for occupation of the Spanish
Netherlands. Not only would he, at last, fulfill his
treaty obligations with the Dutch but he would "protect
his interests in the Low-Countries."  

On October 29, 1665, Louis had ordered Marshal
Henri Turenne to reconnoitre a line of approach through
the Spanish Netherlands in order to reach the beseiged
provinces of Groningen, Friesland, Overyssel, and
Drenthe. Earlier in the same month, Louis had demanded
a passage across the Spanish Netherlands from the Spanish
ambassador at Paris, the Marquis de la Fuente. However,

64 Longnon (ed.), Mémores de Louis XIV, II, 4-8.

65 Geyl, Orange and Stuart, 215. Geyl states that
Louis felt "it was a blow" to his pride that he had not
been able to bring about a negotiated peace especially
since Philip IV's death "had brought the Spanish prize
within his reach."

66 Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne de Turenne, Mémores
du Marechel de Turenne (Paris: Renouard, H. Laurens,
1909-1914), I, 293-345. (Hereafter cited as Turenne,
Mémores).

67 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession
before the six thousand French troops could cross the border, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Don Francesco de Moura Cortereal Castel-Rodrigo, refused to allow the French troops passage across the Spanish Netherlands to intercept the Bishop of Münster. Rather than clash with the Spanish at this time, Louis ordered Turenne to conduct the French army through Liège and Maestricht, avoiding land under Spanish control.68

Meanwhile, England responded to France's declaration of war. England officially declared war on France on February 20, 1666.69 Apparently Louis had anticipated

d'Espagne, III, part 2, 423. See also Lonchay (ed.), Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne... XVIIe siècle, IV, 214. Letter from Castel-Rodrigo to Philip IV.

68 Turenne, Mémoires, I, 312. Turenne claimed that Louis "was not quite ready to swallow the Low Countries; though he would do so if Castel-Rodrigo refused leave for the French contingent to march through his territories." See also Lonchay (ed.), Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne... XVIIe siècle, V, 2-7; Castel-Rodrigo in letters to La Fuente and to Esteban de Gamarra, ambassador at The Hague, expressed considerable astonishment that rumors were circulating about the possibility of a rupture with France or possible clashes with the French army.

his own entrance into the war and had demanded guarantees from the Dutch. One of these demands was that the United Provinces would not enter into separate negotiations with England. The States-General voted unanimously for this guarantee on November 13 and D'Estrades sent Louis a message confirming this vote on November 14.70 Louis also wanted the Dutch to recall their ambassador to London, Van Goch. He was recalled on December 11, 1665.71 Louis decided to help the Dutch fleet and in October 1665, ordered the French fleet to move from the Mediterranean Sea to the English Channel.72 However, the French fleet had to be outfitted and manned and it was late spring, 1666, before the fleet was ready to sail.73 The French fleet of thirty ships, under the command of the Duke of Beaufort, did not arrive in northern France until September 1666, remaining instead off the coast of Portugal.74 And,

70 D'Estrades, Correspondance, III, 212, letter to Louis dated November 14, 1665.


73 Fanshawe, Original Letters, II, 243, letter of William Blunden to Fanshawe, dated March 29, 1666, stating that the French fleet would not be ready to sail "for a month, the delay being caused by their extreme want of men."

74 Petrus Johannes Blok, History of the People of
when the Anglo-Dutch war ended in 1667, the French fleet still had not fought a naval battle with the home-based English fleet. Except for the French fleet, which was active in the English colonies, capturing St. Kitts, Antigua, and Surinam and even threatening New York, Louis (for the remainder of 1666) "engaged in the war as little as possible."75

However, France's diplomats were far from inactive. They had been instructed to mediate a peace between England and the United Provinces and France as soon as possible, gain allies while isolating England, and prepare the path for occupation of the Spanish Netherlands.76 And the task which lay before the French diplomats was a formidable one.

The most urgent problem for the French was to eliminate the Bishop of Münster and his army as a threat to the Netherlands, trans. by Oscar A. Bierstadt (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898-1907), III, 326. The Dutch were expecting at least forty French ships to aid them in their attack of the English fleet planned for June 1666. See also Fanshawe, Original Letters, II, 201, in a letter to Downing, dated August 19, 1666, refers to the French fleet still looking for seamen.

75 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VIII, part 2, 286.

76 D'Estrades, Lettres...d'Estrades, IV, letters of Louis to D'Estrades, November 25 and December 10, 1665, and January 9 and 11, 1666; Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, III, part 2, 423-6.
the Dutch. Turenne had placed the French army under the command of Lieutenant-General Pradel, who joined forces with the Dutch at the village of Arnheim. The French soldiers made themselves very unpopular by pillaging, looting, and paying for "nothing as they passed" or paying with "false money." HowevHowever, Pradel and his small army were very successful against the army of the Bishop of Münster and by December 1665, the Bishop of Münster was evacuating all of the territory he had gained. At the same time that Louis had ordered his troops north to stop the Bishop of Münster, Louis had also instructed his diplomats to separate the Bishop from his friends and would-be allies. Thus while waiting for the winter to end and a new spring campaign to begin, the Bishop of Münster watched himself being isolated while preparations were made for the invasion of Münster.

The isolation of Münster began with a diplomatic courtship by France of the Great Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg. In October 1665, the Elector had

77 William Temple, Letters...Containing an Account of the Most Important Transactions...in Christendom from 1665 to 1672 (London: J. Tonson, 1700), I, 96.

78 Turenne, Mémoires, II, 175.

79 B. N., Manuscripts française, MS 17,406, fols. 288, 293, 301, and 302, letters of Lionne to D’Estrades, Vernueil and Courtin, Comminges.

80 Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 132,
moved most of his army to the Rhine River in the area of the duchy of Cleves. Apparently, the Elector was concerned about the French army which was located in the area, fighting the Bishop of Münster's troops. Also, the Elector feared that the Dutch would be driven into conceding the town of Wesel to France. Because Wesel was located in territory belonging to him and because he felt that other concessions might be forthcoming, the Elector went to Cleves in late November. Upon his arrival there, the Elector found himself courted by a host of ambassadors. Representing Louis to the Elector, was a counselor of the Elector of Cologne, William Egon Count von Fürstenberg and Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Croissy.

England, hoping to ally Frederick William to their cause, sent Sir Walter Vane, an inexperienced diplomat. Louis initially sent Pierre du Molin to the Elector urging the Elector to "come to the defense of Holland."

Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 160.

Geyl, Orange and Stuart, p. 217, has the Elector travelling to Cleves in December.

Lonchay (ed.), Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne... XVIIe siècle, IV, 214-6, instructions from Lionne to Fürstenberg and Colbert de Terron. They are instructed to assure Frederick William that France will continue to support him in his grievances with the Dutch. Louis would then hope for aid to the Dutch cause and especially aid in halting the Bishop of Münster. See also Goubert, Louis XIV, p. 106.
Vane was instructed to propose a league of England, Münster and Brandenburg. For his part in the league, the Elector could expect that the Prince of Orange would be restored, that all of the fortresses on the Rhine River would be returned to him, and the Elector would receive a subsidy of £100,000. However, the English cause was not well received because of the capture in August of two of the Elector's ships by the English. Still, other factors were also at work against the English attempts to secure the Elector's friendship.

Because of the advantages offered by a friendship with France, the Elector had to negotiate on terms favorable to France. Frederick William believed that only France could prevent further Swedish encroachment of territories in northern Europe. Also, the Elector hoped that by aligning Brandenburg with France, he might be able to thwart Louis' dynastic plans for Poland, while

84 Arlington, Letter's, II, 234-7, letter to Vane dated November 12, 1665.


86 B.N., Manuscript franqueçaise, MS 7,067, fol. 187, a letter from Fürstenberg to Lionne informing Lionne of an audience with the Elector.

gaining French support against the Duke of Neuburg, the Elector's rival for the duchy's of Jüles and Cleves. Thus, when the States-General, through their ambassador Van Beverning, offered Frederick William an initial payment of 200,000 florins, plus a monthly subsidy of 50,000 florins for his twelve thousand men army in case the Elector could not coerce the Bishop of Münster to agree to peace, the Elector agreed to their terms. A treaty was signed February 16, 1666. To provide further security against French plans in Poland, the Elector signed a defensive treaty with Denmark in May 1666, followed by the agreement to support the Dutch and seek peace in the signing of a quadruple alliance in October 1666 with the United Provinces, Brandenburg, Denmark, and Brunswick.

In vain, Arlington sent Temple to Cleves "to try to prevent the Bishop from concluding peace with the Dutch." Escorted by Spanish troops and disguised as a Spanish en-

Queen of Poland, Maria-Louisa de Gonzaga, and Louis XIV had exchanged letters with each other about the possibility of arranging for her senile, aging husband John Casimir, king of Poland, to abdicate. The Duke d'Enghien, son of the Prince of Condé also called Louis II of Bourbon, would then be put up for the throne and crown supported by Louis XIV.


voy, Temple arrived in Cleves too late to prevent the conclusion of the peace treaty. But Temple did bring about a coup on the French. "Five or six thousand of the Bishop's best troops...were pardoned to Castel-Rodrigo for fifty thousand florins," in an agreement made by Temple. Temple wrote that "Colbert actually went to Munster to buy the troops." England had lost her one ally along the Rhine River and had to search in other directions for friends.

In Denmark and Sweden, Louis' envoys and ambassadors clashed head-on with the English diplomats and won each engagement. Although England and Denmark had adequate commercial treaties, Arlington, in preparation for war, wanted to strengthen the ties further while circumventing Dutch trade. An attempt to cement the relationship occurred as early as October 1664, when Sir Gilbert Talbot, English ambassador to Denmark offered terms for a treaty to the Danes. The provisions called for free ports and fixed quotas on some goods if Denmark would issue a

---

90 Homer E. Woodbridge, Sir William Temple, the Man and His Work (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 70-72. See also Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 147, Colbert helped conclude the peace between the Bishop of Münster and the United Provinces.

recall of all Danes serving with the Dutch navy. The foreign minister of Denmark, Hanibal Sehested, countered with a demand for fifteen English ships to patrol near Denmark, a pledge of concerted peace terms, and location of an English factory in Glückstadt. Throughout the year, Frederick III, king of Denmark seemed to be wavering between accepting English bids or staying with the previous alliances with the Dutch, French, and Swedes. Finally, Talbot, without instruction, obtained an agreement from Frederick to sell harbourage to the Dutch fleet, which was commanded by De Ruyter. Talbot had assured Frederick that the English navy had De Ruyter blockaded from his home ports and the Dutch fleet would have to sail on to Denmark. The Dutch failed to cooperate. However, the financial stresses upon Frederick were so great, that when the new English envoy, Thomas Clifford, presented his instructions to Sehested, Denmark signed a treaty on October 18.


94 Alliances with all three countries had been arranged for many years, the more recently signed alliances were Dutch, 1661 and 1662; France, 1663; and Sweden, 1660, 1662.

1665. The terms of the treaty were that the English would provide twelve ships at her own expense for patrol duty in the Baltic Sound; Denmark would declare war and close her ports to the Dutch; Denmark would not make a separate peace; and all English shipping was exempt from duties during the war and for five years afterwards.

To all appearances, French diplomacy had failed with Denmark. However, there was one provision added to the treaty which stated that unless Sweden declared war against the United Provinces in six weeks, the treaty with Denmark was voided. Not only did Sweden not declare war within six weeks, but the French envoy, Terlon, had received special instructions from Louis to "buy Denmark's alliance" no matter the cost, so that the king of Denmark "would close the Baltic Sea to the English and prevent them from obtaining naval stores from there..."

96 Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 188, states that a threat of war against Denmark was necessary to bring about the signing of the treaty.


100 Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 128.
Ion arranged for a subsidy from France of one hundred thousand écus to be paid to Frederick III and a promise of French efforts to obtain an assurance that Sweden would not attack Denmark. Denmark agreed that they would fight the English navy only in the Baltic Sea and would assist the Dutch in their war with England. Sehested went to The Hague and signed the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance with the United Provinces, Brandenburg, and Brunswick on February 16, 1666. The English had to look elsewhere for allies.

Chances for a successful negotiation of an alliance between England and Sweden in 1664-1665 was enhanced by several confrontations between France and the United Provinces with Sweden. The Dutch navy had captured or taken land in the East Indies and in the America's that was claimed by Sweden. Also the Dutch had forced heavy tariffs upon Sweden. French diplomatic ties were also weakened because of Protestant resentment in Sweden towards France's anti-Protestant attitude and because of lowered subsidy payments. The English sent a competent envoy.


102 Geyl, Orange and Stuart, p. 217.

103 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Suède, Vol. 31, fol. 135.
to Sweden in late 1664 in the person of Henry Coventry. But his talents were wasted by the failure of the Clarencon ministry to give him any powers or directions. Although a treaty agreed to in March 1665, did provide for mutual defense and subsidy to be paid by England, the English had repudiated the treaty by August.

Upon the arrival in Sweden in November of both Clifford and the Danish treaty, coupled with the arrival of new instructions from Clarendon in December, Coventry again tried to negotiate with Sweden. England offered £100,000 in subsidies, an offensive alliance against Denmark, and an ultimate alliance which would include the United Provinces, Sweden, Spain, and England.

Not only was Coventry having to deal with the inert foreign office but he was faced with one of the strongest French diplomatic offices. The Chancellor of Sweden was Magnus de la Gardie, brother-in-law to the Queen of Sweden. When de la Gardie was joined by Simon Arnould,

---


Marquis de Pomponne\textsuperscript{107} in early 1666, offering French monies and guarantees, Sweden repudiated all treaties with England and offered to mediate the war between the antagonists.\textsuperscript{108} France, for a while, was the winner of the diplomatic wars in northern Europe. And in southern Europe, Louis' diplomats were proving just as successful.

With the alliance brought about by the marriage of Catherine of Braganza and Charles II, relations between Portugal and England were expected to improve. England sent troops to serve in the army of Portugal and subsidies to aid the Portuguese government. However, Portugal failed to pay the dowry of Catherine and also was unable to pay the English soldiers. In return, England sent her worst troops to serve in Portugal and refused to wage war in Spain. Thus tensions increased and led only to worsening relations.\textsuperscript{109} Realizing that not only was she at war with the Dutch, but that war with France was imminent, England renewed her attempts to mediate peace between Portugal and Spain. In July 1665, Arlington had sent instructions to Sir Richard Fanshawe, the English ambassador

\textsuperscript{107}Feiling, Foreign Policy, 193, refers to Pomponne as the "greatest of French envoys."


\textsuperscript{109}Prestage, Diplomatic Relations, pp. 56-183.
to Madrid,\textsuperscript{110} that he should pressure Spain into an alliance with England and arrange a peace between Spain and Portugal.\textsuperscript{111} Fanshawe signed a commercial treaty with Spain on December 7, 1665, but without the authorization of Arlington.\textsuperscript{112} In fact, Fanshawe received notification in December 1665, that his successor was on the way to replace him and to stop negotiating. Fanshawe, "undismayed by the knowledge that negotiations" for a treaty were nearing completion back in England or that he no longer had the authority to negotiate for England, left for Lisbon to obtain a Portuguese treaty in January, 1666. When Fanshawe arrived at Lisbon on January 29, the Portuguese minister, Castel Melhor refused to talk with him. Fanshawe stayed long enough to meet and welcome his successor, Edward Montagu Sandwich, and then died.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} Fanshawe had also been ambassador to Lisbon, July 1662 to August 1663. He had attempted at various times to arrange a triple league of England, Spain, and Portugal, an English-Portuguese war against Spain, and peace between Spain and Portugal.

\textsuperscript{111} Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part III, 427. See also Arlington, Letters, II, 7-19, letter dated June 28, 1665.

\textsuperscript{112} The commercial articles agreed upon offered nothing new to England. A set of secret articles arranged for a thirty year truce with Portugal with an English pledge of ratification within four months. See Arlington, Letters, II, 100-15, for the complete treaty.

\textsuperscript{113} Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 177.
Sandwich's instructions from Arlington for Spain were explicit: chart a league composed of England, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, with plans to eventually include the United Provinces; demand that Spain attack France, for which England would guarantee no peace for three years; arrange for free trade between Spain and England; and give a royal title to Portugal. Spain waited for a counteroffe from France.

As soon as Louis heard of the English attempts at mediation between Portugal and Spain, he endeavored to override any offers made by England. Louis sent a new ambassador to Portugal, Abbé Saint Romain. Arriving in Lisbon on January 31, 1665, Saint Romain began countering English peace proposals. Finally, because of a combination of the marriage agreement of Mademoiselle d'Aunuaile de Nemours to Alfonso VI and French money, Portugal continued war. The terms Louis had offered were:


116 Recueil: d'Espagne, XIV, 327, letter of instructions from Lionne to the Archbishop of Embrun, ambassador of France to Madrid.

117 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 2, 459, the marriage, which took place in August, was arranged by the Portuguese ambassador to England, Francisco de Mello, the marquis of Sande.
Portugal would continue her war with Spain and as soon as France and England were at peace, Louis would attack Spain; no peace settlement would be made with Spain that did not include the guarantee of the Portuguese monarchy; and France would subsidize Portugal "on a royal scale."\(^{118}\)

At the same time that he was pledging to attack Spain, Louis was instructing the Archbishop of Embrun to enter into a discourse with the Marquis de Caracena, Spanish minister at Madrid, about a league "between France and Spain against England..."\(^{119}\) As in northern Europe, Louis had once again won the diplomatic battles.

Only the negotiation of a settlement of peace between England, the United Provinces, and France remained for the extremely active and effective French diplomats. Even before France's formal declaration of war in January 1666, various English agents were suggesting to the Dutch that the United Provinces should terminate their alliance with France.\(^{120}\) Because of the French declaration of war, reports from the English agents of Dutch unrest with the course of the war, and rumors, Arlington instructed one of

\(^{118}\)Prestage, Diplomatic Relations, pp. 93-8; Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 2, 458-65.

\(^{119}\)Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 2, 468.

\(^{120}\)Feiling, Foreign Policy, pp. 196-7.
the agents to present terms to De Witt. Thus, Gabriel Sylvius, a Huguenot from Orange and an English agent, assisted by Henri de Coulant, seigneur de Buat, discussed the terms with De Witt sometime around February 5, 1666. England wanted a return to the status of the last treaty between the United Provinces and England, an indemnity of 200,000 which would be reduced if the Dutch guaranteed an alliance against France, and an assurance that the Prince of Orange would be given his rightful office when peace was signed. The English government felt betrayed at their attempts to negotiate secretly with the Dutch when the English learned that their ambassador at Paris, Lord Holles, was invited to a conference with the French ministers and Von Beuningen. And there, he learned that De Witt was forwarding to Louis XIV all of the proposals made by Buat to Louis.

However, signs of discontent between France and the United Provinces did begin to appear as the 1666 campaign.


season entered into the summer months. The war had never been popular in the French countryside. The successes of the English had "reawakened...the ill-humour of the malcontents." In several of the provinces, such as Languedoc, Provence and Dauphine, the Huguenots were inviting the English to co-operate in "moving the provinces...to revolt." The interruption of trade with England and the United Provinces hurt merchants, wine makers, seamen, and the state economy. Without the Dutch carriers French exports dropped drastically. "Peace was desired," Louis wrote to D'Estrades, "whether a separate one secret" between Louis and Charles or "in common with the allies." The Dutch concern about the alliance with France was evidenced more "as a consequence of the operations in the summer of 1666," as it appeared "neither party trusted the other." And by winter 1666, both the English and Dutch


125 Charles Auguste, Marquis de La Fare, Mémoires et réflexions sur les principaux événemens du règne de Louis XIV (Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1755), pp. 183-201, Lavisse, Histoire, VIII, 90-137.

126 D'Estrades, Lettres...d'Estrades, IV, 635-6, letter of Louis XIV to d'Estrades, dated December 24, 1666.

127 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers.
began to show strains of the war. Both sides were tired and the war was not going well.

Conditions were so bad in London that rumors of a French or Dutch invasion had provoked the government into issuing commissions "to persons of consideration, empowering each of them to raise a troop."\(^{128}\) Added to the fears of war, was a plague that kept London and many of the provinces draped in black mourning crepes. In September, fire broke out in London and two thirds of the city was destroyed.\(^{129}\) The British admiralty had made several bad command decisions with the resulting loss of many ships. Seamen were mutineering because of lack of pay - twenty months in arrears on some ships.\(^{130}\) The navy debt at the beginning of 1667 was £1,000,000.\(^{131}\) And as the new year

Foreign: Venice, 1666-68, XXXV, 64, letter of Guistinian to the Doge and Senate, dated September 7, 1666.


\(^{129}\) Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 208. Even Louis commented on the losses to merchants and the jobless workers. He believed Charles "himself stood to lose by it," not just because of the workers, who might cause trouble, "but because a great quantity of ammunition had been destroyed" and "the impoverishment of this city" deprived Charles of his steadiest source of income.

\(^{130}\) Pepys, Diary, XIII, 17-35.

\(^{131}\) Public Record Office. Calendar of Treasury Books, 1660-1667, XXXV, 47-8.
of 1667 began, both England and the United Provinces were beginning to feel the large economic burden of the war. Rising prices on wages and goods, increased operating expenses of their navies, and a severely limited trade forced both governments to seek peace.

The belligerents had accepted, in July 1666, the offer of Swedish mediation. In October, Louis had instructed Ruvigny to contact Henry Jermyn, Count of Saint Albans, Charles' mother's second husband, about the possibilities of a separate peace with England. Although both Charles and Louis, through their ambassadors, continued to talk of a separate peace, the emphasis of the correspondence was upon the conditions, place, and terms for accepting a peace that would include all parties at war. By December 1666, Charles had agreed to a conference in a neutral city and France had agreed to urge the Dutch to accept negotiations.

Also, in December 1666, the ambassador of the Emperor, Baron Franz Paul von Lisola, arrived in London.

See also Geyl, Orange and Stuart, p. 262; B.N., Manuscripts française, MS 15,889, fol. 355, instructions and letters to Ruvigny from Louis; and Charles II, Letters of Charles II, p. 197, letter to Madame, dated October 18, 1666.

133 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 86, fols. 62-4, letters from and to Ruvigny from Saint Albans, dated October through December, 1666.
He offered to mediate with the Dutch. But Lisola actually wanted to form an alliance against the French and worked toward this end. Arlington decided to use Lisola as an intermediary, still hoping for a separate peace with the United Provinces.

In the winter of 1666-67, peace was all important to Charles. Saint-Albana was ordered to France as ambassador extraordinary. He sailed for France on January 28, 1667 with instructions from Clarendon, instructions which gave him the authority to accept from the principle of retaining land in possession; a Dutch compliance to the last Anglo-Dutch treaty 1665, security and respect from the Dutch for shipping on the seas, and payment of £200,000 indemnity from the United Provinces, and obtain from France the promise of the return of the island of St. Kitts. But Louis had his own terms. Lionne informed Lisola that France would agree to the terms if Charles would promise, in a written declaration to Henrietta Maria, that he would not enter into any alliance.

134 Onno Klopp, Der Fall des Houses Stuart (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1875-1888), XII, 245-50, see especially Lisola's letter to the Emperor, dated January 21, 1667.

135 Arlington, Letters, II, 112-20, letters of Arlington to Temple, dated December 10, 1666, and January 12, 1667, also Temple, Letters, II, 212, letters same dates.

136 Thomas Henry Lister. Life and Administration of
against France for one year. Also, France would agree to urge the United Provinces to quickly conclude peace with England. Charles signed the pledge on February 12, 1667, agreeing to the provisions offered by Saint Albans and Lionne.

Both France and the United Provinces refused the consideration of The Hague as a neutral site for the conference as proposed by Arlington and Coventry. De Witt believed The Hague was suggested by England to enable the English negotiators to confer with his rivals. Louis saw the suggestion of The Hague as an attempt by England to divide France and the United Provinces. Apparently, both men were right. Louis suggested Dover as a neutral site. The States-General offered Charles the choice of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1837-38), III, 443.

Manuscript français, MS 10,260, fol. 55, Lionne's letter to D'Estrades, February 6, 1667.


Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession, I, part 3, 522, letter of Louis to J'Estrades, March 9, 1667.
Breda, Maestricht, or Bais-le-Duc.  

It appears that at this time, Charles and his ministers decided to "divide, isolate, and conquer." Charles informed the States-General of his acceptance of Breda as a neutral site, "hoping to isolate them." At the same time, Charles proposed to Louis a secret alliance between England and France, hoping to further alienate De Witt and Louis. According to Louis, Charles had chosen Breda in order to please him and influence his decision on the proposal of the secret agreement. Louis explains that he and Charles did not want the United Provinces to know about the secret agreements. Therefore, "they were stated only in private letters written in my hand and that of the King of England to my aunt his mother." They reached an agreement in letters dated April 18, 1667, whereby Charles promised not to enter into any alliance prejudicial to France for one year and Acadia would be exchanged for St. Kitts.

---

141 Lónchay (ed.), Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne. . . XVIIe siècle, VII, 381, letter of D'Estrades to Louis XIV, dated February 15, 1667. See also Feiling, Foreign Policy, p. 215.

142 Fontalis, De Witt, I, 379-81.


145 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession
Although hostilities resumed, the negotiators began to arrive in Breda in May. The United Provinces' representative was Von Beverning, France's representatives were Courtin and D'Estades, England's representatives were Holles and Coventry. When England began making impossible demands while refusing to accede any terms, De Witt ordered the Dutch fleet to attack England. And on June 20, 1667, the Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames River attacking English ships and shipyards at will. This action, coupled with the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands by France on May 24, quickly brought both countries into agreement. The Treaty of Breda was signed on July 31, 1667, ending hostilities. 146

Chapter III

The first national war for Louis XIV, The War of Devolution,\(^1\) was a display of magnificence. The invasion of the Spanish Netherlands began on May 24, 1667. "Invasion" is hardly the proper word to use, because what followed was in fact no war, since Louis' army met with little or no resistance. The French referred to the campaign as a promenade militaire\(^2\) which translates literally as "taking a walk in military fashion."

The Spanish Netherlands was garrisoned with a Spanish army of roughly twenty thousand men, thinly deployed over the ten southern provinces, defending fifty separate areas. The commander of the Spanish army was Francisco de Moura, Marquis de Castel-Rodrigo. Castel-Rodrigo had been pleading with Spain to send him additional troops and supplies to fend off an eminent French invasion.\(^3\) Frustrated at the inertness of the Spanish throne to assist him,

\(^1\) Although some earlier contemporary of the period may call the war "The War of Devolution," the earliest reference that I have found is in a pamphlet by J. Baker, **The French King Vindicated** (London: J. Baker, 1712), p. 40.


\(^3\) Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne*, II, part 1, 118.
Castel-Rodrigo wrote to the court at Madrid in December 1666 that if the armies of the French 'attack us in the spring, I see nothing short of a miracle which can save these provinces.' Again, he wrote on March 20, 'I no longer see anything that can save the Low Countries, barring a miracle.' Short of men and with no foreseeable aid from Spain in the immediate future, Castel-Rodrigo tried to strengthen his position by withdrawing troops from several fortresses that appeared likely to fall to the French such as Armentières, Charleroi, Condé, La Bassée, and Saint-Ghislain.

In desperation, Castel-Rodrigo wrote a letter to Louis in early May, asking if it were not possible for Louis and Castel-Rodrigo to come to some decision about terms for 'Flanders,' rather than the two powers engaging in a clash that would undoubtedly lead to war. Louis did


5 Ibid., p. 93.

6 Turenne, Mémoires, II, 151. See also Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 119; Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers: Venice, XXXV, 185, Giustinian wrote that Castel-Rodrigo, anticipating the French attack, 'had been preparing a defense and laying in supplies' since the beginning of the year.

7 Lonchay (ed.), Correspondance... au XVIIe siècle,
not bother to answer the letter. Instead, Louis began the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands.

The French army had been assembling in the province of Picardy for over a year. Encamped along the banks of the Somme River, the army had been rehearsing and preparing for invasion with reviews and parades, many attended by Louis and his court, affording opportunities for festive entertainment. There were three divisions, at Péronne, Corbie, and Amiens. The commander of the army, Henri de la Tour D'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, joined his army on May 10.

Louis and his entourage, arriving on May 19, had established headquarters at Amiens. The troops had been ordered to move out on May 20. Taking personal command of the larger of the three armies, Turenne instructed 35,000 French troops to march northwards toward Brussels, the capital of the Spanish Netherlands. ⁸


⁸Although the consensus amongst historians about the size of the French army seems to be about 70,000 troops, the actual size of the invading army varies from 35,000 to 70,000. John C. Rule - 67,000; John Wolf - 70,000; Mignet - 55,000; A. L. Pontalis - 51,000; Karl Bartz - 72,000; Blok - over 50,000; and Gaxotte - 60,000. Louvois in a memorandum to Louis on May 18 listed 35,000 infantry and 12,000 horses.
The King looked magnificent and as he topped the small hill and the troops saw him, the cheers broke out thunderously around us. Everyone could feel the excitement! It was as if Spring was for France! Drums and fifes began playing! The regiments marched past, officers saluting his Majesty with their swords. The King smiled, "I am satisfied." 

A remaining 20,000 soldiers were split into two small corps. One corps under the command of Marshal Jean d'Aumont, comte de Châteauroux, drove northwest toward the Lys River and the seacoast. The second army, commanded by Lieutenant General Francois de Créqui, the Marquis of Créqui, marched towards Luxembourg and the frontiers of the German states. 

With Brussels as the apparent goal, Castel-Rodrigo recalled the remaining Spanish regiments from the areas which appeared free from the French attack. At the same time, realizing the futility of any direct and sustained opposition against the massive French army at several undefendable positions, Castel-Rodrigo burned more of the fortresses and retreated to Brussels, preparing for his final defense.


10Turenne, Mémoires, II, 156. See also Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, Part 2, 119; Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 230; B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 11,231, fol. 23.
In order to justify to all concerned parties, the sending of his army to occupy the Spanish Netherlands, Louis asserted that he was only establishing the legal rights of Queen Maria Theresa, his wife, to Spanish lands that belonged to her. The legality of the claims of his wife were explicitly detailed in a two hundred and seventy page manifesto entitled *Traité des droits de la reine très-chretienne sur divers états de la monarchie d'Espagne*. Included in packet with a letter addressed to the Queen and regent of Spain, Maria Anna of Austria, the manifesto was sent to Madrid on May 8, 1667. In the letter, Louis stated that his patience was exhausted and his troops would enter the territories that rightfully belonged to his wife by the end of the month of May. The manifesto, written in French and Spanish, was divided into two sections with seventy-four reasons for his wife's renunciation. The first part dealt with an explanation.

---

11 Baker, *French King Vindicated*, even argued that Louis had to occupy the Low Countries in order to "fortify the frontier against the designs of the Emperor," p. 16.

12 *Traité des droits de la reine très-chretienne sur divers états de la Monarchie d'Espagne* (Paris: Imprimerie royal, 1667). See also B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 16,682, fols. 133 and 144.

13 Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne*, II, part 3, 58-61. See also B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 16, 682, fol. 4.

of the reasons that Maria Theresa should inherit the Spanish Succession, if the male line of the Spanish Hapsburgs should die out. The intention of this part of the manifesto, obviously, was to notify all Europe, particularly Spain, Austria, and the United Provinces, that Louis was pressing his claim to the Spanish throne if Carlos II, the six year old son of the late Philip IV, died without children.15 Thus, Louis refused to heed the testament of Philip IV, which appointed Carlos II as his heir. Also, the testament provided that, if upon the death of Carlos II, there should be no children, then the children of the second daughter would inherit the Spanish throne. If the second daughter had no surviving children, the inheritance would go to Philip's second sister.

Philip IV's dislike of the French had completely ignored his first daughter, Maria Theresa, Louis' wife.16

15 Pierre Gaxotte, The Age of Louis XIV, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 86. Gaxotte maintains that Louis XIV had to claim the succession. If he had not acted, the Spanish succession would have gone to the Austrian Hapsburgs, which would have reconstituted an empire similar to Charles V (1519-1556), encircling France.

The second section of the manifesto defined the claims of Maria Theresa according to the laws of Jus Devolutionis droit de dévolution. The lawyers of the king had constructed a well-defined legal case founded on custom, history, and default. Since no part of the 500,000 écus as stipulated in the marriage contract had been paid, then Maria Theresa had not and would not renounce her claims to the Spanish inheritance. Also, since there was a legal questionability whether a minor could renounce her rights, Maria Theresa was entitled to her mother's marriage settlement, including the crown jewels. Furthermore, an examination of the renunciation of rights according to the laws of Spain, the Roman laws, the terms of the decree of Boniface VIII, and in the consultations of lawyers, established a serious doubt about the legality of such an act. Therefore, since neither the

17 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 16,682, fol. 144 and see also Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 78.

18 William F. Church, "Louis XIV and Reason of State," in John C. Rule (ed.), Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship, p. 403, points out that the manifesto "is usually attributed to the jurist Antoine Bilain." One other name has appeared in the research for this paper in a pamphlet with Louis Leblanc, as author, entitled Des droits du la Roi (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1667). This pamphlet is written in a jurists vocabulary, listing reasons for Louis to seize the Spanish Netherlands. Both of these tracts are found in B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 16, 682, fols. 238 and 273.
dowry nor inheritance of the marriage contract had been paid, Maria Theresa was laying claim to such territory in the Spanish Netherlands to satisfy these debts by the local right of devolution as found in the provinces of Namur and Brabant. On his wife's behalf, Louis' armies occupied Brabant, Antwerp, Limbourg, Malines, Upper Guelderland, Namur, Artois, Cambrai, Hainault, the country of Burgundy, one fourth of Luxembourg, and one third of Franche Comté.

As final arguments for setting aside the renunciation, the lawyers pointed to a Spanish code of King Alfonso X (1252-1284), which stated that a renunciation was valid only after the Cortes had agreed upon it - this legal step was not taken with Maria Theresa's renunciation. Also, the Treaty of the Pyrenees had not been registered with all the councils of Castile and Aragon as decreed in Article 124 of the treaty - another reason for

19 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 16,682, fol. 4.
20 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 68.
21 The cortes originated from councils of nobles. The Cortes referred to here is a State council of nobles and burghers who, when called into session, passed on laws, treaties, and decrees of the monarchy as a sign of support.
22 Lonchay (ed.), Correspondance... au XVIIe siècle, IV, 175-7.
invalidating the renunciation.  

Louis sent similar dispatches to the ambassadors and ministers of the Emperor Leopold, to the king of Sweden, to the States-General, to the king of Denmark, to the Imperial Diet at Ratisbonne, to the members of the League of the Rhine, to the Duke of Savoy, to the king of England, to the Pope, and to the Governor-General of the Spanish Netherlands. Yet, Louis did want his motive for notifying the heads of state misunderstood. He was notifying them out of courtesy. The steps Louis had taken in the Spanish Netherlands - the occupation of certain territories - was a family affair and not an affair of state.

Upon receiving the manifesto on May 16, 1667, the Court of Spain responded quickly and negatively. In a meeting on May 17, the Queen of Spain, the Secretary of State, Don Fernandez del Campo, Duke of Medina, Marquis

Ibid., p. 189.

D'Estrades, Lettres . . . d'Estrades, IV, 275, D'Estrades delivered a letter and manifesto for the States-General to De Witt on May 15 with additional instructions for D'Estrades to appease De Witt and the Dutch with an explanation that Louis' armies would not seize any land adjacent to the Dutch borders.

Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, part 3, II, 90. The manifesto and a letter from Lionne was given to the Marquis de la Fuente for delivery to Castel-Rodrigo on May 12, 1667.

Grovelle (ed.), Œuvres, V, 189.
d'Aytona, and the Cardinal d'Aragon, all members of the Spanish Council of state, rejected "the rights" of Maria Theresa, stating that (1) Spain did not recognize the provincial laws of Jus Devolutionis; (2) that no laws of Spain or her provinces contained any laws whereby a female heir took precedent over a male heir; (3) that since the dowry was only a claim on private personal property and not on territorial possessions, Maria Theresa could not invalidate her renunciation; (4) and finally, in the abdication edict of Charles V in 1556, Brabant and the other sixteen provinces of the Netherlands were forever joined to the crown of Spain.27 Marie Anne, in a letter to Louis dated May 21, 1667, apparently tried to mollify Louis' demands by offering to abide by any decision of a conference for the examination of the rights of Maria Theresa as covered by Article 90 of the Treaty of the Pyrenees and to allow Louis whatever defense was necessary for the protection of French territory in the area being contested.28

The impact of the treaties upon all Europe was very great with reactions to the pretensions of Louis XIV producing dismay and anger. Perhaps no one gave the ap-

28 Ibid., pp. 109-10.
peerance of being so wrathfully aroused as the Baron François de Lisola, ambassador of the Emperor, and a bitter enemy and adversary of Louis XIV. While Louis' armies were seizing and occupying the southern provinces in the Spanish Netherlands, Lisola was vehemently denouncing Louis' claims and occupation of the Spanish Netherlands as nothing but "lies and aggression," so that Louis could seek universal monarchy. Lisola answered Louis' manifesto with his own treatise entitled Bouclier d'état et de Justice. In his treatise, Lisola argued that Louis could not apply the law of devolution - an inheritance law for property - to the inheritance of a throne. Furthermore, since Spain's rule extended over the provinces of the Netherlands, then these provinces were subject to the laws of Spain. Conversely, Spain was not subject to provincial codes or laws. And lastly, citing the provisions of the Peace of the Pyrenees, Lisola pointed out that the renunciation of Maria Theresa was one of the conditions stipulated within the treaty that was agreed upon by France and Spain in order to validate the

29 There are innumerable references to this rivalry between Louis and Lisola. Nearly all historians refer to it. Louis even mentions it in a letter to D'Estrades, June 20, 1667. Letter is in B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 6,732, fol. 100.

30 François de Lisola, Bouclier d'état et de Justice (Bruxelles: Chez Henry le Jeune et Clan, 1667), p. 7.
treaty and could not, therefore, be rescinded eight years after the parties had signed the treaty.\textsuperscript{31}

It is difficult to believe that Louis and his advisers expected little or no interference in French occupation of the Spanish Netherlands.\textsuperscript{32} However, when the diplomatic preparations prior to the "invasion" are investigated and when, after the "invasion," the reaction from leaders such as Leopold was either passive or not unfavorable, then Louis' very optimistic attitude about the future of the campaign seems highly understand-

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., pp. 39-220. The treatises by Louis and Lisola touched off a furor for all Europe. Both sides of the issue were represented in pamphlets and treatises. See for example the following treatises in the B.N., Manu-

scripts françaises MS 16,682, fol. 249; "Dialogue sur les droits de la Reine très-chrestienne," (Paris, 1667); fol. 381, "Remarques que l'on a faites dans le traîté imprimé dernièrement à Paris, des droits de la Reyne très-


[Lisola], "Suite du dialogue sur les droits de la reine très-chrestienne," (n.p., 1667); Guy Joly, "Remarques pour servir de réponse à deux écrits imprimés à Bruxelles," (Paris, 1667); and others.

\textsuperscript{32}Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 195. Either Louis was badly misinformed or he had a vivid imagina-

tion if he was capable of conjuring up information such as in the following statement, where Louis writes that Sweden declared they "desired nothing better than to see my armies in the Low Countries. . ."
Even though the occupation of the Spanish Netherlands had become the primary goal of Louis as soon as Philip IV died on September 17, 1665, "he could not" as Louis wrote "pursue the task until the proper preparations had been accomplished." And these preparations included building-up the army and navy, warehousing food and supplies, and reinforcing the diplomatic relationships in Europe. Using the French involvement in the Anglo-Dutch war as a pretext, Louis, as early as 1665, began the buildup of the army. Between 1665 and the day of the invasion, he sent troops, supplies, and munitions to the border between France and the Spanish Netherlands. Le Tellier and Louvais had built the French army into the largest army in modern times, approximately 72,000 men. Included in this number were some 25,000 mercenaries from

33 Ibid., p. 228. Louis wrote that the Spanish were short of troops and money in the Spanish Netherlands, the Spanish government badly managed by a foreign princess, and with the Dutch and English still fighting each other, it seemed a good time for the French to occupy the Spanish Netherlands.


Lorraine, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.\(^36\) The found­
ries had been casting cannon for over two years for this
expedition.\(^37\) The French navy, as one of the reform pro­
jects of Colbert, was re-outfitted and, with the addition
of eight new ships, increased to a total of 110 ships with
approximately 22,000 men.\(^38\) While Le Tellier, Louvois,
and Colbert had readied the French war machine, Lionne
and his staff had been busy reorganizing and cementing
old alliances and establishing new alliances.

Before Louis could send his army into the Spanish
Netherlands, the border between France and the Germanies
separated by the Rhine River, had to be secured. The
steps taken by Lionne to prevent invasion across the Rhine
consisted of the arrangement of several alliances and the
renewal of the League of the Rhine.\(^39\) As early as July,

\(^36\) Goubert, Louis XIV, p. 108.

\(^37\) Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 181.

\(^38\) Clement (ed.), Lettres... de Colbert, II, 98;
see also Cole, Colbert, I, 455-72; and Longnon (ed.),
Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 123-5.

\(^39\) Dumont (ed.), Corps universel diplomatique, VI,
part 2, 238-9. The League of the Rhine for the unifi­
cation of Protestant and Catholic forces was formed on
August 14, 1658, including as its original members, the
four electors of Mainz, Cologne, Trèves, and Bavaria, the
king of Sweden, and the Duke of Brunswick, duke of Lune­
bourg, and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. Louis XIV was
its plenipotentiary and subsidizer. The League had been
renewed three times and unless renewed again would be ter­
minated August 15, 1667.
21, 1666, Lionne, in negotiations with the Baron de Leerodt, minister of the duke of Neubourg, had concluded a secret treaty with the duke of Neubourg. It provided that the Duke of Neubourg would (1) help to secure a renewal of the League; (2) prevent passage of any troops across his land; (3) supply 2,500 men and 400 horses if needed by France; (4) have already signed the treaty for the renewal of the League; (5) and last, in return for these services, Louis would pay him 36,000 rixdalers per year.\textsuperscript{40}

A second alliance was concluded on October 22, 1666, with a secret treaty between Louis XIV and the elector of Cologne. This treaty was more easily secured through the services of Wilhelm Egon, Count of Fürstenberg, minister of the elector of Cologne and also, a French agent.\textsuperscript{41} The terms of the treaty were similar to one signed with the duke of Neubourg, only the amount of troops on stand-by and payment differed.\textsuperscript{42}

Von Fürstenberg received further orders from Lionne. Von Fürstenberg was to assist the abbé Gravel,\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{40}Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, \textit{II}, part 3, 23-6.

\textsuperscript{41}Longnon (ed.), \textit{Mémoires de Louis XIV, II}, 168.

charges d'affaires to the elector of Mainz, in convincing
the elector of Mainz to ally with France and sign a new
treaty. The negotiations began in January with the
elector's brother, the Baron of Schönborn representing
Mainz, and the Abby Gravel representing France. The
treaty was signed on February 28, 1667.

The last of the four major alliances was negoti­
ated between Lionne and the Bishop of Münster at Saint-
Germain with a treaty being signed on May 4, 1667. Thus, Lionne had brought about the renewal of the League
of the Rhine until 1670. The Emperor would not be able to
use the Rhine River or the German lands adjacent to the
river as a passage for troops to aid the Spanish Nether-
lands. And all it had cost Louis was an advance of
400,000 livres.

One further step was necessary in order to suc­
cessfully neutralize the Emperor Leopold - an alliance
between France and Austria. As early as 1664, in an

43B.N., Nouvelle Acquisitions françaises, MS 2,039,
XLVIII, 223. See also mémoire of Louis XIV to the Abbé
Gravel dated December 22, 1666 in Mignet, Négociations
relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 31-4.

44Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession
d'Espagne, II, part 3, 35.


Electoral College meeting, the bishop of Strasbourg had discussed the possibility that a "transaction upon the eventual heritage of Carlos II" might now take place between Louis XIV and the Emperor Leopold. The elector of Mainz and the elector of Cologne were instrumental in sending the Emperor a resolution that encouraged Leopold and Louis to seek a possible disposition of the inheritance of the king of Spain in the event of his death.

In May, the French minister to Vienna, Grémonville, sent Louis two dispatches. The first dispatch included a treatise by Grémonville entitled *Etat de la négociation d'un partage éventuel*, explaining the dangers for France that would occur if the Spanish inheritance and crown went to the Austrian Hapsburgs. In the second dispatch, Grémonville informed Louis that it was the elector of Mainz, Jean-Philippe de Schönborn, and the elector of Cologne who were initiating the idea of a partition of the inheritance of Spain.

The idea of partition of the Spanish inheritance was also being discussed by the members of the League of

---

47 A.A.E., Mémoires et Documents, Manuscripts Cologne, III, fol. 292.
48 Ibid., fol. 317, dated March 9, 1665.
49 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Autriche, XXIII, fol. 24, dated May 24, 1665.
50 Ibid., fol. 23, letter dated May 31, 1665.
the Rhine. France's minister and principal director of the League, Robert de Gravel, on April 23, 1665, sent a letter to Louis informing him of the discussions. Lionne requested Gravel to "circumspectly pursue" the issue.

The idea for partitioning the empire of Carlos II upon his death lost some of its impetus when Leopold wrote the elector of Mainz in March 1665 that any talk about an action such as a partition was a bit premature. But the plan of the partition appealed to Louis and Lionne. Therefore, Lionne instructed Von Fürstenberg to continue advocation of the scheme to the elector of Cologne and to assist Grémonville in obtaining some type of agreement with Leopold.

To further hinder any plans by Leopold for war with Louis over the Spanish Netherlands, Louis and Lionne maintained a secret alliance with an aspirant to the throne in Hungary. Their agent was the French ambassador

51 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Allemagne, CXIV, fol. 3.
52 Ibid., CXCV, fol. 7.
54 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 17,407, II, 29.
to Venice, Count Serin, who was in contact with two
Croatian nobles, Count Peter Zrinyi and the count Johannes
Frangepany, the brother-in-law of Zrinyi. According to
their proposed plans, the conspirators would raise an army
and attack Leopold from the rear if he attacked or de-
clared war on France. In return for these services,
Louis, supposedly, would furnish money and assist Zrinyi
to head the new government.

Louis' ambitions for his children and family also
served him in neutralizing Poland. The prince of Condé's
son, known as the Duke of Enghien, had been married to
Anne of Bavaria in 1663. Anne was the niece of Maria
Louisa de Gonzaga, Queen of Poland. Since Maria Louisa
wanted her aged husband John Casimer to abdicate and put
up D'Enghien as his successor to the crown of Poland,
Louis had been sending financial aid to the Polish
Queen. Also, Lionne had placed 25,000 écus at the dis-
posal of the French ambassador to Poland, Pierre de
Bonzi, bishop of Besiers, to be distributed to Polish

55 Victor-L. Tapie, The Rise and Fall of the Haps-

56 B.N., Novelles Acquisitions françaises, MS 2039,
XXVII, 291. The plot was uncovered, the conspirators
gave themselves up and were executed. Tapie, The Rise and
Fall, p. 143. See also Pontalis, De Witt, I, 408-9.

nobles "who might one day be useful in placing the Polish crown into the hands of a prince" of Louis' blood. 58 In February 1667, Maria Louisa sent Jan Andrzej, Count Morsztyn, to Louis asking for French troops to aid her in putting down an outbreak of civil war and putting D'Enghien on the throne. 59 When Maria Louisa died on May 10, 1667, Louis laid aside his plans for placing a Bourbon in Poland. In addition, Louis' Swedish allies had been opposed to a Bourbon on the throne of Poland and along with the elector of Brandenburg had been pushing the candidacy of the duke of Neubourg. And because of their opposition to Louis' plans for Poland, Sweden and Brandenburg had been approached by the Vienna Court about a possible alliance against France. 60 Therefore, Louis ordered his ambassador at Vorsovia, the bishop of Besiers, to try and arrange for a marriage between Casimir and the princess of Neubourg. Thus Louis hoped this action would please Sweden, Brandenburg, and other northern German states, while aiding his own alliance system. 61

58 Ibid., p. 199. See also B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 17,406, XL, 287.
59 Ibid., p. 221.
60 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 2, 280.
61 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Suède, XXXI, fol. 19. See also Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 2, 309-11.
With the knowledge that Lionne had secured France against any potential enemies that might attack from the rear, Louis confidently followed the French armies into the Spanish Netherlands. The towns were taken rapidly. First, Tournai, then Armentières and Charleroi by June 2. Louis "entered Charleroi as though it had been Paris."\(^\text{62}\) Binch, Bergues, Furnes, and Douai were taken by July 6. The campaign was easy. As Louis related, "the campaign succeeded beyond even his fondest dreams."\(^\text{63}\) With the French armies victorious, Louis sent for the Queen, presenting her with the occupied towns, fortresses, and provinces.\(^\text{64}\) With the court present in the field, Louis, after the labors of the day, "would change his clothes and live the life of Versailles, with elegant conversation, courtesy, smiles and the sound of violins..."\(^\text{65}\)

The startling success and the overwhelming strength of the French armies in their invasion of the Spanish Netherlands produced responses of fear and alarm throughout Europe. Spain declared war on July 14, 1667.\(^\text{66}\)

\(^\text{64}\) Grouvelle (ed.), Œuvres, V, 292.
\(^\text{65}\) Bartz, Louis XIV, p. 156.
Emperor issued an order for raising an army and outfitting troops. The United Provinces, still officially at war with England, could not threaten the Spanish. However, De Witt did inform Louis that the United Provinces would offer their services as mediators between Spain and France in these new hostilities. At the same time, the States-General began to assess their strength—army, navy, weapons, and supplies.

With the fall of Lille on August 17 and Alost on September 11, 1667, the rains began and Turenne halted his advancing armies. Louis, at this time, began an assessment of his position, receiving envoys, messengers, and ambassadors from various countries with urgent requests and demands for a cessation of hostilities.

And, when he assayed the "lightning campaign," the strength of his untested army, treaties, promises, and invitations for alliances, Louis wrote that his ambitions were "unfettered, the goals for the future" were open in all directions, and, he continued, "who knows what destiny I may hold for all Europe."

67 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Austriche, vol. 78, 341.
68 Boreel (ed.), Lettres... Jean de Witt, IV, 193, letter to Louis XIV dated June 6, 1667.
69 Pontalis, De Witt, I, 410.
70 Grouvelle (ed.), Œuvres, V, 303. See also Longnon (ed.), Mémoires de Louis XIV, II, 238.
In looking at the diplomatic events of the last half of the year, 1667, the view of Europe as seen by Louis did not seem so far removed from the reality of the situation.

The German princes, members and non-members of the League of the Rhine, meeting at Ratisbon in May 1667, had issued a statement calling for peace, while informing the Emperor that they, the princes, hoped military intervention would not be resorted to by Austria.71 Robert Gravel wrote Louis on June 4 and again on June 9, stating that the Imperial Diet, meeting at Ratisbonne, desired peace. And, even though the minister of Spain to Ratisbonne, Marquis de Malagon, and the Emperor's minister, the Cardinal de Thun, and the Count de Wersenvolf had tried to illicit support from the German princes in the form of money or men, the ministers had been unsuccessful.72 Further verification of the ambivalence of the Austrian emperor towards the occupation of the Spanish Netherlands is written to Lionne in two dispatches from the Abbé Gravel (Robert's brother), the French minister to Mainz in which he relates a conversation he had with Count Philip Ludwig von Zinzendorf, special envoy of the emperor. Zinzendorf informed Gravel that Leopold was in-

71 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 7,067, 183.
72 Ibid., 195-201.
terested in mediation between France and Spain by the mem-
bbers of the electoral college and was not considering any
overt action.\textsuperscript{73}

In the meantime, the Queen of Spain had written a
letter to Louis asking him to suspend hostilities and
egotiate.\textsuperscript{74} Writing from the captured city of Douai,
Louis refused to suspend hostilities until his wife's
claims to territory had been satisfied.\textsuperscript{75} However,
through their respective ministers, the French minister in
Madrid, archbishop Embrum and Lionne in Paris, and the
Spanish minister in Paris, the marquis de la Fuente and
del Campo, letters, offers, and counter-offers were
made.\textsuperscript{76} And with the inducement of the signing of the
Treaty of Breda on July 31, 1667, the courts of Spain and
France accepted the mediators sent by the Pope — Cardinal
Visconti for the Queen of Spain and Abby Rospigliosi for
the King of France.

\textsuperscript{73}Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession
d'Espagne, II, part 3, 173-6. Letters dated June 17 and
June 28, 1667.

\textsuperscript{74}A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, MS Espagne,
69, fol. 1034. Letter of Marie Anne to Louis XIV on
May 29, 1667.

\textsuperscript{75}Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., pp. 183-199.
The Emperor Leopold continued to vacillate between peace and war. Because of family ties and alliances, Austria was to send money and men to aid Spain in case of war. Castel-Rodrigo had sent several dispatches to Leopold, appealing for assistance. But Leopold was not very enamoured of Spain. In the past, Leopold had demanded that Spain end her war with Portugal, unite again the Houses of Hapsburg, and assist him with Spanish armies in combatting the Turkish forces in Eastern Europe. Also, Prince Zdenko Lobkowitz, Leopold's first minister, was anti-Spanish, having openly voiced his dislike of Spain as a hindrance to Austria. However, by August, Leopold had consented to issuing orders to raise a small army.

Lionne instructed Grémonville to do everything in his power to thwart any invasion force. Then, writing to Von Fürstenburg, Lionne ordered him to Vienna to assist Grémonville in halting the Austrian build-up of

77B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 17,408, vol. III, 175.

78Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d’Espagne, II, part 3, 198.


80A.A.E., Ibid., fol. 189. Letter of Lionne to Grémonville dated September 11, 1667.
arms. Therefore, when Lobkowitz, as Leopold's minister, suggested to Von Fürstenburg that the emperor and king should again consider partitioning Spain and its territories upon the death of Carlos II, Von Fürstenburg quickly transmitted this information to Lionne. Lionel instructed Grémonville to negotiate a treaty, informing the Emperor that Louis felt that Spain was "a sick man" and "must be treated" as such. Furthermore, Lionne explained, it would be better for all of Europe if Louis and Leopold would "partition the Spanish empire now" rather than have a war occur because of the question of the successor to the Spanish inheritance. And even though Austria had begun to assemble an army, Leopold interpreted the end of the French campaign in September 1667 as a show of moderation by Louis. And therefore, Leopold informed Grémonville on November 15, 1667 that he would agree to a treaty of partition if it remained secret. Only the

81 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 7,067, 193.


83 Ibid., fols. 219-35, for letters between Lionne and Gréonville for the month of October 1667. See also Legrelle, La diplomatie française...d'Espagne, I, 175-83; and Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 244-9.

84 Ibid., vol. 28, fol. 13. See also Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 249-54.
details and signatures were needed.

While these negotiations were being transacted, Lionne, his envoys, and Louis were engaged in conferences with the Dutch and English envoys and ambassadors, De Witt, and Charles. In England, Ruvigny, envoyé extraordinaire, began receiving special instructions on how to keep England neutral. He was instructed to emphasize the secret treaty between England and France, the commercial ties of England and France, and the fact that France's pro-English feelings had certainly influenced Louis' willingness to assume such a minor role in the fighting of the recent war. In addition, Louis wanted Charles II to consider Louis' significant role in the recently signed treaty of peace at Breda and Louis' willingness for the "restitution of part of the Island of St. Kitts" and Montserrat. And above all else, Louis wanted Charles to consider negotiating a much closer union of the two countries.

What Louis and Lionne did not know until later was that England wanted neutrality. The cabinet of Charles II and even Charles himself might have been willing to enter.


86 B.N., Fond françaises MS 9,719, p. 389. See also Feiling, British Foreign Policy, pp. 246-8.
another war, but the people were tired of war.  

For the position of England on neutrality, one had only to look at the Anglo-Spanish Treaty signed on May 23, 1667 which related mostly to commercial privileges but also arranged for a period in which mediation between Portugal and Spain would be attempted, while at the same time, neither Spain nor England would help the other's enemies.

Upon his arrival in London in September, Ruvigny found that Charles, unlike his subjects, wanted an opportunity to "erase the humiliating treaty." But Ruvigny had to deal with Henry Bennet, Lord Arlington, the chief adviser of Charles and the Duke of Buckingham, Charles' other favorite adviser. Arlington was anti-French and Buckingham, while not anti-French, favored an alliance with France only if it offered advantages to England. Louis had instructed Ruvigny to offer Charles two propositions: one, "a league of mutual support" against rebellious subjects; or two, a joint enterprise of England and France against "mutual allies" in the Spanish West.

---

87 Feiling, British Foreign Policy, pp. 228-9.
88 Dumont (ed.), Corps universel diplomatique, VI, 44-6.
89 Ogg, Charles II, II, 324-6.
90 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 512-3.
Charles explained to Ruvigny that the mood of Parliament and the "exhausted state of England" prevented England from engaging in any new hostilities. However, Charles felt that Parliament might agree to an alliance of neutrality with France, a joint expedition in the Spanish West Indies, and England in the role of mediator. Charles even proposed that, "after a year or so," France and England enter into an offensive and defensive alliance. Louis discreetly refused, offering as his reason the idea that it was in violation of his obligations as set forth in his treaty with the United Provinces. However, Louis displayed much more concern about a fear that any treaty such as Charles proposed might drive the United Provinces into an alliance with Spain and thwart Louis' plans for retaining certain territories in the Spanish Netherlands.

92 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 513-33. Extracts of letters from Ruvigny to Lionne during September 1667.
95 Grouvelle (ed.), Œuvres, II, 231.
96 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers,
Although France was highly successful through their diplomatic maneuvering in restricting English intervention in the hostilities, Lionne and Louis could not restrain England from attempting to negotiate a treaty directed toward the prevention of further France aggression in the Spanish Netherlands.

And through-out all of this frenzied diplomatic activity, no one was more diplomatically active than De Witt. Even before the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands by the French armies, De Witt had instructed Van Beuningen to inform Louis that any attempt to occupy the Spanish Netherlands would be jeopardizing future relations between the United Provinces and France.9^ In reply Van Beuningen wrote to De Witt that "once the French get close to our borders, nothing will stop them until they take our towns and homes."98 De Witt's concern may also be ascertained by the statements he made in a letter to Sir William Temple, in which De Witt expressed a fear that even if Louis' army did not try to occupy the United Provinces, the Dutch were afraid Louis would try to blockade the sea-

37/26. Letter of Henrietta to Charles, September 18, 1667, relating a letter she had received from Louis. Letters are dated new style in this dissertation.

97Boreel (ed.), Lettres...Jean de Witt, IV, 181.
98Ibid., IV, 181.
De Witt was in a dilemma. He did not want war with France but he also did not want French occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. That De Witt felt genuine concern can be evidenced in the letter he wrote to his ambassadors in London: "To abandon Spain is to make France a present of the Netherlands, to take her defence upon ourselves alone would be folly. . ." Only one alternative was left, De Witt decided "there only remains conciliation." Throughout the months of July, August, and September, De Witt conferred with D'Estrades in formal and informal discussion and then by dispatch, and when D'Estrades returned to Breda, De Witt continued to negotiate with D'Estrades by dispatch. Although D'Estrades cautioned Louis that he should consider proposals of mediation, Louis informed D'Estrades "that he would not enter into any negotiations which would give the Spaniard time for defense," and also give Spain time to enlist foreign aid.

99 Ibid., p. 183.
100 Ibid., p. 212. See also Pontalis, De Witt, I, 411.
101 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 9,719,444.
102 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 6,919,201.
103 D'Estrades, Lettres... d'Estrades, IV, 201.
104 Grouvelle (ed.), Œuvres, V, 184. Also, B.N. Neuvelle Aquisitions françaises MS 1,996, p. 148.
De Witt was not thwarted by Louis' refusal. Now that England and the United Provinces had signed their treaty of peace and with a renewed activity by the Dutch and Spanish diplomats to bring about a defensive alliance with Spain, De Witt again offered to mediate for peace, while demanding that Louis make some type of satisfactory proposal that would show proof of his good faith. And, with the "closing-down" of the highly successful campaign in the Spanish Netherlands which had provided Louis with most of his "claims" Louis finally agreed in September to one of the plans proposed by De Witt. Louis' offer declared that Louis would keep all of the conquests France had made in the summer of 1667 and France would cease hostilities until March 1668. Or as a second alternative, Louis would renounce all of his wife's claims on the Spanish Netherlands, if he were allowed to keep a few of the towns along the frontiers of France. As a further gesture of concession, Louis offered to relinquish the town of Lille in exchange for land extending to Charleroi. However, as compensation for this concession, he demanded...

---

105 Boreel (ed.), Lettres...Jean de Witt, IV, 234. See also Pontalis, De Witt, I, 412-3.

106 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Hollande, Vol. 21, fol. 89.

107 Douai, Tournai, Bergues, Furnes, Cambrai, Saint Omer, and Aire, with their baillages, Castlewards, and dependencies.
that Spain give him Franche-Comté and the Duchy of Luxembourg. Furthermore, Louis declared that he wanted Spain to recognize the independence of Portugal. As a balm for all of these concessions, Louis wanted the States-General to undertake to coerce Spain to accept his proposals or promise to join France and force Spain to accept the terms.108

Although De Witt did not object to these conditions, he postponed any final decision, asking clarification of certain claims.109 Also, fearing further encroachment upon the Spanish Netherlands, De Witt demanded that Louis suspend hostilities, giving Spain a chance to receive the proposals and reply. De Witt went even further, informing Louis that if Louis would agree not to invest any other portion of the Spanish Netherlands, he, De Witt would guarantee the aid of the United Provinces to Louis by a secret treaty, in the event that the succession to the Spanish crown again came into question.110

Thus, as Louis stated, "I resolved to show all Europe my moderation by offering to be satisfied with what

108 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 492-5, extract of a memoir of Louis to D'Estrades, September 27, 1667.

109 Boreel (ed.), Lettres...Jean de Witt, IV, 312. See also D'Estrades, Correspondance authentique, III, 87-9.

I had taken in exchange for what I had inherited. . .," and informed De Witt that surely the two of them could reach some type of agreement. However, Louis was not about to give up too much or not allow himself freedom to continue his conquests, a fact which can be seen in his letter of instructions for D'Estrades. Louis did not mention the clause about the Spanish succession. Yet, Louis wanted his willingness for moderation to be very evident, proposing therefore, that he give up claims to Tournay and Charleroi and keep only Luxembourg, allowing Spain to keep Franche-Comté, and finally, Louis agreed to extend the suspension of hostilities to six months.

But De Witt vacillated. He did not really want peace under the above conditions because they did not restrict Louis from "occupying" more of the Spanish Netherlands and if Spain did not co-operate, the United Provinces would have to sever relations with Spain. Therefore, in order to prevent Louis from breaking the peace treaty if signed, De Witt wanted the clauses of the treaty guaranteed by the States-General.

\[112\] B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 17,409, vol. LII, 221.
\[113\] Boreel (ed.), Lettres... Jean de Witt, IV, 238-43.
\[114\] Ibid., p. 247. See also Pontalis, De Witt, I, 416-7.
Although Louis was angry with the Dutch, an ally, he publically showed moderation, instructing D'Estrades:

"...to accommodate himself to the ideas of those with whom he had to deal, instead of pushing matters to a climax, he would be content to obtain from the States a promise of refusing to any troops who might come from the German side to the aid of the Spanish possessions."

Once more, De Witt suggested a further compromise. He wanted Louis, if hostilities should break out with Spain again, to agree to fight in other Spanish possessions and not carry the war into the Spanish Netherlands.

Louis was tired of bickering and, therefore, finally refused. Throughout October and November, De Witt, Van Beuningen, D'Estrades, Lionne, and Louis had negotiated for terms that would end the conflict.

Apparently not trusting the success of the negotiations, Louis initiated alternate plans. While his

115 D'Estrades, Lettres, d'Estrades, IV, 273.
116 Boreel (ed.), Lettres. . . Jean de Witt, IV, 244-55.
117 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 6,732, fol. 111.
118 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 497-532; see also Boreel (ed.), Lettres. . . Jean de Witt, IV, 212-68.
diplomats fruitlessly labored at negotiations, Louis prepared for his next assault.

And De Witt who had driven too hard a bargain had to look to other states for an ally or allies to help the United Provinces check Louis and his pretensions for France.
Chapter IV

With the aggressive ambitions of Louis XIV threatening to claim even more territory in Europe in the Fall of 1667, it would appear that the Dutch would have found many frightened allies ready to form coalitions against France. Instead, De Witt and the States General had to coerce England out of a desired state of neutrality. This position of neutrality had the support of most of the populace of England.¹ But De Witt hoped that he could reverse this policy and with good reason. During the peace conferences at Breda in May, England's envoys, Holles and Coventry, were instructed by Clarendon to make known to De Witt the advantages offered by a triple alliance "composed of the United Provinces, Sweden, and England."²

But, at that time the Dutch still hoped that a compromise could be worked out with Louis XIV. "I can only hope," wrote De Witt "that the long friendship between us [United Provinces and France] will allow his majesty to negotiate," so that the invasion of the French armies "does not...

¹Feiling, British Foreign Policy, pp. 228-32.
²Clarendon, The Life... of Clarendon, III, 155.
But the rapid advance of Louis' armies during the summer campaign, as town after town in the Spanish Netherlands surrendered to the French, posed a much more menacing threat to the Dutch. By August the "merchants were clamoring for action" and threatening the States General.4

Thus, while De Witt continued negotiations with Louis, he prudently sought for other alternatives in case the French broke off diplomatic relations entirely. On August 19, Holles and Coventry were apprised of the change in attitude of the Dutch. In a conference with Meerman, they were asked to convey to Charles the "wishes of the States General to form an alliance as soon as possible" for the mutual benefit of the English and Dutch.5 But Charles was not yet ready to actively assist Spain "for the alarm France will take from it, . . .," besides the fact that England needed rest, while her "neighbours were falling out."6 And any alliance with "so recent an


enemy," especially the "pompous and fat Dutch merchants would bid no good" at this time. 7

But De Witt had a more reliable English arbitrator — — Sir William Temple, Charles' special envoy extraordinary to The Hague. In July 1667, Temple had gone to Breda and after conferring with the various ambassadors representing England, the United Provinces, and France, reversed his former position towards the war and French and Dutch diplomatic positions. Although he had suggested to Arlington in May that England and the United Provinces should unite together, "the best revenge that could be drawn from the game which France is playing. . . ." that is, keeping the two belligerents at war, would be to "let the war rage until we intervened with an overwhelming force" since the combatants would have worn themselves down. 8 Instead, Temple hoped that after the peace with the Dutch was concluded England could "fall in with them into a joint offer of our mediation in the present quarrel," it might "prove an entrance into the renewing of confidence between us [England and the United Provinces], . . ." Temple continued to write that a joint mediation might "loosen them from France, . . ." which will in the

7 Ibid., p. 112, letter from Arlington to Temple, dated August 21, 1667.

8 Ibid., p. 95, letter dated May 27, 1667.
future "either by accord or an opposition" have to put a "stop to the French power and ambition."\(^9\)

With Brussels threatened by the French armies, Temple, still officially a resident of Brussels, sent his family to England and was himself granted permission to go to The Hague where he began a series of conferences with De Witt in October. Temple sent a dispatch to Arlington on October 5, informing him that De Witt was sending an ambassador to England as soon as possible "to induce His Majesty... to enter into a common league for preserving the repose of Christendom..." Temple concluded that De Witt felt "nothing could be more just or more honourable" than bringing the "French King to reason without blows."\(^10\)

Certainly, De Witt felt on firmer ground about a proposed plan of mediation or alliance to stop France since he had been approached in September 1667, by the Swedish envoy to London, Count Christopher von Dohna. Von Dohna was a Calvinist and an Orangist noble by birth who fervently disliked the French. Von Dohna, who had


\(^10\)Ibid., p. 119. See also Feiling, British Foreign Policy, p. 242, in which Feiling disagrees that De Witt was anti-French. In fact, Feiling points out that "De Witt's life-work hitherto had rested on French friendship, and neither before nor after the Triple Alliance was he prepared to lose it."
come to The Hague in September 1667, ostensibly to settle differences in trade that were causing commercial strife, was approached about his countries attitude toward a joint alliance against France by two senators of the States-General. The two senators, Jan Bioernklow and Stan Bielk, were leaders of the anti-French faction in the States-General.11

Sweden had been an ally and recipient of French money for a number of years. The Grand Chancellor, Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie was essentially the head of the Swedish government because of the regency for Charles XI by his mother, Hedwig Eleanor, Duchess of Holstein. However, an opposition clique, which opposed the close French ties, had seized control of the government during a two month illness of La Gardie. And in late October, this faction of senators sent instructions to Von Dohna to remain at The Hague and negotiate the best terms offered for a league with the Dutch for the purpose of armed mediation, if necessary.12 The coalition against La Gardie was so strong that when he returned to office from his illness, he was forced to take leave again in December. At that time Von Dohna received further instructions "to enter

11D'Estrades, Lettres...d'Estrades, IV, 28, memoir to Lionne, October 18, 1667.

12Pontalis, John De Witt, I, 419-20.
into, without reservations, any alliance which can be made with the United Provinces and England..."13

However, De Witt realized that a joint mediation without the support of England would be powerless and therefore, useless. In early October, De Witt sent two close friends, John Meerman, burgomaster of Leyden and Johan Boreel, burgomaster of Middleburg to London as his special envoys. These two men were to implement a policy designed to secure "a mutual alliance for mediating the difficulties between Spain and France," even if they had to threaten Charles with the possibility of a treaty between the United Provinces and France.14 Before leaving Amsterdam, Boreel confidently announced "that he should endeavour to secure a close alliance with England..."15 Meerman arrived in London on October 12 followed by Boreel on November 15, 1667.16

Apparently Meerman and Boreel bungled their assignment or were no match for diplomats like Lisola and Ruvigny. Not only were they to discuss and secure "some


14 Ibid., pp. 212-3.

15 D'Estrades, Lettres...d'Estrades, IV, 51, letter to Lionne, dated October 21, 1667.

type of promises" regarding an alliance composed of England, the United Provinces, Sweden and any willing German princes for the purpose of stopping the advances of Louis XIV, but, in addition, Meerman and Boreel were to negotiate a marine treaty dealing with commerce and respect for each other's ships. But the "vaguely-worded proposals" by Meerman and Boreel along with their unwillingness to commit the United Provinces to any firm steps that would lead toward an Anglo-Dutch alliance only added to English distrust and dislike of the Dutch.

While admitting there were some advantages of a mutual alliance, Charles told the two ministers that the United Provinces had much more at stake than England and it is the "States-General who must take the first steps" since the sea "will separate him [Louis XIV] from England."

It appears that De Witt was caught in a dilemma. He did not want to risk severance of relations with France. But in hopes of drawing Louis into a compromise of demands or into a mediation, De Witt felt he must ap-

17 De Beauval, Annales des Provinces-Unies, II, 48-54.
18 Feiling, British Foreign Policy, pp. 245-6.
proach Charles with an offer of a mutual alliance against France because the Dutch were not strong enough to demand the cessation of hostilities by Louis. De Witt's diplomacy had, more often than not, been founded upon French friendship and he was not yet ready to lose it. But De Witt was no monarch and therefore, had to contend with the States-General which was becoming more bellicose and more alarmed at the obstinacy displayed by Lionne and Louis. So, De Witt continued to try and arrive at some compromise of the question of the Spanish Netherlands that would satisfy Louis and the court at Madrid. In a letter to D'Estrades, De Witt agreed to "offer assistance to France" because it was necessary "whilst seeking security for the King," and that he also had to look after the interests of the United Provinces, "who could only feel themselves safe from His Majesty's great power, in the assurance that he would never be master of Flanders." 

Thus, while still hoping for a break-through in the stalemate of Franco-Dutch negotiations, De Witt again instructed Meerman to obtain a promise of mediation from Charles' government. During several conferences held

---

20 Ibid., p. 382.
22 Ibid., pp. 242-3, instructions dated December 6, 1667.
in late November and early December, with Arlington, Lisola of Austria, and Molina of Spain, the two Dutch ministers made known the fact that the United Provinces intended to withhold subsidies from Spain in an attempt to force her to sacrifice some territories demanded by France, in order that a compromise might be worked out with France. All of the representatives agreed that an alliance with England, Sweden, the Empire and the United Provinces must be formed at once. At this point in the discussions, Lisola asked Meerman if the Dutch would help England and the Hapsburgs if Spain accepted the mediation, but France refused? Meerman replied that he believed they would but did not have the authority to make a firm commitment.

Deciding to negotiate directly with De Witt through Temple, Arlington sent instructions to Temple to accelerate his attempt to reach some kind of agreement with De Witt about joint mediation. Two events prompted this sudden desire displayed by the English to bring about an

---

23 Onno Klopp, Der fall des hauses Stuart, XI, 284, for text of Lisola's discussions during the conferences on December 6 and 7.

24 Boreel (ed.), Lettres et négociations, III, 234-5; see also Klopp, Der fall des hauses Stuart, XI, 280-95.

alliance, an alliance which the Dutch envoys had been attempting to solicit from England for a month. First Clarendon had been ousted, in fact exiled, from England on charges of treason and Arlington (the Earl of) had taken charge of foreign affairs. Arlington was married to a Dutch woman, a daughter of the former Dutch ambassador to London, Beverivaert, and thus, perhaps, was even more than usually interested in an alliance between England and the United Provinces. Secondly, Charles was negotiating with the French for an alliance that would offer better terms to England. According to Pontalis, Charles only pretended to show interest in the French proposals in order to encourage the Dutch to enter into negotiations that would compromise the United Provinces by arousing "the irreconcilable emity of Louis." Even Meerman was suspicious of the abrupt change in English policy and informed De Witt "that the eagerness now shown. . . hides the intention of injuring the States with France." But Meerman was not the only person questioning the direction of the negotiations. Arlington mistrusted the intentions of the negotiations, adding that he felt the Dutch were "actively pursuing a pro-French mutual alliance" and

26 Pontalis, John De Witt, I, 423.
27 Boreel (ed.), Lettres et négociations, III, 238.
were using the English as a lever against Louis," especially since the Dutch were still anti-Spanish and were probably just waiting to "go in for their share of the prey." \(28\)

If neutrality were really the aim of Charles and Arlington, then they were seeking the best offers from the two antagonists, France and the United Provinces. \(29\) However, in a letter to Henrietta, Charles asked her to again inform "His Majesty that I seek nothing but an alliance that will enable England" to regain her honor. Furthermore, if this honor can be accommodated by "an alliance between our kingdoms, making us an invincible force against the jealousies of Europe," then it is to "his advantage also." \(30\)

In an attempt to bring England and France into a closer alliance, Louis had sent one of his most able diplomats, the Marquis de Ruvigny to Charles. \(31\) The desire for the success of the mission can be better understood


\[29\]Feiling, British Foreign Policy, p. 248. Feiling even points out that the English attitude is hazy because of the absence of documents.

\[30\]Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 37/26, letter to Henrietta, dated October 18, 1667.

\[31\]Ruvigny left France on September 9, 1667.
when Ruvigny's qualifications are listed. He was a Huguenot (Protestant), a brother-in-law to the Earl of Southampton, one of Charles' ministers, had other relatives in the English Parliament, and spoke English. Ruvigny's instructions were to offer Charles money and ships so that England could take all or part of Spanish possessions in the West Indies. In return Charles would send 8,000 troops to the Spanish Netherlands to help Louis' armies maintain control. Also, Ruvigny was to let Charles know that Louis expected this action to force Dutch cooperation with Spain, absolving France from all obligations to the Dutch, in the event Charles wished to revenge himself in war against the United Provinces.32

When Ruvigny arrived on September 13, he found that several changes had taken place. As previously mentioned, Clarendon was in disgrace, replaced by Arlington. Englishmen in Parliament were speaking of the power of France and that the aspirations of Louis were for "a universal monarchy." Not only was their talk of an "alliance with Holland" in order to "maintain a balance between France and Spain,..." but the possibility existed that an armed force might be used to stop Louis. The only man within Charles' sphere of influence that was pro-

French, was the Duke of Buckingham.  

Charles received Ruvigny on September 20, listened to the proposals and told him to inform Louis that in its exhausted state England could not engage in any hostilities, even in the West Indies, and suggested that England would adhere to a policy of neutrality.  

But the attitude of Charles seems markedly different in a letter to Henrietta. "I wish a closer tie with France," Charles wrote, but the Clarendon affair "makes me hesitant to ask for an alliance" that might lead us into war. However, he added, "I feel that the attitude will soon change," and "I can take advantage of the French moneys to pay off the military debts," and then "I can help my brother."  

Louis again countered with the offer to Charles of money for ships and the plans for an offensive and defensive alliance. In return Louis wanted English troops in the Spanish Netherlands in case of trouble and freedom to act in the Spanish Netherlands. Louis even suggested

---


34 Ibid., Vol. LXXXIX, fol. 98, letter to Louis, dated September 26, 1667.

35 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 37/26, September 27, 1667.
that Charles would understand his internal struggle with Spain in the Spanish Netherlands and wish for no interference since it was similar to England's continued strife with Scotland and Ireland.  

Charles' answer to Ruvigny was made before receipt of the letter Louis sent on October 5, 1667. Charles, apparently deciding he had a better bargaining position with Louis, asked for money in advance, a share of the conquests in the Spanish Netherlands, and a commercial treaty. By the end of October, Charles was promising Louis that England would only remain neutral for six months. Yet, he told Henrietta that she should inform Louis that "I want an alliance that will put the Dutch where they belong." To try and bribe members of the English Parliament which had convened on October 20, Louis had put 40,000 francs at Ruvigny's disposal.

In a dispatch from Ruvigny to Louis, dated November 8, 1667, Ruvigny related the discussion between him and Charles, in which Charles expressed dismay and sur-

\[\text{A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 89, fol. 99.}\]
\[\text{Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 37/26, October 6, 1667, letter to Henrietta.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., letter dated November 1, 1667 to Henrietta.}\]
\[\text{Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 525.}\]
prise that Louis wished to continue the war against Spain, but also wished to engage the Dutch and the English in the hostilities. And, rumor had it, so Charles declared, that Louis was making secret alliances with other states in order to build up a league against his enemies. And was England one of these enemies?  

Lionne answered Charles by expressing surprise that Charles would think that Louis would enter into "liaisons with other princes. . .," especially after the secret agreement that Louis and Charles had made with each other not to act against one another. But his majesty, Louis, was even more upset that England would only consider neutrality until March, as if Charles did not trust his closest ally. According to Mignet, the rest of the month of November and most of December proved futile to Ruvigny, although numerous conferences were held with Arlington and Buckingham.

---

40 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 89, fol. 123.

41 Ibid., fol. 212, letter of Lionne to Ruvigny, dated November 16, 1667. See also B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 17,410, fol. 238.

42 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 533. Since Mignet's work on the Spanish Succession is considered exhaustive as far as it goes, and cited in nearly any important study about any aspect of the succession, the researcher can assume the evidence is correct. For example, the Recueil des instructions données. . ., XXV, Angleterre, II, has no cor-
But the months of November and December were anything but nonproductive if one looks at the correspondence that Charles and Henrietta were exchanging with each other about English-French relations.\(^{43}\)

Charles explained in a letter of November 28 that Clarendon was in serious trouble and doubted that he (Charles) could aid Clarendon. If Clarendon was charged with treason and found guilty, Charles had decided to prorogue Parliament (Parliament was prorogued on December 19). Although this affair was occupying much of his time, he wanted Henrietta to convey to Louis that he had instructed his advisers to work out the details of an alliance between France and England.\(^{44}\)

And yet, Arlington informed Ruvigny on November 25 that another stipulation to any treaty agreement was that the French must recognize English supremacy at sea, i.e.,

\[^{43}\text{The two portfolios of letters between the king of England and his sister are in English, French, and Latin and cover a period dating from June 1667 to February 1668.}\]

\[^{44}\text{Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 37/27, letter to Henrietta.}\]
lowering their flags first in salute. This conversation was made on the same day that Temple's instructions were being drafted to ask for a triple alliance with the Dutch. The English became even more demanding when Arlington agreed to a league between France and England against the United Provinces but would stipulate that England would remain neutral towards Spain. And in a manner suggesting that the English were trying to break off the negotiations, Buckingham demanded, in return for an alliance guaranteeing English neutrality towards any French hostilities on the Continent, Ostend and Nieuport; a French attack on the United Provinces; no partition of the Spanish Netherlands that would concede any land to the Dutch; and a treaty of commerce. In return the English would aid France only if the Dutch began hostilities and England would remain true to her 1667 non-aggressive treaty with Spain.

Again, a look at the personal correspondence of Charles reveals his strategy regarding France. The "merchants must be made to pay for their haughtiness," wrote Charles, and "His Majesty's troops and our navy will be

45 Arlington, The Right Honourable, the Earl of Arlington's Letters, II, the appendix, memorandum dated December 1, 1667.

46 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 89, fols. 208-9, particularly a letter of Ruvigny to Lionne, dated December 13, 1667.
too much for them." Tell "His Majesty that the treaty will soon be forwarded" by your courier. "I will await his reply with anxiety." 47

On December 22, 1667, Arlington gave Ruvigny a document referring to a proposal for a treaty between the two kings, entitled "Project D'un Traité Secret Entre Les Deux Rois, Du 22 Décembre 1667." The treaty provided for an offensive and defensive league especially directed against the United Provinces, in case the States-General and France began hostilities, England would aid France against the United Provinces, and if England and the States-General came to hostilities, France would aid England, and the king of England would not intercede or come to the aid of Spain against France in the event of the continuation of war between France and Spain. 49 However, Louis rejected the proposal because he did not want to "break with his Dutch friends at this point." Apparently, Louis was still hoping that he could force Spain into further war which might not be as attractive to the Span-


49 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, Vol. 89, fol. 302. See also Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 337.
ish if the English allied with him.  

In other words, Charles was attempting to gain the control of the complex diplomatic struggle ensuing in the winter of 1667-1668. While he was proposing this treaty with Louis and professing only the closest friendship, Charles had already sent orders for Temple to return to England before continuing to The Hague to receive further instructions in order to implement the league that would thwart any further plans of Louis XIV.

Temple returned to London and received his instructions on January 1, 1668, to return to The Hague and insist upon an alliance between the States-General and England. If necessary, Arlington told Temple, "inform De Witt of the proposed alliance with France" which England "will be forced into" if the States-General continues to delay.  

But upon his return to The Hague, Temple was made aware that other leaders were bargaining for their best interests. De Witt was dealing not only with England and with France, but was also trying to obtain some sort of concessions from a very obdurate Spanish court at Madrid.

50 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 536-8, letter to Ruvigny, dated January 4, 1668.

Throughout the summer, De Witt and his envoys, Van Beuningen in Paris and Beverning in Madrid had been attempting to reach compromises between France and Spain that would reestablish peace. As stated before, D'Estrades tried to impress upon De Witt that Louis' demands were quite moderate.52 These demands made by Louis suggested that he would halt the war and cease all hostilities until March 1668, and he would keep all conquests he had made in the summer campaign. Or as a second alternative, Louis would renounce all of his wife's claims in the Spanish Netherlands, if he were allowed to keep for his satisfaction, the duchy of Luxembourg, Cambrai, Cambrésis, Douai, Aire, Saint-Omer, Bergues, and Furnes, with their baillages, castlewards, and dependencies. And he would concede Lille in exchange for land extending to Charleroi. Also Louis demanded compensation that Spain give him Franche-Comté. In return for relinquishing these conquered lands, Louis wanted the Dutch to coerce Spain into accepting his terms for peace. And if Spain refused the peace terms then the United Provinces could resort to.

armed aggression alongside France. 53

With the summer campaigns ending, De Witt, always hopeful for an agreement with France instead of war, delayed his tactics, negotiating as we have seen with all concerned parties. In particular, he asked Louis to give the court at Madrid time to consider the proposals. 54 Through D'Estrades, De Witt implored Louis "to consider that such great affairs, . . ., cannot be treated of without taking precautions which are not in use in kingdoms where the Sovereign's will decides everything." Louis would have to concede more, De Witt told D'Estrades, or the war will continue. And to guarantee the treaty of peace, the States-General and other princes would be called into the mediation. 55 "His Majesty is furious" wrote Lionne, because De Witt's proposed project prevented "him from profiting by the renewal of the war if Spain should decline peace." 56

De Witt's dilemma worsened when first Castel-Rodrigo, then Don Estévan de Gamarra, the Spanish amb-

53 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 492-5, letter of Louis to D'Estrades, dated September 27, 1667.


56 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 17,410, fol. 239, letter to D'Estrades, December 1, 1667.
sor to The Hague, in consideration for conceding to the French the fort and revenue of Wass, demanded 4,000,000 livres from the States-General and authorization to impress men as soldiers in all of the United Provinces.\textsuperscript{57} De Witt was furious because his first minister Baron de Bergheyck had been negotiating a defensive alliance with Spain in case of further French attack, in which the States-General promised to loan 3,000,000 livres to Spain and give them 12,000 men as reinforcements, asking only for the towns of Ostend and Bruges and garrisoning of a few frontier towns.\textsuperscript{58}

The obstinancy of Spain, as well as its indecisiveness, the untrustworthyness of Charles, and the hoped-for continuation of France as an ally prodded De Witt to induce the States-General on December 10 to vote in favor of forcing Spain to the French terms, even guaranteeing that France would not be attacked by a third party if France's future conquests were outside of the Spanish Netherlands.\textsuperscript{59} And apparently, De Witt still felt disposed to reaching concord with Louis because on January 14, 1668, De Witt and D'Estrades exerted further pressure.

\textsuperscript{57}Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 495.

\textsuperscript{58}Boreel (ed.), Lettres et négociations, III, 281-3.

\textsuperscript{59}Japikse, Johan de Witt, p. 262.
on the States-General to support the provisions of the first resolution, while providing a provision that an effort would be made to bring England and Sweden into the agreement to exert further pressure upon Spain to accept peace terms.  

Once again, Louis' goals and policies were under his control. He was the master manipulator. In October, the Elector of Cologne agreed to aid Louis' envoys in bringing about a mutual league which met on December 11, 1667. The "Instructions des electeurs et princes assembles a Cologne, pour les deputes quils envoient a Paris, a Vienna, et a Madrid," was sent to all Germanic princes, especially the members of the League of the Rhine. A treaty entitled Cologne-sur-la-Spree was signed on December 15, 1667, and sent to Louis, who agreed to the propositions of the treaty on December 21, 1667. The major items agreed to were that for certain sums of money agreed to in earlier negotiations, the princes present at the meeting would not allow passage of the Emperors troops across their territories and would aid France with men and arms if the treaty was violated.  


61 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 268-77.
was attended by the electors of Saxony, Brandenburg, Mainz, Cologne, Treves, and Bavaria, the dukes of Neuburg, Zell, Brunswick, and the bishops of Münster and Onsbruck.

As mentioned, in November, Leopold had accepted the principle of partition and in December, Louis and the Emperor Leopold had agreed to sign the treaty partitioning the Spanish inheritance as soon as the provisions were negotiated.62 Leopold in a letter dated December 30, 1667, gave full power to Jean Waicard, Duke of Münsterberg, prince of Aversperg, his chief council of state, to negotiate, conclude, and sign a treaty for the partitioning of Spain in the event of the death of Carlos II.63

The treaty, sometimes called the "Eventual treaty"64 and its provisions were to remain secret. The Prince of Aversperg and Jacques Brethel de Grémonville signed the treaty for their respective monarchs at 2:00 A. M. on the morning of January 20, 1668, although the sessions had started on January 19. The provisions for division of the Spanish lands were in articles 2 and 3.


63 Ibid., fol. 465.

Louis, upon the death of Carlos II would receive Cambrai, Cambrésis, the duchy of Luxembourg or in its place Burgundy, Franche-Comté, Douai, Aire, Saint-Omer, Bergues, and Furnes, the kingdom of Navarre, and the Philippines. Leopold would receive Spain, the West Indies, duchy of Milan, the ports of Tuscany, Naples, Sardinia, the Canary Islands and lands in Africa. And finally, in signing the treaty, Leopold recognized the rights of Maria Theresa.

Louis had many reasons to feel confident. But rumors were drifting in from his various envoys and ministers that a league was being formed for the purpose of stopping his aggression. And, although it was Louis himself who proposed the league to Charles to mediate between Spain and France, Louis was incensed. When Temple had met with Charles and the Foreign Committee on January 1, 1668, the proposals and plans that De Witt had been asking for over the last three months of 1667 were accepted almost in detail, i.e., armed mediation

---

66 D'Estrades, Lettres... d'Estrades, VI, 221, letter to Louis, dated January 12, 1668, in which D'Estrades informs Louis that Temple is acting as an agent for Castel-Rodrigo, who had proposed a league with the Dutch, English, and Swedes for halting Louis XIV.
of England, the United Provinces, Sweden, and Austria (Lisola and the other ministers and envoys were unaware of the negotiations then in process for the partition treaty); an armistice; applied pressure and force if Spain proved beligerent; a defensive alliance between England and the United Provinces with the addition of Sweden, if possible; and a guarantee of peace. Temple, arriving back at The Hague on January 7, was informed about the proposed resolution before the States-General - to ignore the consequences of the renunciation of Maria Theresa; to concede that if France attacked Spain to aid Portugal it would not be prejudicial to any general peace; and to invade the Spanish Netherlands if Spain refused to accept the alternatives that Louis had offered them. In return for accepting these provisions, the Dutch would have their choice of towns in the Spanish Netherlands, not already under French occupation, and could seize the West Indies.

Temple had his work cut out for him. Apparently, he was able to accomplish the "impossible." After


69 A.A.E., Correspondance Politique, Hollande, Vol. 21, fols. 88 and 89.

revealing to De Witt that Ruvigny had proposed an attack upon the United Provinces, impressing upon De Witt that Charles was sincere, and assuring De Witt that Sweden would enter into the alliance if the United Provinces and England took the initiative, Temple added the "ice-breaker" by offering favored commercial trade rights in all English ports.71

De Witt finally agreed, hesitantly he added that "France would take it as ill of us as of them to be stopped in the remaining conquest of Flanders,..."72 One immediate problem remained. According to the rules of the constitution of the United Provinces, no agreement could be entered into without the consent of each of the provincial states.73 Secrecy and speed were important, so Temple convinced De Witt to allow him the opportunity to speak to the "Eight Commissioners of Secret Affairs." After two conferences, an agreement as to the terms of the alliance were reached. On January 23, 1668, the treaty was officially signed. The main provisions were (1) in case of attack upon either England or "the Dominions of the States" by another party, the state not attacked would

71 Ibid., pp. 153-61.
73 Pontalis, John De Witt, I, 432. See also Temple, The Works of Sir William Temple, I, 162.
furnish 40 ships of war, 6,000 foot soldiers, and 400 horses; (2) provided that England and the United Provinces would endeavor "separately, or in concert with France," to seek peace with Spain; obtain a cessation of arms until the end of May 1668; induce Louis to renounce further conquests in the Spanish Netherlands, even if force should be found necessary to compel Spain to observe this agreement; and in a secret article (3) provided that whichever of the parties, Spain or France, refused to consent to the alternatives (offered by D'Estrades September 17 and November 8, 1667), force should be used to compel her to accept peace. If France were the recalcitrant one, the war upon her should not cease until she had been reduced to the limits originally imposed by the Peace of the Pyrenees. Von Dohna signed it on January 26, 1667.

How would Louis XIV react to the Triple Alliance? Perhaps the future actions of Louis were predicted by D'Estrades when De Witt and Temple informed D'Estrades of the treaty. Temple reported that D'Estrades coldly warned them that

...if we thought to prescribe him [Louis XIV] laws, and force him to compliance, by leagues between ourselves, or with Spain, though Sweden and the German Princes should join with

74 Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers, 103/74, extract of the Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden.
us, he knew his Master would not waver, and that it would come to a war of forty years. 75

But Louis' envoys were negotiating alliances and his generals were preparing for other campaigns.

Chapter V

The Triple Alliance between England, the United Provinces, and Sweden was formed to halt further aggressive acts of Louis XIV and to force Spain into concessions that would bring about peace between France and Spain. To the signers of the treaty "peace seemed to be assured."\(^1\) Arlington wrote to Temple "that both the world abroad and at home understand it to be both honourable and safe. . . .", for England.\(^2\)

De Witt gave a banquet for Temple, inviting the Prince William of Orange and the Prince John Maurice of Nassau. The Prince of Orange gave a ball with over eight hundred guests, even acting out an allegorical prologue about the events and characters, antagonists and protagonists, of the treaty.\(^3\)

Eleven days later, February 3, 1668, Louis' army entered Franche-Comté. Commanded by the Prince of Condé,\(^4\)

\(^1\)Pontalis, John De Witt, I, 438, letter to Arlington praising the negotiating of Temple.

\(^2\)Arlington, The Right Honourable, the Earl of . . . to Sir W. Temple, II, 203.

\(^3\)Pontalis, John De Witt, I, 439-40.

\(^4\)Louis II of Bourbon, Duke of Enghein and governor of Burgundy.
the army consisting of 18,000 men occupied the town of Rochefort on February 4 and the whole province by February 19. Franche-Comté had been garrisoned by only 2,000 regulars. Although there were some 10,000 militia, these men were not interested in war and offered no resistance. The capital city, Dôle, surrendered on February 9, welcoming Louis, who had joined his troops on the same day. The diet of Franche-Comté was in session at the time and pledged allegiance to Louis, while announcing all former subjects of the king of Spain guilty of treason if they failed to recognize their new sovereign.5

Louis had been planning the seldom ventured winter campaign against Franche-Comté since early in November.6 And certainly, the promise on December 15, 1667, and the signing of the Partition Treaty on January 20, 1668, with the Emperor Leopold, which included the provision of non-intervention by Austria, contributed to his decision to further prepare for the attack. Yet, the Partition Treaty also placed within his reach the goal of the Spanish Succession for which he had directed his energies. Why did he risk further animosity from Europe by this attack and occupation of Franche-Comté? Surely, discretion on the

5Petitot (ed.), Collection des Mémoires...France, LXVII, 89-115, gives a complete summary of the campaign.

6B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 11,231, fol. 103. Memoir of Louis to Turenne, dated November 11, 1667.
part of Louis would have brought about more gains from the relieved members of the alliance.

Apparently, two reasons prompted Louis' attack upon Franche-Comte. The first motive for attacking Franche-Comte was brought about by the idea that France could enter the peace negotiations with two alternatives for Spain. Louis would show his moderation by either (1) giving back to Spain the territory conquered in the Spanish Netherlands and keeping Franche-Comté or, (2) giving back to Spain Franche-Comté and keeping the lands taken in the summer campaign of 1667.7

The second motive for the campaign against Franche-Comte was his anger and indignation against England, the United Provinces, Sweden - and Europe. When Louis heard about the alliance he "exploded into vindictives about his friends, his allies, his relatives," who had turned against him. "Who do they think they are," he retorted, "treating their greatest benefactor in such a manner?"8

Louis called the alliance "a plot" and he wanted it known to all Europe that "all resistance to France was treason."9 For a while Louis even counseled with Louvois.

8B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 6,919, fol. 231, letter of Louis to D'Estrades.
and Turenne about a "march into Holland," as soon as the troops in Franche-Comté could be returned and united with the rest of the army. As Louis argued, "he had just waged war for these republicans" and now they (the Dutch) have turned on him by agreeing to an alliance "with the very enemy from whom he had saved them." The Dutch, an ally for many years, "now form leagues" against France "on the pretext of setting up a barrier to my expansion in the Low Countries." Furthermore, the alliance "was made nonetheless against myself alone" in order to try and force him to grant peace to Spain, even though "his foes" tried to make him believe that the alliance was directed more against Spain.

Louis was tempted to defy the three powers. His wrath was especially directed towards De Witt and the United Provinces as being mainly responsible for the Triple Alliance. Even D'Estrades, who felt betrayed by De Witt, placed great responsibility upon De Witt for the al-

10 B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 11,231, fol. 281, memoir of Turenne.

11 B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 2,039, fol. 45, memoir of Louis to Colbert, January 30, 1668.

12 Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 4, 543-6, letter to Grémonville, dated January 29, 1668.


14 Ibid., 363-4.
liance, particularly since De Witt had aided in the swift ratification of the treaty.\(^\text{15}\) And as late as March, 1669, Lionne was writing that the Triple Alliance had been constructed by the Dutch "because of their fear of the French occupancy of the Low Countries."\(^\text{16}\)

D'Estrades had known the treaty was being negotiated but relied upon his bribery and friendship with De Witt, as well as De Witt's loyalty to France, preventing a treaty from being concluded. D'Estrades wrote to Louis that "the English are attempting to put together an alliance" but there was very little support for joining their recent enemy. Temple's efforts were "in vain."\(^\text{17}\)

In fact, on January 22, D'Estrades informed Louis that the negotiations "would all end in smoke, and the King his master might snap his fingers at it."\(^\text{18}\)

Informed of the signing of the Triple Alliance on January 24 by De Witt and Temple, D'Estrades expressed

\(^{15}\) D'Estrades, Lettres... d'Estrades, IV, 312-6, letter to Lionne, dated February 16, 1668.

\(^{16}\) Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part IV, 615.


\(^{18}\) B.N., Manuscrits françaises, MS 6,919, fol. 213, letter to Louis.
surprise, anger, and dismay. However, in his correspondence to Louis and Lionne, D'Estrades attempted to explain that De Witt and the Dutch had agreed to sign the treaty only to force Spain to accept the terms of peace being offered by France. Also, the provisions for an armed mediation in the treaty were, in reality, the ideas that had been earlier suggested by Louis. "As far as he could tell," suggested D'Estrades, the treaty was concluded only because De Witt wanted to make certain "that Spain ceased hostilities." When these letters were written, D'Estrades did not know about the secret article in the treaty.

The thoughts of continuing the war must have been very appealing to Louis - a king who was attempting to be second to no one and certainly could not have liked the idea that these two major rivals and Sweden were attempting to dictate terms to him. And Louis gloried in the pomp of war. Pressure to press on to more campaigns and victories, at this point easily won, was exerted by

19 Temple, Observations...the Netherlands, II, 165.

20 D'Estrades, Lettres, d'Estrades, IV, 290-324, and B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 6,920, fols. 23-38, letters written on January 24, 26, 29, 30, February 2, 18, 19, 26, 28.

Turenne, Condé, and Louvois. Arguments that "the Netherlands were ripe for garnishing," that neither England nor the United Provinces were ready for any kind of war, and that the Germanic princes would ally with Louis to stop the Emperor Leopold were reasons given to Louis that his armies should be made ready for another campaign.

But Louis was swayed by the admonitions of his two most trusted ministers, Colbert and Lionne, both of whom urged moderation, an end to hostilities, and acceptance of the proposed treaty of peace. But each had their own reason for wishing to end the hostilities.

---


25 Henri Martin, Histoire de France, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'au 1789 (Paris: Furne, 1858), XIII, 337. At this time, Louis apparently had not brought these ministers into his confidence about the Treaty of Partition, 1668.
Colbert, as controller-general of finances, was responsible for providing the money to make war, or going about the business of war, as Louis might have said. When, in 1661, Colbert began his attempts of bringing financial order out of the chaos that was the financing of Louis' government, Colbert's task seemed impossible. Not only was the king's treasury empty, but "future revenues were mortgaged, the machinery for the collection of taxes was bled by financiers... the tax structure was cumbersome, unequal, and inefficient."26 Certainly, by 1667, Colbert had increased the revenues of France through reforms and restructuring the financial departments so that the government was operating within the black.27 Still, the 1660s were economically bad for all of Europe for many reasons - plagues, wars, inflation, crop failures, and very severe winters. And Louis XIV was an extravagant spender.

To Colbert, further campaigns and war cost France money. This fact alone would have made Colbert an opponent to further hostilities.28 But Colbert urged upon

27 Cole, Colbert... mercantilism, I, 340-1.
28 Some caution as to Colbert's motives toward war must be used. For example, when Louis sent troops to aid the Polish king in 1666, Colbert wrote to Louis that it was "necessary to save five sous on unessential things,
Louis moderation, letting Colbert "fight the Dutch with their own weapons - commerce." 29

Colbert's weapon - to gain economic superiority - had already made a tremendous impact upon Europe through the enactment of the Tariff of 1667. 30 The Tariff of 1667 "was aimed to injure drastically the trade of other countries... - a fighting tariff." 31 And the country that Colbert wanted to hurt the most was the United Provinces. Although Colbert admired the Dutch as businessmen, he wanted to take away their trade with Europe. "There is no reason for us to pay the Dutch as our carriers," wrote Colbert when "we can develop our own merchant fleet." 32 Later Colbert stated that "the Dutch grow fat off of us," while "we bow to their arrogant demands." 33 In another memoir to Louis, he added "There is no reason why France cannot take over all the carrier trade for Europe, if your majesty will just allow your servant to impose just duties and to pour out millions" when it was "a question of your glory." See Colbert, Lettres... de Colbert, II, part 1, 216-8.

29 B.N., Manuscripts françaises, MS 16,737, fol. 103.
30 A.N., Cartons des rois: Mélange, MS K, 118.
31 Cole, Colbert... Mercantilism, I, 428.
32 B.N., Nouvelle Acquisitions françaises MS 4,784, fol. 201, memoire of Colbert, dated March 18, 1665.
33 B.N., Cinq Cents de Colbert, MS 203, memoir to Lionne, dated January 14, 1667.
against the Dutch ships, sailing into French ports.\(^\text{34}\)

The Tariff of 1667 applied to only 61 articles but increased the duties on some manufactured goods by as much as 100%. The two countries most affected by the tariff were England and the United Provinces. Dutch trade with France fell off by over thirty per cent.\(^\text{35}\) However, the tactics of Louis XIV to isolate the United Provinces before the war with the Dutch in 1672, had to have a great effect upon their trade with each other, especially since Louis gave Colbert carte blanche in placing economic sanctions against the Dutch after the formation of the Triple Alliance.\(^\text{36}\)

England felt the effects of the tariff on their manufactured goods sent into France. English merchants called for retaliation and raised duties on French wines and brandies. The Tariff of 1667 initiated a long period of economic war between the two countries.\(^\text{37}\)

\(^\text{34}\)B.N., Cinq Cents de Colbert, MS 204, memoir dated June 16, 1669.

\(^\text{35}\)Elphège Frémy, "Causes économiques de la guerre de Hollande (1664-1672)," in Revue d'histoire diplomatique, vols. XXVIII-XXIX (1914-15), 528. See also Wilson, Profit and Power, p. 141, and Cole, Colbert... Mercantilism, I, 431-2.

\(^\text{36}\)B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 8,751, fol. 211 and MS 8,752, fol. 224.

\(^\text{37}\)Félix Dumss, "Relations Commercial de la France avec l'Angleterre, 1661 à 1688," in Revue politique et
Colbert's entire economic foreign policy was colored by his hostility to the Dutch, a hostility which was conceived in mercantilist principles and nourished by inevitable rivalry, as France sought to expand commercially; a hostility which began as a 'peaceful war' conducted by Colbert...38

And, he wanted to implement further economic sanctions now, instead of war.

Lionne also advocated moderation. Lionne did not feel that the alliance was bad for France. "The Dutch have formed a league that will force Spain to do our bidding," wrote Lionne, and "we do not have to spend a sous."39 To D'Estrades, Lionne stated that the alliance appeared "good and advantageous to the King; the disagreeable style and the terms..." were irresponsible.40

Lionne did show some reservations when he wrote to Ruvigny parlementaire, vol. XIX (June, 1909), 545. See also Cole, Colbert...Mercantilism, I, 431-2.

38 Cole, Colbert...Mercantilism, I, 473. There have been several historians who have believed that the war of 1672 was economic in origin, i.e., Simon Elzinga and Elphège Frémy. But their thesis has been refuted quite effectively by Pieter Geyl and N. Japikse. See Herbert H. Rowen's "John De Witt and the Triple Alliance," The Journal of Modern History, vol. XXVI, no. 1 (March 1954), 14. Rowen admits that the antagonism between the two states must have been further "exacerbated by the tariff war begun by Colbert's high protective tariff of 1667."

39 B.N., Mélanges de Colbert, MS 150, fol. 31. Letter to Colbert, dated February 21, 1668.

40 B.N., Manuscripts françaises MS 17,411, fol. 239, letter dated March 9, 1668.
in London that the "behaviour of the States-General would try the patience of the most moderate man in the world." The effect upon Louis, "who places his honour before any other consideration," must be almost beyond his endurance. Lionne, then, wanted to occupy the various territories by negotiation of treaties. His motive for using this method was reinforced, perhaps, because of the failure of his staff in preventing the fruition of the alliance.

Louis decided to accept negotiations towards a peace. He wanted to show Europe how a great monarch should act. He displayed a sensibility and moderation that was most unusual in a monarch so absolute. On April 15, 1668, at Saint-Germain, a treaty of truce and procurement of peace between Spain and France was signed by Colbert, Le Tellier and Lionne for France, Van Beuningen for the United Provinces, and Sir John Trevor for England. Sweden did not officially ratify the Treaty of the Triple Alliance until May 15, 1668, although Von Dohna had committed Sweden to the alliance on January 26.


The provisions were (1) England and the States-General would guarantee the peace; (2) cessation of arms until the end of May; (3) if Spain refuses treaty provisions, France would add Franche-Comté, Cambrai, and Cambrésis or Luxemburg or Lille and Tournai; (4) if Spain refuses treaty, England and the United Provinces would employ forces to bring about compliance; (5) if peace is not concluded by July, France is not held to treaty; and (6) in case of war, France would not fight in certain areas of the Spanish Netherlands.  

When the representatives of England and the United Provinces went to Brussels, seeking the signature of Castel-Rodrigo, who had full powers to negotiate for Spain, they found him obstinate, refusing to sign any agreements while preparing for continuation of the war. As he stated to Temple, England's representative, Spain had to give up land and pay indemnity whichever choice he made. Van Burgersdyck and Van der Tocht, representing the United Provinces, finally, with the influence of Temple, persuaded Castel-Rodrigo to accept peace terms.  

44 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 103/74, extract of the Treaty between France, England, and Holland signed at Saint-Germain, April 15, 1668.  

Between May 2 and May 26, 1668, Charles Colbert de Cressy, plenipotentiary for France, Baron de Bergheyck, representing Castel-Rodrigo and Spain, monsieur de Beverningk, envoy for the United Provinces, Baron de Schönborn, representing Mainz and the elector of Strasburg, Francis Egon de Fürstenberg, representing the elector of Cologne, Chevalier Schmising, the envoy of the Bishop of Münster, and Augustine Franciotti, archbishop of Trébizande, acting as the Pope's plenipotentiary, signed the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, ending the war between Spain and France. The treaty provided that Louis return Franche-Comté and that France retain the fortress of Charleroi, the towns of Binche and Ath, Douai, the fort of Scarpe, including Tournaï, Oudenaarde, Lille, Armentières, Courtrai, Menin, Bergues and Furnes, and return Franche-Comté. 46

Was Louis XIV acting with moderation or did the Triple Alliance force him to halt further invasion plans and agree to peace with Spain? Officially, the French court claimed that only the moderation of Louis XIV induced him to halt the war short of total victory, and that the Triple Alliance had "no part in halting his conquests." 47 However, in his memoirs, Louis XIV wrote that

46 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 103/74. The original of the Peace at Aix-la-Chapelle.

he would like "to profit from the present conjunction," but felt it advisable to halt his advances until a more suitable time. And in a memorandum found among the letters of Louvois, Louis XIV admits he was amazed at "the insolence of the attitude of that ingrate nation," but he would rather apply prudence since he did not have the number of troops that would be required for a parallel enterprise with the allies of the Triple Alliance. Therefore, he concluded the peace under honorable conditions, resolved to punish them at another time. And on another occasion, he remarked that if he had maintained the war, the league which had formed to stop him would have always presented an opposing barrier to his further pretensions.

Perhaps the real attitude of the court can be observed more objectively by the report of the Venetian Ambassador to Paris, Marc Antonio Guistinian, who wrote that the conclusion of the alliance "caused considerable perturbation in France, though they did their best to appear unconcerned." A month later, he stated that the

51 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers,
French now realize "their powerlessness against such a formidable combination at sea," and the king refers with bitterness to the alliance which prevented him from "having that which justly belonged to him."\(^5\) And in London, the Venetian ambassador, Piero Mocenigo, remarking about the French ambassadors in London, wrote that the Triple Alliance "had, at least for the moment, checked the ambitious schemes of Louis XIV."\(^5\)

J. Basnage de Beauval, writing an early Dutch history, stated that even though the king of France and his armies "appeared infallible," Louis XIV had to consider the opinion of the other powers, and therefore he signed the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.\(^5\) Yves Jose La Mothe, an early French historian, not only believed that the Triple Alliance stopped Louis XIV, but believed that only this alliance saved the United Provinces from becoming a province of Louis XIV.\(^5\) Agreeing with Beauval, Mignet adds

\(^{52}\)Ibid., 215, March 16, 1668.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., XXXVI, 13, letter from Moncenigo to the Doge and Senate, February 8, 1668.


\(^{55}\)Yves Joseph La Mothe, Histoire de la vie et du
that the Triple Alliance was not an offensive alliance and Louis XIV, realizing this, preferred to halt his ambitions for the time. Thus his actions were "half voluntary and half forced."\(^56\)

Leopold von Ranke, not very sympathetic to the French, believed Louis XIV was not willing to accept peace, on the basis of the alternatives. Furthermore France was armed well enough to have resisted the allied powers. But rather than "meet the formation of a European opposition, which might at any moment have turned into a coalition," Louis XIV preferred the peaceful counsel of his ministers.\(^57\) But the Dutch historian, Petrus Johannes Blok, believes Louis XIV halted for a different reason. By April, 1668, the United Provinces had over twenty-five regiments and 4000 cavalry ready for combat and the duchys of Lüneburg and Lorraine had promised 14,000 more men. The English Parliament had granted regne de Louis XIV, roi de France et de Navarre(The Hague: Brugen de la Martiniere, 1741), III, 355-61.

\(^{56}\) Mignet, Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne, II, part 3, 3-5.

£300,000 for defense of the alliance. Louis XIV "was not prepared to enter upon a great war." According to Lavisse, the Dutch and the English were not the only powers preparing for war. When Portugal signed a treaty of peace with Spain on February 13, 1668, the Spanish troops were released from a defensive position in the south and were preparing to move northwards. The Duke of Lorraine offered the Triple Alliance an additional 8,000 troops. The Swiss cantons were becoming uneasy. And several German princes had issued a call to arms within their provinces. Thus, Louis XIV very wisely accepted the proposals for mediation.

To Gaston Zeller, the Triple Alliance had not just been a small hurdle for Louis XIV to overcome. Zeller believed that the alliance "was a collosal setback to the plans of Louis XIV," and Louis swore he would teach the —

---


59 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VII, part 2, 296 and 297. See also Philippe Sagnac and Alexandre René de Saint-Léger, who endorse the same view, but add that Louis XIV was also confronted with the mobilization of the Dutch navy. Thus, Louis XIV, with the sudden diplomatic activity and a menacing coalition completely encircling him, accepted the mediation of the maritime powers. Louis XIV, 1661-1715 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), p. 130.
Dutch a lesson. The alliance had created a "storm in the soul of the great king, and the thunderbolt did not long delay, before it fell on them" in the form of the Dutch War of 1672. This war was a sequence and consequence of the first, caused "without any doubt by the resentment" of Louis XIV toward "the people who had shown enough boldness in 1668" to stop the march of the victorious armies of the king. One of Zeller's students, Victor-Lucien Tapié, agreed with Zeller, but emphasized that Louis felt a great concern towards the growing European hostility, which forced him to halt his advances.

60 Gaston Zeller, "French Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in their European Setting" in The Ascendance of France 1648-88, Vol. V of The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by Francis L. Carsten (Cambridge University Press, 1961), 213. See also Mary Caroline Trevelyan, William the Third and the Defense of Holland, 1672-4 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 59. Although she is looking for a cause of the Dutch War of 1672, she asserts that "to a man of the temper of Louis XIV, such a peace was but an incentive to further conquests," in which his central theme was "the annihilation of the Dutch Republic." (One must be careful of her pro-Dutch, anti-French sympathies).


62 Edmond Préclin and Victor-Lucien Tapié, Le XVIIe siècle monarchies centralisées 1610-1715 (Paris: presses Universitaires de France, 1949), p. 423. See also Herbert H. Rowen, The Ambassador Prepares for War, p. 29, who supports this view, stating that Louis XIV feared alliances made against him, and this fear "played some very part in the French decision to halt their conquests for the time being."
However, Tapie later adopted a more moderate position, writing that with the conquest of Franche-Comté, and the secret treaty with Leopold I, Louis XIV felt he was in a bargaining position. Although Louis XIV had not obtained the total conquest of the Spanish Low Countries as he had hoped, "the war had covered the armies with gloire, augmented the prestige of its generals," and had given France a series of strategic points to use for future wars. Thus, the Triple Alliance did stop Louis XIV, but the gains for France made the surrender more accommodating.63

Tapie was not the only historian who felt that even though the Triple Alliance had stopped Louis XIV, it did so with his permission. For example, Osmond Airy stated that "Louis XIV had every temptation to continue the war," but felt that "war would but consolidate the Triple Alliance, which was sure before long, if he was moderate, to fall asunder by its own weight."64 Although Georges Pagès admitted that the Triple Alliance succeeded in halting Louis XIV, it was temporary, because the allies hoped to restrain and to limit the ambitions of the king of France, who "was not in the mood for letting someone else pre-


64Airy, English Restoration, pp. 170-1.
scribe the laws." Agreeing with Pages point of view is George Norman Clark, who stated that although the Triple Alliance did check France briefly, it was "evident from the map that this was not a frontier with which she, France, would be permanently content," but instead "provided an excellent take-off for further advance." Maurice Percy Ashley agreed that Louis XIV began diplomatic preparations to change the frontier even before the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed. However, he claims that Louis XIV, using prudence and daring, acted as he did in all of his foreign affairs. Thus, Ashley questioned the success of the Triple Alliance in forcing Louis XIV to end the war.

As Ashley stated, the question is still disputed. And a number of historians believe that Louis XIV was not stopped by the Triple Alliance. A meaningful appraisal is given by Lodge, who states that Louis XIV "was tempted for


Maurice Percy Ashley, Louis XIV and the Greatness of France (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1946), pp. 45-6. Although a brief survey, it has some very good observations.
a moment to defy the allies," but when he was able to dictate the terms of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and also took into consideration his secret treaty with Leopold I, he realized that the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was a triumph rather than a humiliation. Not only had Louis XIV disregarded his wife's renunciation and added outposts in the north, but he had induced his strongest rival to make an agreement with him and acknowledge the renunciation as null and void. The late, brilliant Dutch historian, Pieter Geyl, also accepted the position that Louis realized he would receive more land than he had conquered by accepting the negotiations for peace. However, as Geyl pointed out, Louis' displeasure "was wholly directed against the Republic." Another historian, agreeing with the same idea, is Picavet. He stated that the Triple Alliance was no hindrance because of the ease with which Louis XIV systematically isolated the United Provinces between 1668 and 1672.

Charles Wilson feels that "it would be misleading to attach too

68 Westergaard, Triple Alliance, p. xxi. He also states that the treaty was largely Louis XIV's making and it had won a diplomatic victory for Louis XIV.


71 Picavet, Le diplomatic Francaise, p. 198.
much importance" to the Triple Alliance, because "the al-
liance was scarcely formed" before Louis XIV had coaxed
and coerced Sweden and England out of it. 72

Even the latest writing about Louis provides
further challenges but no revisions. John B. Wolf's
monumental work on Louis offers no fundamental change of
ideas about Louis' decision. As Wolf states, Louis "by
being agreeable at this point, . . . " hoped to prevent a
permanent coalition or league "opposed to my most legiti-
mate pretensions." 73 John C. Rule offers the position
that the "Triple Alliance appeared to France as an ag­
gressive move on the part of the Dutch, and Louis XIV
countered by weaving a diplomatic web of alliances around
the United Provinces, . . . " 74 Professor R. M. Hatton
suggests that "Louis at this time certainly envisaged a
chastened Republic and the road open to a future incor­
poration of the Southern Netherlands with France." She
adds that in dealing with the Dutch, Louis "accepted the
basic lesson of war: the impracticability of aspiring
to the Southern Netherlands against the wishes of the

72Wilson, Profit and Power, p. 156.
73Wolf, Louis XIV, p. 209.
Dutch." And finally, the idea that the Triple Alliance stopped Louis is again repeated by Pierre Goubert. Goubert takes to task historians who "have even maintained that the Triple Alliance did nothing to halt Louis XIV and actually helped him to achieve his objects in the war." As Goubert explains, "this astounding piece of sophistry takes little account of a secret clause providing for the entry of England, the United Provinces, and Sweden into actual war against France "if Louis rejected their mediation...."

This paper offers no new ideas about Louis' decision to halt his campaigns in 1668 but does add credence to several of the theories of Louis' moderation. Because of several letters written to Henrietta by Charles and Louis after the signing of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance on January 23, 1668, apparently Louis felt that his diplomacy was controlling events in about the manner in which he wished. For example, on March 2, 1668, Louis expressed concern to Henrietta about her brother's "judgment of allies" but because of Charles' explanation concerning his league with the Dutch, "felt he [Louis] un--


76 Goubert, Louis XIV, p. 110.
derstood" Charles' reasons. But Louis warned her, "tell him that he must be ready to strengthen the bonds" between France and England as soon as the Spaniards sign the peace treaty.

In a letter to Henrietta, dated January 28, 1668, Charles asked her to inform "His Majesty that as far as he was concerned, the Alliance was a piece of gross political knavery." Charles continued to write that he had joined the alliance "to force Spain to end the war" or "involve the Dutch in another act of hostilities," wearing them down financially. Charles even intimated that he would drop the alliance sooner if France would lend him money and troops to "fight our mutual enemy." But within each of the letters to Henrietta, where Charles talks of the Triple Alliance, he constantly refers to his loyalty to Louis and Charles' hopes that Louis values Charles' endeavors to keep that friendship.

77 Public Record Office. Calendar of State Papers, 37/27, letter to Henrietta from Louis.

78 Ibid., letter to Henrietta from Louis, dated March 11, 1668. Other letters from Louis relating to the Triple Alliance are dated February 12 and 26, March 30, April 12, and May 11, 1668.

79 Ibid., letter to Henrietta from Charles.

80 Ibid., letter to Henrietta from Charles, dated March 25, 1668.

81 Ibid., letters cited, as well as, letters of
These letters seem to offer evidence that Louis was not unwilling to "close-down" the campaigning for a brief period. However, with the alliances already formed throughout Europe and with Lionne and France's ministers negotiating new treaties, especially treaties directed toward the isolation of the United Provinces, Louis' diplomacy appears to have already risen above any aggravation that the Triple Alliance had caused France. Yet, for any further advances or aggressive ideas that Louis XIV contemplated, he had to consider the Triple Alliance as a threat to France and his plans. The Triple Alliance had been formed to halt further French aggression, and because of the interest given to the alliance by other European powers, who offered to join or send aid to the alliance, Louis XIV had to pause momentarily for reflection before continuing towards his "grand design."

Thus, "for the first time, a coalition was drawn up to face France..." 82


But Louis' patience, which was always on public view, was also a part of his many "tasks of kingship." He had learned well that his craft included "political prudence." He was briefly interrupted from his military role in his goals for France, but as this paper has shown, Louis XIV never ceased functioning in his other roles. The Triple Alliance allowed Louis XIV to expend more energy towards diplomatic goals for France.

_____________

A Bibliographical Introduction

The best guides to printed works for the years 1659 to 1668, as well as for the seventeenth century in France, are Bibliographie annuelle de l'histoire de France du cinquième siècle à 1939 (1953/54–), Émile Bourgeois and Louis André (eds.) of a series Les Sources de l'histoire de France: XVIIe siècle (1610-1715) (1913-35), and Gaston Brière et al. (eds.), Répertoire méthodique de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France (9 vols., 1899-1932). A guide to recent published works is La Recherche historique en France de 1940 à 1965 (1965).

A general guide to the works published in diplomatic history is the recently published Table générale et méthodique de la revue d'histoire diplomatique depuis son origine (1887-1963) (1965), ed. Georges Dethan. Two standard guides to the books and articles specializing in the field of diplomacy during the reign of Louis XIV, appearing in journals, are Georges Pagès' "L'histoire diplomatique du règne de Louis XIV," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, VII (1905-06) and Gaston Zeller's "Politique extérieure et diplomatique sous Louis XIV," Revue d'histoire moderne, VI (1931).
Another specialized guide is one about works in French military history by Claude Sturgill in the *French Historical Studies*, IV (1965), entitled "Bibliothèque du ministère des Armées."


One of the most complete and most recent guides to the reign of Louis XIV is the annotated bibliography by John C. Rule. Rule divides the reign into sections and then proceeds to give a critical view of the major works written about the reign of Louis XIV. Rule's guide is "Louis XIV: A Bibliographical Introduction," which is in the book edited by him, *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (1969).

While there are many books of history written about Louis XIV, about French diplomacy during Louis' reign, and about the military wars of Louis XIV, there are no single works written exclusively about the War of Devolution, Triple Alliance, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In fact, even with the emergence of modern scholarship, very few historians writing about the reign of Louis XIV
is considered scholarly, his Dutch prejudice influences his interpretations of Louis' motives. A successor to Blok, the late Dutch historian, Pieter Geyl, has written several histories of the Dutch people and their relationships with France and other European countries. Geyl's Holland and Belgium, Their Common History and Their Relations (1921), History of the Low Countries, Episodes and Problems (1964), and The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century, 1648-1715 (1964) deal in part with French diplomacy and actions before, during, and after the War of Devolution. But Geyl's Orange and Stuart, 1641-72 translated into English in 1969 gives a full treatment of the English and Dutch diplomacy and activity during the years 1664-1668, including not only the War of Devolution but the Triple Alliance and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Although this book is, at present, the most complete accounting of these events, Geyl's concern in this period is in the Anglo-Dutch relations and not in the detailed activities of France except as these activities were directly influential upon the Netherlands and England.

As for other histories of the Netherlands, they tend to treat the War of Devolution lightly or not at all, while emphasizing other aspects of the Dutch people during the period or discussing the war as it specifically re-
lates to their topic. Some of these general or more topically selective works are Violet Barbour's *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century* (1950), relating the events in that century which affected Amsterdam and its commercial trade with the world; J. F. Bense's *The Anglo-Dutch Relations from the Earliest Times to the Death of William the Third* (1925), an older history which is mainly concerned with an accounting of England's inerant ties with the Netherlands; and J. H. Huizinga's *Dutch Civilisation in the Seventeenth Century* (1968), a book which deals primarily with the social, economic, and cultural ideas of the Dutch. Since they are relevant to any treatment of the history of the Dutch during the decade of the 1660s, James Geddes' *History of the Administration of John De Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland* (1880), Nicolass Japikse's *Johan de Witt* (1915), and M. Antonin Lefevre Pontalis' *John De Witt* (1885) provide a thorough biography of this Dutch statesman. However, while all three histories discuss French relations with De Witt, only Pontalis' *John De Witt* offers, without sources, an accounting of the correspondence and verbal exchanges between De Witt and the French ministers in this period, and Pontalis was more than a little enamoured with De Witt. All of the biographies are old and are poorly
footnoted and documented.

The number of historical works written about England and Anglo-European relations in the 1660's are almost endless. However, the list is narrowed rapidly, when one begins to examine the books for an account of the War of Devolution. For example, Sir George Clark's *The Seventeenth Century* (1947), revised edition, is a good general history of Europe with a good bibliography but barely mentions the War of Devolution. Even Clark's *The Later Stuarts, 1660-1714* (1934) is found lacking when one looks for the intricate Anglo-French relations in the 1660's.

Another older and more specific work, John Drinkwater's *Mr. Charles, King of England* (1926), although a source of several unpublished letters of Charles II, is a character study not a definitive history. Other histories dealing more exclusively with Charles II and his relations with France are Cyril Hughes Hartmann's *Charles II and Madame* (1934) and *Clifford of the Cabal* (1937). While neither book contains specific information about the War of Devolution, Hartmann does write of Charles' and his cabinet's involvement with France at this time. A more recent history of the cabinet of Charles II, is Maurice Lee's *The Cabal* (1965), a scholarly work which contains some material about Anglo-French diplomacy. However, one should read
reviews of the book. Individual members of Charles II's cabinet also have been investigated thoroughly. Such studies that also include some coverage of the Anglo-French relations are Violet Barbour's *Henry Bennet, Earl of Arlington* (1914), which contains many of Arlington's letters explaining his decisions in his actions with France and Thomas H. Lister's *Life and Administration of Edward, first earl of Clarendon* (1857-38), a three volume study which includes much of the correspondence of Clarendon with his ambassadors and envoys in European countries. A thorough study of England and its people during the reign of Charles is found in *England in the Reign of Charles II* (2 vols., 1934), written by David Ogg. Again, the work lacks depth in its treatment of relations with Louis XIV. A very useful but very anti-Catholic and anti-Louis XIV, as well as, a very prejudiced English interpretation, is *The History of England During the Reigns of the Royal House of Stuart* (1730) by John Oldmixon. Although Oldmixon later revised his views, his earlier work was influenced by the proximity of the events during Charles II's reign, Oldmixon adds color to his narrative and allows one to understand the depth of feeling that underlie the course of events of the period. His account of the circumstances before and after the Anglo-Dutch War
and the War of Devolution are very helpful when used with documented sources. A very recent study of Charles II is Charles II and the Cavalier House of Commons 1663-1674 (1966) written by Dennis T. Witcombe. Although Witcombe does write about how Charles' seemingly pro-French policy effects his proceedings with Parliament, Witcombe is more concerned with the English activities.

The more generalized studies of England during this period which also relate some information about the War of Devolution are Keith Feiling's England Under the Tudors and Stuarts, 1485-1688 (1927) and Richard Lodge's The History of England from the Restoration to the Death of William III, volume VIII in The Political History of England (1910). One should include the works of the two German historians, Onno Klopp, Der fall des houses Stuart (14 vols., 1875-1888), and Leopold von Ranke, A History of England Principally in the Seventeenth Century, translated by C. W. Boase (6 vols., 1875), in the generalized studies, although their histories are considered very definitive while lacking more recent research and discoveries.

A very useful book for its interpretations of the Anglo-Dutch wars is Charles H. Wilson's Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (1957). However, the study only includes information on French participation
through the second war. For a very detailed and documented study of English diplomatic relations with France, one can use Keith Feiling's *British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672* (1930). The work is a fairly comprehensive and chronological history of the activities of the ambassadors of both countries and the relations between Charles and Louis and is footnoted and documented well. However, there is a lack of depth in the correspondence and dispatches between the agents and monarchs of the two countries, too broad a coverage of English foreign relations with all countries, and, of course, is written as a history of English foreign policy. A similar type of work is *Notes on the Diplomatic Relations of England and France, 1603-1688* (1906), edited by Sir C. H. Firth and Sophie C. Lomas. While the few exclusive source letters are useful, the collection is very general and weighted to English documents.

For a general diplomacy of Europe in the 1660's, one can consult David J. Hill's *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (3 vols., 1905-1914), François Combes *Histoire générale de la diplomatie européenne* (2 vols., 1954-56). However, one has to turn almost exclusively to the French historians for the detailed accounts of the diplomacy of France. One of the older histories written about French diplomacy is Gaétan Flsson's
seven volume *Histoire générale et raisonnée de la diplomatie française, ou de la politique de la France, dupuis la fondation of la monarchie, jusqu'à la fin des règne de Louis XIV* (1811). Even though Flasson includes the War of Devolution in his writings, he was writing a general political and diplomatic history and was not able to avail himself of research since 1811. Falling into the same category as Flasson's work is René Pinon's *Histoire diplomatique*, vol. XII of *Histoire de la nation française* (1920-29) series. Pinon's study covers French diplomacy from France's beginning and therefore offers no pretext as an in-depth coverage of any one period.

The most serious secondary studies of French diplomacy for the period of the 1660's are Arsène Legrelle's four volume *La diplomatie Française et la succession d'Espagne* (1888-92), Camille Georges Picavet's *La diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV* (1661-1715) (1930), and Gaston Zeller's two volumes of *Les temps modernes: de Louis XIV à 1789* in the *Histoire des relations internationales* series (1953-55). Legrelle's scholarly study is comprehensive and interpretative. Again, Legrelle's concern with the diplomacy of France is that it primarily deals with the Spanish succession, thus there is some slighting of all the events involving the War of Devolu-
tion, and more recent scholarship detract from Legrelle's study. Although Ficavet's study of French diplomacy during the reign of Louis XIV is scholarly, the work is far too limited in size and thus is very limited in its treatment of the War of Devolution. Zeller's two volume work is the most recent history of its scope written about French foreign relations but because of the scope of the work, Zeller has limited his selections of study, especially events of the War of Devolution.

Even the more specific studies on French diplomacy lack detailed information about the War of Devolution and the 1660's. Examples of these studies are Jules Joseph Valfrey's *La diplomatie française au XVIIe siècle: Hughes de Lionne, ses ambassades en Espagne et en Allemagne, la paix des Pyrénées d'après sa correspondance* (1881), a short history discussing Lionne in the 1650s, that is more concerned with personalities and inter-relationships and Bertrand Auerback's *La diplomatie française et la cour de Saxe, 1648-1680* (1888), a good but dated study of the court intrigues at Saxony with some history of the French diplomats. J. J. Jusserend's *A French Ambassador at the Court of Charles the Second* (1892) offers a picture of the social life at Charles' court with some insights of the reactions of this court to France. Victor-Lucien Tapié's recently
translated work, The Rise and Fall of the Hapsburg Monarchy (1971), relates some of the many-faceted diplomatic relations of the Emperor, Leopold I, during this time period, and gives some interpretations as to why Leopold signed the Treaty of Partition and did not move against Louis XIV. Georges Pagès' Le grand Électeur et Louis XIV 1660-1688 (1905) is an excellent authoritative history of the relations and diplomacy between the Elector Frederick William and Louis XIV with documents and sources as evidence of their decisions and activities involving the two states. Edgar Prestage's The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England and Holland from 1640-1668 (1925) surveys Portugal's diplomacy with these countries during this period with the interpretive emphasis upon Portugal as it dealt with these powers, offering a biased but informative history. Herbert H. Rowen's The Ambassador Prepares for War; The Dutch Embassy of Arnould de Pomponne, 1669-1671 (1957) actually covers a time period beyond the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, but Rowen, as an introduction to Pomponne's embassy at The Hague, reviews the history of Dutch events prior to 1669, including brief well-documented material on the War of Devolution, the Triple Alliance, and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Finally, Victor-Lucien Tapié's Les relations entre la france et l'Europe centrale
de 1661 à 1715 (1958) is a definitive history of France and her relations with the several states, duchys, and imperial cities of central Europe which includes an excellent bibliography and excellent accounting of the diplomatic activities of France with each of the countries.

In order to better understand the reasons that lay behind the orders issued by Louis XIV, Lionne, le Tellier, and the French ambassadors as they directed their diplomatic and military policies toward other countries, one must look at the more definitive histories of France, the specialized studies of Louis' government, and the biographies of the policy-makers of France. The more scholarly of the multi-volume histories of France are Henri Martin's *Histoire de France depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'en 1789* (16 vols., 1855-60), Ernest Lavisse's *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution* (Vols. VII¹, VII², VIII¹, 1901-11), Germain Martin's *Histoire économique et financière*, vol. XIII of *Histoire de la nation française* (15 vols., 1920-29), and Roland Mousnier's *Les XVIe et XVIIe siècles: les progrès de la civilisation européenne et le déclin de l'Orient* (1492-1715), vol. IV in the *Histoire générale des civilisations* (1954).

Four recent studies about Louis XIV and factors motivating him and his ministers appear in *Louis XIV and

The specialized studies of Louis' government which contain useful information about the events surrounding the War of Devolution are Pierre Adolphe Chéruel's De l'administration de Louis XIV (1661-1672) (1850), a study of the state-building apparatus at the beginning of Louis' rule and Georges Lacour-Gayet's L'éducation politique de Louis XIV (1898), which investigates the political influences in Louis' early years.

Biographical histories of the various ministers and members of Louis' staff offer insights into the interrelationships between Louis and his staff, as well as, limited information of the War of Devolution. Because he was the first major influence upon Louis' governing policies, an examination of Mazarin's thoughts and policies are in order. The three biographies that are acceptable, although dated, are Pierre Adolphe Chéruel's Histoire de France sous le ministère de Mazarin (1651-
1871), James Breck Perkin's two volume France Under Mazarin with a Review of the Administration of Richelieu (1886), and Arthur Hassal's Mazarin (1903).

The great importance of Colbert upon Louis XIV and his reign during Colbert's administration is revealed in the definitive study of Colbert in Charles Woosey Cole's two volume Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism (1939), a history which includes many of Colbert's letters and instructions. Another useful biography of Colbert is found in G. P. R. James' two volume Lives of Cardinal de Retz, Jean Baptiste Colbert, John De Witt, and the Marquis De Louvois (1837). Although James' biography is outdated and biased, he includes his characterizations of leading personalities which are quite useful in analyzing decisions made by Colbert. Also included in this work is a biographical sketch of Louvois. A more recent biography of Colbert, which is more complete because of the inclusion of all of the life of Colbert, is Georges Mongrédiens Colbert, 1619-1683 (1963). The study is well-documented and contains good material about decisions of Colbert that related directly to the War of Devolution. Because of Colbert's interest in the French fleet and because of the importance placed upon the failure of the French fleet to aid the Dutch in the Anglo-Dutch War
1665–67, one must examine the history of the French navy. The *Histoire de la marine française* (1899) by Charles Germaine and Marie La Roncière is still considered definitive and does include some of the evidence of the activities of the French fleet in this period.

For further examination of the military actions and decisions before, during, and after the War of Devolution, the biographical studies of Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire*, (4 vols., 1863–64), Louis André's *Michel le Tellier et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique* (1906) and the sequel *Michel le Tellier et Louvois*, Paul Lazard's *Vauban* (1934), Camille Georges Picavet's *Les Dernières années de Turenne (1660–1675)* (1914), and Maxime Weygand's *Turenne: Marshal of France* (1930).

And finally, for two secondary sources that offer a picture of the ladies of the court who were able to detail some of the events during the period, one can examine Geoffrey F. Hall's *Moths Round the Flame* (1936) and Charlotte Haldane's very illuminating biography, *Madame de Maintenon* (1970).

As indicated by the preceding pages, there are abundant secondary sources that include a limited history or reference to either the War of Devolution, the result-
ing Triple Alliance, or the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Furthermore, any historical study of all three is either a brief survey of the three events or a partially-related but segmented discussion.

Because the treaties and alliances between France and the other countries are very significant to the diplomatic events of the period, original copies and extracts have to be examined. The sources for these treaties and alliances were the Public Record Office, the Archives des Affaires Étrangères, the Archives Nationale, and the Bibliothèque Nationale. Sources of treaties can be found in, Articles of Peace Between the Two Crowns of France and Spain, concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, the second of May, 1668(1668), Miscellanes Aulica: Or, a Collection of State-Treatises, Never before Published(1702), edited by Thomas Brown, A General Collection of Treatys, Declarations of War, Manifestos, and other Public Papers(1710) by Andrew Bell, Corps universal diplomatique du droit des gens(8 vols., 1726-31) by Jean Dumont, and Les Grands Traité du Règne de Louis XIV(3 vols., 1893-99) by Henri Vast.

Through an examination of the secondary sources, the chronological events from the marriage of Louis XIV to the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle are corroborated and interpreted by the use of the following primary
sources: the governmental records of France located in the records of the Archives des affaires Étrangères, Archives Nationales, Bibliothèque Nationale, and the records of the government of Great Britain in the Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series, Domestic Series, and Foreign Series and the Calendar of Treasury Books and Calendar of Treasury Annals.

The records located in the French Archives and the Bibliothèque Nationale include complete files on nearly all of the instructions, letters, and memoirs of the envoys, ambassadors, ministers of France, and Louis XIV. They are located as folios with numbered pieces. For further letters, instructions, and memoirs of Louis, one can examine Mémoires de Louis XIV, écrits par lui-même (2 vols., 1806) ed. J. L. M. de Gain-Montagnac and Œuvres de Louis XIV (6 vols., 1806) ed. P. A. Grouvelle. Contemporary French writings about the events of Louis' reign during the 1660's can be found in Yves Joseph La Mothe's five volume Histoire de la vie et du règne de Louis XIV, roi de France et de Navarre (1740-42), a biased but lengthy history of Louis' reign; Charles La Fare's Mémoires et réflexions sur les principaux événemens du règne de Louis XIV (1755), an excellent source about events from a man who lived through them; and two pamphlets in the University of

Some of the diplomatic instructions to the individual ambassadors also can be located in the *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française* (1879-), in which the instructions to each country is separately compiled. For the specific history of the Spanish Netherlands, François Mignet's *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV* (4 vols., 1835-42) is a necessity for information that is only in his works. Supplementing Mignet's works is the inclusion of the Spanish correspondence upon the Spanish Netherlands found in *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVIIe siècle* (6 vols., 1923-37) edited by Henri Lonchay.

The correspondence from Louis and Lionne to the
French ambassador D'Estrades (England and the Netherlands) is included in Correspondance authentique de Godefroi, comte d'Estrades (4 vols., 1924) and Lettres, mémoires, négociations de monsieur le comte d'Estrades (5 vols., 1709). The reflections of Pomponne about the Triple Alliance is found in Mémoires du marquis de Pomponne (1860-61), ed. Georges Mavidal.

The primary sources in this period for England would be overwhelming if it were not for the elimination of material that does not deal with the scope of this paper. For the letters and instruction of Charles II, there are not only the government records, but several monographs. Examples are David Jones' The Secret History of Whitehall, from the Restoration of Charles II down to the abdication of the late K. James (1697), a source of unpublished private papers; and The Letters, Speeches and Declarations of King Charles II (1968) edited by Sir Arthur Bryant, an annotated collection of papers, several of which are in private collections. However, more important for this paper and its conclusion are the unpublished letters of Charles II and his sister, Henrietta, found in the Public Record Office. These letters, three large bundles numbering three hundred pieces, have given an opportunity for a proof of Charles' and Louis' intentions from 1666 to 1669.
The thoughts of the cabinet members of Charles' court and the English ambassadors are found in their letters and instructions. The letters of Arlington and Clarendon are particularly important because of their influence upon this period and are found in Arlington's pamphlet, *Hispania Illustrata: or, the Maxims of the Spanish Court, and Most Memorable Affairs from the Year 1667 to the Year 1668* and book, *The Right Honourable, the Earl of Arlington's Letters to Sir W. Temple* (2 vols., 1701), ed. Thomas Bebington, and in Clarendon's *Charles II, King of Great Britain, 1660-1667*. Notes which passed at meetings of the Privy Council between Charles II and the Earl of Clarendon, 1660-1667 (1896), ed. Reverend W. D. Macray, and Clarendon's *The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon* (3 vols., 1761). The Ambassador to Portugal and Spain in the period between 1663 and 1665, Richard Fanshawe, left invaluable sources to the negotiations in Portugal and Spain of the French, English, Portuguese, and Spanish ambassadors in his *Original Letters and Negotiations of His Excellency Sir Richard Fanshawe, the Earl of Sandwich, the Earl of Sunderland, and, Sir William Godolphin* . . . (2 vols., 1724). Also the writing of Temple, both letters and history, of his assignment with England during the period of 1663 to 1668, make William Temple's
books a must. His works are Letters...Containing an Account of the Most Important Transactions...in Christianity from 1665 to 1672(2 vols., 1700), Memoirs of the Life, Works, and Correspondence of Sir William Temple(2 vols., 1836), Observations Upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands(1705), and The Works of Sir William Temple (2 vols., 1720). For a contemporary view of the 1660's, one finds useful source material in Richard Bulstrode's Memoirs and Reflections upon the Reign and Government of King Charles I and K. Charles the IIInd(1721), a study that attacks both governments; Gilbert Burnet's Burnet's History of My Own Time(3 vols., 1897-1900), ed. Osmond Airy, and Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys(18 vols., 1892-99), ed. Henry B. Wheatley, whose diary tells of court intrigue, London life, and the office of the Department of the Navy.

One major primary source is The First Triple Alliance: The Letters of Christopher Lindenov... (1947), tr. and ed. Waldemar Westergaard, which includes letters, as well as a history, of the period when Lindenov served as the Danish envoy at London.

The history of the Netherlands at this period and its diplomatic relations with France and the rest of Europe are documented in the Annales des Provinces-Unies
1648-78 (2 vols., 1726) by J. Basnage De Beauval, and in the letters and instructions of De Witt as found in his four volume *Lettres et négociations entre Mr. Jean de Witt et Messieurs les plenipotentiaires des Provinces Unies des Pais-Bas* (1725).

Finally, the administration of Colbert and his policies that were anti-Dutch are greatly supplemented by the seven volumes of *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert* (1859-82) edited by Pierre Clément. And the military tactics and decisions affecting policy-making are more easily understood by examining Turenne's *Mémoires du vicomte de Turenne* . . . *du Marechal de Turenne* (2 vols., 1909-1914).

There are additional sources used in the dissertation that are not included in this historigraphical essay because of the small addition they offer to the total work.
Bibliography

Bibliographical Aids

Bibliographie annuelle de l'histoire de France du cinquième siècle à 1939. Paris: Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1953/54-


Manuscripts


France. Archives Nationales. MS K. 1,616, fols. 3, 7, and 8.

France. Archives Nationales. MS K. 1,618, fols. 5-7.

France. Archives Nationales. MS K. 1,619, fols. 6 and 7.


France. Bibliothèque Nationale. Cinq Cents de Colbert, MS 204.


France. Bibliothèque Nationale. Manuscript française. MS 4,213, fol. 89.


France. Bibliothèque Nationale. Manuscript française. MS 8,751, fol. 211.


France. Bibliothèque Nationale. Manuscript française. MS 16,682, fols. 4, 26, 144, 238, 249, and 273.


France. Bibliothèque Nationale. Manuscript française. MS 17,408, fol. 175.


Manuscripts Printed


Printed Works


Articules of Peace Between the Two Crowns of France and Spain, concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, the second of May, 1668. London: Printed by E. O. for William Crook, 1668.


Bulstrode, Sir Richard. *Memoirs and Reflections upon the reign and government of King Charles the 1st and K. Charles the IIInd.* London: N. Mist, 1721.


Fanshawe, Sir Richard. Original letters and negotiations of His Excellency Sir Richard Fanshaw, the Earl of Sandwich, the Earl of Sunderland, and, Sir William Godolphin... Wherein divers matters of importance between the three crowns of England, Spain, and Portugal, from the year 1663 to 1678, are set in a clearer light than is any where else extant, 2 vols. London: J. Wilford, 1724.


Jones, David. The Life of James II. London: F. Knapton, etc., 1703.


La Fare, Charles Auguste, marquis de. Mémoires et réflexions sur les principaux événements du règne de Louis XIV. Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1755.

La Motte (La Motte), Yves Joseph. Histoire de la vie et du règne de Louis XIV, roi de France et de Navarre, 5 vols. La Haye: Bruzen de la Martiniere, 1740-42.


Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France...Angleterre. Vols. XXIV and XXV. Edited by Eugene de Boccard. Paris: De centrale national de la recherche scientifique, 1929.


Pamphlets

Anonymous. Some Conjectures Concerning the Difficulties which the German Branch of the House of Austria Meets with at this time, in their way to the Crown of Spain. London: unknown, 1705.

Arlington, Henry Bennet, Earl of. Hispania Illustrata: or, the Maxims of the Spanish Court, and Most Memorable Affairs from the Year 1667 to the Year 1668. No publishing date.


Secondary Works


Bense, John Frederick. The Anglo-Dutch relations from the earliest times to the death of William the Third. M. Nijhoff, 1925.


Pinon, René. Histoire diplomatique, Vol. XII of Histoire
de la nation française. Edited by Gabriel
nationale, 1920-1929.

Pontalis, M. Antonin Lefevre. John De Witt. Translated
by S. E. and E. Stephenson, 2 vols. London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1885.

Préclin, Edmond and Victor-L. Tapié. Le XVIIe siècle
Monarchies centralisées 1610-1715. (2nd edition
revised et corrected). Paris: Presses Universi-
sitaires de France, 1949.

Prestage, Edgar. The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal
with France, England and Holland from 1640 to 1668.

Ranke, Leopold von. A History of England Principally in
the Seventeenth Century. Translated by C. W.
Boase, W. W. Jackson, et al., 6 vols. London:
Macmillan and Co., 1875.

Riemens, Hendrik. The Netherlands: Story of a Free

Rousset, Camille Félix Michel. Histoire de Louvois et de
son administration politique et militaire, 4 vols.
Paris: Didiér et cie, 1863-64.

Rowen, Herbert H. The Ambassador Prepares for War: The
Dutch Embassy of Arnauld de Pomponne, 1669-1671.

Rule, John C. (ed.). Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship.
Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1969.

Sagnac, Philippe and Alexandre René de Saint-Léger. Louis
XIV, in the Peuples et civilisations series.
Edited by Louis Halphen et Philippe Sagnac. Paris:

Sanders, Mary F. Lauzan: Courtier and Adventurer. New
York: Brentano's, 1909.

Sorel, Albert. L'Europe et la revolution française.


**Articles**


Chéruel, Pierre Adolphe. "Politique extérieure de Louis XIV au début de son gouvernement personnel (1661)," _Revue d'histoire diplomatique_, IV (1890), 161-73.


Dumas, Felix, "Relations Commercial de la France avec l'Angleterre, 1661 à 1668," in _Revue politique et parlementaire_, XIX (June, 1909), 74-95.


