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An epistemological analysis of contemporary curriculum theories

Yoon, Byung Hee, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1987
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY CURRICULUM THEORIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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DEDICATION

To My Parents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am very appreciative of the invaluable advice and guidance received from Dr. E. Alberty. I also want to thank Dr. B. Gordon and Dr. G. McCutocheon for their stimulating suggestions and encouragement. To my family, I offer sincere thanks for support and love.
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CHAPTER I
PROBLEM STATEMENT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the major concerns of both theorists and practitioners in the field of curriculum studies has been the question of 'What should constitute the curriculum content to be taught in school?'. Since the 1920's when curriculum studies emerged as a self-conscious independent field of inquiry, a considerable amount of attention has been devoted to answering this seemingly straightforward question, and now we have a sizable body of literature on this issue. Many of the proposed answers have been expressed under the rubric of curriculum theories, even though not all curriculum theories are directly or exclusively concerned with school curriculum content.¹

Most curriculum theories that are concerned with curriculum content make one assumption in common: knowledge constitutes part of school curriculum content, whatever knowledge is and however it is to be defined. In fact,--------------------------------

¹ Some curriculum theories are concerned not so much with what is to be taught and why as with the issue of what makes particular curriculum content part of school curriculum, for example.
curriculum theories make systematic claims about knowledge as part of curriculum content. This assumption is the central topic of this thesis. Other elements that might constitute curriculum content will not be considered.

Specifically, this study is an attempt for a conceptual exploration of the knowledge claims embedded in curriculum theories. They will be examined in an analytic and critical manner. Here, the term 'analytic' is not to be associated with its usage in linguistic analysis, the major purpose of which is to clarify the meanings and concepts of particular words or sentences in the discourse. The present study intends to clarify and elucidate the alleged relationship between epistemology, theory of knowledge, and curriculum theories, with its focus on their knowledge claims. This will be done by articulating the complicated relationship between epistemology and curriculum theories and by criticizing the various types of epistemological claims embedded in them.

Of the many positions which an intellectual inquiry can take, especially, when it tends to be theory-oriented, we can identify the following three different positions on its major task. The first position takes given or existing problems and issues for granted (i.e., believes that they are 'objective' and deserve serious attention) and strives
to provide the most appropriate solutions for the problems. The second position maintains that the problems in question are not real or are irrelevant, thus, making them not deserve a serious inquiry. The third position distances itself from the ontology of the problems at hand and tries to conceptualize and understand the nature, origins, and characteristics of the problems; it neither 'makes' nor 'takes' problems. Its primary purpose is to understand the relevant phenomena or its state of affairs. The present study takes the last two positions. It not only attempts to articulate and conceptualize the current state of affairs regarding knowledge claims in curriculum theories but attempts to critique some of the claims by carefully comparing and contrasting them.

The intent of this chapter is to state the purposes, assumptions, and methodology of the present study. In addition, a brief review of the state of the recent curriculum field will be presented in order to give a better understanding of the diversity and complexity of curriculum studies. In the section on methodology, the general organization of the paper followed by the limitations of the study will be stated.
1.2 PRESENT STATE OF THE FIELD

What is the present state of the curriculum field? Even a cursory look at the curriculum field clearly reveals that the field is replete with controversial thoughts on both its theoretical and practical front. Apparently, it is impossible for a curriculum scholar to understand and communicate with others without considerable difficulty at the present time.

This problem was recognized by H. Rugg as early as in 1926,\(^2\) only a few years after curriculum emerged as a self-conscious field of study.

> From the beginning of our discussion, it was apparent that we did not understand each other. The chief task which we confronted was the erection of a common vocabulary. (Rugg et al., 1927, p. 4)

Sixty years have passed since then, but the difficulty in communication and understanding among curriculum scholars has not eased away. In fact, the nature of the difficulty has become even more complicated due to the many linguistic terms that have been added.

The purpose of this section is to understand the diversity and complexity of the present state of the curriculum field in general. In order to assess the current situation precisely, it is necessary to overview the recently emerg-

---

\(^2\) Curriculum history scholars generally agree that curriculum studies has existed as an independent discipline since the 1920s.
ing approaches to curriculum studies. As the temporal criterion for selecting the curriculum theories to be considered for this study, the year 1970, a turning point in the curriculum history, has been chosen. The complexity and diversity mentioned above can be understood in this historical context.

Since the year 1970, many curriculum scholars have diagnosed the curriculum field with regard to both theory and practice and attempted to provide appropriate prescriptions for the symptoms they discovered. Diagnosis was popular at that time, and as it turned out, most of the diagnoses were pessimistic in tone and oftentimes extremely critical of the subject matters and research programs employed in the traditional, dominant mode of curriculum inquiry. Despite the considerable diversity in their mode of expression, the diagnoses had one thing in common: namely, the criticism that the so-called traditional curricularists had conducted their inquiry on the basis of unexamined and/or irrelevant assumptions.

The critics often invented a variety of sickness metaphors or exotic languages to describe the state of the curriculum field. Some examples of the diagnoses are: "moribund" (Schwab, 1970; Huebner, 1976); "abehistorical posture and ameliorative orientation" (Kliebard, 1970); "Conceptual muddiness and flabbiness" (Pinar, 1981a); "a state of arrest" (Giroux, 1979); "in disarray" (Schiro, 1980. p. 3); and "ter-
their diagnoses, however, is not relevant here. What is relevant is the emergence of a group of curricular scholars who for the first time repudiated the traditional approaches to theory and practice in curriculum studies. They all agree that the curriculum field has suffered from serious misconceptions regarding its mode of reasoning and methodology (Giroux, 1979, pp. 248-281). Certainly, the spirit of dissatisfaction was overwhelming among the members of the emerging group. A growing body of literature continues to show that curriculum study has been dominated by a technological mode of thought that is inadequate for dealing with the social, moral, and political complexity of curricular concerns (Mazza, 1982, p. 5).

Even though there is no unanimous consensus upon the labelling of the new wave of scholars, it has been recognized that their approach to curriculum studies radically differs from the established, prevailing paradigm of curriculum inquiry in both content and method. The common features and characteristics of the group, of course, go beyond the simple diagnoses and dissatisfaction, and they can be identified easily when compared with the traditional positions.

minally ill or already deceased" (Pinar, 1981b).
According to J. Macdonald (1975, pp. 5-13), there are three groups of curriculum theorists with respect to the purpose of curriculum "theorizing". The first group mainly concerns itself with prescribing and guiding practical activity. People in this group regard a curriculum theory "as a guiding framework for applied curriculum development and research and as a tool for evaluation of curriculum development" (p. 5). Their foremost concern is administrative efficiency and effectiveness. The second group, relying on a "conventional concept of scientific theory", attempts "to identify and describe the variables and their relationships in curriculum" (p. 6). The goal in this group is to provide an empirical explanation for the curriculum variables and their relationships in an objective and scientific manner. The third group of curriculum theorists contrasts with the first two groups in attempting to "reconceptualize" the way of talking about curriculum. Reflecting their diverse philosophical backgrounds—phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, psychoanalysis, and neo-Marxism to name a few—scholars in this group develop new languages and research programs significantly different from those employed in the previous modes of inquiry.

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4 Pinar's classification is an elaboration of Macdonald's with specific labels assigned to the categories.
In a similar vein, W. Pinar\(^4\) recognizes three different modes of curriculum writing that roughly make up the field today as he depicts the historical evolution of the curriculum field. The three groups are labelled respectively as traditionalists, conceptual-empiricists, and reconceptualists (Pinar, 1981a, pp. 1-9, 1981b, pp. 87-97, 1975a, pp. ix-xii). Pinar compares the three groups of curriculum scholars, citing particular individuals as prototypical proponents of each group.

Referring to the traditionalists, Pinar (1975a) says:

> I mean (by "traditional curriculum writing") the work of Professor Tyler, and all the work that falls under his considerable shadow, e.g., Hilda Taba's famous book, Saylor and Alexander's, the Smith-Stanley-Shores volume, and so on. This genre constitutes the heritage of the contemporary curriculum field, and it is a field characterized by the pragmatic, by the concrete ever-changing task of curriculum development, design, implementation, and evaluation. The bulk of this writing has one essential purpose; it is intended as guidance for those who work in school. (p. ix)

Thus, the prevalent mode of inquiry, supported and maintained by the most prominent scholars\(^5\) in the field, functions mainly to facilitate guidance for the practitioners in school. Pinar continues to explicate the basic characteristics and nature of the group. Associating the rationale of the traditionalists with their allegiance to administrative convenience, professional responsibility,

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\(^5\) Pinar estimates that probably 60 to 80 percent of the professors of curriculum studies belong to this group (1975a, p. x).
scientific management, and bureaucraticism, he claims that the traditional curriculum theories function to guide practice as they anticipate and attempt to control it (1981a, pp. 1-4. and 1981b, pp. 88-90).

The second category, that of conceptual-empiricists, is much smaller than the first one in number. With such scholars as G. Beauchamp, M. Johnson, G. Posner as its members, this group tends "to be steeped in the theory and practice of present-day social science" (1975a, p. x). Even though there are wide "thematic" variations among the conceptual-empiricists, there is very little functional difference. "Like most work in contemporary social and behavioral science it investigates 'phenomena' empirically, with an eye to the goal of prediction and control of behavior" (1975a, p. x). Thus, the conceptual-empiricists resort, as their mode of inquiry, to a model of logic and investigation which has been the backbone of the mainstream social and natural sciences. They are less interested in administrative convenience and efficiency or commitment to practice.

The third category, that of reconceptualists, appeared during the 1970s, though it has deeper historical roots. With Macdonald and Pinar as its two outspoken orthodox mem-

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maybe 15 to 20 percent of curricularists (Pinar, 1975a, p. x)
bers, the group includes D. Huebner, M. Greene, M. Apple, H. Giroux, J. Anyon, M. van Manen, etc. Drawing selectively upon such Continental philosophies as phenomenology, existentialism, neo-Marxism, psychoanalysis, and critical theory, they "attempted to offset the relatively apolitical, ahistorical, and technological orientation that has characterized the curriculum field for the last fifty years" (Pinar, 1981a, p. 7). Even though the number of scholars who belong to this group is relatively small, their importance for the field has far exceeded their number (Pinar, 1975a, p. x).

To understand the most important characteristics of 'reconceptualization', the central claim in the reconceptualist camp, one needs to understand why they do not use the term 'reconceptualism'. As pointed out by Pinar, "the term is a misnomer because it connotes a degree of unity (conceptual and methodological) nonexistent among reconceptualists" (1981b, p. 393); there is no such thing as 'reconceptualism'. Reconceptualization is fundamentally an intellectual phenomenon, not an interpersonal-affiliative one so that they have no original group (Pinar, 1981b, pp. 94-5). Reconceptualization, therefore, has multi-faceted

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7 about 3 to 5 percent of curricularists

8 Some harshly charge that the reconceptualist curriculum scholarship is seriously misleading in both research content and method. For instance, see D. Tanner and L. Tanner (1981).
features, e.g., it applies to various modes of inquiry.

The reconceptualists are unanimous in criticizing the logical positivist scientific rationale of the traditional curriculum inquiry and also in stressing particularity and effective communication between persons rather than effective control (Feinberg, 1985, p. 46). However, each of them may have a completely different research paradigm and methodology. They are united only in repudiating the instrumentality of the traditional curriculum studies and in challenging the boundaries and horizons that previously delineated the field of curriculum studies (Pinar and Gru- met, 1981, p. 31).

Thus, while they can be viewed as anti-reductionists in that they are opposed to the idea that the curriculum study can be reduced to scienticism in content and methodology, they are also conceptually involved in expansionism; they contend that the scope of, and the possibilities for, the curriculum study should be expanded beyond the empirical-technological analytic tradition (Feinberg, 1985). This implies a possibility of academic 'sectarianism'. (Of course, sectarianism itself is not necessarily harmful for a constructive transformation of the field; it may even promote it.) For instance, of the many possible subdivisions within the reconceptualist group, Macdonald identi-
fies two opposing orientations: "existential" and "structural" (Benham, 1980, pp. 164-5). The existential position emphasizes the individual's experience, his awareness of it, his feelings about it, and his interpretations of its meaning for him. In contrast, the structural orientation stresses certain types of political act for transforming social reality.

As discussed above, Macdonald's and Pinar's conceptualization and depiction of the field not only help us understand the complicated and diversified nature of the field in general but awaken us about the potential impacts of the recently emerging 'third force' in the field. Furthermore, the multi-faceted nature of the reconceptualization due to selective dependence upon a variety of intellectual and philosophical traditions is expected to diversify the future of the field. As already mentioned, it is inclined toward expansionism rather than reductionism. Consequently, more imaginative and critical questions are expected to be asked and more sophisticated and elaborated methodologies relevant to the questions to be developed. Due to the multiple perspectives and manifold orientations in the field, no canonical paradigm will work better as in any other social sciences. As generally admitted, social sciences have relatively few unifying concepts and theoretic schemes permitting wide synthesis (Phenix, 1969, p. 194).
'Anomalies' are often observed and claimed by some, and it is difficult to expect a total agreement on a concrete set of accepted criteria in terms of which anomalies of the research paradigm are to be adjudicated.

The same logic can be applied to the problem of knowledge claims in the contemporary curriculum theories, the subject matter of this study. The complexity and diversity of the approaches to curriculum studies naturally imply diversified epistemological positions among different curriculum theories, which oftentimes seem contradictory and antithetical to one another. The multi-faceted perspectives of the reconceptualists toward curriculum theories warrant a more thorough investigation.

In summary, the current state of the curriculum field reveals a composite mosaic of competing (sometimes controversial) research paradigms representing diverse philosophical assumptions and backgrounds. The epistemological analysis in CHAPTER III and IV will show how this complexity comes to be conceptually arranged and organized by looking, in detail, at the different epistemological positions in different curriculum theories.
1.3 PURPOSES AND ASSUMPTIONS

The primary purpose of the present study is to determine the epistemological characteristics of contemporary curriculum theories and to critically investigate them with the focus on their knowledge claims (if any) regarding curriculum content. Specifically, this study analyzes and investigates fifteen well-known contemporary curriculum theories dating from the 1970's to the present time. Eventually, it aims to conceptualize the various complex knowledge claims by analyzing and critiquing them with a set of criteria. 'Conceptualization' here is to mean the development of a new classification system.

This goal presupposes several assumptions. A first assumption is about the relationship between curriculum theory and epistemology. On the one hand, there are theories which have their own unique and particular viewpoints about knowledge as part of curriculum content or are at least conspicuously in line with certain claims or assertions of particular epistemologies. On the other hand, there are curriculum theories in which epistemology per se has little implication for the curriculum content. However, the involvement of epistemology in curriculum theories is a matter of degree, not of kind. The difference

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9 It must be clarified that those theories which do not have any knowledge claims regarding curriculum content could involve the particular epistemological position with respect to their theory construction itself. In
between the two basic types of theories will be delineated later.

A second assumption is that upon careful comparison and contrast knowledge claims in the selected contemporary curriculum theories will show idiosyncrasies as well as similarities. This assumption follows from the methodological nature of an analysis, like the present one, which utilizes and employs a set of epistemological criteria by which the knowledge claims of each theory will be examined. With the criteria, knowledge claims in each theory will be analyzed in a uniform way. Consequently, we expect some categorical similarities and differences to emerge as a result of the analysis in CHAPTER III.

A third assumption, directly related to the second one, is that given the differences and similarities among the epistemological positions of the curriculum theories, one can expect a certain type of classification to emerge, one that encompasses all the theories selected for the analysis. On the basis of the discrete criteria to be developed in CHAPTER II, a synthesis of the theories will be made in CHAPTER IV. Also, each categorical group will be subjected to a critical discussion toward the end of CHAPTER IV.

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fact, it is hard to claim that there is any curriculum theory totally devoid of any kind of epistemology.
The final assumption has already been mentioned in the first section of this chapter, namely that only part of curriculum content is constituted by knowledge, whatever the remaining part might be. As a seemingly commonsensical statement, this assumption is the most fundamental one without which a serious conceptual confusion may result—confusion between knowledge and curriculum content. In this way, the controversial issue of what constitutes curriculum content besides a body of knowledge is intentionally, not inadvertently, avoided.

This study is intended as a contribution to curriculum studies in several ways. In the literature, we find a considerable number of curriculum studies dealing with the nature and function of the curriculum content to be taught in school. However, we find very few studies that provide a systematic philosophical analysis of knowledge claims in curriculum theory. Furthermore, most of them do not consider recently emerging diversified orientations in curriculum theory and theorizing, which are taken to be responsible for today's widened horizon for knowledge as curriculum content. The present study is intended to bridge this gap in the literature by presenting a systematic analysis of the curricular phenomena regarding knowledge claims.
Another contribution of this study is the development of a set of epistemological criteria. In many curriculum theories, their epistemological claims or positions are not explicitly stated, oftentimes being vague and ambiguous. They are particularly intangible when interwoven with other types of philosophical claims such as axiology and ontology in a complicated way. This study develops and utilizes a set of epistemological criteria\(^\text{10}\) with which one can identify and conceptualize the seemingly intangible epistemological phenomena in curriculum theory.

A third contribution of this study is to distinguish between curriculum theories which are concerned with curriculum 'content' implicitly or explicitly and those which are not; therefore, called 'content-free' theories.\(^\text{11}\) Even though there is no clear-cut criterion to separate the two groups, some have argued that all curriculum theories are necessarily to be conceived of as theories directly involved in knowledge claims regarding curriculum content. In spite of the increasing body of literature persistent about the relationship between curriculum theory and epis-

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\(^\text{10}\) Most of the existing analyses are unsatisfactory because they are based upon comparison and contrast between various types of orientations without explicit and systematic criteria to be applied to the comparison and contrast.

\(^\text{11}\) This point will be clarified over and over again through the three-way distinction of curriculum theories which will be made in the following chapters.
temology, counter arguments against the claim also exist. However, the question of why and how the distinction is possible has seldom been raised, much less answered. This study attempt to answer this question in CHAPTER IV.

14 METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES

One of the most important factors for a successful epistemological analysis and critique is to develop a set of epistemological criteria for the analysis. The epistemological criteria will be proposed in CHAPTER II, along with the reasoning behind the question of why some criteria are appropriate and relevant to the investigation and why others are not. Relevant generic vocabularies of the theory of knowledge—such as 'nature', 'origin', and 'verification' of knowledge—and some other issues particularly relevant to the curriculum discourse will be examined and selected. The set of criteria will serve to clarify the complex state of affairs associated with the epistemological claims in various curriculum theories.

Curriculum theories are the subject matter of this metatheoretic study, and in view of the many theories that have appeared since the beginning of the 1970s, selection is inevitable for analysis. For this study, fifteen contemporary theories dating from 1970 to 1985 were selected for analysis. Explanations for why and how they were selected
among the many candidates will be addressed in detail in CHAPTER III.

In CHAPTER III, the selected theories will be analyzed one by one according to the criteria to be developed in CHAPTER II. In the analysis, implicit and explicit epistemological characteristics of each curriculum theory will be articulated. In CHAPTER IV, on the basis of the analysis in CHAPTER III, an attempt will be made to categorize the theories. Inevitably, this attempt is a tentative one, maybe valid only for particular epistemological viewpoints. Different ways of classifying the same fifteen theories should be possible if different criteria are employed. Thus, this classificational attempt is an epistemological synthesis from a particular point of view. Following the synthesis is a critical discussion of the categories that have been developed. In this section, epistemological weaknesses as well as strengths of each categorical group will be analyzed and assessed in detail, utilizing some sets of epistemological theories and critiques available from both inside and outside the study of education and curriculum. In the process, much attention will be paid to a careful comparison and contrast among the different categorical groups.

12 For instance, B. Hill (1973) employed a set of epistemological criteria which consist of content, aim, method, and evaluation to show that curriculum designers tend to reflect partisan epistemological stances.
15 LIMITATIONS

Several limitations of the present study have to be recognized. They concern both substantive and methodological aspects of the study. First, the scope of the study is moderately narrow in that it is confined to an analysis and critique of the knowledge claims in fifteen selected curriculum theories. Despite the attempt to make the selection as comprehensive as possible in its coverage, the selection is arbitrary to a certain extent and inevitably reflects the researcher's personal preference.

Second, the research program employed in this study is basically a 'meta-theoretic' approach. Meta-theory, when applied to curriculum studies, refers to a comparative study of the different conceptual schemes and methodologies employed by curriculum theories. Thus, this study has no ambition to develop or formulate a new model or theory. Rather, it is concerned with developing and applying a set of epistemological criteria for the analysis of the existing curriculum theories. The meta-approach is useful when we try to understand the nature or origin of the issues and problems. This viewpoint is clearly manifested when M. van Manen (1982b) argues:

[D]issatisfied with our ability to theorize we might be better at theorizing about theory. The irony of meta-theorizing is that by taking distance we may be trying to understand better the nature and good of something we need to get....[It] should at least make us aware of the
pedagogic consequences of nihilistic predicament in which much educational theorizing finds itself. In our search for (improved) theoretic principles, our real problem is that we suffer from a lack of ground; a lostness with respect to the origin or source which would vouchsafe our pedagogy with a sensitivity to perceive those principles which serve the pedagogic good. (p. 45)

A third limitation of the study is the inherent weakness of the epistemological approach to educational research. As acknowledged by many, epistemological endeavor is not always sufficient in characterizing significant issues like curriculum content in the education discourse. In addition to the epistemological aspects of curriculum content, we also have to take into account its ontological, axiological, aesthetical, and metaphysical aspects in order to fully characterize the nature and functions of the theory. K. Harris (1979) describes the insufficiency of epistemology.

Epistemology may provide relevant considerations in determining answers to educational questions, but education is, at bottom, based on ethos and politics, and even the content of education is politically determined. Although education is essentially concerned with the transmission of knowledge, it does this not in a vacuum or in a mystical epistemological realm, but rather within the material conditions of existing social relations, which determine what shall be transmitted, and how. (pp. 138-9)

The final limitation of this study is its selective treatment of the essential questions of epistemology as relevant to curriculum research. Thus, the question 'What
constitutes the subject matter in the domain of epistemology' will not be raised because it has no clear answer. It is not even clear to what extent the unolarity is due to conceptual ambiguity of the term 'knowledge' itself. However, there are not a few problems and issues that have been recognized and identified as fundamental by most philosophers, and they will be selectively employed as a set of criteria, as they are relevant to the goal of the study.
CHAPTER II

EPISTEMOLOGY AND CURRICULUM THEORY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Macdonald (1976) observes the status of curriculum theory and theorizing in the early 1970s as follows:

Curriculum theory and theorizing may be characterized as being in a rather formative condition, for essentially there are no generally accepted and clear-cut criteria to distinguish curriculum theory and theorizing from other forms of writing in education. The present situation may be summarized by saying that curriculum theory and theorizing exists because a fair number of thoughtful and respected professional persons say they do it and that it exists. Still others refer to the work of these persons as theorizing and their efforts as theories. (p. 5)

As this brief passage implies, theorizers or theory builders had no agreement on the nature, function, and purpose of curriculum theory itself. Thus, certain writings which might be considered as a curriculum theory by some theorists may be rejected by others on the ground that they do not satisfy their criteria for a curriculum theory or theorizing.

The early 1980s did not see much improvement in clarifying the confusion about the definition of curriculum theo-
ry. G. McCutcheon (1982) observes that the curriculum field was dominated by talking about curriculum theory rather than by actual production of curriculum theory.

To be sure, we curriculum folks have written more about what curriculum theory ought to be than we have provided examples of such theories. Perhaps we write so frequently and verbose about curriculum theory to allow to call ourselves "curriculum theorists," for it sounds so lofty, high falutin and scientific. Perhaps also, we write so much about curriculum theory; procrastination is easy and making theories is hard work. (p. 18)

Macdonald's and McCutcheon's observations together describe very well what the current situation of curriculum theory is: in the absence of generally accepted sets of criteria for curriculum theory, there is a plethora of talking 'about' curriculum theory and a paucity of actual theory.

In light of these observations, what is required, among other things, is to recognize the diversified nature of curriculum theory. The difficulty in agreement on the definition and actual construction of curriculum theory generated diverse approaches to curriculum theory. In this sense, personal or 'personalized' approaches to curriculum theory, which are mainly associated with the 'reconceptualists', can be seriously taken into account. As indicated in the previous chapter, the multi-faceted nature of the curriculum field necessarily requires a more broad conception of curriculum theory and recognition of the methodological pluralism in curriculum theorizing, in so far as cur-
curriculum theory is a sub-domain of curriculum studies in general.

In this context, the concept of curriculum theory can be defined in numerous ways depending upon the purposes and functions to be served by the definition. In this thesis, the term 'curriculum theory' will be used in a very broad sense, namely as systematic and coherent statements or propositions about curricular phenomena including explanations, descriptions, opinions, interpretations, beliefs and their interrelationships insofar as they address the theorist's own personal claims. Thus, the selection will include as many contemporary curriculum theories as possible so that they can cover various epistemological positions. Meanwhile, the normative question of what curriculum theory 'should' be like will no longer be considered in the following discussion.

The next section examines the generic nature of the relationship between knowledge and curriculum theory. As mentioned in the previous chapter, not all curriculum theories are necessarily involved with knowledge claims or epistemological issues. Utilizing some useful conceptual categorization systems of curriculum theory, this proposi-

13 Of course, this broad conception encompasses the reconceptualist conception of 'theorizing'. A more detailed delineation of the concept will be presented in the section on SELECTION OF CURRICULUM THEORIES in CHAPTER III.
tion will be examined in depth. Also, the rationale for the importance of epistemology with respect to curriculum theory will be scrutinized.

In the next section, a set of criteria as a conceptual framework for the epistemological analysis will be presented. It will be formulated through an examination of some general epistemological issues and problems in philosophy as well as particular epistemological issues in curriculum inquiry which are not dealt with as issues in general epistemology. The criteria, as a meta-language, function as a means for the analysis and critique. That is, the criteria determined through an investigation of both the general issues in theory of knowledge and the particular issues in curriculum will become the basic framework in terms of which the selected curriculum theories will be analyzed, classified, and critically discussed.

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14 We can discourse either poetically about science or scientifically about poetic. In the first case, the meta-language would be poetic and the object-language scientific, and the latter, vice versa (Ladd, 1957, p. 29). In the same analogy, in this study, the object-language will be curriculum theories to be analyzed and critiqued and the meta-language a set of epistemological criteria in terms of which the theories are to be analyzed.
2.2 KNOWLEDGE AND CURRICULUM THEORY

A fundamental question about curriculum content was raised by H. Spencer in 1859: "What knowledge is of most worth?". In his view, the most worthwhile knowledge is one which: a) contributes to self-preservation, b) helps individuals earn a living, c) helps individuals discharge the parenthood duties, d) facilitates citizenship activities, and e) contributes to wise occupation of leisure hours (Spencer, 1875, p. 32). Even though Spencer is not likely to have had curriculum theory in mind, his claims are epistemological in nature. Should any curriculum theory involve certain types of knowledge claims or epistemologies? For Spencer, the answer was, without a doubt, yes.

Likewise, some curriculum theorists lean towards the positive answer. C. Cherryholmes (1982), for instance, contends that "curriculum theory should address the question of what counts as knowledge and how it is obtained in various subject areas" (p. 31). Under the similar assumption, H. Kliebard (1972) states the general purpose of curriculum theory.

The field of curriculum is devoted to the study and examination of the decisions that go into the selection of what is taught. Implied in such study is the notion that a curriculum may be planned with basic principles in mind. These principles, when they are reasonably consistent and coherent, constitute the essence of curriculum theory. (in Schubert, 1986, p. 131, underline added)
More than a decade later, Kliebard (1985) is still consistent in his viewpoint. He states:

Thinking about curriculum is as old as about education. It is hard to imagine any inquiry into the nature of education without deliberate attention to the question of what should be taught. From the point of view of a serious educator, whatever the historical period or the particular setting, the question of what to teach involves a selection from a vast array of knowledge and belief within culture. Since it is impossible to teach everything, that selection from that culture reflects in part some sense of what is most worthwhile in that culture seen in relation to the kind of institution the school is and what it can reasonably accomplish. (p. 31, underlines added)

The claim that any curriculum theory should involve certain epistemology has been supported for various reasons and in different languages.

Adding to the arguments by Cherryholmes and Kliebard, McClellan (1969) asserts:

The task of curriculum theory is to say what part of that which is known by some in the culture is to be taught to some or all of those who do not know it.... Curriculum construction begins with the state of affairs that some persons in a society know some things not known by the rest.... Some persons know certain propositions or statements...and can offer some reasoning for the belief that the proposition is true. (pp. 197-9)

Assuming that theory of knowledge is relevant to the problems of design and validation of the curriculum (1) methodologically, (2) substantively, (3) contextually, Vanden-berg (1969) argues:

What kinds of knowledge should constitute the curriculum and what arrangement of it is conduc-
tive to the pupil's knowing? The phrase "kinds of knowledge" in the question includes any and every kind in order to avoid begging the prior question of whether or not there should be non-cognitive components to the curriculum. We can say that the curriculum should exclude noncognitive components if cognition is initially conceived very broadly to avoid imposing perceptions on the inquiry, if we ask for kinds of knowledge. If one wishes to argue that sports do not contain forms of cognition or knowing the way we use those words when we talk about curriculum matters, he is well on his way into the substantive issues of the epistemology of curriculum. (pp. 149-50, underline added)

They agree that basic assumptions about the nature of knowledge are particularly relevant and influential in curriculum work and curriculum theory since education's major focus is on knowledge (Zais, 1976, p. 15) and that curriculum theory must take into account the subject matter as a main consideration in the theory construction process (Taylor and Richards, 1985, p. 177).

Despite the differences in their view as to which aspects of epistemology are to be focused (for example, cultural knowledge, propositional knowledge, and cognitive versus noncognitive issue), they all agree that knowledge as curriculum content should be a foremost consideration in education and curriculum theory. Thus, their argument reminds Dewey's famous injunction that subject matter is a concept that cannot be dispensed with in a theory of education even based upon experience (in Bellack, 1956, p. 98). As Macdonald (1975, p. 8) points out, the most prolific
group of curriculum theorists in the past have been those concerned with knowledge claims and epistemological issues.

The normative positions with regard to the relationship between knowledge and curriculum theory introduced above, however, do not tell the whole story about the relationship. We may agree that any educational theory and practice including curriculum studies as a sub-area is based on the generally accepted fundamental epistemological presupposition that individual human beings are educable, i.e., that knowledge can be transmitted by some people to others (Machan, 1970, p. 253). Even though we are obliged to accept this philosophical presupposition as a starting point for any curriculum theory and theorizing, there are some curriculum theories that are not exclusively concerned with knowledge issues related to curriculum content. What is important is to understand that the presupposition about the educability of individuals is one thing and the question of what to teach and why is another.

The distinction between curriculum theories which are epistemologically oriented and those which are less directly concerned with knowledge claims can be manifested by a careful investigation of the existing conceptual studies on curriculum theory categorization. As we will see below, the distinction is a matter of degree in epistemological implication.
A first categorization useful to understand the difference is the dichotomy between philosophical curriculum theory and scientific curriculum theory. According to D. McCory (1981), curriculum theory includes both philosophical statements concerning what ought to exist and scientific statements concerning what does exist. Characterizing curriculum theory as possessing two-by-two factors on continuity—content versus process and philosophy versus research—McCory explains the possible combinations of the quadrants.

One conceptual emphasis is in contexts where curriculum theory refers to systematically related statements about the content that is planned for instruction. A second emphasis places curriculum theory as the statements about content that ought to be planned for instruction. In a third conception curriculum theory represents statements about activities which ought to be planned. The fourth emphasis refers to curriculum theory as statements about activities which are planned for instruction. (p. 99)

This categorization clearly reveals that among other things we can distinguish between content-oriented philosophical curriculum theories and process-oriented scientific curriculum theories. However, it is important to note that there are no clear-cut standards to identify the characteristics and nature of the two types of theories objectively. Therefore, any content-oriented curriculum theory has some process-oriented implications, and vice versa. His primary concern being to formulate a map to understand
the complex concept of curriculum theory, McCory does not suggest explicitly which orientation is more desirable.

On the other hand, Macdonald (1975) holds a radically different viewpoint about categorization of curriculum theory. He repudiates "the dominant production model of the past 50 years" (in Kliebard's terms) in curriculum theory. Defining the previously prevailing curriculum model as "technical model" (also in Kliebard's terms), Macdonald suggests establishing foundations for philosophically oriented curriculum theory rather than a technological rationale which indiscriminately accepts contemporary social values. Philosophical curriculum theory, according to Macdonald, is differentiated into three areas:

[O]ne is always involved in assumptions and implicit (if not explicit) statements which could be classified at various times and places as ontological; axiological; and epistemological. Concern for the nature of human "being," value theory, and the nature of knowledge are intricately interwoven....curriculum theorizing can be conveniently categorized as oriented toward statements about knowledge, statements about the curriculum realities, and statements about valued activity. (p. 8)

Undoubtedly, his categorization recognizes the fact that some curriculum theories can be epistemological, while others are not. As Macdonald indicates, however, the distinction is sometimes difficult to make because of the intricacy with which the statements constituting curriculum theory
are interwoven with one another. In other words, it is hard to have a purely epistemological curriculum theory with no implications on ontology, axiology,\textsuperscript{15} and aesthetics, for instance.

The other example demonstrating the characteristics of epistemology-oriented curriculum theory is proposed by D. Huenecke. Huenecke (1982) differentiates between three types of curriculum theorizing: structural, generic, and substantive. According to Huenecke, the structural theorizing\textsuperscript{16} focuses on "identifying elements in curriculum and their interrelationships or on the structure of decisions involved in curriculum theorizing" (p. 290). Huenecke claims that those who belong to this group consider themselves to be engaged in value-neutral scientific management processes that objectively identify the components of the curriculum development. They attempt to pinpoint practical problems in school curriculum and to eliminate harmful practices relying on the prescriptions they provide. For them, the primary purpose of a theory is to guide practice.

\textsuperscript{15} R. Ubbelohde (1972) presents a good example of an axiological analysis of curriculum theory.

\textsuperscript{16} Curriculum theorists who practice this type of theorizing, according to Huenecke, include Tyler (1950), Goodlad (1966), McNeil (1977), Saylor and Alexander (1974), Taba (1962), Tanner and Tanner (1980), Beauchamp (1975), and Johnson (1987).
In this type of theorizing, the issue of knowledge is conceived of as a possible element or component which constitutes only part of curriculum theory. Since the main focus is upon the arrangement and balanced structure of the curriculum components and their relationships, epistemological claims are not the central issue. That is, the question of what to teach and why is deliberately avoided as it is reduced to the question of educational objectives and aims, which are 'actually' determined outside the domain of curriculum.\textsuperscript{17}

Most of all, however, it is crucial to recognize that this theorizing approach also maintains certain types of epistemological positions and viewpoints about curriculum content, though implicit and passive in most cases. Some theories in this category manifest their epistemological positions, but when they do, the epistemological positions themselves are not the major concern in theory construction.

A second approach, "generic theorizing", focuses "not on curriculum making or on curriculum elements, but on outcomes of curriculum" (p. 291). Such theorists view curriculum development through the process of curriculum development. But theorists in this orientation pay more attention to how to state and arrange the pre-determined objectives. As a matter of fact, it is one of the most important tasks in curriculum development.

\textsuperscript{17} Of course, objectives themselves are 'supposed' to be determined through the process of curriculum development. But theorists in this orientation pay more attention to how to state and arrange the pre-determined objectives. As a matter of fact, it is one of the most important tasks in curriculum development.
Curriculum as broadly conceived, as encompassing the total educational environment of the school, stressing the underlying decisions of 'what to teach'. Characterizing a common theme of this theorizing as "human liberation", Huenecke describes the major characteristics of this approach.

[It] seeks not to put boundaries on the field in order to manage it, but rather to remove as many barriers as possible in order that all persons involved in the educative process can be liberated from the entrapment of unexamined assumptions. (p. 292)

The thrust of liberation can be one of two different types. With reference to B. Benham's categorization (1980), Huenecke distinguishes between those who look for liberation within the individuals and those who look for liberation outside the individuals. The former stress the uniqueness of individual experiences and "examine the inner self through the study of such philosophies as existentialism and phenomenology". The latter typically use "sociological and political frameworks to question the dynamics of power, control, and influence--for example, who has the power in curriculum making, what controls which knowledge becomes school knowledge?" (p. 292). It is obvious that beliefs about knowledge or knowledge claims are one of the major themes of generic theorizing and it involves epistemology to a great degree, in contrast to the structural theorizing.
A third form of theorizing, "substantive curriculum theorizing", highlights "desirable subject matter or content". The substantive theorizers are not concerned with structural issues nor critiques of curriculum in general (p. 293). Rather, they attempt to (a) make "relevant" curriculum, one that corresponds to current and future needs of students; (b) foster academic excellence through rigorous disciplinary curriculum; and (c) educate the total person through an integrated curriculum which covers broader conception of human intellect and possibilities (pp. 293-4). According to Hueneoke, substantive theorizing offers alternatives to present patterns of content, subjects, and programs and provokes such questions as "Why have we always taught X? What would happen if we taught Y instead?". Thus, knowledge claims and epistemological issues are involved most explicitly in substantive theorizing. The major concern here is what knowledge should be taught and why.

From the examination of the three different categorization schemes¹⁸ discussed above, it is clear that some curriculum theories involve more explicit epistemological

¹⁸ Note that there is a close parallelism between Hueneoke's categorization and Pinar's grouping of curriculum theorists. Approximately, Pinar's traditionalists and conceptual-empiricists together correspond to Hueneoke's structural curriculum theorists, and reconceptualists to generic theorists; Hueneoke's substantive theorizers have no counterpart in Pinar's classification.
positions and are primarily concerned with knowledge issues regarding curriculum content, while others show implicit or passive positions and do not highlight knowledge issues as a central theme of curriculum theory. More to the point, every curriculum theory somehow involves epistemology, though it is difficult or even impossible to extract epistemological claims and implications from certain theories. They have very little epistemological implications. This conclusion provides a justification for a broader selection of the contemporary curriculum theories for analysis and critique.

2.3 EPSTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES AND CRITERIA
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, many thinkers have been concerned with the issues and problems concerning human knowledge under the basic presupposition that all human beings by nature desire to know and are able to know. With all the differences in specific claims and viewpoints among their theories of knowledge, they unanimously acknowledge the significance of epistemology as a branch of philosophy and furthermore agree on the basic issues and themes of the discipline.

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19 the famous first sentence of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
First, the significance of epistemology penetrating deeply into human life is well described by N. Capaldi (1969):

Epistemology is more than just a branch of philosophy; it is of great practical relevance. A man's theory of knowledge determines what policies he pursues in the acquisition of further knowledge and in using the knowledge already at his disposal, and most important, it determines how he judges the behavior of other men in so far as that behavior is related to what they know or claim to know. In calling attention to the great practical relevance of epistemology, philosophers have spoken of it as a normative discipline. That is, epistemology is a discipline concerned with prescribing norms or guidelines for the use of knowledge and claims of knowledge. (p. ix)

Capaldi's claim that epistemology is not merely a purely theoretical inquiry conducted to satisfy intellectual curiosity but one that also encompasses practical implications on human life well designates the significance of epistemology in a general sense.

However, Capaldi's characterization of epistemology does not tell us very much about what the central concerns of epistemology are. In order to understand the general issues and problems of theory of knowledge, it is necessary to clarify the concept of knowledge itself. The attempt to define the concept of knowledge is valid and promising insofar as we can infer related issues and problems of epistemology from the concept of knowledge itself. But the attempt appears to necessarily involve a serious problem:
How can we provide a general description of the logical status of knowledge? The nature of the problem has been recognized by many. For example, Gallagher (1964) states:

For what, after all, does it mean to "know?" This is a question which many will feel should have been asked at the beginning, but there are certain advantages in postponing it.... What is immediately clear is that there can be no question of a "definition" of knowledge, since to define something is to render it in terms of something else which is more simply intelligible; that is impossible in the case of what is itself simple and ultimate. Since knowing is an ultimate and irreducible event, it cannot be conveyed in terms more fundamental than itself. (p. 15)

Because of this problem, few philosophers have strived to define the concept of knowledge. Rather, in order to have a general grasp of the central issues and problems, some philosophers have paid much attention to the possibility of differentiating types of knowledge. They claim that not only the ways of knowing are multiple but knowledge can be conceptually differentiated in various ways. Logically, if we can identify different types of knowledge, it should be possible to know, on the basis of the characteristics of each type, how and why we develop and acquire particular types of knowledge or why we value them instead of others. In part, this is what epistemology, in philosophy of education, is supposed to do.

The attempt to distinguish different types of knowledge also serves to delineate the scope and domain of knowledge.
Even though it is difficult to define the concept of knowledge, we are still able to identify what constitutes knowledge in a general way by distinguishing different types of knowledge. Particularly, different ways of distinguishing them are relevant to the inquiry of curriculum theory because different distinctions can shed a light on the issue of what should constitute curriculum content. This issue will be discussed later in relation to the issues about relevant criteria for the analysis.

Although central issues in epistemology have varied through the history of philosophy, there is a set of problems that have remained crucial. These issues and problems constitute the subject matter of epistemology. Some of the claims about the subject matter of epistemology are stated below:

The theory of knowledge leads to two ultimate problems—the problem of the nature and the problem of the origin of knowledge. The first problem is expressed in the question: What is knowledge? Different answers are given by Realism and Idealism or Phenomenalism.... The second question is: How does knowledge arise? This question also give rise to an antithesis that runs through the entire history of philosophy—the antithesis between Empiricism and Rationalism. (Paulsen, 1912, p. 49)

The technical term for the theory of knowledge is epistemology, which comes from the Greek word episteme, meaning "knowledge." There are three central questions or problems in this field: (1) What are the sources of knowledge? Where does genuine knowledge come from, or how do we know? This is question of origins. (2) What is the
nature of knowledge? Is there a question of appearance and reality? (3) Is our knowledge valid? How do we distinguish truth from error? This is the question of truth, of verification. (Titus, 1970, pp. 23-24)

Philosophers study and discuss what they technically call epistemology: the investigation of the origin, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge. Philosophers wonder about and often answer such questions as: What is the nature of knowledge? What criteria distinguish genuine knowledge from the spurious article? Does all knowledge come from sense experience, or can our reason know that certain propositions must be true independently of sense experience?... Is all knowledge that is worthy of the name produced by science and science alone? (Burr and Goldinger, 1984, p. 399)

Other philosophers have given similar characterizations of epistemology. J. Thiroux (1985), for instance, claims that sources of knowledge, nature of knowledge, and truth of knowledge are three major topics of epistemology along with the issues of perception and belief (pp. 457-537). J. Baldwin ((ed.), 1960) lists origin of knowledge, nature of the object of knowledge, validity and limits of knowledge as major questions confronted in epistemology, while emphasizing the immanent relationship between ontology and epistemology (p. 335). To cite one more philosopher, D. Runes ((ed.), 1983) provides a set of questions relevant to epistemology, which is relatively comprehensive but basically similar to others in character: possibility, limits, origin, methodological problems, kinds, and structure of knowledge and problem of truth (pp. 109-111).
When we compare these characterizations, we can identify three major issues and problems which are mentioned again and again as constituting the subject matter of epistemology. They are: (1) nature of knowledge—the reality issue, (2) origin and source of knowledge, and (3) verification of truth of knowledge. Some might claim that some other issues are central to epistemology, and they may very well be right. However, our goal here is not to investigate what should be the subject matter of epistemology, but to construct a set of relevant epistemological criteria according to which curriculum theories are to be analyzed.

In order to develop a comprehensive set of epistemological criteria for the analysis of the curriculum theories, it is necessary to understand the nature and implications of the three issues singled out above. In doing so, we will be able to determine whether or not they are suitable as epistemological criteria for the analysis of curriculum theories, and if suitable, which aspects of each issue are viable as important constituents of the criteria and why. By relating these questions to curriculum questions, we can assess the relevance of the issues to the appropriate criteria. In case certain components of an issue turn out to be irrelevant to our curriculum theory analysis, we can always consider some other criteria.
The first issue, the issue of the nature of knowledge, is basically concerned with the relationship between the knower (subject) and the known (object). This is therefore an ontological issue. We can ask questions such as: What does it mean that someone knows something?; In what ways can we make a distinction between the subject and the object, and why?; What is the object of knowledge?; Is the object of knowledge real? The controversial dichotomies between realism and idealism, subjectivism and objectivism, relativism and absolutism, appearance and reality, etc. are directly involved in the inquiry of the nature and object of knowledge.

Philosophers have had difficulty in distinguishing between the domain of epistemology and that of metaphysics or ontology, particularly with regard to the nature of knowledge. The conception of knowledge—not in terms of literal definition—is largely dependent upon our conception of what is real. That is, it has something to do with our understanding of the structure of reality and existence. What one individual or society means by knowledge is not always meaningful to others because of the different ways of comprehending reality (Pai et al. (eds.), 1967, pp. 189-90). After all, man's knowledge is an attempt to express to himself his attachment to "being", and man's knowing is a function of his mode of "existing" (Gallagher, 1964, pp. 13-4).
The relationship between ontology and the nature of knowledge has been lucidly described by Anton.

A broadly conceived theory of knowledge is inextricably bound up with the ontological problem, because questions about being are raised from the very start of any given inquiry.... Knowledge in any form involves a conception of some being by another being. This means that theory of knowledge, broadly understood, is more profoundly involved in the problem of existence than any other cognitive enterprise. (in Papanoutsos (1968), p. xxiii)

A further elaboration of the relationship is found in Papanoutsos (1968).

[It] is inevitable that every branch of philosophy should contain its "metaphysics," a need which is felt more strongly in epistemology than anywhere else. Here the problem of being is posed at the very outset, which methodologically speaking is the proper point of departure. Its object is knowledge, and knowledge—regardless of the definition which may be given to the term—is not only a specific conception of being, but also the apprehension of being by a being. By its very nature, then, the theme of epistemology is connected more than anything else with ontological problem. (pp. 3-4)

Therefore, it is clear that epistemology and ontology are logically dependent on each other, even though 'which one has the priority' is an ongoing controversy, and as Runes ((ed.), 1983) remarked, a metaphysically presuppositionless epistemology seems unattainable as does an epistemologically presuppositionless ontology (p. 109). However, as R. Zais (1976) observes, while this interdependence may indi-

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20 Incidentally, this argument reminds us of Macdonald's observation in the previous section that both ontological and epistemological statements may be intricately interwoven with one another in curriculum theory.
cate "a degree of circularity", the necessary relatedness between the two does not give rise to a significant problem as long as philosophy itself is by definition a rational enterprise (p. 112).

Now with the understanding that the reality issue is the central issue with regard to the nature and object of knowledge, we can probe into the nature and features of the controversial subissues already mentioned: realism versus idealism, objectivism versus subjectivism, and relativism versus absolutism. The literature is full of evidence that they are central constituents of the issue of the nature of knowledge.21

The first subissue to be examined is the opposition between idealism and realism 'in epistemology'. (One can talk about the opposition from a different perspective—ethical realism or aesthetical idealism, for example.) Their general meanings are well described in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edwards (ed.), 1967):

In the early history of philosophy...the term "realism" was used, in opposition to "nominalism", for the doctrine that universals have a real, objective existence. In modern philosophy, however, it is used for the view that material objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense experience. Realism is thus opposed to "idealism" which holds that no such material objects or external realities exist apart from

our knowledge or consciousness of them, the whole universe thus being dependent on the mind or in some sense mental. (p. 77)

In other words, realism refers to an epistemological conviction that the objects we perceive are able to exist and retain some of the properties we perceive them as having, even when we 'unperceived' (Dancy, 1985, p. 144). The realist idea that the existence of the objects is independent of and apart from the existence of any perceiver is just an antithesis of the idealist claim that

there are no other than thinking beings, that the other things which we believe ourselves to perceive are only ideas in thinking beings--ideas in fact to which there is no correspondent object outside of or beyond thinking.... [The mind is primarily limited in knowledge to a perception of its own subjective status. (Kant in Baldwin (ed.), 1960, p. 503)]

Idealism (more precisely defined as 'subjective idealism') holds that the reality and existence of the 'out there' objects is merely its perceptibility. Material objects cannot exist independently of human mind. In contrast, realism maintains that in sense-perception we have assurance of the existence of real objects apart from the interpretation of the subject and its perception.

There are several types of realism: e.g., naive realism, representative realism, critical realism, and so on, as there are different types of idealism: e.g., eliminative idealism and reductive idealism (Dancy 1985, pp. 144-57).
Besides, many philosophers admit that there is phenomenalism, which holds that there is a physical world and an object, but we never experience either directly; what we perceive is our sense data, that is, our experiences of them (Thiroux, 1985, p. 509). Thus, phenomenalism is regarded as a middle ground between realism and idealism.

An in-depth examination of the types or kinds of epistemological idealism and realism, however, will not be taken up in this study, not because such an examination is no longer important, but because it will not be quite relevant to the substantive part of the study. As we will see, no knowledge claim or position addressed in any curriculum theory goes so far as to call for an examination of a particular type of epistemological idealism or realism. Rather, what is important for an analysis is to have a good grasp of the meanings and implications of the basic concepts of the subissues themselves.

The next subissue to be examined is the issue of objectivism and subjectivism. It must be pointed out that, throughout the discourse about the concepts, the terms 'realism' and 'idealism' are used in a very similar manner as the terms 'objectivism' and 'subjectivism' are used in epistemology. Epistemological realism frequently refers to epistemological objective realism and epistemological
idealism to subjective idealism. Moreover, some philosophers think the two pairs of terms are interchangeable. C. Fay (1967), for instance, states: "that which is subjective is that which would not exist unless there were a sensation taking place. That which is objective is that which actually exists whether or not there is a senser" (p. 62).

Nonetheless, the concepts of 'realism' and 'idealism' occupy a somewhat different conceptual dimension from that for the concepts of 'objectivism' and 'subjectivism'. In a common-sensical approach to the problem, it can be said that subjectivism refers to a conviction that judgment or decision as to something is a matter of mere personal and individual preference, opinion, belief, taste, or prejudice; while objectivism refers to the philosophical assertion that judgment or decision is based on and dependent upon ultimate and fixed standards and criteria outside the subject—a subject is the self who knows or perceives something, while an object is the physical thing to be perceived or known. Based upon this conception, epistemological subjectivism can be defined very succinctly: every object known or apprehended is created, invented, or constructed by the subject (Runes (ed.), 1983, p. 320). Subsequently, it can be claimed that under the realm of

22 The concept of objective idealism is logically plausible according to Runes ((ed.), 1983, p. 153), while there cannot be such thing as subjective realism.
subjectivism everything is dependent upon 'personal' decisions and judgments. This is the reason why 'subjective realism' is unattainable.23

Often subjectivism is associated with 'relativism', which is supposed to be the antithesis of 'absolutism'. According to R. Bernstein (1983), the relativists believe that

the concept of rationality, truth, reality, the good, [or knowledge]...must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture.... there is (or can be) a nonreducible plurality of such conceptual schemes, [therefore,] he or she challenges the claim that these concepts can have a determinate and univocal significance. For the relativist, there is no substantive overarching framework or single metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing claims of alternative paradigms. (p. 8)

However, "a relativist need not be a subjectivist, and a subjectivist is not necessarily a relativist" (p. 11). Relativism need not be exclusively associated with the issue of who is involved in the judgment or decision process. The fundamental claim of the relativists is that there is no particular external, independent standards or criteria applicable to an assessment of all philosophical or social discourses. Thus, a relativist does not necessarily insist that there is anything subjective about the

23 When we speak of the theory that the object exists independently of the subject, we should already admit that we cannot create or invent the object.
rules, criteria, and standards. Rather, it is conceived of as a matter of subjectivist concern.

Given the above explanation for subjectivism and relativism, we can conclude that epistemological absolutism is no longer attainable nor viable. As Bernstein correctly observed, philosophers "who disagree on almost everything else agree that there are no nontrivial knowledge claims that are immune from criticism" (p. 12). Every knowledge is fallibilistic and subject to criticism. Absolutism, therefore, is no longer a live, arguable option.

The next concept to be discussed is that of objectivism, the opposite concept to subjectivism. Frequently, objectivism is associated with epistemological realism, a view that the object of knowledge exists independently of, and external to, the subject as knowing mind. Quoting Bernstein's definition again, objectivism is:

the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. (1983, p. 8)

Therefore, the objectivist's conviction that there are fixed, permanent, and immutable standards or criteria to which we can appeal is sharply contrasted to the relativist's claim that there are no such warranted standards, rules, or criteria applicable to all circumstances. In
this context, it is important to recognize that, while nei­
ther absolutism nor subjectivism is a viable option in
philosophical and social discourses, the concept of objec­
tivism is not the exact opposite of that of relativism.
Objectivism, as opposed to subjectivism, is concerned with
'who' is involved in the issue of the permanent and fixed
criteria or standards, while relativism (and absolutism) is
concerned with whether such criteria and standards exist or
not.

The following passage from Papanoutsos (1966) helps us
to understand the complex nature of the relations between
the concepts.

Just as realism, by turning toward the object,
leaves the subject out of its field of vision,
and finally becomes unable to penetrate its mean­
ing, so idealism becomes involved in the opposite
difficulty. Overwhelmed by the subject's synthet­
ic power, idealism minimizes the role of the
object, and when it finally comes up against the
latter's unyielding resistance, it no longer
knows how to justify the fact that it has
assigned the object a position in the system.
Thus, the antithetical nature of our problem
becomes clear. Realism gives priority to the
object, while the subject becomes so secondary as
to lose the function that constitutes its essen­
tial justification. Within idealism, the oppo­
site is the case: the subject swells to primal
importance while the object is assigned a place
in the background until it status becomes almost
wholly uncertain. (p. 32)

So far some issues about the nature and object of knowl­
edge have been examined and articulated. Specifically, we
discussed three major oppositions in epistemology: (1) idealism and realism, (2) subjectivism and objectivism, and (3) relativism and absolutism. A practical question to ask at this point is whether these delicate and complex conceptual distinctions are necessary for or even relevant to the analysis of curriculum theory. The answer is negative in that most of the curriculum theories do not take such exceptionally delicate positions as to resort to an uncommon construct such as 'objective idealism', for example. In most cases, they can be judged to fall into one of the three major conceptually coherent categories: subjectivism (subjective idealism), objectivism (objective realism), or relativism—despite Bernstein's claim that subjectivism is no longer a live option. This, however, should not be interpreted to imply a reductionist posture. Rather, its pure intention is for practical convenience and based on a preliminary investigation of the nature and characteristics of the prospective curriculum theories, which will be selected for the analysis. Consequently, in the course of the analysis each curriculum theory will be analyzed in terms of these criteria and their possible interrelationships whenever it addresses the nature and object of knowledge.

The second issue to be discussed is the issue of 'the origin and source of knowledge'. This issue basically
deals with such questions as: Where does our knowledge come from?; On what basis do we claim to know something?; How does knowledge arise?; In what ways can we acquire infallibly and indubitably valid knowledge? The old controversy generated by the conflict between traditional empiricism and rationalism represents well the central characteristics of the issue.

As popularly acknowledged, empiricism holds that all knowledge derives from sensory experience and that there is no such thing as innate ideas given to the human mind. The mind is dependent upon experience for the components or elements of ideas and their combinative interrelationships. In contrast, the rationalistic tradition holds that all indubitable knowledge presupposes another principle that cannot be derived from sense or perception. It argues that ideas of reason intrinsic to mind are the only source of knowledge.24 It supposes "the source of genuine knowledge to be within, and the knowledge itself to be capable of elicitation by questioning the suggestion which merely draws the mind's attention to that which it already possesses" (Scheffler, 1965, p. 3).

24 Thus, traditional rationalists regarded mathematics and geometry as models of indubitable knowledge.
This type of dichotomous dualism concerning the origin of knowledge, however, can lapse into an unacceptable oversimplification, as repeatedly pointed out throughout the history of epistemology. The dogmatic extremes stressing either sensory perception or human reason do not seem to shed much light on either epistemological discourse in general or curriculum inquiry in particular. Nowadays, few people advocate one position to the exclusion of the other. This, however, by no means implies that the generic concept of the two sources of knowledge itself is not important. Also, even though the issue of how to get certain knowledge is fundamental in the curriculum discourse, we need to think about the possibilities for different sources or channels from which knowledge as curriculum content is derived and generated. As suggested by Thiroux (1985), for example, we can take into account intuition, authority, revelation, faith, tradition, common sense, and other sources, along with sense experience and reason—both inductive and deductive—as sources of knowledge (pp. 477-83).

The various sources of knowledge as curriculum content may be appealed to, selectively, by different curriculum theories; some theories may claim that knowledge as content should be derived in a deductive manner, and others may subscribe to an inductive method. Some may claim that curriculum knowledge should be such that it is 'discovered'
rather than 'created', or vice versa. The ensuing analytic investigation will show whether or not a particular curriculum theory maintains a particular position concerning the source of knowledge and what the features of the position are, if it does. However, unlike the criterion of the nature of knowledge, due to the considerable degree of diversity in knowledge claims with regard to the issue of where knowledge comes from and how, no fixed and predetermined subcriteria are set forth here.

The third issue, the issue of how to verify the truth of knowledge as curriculum content, is also very important in epistemology because the concept of knowledge necessarily involves the concept of truth. In the tradition of philosophy, there are several theories about the issue of how to verify the truth of knowledge: the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, the pragmatic theory, and the descriptive theory (for instance, Titus, pp. 61-4 and Thiroux, pp. 462-5).

The correspondence theory of truth, often favored by the objective realists, says that a proposition is true if it corresponds to the fact and the reality sensed or perceived; otherwise it is false. The coherence theory, usu-

25 In the tradition of analytic philosophy, in general, the truth of propositional knowledge is considered one of the conditions on knowing, along with the belief condition and the evidence condition.
ally maintained by the subjective idealists, is interested in the interrelationship between the propositions stated. It is not concerned with a state of affairs or external facts. When a proposition is proven to be true, the proposition's truth can be determined in terms of its logical consistency and coherence with the previously related proposition (Thiroux, pp. 462-3). The pragmatic theory of truth, or the "truth is what works" theory, holds that if a certain proposition yields good results or desirable consequences for human beings, then it is workable and consequently regarded as true. Finally, the descriptive theory, a modification of the correspondence theory, claims that "a true proposition describes, not corresponds to, a state of affairs that was, is, or will be actual or that has occurred, is occurring, or will occur," and consequently, a false proposition describes "a state of affairs that was not, is not, or will not occur" (Thiroux, p. 465).

Given this account of the truth of knowledge, the question is whether this issue is relevant to a curriculum theory analysis. As a matter of fact, when we talk about school curriculum content we already assume that it is true according to a particular theory endorsed by the curriculum theory. That is, we presuppose the content is already taken for granted as being true and worthwhile. Curriculum theory is concerned with 'what is to be taught', but not
with how to verify the truth of knowledge selected as curriculum content. In other words, the task of verifying the truth of knowledge itself is hardly considered part of curriculum inquiry; therefore, it is not an object of curriculum theory.

Of course, a curriculum theory may be concerned with the issue of 'who' is supposed to validate the truth of curriculum knowledge and the complex dynamics of 'why'. But it cannot be interested in the epistemological issue of 'how' to do it. As we examined, the theories of truth are all about 'how' to prove the truth or falsity of knowledge as such. Thus, when a curriculum theory is exclusively involved in the issue of how to verify and test truth or falsity of curriculum knowledge, it already is out of the realm of curriculum theory. The very conduct of verification can hardly be regarded as a curricular phenomenon— even though we do not and need not eliminate the possibility that a curriculum theory may be committed to why the particular knowledge is validated to be true, whose influence is exerted in the process of the validation, and for what purposes. On this ground, the issue of the verification of knowledge is not considered a relevant criterion for the analysis of curriculum theory, and therefore will

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26 We understand that even the most epistemologically oriented curriculum theories do not attempt to verify truth of curriculum knowledge in their theories.
be out of further consideration.

Thus far, we have discussed which issues in epistemology should be utilized as a set of criteria for the analysis and which should be disputed as inadequate. Along the way, we also discussed discrete subissues as subcriteria. Are these then sufficient for the analysis? It seems that there are two more criteria relevant to the nature of curriculum and curriculum theory in addition to the two epistemological ones already identified.

The first one is the purpose of knowledge (or justification of the values of knowledge). After all, the conception of knowledge as something sought, as a value, suggests two quite different things: (1) knowledge as a good or end-in-itself independent of any use to which it may be put; (2) knowledge as a means necessary for the securing of some other value (Burr and Goldinger, 1964, p. 397). The two contradictory positions are well described in Papanoutsos (1968).

Two viewpoints opposing each other in their respective interpretations and solutions to the problems of (scientific) knowledge are being singled out for critical analysis and investigation: (a) The view that holds truth to be valuable in itself, which maintains that the purpose of knowledge is knowledge itself (b) The view that considers knowledge as one of the goods in life and insists that the primary objective of all science is dominantly practical, in the broader sense of the term. The school that on the whole supports the second view goes under the name of pragmatism. Proponents of the first view do not
really constitute a unified camp but the champions of pragmatism usually refer to it as "intellectualism." (p. 181)

In curriculum theory, those two positions are frequently expressed in terms of 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic' value of knowledge. Even though not all curriculum theories explicitly support one position or the other, it is worthwhile to consider particular viewpoints on the purpose or value of knowledge in relation to the dichotomy. Some curriculum theories hold the position that knowledge as curriculum content is valued primarily because of the inherent value and internal worth from which it derives, while in some other theories it is valued because of the uses to which it is put.

In addition, a set of different dichotomies regarding the value and purpose may be also taken into account. The deep-rooted controversy in the curriculum history regarding whether knowledge is for the individual or for the society may be considered in the same context. Nonetheless, the concepts such as 'individual' and 'society' are so vague and ambiguous that they beg further questions. Conceptual demarcation between individual and society generates endless controversies over the relationship between the two. More often than not, the phrase 'for the individual' is interpreted as 'for the society', because of the obvious
fact that aggregation of individuals constitutes society and that therefore a good society consists of good individuals with valuable knowledge.

In order to avoid this and other consequent conceptual muddiness, it is necessary to establish a different type of epistemological subcriterion other than the dichotomy of knowledge for individual or for society. Thus, what is employed is the distinction between the personal/individual dimension of knowledge and the public/collective dimension of knowledge. Apparently, some curriculum theories subscribe to personal knowledge and personal ways of acquiring knowledge. In contrast, some others emphasize the public dimension of curricular knowledge for particular ends. Even with the danger inherent in this dichotomy, this criterion will be used to investigate the characteristics of the curriculum theories which maintain or at least support, directly or indirectly, one of the extreme positions. For it can clarify the epistemological characteristics of curriculum theory, one of the main purposes of this study.

A second and final criterion is the scope and content of knowledge. What does curriculum knowledge consist of? To what extent can we limit knowledge as curriculum content? The content issue is apparently a more unique issue in the curricular discourse than in philosophy in general in that,
after all, curriculum is directly concerned with 'which knowledge' to be taught. In the history of curriculum studies, there have been several different orientations to the selection of knowledge as curriculum content—such as subject matter, experience, activities, structure of knowledge, culture, common sense, etc.—and curriculum theories have accepted one or more of these positions while rejecting others, whether implicitly or explicitly.

However, this traditional characterization of curriculum knowledge does not seem to provide very promising results because the concepts describing the characteristics of knowledge as curriculum content, such as subject matter and structure of knowledge, are just tautological to the concept of knowledge which each of them tries to emphasize. In other words, it is quite meaningless only to say that knowledge claims in a particular curriculum theory can be justified and accounted for in terms of 'the structure of knowledge', for instance. Rather, what is called for is a systematical investigation of the nature and characteristics of the knowledge claims of each curriculum theory in detail. Thus, the superficial 'labelling' approach will not be adopted in the analysis.

Given this condition, some other alternatives in dealing with the issue of the content and scope of knowledge seem
to be possible. A first alternative subissue is the utilization of the classification systems made by some philosophers both in and out of the field of education. They have attempted to sort out different kinds of knowledge in order to delineate the scope and possible domain of human knowledge. The epistemological endeavor to categorize knowledge directly involves the issue of what constitutes knowledge and what its components are. When we distinguish different types of knowledge, we are in fact already involved in the issue of the scope or limit of knowledge.

From Plato to contemporary philosophers, there have been many ways of categorizing knowledge. Plato differentiated episteme—knowledge of the intelligible and necessary, and doxa—knowledge of the sensory and contingent or knowledge as opinion or belief. In contrast, Aristotle conceptualized three different sorts of knowledge: theoria (theoretical knowledge), praxis (practical knowledge), and techne (technical knowledge). In the 18th century, Kant provided us with a conceptual matrix composed of two different dimensions: synthetic versus analytic and a priori versus a posteriori. He emphasized the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge. More recently, B. Russell (1948, 1976) distinguished between knowledge of truth and knowledge of things, and, within the latter, between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. In a similar
tradition of analytic philosophy, G. Ryle (1949) provided the famous categories of "knowing how" (methodological knowledge) and "knowing that" (propositional knowledge). Combining Russell's categories with those of Ryle's, Thierry (1986) identifies three types of knowledge: knowledge as acquaintance, knowledge as ability or knowing how, and knowing that as propositional knowledge (p. 458). M. Polanyi (1983) suggests the concept of "tacit knowledge" as personal knowledge in contrast to explicit knowledge (pp. 3-25). Especially, Polanyi's notion of tacit knowing is considered very significant by some contemporary curriculum theorists—which will be shown later.

In the actual analysis of the characteristics of curriculum theory with regard to its content of knowledge, one or more of the modes of classification may or may not be utilized. Of course, the relevance of these modes of classification may be called into question since it is not certain whether any claims about content of knowledge by particular curriculum theories are compatible with the modes introduced.

A second alternative subissue considered is the problem of the boundary of knowledge. The issue of the division of knowledge in curriculum content is conceptually related to the issue of the content of knowledge. The possibility or
impossibility of division itself and the mode of division (if possible) is by and large dependent upon the characteristics of knowledge advocated by a curriculum theory. Some curriculum theories are adherent to the division of knowledge presented as curriculum content, while some are indifferent to the issue, and some others are opposed to division. In this study, those theories that resort to the rigid boundaries and distinct divisions of knowledge are labelled as the 'reductionist', and those that claim that curriculum knowledge should not be confined to certain boundaries and zones are labelled the 'expansionist'. Each position has its rationale and often provides an example of division as a model.

One more thing to be commented on concerning the issue of the 'zone' of knowledge is the possible conceptual confusion over the concept of the modes of classification already presented versus the concept of the zones of knowledge issue. The first is a generic one, which is applicable to the general discourse about knowledge. Consequently, it may have an impact on the issue of the second. In contrast, the issue of the boundary of knowledge is limited to the curriculum discourse with the assumption that a body of knowledge is determined as part of curriculum content. For example, if it were claimed that knowledge as curriculum content should consist only of propositional knowledge,
then there might be claims in the curricular discourse about whether or not the body of propositional knowledge should have clear zones and, if so, why.

24 SUMMARY

In the INTRODUCTION of this chapter, we discussed the present status of curriculum theory and concluded that the multi-faceted perspectives of curriculum theory and theorizing at the present time not only resulted in difficulty in conceptualizing curriculum theory itself but provided us with the necessity to pay attention to a meta-theoretic approach to curriculum theory. The diverse approaches to curriculum theory, most of which are mainly associated with the reconceptualist theorizing endeavors, may make it difficult to apprehend the general features of curriculum theory, but on the other hand they seem to make a contribution to improving the stagnated state of curriculum theory.

On the basis of the understanding of the multiple and complex characteristics of curriculum theory, we have examined possible relationships between knowledge and curriculum theory. Through a consultation with some curriculum theorists—they are by nature meta-theorists—we made the conclusion that, in accordance with one of the assumptions presented in the previous chapter, not all curriculum theories are exclusively concerned with knowledge claims
regarding curriculum content. Some are more interested in the process and structure of curriculum theory, even though one can hardly deny that we often tend to have a temptation to make a direct and inevitable connection between the concepts. However, the issue of how much a curriculum theory is involved in epistemology is a delicate one. There is no clear-cut criteria for judgment—it is a matter of degree or extent, not of kind. This is part of the reason why we can select any curriculum theory for an epistemological analysis.

The next task was to develop and formulate actual epistemological criteria for the analysis of the selected curriculum theories. For this purpose, we examined in depth the central issues and problems of epistemology and curriculum theory, and identified four different criteria to be used for the analysis of curriculum theories: (1) the nature of knowledge (reality issue), (2) the origin and source of knowledge, (3) the purpose or values of knowledge, and (4) the content and scope of knowledge. Some criteria entail subissues as subcriteria: (a) subjectivism, objectivism, and relativism in the nature of knowledge, (b) extrinsic or intrinsic (means or ends) and personal or collective knowledge in the values of curriculum of knowledge, and (c) a classification of knowledge and the distinction between the expansionist and the reductionist position in content and scope of knowledge.
In CHAPTER III, on the basis of these criteria and sub-
criteria, knowledge claims expressed in fifteen contempo-
rary curriculum theories, whether implicitly or explicitly,
will be analyzed. Also, in the process, some other emerg-
ing issues considered critical in the analysis of charac-
teristics of particular curriculum theories will be taken
into account in relation to the concepts of the criteria
already set forth, if necessary.
CHAPTER III
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
CONTEMPORARY CURRICULUM THEORIES: ANALYSIS

3.1 INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of the present chapter is to analyze the
knowledge claims of the selected contemporary curriculum
theories according to the epistemological criteria formulated in
the preceding chapter. In order to do the analysis, we need
to decide which theories are going to be analyzed.

In selecting curriculum theories for the analysis, the
researcher takes into account two factors: the concept of
'curriculum theory' and the method of actual selection.
The latter rests on the former to some extent because the
way of defining curriculum theory influences the way of
selecting theories, by circumscribing the scope and limit
of the concept. In the next section, the concept of curri-
culum theory will be delineated, and fifteen curriculum
theories will be chosen on the basis of the selection cri-
teria. In this process the reason why the particular curri-
culum theories have been selected will be explained and
justified.
3.2 SELECTION OF CURRICULUM THEORIES

The concept of curriculum theory defined in this study is so broad and inclusive that it encompasses opinions, beliefs, descriptions, interpretations, or personal assertions about curricular phenomena and the relationships between the statements and propositions. However, one thing must be clarified with regard to the conception: a curriculum theory should necessarily entail and involve a particular theorist’s 'personal' positions, viewpoints, or claims, regardless of the characteristics and nature of the theory. A curriculum theory should reflect and manifest at bottom the theorist’s 'own' standpoints regardless of whether it is 'scientific or philosophic'; 'normative or descriptive'; and 'context-specific or generic'. Hence not all statements about curricular phenomena are curriculum theory, regardless of whether or not they are logically coherent and consistent unless the statements expose the theorist’s personal claims and viewpoints.

In consequence, of most importance is the distinction between the concept of 'research' and theory. Curriculum research, whatever purposes it may serve, may or may not have impact on curriculum theory. And it may or may not involve the researcher's personal claims or viewpoints—thus, if any research manifests the researcher's own positions, then it can be said to be a curriculum theory for
A consequence of this stipulative definition is that many well-known curriculum textbooks—what Schubert calls "synoptic texts" (1980 and 1985, p. 46), which mainly aim at introduction, comprehensive summary, and historical overview of curriculum studies—are no longer considered curriculum theories. To be sure, they have substantive instructional values in that they promote a proper understanding of the field in general; however, they can hardly be called curriculum theories in that they usually lack the authors' own particular positions and claims concerning particular curriculum phenomena.

As indicated, selection is a prerequisite for the analysis. In this study, several factors were considered in circumscribing the theories to be selected. They are: (1) temporal limitation, (2) geographic factor, and (3) number of sampling. These selection criteria will explain and further justify why particular theories have been chosen for analysis.

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Some may argue that at this point every research is unavoidably involved in some types of theoretical presuppositions and assumptions somehow at the outset; however, certain covert and hidden inference with regard to 'theoretical background' is out of consideration here.
A first consideration was the temporal limitation. This study focuses on the curriculum theories spanning the period between 1970 and 1985. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the year 1970 can be considered a turning point in the field of curriculum studies due to the emergence of the various and diversified approaches. Few curriculum theorists will have disputes over the identification of the major historical trends and traditions in the field during the period between 1920, when curriculum studies emerged as a self-conscious field of study, and 1970, when attempts to identify discrete trends began to bring about uneasiness. Approximately, starting from the year 1970, the controversial claims regarding both the content and method of inquiry in the field, frequently criticized and repudiated by the opponents as unwarranted and unexamined, have prevented us from assessing accurately the actual and real circumstances. Often associated with the 'reconceptualist' curriculum theorists, conceptual confusion in understanding the state of the field requires a more systematic and circumspect analysis of the contemporary curriculum theories, which endorse multiple perspectives and orientations to both content and methodology of the inquiry.

Along with the researcher's personal interest in this particular period of time, this observation about the field affects the decision about temporal limitation. One more
problem to be clarified is that of actual publishing date in regard to the time issue. Most of the selected theories are dated in 1970 or later with a few exceptions whose first editions are dated before 1970. In this case, the date of the second or later edition of the particular volumes shall be considered as the temporal criterion on the ground that they are assumed to maintain enough significance and influence yet.

The second consideration for the selection was the geographic limitation. Most theorists selected—it may not be correct to say 'theorist' since what is selected is not the person, but his theory—were Americans, with a few exceptions (Brazilian, Canadian, and British theorists). This fact by no means implies that curriculum theories found in other countries and cultures other than this particular geographic boundary are not important or valuable. The major reason for not considering curriculum theories from non-English speaking areas is that the researcher had no opportunities to be acquainted with them. This kind of practical reason, however, does not negate the claim that any curriculum theory can be analyzed given the conceptual framework as epistemological criteria provided in the previous chapter. Nobody can be completely free from such personal and environmental factors in selecting of the subject matter of his study.
Finally, the selection of the theories was intended to include as many theories as possible. The issue of the number of theories to be selected is directly related to the question: 'What is the reason for selecting 15 theories instead of 10 or 30, for instance? And why are particular theories included while others excluded, given the first and the second considerations?' Perhaps, this is the most difficult problem to justify if the answer has to be given. One thing clear is that there are no completely 'objective' standards for selecting theories. It is a matter of the researcher's personal judgment relying upon his knowledge, familiarity, and acquaintance of the theories. The important thing is that any theory can be dealt with. Arbitrariness is to some extent unavoidable. Although the theories may or may not be considered renowned and influential in the field of curriculum studies, the judgment is by and large subjective and arbitrary. Thus, it is possible for a researcher to inadvertently lose sight of some famous theories recognized by others due to his ignorance.

Therefore, it is very difficult, and at the same time unnecessary to say whether or not they represent the entire contemporary curriculum theories in terms of possible epistemological characteristics and nature. The issue of balance and skewedness in sampling is not a concern in this study. The number 15, though relatively a large number, is
arbitrary. It could be 20 or more, for example, if the researcher has no restrictions in terms of time and energy. At the same time, it must be noted that the smaller the number, the bigger the possibility of losing sight of particular epistemological positions.

One more important thing to be clarified is the relationship between the theorist and his theory itself, which was briefly mentioned earlier. A person's theory is expressed and addressed through a set of written 'statements'—despite the possibility of non-written statements. A person's ideas often evolve, change, and transform as time goes by. What is to be analyzed in this study is not a 'theorist' but his/her writings. Therefore, it is not important to know 'who has which theory' at a particular moment. Rather, it is important to understand the meanings and implications of the theorist's respective curriculum theories themselves. However, for the sake of convenience, names of curriculum theorists will be frequently used to refer to the theories advocated by them.\(^{28}\)

The names of the fifteen curriculum theorists whose theories have been selected for this study are as follows: M. Adler, M. Apple, G. Beauchamp, J. Bruner, E. Eisner, G. Esland, P. Freire, H. Giroux, P. Hirst, I. Illich, A. King

\(^{28}\) For instance, a theorist's name 'T' refers to his theory or theories in particular volume(s).
and J. Brownell, J. Macdonald, W. Pinar, J. Schwab, M. van Manen. In the next section, these theories will be analyzed one by one in a uniform manner on the basis of the epistemological criteria formulated earlier.

3.3 ANALYSIS

3.3.1 Mortimer Adler

The question of whether or not Adler is a curriculum theorist is a quite meaningless one. Even though Adler has not written a single volume whose title includes the term 'curriculum', and even though he has never addressed himself as 'curriculum theorist', we can easily identify his unique curriculum theory in his writings. One of the most prolific scholars in the field of philosophy of education, Adler clearly manifests his own unique and somewhat provocative position on curriculum, e.g., a heavy emphasis on the issue of what to be taught in the elementary and secondary school. His theory, which is consistent and coherent, is well represented in the so-called Paideia series: The Paideia Proposal (1982), Paideia Problems and Possibilities (1983), and The Paideia Program (1984). Accordingly, the epistemological analysis will primarily focus on the knowledge claims in the series.
Nature of Knowledge. The reality issue concerning the relationship between the knower (subject) and the known (object) is not explicitly addressed in the Paideia series. Therefore, we have to infer Adler's position on the nature of curricular knowledge from his general statements and remarks on curriculum content.

The Paideia Proposal (1982) is based on the basic convictions such as "the same objectives for all without exception" (p. 15) and "the same course of study for all" without any electives with an exception of the choice of a second language (p. 21). Aiming at the promotion of intellectual power, cultivation of human mind, the one-track system of public schooling calls for an identical education program "that is general, not specified; that is liberal, not vocational; and that is humanistic, not technical" (1983, p. 30).

Along with threefold major objectives or ends of basic schooling, which also should be the same for all (1982, pp. 15-20), Adler prescribes what should actually constitute curriculum content--the course of study. He refers to them as "three distinct modes of teaching and learning" (1982, p. 22), which consists of (1) the acquisition of organized knowledge; (2) the development of intellectual skills; and (3) the enlargement of understanding, insight, and aesthet-
ic appreciation" (1982, p. 22). Further, he proposes that particular subject areas correspond to the three different modes. For the "acquisition of knowledge", three areas of subject matters are indispensable to basic schooling: language, literature, and fine arts; mathematics and natural science; history, geography, and social studies.

In order to disclose Adler's knowledge claims with respect to the nature of knowledge, it is helpful to exclusively focus on the first category of the course of study—it is likely and valid that this category deals with the 'content' aspect of knowledge while the second and third ones with the 'process' aspect of knowledge. According to Adler (1982), inclusion of those particular subject areas for the acquisition of organized knowledge is justified:

Why these three? They comprise the most fundamental branches of learning. No one can claim to be educated who is not reasonably well acquainted with all three. They provide the learner with indispensable knowledge about nature and culture, the world in which we live, our social institutions, and ourselves. (p. 24)

Implicit in this brief passage is the bold assumption that there is an objective and ultimate existence of the world of knowledge and truth independently of and apart from the individual knowers' judgments or claims, and they are knowable in themselves. In other words, the three areas of study—distinct and discrete bodies of subject matters to study—as the objects of knowledge have an existence in an
absolute and unchangeable manner independent of and external to the knowing mind waiting to be discovered and disclosed. Thus, subjective knowers have no influence or impact on the status of the objects to be known. These areas of subject matters are justified in themselves outside the knowers' interpretation, realization, understanding, interaction, or any other cognitive operation. For this reason, we can conclude without any hesitation that Adler's knowledge claims can be classified as epistemologically objectivist and (ontologically) realistic.

Origin and Source of Knowledge. Like the nature of knowledge, the origin and source of knowledge with regard to curriculum content is not explicitly expressed anywhere in the Paideia series. This, however, does not necessarily mean that Adler's curriculum theory does not espouse any particular position on the origin of knowledge. A careful examination of "the areas of operations and activities" covering the three modes of teaching and learning (1982, p. 23) reveals that the areas represent to a large degree the whole of the Western cultural heritage and intellectual traditions which have been thought to be the most fundamental and universal for cultivation of rationality and development of human mind. As indicated in the Paideia Proposal (1982, p. 22) and elsewhere, it was Adler's basic conviction that the mind can be improved and developed by the study of the three modes of course of study.
The underlying philosophical assumption of such intellectualism is that man possesses certain intellectual virtues or faculties and that knowing is a function of the intellectual faculties operating on 'materials' and on really existing 'substances' which human senses provide. The most conspicuous and important faculty is the highest rational power called reason. And the disclosure of reason constitutes the objects of knowledge, which first of all intend to search for self-evident truths both in deductive and inductive manner—to disclose transcendental and ultimate reality.

J. Wynne's analysis of the relationship between the faculty of reason and subject matter with which the faculty is supposed to deal is very instructive (1963, p. 414) when he speaks of Adler’s intellectualism focusing on the basic philosophical presupposition.

Subject matter content rather than method is... the primary consideration. Any subject may be disciplinary, but only the right kind may give cultivation. Only the subject matter which embodies the proper standards of direction is satisfactory. Theoretically they are the disclosures of reason wherever they may be found, but practically they are most readily available in the great books, historical, scientific, and literary. (1963, p. 414)

These subjects are tools of civilized people and have a disciplinary effect on reason and mind. As such, in Adler's curriculum theory, the source and origin are to be
found in the organized accumulation of Western civilization—knowledge is embodied within the cultural heritage and it has a function of cultivating rationality and intellectual power. At the same time, the cultivated reason and the intellectual power work to acquire more valid, indubitable knowledge, which comprises objective and fixed truths as realities. In this sense, human reason is free from and detached from its historical or socio-political contexts and situational horizons.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. As discussed, the ultimate but general purpose of curricular knowledge is to improve and train the human mind towards individual excellence (1983, p. 10). Subsequently, the three objectives prescribed serve to achieve the foremost purpose. The trained intelligence has the power to adjust and adopt (1983, p. 43). This sort of claim is based on the fundamental premise that all human beings possess the same intellectual properties.

[The] sameness of human beings—as members of the same species—means that every child has all the distinguishing properties common to all members of the species. They all have the same inherent tendencies, the same inherent powers, the same inherent capacities. The fact that individuals possess these common traits to different degrees is itself proof that they share a common nature at the same time that differ in degree in the many ways that makes each a unique individual. (1982, p. 43)
Logically, it is not possible to expect the human mind to develop or improve in the same manner providing the same objectives and the same course of study without exception, unless there is a presupposition that it consists of the same properties or powers despite the difference in degree, not in kind.

At the outset, Adler maintains an underlying assumption that knowledge is important as an end-in-itself and that it possesses intrinsic and inherent values, independent of any use to which it may be put. In other words, the areas or operations activities entailed in each mode of course of study reflect the fact that each of them has inherent values to help to acquire organized knowledge, to develop intellectual skills, and to enhance understanding of basic ideas and values (1983, pp. 16-7). Therefore, they cannot be replaced with other areas of study if we expect the same disciplinary values. They are regarded as the most appropriate and suitable subject areas for achieving the objectives.

With regard to the issue of emphasis either on the individual or collective dimension of knowledge, Adler’s position seems to be relatively ambiguous. Basically, he believes in democracy and free institutions. He is convinced that citizens are the principal and permanent rulers
of a society. For him the hallmark of the one-track basic schooling system—the same curriculum and the same objectives for all—is the preservation of universal suffrage and an adequate preparation for discharging the duties and responsibilities of citizenship (1982, p. 17). Individuals' trained intelligence and cultivated mind through the presentation of the identical bodies of knowledge automatically ensure the betterment of a society and the preservation of democracy.

Thus, Adler seems to justify the values of knowledge in terms of the individual's trained intelligence, and he assumes that the democratic society is composed of the aggregation of well-educated individuals. We can, then, say that Adler's curriculum theory primarily concerns curricular knowledge which focuses on developing individual potentials, but the individual dimension of knowledge is valuable to the extent that it contributes to the construction of a 'better' society.

Scope and Content of Knowledge. The criterion of the scope and content of knowledge seems to be the most apparently manifested one among the four. This criterion is logically coupled with the reality issue delineating the characteristics of the objects of knowledge. Under the realm of objective realism, we have objective bodies of knowledge to
be discovered and mastered (not created, negotiated, or constructed) apart from our knowing mind and consciousness. Therefore, a circumspect investigation can reveal the distinct types of subclusters. (As a matter of fact, this enterprise is one of the main staples for philosophers and scientists.) In line with this idea, division and categorization of knowledge is a natural consequence for Adler. Knowledge is to be broken up into distinct clusters with or without hierarchy due to its unchanged and absolute nature.

A couple of examples will show how Adler deals with this issue. As already noted, the three basic modes of learning and teaching presented from K through 12 are: knowledge, skills, and understanding. With regard to the different modes of study, Adler posits:

the first of these three...involves branches of knowledge designated by the names of subject-matter....[It] results in knowing that or knowing what. The second results in knowing how (for every skill, act, or technique consists in knowing how to do something well). The third mode of learning... consists in knowing why and wherefore. (1983, p. 17.)

Furthermore, Adler prescribes particular subject matters appropriate to each domain of the course of study. For instance, in order to acquire organized knowledge, he requires three distinct fields of subject matters, as indicated earlier. In a broad sense, this type of establishment of fixed zones of boundaries of curricular knowledge
can be thought to be an unavoidable thing warranting a reductionist posture which strives to identify the most significant and serious areas of knowledge and to make them curriculum content.

Beyond the curriculum discourse, Adler’s attempt to classify the whole body of knowledge enshrined in the Western culture and civilization into a number of discrete branches of human knowledge—of course, the study of them is basically for the cultivation of human rationality—is well presented in his recent book titled *A Guidebook to Learning* (1986). In the volume, he not only describes different types of knowledge worthwhile and inevitable to human life but prescribes how to acquire them in detail.

### 3.3.2 Geoffrey Esland

'Sociology of knowledge' is one of the recently emerging approaches to education and curriculum, although it has a relatively long history. In spite of the label 'sociology', it has had significant impacts on the field of curriculum studies both in content and mode of inquiry, as it advances different notions of man and knowledge. Advocates of the sociology of knowledge are, most of all, in common in calling into question the existing definitions and conceptions of curricular reality and in reexamining the issue of what counts as curriculum knowledge in a critical man-
ner. Among them is G. Esland, whose curriculum theory is presented in an article titled "Teaching and Learning and the Organization of Knowledge".29

**Nature of knowledge.** Esland presents "a possible framework for the analysis of the knowledge...and the epistemological traditions" (p. 70), with a criticism of the traditional "Individualism" epistemology of Bacon, Locke and Kant.

According to him, Individualism endowed man with an absolute rationality in which the knowing subject is detached from his social context. The world of the theoretical was judged to be autonomous, stripped of the distorting influences of institutional attachment. This individualistic epistemology,...has become the scientific epistemology. (p. 71)

The traditional epistemology supports the objectivistic view of knowledge. It considers knowledge as a set of abstract and objective structures with inherent values for improving an absolute capacity of rationality—universal 'reason' or 'intelligence'. This view is subject to the trenchant challenge of the sociology of knowledge, which insists that man is existentially related to his social structure and that categories or realities are socially constructed, not discovered (Esland, pp. 76-7).

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29 It appears in Knowledge and Control, written by M. F. D. Young and his associates in 1971.
The problematic nature of the ontological and epistemological position taken by traditional objectivism is uncovered when Esland argues:

Knowledge is...detached from the human subjectivity in which it is constituted, maintained and transformed. Such a view implicitly presents man as passive receiver, as the pliable, socialized embodiment of external facticities....We have, therefore, a reified philosophy in which objectivity is autonomized and which does not regard as problematical for the constituency of the object its constitution in the subjective experience of individuals....this epistemology...ignores the intentionality and expressivity of human action and and the entire complex process of intersubjective negotiation of meanings. (p. 75)

In contrast, the essential feature of the sociology of knowledge is found in the claim that the products which man has created become his objective reality, a reality in terms of which the definition of others is available. The objective structures with intrinsic natures are thus transformed into subjective consciousness and the static and analytic conception of knowledge is called into question (p. 77).

The sociology of knowledge repudiates this notion of objectivistic viewpoint of knowledge. Issues of criteria of truth and validity are problematic for the advocates. They are not transcendental but themselves socially constructed, and open to socio-historical relativization (p. 77). The question of power as control over reality defini-
tion is, therefore, central to the social construction of knowledge (p. 81). The curriculum is just a set of bodies of intentioned knowledge which are supposed to have a purpose related to power. Through the control of the transformations of the child's consciousness, its exponents operate a particular world view which is thought to be valid currency in the society, according to him (p. 84).

Thus, epistemology functions as a means for 'reification' of both the child and curricular knowledge as inert things to be mastered. Subject areas are mystifications which arbitrarily differentiate and objectify the physical and symbolic universe. They thereby constrain the subjective identities of the individuals in a society, and obscure their relation that they are humanly produced. From this analysis, it can be concluded that Esland sustains a dramatic example of relativism rejecting objectivist views of curricular knowledge and criticizing realistic positions on the existence of objective knowledge.

Origin and Source of Knowledge. We come to have much difficulty as well as uneasiness when we talk about the issue of the origin of curricular knowledge in Esland's curricular theory. This uneasiness, however, seems to be an inevitable consequence of the peculiar characteristics of his claims and arguments which mainly concentrate on the
theme of what is wrong with the curriculum knowledge that is currently being dealt with in schools.

As examined, Esland's theory does not tell much about what should actually be taught and why; rather, he attempts to elaborate the nature and problems of the curricular knowledge being transmitted and disseminated as curriculum content in educational institutions. Put another way, he is mainly interested in the issue of 'what should not be taught and why' based on the concept of reification and dereification of epistemological realities. His assertion that the world and the stock of knowledge manipulated in school is the external face of subjective reality (p. 99), for instance, does not give a good description of the derivation of knowledge.

Given no concrete bodies of knowledge for curriculum content, the only inference we can make is that curriculum knowledge has to be constructed through negotiation and mutual compromise between the social and individual agencies. That is, knowledge should be 'dereified' through the process of subjective and intersubjective interpretation of the realities and meanings developed from continuous interactions of the agencies. In this very sense, knowledge is thought to be something created and constructed rather than discovered or received--human products, that is.
Justification for the Values of Knowledge. What Esland is criticizing is the view of curriculum as a set of arrangements of intentioned knowledge which are assumed to have a concrete purpose, among other things. The concrete purpose is directly bound up with the utility criteria of curricular knowledge. According to him, the criteria of utility could be either "extrinsic"--economic, humanitarian, world-improving, social integration--or "intrinsic"--developing particular qualities of awareness (p. 86). The intrinsic perspective stresses the propensity of knowledge for developing a particular capacity in human mind, and the extrinsic perspective emphasizes direct application of knowledge to problematic situations defined by the needs of the society.

In the final analysis, Esland apparently rejects and criticizes both utility perspectives. This is clear when he parallels the intrinsic criteria with technology for effective learning for developing rationality and intellectual power in a reified manner in order to efficiently deal with the predefined economic and political problems in a society; and when he observes that the curriculum will have an increasing social problem orientation and that justifications for inclusion of socially-approved knowledge will contain a technology rationale in the interests of economic nationalism (pp. 102-3). That is, both development of an
individualistic epistemology approach to the human mind and the ideologization of technology, derived from economic rationality and political democracy should be called into question (p. 103).

Granting that the criticism is valid, however, what is unclear is his own position on how to justify curriculum knowledge—again, this is due to his peculiar posture, which heavily criticizes the utility criteria. After all, one thing clear is the fact that the intentionality and subjectivity of knower should be taken into account with regard to the value of curricular knowledge.

Scope and Content of Knowledge. The issue of divisions and zones of knowledge is one of the central issues in Esland's theory. Regarding the nature and problems of existing subject boundaries in school curriculum Esland maintains that "subjects are the institutionalized symbolic universes oriented around particular questions about different entities within the universe, and man's relationship to them" (p. 84). Thus, the human consciousness is to be structured into this symbolic zones when knowers are introduced to the "mapped-out" theoretical zones of knowledge called "subjects" (p. 80).

His account of the discrete boundaries of knowledge is based on the concept of mystification and reification.
To refer to knowledge as structures, or "subjects" is immediately to "mystify" (and therefore obscure) how knowledge and human thought are reversibly one and the same thing...It is, therefore, necessary not to consider subjects as given, but to analyze what a teacher thinks a subject is. (p. 99)

Subjects as a man-made category are mystifications, which arbitrarily differentiate and objectify the physical and symbolic universes and which constrain the subjective identities of the individuals.

The boundaries of curricular knowledge should be understood in terms of division and integration—both of which serve either intrinsic or extrinsic utility criteria. The accusation of the traditional ways of dividing curricular knowledge has the same grounds as we make an accusation of the integration of knowledge in that both are conventional and arbitrary serving the utility purpose. Therefore, it is a pointless question to ask which perspective Esland values and warrants. What he repudiates is the concept of 'division or integration' of knowledge per se.

In consideration of his intent, we can conclude that curricular knowledge should not be confined to particular conceptual forms and schemes. There are no such objective and fixed categories of knowledge justified by the nature of disciplines or human rationality. Curricular knowledge has to reflect a wide range of subjective meanings negoti-
ated and interpreted through lived experiences of the individuals. For this reason, it is valid to say that the scope of knowledge is broadened and diversified; it takes an expansionist posture.

3.3.3 Jerome Bruner

Known to be one of the post-Sputnik scientists and educational theorists, Bruner explicates his unique position on school curriculum under the rubric of the so-called discipline-centered curriculum, which is manifested in the famous book titled *The Process of Education* (1960, 1977). His basic intent was to depict an image of education, which is based on the nature of the structures of knowledge embedded in each discipline. That is, curriculum content should be organized and presented according to the inherent basic structures of knowledge for an optimal learning. His curriculum theory encompasses not only the issue of what is to be taught but how to teach the content effectively.

**Nature of Knowledge.** The most crucial concept in Bruner's curriculum theory is that of "structure of knowledge". Without having an understanding of this theoretical construct, it may be totally pointless to talk about his curriculum theory. The meaning of the structure of knowledge involves the issue of the nature of knowledge and the rest of the epistemological criteria as well. Bruner, however,
does not clearly define the concept anywhere in his writing—more precisely, the term 'structure' itself is an ultimate concept that can no longer be defined in terms of more fundamental concepts. Therefore, we have to infer its meaning from the general context in which the term is used.

The most basic premise of the concept of structure of knowledge is that every respective academic discipline possesses its own particular structures, which are inherent and immanent in its nature. The structure(s) of knowledge, often used as a synonym for "fundamental ideas" or "basic ideas", is just what should be taught as curriculum content. In other words, curriculum content should be decided in a way that reflects the basic structures of a field of knowledge, and it requires the most fundamental understanding of the field. Thus, curriculum construction is a task that cannot be carried out without the active participation of the ablest scholars and scientists (1977, p. 32).

Implicit in this statement is the claim that the structure of knowledge as objects of knowledge independently exists 'out there' apart from the knower's personal states. That is, the basic ideas, fundamental concepts, or principles which lie at the heart of all disciplines while constituting curriculum content, can be identified and determined through devoted endeavors of the experts and
specialists who are at the forefront of their respective disciplinary areas. In this regard, we can infer that the structure of knowledge is something to be mastered, acquired, internalized, and understood by the knower, and the knowing process does not transform or change the objective nature of the structure of knowledge. In short, the notion of the structure of knowledge involves a realist position that the objects of knowledge to be known are there waiting for the knower to grasp and discover; and it espouses an objectivist view of knowledge in that it implicitly admits the existence of certain objective standards or criteria—those are to be determined and identified by the experts and specialists in the particular disciplines—through which validity, credibility, or significance of knowledge can be assessed and examined.

A word about the reality issue is necessary at this point. Being involved in a psychological epistemology, Bruner is concerned with the dialectical relationship between human cognition and the properties of knowledge, i.e., the subject and the object of knowing. He modifies the traditional objectivistic and psychometry-oriented (in Esland's terms) viewpoints of human intelligence and cognition, which unduly emphasizes the 'passive' aspects of human mind in contrast to the active and intuitive aspects. However, it is important to recognize that what he modifies
is not the conception of objective reality but the conception of mind and the process of acquiring knowledge.

Origin of Knowledge. From where does the structure of knowledge derive? Put differently, what brings the inherent structure to curriculum content from the distinct disciplines? As noted, this question has to be answered in consideration of the roles and functions of the frontiers of the scholarship. According to Bruner, the fundamental structures of subjects we choose to teach should be determined by the most fundamental understanding that can be achieved of the underlying principles that give structure to the subjects (p. 31). We have to depend upon the scholars at the forefront of their disciplines to get valid and significant knowledge as curriculum content. This is why the curriculum specialists in education have a relatively minor role to play in curriculum development. The disciplinary authorities are regarded to be qualified to decide the structures of knowledge and to generate relevant and optimal conditions to effectively teach them.

One thing important to know is that the process and intellectual activity of the scholars in dealing with the structure of knowledge is exactly the same as the knower's knowing process of the structure (p. 14). The difference is in degree, not in kind (p. 14). One more thing to note
is the fact that Bruner deliberately neglects the socio-political aspects of knowledge as curriculum content. This is obvious when he claims in another source (1962):

The issue of subject matter in education can be resolved only by reference to one’s view of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge is a model we construct to give meaning and structure to regularities in experience. The organizing ideas of any body of knowledge are inventions for rendering experience economical and connected. To attempt a justification of subject matter... in terms of its relation to the child's social activities is to misunderstand what it is and how it may be mastered. (pp. 120-1)

**Justification for the Values of Knowledge.** In the theory of the structure of knowledge, the values of knowledge are justified in an intrinsic manner. As a crucial theme of the theory, this point is very transparent. In several places in the book, Bruner asserts the importance of intrinsic values of the structure of knowledge. For instance, we can easily notice that he endorses a particular aspect of the formal discipline theory when he says:

Virtually all of the evidence of the last two decades on the nature of learning and transfer has indicated that, while the original theory of formal discipline was poorly stated in terms of the training of faculties, it is indeed a fact that massive general transfer can be achieved by appropriate learning, even to the degree that learning properly under optimum conditions leads one to "learn how to learn." (1977, p. 6)

For him, cultivation of excellence and optimum development of intellectual power are the most general objectives of education (1977, pp. 9-10). These objectives can be
achieved through apprehension and understanding of the structure of knowledge. The teaching and learning of the structure, rather than simply the mastery of facts and techniques, is at the heart of the transfer problem, and the more fundamental the idea one has learned, the greater will be its breadth of applicability to new problems—the massive general transfer (p. 17).

Given this argument, we can conclude that the structure is taught for the promotion and development of general mental ability which can be transferred to particular and specific situations. Thus, the values of knowledge are justified in terms of the structure’s inherent power and worth. (However, we can notice that in the theory Bruner does not address whether the personal dimension of knowledge should be valued over the collective dimension or vice versa.)

Scope and Content of Knowledge. Bruner does not openly deal with the issue of the scope of knowledge, though he argues that discrete structures should constitute curricular knowledge. The scope and range of knowledge, therefore, should again be apprehended through an examination of the concept of the structure of knowledge itself. What is clear about the notion of structure is that on the one hand, there are disciplines which embrace their unique structures warranted by their academic communities com-
prised by experts and specialists, and there are some subject areas whose structures are hardly identified or which do not possess any inherent structures at all, on the other. According to the discipline-centered curriculum theorists in general, the latter should be displaced from the domain of curriculum. On the same line, Bruner himself argues that some social sciences as well as natural sciences and mathematics could be included in the curriculum; however, he does not make any comment on any other non-traditional and practical subject areas when he provides examples of the structures in the disciplines. The different structures embedded in the different disciplines, of course, maintain their own unique identity sharply contrasted to others.

What is inferred from these arguments is that Bruner not only admits the significance of logically segmented boundaries and divisions of disciplines but requires curriculum knowledge to focus exclusively on the divided lines of discipline areas. Therefore, Bruner's theory can be considered to take a reductionist posture with respect to the issue of the scope of knowledge.30

30 This fact, however, should not be confused with the multi-disciplinary curriculum organization which is based on the recognition of the significance of the boundaries of independent disciplines.
3.3.4 George Beauchamp

Through a series of volumes titled *Curriculum Theory* (1961, 1968, 1975, 1981), Beauchamp has devoted himself to the articulation of a coherent conception of curriculum theory for over 20 years. In his own words, the volumes from the first edition to the fourth one aim to "present an organized statement of the status and dimensions of curriculum theory" (1975, p. 69). Without any doubt, his intensive and persistent academic commitment to the field of curriculum theory not only has stimulated others to reconsider the significance of curriculum theory itself in terms of both actual theory construction and conceptualization of curriculum theory but resulted in an exemplar of an actual theory. At the same time, his theorizing attempts invited some serious criticisms, most of which are related to his system-oriented and purely scientific conception of curriculum theory.

With respect to the issue of what are the epistemological characteristics of his knowledge claims addressed in *Curriculum Theory*, what is required first of all is to examine whether or not his *Curriculum Theory* presents in fact a curriculum theory in accordance with the conception of curriculum theory delineated in the preceding and present chapters. Then we can identify epistemological claims for the analysis, if any.
In dealing with the first issue, we first note that Beauchamp clearly includes various kinds of substantive curricular phenomena in the discourse and that he manifests his own positions as to how a curriculum theory ought to be and what constitutes it. Therefore, we can say that *Curriculum Theory* itself is a curriculum theory despite the frequent criticisms that it is no more than a theory about curriculum theory—-that is, a meta-theory.

Granted that it is a curriculum theory, what is crucial is to investigate the theory's knowledge claims related to curriculum content. Beauchamp often talks about curriculum content or knowledge in his writings, which can be singled out easily. For instance, he argues:

Too often, criteria for selection of content are not apparent, if they exist at all. In selecting content, a (philosophical) curriculum theorist must take into account the nature and structure of knowledge. (1975, p. 70)

And he continues:

A fundamental process in curriculum planning is that of selecting curriculum content from the total culture; therefore, curriculum planners must address themselves to questions of what knowledge and skills are of most worth and which of those should be included in the curriculum. (1975, p. 85)

It is interesting to note that he uses the term "culture content" to avoid any argument about the interpretations of such terms as subject matter, content, or any other terms that might be used to refer to what is to be taught (1975,
According to him, the ultimate content is systematically organized through two distinct bodies of knowledge: the discipline and the practical knowledge, and any concept of curriculum design must account for the "form" and "arrangement" of the culture content (1975, p. 117).

At this point, we can understand what Beauchamp is talking about. Apparently, his curriculum theory is not concerned with what ought to constitute curricular knowledge to be taught. The notion of "culture content" just refers to a representative of curriculum content to avoid conceptual confusion and possible communication problem. He is not interested in the character and nature of knowledge to be included in curriculum content. In a broad sense, the issue or claim as to what should be taught is out of consideration in his theory. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze the theory's knowledge claims or positions through the four criteria—despite the plausible claim that the examples presented as curricular knowledge may reflect or provide clues to his epistemological position.

In order to better understand the circumstance, it is useful to look into the theory's basic assumptions and rationale. Beauchamp begins his theory with the premise that curriculum theory as a sub-theory of educational theory—which in turn, contains two primary dimensions or
sub-theories, curriculum design and curriculum engineering—should be either a philosophy-oriented prescriptive theory or a science-oriented descriptive theory. A prescriptive theory is dictated by a certain philosophical attitudes toward the nature of knowledge, the nature and derivation of values, and the nature of man (1975, pp. 37-8). In contrast, a descriptive theory has the functions of describing, predicting, and explaining the related phenomena. Even though Beauchamp emphasizes the significance, necessity, and interdependence of both types of theories, it is apparent that his own curriculum theory is a model of a descriptive theory.

According to him, a "curriculum design theory" consists of some discrete components or elements, one of which is the culture content; and a "curriculum engineering theory" comprises planning (input), implementation (process), and evaluation (output) procedures as system engineering factors. In sharp contrast with a prescriptive theory for which philosophy should encompass a theory of knowledge, his curriculum theory is not involved in philosophical issues. For this reason, it is not possible to analyze the theory's epistemological claims.31

31 It is important to note that he does deal with the value issues in his theory but what is argued is the possible impact of values and value theories upon curriculum theory; he does not argue that axiological claims should be included in any descriptive curriculum theories.
3.3.5 Paulo Freire

Freire's radical and revolutionary proposal on education and curriculum has its roots in Marxist humanism and Hegelian dialectics. The basic idea of humanism, which stems from Marx, is that men should be liberated from the taken-for-granted structural oppression through social consciousness arisen from practical activity. For Marx, the oppression and domination of ruling classes over ruled classes continue to exist in accordance with the unequal economic and material conditions of the particular society. Along with the notion of humanism, Hegel's notion of thesis/antithesis/synthesis dialectics plays a vital role throughout his entire radical curricular proposal. According to Freire, the concept of knowledge and reality must be understood in terms of a "dialogical" process, by which "false consciousness" is realized in order for the world of knowledge and reality to be transformed for human emancipation.

When we attempt to comprehend Freire's epistemological position on curricular knowledge, we get an uncomfortable feeling. One of the reasons is found in his personal position, which is mostly concerned with a critique of the current practice of curriculum especially focusing upon methodological aspects of curriculum operation like any other critical curriculum theorists. Nonetheless, we can identify—

32 P. Freire is the only theorist from non-English speaking culture in this study's selection.
fy his particular view on a desirable curriculum, concerning both content and method. Accordingly, we can call his proposal a curriculum theory, which is addressed in his writings, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972) and *Cultural Action for Freedom* (1979). Both of them maintain a consistent viewpoint about knowledge claims.

**Nature of Knowledge.** Reality and the knower-known relationship is one of the most highlighted issues in Freire's curriculum theory. In order to understand his reality claims with respect to curriculum knowledge, it is necessary to have a broad comprehension of his ontological claims and metaphysical assumptions in a general context.

In his justification for a pedagogy of the oppressed, first of all, Freire pronounces a radical demand for "the objective transformation of reality" and a rejection for the concept of "subjectivist immobility". The dialogical relationship between objectivity and subjectivity is expounded well in the following excerpt:

> one cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized. The separation of objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of the latter when analyzing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the other hand, the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which leads to solipsistic (idealist) positions, denies action itself by denying objective reality. Neither objectivism nor subjectivism,... is propounded here but rather subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship. (1972, p. 35)
What he is repudiating is not objectivity or subjectivity itself but either an objectivism assuming "a world without men" or a subjectivism postulating "men without world". The world of conceptual and material property and men of both action and reflection do not exist apart from each other (1972, pp. 35-6). They are not in conflict or contradiction.

Oppressive objective social reality can be overcome by means of "praxis", which consists of reflections and actions upon the world in order to transform it, Freire claims (1972, p. 36). That is, in the dialectical process of praxis, the world of objective reality and action/reflection of subjective reality are conceptually interdependent. Reality is not just simply the objective and concrete data outside the subjective process of knowing but also is knowers' perception of it (1979, p. 13). Thus, action and reflection upon the objective reality are inseparable constituents of the transforming act of the reality itself (1979, p. 28).

Along the same line, we can analyze Freire's knowledge claims on curriculum content. Freire's basic presupposition is that "humanizing pedagogy in which revolutionary leadership establishes a permanent relationship of dialogue with the oppressed" is the backbone of education for liber-
ation and emancipation. He distinguishes the concept of such emancipatory pedagogy from the traditional concept of education called the "banking concept of education", according to which education is an act of depositing, and according to which "the students are depositaries and the teacher is the depositor" (1972, p. 58). According to the banking concept, knowledge is

a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as process of inquiry. (1972, p. 58)

Implicit in this banking concept is the presupposition of a separation between subjectivity and objectivity. That is, man is merely 'in' the world, not 'with' the world. Man is not considered to be a conscious being; rather, he is the possessor of only consciousness (1972, p. 62). Therefore, detached facts and information constitute "true knowledge" in this concept—a false concept of men as objects.

On the contrary, in "problem-posing education", what is emphasized is a "consistent unveiling of reality" striving for "the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality" (1972, p. 68). Problem-posing education aims at demythologizing: it is directly against banking education which mythicizes reality to conceal objective facts "which explain the way men exist in the world" (1972, p. 71) in order to be critically objective about the reality.
Then what is the knowledge content of the dialogical, problem-posing education? With regard to the content issue, Freire takes a relatively superficial and passive view. For instance, Freire contends:

For the problem-posing education,...the program content of education is neither a gift nor an imposition--bits of information to be deposited in the students--but rather the organized, systematized, and developed "re-presentation" to individuals of the things about which they want to know more. (1972, p. 83)

Further, he continues:

the program content of education...must be the present, existential, concrete situation, reflecting the aspirations of the people....We must never merely discourse on the present situation, but never provide the people with programs which have little or nothing to do with their own preoccupations, doubts, hopes, and fears--programs which at times in fact increase the fears of the oppressed consciousness....It is the reality which mediates men, and to the perception of that reality held by educators...that we must go to find the program content of education. (1972, pp. 85-6)

What is inferred from these claims about the content of a problem-posing education is that Freire is depicting the fundamental characteristics of the curriculum content to be included in the program, not the curriculum content itself.

Implicit in this notion of curricular knowledge, whatever it might be, is that it ought to be understood in terms of the dialogical relationship between the knower and the known beyond the distinction between them. That is, for Freire, it is almost pointless to think of curricular
knowledge as objectively given, apart from the knowers' consciousness and comprehension as well as their subjective condition itself without objective and concrete reality outside of them. A world of material objects exist apart from subjective consciousness. Therefore, it can be said that Freire's concept of curricular knowledge involves a conception of the inseparable properties of both the realistic and the idealistic—the "dialectics", that is.

However, it must be noted that the terms "objectivity" and "subjectivity" used by Freire do not exactly refer to the same concepts regarding the issue of whether there is a permanent and immutable set of criteria or standards for the epistemological discourse. Rather, they are used in a particular way, in which they can be substituted with the concepts of realism and idealism. Therefore, from his arguments it does not follow that Freire's epistemological claims involve objectivism or subjectivism in their literal sense. This sort of problem can also be resolved by a brief examination of the nature of dialectics which espouses neither objectivism nor relativism. On the one hand, he does not believe in the existence of any particular permanent and fixed judgmental frameworks for praxis; on the other hand, he does not consider relativism as a promising alternative. Standards or criteria for truth or knowledge are no longer applied to the same reality statements
because reality itself is transformed in a dialectical and dynamic manner.

Source and Origin of Knowledge. Like the issue of the nature of knowledge, the issue of the derivation and methodology of curricular knowledge can be examined with reference to the concept of "dialogue" and "praxis". Freire refuses banking education, in which knowledge is accepted as taken for granted and as having nothing to do with "critical consciousness". According to the problem-posing education, on the contrary, curricular knowledge is derived from practical experience, that is, praxis, which is brought about through the authentic unity of subjective action and reflection upon the objective world of social as well as material realities. (Critical and revolutionary consciousness, in turn, results from praxis.) Knowledge has its origin in the active participation of the knower in the transformation of the social and natural world of objective realities. That is, knowledge involves a dialectical movement which goes from action to reflection and from reflection upon action to a new action (1979, p. 13).

However, for Freire praxis is only possible where the dialectical relationship between the knower (men) and the known (the world) can be maintained and where the critical comprehension of how these relationships evolve and how
they in turn condition men's perception of concrete reality (1979, p. 47). In short, knowledge is something which is not discovered or received. Rather, it is something which should be created, recreated, constructed by the dialectical praxis which aims at the promotion of a critical revolutionary consciousness to transform the social and material conditions of the oppressed.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. Basically, Freire's notion of curriculum knowledge can be justified in terms of practical/pragmatic values at which it aims. In his theory, the values of knowledge are defined with reference to the adequacy in promoting critical consciousness—"conscientization". There is no such thing as complete and genuine knowledge. Knowledge itself is a dynamic and dialogical property and, therefore, it changes in correspondence to the mutation of social and political contexts in which subjectivity-objectivity dialogue takes place. Hence, we cannot assume a particular state of knowledge which maintains static and inherent values insensitive to the socio-political circumstance.

This kind of assumption is closely linked to the oppressive ideology which strives to maintain the exploitative and distortional status quo. Valuable knowledge derived from the dialogical praxis not only functions to unveil
this oppressive reality and to help transform the superstructure but also helps transform and recreate the reality in a progressive manner. For this reason, we can easily infer that Freire is obstinately against the conception of intrinsic values of curricular knowledge.

Along with the practical aspect of knowledge, Freire is concerned about the social dimension of human knowledge. Most of all, the concept of dialogue or dialectics has to be understood in social and political contexts at a particular time. For him in the process of knowledge acquisition, the notion of "I know" cannot be explained apart from the plural notion of "we know". Put simply, for a knower to know something necessarily requires someone else to know. In this sense, knowledge is seen as a social and public entity collectively shared.

Scope and Content of Knowledge. Even though Freire does not address explicitly the question of what knowledge should constitute school curriculum content, he delineates the characteristics of the content of curriculum in his claims about the basic features of dialogue content. Insofar as dialogue has to be conceived of as education itself, as he suggests, its content can be seen as curriculum content. With regard to the content, he writes:

The content of that dialogue can and should vary in accordance with historical conditions and the level at which the oppressed perceive reality.
But to substitute monologue, slogan, and communiques for dialogue is to attempt to liberate the oppressed with the instruments of domestication. (1972, p. 52)

Thus, content should not be detached from reality, or dis-connected from the totality that engendered it and could give it significance (p. 57). It must be based upon the present, existential, concrete situations and realities.

In another place, Freire characterizes the content of curriculum in great detail.

[The program content of the problem-posing method--dialogical par excellence--is constituted and organized by the students' view of the world, where their own generative themes are found. The content thus constantly expands and renews itself. The tasks of the dialogical teacher in an interdisciplinary team working on the thematic universe revealed by their investigation is to "re-present" that universe to the people from whom he first received it--and "re-present" it not as a lecture, but as a problem. (1972, p. 101)

From this passage we can extract two profound features of curriculum knowledge as program content in a dialogical problem-posing education. First, program content should be constituted by the knowers' concrete experiences which are directly bound up with the knowers' own perception of the objective socio-political as well as material realities. Here what Freire is emphasizing is the knowers' perceived reality. He does not make any distinctions between types of knowledge. Any type of knowledge is significant enough to become curriculum content insofar as it is considered
problematic for the knowers, in terms of their view of reality. This is just the starting point where the critical dialogue begins to unveil how the structurally mythicized mechanism of oppression operates.

A second feature of such content, which is in turn conceptually inseparable from the first one, is the way of organizing curriculum knowledge. Any body of knowledge can become curricular knowledge as long as it has a close connection to the knowers' subjective perception of the realities. Based upon this expansive view of curriculum content, appears the notion of integrated curriculum which is thematically organized. For Freire, the issue regarding the division or boundaries of knowledge is a pointless one because knowledge not only derives from the knowers' dialogical praxis but is justified in terms of the degree of conscientization. Therefore, it is not possible to circumscribe any rigid boundaries in which the whole body of knowledge is to be confined. Instead, the concept of knowledge is broadened according to the diversification of the socio-political contexts and varying dimensions of the knowers' perception of the realities.

Thus, any knowledge that results from this dialogical process is real knowledge. This is the reason why the problem-posing, problematizing concept of curricular knowl-
edge is proposed, in which various interrelated bodies of knowledge are structured around a particular problematic topic or theme in an interdisciplinary manner. Given this analysis, it is evident that Freire's curriculum theory maintains an expansionist viewpoint of curriculum knowledge and rejects the establishment of divisions and zones of curriculum knowledge.

3.3.5 Paul Hirst
Since the late 1950s some analytic philosophers have exerted considerable influence upon the field of education in general and upon the field of curriculum studies in particular, by mainly consolidating their foundations on teacher education institutions. One of them is P. Hirst, a British philosopher whose idea of liberal education is relatively well represented in the United States. In the ensuing analysis, his curriculum theory titled "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge" in Knowledge and the Curriculum (1974, pp. 30-53) will be examined, as well as the article titled "The Forms of Knowledge Re-visited" (pp. 84-100) in the same volume.

From the outset, Hirst's curriculum theory seems manifestly an epistemology-oriented one, as the thesis of "forms of knowledge" apparently addresses the issue of what

33 It was first published in 1965 in Philosophical Analysis and Education.
ought to constitute curriculum knowledge and how it is to be justified. In order to characterize his knowledge claims embedded in the thesis, it is necessary to have a good grasp of the concept "forms of knowledge" itself. It is the most fundamental conceptual thread running through the whole theory.

Put simply, the thesis of forms of knowledge is that the whole domain of human knowledge can be categorized into six or so logically distinctive forms of knowledge through conceptual and logical analysis of serious human activities, none of which can be reducible to another and any combinations of which cannot generate a third form. They maintain "mutual irreducibility" and discrete categorial divisions. The names of the categories are: mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and arts, and philosophy (p. 46). Moreover, all forms share several commonnesses: 1) every form involves some unique "categorial concepts"; 2) every form has a distinctive logical structures for inquiry; and 3) every form has expressions or statements which can be tested against experience in accordance with particular criteria unique to the form (p. 44). According to Hirst, these forms as "disciplines" should constitute curricular knowledge for liberal education.
Liberal education is no more than an education in which the teacher initiates these distinguished forms of knowledge into students. That is, it enables them to appreciate the distinction between them, to understand what it is meant by the difference, and to notice the different values and truths criteria they embody. Now we can make an attempt for the epistemological analysis based upon this brief depiction of Hirst's curriculum theory.

Nature of Knowledge. Since Hirst claims that the thesis of the forms is justified on an "objective" ground—i.e., they are consequences of a conceptual and logical analysis of all meaningful human experiences and forms of life, we can take his knowledge claims to be objectivist. He argues that the forms not only derive from public experiences but also can be tested by "public criteria". This point is clear when he says:

> It is a necessary feature of knowledge... that there be public criteria whereby the true is distinguished from the false, the good from the bad, the right from the wrong. It is the existence of these criteria which gives objectivity to knowledge; and this in turn gives objectivity to the concept of liberal education. (p. 43)

Therefore, curriculum content can be established in an objective manner in that the forms are publicly describable and publicly testable. For Hirst, the forms are the basic articulations whereby the whole public experiences and activities become intelligible to man (p. 40).
But, how can it be said that the notion of public criteria itself ensures "objectivity"? According to him, this issue has to be understood in light of the nature of public languages.

It is by means of symbols, particularly in language, that conceptual articulation becomes objectified, for the symbols, give public embodiment to the concepts. The result of this is that men are able to come to understand both the external world and their own private states of mind in common ways, sharing the same conceptual schemata by learning to use symbols in the same manner. The objectification of understanding is possible because commonly accepted criteria for using the terms are recognized even these are never explicitly expressed. (p. 38)

Implicit in this passage is that even though men have all types of subjective and private forms of experiences, when men agree to recognize certain experiences that they have in common as shared and to describe these in a linguistic form, they become objectified and are accessible to public understanding, examination, and development (Brent, 1978, p. 98). As such, the forms are testable and analyzable with reference to public languages with which we can share the same conceptual schemata in common ways. This is the reason why some critics such as Brent (1978, 1983) point out that Hirst's theory is basically resorting to a "linguistic intersubjectivism", not an objectivism in a restrict sense (1978, p. 98 ff. and 1983, p. 280).
According to Brent's analysis, objectivity rests upon linguistic intersubjectivity, which depends upon the late-Wittgenstein's notion of the "language games" and the "forms of life" (1978, p. 136) not upon objective reality outside of language itself—for Hirst, objectivity derives from the forms of life in which men share, reveal in their agreement to describe and conceptualize certain of their subjective experiences in common ways. Therefore, in spite of Hirst's claim that his thesis is "not to be regarded as a transient articulation of a merely socially relative concept of knowledge" (p. 95), the forms themselves show somewhat relativistic characteristics in that the rules, criteria, standards for the public language games are subject to potential change even though we admit that they are relatively stable and fixed.

Given this argument, we can conclude that Hirst maintains an objectivistic view of curriculum knowledge as long as he is convinced about the objectivistic nature of public criteria which are independent of human choice and judgment; at the same time, we cannot rule out a relativistic potential as long as the criteria resorting to linguistic intersubjectivity are not necessarily immutable and permanent. On the other hand, his thesis shows that it espouses a realist view with respect to the knower-known relationship. As he made it clear several times, while his thesis
is rejecting the Platonian types of metaphysical realism which assumes a supersensible world of unverifiable and indescribable ultimate forms outside of the knower—for him there is no transcendental or ultimate reality beyond linguistic description—it is clear that the forms as formal disciplines exist independently of and regardless of the knower's intention or consciousness. The knowing subject's pursuit of the forms, therefore, does not affect any phase of the forms themselves. Formulating the logically distinctive categories is a separate process from that of attaining and internalizing the forms. Consequently, his thesis can be regarded to be rooted in an ontological realism.

Origin and Source of Knowledge. The question of where curriculum knowledge derives from was already addressed to a great extent when the nature issue was dealt with. As discussed, the six forms of knowledge as curriculum content for liberal education are formulated through elaborated, logical and conceptual analysis of the whole of meaningful and serious human experiences and activities in a particular linguistic society. That is, whatever activities and experiences we are involved in, in which certain knowledge claims can be made, we come to encounter one of the six or so forms of knowledge in the final analysis.
This necessarily requires an agreement on meanings of shared experiences and activities, which in turn are describable and verifiable in terms of public language. The process of analysis itself has nothing to do with such external factors as socio-historical constructs of a particular time. However, what is still unclear is the problem of who is to participate in the process.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. As Hirst often emphasizes, values of the forms are justified in an intrinsic manner. This is an apparent fact directly associated with the aims of liberal education, the core of his whole curriculum theory. Although Hirst is skeptical of the classical notion of mental discipline—he argues that the mind is not some kind of organ or muscle with its own built-in forms of operation, which is somehow developed, naturally lead to different kinds of knowledge—he manifestly states his conviction of mental development by virtue of initiation of children into the forms.

With regard to this point, Hirst says:

It is rather that to have a mind involves coming to have experiences articulated by means of various conceptual schemata....A liberal education is, then, one that, determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind. (p. 41)

This implies that knowledge is in itself the good of the human mind, and this claim is consistent with the original
Greek concept of liberal education: freeing human mind to achieve its own virtue in knowledge. For him to have and to be initiated into the forms is no less than to have a rational mind. In doing so, the knower can understand the cultural world with distinctive qualities. The forms are disciplines that furnish the human mind.

Scope and Content of Knowledge. As mentioned, in Hirst's thesis, school curriculum content is exclusively composed of the forms, which are comprised of six or seven divisions of disciplines. With regard to the issue of division, it is important to note that the whole domain of human knowledge just becomes curriculum content for liberal education. What he is emphasizing is the logically distinctive and distinguishable categories of the whole domain of human knowledge, not the mode of organization of curriculum content.

To understand this point appropriately, it is necessary to introduce a concept which he calls "fields". Being sharply contrasted with the concept of disciplines as forms, the convenient organization of school subjects called fields—such as geography and engineering—are not concerned "to validate any one logically distinct form of expression", he says (p. 46). They are held together simply by their subject matter, drawing on all possible forms
that can contribute to them (p. 40). For instance, as Brent (1978, p. 97) indicates, the subject medicine can be reduced to several areas of the forms of knowledge such as mathematics, physical sciences, the moral forms.

Therefore, the issue of subject organizations between the integration or topic/project-oriented organization and the traditional subject-oriented organization is out of concern. What is important is the claim that whatever kinds of knowledge as subjects or fields might be dealt with as curriculum knowledge, they are meaningful so long as they reflect the concept of the forms of knowledge in a fuller sense and they incorporate the forms. Hirst is clear about his position on this issue:

School subjects in the disciplines as we have them are in no way sacrosanct on either logical or psychological grounds. They are necessarily selections from the forms of knowledge that we have and may or may not be good as introductions for the purposes of liberal education. (p. 50)

Even the concepts such as vocational education or specialized education, which are often considered as an antithesis of the thesis of the forms, are not necessarily inconsistent with the notion of liberal education because any particular skills, attitudes, value systems with regard to, say, vocational education can be naturally derived from the real concept of the forms insofar as they are significant and serious as human experiences.
However, this notion of the mode of curriculum-knowledge organization should not be confused with the fundamental characteristics of curriculum knowledge derived from the forms of knowledge. Even though Hirst's theory does not appear to be concerned with the issue of division in the level of organization for presentation, the categorical distinctions between the forms are the most essential nature the theory. Regardless of the mode of presentation and organization of knowledge itself, therefore, what is evident is the fact that boundaries and divisions of knowledge are conceptually inevitable in his theory.

3.3.7 Michael Apple

In the 1970s, we witnessed an emergence of curriculum scholars who are oriented to a radical research program that has its roots in Marxism and neo-Marxism. Despite the wide range of differences in the details of their inquiry, both in mode and in subject-matter, they share a commonness in harshly criticizing the traditional mode of curriculum inquiry for having its foundation on unexamined, taken-for-granted theoretical assumptions.

Thus, they begin their investigation with a critical analysis of the existing theoretical frameworks, hence the label 'critical theorists' in the field of curriculum studies. One of them is Apple. In the present study, one of
his many influential works, *Ideology and Curriculum* (1979) has been chosen for analysis. In this volume, Apple cogently exposes his position on curriculum knowledge. He explicates the nature and characteristics of school's 'overt curriculum' as curricular knowledge in unambiguous terms.

However, in spite of his explicit position on the issue of curricular knowledge, we come to face a great deal of uneasiness in carrying out our analysis. One of the reasons for such a feeling is inextricably bound up with Apple's own research program—radical criticism. Put simply, Apple is less concerned with the issue of what actually ought to constitute curriculum knowledge than with the understanding of the mechanism of constitution of curriculum knowledge in reality. In other words, he confines his research program to a critical elaboration of how curricular knowledge is selected and organized, and in doing so, he borrows as conceptual tools various neo-Marxist frames of reference such as 'hegemony', 'ideology', 'power', which can be understood in terms of ongoing dynamic practices of political economy and culture of particular society. Thus, what is dominant in his theory is an inexorable criticism of the current curriculum practices, in which curriculum knowledge is selected and organized in the interests of particular dominant groups in the society. The issue of
which knowledge should be taught in school settings as curricular content, in turn, turns out to be out of main consideration.

For Apple, most of curriculum knowledge is preordained to be included in the overt curriculum content through the dynamic process of socio-political and cultural practices outside as well as inside classrooms. Essentially, there is no such thing as neutral or depoliticized curriculum content since there are no neutral educational institutions or educators.

Thus, we can say that his knowledge claims are 'about' curriculum content. Apple is just explaining and elaborating how curriculum knowledge is legitimated and distributed for the particular interests of the particular dominant classes in a society at a particular time. In the process of critical analysis, he not only employs the concept of political economics and cultural capital but pays attention to the relation between them to comprehensively characterize the current practice of curriculum knowledge produced, distributed, and created inside as well as outside school. 34 For this reason, despite the strong epistemological impositions embedded in his theory 'about' curriculum

34 In a broad sense, like the famous dictum of the neo-Marxist interpretation of schooling, school not only processes people (with hidden curriculum) but processes curriculum knowledge (with mechanism of overt curriculum), according to Apple.
content, we may classify Apple's curriculum theory as a 'content-free' theory, which was conceptualized in the preceding chapter. The problem of 'uneasiness' previously mentioned is now resolved in a satisfactory manner when we characterize his theory as 'content-free' and attempt no further analysis.

However, when we decide not to go any further, we begin to feel a different type of uneasiness. As will be examined, his epistemological claims 'about' curriculum content are so explicit and systematic that we can easily envision his idea of what should actually constitute curriculum knowledge. That is, it is possible to infer the projected epistemological characteristics through an analysis of his critical analysis, even though they may not be as transparent as we expect.

Nature of Knowledge. As mentioned, Apple does not openly express what knowledge should constitute curriculum knowledge. Everything that is taken for granted is problematic to a critical viewpoint; therefore, it is subject to a serious reexamination. The same is true of the curriculum knowledge, which we have accepted and taught without any serious intellectual reflection, and which should take into account political and economic resources outside of the classrooms.
As such, his critical analysis of the problem of curriculum knowledge begins by raising some serious questions.

[The] issues surrounding the knowledge that is actually taught in schools, surrounding what is considered to be socially legitimate knowledge, are of no small moment in becoming aware of the school's cultural, economic, and political position. Here the basic act involves making the curriculum form problematic so that their latent ideological content can be uncovered. Questions about the selective tradition such as the following need to be taken quite seriously. Whose knowledge is it? Who selected it? Why is it organized and taught in this way? To this particular group? (pp. 6-7)

These types of questions themselves, however, do not provide valuable clues to understanding how Apple is envisioning ideal curriculum knowledge. Rather, we have to be more concerned with the way he answers these questions.

The first step in approaching these questions is to "situate" the curriculum knowledge within the real social conditions which determine it. The "act of situating needs to be guided by a vision of social and economic justice" (p. 13). In doing so, we can ask such questions as "why and how particular aspects of the collective culture are presented in school as objective, factual knowledge?" and "how, concretely, may official knowledge represent ideological configuration of the dominant interests in a society?" (p. 14). Thus, the attempt to situate the issue of curriculum knowledge within its socio-political and economic context in which it is generated becomes an important element to a critical analysis.
The concept of curriculum knowledge is necessarily bound up with both social, economic power and ideology. He further clarifies this point when he argues that:

"[T]he problem of [curriculum] knowledge, of what is taught in schools, has to be considered as a form of the larger distribution of goods and services in a society. It is not merely an analytic problem (what shall be constituted as knowledge?), nor simply a technical one.... nor, finally, is it a purely psychological problem.... Rather, [it]... is a study in ideology, the investigation of what is considered legitimate knowledge... by specific social groups and classes, in specific institutions, at specific historical moments.... the overt... knowledge [is] value-governed selections from a much larger universe of possible knowledge and selection principles. (p. 45)"

According to Apple, the political economy and cultural apparatus are dialectically interwoven in determining what is real knowledge to be incorporated into curriculum content. Therefore, either the conceptualization of cultural capital which functions as "an effective filtering in the reproduction of a hierarchical society" (p. 72) focusing on mental and intellectual structures of individuals or the political and economic control mechanism as to production and manipulation of curriculum knowledge is insufficient and, thus, unsatisfactory. What is demanded is a closer dialectical connection between cultural distribution and control of economic and political potency--the relationship between curriculum knowledge and cultural and politico-economic hegemony (1977).
What is inferred from the analysis is that in any circumstances we cannot imagine an absolute or permanent set of categories for defining curriculum knowledge because it should be understood in terms of possible radical transformation of socio-political and economic realities. The concept of transformation is justified in that, through the lens of the Marxist intellectual tradition, knowledge as a potential mechanism of socio-economic manipulation should be dialectically transformed in order to accomplish social and economic justice in the direction in which "the advantage and power of the least advantaged" (1979, p. 158) can be increased. All curriculum knowledge should not be thought as mere products of relativistic socio-economic forces.

We can draw a conclusion from the discussion that any set of curriculum knowledge is neither ultimately fixed and immutable as objective reality apart from knower's consciousness and his knowing process nor relativistic to particular socio-economic practices. The research program endorsing the historical transformation of political and economic reality necessarily presupposes a kind of progressive dialectics, which emphasizes not only the subjective consciousness of the knowers but the objective dimension of contextual constraints.
Source and Origin of Knowledge. This issue has been resolved to a large degree in the discussion of the nature of knowledge issue. As indicated, for Apple curriculum knowledge is "already a choice from a much larger universe of possible social knowledge and principles", which is repeatedly filtered through political and economic, therefore, ideological commitments (1979, p. 8). Curricular knowledge is inherently political and economic. There is no neutral or value-free, therefore, non-ideological curricular knowledge. It should not be taken as something passively given and received. It should not be regarded as something to be passively acquired by the knower as a body of information, or artifact, or technical knowledge, but should be actually situated in the context of human interests closely bound up with political and economic power.

However, the point is how to situate the curriculum knowledge into a "politically progressive movement" and how to determine "a political point to be made...about how such a political and economic movement...advances". Such a movement, according to Apple (p. 156), must embody a "collective commitment" to an understanding of the context. And just this is part of the reason why any attempt to deal with the curriculum phenomena should be concerned about the responsibility to be a critical science. The function of a critical science is
to be emancipatory in that it critically reflects upon the field's dominant interest in keeping most if not all aspects of human behavior in educational institutions under supposedly neutral technical control. Such a responsibility is rooted in analysis, in seeking out and illuminating the ideological and epistemological presuppositions of curriculum thought. (p. 122)

In conclusion, curriculum knowledge is to be derived from and determined by a particular political, economic context of a particular society at a particular time. Nevertheless, a critical science not only has to interpret the dynamics of the political and economic contexts from which curriculum knowledge derives but has to be involved in an active provision of how we can reach a collective commitment for the emancipation by presenting an alternative set of concrete curriculum knowledge.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. In Apple's curriculum theory, values of curriculum knowledge are justified on extrinsic and social grounds. To draw this conclusion, we do not have to investigate the whole notion of the Marxist-oriented curriculum scholarship in which Apple is involved. Rather, we can make this bold conclusion inductively from the various epistemological claims examined so far.

First, it can be said that the knowledge claims are justified extrinsically on the ground that Apple repudiates,
implicitly and explicitly, the concept of neutral and context-free knowledge, which is supposed to promote human rationality and develop any kinds of abilities in human mind. Furthermore, the claim that inherently any curriculum knowledge has political and ethical implications and reflects the interests of a particular group prevents us from thinking that knowledge is justified in intrinsic terms. However, the claim that the nature of certain technical and instrumental knowledge considered to be high-status knowledge should be reconsidered does not debase the practical or extrinsic values of curriculum knowledge. What is criticized is, rather, the traditional view of curriculum, which emphasizes the mere instrumental-productivity aspect of curriculum knowledge. Curriculum knowledge, whatever it might be, should in essence be concerned with economic and political justice of a society—emancipation, that is.

Second, emphasizing the social valuation of knowledge, he rejects the normative possibility of individualistic epistemology, both in knowledge acquisition and creation. The point is very clear when he criticizes the traditional individual-oriented research programs in the history of curriculum studies. Political and economic conditions of a particular society is a prior condition to be considered for knowledge acquisition and creation. As he suggests, we
should not expect that one or a particular elite group will
answer, or even pose, all of the important questions con­
cerning what might best be seen as the relation between
power and knowledge (p. 157).

The knowledge is essentially socially constructed as
well as socially transformed for the ultimate goal of eman­
cipation. Knowledge as cultural capital, therefore, cannot
be seen as necessarily good or bad in and of itself. It is
historically and ideologically conditioned as he argues
below:

The long tradition of abstract individualism and
a strongly utilitarian frame of mind would no
doubt cause one to look less than positively upon
both a more social conception of 'man' and ideal
commitment that is less apt to be immediately
ameliorative and more apt to raise basic ques­
tions about the very framework of social and cul­
tural life that is accepted as given by a socie­
ty. (p. 132)

He continues:

The knowledge that gets into school—those 'le­
gitimate principles, ideas, and categories'--
grows out of particular history and a particular
economic and political reality. It needs to be
understood by situating it back into that socio­
economic context. (p. 167)

Scope and Content of Knowledge. As we saw, it was not pos­
sible to analyze Apple's knowledge claims on curriculum
knowledge itself because he does not explicitly address
what knowledge should actually constitute curriculum knowl­
edge. However, as with other epistemological criteria, his
view about the issue of the scope of knowledge can be obtained by examining some of his comments on the overt curriculum knowledge. Most importantly, he criticizes the traditional subject-centered as well as the discipline-centered curriculum on the ground that both of them presuppose "high-status knowledge" and rigid division and stratification of knowledge as curriculum content (pp. 35-40).

According to him, stratification of knowledge necessarily involves stratification of people and high-status knowledge, which appears to be discrete and to have identifiable concept and relatively stable structures. It has to be seen "as macro-economically beneficial in terms of long run benefits to the most powerful classes in society" (p. 38). Seen in this light, science, for example, is in fact not just a domain of knowledge. It is a group of individuals and a community of scholars probably representing particular interests of the social group.

What can be inferred from this argument is that any type of artificial division of curriculum knowledge which neglects the much larger universe of possible knowledge and its selection principle has to be seriously called into question. Curriculum knowledge which is supposed to promote the radical transformation of social and political institutions must encompass a broad and increased range of
knowledge so as to take into account the contextual diversity of the political and economic conditions of particular societies. We must not envision distinct boundaries and zones of curriculum knowledge assuming an ultimately fixed objectivity for maintenance of common-sensically accepted view of reality and the status quo.

3.3.8 Elliot Eisner

Eisner is known for having developed a number of unique conceptual models accounting for complex curriculum phenomena on the basis of his personal commitment to arts and aesthetics. We can easily notice that throughout his whole curriculum scholarship he has maintained a very consistent viewpoint as to what ought to be taught in school. His curriculum theory can be found in various sources, one of which is Cognition and Curriculum: A Basis for Deciding What to Teach (1982). This volume will serve as the basis for the ensuing epistemological analysis. As the title implies, this book is basically concerned with the issue of 'what to teach'. His curriculum theory possesses a remarkable idiosyncrasy in that it proposes a quite unique perspective, which attaches its main importance to artistic experience in dealing with curriculum problems and issues.

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35 Probably, The Educational Imagination (1979, 1985) is the most well-known one, which also emphasizes the importance of artistic and aesthetic experience in education.
There are several crucial concepts constituting his curriculum theory on which Eisner puts a great emphasis in connection with artistic and aesthetic experience. First of all, the concept of "experience" itself is a significant one with regard to what to teach. For him, the problem as to what to teach goes beyond the question of whether to devote more time to instruction of the three Rs.... The problem of deciding what to teach is not resolved by achieving highly prized goals related to a few important skills, but, by grappling with questions related to the kinds of experience and opportunities for learning children should have.... Reduction of the curriculum to a limited conception of content is far from the only significant consequence of the current climate. (p. 11, underline added)

In this expanded view of curriculum, curriculum content should be chosen in consideration of how children construct meaning and acquire knowledge from their experience in a way their perception of reality is not distorted.

According to him, "knowing is related in a fundamental way to the experience that senses make possible" (p. 34). One must experience something in order to form a concept, to know, to cognize, and to have the meaning of it. This point, though seemingly common-sensical, is worth mentioning in order to understand Eisner's idea about curriculum content. He continues his argument for the importance of experience.

Even the experience of nothingness depends upon ability to imagine what it means. Because
experience is a necessary condition for knowing, and because the character of experience is dependent upon the qualities to which it is directed, and because these qualities are picked up by our biological apparatus—the senses—to experience, and, hence, to know, one must interact with a content that one or more of the senses make possible. Because the kind of content the senses pick up is specific to their nature, the quality of experience will depend upon what one's senses have access to and upon how well one is able to use them. (p. 35)

Knowing, concept formation, thus, is possible through experience which is in turn dependent upon the kinds of qualities the sensory systems pick up.

For Eisner the 'affect' and the 'cognition' are not independent, separate, and distinctive processes or states in human experience as traditionally conceived. He rejects the narrow conception of cognition in which cognition is supposed to deal only with knowing itself and not with feeling. There is no affective activity without cognition, and no cognitive activity without the affective (pp. 27-8). The function of the senses must be carefully reexamined, and the role they play in the achievement of mind should be identified in this regard (p. 30). What is experienced through the sensory systems depends not only on the characteristics of the qualities in the environment but on the frames of references or the conceptual schemata we already possess. Thus, when we observe something, what is observed is not only determined by the particular properties the
object has but by the cognitive structures we already built. Experiencing the sensory qualities necessarily accompanies certain type of cognitive activity.

Therefore, a view of cognition that "restricts thinking and knowing to forms of mentation that are exclusively discursive or mathematical" (p. 29) is critically misleading. Similarly, the idea that knowledge that is dependent upon sense experience is untrustworthy and that affect that is "a seductive distraction that kept man from knowing the truth" (p. 29) has to be called into question. This is the second important concept about human mind related to human experience which plays a crucial role in Eisner's curriculum theory. As discussed, no form of experience is possible without cognition, and cognition is dependent upon human sense and perception.

The third and fourth concept that need to be considered are the concept of "quality" in the environment and the concept of "forms of representation". The two are distinct; however, it is convenient to examine them together since they are conceptually closely related. The term "quality" mentioned several times above refers to a property or state possessed by a particular object in the environment that can be experienced by various sensory apparatus. The qualities in the environment, in turn, are
multiple so that the ways in which they can be cognized or known are also multiple. According to Eisner, the "ability to experience the multiplicity of environmental qualities is one of the aims" of education (p. 40). As he argues, as long as they are multiple and concept formation with respect to them is multiple, "it is unlikely that one's conception of complex qualitative whole is likely to be singular" (p. 41).

The notion of the multiplicity of environmental qualities and sensory systems' contribution to the concept formation, knowing, and cognition through the experience of the qualities has a very close relationship to the concept of "forms of representation". According to him, forms of representation just refer to

the devices that humans use to make public conceptions that are privately held. They are the vehicles through which concepts that are visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile are given public status. This public status might take the form of words, pictures, music, mathematics, dance, and the like. (p. 47)

As indicated, the qualities in human experience are multiple in form and meaning. This is related to the fact that every form of representation neglects certain aspects of experience in the nature. Each form has unique aspects in order to effectively convey the content of experience. Hence, "the choice of a form of representation is a choice in the way the world will be conceived, as well as a choice
in the way it will be publicly represented" (p. 50), according to Eisner. For instance, literature is an effective way for conveying some aspects of human cognition, but not all aspects.

One thing striking about the concept of the forms is the way Eisner excludes the traditional disciplines such as philosophy, biology, history, sociology, or psychology from the realm of the forms. He does this on the ground that they are all couched in "propositional" language, which is just one of the forms, although different disciplines employ different concepts and methods.36 This is in part based upon his conviction that "the kinds of meanings we are able to secure depend in large measure on the varieties of sensory information we can experience" (p. 53).

Then what is the relationship between qualities constituting the environment and the forms? Presenting a model explaining transactions between an individual and the environment, Eisner treats the issue in depth. According to his model, the individual possessing sensory systems as well as particular internal conditions comes to interact with the environmental qualities to yield experience. Out of this interactional experience meaning is constructed, concept formed, and knowledge acquired. In this mechanism,

36 This point is sharply distinguished from Hirst's conception of the "forms of knowledge".
the kind of meaning the individual secures as he interacts with the qualities of the environment will depend on the character of the qualities he has selected and experienced as well as on the cognitive structures already possessed (p. 54).

Further, when the concept is formed the individual must use some form of representation if he wishes to express the concept or meaning secured through the interaction. This point is just where the qualities and the forms merge together. Once he makes the transformation from the conception to the representation, the qualities he creates in these represented forms become a part of the environment upon which he can reflect further. Therefore, creation of new environmental qualities through the creation of a form of representation makes the editing process possible, which, in turn, makes it possible to revise, correct, and change the ideas expressed through the form chosen (p. 55).

One of the most vital things in this circulatory model (qualities in the environment with individual--experience--concept formation--forms of representation--the qualities) is that we have "no direct access to the internal conditions of the individual except through the qualities they create in the environment" (p. 55). Therefore, curriculum must be concerned with the manner in which the forms become
a part of the qualities constituting the environment to yield experience upon which concept formation and meaning construction is dependent. Although we cannot control or determine experience itself, it can be influenced by the qualities with which an individual interacts (p. 55).

The above brief sketch of Eisner's curriculum theory, however, does not tell the entire story. What was depicted is just part of his theory relevant to our epistemological analysis. Nevertheless, the following analysis will be by and large based upon this selective abstraction of his curriculum theory.

**Nature of Knowledge.** What is the ontological status of curriculum knowledge Eisner is proposing? What is the relationship between the knowing subject and the known object? In order to answer these questions we have to first of all understand his claims about curriculum knowledge. With regard to this issue, one thing obvious is that Eisner does not provide anything as curriculum knowledge employing the term "knowledge", although he often uses the term in different contexts. Rather, "the forms of representation" which convey and shape particular content in order to become qualities for experience (it subsumes the concept of qualities constituting environment), must be regarded as curriculum knowledge to be taught. There is no
conceptual problem in this claim, because, for Eisner what must be presented as curriculum content is just the appropriate forms of representation—whatever particular expressive medium they might take—words, numbers, propositions, and the like which function as a bridge connecting private forms of cognition and knowledge with public concepts, which, in turn, become constituents of upgraded qualities.37

In selecting appropriate forms, Eisner does not believe that there is any objectivistio and permanent standards or criteria in terms of which any fixed forms can be judged correct or wrong. Instead, working within the forms provides the individual with an opportunity to correct, modify, revise,—a heuristic process through which ideas are formed, negotiated, revised, and discovered in a critical manner (p. 51). In consideration of the multiplicity of the qualities constituting environment, the transforming characteristic of the forms of representation itself is in harmony with the character to a large degree.

In many cases, elements of the forms are not necessarily to be arranged according to a publicly "codified" set of rules. Thus, the dichotomy between correct-incorrect, truth-false, is increasingly inappropriate. This is why

37 Thus, mathematics or literature is only an example of the forms of representation and the selection of a form is a choice in the way the reality is conceived.
"deliberation" and "judgment" become crucial (p. 66). Any form of representation is to a degree incomplete and therefore asks for qualitative negotiation (p. 51). In this context, the knower modifies the known objects, as well as the known influences the knower. There is no such thing as the known object waiting to be discovered apart from the knower's consciousness based upon either sensory experiences or imagination. Forms of representation always shape and influence the content to be conveyed in this very sense. According to Eisner, therefore, a "practical approach to epistemology" has to be seriously taken into account (p. 77).

Eisner advocates a version of relativism with regard to the nature of knowledge when he explicitly criticizes objectivist realism. For him, knowledge is created, transformed, and critically revised. However, it seems difficult to categorize his position as subjective idealism in which reality is regarded as perception itself, for he does not provide a strong statement on this issue.

Source and Origin of Knowledge. The answer to the question of where curriculum knowledge comes from and how was already given in the previous discussions of the general features and nature of knowledge in Eisner's curriculum theory. To reiterate it, the forms of representation
reflecting curriculum knowledge are determined and selected in consideration of the knowing subject's construction of the meaning and interpretation of the environmental qualities from his own experience with an undistorted perception of reality. Experience as a necessary condition for knowing is inevitably related to both the knower's inner conceptual framework and the environmental qualities.

This argument leads us to confirm that the forms of representation are necessarily multiple. They are not restricted to the cognitive or propositional foundations of knowledge. Rather, selection and acquisition of the forms of representation must be understood in terms of a "heuristic" process in which constant revision and correction is required. There are no fixed and predetermined substantive foundations for deriving the forms. This is part of the reason why Eisner highlights the significance of the expressive and aesthetical sources of knowledge beyond the cognitive and numerical bases.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. The way values of curriculum knowledge are justified in Eisner's curriculum theory is relatively explicit: intrinsic and individual-oriented. First, for Eisner, the forms of representation are justified on the ground that they cultivate the human senses. According to him, we have to understand
how particular fields of study contribute to the intellectual development of the young and how programs can be created that encourage such development. (p. 21)

Further, he accepts the idea that cognitive development is one of the primary aims of schooling:

Schools as institutions and education as a process ought to foster the student's ability to understand the world, to deal effectively with problems, and to acquire wide variety of meaning from interactions with it. The development of cognition is the primary means to these ends. (p. 27)

He believes in the values of knowledge by and in itself in the creation and construction of meaning for understanding the world of reality, although he does not underestimates the pragmatic and instrumental values of curriculum knowledge like the three Rs. The content conveyed by the forms has its generic and immanent power to improve directly or indirectly the qualities constituting the environment, and, in turn, the transformed environmental qualities themselves result in the formation of a better conception, knowledge, and meaning.

Secondly, we can notice that Eisner's curriculum theory is focusing upon the individual, private aspects of concept formation, knowledge acquisition, and meaning construction. Every element proposed in the model functions in a way in which individual's subjectivity plays a significant role. Interaction between the qualities in the environment and an
individual yields private experience which, in turn, generates private concept formation and knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, although the forms of representation themselves are means to make content of the private experience public, the activities with the forms are most individualistic in nature. In part, this issue is directly related to the reason why Eisner is against the tendency to exclusively emphasize some particular forms which maintain "rule-governed" and "publicly codified syntaxes" in school curriculum. Such types of forms necessarily take objectivity and propositional logic as central concerns.

Content and Scope of Knowledge. The issue of the range or scope of curriculum knowledge is one of the most explicitly stressed issues in Eisner's theory. As discussed, multiplicity of the forms of representation and the qualities of environment indicate Eisner's expansionist posture on this issue. According to him, the concept of "knowing" should be distinguished from that of "knowledge" in the sense that in general the term knowledge itself is regarded as propositional knowledge, which is either analytic or synthetic. This type of knowledge has been dominant and attractive due to the mandate of the traditional philosophical and scientific paradigms that requires publicly available tests of validity of knowledge.
However, the synthetic proposition about the empirical world itself has an unavoidable potential of reduction. We have to remember that "for synthetic propositions the referents for the propositions are still nonpropositional matters; they are qualities that the sensory systems pick up" (p. 38). Thus, to restrict the concept of knowledge to what propositions about qualities can reveal is to exclude all that propositions as a form of representation cannot embody from the scope of knowledge (p. 38). Proposition is only one form of representation. Therefore, the almost exclusive curricular emphasis upon the "discursive and numerical forms" as curriculum knowledge should be modified and we have to pay more attention to the "expressive" or "mimetic" modes of treating the forms (p. 73). That is, subject areas called 'fine arts', which cultivate and refine the sensibilities (such as visual arts, music, dance, drama, literature, or poetry) should be more emphasized than they used to be. We have to widen the array of the forms and at the same time consider different forms of representation conveying various curriculum knowledge.

3.39 Ivan Illich

In the 1960s and the early 1970s, we encountered a group of critics of compulsory public schooling. Scholars such as A. S. Neill, J. Kozol, J. Holt, C. Silberman, and I. Illich were deeply involved in the humanistic open education.
Although they differ in their detailed curriculum proposals, they all agree on the belief that public education systems in general failed to achieve their intended goals especially with respect to the fulfillment of the intellectual potential of the learners and their freedom to learn.

They contend that the formal educational systems established and regulated as institutions are inherently responsible for the failure, which is preordained due to the very nature of the systems themselves. Associated with the concept of 'hidden curriculum', they attempt, more often than not, to identify the negative aspects of dehumanizing mechanisms of institutionalized public schooling, and some of them propose radical alternatives, application of which to practice itself is in turn often criticized—this is part of the reason why they are sometimes called 'romantic critics'.

Among the critics, Illich or rather his curricular proposal for the alternative school is taken for analysis in the present study. Selection of Illich's theory has nothing to do with whether he represents the whole romantic critics. As stated earlier, the notion of 'representativeness' is totally out of concern in this study. His curriculum theory is well expressed in a seminal work, *Deschooling Society* (1971), which proposes a very provocative alternative to the current obligatory school system.
In order to analyze his claims about curricular knowledge, it is necessary to examine whether or not Illich addresses a particular curriculum theory in the volume—curriculum theory in the sense that some relevant curriculum phenomena are identified and that his own particular positions and viewpoints with respect to the phenomena are explicitly stated. Then we have to find out his particular knowledge claims pertaining to curriculum content for the ensuing analysis, if any.

Even a cursory reading of the book clearly reveals that Illich includes as a central issue of his theory some curricular topics and themes such as hidden curriculum, teaching-learning relationship, packaging mechanism of school curriculum, concept and problem of current curriculum, types of curriculum learned in school, nature and function of predetermined curricular package, and the like. All of these issues are involved in his theory construction in order to provide a rationale for "deschooling" and generation of its alternative. Further, he manifestly addresses his own position when he claims that the institutionalized compulsory schooling must be "disestablished". He does it on the basis of the radical criticisms of the nature of modern schooling and the irrelevant and inconsistent curriculum content which is always attached to it. This point will be exposed more clearly as the analysis progresses.
Illich employs different terminologies referring to curriculum knowledge or at least to curriculum content. However, the way he is talking about curriculum knowledge is fundamentally different from the general context in which we discourse, whatever the labels attached to it might be. Vital to an understanding of this point is the logic of deschooling, the central theme of Illich's curriculum theory. As will be recognized, a thorough investigation of the theory leads us to a paradoxical situation in which on the one hand we think he maintains a particular position on curriculum knowledge, and on the other hand we are not able to analyze his claims for a curious reason.

The thesis of deschooling is based upon a relatively simple assumption. For Illich, school is regarded as one of the numerous modern institutions that determine and regulate our forms of life—that is, our world view and language (p. 2). And everywhere the school system has the same structure in nature, beyond the differences in socio-political or economic contexts in which it is embedded.

[Everywhere the school system has the same structure, and everywhere its hidden curriculum has the same effect. Invariably, it shapes the consumer who values institutional commodities....Everywhere the hidden curriculum of schooling initiates the citizen to the myth that bureaucracies guided by scientific knowledge are efficient and benevolent. Everywhere this same curriculum instills in the pupil the myth that increased production will provide a better life. And everywhere it develops the habit of self-defeating consumption of services and alienating production.... (p. 74)
Schools have the same structural, institutionalized problems regardless of the differences in ideological and economic circumstances in which they are submerged. This sameness of the school system leads us to recognize "the profound world-wide identity of myth, mode of production, and mode of social control, despite the great variety of mythologies in which the myth finds expression" (p. 74). All over the world this type of antieducational effect of the schooling on society is evident and, therefore, both education and society need deschooling (p. 3).

With regard to this universal identity of the decontextualized problems of schooling, Illich points out that some neo-Marxist analysts are misleading in that they claim that "the process of deschooling must be postponed or bracketed until other disorders, traditionally understood as more fundamental, are corrected by an economic and political revolution" (p. 46). For him, schools must be considered not as a separate and independent institution passively influenced by socio-political practice outside it but as an industry in which economy and politics themselves work. Therefore, to expect a radical change in the school system as an effect of socio-political and economic change is nothing but an illusion (p. 74). Schooling itself is a serious social problem.
Based upon this understanding of the rationale for deschooling, we have to relate the concept more closely to curricular issues for the ensuing analysis. With regard to the basic curriculum issues related to the necessity of deschooling and disestablishment of schools, Illich’s argument is extremely straightforward: that learning is result of "curricular teaching" is a spurious hypothesis (p. 60). Valuable learning of either basic skills or "liberal education" is not necessarily the result of "packaged curricular instruction. Most people acquires most of their important knowledge not from school curriculum but self-motivated casual learning outside school (p. 12).

He uses the term "curriculum" to refer to a prescribed and authorized formal package to be mastered through compulsory attendance in a public institution called school over a number of years. Thus, curriculum is thought to be something to "assign social rank", which takes the form of a social "ritual", of sequential scared ordinations, or it could consist of a succession of feats in war or hunting, of further advancement could be made to depend on a series of previous princely favors. (p. 12)

Modern school systems providing learners with this prescribed, pre-selected, and approved authoritarian curriculum package detached from the learners' motivations and interests are, therefore, economically absurd, intellectually emasculating, socially polarizing and destructive (p. 10).
Learning is the result of unhampered participation in a meaningful setting in which learners' current concern is central (p. 39); it is not the result of the compulsory "ritual game of graded promotions" (p. 44). Curriculum as an educational package which teachers obligate the learners to consume does not enhance learning in this very sense. With this formal package, school

enslaves more profoundly and more systematically, since only school is credited with the principal function of forming critical judgment, and, paradoxically, tries to do so by making learning about oneself, about others, and about nature depend on a prepackaged process. School touches us so intimately that none of us can expect to be liberated from it by something else. (p. 47)

School itself, therefore, hampers the individual's natural inclination to grow and learn by the demand of instruction (p. 60) when it sells curriculum--"a bundle of goods" made according to the same process and having the same structure as any other goods. For these inherent problems of school curriculum, we must disestablish school as a compulsory institution in which such problematic educational packages are sold and bought in the same way any other merchandises are produced and consumed in a society.

However, the logic of deschooling does not necessarily imply negation of any other educational institutions for learning. Illich proposes an alternative for the school system and envisages an image of the deschooled society.
Probably, provision of the alternative is the most essential point in his theory. He suggests some general characteristics of the "new educational institutions" he envisions. According to him, such an alternative educational system should have three purposes:

it should provide all who want to learn with access to available resources at any time in their lives; empower all who want to share what they know to find those who want to learn it from them; and, finally, furnish all who want to present an issue to the public with the opportunity to make their challenge known.... Learners should not be forced to submit to an obligatory curriculum... (p. 75)

He introduces "four resources" and "four networks" as the essential elements of the new system. According to him,

[things, models, peers, and elders, are four resources each of which requires a different type of arrangement to ensure that everybody has ample access to it. I will use the term "opportunity web" for "network" to designate specific ways to provide access to each of four sets of resource. (p. 76)

The labels of the four networks are: Reference Services to Educational Objects; Skill Exchanges; Peer-Matching; and Reference Services to Educators-at-Large. Projecting an incidental or informal education through an autonomous assembly of resources, he is proposing an educational network or service which gives each learner the same opportunity to share the current concern with others motivated by the same concern (p. 19). It is assumed that in this edu-
oational "matchmaking" system each learner is responsible for his own knowledge acquisition and that experience for learning occurs through self-chosen personal encounter (pp. 70-1).

At this point it is interesting to recognize that provision of the alternative can be seen as a curricular proposal for the new mode of education. (It is not difficult to notice that the resources are just curricular resources, for instance.) However, this point is out of further consideration since what Illich is projecting is just "deschooled" curriculum which profoundly deviates from the basic concern of this study—'school' curriculum content, that is.

There is a serious conceptual problem here with regard to the epistemological analysis. To be sure, what Illich is talking about is why schools must be disestablished, why we need a society where we no longer have schools, and why and how the curriculum packages of the schools are responsible for deschooling. And finally, he proposes a curricular alternative for deschooled educational institutions. Therefore, logically, it is not possible to analyze his knowledge claims concerning "school" curriculum content. His critical analysis on the problems of school curriculum exclusively serves to develop "deschooled" curriculum.
This is the paradoxical problem hinted at the beginning of this section: we can identify his knowledge claims about curriculum content as partially accomplished thus far; but it is not possible to analyze the claims (to state correctly, we do not have to do so) according to our epistemological criteria since Illich rejects the necessity of school curriculum itself. In a restricted sense, therefore, we can conclude that Illich does not address any knowledge claims as far as school curriculum is concerned. This is a dramatic example of a curriculum theory which repudiates the values of curriculum theory itself. In conclusion, we can categorize Illich's curriculum theory as 'content-free' on the ground that it does not provide any particular knowledge claims pertaining to 'school' curriculum content.

3.3.10 Arthur King and John Brownell

King and Brownell have been considered two most outspoken proponents of the so-called 'discipline-centered' approach to curriculum studies. Even with a very cursory examination of their curriculum theory addressed in a seminal volume titled The Curriculum and the Disciplines of Knowledge: A Theory of Curriculum Practice (1966, 1976), we come to recognize that they deserve such labelling. In this volume, they expose their theoretical position straightforwardly, employing the notion of 'disciplines' of knowledge. All the significant issues and problems of curriculum theo-
ry and practice rest with the concept of discipline of knowledge. Accordingly, the question of what should constitute school curriculum content has to be answered in terms of the concept: it should be solely constituted by disciplinary knowledge itself and nothing else.

The theory begins with a very logical premise and a simple but remarkably bold thesis. The premise is that "the deliberately designed portion of education is schooling, the heart of schooling is curriculum, the irreducible element of the curriculum is knowledge, and the significant characteristic of modern knowledge is its humanity (1966, p. vi). On the basis of the premise, they propose the thesis that disciplines of knowledge as "communities of discourse" should constitute any fundamental curriculum content which primarily focuses upon human "intellect". They view the curriculum theory as liberal, general, and humanistic one because it is ultimately concerned with the issue of "intellectual man".

They reason that a liberal curriculum putting its priority on intellect makes fundamental contributions to the education of other dimensions of man such as occupational man, political man, social man, and religious man (p. 30). This point is convincingly expressed when they argue:

We believe that the claim of the intellect deserves priority. This assertion means that the curriculum is the heart of the school. The cur-
riculum, with intellect prime, demands of the school qualities neither required by nor compatible with other claims. (p. 33)

They further argue that intellect is "the schooled capacity for knowing accomplished through mastery of symbolic systems" and that "the processes and products of man's symbolic efforts to make his experience with the world intelligible are the disciplines of knowledge" (p. 37).

The next task they confront is to characterize the "modern" disciplines of knowledge which are sharply distinguished from the views of knowledge that have been dominated by philosophical "hegemony" until the last century. They conclude that the world of modern disciplines possesses pluralistic diversity as well as autonomy based upon the wide-range analysis of problems and the nature of the contemporary world of knowledge.

There is an imperative in the indispensable distinctions among the various disciplines of knowledge. Granted that each landmark system of knowledge admitted of another view if it was looked upon a different standpoint or different angle, we must now acknowledge the irreducible distinctions of the autonomous disciplines. (p. 60)

However, no imposed, monolithic unity can account for the distinctive aspects of knowledge. The unity of diversities is to be found in the "end" and direction of movement, not in the content and method in generating knowledge (p. 61).
The next issue is how schools as a "microcosm of the realms of knowledge" select particular disciplines of knowledge for curriculum content. This task requires a prerequisite conceptual "theory model" which fully describes the common characteristics, "isomorphic" features of the autonomous disciplines. They call this model "communities of discourse" from which the theory of curriculum can be generated. The isomorphic aspects constituting the communities of discourse are made up of some ten distinctive propositions, each of which will lead to some corresponding part of the curriculum theory. According to them, a discipline is 1) a community of persons, 2) an expression of human imagination, 3) a domain, 4) a tradition, 5) a syntactical structure—a mode of inquiry, 6) a conceptual structure—a substance, 7) a specialized language or other system of symbols, 8) a heritage of literature and artifacts and a network of communications, 9) a valuative and affective stance, and 10) an instructive community (pp. 68-95).

Scientific, social scientific, and psychological models for curriculum theory construction are rejected because they fail to meet the characteristics of the community of discourse model and diversified nature of modern knowledge. Meanwhile, they characterize their curriculum theory as a philosophical/humanistic one in which "the primacy of the intellectual claim on the content of the curriculum" is
indispensable (p. 119). With the premise that the community of discourse represents the world of modern knowledge, they propose that "the communities of discourse or disciplines of knowledge are represented in a school", and that the teacher as a veteran of encounters with the community and student as a "neophyte" in the encounters are essential elements of the theory (p. 121). Given this context, they define the liberal curriculum as "a planned series of encounters between a student and some selection of communities of discourse" (pp. 121-2). And a "course" is defined as "a planned series of encounters with the structure of any single discipline" (p. 122).

Now that we have examined part of the theory, the criterion for the inclusion or omission of disciplines of knowledge for the curriculum content can be dealt with appropriately. First, King and Brownell call into question the values of external criteria in the selection of curriculum knowledge such as tradition, money, instrumental usefulness, manpower, children's needs, and the like (pp. 27-30), and suggest that the inclusion/omission issue has to involve several prime considerations. First, the nature of the intellectual community should be a constant reference point and should be described and communicated to all participants in the arena such as schoolmen, publics, governments, textbook publishers, and university, whenever the
decision about inclusion and omission has to be made (p. 141). Second, a primary consideration in the every decision is the consonance of the proposal with the notion of intellectual concerns. "If the intellectual claim is granted primary, then the claim becomes a criterion" for the decision (p. 141). Finally, "any proposal for controlling the decision must be built into the structure both internal and external criticism" (p. 141).

Taking into account these considerations and the fundamental characteristics of the disciplines themselves, they reject the notion of non-disciplinary courses and interdisciplinary or multi-disciplinary courses as curriculum knowledge. The frequent claim that the disciplinary knowledge has its immanent problems in dealing with the issues of values, problem solving, pluralistic view of man, development of skills, and the like cannot be accepted for it fails to comprehend the significance of "intellect" which is primarily attached to the concept of discipline. Further, their curriculum theory proposes a set of subtheories on the governance and staffing of the school considering its effects on curriculum, on the necessary conditions for the development of a course in a discipline, and on the characteristics of the curriculum languages.
Nature of Knowledge. It is apparent that King and Brownell do not address their own ontological standpoint in an explicit manner. However, the thesis of disciplines of knowledge itself clearly reveals their position on the nature of knowledge issue. Because it is unquestionable that curricular knowledge must be composed of selected disciplines or the communities, we can correctly comprehend this issue satisfactorily when we take into account the nature of discipline itself.

First, we can argue that the disciplines as communities of discourse manifest objective realism to the extent that, whatever the sources are, they exist 'out there' regardless of the process of the knowers' acquisition of knowledge—even though their active role in the 'discovery' of it is highly valued. The domain of disciplines is the neutral, natural phenomena, process, material, social institution, or other man's concern on which the members of the discipline focus their attention (p. 74). Furthermore, both the syntactical and conceptual structure of the disciplines enjoy their pattern of existence according to the rules of truth in particular disciplines apart from any external conditions or constraints such as social, cultural, economical, and political contexts in which the knowers are involved. There is no notion of relativism or subjectivism in this view. The notions 'creativity', 'intuition', and
'imagination' are altogether significant according to the theory; however, the concepts should be meaningful to the extent that they are related to the development of particular disciplines.

At the same time, the relationship between the subject as the knower and the object as the known is quite clear. There is a categorical distinction between them, and there is very little room for mutual transformation. As indicated, the knowing process or consciousness of the knowers do not influence the predetermined and fixed features of the structures of the disciplines—of course, the content of the structures may undergo radical or piecemeal changes, but the issue is related to the academic community which develops and generates pertinent knowledge. Despite the claim that knowledge is not a product but a process, it is evident that the concept of disciplines of knowledge is very little concerned with the notion of negotiation, transformation, transcendence, or dialectical involvement on the side of the knowers.

Source and Origin of Knowledge. To put it simply, we can claim that curriculum knowledge comes from various disciplines of knowledge, each of which maintains its unique characteristics as its major criteria in terms of which relevancy of any body of knowledge can be assessed. This
type of answer to the question of the origin of curriculum knowledge, however, is incomplete unless we provide a set of general principles governing the characteristics. It is not possible for anyone outside the particular community of discipline to identify the characteristics; therefore, the answer must be given in consideration of the generally shared principles for the selection of disciplines as curriculum knowledge. The prime concern in this task is, of course, the "intellect" claim.

Not surprisingly, King and Brownell seek general principles resorting to the "criteria of community of discourse". That is, the curriculum knowledge should come from the most disciplined knowledge; and the most disciplined knowledge is the knowledge which best meets the ten isomorphic criteria. In this regard, the question of where curriculum knowledge comes from is logically equivalent to the question of where the disciplines of knowledge come from. Meanwhile, the procedural problems such as who decides it as curriculum content and what the possible contextual elements are which may or may not influence the process are also dealt with. But they are not in the heart of the major issue—hence, the theory puts them in the category of "subtheories".
In brief, in consideration of the criteria it is valid to claim that curriculum knowledge originates from the disciplines of knowledge and that the most disciplined knowledge is the knowledge which satisfies the major criteria like "community", "domain", "structure", "intellectual heritage", or "symbolic system". One word to be added at this point is that it is very clear that curriculum knowledge cannot be viewed as created, transformed, or constructed through mediation between the knower and the known; rather, it is viewed as something to be discovered, internalized, and mastered.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. Values of the disciplined knowledge are justified in intrinsic terms in King and Brownell's curriculum theory. As emphasized by them, values of disciplines are inextricably bound up with the notion of intellect and rational power. Even though the theory does not manifestly advocate any conception of mental discipline or faculty psychology, it convincingly speaks of the significance of human intellect itself and the inseparable linkage between the discipline and the nature of intellect.

This conviction is based upon King and Brownell's view of man as a "symbolizer"—a man who reasons, reflects, remembers, mediates, imagines, and creates. They believe
that the general curriculum based upon the disciplines of knowledge insures the widest applicability and highest power of understanding in dealing with the world and reality (p. 26). In this regard, they are openly against any extrinsic claim that curriculum knowledge should be instrumental and directly applicable to problems of life. It is an unwarranted false doctrine. Curriculum knowledge is valuable for its own sake.

Like any other theories resorting to the intrinsic justification for the values of knowledge, the curriculum theory 'seems' to value the singular-personal dimension of knowledge in a superficial level. However, the tacit message is that if any individual is well educated—that is, well disciplined—then the totality of the well educated individuals may constitute a good society as a whole. This point can be indirectly inferred from the issue of "values" and "virtue" associated with the concept of discipline.

We speak of the values implicit in intellect itself: probing questions; clarity of language; attention to the canons of each tradition of human thought.... The intellectual life is not inattentive to moral action as is sometimes assumed; it is respectful of it and refuses to oversimplify the moral complexity and personal meaning of the human act. The intellectual heritage refuses to make men and their act trivial, to debase men by indoctrination.... Intellectualism...has faith in the human person to use his thoughts and his conscience in moral situations. (p. 146)
Content and Scope of Knowledge. As discussed, the knowledge selected in light of the criteria inherent in the nature of discipline itself becomes the curriculum knowledge for general education. The isomorphic features of the disciplines function to delineate basic characteristics of curriculum knowledge. However, all disciplinary knowledge does not become curriculum knowledge in that it is practically not possible to include all realms of the diversified modern disciplines. To resolve this problem of practical inclusion and omission, King and Brownell suggest a set of secondary criteria besides the primary ones which were previously examined as the model of community of discourse. They set forth nine kinds of general principles as the criteria for the selection of disciplines.

What is inferred from the establishment of the set of criteria is a refined reductionist view of curriculum knowledge. In consideration of the central tenets of the discipline-centered curriculum theory, this type of narrowness in scope of knowledge is seen as an ineluctable consequence.

Related to the notion of reductive scope of knowledge is the view of division and boundary of curriculum knowledge. Needless to say, as King and Brownell manifestly claim, their curriculum theory assumes sharp divisions and segmen-
tations among the particular areas of disciplines. To be sure, establishment of distinctive zones of knowledge is one of the central characteristics embedded in the nature of the discipline-centered curriculum theory. They openly make an accusation against any approach to interdisciplinary or multi-disciplinary organizations of courses as well as non-disciplinary courses. This point is too transparent to demand further discussion.

3.3.11 Henry Giroux

Giroux is one of the central theorists in the 'reconceptualist' curriculum scholarship. His radical curriculum proposals are widely introduced. They are quite influential and persuasive despite frequent criticisms. At the outset, he argues that the field of curriculum studies has been dominated by the 'traditional' mode of reasoning, which is based upon certain unexamined and unwarranted assumptions about theory-practice relationship, science, rationality, and epistemology. Along with the critique of the traditional approach to curriculum inquiry, he proposes a model for constructing a radical curriculum theory mainly drawing its basic conceptual underpinnings from the neo-Marxist scholarship as well as the intellectual tradition of phenomenology.
Among the many articles and books written by Giroux, *Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling* (1981) was taken for the analysis of his 'critical' curriculum theory. The volume consists of six independent articles, each of which appeared in various education and curriculum periodicals. In spite of their differences in particular themes and subjects, we find a core element which maintains a remarkable consistency and coherence throughout his whole writings.

The core element running through his entire curriculum scholarship is the concept of 'critical dialectic'. More specifically, his curriculum theory starts with a radical critique of the existing modes of curriculum inquiry both in content and method, and ends with an articulation of the significance of the concept of dialectics in the process of curriculum theory construction. Even though he does not provide any 'complete' curriculum theory, it is his profound conviction that the concept of critical dialectic must be thoroughly examined and employed to develop a more promising curriculum theory in the future.

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Given this understanding, we have to perform the ensuing analysis in consideration of the basic concept centering around Giroux's curriculum theory. That is, the attempt for the analysis must be directly linked to the problem of how to comprehend the dialectical view of knowledge in general, and of curriculum knowledge in particular. For this reason, with the risk of redundancy and repetition, it is necessary first to investigate the concept of critical dialectic, mainly focusing upon its epistemological ground.

Comprehension of the radical concept of dialectic knowledge requires an understanding of the concept of dialectic itself. According to Giroux, since the formulation of "self-criticism and self-renewal" is one of the most urgent tasks of the curriculum theory, it is necessary to develop a mode of critical analysis that stresses political and ideological dimensions of school curriculum (p. 113). The concept of dialectic provides us with a new perspective to break through the conventional taken-for-granted attitudes and beliefs towards curriculum theory and practice. It speaks to the existence of contradictions and constraints of which we are not usually aware. Its message is "neither a celebration of relativity nor cynicism, but rather an acknowledgement that the search for the truth must begin by seeing beyond the false harmony between subject and society" (p. 114). In detail, the dialectic defined as "a crit-
ical mode of reasoning and behavior" can be viewed as nei-
ther a monolithic methodology governed by universal and 
permanent laws nor a form of epistemology that functions as 
an only means for rational understanding. By virtue of its 
critical force, the dialectic occupies a transcendent posi-
tion for pursuing emancipation beyond more cognitive rea-
soning of reality and objective methodology as omniscient 
rules (pp. 113-4).

Accordingly, it rejects both abstract objectivism, which 
assumes an ultimate and fixed criteria for truth and knowl-
edge, and abstract subjectivism, which rests with relativ-
ised cognition of social and material reality. As a form 
of critique, "the dialectic functions so as to help people 
analyze the world in which they live, to become aware of 
the constraints that prevent them from changing that world, 
and finally, to help them collectively struggle to trans-
form that world" (p. 116, underline added). This is the 
reason why any emancipatory notion of dialectics has to be 
necessarily related to the concept of critical praxis. It 
not only helps us realize forms of mystification and ideolo-
logical distortions that conceal the essence of social and 
material reality but leads us to make transition from the 
critical consciousness to reflective intervention in the 
world (p. 117)—critique and praxis, that is.
This concept of dialectic, in turn, possesses as its inherent trends several central categories such as "totality", "mediation", "appropriation", and "transcendence". The category of totality refers to the belief that any fact, issue, knowledge, or phenomena should ultimately be examined within the context of the social and historical totality that gives its meaning (p. 118). As a fundamental category, it guides us to see the socio-political reality of a particular time as the "unity of production and products, of subject and object" (p. 119).

Thus, according to Giroux, the totality category speaks to the importance of seeing things rationally in their many-sided development, moreover, it points to a world in which things, meanings, and relations are not conceived as objects removed from human history and action, but rather are seen products of human praxis....there is little room for a reified, positivistic vision of the world....that is....fragmented, isolated, and ahistorical. (p. 119)

In this sense, this category allows us not only to become more critically conscious of the oppressive and contradictory reality but suggests new ways of action for the transformation of it. Further, we come to understand that any type of curriculum knowledge is inherently related to the specific interests of particular classes.

A second central category of dialectic is that of mediation. In Giroux's view, the concept suggests two important points worth quoting:
mediation is a process that embodies the object itself, i.e., those forces that shape our perceptions of the world are not just in our minds, but are a material and constitutive part of our everyday routines and practices; (2) pure immediacy in its various forms: perception, common-sense, 'facts', and sensation is an illusion.... It can be used to reveal how the mechanisms of social and cultural reproduction both determine and legitimate the meaning of various socio-cultural institutional arrangements, modes of knowing, ways of behaving, patterns of interests, etc. (p. 120)

This passage implies that Giroux takes an ontological position which is sharply against subjective idealism. As we discussed, in the realm of subjective idealism, subjective perception in our mind itself constitutes the reality of the world. The notion of mediation apparently defies this conception of reality and highlights the importance of "the combination of objective and subjective forces" in search for the essence of phenomena beyond "the distorting fabricated 'reality' of ideology" which we perceive. Thus, the category of mediation forces us to raise our consciousness so that we realize specific social and political forces which mediate between ourselves and the larger society (p. 120).

A third category is appropriation, which seemingly emphasizes the subjectivist aspects of human rationality and understanding. In Giroux's view, "a human agent who is never merely a passive being removed from the historical arena" (pp. 120-1) is at the center of dialectic. He is
the active agent who "with qualitatively different levels of reasoning and action appropriates and penetrates the reality" in the socio-cultural matrix in which he finds himself (p. 121). But it is not "a celebration of subjectivity". What is emphasized is more than the subjective role in producing and acting upon the socio-cultural conditions. Thus, it is beyond the abstract subjectivism itself which maintains an unwarranted assumption that the very judgment or decision in discourse is a matter of purely personal opinion, taste, disposition, or prejudice.

A final and fourth category, transcendence, leads us to refuse the world as it is. On the basis of the philosophical world view that things must change toward an emancipation, it asks "to develop an awareness of our own historically conditioned self-formative process as well as an awareness of those socially unnecessary modes of domination that shape the larger society" (p. 122). Through the grown consciousness and reflective action, transcendence envisions a society free of alienation and oppression. Social reality is neither neutral, inevitable, nor fixed; it is product of the particular society in which we live.

Taking into account the fundamental characteristics of critical dialectic and its inherent categories, Giroux makes a very important conclusion as the central core of his model for developing a theory of curriculum.
Teaching...critical conceptual categories that help... to confront [the knowers'] own unexamined and implicit views of the world should not be reduced to a mere celebration of subjectivity, i.e., 'you have your views and I have mine'. The latter is a form of a 'bad subjectivity' and can be avoided by teaching [them] to challenge and test the relationship between what they know and reality as it objectively exists. The world does not necessarily correspond to the way people view it. Not to understand this is to ignore the importance and meaning of false consciousness and to end up supporting a mystifying form of cultural relativism. (p. 125)

Thus far, we have examined the concept of dialectic and the significance of the categories attached to it. During the analysis, the radical concept of dialectic knowledge has been partially dealt with. However, at this point, the issue of curriculum knowledge along with the dialectic view of knowledge warrants a more thorough examination. This particular issue is directly tied up with the mode of inquiry which Giroux endorses. More specifically, heavily appealing to the concept of critical dialectics in the development of a curriculum theory, Giroux intentionally avoids the issue of what knowledge should actually constitute curriculum content, as do many other 'critical' curriculum theorists. Giroux never explicitly argues that the issue itself is not a significant one. Rather, the hidden tenets embedded in his critical research program prevent him from being actively involved in the issue.39

39 This point is dramatically revealed when Giroux (1981) provides some problematic issues with regard to social studies curriculum. He addresses such questions as
Therefore, we have to carry out our analysis on the basis of the general knowledge claims mainly addressed in the context of critiquing other modes of curriculum inquiry. As discussed, the concept of dialectic itself is not directly concerned with the description or provision of curriculum knowledge. Rather, it helps us envisage an image of dialectical knowledge which should be taken as curriculum content. The following analysis, therefore, will be based upon the preceding analysis as well as other knowledge claims addressed in the volume.

Nature of Knowledge. As seen in the analysis of the concept of the dialectic, the issue of reality and the knower-known relationship were one of the most salient issues in Giroux's curriculum theory. Most of all, he clearly rejects both the objectivistic, monolithic view of knowledge advocated by "technocratic rationality" and the relativized intersubjective view of knowledge based upon "interpretive rationality" (pp. 9-13). The former maintains an epistemology in which knowledge is equivalent to objective "facts", which are considered neutral and value-free outside the knowers' consciousness and process of knowing. The latter calls this position into question and adopts an epistemology in which "truth and objectivity are

"What counts as social studies curriculum?", "How is this knowledge produced and legitimized?", and "Whose interests does this knowledge serve?"(p. 59) instead of 'What should count as social studies curriculum?'.
seen as nothing but social construct and man is seen as the ultimate author" of knowledge and reality with a focus upon the importance of intersubjective consensus, understanding, and communicative discourse (pp. 11-2).

Both types of rationality—technocratic and interpretive—are problematic. He suggests a third form of dialectical rationality which takes a revised form of "reproductive rationality". It entails the most viable epistemology informed by a variety of Marxist perspectives. It begins with the assumption that man is not free in either objective or subjective terms. Reality must be questioned and its contradictions must be traced to the source and transformed through praxis (p. 17). This notion is just the conceptual cornerstone where the problems of both views of reality are dissolved and a recognition of the significance of the dialectical nature of reality emerges.

In the realm of the rationality, the dialectic highlights significance of the knowers' subjectivity that links mediation with the totality category in order to change the social reality.

Then what are the implications of the concept of the critical dialectic to the curriculum knowledge Giroux is envisioning? Most of the answer was already given throughout the previous analysis insofar as the dialectical knowl-
edge itself constitutes curriculum knowledge. However, at the danger of reiteration, we can articulate the nature of the dialectical knowledge as curriculum knowledge when we characterize two crucial positions Giroux stresses.

First, the notion of dialectical knowledge rejects the abstract objectivism explicitly supported by positivistic technocratic rationality, which supposes "facts" detached from particular social and historical contexts. What is missing from this orientation is the dialectical interplay among knowledge, power, and ideology. Facts become the foundation for all types of knowledge, and values and intentionality lose their political potency by being divorced from the political and cultural traditions that give its meaning (p. 51). Thus, knowledge objectively exists 'out there' to be learned and mastered regardless of the knowers' consciousness and knowing process. It is independent of, and external to, human beings and viewed as independent of time and space; it becomes universalized, ahistorical, reified, and permanent knowledge never being subject to change (p. 52).

Second, the dialectical curriculum knowledge seriously calls into question the abstract subjectivism and relativism.40 To emphasize the function and role of knowing sub-

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40 The two are not conceptually identical according to the definitions we already made in CHAPTER II.
ject in the process of knowing does not necessarily involve a subjectivism which regards knowledge acquisition and understanding of reality as merely personal matters such as personal inclination, taste, preferences, or judgment.

At the same time, it does not involve a relativism which rejects the notion of ultimate and permanent criteria or standards in the acquisition of valid and trustworthy knowledge. The notion that reality as well as knowledge is socially constructed is incomplete unless it can account for knowledge that removes from the interpretation of life and reality—critique of hegemonic ideology and how knowledge can be distributed and falsified in the interest of dominant ideologies (p. 104).

The dialectical concept of knowledge is based upon these critiques of both the technocratic notion of objectified knowledge and the conservative phenomenological notion of relativised knowledge. As carefully investigated, a more critical view of knowledge does not intend to separate the knowing subject from the known object under the valid assumption that each of them mutually influences one another and transforms the act of knowing itself (p. 151). Consequently, we can draw a conclusion that curriculum knowledge envisioned by Giroux is the dialectical knowledge which is beyond subjective idealism, objective realism, or relativism.
Origin and Source of Knowledge. In the dialectical view of curriculum knowledge, the process of knowing itself cannot be divorced from its consequence since there is no objective knowledge 'out there' waiting to be discovered and transmitted. The dynamic interdependence between the knowing subject and the known object assumes an active mediation between them, which is crucial for the creation and transformation of context-bound knowledge indispensable for emancipation from the distorted and falsified consciousness of reality. Thus, according to this view, curriculum knowledge is generated from particular historic and social circumstances, which are critically mediated by human consciousness and reflective action. That is, knowledge is historically grounded and contextualized and must be linked with the existential situation of the knower through the process of appropriation and mediation (p. 33). Any type of curriculum knowledge is seen as problematic for it is always linked with specific normative interests and, therefore, subject to transformation.

Furthermore, we can easily understand that in this view curriculum knowledge is considered to originate neither from solely external human experience based upon perception and sensation nor from internal mechanism of pure rationality. Both views about the source of knowledge are radically criticized because of their ahistorical and apolitical tendency towards human knowledge.
Justification for the Values of Knowledge. In the dialectical view of knowledge, values of curriculum knowledge are justified on the ground that it is directly related to the notion of emancipatory intentions which aim to free individuals and social groups from both subjective and objective conditions that bind them to the forces of exploitation and oppression (in Giroux et al., 1983, p. 107). Valuable knowledge functions to motivate individual knowers to realize the distorted (sometimes fabricated) social as well as material reality and the taken-for-granted meanings, which are unduly defined in the interests of particular ideologies. That is, throughout the process of totality and mediation it generates a mode of critical thinking and historical consciousness for the purpose of emancipatory praxis.

The objectified view of static knowledge, on the contrary, intends to legitimate the status quo without any consideration of the knowers’ existential situation and historical roots of knowledge. It makes an unwarranted assumption that the objectivist knowledge has unchangeable qualities constituting ultimate and permanent values.

Furthermore, the dialectical dimension of knowledge implicitly rejects the intrinsic values of curriculum knowledge which assumes certain inherent and neutral attri-
butes cultivating human mind and rationality. As previously indicated, human rationality as a specific quality that mediates between an individual and the world of reality cannot be understood in terms of either purely objectified or subjectified property detached from the particular historical and social context. There is no knowledge by and in itself valuable and, therefore, context free.

A final comment on this issue is that the concept of emancipation itself is inextricably associated with the collective dimension of knowledge. It is a collective struggle for freedom. This is clear when we examine the concept of praxis as a guiding condition for emancipation. According to Giroux, praxis as a transition from critique to reflective action suggests

a struggle that defines freedom in social and not merely personal terms. Emancipation is linked in this case to groups of people struggling against the social forces that oppress them....Praxis, then, typifies a conception of freedom that analyzes the content and form of existing struggles within the context of their historical genesis and development. (p. 117, underlines added)

Based upon this analysis, we can conclude that the dialectical curriculum knowledge is justified in extrinsic terms and that the notion of the collective dimension of knowledge rather than its private and personalized dimension is emphasized.
Content and Scope of Knowledge. As long as the issue of the content of knowledge is concerned, we can argue that in Giroux's curriculum theory curriculum knowledge is composed of the dialectical knowledge. He is not directly concerned with the issue except when providing a critical analysis of the configurations of the dialectical knowledge.

Nevertheless, it is not difficult to find the statements relevant to the issue of the scope and boundary of curriculum knowledge. Of course, we can infer how the dialectical knowledge views the scope issue from the analysis of the nature of the critical dialectic itself, which was done earlier. But the message is so clear that we do not need to make such an inference. With regard to the issue, Giroux remarks:

The interplay of power, norms, and value will have to be connected with a more relational view of...knowledge. The artificial constructs that characterize the ordering and the boundaries of subject matter must give way to more fluid interconnections....the central task of...education will be to relate those principles of selection and organization that underlie curricula to their institutional and interactional setting in...classrooms to the wider social structure.

Thus, the dialectical view of knowledge rejects the arbitrary division of curriculum knowledge as well as the unwarranted boundaries of the subject matter since it considers the criteria for such rigid distinctions between types of knowledge as an unwarranted curricular practice
based upon the objectified, therefore imposed, view of knowledge.

What is more, as long as the values of knowledge are accounted for in terms of particular social and historical contexts to which the knowers belong, the scope of curriculum knowledge can be seen to be broadened and expanded. The knowers themselves can define what knowledge is significant in various ways in consideration of the specific contexts with the intention of emancipation both in subjective and objective terms.

3.3.12 James Macdonald

Are there not any realms of curriculum knowledge rather than the cognitive intellectual knowledge steeped into the rational/empirical grounds? What is the nature and significance of such non-objectified knowledge, if any? And what is the relationship between the epistemology configuring and justifying such knowledge and the value issue in curriculum theory? Some curriculum theorists, especially members of the reconceptualist curriculum camp, have been deeply involved in a search for an alternative view of curriculum knowledge and its axiological foundations in their curriculum theorizing. Insofar as the knowledge issue is concerned, they share the view that there is more in human knowledge than the bodies of verifiable propositional
knowledge such as analytic and synthetic knowledge and that values are necessarily involved in the process of defining, selecting, and distributing any type of knowledge.

One of the central figures in this group is J. Macdonald, who for several decades has devoted himself to a 're-conceptualization' of the meaning of knowledge and the subject matter and also of the significance of values in curriculum theory and practice, among other things. Like any other reconceptualist curriculum theorists, Macdonald had been influenced by some European intellectual traditions such as phenomenological hermeneutics, Marxism, and existentialism, which have figured in the process of his curriculum theory construction. However, 'influence' does not necessarily mean direct application of such philosophies to curriculum inquiry. Rather, he adopted their languages dialectically to espouse his own curriculum theory in a creative and imaginative manner.

Throughout the whole body of his curriculum work, Macdonald maintains his basic concern for the value-based humanistic curriculum through a dialectical process of critical self-reflection in a tremendously coherent and consistent manner despite differences in topics and themes relevant to diverse curriculum phenomena. By virtue of the coher-

41 Nonetheless, we witness a transition of focus from the emancipatory interest to the hermeneutic interest after he gave up positivistic curriculum inquiry.
ence and consistency in his framework, we are able to at least 'infer' his own epistemological position with regard to the issue of what should be central in curriculum knowledge.

Given this context, fortunately, we can identify a paper that manifestly shows his own epistemological position. The paper is titled "Curriculum, Consciousness, and Social Change" (1981).42 In this paper, Macdonald attempts to build a curriculum theory in which the subject matter or knowledge is dealt with as a crucial consideration for the theory. It contains straightforward claims about curriculum knowledge with an exception of the origin of knowledge issue. Because of this manifest exposition and the consistency and coherence previously mentioned, we do not have to investigate his curriculum theory in detail nor have to 'infer' to determine his epistemological position.

In the paper, Macdonald addresses a curriculum theory whose major thesis is that curriculum talk and work should focus upon the derivation of reasonable "expectations" and the development of cultural "consciousness" through which we can meet the expectations. For him, the ultimate expectation to be fulfilled through schooling is just the task of human liberation. Based upon the central conviction

42 It appeared in The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (1981), which is almost exclusively reconceptualist-oriented.
that society can be changed in the direction of human liberation from the arbitrary social and psychological constraints, he clearly provides a set of curricular areas which are more relevant to the task of changing consciousness towards a more liberating human existence. The areas are: (1) ideas and perspectives; (2) personal growth; (3) substance or subject matter; (4) performance rules; and (5) constitutive rules (1981, p. 146 ff). As indicated here, Macdonald evidently includes the area of subject matter as a central consideration of curriculum, whose potential alternative may change our consciousness for human liberation.

We will quote the most central part of Macdonald’s epistemological claims at length prior to the analysis. With respect to the "substance or subject matter" as one of the central areas, Macdonald argues:

When we approach the task of the actual substance of the curriculum, and wish to provide liberating possibilities through this avenue, we must keep some fundamental epistemological assumptions clearly in mind. Among these epistemological assumptions are: 1) Knowledge is uncertain, not absolute. 2) Knowledge is personal. 3) Knowledge is for use, not simply storage. And, perhaps of a slightly different order: 4) Knowledge of social arrangement is knowledge of human creatures that reflects more than anything else historical accidents within the broad organizing trends of such areas as growing technology, sciences, industry, and religion. 5) Knowledge is not disparate or segmented in a broad human sense of lived meaning, but rather unitary and only by specific highly rationalized human interests and tasks has it seemed so. (1981, pp. 149-50, underlines added)
These explicit epistemological claims and some other relevant statements provide the basis for our analysis.

Nature of Knowledge. Macdonald explicates the basic conceptual setting from which the crucial expectations of liberation come.

Historically, at least over the past 2,500 years in Western culture, we have witnessed a basic confrontation between brands of idealism and realism. Pushed to their polar extremes it may be argued that reality rests in our consciousness and the material objects of the world are appearances. The extreme materialist position would posit that reality is what appears to be (what we sense), and that mental phenomena are epiphenomena of our action in the world. (1981, p. 144)

Presenting a version of realism and idealism, each of which is reduced to the concept of material and consciousness respectively, Macdonald addresses a third ontological position by adopting both types of the world view selectively and critically.

Macdonald borrows both the notion of the personal dimension of "tacit knowledge" and the independence of human consciousness or mind as a separate entity from M. Polanyi, and the unique version of the Marxist theory of social and cultural change from A. Gramsci. In doing so, he makes a dialectical conclusion that human consciousness as an independent quality exists apart from the material existence of human body and that changes in human consciousness are "necessary and a precondition of later political change"
(1981, p. 145). In this regard, all knowledge necessarily involves person knowing and his consciousness and the changes in human consciousness through the personal knowing is considered to be a warrantable step towards liberation from arbitrary domination by unjust social structure or other persons.

However, most importantly, "there is no one brand of liberation" and "no predictable absolute outcome that we should expect from our effort" (1981, p. 145). Rather, we expect "a diversity and apparent inconsistency of comparative efforts"; therefore, any concrete or spontaneous efforts based upon lived experiences for freeing from "repressive or oppressive structures, practices, and ideas should be treated as valid" for changing human consciousness. Along with the selective acceptance of objective realism and subjective idealism, in this argument about liberation, we witness a version of relativism which maintains that the issue of liberation is context-bound and that freeing human potential and raising consciousness for liberation are a matter of relativistic considerations. The good of activity for liberating human consciousness rests with the validity of the immediate activity in concrete contexts, he claims (1981, p. 145). In this sense, it is problematic to assume any ultimate, immutable, and fixed rules or laws to regulate and characterize values,
attitudes, morality, and beliefs, all of which are central constituents of human consciousness.

This relativistic view of human consciousness and liberation is clearly addressed when Macdonald proposes the epistemological claims, one of which says that curriculum knowledge is uncertain, not absolute. Therefore, for Macdonald, the question 'what knowledge is of most worth?' is in part misleading since it presupposes absolute values of objectified bodies of knowledge. Knowledge should be organized so that "it reveals to the great possible extent its instrumental and interpretive relevance to the social world" (1981, p. 180).

The issue of the knower-known relationship is also directly related to the relativistic view of knowledge. In this view, the knowing subject necessarily occupies a very significant place in knowledge acquisition. He comes to interpret and understand the meaning of curriculum knowledge and its values. All knowledge involves active participation of the knowers' creativity and imagination. In this regard, Macdonald's interpretation of Polanyi's conception of personal "tacit knowledge" is relevant to the very issue. Personal knowledge or personal way of knowing refers to a very significant dimension of human knowledge that attaches its importance to the concept of subjective human consciousness.
Source and Origin of Knowledge. There are very few explicit statements concerning the source and origin of curriculum knowledge in his paper. One exception is the claim that curriculum knowledge should be "directly related to needs, interest, past experiences and capacities" of the knowing persons (p. 150). However, this is not enough to show where curriculum knowledge comes from.

In a different work, "Theory-Practice and the Hermeneutic Circle" (1980), Macdonald explicates the concept of hermeneutic knowledge and its relation to curriculum theory and practice. Regarding curriculum theory as a form of hermeneutic theory which attempts to understand, interpret, and create curriculum reality, Macdonald highlights the "mytho-poetic" method of knowledge beyond the scientific-technical and the emancipatory political method. According to him, either science as the source of knowledge for technical knowledge for the purpose of control or critical theory as the source of knowledge for the purpose of praxis is necessary, but they are insufficient in that both of them are 'epistemological' (methodological) in nature. In other words, they lack 'ontological' characteristics in defining and understanding curriculum reality. Thus, he proposes a third epistemological method called the mytho-poetic, which leads us to the increased understanding of reality through interpretation and reinterpretation of the reality.
With the combined utilization of the three methods of knowledge, we can expect the ontological forces of the hermeneutics. Search for understanding in the long run is the basis on which science and critical theory are grounded. And the search for meaning and the basic human capacity for this search are experienced in the hermeneutic process of the interpretation of the contextual curriculum reality. In his view, science itself cannot deal with ultimate meaning, while critical theory in its concern for praxis neglects the question of infinity and eternity.

The mytho-poetic method of knowledge as the most central epistemology of the hermeneutics is fundamentally concerned with the aesthetical, ethical, and metaphysical dimension of curriculum reality which is essentially separate from science and praxis. Consequently, it emphasizes as a source of knowledge the personal non-cognitive qualities such as insight, imagination, feeling, intuition, and the like, all of which are distinguished from the mathematical-rational and critical reflection for praxis. As long as we think of the hermeneutic knowledge as warranted knowledge—this is the very point Macdonald stresses—we can conclude that the origin and source of curriculum knowledge is the mytho-poetic methodology, which is dependent upon such non-cognitive qualities, beyond science and critical knowledge.
Justification for the Values of Knowledge. Macdonald claims that knowledge is for use, not for simple storage. Any curriculum knowledge is valuable insofar as it contributes to changing consciousness for the ultimate expectation of human liberation. Curriculum knowledge should be helpful to transcend the limitations and constraints of the knowers' social conditioning and day-by-day common-sense.

Essentially, for Macdonald, the value issue is the most central one as it serves as a starting point for all types of curriculum work and talk. And the mytho-poetic methodology for knowledge acquisition in hermeneutics embodies the notion of ethics and morality—that is, axiological basis. He points out the problems of the axiological and ontological grounds of technical and emancipatory knowledge. Science and critical theory lack the concept of understanding and interpretation of meaning of contextual values of curricular reality. This is the reason why he highlights the values of the hermeneutic knowledge which in nature possesses the potential of human liberation beyond the two types of knowledge. In this context, we come to understand that the values of hermeneutic knowledge are extrinsically justified. It contributes to changing human consciousness for liberation.
Furthermore, the most crucial dimension of the hermeneutic knowledge is personal knowledge which appeals to individual's insight, imagination, intuition, artistic experience, etc. As seen in the "epistemological assumptions", Macdonald argues that all knowledge is personal, and it is useful for changing personal consciousness, not collective consciousness. Macdonald includes the category of "personal growth" in the "areas" for changing consciousness and argues that there is "little chance that persons will be concerned about liberating human potential in others unless they themselves are also involved in their own personal structures in a liberating quest and set of experience" (1981, p. 148).

Scope and Content of Knowledge. In Macdonald's curriculum theory, curriculum knowledge is mainly composed of the hermeneutic personal knowledge besides bodies of knowledge derived from science and critical theory. That is, the essential part of curriculum knowledge is the knowledge for interpretation and understanding in order to seek for undistorted meaning of reality and transformation of it through personal liberation. Tacitly held personal knowledge involves the knowing persons' diverse qualities and reflects concrete realities in terms of temporality and contextual boundary. Consequently, it assumes a broadened and expanded view of curriculum knowledge. Its scope is
beyond the objectified static knowledge, which is cogni-
tive, propositional, and technical, therefore, often sup-
posed to be value-neutral.

In addition, the personal knowledge as ourrioulum knowl-
edge is "not separate or segmented" but rather "unitary", ac-
accoding to the theory. Macdonald refutes the reduction
of the definition of ourrioulum back to the "subject matter
to be taught" (1981, p. 150) which maintains rigid divi-
sions and boundaries of knowledge. In order to "allow for
maximum possible variation" of any individuals; in order to
take into account "meaning for everyday living" of the
individuals; and in order to "contribute directly to the
creation of meaning structures which deals with the human
condition", ourrioulum knowledge must be organized in a
wholistic mode centering around core, broad fields, or
problems of living (1981, p. 150). Thus, Macdonald's our-
rioulum theory clearly rejects any attempts for establish-
ment of distinctive, discrete zones and categorization of
ourrioulum knowledge.

3.3.13 Max van Manen

Van Manen, a Canadian ourrioulum theorist, maintains a very
unique position on ourrioulum theory construction. Having
his philosophical backgrounds in phenomenology and herme-
eutics, he proposes somewhat 'unfamiliar' ourrioulum theo-
ry which makes use of a variety of exotic languages and concepts; therefore, often regarded as esoteric and misunderstood as "a pretentious way of displaying jargon" (1982a) by those who have had little opportunity to become acquainted with the particular Continental philosophies. Moreover, there is no universally agreed definition and method of the philosophical inquiries. Occasionally, phenomenology and hermeneutics mean different things to different people.

Such uneasiness is not exceptional of some of van Manen's papers which are taken for the analysis in this study. They are Pedagogical Theorizing (1980) and "Phenomenological Pedagogy" (1982a). At the same time, a third paper titled "Linking Ways of Knowing with Ways of Being Practical" (1977) will be considered as an auxiliary source to the extent that it is pertinent to particular points under discussion.

As the titles indicate, the basic concern of the studies is to elaborate a pedagogical theory based upon the tenets of phenomenology. According to van Manen, pedagogical theorizing as "the attempt to bring to speech the everyday experience of living with children" (1982a, p. 283) must

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43 A paper presented at the conference of the AERA in Boston.

44 It appeared in the journal of Curriculum Inquiry as a different version of the former article.
have its foundation on phenomenology in that being practical in nature phenomenology itself is to be found in the lived world of concrete experience and real life situations. Pedagogy does not derive its fundamental principles from some life philosophy or value system. Rather, the meaning and significance of its principles are immanent to its very ontology (1982a, p. 284). Thus, pedagogical theorizing has to be phenomenological because phenomenology is concerned with the ontological dimension of "being" and its meaning for pedagogy.

For the same reason, a phenomenological curriculum theory is exclusively concerned with the reality of lived experience of curriculum itself on the side of both children and pedagogues, not with theoretical abstractions. Therefore, the traditional curricular question as to how to select and organize curriculum content or learning experiences is no longer qualified as an essential question. Rather, "the question whether we really know what it is like when a child 'has an experience' or when the child 'comes to understand' it" is fundamental in that it grapples with the ontological dimension of curriculum (1982a, p. 296).

In this context, with respect to "subject matter" as one of the crucial curricular concerns of phenomenological
pedagogy, van Manen emphasizes the significance of the nature and meaning of the lived experiences through the subject matter.

But what is the significance of a certain subject matter? The important question is not, do you teach math? or do you teach children? This is a false dichotomy which flows out of one-sided intellectualizations about education. (1982a, p. 295)

For van Manen, the answers such as "I teach both" and "I teach children math" are misleading. He continues:

But what is it like to teach these children math...? What is the nature of the subject in the teaching experience?....Evidently, to know a particular subject means that I know something in this domain of human knowledge. But to know something does not mean to know just anything about something. To know something is to know what that something is in the way that it is and speaks to us. (1982a, p. 295)

That is, the significance of the subject matter must not be interpreted in terms of its own inherent values assumed, but rather in terms of the basic understanding of what it is that the subject matter lets children know. To know a subject matter means to have knowledge of the subject "in a way which shows that the knowledge is valued for what it lets itself be known for" (1982a, p. 295).

Therefore, in this view, to say that "we learn about the subjects contained in the school curriculum" is less correct than to say that "the subjects let us know something". It is very important then to recognize that the
subject matter's "letting us know" is just the ontological potency of phenomenology (p. 295 ff). That is to say, by virtue of the 'phenomenologization' of the subject matter we can build a transformational relationship between the subject matter and the knowing subjects as children based upon their lived experience of the subject matter. Now we can infer that the most fundamental curricular concern of phenomenological pedagogy is to 'phenomenologize' curriculum knowledge—phenomenological knowledge, that is—through the transformation from the object (subject matter) to the subject (children).

On the basis of this brief description of van Manen's phenomenological conceptualization of pedagogy and the subject matter as curriculum content, we can further investigate his epistemological claims with regard to curriculum knowledge. However, in the process we are to be confronted with two kinds of basic problems. First, van Manen does not say explicitly anything about what knowledge should constitute curriculum content. In the third paper, he claims that curriculum concerns are practical matters and that the issue as to "what knowledge should be included in the curriculum" is one of the practical concerns which should be resolved through the utilization of hermeneutic-phenomenological knowledge that is practical in nature (1977). Even a thorough examination of this paper, which
seems to be exclusively focusing upon curriculum with interpretation of the concept of the practical through analysis of a variety of epistemologies toward social science, does not show any indications of treating the issue.

Nevertheless, we have to understand that this indifference to the issue of curriculum content has its roots in the research program of phenomenology itself rather than in unattentive neglect. Phenomenology, as we see, is mainly concerned with the interpretive aspects of curriculum experience. It seeks for the ontological meaning of the nature, essence, and quality of the experience. Thus, phenomenological curriculum studies do not concern any propositional and normative claims on the issues such as what knowledge should be taught. As van Manen says, paraphrasing Heidegger, the most important question in phenomenology is not "Can we do something with phenomenology?", but "Can phenomenology, if we concern ourselves deeply with it, do something with us?" (1982a, p. 297).

Thus, we must not claim that we can determine which knowledge to teach with phenomenological curriculum studies; rather, we have to think about the way phenomenology helps us deal with the issue. Phenomenological curriculum studies only disclose reflectively what it is like to deal with certain types of knowledge in curriculum. Therefore,
it is pointless to argue, for instance, whether a propositional body of knowledge, 2+2=4, for instance, is to be included in curriculum content. Rather, what is important is to understand the meaning and implication of the knowledge in concrete lived experience of the knowers.

What is connoted from this statement is that any knowledge can be included in the curriculum content insofar as it is to be brought to the ontological dimension of phenomenology. At this moment, the essence and reality of the particular bodies of knowledge can be understood through phenomenological interpretation of the lived world experience of the knowers with interaction to the knowledge. In doing so, the knowledge becomes "phenomenological knowledge".

Then we can raise the question of whether the phenomenological knowledge itself can constitute curriculum knowledge. This is the second problem we come to face. Apparently, van Manen does not set forth any explicit linkage between the phenomenological knowledge and curriculum knowledge.\textsuperscript{45} Van Manen clearly deals with the issue of what counts as knowledge in phenomenology and attempts to characterize its essence and nature. And he builds a con-

\textsuperscript{45} It is important to notice that often the term "curriculum knowledge" which is used by van Manen or some others does not refer to curriculum content. To put it simply, it refers to knowledge about curriculum as a field of study or knowledge as result of curriculum inquiry.
ceptual bridge between the subject matter of curriculum and the phenomenological knowledge when he emphasizes the phenomenological aspects of the subject matter. For this reason, we can assume that the phenomenological knowledge should be at the heart of curriculum content even though van Manen's theory hardly presents any concrete configurations of curriculum knowledge in an explicit manner.

**Nature of Knowledge.** Phenomenological knowledge, after all, is opposed to any reified view of knowledge. In the reified view, knowledge can be thought of as a thing that could be transmitted and produced. With respect to this reality issue of knowledge, van Manen posits:

> We need to push off the temptation to treat knowledge as commodity. When I think of "having" knowledge or "producing" knowledge then I have already declared a commitment to treat knowledge as some-"thing", something that lies outside of myself. We could refer to this commitment as a (positivist) form of life, a form of life which creates things out of everything. Even our questions and answers become "thing", if we forget to constantly refer them back to that which brings them into being. (1980, p. 7)

As such, van Manen calls into question the view of knowledge in which knowledge is objectified and reified apart from and independent of the subjects' meaning of lived experience in particular contexts. Because knowledge cannot be treated as an objective entity existing 'out there', such questions as "Where can I find it?" and "How can phenomenological knowledge be put on paper?" are quite mis-
leading. Such ways of questioning lead us "to miss what we wish to understand. The idea of knowledge as information stored in the brain or as words put on paper" would commit us to the tempting view that knowledge can be possessed or acquired "that is contained in brain cells, or in a book, etc" (1980, p. 7).

Knowledge is oriented toward the subjects' interaction with the lived world and is conditioned by the ways in which they act and are acted upon. There is no clear distinction between what they know and the way in which they know it. Thus, there is no separation between the knowers and the known in this sense.

In this way, van Manen does not assume any type of ontological realism which warrants existence of the objectified, reified knowledge as thing or commodity. Furthermore, he never accepts the hypothesis that there might be certain ultimate and immutable theoretical frameworks or standards by which the trustworthy or validity of the phenomenological knowledge can be adjudicated in an objective manner. That is to say, he rejects both objective realism and epistemological objectivism insofar as the phenomenological knowledge is concerned. Therefore, we can conclude tentatively that van Manen's theory takes a subjective relativism. It is tentative to the extent that the analysis does not provide sufficient reasons for the claim.
Source and Origin of Knowledge. Phenomenology is the kind of thinking which leads us back from theoretical abstractions to the reality of lived experience of ordinary life that is concrete and context-bound. Therefore, from a phenomenological point of view, the question of where knowledge derives from must always be understood and answered in terms of our personal experience of its own presence—unique texts of real life situations. Van Manen was making this point when he says:

From a phenomenological point of view we keep reminding ourselves that the question of knowledge always refers to our world, to our lives, to what we are, and to what makes us write, read and talk...it is what stands behind the words, the speaking, and the language. (1980, pp. 7-8)

With regard to the issue of the source of the phenomenological knowledge, thus, what van Manen is emphasizing is the notion of the lived experience of lifeworld. Diverse and personal experiences as an encounter with the lifeworld is the very ground upon which the phenomenological knowledge is constructed and developed.

Then, in what ways can the unique lived experience be disclosed and uncovered in order to reach the stage of sound understanding? In other words, which particular method do we employ for the formulation of the phenomenological knowledge? Even though it is problematic to assume any universal and unequivocal means for understanding, van
Manen claims that the lived experience can be disclosed by means of "the hermeneutic-phenomenological" method. For him, hermeneutics as an interpretive device is supposed to encompass the methodological function of "unconcealment" of the lifeworld experience. However, it is necessary to understand that the detailed ways of reading particular texts vary greatly.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. The basic concern of phenomenology is to understand what it is like to have particular personal experiences; such an understanding constitutes phenomenological knowledge. We have to really know what it is like when the knower has an experience or when he comes to understand the knowledge. As van Manen stresses frequently, the usefulness of the phenomenological knowledge rests upon the power of its "letting us know" something. We must not think about what we can do with the knowledge or what we can acquire from it. Rather, it is crucial to seek for a different ontological dimension of the knowledge. We have to concern ourselves with what the nature of the being of our experience and what lets this being be what it is. That is, we have to be concerned with what the phenomenological knowledge leads us to do or to think. It guides us to disclose the hiddenness and essence of human lifeworld. Therefore, it is misleading to assume that we employ the phenomenological knowledge to describe and to interpret our as well as other's lived experience.
In this sense, we can determine that the phenomenologi-
cal knowledge in its nature entails an intrinsic quality by
which its very values can be justified. It does not func-
tion as any means for certain ends. Rather, it presupposes
immanent values for its own. In addition, we do not have
much difficulty in arguing that it needs to be anchored in
the personal and individual dimension of knowledge. Need-
less to say, it pertains to a particular life-style and
experience of particular individuals. There is no implica-
tion of the collective dimension of knowledge. The pheno-
menological knowledge centers around the personal reactions
of individuals to their unique lifeworld experiences and
qualities of the world.

Content and Scope of Knowledge. Van Manen does not say
which knowledge actually constitutes the phenomenological
curriculum knowledge. But it is apparent that he criti-
cizes the particular conduct of "categorial abstractions of
knowledge". There are no discrete distinctions of knowl-
edge in the concept of the phenomenological knowledge.

One way of dealing with this question [of what
counts as phenomenological knowledge] is to
theorize about knowledge...about the distinctions
between different types of knowledge....But if we
wish to remain responsive to the commitment of
phenomenology then we should try to resist the
temptation to develop positivistic schemas, para-
digms, models or other categorial abstractions of
knowledge. Instead we should refer questions of
knowledge back to the life world where knowledge
speaks through our lived experience. (1980, pp.
6-7)
In this regard, it is quite inappropriate to think of propositional knowledge (both synthetical and analytic), systematic agreement, the sequence of propositions for a logical conclusion, a reliable generalization, or a truth statement. Hermeneutic-phenomenology is not involved in the development of testable hypotheses and categorical schemas.

Furthermore, the phenomenological knowledge maintains a broadened view of knowledge in that it entails the personal dimension of knowledge and in that it incorporates personal feelings and emotions as a new concept of knowledge. Such distinctions between thinking and feeling, or between cognitive and affective domains of mode of thought are no longer qualified in this expansive view of knowledge (1977, p. 215). Rather, the broad concept of phenomenological knowledge includes the concept of "knowing" which refers to "the traditional sense of theoretical-practical knowledge" and the concept of "understanding" which is closely linked with "the concept of 'world' and of 'disclosure' or 'unconcealment'" (1977, p. 215).

3.3.14 William Pinar
Retrospecting the field of curriculum studies in the 1970s and the beginning of this decade, it is not an overstatement to say that Pinar has been one of the most active
and prolific workers in the reconceptualist curriculum scholarship. His academic activity and productivity itself brought about a variety of conflicting appraisals of his works. Nevertheless, we can hardly deny Pinar's potential impact on curriculum studies beyond the controversy over his contribution to the field.

Pinar's approach to curriculum 'theorizing' is based upon some of both European intellectual traditions such as phenomenology, existentialism, and psychoanalysis, and Eastern philosophies such as Buddhism and Zazen. A quick look at his work readily shows how deeply he is involved in and affected by the particular philosophies—although the latter's direct influence seems piecemeal. It is for this reason that it is almost impossible to attempt to fully understand his theory of curriculum without taking into account such philosophical backgrounds.

Among the many works of Pinar, "Life History and Educational Experience" (1980a) has been selected as the major source for his epistemological claims because it contains more comprehensive and systematic curriculum theory than others. However, we should not hesitate to consult other works of Pinar as long as they provide consistent information pertinent to the themes under investigation. The sole purpose for singling out a main source is to explicate his theory of curriculum more clearly.
Prior to the analysis, we need to examine Pinar’s proposal for curriculum theory in general. In doing so, we can determine whether the theory is viable for the analysis on the one hand, and we can accomplish the task more efficiently on the basis of the general understanding of the theory on the other hand, if it warrants the task. The first thing to be done for the general understanding is to comprehend the concept of "currere" which probably is the most central concept in his curriculum theory construction. Putting it abruptly, for Pinar, curriculum is currere in terms of both content and mode of inquiry. His theory of curriculum is just about currere, which is a reconceptualization of the traditional concept of curriculum.

Then what is currere? What is the difference between curriculum and currere? Why is currere necessary? What is the methodology of currere? What does currere do? Or what do we do with currere? To answer these questions is to understand Pinar's curriculum theorizing. There are several distinctive characteristics of currere, which are sharply contrasted to the concept of curriculum. First, it begins with an opposition to the concept of curriculum "design" with which the curriculum has been preoccupied. The same is to the traditionally important contents of curriculum studies such as curriculum development, evaluation, organization, and instruction. One cannot 'design' a mean-
ingful educational experience. One "cannot predict human response, except in trivial matters and in artificially circumscribed circumstances, as necessary for experiments" (1980b, p. 76).

For Pinar, it is considered a gross mistake to think that if we invented reified and objective methodologies to identify and control all possible variables for a true experiment then we could design a curriculum efficiently and effectively with the principles and generalizations obtained. "What is special, what is unrepeatable, potentially interesting and on occasion revelatory, is the moment experience of particular individuals in particular rooms particular time" (1980b, p. 76). Thus, ourrere deviates itself from the empirical-scientific notion of curriculum studies in repudiating the notion of "abstraction" and objectification.

Second, ourrere focuses upon the individual's personal history of lived experience as a subject matter of study, and proposes as a method a unique strategy called the "regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic" method of psychoanalysis for comprehension and interpretation of the meaning of lived experience. That is, ourrere employs an "autobiographic" method which exposes the deeply hidden dimension of individual's life history of educational
experience. On the specific meaning of experience, Pinar writes:

Because we in curriculum have used this word "experience" to refer to activity, I have used the German Lebenswelt to indicate the more specific use of the word I intend. Lebenswelt translates as "lived experience" and suggests in English a life-world....this refers to private existential experience. So curriculum reconceptualized is currere it is not the course to be run, or the artifacts employed in the running of the course; it is the running of the course. The course most broadly is our lives, in schools and out, and the running, is our experience of our lives. (1976a, p. 18)

The implication of Lebenswelt is distinct from the objective and collective notion of experience in ordinary use. It is broad enough to encompass both horizontal and historical dimensions of particular individual's inner experience which used to be regarded as trivial in that it lacks objective as well as valuative significance.

Pinar argues that any type of institutional and formal theory construction and its results is necessary in the state of "arrest" when set apart from the concrete personal experience. Those who are involved in the research program for abstraction of individual reality of existence as well as the consequences of the research are arrested and frozen. After all, currere itself is the experience which is intelligible only when it is about the experience of a concrete subject. The arrest is political, psychological, metaphysical, and intellectual in that there is "no free-
floating experience-in-general" (1980a, p. 164). An individual's inner experience itself at any circumstances is inextricably related to the reality of power, being, consciousness, and conception in the particular context at the particular time. In this regard, we can understand why Pinar charges that the current field of curriculum studies is conceptually "arrested". It insists on abstraction and objectification of the curriculum phenomena without consideration of the singularity, subjectivity, and idiosyncrasy of personal experience of Lebenswelt.

Third, and most importantly, it is crucial to understand that curriculum itself is basically concerned with the issue of curriculum knowledge. Beyond the superficial understanding of the reason why Pinar refuses to include the issue of design or development in curriculum theorizing, it is necessary to recognize that the most important function embedded in curriculum is to generate the most worthwhile curriculum knowledge through the autobiographic methodology. Virtually, it is knowledge on a different dimension. Any reified view of knowledge is called into question here and knowledge based upon a phenomenological epistemology is newly emerging.

In curriculum, curriculum itself is identical to the relationship between the knower and the known (1980a, p. 166,
and sometimes regarded as educational experience itself (Pinar, 1975c, p. 418). What is important is that currere constitutes knowledge and knowing through understanding researcher's own relation to his inner self and others, including artifacts (Pinar, 1975b, p. 401). Therefore, says Pinar, curriculum is

not only an environment-producing discipline [as Maxine Greene claims]...It is a knowledge-producing discipline, with its own method of inquiry and its own area of investigation. Currere, historically rooted in the field of curriculum, in existentialism, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis, is the study of educational experience. (Pinar, 1975b, p. 400)

In this regard, although Pinar does not have in mind anything about the traditional view of curriculum knowledge which is supposed to constitute curriculum content, we do not face difficulty in the epistemological analysis to the extent that the particular epistemology embedded in the theory manifestly delineates the characteristics of curriculum knowledge under interest. Different ways of conceptualizing curriculum itself always result in different conceptualizations of curriculum content.

Nature of Knowledge. Most of all, the phenomenological epistemology in Pinar's theory of curriculum rejects the reified and objectified conception of knowledge. This point is emphasized repeatedly throughout. For instance, he argues:
Given the historicity of the individual, no final sense of understanding can be attained. What attainment is possible is contingent upon the historical moment and the individual's developmental moment...Comprehension of this immutable fact frees one from reified conceptions of knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge produced at a particular time, under particular circumstances, by particular people. (1980a, p. 165)

The historical contingency and concreteness of knowledge rests upon the subjectivity of the individual's lived experience in which knowledge is no longer imposed and conception of the individual is no longer alienated and abstracted from the texts--arrested, that is.

In the phenomenological epistemology, thus, subjectivity as the ontological foundation in the live reality guides the quality and the content of knowledge production. "Arrest" is just the state in which the knowing subject is "dissociated" with his particular subjective experience and understood in terms of universal laws and principles which are "objectively" imposed on. For Pinar, "the subjective is prior to and foundational to all efforts at objective knowledge" (1980a, p. 177); and, therefore, "pre-conceptual, pre-categorical dimensions, which in phenomenological imagery constitute a substratum of primary experience, antedate, temporally and spatially as it were, the conceptual and the categorical" (1980a, p. 171). Subjectivity underlies any derived objectification, and remains logically and ontologically prior to its derived appearanc-

In brief, as the most central concept in Pinar's theory of curriculum, the "biographic situation" of the subjective takes precedence over the universal and the objective. The reflective consciousness of self and others including material conditions is the most fundamental to transforming the subject as well as the world. In other words, without subjectivity there is no meaningful objectivity; without subjective knowledge there is no intelligible objective knowledge.

In Pinar's curriculum theory, an objectivistic epistemology is explicitly repudiated while the subjectified personal knowledge which is attained through the autobiographic method of currere is emphasized. However, this does not necessarily imply that it takes either ontological idealism or relativism. It does not involve idealism in that it by no means assumes that the reality of the external world of knowledge is the knower's perceptibility. Neither does it claim that the objects of knowledge are nothing but appearances and have no independent existence outside the knower's mind. Rather, putting emphasis on the concreteness of the subject's knowledge, its existentialism's tenet repudiates idealism. The existential slogan 'existence precedes essence' is pertinent in this sense.
Moreover, it does not claim that there is no universal and permanent conceptual frameworks for the discourse on knowledge. What it is concerned with is the subjective knowledge and its relation to objective knowledge, not whether there are such criteria. Admittedly, the subjectivist position does not necessarily entail relativism.

For these reasons, we may conclude that Pinar's curriculum theory takes a subjective position with respect to the nature of knowledge. But at this point we need one further consideration about this tentative conclusion. Here, we have to recognize that its emphasis on subjectivity was a reaction to the over-emphasis on objectivity and abstraction and to the extreme repression and neglect of subjectivity itself. Thus, the next stage is to synthesize both of them dialectically. In ourere, as the relationship between the knower and the known, there is "phenomenology's emphasis on the reciprocity of subjectivity and objectivity in the dynamic constitution of human knowledge and existentialism's emphasis on the dialectical relationship of man to his situation" (Grumet, 1976, p. 35). On the dialectical nature of ourere, Pinar says:

It seemed that an objective understanding of the issues concerning me would come only through intensive subjective study. At some developmental--and corresponding epistemological--point the two--subjective and objective--become a dialectic whose synthesis is ineluctable. Simultaneously, I thought of working to extend myself intellectually, in some sense
"improving quality" of my intellectual work, and I became forced to examine the ontological and biographic ground of the work. (1980a, p. 190)

Thus, we can conclude that Pinar's curriculum theory takes dialectical position with its main emphasis on subjectivity with respect to the nature of knowledge. Needless to say, the close relationship between the knower and what is known is essential in the dialectic.

Origin and Source of Knowledge. As discussed, in curriculum, knowledge is produced and generated by the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic method of the autobiography based upon psychoanalysis. A curriculum researcher attempts a structural description of his own educational and curricular experience in order to attain the qualified knowledge. The act of autobiography to describe the individual's particular life history of curriculum experience "constitutes a bringing to consciousness of the nature of one's existence, transforming the mere fact of existence into a realized quality and a possible meaning", claims Pinar quoting James Olney (1980a, pp. 190-1). Pinar explains in detail about the autobiography strategy as follows:

It is a research strategy that produces knowledge of the character of lived experience of schools, and so contributes to our knowledge of schools and the educative process. The knowledge is knowledge of the individual, a point of view that insists upon the primacy of such knowledge....The method of curriculum...is a research method that is an alternative to those of contemporary social
science, not only in procedure but in the order of knowledge thereby produced. It is knowledge that makes explicit the developmental as well as epistemological bases of its production. It is knowledge based in the concrete rather than the abstract. (1980a, p. 192).

Then, what is required of the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic process? An examination of the nature and concept of the four constituents of the strategy of ourrere forces us to recognize the significance of some sorts of individual's internal, non-cognitive qualities such as imagination, intuition, mediation, reflexivity, excitement, etc. Certainly, there is no notion of traditional empiricism or rationalism as legitimate source of knowledge. At this point, suffice it to say that the source of knowledge in ourrere is the autobiographic method focusing upon the individual's lived experience of curriculunm and that it depends to a great extent upon the individual subject's non-cognitive qualities as such.

Justification for the Values of Knowledge. Needless to say, curriculum knowledge attained by the ontological autobiography is an exclusively personalized one. There is no knowledge aggregate and abstract. Knowledge is meaningful and intelligible only when it is considered as 'someone's' knowledge. This point does not demand further elaboration.
Nevertheless, the problem of whether knowledge is justified either in intrinsic or in extrinsic ways warrants a further discussion. According to Pinar, "the value of knowledge is its multi-dimensional function in the lives of individual, unrepeatable beings" (1980a, p. 179). There is no knowledge which maintains ultimate values apart from particular personal contexts of historical contingency. Thus, knowledge by no means refers to static words or propositions which presuppose permanent context-free values without consideration of the knower's particular biographic history of educational experience.

Instead, knowledge is valuable and useful insofar as it contributes to the "ontological shift" of a particular individual being. That is, the values of knowledge in Pinar's curriculum theory are justified in terms of the transformation from "arrest", "alienation", or "estrangement" to personal human freedom through the raised consciousness. The transformation as the ontological shift is possible only when the knower attains concrete personal knowledge through the method of the autobiographic study. Imposed and reified knowledge, on the contrary, hardly helps the knower make the ontological shift for liberation. In this context, we can make the conclusion that Pinar's curriculum theory sustains an epistemological position that warrants the personal/singular knowledge and an extrinsic way of justifying knowledge.
Content and Scope of Knowledge. In Pinar's theory, it is not possible to discern the configurations of curriculum knowledge clearly in that the phenomenological epistemology suggests the multi-dimensional nature of knowledge. Different individuals come to attain idiosyncratic knowledge through the process of autobiography of the particular lived experience. The knowledge is to be varied according to the different temporal contexts and spatial situations in which the individuals find themselves.

This multi-dimensional characteristic of knowledge reflecting the individual's biographic situation determine the issue of categorization and the scope of knowledge. To be sure, Pinar is against any attempt for rigid categorization and division of knowledge, which is one of the major concerns of the traditional curriculum 'design'. The practice of categorization is reified and, therefore, arrested. Personal knowledge contingent upon the biographic historicity cannot be organized and classified neatly by any objective or arbitrary criteria.

Moreover, the dialectical characteristic of curriculum envisions a very broad and expanded view of knowledge. The dialectical transformation between the knower and what is known not only assumes a mutual influence between the two, but breaks up with the fixed and confined scope of human
knowledge. In short, there are no universal categories and
generic laws to regulate the scope and division of the dia-
lectical knowledge.

3.3.15 Joseph Schwab

Looking back at the 1970s, we come to witness some self-
conscious curriculum scholars who diagnosed critically the
status of curriculum. It was not uncommon then to make use
of a variety of illness metaphors in order to describe the
unhealthy status of curriculum studies both in content and
mode of inquiry. Even though they pointed out different
causes of the illness of curriculum, they shared the opin-
ion that the extant ways of curriculum studies had some
inherent problems and, therefore, they might undermine the
raison d'être of the curriculum study itself.

One of them is J. Schwab, who pronounced that the field
of curriculum is "moribund". Through a series of seminal
essays called "the practical", Schwab not only castigated
the field's unwarranted preoccupation with "the theoretic"
but provided a unique research paradigm as an alternative
to the traditional modes of inquiry. The series of essays
are: The Practical: A Language of Curriculum (1970), "The
Practical: Arts of eclectic" (1971), "The Practical 3:
Translation into Curriculum" (1973), and "The Practical 4:

46 See the second section of CHAPTER I.
Something for Curriculum Professors to do" (1983). The primary focus will be given to the first essay because, as the first work in which the proposal of "the practical" was made, it best expresses what Schwab thinks of curriculum and because it is the conceptual foundation from which the other works are derived. Consequently, without grasping the main ideas in the first essay, it might be difficult to understand fully what is said in the other essays.

Turning to the task of epistemological analysis, first, the central ideas of the practical will be briefly sketched; then, on the basis of a general understanding of the practical, the viability of the analysis will be discussed in detail. The epistemological task will be carried out if the theory of the practical is proven to be viable and valid for the task.

Schwab's basic thesis in the practical (1970) is very simple but provocative. He claims that any curriculum problem is unique and situational and therefore should be resolved by the practical mode of inquiry and not by the theoretic which has inherent weaknesses of "incompleteness" in its subject matter and of "partiality" in its view. Dissatisfied with the domination of the theoretical modes

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47 The first three essays are collected with some others in the volume by Westbury and Wilkof (1978). For the sake of convenience, the collected volume shall be taken in the present study.
of inquiry, he diagnoses that the curriculum field is moribund and the states of illness are caused by an "inveterate, unexamined, and mistaken reliance on theory" (1978, p. 287) which is derived form both inside and outside the curriculum field. Theory in nature is inappropriate to problems of actual circumstances and particular situations.

Theory, by its very character, does not and cannot take account of all the matters which are concerned to questions of what, who, and how to teach; that is, theories cannot be applied, as principles, to the solution of problems concerning what to do with or for real individuals. Theories of personality, for example, beg or ignore problems of social structures and ethics. Theories of knowledge usually ignore problems of personality. (1978, pp. 287-8)

Therefore, the "present methods and principles" under the realm of the theoretic should be abandoned in order to get a "renewed capacity to contribute to the quality" of education. And curriculum inquiry should be diverted from the theoretic pursuits to three other "modes of operation": the practical, the quasi-practical, and the eclectic, which differ radically from the theoretic (1978, p. 288).

The practical is different in its method, subject matter, and outcome. The outcome of the theoretic is lawlike generalizations and principles which are supposed to be durable and extensive. The end of the practical, on the contrary, is "a decision, a selection and guide to possible
action. Decisions are never true or trustworthy" (1978, p. 288). A decision warrants only comparative judgment and assumes better alternatives. It is supposed to be applied to the case for which it was sought.

Likewise, the subject matter of the practical is "something taken as concrete and particular and treated as indefinitely susceptible to circumstance". It is not universal, extensive, or pervasive. The problems of the practical arise from "states of affairs" in relation to individuals' "needs and satisfied desires". Thus, practical problems can be resolved by changing either the state of affairs or their desires (1978, p. 289).

The method of the practical is also radically different from that of the theoretic. There is no principle which guides or rules the ways of inquiry. The practical problems cannot be neatly defined and shaped by theoretical frameworks. They slowly emerge only as we examine the situation closely and as we attempt a search for data which is only "gradually given direction by the slow formation of the problem" (1978, p. 290), asserts Schwab.

This practical mode of curriculum inquiry centers on "deliberation", which is the most adequate means for the resolution of practical curriculum problems. Central to deliberation is the moral and ethical commitment to gener-
ate better decisions to improve and advance situations in the educational contexts. The method of deliberation is neither deductive nor inductive.

It cannot be inductive because the target of the method is not a generalization or explanation, but a decision about action in a concrete situation.

It cannot be deductive because it deals with the concrete case and not abstraction from cases, and the concrete case cannot be settled by mere application of a principle. (1978, p. 318).

Deliberation is thus a complex process and values alternatives. There is no such thing as the right alternative but the best one (1978, p. 319).

Along with the practical, Schwab proposes the quasi-practical and the eclectic as modes of operation to curriculum. The quasi-practical is necessary because the subject matter's "increasing internal variety" is difficult to be effectively practical. It is useful to solve the problems of the practical in consideration of the wide variety in the subject matter. Deliberation about one specific aspect of the subject matter in the practical requires the other aspects to be considered. They mutually affect one another. The latter, the eclectic, "recognizes the usefulness of theory to curriculum, takes account of certain weakness of theory as ground for decision, and provides some degree of repair of these weaknesses" (1978, p. 295).
The weaknesses of the theory, according to him, is derived from two major sources: first, the inevitable "incompleteness" of the subject matters of the theories; and second, the "partiality" of the view each takes of its already incomplete subject (1978, p. 296). The eclectic operation repairs these weaknesses.

First, eclectic operations bring into clear view the particular truncation of subject characteristic of a given theory and bring to light the partiality of its view. Second, eclectic operations permit the serial utilization or even the conjoint utilization of two or more theories on practical problems...The first and the second together enable us to make sophisticated use of theories without paying the full price of their incompleteness and partiality. (1978, p. 297)

Putting emphasis on the significance of the practical and its relation to the other two modes of operations, Schwab looks for the ways in which the practical is to be operated in curriculum. The operation is again closely related to the crisis and incompetences of the extant modes of inquiry. First, the curriculum is in crisis of principle in correspondent to the crisis of principle in general. Signs of the crisis are exposed by the "flight" from the subject of the field.48

48 There are six types of flights: a flight of 1) the field itself, 2) upward, 3) downward, 4) to the sidelines, 5) perseveration, and 6) eristic, contentious, and ad hominem debate (1978, pp. 301-4).
And the theoretic has three types of inherent incompetences: failure of scope, vice of abstraction, and radical plurality. First, curriculum theory is incompetent in that all the features of the typical efforts at curriculum making are grounded in a particular theory from the social or behavioral sciences and each of them concerns a different subject matter. No curriculum, grounded in but one of the subjects such as individual, groups, cultures, communities, minds, or the extant bodies of knowledge can possibly be adequate or defensible. Contributions from all are required. However, according to Schwab, there is "no foreseeable hope of a unified theory" in the future, nor of "a meta-theory which will tell us how to put them together" (1978, p. 308).

Second, the vice of abstraction is one overall weakness. Extant attempts for curriculum theory tend to unduly rely upon the ideal rather than the concrete reality. A plethora of such abstract theories does not contribute to the resolution of the practical problems in curriculum. Such abstract theory "leaves behind the nonuniformities, the particularities, which categorize each concrete instance of the facts subsumed" (1978, p. 309). Curriculum in action deals with real things which are distinctive of theoretical abstraction and idealization. Reality and artificial construct do not match. This is the reason why arts are required which bring theory to its application (1971).
Third, incompentence of the theoretic is found in the notion of the radical plurality. All theories from different schools deliver different messages on the same subject matter. Each of the theories is incomplete to the extent that competing theories take hold of a different aspect of the subject of inquiry and treat it a different way (1978, p. 311). Such theories are not appropriate by themselves to tell us what to do with and how to do with actual human beings. Various suggestions and contrary guidance must be mediated and combined by the arts of eclectic of the practical.

In contrast to the incompentence of the theoretic, the practical arts of curriculum have the ground in the existing institutions and human beings and are directly concerned with the diagnoses of the actual problems and their treatments. The change is thus piecemeal rather than radical. An effective decision requires practical deliberation for the most appropriate alternative solutions of the problems. The character of the problems depends on the discerning eyes of the observers involved in the deliberation. Thus deliberation requires consideration of the widest possible variety of alternatives if it is to be most effective. Situations are essentially unique and the subject matter of the curriculum is much complex, fragmented, and interdependent.
As briefly reviewed, Schwab's curriculum theory of the practical does not deal with the issue of curriculum content and its epistemological bases. Even in "The Practical 3: Translation into Curriculum" (1973), although Schwab is talking about "subject matter" as one of four "commonplaces" that he considers to be the most essential constituents of curriculum (along with teacher, learner, and milieu), he does not concern himself with anything about the particular epistemological features and knowledge claims of the subject matter as curriculum content. Rather, this essay emphasizes the dynamic interplay between the commonplaces in the process of decision making about curriculum. He shows how decision making in a particular and unique curriculum situation is affected by the interaction of the four elements. He is concerned not so much with what the subject matter should be like as with how the subject matter is developed and built through the process of the practical deliberation. In doing so, the formal epistemological questions about the subject matter turn out to be out of main consideration.

This, however, does not necessarily indicate that Schwab does not maintain an epistemological position in his own theory. In a broad sense, it can be claimed that for him bodies of "knowledge" generated from the practical inquiry are more valuable and adequate than those from the theoreti-
ic for the solution of curriculum problems. But this type of meta-theoretic knowledge claims take a radically different dimension both in content and direction as intended in this study. The knowledge is about the theory per se, not about the subject matter. The thesis of the practical is obviously meta-theoretic in that it deals with curriculum theory per se exclusively even though Schwab does not attempt to combine particular curriculum theories nor makes an integral analysis of the theories. As a theory about theory for justifying the practical as a viable alternative for curriculum theory, it saves no room for the issue of the epistemological features of the subject matter of the curriculum itself.

Furthermore, it is evident that he refuses to accept the view that curriculum theory itself is adequate to and worthwhile for the practical curriculum problems. Probably, the implication of the practical can be interpreted as a serious critique of abuse of theory and of overabundance of impractical, useless theory. Or it might be interpreted as an attempt to elucidate the limitations and weaknesses of theory, which have not been well recognized so far.

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49 Again, this kind of 'curriculum knowledge' should not be confused with curriculum content, as indicated in the analysis of van Manen's theory.
Nonetheless, both the meta-theoretic nature of Schwab's curriculum theory and the practical-oriented position highlighting the process of deliberation prevent us from continuing our epistemological analysis. There is no object or rationale for the analysis. Thus, we classify Schwab's curriculum theory as a 'content-free' theory.

34 SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze the epistemological claims of selected contemporary curriculum theories with respect to school curriculum content. First, the concept 'curriculum theory' was delineated in detail as the conceptual boundaries circumscribed are directly applied to the selection of the theories to be analyzed. A broad definition permitting an inclusive view of curriculum theory was made, along with an auxiliary condition. According to the definition, a curriculum theory is 'a set of coherent and systematic statements and propositions about curricular phenomena and their relationships' encompassing opinions, beliefs, descriptions, interpretations, and explanations. However, the auxiliary condition requires that a curriculum theory entail a particular theorist's personal claims, positions, or viewpoints.

On the basis of this broad conception of curriculum theory, fifteen extant curriculum theories were selected
for an epistemological analysis. In the selection process, three basic criteria were taken into account: temporal limitation; geographical limitation; and number of sampling. First, this study exclusively focused upon curriculum theories that surfaced during the period between 1970 and 1986. The major reason to establish such a temporal boundary was that the time around 1970 is considered to be a turning point in the field of curriculum studies due to the emergence of a variety of controversial modes of curriculum inquiry. Besides, the researcher’s personal interest in the contemporary curriculum was in part responsible for the decision.

Second, with regard to the geographic boundary, we recognize that American theorists are dominant in number. Among the fifteen, only four were non-Americans. Moreover, talking about the linguistic boundary, most of them were from English-speaking cultures with only one exception, Freire. These kinds of limitations should be understood in terms of the researcher’s personal knowledge, backgrounds, and acquaintance. It does not necessarily mean that those that were not selected are neither important nor valuable.

Finally, the number of the selected theories (fifteen) is largely arbitrary and situational. Therefore, it is pointless to ask whether or not they should represent the
contemporary curriculum theories as a whole. What is important is that any curriculum theory could be analyzed according to the epistemological criteria. In this regard, one should not attempt to make any kind of generalization from the results of the analysis. The notion of representativeness is not warrantable here.

The actual analysis followed the selection of the theories. We were comfortable in dealing with some of the theories, while we had difficulty and uneasiness with some others. Furthermore, we identified several 'content-free' curriculum theories which were not subjected to the analysis according to the criteria. A systematic summary of the analyses of the theories will be given in the section on SYNTHESIS and CRITICAL DISCUSSION in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
CONTEMPORARY CURRICULUM THEORIES: SYNTHESIS AND
CRITIQUE

4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter, we provided a somewhat detailed analysis of the knowledge claims of fifteen contemporary curriculum theories according to a set of epistemological criteria. In this chapter, the results of the analysis serve as a foundation for the next task of epistemological conceptualization: synthesis and critique. As such, the basic purpose of this chapter is to establish a number of synthetical classifications and to critique the respective epistemological categories in the classification systems.

In the section on SYNTHESIS, we will attempt to make three different classifications of the theories on the basis of their epistemological claims regarding school curriculum content. First, all curriculum theories are to be classified into one of the three categories depending on the degree of manifestation in expressing their knowledge claims.
A second classification is based on four discrete epistemological criteria. With the exception of the 'content-free' theories, each theory will be categorized into one of the subcriteria of the respective epistemological criteria. However, in the case of the criterion of the origin and source of knowledge, a more loose and broad conceptualization is required for the reason that there were no established subcriteria in it and that all the theories showed very diversified answers to the issue.

Finally, a third classification is concerned with the prospective aggregation of the theories as consequences of the two previous ways of groupings. In this case, what is important is to understand the general tendency of aggregation of theories regardless of the criteria working for the groupings. A preliminary investigation warrants the hypothesis that there is a tendency that the same theories under a particular subcriterion of a particular epistemological criterion incline to take the same place under a different subcriterion with very little variation. Moreover, this way of grouping is compared with and contrasted to some extant examples of curriculum theory classifications and the degree of commonness and differentiation will be examined.
The second section, the critical conceptualization, focuses upon the strengths and weaknesses of the individual categories established in the synthesis. That is, in the process of critical discussion, the conceptual categorization already set forth will be utilized for a comparative critique. Therefore, a critique of the individual theories is not the main point. If any, it has to be understood in terms of the particular category in which they are included.

Furthermore, the literature on epistemology from both inside and outside of education and curriculum studies will be selectively utilized to the extent that it promotes a critical understanding of the characteristics of each category. It is highly expected that through the process of the critical discussion, the problems and drawbacks which remained unexamined or overlooked will be brought to light and the implications of the problems will also be investigated. In doing so, we will be able to better understand the deep-rooted epistemological grounds of the problems.

4.2 SYNTHESIS

The first leg of our synthetical conceptualization is the differentiation between the 'content-free' theories and those which are concerned with curriculum content. What is important in this categorization is that the distinction is
a matter of degree, not of kind. All curriculum theories somehow involve epistemology in the process of theory construction, as epistemology constitutes basic assumptions or premises. With most theories, the influence of epistemology is perceivable, though the extent of the influence varies from theory to theory. With some theories, however, the influence of epistemology is too insignificant to be perceived. Thus, they do not maintain particular knowledge claims on curriculum content and it is not possible to make an analysis according to the epistemological criteria.

Beauchamp and Schwab examplify the latter case. Both of them by and large embody specific epistemological tenets in the process of their theory construction particularly with respect to the reality issue of knowledge. In the case of Beauchamp, it is apparent that he takes an objectivistic ontological position which values scientific and technological knowledge in curriculum theory construction. But we can hardly identify in his theory any knowledge claims regarding curriculum content that reveal his own epistemological position. Likewise, Schwab maintains a general epistemology which endorses relativistic knowledge in the process of practical deliberation for the "practical" curriculum theory. But he never talks about what knowledge as curriculum content should be or should not be dealt with in school.
Finally, in the case of Illich, the logic of "deschooling" itself deprives us of the opportunities to discuss curriculum content. It functions as the basis for his own curriculum theory which repudiates values of institutionalized schooling and any theorizing attempt to sustain it. Unlike the case of Schwab and Beauchamp, we cannot find any relevant epistemological implications due to the negation of the existence of school system and its curriculum itself.

With the remaining twelve theories, their epistemology was tangible enough for the analysis despite the differences in the degree of manifestation and inference. They can be classified into two loosely distinguished categories: 'explicit group' and 'implicit group'. Curriculum theories in the explicit group address manifestly what knowledge should be taught as school curriculum content. They provide concrete bodies of knowledge as curriculum knowledge. Included in this group are Adler, Bruner, Hirst, and King and Brownell. Regardless of the differences in labels referring to curriculum knowledge, they are in common in proposing what actually constitutes curriculum knowledge. Provision of particular bodies of knowledge as curriculum content evidently exposes their particular epistemological positions.
In comparison with this explicit group, curriculum theories in the implicit group are primarily concerned with the critique and appraisal of the current practice in selecting and organizing curriculum content. That is, their major concern is what should not be taught as school curriculum content and why rather than a positive proposal of what knowledge should be included in the curriculum content. In spite of a considerable diversity of the reasons why what is being taught has to be seriously called into question and reexamined, they are unanimous in the critique of curriculum knowledge currently being dealt with in school. However, in contrast to the content-free group, we can still identify their particular knowledge claims though we have to make inferences or reflections on the passive viewpoints about curriculum knowledge.

At this point, it must be reminded that it is possible to assume that differences in the degree of manifestation can certainly exist among the theories in a particular group of the three. However, a further attempt for a smaller grouping is discontinued considering the intent of this study. And more detailed discussions about the individual theories in relation to the group to which they belong are reserved for the section on CRITICAL DISCUSSION.
The second mode of conceptualization rests with the epistemological subcriterions already utilized in the previous chapter. We established four types of criteria for the analysis and each criterion encompassed two or more subcriterions. The first criterion, the nature of knowledge, entails objective realism, subjective idealism, and relativism. The detailed descriptions and explanations make it suffice to match the theories with the epistemological positions as the subcriterions. Thus, it seems not necessary to review all the individual theories in detail. According to the analysis, we first come to recognize that there is no theory resorting to subjective idealism. This, however, does not necessarily imply that all curriculum theories do not advocate this particular ontological position. It seems more valid to say that the limited number of the theories selected for the analysis affects the possibility of inclusion of such theory.

In contrast, we can classify such theories as Adler, Bruner, Hirst, and King and Brownell\(^5\) into objective realism on the ground that they hold a common ontological belief that objective bodies of knowledge exist 'out there' independently of and apart from the knower's subjectivity and knowing process. Existence of the knowing subject and pursuit of knowledge themselves by no means affect the

\(^5\) Again, in this case the names refer to their particular theories.
objective status of knowledge. There is no logically or conceptually necessary relationship between the knower and the known. Knowledge is something to be discovered, acquired, and mastered.

On the other hand, such theories as Eisland, Eisner, MacDonald, and van Manen maintain a relativistic ontological position with regard to curriculum content. According to them, there is no such thing as reified and objectified knowledge based upon some permanent, universal, and unequivocal standards or criteria. Every kind of knowledge is somehow arbitrary, artificial, and socially constructed. It is subject to radical change and revision corresponding to changes in particular contexts of society in which the knowers find themselves. The relativism not only involves the historical dimension but the cultural and horizontal dimension of the relativity of knowledge.

Besides these two types of ontological positions, there emerges a third position. It is called dialectics. The reason for not being introduced is that dialectics involves both the subject and the object at the same time at the center of its ontology. As mentioned, the heart of dialectics is the dynamic mutual interplay between the subject and the object, the knower and the known, that is. In dialectics, either the subject without the object or the
object without the subject is meaningless. Both of them influence each other in order to constantly transform their realities. The ultimate aim of the dialectics is found in human liberation and emancipation from both objective and subjective distortion and exploitation of material as well as social realities. Thus, dialectical knowledge is an essential means to raise the knower's critical consciousness toward liberation.

Freire, Apple, Giroux, and Pinar are regarded as the most rigorous proponents of the dialectical view of knowledge. For them, in spite of the thematic variations, human consciousness is the most crucial concept for the subject to correctly understand the objective conditions of both material and social realities in which the subject is involved. However, it must be noted that it is possible to trace certain tendency toward the dialectics in some curriculum theories other than the three. But it is apparent that the three theories are the most conspicuous in emphasizing the significance of the dialectic.

The second epistemological criterion in the second mode of conceptualization, the source and origin of knowledge, does not contain any particular subcriterion for conceptualization. Very few curriculum theories explicitly address knowledge claims as to where curricular knowledge comes
from. Thus, we carefully investigate the scattered statements which seem to be relevant to the issue by way of conceptual inferences. There is a considerable degree of diversity in the results of the analysis. All the theories expose multiple and varied knowledge claims concerning the issue. The diversity in the epistemological positions addressed by the theories, which in turn does not permit provision of a unifying set of subcriteria running through them, must be understood considering the conceptual inclusiveness of the issue of the source and origin of knowledge itself. The question of where curriculum knowledge comes from in nature hardly warrants any classified and systematic answers. Moreover, not a single curriculum theory overtly endorses one of the traditional viewpoints of the source of reliable and indubitable knowledge: empiricism, which exclusively rests on sensory/perceptual experience of the external objects; and rationalism, which exclusively emphasizes the intrinsic mechanism of human rationality as power of reason. Therefore, we did not employ a set of deductive subcriteria.

However, according to the results of the analysis, we come to recognize that it may be possible to formulate a loose grouping in an inductive manner. It is inductive in the sense that some commonnesses in the claims emerge as a consequence of the comparison and contrast. All the claims
about the issue can be loosely classified into two distinguished categories. A first group takes an epistemological position that curriculum knowledge derives from certain concrete and fixed 'content'\footnote{The term 'content' should not be confused with that which is used in the phrase of 'content-free' theories. As defined in the section on PURPOSES AND ASSUMPTIONS, they refer to those curriculum theories which are not concerned with curriculum content.} as fundamental source. Put another way, whatever the curriculum knowledge might be, there is a relatively complete and stable substantive content from which curriculum knowledge is to be derived and originated.

In contrast, the other group does not take such formal and predetermined substance as the source of curriculum knowledge. Rather, curriculum knowledge derives from certain intangible 'process' beyond the fixed substance. For the theories in this group, such concepts as interaction, transformation, and dialectics are the most essential things. Curriculum knowledge should not be considered something to be given, discovered, transmitted, or mastered. Neither should it be confined to any objective and artificial boundaries. It is somewhat indeterminate and amorphous; therefore, incompatible with any rigorous modes of verification.
The curriculum theories that belong to the first group are: Adler, Bruner, Hirst, and King and Brownell. In spite of the variation in detailed knowledge claims, they all share the belief that curriculum knowledge comes from some substantive content independent of the knower. In the case of Adler, the same bodies of knowledge have to be included in school curriculum for all regardless of any possible differences in the individuals. And 'the same' knowledge derives its essentials from the Western cultural heritage and intellectual traditions that are thought to be the most fundamental to every human being's living in the contemporary democratic society. Bruner and King and Brownell expound that any curriculum knowledge should necessarily be originated from the distinctive academic disciplines. Despite the problem of selection, frontiers of the scholarship (as disciplinary authorities) play critical roles in determining what is to be included in the curriculum. For them, evidently, knowledge comes from the disciplines and it is mediated by the authorities in particular disciplines.

In a similar vein, Hirst also assumes certain substantive and concrete bodies of knowledge for the derivation of curriculum knowledge. The "forms of knowledge" as consequences of the logical and conceptual analysis of intelligible human activities serve to organize curriculum knowl-
edge, even though it is not possible to make curriculum knowledge identical to the forms of knowledge themselves considering the psychology of the learner and the practice of schooling.

In contrast, the rest of the theories sustains, implicitly or explicitly, the process-oriented position with respect to the source of knowledge issue. Esland argues that knowledge, any meaningful human knowledge, has to be based upon the process of negotiation and mutual compromise between the individual and social agencies. There is no absolute and fixed source of knowledge which presupposes immutability.

Freire focuses upon the significance of the dialectical praxis as the most critical source of knowledge. According to him, knowledge is attained and formulated through active participation of the subjective knower in the process of the transformation of the world in which he finds himself, both in material and spiritual terms. Critical revolutionary consciousness is generated through the active engagement in the practical experience—dialectical praxis, that is. There are no fixed bodies of knowledge which are supposed to construct the content of the "problem-posing education".
For Apple, curriculum knowledge is already a choice from a much larger universe of possible social knowledge and principles of the dominant social classes. It, therefore, has political and economic commitment to ideology. Curriculum knowledge is derived and determined from the particular ideological contexts at the particular time. It is misleading to claim that there is certain ideology-free and value-neutral source of curriculum knowledge unaffected by the dynamic interplay between power and interest.

Eisner posits that knowing is related in a fundamental way to the "experience" that senses make possible beyond the intrinsic function of the cognitive qualities of human mind. For him, knowledge is generated by the combinative function of experience through the sensory systems and the frames of references, the conceptual schemata we already possessed. The traditional viewpoint on the source of reliable knowledge unduly underlines the function of cognitive qualities and the significance of propositional and mathematical knowledge. Sensory and perceptual experience which interplays with the cognitive structure must be also considered as a valid and trustworthy source of knowledge.

Giroux maintains a similar position as Freire with regard to this issue. Curriculum knowledge varies according to the particular historic and social circumstances.
It derives from the critical mediation by human consciousness and reflective action. Being closely linked with the existential situations of the knower, knowledge is historically grounded and contextualized. There are no objective and permanent bases for derivation of knowledge.

Finally, Maodonald, van Manen, and Pinar maintain a similar position as to where knowledge comes from. Maodonal's "mytho-poetic", van Manen's "hermeneutic-phenomenological knowledge", and Pinar's "currere" through the autobiographic self study share one thing in common in that they all repudiate the existence of the reified and objectified substances as a source of curriculum knowledge. They agree that the most significant knowledge is derived from the subjective interpretation of realities and from the process of searching for the intersubjective meanings. They are concerned with the individual's real life situations and his/her inner personal experience. For this reason, they stress the non-cognitive qualities in creation and construction of knowledge such as insight, intuition, imagination, reflexivity, and the like, all of which are distinguished from the cognitive qualities of reasoning and mental operation.

As noted, for the content-based group, curriculum knowledge is derived from the substantive content. Therefore,
It is regarded as something to be 'discovered', 'transmitted', or 'mastered'. There is no commitment to a political and ideological criticism or personalized singular dimension of knowledge in this particular epistemological position. In contrast, the latter group, the process-based position regards curriculum knowledge as something to be 'created', 'produced', 'constructed', 'negotiated', or 'compromised'. There are no immutable or fixed grounds as the origin and source of curriculum knowledge. To think that it exists is a mystification and distortion of reality. It is situational and in process and, therefore, is subject to a radical alteration in accordance with the contextual needs for change.

The third criterion is justification for the values of knowledge. With respect to this issue, we set forth two types of antithetical subcriteria: intrinsic vs. extrinsic; and personal, individual, or singular vs. public, social, or collective dimension of knowledge. An intrinsic way of justification holds that knowledge as curriculum content is an end-in-itself independent of any use to which it may be put. Curriculum knowledge is valued by virtue of its inherent and immanent values deeply embedded in the essential nature of knowledge per se. Often, this notion of intrinsic values of knowledge is associated with the cultivation and development of human intellect. Proponents of
the intrinsic position have an unequivocal conviction that acquisition of knowledge by and large guarantees improvement of certain mental qualities and intellectual powers which are not always easily discernable.

Included in this intrinsic position are such curriculum theories as Adler, Bruner, Hirst, King and Brownell, Eisner, and van Manen. Not surprisingly, with the exception of the last two persons, they are strongly associated with the disciplinary curriculum approach. In the case of Eisner and van Manen, it is evident that they never appeal to direct applicability and usefulness of curriculum knowledge even though they do not accept the notion of disciplinary values of knowledge. They assume certain intellectual as well as non-cognitive qualities through the process and consequence of knowledge attainment.

The opposite position, the extrinsic justification of knowledge, holds the popular belief that curriculum knowledge functions as a means necessary for securing of some other values. It explicitly rejects the viewpoint that knowledge possesses certain immanent qualities completely detached from the usage. Rather, advocates of this position agree that knowledge is valued because of the uses and applicability to which it is put. Thus, apparently, in this pragmatic point of view, knowledge is considered to be
a means for achieving other ends outside of it. There are no ultimate and fixed values of knowledge apart from the notion of contribution to certain ends—even though the ends vary.

This extrinsic epistemological position is supported covertly or overtly by such curriculum theories as Freire, Apple, Giroux, Macdonald, and Pinar. Despite some thematic differences in their ends and purposes, they all unequivocally argue that any curriculum knowledge is to be valued to the extent that it functions as a powerful means to achieve certain ends at which curriculum is aiming. In the case of Freire, the content of the "problem-posing" education is worthwhile in that it is geared toward promoting "conscientization". For him, there is no such thing as complete and indubitable knowledge which embodies ultimate values. Rather, knowledge as dialectical knowledge has to be pragmatic in order to raise critical consciousness for the transformation of both the subject and the object.

Apple repudiates the concept of neutral and context-free knowledge which is supposed to promote human rationality with its generic values. Instead, any curriculum knowledge inherently has political as well as economic implications. Therefore, it must focus upon the notion of 'justice' in the society in terms of power and hegemony. In a broad
sense, emancipation refers to a state in which social justice is achieved. Any knowledge that does not contribute to the promotion of social justice is worthless and meaningless in this regard. Thus, knowledge is necessarily ideological.

In a similar way, Giroux contends that the value of curriculum knowledge is justified on the ground that it is directly linked with the notion of emancipatory intentions which aim to free individuals from both subjective and objective constraints imposed by distortion and exploitation of reality. Valuable curriculum knowledge motivates individuals to realize the oppressed conditions and the fabricated social and material realities. That is, it plays a central role for human-consciousness raising. There is no knowledge by and in itself valuable which is remote from the knower’s external situations and particular historical contexts.

Macdonald and Pinar also hold an extrinsic view on curriculum knowledge. Like Freire, Macdonald considers a curricular knowledge to be worthwhile if it contributes to the alteration of human consciousness for the ultimate expectation of liberation. It must be useful to transcend the limitations and constraints of the knower’s social conditions and the taken-for-granted meaning of everyday life.
Likewise, in Pinar's view, there is no knowledge which maintains the ultimate values apart from the particular personal contexts of historical contingency. Curriculum knowledge is valuable for it helps the "ontological shift" from the state of "arrest", "alienation", and "estrangement" of the particular individual being. The shift is possible only through the subjective knowledge attained by the autobiographic self study.

The second subcriterion in the justification criterion is the antithesis of the personal, individual, or singular dimension of knowledge vs. the public, social, or collective dimension of knowledge. As indicated in CHAPTER II, the question of whether the beneficiary of knowledge is the individuals or the society is pointless in that the demarcation begs further questions about the concept of the terms themselves and the controversial relationship between the two. Thus, in the analysis we were concerned with the issue of whether curriculum knowledge values personal knowledge or collective public knowledge.

According to our analysis, it is clear that the majority of the theories subscribe to the value of the singular dimension of knowledge for personal sake. For example, such theories as Adler, Bruner, Hirst, King and Brownell, Eisner, Esland, Macdonald, van Manen, and Pinar emphasize
overtly or covertly the significance of individual knowledge attainment, even though we come to recognize a very subtle difference by which they can be dichotomized into two idiosyncratic groups.

First, in the case of Eisner, Esland, Macdonald, van Manen, and Pinar, all of them give a priority on personal knowledge in terms of both content and method under the assumption that each individual necessarily has different ways of knowing and different kinds of knowledge. The different bodies of knowledge attained by different individuals are considered meaningful and useful only for the subjective knowers themselves.

Emphasis upon the personal dimension of knowledge is highlighted when Macdonald introduces the concept of 'tacit knowledge' borrowed from Polanyi and hermeneutic knowledge, which appeals to the individual's existential inner experience. For Pinar, knowledge attained by the ontological-autobiography method is an exclusively personalized one. Knowledge is meaningful and intelligible only when it is considered as 'someone's' knowledge. There is no aggregate or abstract knowledge. In the case of van Manen, phenomenological knowledge pertains to a particular experience of a particular individual at a particular time. It centers around the personal reaction of the individuals to their
unique Lebenswelt experience and qualities of the world. In the same vein, Esland endorses a personal dimension of knowledge when he stresses intentionality and subjectivity of the knower.

In contrast, we come to perceive a slightly different version of justification of personal knowledge, which is taken by Adler, Bruner, Hirst, and King and Brownell. Apparently, all of them commonly hold the position that personal and individual knowledge—even though it is derived from the public domain of knowledge—is valued because it contributes to the development and cultivation of certain 'individual' intellectual qualities.

However, the priority on individual and personal knowledge is to a great degree 'conditional' for the reason that individuals with a developed mind and cultivated intellect are supposed to contribute to the maintenance of a good society as a whole. They maintain a conservative viewpoint that the aggregation of well educated individuals equipped with such individual knowledge is a prerequisite for building a good society—a stable and fixed society.

In the case of Hirst, initiation into the forms of knowledge ensures preservation of the status quo of the society, for instance. They, therefore, deliberately avoid arguments on the ideological and political dimension of
ourriculum knowledge. Thus, their emphasis upon individual knowledge has a hidden message of collectiveness. However, due to the outward commitment to the individual dimension of knowledge, they are classified 'tentatively' into the group of justification of personal knowledge.

On the contrary, some other theories that mainly advocate the notion of 'dialectic' take an epistemological position which subscribes to the collective dimension of knowledge. They argue that the primary concern of dialectic is emancipation or liberation, which demands the collective concept of knowledge. Of course, the subjective dimension of personal knowledge is also important in the process of dialectic; however, the ultimate aim of emancipation is only possible through a radical change of the collective, not singular, consciousness of the knowers. The personal subjective knowledge is a necessary condition for dialectic to bring about a collective consciousness change for emancipation, but not a sufficient one.

Included in this grouping are Freire, Giroux, and Apple. For Freire, the social dimension of human knowledge is significant in that the concept of dialectic has to be understood in a socio-political context of a particular time. The notion of 'I know' cannot be explained detached from the notion of 'we know'. Apple rejects the individualistic
epistemology in knowledge attainment and creation. Knowledge is socially constructed and historically/ideologically conditioned. Giroux argues that the concept of emancipation is inextricably associated with the collective dimension of knowledge. Praxis suggests a struggle that defines freedom in social and not personal terms. Emancipation is linked with a group of people struggling against unjust social forces.

The fourth and final criterion is the content and scope of knowledge. As examined in CHAPTER III, some theories maintain a very broad perspective regarding the scope of knowledge and others adhere a reductionist position, which sets forth clearly demarcated boundaries delineating the range of curriculum knowledge. The former position, the epistemological expansionist, does not establish any type of categorization or delimitation of curriculum knowledge. In consequence, the conceptions of curriculum knowledge itself are tremendously diversified, and ways of answering the question of what actually constitutes curriculum content vary from theory to theory in most cases. On the contrary, the latter position of reductionism manifestly expounds what counts as curriculum knowledge and involves the issue of kinds and divisions of knowledge. Included in this grouping are such theories as Adler, Bruner, Hirst, and King and Brownell.
According to Adler, objective bodies of curriculum knowledge are mainly derived from the Western culture and civilization and can be broken up into several distinctive clusters. The most significant areas of accumulated human knowledge enshrined in the Western intellectual tradition not only can be identified but can be organized into a number of discrete bodies of educable knowledge which constitute the study areas in curriculum.

Bruner does not overtly argue for the necessity of the division of disciplines. Nonetheless, the basic assumption of the disciplinary curriculum demands certain articulated distinctions between different disciplines. As acknowledged, the structure of knowledge as the central concept of the discipline-centered curriculum logically necessitates discrete and unique structures embedded in each independent discipline. Each discipline embraces inherent particular structures. Implicit in this conception of the structure is demarcation and clear division of curriculum knowledge. For this reason, we include Bruner in the category of the reductionist position even though there is no mention about kinds of knowledge in the theory.

In the case of Hirst, curriculum content is exclusively constituted by the remarkably distinctive forms of knowledge which are derived from the logical and conceptual
analysis of serious human activities and public experiences. He emphasizes the logically inevitable distinctions of the categories as the forms. Any meaningful curriculum knowledge, therefore, should be derived from one or more of the forms in order to maintain its logical status. Although Hirst does not seem to be concerned with the division or zones of curriculum knowledge itself, we come to classify his theory as taking a reductionist position in this regard. In his view, any curriculum knowledge is meaningful insofar as it reflects and incorporates the concept of the forms of knowledge.

The most conspicuous exemplar of the reductionist position is found in King and Brownell. According to them, curriculum knowledge for general education is derived from the various modern disciplines. But not all the disciplines can be included in the curriculum for practical reasons. Therefore, selection is inevitable. Certainly, this way of selecting curriculum knowledge not only indicates a reductionist position but shows a narrow scope of curriculum knowledge. Establishment of the distinctive zones of knowledge is one of the central ideas in the theory. Sharp distinctions between clusters of knowledge are essential in their discipline-centered curriculum.
The remaining curriculum theories maintain an expansionist position. They do not explicitly expound which knowledge curriculum content should consist of. For Esland, subject boundaries are the institutionalized symbolic universes arbitrarily imposed by the mystified and reified interpretation of reality. The boundaries are mystifications which deliberately objectify the physical and symbolic universes and function to constrain the subjectivity of the individuals. Thus, they are ineluctably bound up with the "utility" criteria. He openly rejects any attempts to divide or integrate knowledge. Curriculum knowledge should not be confined to any particular conceptual schemes and pseudo-objective categories.

Freire argues that curriculum knowledge should not be detached from the subjective identity and objective circumstances. It has to be based upon the present, existential, concrete situations and realities. It should be constituted by the subjective knower's concrete experiences taking into account his own perception of the objective world of material as well as social realities. In turn, he does not make any distinctions between kinds of knowledge. Any knowledge is significant as long as it generates a critical dialogue for conscientization. The problematizing concept of curriculum knowledge is based upon the thematic organization of knowledge which necessarily embraces a very broad and expansive viewpoint.
Apple also clearly repudiates the concept of "high-status" knowledge and rigid division of stratified curriculum knowledge. Stratification of knowledge necessarily involves some benefit to the most powerful classes in a society. According to him, any type of artificial establishment of a body of knowledge should be seriously questioned and reexamined. Curriculum knowledge for promoting a radical transformation of social and political institutions must encompass a broadened range of knowledge in consideration of the unique situation of a particular society.

One of the most salient emphases of Eisner is the expansionist position about knowledge. He stresses the multiple dimensions of the "forms of representation" as ways of knowing and contents of knowledge beyond the cognitive and propositional dimension of knowing and knowledge which has been dominant in curriculum. Proposition is only one form of "representation". There are "expressive" or "mimetic" modes of treating the forms beyond the "discursive and numerical" forms. The expanded view of knowledge in turn demands certain subject areas that cultivate and refine human sensibilities conveying diversified and various forms of representation.

Giroux's notion of dialectical knowledge calls for a more "relational" view of knowledge. It rejects the arbi-
trary division of curriculum knowledge as well as the myst-
ified and unwarranted demarcation of the subject matter
areas which carry certain reified and imposed knowledge.
The knower himself is the final and ultimate authority to
judge which knowledge is significant for him in a particu-
lar social and historical context. The boundaries of cur-
riculum knowledge, therefore, must give way to a more flex-
ible mode of defining curriculum knowledge.

The essential part of Macdonald's curriculum knowledge
is the hermeneutic personal knowledge which overcomes the
distorted meanings and which transforms personal libera-
tion. He explicitly rejects the "separate or segmented"
curriculum knowledge and pays attention to "maximum possi-
ble variation" of individuals in order to contribute
directly to the creation of meanings for everyday living.
For him, the hermeneutic curriculum knowledge attained by
the "mytho-poetic" has a wide scope beyond the objectified
static knowledge often regarded as value-neutral.

Van Manen criticizes the current curricular conduct of
"categorial abstractions of knowledge". There is no dis-
inctive boundaries or zones in the conception of the phe-
nomenological knowledge. It not only entails personal
dimensions of knowledge incorporating personal feelings and
emotions, but embraces the concept of the world and of dis-
closure or "unconcealment". Any question of knowledge should be situated back to the life world where knowledge speaks through the knower's lived experience.

Finally, Pinar does not clearly say which concrete bodies of knowledge comprise curriculum content. Nonetheless, the knowledge attained through the autobiographic method shows a tremendous variety due to the idiosyncratic contexts in which different individuals find themselves. The multiplicity of knowledge reflecting the individual's biographic situation refuses the conduct of categorization and division of personal knowledge which is contingent upon biographic historicity. The expansionist position contributes to the ontological shift from "arrest" and alienation to self consciousness.

The third and final mode for the synthetical conceptualization is based upon the two previous modes of synthesis: 1) the grouping according to the degree in manifestation of knowledge claims; and 2) the classification according to the epistemological subcriteria. As mentioned in the section on INTRODUCTION of this chapter, the results of the two modes of synthesis reveal a considerable degree of consistency in the pattern in which the theories are grouped. (An exception is the subcriterion of the personal versus collective dimension of knowledge.) This tendency can be elaborated in several ways.
First, one of the most remarkable things in the tendency is the consistent aggregation composed of Adler, Bruner, Hirst, and King and Brownell. The four theories combined always form a group in any circumstances regardless of the difference in modes of classification. According to the first mode of classification, they constitute exclusively the 'explicit' group. This tendency continues throughout the whole classification attempts in each subcriterion. The tendency must be understood in terms of the similarities in epistemological assumptions embedded in each of the four theories. That is, it can be argued that despite the possible superficial differences in the epistemological claims, they share many points in common as long as the epistemological criteria are concerned. Of course, it is valid to claim that they may or may not form an identical group with different epistemological criteria as bases for the analysis.

A second conspicuous phenomenon is the coherence and consistency taken by particular curriculum theories across the whole classification systems with some minor exceptions. Put simply, the theories classified into the 'implicit' group take relativistic or dialectical ontology, the 'process'-based position as the source of knowledge, the 'extrinsic' way of justification for the value of knowledge, and the 'expansionist' view of scope and con-
tent. On the contrary, the theories taking the 'explicit' position belong to objectivism, the 'content'-based, the 'intrinsic', and the 'reductionist'.

The tendency that the same theories occupying a particular category of the classifications also tend to constitute the other particular categories implies that there is a considerable degree of congruency and coincidence among them. But, logically, it by no means indicates the problems of conceptual articulation and distinction between the criteria. Rather, it seems to be more valid to interpret the tendency as coherence in the epistemological claims of the curriculum theories.

However, two kinds of exceptions are found with this tendency. First, we find Eisner and van Manen included in the category of the intrinsic justification. This reveals the fact that both of them maintain certain epistemological positions which deviate from what we assume to be. In other words, they propose deviated knowledge claims as long as the justification issue is concerned. Second, the category of the personal versus collective dimension of knowledge is also inconsistent with the other patterns of groupings. Only three theories (Freire, Apple, and Giroux) are included in the category of collective knowledge. There is a mixture between the implicit group and the explicit group.
in this particular category. That is, as long as this sub-
criterion is concerned, the two groups except the three
share a common epistemological position—provided we agree
tentatively that the explicit group is included.

Thirdly, it is of interest to compare this tendency with
some of the classification systems of curriculum theory.
Some have attempted to categorize curriculum theories in
consideration of the diversified approaches to curriculum
 theorizing. In a similar way as Beauchamp does, McCoy
(1981) distinguishes between "philosophical curriculum
 theory" and "scientific curriculum theory" taking into
account the fundamental dichotomy of 'ought' and 'is' in
curriculum theory. The results of the classification
indicate that all the curriculum theories included in this
study belong to the domain of the philosophical curriculum
theory with an exception of Beauchamp's content-free theo-
sy. Thus, considering McCoy's dichotomy, the selection of
the theories in the present study seems to suffer the prob-
lem of skewness. But, again, this does not warrant the
claim that the contemporary curriculum theories incline to
be "philosophical".

Huenecke (1982) also differentiates between three kinds
of curriculum theorizing: "structural", "substantive", and

52 See the second section of CHAPTER II.
"generic". In light of Huenecke's claims regarding the differentiation, it is apparent that the classification systems set forth in this study are by and large compatible with Huenecke's categories. First of all, we can include Beauchamp in the category of the structural for the reason that it insists on the value-neutral scientific process which objectively identifies elements and components of curriculum theory for curriculum development.

A second form of theorizing, called the substantive, is exclusively concerned with the desirable subject matter or content focusing upon relevancy in curriculum. Evidently, according to the detailed depiction of the characteristics of the substantive theorizing, the category corresponds to the 'explicit' group which is composed of Ader, Bruner, Hirst, and king and Brownell—in turn, they are exclusively objectivistc, content-based, intrinsic, and reductionist.

Finally, all other 'epistemological' theories belong to the final category of the generic curriculum theorizing, which is further classified into two subgroups of existential/phenomenological theory and sociological/political theory. With reference to Huenecke's rationale for the differentiation, the theories endorsing relativism

53 See the second section of CHAPTER II.
54 This dichotomy is dependent upon that of Benham (1980), which consists of "existential" and "structural", as shown in CHAPTER I.
and personal knowledge except those in the substantive category are parallel to the existential/phenomenological; meanwhile those advocating the dialectics and collective dimension of knowledge are compatible with the sociological/political category. However, it was found that all of the generic theories take the 'process'-based source of knowledge and the 'expansionist' viewpoint with regard to scope of knowledge.

In addition, Pinar's classification of the three groups of curriculum scholars,\(^\text{55}\) which is conceptually consistent with Macdonald's depiction of the three types of different groups among curriculum theorists, sheds some light on the synthetical conceptualization. Most of all, we cannot identify any single theory or theorist which is thought to be corresponding to the category of the "traditional", if we ignore the statements in 1975 (1975a, pp. ix-xii) that include some of the discipline-centered curriculum theorists in the "traditional". Nonetheless, we can include Beauchamp in the category of the "conceptual-empiricist".

Furthermore, we do not have any difficulty in establishing the parallel between the implicit group and the "reconceptualist". Although Pinar does not make any distinction between the theories in the reconceptualist group and emphasizes the multi-faceted features of both content and

\(^{55}\) See the second section of CHAPTER I.
mode of inquiry, we come to recognize the general tendency which distinguishes between the relativistic and the dialectical theories in the criterion of the nature of knowledge, as the results of the synthetical conceptualization indicate. The same is applicable to the distinction between the personal dimension and collective dimension of knowledge. We recognize a dichotomy in this category in the reconceptualist theorists.

However, there is a difficulty in the comparison of the present classifications with Pinar's. In Pinar's categorization, it is totally unclear how to treat the explicit theories of Adler, Hirst, and King and Brownell even though we tentatively include Bruner in the category of the traditional or the conceptual-empiricist. Undoubtedly, it is a misreading of Pinar's arguments if we consider them as the traditionalists or the conceptual-empiricists. Moreover, if we correctly accept his rationale for the distinction, it is a gross error to identify them with the reconceptualists. If they are unclassifiable, what is the reason? This sort of difficulty warrants a further examination of Pinar's categorization itself.
4.3 CRITICAL DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of this section is to make a comprehensive critique of the categorial groups on the basis of the classifications as an epistemological conceptualization. Therefore, instead of focusing upon the individual theories, each category is subject to critique paying attention to contrast and comparison among the categorial distinctions. For this reason, any critical treatment of the individual theories should be understood in relation to the particular epistemological categories to which they belong.

In the previous section on SYNTHESIS, we provided various modes of epistemological classification in order to establish a number of distinctive categories. First, all the theories were classified into three major categories: the content-free group, the implicit group, and the explicit group. Second, with respect to the distinctive epistemological criteria, we established a variety of categories: 1) objectivism, relativism, and dialectics in the criterion of the nature of knowledge; 2) the content-based, and the process-based in the criterion of the source or origin of knowledge; 3) intrinsic versus extrinsic and the personal dimension versus the collective dimension of knowledge in the criterion of justification of the values of knowledge; and finally, 4) reductionist and expansionist in the criterion of the scope and content of knowledge. In this sec-
tation each of the above categories will be critically investigated focusing upon the salient distinctions generated by the indepth comparison and contrast among the contradictory and controversial categories.

Turning first to the category of the content-free theories in the first mode of classification, we recognize that they expose very unique characteristics. After all, they do not concern the issue of what counts as school curriculum. Thus, they are not involved in any particular epistemological claims concerning curriculum content. Rather, they are more concerned with providing useful guidelines and suggestions for curriculum theory construction itself, especially in the case of Beauchamp and Schwab. A central concept useful to elucidate this unique theoretical position is the concept of 'meta-theory', whose meaning was examined in CHAPTER I. As a version of meta-theory, a common major subject matter is 'theory' itself in their curriculum theories. They discuss about what a curriculum theory should be like, how we construct it, or what are the problems of the theory-oriented curriculum theories. That is, they have one thing in common in that they are concerned with the same 'object language' as theory itself. We find this meta-theoretic orientation in Beauchamp and Schwab.
In the case of Illich, the judgment demands a little more consideration. The fact that Illich undermines the necessity of the current school system and its curriculum and that he proposes a curricular alternative in the deschooled society may lead us to regard the theory as an epistemological one. However, insofar as he negates the values and necessity of curriculum theory itself—even in an implicit fashion—in his own theory, we can consider it a meta-theory. We must remember that the organizing principle of the present study is just the school curriculum and its theory.

All of these content-free theories do not by themselves bear any significant implications as to what knowledge should be included and dealt with in school curriculum and why. Nevertheless, we notice a substantive number of contemporary curriculum theories being committed to this metatheoretic approach. It is hard to deny their contribution to the field of curriculum studies. But we can recognize that this type of theorizing endeavor is sharply against the claims of those who argue that any curriculum theory should address and be involved in the issue of what counts as curriculum knowledge and how to obtain it.56

56 This particular position was advocated by such curriculum scholars as Cherryholmes (1982), Kliebard (1985), McClellan (1969), Taylor and Richards (1985), etc. as indicated in CHAPTER II.
The second category of the implicit group contains curriculum theories which maintain a negative or passive position concerning curriculum knowledge. They express very little commitment to the traditional notion of curriculum development and design. Both a critique of the current curricular practice and claims as to what knowledge should not be included in curriculum content and why are dominant over the positive proposal of what knowledge should constitute curriculum content. Consequently, we infer the varying epistemological positions from their critical knowledge claims about curriculum content. Of course, they differ greatly in the reason why they criticize other viewpoints of curriculum content. There is no single, and unitary paradigm or conceptual framework by which the critique is generated and warranted.

This point is quite understandable when we recognize that the theories in the category are just parallel to those of the "reconceptualist" scholarship which has a variety of philosophical backgrounds and intellectual roots such as Marxism, neo-Marxism, phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, psychoanalysis, etc. Moreover, they interpret one particular philosophy or paradigm among them in the radically different ways and it is not unusual to combine two or more from them in the process of their curriculum theorizing. This phenomenon must be understood in
the multi-faceted and diversified features of the reconceptualist group both in content and method of inquiry.

In turn, despite the complexity in the rationale for the critique, when we confine the focus of discussion to the issue of curriculum knowledge per se, we can accomplish a general critique which is relevant to the issue. The fundamental shortcoming inherent in the theories in the category is the problem of the lack of the practical alternatives. Put simply, we are confronted with the problem of 'after critique, then what?'. As most of the reconceptualists admit themselves, even though we warrant the significance and urgency of the critiques for reconceptualization of the field of curriculum studies, they seem to be not ready to provide a satisfactory answer as to which knowledge should be dealt as curriculum content in a concrete manner. A critique of what is being taught is not enough for making a practical decision about what to teach.

Probably, this kind of the lack of the practical implication can be understood as an immanent shortcoming of the implicit group that stresses the critical function of curriculum theory. This problem is well pointed out when Pinar (in Feinberg, 1985, p. 92) posits that there is no school presently implementing a reconceptualized curriculum—it is still in the formative stage. In a simi-
lar vein, Apple (in Benham, 1980, p. 168) admits that he does not think the reconceptualists are going to have any major impact on the school curriculum practice. He thinks that the schools are doing exactly what they are supposed to be doing.

No matter what are the reasons for the difficulty of the practical implementation with the implicit group, there must be a more serious consideration on the strategic dimensions for the application of the ideas to school curriculum. The value of any curriculum theory can hardly be justified unless it is related to the practice in some way.

In contrast to the previous two categories, the third group, the explicit group, of the general classification proposes directly and manifestly which knowledge should be included in school curriculum content and why. The theories in this category can be thought of as the most epistemology-oriented ones on the ground that they clearly expose their knowledge claims about curriculum content. As a consequence, we do not face much difficulty in the epistemological analysis. As Bruner notes (1962, p. 120), the issue of the subject matter in curriculum can be resolved "only by reference to the view of the nature of knowledge". All the theories in this category subscribe to this belief in the epistemological model of curriculum theory overtly or overtly.
Thus, it is understandable that the theories contribute to the actual curriculum development and design most manifestly. The explicit claims as to what counts as curriculum content and why lead the school people to have a relatively clear viewpoint of curriculum development and design. This is part of the reason why some of the curriculum reform movements in the past were so strongly associated with this particular position. Their claims and arguments were persuasive and cogent enough to be easily implemented in the actual process of school curriculum making.

Nonetheless, like other positions, the theories have some shortcomings and involve controversial issues in terms of epistemology. These will be discussed in the following critical discussion of objectivism, content-based source of knowledge, intrinsic justification, and reductionist position. As indicated, because they always constitute the same group without an exception, the reservation of critique in this subsection for the following subsection of critique of each category does not bring about any problem.

The most crucial conceptual framework running through all the categories in the issue of the nature of knowledge is the concept of 'reification'. The concept is not only inherently bound up with the problem of objectification of
knowledge but is directly connected with the establishment of relativism and dialectics as an attempt for 'dereification' of knowledge.

Objectivism holds that knowledge as object exists 'out there' independent of and external to the knowing subject's process of knowing and interpretation of its meaning attached to him. This view presupposes some permanent, ahistorical, universalistic, and value-neutral standards or criteria in terms of which we can adjudicate the truth and validity of knowledge. That is, objective knowledge, which is objectified, is assumed to possess certain unvarying and ahistorical 'essence' which is unaffected by the process of knowing and producing knowledge. Thus, in this view, knowledge is obtained when the knower correctly grasps the objective facts imposed on him through a rigorous and refined mode of inquiry. In this regard, a rigid dichotomy between the subject and the object is inevitable. Knowledge is completely detached from, lying outside, and beyond the knower himself; it is already prescribed and set up for him by someone else (Sarup, 1978, p. 142).

Consequently, the knower comes to have a passive viewpoint of the knowledge as the object. He is forced to see the knowledge and the world of reality in a particular way regardless of his own conception and consciousness. It is
by no means something to be questioned, negotiated, or criticized. Rather, it is conceived of as something to be mastered, transmitted, collected, and accumulated (Giroux, 1979). There is no room for considering the self-formative process of generating the knower's own meaning, the process which involves an interpretive relationship between the knower and the known. The subjective dimension of meaning is no longer considered in this view; therefore, the knower has no control over his own selection of knowledge or process of knowing (Harris, 1979, p. 150).

This objectification of knowledge and strict distinction between the knowing subject and the known object necessarily results in the problem of reification, according to some of the theorists who are involved in interpretive, phenomenological, or critical paradigm both outside and inside the field of curriculum studies. They are in common in insisting that there is no such thing as value-neutral and interest-free objective knowledge which is supposed to be supported by the ahistorical, universal, and permanent standard for verification. Whenever knowledge is objectified, it is already reified in order to serve interest of the particular dominant social groups.

Reification is the process in which knowledge is thought of as a thing, commodity, or neutral entity, which has
nothing to do with the conception of the knower’s production or creation of knowledge. It is in fact inextricably linked to the special interests or values that are disguised by its universal and objectified claims (Bredo and Feinberg, 1982, p. 277). It is already distorted and mystified through a structured and systematic misrepresentation of the world of reality. The notion of essence or permanent framework embedded in objectified knowledge is nothing but a pure intellectual abstraction for the service of someone else’s interest. Thus, the claim that knowledge should be objective and capable of being investigated and described in a neutral fashion in fact neglects the involvement of power relations and ideology in a particular society (Giroux, 1979).

Consequently, the reified knowledge ‘alienates’ the knower from the actual contexts in which the knowledge is created and formulated. The reified knowledge that is independent of historic, traditional, cultural situations removes the subject from the creative endeavors (Matthews, 1980, p. 122). Negation of the claim that knowledge is no more than the historic and social constructs of a particular time ineluctably leads us to alienate the knower from the knowledge itself. It separates knowledge from the context of its use. Therefore, knowledge becomes the subject and the knower the predicate (Sarup, 1978, p. 64). That
is, the human subject becomes the object of his own product (Sarup, p. 117) as the consequence of alienation.

Relativism, as a way of dereification, is advocated by a number of philosophies such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, or symbolic interactionism, and sociology of knowledge in education. The variety of sources of relativism prevents us from thinking that there is certain unequivocal rationale for adopting the ontological belief. As we discussed in CHAPTER II, the curriculum theories endorsing relativism have diverse philosophical backgrounds.

Nevertheless, we can identify certain fundamental common characteristics of relativism which are able to be applied to all the theories in the category. The central belief of relativism is that the ways we conceive of reality are socially as well as historically constructed; therefore, truth, objectivity, and knowledge are only human products in particular society at particular time as Gorbett asserts (in Dearden, 1984, p. 30). Knowledge as a social construct in turn is thought to be interpreted or filtered through the culture of those acquiring knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1966), as reality is interpreted differently by the different social groups. As Hamilton argues (1974), in this view of reality, there is a close "connection between the social relationships of individuals and the meanings
those relationships have to the extent that the nature of those relationships and the structure of their intersubjective meanings" determine content of all knowledge (p. 135).

There is no 'reified' objective criteria for verification of the truth of knowledge which are considered to be absolute and universal. Rather, such notions as "non-reducible plurality" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 8) and what is called "incommensurable paradigms" (Kuhn, 1962) are important in accounting for human rationality. Thus, the argument is persuasive that all kinds of objectivist claims which presuppose such ahistorical and decontextualized conceptual framework for judgment inevitably lapse into certain "vulgar or sophisticated forms of ethnocentrism" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 19) in which objectivity of knowledge functions as mystification and disguise of social reality.

In this context, Brent's (1978) explanation of why Blum rejects the reified view of knowledge seems to be quite relevant to the issue.

If objective knowledge is taken to mean knowledge of a reality independent of language, or presuppositionless knowledge, or knowledge of the world which is independent of the observer's procedures for finding and producing the knowledge, then there is no such thing as objective knowledge.... What counts as knowledge is what is comprehensible within system that human beings create in particular communities of judgment as a result of accidental historical circumstance. (Brent, 1978, p. 240)
Thus, in the process of dereification, what is emphasized is the positive and active function of the knowing subject's consciousness and interpretation of the reified reality. Knowledge is inevitably related to the thought and consciousness of the subject, which is situated to the particular contexts. Knowledge is grounded in the actions and interpretations of the meanings of the contexts in which the subject finds himself. The individual's subjective interpretation of meaning of reality (subjective meaning) develops from the continuing process of interaction of people (intersubjectivity) in their daily routine of lived world experience (Mazza, 1982, p. 48).

The first problem which relativism comes to face is the conceptual and logical one which is often pointed out by analytic philosophy. If all bodies of knowledge are relative to social relations, then there are no permanent epistemological norms or values—knowledge is conceptually related to 'real' and 'true' (Brent, 1978, p. 226). That is, if all knowledge is socially relative, then "those who impose as well as those who oppose the imposition have no basis on which either to justify their own practices to reject those of their opponents" (Brent, 1978, pp. 241-2). Moreover, if we think that all knowledge is relative, how can we sustain the claim that it is superior to those who hold possible different views? It is not possible to know which view is right or wrong (Sarup, 1978, p. 33).
Besides this type of analytic criticism, some theorists in critical theory or neo-Marxism repudiate relativism on the ground that it overemphasizes the subjectivity of the knower and overlooks the significant dimension of practical and material dereification beyond the mental dereification. According to Mazza (1982), in the relativism of phenomenology there is very little consideration that influences selection, distribution of particular meaning because it eliminates the influence of the material conditions of the objective reality by overemphasizing the significance of subjective consciousness (p. 49). It does not account for the possibility of false consciousness, and there is no notion of transformation of human consciousness for improvement of material as well as social conditions. Sarup's critique of phenomenological way of dereification is quite cogent in this sense. As a concluding critique of relativism, thus, Sarup's argument is quoted at length.

Though it [the phenomenological model] stresses that men act in terms of their interpretation of, and interactions towards, their external conditions, it has difficulties in analyzing the particular mechanisms by which a particular social structure constrains its members....It neglects such issues as ideology and false consciousness....[It has] nothing about a dialectical understanding of historic change....[Its] theory of consciousness is insufficient. It stresses mental-dereification at the expense of other aspects. It tends to ignore the material conditions of existence. (1978, PP. 3-4, underline added)
As a view of reality and of relationship between the knower and the known, dialectics takes a unique ontological position which compensates the pitfalls of both objectivism and relativism. That is, the dialectical dereification is concerned with both objectivism's overemphasis on the objectivity to be known, which unduly underestimates the knower's subjectivity, and relativism's overemphasis on the knower's subjective dimension, which overlooks the objective nature of reality. In the strategy of dialectic, what is the most significant is just the inevitable ontological relationship between the known and the knower. It highlights the dynamic, developmental interplay between the subject and the object in the process of knowledge acquisition. There is an irreducible tension between them. And the relationship is not two separate, ontologically distinctive, things but as "two elements of reality which mutually affect each other to produce a reality" (Hamilton, 1974, p. 19) not subsumable either to the objective material condition or subjective consciousness alone. Thus, the knowledge generated through dialectical is part of process of mutual growth or evolution on the part of both parties (Bredo and Feinberg, 1982, p 6).

As such, focusing upon the conception of reality and the world of knowledge as a never-ending formative process for development, wherein everything undergoes internal change,
it undermines both objectified and subjectified relativistic bases of epistemology. According to dialectic, first, there is no objective reality external to the knower. Knowledge must discard the illusion of objectivism in which the world of reality appears objectively as a universe of facts whose lawlike connection can be grasped descriptively (Habermas, 1971, p. 304). There is no such thing as the absolute subject or object which is based upon the complete and fixed picture of reality. Nothing is merely self-identical and self-contained. All real things are part of the world of interaction of essentially and inherently contradictory things and phenomena (Sarup, 1978, pp. 132-3). Reality is not a mere objective datum external to the subject, but is shaped by the human subject and the basic unit of reality is not a thing but a relation between the things.

On the other hand, the never-ending dialectical pursuit for apprehension of reality also calls into question the relativistic way of dereification which stresses a subjective interpretation of meaning to search for an undistorted reality and intersubjective world of reality. As Sarup (1978) points out, relativism lacks the notion of transformation of potential false consciousness and structural and ideological misrepresentation of reality (p. 95). It does not take into account the irreconcilable conflicts and
oppositions which should be dialectically synthesized for the establishment of the status of material as well as social emancipation.

Moreover, the ahistorical character of relativism is bereft of the normative envision for a 'better' society. This type of relativism's possible shortcomings in the process of the subject-based dereification is well pointed out when Bernstein (1978) writes:

Individuals may have not only occasional false beliefs about what they are doing, but systematically distorted misconceptions of themselves, the meaning of their actions, and their historical situations. The recognition of the appropriateness of an interpretation by the subjects involved is not sufficient to justify the correctness of the interpretation. (p. 202)

Beyond the objectivism and the subjective emphasis on reality and the world of knowledge, a dialectical view of dereification concerns the ultimate status of human liberation and emancipation through the process of subject's active engagement in the objective world of reality. That is, knowledge is not only created and produced by subjective human agency, but the latter himself is also shaped by the knowledge he creates and produces. Thus, the reified alienation could be only overcome by the reflective action that is mediated by the dialectical knowledge. Dialectic is, therefore, an essential means for liberation from both objective and subjective distortion and exploitation of the
material and social reality in a particular society. Bredo and Feinberg's argument regarding the function of the so-called critical knowledge is very pertinent to the ultimate aim of dialectic in this sense.

Knowledge must be seen in the context of its constitution in and potential contribution to social evolution, where social evolution is conceived of in terms of possibility for progressive material and symbolic emancipation. This view places knowledge in a societal and historical-developmental perspective that highlights its repressive or emancipatory potentials. (1982, p. 272)

The second epistemological criterion, origin and source of knowledge, inductively generates two types of subcategories: content-based group and process-based group. In the section on SYNTHESIS, we conceptually elaborated the characteristics of the two contradictory approaches of curriculum theories to the issue of the source of knowledge. The content-based group takes an epistemological position that knowledge comes from certain concrete, substantive, and fixed content. It assumes a relatively complete and stable ground as a fundamental source from which curricular knowledge derives. In contrast, the process-based group holds a view that curriculum knowledge derives from certain indeterminate and intangible process beyond the fixed substance. There is no fixed and absolute grounds of knowledge which presuppose immutability. Curriculum knowledge is situational and subject to the radical alteration in accordance with the contextual needs for change.
The most problematic factor embedded in the content-based curriculum theories which derive curriculum knowledge from the substantive content is the tendency towards 'abstraction' of knowledge. Abstraction simply refers to a mechanism of distortion by reduction of concrete reality to abstract constructs. In this view of the source of curriculum knowledge, what is completely neglected is the notion of ideology, interest, and power relations which are mediated in the process of knowledge formation.

They heavily depend upon two traditional powerful bases for the derivation of knowledge that are called empiricism and rationalism—even though very few theories exclusively advocate one of the bases. The former bases knowledge on sensory or observational experience and the latter bases knowledge on self-evidently clear and consequential arguments. For these bases of knowledge, logic becomes the scaffolding on which the knower models the world, while facts of sensory or observational experience puts the constraints to which the logical model has to conform (Bredo and Feinberg, 1982, p. 14). Thus, knowledge derived from rationalism and empiricism becomes abstracted knowledge, which is detached from, independent of, particular socio-historic and political situations to which the knowers are inextricably attached.
In this framework of the source of knowledge, it is very natural to repudiate the view that knowledge is no more than a socio-historical construct of a particular time. Rather, worthwhile curriculum knowledge is generated from the law-like generalizations, principles, facts, or mathematical axioms, all of which are able to be tested and verified by certain objective and public criteria. Thus, potential concrete knowledge of reality is reduced to abstract and nomological knowledge. The Marxist thesis that not only knowledge but people are processed and rationality itself is man-made is totally ignored in this view (Sarup, 1978, p. 14).

In this regard, Phenix's epistemological viewpoint is quite appropriate to a further articulation of this position. According to Phenix (1969), the essential structure of things (and knowledge) is revealed (discovered), not invented (created or produced) and "it is the business of inquiry to open that structure to general understanding through the formation of appropriate concepts and theories" (p. 196). For him, the structure is given, not chosen and if the knower is to gain knowledge he must employ the right concepts and methods. Needless to say, such central terms as "concepts", "theories", and "methods" result from the process of reductive abstraction. Reality is too complex to be understood and comprehended without the process of
reductive abstraction. Through abstracted frameworks we can understand the structure of things and knowledge, according to the Phenix's realism.

The process-based curriculum theories, on the contrary, speak completely different languages. As remarked, they consider such concepts as ideology, power, interest, personal meaning, intersubjectivity, etc. as the most central constructs in understanding the derivation and origin of curriculum knowledge. For them, curriculum knowledge has multiple and diversified sources. Knowledge is neither inherent in the individual knowers, nor can it be imposed on them by others; rather, knowledge is formulated through personal interaction in and with the world of reality, and is produced as a response to particular interests and needs in particular historic-social context (Harris, 1979, p. 176). It results from the creative power of the knowers as it organizes experiences to form a highly complex, personal system of interpretation and interactions.

In other words, knowledge is "a matter of coming to perceive the world in particular ways from particular perspectives, which are largely determined by and arise out of one's interactions in and with a particular historical and social context" (Harris, 1979, p. 2). Thus, the way knowledge is produced is in direct relationship to the power and
structure of society (Hamilton, 1974, p. 28). As Gadamer says, knowledge must be seen to be generated within the framework of tradition and history; the discernment of truth has a temporal structure. As a consequence, there can be no such thing as the correct or final understanding of a phenomenon, and the meaning of a text is always open to future interpretation from new perspectives (Held, 1980, p. 313).

Besides, Habermas's proposition regarding the inevitable relationship between knowledge and human interest sheds much light on the issue. According to Habermas (1971),

[k]nowledge is formed in virtue of three different human interests: information that explains our power of technical control; interpretations that make possible the orientations of action within common traditions; and analyses that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized power. (p. 314)

The three knowledge-constitutive interests are general interests; they are underlying modes through which reality is disclosed and acted upon. They delineate a general orientation which yields a viewpoint from which reality is constructed, rightly interprets Held (1980, p. 297).

The third epistemological criterion of justification for the values of curriculum knowledge involves two different sets of subcriteria as epistemological categories: 1) the category of intrinsic versus extrinsic justification of
knowledge; and 2) the category of personal/individual versus public/collective dimension of knowledge.

The curriculum theories subscribing to the intrinsic view maintain that curriculum knowledge as a good or end-in-itself independent of any use to which it may be put is valued by virtue of its inherent and a priori logical power for developing reason and cultivating human mind. Acquisition of knowledge and the process of acquisition is strongly associated with improvement of mental qualities and intellectual power which are crucial in any situations of intellectually serious human activities. In contrast, the extrinsic/pragmatic view of justification holds the position that the value of knowledge is justified as a means for securing some other values. The purpose of knowledge cannot be predetermined without consideration of its potential use. Thus, in this view the value of knowledge appeals to particular contexts to which knowledge is applied and upon which knowledge is acted.

The most common ground on which the intrinsic view is criticized is the claim that human rationality, which is regarded as an ultimate and generic quality inherent in human mind, is itself a fictional construct. The assertion that reason can be cultivated being detached from the particular contexts in which the particular knower is situated
is an epistemologically naive illusion. Rationality is not a faculty or capacity which is free from the subject's socio-historical contexts. Any rationality is situated and contextualized rationality which gains its power within a particular living situation (Bernstein and Feinberg, 1982, p. 37). It is man-made and socially produced. Thus, knowledge cannot be thought to be something solely for cultivation of rationality. It cannot be separated from its use and should be understood in its social and historical context (Sarup, 1978, p. 61). Knowledge does not speak anything for itself.

In this regard, the dominant claim advocated by the intrinsic curriculum theories that particular curriculum knowledge is intrinsically worthwhile and superior to others in cultivating rational power should be reexamined in a critical way. In fact, what is hidden in this view is that it deliberately endorses certain human institutions and practices which perpetuate present social relations and legitimate them. According to Sarup (1978), such a view of knowledge can be interpreted as an 'ideology' serving the particular interests of the dominant social groups to maintain the status quo (p. 19).

In a similar way, Matthews (1980) critically examines Hirst's thesis of the "forms of knowledge". In Matthew's
critique, Hirst's argument that it is the cultivation of reasoning in accord with "Reason" which is constitutive of the educated man is not only an "absolutism about intellectual endeavor" (p. 28), but an unwarranted imposition of the world view that inspires the ruling class. In this context, Harris' characterization (1979) of Hirst's theory as the "supportive rhetoric" (p. 78 ff) for the conservative maintenance of the status quo is quite adequate.

Moreover, Hirst's exclusive emphasis upon cognitive and propositional knowledge seems to result in an underestimation of the extrinsic dimension of the value of knowledge. His conception of liberal education as the development of mind and the identification of the intrinsic value of knowledge with the development itself (Martin, 1981, p. 39) neglects noncognitive status of knowledge such as feelings, emotions, attitudes, and skills. The view that acquisition of the fundamental rational structure of knowledge and its logical relations contributes to the development of mind inevitably leads to neglect the concern for an extrinsic way of justification.

Unlike the intrinsic view, the theories in the extrinsic category clearly reveal the way the value of knowledge is justified. In other words, they manifest the particular use of knowledge for achievement of particular purposes
expressed in the theories. As examined in the section on ANALYSIS, the theories in the category emphasize functional values of curriculum knowledge in the process of achieving particular purposes such as emancipation, liberation, transformation of consciousness, intersubjective understanding, phenomenological shift, and so forth.

As such, the extrinsic function of knowledge is conceptually linked to the concrete texts in which the knower is situated. The theories do not assume any ontological status of knowledge which is totally separated from social and historical contexts in which knowledge is created, produced, and used. For instance, as remarked in CHAPTER II, an existentialism's view of knowledge that claims that man's knowledge is an attempt to express to himself his attachment to 'being' and man's knowing is a function of his mode of existing that is essentially temporal is quite proper for the articulation of knowledge's extrinsic feature (Gallagher, 1964, p. 13). Human knowledge exists, but it exists subject to the conditions of human existence; thus, knowledge derives its value from its ability to fulfill needs within the existing conditions in this particular view.

The second set of subcriteria in the criterion of justification involves two contradictory types of categories:
justification of curriculum knowledge either in terms of individual/personal values or public/collective values. However, some curriculum theories (i.e., Adler, Bruner, Hirst, King and Brownell) take an ambiguous position which does not incorporate exactly one of the two positions. In an explicit level, they seem to advocate the importance of the personal dimension of curriculum knowledge; while in an implicit level, they seem to deliver a hidden message that each well-educated individual is constitutive of a 'good' society. In other words, individual human rationality cultivated through the study of bodies of substantive knowledge is to be seen essential for the promotion and maintenance of social norms and values in a particular society. Thus, the epistemological dimension regarding what counts as worthwhile curriculum knowledge and how to acquire it, and the societal dimension regarding how individuals constitute the society are interwoven in a deliberate manner. For this reason, we do not openly assert that the theories are classified into one of the contradictory positions discretely.

Nonetheless, the other curriculum theories are judged to be included in one of the two positions. The theories subscribing to the significance of the individual dimension of knowledge, which in turn is regarded as a crucial conception in phenomenology and existentialism, have one thing in
common: they believe that knowledge is only meaningful when it is directly linked with each individual's 'being' and existence. Knowledge is valued because it promotes a particular individual's self-consciousness and enhances the meaning of his independent 'being' in the concrete world experience. This kind of epistemological focus upon the individual dimension of knowledge is clearly delineated when Taylor and Richards (1985) write:

Knowledge is viewed as subject to individual interpretation and is in an important sense unique to every human being. The individual is seen as a 'meaning-maker' who is able to build data into his own scheme of thing and relate uniquely to what he already holds as experience. Thus he builds a world of his own. (p. 23)

In a similar context, Polanyi's well-known notion of the personal dimension of "tacit knowledge" is very relevant to the pending issue. Stressing 'self' and the knower's participation in the process of knowing and shaping his knowledge, Polanyi argues that all knowledge is necessarily personal (1958, pp. 26-7). However, the claim that all knowledge is personal does not mean that it is relative and idiosyncratic to individuals; rather it means that knowledge involves person knowing, and knowing involves the process and a tacit subsidiary ground is needed to form the elements of personal knowing, as interpreted by Macdonald (1981).
In another place, Polanyi (1983) again emphasizes the significance of personal knowledge in interpretation and judgment of objects in reality. His argument is worth a quote here in that it explicitly advocates the values of the personal dimension of knowledge.

To hold such [tacit view of] knowledge is an act deeply committed to the conviction that there is something there to be discovered. It is personal, in the sense of involving the personality of him who holds it, and also in the sense of being, as a rule, solitary....His act of knowing experiences a personal judgment in reality evidence to an external reality, an aspect of which he is seeking to apprehend. (p. 25)

On the contrary, the position stressing the significance of the collective dimension of knowledge is concerned with the inherent social factor of knowledge. The theories in the category sustain a common preassumption that all knowledge has to be understood in a collective dimension. As knowledge is a social product, individual accounts of human knowledge is largely rejected here.

Often, this epistemological belief is associated with a Marxist view of the relationship between knowledge and society. The Marxist theory fundamentally repudiates any individual accounts of human knowledge. In this view, there is no such thing as an isolated human subject and human thinking or rationality (Matthews, 1980, p. 96); correspondingly, there is no such thing as isolated and inde-
pendent human knowledge. It is incorrect, thus, to think that the 'individual' knows. He participates in the social relation in which knowledge is produced, processed, created, and used. The relation is not only material but socio-historical. Creation and production of knowledge is necessarily based upon the tradition which has been transformed by other human agents before him. Therefore, the notion of 'we know' is prior to the notion of 'I know'. Private and personal knowledge is already itself a part of the collective social knowledge (Matthews, 1980, p. 16).

In this context, some neo-Marxist critique of the individual dimension of curriculum knowledge is quite persuasive. Focusing on the political economy in schooling and curriculum, they claim that the emphasis on the 'self' and the individual knowledge for understanding of the lived-world experience obscures the role of political critique in disclosing the oppressive and exploitative forces in society (Mazza, 1982). In doing so, the prevailing view of knowledge which considers curriculum knowledge as a means for subjective interpretation of the world of reality and for acquisition of intersubjective meaning is seriously called into question. Coupled with the notion of praxis for freedom and emancipation, they highlight the significance of collective consciousness in order to struggle against the unjust social forces.
The final and the fourth epistemological criterion, the content and scope of knowledge, generated the dichotomous categories of the reductionist and the expansionist. What has to be noted with respect to this categorization is the fact that the expansionist position does not attempt to make any types of divisions or distinctions of curriculum knowledge. In this position, therefore, the answers to the question of which knowledge constitutes curriculum knowledge is quite differentiated and divergent. In contrast, the reductionist position not only proposes explicitly which knowledge constitutes curriculum content, but adheres to certain types of classifications and boundaries of curriculum knowledge.

The most critical problematic factor embedded in the reductionist position is an unwarranted dependence upon particular epistemology in determining the content of curriculum knowledge and partition of the knowledge into the distinguished categories. More often than not, the curriculum theories in this category maintain a curious viewpoint that curriculum knowledge is to be determined in a neutral and value-free fashion independent of the particular socio-historic conditions in which the knowers identify themselves. They set up a body of objective knowledge as curriculum content and establish a set of discrete categories. In Hirst's conception, for example, curricular decisions
about what ought to be included in school curriculum for liberal education can be made detached from the "predilections of pupils, the demands of society or the whims of politicians" (in Matthews, 1980, p. 164). The "forms of knowledge" as prospective curriculum knowledge are composed of six or seven categorically distinctive realms of knowledge which result from the "logical and conceptual" analysis of intellectually serious human activities in a civilized society.

The very epistemological ground on which the reductionist curriculum theories are founded is subject to a general critique. As Martin points out, the problem of the unwarranted over-reliance on particular epistemology in curricular decision making should be reexamined. With regard to this issue, Martin (1981) writes:

The epistemological fallacy...consists in arguing from a theory of knowledge to conclusions about the full range of what ought or ought not be taught or studied....[D]ecisions about curriculum content and objectives necessarily rest on value judgment. Theories of knowledge are relevant to curriculum theory and planning, but they are not in themselves decisive. (p. 47)

Besides this kind of general critique, some raise serious questions regarding the specific issue of the division and scope of knowledge. First, it is criticized that the establishment of boundaries of knowledge on the basis of the fixed and substantive content of knowledge is no more
than an artifact, which has a covert linkage with the notion of the interests of particular dominant social classes. The epistemological conduct of restricting knowledge's boundary into some narrow categories presupposes stratification of knowledge assuming the distinction between high-status knowledge and low-status knowledge. In turn, high-status knowledge is deliberately controlled and manipulated by those who already possess it in order to put a limit on the opportunity for those who do not to have an access to it. Thus, the distinctions between types of knowledge are purely regarded as a conventional institutionalization to serve particular interests (Sarup, 1978, p. 6).

Moreover, it is also criticized that the categorization into hierarchies and invidious distinctions dissociates the knower from himself (Sarup, p. 142). Artificial boundaries between subject areas, for instance, lead the knower to misapprehend the reality, according to the critique. Neither is there any correspondence between the world of reality and the man-made categories of curriculum knowledge, nor has knowledge a necessary logical existence detached from the knower's lived world.

Along with these radical critiques of the reductionist conception of the division of curriculum knowledge, it can
be criticized of its unduly narrow perspective regarding the scope of knowledge. As discussed, the objectivistic curriculum knowledge is mainly composed of cognitive and propositional bodies of knowledge. Therefore, there is very little room for considering other aspects of human knowledge such as emotions, attitudes, or skills. Any knowledge which refuses in nature the employment of certain objective standard for test and verification is regarded inadequate as curriculum knowledge. In this sense, Eisner's suggestion that "expressive" and aesthetic aspects of knowledge should be seriously taken into account beyond the "discursive and numerical" dimension of knowledge in school curriculum is quite pertinent, as discussed in CHAPTER III.

4.4 SUMMARY
In this chapter, we have performed the dual tasks of synthesis and critical discussion. We established a set of classifications for grouping the theories based upon the results of the analysis in CHAPTER III and made some critiques of each category of the classifications.

In the section on SYNTHESIS, we made three different types of classification systems. First, all the curriculum theories analyzed were classified into one of the three categories: the content-free group, the implicit group, and the explicit group. The content-free group does not make
any epistemological claims regarding curriculum knowledge, while other groups are committed to particular epistemology in dealing with curriculum content despite the difference in the degree of manifestation.

The second mode for the classification rested on the respective epistemological criteria and subcriteria. The first criterion, the nature of knowledge, subsumed three distinctive categories of objectivism, relativism, and dialectic. It was found that all the theories except the content-free theories subscribed to one of the particular ontological positions.

The second criterion in this mode of classification was the source and origin of knowledge. It generated two different categories of the content-based group and the process-based group.

The third criterion of justification for the values of knowledge entailed two different sets of categories: the categories of intrinsic versus extrinsic values of knowledge, and the category of personal/individual versus social/collective dimension of knowledge. All curriculum theories take a particular epistemological position.

The fourth and final criterion of the scope and content of knowledge had two categories: the expansionist and the
reductionist. It was found that all the theories involve one of the particular viewpoints regarding the range and division of curriculum knowledge.

The third mode was concerned with general tendency and degree of consistency in pattern of groupings. Through the synthesis we discovered some conspicuous features of the classifications. First, it was found that the explicit theories always constitute the same group under any circumstances. Second, there was a considerable consistency in pattern. Third, there was a correspondence between the ways of groupings in the present study and the ways addressed by the proposals for classifications of curriculum theory/theorizing.

In the section on CRITICAL DISCUSSION, we performed a relatively intensive critique of some inherent conceptual drawbacks of the theories in each category. Content-free theories were criticized in terms of a meta-theoretic approach. The implicit group also had a serious pitfall. Focusing on the critical function of theory, it does not have positive impact on practical curriculum decision makings. In contrast, the explicit group’s over-reliance on particular epistemology in curricular decision making was pinpointed as a shortcoming.
In the second mode of classification, objectivism was severely criticized for its tendency to 'reify' curriculum knowledge. Relativism and dialectic are unanimous in their claim that curriculum knowledge should be dereified. However, the approaches to dereification differ. Relativism was basically concerned with the subjective dimension of consciousness change for dereification. In contrast, dialectic pointed out both objectivism's overemphasis on objectivity and relativism's overemphasis on subjectivity. It stressed the never-ending mutual interplay and ontological relationship between the two components of reality. A dialectical view of dereification sees both not as two separate, ontologically distinctive, things but as affecting each other in order to transform the reality.

In the discussion of the critique of the content-based and the process-based group, we briefly investigated how curriculum knowledge is intricately tied with such notions as human interest, power, and ideology in social relations. Thus, it was problematic to think that curriculum knowledge comes from certain substantive, fixed, and complete foundations in a value-neutral and detached manner.

Regarding the ways of justifying knowledge, it was argued that the most common problematic feature inherent in the intrinsic view of knowledge was the unwarranted concep-
tion of human rationality, which is assumed to be something cultivated by the acquisition of particular bodies of curriculum knowledge. It was argued that rationality is not a faculty or capacity which is detached from the subject’s socio-historical conditions. The viewpoint was further criticized for deliberately supporting the present practices and institutions to perpetuate the status quo.

The curriculum theories subscribing to the values of the personal dimension of knowledge concerns the individual’s self-consciousness and ‘being’ in the concrete lived world. Each individual is seen as a meaning-maker in his own terms. In contrast, the theories in the category of the collective dimension of knowledge emphasize knowledge’s immanent social factor. There is no such thing as isolated and independent human knowledge insofar as the knower participates in the social relations in which knowledge is produced and used.

The final criterion had two categories: the reductionist and the expansionist. The most serious conceptual weakness in the reductionist position was that a theory of knowledge plays an exclusive role in determining which knowledge ought to be included in school curriculum. Moreover, establishment of the boundaries of knowledge was criticized. Artificial divisions and stratification of curriculum-
lum knowledge not only disguise the fact that they serve the particular interest but lead the knowers to misapprehended the reality. There is no partition in the real world as suggested by the distinction of subject areas.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSIONS

The primary purpose of the present study was to determine the epistemological characteristics of curriculum theories by investigating the alleged relationships between epistemology and their knowledge claims concerning curriculum content and to critique them. Specifically, this study attempted an epistemological conceptualization of curriculum knowledge as part of curriculum content by critically examining a number of major contemporary curriculum theories against a set of epistemological criteria.

First, fifteen contemporary curriculum theories were surveyed to determine their position on curriculum knowledge and categorized into three groups. The theories in the first group do not concern themselves with curriculum knowledge to such an extent that they deserve the label 'content-free'; the theories in the second group maintain an implicit position, not expressing manifestly which knowledge should constitute school curriculum knowledge; and the third group of theories addresses explicitly what should count as curriculum knowledge and why.
Second, the theories in the last two groups, which have identifiable epistemological positions—whether implicit or explicit—were analyzed in terms of four epistemological criteria developed in CHAPTER II. They are: (a) nature of knowledge, (b) source or origin of knowledge, (c) justification for the values of knowledge, and (d) scope and content of knowledge. Of the differences in their knowledge claims that have been brought to light by the epistemological criteria, we were able to identify certain common threads running through the different curriculum theories.

Third, on the basis of the common threads, we constructed a number of classification systems, resorting to distinct subcriteria of each epistemological criterion. The curriculum theories were classified into 1) objectivism, relativism, or dialectic within the criterion of nature of knowledge; 2) content-based group or process-based group within the criterion of source or origin of knowledge; 3) extrinsic group or intrinsic group, and personal dimension of knowledge or collective dimension of knowledge within the criterion of justification for the values of knowledge; and 4) reductionist or expansionist within the criterion of the scope and content of knowledge.

Fourth, it was pointed out that each of the above categories has particular epistemological problems, some
inherent in the particular epistemological beliefs in which it has its philosophical roots. Among the most conspicuous problems identified are such issues as reification of curriculum knowledge, intrinsic ways of justifying knowledge, abstraction of knowledge, and the reductionist approach to the scope of curriculum knowledge.

Finally, it was confirmed that epistemology in itself is not the only consideration for constructing a justifiable curriculum theory, particularly with respect to the issue of curriculum content. As found in this study, some curriculum theories do not consider epistemology as the most significant component in the process of theory construction, while others exclusively subscribe to the 'omnipotent' power of epistemology, leaving very little room for consideration of different potential sources for curriculum theorizing.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
For a proper assessment of the relevance of the knowledge claims of each curriculum theory to curriculum theory construction, we would need to examine a lot of issues that may potentially affect the epistemological position of a theory and eventually its viewpoint on curriculum content. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, however, such an endeavor is practically impossible. Thus, there
will always be more research to be done. The following is a list of suggestions for further study. In part, they are conceptually related to the limitations of the study stated in CHAPTER I.

The first suggestion is that it is necessary to examine the problems of the exclusively epistemology-oriented curriculum theories more thoroughly and systematically. Particularly, the philosophical assumptions and presuppositions embedded in the theories should be carefully reexamined and adjudicated. Then, we might able to better understand the reasoning behind their indifference to other possible factors other than epistemology in the process of theory construction. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to investigate the directionality of the relation between epistemology and curriculum content, because it might be the case that epistemology determines the way curriculum content is selected and organized.

Secondly, with respect to the weak relevance of a meta-theoretic research program to practical matters, more serious effort should be made to bridge the gap between the theoretical level of discourse and the practical level of application. Though relevance to practical application is not, and in fact should not be, the only criterion for evaluating a theory or meta-theory, it will surely be
rewarding for curriculum practitioners to take advantage of the advance made in the theoretical field.

Third, it is recommended that those epistemological positions which have received relatively little critical attention be subjected to rigorous examination. Especially, such epistemological positions as the extrinsic position, the expansionist position, and the dialectical position must be given more intensive critiques, especially in terms of their practical implication.

Fourth, with regard to the methodology employed in selecting theories for the analysis, it is suggested that more theories from other linguistic cultures as well as English-speaking cultures be examined. Also, an attempt should be made to develop an objective set of criteria for selection itself, if we are concerned with the validity issue with regard to the results. As stated earlier, the selection criteria employed in this study were by and large arbitrary and subjective. As such, one should not make any expansive interpretations based upon the results reported here.

Finally, it is recommended that a more detailed examination of the different epistemological features of the theories in the same category be done that goes beyond the categorical distinctions with reference to the similarities.
As noticed, in this study subtle differences in epistemological claims among the theories in the same category were intentionally ignored. This endeavor is likely to contribute to a better understanding of the idiosyncrasies of seemingly identical epistemological positions.
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