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OF POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PARTY VARIABLES ON
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1971
POLITICAL PARTIES IN WEST GERMANY: THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PARTY VARIABLES ON PARTY ORGANIZATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Margot Schenet Nyitray, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University
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Approved by

Adviser
Department of Political Science
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April 4, 1943 . . . . Born - Elgin, Illinois

1964 . . . . . . . B.A., Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois

1964-1965 . . . . Graduate Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1965-1966 . . . . Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1966 . . . . . . . M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1966-1968 . . . . Teaching Assistant, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Comparative Politics. Professors Giacomo Sani and James B. Christoph

Minor Fields: American Politics. Professor Myron Q. Hale

Political Theory. Professors David Spitz and David Kettler

International Relations. Professor Philip M. Burgess
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The topic of this study is a comparison of the two major West German political parties—the Christlich-Demokratischen Union (CDU) and the Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (SPD). This chapter will provide a statement of the theoretical concerns involved in this comparison, by reviewing the literature which relates to some aspects of party structure and organization to be studied. An attempt will be made to draw from that literature a framework for analysis including certain tentative propositions about relationships between variables. Operational definitions of terms used as well as a discussion of the data to be collected will also be included.

Rather than macroanalytic comparison of whole political systems, we see the best hope for furthering the development of theory in comparative politics in what Sidney Verba has termed "the disciplined configurative approach."¹ That is, the relevant variables which account for a particular segment of a nation's politics must be

explicated and put into such form that like factors in other countries can also be subsumed under the same headings. This requires some theoretical framework which delineates general factors, while at the same time, working within a single country allows for a fuller descriptive treatment of particular national characteristics.

In a recent article, J. LaPalombara reaffirmed the importance of systematic empirical research at the middle-range in comparative studies, selecting some partial segment, such as parties, as the focus for analysis. He also called for renewed interest in Western European politics where, despite their greater familiarity to American political scientists, there remain large lacunae in even basic descriptive data about parties, legislatures, etc.² In line with these recommendations, this study is concerned not with party or party systems theory in toto but with the development of theory relating to certain aspects of political parties.

We are interested in comparing certain organizational features of the two West German parties—leadership characteristics, the internal distribution of power, and party policy processes. It is hoped that similarities and differences among them can be explained in terms of certain

national political system characteristics and other party factors. This perspective thus sees these organizational characteristics of parties as essentially dependent variables, the structure and processes of party organization being dependent both upon certain features of the particular national politics as well as on other factors unique to the party in question.

The focus in this research on party decision-making processes is not a particularly common one in the literature. Many traditional democratic theorists do stress the importance of the political party as the formulator and transmitter to the public of alternative public policy formulas and goals. In this view, party competition for votes is not sufficient in a democracy, but is made meaningful in democratic terms because the parties represent alternative policies and goals, and provide for public discussion and choice of these. Despite this emphasis however, as F. Engelmann has pointed out in his review of the literature on parties: "There is an apparent neglect by stasiologists of intra-party processes that lead to the

\[3\] For a particularly strong statement of this view of the importance of party policy-making to democratic theory, see Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 36-40. Giovanni Sartori, in Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), puts more emphasis on choice between leaders who are in turn committed to, or representatives of particular policies. See pp. 82-83.
making of public policy."^4 It is to be hoped that the present study will go some small way to filling this gap in the literature and will suggest ways in which various system and party variables may influence the internal policy-making processes in different parties. In this respect, this study fits in with the recent emphasis in the discipline on decision-making within political institutions as a theoretical focus of analysis.^5

This is perhaps the appropriate point to look at how this perspective for research relates to certain other themes in the literature on political parties. One theme, stemming from the classic work by Michels, is the relationship between party organization and internal democracy. While a full review and critique of Michels' *Political Parties* would not be relevant to our purposes here, the main themes of his analysis and how it differs from our perspective may be pointed out.

Michels, viewing party as a homogeneous group united by objective interests, uses data from the social-democratic parties of Europe to demonstrate the incompatibility of


^5See, for example, LaPalombara, op. cit., pp. 72-73, where the author urges attention to decision-making in research on various West European institutions, including parties.
organization and "democracy"—thus the famous "Iron law of oligarchy." Concerned with the leadership's representation of the objective interests of the working class, Michels documents the obstacles to representation in large, bureaucratic organizations. These obstacles lead in turn to the development of a leadership "oligarchy," unresponsive to the interests of the class it represents, controlling its own recruitment and turnover, and dominated by parliamentary representatives responsive to voters and not party members.6

While this study is also concerned with internal organization, we will leave open the question of democracy and party. This issue, in any case, depends on whether one is considering the party's role in the larger society as well as internal party relationships. A party whose leaders were unresponsive to voters and controlled by a minority of actual members may not be considered democratic in the larger sense of its role in a democratic polity.

In addition, Michels' analysis posits technological, intellectual, and psychological aspects of leaders and mass as inevitably pushing parties toward oligarchy. Since these factors occur in all large parties (social-democratic ones being distinguished only by the fact that their doctrine rejects these tendencies), Michels doesn't provide a

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framework for explaining the differences between parties with respect to internal organizational dimensions. Nor does Michels consider the possible national characteristics as they may operate on party organization in a particular system. Where Michels' work suggests possible relationships between various aspects of the political system and party organization, it may be useful to this study and will be considered in the appropriate sections in the literature review.

Two more recent works, in different ways, also elaborate on Michels' theme of organization and democracy. Neither, as we shall see, provides a framework entirely appropriate for our research. It might be useful however to briefly consider their perspectives and how they relate to or differ from this study.

In his book, Political Parties, Samuel Eldersveld constructs an alternative to Michels' model of party organization, based on four descriptive dimensions: clientele-orientation, alliance of subcoalitions, stratarchy, and multiple career patterns. After testing this model's validity against the two local party organizations in Wayne

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7For example, the political culture in Germany may have had an impact on the oligarchical features of the German Social Democrats.

County, Michigan, Eldersveld then looks at the relationship between these dimensions and certain aspects of the party as "an organizational system"—i.e., task group, communications subsystem, and decisional group.\(^9\) Coming to conclusions quite unlike Michels, he sees parties as moderately inefficient organizations dominated by parochial concerns, having autonomous decision levels with reciprocal deference, open recruitment, and little leadership control over career mobility and turnover.

Eldersveld suggests the wide applicability of his model for the study of party organization in any democratic political system. However, there are substantive problems in applying it to the present study. One is the lack of consideration of the role of candidates and public officials in the model. And despite the section on the party as a decisional system, there is no consideration of the way in which the party makes decisions on public policy stands.\(^{10}\)

In addition, despite references in the introduction to the relationship between party organization and political system factors, Eldersveld's model does not explore these relationships, nor does it attempt to provide an

\(^9\)Ibid., pp. 333-436.

\(^{10}\)In part, these omissions may be due to the study's restriction to local organization.
explanation of differences between two parties in a similar environment.

We are in no position to explain satisfactorily why these differences exist. It seems highly probable that particular structures develop over time in a geographical area, with particularized political norms, ideological perspectives, operational codes, and patterns of organizational relationships. It is however precisely the relationship between such "political norms, organizational patterns," etc., and the differences between parties within one country with which we are concerned in this study.

There are also some procedural problems in applying Eldersveld's framework. The model's definitions are operational ones, closely tied to the type of attitudinal-interview data which Eldersveld used. While this is definitely not a criticism, it makes it difficult to apply the concepts where, as in our case, different sorts of data are to be used.

The other work on local organization and party democracy, Samuel Barnes' study of an Italian Socialist Federation, also is an empirical attempt to clarify the

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11Ibid., p. 533.

12Since we are unable to conduct the same type of intensive interview research, the adoption of these concepts would probably only serve to cloud theoretical consistency.
issues raised by Michels.\textsuperscript{13} Barnes defines internal democracy as widespread influence on decision-making by those affected, and thus sees the key organizational factor promoting democracy as independent communication channels within the party.\textsuperscript{14} The book itself however is not a study of the actual communication system and flows between units, nor of decision-making processes within the party and who participates, but rather an analysis of interview data on membership characteristics, attitudes, and participation. Party organization is only one of three aspects important in the study of internal democracy; the others are political participation and leadership.\textsuperscript{15} The study is mainly concerned with the way in which members' and leaders' attitudes and competence affect participation. Barnes also suggests certain organizational and environmental variables which may limit or facilitate internal democracy: belief systems, party structure, and the party system.\textsuperscript{16}

The focus of the Barnes book is thus both broader and narrower than that of this study. It is broader in the sense that it is concerned with factors beyond party organization in relating political system and party variables.


\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., pp. 15-16.  \textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 215-24.
to explain internal democracy. It is narrower in the sense that it is concerned with one local unit of one party, whereas we hope by comparison of organizational features of two parties to be able to assess more clearly the relative influence of system and party variables on those features. Suggestions in Barnes' work on the relationships between party structure and other variables will be discussed in the following sections of this review.

One of the more recent research frameworks to gain favor in comparative studies is the structural-functional approach. Unfortunately, in the literature on parties at least, this approach has yielded little more than catalogues or lists of the various possible or actual functions which parties perform in different systems. In some respects, functionalism has provided a new vocabulary, but not a new theory on parties. The list of potential or actual party functions varies from author to author. Sorauf states essentially five functions for political parties: voter mobilization, political socialization, government organization, leadership recruitment, and policy expression. He suggests that the extent to which parties exercise these functions and the way they go about them are

\[17\] A good example of this failure to provide new theory is the book by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
what distinguish between different parties. He doesn't however, specify what other variables may influence party differences in these respects. Further and varying lists of party functions have been suggested by other authors.

While this study will not employ functional language, at least two of the most frequently mentioned functions of parties and the variables that influence their performance are a part of the focus, i.e., leadership recruitment and party policy expression. Beyond this, J. Schlesinger has pointed out, in a recent article, that the answer to the question of functional for whom has an impact on the areas of party one studies. That is, those looking at the functions which parties perform for their members are more likely to be concerned with membership benefits and internal organization and relationships. Those emphasizing party functions in the larger society are likely to ignore differences in internal structure and concentrate on parties as units and their relationship to other political

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19 For example, Sigmund Neumann, in *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 395-421, lists four specific functions: organization of public will, education of citizen, linking government and public opinions, and selection of leaders. He then goes on to discuss various possible classifications of parties based on other factors entirely.
Institutions. In this study, we are concerned primarily with internal relationships as, however, they are affected and influenced by both party-related and political system variables.

**Literature Review**

In reviewing the literature, we may begin by looking at those national political system variables most frequently suggested as influencing the organization and internal processes of political parties. What does the literature say about relationships between system variables and the party dimensions we are interested in? Which factors are considered important in explaining similarities in parties within one system? While a number of authors mention the importance of relating parties to their environment, there is less literature which specifically explores and re-searches this relationship.

The Eldersveld book does suggest essentially three kinds of variables which may influence organizational dimensions of parties. These are the political environment (socio-economic conditions and the party system), the political culture and styles of activism, and the political history of an area. However, the book makes little attempt

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to actually specify or analyze these relationships.\textsuperscript{21} 

A recent book by Frank Sorauf, \textit{Political Parties in the American System}, goes much further in suggesting the dimensions of the political system relevant to party characteristics. Although it doesn't provide an actual theory which specifies these relationships, it suggests the basic variables important to such a theory and gives examples from American parties. Sorauf considers certain aspects of a party's environment important influences on party structure and functions. Basically, these are the constitutional arrangements such as form of government institutions and areal distribution of power, socio-economic characteristics and institutions, electoral laws and legal regulations of parties, and political culture—including general attitudes about politics, parties, and politicians.\textsuperscript{22} He suggests that differences in these variables should be reflected in differences in party structure, although he doesn't consider explanations for differences between parties in the same

\textsuperscript{21}Eldersveld, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 12-13. One section does speculate about historical events surrounding the decision to participate, and there is a brief discussion of the possible influence of competitive position on recruitment of members, but this is all.

\textsuperscript{22}Sorauf, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 154-55, also pp. 136-39.
In the next section, we will consider how certain factors having differential impacts on different parties may be added to the system variables to help explain intra-system differences as well as similarities.

Summarizing then, there appear to be two major system variables which operate similarly on party organizations within a system. These are the constitutional-legal arrangements (which would include types of governmental systems, and electoral and regulatory laws), and the political culture. The other major factor mentioned—socio-economic characteristics—will be considered in a later section as one of those party related variables which have differential impacts on parties within the same system.

Some of the relationships between these system variables and party organization have been explored in the literature on specific parties. Within the range of constitutional-legal arrangements, for example, the impact of the institutional arrangement has been most clearly examined with regard to British parties, particularly in McKenzie's work. McKenzie's thesis, developed from a historical analysis of individual leaders in the Conservative and Labor parties, is that, "The most important

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23 In the next section, we will consider how certain factors having differential impacts on different parties may be added to the system variables to help explain intra-system differences as well as similarities.

conditioning influence on the internal life of any British political party is the fact that it is either responsible for the government of the country or has a reasonable prospect of winning such responsibility."^{25} His analysis thus suggests a relationship between a two-party parliamentary system, and strong parliamentary party leadership without mass membership control within the parties. In turn, a different constitutional arrangement, holding other factors constant, may lead to a different internal power distribution in a country's parties.

Another aspect of the constitutional-legal dimension mentioned in the literature is the impact of federalism v. unitary government on party organization. Epstein, in his book on Western European parties, discusses the effect of federalism as an aspect of what he terms developmental circumstances. As with other authors, he sees federalism as providing an organizational basis for countering the centralizing pressures of modern government in the structure of political parties.^{26}

A third aspect of the constitutional-legal dimension

^{25}Ibid., p. v.

^{26}Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 31-32. Books on American parties, of course, often mention the importance of federalism in explaining their decentralized character. For example, see Sorauf, op. cit., p. 40.
is electoral laws and regulations. Most of the literature on the subject is concerned primarily with their impact on the party system rather than on internal party organization, with the exception of specific studies on the unique American primary system and its relationship to party organization.27 One of the few studies which does look at an electoral system's influence on internal organization is the work done by Zariski on Italian parties. He suggests a number of variables which may influence the degree of internal factionalism in political parties, among them proportional representation, district size, and ballot structure.28

Political culture, as a system variable, has received more attention lately in explanations in comparative studies, particularly since the publication of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*. They define political culture as "the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward


the role of the self in the system." Perhaps the book by Samuel Beer, *British Parties in the Collectivist Age*, is the most explicit attempt to explore the relationship between political culture and party organization. Beer stresses the importance of attitudes towards leadership, consensus or support for the governmental system, notions of governmental responsibility, and prevailing theories of representation as influences on the politics of an era. He discusses the way in which current British attitudes in these areas influence party organization and processes of decision-making.

Hopefully, these brief suggestions in the literature on the relationship between system variables and party organization may be useful in the final section of this chapter. There we will attempt to draw up some list of tentative hypotheses about those factors in the West German political environment likely to influence German party organizations in a similar direction. Comparison however involves the attempt to explain differences as well.


30. Samuel Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. x and passim. Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-24, also lists belief systems, i.e., attitudes toward systems of power—democracy, socialism, and traditional values, as factors which may facilitate or limit internal party democracy.
as similarities. Therefore, we must now look at what the literature has to say about factors having a differential impact on parties within the same system, i.e., those that may influence party organizations in different directions.

Of the party-related variables influencing party organizations, the one most frequently considered in the literature, and listed above by Sorauf and others as a system variable is socio-economic conditions—that is, the economic and class structure and attitudes of a society. With respect to party organization, this variable is usually viewed in terms of class differences in party membership and adherents, and the different relationships of socio-economic groups to different parties. It thus appears to be a variable having a differential impact on parties within a system.

Although not usually considered from this perspective, the most extensive discussion of class differences and their influence on party organization appears in Duverger's Political Parties. As Wildavsky suggests in his excellent critique of the book, Duverger appears to reject outside factors to explain party organization, relying on structural political variables for his explanatory factors. However, implicit throughout the book is the notion that a single key factor is responsible for his types of party
organization—i.e., social class behavior.\textsuperscript{31}

Duverger enumerates and discusses several clusters of factors which comprise three basic types of party: two working-class and one middle-class. Using an evolutionary analysis characteristic of his work, he sees the development first of middle-class conservative, then working-class socialist, and finally communist type parties.\textsuperscript{32} Thus he provides three party types related to class, with a cluster of associated organizational variables. Aside from the communist variety, there are small, middle-class parties, and mass working-class parties. The middle-class parties, organized around the caucus form, are decentralized, with weak discipline and oligarchic leadership, while the working-class parties are organized on a branch basis, are strongly disciplined, and centralized, with oligarchic leadership.\textsuperscript{33} Class factors for Duverger determine the basic units—caucus or branch, and these in turn basically determine the other organizational characteristics such as

\textsuperscript{31}Aaron B. Wildavsky, "A Methodological Critique of Duverger's 'Political Parties'" in Eckstein and Apter, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 370.


\textsuperscript{33}As is clear from the list, class membership doesn't determine the internal power distribution. Duverger agrees with Michels that all parties are oligarchic. He does, however, cite certain factors which may determine who belongs to the oligarchy, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 151-57.
centralization and discipline.\textsuperscript{34} As Wildavsky suggests in his critique, the utility of Duverger's general classifications is somewhat doubtful, since few parties fit in all respects his typology.\textsuperscript{35} Yet his implicit reliance on class factors as determining influences is also reflected in other literature on parties.

Epstein, for example, devotes considerable attention to the development of working-class parties.\textsuperscript{36} He sees mass membership as the main differentiating characteristic between working-class and other parties. However, he doesn't suggest any relationships between class membership and other party organizational characteristics.

The group ties dependent upon the class character of a party have also been mentioned by a number of authors as significantly affecting party organization.\textsuperscript{37} Thus a

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1-35, 46, 59-60, 63-67.

\textsuperscript{35}Wildavsky, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 371-72.

\textsuperscript{36}Epstein, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 163-66. The discussion is mainly directed toward refuting Duverger's notion of their evolutionary modernity. He suggests that the original relationship between mobilization of a class and mass membership organization is being diluted as working-class attitudes and numbers decline, and that these parties may come to resemble more closely the caucus type organizations of older parties.

\textsuperscript{37}For example, Beer's book, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 240-42, has some interesting suggestions about the role of unions in party organization, and their influence on factionalism and policy disputes. Clearly the union affiliations of the British Labour Party were a significant factor for unity despite deep policy conflicts. For some other comments about group ties, see also Epstein, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 166.
party's relationships with various socio-economic groups may be considered another aspect of the socio-economic variable. Both Chalmers (in his book on the German SPD) and Barnes suggest that the group ties which a party maintains are a general factor influencing organization. Chalmers suggests that both control of, and the nature of a party's policy process will vary with the degree of ties to or independence from external groups.  

Barnes makes the somewhat different point that the extent of organizational relationships with external groups will influence party factionalism—alternative organizations providing a structural basis for internal opposition.  

Another variable possibly having a differential impact upon party organization is the party system itself as it is reflected in the respective competitive positions—electoral and governmental—of parties within a system. Thus a party's percentage of votes over a period of elections (nationally and locally), and its percentage of seats in the legislature and position in or out of government may have an effect on a number of organizational characteristics, as well as on the control and substance of party policy.  


39Barnes, op. cit., p. 252.
The McKenzie book on British parties points to the impact of government/opposition status on leadership characteristics and participation in party policy-making. The book has a rather narrow scope, being concerned chiefly with the single top leader in each party, but it does illustrate the probable relationship between governmental position and the participation of various party elements and their control over party policy. His discussion of this relationship is obviously tied to the particular nature of the British party and governmental system, but competitive position—in or out of government—may be considered a general variable to be explored for its impact on party organization in other systems as well.

As for competitive position in the electoral sense, various authors have commented on its impact on a number of party characteristics. Thus, J. Seligman, in an article on leadership recruitment, argues that the larger the competitive gap between majority and minority parties, the more likely the minority party is to recruit leaders skilled in opposition, but lacking executive experience. Close

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40 McKenzie, op. cit., passim.

41 In more general terms, Michels and others have noted that being in a government increases the power of M.P.'s in the policy process whereas opposition increases the influence of ideologically oriented party bureaucrats. Michels, op. cit., p. 212.
competition, on the other hand, is likely to increase the desirability of political careers and thus affect leadership mobility and turnover. In addition, Zariski, defining the dominant party in electoral competitive terms, suggests that electoral dominance over a period of time is related to the emergence of party factionalism. This is so because as a consequence of attaining dominance, a party must increase the number of diverse elements contained within it.

As to party policy-making control, J. Schlesinger has also argued that close electoral competition increases the dominance of office-holders or office-seekers within a party; parties in favorable competitive positions being dominated by these leaders. Actually, Schlesinger has


44Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 767. In an article concerned primarily with party policy content, Kirchheimer has implied much the same thing. He argues that close competition leads to renewed efforts to attract votes. Therefore, party office-seekers are able to change party policy in the direction of moderating differences with opponents, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., pp. 188-90.
attempted to develop a model of party organization which interrelates a number of variables, including competitive position, which we have been considering separately in this review. He proposes a concept—structure of opportunities—and relates it to the leadership characteristics of several parties. "Structure of opportunities" comprises "the various rules, formal and informal, which define the routes of political advancement, as well as the party system which defines the relative chances of each party to gain office. . . ." Thus he appears to combine in one concept several variables: the organizational structure of government, electoral arrangements, and the competitive positions of parties within a system.

Operationalizing this, however, as the available legislative seats in a country over a period of elections, he is unable to explain differences in party organizations based on such leadership characteristics as age at first election and prior office-holding, both of which he considers important indications of leadership control of recruitment and office-holders' dominance in a party. Perhaps this is due to the fact that he must omit relative


46 Ibid., pp. 269-93.
competitive positions of parties when constructing an opportunity rate for an entire system. Possibly a separate assessment of the influence of competitive position may be necessary to account for the party career differences he finds but cannot explain.

Party doctrine is a final party-related variable which may help explain party organizational differences. We use the term "doctrine" to distinguish these beliefs and attitudes from party ideology which is directed towards external society and the party's view of it. Party doctrine refers to the accepted beliefs and attitudes within a party about who should participate in and control the party organization and party policy-making. Beer's book on British parties provides a good example of the way in which changing party attitudes towards leadership and policy-making may affect the actual internal power distribution and other organizational features.47

In summary of this section, the literature on parties suggests three variables which are related to individual parties within a system and which may help explain party organization differences: socio-economic characteristics

47 Beer, op. cit., passim. See also Barnes, op. cit., pp. 522-28, where Barnes suggests the general importance of attitudes towards party organization as they influence membership participation and thus leadership control of policy.
and relationships, electoral and governmental competitive position, and party doctrine. We now turn to a review of the literature from a different perspective. How have various authors conceptualized the organizational dimensions of the political party, particularly such aspects as power distribution and leadership characteristics? What variables—the ones considered above, or others—have been used in explaining party variations in organization?

There are a variety of ways in which authors may categorize the complex of relationships between leaders and followers in a political party. Neumann, in *Political Parties*, suggests several dimensions to be investigated: membership characteristics, size of organization, strength of central party authorities in relation to number of functions performed, and leadership fluctuation and turnover.⁴⁸ Stated somewhat differently, we see four aspects of organization: candidate selection, leadership career patterns and characteristics, factionalism, and party policy-making processes, as particularly relevant to an understanding of party organizational relationships and power distribution. What does the literature say about these dimensions?

Involved in considering a party's process of candidate selection are such questions as who controls, what

⁴⁸Neumann, *op. cit.*., pp. 408-10.
procedures are used, and what criteria or characteristics predominate in those selected? This organizational dimension of parties is frequently discussed in the literature primarily in terms of whether control of the selection process is exercised locally or nationally.\(^{49}\) Epstein suggests that it is a country's electoral system which sets limiting conditions to the degree of local control. Thus countries with proportional representation and large multi-member constituencies cannot have as much local control as those with small single-member districts.\(^{50}\)

Seligman suggests three types of selection process: interest group allocation, devolution to local branches, and centralized selection, and relates these to some of the system and party variables we considered above. He identifies four factors related to these types: the electoral system, the political structure (unitary or federal), group relationships to parties, and party ideology. The electoral system and the political structure set limits to the amount of decentralization possible, while the extent of group ties determines whether a party becomes a broad front

\(^{49}\)Duverger, op. cit., pp. 355-60, indicates that the key issue is local v. central control; however, he doesn't provide any explanation for variations in control in different parties.

\(^{50}\)Epstein, op. cit., p. 225.
for the legitimation of group efforts. Party ideology and doctrine may operate in two ways to influence the selection process: an explicit ideology may make candidate conformity crucial and justify central control, or party doctrine may stress broad membership participation in the selection process, thus limiting the central authorities.51

Some of the other system and party variables discussed above may also influence a party's selection process. For example, the political culture, as well as a party's competitive position may affect the desirability of political careers and thus, the range of individuals available for nomination and a party's degree of choice in their selection.

The leadership career patterns and characteristics of a political party is an important organizational dimension and one which may also have an impact on the party's role in the polity. Leadership mobility and turnover may be decisive in determining a party's flexibility and responsiveness to new political issues. In addition, a party's ability to provide for smooth transition and succession of leaders may play a role in the overall legitimation of the political system.52

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51 Seligman, op. cit., pp. 310-12.
52 LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit., p. 411.
There are a number of ways of looking at the career patterns and leadership characteristics in political parties. The Schlesinger article mentioned above attempts to provide a typology based on certain aspects of the party's elected officials' career patterns. He places parties in one of four quadrants based on the percentage of party representatives elected for the first time before age forty-five, and the percentage with recent political office prior to election. Parties characterized by earlier ages of entry and less prior office-holding are hierarchic and legislative which indicates that recruitment is highly controlled and leadership develops largely within the national legislature. The opposite type, older age at entry and more prior office experience is also characterized as hierarchic, but leadership develops prior to the legislature at lower governmental levels. The third type, earlier age, and more office experience, are seen as open parties where office-holders can use their influence to advance at an early age. Finally, there are parties

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53 Eldersveld, for example, op. cit., pp. 140-42, 118-76, studies career origins and mobility in terms of motivational analysis. He characterizes careers in terms of initial motivations to participate, but doesn't consider factors influencing party differences in this regard.

characterized by older age and less prior experience which Schlesinger suggests are best seen as open in recruitment, but dominated by non-party groups. Unfortunately, Schlesinger does not clearly relate these types to the system and party variables he includes in his notion of opportunity structures.

Other authors have concentrated more on the questions of selection, mobility, and turnover of internal party officials or bureaucrats. Duverger accepts Michels' notion that oligarchy is inevitable and also relies on psychological factors such as mass respect for age and authority as explanations. He distinguishes between central approval of nominations to the leadership, and its absence, but doesn't consider explanations for party differences in this respect.

Duverger does suggest three factors which may

55Ibid., pp. 281-84. While one might quarrel with the interpretation of these patterns; for example, the first type might indicate dominance by party bureaucrats rather than legislators, the measures do have some utility as indicators of career patterns.

56Michels, of course, cites a variety of psychological and technological reasons why leaders remain in office for extended periods despite frequent elections. Because it is the result, which is similar in all parties, i.e., oligarchy, that interests him, he doesn't consider possible explanations for leadership variations in different parties. Op. cit., p. 93-105.

57Duverger, op. cit., pp. 135, 141-45.
influence leadership turnover rates as measured by the average age of party leaders. One is the class composition of the party. Working-class parties must train their own political leaders first, unlike middle-class parties where the members' educational attainments allow them to recruit directly into the leadership at younger ages. A second factor is the degree of party centralization. More centralization makes possible the establishment of training schools and formal procedures for the replacement of leaders, whereas in decentralized parties, replacement is likely to be the result of exceptional circumstances. Finally, parties whose organization includes research and staff groups provide more opportunities for early advancement to positions of influence through these bodies.58

McKenzie's thorough historical analysis of British political party leaders is also concerned with the question of careers. However, it is limited to the narrower question of the power of the top leader.59 Yet his work does suggest certain issues important in studying all top leadership positions, such as the formal party requirements, the leadership's responsibility for programs, and its relationship to parliamentary members, mass organization, and

58Ibid., pp. 161-68.
59McKenzie, op. cit., passim.
the party bureaucracy.

The question of factionalism within a political party is also relevant to our concern for the complex of relationships between leaders and followers. The causes of factions have been located in a number of factors. Duverger, for example, lists: regionalism, ideology, and socio-economic differences as sources of intra-party disputes.\(^0\) He suggests that regional, and/or socio-economic factions within a party contribute to the decentralization of policy-making. The national party decision process becomes one of combining positions taken elsewhere. Ideological factionalism, on the other hand, stimulates fuller policy discussion and broader decisions at the top levels of a party.\(^1\)

Zariski has also analyzed this aspect of party organization. He defines faction as "any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively—as a distinct bloc within the party."\(^2\) The dimensions of factionalism include: continuity, cohesion, scope of organization, number, mode of settlement

\(^0\)Duverger, op. cit., pp. 53-56. Michels includes among the reasons for leadership disputes status rivalries, generational disputes, socio-economic differences, special functional claims, and ideological differences, op. cit., pp. 165-67. See also, Seligman, op. cit., p. 298.

\(^1\)Duverger, op. cit., p. 56.

\(^2\)Zariski, "Party Factions . . . .," op. cit., p. 33.
of disputes, and factional *raison d'etre*. Different types of *raison d'etre* produce the different types of factions. There are factions united on: shared values regarding party policy, strategic conceptions, common material interests, origins or functions, or personal or local cliques.63 Based on his study of the Italian Christian Democrats, he relates personal/local factions to dominant competitive position. The degree of factionalism may also affect the type of party leadership—the more factionally divided a party, the more likely its leaders will practice a "broker style" in an attempt to negotiate disputes and maintain unity.64

Factions frequently manifest themselves in disputes over party policy decisions and have an influence on the exercise of authority by the party leadership. This leads to a consideration of the way in which parties make decisions. How does the literature characterize the dimensions of the party policy process? How is this process related to the other system and party variables we have reviewed?

Whether it is considered a primary function or not,

63Ibid., pp. 34-35.

64Zariski, "Intraparty Conflict . . . ," op. cit., p. 33. Peter H. Merkl, "Equilibrium, Structure of Interests and Leadership," The American Political Science Review, LVI (September, 1962), 638, also makes this point with respect to Adenauer's leadership of the CDU.
all parties must make some decisions concerning their position on political issues, and can thus be viewed as policymakers. This viewpoint involves questions of the participants in party policy-making, the origin of initiatives in party policy, the extent and direction of intelligence and information activities, and discipline regarding decisions taken. In reviewing the literature, we shall look at how these aspects of party policy process have been characterized and related to other variables.

The main question in the literature has usually been whether party policy decisions are made by the organizational bureaucrats outside government, or by the elected public officials who are party leaders. The focus is not the process itself, but who are the most powerful participants in decision-making. This is the major concern of both Michels and Duverger. Because of conditions of tenure (outside organizational control), public prestige due to their official role, and technical devices such as membership on policy organs, Michels believes that the party parliamentarians will be able to assert control over the party's

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65 Epstein, op. cit., p. 264.

policy decisions. Although Duverger makes no direct mention of policy deliberations, this is implicit in his discussion of leadership. Unlike Michels, he sees a trend towards control of the parliamentary representatives by the central organs of the external membership.

Following his usual evolutionary analysis, Duverger sees three possible stages in the relationship between party legislators and bureaucrats: representatives control external organization, equilibrium, and external organization controls representatives. Each stage corresponds to a type of party. Thus, parliamentary domination coincides with weak, decentralized middle-class parties where the m.p.'s control the executive committee and there is a lack of organizational bureaucracy to challenge their dominance. British parties are an exception which Duverger explains by reference to the internal discipline of the parliamentary group which insures its control.

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67Michels, op. cit., pp. 136-39. This is objectionable in his view because it means greater concern for party policy positions with electoral appeal than for those advancing objective class interests.


69Ibid., pp. 183-88. McKenzie, op. cit., details the parliamentary parties' control of party policy in Britain. He analyzes leadership control in relation to other party organs and officials by looking at the historical succession of leaders and their control of the external organization. Parliamentary party dominance is attributed to the features of the constitutional system and the close competition of the two parties.
a balance of power between the two groups of leaders—is found in working-class parties with large members and strong organization. Voting discipline imposed by the external organization and the establishment of research groups increases bureaucratic influence, but this is balanced by the m.p.'s' prestige, financial independence, and control over their own renomination. The third stage—external organization controls the representatives—is found only in Communist and Fascist parties with exceptionally strong organization. The financial dependence of deputies and organization control of nomination gives the party bureaucrats the upper hand. As we have seen before, in discussing Duverger, the type of party organization, in turn dependent on social class, determines also this question of leadership control of party decision-making.

One theme which is found in many of these discussions of participation in the party policy process is the potential for conflict between electoral considerations and

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70 Ibid., pp. 190-96.
71 Ibid., pp. 198-99.
72 This argument finds some support in Epstein, op. cit., pp. 289-90, 309-13, which suggests that differences in party doctrine and ideology related to social class influence party policy processes. Thus working-class socialist parties, committed to a movement for social reform, are more likely to give a role to the external membership than conservative middle-class parties.
programmatic policy goals. Otto Kirchheimer discussed this in an article on trends in Western European parties. He saw a trend towards the "catch-all party," one with a declining interest in programmatic and ideological concerns, and a concentration on electoral activity and bidding for votes. In part, he attributed this to changing socio-economic conditions in these societies, which allow parties to appeal to all groups instead of being restricted to one class. The advent of the "welfare state" also reduced the number of issues on which distinctive party positions could be based. In turn, this development in party policy may strengthen the top leadership and increase the party's receptivity to interest group involvement. Implicit in this and other discussions is the notion that those most likely to be affected by electoral considerations, i.e., the elected officials, dominate the policy process within the party.

73See, for example, Sorauf, op. cit., p. 70. Barnes, op. cit., p. 12, 158, also sees ideological goals as sources of conflict within the leadership, although unlike some authors, he doesn't see electoral considerations necessarily predominating.

74Kirchheimer, op. cit., pp. 184-87.

75Ibid., pp. 190-98. It is interesting to note that Michels saw something of the same trend towards lack of concern with doctrinal goals and the development of vague programs to appeal for votes. He, however, attributed this to the party's acceptance within the system, and the internal pressures of bureaucratization, op. cit., pp. 366-75.
This assumption about the key participants in policy decisions is explicit in A. Downs' book on parties. His model as a whole is not particularly relevant to our topic since it is concerned with parties as homogeneous units acting on the electorate. However, certain aspects of his analysis, in which he considers party policy and ideology, are of interest. Both governing and opposition parties in Downs' scheme adopt policies solely on the basis of their potential for winning votes. Thus competitive position and goals are crucial to party policy making. Yet uncertainty in the real world about voter preferences makes possible the development of party ideologies. These are likely to remain consistent over time in order to maintain a rational party image with the voters. Thus, winning elections may come in conflict with ideological positions institutionally rooted and slow to adapt to changing circumstances. One should note however that this conflict is not tied, in Downs' analysis, to different leadership groups, since he views the leadership as united on electoral goals.


77Ibid., pp. 54-63.

78Ibid., pp. 96-113.
In various ways, other studies also point to the influence of competitive position on policy-making, and in particular, to the importance of electoral success or defeat in determining changes in party policy. Schlesinger has suggested a connection between competitive position, tenure, and leadership control of policy. Those parties in a favorable competitive position are able to maintain in office elected officials who thereby have a better vantage point in competing with the external organization for control of party policy-making. 79

Eldersveld also has some interesting findings with respect to ideological distinctiveness and competitive position. In the more closely competitive districts in his study, the parties articulated more ideological differences, whereas in noncompetitive areas, the minority party moderated its views. 80 This suggests that as competitiveness increases, so does ideological distinctiveness. In both cases, it implies changes in party positions are a result of calculations of electoral chances. Depending on the definition of close competition, this finding may

79 Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," op. cit., p. 778. Both Beer, op. cit., pp. 594-631, and McKenzie, op. cit., passim, also note the use of the electoral status of the party by elected leaders to secure changes in policy necessary to gain more votes.

80 Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 203-05.
complement those authors who implicitly or explicitly see competition resulting in decreasing differences in ideological distinctiveness in European party systems.

This theme is found particularly in the writings on "the end of ideology." While a detailed review of the extensive literature on this subject is not necessary here, the arguments by two of the authors in this group, Lipset and Dahrendorf, do have some relevance to our concerns. They suggest that the advent of the welfare state and decreased class distinctions have resulted in a decline in differences in the appeals and programs of various parties in Western Europe. Competition remains, but not in terms of distinctive ideologies. There appear to be two assumptions underlying this argument (both of which are found elsewhere in the literature on parties): one, that elected officials most concerned with votes control party policy decisions; and two, that increased competition results in lessening ideological differences. Taking into account these assumptions, this suggests that there are intervening

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variables which may affect the relationship between changing socio-economic conditions and "the end of ideology" as expressed in party decisions and party platforms. These intervening factors are who controls policy within the party, i.e., whether office-seekers in fact dominate over ideologues, and the competitive positions of the parties in the system.

A number of other system and party-related variables are briefly mentioned in the literature as influences on a party's policy process. Issue area, for example, may be related to the question of who participates in party policy-making. Daalder has suggested that leadership control over policy is related to the specific policy issue involved. Voter, and particularly, member attitudes are likely to be much more salient on some issues (possibly bread and butter economic ones), and therefore would have to be given more consideration by the leaders.83 In addition, Beer's analysis of British parties suggests that issue consensus within a party allows broad participation in policy, while maintaining strong leadership. On the other hand, issue conflicts and factions dividing leaders as well as party members may force elected leaders to attempt to dominate the

policy area and restrict participation in policy decisions.  

Party doctrine and a system's political culture may also have an impact on the party policy process. Membership expectations and attitudes about participation in the process, and about party unity and voting discipline are important here. Although there is not much direct discussion of it in the literature, general cultural attitudes, such as those towards expertise and the role of experts, may also influence such aspects of the process as participation and policy initiative.

Theoretical Framework

We are concerned with comparing the two major party organizations in West Germany with respect to four organizational dimensions: procedures of candidate selection, leadership characteristics, factionalism, and internal policy-making processes. The above review of the literature suggests that in explaining similarities and


85Much of the British literature discusses this. See Ibid.; and McKenzie, op. cit. Michels also discusses the use of unity and discipline to retain policy control, op. cit., pp. 169-77. See also, Sorauf, op. cit., p. 113.

86The question of who initiates policy may also be related to the extent of external group relationships of a party. See Epstein, op. cit., pp. 280-94.
differences between the two parties on these dimensions, we should take into account certain system and party-related variables. The system variables which, operating on both parties, might explain similarities are the constitutional-electoral arrangements and the country's political culture. Those variables related to particular parties and having a differential impact, which might help explain party differences, are socio-economic characteristics, competitive position, and party doctrine. It is clear that these explanatory variables themselves may be interrelated, federalism, for example, providing the possibility of alternative competitive positions at different levels of government.\footnote{Thus the German SPD is in a better competitive position, in fact a majority position frequently, at the Land level, while remaining the opposition party at the national level until a few years ago when the coalition was formed.} However, in the following statement of our framework we will treat these as separately operating variables.

In looking at the organizational characteristics of the two German parties, we shall be concerned with the period from the 1953 elections to the 1969 elections. This allows us to look at the leadership shifts and policy changes which took place in the SPD in the late 1950's after the death of Schumacher, the party's post-war founder. For purposes of comparison, the CDU analysis will cover the
same time period. The CDU's initial leadership succession did not take place until Adenauer's retirement in the early 1960's. Using this time span also allows us to include a dynamic element in the analysis, since we will be able to consider changes over this period of time in some of the variables, particularly socio-economic characteristics and competitive position. The SPD, for example, entered the government for the first time in the 1960's. Also, in the earlier period, approximately 1946-1953, the West German parties were in the unique position of determining to a considerable extent such system factors as the constitutional-electoral arrangements. By focusing on the parties after the founding of the Federal Republic, we are able to look more clearly at how these factors in turn influenced the on-going party organizations.

We might make some comment here about information sources on the system and party-related variables. Constitutional-electoral arrangements, party competitive positions, and socio-economic characteristics are readily available from a number of secondary sources. Both government documents and private studies are obtainable on such 88

88 The only previous analysis of the CDU organization, Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) has only a brief section on the 1950's, another justification for beginning our study with the 1953 election.
factors as elections results, and the parties' membership characteristics. As for political culture, we will rely on the survey data collected by Almond and Verba, as well as a number of German works on political attitudes. Party doctrine can be determined from the party literature and published statements by party leaders and members.

Candidate selection

The first organizational dimension in our framework is the parties' selection of candidates for the Bundestag. This involves four aspects: (1) participants in the process and the level of dominant influence—central, local party, or external group; (2) the frequency of contested nominations including challenges to incumbents; (3) the criteria used by participants in the nominating process; and (4) the characteristics of elected candidates—age, SES, prior political experience, and turnover.

Similarities

The literature review above indicates that two features of the West German political system—the constitutional-electoral arrangements and the political culture—set certain limits or structure to the nomination process, within which the parties may differ. A frequent contention of

89Seligman, op. cit., has a discussion of this.
the literature is that electoral systems directly affect the level of control of nomination processes—straight proportional representation leading to centralized control, pure single-member districts to the independence of local party units. The West German system is an unusual mixture with one-half of the m.p.'s nominated on Land (state) lists and one-half in districts and with legal authority for nominations vested in Land and district party conventions. Thus, one would expect a minimal influence by national party or parliamentary leaders in Bundestag nominations, Land party control of lists, and local party organization control of district nominations.

West German federalism can be expected to reinforce the Land control of lists since it provides political positions independent of the national legislature. With respect to nomination criteria and m.p. characteristics, federalism is likely to diminish the attention to requirements important to the parliamentary party and provide opportunity for some political experience at lower levels for most m.p.'s before reaching the Bundestag. Evidence from periodical accounts and published research on CDU and SPD nominations that the parties differ on these general features of the nomination process would indicate that, contrary to the hypotheses, electoral-legal variables do not have much impact on internal party nomination processes.
Hypotheses about the impact of the West German political culture on party nominations must be more tentative since there is much less in the literature relating political attitudes explicitly to this process, and because these hypotheses depend on the extent to which studies and polls show that the relevant general political attitudes do not vary by party. The relatively low status of politicians in West Germany, and its material concomitant—poor salaries—might limit the availability of potential Bundestag candidates and the occupational groups from which they are recruited for both parties. This might give more advantage to local activists, produce a narrow range of occupational groups and some stagnation in the CDU and SPD parliamentary parties. Two other general characteristics of the political culture—dislike and avoidance of political conflict and belief in the importance of expertise and professionalism in compartmentalized social areas—might perhaps result in a low level of contested nominations in both parties, a resentment towards external interest group participation in party nominations, and an expectation of some previous political experience as a requisite for Bundestag nomination. Finding, on the other hand, in the research on nominations that there is a wide difference between the CDU and SPD on
the number of contests, external group influence, and various characteristics of m.p.'s—experience and turnover particularly—despite similar attitudes across party lines would disprove these tentative associations and suggest that party-related variables are more significant than political culture in the nomination process.

Differences

The literature suggests some relationship between differences in competitive position and some aspects of the nomination process. Because the West German system is at least formally decentralized and federal, hypotheses on the impact of differences in national competitive position (both vote percentages and governmental position) on the nomination processes must be tentative.\(^1\) During the period studied, the CDU has had a larger percentage of votes for the Bundestag than the SPD at each election and until 1966 when the two parties formed a coalition government, the CDU has been in government, the SPD in opposition. Because of its minority position and less promising career opportunities, we expect fewer contested nominations in the SPD than in the CDU as well as a somewhat slower rate of turnover in

\(^1\)Thus the SPD and CDU get different vote percentages in each Land. Since lists are made at the Land level, these may be more important than national percentages.
its parliamentary party. In addition, the SPD's greater need to gain votes might make the candidate's potential vote-appeal a more important selection criterion than in the CDU. As the SPD's competitive position has improved considerably in the 1960's, changes in these characteristics in the same period would be further indication of a relationship. On the other hand, if the CDU and SPD do not differ on these aspects of candidate selection, these tentative relationships may be rejected.

A number of the authors reviewed above also suggest that the socio-economic characteristics of party members and the ties of a party to particular interest organizations are features which can help explain differences in party organization. One, if studies of CDU membership indicate (as usually assumed) that the CDU differs from the SPD in having a much greater socio-economic range among members, dominance of middle-class occupations, and closer ties to a number of economic interest organizations, one would expect its nomination process to also differ in the direction of a much greater involvement of external organizations in nominations at the local and Land level. This, in turn, would produce a greater occupational range among m.p.'s and perhaps a younger age than in the SPD.
parliamentary party. On the other hand, the legal framework may make it impossible for external groups to dominate nominations and an examination of this question should give some insight into the relative weight of system vs. party-related variables in influencing party organization. Two, if as expected, the SPD has a larger percentage of working-class members from which it must recruit candidates, this may produce a greater tendency to job security compared to the CDU, i.e., more hesitancy to challenge incumbents for renomination and a slower turnover rate among m.p.'s, as well as a narrower occupational range. It may be, of course, that political careers are so structured by the system as to be limited to the middle-class in which case the two parties may show little difference in the occupational background of m.p.'s despite differences in membership.

The Schlesinger article mentioned above in the literature review argues that party differences in age and political experience prior to a mandate are dependent on

92Epstein, op. cit., argues that politics is a middle-class occupation. Thus, either working-class parties have or the leaders are middle-class and do not reflect the class character of the party.

93Loss of job meaning greater economic deprivation than for members of independent professions.
the differences in the nomination process itself—the degree of centralization and role of the party vs. external groups in the process. We would expect the SPD to have a decentralized process, with m.p.'s predominant in the organization and younger, more experienced m.p.'s than the CDU, whose process would also be decentralized, but with a greater external group role. If this is not the case, this suggests that age and experience of m.p.'s are not adequate as indicators of his dimensions of the nomination process and other party and system variables must be considered.

Finally, we would expect party doctrine to have some effect on the nomination of parliamentary candidates, although it is difficult to indicate precisely the relationship. If CDU and SPD doctrine differs on the role of members in party decision-making and the tradition of deference to those in authority, this may produce differences in centralizing tendencies in the process. For example, we would expect the SPD doctrine to place a stronger emphasis on deference to party authorities and leaders as compared to a CDU doctrine which emphasizes federalism and the party as a coalition of independent political powers.94

94 On the other hand, the SPD is also famous for insistence on internal democracy in its organization doctrine (whether fulfilled in practice or not) which might produce stronger negative sanctions against national interference in local decisions than in the CDU.
If this is the case, it may result in a greater role for the national leaders in SPD nominations and produce a higher value on incumbency. The CDU's initial organization as a union of all Christians and its self-image as an equal coalition of the two formerly antagonistic religious denominations in Germany is likely to mean that religion will play an important role as a criterion for candidate selection in the CDU.

National party leaders: selection and characteristics

The second organizational dimension, the national party leadership, includes the top positions in the party organization itself, as well as the leadership of the parliamentary parties. We are interested in the formal and informal selection procedures as well as certain characteristics, particularly career patterns as reflected in prior offices and turnover rates. These characteristics are likely to reflect the degree of centralization within the party organization. Party regulations and documents, as well as the accounts of outside observers, will be used as sources of information on CDU and SPD similarities and differences on this dimension.

Similarities

Since West Germany is a federal system, which
provides the opportunity for a number of levels of political participation and office-holding, we would expect both CDU and SPD national organization leaders to exhibit some experience at lower levels and a number of career patterns. In addition, the existence of state government and party organizations as independent sources of influence at this level may mean that neither party can develop a completely central oligarchy, excluding lower levels from participation in the selection of the top leader. To determine this relationship, we need to investigate whether the federal system indeed allows for development of political influence independent of national party leaders as well as the degree of overlap between national and Land leadership positions. If this is the case, but the parties still differ in centralization of selection and diversity of career routes, this relationship must be rejected.

It is possible that the political culture, as mentioned above with regard to candidate selection, may also have a similar impact on internal organizational leadership in the CDU and SPD. A general deprecatory attitude towards political careers, regardless of party, might produce a certain stagnation and low turnover in both parties' leadership.
Differences

The differences in the electoral positions of the CDU and SPD may also affect the national party leadership. The SPD's position as a minority party and in opposition until the late 1960's might be expected to discourage selection of a party career as an opportunity for advancement and political prominence, thus producing a slower turnover than in the CDU, as well as less interest in the position of national chairman (since it is unlikely to lead to the Chancellorship). In the CDU, on the other hand, the expectation of national prominence, as well as governmental leadership positions, might increase the importance of leadership offices and produce more contests and turnover in national party positions. These tentative relationships, of course, assume that party offices are directly linked with governmental position (i.e., CDU national chairman = Chancellor), and if this is not the case, they will not apply.

Duverger is the primary source for hypotheses on the direct effect of the socio-economic characteristics of party members on other aspects of party organization. If the membership of the SPD is predominately working-class and that of the CDU is predominately middle-class, Duverger's thesis suggests that the SPD will have a centralized leadership selection process and older leaders with less
turnover. The CDU conversely would be decentralized with younger leaders and more turnover. We might also suggest that the heterogeneity of CDU membership could lead to the need to satisfy and compromise a number of group claims in the selection of chairman, making the process more conflictual than in the more homogeneous SPD.

Again, as in candidate selection, hypotheses about the impact of party doctrine on these processes are more tentative and depend to a considerable extent on the actual differences which may or may not exist in CDU and SPD doctrine. Michel's study, for example, suggests a strong SPD tradition of deference and respect for authority which would mitigate lower organizational participation and influence in the leadership selection process. Whether the CDU support of federalist principles will produce opposite effects is a question to be investigated.

**Factionalism**

Party factions may be defined as self-conscious groups pursuing their aims within the larger party organization, as evidenced through behavior and statements at party conferences, and voting in the legislature. Two aspects of factions are of importance: the existence and extent of factions within the CDU and SPD, and their

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95 See Zariski, *op. cit.*
nature, whether issue, socio-economic, personal, functional, or regional. Evidence of factions within a party can be obtained from an examination of party literature and party and other records of conferences and legislative voting behavior.

Similarities

The federal system in West Germany may make the development of regional factions within both parties more likely, although this also depends on whether West German federalism does indeed have historical roots and significant regional differences. In addition, the existence of Land lists for Bundestag nominations may invite the balancing of competing claims and the organization of various interests within the parties to press for their share of list places, although this is a very tentative proposition.

Differences

The differences in the CDU and SPD's electoral positions may be related to differences in the extent of factionalism in each party. Zariski's study, discussed above, suggests that the maintenance of the CDU's majority status over a period of time, requiring the incorporation of a wide variety of interests, would increase the extent of factionalism in the CDU. Because the party was relatively secure in its winning position, party groups may also have been
less hesitant in breaking any facade of party unity. In contrast, the SPD's long exile in the opposition would increase the need and demands for unity and lower the party's tolerance for internal dissent on issues important to its electoral chances. No evidence of a decrease in CDU factionalism after its decision to share power with the SPD in 1966 or of an increase in SPD factionalism after joining the government would suggest the invalidity of these hypotheses. The diversity of socio-economic groups among CDU members might also increase the probability of economic issue factions within this party, whereas the greater homogeneity of the SPD might make their emergence less likely.

Finally, party doctrine may affect the extent and kind of factionalism. The long history of the SPD as a disciplined movement as well as its commitment to a coherent goal system would lead one to expect less factionalism, particularly on issues. The abandonment of a comprehensive orthodoxy in the SPD in the early 1960's will give us a chance to investigate whether tolerance for issue diversity has increased since then.

Party policy-process

The final aspect of party organization with which we are concerned is the internal policy-making process of each
party. The process may be divided into five different elements: (1) the level of initiative on policy positions and of final decision-making; (2) the actual groups involved in the process, including the role of the formal organization in substantive policy-making; (3) the discipline and cohesion on policy positions taken by the party; (4) the relationship between issue areas and internal party conflicts; and (5) the degree and direction of policy change.

Policy refers to the formal programs of the party, which may or may not form a coherent ideology, as well as to the election platforms and specific statements of party positions on issues and party strategy. Sources to be used for information in order to compare parties on this basis are party documents, reports of annual conferences and decisions, and public announcements of positions and programs. Also of importance are periodical and government reports on party voting in the legislature.

96Ideology may be defined either as a Weltanschauung or attitude structure, i.e., "A more or less institutionalized set of beliefs about man and society," James Christoph, "British Political Ideology Today," The American Political Science Review, LIX (September, 1965), 629. Most parties are likely to have some element of the latter. Chalmers, op. cit., p. 115, defines party policy as "any stated course of action to which the party publicly commits itself and which is therefore binding in some important way on party members."
Similarities

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, there is much less attention in the literature to the internal policy-process or the system and party related variables which may affect it. Nevertheless, we may make a few tentative suggestions as to these relationships. It is possible, for example, that the West German cultural emphasis on expertise in compartmentalized issue areas will result in both parties' utilization of formal research units and in an avoidance of issue conflict. These aspects and others, however, seem more likely to differ between the parties as the result of the differences in other party variables.

Differences

The differing electoral positions of the CDU and SPD are perhaps of primary importance in explaining party policy-process differences. Until the mid-1960's, the CDU appeared locked into the government position. Since policy positions in the CDU thus carried the weight of potential governmental action, one would expect the actual public office-holders in the executive and Bundestag to hold the dominant influence in party policy-making. Policy

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97 Both in terms of voting percentages and the unwillingness of the FDP to perform a swing role and conclude a coalition with either major party.
changes would be directed more towards the adjustment of internal claims than increased attractiveness to unneeded new voters. Conversely, as a result of the SPD's continuing opposition role, the external party organization might seek a greater role in policy-making, producing conflicts between it and the parliamentary leaders, particularly with regard to policy change in the direction of modifying differences between the two parties and thus attracting more votes. If these hypotheses are correct, the changes in electoral fortunes in the 1960's, resulting in SPD participation in the Grand Coalition, should result in increased parliamentary party dominance in the SPD process.

Again, Duverger suggests that the socio-economic status of members will directly affect the party policy-process. According to his categories, the CDU as a middle-class party should exhibit much more dominance by public office-holders in policy determination than the working-class SPD. Studies which indicate that the two West German parties are becoming less class-distinctive, i.e., that the socio-economic range is increasing in the SPD, should make it possible to determine whether this trend (if it exists) has been accompanied by an increase in the office-holders' role in policy-making.

As far as the impact of party doctrine is concerned, it is possible that the much stronger tradition of an
external membership organization in the SPD will strengthen the role of its bureaucracy in the process as compared with the CDU.

Finally, the differences in the organizational dimensions discussed above are obviously related to the nature of the policy process in the CDU and SPD. If, as we expect, nominations are less centralized in the CDU than the SPD, this is likely to make voting discipline more difficult in the CDU. The expected greater degree of factionalism in the CDU might also have some effect on its policy process. Initiative and decisions may take place at lower levels than in the SPD, the national party organization serving only as an arena for compromise. In turn, this might produce a particular kind of leadership response; the national chairman acting passively as a broker between competing groups.

The framework briefly outlined above is stated in very general terms. The suggestions of possible relationships between variables summarized from the literature do not constitute a theory of party organization, nor are causal relationships necessarily implied. The data for an explicit theory is not readily available nor are the relationships easily quantifiable in all aspects. Besides, our study is concerned only with the investigation of these possible relationships in the West German case. We hope
that, by comparing these two parties, some of these propositions may be clarified, altered, or rejected. This is a necessary prerequisite for more detailed research on parties, both in Germany, and in the comparison of other parties, within countries and cross-nationally.

There are some aspects of the West German party system which make application of this framework to the German case especially interesting. For example, the West German Basic Law requires internal democracy in the political parties, and this provision was implemented by Federal statute in 1967. Thus, the legal system gives sanction to a certain type of organization and increases the possibility of constitutional-electoral arrangements having an important impact on both party organizations. In addition, the decline of ideology literature frequently treats the West German SPD as a prime example supporting the argument. Why this is the case, how the relatively smooth changes in the SPD program came about, and how leadership and competitive position operated to affect the apparent relationship between declining socio-economic differences and de-ideologization are questions which can perhaps also be more closely examined in our analysis of the party policy-process.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND PARTY VARIABLES

Before we turn directly to the West German parties and the organizational dimensions outlined in the framework, a brief description of the political environment in which the parties operate and a survey of the independent system and party-related characteristics is necessary.

West German Political Culture

In discussing German traditions and conceptions of authority and conflict, several authors emphasize a cluster of attitudes which include respect for authority as embodied in the State, the desire to avoid conflict, and a reliance on objective "expertise" to depoliticize issues.¹ Dahrendorf traces this attitude towards conflict to Hegelian notions concerning civil society and the state. The world of conflicting interests represented by civil society is

aufgehoben, i.e., finds its synthesis in the state which becomes the ultimate impartial authority. Thus, the retreat to private pursuits and disinterest in the political which Dahrendorf finds characteristic of the political culture is the other side of this same basic attitude; if some have certain knowledge, the rest can resign and renounce any claims to participation. More concrete political manifestations of these attitudes include: (1) dislike for the conflict inherent in the multiparty system and the search for unity through such devices as the Grand Coalition; (2) a preference for appointment over voting as a more efficient and practical procedure; and (3) compartmentalization and functional specialization to restrict participation in politics. These attitudes are widespread and apply to political activists in both parties as well as to the general population.

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2 Dahrendorf, "Conflict and Liberty," op. cit., pp. 204-10.

In another, but similar formulation of the characteristic manifestations of this effort to avoid politics, i.e., conflict, Spiro suggests that there are four preferred courses of action which illustrate this syndrome: institutional engineering, legalism, ideologism, and intellectual elitism. "Legislation can reduce political issues by anticipating disputes and prescribing settlements for them. Provision for further adjudication can accomplish the same on the assumption that the machinery of justice operates independently of politics." The third method—finding a new ideology which bridges old opposing ones in order to obscure conflicts—reflects a German conviction that political commitments must be based on a set of principles from which a comprehensive system of knowledge can be built and capable of solving all problems. The fourth method—"faith in depoliticizing effects of education"—is founded on the assumption that correct solutions to most issues can be found, given general and complete knowledge." These strategies for conflict avoidance were common to both parties in the controversy over mitbestimmung (codetermination) studied

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5Ibid., p. 8. 6Ibid., pp. 6-12.
The now classic study by Almond and Verba provides a differently phrased but similar overview of West German political culture based on survey research. The German political culture is characterized as one of "political detachment and subject competence." Despite a fairly high degree of cognitive information, there was a low level of attachment or pride in the political system. Participation in organized activities, including politics, was viewed in a passive form. Among both CDU and SPD supporters the common response to possible party membership was negative.

The data obtained in public opinion polls also support these generalizations on political attitudes and provide additional information on the status of a political career. In periodic polls from 1952 through 1965, the percentage of those interested in politics rose only slightly, while unwillingness to join a party remained at the same high level—85 per cent of population, and the number actually attending party activities declined by a few

7Ibid., passim.


9Ibid., pp. 68, 103. The attitudes mentioned did not vary significantly by class or education, pp. 68, 110, 134, 322. Since the most important distinction between party members is class, we may assume that these attitudes cut across party lines as well.
percentage points. Those believing that a parliamentary career requires great ability increased only slightly to approximately half the population, with a somewhat larger percentage of CDU supporters giving this response (63 per cent - CDU supporters, 50 per cent - SPD supporters).10 Other studies confirm that a Bundestag career is only moderately attractive in terms of status and other more material rewards.11

The Constitutional-Electoral System

When the Bundesrepublik Deutschland was founded after the war, federalism along traditional German lines was one of the features of the new constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz). In contrast to the more familiar American federalism, German federalism traditionally involved a division between policy-making and execution. Policy, with the exception of a few cultural areas, was made at the national level and administration left to the states.12

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Although the eleven western zone Länder (states) after the war were mostly artificial creations of the Allies, the German Parliamentary Council which wrote the Basic Law set up a federal system; the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and Federal Council (Bundesrat) at the national level have exclusive jurisdiction in most major policy areas and concurrent jurisdiction with the state governments in others. The Bundesrat, composed of delegations from the Länder governments, does have a veto in some important areas—particularly those of finance and tax legislation, and as a result, the composition of state governments is considered important by the parties in attempts to gain influence at the national level. Since the state governments also have a wide range of discretion in the administration of federal legislation and policy-making powers in the increasingly important areas of culture and education, they cannot be viewed simply as adjuncts of the national government. In addition, since federal and state elections are held at different times, party competition can develop at the state as distinct from the national level.

For a detailed study of the Bundesrat and its role, see ibid., passim.

A description of the organization of national, state and local governments can be found in Roger H. Wells, The States in West German Federalism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961), especially pp. 72-79. Peter Merkl, "Executive-Legislative Federalism in West Germany," American
The Länder are not homogeneous in terms of size and socio-economic characteristics, and while only a few, such as Bavaria and the Hanseatic city-states, have any historical continuity, their diversity in wealth and population produces different regional interests. Thus, the German system creates alternative political positions with some influence and interests different from the national level.

The Basic Law also explicitly recognizes the role of parties in the system and provides certain standards for their organization. Article 21 and less directly Article 38 deal with parties: Article 21 defines the parties' role as cooperation in forming the political will of the people — "Die Parteien wirken bei der politischen Willensbildung des Volkes mit"— and requires that their internal organization correspond to basic democratic principles; Article 38

Political Science Review, LIII (September, 1959), 732-41, discusses functional federalism and concludes that such a division of powers falls within the accepted concepts of federalism. For a contrasting view of the declining importance of federalism and its lack of influence on the party system, see Lewis Edinger, "Political Change in Germany: The Federal Republic After the 1969 Election," Comparative Politics, II (July, 1970), 571-72. The author argues that there is no traditional cultural support for the state divisions and that the institutional framework alone cannot have a significant impact on the parties—a question we shall consider in our analysis.

For figures on the size and socio-economic characteristics of Länder populations, see Wells, op. cit., pp. 15-23, 108.
defines the role of the m.p. as a representative of the entire people, free from party discipline and bound only by conscience. As interpreted by constitutional authorities, the legal definition of party includes the following elements: continuity of organization based on democratic principles, the presentation of candidates for public office, and a specific program. Interpretations of this section of the Constitution abound, and in 1967, a Federal Party Law was passed to regulate party organization. It generally reaffirmed the existing formal organizational structure and processes of the parties.

The West German electoral system is a unique mixture of proportional representation and single-member districts.

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17 A good example of the interpretive literature is Ute Müller, Die Demokratische Willensbildung in den politischen Parteien (Mainz: v. Hase and Koehler Verlag, 1967). The author applies democratic criteria such as equality and popular sovereignty to the party organizations and suggests needed reforms. Excerpts of the Party Law can be found in Flechtheim, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 134-38.
With the exception of the first election in 1949, an electoral law has been repassed in essentially the same form (with the exception of progressively stricter requirements for minority parties) for each election through 1969. The West German voter casts two ballots, one for a Wahlkreis (election district) candidate, and one for a Land party list. A party's number of seats from each Land is assigned on the basis of its percentage of the second vote, and additional seats are added to the Bundestag for those parties whose Wahlkreis m.p.'s exceed the number allotted by the proportional formula, thus giving some advantage to the party with a stronger first vote position in the constituencies.\(^{18}\)

The electoral law also regulates the parties with regard to the nomination of Bundestag candidates. Wahlkreis candidates (one-half of the Bundestag) must be nominated on a secret ballot at a convention of party members or delegates within each district. If the state party executive objects, the nomination must be reconfirmed by the district convention. Land list candidates must be nominated on a secret ballot by a statewide party delegate convention.\(^ {19} \)

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Tables 1 and 2 present the results of Bundestag elections in the period of this study. From 1953 to 1957, there was little change in the SPD's competitive position with only a slight increase in its percentage of the votes. CDU gains, on the other hand, were the result of its continued success in gathering in the votes of smaller parties to the right, a trend begun in 1953. The period through 1957 can be characterized as a lopsided process of reduction in the number of parties through a concentration on the right of the political spectrum. The historic victory of the CDU in 1957 was due to this long-term process plus the short-term extraordinary popularity of Adenauer, both factors fated to decline in significance as Adenauer aged, throwing the CDU into a crisis over his successor, and as the smaller right parties were absorbed.

Studies of the 1961 election suggest that it marked a turning point in the development of the party system and in competitive trends. The results indicated a weakening of traditional class and ideologically bound voting patterns, and a higher degree of pragmatism on the part of voters with

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20 For an analysis of the 1957 results, see Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 279-80; and Heino Kaack, Die Parteien in der Verfassungswirklichkeit der Bundesrepublik (Schleswig-Holstein, 1963), p. 63.
### TABLE 1

**NATIONAL VOTING RESULTS, 1953-1969**

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*minus non-voting m.p.'s from Berlin.*

**Source:** Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1965, 1969, 1970 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag).
TABLE 2
BUNDESTAG VOTE RESULTS, BY LÄNDER

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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1965, 1969, 1970 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag).
regard to party choice. This opened the way to a more competitive two-party system with at least the potential for alteration in the national government.\textsuperscript{21} The 1965 election produced further increases in these trends, with the SPD picking up votes in former CDU strongholds and vice-versa. A post-election analysis of results in the largest Land—Nordrhein-Westfalen—found that a decline in party identification and a decrease in the psychological distance of voters in the two parties produced the SPD increases. The SPD gains among Catholic workers were linked to a changed image of the party, its reconciliation with the churches, and to an increased secularization of society which made the CDU appeals to "Christian" politics less salient. Increased urbanization was also an important factor in the growth of SPD votes in former rural CDU strongholds. As traditional class lines changed into more complex socio-economic divisions, the two parties' socio-economic voter characteristics were growing somewhat more similar. SPD percentage increases, for example, were due in large part to increases in the vote of white-collar

Finally, the 1969 election pattern which allowed the SPD to form a government for the first time (with the help of FDP) was a reflection of large increases in trends essentially begun in 1961 and 1965. The SPD continued its inroads into CDU strength in the rural areas and among the Catholic urban population—particularly among Catholic workers in the Ruhr area. The CDU/CSU was able to make a relatively good showing only because it profited from FDP losses. The year 1969 also brought a considerable increase in voters switching directly from the CDU/CSU to the SPD. The SPD also increased its vote percentages among women in the younger age groups, formerly solidly CDU, and among youth and first voters in general.  


23 In Hans D. Klingemann and Franz U. Pappi, "The 1969 Bundestag Election in the Federal Republic of Germany," Comparative Politics, II (July, 1970), 527-32, the authors examine four constituency types and conclude that Catholic urban and Protestant rural areas produced the major SPD gains. Survey data on voting preferences also indicated an increased tendency to shift from the CDU to the SPD instead of the FDP—the more common previous pattern. The authors also suggest, pp. 540-52, that two events produced these shifts in voting patterns; the participation of the SPD in the "Grand Coalition" with the CDU/CSU, and the election of the SPD's candidate as Federal President. For an analysis of regional and socio-economic trends in 1969, see Beger,
Most analyses of trends in the competitive situation and party system in the Federal Republic agree that socio-economic changes in the population and SPD reform have gradually moved the system to something close to two-party competition. By 1969, the two major parties received approximately 90 per cent of the votes cast. The likelihood of voters switching between the two parties, particularly from the CDU to the SPD, has also consistently increased as SPD internal reform and participation in the Grand Coalition changed its image from that of a traditional "socialist" opposition to a reformist party equally capable of governing (regierungsfähig). The strong constitutional position of the Chancellor plus Adenauer's use of the office combined with his position as party leader also strengthened the tendency to make federal elections into a


choice between the two parties' chancellor-candidates.26

An assessment of the competitive positions of the two major parties is complicated by the existence of a federal system. The SPD’s competitive position at the Land level—its percentage of votes in Landtag elections and control of Länder governments—has always been better than its position in Bundestag elections. Although changes have finally taken place in the national electorate’s image of the SPD, throughout much of the period studied, voters tended to have a different image of the SPD on the Land and national levels, thus producing consistently better showings for the SPD in Land elections. Some authors have suggested that this is due to the salience of foreign policy at the national level. For much of this period, the CDU position was more in agreement with post-war voters’ desires for stability. Turnout has also been a factor in Land/Federal electoral differences. While SPD voting percentages have been similar in Land and national elections, a number of CDU/CSU voters apparently are apathetic with regard to state political contests.27 Land governments have had more alteration in power, and the SPD’s consistent control of at


27Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 296-300; and Lowell W. Culber, "Land Elections in West German Politics," The Western Political Quarterly, XIX (June, 1966), 312.
least some Land governments has mitigated the national dominance of the CDU and given the SPD leadership governmental experience. Shut out of power at the national level until 1966, federalism became valuable to the SPD, although the party originally was a strong supporter of centralism.28

A 1967 study of party competition by Länder in federal and state elections from 1945 through 1965 measures precisely the competitive situation in each Land during that period. The author uses five categories of competitiveness: (1) competitive, (2) cyclically competitive, (3) one-party cyclical, (4) one-party predominant, and (5) one-party states, based on two dimensions: division in party control over a period of time and the rapidity of alteration in office. An analysis of Bundestag elections by state, using these categories shows all but two Länder as one-party states, i.e., the minority party never won an election. Thus, the CDU/CSU has completely dominated Schleswig-Holstein, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, and the Saar in all Bundestag elections, while the SPD has won all federal elections in Hamburg and Bremen. The other two Länder—Hessen and Niedersachsen—are both one-party dominated, the CDU in

Niedersachsen, the SPD in Hessen.  

In Länder elections most states also fall in the fifth category—one-party states. Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Württemburg, and Saar are all CDU; Bremen, Hessen, and Niedersachsen are SPD. Bayern and Hamburg become one-party predominant for the CSU and the SPD, respectively, while only Schleswig-Holstein appears to be cyclically competitive. At the Land level, SPD fortunes have more nearly equalled those of the CDU. It has dominated or been predominant in four states, the CDU in five, with one Land alternating between the two parties, whereas in national elections the division is seven Länder predominantly CDU, three predominantly SPD.

Socio-economic Characteristics and Party Differences

An early study of social stratification in West Germany in the 1950's found occupational divisions very similar to the pre-1939 structure. Despite increases in

29Forest L. Grieses, "Inter-Party Competition in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1965: A Methodological Inquiry," The Western Political Quarterly, XX (December, 1967), 914-916. The 1969 election produced one shift. NRW moved into the one-party dominant category as the SPD gained a higher percentage of votes there for the first time.

30For statistics on Länder election results through 1967, see Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1968, 1970 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag).
urbanization and the size of the white-collar category, industrial workers remained the largest population segment. Inter-generational social mobility was highly dependent on education, access to which was extremely limited. Results of a survey question on subjective class identification indicated the overwhelming majority of the population divided evenly between middle-class (41.2 per cent) and working-class (48.5 per cent). These results do not suggest the emergence of a middle-class consensus society, but rather traditional class cleavages.31

A 1959 study reconfirmed the existence of substantial gaps in income between the manual/nonmanual strata, and the retention of class distinctions with no significant popular perception of trends towards blurring class lines. Challenging the notion of increased similarity in income and style of life in modern "middle-class society," the author's analysis of consumption patterns indicated just the reverse. From 1953 to 1959, increased differences in consumption trends and life-styles appeared between the middle-class and workers.32


Using more recent figures, Dahrendorf, in his survey of German society, constructs his own stratification model. While he accepts the validity of arguments about the leveling of income gaps, he criticizes those who suggest there are no longer important socio-class divisions in West Germany. The flattening of the income pyramid is misleading, as higher education remains a monopoly of a small percentage of the population, thus limiting mobility and creating barriers to it. "It divides an Above from a Below—namely, approximately the upper third of the edifice of stratification [the elite, service, and old middle-class] from the lower two-thirds [working elite, false middle-class, working, and lower]. . . ."  

Dahrendorf is strongly critical of the popular "leveled middle-class society" thesis and suggests that its popularity is attributable to the "striking German aversion

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34 Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, op. cit., p. 109. For a diagram of his stratification model and description, see pp. 92-102.
to recognizing existing inequalities."³⁵ Dahrendorf argues that rather than evidencing increasing social mobility, Germany is a society in which only one of ten working-class children has the opportunity to move upward. He suggests that this theory is itself a useful ideology for the service class---". . . behind the screen of this ideology the elites can conduct their business undisturbed by awkward questions and worries---a business that may often be harmless enough, but always also serves the preservation of their own power position and thereby the cementing of the status-quo."³⁶ Regardless of the final judgement on this argument over the nature of German society which concerns attitudes much more than objective demographic divisions, those divisions are linked through the membership and voter characteristics to the nature of the German parties.

Throughout the 1950's, surveys of voting behavior and its relationship to demographic characteristics, as well as research on party preference, indicated fairly

³⁵Ibid., p. 121.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 121-24. The following is representative of the view Dahrendorf is arguing against: ". . . result of pervasive and comprehensive upward and downward mobility is levelled middle-class society. . . . the social leveling into a relatively uniform social stratum, which is neither proletarian nor bourgeois, that is, which is characterized by the disappearance of class tension and social hierarchy."; quoted on p. 122.
stable party divisions on various demographic variables. Party supporters varied on sex, age, and religion. The SPD was strongest among men, under 30's, weakest among those over 60; the CDU strongest among women, over 60's, and weakest among those 30-59. Despite CDU efforts to overcome religious divisions, almost two times as many CDU supporters were Catholic, while SPD support was approximately split between Catholics and Protestants. As for distribution of party support along occupational lines, in the 1950's over two-thirds of the SPD's supporters were workers and farm laborers, the other third white-collar employees and civil servants. CDU supporters, on the other hand, were more evenly spread across occupations, largely paralleling the population with the exception of a larger percentage of farmers, and a slightly lower percentage of workers.37

An extensive study of party supporters in 1961 differentiates between two groups within each party: those historically tied to the party through class ideology or religious loyalty—an intensive, status-related

identification; and those who were attracted to a party in the post-war period because of particular leaders or policies—a more pragmatic identification. Comparing the relationship between social structure, attitudes and party identification in the United States and West Germany, the authors conclude that: (1) the socio-economic characteristics of party supporters are more distinctive in Germany; (2) agreement between party preference and voting is less than in the United States; (3) German party supporters perceive more programmatic differences between the parties than in the United States; and (4) like the United States, a large range of differing political viewpoints exists within each party's supporters. There is a decline in the first group of supporters and an increase in support based on the pragmatic evaluation of events, although the number of independent voters remains quite large, perhaps a product of the Nazi past and the newness of the Republic. 38

During the 1960's, a number of studies indicated certain trends in the social composition of party preference. There appeared to be little change in the relationship between sex, age, and religion, although in the 1969 election, the SPD had some successes in attracting support from younger women and youth. Most commentators have agreed that

38 Wildenmann and Scheuch, op. cit., pp. 144-60, 164-66.
religion is also declining as a factor of importance in voting behavior, if not party preference.\textsuperscript{39} In terms of occupational characteristics, a number of changes have occurred in the period 1961 to 1969. White-collar support for the SPD rose from 22 per cent in 1961 to 45 per cent in 1969 and there was also a less dramatic, but significant increase among civil servants' support for the SPD, which rose from 28 per cent to 38 per cent in 1969. The CDU/CSU, on the other hand, has lost support almost across the board, but specifically most among farmers, whose support fell from 73 per cent in 1965 to 58 per cent in 1969. Thus, although labor continues to be the largest group among SPD supporters, its predominance is no longer as marked, and the white-collar employees' ratio has increased beyond its increase in the population. CDU/CSU trends are less clear: the farmers' proportion among supporters has dropped sharply, the white-collar percentage has declined slightly, the self-employed have remained approximately constant despite a declining population ratio, and the proportion of skilled workers has increased since 1961.\textsuperscript{40} Religion and union affiliation, however, remain important in

\textsuperscript{39}Wildenmann, Unkelbach and Kaltefleiter, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 24-36; Kirchheimer, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 426-32; and Edinger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 564-65.

\textsuperscript{40}Klingemann and Pippi, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 533-35.
differentiating party support.\(^4^1\)

Shifting from supporters to party members, the differences are much stronger within this small percentage of the population (approximately 3 per cent). The member/voter ratio throughout the period has been approximately 3 of every 100 for the CDU, and 9 of every 100 for the SPD, which reflects both the mass-party tradition of the SPD as well as its divergence from reality. About 75 per cent of the supporters of both parties have been unwilling to become members.\(^4^2\) Accurate, up-to-date statistics on the characteristics of party members are not published by either the CDU or the SPD and Table 3 is based on estimates from various sources, plus a random sample of members for 1969.\(^4^3\)

\(^4^1\)Morris Janowitz and David Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the U.S.," American Journal of Sociology, LXXII (May, 1967), 612-16. SPD support ranges from 72 per cent of the working class, union-member, non-practicing Catholic group to 18 per cent of the middle-class, non-union, Catholic group.


### TABLE 3

PARTY MEMBERS, BY OCCUPATION

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<tr>
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<th>1955</th>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU%</td>
<td>SPD%</td>
<td>CDU%</td>
<td>SPD%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>(Angestellte)</td>
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<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>(Beamte &amp; Angestelle in öffentlichen Dienst)</td>
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<td>Professionals</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
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</table>

*Housewives classified according to occupation of bread-winner.

Table 3 illustrates the extent to which party membership as distinct from preference and voting continues to be very strongly class-based. Despite the considerable increase in white-collar employees among SPD members, workers are still the largest group in the party, whereas up 60 per cent of the population. It is assumed that the large percentage of retired in the SPD are about evenly distributed among workers and white-collar employee.
the CDU proportion from the working class continues to be small. White-collar employees form the next largest group in the SPD as well as the largest group in the CDU. In general, more CDU members tend to come from the more prestigious upper-half of the social ladder, while the SPD is a party of the working and lower middle classes.

Table 4, which presents information on educational and income differences for the 1969 sample, reinforces

**TABLE 4**

1969 PARTY MEMBERS, BY EDUCATION AND INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>CDU%</th>
<th>SPD%</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>CDU%</th>
<th>SPD%</th>
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<td>Elementary school only</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Up to DM 400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elementary school &amp; basic occup. training</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>401-600</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Middle school</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>601-800</td>
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<td>Higher (Abitur)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>801-1000</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1001-1200</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1201-1400</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1401-1800</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801+</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

this distinction between CDU and SPD members. In addition, there are significant differences in affiliations with organized groups and in religion between the two parties' members. Thirty-seven per cent of SPD members are affiliated with unions, 12 per cent of the CDU. On the other hand, 18 per cent of CDU members have ties to other economic interest groups (predominately business associations), while only 7 per cent of SPD members have such ties. The CDU also remains a predominately Catholic party in its membership: 67 per cent Catholic, 33 per cent Protestant, and the SPD predominately Protestant: 69 per cent, with 18 per cent Catholic and 14 per cent without church membership.

Party Doctrine and Organization

The characteristics of German party organization in the Weimar period included large mass memberships, the development of party bureaucracies, and increasing power for the national party organization vis-a-vis the parliamentary

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44 Diederich, op. cit., p. 15. A recent study indicates the continuing importance of union membership as a step to party membership in the SPD. In the CDU, religious youth groups are the most frequent step prior to joining the party, Merkl, "Party Members and Society: West Germany and Italy" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1970), p. 11.
parties. These features were common to all parties, including the center party which may be considered an antecedent of the CDU, although because of Michels' study, the most well-known example is the SPD. During this era, the SPD was controlled by a national executive in which the bureaucracy had a majority, and the entire party was dominated by those full-time officials who numbered in the ten thousands.

Although there were obvious new influences on party formation after the war—the Nazi experience, chaotic social conditions, occupational authorities—ties to the pre-Nazi era were not completely broken. The initial, and, as it turned out, most important parties to be licensed—the SPD and the CDU—in spite of many modifications exhibited a number of similarities to the parties of the Weimer era. This, of course, was most obviously true of the SPD which, with the exception of the German Communist Party, was the only party with a direct line of continuity

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45Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 20-21. Chapter II reviews the development of German parliament and party tradition.

46Michels is still the best description of this organization. For a briefer description, see David Childs, From Schumacher to Brandt (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966), pp. 4-12.

to the previous party system.

Despite its trials during the Nazi era, the SPD re-built after the war with amazing rapidity. Its membership was equivalent to 1932 by 1946—a tribute both to the viability of the original structure built up during Weimar as well as to the energy and effectiveness of Kurt Schumacher, who became the post-war leader. The Buro Schumacher in Hannover quickly became recognized as a functional national executive and with the lifting of some occupation restrictions in 1946, was formally organized as such at the first national convention. This party congress re-established virtually intact the pre-1933 organizational structure of the party, including its auxiliary organizations. Traditionally, the party has placed high value on its democratic norms—both internally and in its relations to other groups in the political system. The party self-image is of a community dedicated to the workers' movement. The trust and participation of members is given high priority in party doctrine, and the leadership is seen as the expression of the members' will. In organizational terms, the democratic norms are often transformed into an insistence on formalized and bureaucratic characteristics. Despite

leadership efforts to broaden the internal and external 
image of the party's membership base from a worker's party 
to a Volkspartei in the 1960's, the party activists still 
view the SPD as a political community (Gesinnungsgemein-
schaft).\textsuperscript{49}

The CDU pattern of establishment and its self-image 
are quite different. Growing out of a number of local 
groups with ties to Catholic and other parties to the 
right of the SPD in Weimar, the establishment of a national 
organization in the CDU was a slow process. A zonal group 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft) founded in 1947, and then later the 
Land conference executive with Adenauer as chairman re-
mained representative bodies with few functions and little 
effective authority. The first national party convention 
was not even held until 1950, after the first elections in 
the Federal Republic. At this convention, a national or-
ganizational structure was established, although it was 
not until 1952 that a real central organizational head-
quartes was set up with an administrative officer (Federal 
Agent). The formal organization has remained to some ex-
tent a confederation of local and Land parties, and is 
still rudimental in some regions with activity only at

\textsuperscript{49}Wolf-Dieter Narr, CDU-SPD: Programm und Praxis 
seit 1945 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1966), pp. 
216-27; Zeuner, op. cit., p. 86; and Flechtheim, Vol. V, 
op. cit., pp. 105-07.
election times.\textsuperscript{50} Both the "C" and the "U" have been sources of some internal disagreement over the party's self image. While the original choice of union over party reflected both dissatisfaction with parties in Weimar, and an effort to bridge the antagonisms between the two religious denominations, it has come to mean a coalition of all those groups and classes to the right of the SPD. Party doctrine legitimizes the claims of various internal groups who are united only by a commitment to Christian responsibility and the common good. Consistent with its origins, CDU party doctrine also stresses the federalist character of the organization. Membership participation has never been widely valued within the party, despite the exhortations of national leaders on the need to develop a mass membership party to compete with the SPD.\textsuperscript{51}

Both parties have organizational statutes, revised on occasion at party conventions, which outline the formal organizational structure of the parties. In each party, there are three basic levels of organization: the

\textsuperscript{50}The early period of CDU development and Adenauer's role is described in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, \textit{Adenauer and the CDU} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 97-201. Excerpts of the official party history can be found in Flechtheim, Vol. I, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 18-20.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 10-12, 64-65; Wildenmann, Unkelbach and Kaltefleiter, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 102-03; and Friedhelm Baukloh, "Soziale Koalition - Eine Alternative?" \textit{Frankfurter Hefte}, Vol. 17 (1962), 656.
Fig. 1.—The Parties' Organizational Structure

**SPD**

- Partei-Präsidium
- Kontroll-Kommission
- Partei-Vorstand
- Parteitag (300 delegates)
- 20 Bezirke
- UnterBez.
- Ortsvereine

**CDU**

- Bundesvorstand & Präsidium
- Vereinigung
- Bundesparteitag (574 delegates)
- 18 Landesverbände
- Kreisverbände
- Ortsverbände

national executive, convention, some bureaucracy, and auxiliary organizations; the regional or Land organizations with similar subdivisions; and local organizations. Membership in each party is a formal act, with fixed dues structure, and is a requirement for organizational participation.

The horizontal organization in the SPD consists of the Bundespartei and twenty regional party units (Bezirke), each of which may have some or all of the following subdivisions: Unterbezirke, Kreisvereine, Ortsvereine, Distrikt or Stadtbezirke. The SPD national organization is headed by the executive committee (Parteivorstand) whose members include the elected party officials: party chairman, two deputy chairmen, and treasurer, as well as a varying number of additional members—all elected at the national party conventions. A smaller group within the executive (PV)—the präsidium—is selected to conduct day-to-day business. The PV, according to the party statute, has responsibility for directing the party, conducting party business, and controlling the actions of all party organs. There are also two other national executive organs of the party whose functions appear to be more formal

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and less important in the actual leadership. These are the Parteirat (Council) (formerly Parteiausschuss) and the Kontrollkommission (KK). The Rat is composed of representatives of the Bezirke, as well as the party's public officials at the Land and federal level. It is supposed to meet four times yearly, to advise the executive on political and organizational questions, as well as election preparation, to coordinate Bund-Länder relations, and to serve as a watch-dog for the convention to see that its decisions are carried out. Its main actual function appears to be providing a formal structure for the exchange of views among regional and national leaders.\(^5^3\) The KK is essentially a nine-man accounting committee whose members are chosen by the tag from those not in other leadership groups. Though it had a powerful early history, it is now a formal group with no political functions.\(^5^4\)

The highest organization of the party, according to the statute, is the Bundesparteitag or national party convention which meets every two years. It is attended by the following: 300 delegates elected at the Bezirk conventions according to Bezirk membership size; members of the PV; and, without voting rights, Parteirat members,

\(^{53}\)1968 Statute, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 18-19.

\(^{54}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 20. See also Muller, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 21-24.
one-tenth of the parliamentary party, and speakers selected by the PV. Its formal duties include electing the PV and KK, hearing reports from the executive, the KK and the Bundestag fraction, voting on resolutions, and deciding on "all questions of party organization and those affecting party life."55

At the national level, the functionaries (paid professional party employees) include the Federal Manager (head of the national organization) and those working in departments (referente) in the national office. There are a number of advisory bodies attached to the PV which serve as essentially unpaid staff, in addition to the Fachausschusse, Beirats and Kommissions which provide advice on areas of policy. These units usually parallel the organization of the parliamentary party committees and the chairmen and members are frequently parliamentarians or members of the regional or national executives. Their efficiency and influence vary. Some parallel committees are often found at the regional level.56

Full-time paid professionals also include the Geschäftsführer (party secretaries) at the Bezirk and sometimes the Kreis level. These individuals, considered so


influential in Michels' era, are occupied with routine organizational tasks—dues collections, scheduling, and recruitment. Poorly paid, they no longer have high status and function to preserve the membership organization. Their numbers are relatively small. 57

Finally, the SPD has a number of auxiliary organizations. Some of these are organized nationally, while others function at the regional and local levels, although they may hold national conferences to exchange ideas and discuss policy issues. These organizations are not dues-collecting, or restricted in membership, although the officers generally must be party members. They are supposed to provide traditional "labor movement" functions—socialization, education, training—as well as recruitment for the party. Some also perform advisory functions for the national leadership on related policy issues. They include a number of groups of professionals sympathetic to the SPD, the women's organizations and communal-politicians groups, as well as the youth organizations of the party—the Jungsozialisten, the Falken, and the Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund (successor to an earlier student organization—the SDS). Because, according to party doctrine, the SPD

is a worker's movement, economic interest groups, including the unions, are not represented through any formal auxiliary organization.\textsuperscript{58}

The horizontal organization in the CDU consists of the Bundespartei, eighteen Landesverbände (two of which are paper organizations representing refugees) and their subdivisions, the Kreisverbände and Ortsverbände. Unlike the SPD whose basic organizational framework has been little changed from the pre-war era, the CDU national organizational structure has been complicated, changed, and readjusted frequently in shifting power plays by various groups within the party. Its functions have only recently been defined, somewhat unclearly. The national executive (Vorstand) has thirty members: the national elected party officials—the party chairman, five deputy chairmen, the treasurer, and General Secretary, plus a number of other non-specified members, all elected by the national convention. Also members by statute are the Chancellor and Bundestag President (if the CDU heads the government), the Chairman of the parliamentary party, and the Federal Manager (Bundesgeschäftsführer). According to the statute, the Vorstand leads the federal party and carries out decisions of the convention and of the party's federal council

\textsuperscript{58}Chalmers, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 170-83.
(Ausschuss). The Vorstand also selects the federal manager who is the professional administrator of the party's central office. Unlike the SPD, where a tradition of collegial leadership is stressed through the lack of specific duties for a national chairman, the CDU statute specifies certain responsibilities of the party chairman and general secretary (essentially an administrative assistant to the chairman) in conducting party business and coordinating organizational activities. 59

Membership in the CDU Präsidium is determined by the statute. The members are: the party chairman, general secretary, five deputies, the treasurer, the Chancellor, the Bundestag President, the fraction chairman, and the federal manager, all of whom are members of the Vorstand. This is obviously a more elite circle of leading figures in the CDU, and the statute gives it responsibility for carrying out Vorstand decisions, conducting day-to-day

59 Statut der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands, 1967; in CDU: Geschichte, Idee, Programm, Statut (Bonn: Bundesgeschäftsstelle der CDU, 1967), pp. 95-96. Changes in the statute, and the organization of the national executive since 1950 have reflected increasing centralization. It was not until 1960 that leading the party was included in the executive's duties; earlier statutes referred all important questions to the Ausschuss or Tag for approval. As its size has grown, the confederate aspects of the early organization, such as Länder officials' membership in the Vorstand, have been eliminated. Earlier statutes are reprinted in Flechtheim, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 203-78.
business, and keeping lower organizational levels advised on leadership decisions. The other national executive group in the CDU is the Bundesausschuss (Federal Committee), which has ninety members. At one time it had somewhat more influence than the corresponding Parteirat in the SPD, since it was clearly an organization of important regional leaders—the chairmen of Land parties and public officials with power to appoint non-elected members of the Vorstand. It is currently composed of delegates from Land party conventions, Vorstand members, the chairmen of CDU auxiliary organizations, and of special commissions of the Vorstand (with advisory vote only). The 1967 statute gives it responsibility for all political and organizational questions of the federal party not previously decided by the national convention. It reports to the Vorstand three times a year.

The CDU Parteitag meets every two years and is attended by approximately 574 delegates of the regional organizations. The exact number from each region is determined by a formula which gives representation according to both membership size and voting for the last federal

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601967 Statute, op. cit., pp. 95-96. In earlier statutes, this was called the managing Vorstand, and its membership was left up to the party chairman, Flechtheim, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 203, 210-11.

611967 Statute, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
election Land list, plus ninety-five delegates from the paper Landesverbände—the exile CDU and Oder-Niesse. The Tag "decides the basic principles (Grundlinien) of CDU policy, as well as the party program," it elects the national officers and other Vorstand members, hears and votes on reports of the Vorstand, and fraction, and decides financial questions. 62

Professional, paid party workers in the CDU include the Bundesgeschäftsführer, staff in the departments of the national office, and a smaller number of geschäftsführer at the regional and local levels with duties similar to those in the SPD. While each regional party has one full-time professional at least, there are a large number of Kreis without any paid employee. An understaffed bureaucracy has been a constant problem for the CDU and appeals from the general manager for recruitment of paid professionals for full-time party work are common. 63 As in the SPD, the CDU Vorstand has a number of special committees. Unlike the SPD, however, these are seldom composed of experts in various policy areas, but are usually made up of

62Ibid., pp. 93-94. Prior to 1960, the number of delegates from a given region was determined by voting rather than by membership figures. Until the late 1960's, the Vorstand was not elected by the Tag, but by the Ausschuss, Flechtheim, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 201-02, 209.

the representatives of various groups within the party who advise and lobby the Vorstand on behalf of the interests each group represents. Members are usually chosen from the members of parallel committees at the Land level.\textsuperscript{64}

There are five auxiliary organizations (Vereinigung) formally recognized by the CDU statute—the Junge Union, Frauenvereinigung, Sozialausschüsse, Kommunalpolitsche Vereinigung, and Mittelstands Vereinigung. These are open to non-members, but are much more closely tied to the party organization than in the SPD. Their structure parallels that of the party organization and the national chairmen belong to the party Bundesausschuss, and are elected by members "with advice of the party general secretary." These organizations are recognized in the party statute as a means to link the party to these groups in society as well as a voice of these interests within the party on questions of policy and personnel. Their activity at lower levels of the party varies.\textsuperscript{65} There are also three organizations recognized as associated with the CDU but considered non-party organizations and therefore not regulated by the party. These are the Evangelical Arbeitskreise, an

\textsuperscript{64}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 57. See also, Flechtheim, Vol. I, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 215.

\textsuperscript{65}1967 Statute, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97. See also, Wildenmann, Unkelbach, and Katterleiter, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.
organization of Protestant CDU members, the Wirtschaftsrat der CDU, representing CDU businessmen, and the Ring Christlich-Demokratischen Studenten (a student group similar to the SHB in the SPD). All three combine the functions of advisory and pressure groups on the party.66

The Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) does not consider itself and isn't considered as merely a Land organization of the CDU, but is recognized as an independent regional party. Within Bavaria, its organization is somewhat different from other CDU Landesverbände. It has a very well staffed central headquarters, a large membership, and a gradually decreasing dependence on other outside groups such as farmers and the church. In the 1960's, it developed a more complete Kreis organizational network with professional workers.67 The CSU does not participate in the national party organization described above. Its only ties with the CDU at the national level are a formal Arbeitsgemeinschaft (association) of the two parties, which has no structure or officers, and the more important formation of a unified parliamentary party in the Bundestag.68

661967 Statute, op. cit., p. 25.


The regional and local organizations in the SPD are the twenty Bezirke, the Unterbezirke, and the Ortsvereine. The Bezirke are recognized by statute as the basic unit of the party organization. They have a fairly standardized structure. Where (as in most cases) the Bezirke boundaries do not follow Land lines, the PV may approve the organization of a Land-level ausschuss for certain purposes—primarily nomination functions. Bezirke organizational units parallel the national level and include a Vorstand elected by the regional convention, a council or ausschuss which is usually a coordinating group composed of officials from the Bezirk and lower levels, and a regional convention concerned primarily with electing Bezirk officials and delegates to the national convention. The Bezirk convention may also be involved in list candidate selection or there may be a special Land convention for this purpose. The size of Bezirke staff and number of fachausschuss and branches of auxiliary organizations varies.69

The Unterbezirke are primarily administrative units found in large Bezirke for coordination between the Bezirk and the basic membership units or Ortsvereine of which there are eight to nine thousand in the SPD. The geographical distribution of Ortsvereine is uneven with more in

the cities and their membership size varies. This is the smallest party unit which participates in SPD internal processes. It may send resolutions to the Tag and has a Vorstand with a chairman, deputy and treasurer elected by a membership rather than delegate meeting. The pattern of meetings and attendance varies with the programs which include non-political, social activities as well as political discussions.70

Of the eighteen Landesverbände in the CDU, sixteen are actual regional organizations—eight of which follow Land lines. The Landesverbände are recognized by the party statute as independent for all political and organizational questions in their geographic area. Coordinating units regulated by the national party are set up where political boundaries overlap. Although their actions may not conflict with guidelines established by the national party, there is much more variation in their organization than in SPD Bezirke. All do, however, have the usual vorstand, tag, and ausschuss. Where the Landesverbände parallels the Land boundaries, the party organization officials are likely to be political leaders in the state. Unlike the SPD, CDU Land executives vary

greatly in membership. Most are a mixture of ex-officio members—Land and Bundestag m.p.'s, and auxiliary organization leaders—and members elected by a Land convention of delegates from the Kreis level. The Land ausschuss as in the SPD serves as a coordinating group for officials from different levels in the region.71

The four hundred Kreisverbände are the smallest independent organizational units in the CDU. Like the Land organizations, they have their own statute and are responsible for organization and political questions in their geographic area. Most have a vorstand composed of ex-officio and elected members from the local units, as well as a delegate convention. In some areas, the Kreisverbände are active organizations; however, most are understaffed associations of officials whose primary activity is at the local level. The local organizations or Orstvereine (approximately 6000) are much more poorly organized than in the SPD and are frequently little more than small groups of local notables.72

71 CDU 1967 Statute, op. cit., p. 91; Muller, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
72 1967 Statute, op. cit., p. 91; and Lohmar, op. cit., p. 38. For a detailed study of one Kreisverband and a number of Ortsgruppe in the Berlin CDU, see Renate Mayntz, Parteiorganisation in der Grossstadt (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959).
Finally, party financial arrangements are quite different in the CDU and the SPD. The SPD publishes a yearly financial report which gives a fairly accurate indication of the sources of its income. The main source is the monthly dues which are paid by members at the Orstvereine level and sent to the Bezirke which, in turn, send 15 per cent to the national organization. In addition to this regular source which accounts for approximately two-thirds of the party's income, the SPD levies special assessments on members which raise approximately another 15 per cent. The rest of the party income comes mainly from contributions, a levy on m.p. salaries, plus a small income from the party's enterprises such as publishing. Unlike the SPD, finances are a topic difficult to uncover information about in the CDU. Party income is not considered a matter of public record. Studies which have been done indicate that membership dues do not provide more than one-fifth of the revenue needed by the party organization—the dues remain with the local and Kreis headquarters. Another two-fifths of the revenue raised by the party comes from m.p. salary levies, private contributions, and the party's publishing activities. The remainder is contributed by

sponsors' associations which were formed by various trade and industry groups to channel business money for political purposes.\(^7^4\) Thus, despite its commitment to a federal principle in organization, the CDU is unable to raise enough through dues to support the party and must rely on outside sources channeled from the top down.

CHAPTER III

CANDIDATE SELECTION

This chapter will consider the process of nomination of candidates to the Bundestag in the CDU and the SPD. Schattschneider suggests that: "The nomination process has become the crucial process of the party. The nature of the nomination procedure determines the nature of the party. . . . This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party." ¹ Whether or not nominations are the most important party function, they do distinguish parties from other political groups within West German society.² We are interested in the following questions about the selection processes in each party: Which party units at what level influence the nomination and renomination of candidates for the Bundestag; what role do groups external to the party play in the process; what criteria are used by those in control in


selecting candidates; and what are the characteristics of m.p.'s in each party? Due to the mixed character of the West German electoral system, we will also consider whether the answers to the questions differ according to the different types of nominations—Wahlkreis (WK) and Land List. Finally, we will consider which attributes of the political system and the parties themselves may account for the similarities and differences between the CDU and the SPD in candidate selection.

While the party nomination process is not considered "secret," the public attention to these processes is not very high either, presenting obvious problems to research in this area. The following discussion is based on journalistic accounts in each election year, three case studies of nominations in specific Länder, and one general study for 1965.

Both parties have basic internal regulations on

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3Ranney found a similar problem in his study of British party nominations, Pathways to Parliament (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), p. 4

candidate selection. The CDU statute does not mention Bundestag nominations as a specific function of its Land- and Kreisverbände. The section outlining the powers of the national executive gives the Vorstand authority to participate in the nomination process and to raise objections, along with the regional executives, to the candidates nominated by the delegate conventions. This placement in the party statute seems to reflect debate over the proper locus of the process, and the national leaders' dissatisfaction with their current lack of influence. In 1964, at the national Tag, Adenauer proposed a national list to insure the nomination of qualified m.p.'s, a suggestion not greeted with any enthusiasm by the regional party leaders.

The SPD has somewhat different regulations on the procedures of selection. It states that constituency nominations are to be made by the appropriate local organization in consultation with the Bezirk Vorstand and PV, respectively, and that Land list nominations are to be made by the Bezirk with PV consultation. The statute thus clearly gives both the national and lower organizations a role in the process. As in the CDU, an explicit procedure


for coordination is not spelled out.  

**CDU Nominations in the Wahlkreis**

An early study of nominations in the CDU and the SPD strongly criticized the extensive influence of national party leaders who used the nominations to satisfy the needs of the parliamentary parties, despite the federal structure of the system. However, studies since then, and especially after the passage of legal regulations in 1956, indicate that the lines of control in the CDU district nomination process are considerably different.

Formally, the CDU candidates are nominated at the WK conventions of delegates—the average number of delegates in 1965 was fifty-three—selected by the membership. The delegates are usually party activists and officials from the Orts and Kreis levels. In many cases where there is more than one Kreisverband in the district, each Kreis may

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8 This somewhat subjective analysis can be found in Rudolf Wildenmann, *Partei und Fraction* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1955), pp. 133-46. For a later analysis, see Heino Kaack, *Die Parteien in der Verfassungswirklichkeit der Bundesrepublik* (Schleswig-Holstein, 1963).
hold a delegate convention prior to the WK convention.\textsuperscript{9} The actual process may be divided into two types, according to whether only one individual or at least two are considered for the nomination.

Competitive or safe WK where only one individual is considered are almost always those with an incumbent m.p. who is not challenged for renomination, either because of satisfaction with his performance or because the opposition cannot find a viable alternative. It is thus difficult to determine the influence of various groups in such cases, but since most of the districts have had a contest at some time in the past, they will be covered in the discussion of contested nominations below.\textsuperscript{10} In hopeless districts the lack of more than one contender is much more common. This is primarily due to the difficulty in finding individuals willing to wage a campaign with no hope of an election victory. Often the individual nominated has run previously or is also an incumbent m.p. elected on the list who has

\textsuperscript{9}In 1965 there were only three districts in which CDU members nominated the candidate directly, Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 45-48.

\textsuperscript{10}Examples of such unanimity in WK on nominations are by no means rare, see Varain, op. cit., pp. 150-55; and Zeuner, op. cit., p. 24. In general, safe districts are defined as those with a winning margin of ten per cent or better, hopeless those lost by ten per cent or more, and competitive those in-between.
served as a substitute WK representative.\textsuperscript{11}

Contests over a district nomination may be resolved prior to the actual convention in which case other contenders withdraw or there may be a vote at the convention itself. It appears that whether the decision is made prior to or at the convention, similar groups are involved in the process, although their influence may vary somewhat. The Kreis executives within a WK will usually have a number of meetings to discuss the nomination, beginning as much as eighteen months before the election. At these meetings the executive members hear the claims of external groups interested in the nomination, the views of higher party units, and those of other Kreise in the WK. All of these groups may support their own man. The various Kreise in the district frequently attempt to bargain over support for their Bundestag candidate and future support for another Kreis' candidate in Land or local elections.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12}External groups with a strong proportion in the local party membership may be particularly important. The role of the farmers in Schleswig-Holstein is a good example of this, Varain, op. cit., pp. 150-55, 160-63. Nationally, other important groups are the refugee associations, the "Handwerker Verband" and various business associations, Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber and Klaus Schutz, Wahler und Gewählte (Berlin: Verlag Franz Vahlen GMBH, 1957).
The Land (or regional) party executive may also be consulted by the Kreis executives, and its views may have some influence, particularly in hopeless WK where to be elected the candidate must also get a good place on the Land list. Occasionally, individual members of the Land vorstand will make known their support for one of those being considered, but an official position by the Land executive is seldom taken and would be strongly resented. The national party executive has never taken an official position on a particular WK nomination. Even informal expressions of support by national Vorstand members tend to be resented and have a negative effect. Indirectly the national party's ability to persuade an incumbent to retire may limit to a small extent the field of potential candidates.

The CDU auxiliary organizations and committees at the Kreis level frequently also hold meetings during this

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13Varain, op. cit., Kaufmann, et al., op. cit., pp. 80-83; Gerhard Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 75-77. In 10 of 24 CDU contests where individual Land officials supported one contender, the individual they supported won in 5 and lost in 5, Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 45-74.

14Kaack, op. cit., pp. 96-97. In four of 24 CDU contests where national executive members wrote letters endorsing a particular contender, their candidate was successful in only one, Zeuner, op. cit.
period to discuss the nomination and to decide whether to present their own contender or support one of the other individuals being considered. Because of the weakness of the CDU organization in many areas, a majority of the party members and activists who participate in the Kreis executive or delegate conventions may belong to one of these groups and their support can thus be the decisive factor. The Mittelstand organization and the Junge Union (JU) are frequently in this position. The dominance of these groups among party members does not necessarily parallel their ratio in the population of the district, although farmer and refugee groups tend to be important in rural areas and business and worker groups in the industrial WK.15

Most of the disputes over the nomination are settled prior to the WK convention. One of the most common reasons for the contest being carried over into the convention voting is the failure of two or more Kreis within the WK to agree, and each hoping to get its own man nominated. Personal animosities, regional loyalties and interest group disputes are common factors in these cases. The 1965 study found that contested votes at the conventions were

directly related to the number of Kreis within the district. Of all WK in 1965 and 1969, there were contested votes in approximately twenty per cent in the CDU, and these also appeared to be related to the CDU's electoral situation in the district. In 1965, there were contests in sixty-nine per cent of the safe CDU districts, and none in those hopeless for the party.

Where the actual decision on the nomination is made by the convention, the delegates may have considerable power. Their support is sought by various groups prior to the meeting, and although the Kreis executives' recommendation is frequently followed, it is not binding on the delegates. The convention delegates frequently divide on other than Kreis lines. While there is no evidence of the existence of divisions on the basis of policy differences, socio-economic blocs, businessmen vs. workers for example, are common. Junge Union members also frequently form an important voting bloc among delegates, their membership being the largest among the CDU auxiliary organizations. In addition, the personal followings of various local notables—communal office-holders, Landtag

16Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 41, 74-75.

17Ibid., pp. 33-34; and "Die Vatermörder," op. cit., p.33.

m.p.'s, or the Kreis leaders—sometimes are decisive.\textsuperscript{19}

The rare personal appearance of individual national leaders to persuade the convention almost always produces a strong negative reaction and where an individual with such support wins it is because the local support is also strong.\textsuperscript{20}

In general then, WK nominations are made at the local level in the CDU. The role of the national party is practically non-existent, and the Land executive views have some effect only in those hopeless districts where the candidate also needs a list place. The three most important groups in the process are: (1) the members of the Kreis executive; (2) the leaders of the three major Vereinigung—Mittelstand, the Sozialausschuss, and Junge Union; and (3) the locally prominent office-holders. The delegates to the WK convention play an important role only in those cases where the above groups are unable to agree on a single individual before the convention.

\textsuperscript{19}Varain, \textit{op. cit.}, Kaufmann, \textit{op. cit.}; and Zeuner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 75-84.

In the CDU, nomination contests are, as we have seen, more frequent in safe WK. The chance of a contest in these districts also increases if there is no incumbent. A contest is fairly common for the CDU WK m.p. on his first attempt at the nomination, but is much less likely thereafter. Renomination is therefore an important aspect of the nomination process and criteria. Table 5, using figures from three Länder for 1957, and a nation-wide study for 1965 provides some idea of the trends in renomination.

### Table 5

**Renomination of CDU WK M.P.'s**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Renominated</th>
<th></th>
<th>Not Renominated</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Without Contest</td>
<td>With Contest</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Without Contest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 (n=58)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (n=204)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of CDU WK m.p.'s. As the table indicates, few incumbents seeking renomination were involved in contests—sixteen per cent in the 1957 sample, six per cent in 1965. However, once challenged for renomination the incumbent only wins half the time. Analyzing available reports of twenty-eight cases in which the sitting m.p. was not renominated (1953-1969) provides some explanation of the limitations on incumbency. In eleven of the twenty-eight cases the incumbent retired, and in seventeen he lost a contest for the nomination. The major reason for retirement was advanced age and most of these instances involved elderly backbenchers who withdrew more or less voluntarily in favor of younger men.

Discontent over the m.p.'s performance of local party duties, plus age were the most important reasons for losing a renomination contest. This was true in twelve of the seventeen cases, even though in several the m.p. was not a backbencher, but a member of the parliamentary party leadership. The five other cases illustrate the importance of maintaining ties with influential groups in the district. The incumbents lost because of their failure to

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retain the support of a key group or because the balance of interests within the WK changed.22 A 1965 Der Spiegel report provides a good example. The incumbent, a business-association representative, and backbencher, devoted considerable time to party duties, but was defeated by a younger list m.p. supported by the JU and other local auxiliary groups.23 There is no evidence in the above cases that the incumbent's position on national policy was ever an important factor in deciding on his renomination. Although incumbency is a very important criterion, no WK m.p. can assume continued automatic renomination. His age, efforts in the local party, and ties to local groups are also important.

The CDU has no formal party regulations on nomination criteria,24 but the following, in order of importance, appear to be significant assets in winning a WK nomination:

(1) local connections and function within the party,

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24The national office did draft a list of "general viewpoints in the selection of candidates" for use in the 1965 election, although it was never actually sent to the Kreis. It included the following criteria: congruence with the WK social structure, ability for public office, personal integrity and social standing, democratic behavior, knowledge in special areas, and party loyalty, Zeuner, op. cit., p. 172.
(2) the support of locally dominant auxiliary groups (3) local public office, (4) congruence with the dominant socio-economic strata in the party or population in the district, (5) a special skill needed in the fraction, and (6) Land or national party support.

**Local connections**

Surveys of winning WK nominees in the CDU indicate that local ties as well as some office in the party organization are the most common characteristic. Successful contenders are local men who have either grown up, or are employed in the district. Non-locals win nomination only when they are adopted by a local Kreis organization or group in response to another Kreis' candidate. In addition, large numbers of first-time candidates have already held or hold a local party office—usually at the Kreis or Orts level. This appears to be a proof of party loyalty and devotion highly valued in assessing contenders for the nomination. Since, however, the percentage of incumbents with such offices is even higher, the career lines go both ways, many successful candidates assuming such an office after their election. In part this may also be a response to the inadequacy of the CDU bureaucracy for in contrast to *ehrenamtlich* (volunteer) officials, functionaries (paid employees) are almost never CDU nominees. Such an
occupation is viewed as insufficiently prestigious for Bundestag candidacy.²⁵

**Group support**

A number of studies indicate that as CDU party organization has developed, reliance on external interest groups has declined from the earlier period,²⁶ although ties to a wide range of economic interests is common among CDU nominees. Particularly where these ties overlap with a position in the corresponding auxiliary group in the WK, such support is important in winning the nomination. In addition, JU support, due to its size and dominance in many WK, is quite clearly an asset for those hopeful of a Bundestag career.²⁷

²⁵For examples, see Varain, op. cit., pp. 160-63, 172-74, 183-92. In the 1965 study of 51 CDU contenders, the winner almost always was a local man, and all but 2 had some party office. Only two contenders were functionaries—one lost and the other won in a hopeless WK. Sixty per cent of the BT m.p.'s in 1965 had a party office, 45 per cent of all new nominees had one. Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 91-103.


Local public office

While not all successful nominees are communal politicians, it does appear that holding a local public office helps an individual win a CDU nomination. Such a position is fairly common and is apparently considered an asset because such individuals are likely to be well-known and respected in the district. On the other hand, while Landtag m.p.'s are occasionally contenders for a WK nomination, this does not appear to affect their chances of success. Parliamentary office at the state and federal levels seems to be viewed as distinct and not stages in the same career.28

Social status and religious conformity

The socio-economic status of successful candidates appears to be primarily the result of other assets in the nomination contest mentioned above. Most CDU candidates are from the upper-middle or middle class. Their occupation is more likely to be congruent with the largest group among the local party members, not necessarily in the population.29 In addition, while religious denomination

28Ibid., pp. 104-07.

is not enough to win a WK nomination, most successful nominees belong to the denominational majority in the district. Deviations are in the direction of over-representation of Catholics, a reflection of their larger percentages among CDU members. 30

Parliamentary skills

Neither special expertise in national policy areas, nor the expectations of a leadership role play a significant role in selecting nominees. While speaking ability and outstanding personal characteristics may be of some advantage to a contender, his qualifications as a "specialist" are important only in so far as they are considered assets in the representation of regional interests in the Bundestag. 31

Land or national support

It is difficult to judge the role of such support in winning nomination. It appears that successful contenders with such support win because of other assets, and in fact, outspoken support may be a liability. A number of cases testify to local resentment against interference


31 Lohmar, op. cit., p. 97; Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 202; and "Abgeordnete," op. cit., p. 12; and Zeuner, op. cit.
in their responsibility to nominate by higher party officials.\textsuperscript{32}

Age and sex are not significant assets in themselves. There is a wide range of ages among CDU nominees, although as we have seen advanced age can be a liability in renomination. Women are very seldom nominated in the districts and their appearance at all is due to efforts of their auxiliary to claim representation.\textsuperscript{33}

As may be noticed from the above list, the potential nominee's voter appeal is not an asset. It is occasionally an indirect consideration in the effort to get candidates who reflect the socio-economic characteristics of traditional CDU voters, along with assessment of their potential popularity in those districts in which the CDU margin of victory has been quite small.\textsuperscript{34}

In those WK the CDU regards as hopeless, other criteria may be important. Because of a lack of individuals willing to make a futile race, the nomination usually goes to an individual as a reward for past efforts, or to a list m.p. to assure the district of substitute representation


\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 69-72; and Zeuner, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}; Loewenberg, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 78; and "Abgeordnete . . . ," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.
in the Bundestag, although WK nominations ordinarily take place before the list has been agreed upon.\textsuperscript{35}

**SPD Nominations in the Wahlkreis**

At the outset, the difference in the electoral importance of WK nominations for the CDU and the SPD should be noted. Up until the 1969 election, more CDU m.p.'s were elected in WK than were SPD m.p.'s, although the percentage of districts the SPD won increased gradually throughout the 1960's.

The formal nomination decision, as specified in the election law, is of course made by a district convention. The average number of delegates in 1965 was 111, twice the size of CDU conventions, reflecting the difference in membership size. The delegates are usually party officeholders at the Orts or Kreis level. As in the CDU, in many districts there are several Kreis, in which case each Kreis may hold separate conventions of its delegates prior to the WK meeting.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35}See, for example, Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 76-82, 161; and Gunlicks, op. cit., pp. 243-45. Since the difference between candidates and list votes in a WK is rarely more than 5 per cent, large margins of defeat mean that the local organization is not likely to consider voter appeal as particularly important or effective.

\textsuperscript{36}Zeuner, op. cit., p. 47. In the 1957 study of Rheinland-Pfalz one Bezirk held a convention for all 5 WK in its boundaries, at which the districts voted separately, Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 174-77.
The actual nomination process in the SPD is more involved than the legal regulations imply and also differs from the CDU's. In general, there are two types of processes: a large number of nominations in which only one individual is considered, and those in which the nomination is contested. Nominations are usually uncontested in most of the safe SPD WK. In these and large number of hopeless districts, an incumbent is renominated. This occurs in the hopeless WK because of an SPD policy of giving nominees in such districts good list places. Thus the lines of influence are difficult to discern, although presumably the local party is satisfied with the incumbent.

Many of the contested nominations are resolved prior to the delegate convention, thus increasing the appearance of unanimity in the SPD, but study of the process in these cases indicates that the influential groups are similar whether the contest is carried over into the convention or not. The local SPD Kreis executives will have several meetings on the nomination up to eighteen months before the election. Potential candidates supported by groups within the WK are discussed, the views of the Bezirk executive heard, and the chairmen of the largest Ortsvereine in the district consulted. The SPD Orts executives may support a particular individual and usually also hold extensive meetings on the nomination during this same period. In
most cases, the Kreis executive eventually makes a final choice which it recommends to its delegates.\textsuperscript{37}

Because the Kreis executive in hopeless WK is anxious to select a candidate who will have a chance for a good list place, the Bezirk's view of important criteria for the list is considered. Although an official position is rare, the Bezirk executive's recommendation of a particular individual or even an outsider for the nomination may be accepted because it is believed to coincide with local interests.\textsuperscript{38}

Somewhat more frequently, an individual Bezirk executive member may informally support a particular contender for the nomination. This is seldom enough to insure success, although it appears to have somewhat more impact than in the CDU.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the SPD regulations on consultation with the national executive, no such formal consultations take place.


\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., pp. 47-74. For an example, in one WK case reported, a Land official and member of Brandt's "shadow cabinet" was nominated because the local organization felt this would increase their influence at higher party levels and would attract new voters, Bernhard Vogel and Peter Haungs, \textit{Wahlkampf and Wahlertradition} (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965), pp. 237-52.

\textsuperscript{39}Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 64-75; and "Die Vatermörder," op. cit., p. 38. In 1965 of seven instances of such informal support, the individual won in five and lost in two, Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 47-74.
Informal support by individual PV members is somewhat more common than in the CDU, but still occurs very rarely. While such support is taken into consideration by the local organization and is not apparently resented as in the CDU, it is not a key factor in the nomination. Occasionally efforts of the national party to persuade an incumbent to retire may also indirectly influence the nomination by removing a possible contender.  

The West German unions are the only economic interest organizations with traditional if informal ties to the SPD. There is no SPD auxiliary representing labor and when they take a position in support of a particular contender, they are only moderately successful. Their role in SPD WK nominations is based on the extent of overlapping membership between the local union and the party. In districts where industrial workers dominate party membership, union functionaries are frequently contenders for the nomination.  

Informal groups of communal  

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40 See, for example, Varain, op. cit.; and Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 99-101. In the four instances reported in 1965, those supported by the PV informally were successful, although it appears that local considerations were more significant in their victories, Zeuner, op. cit.  

office-holders who are prominent in many districts may also support one of their own for the nomination. The support of such a group or the personal following of a contender may help in winning the nomination.\(^4\)

SPD auxiliaries do not in general play the important role in WK nominations that they do in the CDU. While the Jungsozialisten (Jusos) occasionally discuss the nomination, or informal groups of younger members support a younger contender, their role has not been decisive in the past.\(^3\)

An interesting exception to this pattern however occurred in 1969. The Juso organization, as a representative of certain dissenting policy opinions, and of a younger generation of party activists, took a more active role in contesting nominations with their own contender. By carrying the contest to the delegate conventions in districts where younger members were in a majority, they had some success.\(^4\)

Up until 1969, the number of actual contests at the delegate conventions was much smaller than in the CDU. In 1969, the SPD had a remarkably high number of contests— in

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 81.

\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 75-80; Kaufmann, op. cit.; and Varain, op. cit.

approximately one-third of the districts. Unlike the CDU, there does not appear to be the same relationship between electoral situations and contested WK nominations in the SPD, and in fact more contests have taken place in hopeless than in safe districts. A 1965 study of twenty-three WK found that this relationship was distorted because of particular features of the Baden-Württemburg party organization in which ten of the contests in hopeless WK took place. Excluding these, the pattern of contests in those districts studied was three in hopeless, five in competitive and five in safe districts. This still however does not indicate the kind of clear relationship that exists for CDU nominations. Contests in hopeless SPD districts appear to be due in part to the SPD policy of giving list places to such candidates, thus making such nominations a first stage to the Bundestag. Their occurrence is also increased because such nominations are used as a starting point for a career in communal politics, or because the Kreis organizations in such districts are unusually weak and unable to control the nomination process to the same extent as in safe districts.

While there is greater effort within the SPD to

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46Zeuner, op. cit., p. 86.
resolve disputes prior to the convention than in the CDU, rivalries between two Kreis organizations, generational conflicts or those between a contender supported by higher party units and a local candidate do produce some actual contested votes. In these cases where the actual nomination decision is made at the convention, the dominance of Kreis executives in the process is diminished to a considerable extent. Delegates are not selected according to their support for a particular individual, and the contenders thus have to lobby for their support. SPD WK delegates also appear to be more independent of Kreis instructions than in the CDU, and divisions at the convention on other than regional lines are fairly common. These may include occupational blocs, generations, or policy-oriented groups. In the past, policy disputes have not been frequent, but increased considerably in 1969 due to the new Juso role mentioned above.\footnote{For an example of a common delegate division, see Vogel and Haungs, op. cit., pp. 237-52. Also, Zeuner, op. cit., p. 75.}

In general, as in the CDU, WK nominations are made at the local level. Although the Bezirk and national executive members are somewhat more frequently involved than in the CDU, their role is a minor one. The three most
Influential groups within the district are: (1) the members of the Kreis executive, (2) chairmen of the Ortsvereine and other local activists who may be delegates to the convention, and (3) the local public officeholders. Unlike the CDU, the leaders of external groups and auxiliaries have little influence on the nominations.

Although the number of contested nominations is lower in the SPD, the number does increase when there is no incumbent. Table 6 provides some idea of the pattern of renomination of SPD WK m.p.'s in 1965. Figures for 1957 comparable to those used for the CDU (Table 5) are not presented as no

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<td>RENOMINATION OF SPD WK M.P.'S, 1965 (n=180)</td>
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SPD incumbent was challenged for the WK nomination in these Länder. Nation-wide, only one SPD incumbent lost a renomination contest in 1957. Both the percentage of incumbents renominated and the percentage involved in contests were

very similar for the SPD and the CDU in 1965. However, once challenged, SPD incumbents were less successful at renomination. The former m.p. lost in five of the eight contests. It appears that incumbency is very highly valued in the SPD, and challenges are only undertaken when the chances of success are very good.  

The few available reports on such challenges indicate that incumbents fail to be renominated for reasons similar to those in the CDU: age, personally negative characteristics, and failure to perform party duties in the district. Of the five incumbents who lost contests in 1965, most lost because of their age and personal failings. In addition, two of the incumbents' renominations were strongly opposed by the Bezirk executive. A report in 1969 on fifteen SPD incumbents who were challenged for renomination indicates a new basis for such challenges. Nine of the fifteen contests were the result of the development of an internal leftist opposition group composed of Jusos and unionists who disagreed with the party's position on the emergency law and its participation in the Grand Coalition. The incumbents were challenged because of their

\[49\text{Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 75.}\]

\[50\text{Wildenmann, Unkelbach and Kaltefleiter, op. cit., p. 130; and Kaack, op. cit., p. 95.}\]

\[51\text{Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 92-93.}\]
Bundestag votes on these issues.52

The SPD PV has issued a set of criteria supposed to guide the selection of both list and WK nominees. Those with political and technical ability, and representatives of women, refugees and other groups are to be preferred. Nominations of Landtag m.p.'s and party functionaries are specifically discouraged.53 It is interesting to compare these general guidelines with the five actual characteristics which appear to be assets for individuals seeking a WK nomination. These are: (1) local connections and function within the party, (2) local public office, (3) group support or a particular social status, (4) skills relevant to parliamentary work, and (5) higher party support for a Bundestag career.

Local connections

Almost all individuals considered for an SPD nomination either work or live in the district. In addition, party office appears to be a pre-Bundestag career test in the SPD. Like the CDU, most nominees have held or hold a party office at the Kreis or Orts level. In the 1965


contests studied, there were no successful nominees without such a background.\textsuperscript{54} The SPD also shares to some extent the CDU aversion to party functionaries assuming a Bundestag mandate and the number seeking nomination has declined. In the SPD case, this reflects the PV regulations and party doctrine which put organizational viability first. The PV guidelines specifically state that functionaries should not be nominated because their contribution to the organization is needed.\textsuperscript{55}

Local public office

It is somewhat difficult to judge the importance of this criterion since most individuals competing for the nomination hold a communal office of some sort. It appears in part to be a common career for a great many local party activists who will in turn support one of their own for a nomination. It may also be valued because such candidates are likely to be well-known in the district. While Landtag m.p.’s are not often nominated, SPD politicians who have been members of Land governments occasionally

\textsuperscript{54}Kaack, op. cit., pp. 94-96; "Die Vatermörder," op. cit., pp. 43-45; Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 111-16; and Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 91-103.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., pp. 104-05; and Flechtheim, op. cit.
"retire" to the Bundestag through a WK nomination.56

Group ties

The only important economic group is the unions and while their support is some aid in getting a nomination, most union employees who are nominated also hold a party office. Despite the urging in the PV regulations to nominate the representatives of various groups in order to promote the Volkspartei image, external interest groups play little or no role in SPD nominations. The social status of potential candidates is not often a consideration either directly or because it will attract new voters. Most SPD candidates are either civil servants or white collar employees, but this narrow occupational range does not reflect a deliberate criteria, but is the result of a lack of other middle-class occupational groups in the party membership.57 As we have seen, the only important auxiliary—the Jungsozialisten—played a minor role until 1969.

Parliamentary qualifications

While skills needed by the fraction are not a very


57Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 94-98; Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 111-16; Kaack, op. cit., p. 96; and Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 91-143.
important consideration in the local organization, despite PV urging that they be taken into account, they are mentioned more often than in the CDU. To some extent this is tied to the fact that the wishes of the Bezirk and national party are given a more considered hearing in the SPD. Unlike the CDU, informal support from higher party officials, while not decisive in a nomination contest, does not cause the kind of negative reaction one finds in the CDU.58

Age does not appear to be a significant criterion in itself, although in the 1965 study most SPD candidates were forty to forty-nine. This appears to be due to the requirement of previous party work which is so common among SPD candidates. As we have seen, advanced age may also be a liability in renomination. Women are only rarely nominated, and then only because of the claim of the women's organization for representation and because at least one woman representative will receive a good list place also.59

Voter appeal plays almost no role in SPD WK nomination decisions, although it may be an indirect factor in the nomination of local public office-holders who are well

58"Pie Vatermörder," op. cit., pp. 38-40. In 1965, the few outsiders nominated were supported by the Bezirk and national leaders, Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 91-100.

59Ibid., pp. 91-143.
known and have some prestige in a district.60

Before we describe the CDU and SPD list nomination processes, it is important to consider the practice of "reinsuring" WK nominees with a list place. This policy can affect both the distribution of influence and criteria in list nominations. In both parties, the list nomination process normally begins only after WK candidates have been selected. The question of giving good list places to these individuals must be considered since, particularly in hopeless WK, reinsurance will give the weaker party regions representation in the Bundestag. Such a policy however obviously limits the control of the regional party leadership and increases that of the WK organizations even in list selection. In both the CDU and the SPD the majority of list candidates have also been nominated in a district. However the percentage has been much higher in the SPD than the CDU, despite PV regulations which suggest that such a policy apply only "where necessary." Although there are some differences by Land within each party, the higher percentages for the SPD are true in each state.61 This, of course, has obvious implications for the differences in

60For example, see Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 99-101.

61Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 71-83; Kaack, op. cit., pp. 94-96. For examples of state differences, see Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 197-202; and Varain, op. cit., pp. 172-77; and Zeuner, op. cit., p. 150.
the list nomination processes of the two parties.

**CDU List Nominations**

While the statewide delegate convention has the legal authority to make list nominations, the actual process of deciding on list nominations is much more complex. After the WK nominations have been made, the Landesverband executive (or a special coordinating committee in those Länder with more than one Landesverband) usually meets to decide on the general principles for the distribution of seats, i.e., the extent to which a reinsurance policy for WK candidates will be followed, and how to provide for the representation of various regions. During these meetings the claims of auxiliaries and interest groups and of the different regions are heard. The interests of the Land party and of m.p.'s from the Land are also considered. Where there is more than one CDU Landesverband in the state, the regional executives will also hold meetings to choose candidates for the places they claim. Most of the auxiliary organizations and committees have a seat on these executives and their views are well represented. There is no formal consultation with the lower (Kreis) party units, although some Kreis chairmen may also be members of the regional executive. Final recommendations by these groups
are then sent to the state convention to be voted upon.\textsuperscript{62}

The most influential groups in the nomination of CDU list candidates are the statewide and regional executives, who are in a position to coordinate the various claims for list places. The members of these executives are the state political leaders and office-holders, regional party officers and the heads of the auxiliaries.\textsuperscript{63} In those Länder with more than one Landesverband, an effort is usually made to solve potential regional conflicts by deciding on a principle for the number and order of seats to be allotted to each region. These vary not only in the exact formulas used, though most use some proportional method based on the last Bundestag election votes, but also in whether the same procedure is used at each election, or must be agreed upon anew. In these cases the regional (Landesverbände) executives are the key participants in coordinating the claims of the dominant interests within the region. Neither the Land or regional executives have a completely open choice, since they must satisfy these demands plus take into account the need for reinsurance of WK candidates in hopeless districts. Their

\textsuperscript{62}Kitzinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 67; and Zeuner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 176-84. For examples, see Varain, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 151-55, 160-63.

\textsuperscript{63}Kaack, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97; and Zeuner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 162-63, 195-97.
influence derives from being the only group in a position to coordinate the various elements seeking list places.\textsuperscript{64} Nordrhein-Westfalen provides an extreme example of this process of Land coordination and regional subdivision and the minimal role of the lower party units in the process. The first five places are reserved for Land-wide use, usually for the nomination of prominent parliamentarians who also have a safe district nomination, and the remaining actual list places are divided equally between the two Landesverbände—the one receiving even-numbered places, the other odd. The Landesverbände executives then decide on the candidates for their places, primarily on the basis of interest group claims. Reinsurance of WK nominees is not as important a consideration, and NRW has a large percentage of list-only candidates. These decisions are then sent to the statewide tag which provides the only formal representation for the lower Kreis organizations. However, the convention votes on the entire list en bloc, thus making practically impossible any real lower level influence in the process.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.; Loewenberg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 78-83; and Wildenmann, Unkelbach and Kaltefleiter, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 82-84. For examples, see Varain, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 183-92; and Kaufmann, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 197-202.

While this is an extreme case, the influence of the statewide convention and of the lower party organizations in general is quite minor in the CDU. There is usually some discussion over the arrangement and individual names of the list, but changes in the names, or the order of names proposed by the executive is unusual, since even one change might upset the balance of regional and interest demands. In 1965, there were actual contested votes on list places in only 16 per cent of the individual nominations. In those smaller Länder where the party and state boundaries coincide and in those cases where the regional executives are unable to agree on a principle for balancing regional and other claims, the convention delegates are able to exert some influence. Delegates are not selected on the basis of their position on nominations, and may divide along regional or other lines. Changes in the executive's proposed slate are generally effected by coalitions across regional lines of representatives of the auxiliaries, or the efforts of one region to gain more list places.


67 Good examples of the differences in executives' and delegates' influence are Baden-Württemburg and Rheinland-Pfalz. In B-W, four regional organizations divide
The second most important groups influencing list nominations are thus the economic interest groups whose views are institutionalized through auxiliary and committee representation on the executives. CDU doctrine recognizes the legitimacy of differing interests within the party and the bargaining which takes place within the party executive is really concerned with balancing the claims of these groups. In most cases these groups as well as the traditional women and youth organizations essentially select their own candidates, and in NRW places on the list are reserved for a particular group's representative. The auxiliaries which are important vary somewhat by Land, although the Sozialausschuss is more successful here than in the districts. The women's organization has a claim to at least one place in every Land.68

The major business associations have not been represented by a CDU auxiliary organization. Instead, they have

the list and make recommendations based on interest group claims. The tag rarely does more than ratify these decisions. In the smaller Rheinland-P., the regional organizations are frequently unable to agree on a list division and the convention is able to make changes on occasion. Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 84-90, 163-70.

preferred to set up an independent organization of "businessmen supporting the CDU." This has hindered to some extent their ability to get as many representatives on CDU lists as they wish, despite the dependence of the party on their financial contributions which varies from Land to Land. Business representation among list candidates appears to be due more to a natural congruence between their membership and that of the party than to pressure because of campaign contributions.\(^6^9\)

There is very little evidence of any federal party influence on the Land list nominations, despite the fact that supporters of the list system frequently claim that it allows for more consideration of the parliamentary party's needs than a district nomination system. Individual national party leaders may have some voice in list decisions when they are also members of a Land executive. This is however fairly uncommon in the federalist CDU. Most Land parties are dominated by Land, not national, politicians who are jealous of their prerogatives and react negatively

to open interference from the national leadership. While most fraction leaders have top list places, their election is due to nomination in a safe WK. Loss of the district renomination usually means their removal from the list as well.  

The CSU is an exception to the above description due to its dominance in the past by Franz Josef Strauss, an important figure on the national scene as well. In cases of conflict between the interests of the Land party and the Bundestag m.p.'s in Bavaria, Strauss and his supporters have usually won.

There are electoral differences which affect the importance of the lists for a Land's overall Bundestag representation. However, differences in the nomination process do not seem to be related to the differences in the CDU's competitive position in different Länder. The party organization within the Land appears to have a slightly greater effect. Of those six Länder in which state and party organization boundaries coincide, the delegate

70 Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 78-83; Kaufmann, op. cit.; and "Bundestags-Kandidaten . . . ," op. cit., p. 16.


72 Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 181-82.
conventions are able to play some role in four. The two exceptions are both unusual in other respects—the CSU in Bavaria, and the Saar which is extremely small. Apparently, where regional organizations do not exist to mediate group claims, conflicts are more frequently carried to the convention.\footnote{The best description of Land differences in the list nomination process can be found in \textit{ibid.}, pp. 154-56, 160-63, 176-82.}

It is difficult to ascertain the percentage of CDU list m.p.'s who have sought renomination and failed. Some list incumbents may be renominated technically but given a poor place with little chance of re-election, which is in effect the same as failure in renomination. Other list m.p.'s may be assigned as a substitute district representative and then nominated the second time in the WK. In 1965, 45 per cent of the list m.p.'s were not renominated, including 14 per cent who reportedly wished another term in the Bundestag.\footnote{Examples, Kaufmann, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 88-90, 163-70; and "Absteigs-Kandidaten," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 16-18. 1965 figures, Zeuner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 216-17.} Thus list renomination appears to be somewhat more uncertain than WK renomination. This may reflect the delegation of list selection to regional and auxiliary organizations. A list m.p. who fails to get continued support from the organization he represented, or
whose sponsors have declined in influence in the Land may lose renomination.75

From this description, it is possible to determine the assets important in gaining a list nomination. The top five to ten places (only the first five appear on the ballot) are usually reserved for nationally prominent incumbents. These individuals almost always are also nominated in safe WK, and their names are used on the ballot to embellish the party's image and because of voter appeal, as well as to provide at least one woman with a good chance of election. The effective list places are those immediately below—the number depending on the party's assessment of its percentage of the vote.76

As the above discussion indicates, the most important asset in getting a list nomination is the support of an auxiliary or interest group. Even where regional representation is adhered to, the regional executives give first priority to providing group representation. Because most groups have a parallel party auxiliary, party outsiders are not nominated, but rather a position in one of the

75 Kaack, op. cit., p. 97; Kitzinger, op. cit., p. 74; and "Die Vatermörder," op. cit., p. 42.

organizations may serve as a route to a Bundestag career. 77

The support of the external business associations seems
to be less successful, unless the businessman is also ac-
tive in the party in some way. 78

The principles of regional proportion and rein-
surance of weak WK candidates, although not strictly ad-
hered to, do also provide a more traditional career route
through public office. Membership in the important Land
leadership circles makes getting a list nomination rela-
tively easy, and in those Länder controlled by the SPD,
ambitious CDU politicians may use the list to further
their career. 79 On the other hand, expertise important for
the fraction does not appear to be any more of an asset for
list nominations than it is in the WK. Experts in special
subjects who are nominated owe their place much more to the
fact that they were supported by an important group. 80

As was true of WK nominations, denominational bal-
ance on the lists is taken into consideration, but is not

77 Kaack, op. cit., p. 97; Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 170-71; and Zeuner, op. cit., p. 207.


didat . . .," op. cit., pp. 16-18.

strictly followed. In many cases to do so would interfere with group representation, particularly since the Sozialausschuss candidates are predominantly Catholic. While policy differences may exist among contenders for a list nomination, they are not among the considerations for selection of candidates.\(^{81}\)

In most Länder, the party extends the number of list places beyond any possibility of election and these "filler" places are frequently spread among various occupational groups to provide for more congruence with the population.\(^{82}\)

In general, as a result of the differences in the process, the assets for WK and list nominations in the CDU are somewhat different. Local public office is somewhat less important, while the number of upper-middle-class occupations increases among list candidates due to the larger number of businessmen and professionals. In addition, the number of group representatives on the list is reflected in a somewhat higher age range as compared to the WK nominees.\(^{83}\)

\(^{81}\text{Ibid., pp. 214-22.}\)

\(^{82}\text{See, for example, Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 197-202.}\)

\(^{83}\text{For the differences in 1965, see Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 222-26.}\)
SPD List Nominations

After the WK nominations are made, the Bezirk executive or a Land committee of the Bezirke executives in the state meets to estimate the number of good list places and to assign them on the basis of a regional formula, a practice much more closely followed than in the CDU. The Bezirke or regional executives then hold meetings, consult with subregional leaders, and decide on individuals to fill their places. These decisions are then sent to the statewide convention for the actual nominations.\textsuperscript{84}

The major role in SPD list nominations is played by the Bezirke executives. Their members are usually regional and Land politicians and Bundestag m.p.'s. The desire to avoid open regional conflict is very strong in the SPD, and it is solved by fairly strict adherence to a formula of regional proportionality of seats. Although the PV regulations suggest membership size as the basis for division, most Länder follow some formula which uses population and sometimes vote as well, thus giving some aid to regions with weak party organizations.\textsuperscript{85} Thus the Land coordinating

\textsuperscript{84}Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

group has less influence than in the CDU, as even in those Länder with parallel party boundaries, SPD list places are usually divided among the Unterbezirke or Kreis. The regional executives are however also limited in their control by a number of factors. They must consult and attempt to satisfy the claims of the subregional units, as well as those of Land and Bundestag office-holders who may have differing assessments of the needs to be filled through list nominations. Most importantly, the much stricter adherence to reinsurance in the SPD leaves less room for maneuver to the regional leaders. Since most SPD list nominees are also candidates in a district, the SPD WK organizations have a considerable role as essentially preselection bodies for the list. Even in Nordrhein-Westfalen where reinsurance is least strictly adhered to, it is still the most important consideration in list decisions within the regions.

Because of the efforts to aid weaker regions through

86 See, for example, ibid., pp. 163-65.


88 Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 68-74; Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 71-72; and Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 152-54. In a few cases subregional divisions are made to the WK level, reserving a particular place for the candidate of a district regardless of who is nominated.
distribution formulas and consultation with Kreis or sub-regional leaders, executive recommendations are only rarely challenged at the delegate conventions. Considerable discussion is common, but in most Länder the executive slate is voted en bloc. The infrequent exceptions are usually cases in which a regional claim was not honored by the executive. Thus, although the delegates are not formally controlled by the regional leadership, they seldom do more than ratify decisions made elsewhere.  

Unlike the CDU, the SPD makes no real effort to provide representation for economic interest groups. Regional division of places and WK reinsurance in any case give the leaders less opportunity to use the list to balance other interests. The list nomination of union functionaries is due more to their overlap with SPD party activists, than to any organized role by the unions in the process. Neither of the two traditional auxiliaries have extensive influence. In both cases, their claims to at least one or two places

89Wildenmann, Unkelbach, and Kaltefleiter, op. cit., pp. 129-31. In 1965 there were contests on only four percent of the SPD list nominations, Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 172-73, 195-97. For an example where an executive recommendation was rejected because of the belief that legitimate regional claims were ignored, see "Die Verschobene Kandidat," Der Spiegel, Vol. 11 (June 19, 1957), 22.  

are usually honored. 91

Despite the traditional centralized image of the SPD, the national PV does not play an important role in the list nomination process. Since the national party leaders are somewhat more likely to also hold Land or Bezirk party offices in the SPD than in the CDU, the wishes of the fraction and national organization are likely to be given some consideration. The top list places are, as in the CDU, reserved for prominent politicians, and a somewhat larger number of these individuals in the SPD may have no WK nomination and must rely on the consideration of regional executives for their renomination. They are not always successful, particularly when their claims conflict with Land interests. 92

Despite the differences in the electoral importance of list nominations in different Länder, these do not seem to have any effect upon the nomination processes which are quite similar. Nor does the structure of the party organization in the Land have much effect. Even in those


92 Kaack, op. cit., p. 94; Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 68-74; "Der Verschobene Kandidat," op. cit., p. 22. For example, in NRW the first ten places are supra-regional, and used to fill PV requests, Zeuner, op. cit., pp. 184-89, 200-01.
Länder with a parallel Bezirk the principle of regional subdivision is generally adhered to. Thus the lower party organizations are brought into the process prior to the convention and the delegates play little role in the nominations.\(^9\)

Because of the rule of reinsuring WK candidates with good list places and therefore the considerable overlap between list and WK m.p.'s in the SPD, it is difficult to get a distinct picture of the renomination rate for SPD lists. Certainly the tendency to renominate is quite strong in the SPD and the chances for list m.p.'s are nearly as good as for WK incumbents. In 1965, 35 per cent of the list incumbents were not renominated; only six per cent did not wish to retire.\(^9\) Most of the failures at renomination of those actively seeking it are due to an earlier failure in a district. This clearly gives the local organizations considerable control over list renominations as well.\(^9\)

As mentioned above, the top places on the ballot are

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\(^9\)See the discussion in ibid., pp. 163-65.


\(^9\)For examples, see Varain, op. cit., p. 177; Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 116-29; and "Die Verschobene Kandidat," op. cit., p. 22.
given to important parliamentarians or national leaders whose prominence enhances the party's image and vote. This is the only point at which the SPD makes a direct concession to voter-appeal in its criteria. The other assets closely parallel those for WK nominations, since most list candidates were first nominated in a district. Obviously both a WK nomination and incumbency are important in list nominations. In addition, a position in the party organization or the support of the Bezirk or Kreis leadership is a most important asset, due to their influential role in the nominations. On the other hand, national support does not appear to be particularly significant although it is a consideration and some places on a list may be reserved for extra-regional nominations. Unions and the traditional auxiliary organizations play only a small role in the list selection process.

As in the WK nominations, PV regulations urging the selection of candidates on the basis of ability and knowledge appears to have had little impact, and even


97Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 94-96; Wildenmann, Unkelbach, and Kaltefleiter, op. cit., pp. 82-84; and Kitzinger, op. cit., pp. 68-74.

parliamentary leaders are as likely to get bad places as good in most Länder. The lack of support for Landtag m.p.'s as list candidates may reflect the attitude found in the districts that these are distinct careers, as well as the desire of Land leaders to keep their "parliamentary stars" at the Land level. The PV regulations require special permission for the nomination of an incumbent Landtag m.p.99

Finally, the occupational range for list candidates does not differ significantly from that for WK nominees. Those middle occupations with a strong percentage in the party membership—communal office-holders, white collar employees—form the nucleus of list recruitment also. A broader range of occupations to fulfill the new Volkspartei image and attract voters from the CDU is only attempted in assigning the "filler" places at the bottom of the lists.100

Characteristics of CDU and SPD M.P.'s

We would expect the composition of the CDU and SPD fractions to reflect both the similarities and differences in the candidate selection processes described above. We shall consider the occupational and age ranges among CDU


and SPD m.p.'s, the extent of replacement of new parliamentarians for old, and Bundestag career routes as revealed in their party and public office experience.

There are a number of difficulties associated with any attempt to determine the occupational divisions among m.p.'s. In particular, the official biographies often state original rather than current occupation which in many cases is that of professional politician or employee of an interest group. Many of those listed in the white collar category probably are such representatives, or party employees. In addition, West German teachers and professors are civil servants and while their numbers are not large in either party, they do inflate this occupational category somewhat.\textsuperscript{101}

However, despite these problems, the occupational breakdowns for three Bundestag terms (comparable figures for the Third Bundestag were unavailable) presented in Table 7 do give some rudimentary indication of the similarities and differences in the two parties. In both, the percentages of white collar employees and civil servants is quite high and the civil service group has steadily increased. While some differences between the parties are

\textsuperscript{101}For a discussion of some of the problems in assessing these distortions in occupational categories, see Loewenberg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 111-15.
# Table 7

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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=244</td>
<td>n=151</td>
<td>n=242</td>
<td>n=190</td>
<td>n=245</td>
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<td>Free professions</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, self-employed</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Civil servants</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives, other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Concealed in these groupings—there are more local politicians in these groups in the SPD, and more interest organization employees in the CDU, the increasing numbers reflect a common structure of the opportunities for nomination in
both parties.\textsuperscript{102} The quite low percentages of skilled workers even in the SPD is explicable in terms of the middle-class orientation of those active in the nominations. The workers' representatives in the SPD are predominantly union employees and would be classified as white collar.

While their proportions in the Bundestag have declined over the years, business and professional groups have been consistently more significant in the CDU fraction, thus giving it a broader range of occupations and weighting it more to the upper-middle class. Farmers as a group in the parliament have also declined in numbers, but again have been almost entirely CDU m.p.'s. Many safe CDU districts are in rural areas, and as we have seen, farmers have been an important group in the district nominations.

An early report on the 1969 legislators does not indicate any very startling differences in these occupational groupings from previous years. The CDU fraction gained a few more businessmen, and lost a few farmers, while the number of civil servants increased in both parties.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102}For further discussion on the bureaucratization of German politics, see ibid.; and Otto Kirchheimer, "Germany: The Vanishing Opposition," in Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 432.

\textsuperscript{103}"Bundestag: Sehr angepasst," Der Spiegel, Vol. 23(October 20, 1969), 38-41.
The age groups in the parliamentary parties presented in Table 8 also are to some extent reflections of the nomination process. The CDU fraction has consistently been somewhat older than that of the SPD, the strongest CDU group in the 50-59 range, the strongest SPD group in the 40-49 range. In both parties however the percentage of those under fifty has increased and due to the somewhat larger increases in the CDU, its percentage in this group now

### TABLE 8

**AGES OF CDU AND SPD M.P.'S, SECOND, FOURTH, AND FIFTH BUNDESTAG, IN PERCENTAGES**

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

closely resembles that of the SPD.\textsuperscript{104}

The study from which the 1965 figures differentiating CDU list-only m.p.'s were taken indicates that the overall figures conceal some important differences between the two parties. It appears that the list-only m.p.'s are somewhat older in the CDU. Since almost all list m.p.'s are also WK nominees in the SPD because of the reinsurance policy, no differences were found between the two groups. Whereas forty to fifty seems to be the age range during which SPD activists have reached a career stage acceptable for a Bundestag nomination, the route appears less fixed in the CDU. Both younger and older individuals have a chance at a CDU nomination; the younger through Junge Union support in districts where an elderly incumbent has retired, and the older through prominence in an interest group career which gives them access to list places.\textsuperscript{105}

Table 9 shows the turnover for both parties during the period covered by this study. Turnover is not high in either party, and the variations do not seem to be related to the nomination process. CDU turnover has generally been somewhat higher than in the SPD, which is consistent with somewhat younger m.p.'s in both parties and similar party differences, \textit{ibid.}, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{104} The same trends seem to apply for 1969, with somewhat younger m.p.'s in both parties and similar party differences, \textit{ibid.}, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{105} Zeuner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 129-31.
with the higher number of challenges to incumbents in CDU nominations.

TABLE 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To avoid the distortion due to electoral gains, the following ratio was used for turnover: no. of new m.p.'s - no. of new seats/no. of seats in previous term.


It is very difficult to get an accurate picture of the offices held by parliamentarians. Since a political career does not provide high status, many m.p.'s neglect to mention their party offices in official biographies. Fifty per cent of all CDU m.p.'s in 1953 had at least one party office at the national, state or local level. The 1965 figure was sixty per cent, although as we have seen party office is somewhat less important in getting a
nomination in the CDU than in the SPD. In fact, only forty-five per cent of the new CDU candidates in 1965 held some party office.106

A different study of the 1969 Bundestag candidates provides some further information on the amounts of time devoted to party affairs (not party office) by both candidates and incumbents in the CDU and the SPD. A sample of candidates was asked how much time they spent per week on party work between elections. Fewer of the new CDU candidates spent more than twenty hours a week on party activities—twenty-two per cent to thirty-seven per cent for the SPD, which reflects the differences we have discussed in the criteria used in candidate selection. There is less external influence in SPD nominations, and contributions to party affairs are an important test of the candidate's loyalty. Thirty-seven per cent of the SPD incumbents, the same as of the new candidates, spent more than twenty hours per week on party work. However, fifty-one per cent of the CDU incumbents as compared to twenty-two per cent of the aspirants devoted that much time to party

work. Apparently many CDU m.p.'s assume party duties only after they have been elected to the Bundestag. This may in part be due to the nature of the CDU organization and its lack of sufficient paid functionaries to perform organizational tasks.

The figures are also available for the number of m.p.'s who held Land or local office prior to their election in 1965. Twenty-five per cent of CDU m.p.'s and twenty-three per cent of SPD m.p.'s were Landtag members prior to their election. The percentage of communal office-holders was somewhat higher in the SPD—forty per cent to thirty-three per cent in the CDU. The somewhat higher percentage in the SPD probably reflects the importance of such offices in gaining a district nomination and the larger number of CDU list-only m.p.'s who owe their nomination to positions in important associations. Both the figures for party and public office-holding indicate considerable professionalization in both parties.

Conclusions

Similarities

In studying candidate selection in the CDU and the

SPD, we found a number of similarities between the two parties. These bear out some of the propositions in our framework, while others point to new relationships. In both the CDU and the SPD, the number of contested nominations is quite low. This supports our assumption that negative attitudes towards conflict in the West German political culture would have this effect. As one author points out, even the German word for contested voting (Kampfabstimmung) has a negative connotation.¹⁰⁹

Secondly, the responsible party executive is the most influential group involved in list and WK nominations, i.e., the regional executive for the lists and the Kreis executives for the WK. National leadership interference in list and WK nominations is minimal, and the state leadership only plays a small role in district nominations in those WK regarded by the party as hopeless electorally. Thus the electoral system and the election law which provide for two types of candidates and give the party organization at the respective levels the legal responsibility for nominations do structure similarities into CDU and SPD nominations. Because the electoral system provides two levels for the nomination of candidates, there

¹⁰⁹ Kampfabstimmungen "... sind unangenehm, unberechenbar, sie erfordern aussergewöhnliche Anstrengungen und rufen aussergewöhnliche Schwierigkeiten hervor." Ibid., p. 43.
is also the possibility of some overlap in the nominees and in fact, in both parties the majority of list candidates have also been nominated in a district. This means that the WK organizations also influence list nominations. In addition, for both the CDU and the SPD, position in the local party becomes an important asset for obtaining a nomination. We may be more certain that the legal regulations have had this decentralizing impact, since an early analysis of candidate selection, prior to the passage of the law, indicated considerable national control.110

Interestingly enough, while West German federalism does provide for independent political positions at the Land level, it does not have the expected result of making Land politicians the most important influence in list nominations. Apparently this is because historical traditions are associated with various regions, rather than the states, whose boundaries were created by the Allies. Both parties are organized on the basis of these traditional regions, and it is the regional party leaders who are influential in list decisions. As a result, division of Land lists along regional lines is an important principle for both the CDU and the SPD.

The election law does not provide for direct party

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110See Wildenmann, op. cit., pp. 130-40.
membership participation in nominations, nor for membership control of the delegates to the nomination conventions. Also the convention for list nominations is Land-wide, despite the fact that the party organizations do not correspond to Land boundaries. As a result, convention delegates only play a role in those cases where leadership divisions cannot be overcome prior to submitting proposals to the conventions. In contests that do occur, policy divisions are extremely rare. It may be that cultural attitudes about specialization and the compartmentalization of issues are operating here. Thus the local parties have the responsibility for nominations and the eventual m.p.'s decide policy without drawing the connection between the two.

Finally, in terms of influential groups in the nomination process, two different external groups appear to play similar roles in CDU and SPD nominations: big business associations in the CDU and the unions in the SPD. This appears to be due to the electoral system and to the similar importance which these groups have in the respective party's membership. The election law gives the parties control of nominations, making it extremely difficult for outside groups to nominate independent representatives of their interests. However, since businessmen and unionists are important segments of the CDU and SPD
memberships respectively, their representatives are nominated by the parties because they are an important proportion of the activists from which candidates are recruited and because the parties depend on their organizations to some extent for campaign aid—through financial contributions in the CDU and campaign work and votes in the SPD.

In both parties, the advantage of incumbency is quite high and few m.p.'s even face a challenge for renomination, although when involved in such contests, they do not always win. Indirectly the electoral system promotes this, since as we have seen the local party leaders are the most influential in nominations, and incumbents are in a better position to maintain their support through aid to the local organization and the promotion of regional interests in the Bundestag. Certainly, when incumbents lose renomination, it is due to their failure to perform these duties or retain local support.

As for the criteria used in candidate selection, public office is an asset for individuals seeking nomination in both the CDU and the SPD. Communal offices are more important however than a Landtag mandate. The expectation that the federal system would make a legislative career at the state level a stepping stone to a Bundestag career is not borne out. Apparently West Germany's functional federalism makes national and Land legislative
careers seem two different specialties. Local office is an advantage because of the importance of communal politicians as a group in the local party organizations.

It would seem that the electoral system is more important than the political culture in effecting the degree to which parliamentary skills and expertise are considered a nomination criteria. Because the parties' parliamentary leaders play little role in nominations, expertise needed by the fraction is not a significant criterion in either party. Of course, despite the high value attached to special knowledge in the political culture, it has also been pointed out that there is some confusion on the actual skills important for the role of an m.p. and this may also result in less attention to political qualifications in candidate selection.\textsuperscript{111}

In addition, certain aspects of the electoral system diminish the importance of voter-appeal as a criterion. The list vote determines the overall ratio of seats and the individual WK candidate has never affected the list vote by more than five per cent in any district.\textsuperscript{112} Thus the parties only directly consider voter appeal in the

\textsuperscript{111}For a discussion of the uncertainty in attitudes towards the m.p.'s role, see Loewenberg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 60-72.

\textsuperscript{112}In other words, most voters vote a straight ticket for list and WK, Lohmar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 71.
selection of the first five names of the list which appear on the ballot. Our expectation that the SPD's minority status and greater need to attract new voters would lead to more consideration of this factor than in the CDU was not borne out.

As we expected, the low status of a political career, with unsatisfactory material rewards and the attitude that politics is really an administrative matter has meant that the occupational range of m.p.'s in both parties is fairly narrow, with an ever-increasing proportion of civil servants in both fractions.

Differences

The differences in CDU and SPD candidate selection are due to their differing competitive positions, dissimilar membership composition, and divergent party doctrines. In general, the difference can be summed up by saying that the CDU process is more externally-oriented, while the SPD nominations are more internal.

The hypothesis about the relationship between overall competitive position and number of contests seems to be supported. It appears that the SPD's position as a minority party made it place greater value on party unity; there were fewer contests generally in the SPD than in the CDU at both the list and district levels. There is
additional support for this relationship in the fact that in 1969, after its participation in the Grand Coalition and with real hope for the first time of forming a government, the SPD had more nomination contests than the CDU. The differences in party membership and doctrine probably also contributed to the higher number of contests in the CDU. There are more conflicting interests among CDU members and party doctrine recognizes the legitimacy of their expression, whereas SPD membership is more homogeneous and there is emphasis on the traditional unity of the labor movement. Thus the SPD makes a greater effort to avoid conflict which may be disruptive of internal party relationships and adheres more closely to a regional distribution of list places.

Interestingly, the relationship between competitive position and frequency of contests does not appear to hold up at the level of individual districts. If it did, we should have found more contests in safe districts in both the CDU and the SPD, but this was not the case. While there were more contests in the CDU in safe WK and none in hopeless districts, this was not true in the SPD. It may be that the nature of the party organization is more important. The SPD has a strong organizational structure and in those districts with a likelihood of victory, the leadership would be more concerned to maintain control,
whereas the CDU organization is generally weak, so that the chance of election produces divisions that cannot be resolved prior to the conventions. The frequent contests in hopeless SPD districts may also be the result of its greater adherence to the practice of reinsuring WK candidates with list places. The reinsurance policy does not vary according to the proportion of WK vs. List seats won in a Land; even in those states where the SPD wins all the districts, WK candidates get a list nomination as well. Again, the SPD's extensive reinsurance seems to be due to the high value which contributions to the party and organization have in the SPD. WK candidates are rewarded for their greater campaign efforts and contribution to the vitality of the party by being placed on the list also.

There are also differences between the CDU and the SPD in the importance of different groups in the nomination process for list and WK candidates. While outright intervention by the national party is rare in both, the local SPD organizations do not react as negatively to the informal views of national leaders and give them somewhat more consideration than in the CDU. This supports our expectation that differences in party doctrine would give more influence to the national party in the SPD because of the emphasis on deference to authority and loyalty to the leadership. In contrast, CDU doctrine is strongly
federalist in orientation reflecting its origins in grassroots groups. The recent calls of national CDU officers for a national list indicate their inability to substantially influence the process as it now exists. CDU federalism is also reflected in the smaller overlap of Land and national party office-holders, which makes it more difficult for the national leaders to present their views.

In addition, although party executives are the most influential group in both, the second most important group varies. In the CDU, it is the external interest groups which through the auxiliaries and committees play a key role. In the distribution of list places, while regionalism is important, the representation of all groups is the major criterion of selection. In the SPD, on the other hand, it is the local party units which provide a counterweight to the Kreis or Bezirk executives, because of delegate independence in the WK, and reinsurance and regionalism on the lists which means that in many cases the Kreis executives select the list candidates also. Thus it appears that the membership and doctrinal differences between the parties have had the effect we anticipated. The SPD has fewer ties to external groups and even the

113See, for example, the party manager's speech in 1962, reported in Friedhelm Baukloh, "Soziale Koalition - Eine Alternative," Frankfurter Hefte, Vol. 17 (1962), 656.
unions are not represented by a separate auxiliary and play a limited role. The emphasis on organizational service and the desire to avoid internal dissension which produces strict adherence to reinsurance and regional division also gives the lower party levels a greater role than in the CDU. The impact of such principles as "internal party democracy" is less clear, as it is the activists, not the extended membership who are important.

The CDU's contrasting heterogeneity of membership and attitudes towards the expression of different interests has meant that group balance is the most important principle for the distribution of list places; and group support, rather than that of the lower party units, is the most important asset in winning nomination.

The greater role which the CDU youth organization plays in its nominations is more difficult to explain on the basis of our variables. Both parties have such auxiliaries, but the JU has been much more active than the Jusos, working particularly in the districts for the nomination of younger candidates. Perhaps the best explanation is not any higher value on youth, since the SPD has a somewhat younger fraction, but rather the influence which a well-organized, large member group can have in a generally weak party organization like the CDU.
The year, 1969, produced an interesting exception to the generally low number of contests and renomination challenges in the SPD. Not only did the number of challenges increase, but for the first time in either party, these were based on policy disputes. Although the SPD's participation in the government for the first time undoubtedly increased the importance of an M.P.'s voting behavior, the CDU's governmental position never produced such challenges on renomination. Most important perhaps is the fact that the SPD has traditionally been committed to Social Democracy, i.e., definite principles upon which political decisions are to be based and a commitment to membership participation in making those decisions. Thus when the party leaders, now in government, made decisions not only without consulting the membership, but which some felt conflicted with the party's Basic Program, policy challenges developed in the constituencies. It will be interesting to see how this conflict between governmental responsibility and party doctrine which long plagued the British Labour Party is resolved in the future in the SPD.

While the SPD pays a bit more attention to fraction needs for expertise in its candidate selection, it is not enough to support our expectation that there would be a considerable difference between the parties because of the SPD's minority position and its inability to rely on the
government bureaucracy for needed information. As we have seen the nomination process does not allow for parliamentary party leadership participation in candidate selection.

The differences in the composition of party membership are clearly reflected in the occupational distribution of CDU and SPD m.p.'s. The CDU fraction is more diverse and weighted towards the upper portion of the class scale, while the SPD m.p.'s are overwhelmingly middle-class. The recent efforts of the SPD to present a new image as a Volkspartei have not been able to overcome the fact that there aren't that many occupational groups represented among the party activists from which candidates are recruited. As expected, the CDU does pay some attention to religious balance in its selection of candidates, however Catholics are consistently overrepresented among m.p.'s as among the membership. Apparently of the two definitions of "Union" in party doctrine, the concept of a coalition of groups has become more important than bridging the gap between denominations, particularly since religious antagonism has declined in West German society.

Finally, we have characterized the differences in the nomination process by the fact that while both are decentralized, party units are most important in the SPD, whereas external groups play a major role in the CDU. On
this basis, if the hypotheses suggested by Schlesinger\textsuperscript{114} are correct, the SPD should have younger, more experienced m.p.'s than the CDU. This is the case with respect to the age differences. In addition, there is an interesting difference between the ages of CDU list and WK m.p.'s which apparently is due to the role of external groups in the list nominations and JU influence in the districts. Party office, as we have seen, is also a more important nomination criterion in the SPD. In general, the internal-party orientation of the process has made the SPD route to a Bundestag career much more routinized than in the CDU.

\textsuperscript{114}See Chapter I.
CHAPTER IV

NATIONAL PARTY LEADERS: SELECTION
AND CHARACTERISTICS

This chapter will describe the selection and characteristics of the CDU and the SPD national party chairmen and executive committees. This dimension of party organization should suggest the extent of "oligarchy" or internal party centralization. It will also provide a picture of the routes to power in party and government in West Germany and the extent to which the two major parties perform the important function of recruitment for the major positions in the political system.

The aspects of party leadership we are interested in include: the rules and actual selection process for national chairman and other national leaders; participants in the selection; contests for these positions; criteria used; the career patterns as reflected in characteristics of the leaders; and the links between party office and government position, i.e., party chairman as Chancellor-candidate and the overlap between the national party executives (Vorstände) and Länder, Bundestag, or Cabinet
offices. We will explore the ways in which the political system and other party variables have affected the similarities and differences between the CDU and the SPD in this dimension of party organization.

**CDU National Chairmen and Chancellor-candidates**

According to the current (1967) CDU statute, the national party convention is responsible for the election of the party chairman. Composed of delegations from the CDU Landesverbände, their numbers determined by a membership plus voter formula, such conventions are required "at least" every two years. In fact, there have been CDU Bundesparteitage in every year since 1950 with three exceptions—1955, 1959, and 1963. The chairman's term is two years; however, the actual elections have been irregular, as changes have taken place in mid-term. The voting is by secret ballot, with a majority necessary for election, although particularly in the early years the party was rarely that formal in its procedures. The statute makes no mention of a procedure for the selection of the party's Chancellor-candidate. As we shall see, the lack of rules

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regarding the relationship between the party chairmanship and the Chancellorship was reflected in the so-called "succession crisis" when Adenauer's long domination of both offices came to an end.

The CDU has had three national chairmen and Chancellors—Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger. We will begin this section with a description of their rise to office and the relationship between the two positions. The history of Adenauer's take-over of the CDU and election as the first West German Chancellor, which took place prior to the time period of this study, has been described in detail elsewhere. Briefly, as the party developed out of scattered groups in the late 1940's, Adenauer was able to exert control over the developing organization. This was due in part to his political skill and in part to an advantageous position as chairman of the party in the British zone, and head of the bizonal Economic Council. His party and public prominence prior to the founding of the Federal Republic, the lack of any effective central party headquarters, and his leadership in the 1949 campaign made it possible for him to assume the Chancellorship as CDU leader in 1949 without any formal decision by

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a party unit. Only after the first Federal Government had been in office for some time did the CDU hold a national party convention, at Goslar in 1950. At that time, a party statute was drawn up, the central office and executive in Bonn established, and Adenauer's leadership was formalized by his election as national party chairman. During most of the 1950's, his re-election to the chairmanship was a mere formality, usually unanimous, and his re-assumption of the Chancellorship after the major election victories of 1953 and 1957 a foregone conclusion. It was not until 1959 that the party began to seriously consider Adenauer's role and performance as party chairman and Chancellor, and the question of what to do after he was gone.\(^3\)

In 1958 and 1959, discussion began within the CDU as to the choice of a candidate for the Federal Presidency when the first President, Theodor Heuss's, second term expired. From the beginning it was evident that this question was linked with the choice of Adenauer's successor, primarily because of Adenauer's initial efforts to promote Ludwig Erhard, the popular CDU Economics Minister, as the new Presidential candidate. This was an effort on the part

\(^3\)Ibid. For an official description of early party history up to the founding of the Federal Republic, see CDU: Geschichte, Idee . . . , op. cit., pp. 11-13.
of Adenauer, his personal supporters, and some business interests disturbed by Erhard's economic policies to remove him as a rival and potential successor to Adenauer. When Erhard was nominated by a parliamentary committee, dissatisfaction was immediately expressed by the Land party organizations which had not participated in the decision, and by a large number of m.p.'s among whom Erhard was the popular choice as next Chancellor. This prompted Erhard to decline the nomination. A new nominating committee which included regional party leaders as well as m.p.'s was set up by the party executive, but while it was still deliberating Adenauer announced that he would become the Presidential nominee. The reasons for Adenauer's decision are not entirely clear, but he was apparently convinced that he could use the Presidency to remain in control and to influence the choice and actions of his successor.

This decision brought the succession question into the open, and it soon became clear that both the regional party leaders and the fraction were divided between those who would support whomever Adenauer selected and those favoring Erhard, who appeared to be in the majority. Eventually Adenauer withdrew as a Presidential candidate because of the negative public reaction to his obvious intentions to use the office for political purposes, and as he became aware of the difficulty of overriding his party's
preference for Erhard. He continued, however, to attack Erhard as unqualified to be Chancellor. Although the parliamentary leadership was eventually able to produce a superficial reconciliation between the two leaders, bitterness within the party and fraction towards Adenauer's cavalier behavior and his disregard for attitudes within the party and parliament remained. While the inability of Erhard's supporters to force his choice over Adenauer's personal antipathy indicates the continued strength of Adenauer's dominance within the party, the 1959 episode produced for the first time serious questioning within the CDU on Adenauer's performance as party chairman and Chancellor. From this point on there was growing concern within the party about the need for a chairman who would not neglect the organization, and would work to unify rather than exacerbate party conflicts.

After the 1961 election, there were a few unorganized groups within the CDU which hoped to form the new government without Adenauer, but they were unwilling to precipitate another public conflict, and Adenauer was able to take the

4 Jurgen Dömes, Mehrheitsfraktion und Bundesregierung (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), pp. 94-114.
Discontent with Adenauer's leadership and inattention to the party organization was, however, increasingly clear. This resulted in the creation in 1962 of a new position in the national party—"managing chairman." While party leaders made great efforts to deny that this was an effort to diminish Adenauer's power, their statements justifying the new position made clear the growing recognition within the CDU that the leadership of the party organization was an important and separate function from leadership of the country as Chancellor.

At the same time, declining vote percentages in Land elections after 1961 increased the pressure from regional party leaders for a new Chancellor who would have time to establish a record in office before leading the 1965 campaign. Adenauer finally promised to retire by the end of 1963. Hoping to avoid the last minute indecision and public disunity revealed in 1959, party leaders were determined that a successor be selected several months before


Adenauer's retirement. In the absence of any clear party rule as to which unit was responsible for the Chancellor's selection, the fraction leaders and Cabinet members seized the initiative and played the key role in making the decision. The fraction executive met and set a time limit for the final selection, and appointed the fraction chairman, Heinrich von Brentano, to make a recommendation. Brentano consulted with Josef-Hermann Dufhues, the recently elected managing chairman, who represented the party organization, and with Franz-Josef Strauss, the CSU leader.

While a number of individuals had been discussed as potential successors, including von Brentano himself, and Strauss, it was clear from the beginning that despite Adenauer's continued opposition, Erhard still had the support of a majority of m.p.'s. In addition, Dufhues, reflecting the concern of regional CDU leaders for the selection of someone with electoral appeal, worked for Erhard's selection. None of the other individuals mentioned as potential successors had enough support from the party organization, voters, or m.p.'s, and von Brentano therefore

recommended the selection of Erhard. In the full fraction meeting called to vote on von Brentano's recommendation, no other name was presented. A small number of no votes and abstentions probably reflected the few remaining Adenauer loyalists and some farm and business m.p.'s opposed to Erhard's economic views. Brentano was instructed to present the CDU choice to the Federal President at the appropriate time, and following this meeting, the CDU national party executive met and ratified the choice.\(^{10}\)

Thus, despite the speculation on other individuals—most of it promoted by Adenauer, there was very little real conflict over Erhard's succession to the Chancellorship. Much more debate and controversy surrounded the question of a new party chairman, however. Despite the obvious concern within the party over the need for unity in the top leadership, Erhard was initially quite reluctant to become party chairman as well as Chancellor. Never active in party as opposed to public office, Erhard perceived his role as a non-partisan popular leader. As a result, Adenauer was re-elected party chairman without opposition at the 1964 party convention.\(^{11}\) It was clear, however, that Adenauer

\(^{10}\)See Brentano's report on the procedure, ibid., pp. 112-14.

would use the position to state his own views, while Dufhues, the managing chairman, continued to do the actual organizational work. In a speech at the 1964 convention, Dufhues attempted to justify this awkward divided leadership as a recognition of the importance of the party organization as an independent entity.12

By 1965, it had become evident that the party needed, if not Erhard as chairman, at least someone in the position who would work with him as Chancellor, and Adenauer, who had continued to work to undermine Erhard's position, was finally persuaded to retire at the 1966 convention. Throughout the period from early 1965 until the convention in 1966, there was considerable speculation and controversy over the choice of a new chairman, as Erhard continued to be reluctant to accept the position.13 Adenauer publicly promoted several individuals who would work against Erhard. Initially Dufhues appeared to have majority support, since he was not considered a political rival, but a capable organizer who worked well with Erhard. As a Catholic, his selection would also provide religious balance in the top leadership since Erhard was Protestant. But early in 1966, Dufhues became seriously ill and dropped

12Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), op. cit., p. 44.
out of consideration. Some regional party leaders and Dufhues himself continued to persuade Erhard to become chairman. Another group of younger regional CDU politicians who had hopes of giving the party a more progressive image, decided to support Rainer Barzel, the new fraction chairman, for the party chairmanship. Considering Barzel a potential replacement for Erhard as Chancellor and someone more amenable to his foreign policy views, Adenauer also switched his support to Barzel. Although the formal nomination for chairman to be presented to the convention was the responsibility of the entire national executive, the major factor in their decision was the support of a potential nominee by the regional party leaders who could control the convention delegations. Barzel, an obvious political rival for the Chancellorship and with considerable political power as fraction chairman, publicly announced his candidacy for the nomination in mid-1966, and this threat finally forced Erhard to announce he also sought the nomination for party chairman. The regional party leaders remained divided. Some supported Erhard, a


smaller group from Nordrhein-Westfalen and Rheinland-Pfalz, with a significant bloc of convention votes, supported Barzel, and some were undecided. With the date of the convention approaching, these leaders met and due to Dufhues' efforts a compromise was agreed upon. Erhard was to be nominated for chairman, and Barzel as first deputy chairman—a new position. This agreement was accepted by the party executive, and Erhard was nominated and elected party chairman, without opposition, at the 1966 convention, although continued disagreement with his leadership could be seen in the large number of no votes and abstentions.

But the party's succession problem was not to be resolved so soon. At the same time that Erhard finally established a position of leadership in the party organization itself, a crisis was developing over his weaknesses in the Chancellorship. A number of regional leaders grew increasingly dissatisfied with Erhard's leadership after poor electoral results in Land elections during 1966. In addition, there was growing disunity in the party on foreign policy, particularly with regard to the actions of


17 Erhard received 413 of 548 votes, there were 80 no votes, 50 abstentions, and 5 write-ins, "CDU: Trost beim Bier," Der Spiegel, Vol. 20, no. 14 (March 28, 1966), 31.
Erhard's Foreign Minister, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, which were opposed to Adenauer's views. Not long after Erhard was elected national party chairman, several party leaders—including members of the Cabinet and the CSU—publicly suggested that Erhard resign as Chancellor. His actual downfall was of course precipitated by the governmental crisis in late October, 1966. This involved a dispute over the national budget in which the FDP Cabinet members resigned, and a motion asking for a no-confidence vote was passed in the Bundestag. Both the national party executive and the fraction communicated to Erhard the impossibility of his attempting to form a new government, and were concerned that the decision on his successor be made as quickly as possible. Unlike the situation in the period following Adenauer's announcement of his retirement as Chancellor, no one individual initially stood out as an obvious choice to replace Erhard. Barzel, the fraction chairman, Gerhard Schröder, Defense Minister, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Bundestag President, and Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg, were all mentioned as possible Chancellor-candidates in early meetings of the fraction executive and the national party executive. Each had some source of support within the parliamentary party

or the regional organizations, but most also had enough opponents to prevent a clear majority. Barzel was favored because of his vigorous leadership abilities, youth, and electoral appeal, but was disliked by many m.p.'s for his rough tactics as fraction leader; Schröder was popular among Protestant m.p.'s, and North Germans, but opposed by the older Adenauer group and the CSU because of his anti-French foreign policy views; Gerstenmaier had considerable personal popularity and parliamentary prominence, but was also considered an indecisive leader and was not personally interested in the Chancellorship; and Kiesinger, although supported by a number of South German leaders, had not been active nationally for a number of years and was not in the Bundestag. 19 Prior to the joint CDU/CSU faction meeting at which the decision was to be made, the CDU party executive announced that these four individuals were nominees. The CSU fraction then met separately, and Strauss announced publicly that the CSU m.p.'s would vote for Kiesinger. This strengthened his support considerably and prompted Gerstenmaier to withdraw as a candidate. 20 Thus, at the final meeting, the contest was between Barzel, Schröder, and Kiesinger, who received a majority on the

19 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

third round of votes. The vote divisions appeared to reflect cross-cutting regional and policy differences. Kiesinger's support from the CSU and South German m.p.'s was probably decisive. He and Schröder led on the first two votes, and Barzel's votes went to Kiesinger on the third round rather than to Schröder, apparently because of opposition to Schröder's foreign policy position. 21

Erhard had only assumed the party chairmanship because of the need for coordination with the Chancellor, and so announced he would retire as chairman at the 1967 convention. Thus, the party was again faced with the issue of the link between the Chancellorship and the party leadership post. Despite the obvious lesson from the Adenauer-Erhard experience of the need for unity in the two positions, a number of individuals besides Kiesinger were mentioned as a possible new chairman. As before, those party leaders dissatisfied with Kiesinger's leadership of the Grand Coalition promoted the nomination of individuals who might use the chairmanship to move the party in another direction. Unlike Erhard, whose long hesitation allowed serious opposition to build, Kiesinger quickly saw the need for control of the party organization and announced that he would be a candidate for the chairmanship. He had the

21 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
support of most of the regional party leaders, and those who opposed him were reluctant to continue further public display of CDU disunity. Instead, they concentrated their efforts on the selection of an independent General Secretary as a new rival to Kiesinger's authority. Kiesinger, aware of this effort, and despite strong opposition, was able to persuade the executive to nominate his candidate, Bruno Heck, a Cabinet Minister, for General Secretary. At the 1967 convention itself Kiesinger was elected party chairman by an almost unanimous vote.22

The large number of no votes and abstentions in the party chairmanship election at the 1969 convention were indicative of the extent to which Kiesinger was held responsible for the electoral losses in 1969. However, it appears that most of the leadership was reluctant to provoke a new contest over the chairmanship in the initially trying period of adjustment to the party's first experience in the opposition, and no opposing candidate was nominated against Kiesinger in his re-election as party chairman.23


The history of the CDU's chairmen and Chancellors illustrates the uncertainty within the party about the role of party chairman and its relationship to the position of Federal Chancellor. The two positions were not really perceived as distinct until Adenauer's influence began to decline. During the period of Adenauer's greatest influence, the chancellorship was the dominant position, and this was the position for which the succession issue first arose. In the two individual changes which have taken place in CDU history, the pattern has been for selection of a Chancellor-candidate first, and then a decision on the question of a new party chairman. The lack of any formal rule on which party unit was responsible for the selection of a Chancellor-candidate made it possible for the fraction and Cabinet leaders to seize the initiative and play the key role in the selection of Erhard and then Kiesinger as Chancellor, although in both cases the preference of the majority of regional party leaders was also important.

In neither Erhard's nor Kiesinger's case was their selection as Chancellor unanimous. Erhard's opponents eventually withdrew during the long period of debate which preceded his selection, so that there was no actual contest in the final fraction voting. Since the decision on Erhard's successor was made under pressure of a government crisis, there was no time for a "behind-the-scenes"
compromise or for the several individuals considered to assess their chances prior to the actual fraction vote.

The decision on the party chairmanship, following as it has the selection of Chancellor, is formally the responsibility of the national convention. The convention vote has, however, been only a ratification of the individual nominated by the national executive. Opposition or support for other individuals has not been manifested in the nomination of additional candidates, but in the extent of no votes or abstentions. There has, of course, been a great deal of conflict in the actual selection process prior to the convention. Opposing candidates and their supporters have generally reflected three different views of the nature of the chairman's role and his relationship to the Chancellor: (1) the view of the party chairmanship as a purely managerial position, to be filled by someone other than the Chancellor who will not be a political rival, but who will assist him in the coordination of party and government; (2) the view of the chairmanship as a key political position and symbol of the party, to be filled by the Chancellor as indicative of party unity; and (3) the chairmanship as a position of political influence to be used for alternative leadership and opposition to the Chancellor.
The 1963-1966 split between the Chancellor and party chairman has not been repeated, but in the selection of both Erhard and Kiesinger as chairman there was disagreement among those favoring the Chancellor's assumption of the party office, those favoring a neutral chairman who could devote full attention to party work, and those hoping to undermine the current Chancellor by supporting a political rival for the chairmanship. Once Erhard and Kiesinger decided to seek the chairmanship, their position as Chancellor was undoubtedly an important influence in their eventual nomination by the party executive. However, the decisive factor has been the support of the regional party leaders who could control the delegates' votes at the national conventions, and it has been the preference of these leaders which was reflected in the larger executive's nomination.

For most of the period, the most important criterion in the selection of CDU Chancellor has been electoral popularity, reflecting the party's concern to preserve its dominant competitive position. As long as Adenauer led the party to major election victories in the 1950's, there was no question of his continuing as Chancellor. It was the party's perception of a decline in his public popularity, and the disappointing electoral results in 1961 and 1962 which stimulated the pressure for his retirement and in
turn the regional politicians' preference for Erhard, an immensely popular political figure, to succeed him. Adenauer's efforts to promote opposition to Erhard on the basis of his governing ability and policy views had less impact compared to the crucial consideration of potential election results for public leaders whose careers depended on the party's continued success at the polls. Adherents of differing issue positions within the party have only been able to exert a negative influence in the selection of a Chancellor-candidate in the sense that the individual selected could not be totally unacceptable to any one major group. This factor assumed greater importance in Kiesinger's selection when remaining in government was dependent on his immediate ability to satisfy different party groups and work with a coalition partner, rather than on his future popularity at the polls. While his voter-appeal as indicated by his popularity as Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg was definitely a consideration, the fact that he was not strongly opposed by any regional or policy group within the party was a more important factor. So far, as measured in terms of the individuals who have actually filled the position, the most important criterion for the selection of a new party chairman has been their position as Chancellor. Whether organizational skill will receive more emphasis, if Kiesinger should step down, while
the party remains in opposition, is difficult to tell.

A comparison of the political background and careers of the three men who have been CDU Chancellors and party chairmen makes clear that there has been no single route to the highest governmental and party position. Adenauer, a local politician in the Weimar era, was a skilled political in-fighter who played a role in the early party development and dominated public life even before the founding of the Federal Republic. Ludwig Erhard, on the other hand, owed his public popularity to his reputation as the father of the "economic miracle." He was never interested in a party role, and did not even become a CDU member until after his appointment to the first Cabinet. Finally, while Kiesinger had been a national executive member and an m.p. in the early 1950's, his major background and experience was as a popular regional politician and Minister-President.

SPD National Chairmen and Chancellor-candidates

The 1968 statute of the SPD, as all previous party statutes, gives the responsibility for election of a party chairman to the national convention which is held every two years. The number of delegates from the party Bezirke is determined on the basis of membership size. Voting procedures specify a secret ballot, with a majority
required to elect. Nominations by the current national executive must be made two days in advance of the vote, those by delegates, requiring the signatures of thirty delegates from four Bezirke, must be submitted one day in advance. As in the CDU, the party statute makes no mention of a procedure for the selection of a Chancellor-candidate, although the executive and council’s joint responsibility for decisions relating to the preparation of Bundestag campaigns could be taken to imply their authority for such selection.24

The SPD has also had three chairmen and Chancellor-candidates: Kurt Schumacher, Erich Ollenhauer, and Willy Brandt, who became the first Social Democratic Chancellor in 1969. Although Schumacher’s term falls outside our time period, a brief description of his rise to the position of chairman, and the transition to Ollenhauer in late 1952 may be useful. Schumacher, a minor SPD politician prior to 1933, and a concentration camp inmate during the Nazi era, was able through iron determination and a personality which inspired intense loyalty to re-establish the party organization after the war. By 1946, he had become the dominant party leader and a prominent public spokesman and

was elected as the first post-war chairman without opposition. Although the party's experience during Weimar had been with a more or less colorless, collective leadership, Schumacher's behavior and view of his role appear to have been much closer to the earlier dynamic, personal style and influence of the party's founders— including Lassalle, Liebknecht, and Bebel.  

After 1949, Schumacher devoted most of his attention to his role as leader of the opposition in the Bundestag. Despite superficial similarities to Adenauer in terms of strength of personality and political leadership, Schumacher's relationship to the party organization as chairman and Chancellor-candidate was quite different from Adenauer's. The basis of Schumacher's strength as opposition leader was the SPD organization which he rebuilt, and remained in control of, although the actual managerial work was entrusted to his lieutenants. Schumacher relied on this organizational position plus his public prestige for maximum effectiveness as a symbol of Social Democracy. The outward unity of the party during this early period did

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conceal internal discontent over Schumacher's strategy and tactics, particularly from the so-called "Burgermeister flügel," those SPD regional politicians who held public office. However, no one individual had enough prominence to challenge Schumacher personally, and he was re-elected party chairman by virtually unanimous votes at the party conventions in 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1950.26

Kurt Schumacher died in August 1952, and one month later Erich Ollenhauer, the deputy chairman, a long time party servant, and member of the party's exile-executive during the war, was elected unanimously as the new party chairman.27 There was no SPD succession crisis at this time. Party unity in its choice of Ollenhauer was due to its weak competitive position and desire to avoid internal controversy so close to an election, as well as to the fact that the reform elements within the party were not in a strong enough position to make a bid for the top leadership. In addition, Ollenhauer's reputation as a devoted organization man and a compromiser on policy differences tended to make him acceptable to all sides. Disagreements within the party during this period were more likely to be reflected in policy resolutions and the election of members

26Ibid., pp. 116-28, 322.

27Chalmers, op. cit., pp. 141-42.
of the national executive.  

For most of Ollenhauer's term as chairman, the party seemed to have turned back to the collegial leadership tradition of Weimar, with a reliance on the party's image as a unified community of members, rather than on a single individual leader, to provide a public symbol. While there were scattered criticisms of the leadership after the party's second electoral loss in 1953, and the internal debate on a foreign policy position continued to grow, Ollenhauer was re-elected chairman without opposition at the 1954 convention and again in 1956. In 1956, he was supported by most of the parliamentary leaders who were later to be associated with the party reform, with whom Ollenhauer had cooperated in a modification of the party's position on national defense.

It was only after another disappointing result in


29Chalmers quotes the following statement by a party member as indicative of attitudes towards the chairmanship during the Ollenhauer period: "... in a party in which the majority decisions, taken on a democratic basis, are the highest law, it is in the last analysis a matter of no consequence who is the party chairman, ..." op. cit., p. 140. For a discussion of the 1954 convention, see Theo Pirker, Die SPD Nach Hitler (Munich: Rütten & Loening Verlag, 1965), p. 201; and of the 1956 convention, Schellenger, op. cit., pp. 80-82.
the 1957 campaign which Ollenhauer again led as the party's alternative to Adenauer that open suggestions about his replacement were heard. The 1958 SPD convention was significant in a number of respects. The increasing influence of the reform elements within the party, including many prominent parliamentarians, and a more general recognition of a need for change in the party's style and strategies resulted in the election of two reformers as Ollenhauer's deputies and a reduction in the power of the party bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Ollenhauer was re-elected chairman without an opponent, although the larger number of no votes and abstentions were a clear indication of considerable dissatisfaction with his leadership. In 1959, in the midst of major reform of the party's program, and hoping to capitalize electorally on the CDU's succession crisis, Ollenhauer and the party leadership accepted the need for adapting to the Chancellor-oriented voting patterns and he announced he would not be a candidate for Chancellor in 1961. The party executive then appointed a seven-member commission to select a new Chancellor-candidate and election team for the 1961 campaign. The commission's members, with the exception of Ollenhauer, were regional politicians or m.p.'s associated with party reform.30

While there was initially some consideration given to the selection of Carlo Schmid, a prominent parliamentarian and the party's candidate for the Federal Presidency in 1959, as Chancellor-candidate, the commission eventually recommended Willy Brandt, Lord-Mayor of Berlin. Brandt's primary reputation was not in party organization work, but in his public position. He had been associated with Ernst Reuter and a group of Berlin reformers, and was only elected to the national party executive in 1958. Although not particularly popular with SPD activists in the organization, he had considerable national prominence and popularity as the leader of Berlin.\(^{31}\) His selection was approved by the 1960 convention at the same time that Ollenhauer was re-elected chairman by an overwhelming majority. Thus, for the first time there was a division between the party's election leadership and the organizational leadership. Apparently, the chairmanship continued to be viewed as a position requiring organizational experience and skills, and as a symbol of the more traditional values of party service and loyalty, while the campaign leadership was recognized as a separate instrument for attracting votes and appealing to the public. After the 1961 election Brandt returned to his Berlin post, Ollenhauer remained the fraction chairman and was re-elected party

\(^{31}\)Schellenger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 114-25.
chairman in 1962 at which time Brandt became a deputy party chairman.32

Ollenhauer died unexpectedly in late 1963. No party regulations governed the selection of a chairman when the incumbent dies in office (Schumacher died right before a regularly scheduled convention), and the next convention was not until November 1964. Because of great concern to avoid the public disunity over its top leadership which the CDU had recently displayed, and anticipating the possibility of opposition to Brandt's election as chairman from among older traditionalists who wanted a party chairman doing full-time organizational work in Bonn, the national executive called a special convention in February 1964 for the election of Brandt as the new chairman. At this convention the leadership was apparently successful in arguing that the times required a new view of the chairman as a public symbol and political leader, while the party deputy chairmen could concentrate on purely organizational tasks, and no opposition was put up to Brandt's election. He was then re-elected at the regularly

scheduled convention in November 1964.\textsuperscript{33}

After the party's failure to get beyond forty per cent of the vote in 1965, Brandt was urged by Herbert Wehner, a deputy chairman and the real organization director, to stay in Bonn as leader of the opposition in the Bundestag, but he announced instead his return to Berlin and a decision not to be the party's Chancellor-candidate again in 1969. A number of the top leaders apparently shared his judgement that his background had been used effectively against the party by the CDU in the campaign. Speculation at this point was centered around the selection of a new Chancellor-candidate for 1969.\textsuperscript{34} At the same time, no question was raised concerning the chairmanship, and Brandt was re-elected chairman at the 1966 convention with an overwhelming personal endorsement—the highest vote a party chairman had received. The party thus appeared to be contemplating another dual leadership, the Chancellor-candidate continuing to be viewed as a tool for gaining the best possible electoral results. The perception of the chairman's role seemed to have become less clear, since it


was now held by an unsuccessful popular figure. The situation changed, of course, with the party's decision to participate in the Grand Coalition. Brandt was the obvious choice for the top SPD Cabinet post in the new government, and he was then re-elected chairman in 1968. In 1969, he led the party's campaign and afterwards became the first post-war SPD Chancellor.  

While the post-war history of succession in the SPD party chairmanship has been much more tranquil than in the CDU, the SPD has also gone through a period of uncertainty as to the differing roles of the Chancellor-candidate and party chairman. As we shall see in the next section, conflicts within the party have been much more evident in the selection of other members of the national executive than in the election of a party chairman.

A small group of national party leaders in the executive have made the actual decisions on the party chairmanship. In Ollenhauer's case, there was no real question of an alternative, and the executive nominated from among its own members the second in command with the longest period of organizational service. In Brandt's case, the

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national leadership was able to circumvent the possibility of an alternate candidate by holding a special convention immediately following Ollenhauer's death. Despite serious internal conflicts both during the Ollenhauer period over party reform, and in Brandt's case, over the Grand Coalition and accompanying strategy, dissident elements in the party never organized around a personal alternative to the party chairman. At most, the discontent was expressed in the number of no votes and abstentions in the chairmanship elections, which were at their highest in 1958.

Up until 1958, campaign leadership received less emphasis in the SPD and was assumed to follow from the party chairmanship, and both Schumacher and Ollenhauer served in both roles. As the reformers gained dominance in the top leadership and the party began to accept the fact that electoral gains required an adaptation to the realities of the political system—including elections as a choice between alternative Chancellors—even Ollenhauer and the more traditionally oriented leaders recognized the different requirements of the two positions. Brandt's election to the chairmanship in 1964 indicated that the conception of the chairman's role was also changing. Until then, the party had accepted the need for a popular leader with non-party appeal only in the role of Chancellor-candidate, but with Brandt's assumption of the chairmanship,
the view of the party position also appeared to be changing to a locus for the exercise of a more symbolic political leadership and representation of the party image, while individuals in secondary positions performed the more traditional organizational tasks. On the other hand, the speculation concerning a new Chancellor-candidate at the same time that Brandt was re-elected chairman after the 1965 elections suggests that the possibility of a separation of the two positions was still considered acceptable.

A study of the SPD in the late 1950's suggested two possible future trends in the relationship of its public political and organizational leadership: either public officeholders would come to dominate the organization positions, or these positions, including the chairmanship would diminish in importance and become managerial only. The Ollenhauer-Brandt period seemed to follow the latter, but since then the party does seem to have gone in the first direction—the dominance of public office-holders. Certainly Brandt's career and background in contrast to both Schumacher and Ollenhauer was not primarily in party work. Whether a similar career pattern applies to the secondary leadership positions will be considered in the section on the executive committee.

36 Chalmers, op. cit., p. 160.
The CDU National Executive Committee (Bundesvorstand)

The Bundesvorstand is the top leadership group in the national CDU organization. As noted in Chapter II, the CDU and CSU are primarily linked through a joint parliamentary party, and the CSU does not participate in the national party organization. The CSU has its own independent party headquarters in Munich. Franz-Josef Strauss has been in control of the organization since the late 1950's and party chairman since 1961. Although Bundestag m.p.'s have not usually been in the majority on the formal CSU executive, they and Strauss' Munich-based supporters have controlled the organization.37

According to the most recent CDU statute, there are thirty members of the executive: the party chairman, the General Secretary, five deputy chairmen, the treasurer, nineteen other elected members, the Bundestag President, the fraction chairman, and the party Federal Manager. All except the last three are elected, with separate ballots for the individual officers, at the national conventions. Voting is secret and a majority required for election. In the case of the ballot for deputies, and that for the other

37 For a more extensive description of the CSU organization, see Dömes, op. cit., p. 47; or Rudolf Wildenmann, Helmut Unkelbach, and Werner Kaltefleiter, Wahler Parteien und Parlament (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1965), p. 112.
nineteen members, the delegates must vote for at least three-fourths of the positions. The General Secretary is to be nominated by the chairman and serve four years, the term for the others is two years. Of the three ex-officio members, two are parliamentary leaders, while the Federal Manager is a salaried position filled by the executive itself. Within the executive, a smaller group—the Präsidium—is organized to conduct day-to-day business. It is composed of the chairman, General Secretary, deputies, treasurer, the fraction chairman, Bundestag President, and Chancellor if other than the chairman. This organizational structure has only been in effect since 1967, and there were important changes in the size, ratio of ex-officio to elected membership, and extent of cooptation in the CDU executive during the period of our study. Figure 2 illustrates the organizational changes in the elected membership of the Präsidium from 1953 to 1969.

By 1953, Chancellor Adenauer had been able to exert control over the Land leaders of his party, and their role in national politics had declined. Although these regional leaders dominated the national party executive, the committee met rarely and did not even play an important role

38CDU: Geschichte, Idee . . . , op. cit., pp. 94-95, 98.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Treasurer</th>
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<td></td>
<td>4 other Präsidium members</td>
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<td></td>
<td>treasurer</td>
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**Fig. 2—CDU Präsidium (Elected Members): Changes 1953-1969**
### 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Chairman</th>
<th>1st Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>2nd Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>3rd Deputy Chairman</th>
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<tr>
<td>Managing Präsidium Members</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Other Präsidium Members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 1967

<table>
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<tr>
<th>General Secretary</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
<th>Deputy Chairman</th>
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<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
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in the internal party organization.\textsuperscript{39} Members of the executive during this period were mainly regional leaders, interest group representatives and m.p.'s. In 1953, there were twenty-nine individual members plus all CDU Land Minister-Presidents and Land party chairmen ex-officio. Of these, only the party chairman, two deputies, treasurer, and a three-member managing executive were elected by the national convention. The first important changes in the structure were made in 1956.\textsuperscript{40}

At the 1956 convention, a coalition of regional party organizations led by the chairman of the largest, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Josef-Hermann Dufhues, proposed from the floor and succeeded in getting adopted, despite Adenauer's resistance, an increase in the number of deputy chairmen from two to four. The change was motivated by the desire of the regional parties for more influence on the executive through the number of members elected at conventions. It also provided a position in the national organization for the former Nordrhein-Westfalen


\textsuperscript{40}CDU Bundesvorstand members, 1950, 1953, mimeo, from CDU Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bonn; and Max Lange, et al., Parteien in der Bundesrepublik (Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1955), pp. 109-14.
Minister-President Karl Arnold, who for a long period had resisted Adenauer's attempts to control the organization of CDU Land governments. Arnold and another Land Minister-President and regional party chairman, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, were elected to the new deputy chairmanships. At the same convention, a number of other changes in the organizational structure of the top leadership recommended by the executive were also adopted. These changed the composition of the smaller executive (Präsidium) to include the nine party officers elected at the convention, plus the fraction chairman and the three new ex-officio members—the deputy fraction chairman, the Bundestag President, and the federal manager. The larger executive was made up of these individuals, the CDU Cabinet members, Land Minister-Presidents, regional party chairmen, and national party auxiliary chairmen ex-officio, and ten additional coopted members.

In 1960, this organization was again changed. The three elected managing executive members were dropped, and the size of the Präsidium was increased by the addition of eighteen new members—fifteen selected by the party Ausschuss (itself dominated by the regional leaders) and three coopted by the executive. Thus, only seven members

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41 Merkl, op. cit., p. 255.
42 Flechtheim, Vol. VI (1968), op. cit., 45-47; and CDU Bundesvorstand members, 1956, mimeo.
of the national executive were to be elected at the convention. The other eighteen members were supposed to be specialists in particular policy areas, but most were m.p.'s as well as representatives of various interest groups.43

As noted above, the discontent over Adenauer's party leadership, particularly among the regional leaders, increased after the electoral declines in 1961. Within the party organization, this dissatisfaction was expressed in the changes in the top leadership proposed and adopted at the 1962 convention. Following the previous pattern, individual leaders continued to be re-elected, but their positions were rearranged, and new positions created.44

A second chairmanship—managing chairman—was created to counter Adenauer's power, and Dufhues, the prominent NRW party leader was elected to the position. The four deputy chairmanships were dropped, and von Hassel was elected Dufhues' deputy. This also provided some religious balance as von Hassel was a representative of the Protestant wing, while Adenauer and Dufhues were both Catholics. The Präsidium was changed to include the above three positions, plus the treasurer and four new elected

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43 Kaack, op. cit., p. 89; and CDU Bundesvorstand members, 1960, 1961, mimeo.

44 Lohmar, op. cit., p. 88.
positions of Präsidentium members. The three other former deputy chairmen were re-elected as Präsidentium members. Ludwig Erhard, as Adenauer’s potential successor, was elected as the fourth Präsidentium member. The membership structure of the larger executive remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{45}

As was usual throughout this period, the contested votes were on the proposed organizational changes, not on the election of individuals to fill the positions. There was only one candidate for each position and they were elected by acclamation.\textsuperscript{46}

The prolonged succession crisis, first with regard to the Chancellorship and then the party chairmanship produced further changes in 1966. As a result of the compromise among the regional leaders which resolved the conflict over the chairmanship in Erhard’s favor, a new position—first deputy chairman—had to be created for his rival, fraction chairman Rainer Barzel. As Dufhues was too ill to continue as managing chairman, this position was to be dropped, and the original compromise had assumed that his duties would be assumed by the first deputy. However, a group of Erhard supporters, including a number of m.p.’s who disliked Barzel’s methods in the fraction, and the Junge Union leaders succeeded in persuading the national

\textsuperscript{45}Kaack, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 90.

\textsuperscript{46}Müller, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 50-51.
executive to drop this provision from the recommended changes presented to the 1966 convention. In general, the final changes adopted worked in Erhard's favor. The new Präsidium was composed of the chairman, three deputies, a new elected position of managing Präsidium member (to take over the managing chairman's functions), the treasurer, and six other elected members. Previous officers were re-elected to new positions. The chairman, deputies and managing member were elected unopposed although continued opposition to Barzel was reflected in the fact that he received the lowest number of votes for deputy chairman. Bruno Heck, on the other hand, a member of Erhard's Cabinet and a former Federal Manager in the late 1950's, nominated for managing member, received the highest number of votes with the exception of Erhard. Six individuals were nominated by the executive for the other Präsidium positions, and three additional names were submitted by delegates, so that for the first time there were more nominees than positions. In the voting, one executive nominee was defeated.

This new arrangement of the CDU executive was not, however, destined to last long. When Kiesinger became Chancellor and was nominated for the party chairmanship in


1967, still further changes were necessitated. Kiesinger wished to insure a closer coordination between party and government by nominating Bruno Heck, who remained in the Grand Coalition Cabinet, for a new position of General Secretary. A number of the regional leaders wanted the new position to be a salaried, full-time one, but on the key vote at the convention, Kiesinger's proposal was accepted. Heck was then elected without opposition as General Secretary.49 A number of other changes recommended by Kiesinger and the executive were also adopted at the convention. A fifth deputy chairmanship was added to meet the demand of the women's organization for representation on the Präsident and its membership was changed to: the chairman, deputies, General Secretary, treasurer, and the Bundestag President, fraction chairman, and federal manager ex-officio. In addition, to comply with the new Party Law which required that the majority of a party's national leadership be elected, and because Kiesinger believed a reduction in size would make the larger executive more efficient, the forty-nine ex-officio and coopted members were dropped. The new national executive included the Präsident plus nineteen other elected members.50


For the first time there were contests on each ballot except for the chairmanship. This was due both to the reduction in size which meant choosing among incumbents, as well as to the reluctance of the party after its experience with Erhard to accept without opposition the new chairman's proposals. In each of the cases, however, the executive's nominees did eventually win. Two nominations were made from the floor for the deputy chairmanships in addition to the five nominees of the executive, all of whom had been deputies or Präsidium members previously. In this case the real contest was the result of a split in the Sozialausschüsse between supporters of their representative and former deputy chairman, Paul Lücke, and supporters of Hans Katzer, another Sozialausschüsse leader, which Lücke won. In the case of treasurer, the executive nominee, a former Minister and refugee organization representative won over the former treasurer who was renominated by his Land organization. It took three rounds of votes to elect the nineteen other executive members in a contest between the executive's slate and three individuals nominated by a group of younger, more progressive delegates. While there were no organizational changes at the 1969 conventions, contests again took place, and this time
several of those nominated by the executive lost.\textsuperscript{51}

The CDU national executive can best be viewed, and the party itself has viewed it\textsuperscript{52} as a reflection of and locus for the coordination of a shifting coalition of different organized interests within the party. At no time has any single group been able to entirely dominate the top leadership positions. Particularly the Sozialausschüsse, but also business interests, the women's organization, and the JU have all made claims, recognized as legitimate by the party, for representation on the executive. The deputy chairmanships in particular have been used for this purpose. There have also been varying degrees of representation for the different party units—regional leaders and the fraction. Of course, through 1967, each element of the party organization was guaranteed representation on the larger executive through ex-officio membership. The party bureaucracy, not large in any case, has been represented by the Federal Manager, currently an advisory member of the Präsidium, and throughout the period a member of the larger executive. The position has not been one of political leadership, but has been considered strictly managerial. For


\textsuperscript{52}\textit{See}, for example, the statement reprinted in Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), \textit{op. cit.}, p. 123.
most of the period, care was exercised to also provide religious balance among the top officials. By the late 1960's, however, less consideration was given to this and the over-representation of Catholics in the membership was reflected in the party offices as well. Policy positions and differences, except as reflected in the auxiliary organizations, have not played a key role in the selection of elected members.

Control of the selection process has generally been held by the current executive which recommended its own re-election, and coopted representatives of other groups at the same level. The parliamentary leaders, in office before the first national executive was organized in 1950, have also influenced the choice of top leaders. Because of their role in the selection of a Chancellor, both Erhard and Kiesinger were attentive to their claims in the nominations for deputy chairmanships and Präsidium members. Due to their control of the convention delegations, the regional party leaders have also influenced the executive in its choice of nominees.

Until recently, more than one candidate for each position was quite unusual. With the elimination of ex-officio representation for the regions and auxiliaries in 1967, the contests which occurred involved efforts by these groups to get representation in addition to that
provided in the executive's slate of nominations. Since the voting procedures have allowed delegates to vote for only three-fourths of the positions on a ballot, delegations, by concentrating their votes, do have some chance of getting their nominee elected.

Up until 1967, the ratio of ex-officio and coopted to elected members of the executive was quite high, ranging from three to one to nine to one. Throughout the period, ex-officio membership included the fraction chairman and deputy, Bundestag President, Cabinet members, national auxiliary chairmen, Land party chairmen and CDU Land Minister-Presidents; those appointed by the Party Council or coopted by the executive increased from ten to eighteen in 1960. The actual number of individuals varied, as some held more than one of these positions. The representation of non-party organized interest groups was primarily insured through their inclusion among the appointed and coopted members. In addition, many of these individuals were also m.p.'s—43 per cent of the total non-elected executive members in 1953, and an average of 50 per

53For example, in 1967, two of the three additional nominations for the executive were from the Sozialausschüsse and the JU, respectively, Friedholm Baukloh, "Erfreuliche Initiative: Der Arbeitnehmer Flügel der CDU aktiviert Sich," Frankfurter Hefte, Vol. 22, no. 10 (1967), 664.
cent thereafter.\textsuperscript{54}

Table 10 provides an indication of both the prior political experience and the extent of overlap with other party and public offices which existed among the elected members of the CDU national executive from 1953 to 1969. In the early period, those elected members without prior party office were primarily m.p.'s who had achieved parliamentary prominence before the national party organization was created. Some members of this group continued to be re-elected in each succeeding term. In addition, individuals who achieved prominence in public office or held positions in important outside interest groups—refugees, and farmers—have been elected to the executive. Close to half of the elected leaders in each term, however, have had some previous position in the regional parties or auxiliaries. The consistent decrease between those holding prior regional party office and those holding such positions concurrent with a national elected office, as well as the increase in the number of those with no other concurrent party office would seem to indicate some hierarchical structuring of party careers. Some overlap between the regional and national elected leadership has existed, and of course regional leaders were also ex-officio members of

\textsuperscript{54}The estimates are based on CDU Bundesvorstände members, 1950-1969, mimeo.
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<th>1958 (n=9)</th>
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<td>Prior to 1st Elec.</td>
<td>Con- to Exec.</td>
<td>Prior</td>
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<tr>
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<td>86% (6)</td>
<td>33% (5)</td>
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<td>Local, regional party office</td>
<td>43% (3)</td>
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<td>14% (1)</td>
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<td>1960 (n=6)</td>
<td>1962 (n=8)</td>
<td>1964 (n=8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Con-current</td>
<td>Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other Party office</td>
<td>50% (3)</td>
<td>67% (4)</td>
<td>25% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, regional party office</td>
<td>50% (3)</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>50% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Auxiliary Organization Office</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Party, Inner Executive</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>13% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Office</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>38% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdL Only</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>50% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdB</td>
<td>100% (6)</td>
<td>83% (3)</td>
<td>88% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offices</td>
<td>elected members 1966 (n=12)</td>
<td>elected members 1967 (n=27)</td>
<td>elected members 1969 (n=27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other Party Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, regional party office</td>
<td>33% (4)</td>
<td>50% (6)</td>
<td>7% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Auxiliary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Office</td>
<td>42% (5)</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>74% (20)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Parliamentary Party, Internal Executive Public Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>25% (3)</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>19% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>25% (3)</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>22% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdL Only</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>26% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>50% (6)</td>
<td>42% (5)</td>
<td>37% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdB</td>
<td>75% (9)</td>
<td>83% (10)</td>
<td>56% (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


aTotals may be larger than the number of individuals because of double office-holding apart from executive membership.

bThis includes local and regional party auxiliaries.
the larger executive until 1967. The percentage of current regional leaders on the elected executive in 1967 and 1969 is somewhat larger than their percentage as ex-officio members in the earlier period. This is probably an indication of their greater influence in convention voting, and of their increased importance with the party in opposition.55

In addition to their ex-officio membership, the national leaders of the two most important auxiliaries—the JU and the Sozialausschüsse—were usually elected to the inner executive. At least one Sozialausschüsse leader has been in every Cabinet also. Prior experience in the auxiliaries and particularly the JU has been common for many prominent CDU Cabinet Ministers and parliamentarians elected to the national party executive.

The two top fraction leaders have always been ex-officio members of the executive, but the election of other current fraction officers was less common. Since most Cabinet members were recruited from the fraction executive, those Ministers elected to the inner executive had had prior positions in the fraction. In 1967, instead of being ex-officio members, CDU Cabinet members of the

55The Protokoll of the 1969 CDU convention, op. cit., reflects this, as well as a concern for a greater representation of regional leaders on the executive.
Grand Coalition were elected to the larger executive. An increase in the number of fraction leaders in 1967 and 1969 reflects the altered governmental position of the CDU. Kiesinger was more dependent on the parliamentary party in the new coalition with the SPD. After the 1969 election, many of the former Cabinet Ministers were elected to the fraction executive, although Kiesinger did not become fraction chairman or even enter the Bundestag.

The CDU/CSU fraction leadership itself has consisted of the chairman, a varying number of deputies, the chairman of the "working circles" (subject area study groups), the whip and a large number of additional, mainly coopted members. Elections for the top fraction positions have been used to provide representation for the different groups in the parliamentary party, including, of course, the CSU. Contests over the allocation of these top positions have been rare, although the occasional election of additional members has been contested by groups of m.p.'s to get additional representation. Business, labor, and agriculture representatives have always held at least one deputy chairmanship, and the working circles, set up to correspond to the major groups, have been chaired by their representatives.56

During Adenauer's terms as Chancellor, the Cabinet members were mainly drawn from this group, although he clearly controlled the individual selections. Both Erhard and Kiesinger owed their selection as Chancellor to the fraction and were more receptive to its demands, fraction leaders participating much more extensively in the Cabinet selection.57

As for other public-office experience, the number of former or current Land Ministers elected to national positions in addition to ex-officio membership on the larger executive was fairly small. The numbers elected in 1967 and 1969 represented some increase over their ex-officio membership previously, a reflection of the concern of party leaders to make the executive function more efficiently as a unit for party integration. Those members of the executive with former or concurrent Landtag mandates have usually been Land party chairmen, or occasionally out-of-office Minister-Presidents.

As was true for the non-elected members prior to 1967, the majority of elected party officials have been

members of the Bundestag. The slight decrease in concurrent percentages has been due to m.p.'s who resigned their mandate to assume positions in Länder governments. The larger decline in 1969 is a result of the increase in regional politicians.

In general terms, the CDU seems to have rewarded its public leaders and recognized the importance of those in prominent positions by electing them to the top positions in the party organization as well. Finally, we might point out the development of an organizational position—from Managing Chairman Dufhues to General Secretary Heck, subordinate to the political leadership of the Chancellor and/or party chairman. Although the careers of both men included party and public office, Dufhues as a regional party chairman and Land Minister, Heck as Federal Manager and later a Cabinet member, neither have been regarded as political rivals for those holding major office.

In addition to party service, public prominence, and group representation, incumbency has been an important consideration in the selection of top leaders, as reflected in Table 11. Part of the decrease in re-election rates for each term has been due to deaths or the retirement of elderly leaders. The unusual absence of any turnover in the top leadership in 1964 was probably due to the uncertainty over Erhard's position as Chancellor while Adenauer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Executive Committee</th>
<th>% of new members</th>
<th>Per cent Re-elected at Succeeding Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953/1954</td>
<td>(7 mbrs.) (5)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>(9 mbrs.) (5)</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>(9 mbrs.) (3)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>(6 mbrs.) (1)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>(8 mbrs.) (2)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>(8 mbrs.) (0)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>(12 mbrs.) (3)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>(27 mbrs.) (16)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>(28 mbrs.) (12)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

remained party chairman. Much of the increase in new members in the last three terms has been a reflection of increases in the size of the executive. The 1969 turnover, however, also indicates the reaction to the election results, when a number of older leaders were not even renominated at the 1969 convention.

The SPD Party Executive Committee (Parteivorstand)

Unlike the CDU, the entire SPD national executive has always been elected every two years at the party's national convention. Currently it consists of the chairman, two deputy chairmen, the treasurer (each elected on separate ballots), and additional members, their number determined by the convention, and including at least four women. The rules on voting and nominations are the same as for the chairmanship. The procedural rules adopted at each convention have usually required delegates to vote for each position on the ballot. The size of the inner executive (Präsidium) is also determined by each convention, but its members are selected after the convention by the executive from among its own membership.58

In striking contrast to the continuous re-arrangements in the CDU, the organizational structure of the SPD

executive was changed significantly only once, in 1958, as Figure 3 indicates. Prior to 1958, the executive consisted of: the chairman, one deputy chairman, five salaried heads of various departments in the national office (elected on a single separate ballot), and twenty-three additional members also elected on a single ballot. The Präsidium, composed of the chairman, his deputy and the five paid members, was dominated by traditional organization men and functionaries.\(^{59}\)

As noted above, the reformers' dissatisfaction with the party leadership increased considerably after the 1957 election defeat. Between the election and the 1958 convention, a number of open demands for changing and modernizing the party were made. These included a reorganization of the leadership to more adequately reflect the diversity of experience in the party and a reduction of the apparat's influence and the bureaucratic image of the SPD.\(^{60}\)

Ollenhauer's position as party chairman was not directly challenged, but a first indication of the decline in his influence and control occurred in the fraction executive elections immediately after the 1957 loss. Ollenhauer's two former fraction deputies, one of whom was also

\(^{59}\text{Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1952/1953 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, n.d.), p. 257.}\)

\(^{60}\text{Chalmers, op. cit., p. 144.}\)
Fig. 3—Reorganization of the SPD Executive

pre-1958

Party chairman

deputy chairman

five paid members
(includes treasurer)

twenty-three unpaid members

1958 changes

Party chairman

deputy chairman

deputy chairman
treasurer

twenty-nine paid and/or unpaid members
the party organization deputy chairman, were not re-elected
despite his support. Instead, three new deputy fraction
chairmen, Carlo Schmid, Herbert Wehner, and Fritz Erler—
all associated with the demands for party reform—were
elected. The party executive then set up a seven-member
commission to recommend organizational changes at the 1958
convention. Ollenhauer, his deputy chairman, and the party
treasurer were outnumbered by the four other members—the
three new fraction deputies plus another reformer, Waldemar von Knoeringen.61

Anticipating the reform demands, the changes recom-
mended by the commission and presented by the executive to
the convention included: an increase in the size of the
executive to thirty-three members; a second deputy chair-
manship; and a change in the Präsium membership to the
chairman, deputies, treasurer, and any five other executive
members selected by the executive. By increasing the size
of the executive, representatives of the reform groups
could be elected without necessarily defeating any of the
older members. The Präsium change allowed for a decrease
in the bureaucracy's influence since the paid members
would no longer automatically form the top leadership group.

These changes were accepted without controversy by the

61Ibid., p. 117; and David Childs, From Schumacher
convention, but the reformers proposed an additional change to further reduce the apparat's role which was opposed by Ollenhauer and his associates on the executive. The reformers were successful in adopting a rule change which required the election of paid and unpaid members on the same ballot, thus forcing the older functionaries to run against more popular political leaders. In the election which followed, two party employees, on the executive since 1946, were defeated and the other three paid members were re-elected with considerably reduced margins. The former deputy chairman died shortly before the convention, and the two new deputies, Wehner and von Knoeningen, were both associated with the reformers. Almost half of the other executive members were new also--mostly regional politicians who supported a new party style. This was a considerable victory for the reformers, and particularly the parliamentarians who dominated the new Präsidium selected after the convention. Since 1958, there have been no substantial changes in the structure of the party executive.

In general, as the account of the 1958 change also indicates, the major factor in the election of new leaders has been their nomination by the current executive. There

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62 Schellenger, op. cit., pp. 150-56.
63 Kaack, op. cit., p. 92; and Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 86-88.
have usually been a few additional nominations from convention delegates, and in the 1960's there have always been more nominees than places. However, the voting procedures, readopted at each convention though frequently with opposition, have made it extremely difficult for dissident groups to get their nominees elected, unless they were coopted as a part of the executive slate. The "new left" opposition of the late 1960's has, however, run some candidates for the executive, and was able to defeat several executive nominees at the 1968 convention at which there was a great deal of open conflict with the party "establishment." The executive will probably be more careful in anticipating such reactions in the future, and indeed the leadership has generally made some efforts to include different groups in its own slate. Both the leadership and the delegates have watched the size of the vote for nominees as an indication of the strength of party

64 The only exception was in 1966 when the executive acquiesced in a revision of the rules which allowed delegates to vote for at least 20, Protokoll, SPD Parteitag Dortmund 1966 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, n.d.).

support for particular groups. Frequently, members have been nominated from the floor at a previous convention, and then are nominated by the executive and elected at the next.66

The SPD tradition of collegial leadership also contributes to the tendency to use the executive for the accommodation of different groups within the party. In addition to issue-oriented groups, the executive has attempted to provide representation for most Bezirke in its nominations, although in general those with the largest membership or good electoral results were most likely to be represented. There are few other groups within the SPD to be considered. Only the women's auxiliary has been guaranteed some places on the executive. In addition, a few union officials have been nominated. The executive has also made some effort to provide technical expertise in its nominations, as the party could not rely on the governmental bureaucracy for such expertise.67

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66Protokolls, SPD Parteitäge 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1968 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD). The large number of speeches at the 1969 convention were a result of the leadership's concern to avoid open defeat by allowing more opportunity for the dissidents to express their views, Protokoll, SPD Ausserordentlicher Parteitag Bad Godesberg 1969 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD).

67Childs, op. cit., pp. 27-31; Kaack, op. cit., p. 92; and Rudolf Wildenmann, Partei und Fraktion (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, K.o., 1955), p. 34.
Since 1958, the deputy chairmanships have been used to coordinate the different elements in the party. Thus, after Brandt became the Chancellor-candidate, he was elected deputy chairman along with Herbert Wehner, a faction deputy and responsible for important organizational functions. Since Brandt's election as chairman in 1964, the two deputy chairmen have been Wehner, who came to act as a General Secretary without the formal title and represented the organization, and Fritz Erler, the fraction chairman until his death in 1967, when Helmut Schmidt succeeded him as fraction chairman and party deputy chairman.68

In 1968 the executive created a new salaried position—Federal Manager. Wehner had become increasingly involved in Cabinet and governmental responsibilities and the new post was to take over most of his responsibilities in organizational management. Hans Jurgen Wischnewski, a Cabinet Minister, was appointed to the post. While not a member of the executive, Wischnewski's career had followed a common pattern. He had held a regional party office, was elected to the Bundestag and gained a reputation for expertise in policy toward developing countries, before

68 This use of the three top positions was recognized explicitly in a speech by C. Schmid in 1964 reprinted in Flechtheim, Vol. V (1966), op. cit., 105-06.
becoming the Minister for Development aid.\textsuperscript{69} It is not clear whether this will remain a separate position or is only a transition device until Wehner's retirement, when Wischnewski could be elected a deputy chairman.

The figures in Table 12 give a better indication of the career routes and overlap of positions among the SPD leadership throughout this period. Prior to 1958, a small number of executive members who achieved prominence in the Bundestag were only elected or appointed to other party offices after their election to the national executive. Since 1958, however, the reverse has more often been the case, i.e., most members have had some party position prior to their election. Some of them resigned from the lower party positions after their election. The increase in the percentage of members without other concurrent party office in 1960 was primarily a reflection of a backbenchers' revolt in the fraction executive election, in which a number of current party executive members were defeated. The larger percentage without other concurrent party offices in 1968 was due to the movement of fraction leaders to the Cabinet. In addition, a number of members of the executive in each term were selected for their reputation for expertise or prominence in public office—as Land Ministers or

<table>
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<th>1952 n=30</th>
<th>1954 n=30</th>
<th>1956 n=30</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Prior to</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Prior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Elec.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other Party Office Functionary: Regional or National Party Office</td>
<td>13% (4)</td>
<td>10% (3)</td>
<td>10% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, Regional Party Office</td>
<td>47% (14)</td>
<td>23% (7)</td>
<td>43% (13)</td>
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<td>National Auxiliary Organization Office</td>
<td>57% (17)</td>
<td>47% (14)</td>
<td>63% (19)</td>
</tr>
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<td>7% (2)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>7% (2)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Public Office</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>30% (9)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Land Cabinet</td>
<td>27% (8)</td>
<td>7% (2)</td>
<td>27% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdL Only</td>
<td>10% (3)</td>
<td>17% (5)</td>
<td>10% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Cabinet</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdB</td>
<td>13% (4)</td>
<td>43% (13)</td>
<td>23% (7)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1958 n=33</td>
<td>1960 n=33</td>
<td>1962 n=33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>Prior</td>
</tr>
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<td>9% (3)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional or National Party Office</td>
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<td>9% (3)</td>
<td>33% (11)</td>
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<td>Local, Regional</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Party Office</td>
<td>58% (19)</td>
<td>45% (15)</td>
<td>61% (20)</td>
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<td>National Auxiliary</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization Office</td>
<td>12% (4)</td>
<td>9% (3)</td>
<td>12% (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
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<td>36% (12)</td>
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<td>Public Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
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<td>27% (9)</td>
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<td>58% (19)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Concurrent</td>
<td>Prior</td>
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<td>3% (1)</td>
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<td>3% (1)</td>
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<td>67% (22)</td>
<td>52% (17)</td>
<td>64% (21)</td>
</tr>
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<td>National Auxiliary Organization Office</td>
<td>9% (3)</td>
<td>9% (3)</td>
<td>12% (4)</td>
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<td>Parliamentary Party Executive</td>
<td>30% (10)</td>
<td>39% (13)</td>
<td>31% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>27% (9)</td>
<td>21% (7)</td>
<td>21% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MdL Only</td>
<td>21% (7)</td>
<td>18% (6)</td>
<td>18% (6)</td>
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<td>30% (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MdB</td>
<td>67% (22)</td>
<td>55% (18)</td>
<td>70% (23)</td>
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*Totals may be larger than the number of individuals because of double office-holding apart from executive membership.

*This includes local and regional party auxiliaries.

*Pre-1968 refers to SPD—"shadow cabinet"—selected for the 1961 and 1965 campaigns. The 1966 Cabinet members are reflected in the 1968 column.
m.p.'s, without party positions. One or two m.p.'s who are union chairmen have also been elected.

The figures on functionaries prior to 1958 reflect the fact that in re-establishing the party immediately after the war, most of the major pre-war leaders had not survived and it was minor functionaries from the pre-1933 period who initially assumed local and regional party offices. In addition, the structure of the organization gave considerable influence to those functionaries who ran the national headquarters. Some of these individuals continued to be re-elected after 1958, but such a background has been increasingly rare for the newer generation of leaders. Alfred Nau, the party treasurer and Willi Eichler, who ran a number of departments in the national office, were re-elected to each executive. Eichler retired in 1968. In addition, it has been much more common in the SPD than the CDU for members of the executive to receive some compensation for assuming particular organizational responsibilities, but this is not reflected in the Table as these individuals cannot be considered functionaries in career terms. 70

Throughout the period studied a considerable proportion of executive members have had some prior party

70 Lohmar, op. cit., p. 114.
position at the local or regional level. Most continued in such positions once elected to the national executive, or went on to the Bundestag and became members of the fraction executive. The representation of auxiliary organizations has, on the other hand, been minor. Only a very small number of executive members held a position in the Jungsozialisten in their early career; almost all of those with prior or concurrent auxiliary positions have been representatives of the women's organization. A current Juso chairman was not elected to the executive until 1966.

The figures on the fraction executive suggest the increasing dominance of the parliamentary party in the party organization since 1958. The decline in concurrent compared to prior Bundestag mandates among executive members has been due to those who win election to the Bundestag and then resign the mandate to take a position in the Länder. After 1958, the career pattern has generally been election to the fraction executive and the party executive at approximately the same time, or election to the fraction executive first.

The SPD faction officers are the chairman, two to

71Harmut Soell suggests this is due to the deference of delegates to parliamentary office since most have been legislators themselves at the local or Land level, "Fraktion und Parteorganisation," Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 10, no. 4 (December, 1969), 505-22.
four deputy chairmen, the whips, and approximately sixteen others—all elected by the caucus. Elections are held three times during each legislative term. Since 1957, there have been frequent contests for all positions and backbench nominees have occasionally defeated the executive's candidates. Parliamentary prominence and a reputation for expertise have been more important criteria in election than the representation of groups, although there has usually been one union leader on the fraction executive.72

In general, there has been an even greater overlap between the smaller Präsidium and the fraction executive since 1958. Ollenhauer was both fraction chairman and party chairman until his death in 1963, after which the two offices were filled by different individuals since Brandt was not in the Bundestag. Only two of the new Präsidium members in 1958 were not also members of the fraction executive. One was Alfred Nau, the treasurer, and the other von Knoeringen was a regional party leader. In 1964, another regional leader, Egon Franke, a backbench m.p., replaced von Knoeringen on the Präsidium. He was elected to the fraction executive in 1968. In 1966 another regional leader, H. Kühn, who later became Nordrhein-Westfalen

72Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 179-86.
Minister-President, also became a Präsidium member. The most typical career pattern for members of the Präsidium has been election to the larger party executive first, election to the fraction executive, and then membership on the Präsidium. A good example of this pattern is the career of Helmut Schmidt, the current fraction chairman. He was first elected to the party executive in 1958, while a regional party leader and Land Minister. In the early 1960's, he was elected to the Bundestag and became a member of the fraction executive. In 1966 he became deputy fraction chairman, and a member of the party Präsidium. After Erler's death in 1967, he was elected fraction chairman and in 1968 he became a party deputy chairman as well.

The only change in the proportion of executive members with prior or concurrent Land governmental positions is an increase in current Land Ministers in the 1960's. This has been in part a reflection of better SPD electoral fortunes at the Land level, as well as of the fact that many of the reformers who came to power in the party after 1958 were public office-holders at the regional level. As in the CDU, the Landtag m.p.'s have usually also been regional party chairmen.

There has also been considerable overlap between the SPD shadow Cabinets of 1961 and 1965, and the Grand Coalition Ministers and the party executive. Of the 1961 "team,"
only two were not also members of the Präsidium—Richter, a union representative who was not on the team again in 1965, and Alex Möller, an economics expert, who was later elected to the executive and the Präsidium. In 1965, Karl Schiller, a noted Land official and then economics expert in the Bundestag was not on the Präsidium, but became a member in 1966. Two of the nine SPD Ministers in the Grand Coalition were chosen primarily for their expertise in particular areas, and while both had been local or regional party officials, neither were members of the party executive.

The 1961 and 1965 "teams" were selected by commissions appointed from among members of the executive. In both years there was an effort to include party leaders from a variety of backgrounds, including regional politicians, fraction officers, a union representative, an officer in the women's organization, and a number of policy specialists.73 The Grand Coalition Ministers were selected by the Coalition negotiating team composed of party and fraction leaders. Their decision was then ratified by the fraction and the party executive.74

The careers of the overwhelming majority of SPD

73Kaaek, op. cit., p. 69; and Childs, op. cit., p. 27.

74Soell, op. cit., p. 615.
leaders have thus combined public and party office-holding. The only frequent alternative has been prominence in the Bundestag or Land Ministerial office. The traditional route of party service alone, primarily as a functionary, no longer exists.

Table 13 provides some idea of the value of incumbency in elections to the party executive. Much of the percentage of new members in each term was due to turnover at the regional level, with new regional party chairmen elected to replace previous executive members who had retired. The exception was, of course, the 1958 election, in which there was a considerable percentage of new members due to the reformers' victory. The larger increase in new executive members in 1968 was primarily a reflection of the increase in size, but also of the election of a few representatives of the dissident group.

Aside from the drop in re-election rates due to the 1958 turnover, the re-election pattern has been fairly consistent. There have always been a small number of newly elected members who are never re-elected, but most of the gradual decline in re-election has been due to voluntary retirement rather than defeat in a contest at the conventions. Four members of the 1952 executive were still re-elected in 1968, and almost half of the 1958 group were members through 1968. Herbert Wehner and Carlo Schmid,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Executive Committee</th>
<th>% of new members</th>
<th>Per Cent Re-elected at Succeeding Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>(30 mbrs.) (5)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>87%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>(30 mbrs.) (4)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>(30 mbrs.) (3)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>(33 mbrs.) (14)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>(33 mbrs.) (2)</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>(33 mbrs.) (8)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>(33 mbrs.) (5)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>(33 mbrs.) (3)</td>
<td>09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>(35 mbrs.) (7)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

both associated with the 1958 reform, have been on the executive since 1952 and 1947, respectively.

Turnover in the smaller Präsidium reflects these patterns even more clearly, and is also somewhat more comparable to the figures for the CDU. Table 14 indicates the enormous change in 1958 and the much smaller percentages of new members thereafter. The 1966 increase in new members was due primarily to a turnover in the fraction executive and the inclusion on the Präsidium of the 1965 "team." Three members of the current Präsidium were on it prior to 1958, Alfred Nau, the treasurer, Herbert Wehner, and Carlo Schmid.

Conclusions

Similarities

The description of the selection and characteristics of CDU and SPD national party leaders has revealed some similarities. In neither party has the chairmanship election been contested at the national conventions; delegates have been content to ratify a choice of chairman made elsewhere. Conflicts that have existed over the selection of a party chairman have been resolved prior to the conventions to give the appearance of unity. This desire to avoid the appearance of conflict is perhaps due to those attitudes in the political culture that regard elections as
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Präsium</th>
<th>% of new members</th>
<th>Per Cent Re-elected at Succeeding Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>(7 mbrs.) (2) 29%</td>
<td>100% 100% 29% 29% 29% 14% 14% 14%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(7) (2) (2) (2) (1) (1) (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>(7 mbrs.) (0) 0%</td>
<td>- 100% 29% 29% 29% 14% 14% 14%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(2) (2) (2) (1) (1) (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>(7 mbrs.) (0) 0%</td>
<td>- - 29% 29% 29% 14% 14% 14%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2) (2) (1) (1) (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>(9 mbrs.) (7) 78%</td>
<td>- - - 100% 89% 67% 44% 33%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(8) (6) (4) (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>(9 mbrs.) (0) 0%</td>
<td>- - - 89% 67% 44% 33%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(6) (4) (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>(9 mbrs.) (1) 11%</td>
<td>- - - - 78% 56% 44%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(5) (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>(9 mbrs.) (2) 22%</td>
<td>- - - - - - 67% 67%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(6) (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>(10 mbrs.) (4) 40%</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>(10 mbrs.) (1) 10%</td>
<td>- - - - - - - -</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

disruptive. For the parties, an election contest would destroy the value of the chairman as an expression of the symbolic unity of the party.

Secondly, in both parties there has been a period of uncertainty about the relationship between the positions of chairman and Chancellor or Chancellor-candidate, but both have moved in the direction of unity of the two positions. In each the chairmanship has become a symbolic political position, while actual organizational management has devolved to secondary leaders—a General Secretary in the CDU and a deputy chairman in the SPD. Electoral appeal, crucial to the selection of a Chancellor-candidate, has thus also become important in the party chairmanships. The national parliamentary leaders, with the greatest interest in preserving their positions through elections, have been able to exert considerable influence on the selection of a Chancellor-candidate and party chairman in both parties. Our framework suggests that these similarities are due to the pressures which the electoral system exerts on both parties. The West German system has moved in the direction of a two-party system, where elections are contested as a choice between alternate leaders. For the CDU, forming the first government, electoral criteria and fraction influence have been characteristic from its beginnings. The SPD made the adaptation in the late 1950's, early 1960's with the
selection of Brandt as Chancellor-candidate and then party chairman.

In addition, there is an interesting similarity in the careers of the two current party chairmen. Both Kiesinger and Brandt, while holding regional party office, achieved prominence before being selected as Chancellor-candidates and chairmen, as public office-holders at the regional level—Kiesinger as popular Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg, and Brandt as popular Lord Mayor of Berlin. Although both had been m.p.'s and members of their parties' fraction executive at one time, neither were in the Bundestag at the time of their selection. As suggested in Chapter I, the federal system in West Germany has thus apparently operated to provide positions of electoral prominence and executive experience at other than the national level from which both parties have been able to recruit leaders.

There are also some similarities in the selection and characteristics of the larger national executives of the CDU and the SPD, despite the fact that until 1967, the formal method of selection differed. In both parties, the current executive committee has been the most important influence in the selection of new members of the executive. Full alternate slates of nominees have not been presented at conventions; at most a small number of alternative
candidates have been nominated from the floor. This ability of the executives to select their own successors has been due in part to the parties' use of the national executive as an integration organ for different elements in the party. Both CDU and SPD leaders have made efforts to coopt representatives of the most important groups, and elements of the organization.

The figures on prior experience and double office-holding also indicate certain similarities in recruitment and career routes in the CDU and the SPD. Recruitment of the top leaders in party and government has generally been restricted to party members. Most of those on the national executives of the CDU and the SPD, and through overlap parliamentary leaders and Cabinet members, have been party members for a long period of time. The few exceptions have been prominent individuals who switched party allegiance earlier in their careers. For the CDU, these have mainly been leaders of the smaller parties it absorbed during the 1950's. The SPD's one important exception is Gustav Heinemann (Federal President), a CDU Federal Minister in the early 1950's who resigned and formed his own party for a brief period before joining the SPD. The requirement of party membership for all important positions of course considerably restricts the field for
recruitment of political leaders since less than 3 percent of the population are formal party members. This is probably due to the legal regulations which make it extremely difficult for independents to run for public office and virtually require individuals seeking nomination to go through the regular party organizations.

In addition, large percentages of the CDU and SPD executive members have also held some previous party office. This is both a reflection of the federal organization of the system and attitudes in both parties as to the importance of party service as a criterion for leadership. The fact that there are at least some national leaders in both parties without prior party office-holding illustrates the parties' use of the executive as a mechanism to integrate all members who have some important position in society—prominent public office-holders, or officers of interest associations.

Similarities in the experience and overlap with regional and national public offices are indicative of the parties' adaptation to a federal, parliamentary system which provides a number of different positions and levels of influence—in Länder governments, the Bundestag and the Cabinet—of political significance. Both the CDU and the SPD have used the executive to unify individuals representing the party at different places in the system. The
fact that Land Ministerial experience is more common than Landtag positions may be a reflection of the nature of West German federalism in which the functional division makes the Länder Cabinets more important than the legislatures.

As far as turnover is concerned, the tendency of both parties has been to increase the size of the executive to provide places for new leaders, rather than to oust the old. This supports our contention that the dislike and avoidance of conflict prevalent in West German political culture would lead to relative stagnation and slow turnover in the political leadership.

Differences

Several major differences stand out between the CDU and the SPD in the selection of a party chairman and the relationship to a Chancellor-candidate. The transition, i.e., succession from one leader to another, has been much more conflictual in the CDU. In addition, the regional party leaders have played a larger independent role in the selection process in the CDU—indirectly in the selection of a Chancellor and directly in the choice of party chairman, whereas in the SPD only those regional leaders also in the very top national party positions have been influential. The more heterogeneous nature of the CDU which has made it more difficult to find a leader acceptable to all
party groups than it has been for the more homogeneous SPD may in part account for the greater controversy surrounding CDU leadership succession. In addition, differences in party doctrine and traditions may also be a factor. Traditional SPD deference to authority has probably reinforced the general dislike for conflict, while its long history has provided more regularized procedures for the transition from one leader to another. The CDU, in contrast, had had no previous experience with a change in leadership when Adenauer retired, and its doctrine has recognized the legitimacy of the expression of different interests within the party. The greater independence and authority of CDU regional leaders may also be due to the original development of the national party as only a coalition of regional organizations, in contrast to the immediate re-establishment of a central organization in the SPD after the war.

An important difference can also be seen in the development of the relationship between the party chairman and Chancellor/Chancellor-candidate. In the CDU, as we have seen, the Chancellorship was initially primary, and a recognition of the importance of the party chairmanship developed later. In the SPD, the position of party chairman was predominant, and it was the late 1950's before the party accepted the need for a Chancellor-candidate and leader with popular appeal. These different patterns
appear to be due to the differences in experience and competitive positions of the CDU and the SPD. The CDU formed the national government before its organization was developed, and it was not until Adenauer's hold on the party declined and its electoral success diminished that the party became aware that in order to govern as well as win elections it needed not only a Chancellor-candidate with electoral appeal, but also a party chairman able to hold together the different groups in the organization. The SPD's traditions and initial competitive position made it rely on a traditional socialist appeal for votes while the party chairman concentrated on organizational tasks. It was only after three election defeats and the acquisition of party leadership by those whose primary concern was winning public office that the party adapted to the electoral system and the need for leadership with electoral appeal.

The differences in organizational stability of the top leadership and in the role of the party bureaucracy, particularly prior to 1958, are also attributable to differences in party traditions and development. The constant changes in the organization of the CDU executive in contrast to the continuity in SPD structure may have been due to the CDU's recent founding and coalition characteristics, while the SPD had a long history and tradition in
organizational form. The greater prevalence of bureau­
cratic career experience in the SPD prior to 1958 corres­
ponded to its pre-war pattern and the participation of
functionaries in its re-establishment after the war.

There has also been a difference between the parties
with regard to the representation of auxiliaries and exter­
nal interest groups. As expected, the greater distribution
of socio-economic groups within the CDU and ties to a
variety of interest organizations have meant that the party
has paid more attention to the representation of auxiliary
and external groups on its executive than has the more
homogeneous SPD. Career backgrounds in a party auxiliary
or an important interest association rather than in formal
party office have been much more common in the CDU. In the
SPD where the tradition of programmatic development has
been strong, but the recognition of a diversity of group
interests has not been fully accepted, contests over
executive representation have been based on policy dif­
ferences. In the CDU, its pragmatic electoral and group
orientation has led to conflicts over the adequate repre­
sentation of the different socio-economic wings within the
party.

In addition, the importance of the youth organiza­
tions in the careers of party leaders has differed in the
CDU and the SPD, being a much more common experience in the
CDU. This parallels the difference found in their role in the selection of Bundestag candidates. Again, it would seem to be due to the weaker organizational structure of the CDU and the consequently greater dependence on the youth organization for the recruitment of party leaders.

The different competitive situations of the two parties has also produced a difference in the attention given to policy expertise in the selection of executive members. As the opposition party for most of the period, the SPD has not been able to rely on the governmental bureaucracy for aid in the formulation of policy positions and has made some effort to recruit prominent experts into the leadership. This has been of less importance to the CDU where government officials were available to develop the party's policies.

Similar differences are also present in the selection and characteristics of the parties' parliamentary leadership. The diversity of groups within the CDU has led to the use of the fraction executive as a means to provide representation for all. The executive has been quite large, and the practice of coopting different group leaders has made contests unusual, and when they occur invariably over the representation of a particular group. The SPD's parliamentary party has been much more homogeneous and the executive is smaller with selection
primarily on the basis of reputation in the Bundestag. The frequent contests have been primarily backbench challenges to the executive nominees or over policy differences.

The CDU's governmental position until 1969 has meant that the overlap between national public and party office has been mainly with the Cabinet Ministers rather than the fraction executive. In the SPD, the fraction leaders have been the national spokesmen for the party in opposition, and have been integrated with the party organization through concurrent membership on the executive and the Präsidium. In both parties the recent changes in governmental position have produced a change in this relationship. In the CDU, the representation of the fraction executive on the party executive increased in 1969 when the party entered the opposition, while in the SPD executive the proportion of fraction leaders declined in 1967 when the party joined the government.

Although the differences in turnover are not great, they are in the direction suggested by the framework. The SPD, with the exception of 1958, has had a smaller percentage of new members, and a higher re-election rate for old than the CDU. Both the greater attractiveness of a career in the CDU as the governing party and the greater diversity of career routes in contrast to the more formalized single
pattern in the SPD and the lower prestige of its national party position are apparently reflected in these differences.

Finally, this analysis provides us with a general picture of the centralization or "oligarchy" within the CDU and the SPD. The CDU's leadership is more dispersed, a larger number of groups participate in the selection process, and there are several common career routes to a leadership position including prominence in public office, or positions in auxiliary or external interest organizations in addition to a career in party and public positions. The SPD's top leadership is narrower, fewer groups participate in its selection, and there is one predominant career pattern combining party and public service.
CHAPTER V

FACTIONALISM AND PARTY POLICY-MAKING

The two aspects of party organization to be examined in this chapter are internal factionalism and the process of party policy-making. Both the CDU and the SPD must make decisions concerning their political strategy with regard to the voters and other parties in the system, as well as decisions concerning their stand on public issues. The extent and the nature of internal factions will affect this process. In this chapter we will consider the locus of initiatives and decision-making; the participants, including a description of party factions and their role in the process; the basis of party conflict and cohesion, and the degree of party discipline once decisions have been made; and the flexibility of party positions.

CDU/CSU

Party principles and programs

The slogan "Deutschland: Sozialer Rechtsstaat im geeinigten Europa" appeared in the CDU's election program in 1953. It combines many of the elements which the party
has viewed as defining its basic commitments and goals.¹ The CDU has not had a basic program which would provide it with an explicit ideological base, but instead has passed a series of programs, usually immediately preceding election campaigns, to define its goals and values.² Although the party's self-image includes the notion of fundamental principles which provide unity even in a Volkspartei combining many different viewpoints, these are nowhere developed in the party's programs.³ At most, it is possible to discern a number of themes which reappear with varying emphasis in party discussions throughout the period studied.

The "common Christian principles" which the party's founders believed would provide a worldview were never really developed as the CDU moved into practical politics. Despite recurrent discussions on the meaning of the "C" in CDU, the party has not been clear on what this meant in


practice. In part, the problem has been the different positions of Protestant and Catholic doctrine on the relationship of the Christian to politics. In addition, as secularization has increased in West Germany, the whole issue has become less and less meaningful. In the early period in the 1940's, the Catholic progressive movement did produce a formal statement of "Christian Socialism," the Ahlen program, adopted by a zonal party in 1947. This was a statement of goals and policy positions that emphasized the role of the worker. While not strictly "socialist," it did call for curbs on the power of business interests, national economic planning, and socialization of some basic industries. The CDU has, however, never recognized the Ahlen statement as an official program for the national party. Although the need for a basic restructuring of the economic system was a fairly common assumption immediately

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after the war, once the party became associated with the currency reform and Erhard's economic policies, there was an obvious shift to the right in its position on socio-economic issues. The first official party formulations in 1949 and its first national program in 1953 repeated the progressive demands with regard to workers' representation in industry (codetermination), made some effort to link the party's position to general Ahlen goals of social justice, but dropped the more "leftist" demands for planning and socialization.\(^7\) The "social market economy" became a catchword in CDU programs for its position on socio-economic issues. This never developed into an explicit commitment to the neo-liberal philosophy for which Erhard individually was a spokesman. The neo-liberal movement in West Germany was developed by a number of economists and social philosophers not linked in any way to the CDU.\(^8\)

Throughout the period when Adenauer was Chancellor and party chairman, the most common theme in CDU literature was a negative one that emphasized the party's position to


\(^8\)For an analysis of neo-liberalism as a philosophical world view, see Carl J. Friedrich, "The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," American Political Science Review, XLIX (June, 1955), 509-25.
the right of the SPD at home and anti-communism in foreign policy. This was combined with a stress on the party's commitment to Western European unity, important as a goal in itself, and as a means to German reunification. In the 1960's, even this faded to a mere reiteration of past achievements in Western European cooperation, with little mention of future foreign policy initiatives or goals.

Other themes which have reappeared in party programs, but have never been related into an explicit ideological viewpoint include: the importance of individualism, the role of the family as "urzelle des staates," and farming as the backbone of the community. The "D" in the party's name has never received much consideration. The CDU has no clear position on the public's role in a democratic state beyond the formal act of voting as a legitimization of decisions made by political leaders.

Factionalism

There is considerable factionalism in the CDU,


primarily with a socio-economic base. As we have seen, some of these groups have an organizational base in the party Vereinigung (auxiliary organizations). Some have developed independent issue positions, while others function more as personal factions limited to claims on leadership positions. The most well-known is the so-called arbeitnehmer flugel which is organized as the Sozialausschüsse (Sozis) of the CDU. The original founders in 1947 had clear ties with the Zentrum party of Weimar and to the Christian socialist Catholic worker movements in the immediate post-war period. The Sozialausschüsse are organized at the local and regional levels, and have a national office and executive committee. General membership figures are not available, but the major strength is the Catholic workers, particularly in the Nordrhein-Westfalen area.12 There has always been some overlap between this group and the Deutsche Gewerkschaftbund (DGB); a number of its leaders have been union officials. The members also overlap considerably with the Katholische Arbeiterbewegung (KAB), a church financed worker welfare organization. A group of KAB leaders founded a separate Catholic union in 1955, but this has not received much support from the Sozis, and the Catholic union has remained

small, regionally limited and of little importance.13

The CDU labor wing is also organized within the parliamentary party. Since 1953 it has elected its own executive, and has its own office and staff. It is the largest organized group within the fraction and holds regular meetings to develop a common position to present to the fraction leaders and the caucus. The group is represented on the fraction executive and in Bundestag committees. The importance of the voting bloc it represents for CDU electoral success and the possibility of its m.p.'s voting with the SPD give it some influence.14

During the 1940's, the Sozialausschüsse leaders were largely responsible for the Ahlen program, and worked actively to commit the party to their positions. Its stature was increased by the prominence of its early leaders—Karl Arnold and Jakob Kaiser. During the 1950's, however, the organization gradually dropped its discussion of policy alternatives and emphasized its agreement with the vague goals of social justice articulated in the


national party programs. Within these limits, the Sozis leaders worked for a voice in determining the socio-economic policy positions of the party and for representation in leadership groups in the party and Cabinet.

During the late 1950's and the early 1960's, under the leadership of Hans Katzer, the Sozis again began to develop clear policy alternatives and plans at their national conventions. The leaders worked for a coalition with the SPD as early as 1961, hoping it would provide a better opportunity for the development of progressive domestic legislation. Its ties to the DGB were considerably strengthened when it gave full support to union demands for extension of codetermination in the mid-1960's. At the same time, the KAB was moving left and asserting some independence from church control. The revival of the labor wing as a faction with clearly defined issue positions culminated in 1967. The CDU was, at that time, making preparations for a new party program to be adopted


at its 1968 convention. The Sozialausschüsse convention in 1967 drafted an entire alternative program, the *Offenburger Erklärung*, which included detailed policy plans in a number of areas. Unlike many of the leadership statements in the 1950's, it also made clear the Sozis continued commitment to the Ahlen program, including its anti-capitalist, Christian-socialist principles.\(^{18}\)

As we saw in the discussion of candidate selection, there is no CDU auxiliary which represents big business interests, nor has any organized faction developed within the party to promote business claims for a share of positions, or favorable policy positions. Although individual m.p.'s and party members associated with external business associations undoubtedly have held shared views on some issues, these were expressed informally and through individual contacts.\(^{19}\) In 1963, however, an economic council (*Wirtschaftsrat der CDU*) was formed at the national party level— not as a membership organization like the Sozialausschüsse— to provide a forum for the presentation of industry views on issues and to counter the Sozis statements

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\(^{19}\) Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), op. cit., pp. 116-17; Dömes, op. cit., p. 38; and Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 162.
within the party. Its officially-announced tasks appear to be two-fold: promoting business views in the formation of CDU policy; and providing public relations for government and party programs.\textsuperscript{20}

The CDU Mittelstand Vereinigung, representing small business interests in the party, has not operated as an issue faction, but has made some claims for representation in party and government offices. Like the Sozialausschüsse, this party auxiliary has a parallel organization within the fraction. The small-business discussion group holds regular meetings, and shares an office with the auxiliary. It has been concerned primarily with a share of positions in the Bundestag, fraction, and cabinet.\textsuperscript{21} A number of other socio-economic factions are organized within the parliamentary party, without however any corresponding auxiliary in the external party organization. In the second Bundestag, CDU/CSU m.p.'s representing farm interests formed an agriculture and food study group. It has had close ties with the staff in the agriculture department of party headquarters and been very unified and active on issues involving agricultural policy, particularly those dealing with the Common Market. The group has also claimed a

\textsuperscript{20}Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), op. cit., 183-84.

\textsuperscript{21}Dömes, op. cit., pp. 35-37; and Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 162.
Cabinet post. While it has an obvious base in party membership in the rural South and Southwest, it has not been organized at the membership level. M.p.'s with a refugee background have also held meetings, claimed a Cabinet position, and occasionally developed a unified position. However, the ties of this group outside the Bundestag have been with the national refugee association, rather than a CDU auxiliary.

The basis for the above factions is a common socio-economic background, upon which claims for representation, and less frequently alternative issue positions, have been developed. There have been no factions in the CDU organized on the basis of issues alone. However, there has occasionally been some overlap between factions organized on another basis and issue differences. This was true to some extent in the 1960's in the debate between "Atlanticists" and "Gaullists" in foreign policy. While no factional organizations developed around these differences, some spokesmen for differing views had other organizational bases in the party. For example, Gerhard Schröder, considered a leading exponent of a more pro-American foreign policy position, attempted to use his position as head of

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23 Dömes, op. cit., p. 39.
the Protestant organization, the "Evangelical Arbeitskreise
der CDU," to create a base for his own career and the pro-
motion of his foreign policy views. Indeed, there was some
overlap between these foreign policy differences and the
religious-regional divisions in the party; the North and
West German Protestant areas were more favorable to
Atlantic cooperation, while the South German Catholic areas
were most concerned with closer ties with France.24

The Evangelical A.k. was not formed on an issue
basis, however, but to insure a religious balance in party
offices between Protestants and Catholics. Its membership
at the local and regional levels has never been very large,
nor has its leadership been active in policy discussions
within the party. In recent years, it has not even been
very active in promoting a proportional balance in the
party leadership positions.25

The CDU youth organization, the Junge Union, has
acted as a faction for the promotion of the political ca-
reers of younger party members. It has not developed
unified positions on issues in party policy, nor is it
associated with a particular socio-economic group. In

24 "Kanzler-Wahl: Vorsicht, Vorsicht," Der Spiegel,

25 Baukloh, "Schroders Evangelischer Arbeitskreis,"
Frankfurter Hefte, Vol. 19, no. 5 (1964), 297-98; and
1966, a number of younger CDU m.p.'s formed the "Gruppe 53" within the fraction to work for the advancement of their careers. Most of the members were former or current JU leaders. The Ring Christlich-Demokratischen Studenten (RCDS), a student organization with ties to the CDU, has recently become the locus in some regions for criticism of some party positions, particularly on educational reform, but nationally, the organization has not developed into an issue faction within the party.

The CSU must be considered a special case in the context of party factionalism. Strictly speaking, it is not an internal faction within the party organization, but an entirely separate regional party. It has its own organization, officers and party programs which are developed separately from the CDU, although they tend to parallel CDU programs with the exception of a greater stress on federalism.

Within Bavaria, the CSU has had its own share of

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27 The Berlin area was the focal point of this activity, as it was also the center of student dissent in the late 1960's, Flechtheim, Vol. VI (1968), op. cit., 218-22.

factionalism, originally involving liberal vs. conservative-clerical wings. After the Spiegel Affair, the Petra Kreis, led by a long-time opponent of Strauss in Bavarian politics, was able to gain some influence in the Land party.29

Within the CDU/CSU fraction in the Bundestag, however, the CSU has acted as a unified faction on personnel questions—Cabinet posts, Bundestag committee assignments, and fraction leadership positions. The CSU has its own office, staff, and executive, and an agreement to form a joint parliamentary party must be renegotiated at the beginning of each term.30 Under the leadership of Franz-Josef Strauss in the 1960's, and particularly after he left the Cabinet as a consequence of the Spiegel Affair in 1962, the CSU group in the Bundestag has promoted and published its own alternative views on foreign and defense policy, or rather it has acted as a base for Strauss's positions in these areas.31

29A good description of the CSU and its factions can be found in Erich Kuby, Franz-Josef Strauss Ein Typus Unsere Zeit (Munich: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1963), especially pp. 94-120. See also, Flechtheim, Vol. VI (1968), op. cit., xvii; and "Strauss: Immer Tiefer," Der Spiegel, Vol. 17, no. 8 (February 20, 1963), 26-27.

30Dömes, op. cit., pp. 32-33; and Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 159-60.

Campaigns and governmental coalitions

CDU national campaign strategy in the Bundestag elections has been to emphasize its leader and the national security and welfare benefits which past CDU governments have secured for the voters. Although the specific issues have varied in different campaigns, the general themes have been remarkably similar. As was true in the campaigns led by Adenauer and Erhard, the CDU in 1969 stressed Kiesinger's image as Chancellor and the stability and security which the CDU has provided.32

While Adenauer was Chancellor, the planning of overall strategy and decisions on specific campaign issues to emphasize were made by a small group around Adenauer. This usually included the fraction leaders, the party Federal Manager, and in 1957 and 1961 a specially-appointed campaign manager. There was little consultation with the regional party leaders. This same group also prepared the election platforms which were adopted at party conventions. As early as 1953, extensive use was made of modern polling techniques to determine campaign themes and the most

effective appeals to various voting blocs.  

In the planning for the 1965 and 1969 campaigns, the formal party organization participated more in strategy decisions. While Erhard did the actual campaigning, the Präsidium and particularly managing chairman Dufhues determined the overall strategy. For the first time, specific committees were appointed to develop an election program, again based extensively on poll results. Kiesinger participated more actively in campaign planning than Erhard, but he also worked within the Präsidium as the planning group. His aid and General Secretary, Bruno Heck, resigned his Cabinet post to assume overall responsibility for the campaign.

The CSU has run its own campaigns from its Munich headquarters, and issued its own election programs which under Strauss's leadership were a vehicle for the expression of his views on national policy. The only coordination between the CDU and CSU has been in the exchange of speakers.

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Technical aspects and organizational details of the campaigns have been centrally directed by the staff of the national party office, numbering over 100 by 1969.36 A constant problem in coordinating the campaign has been weak CDU organization in many localities and the lack of full-time Kreis secretaries. Despite complaints by the national executive about the need for more permanent employees in the regions, the lack has, in a sense, probably worked to strengthen central control of the campaign. The regional organizations have had to rely on the national party for finances, and the workers hired to direct the WK campaigns have been paid by the central office.37 The party's organizational weaknesses have also been compensated for by extensive propaganda campaigns for the CDU conducted by private associations—usually business financed, and by the use of the government press services to extol the CDU's accomplishments.38

In general, CDU campaigns have been quite centralized. However, as complaints in the national executive reports indicate, regional leaders have not always been happy with the national strategy. Where they chose to

36Fisher, op. cit., p. 223.
38Hirsch-Weber, op. cit., p. 27.
emphasize different issues in personal campaigning, the national organization could do little to prevent this.\textsuperscript{39}

The CDU participated in the formation of national coalition governments from 1949 through the Grand Coalition in 1966. Decisions on coalitions have generally involved three stages: initial contacts with potential coalition partners, and a decision to pursue negotiations with a particular party or parties; the formal negotiations on Cabinet composition and the content of a final coalition agreement; and the vote on the coalition by the fraction, and ratification by the party executive.\textsuperscript{40}

The pattern for Adenauer's dominance in this process was set in 1949 when he completely ignored the prominent CDU Länder politicians because they favored a coalition with the SPD, and instead selected a small group of lesser known CDU administrators and supporters to negotiate a right coalition.\textsuperscript{41} In the following Adenauer coalitions, Adenauer and a small group of trusted associates, which included the CDU fraction chairman and some interest group and auxiliary representatives in the fraction and Cabinet, made the initial contacts and conducted the formal

\textsuperscript{39}Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), \textit{op. cit.}, 27-38.


\textsuperscript{41}Heidenheimer, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 179-83.
negotiations. The agreements were then approved by the fraction and ratified by the party executive. Although there was at times considerable opposition to the choice of coalition partners, and in 1961 even to Adenauer's remaining Chancellor, he was able to take the initiative and the majority of the fraction voted for the agreements.

Erhard and Kiesinger had less independent authority in forming coalitions. Both were much more dependent on the fraction for their own selection, and the key group in coalition decisions was the fraction executive. In each period there were other party leaders working against the coalitions favored by Erhard and Kiesinger. In 1965, for example, the Sozis parliamentary leaders and Strauss with the CSU were for different reasons working for a coalition with the SPD at the same time that Erhard was making initial moves towards continuation of the CDU-FDP coalition. Erhard needed a formal vote of support from the fraction executive to push through his decision for coalition negotiations with the FDP. Once the decision on a coalition partner was made, the Sozis leaders and Strauss had some

\[42\] Kaack, op. cit., p. 102.

influence in the formal negotiations as well. In 1966, after Kiesinger was selected by the fraction, a number of party leaders still favored attempts to patch up the coalition with the FDP, but the support of a majority of the fraction executive and the CSU enabled Kiesinger to conduct negotiations with the SPD and form the Grand Coalition. Throughout the period, the CSU fraction has played an important role in the coalition negotiations. Although Dufhues played an active role while Erhard was Chancellor, the party executive and regional leaders have only been involved in the process after the actual decisions were made, in ratifying the coalition agreements. The coalition decisions have never been debated at national party conventions.


46Fleschtheim, Vol. VI (1968), op. cit., 133-34. The national party also found it difficult to influence Länder coalitions, although Adenauer made strenuous efforts to ensure a favorable balance in the Bundesrat by forcing parallel coalitions in the states. He had some initial success, but in general, the regional parties have been able to follow an independent course, Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "Federalism and the Party System," American Political Science Review, LII (September, 1958), 814-23; and Rudolf Wildenmann, Macht und Konsens als Problem der Innen und Außenpolitik (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1967), pp. 93-94.
Party policy-making

According to the CDU statute, national party conventions have the responsibility for deciding on general policy guidelines for the party. Regional and local party organizations may send in resolutions on policy to be voted on at the conventions. Despite these regulations, even the vague CDU programs have neither originated in nor been decided by the conventions. Program drafts have been written in party headquarters or at policy conferences held by the executive to which representatives of various interest groups were invited. The draft program has usually not been available to lower organizations prior to the convention.

In general, the local party organizations have lacked interest in and the means to take specific positions on issues of party policy. The local leaders frequently do not hold meetings to prepare resolutions. The lack of a party information service has meant that members are not informed of the issues likely to be discussed. At the conventions, the two to three day proceedings are taken up with speeches by various government officials and national party leaders. The small number of resolutions sent in are


usually supportive of decisions already made and are not phrased as directives to the fraction or party executive.49 Debate and discussion have been at a minimum, and the party auxiliaries and factions have not used the conventions as a forum for the presentation of alternative policy positions.50

The first change in this process for the development of party programs occurred in 1967-1968. An effort was made by the national executive to broaden participation in the preparation of a draft program for the 1969 election. On issues where there was a great deal of internal party conflict, special policy committees were set up with representatives of the various factions. On the question of extension of codetermination, for example, the executive appointed an equal number of representatives of the labor wing and industry to the committee. Perhaps inevitably, the resulting draft from this and other committees tended to be extremely vague, although, in areas where there was agreement within the party, some fairly specific positions


were taken. For the first time, the draft was sent to the local parties for discussion prior to the convention. Although this produced somewhat more discussion and debate during the 1968 convention, there were no real contests; the resolutions sent in did not propose any significant changes in the draft, which was passed without opposition.51

As noted above, CDU programs have been collections of slogans and catalogues of previous CDU positions and decisions made by party leaders in public office. Thus, the party programs and national conventions have not served as a vehicle for influence of the party organization in the actual policy positions with which the party is identified—the statements of the Chancellor, Cabinet Ministers, and fraction leaders, including the legislative programs presented at the beginning of each Bundestag term.52 In speeches at the 1969 convention, a number of party leaders called for increased organizational activity because of the party's new opposition position, and admitted that past decisions had been made not by the organization, but by the party's public office-holders. Actually, these calls for


more participation by the organization in the development and decisions on party positions were made throughout the 1960's without much impact. Despite some overlap between the party executive and national office-holders, there has been a functional division, organizational tasks being the responsibility of the party executive, while the office-holders developed and decided on party policy.

Initiatives for these party policy positions have not generally involved the party executive, or its committees and staff. During the Adenauer period, the party executive did not even meet the four times annually that the party statute required and since then it has not met much more frequently. The policy committees of the executive and the departments in the national office have generally been poorly staffed. Most CDU experts have been in the government bureaucracy or in the fraction. While these committees may help in research to back up positions already taken, they have not been used for the development

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of policy positions.\textsuperscript{55}

Initiatives for the adoption of a party position on particular issues have come from external interest associations, party auxiliaries, the fraction and government ministries. The CDU fraction may consider or adopt draft legislation written in one of the many business associations. In addition, business groups have been active in initiating proposals directly through the Chancellor's office or the relevant Cabinet Minister. Adenauer particularly had close personal ties to a number of prominent business leaders who represented to him their views on policy.\textsuperscript{56} As we have seen, the Sozialausschüsse is the only auxiliary which was very active in developing actual policies. In the 1960's, it presented its proposals to the Chancellor or to the fraction for consideration.\textsuperscript{57} The overall CDU legislative programs and many specific drafts for legislation have been worked out in meetings of the


\textsuperscript{56}Risse, "Adenauer und Die CDU," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 90-92; Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), \textit{op. cit.}, 99-100; and Dömes, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 154-57.

fraction leaders with the fraction committee chairmen and the staff in government ministries.\textsuperscript{58}

The locus for decisions on party policy has shifted somewhat as the dominance of the Chancellor declined. During Adenauer's terms as Chancellor, the locus of decision-making for the party as well as the government tended to be his office. On domestic policy in particular, decisions were frequently made at informal meetings involving Adenauer, ministry representatives, some CDU Cabinet members, and the fraction leaders.\textsuperscript{59} Despite his image of aloofness and a reputation for lonely decisions, this was accurate only in some foreign policy decisions, when indeed even the CDU parliamentary leaders might not know of a position until Adenauer's public statement. On domestic policy, Adenauer's role tended to be that of compromiser. The various groups within the party presented claims to Adenauer who negotiated a final compromise position. In later years much of the negotiating between groups within the party was done by special Minister H. Krone.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Dömes, op. cit., pp. 160-68; and Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Dömes, ibid., and Risse, "Adenauer und Die CDU," op. cit., pp. 90-92.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU, op. cit., pp. 206-07; and Flechtheim, Vol. IV (1965), op. cit., 122-23.
\end{itemize}
While Erhard and Kiesinger were Chancellor, the locus of decision was more likely to be in the fraction which encompassed representatives of all the various groups in the party, as well as the CSU. Erhard had less ability as a compromiser and the political situation in which he was Chancellor made for greater dependence on the fraction. Cabinet Ministers felt responsible to the groups they represented, and as a consequence, Erhard's role was frequently not so much to compromise as to accept positions taken by other party leaders. In the Grand Coalition over which Kiesinger presided, a similar situation prevailed. Rather than the Chancellor, it was more often the fraction leaders who were in a position to make compromises and negotiate among group representatives for a position on which the party could agree. The fraction leaders have not been closely identified with any particular faction and thus have been able to function as coordinators of the different interests. The fraction executive reports have reflected its concern for influence in party decision-making and stressed the joint responsibility of Chancellor and fraction in determining party

63Tilford, op. cit., p. 172.
Auxiliary and interest groups have played a role in party policy-making both through their representatives in the Cabinet and through the chairmen of the fraction working groups. During the Adenauer period, Cabinet Ministers were less influential and the Sozialausschüsse, for example, frequently found that its Cabinet Ministers, dependent on Adenauer for their position, yielded on issues with which they were concerned. Factions and groups thus frequently turned to the working group chairmen in the fraction for influence on party policy. After Adenauer, the Cabinet Ministers played a more independent role in policy decisions on both foreign and domestic issues, and there was closer cooperation between group representatives in the Cabinet and their leaders in the Bundestag. The entire CDU/CSU caucus has tended to play a role only in ratifying decisions made by these leaders. Where compromise among


65Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU, op. cit., p. 207; Dömes, op. cit., pp. 41-43; and Walter Dirks, "Die Christliche Demokratie in der Deutschen Bundesrepublik," Frankfurter Hefte, Vol. 8, no. 9 (1953), 671-78.

different groups was not possible, or conflict between the positions of two working circles could not be resolved by the fraction leadership, the tendency has been to avoid a vote of the caucus to decide the issue, and instead to refer it back for further discussion. The external party executive and the larger Ausschuss have generally held meetings only after policy positions were already taken by the fraction and government leaders and have ratified them. The Ausschuss has also functioned as a link with wider levels in the organization, to communicate the decisions made.

Different issue areas have been the basis for both conflict and cohesion within the CDU. The party during the Adenauer years was unified around foreign and defense policy. Adenauer developed a position on European unity in particular which provided the party with a sense of purpose and also justified strong leadership as necessary for the accomplishment of its foreign policy goals.

Socio-economic policy issues were more divisive and thus

68 Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 81-82; and Kaack, op. cit., p. 87.
received less attention and emphasis within the party. Even the labor wing during this period in the 1950's muted its criticisms on social legislation.\textsuperscript{70} By the 1960's, however, Adenauer's foreign policy began to come into question, as no new aims were developed and the goal of reunification, which had served as the ultimate justification for Adenauer's moves, seemed no closer. Thus, conflicts also began to develop in this area. Despite his new slogan of a \textit{formierte Gesellschaft}, Erhard was not able to forge a new consensus on neo-liberal economic principles. The CDU became more clearly than ever a coalition of groups with different socio-economic policy viewpoints, and the conflict between the labor and business wings took on renewed sharpness.\textsuperscript{71}

Three factors apparently worked to provide some cohesion despite these conflicts. First was the desire to remain in power which required enough unity to be able to govern. Second was party doctrine itself, which while tolerating the expression of different views, placed a high value on compromising differences.\textsuperscript{72} Finally, the very vagueness of party programs and the lack of a programmatic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70}Flechtheim, Vol. VI (1968), \textit{op. cit.}, xvi.
\item \textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. xvii, 161-204; and von der Gablentz, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 611-12.
\item \textsuperscript{72}Wildenmann, \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 108-09.
\end{itemize}
tradition allowed the national conventions to be used for a renewal of a feeling of consensus without making decisions on issues which were bound to be divisive. 73

A further indication that foreign policy served as a basis for cohesion under Adenauer is the fact that the small number of expulsions of party members were concentrated in that period and concerned foreign policy. All involved individuals who made public statements or published views critical of Adenauer's foreign policy and were then expelled from the party. 74 As for discipline within the parliamentary party, formally party doctrine has emphasized freedom of conscience for m.p.'s and a lack of pressure to vote the party line. In fact, unity within the CDU/CSU fraction, in actual voting, has been fairly high. In the 1960's, we do find a shift in statements of the fraction executive which indicates a greater concern for fraction unity along with the usual reiteration of respect for differences of opinion. 75

Actually, fraction leaders have few obvious means to enforce party discipline in voting, considering the small

73 Kaack, op. cit., pp. 85-87; and Böhm, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

74 Flechtheim, Vol. VI (1968), op. cit., 57-72, 84-92, 104-08.

number of Cabinet positions available as rewards, the proportional assignment in Bundestag committees, and the decentralization of candidate selection. The number of roll calls in the Bundestag has steadily declined to a very small number and it is thus difficult to tell the extent of party unity. Those studies done in the 1950's indicate that deviations occurred mainly in domestic policy and were primarily a result of defections by labor wing m.p.'s. They were seldom higher than ten per cent of the total fraction on any recorded vote, although there may have been more deviations on unrecorded votes.76

**SPD**

**The programmatic tradition**

The idea of a basic program which describes the party's commitment to certain fundamental principles, provides a basic guideline for its positions, and at least implicitly places limits on its political actions is still strong within the SPD, although with the passage of the Bad Godesburger Program in 1959 substantive changes from the past were approved.77 Once the SPD was re-established

76Domes, op. cit., pp. 121-31; Loewenberg, op. cit., pp. 172-74, 213; and Reuckert, op. cit., pp. 477-84.

after the war, there was a widespread assumption among members that eventually a new statement of the party's fundamental principles would be adopted. Schumacher, however, was reluctant in what he considered a transition period to devote time to such an undertaking. Despite increasing demands from all segments of party opinion for a new basic program, the leadership postponed action until 1959. Until then, the party program consisted of statements on specific issues and an election platform passed in 1952, which was revised in 1954 and 1956. After the new basic program was adopted in 1959, more specific programs or election platforms were passed at conventions in 1964 and 1968.78

The Dortmund Aktionsprogramm passed in 1952 reflected Schumacher's views. In his own statements, he had emphasized foreign policy, and the special responsibility of the SPD to speak for a German democratic tradition because it had not been compromised during the Nazi era. The party was strongly opposed to a narrow Western European unity based on anticommunism. Its professed goal was a unified, neutral Germany within a united socialist Europe—a clear

contrast to the CDU position. Schumacher paid less attention to issues of socio-economic policy. While he obviously felt a need to distinguish the party's position from that of the Communist party, his own statements on the subject retained a dogmatic Marxist style, despite his insistence that Marxism should not be a dogma, but only a method of analysis. On domestic issues the 1952 program reflected mixed tendencies in the party which had been expressed by various economics spokesmen. It combined old fashioned socialist language about the class struggle, the unity of the working class, and demands for socialization with statements on the need for free competition, the dangers of state control, and a kind of social-welfare position.

The revisions adopted between 1952 and 1959 tended to be in the direction of modification of the party's opposition to CDU positions on foreign policy, particularly in the areas of West European cooperation and national defense. Positions in socio-economic policy continued to reflect the Dortmund program orientation, but the

79Kaack, op. cit., p. 30; and Speier, op. cit., p. 83.

traditional socialist positions received less emphasis. Instead, there was greater stress on the importance of free economic competition, the values of the marketplace, and the need for the use of modern economic techniques for a rational solution to economic problems. 81

After a year's discussion, the SPD adopted a new basic program at a special convention in Bad Godesburg in 1959. The Bad Godesburger program did not contain much new in the specifics of foreign and domestic policy or even in the area of the party's relationship with the churches. It summarized trends which had been present throughout the 1950's. It differed from previous statements mainly in dropping those positions in socio-economic policy which were based on a Marxist world view—socialization, for example, was no longer mentioned—and in a greater emphasis on broadening party representativeness to include all lower income groups and not just the workers. What distinguished the Bad Godesburger program from previous basic programs in earlier eras was the lack of any explicit theoretical analysis—either Marxist or some new theory—on which positions were based. Instead, it did no more than state the party's adherence to a number of

general ethical principles, including liberal democracy, the dignity of the individual, social justice for all, and prosperity for lower income groups. In 1960, the party moved further in foreign policy and dropped any semblance of opposition to Western European unity and national defense, although it has continued to place more emphasis than the CDU on the need for positive action to achieve reunification. The Bad Godesburger program thus provided a balance sheet of the party's development throughout the 1950's and a statement of its commitment to certain basic democratic values, without committing it to a great number of specific future actions.82

Factionalism

Unlike the CDU, few factional groups have developed in the SPD, and these have not had a permanent organizational base in party auxiliaries. Instead, individuals unified on a position on issues or party strategy have occasionally found a platform in some regional organizations, the party or independent press, or in the local youth auxiliaries—particularly the student organizations.

These groupings have had no formal organization or leaders and no recognized claim to representation in the party. They have generally pursued their aims through public statements of their views, and resolutions to party conventions.

During the 1950's, there were a number of individuals throughout the party who could be viewed as a traditional leftist faction. Some in this category were primarily concerned with questions of strategy and style. They advocated a more revolutionary orientation, working class solidarity, and emphasized the party's special moral responsibility for maintaining democratic standards. Others opposed what they felt were tendencies in party positions to ignore traditional socialist principles and advocated more cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These individuals, however, had no formal leaders or membership group within the party, although they dominated one or two Bezirke which consistently sent leftist-oriented resolutions to party conventions in the 1950's. Their platform was primarily articles in local party papers, plus a number of left-oriented independent journals. The most prominent of these was Funken: Aussprache-Heft radikalen Sozialisten, a journal founded in 1950. It served as a

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83For examples of these views, see Flechtheim, Vol. VII (1969), op. cit., 10-88.
center for the expression of traditional leftist views, and in 1958, it organized a conference to criticize party strategy and propose a basic program draft. However, after it became clear that the majority in the party approved the passage of the clearly reformist, non-Marxist Bad Godesburger program in 1959, *Funken* stopped publication and a number of those associated with the journal left the party.  

During this same period prior to the adoption of a new basic program, there were a number of individuals who felt the party was not reforming rapidly enough. They urged the elimination of all symbolic trappings reminiscent of the SPD's Marxist heritage, and a broadening of its electoral base by becoming a *Volkspartei*, less tied to the working class. Again, there was no organizational base, but these views were expressed in various local party papers. In addition, some chapters of the university student organization with ties to the SPD also served as focal points for these reformist arguments.  

These views, of course, overlapped with those of the reformers in the

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85Flechtheim, *Vol. VII* (1969), *op. cit.*, 22-23, 41-51, 78-88. The central party journal *Vorwärts* published some articles on both sides during this period, although in the 1960's it was less open to dissidents.
party leadership, primarily in the fraction, for which Carlo Schmid was an early spokesman. Although not an organized group either, the so-called "Burgermeister flügel" in the early 1950's tended to be reformist and critical of Schumacher's positions on foreign policy. The Hamburg party organization, where Max Brauer was the well-known Minister-President, sent in a number of resolutions to the national conventions favoring more moderate positions. 86

In the period 1959 to 1961, the student organization (SDS) began to develop as an organizational locus for a new left opposition within the party. The national SDS publicly attacked the Bad Godesburger program, and the foreign policy changes in 1960 and 1961, accused the party of becoming a part of the conservative establishment, and urged its local chapters to work to take over the party organization. A number of prominent intellectuals in the party were associated with the SDS through the formation of support groups in the universities. In 1961, the party executive issued an "incompatibility ruling" charging the SDS with East German ties and Communist infiltration, and making membership in the party and SDS or its support groups incompatible. The party then founded a new student

organization—the SHB.  

In the mid-1960's, dissenting groups critical of the party's strategy and positions re-emerged. They attacked the strategy of "Gemeinsamkeit" with the CDU on the basis of the disappointing election results in 1965, and argued for the development of more distinct alternatives in foreign and domestic policy. In some cases they urged a return to the Bad Godesburger program positions, which they accused the leadership of ignoring. Again, the only internal party platforms were a few Bezirke—primarily Hessen-Süd and Schleswig-Holstein—which sent critical resolutions to the convention in 1966, and some local chapters of SHB and the Jusos.  

After the formation of the Grand Coalition in December, 1966, the national SHB and Juso organizations became a base for those within the party who opposed participation in a government with the CDU, the leadership's position on emergency legislation, and its wavering on the question of extension of codetermination. The national Juso and SHB conventions in 1967 and 1968 called for working within the party to defeat candidates for party and public office who  


supported the national leadership's actions and for a renewal of inner-party democracy. In 1968, the national party executive responded by withdrawing financial support from the SHB, although it has not broken all association as it did with the SDS. The SHB and Juso leaders made clear their wish to work within the party despite the ties of both groups to the extra-parliamentary opposition movement. In addition, in 1967, an independent left paper, Express International, sponsored a conference at which a few regional party leaders expressed similar criticisms. Among those attending were officers in the Hessen-Süd, Schleswig-Holstein, and Munich organizations, as well as the head of IG Metall, a leftist union.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 259, 263-69, 277-85; and "SPD: Gemurmel und Gejammer," Der Spiegel, Vol. 21, no. 46 (November 6, 1967), 28.}

The internal left opposition in the SPD shared many positions with some of the unions. In part its weakness has been due to the lack of any internal position for the unions in the party. Unlike the British case, West German unions and the national labor federation, the DGB, maintain a formal neutrality towards the parties. The SPD did make efforts throughout the period to revive local party units composed of members within individual factories, but these "betriebsgruppe," remnants of the pre-war organization,
were never developed, nor was their purpose ever clear.\textsuperscript{90}
The component unions in the DGB have, of course, not been unified on all political questions. The spectrum ranges from a more conservative, status-quo oriented wing to an outspoken leftist position, of which the largest union representative is the metalworkers, IG Metall. In general, the union officials who have been members of the national party leadership have been to the right, or moderates in the DGB political spectrum.\textsuperscript{91}

During the 1950's, the DGB and SPD position on a number of issues coincided and the party presented union drafts on codetermination legislation in the Bundestag. However, party strategy in the 1960's emphasized appealing to all classes and the national leaders were increasingly reluctant to take positions clearly labeled as union-originated. At the same time, there was a resurgence of social criticism and a left-wing orientation among some unions.\textsuperscript{92} The growing divergence between the SPD and union positions was clearest with regard to the question of emergency legislation. While the SPD fraction participated in writing a compromise bill with the CDU/CSU, the

\textsuperscript{90}Flechtheim, Vol. V (1966), op. cit., 152-55.

\textsuperscript{91}Childs, op. cit., p. 84.

DGB flatly opposed any such legislation at all. This viewpoint of course overlapped with some of the new left opposition within the party, and some resolutions at the 1966 convention reflected union views. 93

In 1967, for the first time, a number of unionists in the party called for the establishment of an organized worker wing or union auxiliary. In one Land—Rheinland-Pfalz—where a number of Bezirk leaders were also union officials, they were able to establish an "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischen Gewerkschafter" at that level. 94 The national leadership, however, has remained firmly opposed to the establishment of a union wing and Brandt's speech at the 1968 convention was sharply critical of demands for a workers' auxiliary. 95

Although the SPD did organize an auxiliary for middle-class members, in the 1950's, it has not developed into a socio-economic faction working for representation in party offices or for particular policy positions. A group of mainly middle-class backbench m.p.'s was formed in 1965,

93"Der Dortmunder Parteitag der SPD," Politische Studien, Vol. 17, no. 168 (July/August, 1966), 264; and Tilford, op. cit., p. 176.


but it has evidently not become an active, permanent organization. In general, there have been no organized groups in the SPD fraction parallel to those in the CDU.  

Campaigns and government coalitions

In its first three election campaigns, the SPD's general strategy was to stress its foreign policy differences with the CDU and traditional socialist appeals to working class solidarity. The emphasis was not on the party chairman as an alternative to Adenauer, but on an appeal to the voters through detailed programs for specific issues. The 1952 party program and the 1956 revisions were elaborated in a series of pamphlets. After the leadership changes in 1958, 1959, a new strategic orientation was evident in the following campaigns. The emphasis was on the governing capabilities of the party and the attractiveness of Brandt as an alternative Chancellor. Differences with the CDU were minimized, while modern research techniques were used to find specific issues with which to appeal to different voting groups. After participation in the Grand Coalition, the strategy changed again somewhat.


in 1969. With less need to prove its ability to govern, the SPD placed more emphasis on differences with the CDU.  

The Präsidium planned the national strategy for the campaigns. Prior to 1958, this gave an important role to top functionaries in the national office. Fritz Heine, head of the propaganda department, was campaign manager.  

In the 1960's, of course, the Präsidium was composed of the fraction leaders and prominent public office-holders in the party. Herbert Wehner seems to have had chief responsibility for strategy decisions until 1969 when the newly appointed Federal Manager ran the campaign. Considerably more reliance was placed on polling and modern research techniques to determine the best themes to emphasize.  

The national office staff has been responsible for the technical organization of the campaign, including the development of publicity and coordination of speakers. In the 1960's, the party also hired outside experts in public relations techniques. The size of the staff has averaged approximately 100-150 full time workers in the national office.

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98 Gaus, op. cit., pp. 60-84; and Fisher, op. cit., p. 557.


campaign headquarters. This group has also held a series of conferences with regional and local party secretaries to inform them on campaign techniques and coordinate the campaign. 101

While SPD national campaigns have thus appeared superficially to be highly centralized, the party has had difficulty throughout the period in coordinating strategy and technical aspects between the national headquarters and the regional parties. There have been two sources of differences. With regard to strategy, the central organization has not been able to prevent regional and local candidates from campaigning on the basis of issues different from those emphasized by the national leadership. In the 1950's, in Länder with SPD governments, candidates frequently stressed the party's accomplishments and governing ability in the Land, while ignoring the more elaborate opposition positions and traditional socialist appeals that the national organization emphasized. By the late 1960's, on the other hand, considerable dissatisfaction developed in some areas over the national strategy of minimizing party differences, and district candidates frequently campaigned on the basis of appeals to unionists, and a more

101 Fisher, loc. cit.; Gaus, op. cit., pp. 60-84; and Peter Merkl, "Comparative Study and Campaign Management," The Western Political Quarterly, XV (December, 1962), 682-86.
left position on some issues.\textsuperscript{102}

In addition, in 1957 and particularly in the 1961 campaign, the national party had a great deal of difficulty convincing local functionaries of the value of the "new style" and public relations techniques. While frequent conferences were held, and weekly newsletters were sent out to the local party secretaries, many were reluctant to pay much attention to the new methods and continued to organize campaigns in the old mode of socialist propaganda.\textsuperscript{103}

In the aftermath of the Spiegel Affair in 1962, the SPD made some efforts to join a coalition with the CDU, but it was not until the formation of the Grand Coalition in 1966 that the party actually participated in a national government. The 1962 efforts appear to have been almost entirely the initiative of Wehner, who first contacted the CDU. The party executive, with some opposition, agreed to continue the efforts and appointed a negotiating team which was made up of the Präsidium members. The fraction, on the other hand, while formally approving the coalition effort, indicated its strong opposition to the idea by appointing

\textsuperscript{102}Kitzinger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 133-36; and Baukloh, "Wandlungen in der SPD," \textit{Frankfurter Hefte}, Vol. 20, no. 12 (1965), 816-19.

\textsuperscript{103}Kitzinger, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 136-37; and "Schütz: Held nach Mass," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 34.
an additional negotiator noted for his violent anti-CDU views. It is not clear that Adenauer had any serious intention of bringing the SPD into the government anyway, and shortly thereafter the talks broke off. There was no discussion of this effort within the regional organizations or at the 1964 convention.\textsuperscript{104}

Again in 1966 the initial contacts with the CDU appear to have been made by Wehner, who was later joined by Brandt and H. Schmidt. The eventual negotiating team was again the Prasidium, which reported back to the fraction and the executive at each stage. Throughout the period of negotiations, there was clear opposition to a Grand Coalition in both the fraction and the party executive. In addition, large scale protests came to the executive from the local parties, including delegations sent to Bonn to persuade their m.p.'s to vote against the coalition.\textsuperscript{105}

There was a long and sharp debate within the fraction prior to the final vote on the formal coalition agreement. Although the leadership was eventually able to persuade enough undecided m.p.'s, with appeals to loyalty, to get a majority

\textsuperscript{104}Hartmut Soell, "Fraktion und Parteiorganisation," Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 10, no. 4 (December, 1969), 608-10.

for the coalition, over one-third of the m.p.'s voted against it, and some continued to register their opposition by abstaining in the final Bundestag vote on Kiesinger. The party executive and Council held a meeting after the fraction vote. The opposition in these groups, however, found it difficult to hold out in view of the fraction decision and they eventually approved the coalition 73 to 19.\textsuperscript{106} It was quite clear, however, that unlike the CDU, many in the party felt the fraction and executive had overstepped the bounds of their authority in making such a decision without wider participation by the regional organizations, and opposition bitterness was demonstrated at the 1968 convention. In an effort to demonstrate party unity, the executive submitted a resolution that provided tag approval \textit{ex post facto} for the Grand Coalition. This almost backfired when an alternative resolution submitted by several Bezirke, which made clear there was no specific party approval of the decision, lost by only a four vote margin.\textsuperscript{107}

At the 1969 party convention, there were some resolutions calling for a special convention immediately after


\textsuperscript{107}Protokoll, SPD Parteitag 1968 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD), pp. 124-250.
the election to restrict the leadership's authority, and require convention approval of any coalition decision. These were defeated in part because the leadership made a special effort to prevent another gap between itself and the lower party levels by permitting a wide-ranging discussion on the coalition possibilities and by recommending yearly conventions in the future. Immediately after the 1969 voting results began to come in, a number of individual party leaders, including Brandt, Schmidt, and Heinz Kühn—the Nordrhein-Westfalen Minister-President—made contacts with both the FDP and the CDU. The following day, the fraction executive and party executive voted to direct efforts towards the FDP, although some sentiment for continuing the Grand Coalition was expressed. The negotiating team which included the Präsidium and Grand Coalition Cabinet members conducted the formal negotiations, and the final agreement with the FDP was ratified by the fraction and party executive without any active opposition.

Party policy-making

According to the party statute, the national

\[108\] Protokoll, SPD Ausserordentlichen Parteitag, 1969 (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD); and Soell, op. cit., p. 622.

conventions decide the general policy of the SPD. The process by which the Bad Godesburger program was developed, and the participants in it, are generally illustrative of the process for other party programs as well. In 1957, the party executive finally appointed a commission to prepare a draft of a new basic program to be presented to the 1958 convention. The commission members were m.p.'s or regional public office-holders and party officials with reputations for expertise in particular policy areas. This group also consulted with other advisors from the academic community and wrote a draft which was submitted to the 1958 convention for discussion, not adoption. After this convention, at which some minor changes in language were accepted, and after the commission made further changes—decreasing the length by dropping the vague attempts at a theoretical analysis—the new draft was sent to the regional and local organizations for discussion prior to the special 1959 convention. Over 276 resolutions on the draft as well as several entire alternative programs were sent in by local organizations. The majority of these did not suggest substantive alternatives, although there were a number which reflected a traditional left position and opposed abandonment of socialization demands and references to the party's

Marxist heritage. At the special convention in 1959, a clear majority of delegates, who indeed had been selected prior to publication of the 1958 draft, supported the executive draft. The opposition was scattered among a number of Bezirke and got its largest vote—almost one-third of the delegates—on an alternative resolution which stated a more traditional socialist position on economic policy. But, in voting on the program itself section by section, even this opposition declined and the highest no vote, again on the economic section, was only 42 delegates, the rest of the program receiving large majorities.

The other party programs that stated general positions and anticipated or approved changes in the party's position already made by the leaders followed similar patterns of initiative and decision. They were drafted by committees of the executive and sent to the lower units several weeks before the convention. Resolutions concerning these programs were usually affirmative or suggested minor changes which were frequently incorporated in the program at the convention. Where dissidents sent in resolutions that presented clear alternatives to leadership


112Resolutions, speeches, and the most important votes are in Flechtheim, Vol. VII (1969), op. cit., 135-47.
positions, they have always been defeated in convention voting.\footnote{113}

In addition to the programs, SPD conventions have also discussed and voted on an average of 100 to 300 other resolutions, some submitted by the executive, others by the locals, which have specified a party position on particular issues. These have not always been covered by the programs themselves. The language of these resolutions has usually been phrased in terms of committing the executive or the fraction to a particular course of action. This reflects traditional party doctrine on the relationship of the party organization and its public office-holders, which gives the convention responsibility for setting guidelines which the fraction and party executive carry out.\footnote{114} On the other hand, the fraction and the leadership have made it clear that their acceptance of this tradition is limited to the vague following of general principles, and not the conventions' determination of specific acts. Thus, the fraction rules do not state any subordination to the party organization, and Brandt, in a speech at the 1960 convention after his selection as Chancellor-candidate, clearly

\footnote{113Childs, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 95-96. For examples, see Flechtheim, \textit{Vol. III} (1963), \textit{op. cit.}, 134-37; and \textit{Vol. VII} (1969), 293-310.}

rejected the idea that the organization could dictate decisions if he were elected Chancellor.115

Actually, the majority of resolutions at conventions have generally come from the leadership and have reflected their views. These resolutions are developed by PV committees and submitted by the executive for convention consideration. The committees of the executive, which have increased to twenty-three, are organized according to such subject matter areas as foreign policy, economic policy, family and youth policy. The members, appointed by the executive, have included regional public office-holders, Land Ministers and m.p.'s with expertise in particular areas, a few members of the women's and youth auxiliaries, members of the Bundestag fraction working groups in these areas and the fraction staff. Because they are most familiar with legislative details and because they are always available for meetings in Bonn, the Bundestag m.p.'s and fraction staff have dominated these committees with the possible exception of those in policy areas such as education where Länder governments have the main responsibility. In these, Land politicians and experts have regularly

participated.\textsuperscript{116} The resolutions they have drafted for the national conventions have generally been either statements of positions already taken by the fraction or have been so vague as to allow the leadership room to make any decision on the issue later.\textsuperscript{117}

In addition, of course, the regional and local parties have sent resolutions to each convention. Most of these have been minor, or similar in content to the executive resolutions and are either adopted or referred to the executive. Those from opposition groups attempting to bind the executive and fraction to a new policy initiative or to change specific positions have been defeated.\textsuperscript{118} The 1968 convention was something of an exception, at least in the very large number of resolutions (over 900), and the percentage of these which opposed the leadership position on a number of issues—emergency legislation, the extension of codetermination, and initiatives towards Eastern Europe in foreign policy. It was also unusual in that the vote was very close on a number of these, although in each case

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{116}] Kaack, op. cit., p. 103; Soell, op. cit., p. 610, 623-24.
\item[\textsuperscript{117}] Childs, op. cit., pp. 95-103; Pirker, op. cit., pp. 190-205; and Soell, op. cit., p. 612.
\item[\textsuperscript{118}] Müller, op. cit., pp. 83-90; Schellenger, op. cit., pp. 76-86; and "Der Dortmunder Parteitag der SPD," op. cit., p. 464.
\end{itemize}
the executive position was adopted.\textsuperscript{119}

Despite their defeat, these policy initiatives in resolutions from the lower party organization may occasionally have some influence on the national leadership. At least it seems clear that the party leaders took careful account of the close votes in 1968, for at the 1969 convention, the executive submitted a number of its own resolutions which essentially adopted the opposition demands of the previous year. Thus, executive resolutions which committed the party to an extension of codetermination, and compromised on the new initiatives in foreign policy—recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and the German Democratic Republic—were passed. At the same time, it was clear that the decision still rested with the national leaders. In the case of a Bezirk resolution on economic policy with which the leadership disagreed, the first vote on which it passed was declared invalid by the convention chairman and it was defeated on the second vote.\textsuperscript{120}

Beyond the programs and policy resolutions adopted at conventions, SPD positions are stated by fraction leaders, in draft legislation introduced in the Bundestag, as

\textsuperscript{119}Soell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 619.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., pp. 621-22; and Klaus von Beyme, "The Ostpolitik in the West German 1969 Elections," \textit{Government and Opposition}, V (Spring, 1970), 197-99.
well as in a great number of position papers and plans issued by the party executive. These are not necessarily ever mentioned at conventions or may take a different position without ever being referred back to the next convention. The circle of participants which the party tries to include in the development of these positions, though not in the final decisions, is quite wide. The agenda for meetings of the executive committees is usually determined by the fraction staff and members of the relevant fraction working circle. Non-party academics, group representatives, and Land politicians and party leaders are frequently invited to the meetings. Special conferences are sometimes held with the participation of these groups. These provide an occasion for the presentation of different views, the analysis of problems, or the legitimation of decisions already made.121

In addition, the fraction executive and the working circles in the fraction have independently developed some positions and usually draft legislation. Groups of members may also take the initiative and submit drafts, as the

unionists did in the 1950's. Occasionally draft legisla-
tion in the area of family and youth policy is developed
in the women's auxiliary.\textsuperscript{122}

Participants in actual decisions on whether to make
these official party positions have, however, been much
fewer in number. The Präsidium appears to be the key
locus for policy decision-making, as it unites the leaders
of the various elements of the party. Prior to 1958, the
national party bureaucrats thus clearly participated in
decision-making, although the fraction leaders also were
an important influence. Since 1958, of course, the Präsidi-
dium has been dominated by the party's important public
division. Though composition of the Präsidium thus
changed, it remained the locus of party decisions.\textsuperscript{123}

Most positions are eventually issued as joint deci-
sions of the fraction, the larger executive, and the party
council. However, the executive and council have generally
served only to ratify, or to communicate to a wider circle
of secondary leaders, decisions already made. As in the
CDU, these larger groups have met less often, and have thus

\textsuperscript{122}Loewenberg, op. cit., p. 178; and Soell, op.
cit., p. 618.

\textsuperscript{123}Soell, op. cit., pp. 605-07; Loewenberg, op. cit.,
pp. 184-85; and John Snell, "Schumacher's Successors,"
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXVI (March, 1956),
336-37.
been unable to anticipate the need for decisions. Once made by the top leaders, they are very difficult to disavow. There have been some exceptions, where the fraction leaders and Präsidium have not been clearly agreed, in which the executive may make the decision, but this is very rare.124

Finally, the larger circle of fraction leaders, as well as the Cabinet ministers after 1966, have often played a key role in deciding on specific draft legislation. And the entire fraction caucus cannot be overlooked as a participant in decisions. Fraction leaders stand for re-election three times in each session and are usually willing to listen and frequently revise drafts to incorporate the views of backbenchers. Although the majority of m.p.'s has usually supported the fraction executive's position in the caucus, long debate is common and actual votes in which there is a real contest are much more frequent than in the CDU/CSU caucus.125

As we saw in the discussion of factionalism, there has been considerable internal debate within the SPD over

\[124\] Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 74-75; Kaack, op. cit., p. 87; Wildenmann, et al., op. cit., p. 125; and Soell, op. cit., pp. 605-07, 611.

both policy and strategy. In the 1950's, it was between
the more traditional leftists and the reformers over style,
as much as domestic and foreign policy positions; in the
late 1960's, renewed debate began over the strategy of ac-
commodation to the CDU, and over policy. Several factors,
however, have worked to maintain cohesion and provide the
SPD with a general consensus. First, despite the disagree-
ments on strategy and reform, all groups have been agreed
in their desire to increase the party's vote. The differ-
ences have been on how best to achieve an electoral vic-
tory, and thus only a few dissidents were ready to leave
the party or form splinter groups. In addition, during
the 1950's, all groups recognized the party's need to ad-
just to new political situations and relationships in the
Federal Republic. Differences arose primarily on the de-
gree of adaptation. After the new basic program was adopt-
ed, it provided a basic statement of general principles
upon which almost all could agree and thus provided a sense
of cohesion. Even the opposition leaders in the late
1960's appealed to the Bad Godesburger program for legiti-
mation.126

Second, SPD doctrine includes a strong tradition of


126 Piechtheim, Vol. VII (1969), op. cit., xv-
xvii, 206-14.
leadership has made every effort to carry over to their policy positions as well). This has frequently prevented dissidents from sharper attacks, and meant a general reluctance, after a position has been stated, to go on record with a vote against the leadership. Thus, at conventions, the size of any internal opposition is usually not accurately reflected in the actual votes on resolutions.\textsuperscript{127}

In addition, the possibilities for discussion and for sending in resolutions to conventions have provided an outlet for conflict without splitting the party. The leaders in the late 1960's in particular have recognized the advantage of allowing considerable latitude for the expression of dissenting views at conventions, thus providing at least a sense of participation in decisions, without much actual influence, and thereby avoiding the bitterness which led to a number of resignations of party members in the 1950's.\textsuperscript{128}

Actually, the process of development of party policy has been structured to include most elements in at least some discussion of the issues, if not the actual decisions. Perhaps part of the reason for the frequent development of the youth organizations as a focus for dissent has been the fact that they have had little or no representation on the

\textsuperscript{127} Schellenger, op. cit., pp. 70-86.

\textsuperscript{128} Chalmers, op. cit., p. 131; Wildenmann, et al., op. cit., p. 124; Protokoll, SPD Parteitag 1969, op. cit.
party council or executive.\textsuperscript{129}

In the late 1950's, party discipline at the national and local levels was fairly severe. Besides the SDS ruling, there were a number of expulsions of outspoken leftists. Immediately after the Bad Godesburger program was passed, it was used to a certain extent to rid the party of dissidents whose leftist positions, in the national leadership's view, endangered its efforts for respectability in the voters' eyes.\textsuperscript{130} Since then, the number of expulsions has declined. Where they have occurred, they have reflected the overzealousness and intolerance of some local organizations towards the New Left. In some cases, these local expulsions were overruled on appeal to the executive.\textsuperscript{131}

Within the fraction, as in the CDU, there are few sanctions available to the leadership. In fact, the SPD executive has been somewhat more vulnerable to backbench revolts than in the CDU. Nevertheless, in the 1950's, once

\textsuperscript{129}Chalmers, op. cit.; Lohmar, op. cit., pp. 81-82; Wildenmann, et al., op. cit., p. 125.

\textsuperscript{130}For examples, see Flechtheim, Vol. VII (1969), op. cit., 105, 151-62.

\textsuperscript{131}Flechtheim, Vol. VII (1969), op. cit., 191-92, 348-63. The Berlin organization has been the scene of particularly bitter conflicts between a right-wing party establishment and student dissenters, and there were 35 expulsions by the local party in 1968, pp. 458-60.
the caucus majority decided on a position, voting unity was extremely high. During the 1960's, there were a few issues on which about thirty m.p.'s voted against the party position. One of the most notable examples was the emergency legislation. A sizable group opposed the majority decision to accept compromise legislation, and many of these m.p.'s then also abstained or voted no in the Bundestag voting. There have not been any cases of leadership attempts to sanction these few deviations. In fact, there is some indication that the leadership has been eager to advertise these few differences of opinion, in order to erase any remaining public image of socialist party discipline.132

Conclusions

Factionalism

Similarities

West German federalism has apparently not had sufficiently significant regional differences and historical roots to provide the basis for regional factions in either the CDU or the SPD. The one possible exception is the CSU. The SPD, however, has not had a Bavarian wing as one would expect if regional differences and traditions alone

explained the CSU.

Although the electoral system produces two categories of m.p.'s, this had not led to any discernible factions within either parliamentary party based on list vs. district m.p.'s, perhaps because the practice common in both parties of giving list m.p.'s districts to represent has lessened the distinction.

Differences

The difference in competitive positions of the CDU and the SPD has, as expected, led to differences in the extent of factionalism in the two parties. There is much more extensive factionalism in the CDU than in the SPD. Also, as a minority party striving to win votes, the Social Democrats have been less tolerant of those issue factions which they felt would hurt their chances at the polls. The conclusion that competitive position has an impact on factionalism is partially reinforced in that after SPD participation in the Grand Coalition accomplished the aim of making the party appear "regierungsfähig," the leadership was somewhat more tolerant of the new dissident groups which developed in the late 1960's. It is possible that in its new opposition position after 1969 the CDU's tolerance of factionalism will decline.

Differences in party doctrine have, of course,
reinforced these differences in the extent of factionalism. Thus, the CDU's acceptance of the legitimacy of different internal groups and their organization in the auxiliaries, has facilitated factionalism, whereas the SPD's tradition of "Geschlossenheit" and party unity has inhibited their development.

Differences, particularly in the range of socio-economic groups among party members and voters, have also affected the nature of factions in the two parties as we expected. CDU factions have thus been based on socio-economic differences. In the SPD, the few factional divisions have been on the basis of party strategy and policy. It may be that as the SPD base widens to include more income groups, this will eventually lead to the development of socio-economic factions. At least the calls for a union-wing in the late 1960's indicate a trend in that direction.

Finally, as in the other organizational dimensions studied, the very weakness of the CDU's formal organization, as well as its origin in local groups has led to the development of functional factions which are not present in the more strongly organized SPD. Thus, the JU and occasionally the regional party leaders have acted as factions on the basis of their function in the organization.
Similarities

There are several similarities in the policy-making process in the two parties which appear to be the result of the constitutional-electoral system. In both the CDU and the SPD, the primary participants in the development and decisions on party policy positions have been the public office-holders. The number of individuals with a role in decision-making has been fairly small, and the larger leadership units of the national party organizations—the executive and council—have functioned primarily to ratify the decisions of the top group and to communicate them to wider levels of the party. This tends to support the common assumption that competitive, democratic parliamentary systems favor the dominance of publicly-elected leaders, and minimize the roles of external party organizations. In addition, in such a system where the elected leaders dominate, the importance of winning or staying in office provides a goal on which the leaders can agree, and is a source of cohesion within each party. On the other hand, the decentralization of the election process has made it difficult for each party to entirely centralize campaigns and electoral strategy. Regional and local candidates in both have on occasion pursued their own different
strategies, independent of the national party.

As the framework suggested, certain attitudes in the political culture—dislike of conflict, the preference for letting those with presumed expertise make decisions, and the lack of interest in political participation—have also produced similarities in the CDU and the SPD. In both parties there is a tendency for national conventions to produce vague affirmations of leadership decisions, and the lower party organizations are inclined to allow the national leadership wide room for discretion in political decisions. As a result, CDU and SPD conventions usually function as public displays of party unity and for the reinforcement of internal cohesion.

Differences

The CDU's government position and extensive factionalism have affected its process of policy-making. The locus for both initiatives and decisions on party policy has been external to the CDU party organization. The party has instead relied on governmental experts in the ministries and the fraction, as well as auxiliaries, or independent interest groups for the development of positions. The locus of decisions has been the Chancellory or the fraction, where the process has involved compromise among different party groups. Policy changes have reflected
shifts in the internal balance of different factions in the party. The opposition SPD, on the other hand, has been unable to rely on government ministries for expertise. With fewer groups among its voters, and fewer factions, the party organization itself has served as the locus for policy initiatives, and it has relied to a greater extent on its own staff and outside expertise. The party Präsidium which unites the various leadership elements in the SPD has generally served as the locus for party decisions. The lack of diversity of internal groups has meant that changes or shifts in the party's position have been primarily directed towards increasing its electoral support.

There are indications that the gradual shift in competitive positions in the 1960's had some effect on these differences. As the CDU's continued position in government became less secure, the party became more dependent on its various groups for votes. Without a strong leader to force compromises, the process of balancing group claims became more difficult and there was a tendency to stalemate instead. On the other hand, the SPD's participation in the government in 1966 made participation in party policy-making more important and increased the attempts of issue groups to use the mass-party tradition and organization to force changes in the party's positions.

It is a frequent assertion of the literature on
political parties that class differences in party members and voters influence the internal organization. Duverger makes the most extensive use of middle-class, working-class differences to explain party differences. Particularly in the 1950's, this relationship seems to be borne out in the differences between the SPD and the CDU. Prior to 1958, the SPD party bureaucracy did have a role in decision-making through membership on the Präsidium. CDU public office-holders, on the other hand, have always made the decisions on party policy. After 1958, while the SPD Präsidium remained the locus for decision-making, its changed composition gave a dominant influence to the party's public office-holders, and the party bureaucracy has had little influence in policy decisions. Interestingly, the change was the result of a new concern to appeal to other groups beyond the working class, and not because of any actual major change in the class structure of the party's membership. However, some differences remain as a result of the SPD's mass-party character and its extra-governmental origins. The possibility of influence by the party organization in party policy-making is somewhat greater than in the middle-class CDU.

The diversity of socio-economic groups and factions

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133See Chapter I.
within the CDU has also affected its process of policy-making. The CDU needs a strong leader to effect compromises among the various groups, and it has had greater difficulty in enforcing party discipline. The more homogeneous SPD has been led by a small collegial leadership group that is somewhat freer to make changes, and has less problems with party discipline.

It has also been suggested that the nature of the factional divisions within a party will affect the process of party policy-making and this relationship is at least partially supported by differences between the CDU and the SPD. The hypothesis that the existence of socio-economic factions, as in the CDU, will lead to decentralized decision-making, and coordination by the national leadership of decisions made elsewhere is partially correct. However, it would be more accurate to speak of a dispersion of decision-making among various groups at the national level in the CDU. Without strong leadership following Adenauer's retirement, the Chancellor/party chairman and the fraction leaders have functioned to coordinate decisions rather than to control them. On the other hand, the suggestion that parties, like the SPD, where issue disputes are characteristic will have more internal discussion at the national level, but that participation in decision-making will be restricted to a small group of public
officials appears to be accurate.

Certain aspects of party doctrine and tradition in the SPD and the CDU also appear to have influenced the process of policy-making in both parties. Thus, the traditional aspects of mass-party doctrine which emphasize the participation of party members, the role of conventions in policy-making, and generally, internal party democracy have provided at least a greater potential in the SPD for the convention and activists in the local organizations to influence the policy positions of the leadership. As conventions in the late 1960's have illustrated, the leadership must take the local party views into account or face the possibility that it will be defeated in convention votes. This has also given the fraction caucus more influence since votes are expected on contested issues. The CDU, on the other hand, has had no tradition of internal party democracy or rules on the relationship between the external organization and the party's office-holders. Both at party conventions, and in the fraction, direct votes and majority decisions on controversial issues are avoided if possible, and these groups have not participated much in party policy-making.

Of course, this is not to suggest some sort of participatory democracy in the SPD, or that party members make decisions. In fact, other aspects of SPD doctrine and
tradition have served to mitigate the potential for influence and strengthen leadership control. These include the emphasis on party solidarity, the traditional respect for, and loyalty to the party leaders, and the programmatic tradition. These have continued to produce a general reluctance to challenge leadership positions on policy and have made it possible for the leaders to use the basic program as a test of party loyalty and to enforce a high degree of discipline in fraction voting. The CDU’s origin in a coalition of diverse groups; its emphasis on the legitimacy of different opinions within the party, and the lack of a basic program have made it more difficult to define party loyalty, without a strong leader such as Adenauer, and to enforce fraction discipline.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Drawing on the specific conclusions made in the substantive chapters, in this chapter we will describe patterns of similarities and differences across the four organizational processes studied—candidate selection, leadership selection, factionalism, and party decision-making. A general assessment of which system and party-related variables were more important will also be included. In addition, we will consider the utility of the framework and the possible clarification of some variables, as well as a few suggestions for further research.

The Influence of System and Party-Related Variables on Party Organization

System variables: similarities in the CDU and the SPD

The system variables discussed in Chapter I, constitutional-electoral arrangements, and the West German political culture, do, as we have seen, set general limits within which the parties vary. There are thus some broad similarities between the CDU and the SPD across the organizational dimensions studied. Constitutional-electoral
arrangements may be subdivided into various components which have affected party organization. These are the electoral system, legal regulations, and federalism.

Certain aspects of the electoral system have primarily produced similarities with regard to the two parties' recruitment and political leadership careers. As a result of the decentralized election system with Land lists and single-member districts, plus party organization control of the nomination process, decisions on candidate selection in both the CDU and the SPD are decentralized and not controlled by the national organizations or parliamentary parties. Instead, the locus for nominations is the local or regional party organization. External groups, such as business associations and the trade unions, serve as sources of recruitment in the CDU and the SPD, respectively, because of an overlap of individual members; but neither business associations nor trade unions have any formal link with the party organizations, and they cannot control the nomination of candidates or party leaders. The party organizations thus become funnels for the recruitment of national public and party office-holders, and party activity or service a common background in such careers. Other decisions relating to the electoral system, i.e., campaign organization and strategy, are also somewhat decentralized despite efforts of the national party leaders.
to centralize and coordinate these activities.

Another aspect of the electoral system has had some impact on the organizational processes in both parties. As discussed in Chapter I, it is a common assumption in the literature on political parties that in competitive, democratic parliamentary systems, the public office-holders will dominate party decision-making.¹ This is borne out for the CDU and the SPD in that the national public office-holders do dominate the parties with respect to decisions on their party's stand on questions of public policy. In addition, as the West German electoral system has developed into a focus on the choice between two alternative national leaders, this has led to an emphasis on the public role of Chancellor or Chancellor-candidate of both the CDU and SPD top leaders. The party chairmanships have become more symbolic, with less independent criteria for selection.

The second subdivision of constitutional-electoral arrangements, the legal regulation of the parties' internal organizational structure, seems to be a much less significant variable. This could perhaps have been anticipated, since the parliamentary parties cooperated in drafting the legislation which was passed after the party organizations had been in operation for almost two decades. Those

¹See the literature in Chapter I, particularly the discussion of McKenzie's study of British parties.
provisions calling for some minor changes in the formal methods for the selection of national party leaders and representation of the local and regional party units have not done much more than provide the surface forms of inner-party democracy and formal mechanics for membership participation. In reality, the similarities and differences between the CDU and the SPD in this area are related to other variables.

The third subdivision of constitutional-electoral arrangements, federalism, has had a mixed impact on similarities in the parties' organizational processes. This is a result of the somewhat unique characteristics of West German federalism. As expected, the very existence of state elections and office-holders with some important independent political functions has produced some parallel decentralization or federalism in the party organizations. These lower levels then require representation in the CDU and SPD national organization executives in order to integrate the various party leadership positions. On the other hand, historical roots and traditions have been more closely associated with the older regional divisions rather than current state boundaries and the actual party subdivisions have followed these lines. This has mitigated

2This is described more fully in Chapter II.
the influence of Land politicians within the party organizations, since there are in most cases several regions within one Land. These regions have not, however, produced any discernible regionally-based factions in either the CDU or the SPD. Finally, the functional division of powers between the national and state governments in the West German system appears to have some effect on the recruitment of political leaders in both the CDU and the SPD. Executive experience in Land ministerial office has more frequently been a stage in the political careers of national party leaders and parliamentarians than a mandate in the various state legislatures.

The other major system variable, West German political culture, has also produced some similarities in the organizational processes of the CDU and the SPD. Of the attitudes described in Chapter II which might be expected to affect the functioning of the party organizations, the one which appears to be most significant is the widespread negative reaction to conflict and desire to avoid political disputes. Thus, in both parties, we found the leaders making efforts to avoid disputes, contested nominations of Bundestag candidates, or contested elections of national executive members in order to provide at least a public appearance of unity. This, in turn, gives considerable advantage to incumbent m.p.'s and party office-holders and
has produced a relatively low turnover in both the CDU and the SPD. In addition, there have also been similar efforts to paper over disputes on questions of party policy, or at least to avoid their resolution in a context which would involve a public display of the differences of opinion within the parties. The general attitudes of disinterest in political participation and a willingness to leave political decisions to others have reinforced these similarities. These attitudes would appear to be related to the disinclination of most CDU and SPD regional and local parties and activists to challenge the decisions of national party leaders, and to the dominance of each organizational level by a small group of activists who actually participate in organizational processes.

On the other hand, the other component attitudes of the West German political culture discussed in Chapter II appear to have had less significance than we expected. The high valuation of expertise, tendencies to compartmentalization of issues, and ideologism—a view that specific political positions must be based on more comprehensive systems of principles—are less clearly related to similarities in the parties' organizational processes than the other system variables. The party-related variables, and party doctrine and traditions in particular, rather than these cultural attitudes, seem to have had a more important
effect on those aspects of CDU and SPD organization.

Party-related variables: differences between the CDU and the SPD

Within these broad similarities in the CDU and SPD organizations described above, we found a number of important differences in organizational processes which appear to be related to the party-related variables in our framework, i.e., to respective differences in competitive positions, socio-economic characteristics, and party doctrine and traditions. In summarizing overall patterns of differences between CDU and SPD organizational processes, the CDU can be characterized as having more dispersed processes and participation of groups external to the formal party organization. The CDU leadership structure has been unstable, and there has been less routinization of careers. Instead, there have been several career routes to positions of leadership in the national party. In contrast, SPD characteristics include a narrower range of participation, and the formal organization has served more consistently as the locus for party decision-making. The leadership structure has been more stable, and careers have been more routinized, that is, there has been less diversity in career patterns of the national party leaders than in the CDU.
In terms of more specific differences in the organizational processes studied, we found that differences in the socio-economic characteristics were a particularly important factor. Interestingly, it is not so much the class distinctiveness of the CDU and the SPD, which is not clear-cut in any case, although the CDU is weighted towards the higher income groups among its members, and the SPD toward the lower income levels, but rather differences in the number and diversity of socio-economic groups within the parties that are most clearly related to differences in CDU and SPD organizational processes.3

Thus, the CDU with its broader range of socio-economic groups—from upper-income businessmen to farmers and wage-earning industrial workers—has developed a number of socio-economic factions which have recognized claims to representation in the top levels of the party organization and to participation in decisions on political leadership. These organized groups also provide alternative career routes to party leadership. The decision-making process within the CDU thus becomes a matter of bargaining and adjusting the balance between various group interests. This, in turn, requires strong leadership to enforce compromises or the result is frequently stalemate and

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3The socio-economic characteristics of party members and supporters are described in Chapter II.
inflexibility in party policy.

In the SPD, however, with its more homogeneous membership and fewer different socio-economic groups, there have been no organized factions based on shared socio-economic characteristics. Group representation has not been a significant criterion in the selection of candidates or party leaders, and this has meant fewer alternative career routes available to party leadership positions. Because there are fewer claims for participation in party decision-making, the process in the SPD has involved less bargaining. The key factor has been agreement within the small collegial leadership group.

The impact of a predominantly middle-class membership in the CDU versus a predominantly working-class membership in the SPD, that is, the class distinctiveness of the two parties, is less clear. In the narrow sense which suggests that the party bureaucracy and party employees will play a major role in working-class parties, this was true for the SPD to some degree only in the 1950's when party functionaries had some influence through their membership on the party Präsidium. However, the party secretariat has not provided an important career route for SPD leadership in the Federal Republic.

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Duverger makes the clearest argument for these relationships, see Chapter I.
In the broader sense in which working-class parties are associated with certain mass party traditions about the role of the external organization and the membership in party decisions, in contrast to middle-class parties which are associations of notables, there is, however, some parallel in the differences between the SPD and the CDU. That is, there appears to be more potential for influence by the external party organization through the national party convention delegations from the regional and local parties on public office-holders and parliamentarians in the SPD than in the CDU. There does not appear to be even much potential for such influence in the CDU.

The second major party-related variable, the respective competitive positions of the CDU and the SPD, is also related to a number of differences in the organizational processes in the two parties. This variable covers several aspects: differences in the vote percentages of the CDU and the SPD—in Bundestag and state elections—and the different positions of the parties as government or opposition at the national level. Our expectation that the larger national CDU vote throughout the period would lead to greater internal factionalism in the CDU and more contested nominations for the Bundestag than in the SPD, which with its smaller vote base would be more concerned to avoid divisive internal conflicts, appears to be supported.
However, this relationship cannot be clearly established at the level of individual election districts where factors other than the local competitive situation are apparently more important. On the other hand, the more nearly equal SPD competitive position in state and local elections has produced similarities in the parties' ability to use state politics as a training ground for political leadership and executive experience, and as a source for the recruitment of national political leaders.

In terms of the respective government, opposition positions of the CDU and the SPD, throughout most of the period studied, competitive position has also had discernible effects on differences in CDU and SPD processes for selecting national leaders and making party policy. First, the CDU has been able to depend on the governmental bureaucracy and has thus been less interested in the recruitment of experts in particular subject areas independent of group representation. It has had less need to rely on the party organization's staff or independent experts for the development of party policy positions. The SPD, on the other hand, has had very limited access to government ministries, and subject expertise has thus been an important selection criterion. In the development of party policy, the SPD has been more dependent on party staff and on the involvement of independent non-party specialists in particular policy
areas.

Second, since the most important national public office-holders in the CDU have been Cabinet members, there has been more overlap between Cabinet and party leadership positions and correspondingly less overlap with the larger fraction executive. In the SPD, of course, there has been considerable overlap between the fraction and the top party leadership.

Third, because of the CDU's government position, the locus for party decision-making and for integration of the various elements in the party has been the governmental units—the Chancellor's office, or the fraction executive. For the opposition SPD, however, the external party organization and the Präsidium in particular have served as a locus for party decision-making and integration of the various party leaders. Party roles have thus had somewhat more importance in the SPD independent of public office than they have had in the CDU.

Finally, the third party-related variable, party doctrine, has generally reinforced differences summarized above, as well as having some additional independent effects. CDU acceptance of different interests and of their expression within the party as legitimate has reinforced the tendency to more conflicts and contests than in the SPD. Most of these have indeed revolved around adequate
representation for various groups institutionalized in the party auxiliaries. In the SPD, the strong emphasis on solidarity, party unity, and deference to the national leadership has reinforced efforts to avoid open conflicts. Recognition has not been granted to different groups and there is opposition to the use of auxiliaries for the organization of internal factions.

In addition, the difference in the programmatic traditions in the CDU and the SPD has had some consequences. The CDU, without any basic statement of long-range goals and principles to serve as a source of unity, has found it much more difficult to reach a consensus without the authority of a strong leader such as Adenauer. Defining party loyalty and enforcing discipline is therefore more difficult. In the SPD, its basic program has served as a source of internal party cohesion, and in addition has been used by the party leadership to define loyalty and enforce party discipline.

The additional lack of any tradition of inner-party democracy or of a convention role in party decision-making in the CDU has reinforced the public office-holders' dominance in the party. In contrast, SPD doctrine, as we noted above, includes certain mass party traditions of membership participation in decision-making and convention control of the parliamentary party. This has, as we said,
meant some potential for influence from the external organization on the party's leaders. At least, to avoid the embarrassment of public defeat or repudiation at the national convention, national party leaders have had to take into account the attitudes and reactions of party activists to their decisions.

Changes over time in two party-related variables

There have been gradual changes during the period studied in both the competitive positions and the socioeconomic characteristics of the CDU and the SPD. The resulting changes in some aspects of the parties' organizational processes reinforce our conclusions about some of the relationships between these variables and party organization.

First, the 1961 election marked a turning point in the competitive positions of the parties. In the following elections in the 1960's the distance between the CDU and the SPD decreased as the CDU lost some ground and there were significant increases in the SPD vote. As the CDU's competitive position became less secure in the 1960's and the possibility of finding itself in opposition became a reality, there were efforts to strengthen the party

5These changes are discussed more fully in Chapter II.
organization and a gradual recognition of the importance of the party chairman's role in providing internal cohesion. While not particularly successful, CDU leaders also made more efforts to close ranks and reinforce party unity and party discipline. In the SPD, on the other hand, we see a shift in the 1960's towards greater recognition of the role of the Chancellor-candidate in contrast to the party chairmanship and some relaxation of discipline. In 1969 there was an interesting reversal with more contested nominations in the SPD than in the CDU.

Some changes were also apparent in the parties' policy processes from the 1950's to the 1960's. As the CDU's position became less secure, the party became more dependent on the support of various groups. This made the process of bargaining and compromise more difficult, and the frequent result was an inability to make new decisions on party positions. In the SPD, the increasingly successful electoral results and eventual government participation strengthened the influence of the national public office-holders in the party, while at the same time allowing them to be somewhat more tolerant of dissidents within the organization.

Secondly, there were some less clear-cut changes in socio-economic characteristics which primarily affected the SPD. During the 1960's, there was a considerable increase
in the white-collar percentage among SPD voters, although this increase was less marked among party members.\textsuperscript{6} There are some indications that this increase in other groups besides workers may begin to have some effect on the nature of factionalism in the SPD. At least, in the late 1960's, there was a perception on the part of unionists in the SPD of the need for a special organization within the party to represent their views, as the party as a whole no longer did so.

\textbf{A Note on the "End of Ideology" and the SPD}

We might at this point briefly consider the application of our study of leadership selection and policy-making in the SPD to the "end of ideology" literature and its use of the SPD as an example.\textsuperscript{7} A number of authors have argued that the advent of the welfare state and decreased class divisions in society have made party competition on the basis of explicit ideological commitments no longer viable, and that, as a result, democratic political parties have become non-ideological. While it is not entirely clear how

\textsuperscript{6}See Chapter II.

\textsuperscript{7}The thesis on the "end of ideology" as developed by Lipset and Dahrendorf is discussed in the literature review in Chapter I.
these authors define "ideology," if we take it to mean an end to an adherence to strict Marxism, this does seem to be the case in the SPD with the passage of the Bad Godesburger Program in 1959. As we suggested in Chapter I, this thesis really assumes that those most concerned with electoral results, i.e., a party's public office-holders, will be in control of party programs. Certainly in the SPD case, the assumption of control in the party organization by the reformers in 1958 was the key factor which linked the perception of changed societal conditions to the abandonment of Marxism in 1959.

Briefly, throughout the 1950's, a perception gradually spread within the SPD that it was not possible within the social context of the Federal Republic to win elections on the basis of class, socialist appeals. This perception was vocalized by a small group of prominent SPD politicians—office-holders in Länder governments and prominent parliamentarians. Despite the fact that class differences did continue to exist in West Germany, and the working

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8 Do they mean only leftist and specifically Marxist ideology, from which they take their examples, or some more inclusive phenomenon of individual thought in general? See the discussion of this in Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and An Interpretation," 5-16; S. Lipset, "Some Further Comments on 'The End of Ideology,'" 17-18; and "Communications," 110-11, in The American Political Science Review, LX (March, 1966).
class made up a population majority, growing numbers in the SPD were persuaded that the party's poor electoral results were a consequence of futile appeals to class consciousness and references to its Marxist heritage.

An alternative view was advanced by a smaller group of leftists in the party who were also concerned with electoral results. They argued that the problem was the ineffectiveness and conformity of the party bureaucracy in presenting socialist appeals, and that if adequately presented, a class-ideological appeal could win a majority of the votes. This group was, however, primarily made up of local activists and intellectuals who were not prominent party or public office-holders. The initial response to these perceptions of a need for change was not, however, an alteration of the party program, but a change in the party leadership in 1958. The leftists and reformers united to reduce the influence of party functionaries, and the parliamentary leaders and reformers were able to gain decisive influence in the party Präsidium.

Although throughout the 1950's, the SPD's positions on specific socio-economic issues had gradually shifted to a more moderate, less socialist emphasis, it was after the reformers took party leadership positions that the last vestiges of Marxist ideology were dropped from the draft of a new basic program. Whether due to traditional loyalty
to the leadership, to indifference, or to agreement that something had to be done to achieve the party's electoral goals, a clear majority of delegates at the 1958 convention accepted the new, non-Marxist, non-ideological basic program. Regardless of whether the reformers were accurate in viewing the party's Marxist legacy as the cause of the disappointing electoral results in the 1950's, their assumption of the top leadership posts and subsequent acceptance of this perception were the key factors in the 1959 program change.

After the new basic program was adopted, a change did indeed gradually take place in the SPD's competitive position, and it was somewhat more successful in appealing at least to other lower-income groups besides industrial workers. While there continue to be some differences both in the class composition of SPD and CDU party members and voters, as well as in their stands on socio-economic issues, and emphases in fundamental principles, 1959 did mark an end to adherence to traditional Marxist ideology in the SPD.

With regard to the "end of ideology" thesis, the SPD case suggests that more than just changed social conditions, it was the perception of these changes as the cause

9The leadership changes, and process of adopting a new program in the SPD are more fully described in Chapters IV and V.
for a poor competitive position and the assumption of party leadership by reformers with these views that were the key factors in the end of Marxist ideology within the SPD. That it is one of the party-related variables in our framework, competitive position, which is in general related to the direction of policy changes in a party, would seem to be further indicated by SPD changes in the late 1960's. After participation in the Grand Coalition, and with increasingly close competition between the SPD and the CDU, the party began to emphasize much more strongly its programmatic and policy differences from the CDU in the 1969 campaign. This supports other findings on the relationship between close competition and policy differentiation between parties.10

The Utility of the Framework

There were a few problems which arose in the application of the framework set out in Chapter I which should be pointed out. The first concerns the relationship between political culture and the organizational processes studied. There is always some difficulty in determining direct links between attitudes and political behavior. As discussed above, the only clear relationship we found

10See, for example, the discussion of Eldersveld's conclusions in this respect, Chapter I, note 80.
appeared to be between negative attitudes towards conflict and disputes which could explain the efforts to avoid contests, and hesitancy to challenge the leadership, with the resulting low turnover in both the CDU and the SPD. Yet, even in this instance, there are important differences between the parties in these characteristics which would seem to indicate that other variables may be more directly related. In addition, the fact that the attitudes towards politics which comprise a "political culture" are not necessarily logically related, or may even be contradictory also create problems. For example, it is not clear that the high value on neutral expertise and compartmentalization of issues found in West German political culture are related to or considered in those attitudes concerning the role of the m.p. or criteria for his selection.  

In view of these problems, political culture should perhaps be regarded as a residual variable, i.e., one which reinforces characteristics directly related to some of the other variables, or to which unexplained differences might be attributed.

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11 Loewenberg, in fact, discusses several different concepts of the legislator's role common in German tradition, but it is not clear how these have affected the selection criteria of local party organizations, *Parliament in the German Political System* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 40-48.
Second, some problems arose in considering the impact of party doctrine on the organizational dimensions studied. For one thing, in the absence of interview or other data on the actual attitudes and beliefs of party members and activists, we had to make an assumption that the statements of party leaders, and those in party publications reflected generalized beliefs and traditions within the parties. Perhaps where such data are not available, it might be possible to avoid the problem of making such an assumption by using an alternative, more concrete variable which at least seems to cover some of the same factors, such as developmental origins. For example, instead of considering the relationship between CDU doctrine on the coalition of various independent groups, or the SPD's doctrine of unity and loyalty to the leadership and various differences in the parties' organizational processes, perhaps the same factor could be discussed in terms of the federal and local origins of the CDU versus the central development of the SPD.12

In addition, some aspects of SPD doctrine appeared to be somewhat contradictory. Attitudes of deference and

12 The question of developmental origins is discussed from a different perspective which considers the circumstances which led to the development of political parties in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 7-21.
loyalty to the leadership, and unwillingness to challenge or contest them are accompanied on the other hand by certain traditional mass-party conceptions about the participation of members, and the influence of the external organization through the national convention on the party's decision-making. Our research indicates that the former attitudes, probably reinforced by the general political culture, have been more significant. However, as we saw in the events of the late 1960's, the mass party traditions do set some limits to the willingness to go along with the national leadership. It appears that these norms of inner-party democracy have generally been used by a minority of local and lower-level activists to legitimate their opposition to particular decisions of the national leadership.

Third, the different role which the youth organization plays in the CDU in the recruitment of candidates and in the political careers of the party leadership, not found in the SPD, would seem to require the consideration of some variable other than those presented in our framework. The differences in the roles of the CDU and SPD youth organizations do not seem to be related to any greater percentage of young people among CDU members, or to any particular doctrine on their role, although the more favorable competitive position of the CDU may have made careers in the CDU more attractive than in the SPD. Instead, the differences
appear to be related to differences in the viability of CDU and SPD local organizations. By this, we mean the extent to which there is a regular, active membership in each district to perform the functions of candidate selection and participate in other party activities. In the CDU, there are numerous areas with a small, inactive membership which allows the better organized youth auxiliary to dominate local activities and processes, while this is less often the case in the well-organized SPD. Although there is a clear difference between the numbers of CDU and SPD members, the viability of the local organization may not necessarily be a function of size so much as of actual participation and regularized organization.

Fourth, it is possible to clarify the definition of the socio-economic characteristics variable. From our research, it appears that it is the socio-economic characteristics of party members much more than of voters and supporters which is significant in relation to the organizational processes studied. One problem is the question of the similarity between the characteristics of the membership and those of voters and supporters. In the CDU, the two groups are quite similar, both in terms of range and class distinctiveness. In the SPD, however, there was a considerable increase in the percentage of white-collar supporters in the electorate in the 1960's, without
anything like as large a parallel increase among the party membership. Yet, we found that despite the SPD's increased appeal to middle-income voters and the party's own efforts to present a Volkspartei image, it was the continuing narrower socio-economic range in the membership which was most clearly related to SPD organizational characteristics such as recruitment and factionalism.

Fifth, some of the problems that occurred in attempting to describe party policy-making should be mentioned. It is important to make a distinction between party policy positions and government policy. This did not present much of a problem with the SPD as party programs and positions issued by the executive of the national party organization, and positions and draft legislation announced by the SPD Bundestag fraction could be considered party policy. But for the CDU it was often more difficult to separate government from party policy. This was particularly true with regard to foreign policy while Adenauer was Chancellor, as he made governmental policy decisions which were then adopted as the position of the CDU. In general, an effort was made to distinguish those positions, programs, and plans worked out among CDU Cabinet members and parliamentary leaders that were then used as a starting point for negotiation with its coalition partners in the government or for passage in the Bundestag and to
consider these as an aspect of party policy-making. Those positions and legislative programs which were a product of, and presented as coalition government decisions and legislation were not considered in the discussion of how party policy was made.

Finally, we should point out the significant impact which Adenauer's individual leadership style and personal characteristics had on the CDU, in terms of integrating the party, providing a source for cohesion, and dominating party decision-making. All these aspects of the party organization showed some changes after Adenauer's retirement from a CDU leadership position. It is difficult to generalize from the impact of a particular individual except to state that in view of the other characteristics of CDU organization, the presence or absence of a strong, authoritarian individual in the top leadership role had an important effect on organizational processes in the CDU.

Further Research

There are some obvious areas in the study we have made where further research would be useful. The relationship between competitive position, and in particular between a party's position in government or opposition, and the four organizational processes we considered could be studied now that the SPD has formed a national coalition
government with the FDP, and the CDU is in opposition for the first time in its history. A study of the organizational dimensions under these conditions would indicate the strength of the relationships with competitive position which we found and also provide an indication as to whether the differences between the CDU and the SPD in recruitment criteria, factionalism and party policy-making were instead more dependent on other party variables. For example, if government position is the most important factor, we might expect to find that the locus of decision-making in the SPD has shifted from the Präsidium to the Cabinet, while the CDU becomes more dependent on its external organization leadership units. In addition, what is the role which Kiesinger now plays in CDU policy-making as former Chancellor and current party chairman? Are CDU policy decisions still centered within the fraction executive and its leaders even though Kiesinger is not a member of the Bundestag, or has his influence and position, plus the party's new opposition role given the external organization—the Präsidium and the party executive—a new importance in CDU decision-making?

Further research could also help to clarify the relationships between party organizational processes and political culture and party doctrine with regard to the problems discussed above. Interviews and other data on the attitudes
of local activists and party members could help determine the extent to which some of the general cultural attitudes influence member behavior. In addition, it would be useful to have research on the particular motivational experiences and background which lead to the decision to join a party and participate in party activities. This is particularly so in view of the general antipathy and disinterest in political participation common to West German political culture. Such research on local and regional party activists could also consider their actual beliefs and attitudes with respect to various aspects of party doctrine, such as the member's role in party decision-making and thus contribute to an assessment of the importance of party doctrine as a variable and its effect on the various organizational processes we studied.\footnote{For preliminary findings on some research currently being done on the decision to join and the background of party members, see Nils Diederich, "Some Aspects on the Structure of Party Membership in Germany," Paper prepared for Regional Conference on German Politics (Sacramento, Calif., April 1, 1970); and Peter H. Merkl, "Party Members and Society in West Germany and Italy," prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Los Angeles, Calif., September 7-12, 1970). There is one study of a local CDU organization in Berlin which addresses itself to some of these questions, but it is not clear how representative this is of other CDU local parties, and there is no comparable information for the SPD; see Renate Mayntz, Parteigruppen in der Grossstadt (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959).}
the framework which deals with party policy-making processes to consider more closely in turn their impact on governmental decision-making in West Germany. In that case, party policy processes could be viewed as intervening variables between the overall system characteristics and policy outcomes. This could be useful in assessing the extent to which the party organizations do serve a certain linkage function in the political system.
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