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Making connections in the heartland: An educator's case study of a local business retention and expansion program

McLaughlin, Robert Taylor, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1987

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MAKING CONNECTIONS IN THE HEARTLAND:

AN EDUCATOR'S CASE STUDY OF A LOCAL BUSINESS RETENTION
AND EXPANSION PROGRAM

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Robert Taylor McLaughlin, B.A., M.S.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1987

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

V. E. Blanke

L. L. Cunningham

W. G. Hack

G. W. Morse

Advisor

College of Education
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VITA

September 26, 1955 . . . . Born - Morristown, New Jersey

1977 .................. B.A., Denison University, Granville, Ohio

1977-78 ............. Fellow, Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois

1978-79 ............. Houseparent, Scott Johnson Children's Home, San Anselmo, California

1979-81 ............. Assistant Academic Dean, Long Range Planner, Fort Berthold Community College, New Town, North Dakota


1982 .................. Woodrow Wilson Administrative Fellow, Acting Director, White Shield Community Development Corporation, White Shield, North Dakota

1982-83 ............. Woodrow Wilson Administrative Fellow, Planning Analyst, Bowie State College, Bowie, Maryland

1983-85 ............. President and Founder, the MC Squared Corporation, Washington, D.C.
PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Educational Policy and Leadership.

Studies in community resource economics (Dr. George W. Morse), educational policy (Dr. Brad L. Mitchell), higher education finance (Dr. Walter G. Hack), interprofessional education and practice (Dr. Luvern L. Cunningham), organizational theory (Dr. Virgil E. Blanke), and qualitative research methods (Dr. Donald P. Sanders). Organizing theme of studies: the utilization of higher educational resources for community development.
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CHAPTER I.
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION

A. Introduction

According to Pulver (1979), there are five widely recognized strategies for fostering local and statewide economic development in a developed society such as the United States. These strategies are 1) attracting firms to relocate into an area targeted for development; 2) lobbying for an increased influx of governmental monies into this area; 3) encouraging local consumers to purchase their goods and services from local vendors, whenever possible; 4) facilitating creation of new firms; and 5) improving the efficiency of existing industry, usually known as business retention and expansion.

The first three strategies above are "zero sum" approaches to development, in the sense that they seek to generate a gain in income and employment for one community at the expense of other localities. The fourth strategy, creating new local enterprises, is a positive sum approach, because the increase in local income or employment need not be at the expense of decreased income or employment in another community. However, given the high failure rate of new enterprises, this is an economic development strategy with clearly uncertain outcomes. The fifth strategy, which seeks to increase local income and employment by retaining and expanding existing firms, is another "positive sum" approach. However, it may yield more certain outcomes and involve less capital expenditure than the other positive sum approach, that of starting new enterprises (Morse, Wilson & Gordon, 1985).
The "business retention and expansion" strategy is a fairly new tool in the development professional's repertoire. The traditional development approaches -- strategies 1 through 4 above -- are still widely practiced, but in at least 11 states since 1982 efforts statewide have been made to retain and expand existing firms at the local level, as an alternative growth strategy (Otto, 1985). In 1986, the Council of State Governments reported that the retention and expansion approach was the number one priority for additional information among state officials (Haskett, 1986). These retention and expansion ("R and E") programs seek to help firms improve their comparative advantage within the community by improving their efficiency in production and marketing.

1. The Basic Business Retention and Expansion Concept

The primary aim and objectives of the retention and expansion concept now will be described as they are understood in the literature. Following this will be an explanation of how R and E activities, in support of these purposes, are implemented and by what kinds of state and local organizations. Ultimately the aim of the business retention and expansion strategy, according to the literature, is to create an environment conducive to the retention and expansion of existing enterprises. In order to identify ways that interested community groups can achieve this goal, the market forces which influence community economic growth must be identified.

The retention and expansion of firms and the resultant growth in jobs and income within a community are a function of the extent of capital investment in the community (Morse, Wilson and Gordon). Investment decisions, either for establishing new firms or expanding existing ones, are a function of both profits and non-economic factors.

The importance of non-economic factors in firm investment decisions is well established (Ady, 1984).
One R and E objective is to express community appreciation to the firm for its economic contributions. This is a means of demonstrating a pro-business attitude, which constitutes one important factor in encouraging increased local business investment. Solving the problems a firm has with local government, another R and E objective, has similarly valuable public relations benefits. Possibly more important, solving such problems can reduce the costs to the firm of doing business in the community, thereby increasing profits for the firm.

In addition to the above non-economic inducements to investment are R and E activities which provide economic inducements. For example, a local business retention and expansion strategy can reduce unit production costs to local firms by providing them with up to date information on cost-reducing technology. Although the adoption of such technology frequently involves the partial substitution of employees by machinery, it is clear that for many firms it is imperative to remain current with new technology to maintain a competitive posture in their markets. Retaining an existing firm, although with fewer employees, is preferable for many communities to losing altogether the employment provided by that firm.

Another formal R and E objective is to assist firms in making increased and more effective use of existing local, state and federal government development-related programs. Such programs often provide subsidized credit, technical and locational assistance and other services and resources. Greater utilization of such programs by the firms in a given community can lead to increased local employment and can prevent some businesses from closing or moving from the locality.

Additionally, it has been found useful to incorporate the development of a fairly sophisticated local data collection and interpretation capability into the R and E strategy. Many firm owners lack important information concerning market and demographic trends, often because firms individually cannot afford the expense in procuring such data. Armed with such useful
information, firm owners can make decisions more responsive to changing market conditions, thereby enhancing their ability to maintain or increase current employment levels. This process of identifying trends and suggesting responses by local firms is here referred to as "local economic strategic planning" (Morse, 1986).

Creation of this local data collection and analysis capability also may be useful in devising "an early warning system that anticipates possible firm closings" (Vaughan, 1985). Here a local group or organization studies the "economic outlook" for the industries in which local firms operate, in order to anticipate which local employers may have to reduce substantially or eliminate employment because of significant market developments (Morse, Rohrer & Crawford, 1985). By being able to anticipate that a local firm may have to close, the local group can initiate communication with that firm's owner or CEO, seeking to devise ways of minimizing or preventing the closing.

The relative ability of R and E programs to succeed in anticipating the closing of a business becomes particularly important to discern, in light of the intense debate in Congress in 1987 concerning whether to require that firms announce in advance their plans to close. Proposed legislation was introduced into that Congressional session both to provide $980 million for the retraining of displaced workers and require that employers "give workers timely notice of plant closings or mass layoffs" (Associated Press, Columbus [Ohio] Dispatch, January 13, 1987). Various labor groups, according to the Dispatch article, have supported the advance notification requirement, citing the need for workers to find and become trained for new employment, while business groups and the Reagan administration have vigorously opposed such a requirement. The capacity of a voluntary, "grass roots" effort, through R and E, to develop an effective system for anticipating local plant closings clearly would better inform this debate.

To summarize, Morse, Rohrer and Crawford cite five basic formal objectives in the R and E strategy:
1. Demonstration of the community's pro-business attitude and appreciation for the contributions of the firm to the local economy;

2. Assistance in solving local problems of the firm in working with local governments, thereby cutting the costs to the firm of doing business;

3. Help in using state and federal programs, especially those that improve the efficiency of the firm in production or marketing;

4. Development of a data base for local economic strategic planning, thus improving the decision-making of firms;

5. Establishment of an early warning system for plant closings, allowing communities to prevent these changes or adjust to them as rapidly and painlessly as possible.

2. The R and E Service Delivery Model

As will be detailed shortly, there is considerable variation in the ways in which the R and E strategy is being implemented. However, there appear to be certain important commonalities. Most significantly, community-level efforts to attain R and E objectives have been accompanied in some states by the statewide provision of training to the groups working at this local level. At the local level, volunteers interested in increasing employment and income in their community have been forming "business visitation teams". Such a team visits local firms to interview the chief executive officers (CEO's) and, if permitted, to tour the business facilities. These volunteer groups differ from one another in the extent to which they may fulfill the five abovementioned R and E objectives, but they all appear to share the economic developmental aim of retaining and expanding existing firms, and therefore of increasing local employment and income.
There are in many states statewide coordination and provision of training to such volunteer, local business visitation teams. An organization interested in fostering business R and E will educate these community groups in the skills and knowledge useful for attaining R and E objectives (Otto, 1985). In some states private utility companies have been providing such training to the local business R and E visitation teams. Examples of such utility involvement are the R and E programs of New Jersey Bell Telephone, Wisconsin Bell Telephone and Michigan Bell Telephone. In other states the Cooperative Extension Service programs of land grant universities are playing this lead role in coordinating and training local R and E efforts. Examples of such land grant university participation are the R and E programs of Ohio State, Pennsylvania State and Iowa State universities. In Georgia meanwhile, the Department of Community Affairs has become involved in providing R and E training to local groups.

Just as there is diversity in the mix of objectives being pursued at the local level, so is there considerable variation in the degree and kinds of state-level training. According to a 1985 survey of state government development officials, 40 of 44 responding officials claimed that "some type of program to assist communities in their efforts to retain and expand existing businesses" had been started in their state (Otto, 1985). Several of these state-level programs were well articulated, with educational materials and systematic procedures. In one state, for example, five full-time equivalent staff and $320,000 annually were being allocated to help communities start these programs (Otto, 1985).

However, only 17 states in this survey were found, in fact, to have been providing training to these groups. Only six of these reported having developed or actually having used training materials. This suggests that while many express considerable "interest" in providing training statewide to local R and E visitation teams, few may have been doing so in a substantive, formalized manner.
Most statewide training programs and local R and E activities are less than five years old. There is understandably a paucity of research describing the effectiveness of these state and local efforts. To underscore the need for such research, the potential value of the R and E strategy as an economic development method is described briefly below.

3. Impact of Retention and Expansion Programs

One research study suggests the considerable potential of the R and E approach for attaining employment and related development objectives. This study (Miller, 1985) on the retention and expansion of firms in the North Central Census tract suggests that local R and E programs do not need to prevent every plant closing or succeed in retaining every existing job to have significant impact. A conclusion that could be reached by analysis of Miller's data is that if only one in five of the 4.1 million jobs lost in this region in 1976-80 had been retained and if expansion had been only 20 percent greater in existing firms, there would have been a net employment growth of 2.88 million jobs -- nearly double the net growth observed for this period (cf. Miller, 1985).

While the above demonstrates only potential benefits of the R and E strategy, studies of existing programs suggest that it may not be unrealistic to expect significant positive outcomes. A 1984 survey of 33 local business visitation programs in Ohio found that the R and E approach is often "successful", at least in the view of the program participants themselves (Morse, Wilson and Gordon, 1985). Fully 91% of program officials surveyed viewed their efforts as "successful" or "very successful". Local payrolls reportedly increased by an average of $2.6 million per community in the first year of initiating R and E efforts. The net benefit-cost ratios averaged more than 12 to 1, based on the reports of the survey respondents. It is particularly noteworthy, however, that this research found great disparity in the benefit-cost ratios among the different programs. In more than half the visitation programs studied, no tangible benefits were reported.
4. **Research Needed to Assess R and E Program Effectiveness**

Many economists and R and E participants use quantitative indicators to gauge the effectiveness of R and E programs. Such indicators include the number of jobs retained, the number of jobs added, the number of firms prevented from closing, etc. However, it often is difficult to specify to what extent such impacts may be attributed directly or indirectly to R and E program efforts. Local R and E program personnel may identify a firm as possibly having to close or reduce its employment substantially; they may then meet with that firm's chief executive officer to identify strategies for preventing layoffs or firm closure. If indeed that firm survives, without reducing the number of jobs it generates locally, ought the R and E program personnel to claim their efforts have "saved" that firm? Could not demographic, technological, market and other forces have been the chief factors in enabling the firm to retain the local jobs? In order to develop methods for assessing local R and E program effectiveness, more needs to be understood about how participants enact local R and E program objectives. The organizational, social and economic factors which influence the attainment of the R and E objectives should be identified. R and E programs involve many participants, and the results of their efforts are influenced by innumerable factors external to the R and E program itself. Research is needed to determine which internal and external factors are most salient in determining effectiveness.

In addition, more clarity is needed in defining what "effectiveness" means as it pertains to R and E programs. Does it mean the number of programs started or completed? Is it the increased capacity of local leaders to assist firms? Is it the net growth of local firms and employment?

The local volunteers who receive R and E training can be expected to have different expectations and
motivations concerning their own participation in the R and E process. To what extent are their personal objectives consistent with the formal objectives described in the literature on R and E programs? A program that is "successful" or "effective" for some constituencies might not be considered so by others. Alternatively, a given local program conceivably might be considered effective by all constituencies, yet the different constituencies may have varied reasons and criteria for finding the program to be effective. Indeed, it could well be that a program universally regarded as successful may be able to achieve this acclaim precisely because program participants have been able to define and enact the local program so that it is seen as consistent with the differing demands and values of diverse constituencies.

Prior to this study the researcher speculated that the research could discover that the participants in a local program may need to accomplish more than the Ohio R and E program's five formal objectives in order to attain the basic goals of retaining and expanding local employment and income. These goals are 1) demonstrating a pro-business attitude; 2) solving firms' problems with local governments; 3) helping firms use state and federal programs; 4) collecting business data for strategic economic planning; and 5) acquiring early warning of business closures. This research was undertaken, in part, to describe how state and local participants perceive the reasons for their own participation. The researcher hoped that this would enable the development of a more comprehensive concept of program effectiveness.

Those land grant university and utility firm personnel who train the local program participants would benefit from this knowledge, it was anticipated. Knowing how local volunteers and other constituencies define program effectiveness, the trainers could design volunteer training programs accordingly.

It was felt that persons and groups, contemplating whether to initiate local R and E programs, could benefit from information concerning the expectations
which participants in other programs have had and whether and why those expectations have or have not realized. Educators and educational administrations often have been involved in the leadership and implementation of local R and E programs. The researcher expected that the research would suggest potential benefits and risks of involvement by the representatives of educational organizations in such community development efforts as retention and expansion.

The researcher hoped that a description of the factors that contribute to or inhibit program effectiveness could be disseminated in the near future, lest many who would become participants in new R and E programs "blunder", in an enthusiastic but uninformed way, into this potentially important approach to development and job generation. Such enthusiasm without adequate understanding increases the likelihood of unfulfilled expectations, which in turn might discourage development professionals and other potential program participants from pursuing this possibly promising strategy.

It was deemed that research was needed, in conclusion, to consider both how "effectiveness" is defined as well as what factors enhance or impede it.

B. The Research Problem

1. Objectives of the Research

The overriding aim of this study was to generate a theory of the factors inhibiting and enhancing local program effectiveness, as effectiveness is variously defined by program participants. The aim, therefore, was neither to test such theory empirically through this research, nor to conduct an evaluation of the extent to which local R and E programs fulfilled the five formal program objectives. Instead, the purpose was to develop a theory by which future researchers could measure and predict program effectiveness, where such evaluation criteria would be grounded in the range of expectations and evaluation criteria employed by the participants.
The central questions to be addressed by the research therefore were 1) What are the criteria used by R and E program participants for assessing R and E program effectiveness? 2) What factors appear most salient in enhancing or impeding such effectiveness as it is variously defined?

2. Elements of the Problem

Prior to this study Morse and McLaughlin identified a number of service delivery factors that, in theory, might contribute to R and E program effectiveness. These included such factors as:

1. Program Financing: How well and securely is the state level R and E training process financed?

2. Program Staffing: How many individuals, at what levels of time commitment, affiliated with what kinds of formal organizations, and of what prior experience or professional qualification comprise the state and local R and E staff?

3. Participant Attitudes and Motivations: What do the various participants perceive as the aims of the R and E effort and of their own involvement in it?

4. Educational Service Mix: To what extent does a given state R and E program emphasize the promotion of its efforts more or less than it emphasizes provision of training to local volunteers? What are the training or educational goals and objectives of the program?

The above were enumerated in the research proposal to illustrate the kinds of factors which study could identify as more or less salient in affecting program effectiveness. In the project, the researcher did not propose to test hypotheses derived logically from this preliminary theorizing concerning factors that enhance or impede program effectiveness. Instead, he sought to determine how various program participants and
constituencies themselves define "effectiveness". Then, the researcher would ascertain what factors they identify as most influencing effectiveness. Through observation of the local R and E process, the researcher would seek to determine inductively what factors may most enhance or impede local program effectiveness.

Given the logic of this inductive research approach, the following were considered to be the key research elements:

1. Who are the important participants in implementing R and E activities?

2. What attributes do those participants have who make the most impact on program effectiveness? The determination of which participants were "important" would be derived from the perceptions of the participants and the researcher.

3. What constituencies are perceived as having an important stake in the outcomes of these R and E activities? The identification of key stakeholders would be made by the R and E program participants and the researcher.

4. How do these various important participants and stakeholders define and measure local program effectiveness?

5. What factors do these various participants and stakeholders perceive as most impeding or enhancing local program effectiveness?

3. Brief Overview of the Research Design:

The researcher originally proposed to conduct the study in three phases, using qualitative research techniques. First, the researcher proposed to conduct in the summer of 1986 three to five one-hour telephone interviews with a purposive sample of local R and E program coordinators from other states whose programs
would be identified by Morse as participating in highly
effective local R and E programs. The interviews were
to employ a brief schedule of open-ended questions
designed to elicit the perceptions of the local
coordinators concerning:

1. Whether and in what ways the local program had
achieved positive impacts;

2. What indications the coordinator used to
validate his or her assessment of the local program's
effectiveness;

3. What factors the coordinator believed: a) most
enhance local program effectiveness, and b) most impede
local program effectiveness;

4. What the coordinator believed those interested
in starting up R and E programs elsewhere should know in
order to make their programs more effective;

5. Who participated in the local R and E program,
and in what ways did they participate?

The researcher anticipated that certain themes and
patterns were likely to emerge over the course of these
interviews. It therefore was anticipated that the
schedule of interview questions would change over time,
becoming more precise. This phase was intended to
prepare the researcher for developing a more compre­
hensive schedule of open-ended questions for use at the
beginning of the second research phase.

In the second phase the researcher would study one
local R and E program site in which a new program was
just beginning. It was proposed that Morse and the
researcher would jointly select the site in which
observation was to take place, based on various criteria
including permission by program participants to be
observed and the perceived likelihood that the program
eventually would be "successful" and, therefore,
somewhat representative of "successful" programs in
general.
As a non-participant observer, the researcher would observe the training of that program's volunteers and some of the business visitations they would then conduct. The intention was to develop a "visceral" appreciation for the kinds of attitudes, behaviors and personal interactions which may characterize an R and E program operating at these stages in its development. The researcher would be observing these processes, having been sensitized and informed by the first research phase.

Finally, a third research phase would be conducted in which the researcher would perform an in-depth case study of a local Ohio program that was progressing from program initiation toward production of the final program report. Criteria for selecting this site would be identical to those for the second research phase, with the exception that the researcher would rely upon Morse's determination of which local program was likely to be "generally recognized as effective". By this stage in the study, the researcher would have obtained brief summative evaluations of their own by several local coordinators through telephone interviews and would have observed closely the initial stages of a new local program in Ohio. It therefore was anticipated that the researcher would have a moderately heightened understanding of both the variability in local program strategies and outcomes (through the first research phase) and the various kinds of factors to consider as potentially salient, during the initial program stages, in determining program effectiveness (through the second research phase). Based on this information, a more comprehensive schedule of questions would guide the third phase of intensive observation and interviews, than could be devised a priori, prior to the research.

The researcher proposed to stay on site, resources permitting, for the equivalent of four weeks to observe interactions between program participants and other stakeholders and to conduct personal interviews with them. The actual list of questions to be addressed at the start of this third phase would guide in testing any hypotheses concerning program effectiveness which had emerged from the prior research, and also would address
the following more generic concerns:

1. Who are the participants in the community's R and E process? This would involve a "thick description" of the participants' attributes, including age, sex, ethnicity, prior work experience, organizational affiliations, etc.

2. Which constituencies does each of these participants believe are affected by the local R and E process?

3. Concerning those constituencies which any participant feels should have been involved but in fact have not been, what reasons do the participants and these constituencies themselves give to explain this uninvolvelement?

4. Why do the participants feel that they and their fellow participants took part in the program?

5. How does each participant define effectiveness?

6. To what extent does each participant feel there has been consensus concerning what the program should accomplish?

7. How is effectiveness actually assessed by the participants? Whose definitions of effectiveness are employed by the participants as a group?

8. What informal coalitions exist within the participant group and between each participant and constituencies?

9. Does the concept of "equity" (as in "fairness) arise in discussions with and among the various participants and stakeholders? That is, does the notion arise without the researcher posing the question of how stakeholders define and assess it? Whose notions of equity appear to be dominant among the participants? Do participants see equity as one criterion of program effectiveness?
10. What resources can and do participants call upon in their efforts to attain the R and E goals of participants? What rationales and tactics are used to seek and secure these resources?

11. To what extent do the observable R and E activities diverge from those which the R and E training materials prescribe?

12. In what ways and for what reasons do participants view their training as enhancing or impeding the effectiveness of their local program efforts? How might the training be improved?

13. How do participant and stakeholder values, perspectives and tactics change over time?

14. What are the formal and informal objectives of the state training personnel, and in what ways do their purposes differ from those of local participants and stakeholders?

15. What descriptors do the participants tend to use in describing how the program has emerged from its inception to its present status?

Many of these questions were developed based on Harold Lasswell's notion of the "decision seminar" to describe the important components of a process of formulating and implementing policy (Sloanaker & Burgess, 1985). The decision seminar consists of a "problem solving strategy", a "social process model", a "decision process", and a "social values" model. Together these constitute a heuristic device for understanding and enacting policy processes.

The researcher proposed to engage in the third phase interviews and observation until a point of "theory saturation" had been reached, in which continued study would very likely only further substantiate the findings already reached. At this point a summary report would be drafted and disseminated to selected participants and stakeholders to assess the extent to which they agreed with the research findings. This
"member check" would enhance the internal validity of the findings. The research then would conclude with preparation of the full dissertation.

As will be described, the research actually progressed in a fashion somewhat divergent from the proposed strategy above. (See Chapter Three for a more detailed description of the research strategies that were proposed, of the methods actually used, and the rationale for divergences from the proposal.)

4. Limitations and Delimitations of the Research

A number of important limitations and delimitations were inherent in this design. One delimitation was that small purposive samples would be used in both phases. This limited considerably the capacity to generalize based on research findings, constituting an issue of validity. In neither phase would the researcher seek to control for or make unwarranted generalizations concerning the influences of such variables as socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, sex, age, geographic location, professional qualifications of program personnel, and market and demographic trends.

The schedule of interview questions would change over time, seriously limiting the replicability of research findings, constituting an issue of reliability. Throughout both research phases the reliability of the ongoing qualitative data analysis would be limited by the biases, values, unexamined personal assumptions and cognitive limitations of the researcher.

Another delimitation was that the sample of phase one subjects would be drawn only from communities in states where a state-level R and E training program was actually using training materials. Morse had maintained that a "state training program" was not seriously engaged in training unless it was using tangible training materials and therefore can provide evidence of these materials. The first phase telephone interview subjects were to be sampled purposively by Morse, who
would select from various states three to five local programs which he perceived as "highly effective", relying on his personal familiarity with program personnel or on the assessments of trusted colleagues in other state R and E training programs. While this introduced an important sampling bias, it was necessary to avoid states that are simply claiming to be conducting R and E programs due to the current popularity of the concept.

A major limitation of the design was that the researcher would be relying heavily upon the respondents' articulations. The quality of their input would be limited by their willingness and ability to respond accurately and truthfully.

Given the important limitations and delimitations above, why was this research pursued as it was designed? The R and E development strategy is a fairly novel and perhaps unique approach to domestic economic development. Preliminary research had suggested that it has the potential for yielding substantial, positive development impacts. The researcher therefore believed that the R and E strategy merited in-depth study. However, there existed no body of theory or research which encompassed the complexity of this new development strategy, nor which could explain how R and E program designers and implementors might make it highly effective.

The literature on R and E noted considerable variability in the economic effectiveness of the local programs, variability unexplained by economists. Prescriptive and descriptive literature suggested that the local R and E progress process is a complex social phenomenon, one for whose intricacies sufficient theory did not exist. Adherence to and the research application of any single theory would have been premature. Instead a highly inductive investigative approach would be employed, from which an expanded theory of specific relevance to this development process eventually could emerge.

The dissertation committee agreed to supervise the
identification of the complete initial set of interview schedule questions and the revision of questions as the study proceeded. An "audit trail" was to be maintained to permit anyone desiring to audit the research methodology to determine, inter alia, how and why questions were framed and revised. The researcher was to maintain a comprehensive recording system, including auditory tapes of all interview sessions, a personal diary, and all documents developed by the researcher and collected from the research respondents. These standard qualitative methodological procedures would enhance the reliability and validity of the study. Finally, the subjects themselves, prior to submission of the final research report, would be asked to indicate whether and in what regards they agreed or disagreed with the research findings.

5. Definition of Terms

The following are the conceptual and operational definitions of key concepts, in order of their appearance in the dissertation.

1. Business Expansion: The process whereby the number of persons employed (in full-time equivalents) by a firm increases as a result of the intervention from R and E personnel.

2. Business Retention: The process whereby a firm remains in existence in a locality where, without intervention from R and E personnel, the firm otherwise would have closed or moved from the locality.

3. Pro-Business Attitude: The holding of values which favor "free enterprise", profit-making and entrepreneurship.

4. Locational Assistance: A service, frequently provided by governments, which facilitates the selection of a suitable location on which a firm owner will situate new or expand existing facilities.
5. Local Economic Strategic Planning: The process whereby a) data are gathered about trends affecting the future profitability and employment levels of existing local industries; b) options are identified concerning how the community can assist existing local firms in responding to these trends; and c) data are used to identify and support the recommendations for community action.

6. Early Warning System: An at least somewhat routinized procedure for a) gathering and analyzing data to anticipate when a local firm is in danger of closing; b) identifying activities by which the firm closure can be prevented or its negative consequences reduced; and c) initiating these activities prior to the plant closure.

7. Local Business R and E Visitation Team: A group of individuals in a given locality whose explicit purpose for grouping together (usually on an unpaid, volunteer basis) is to survey local firms to gather data useful in a business program.

8. Formal Program Effectiveness: The degree to which a given R and E program achieves the two basic R and E program goals of retaining and expanding local employment and income and the five formal R and E program objectives.

9. Perceived Program Effectiveness: The degree to which different R and E program participants perceive a given local program as effective, according to their own effectiveness criteria.

10. R and E Program Participants: Those who serve in one or more of the following capacities: statewide R and E program coordinator, statewide R and E program employee subordinate to the statewide coordinator, professional volunteer consultant to the local groups, coordinator of the local business visitation groups, member of the local business visitation task force or visitation volunteer.
11. R and E Program Stakeholders: Those who perceive themselves and/or are perceived by others as having a stake in the outcomes of the program. The funding agencies, the Ohio Department of Development and the Ohio Cooperative Extension Service are examples of two major stakeholders.

C. Summary

An apparently novel community development strategy has emerged in recent years, one which previous research suggested has the potential to generate significant benefits. Increasing interest in this strategy was evident at community and state levels in many regions of the country. However, quantitative studies indicated that there was a considerable variability in local program success, a variability for which no extent theory had been identified to provide any explanation.

The conduct of R and E programs involves the active participation of educators and educational administrators. At the state level, statewide organizations—including land grant universities—provide training to local groups in how to perform business visitation surveys and how to interpret and act upon the survey results. At the local level, the representatives of many kinds of educational organizations participate in the groups which coordinate the local R and E activities.

Given the sociologically complex nature of the local R and E program process, it was recognized that program participants and stakeholders might vary in how they even define program "effectiveness", let alone in the factors to which they attribute program success.

It therefore was determined that:

1. Because the R and E development strategy may yield significant benefits, it merits our understanding:
2. Because interest in employing this strategy at the local level was increasing markedly, research concerning R and E would be of timely value;

3. Because educators and educational administrators were known to be playing diverse important roles in statewide R and E training and local R and E programs, such research would be of interest in the educational field; and

4. Because theory did not exist to adequately explain the variability in local program effectiveness, research was proposed to develop such theory;

5. Given the absence of acceptable a priori hypotheses to explain program effectiveness, a qualitative design was formulated which would begin with broad, open-ended questions to ascertain how effectiveness may be defined and explained differentially by program participants and the researcher. As the study progressed, the researcher would periodically refine the research questions, under the supervision of the dissertation committee. The proposed research design was then described.

6. This research design had certain limitations and delimitations which would be important to acknowledge when interpreting the research findings and implications.
CHAPTER II.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A. Introduction

There are several bodies of literature that are pertinent to the proposed research on R and E programs and their effectiveness. First, there is a small but growing amount of largely descriptive information on the R and E process. Much of this literature has been cited in Chapter I. Second, there are publications which describe the trends in how economic development has been defined throughout history. As will be seen below, the R and E process is a development strategy with some historically novel characteristics. There is literature that describes the need for and the rise in volunteerism and public-private cooperation in meeting social needs. Both volunteerism and cooperation between the public and private sectors are among the novel traits which appear often to characterize R and E activities.

A major theoretical orientation in economics that has emerged over the past three decades has been "human capital theory". This perspective seeks to understand how best to "invest" in people so that they in turn can contribute to the realization of economic outcomes. The R and E strategy constitutes a new way of investing in people, particularly in the skills and knowledge of local R and E volunteers, so that they may develop and sustain their own community developmental capabilities. The human capital literature is briefly discussed for its relevance to an understanding of the novelty of the R and E process.

Literature related to the philosophy and methodologies of "community education" next is considered. For, much of the spirit of community education, particularly the notion that community members can and should cooperate to achieve shared community developmental
aims, is embodied in the emerging approaches to business retention and expansion.

During the 1960's and 1970's many educators and educational administrators voiced community educational concerns, such as participatory democracy, education, and community self-determination. In recent years, as American educational institutions are experiencing increasing fiscal constraints, such concerns are much less frequently voiced. It seems that such humanistic values have been nearly removed from the public dialogue on American education and its purposes.

Meanwhile, it appears that increasingly many development economists are introducing such humanistic concerns into their considerations. Many development economists seem to be recognizing increasingly that various intangible factors must be addressed in designing equitable and effective development policy. Such intangibles include indigenous cultural values, local politics, the organizational design features of agencies responsible for providing development services, and the extent to which indigenous peoples themselves participate in defining policy goals and objectives. The literature on the growing appreciation among development economists for the importance of these factors in determining the outcomes of development efforts is noteworthy for its obvious relevance to the proposed research assessing R and E program effectiveness.

This literature and the proposed research may help American educational administrators realize that, in their efforts to be more efficient and responsive to market forces, they need not ignore humanitarian and humanistic concerns. What, in other words, many American educators seem to have forgotten, they may re-learn from a growing number of humanistically oriented development economists—and perhaps from those educators who have participated in development efforts such as R and E programs.

Another body of literature that will be helpful in interpreting the data gathered from the research
concerns organizational theory. Such theory addresses how organizations are designed and enacted to produce goods and services. The business retention and expansion process involves the organization of people and resources to meet varied formal and informal purposes. An understanding of the major perspectives in organizational theory will help the researcher notice, conceptualize and interpret patterns perceived when observing the behavior of R and E participants. Similarly, there is considerable literature describing different ways of understanding and evaluating policy implementation. As R and E participants seek to carry out R and E activities they are, in effect, enacting and interpreting R and E "policy".

Literature from the critical theory perspective will be considered, particularly inasmuch as critical theorists frequently hypothesize that increased participation in decision making will lead to a greater equitability of the outcomes of those decision processes. Because the R and E development strategy is predicated upon volunteer cooperation and the formation of state-local and intra-local networks, an important aspect of the R and E process therefore is the manner and extent to which different constituencies participate in R and E-related decisions. Unfortunately, critical theorists thus far have failed to indicate sufficiently what "participation in decision-making" is, and what it looks like. The proposed research will consider who participates in R and E activities and decisions, and how they participate.

A final body of literature to be considered is that concerning research methodologies and their underlying epistemologies. The proposed research will utilize qualitative, inductive methods for gathering and interpreting data. The debate concerning the legitimacy of such an approach will be referenced at the conclusion of this chapter.
B. Summaries of Relevant Literatures

The following are brief overviews of the more salient features of literature pertinent to an understanding of the R and E process.

1. R and E Process: Research and Theory

The business retention and expansion approach to economic development already has been described in some detail in Chapter I. As discussed, the R and E strategy is a fairly new addition to the development professional's repertoire. The first known federal report describing and assessing the potential importance of this strategy was published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1981 (Vaughan, 1985). Also mentioned was research indicating that the R and E approach was found to yield a mean benefit-cost ratio of 12-to-1 in Ohio communities with active business visitation programs (Morse, Wilson & Gordon, 1985). As discussed, there is considerable and rapidly growing interest in this development strategy. One reason for the growing interest then would appear to be that this strategy is able to demonstrate a potentially high rate of return.

An additional reason for the growing interest in R and E may be that this approach constitutes a "positive sum" means of increasing local employment and income. As noted previously, there are five basic strategies utilized by development practitioners in a developed society such as the United States. (Pulver, 1979) Three of these represent "zero sum" approaches, in that a gain in employment and income for one locality is at the expense of a corresponding loss for other communities. Thus there remain two "positive sum" development strategies, wherein one community's gain does not necessarily involve a loss for other localities.

The first of these two positive sum approaches is that of creating new enterprises. The creation of new firms typically requires considerable start-up and initial working capitalization. Despite the often considerable capital expense to create a new firm, there
is no guarantee that the firm will remain a profitable venture over the long term. The majority of firms fail within the first five years. Thus, this approach, while having the virtue of being "positive sum", tends to involve relatively considerable capital expense as well as highly uncertain returns.

The other positive sum approach is that of business retention and expansion. The principal intent of business R and E efforts is to retain and expand the jobs and income generated by existing local firms. Existing firms tend to have more stability, because they already have survived the difficult start-up phase. Thus, an investment in their ability to retain and generate increased employment and income is likely to have more certain results than corresponding investment in creating new ventures. Finally, as we have seen, the benefit-to-cost ratio of the recently instituted R and E training efforts in Ohio was quite favorable, indicating that considerable benefits can be obtained with relatively little expense (Morse, Wilson & Gordon, 1985).

What may be of particular interest to educators and educational administrators is the fact that the R and E approach explicitly involves the provision of training and education to local community groups (Morse, Rohrer & Crawford, 1985). To assess the effectiveness of the R and E approach therefore involves a consideration of how educational as well as economic development programs are evaluated.

2. Changes in Theories and Philosophies of Economic Development

It is useful to consider how "economic development" has been conceived historically. The term, "economic development" itself, has undergone an evolution, illustrative of changing concepts of its aims and dynamics. Prior to the end of the second world war, the term was rarely used (Arndt, 1981). Adam Smith, for example, referred not to development but to "material
progress". Others during the eighteenth and nineteenth century spoke of "modernization", "westernization" or "industrialization". As historian W. H. Arndt notes, with only few exceptions the term "development" was employed until the 1930's to describe historical change, but without any reference to economic change.

One exception Arndt mentions was the publication in 1911 of J. A. Schumpeter's *Theory of Economic Development*, which made explicit the idea that there are important economic sorts of historical change. Another noteworthy exception, of course, was the description by Karl Marx of economic development as a crucial aspect of historical social change. Marx borrowed from Hegel's use of the term "development" as an inexorable, dialectical process of change. As Hegel had written: "The principle of development involves...the existence of a latent germ of being-- a capacity or potentiality striving to realize itself...The history of the world...is the process of development...Development, therefore, does not present the harmless tranquility of mere growth" (Arndt, p.459).

As Arndt indicates, "it was Marx who gave development a specifically economic connotation" (Arndt, p. 459). Marx described a process of struggle, between oppressor and oppressed classes, whereby humanity would progress inexorably toward the equality of communism. As Arndt further indicates, it was not until after World War II that wealthy and impoverished nations were described commonly in terms of their being "developed", "developing" or "underdeveloped".

Arndt makes a particularly insightful distinction when he describes how the term "development" has been used in either a "transitive" or "intransitive" sense. In its transitive sense, development is a proactive process, whereby individuals and human collectivities seek to identify and then implement social or economic changes. In the intransitive sense, development is seen as something which happens, more or less inexorably, without conscious human effort or intention. Marx's notion of dialectical development, then, was the use of the term with this intransitive connotation (Arndt, p.}
The transitive connotation of development first gained currency, it appears, in Australia. Not until much later did other "developed nations" like Canada and the United States begin using the term at all, let alone in its transitive or proactive sense.

In Australia's hostile environment, where settlers from the earliest convict days had to contend with drought, flood, pests, distance and more drought, economic development did not happen. It was always seen to need government initiative, action to "develop" the continent's resources by bringing people and capital from overseas, by constructing railways, and by making settlement possible through irrigation and other "developmental" public works. So well established did this notion become in Australia that by the 1920's it was referred to as "the doctrine of development before settlement" (Arndt, p. 466).

Arndt believes it was probably Wilfred Benson, secretary of the International Labor Organization, who first spoke of "underdeveloped areas" in 1942. Perhaps because the world war ironically had brought nations "closer" together (at least, in a market and technological sense), it was immediately thereafter that "economic development" gained currency, as a term understood as a conscious, proactive process.

By the early 1960's, the profession of development economics was flourishing. By this time, the field of development economics had become sufficiently sophisticated as to recognize the limitations of theory, research and policies which failed to account explicitly for "the human factor".

As Arndt states in his 1981 article:
What many development economics have tried to do in the last 20 years is get away from this identification of "economic development" with "economic growth." One form this endeavor has taken is to breathe into "development" some of the Hegelian connotations that had got lost on the way (p. 466).

He means, it appears, that some economists grew concerned by the "economistic" orientation of most development thinkers and practitioners, and that development should also be seen as nurturing the "latent germ of being" of which Hegel had written. (An "economistic orientation" here is one where socio-economic phenomena are explained in predominantly reductionist quantitative terms, terms which exclude many social and psychological factors from consideration.) The rise of "human capital theory" since the late 1950's and early 1960's may be seen as indicative of the growing perception that economic developmental thought must better account for the human factor, i.e. must move beyond the economistic view.

As it is prescribed in the literature, the local R and E program involves such aims as solving problems that firms have with local government, and the expression by volunteers of their appreciation to local firms. The R and E strategy thus may represent an effort to account for the human factor explicitly in local development.

3. The Rise of Human Capital Theory

The lending policies of the World Bank, one of the most significant international development institutions, have reflected the growing interest in this theory. As will be seen, in the 1960's the World Bank began to stress the importance of applying such theory to its lending policies. Human capital theory states, in essence, that the skills, knowledge and attitudes of
people constitute important "resources" which should be cultivated, invested in, in order to fuel economic development effectively.

One of the principal reasons for the shift in thinking was the growing interest in the 1960's in the economic value of education, which was described...as the "human investment revolution in economic thought." Before long, economists were trying to measure the contribution of education to economic growth...and many were examining the concept of investment in human capital. This activity influenced governments, planners, international agencies, and educators throughout the world (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985, p. 3).

This "revolution in economic thought" was due largely to the proven inadequacy of prior development strategies that had failed to consider the role which cultural, nutritional, psychological, educational and other "non-economic factors" may play in determining economic development outcomes. Established in 1944, the World Bank did not enter into its first development education project (i.e., one that utilizes educational resources to achieve economic development purposes) until 1962 (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, p. 3). Since that time the World Bank--and other major international development agencies followed suit--diversified its "portfolio" of development education projects.

Initially, [World Bank] lending for education could not be for primary education or for liberal arts colleges, but had to be restricted to engineering, technical, managerial, or other vocational education closely allied with other Bank projects. Furthermore, investment was confined to bricks
and mortar. Today, however, the Bank is investing in primary and basic education (including nonformal education) as well as in technical and vocational education and teacher training. It is also investing in curricula reform, school textbooks, and other software as well as school buildings and equipment. Thus the emphasis now is on both qualitative and quantitative improvements, and there is as much concern with equity as with the efficiency of educational investment (Psacharopolous & Woodhall, p. 5)

In the years since 1962, the World Bank, as but one of many international development institutions, has invested more than $5 billion in development education, helping to "provide a total of 3 million school, college, or university places, in more than 20,000 institutions" in the developing world (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, p. 4)

Development economists have learned several important lessons in recent years. Some of these merit attention here. One concerns the growing appreciation among development officials that to facilitate sustained and stable long-term economic growth requires a "holistic" approach to investment and planning for development. In other words, the conventional segmented approach is now viewed by many as ineffective. Since development efforts began on a nearly global scale after the second world war, the tendency until recently has been for professionals to devise and implement development projects which concerned their own professional areas of expertise. Farm projects, health care investments, educational activities—these would go on in a given third world country, but with very little coordination among the segmented efforts. The World Bank and other major development agencies are revising such overspecialized approaches.

Thus, all the evidence of a strong, but
complex set of relationships between parental education, children's education, fertility and the relationships between education, health and nutrition indicate that decisions about education projects need to consider both indirect and direct effects, even though these are difficult to predict precisely...The complementarities between training and the formal education sector are so important that all forms of human resource development, including general and specific training, must be given a high priority and central focus in the design and evaluation of projects in other sectors (e.g., such sectors as health, agriculture, manufacturing, etc.) (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, p. 310).

This appreciation for the interrelationships between sectors has led the World Bank to adopt a more interprofessional team approach to development policy analysis and program planning. "Experience repeatedly demonstrates the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of education and other forms of investment in human capital" (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, p. 4).

A second important development lesson recently learned concerns the capacity of impoverished individuals and communities to help themselves. Perhaps ironically, while American educators have shied away from such a "community educational" concept, some "hard-nosed" development economists are coming to view "people power" as a tremendous and important resource for economic growth and welfare. Some refer to the process of enabling persons to better sustain themselves, as "empowerment". World Bank development economists, Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, refer to this as "self-help":

Some countries have attempted to overcome financial constraints by using direct labor to build schools, by allowing
communities to provide goods and services in kind rather than cash payments, and by relying upon other forms of local community involvement or self help. Zymelmann concludes that self-help has great potential as an educational financing method because it can provide extra resources and ensure that they are used efficiently and flexibly (p. 159).

A third important lesson concerns the need to involve the intended beneficiaries of international development activities more directly in needs identification, political decision-making and problem resolution processes.

The political commitment of a [third world] government to change and development is one of the most obvious, yet often neglected, factors explaining the success of certain educational technology projects (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, p. 227).

Many development economists thus have begun to perceive serious limitations in the conventional approach to development concerns. The limitations perceived in this approach are that it tends to be overly quantitative, fragmented in planning and implementation, and neglectful of cultural, political and "human resource" factors. Many researching and theorizing concerning the American economy, however, appear not to have arrived at such conclusions concerning the limitations in the economistic orientation. At least, most literature concerning the U.S. economy makes little or no mention of considerations about such factors. The five economic development strategies described by Pulver (1979) make no mention of these factors.

An important distinction needs to be made concerning human capital theory and the development policies which it has been used to legitimate. While it constitutes the intellectual recognition that the
attitudes, skills and knowledge of individuals constitutes a sort of "fuel" for the development process, this should not be seen as a necessarily "humanistic" orientation:

Since the 1960's, the development orthodoxy has increasingly taken a "human capital" perspective wherein the poor are viewed as "resources" in which financial investment should be made. The aim of such investment is to transform the poor into more "productive" resources, whose productivity will yield fiscal and economic returns....A recurring theme in the human capital theory literature is that investments are needed in skills, health, attitudes and values of people, because [emphasis added] people are needed for the realization of development goals...It should be readily noticeable that in community education, development is the means to personal and collective local ends, whereas in international development, persons are induced to serve development goals (McLaughlin, 1986, pp. 46-47).

In other words, human capital theory may be seen as viewing individuals as means. Moreover, despite the acknowledgement made by World Bank authors Psacharopoulos and Woodhall that third world governments should be permitted to participate actively in setting development policies affecting their peoples, this may do little to bring the poor in these nations into the agenda setting process. Concerning those who manage third world government agencies and international bureaucracies, it has been said that:

The managerial elite in such organizations are charged with the task of steering the organization,
of defining and defending its actions (and, therefore, their own legitimacy as leaders). The top leadership, additionally, must represent the organization to a multitude of interested publics, such as national legislatures, corporate owners, diplomatic emissaries. They thus navigate in the rarified atmosphere of the world's movers and shakers. Not only are they far removed from the lower strata within their own organizations, they also are astronomically distant from the purportedly intended beneficiaries of their decisions: the world's poor (McLaughlin, 1986, p. 39).

While human capital theory at least brings the poor "into the development equation," it does not guarantee that they will participate in the decisions which affect the quality of their lives. Nevertheless,

In fairness, it should be noted that the human capital approach to "human resource" investment and utilization constituted an important advance over previous approaches, in that it recognized the primary role which people play in determining the quality of development project outcomes. Repeated experience had proven, prior to the ascendancy of human capital theory, the inadequacy of theories and practices which did not factor humans into the development equation. Furthermore, one suspects, the theory has proven a blessed tool by which humanistically inclined development professionals could justify, to international elites, the value of providing services directly to the
poor...Human capital theory provides a necessary short term "cover" behind which humanistic development policies sometimes can be enacted. However, the capacity of development efforts to empower the poor to make decisions affecting the quality of their own lives is limited by any mindset which measures policies in terms of their service to the abstract preconceptions and values of (geographically and spiritually) distant elites (McLaughlin, 1986, p. 47).

While human capital theory may not ensure an empowering or humanistic approach to development, it nonetheless has been employed to legitimate tremendous investments in the third world in education, health care, sanitation and related services for the poor. Of particular note is that development practitioners and researchers have been steadily intensifying their efforts to understand and tap the economic developmental benefits of investments in third world education (cf. Selowsky, M., 1976; and Selowsky, M., 1982). Many educators in the United States, however, have only "flirted" with the idea of explicitly utilizing educational institutional resources for developmental aims. With few exceptions, American educational administrators are reluctant to address economic developmental considerations directly, for essentially political and ethical reasons. One major exception has been the involvement of Cooperative Extension Service educators in community development efforts.

According to the literature describing R and E programming, these programs often involve local educational leaders. The research thus may serve to illuminate the actual qualities of their involvement in R and E programs. In so doing, the research findings may serve to inform educators concerning the potential advantages and disadvantages of such involvement in local development.
4. Changing Perspectives in Education Concerning Development

Currently, land grant universities and private utility firms are the major providers of such training as is being provided to local R and E volunteers. The research might shed some light on whether higher educational institutions are particularly adept in providing such training. It, therefore, would be useful to understand how American higher educational administrators currently might view such a research finding. American educators have viewed explicit institutional involvement in community development in different ways over the years.

While economic thought was moving to incorporate political, sociocultural and like considerations, thinking in education was striving in the 1950's and 1960's to incorporate such social scientific understandings as found in economics. Rooted in the debates of the Vienna Circle in the 1920's, where emerged in the field of educational administration in the late 1940's and 1950's a "theory movement." This movement, spearheaded by Andrew Halpin and other prominent educational thinkers, advocated the use of logical positivist theory and research to advance a "scientific" understanding concerning education (Culbertson, 1985). Given the virtual absence of "hypothetico-deductive" research and theory-testing in education, logical positivist educational theorists and researchers turned to the social sciences, seeking to apply their theory to educational research concerns. Many turned to the most "scientific" of social sciences--economics-- thereby creating the sub-field of inquiry, the economics of education. The first textbook in this area was published in 1958 (Lowenstein, 1958).

The involvement of American educators began in the 1940's and 1950's, in a very practical manner, with the work of the Cooperative Extension Service in supporting community development. The Cooperative Extension Service was created by the Smith-Lever Act in 1914, through a partnership between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the land-grant educational institutions.
From the beginning, Cooperative Extension played a part in rural development. However, not until 1956 did Congress amend the Smith-Lever Act to make rural development an official function of Cooperative Extension. Over the years, the scope of Cooperative Extension activities has increased in rural development in response to legislation and policy shifts...Extension's resources devoted to community and rural development, let alone economic development, are small in comparison to its other major program areas. By one estimate, only about one percent of total Extension resources is actually allocated to economic development....By the same token, much of the work in [other] program areas within Extension is clearly related to economic development (Honadle, 1987, 3, 1-2).

However, such education-for-development was largely ignored by educational theorists and philosophers. It was only later, under the rubric of "community education" that the potential value of applying educational resources to meet community development needs was considered. In the late 1960's and early 1970's this philosophy of education known as "community education" gained brief, intense popularity. In a 1973 publication, Robert I. Berridge describes community education:

As a philosophical concept which serves the entire community by providing for all of the educational needs of all of its community members. It uses the local school as the catalyst for bringing community resources to bear on community problems in an effort to develop a positive sense of community, improve community living,
and develop the community process toward the end of self-actualization (p. 41).

Another proponent of community education wrote that "Americans in the seventies are becoming more and more interested in community education—the process that achieves a balance and a use of all institutional forces in the education of all the people" (Seay, 1974). Imbedded in this philosophy are several notions: that every community member has the right to participate in defining what community problems are and in determining how to resolve them; that community "development" should consist of the "self-actualization" of all its community members; and, that persons individually and collectively possess largely untapped resources (in terms of their knowledge, attitudes and skills) which can be brought to bear in such problem resolution.

More recently, there appears to be much less concern among American educational administrators regarding such ideals of participatory democracy and holistic concepts of the term "development," and correspondingly greater concern with how to finance educational institutions in an era of growing fiscal constraints. At the primary and secondary school levels, many school systems are facing the financial pinch wrought by rising costs and voter approved ceilings on tax support for public education. There are indications that educational administrators are responding increasingly by adopting "entrepreneurial" approaches to generating need revenues.

Higher educational administrators also generally appear to be responding to institutional finance issues in a more entrepreneurial fashion now than in the financially more comfortable 1960's. Among the threats compelling a greater entrepreneurial approach to revenue generation by higher educational administrators are:

1. Political pressure to "streamline and alter tax regulations, which may reduce or eliminate existing incentives for donors to provide philanthropic support for higher education (Chronicle of Higher Education,
November, 1985);

2. A considerable decline in the 1980's in the size of the traditional college-age population, which may result in: increased inter-institutional competition for traditional students who are highly qualified scholastically or wealthy enough to bear full tuition costs;

3. The growing need to attract non-traditional students, necessitating investments costs entailed in creating new programs and facilities;

4. Implementation of new federal and state student loan and voucher policies which allow for greater "student choice", such that students can more easily attend a private institution (provided that loans are available in sufficient amounts, an important caveat), thereby intensifying the competition faced by public institutions in attracting students (Chronicle of Higher Education, October, 1985); and

5. A levelling off of federal research and development support (which becomes a decline since 1967, when viewed in real dollars, controlling for inflation), making higher educational institutions increasingly concerned with how to finance the research portion of their mission (Daniels, R., Martin, R., Eisenberg, L., Lewallen, J. & Wright, R., 1977).

Few American educators seem explicitly to advocate using educational resources for income redistributive or other economic developmental purposes. Ostensibly, the justification for avoiding explicit involvement in development has been the need to retain the "value neutrality" and "academic freedom" of educators and educational institutions. Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, articulates this rationale most forcefully and eloquently (Bok, 1982, esp. Chs. 3 and 9).

In 1985 an "ad hoc committee on university-industry relations" was formed at The Ohio State University to address policy issues concerning the terms
under which university faculty should be permitted to engage in research, development or public service projects. This committee advocated a series of policies and procedures. Most were adopted, advocating that universities be involved in sponsored projects (i.e., ones funded under contract with external agencies) only if and when a) knowledge gained from the project could be freely disseminated (with certain exceptions, for "national security", for example); b) university project personnel would not receive undue financial gain via "insider" information obtained through project involvement; c) faculty are not inordinately drawn away from their teaching commitments by sponsored project involvements; and perhaps most significantly, d) there is no other kind of organization equally suited to perform the project tasks. In other words, the university should not seek to perform sponsored work that others are or could as easily be doing (OSU onCampus, April, 1983).

Given the pressure upon American higher educational administrators to be more "entrepreneurial" in generating revenues, such policies concerning the solicitation and uses of external grants and contracts are receiving increasing attention. On the one hand, many institutions want very much to obtain such funds. On the other hand, colleges and universities thereby become involved more and more explicitly with the potentially politicized or profit-making purposes of external funding sources. Many thus see in the increasing utilization of sponsored research funding a very real threat to academic integrity and the freedom with which information flows in and out of academe.

Many upper-level higher educational administrators, forced to balance concerns over academic ethics with the need for additional revenues, express a certain ambivalence regarding institutional participation in projects which might give the institution the appearance of being anything other than "purely" value-free and a-political.

Investigations of basic principles are the soul of the university, from which
everything else flows. Science and scholarship are the foundations of our teaching, and these in turn are enriched by the curiosity and energy of our students. Research helps keep university public services -- health care, agricultural extension, and information services -- abreast of new developments....Beyond the campus the fruits of research are pervasive, too, in our culture and in our material condition. Much of the knowledge cultivated in the university can help industry develop new products and services, improve health and medical care, or otherwise raise living standards....One of the most widely discussed benefits of university research is its function in promoting technical advances and economic progress....But this utilitarian view ignores much of the university's most important scholarship (Hollander, 1985).

While the above and other educational finance developments in recent years may constitute an impetus to administrative entrepreneurship, fiscal constraints also may be understood as placing administrators in a "cutback management" posture. Some interpret having to cope with significant revenue declines as an organizational "crisis". For some theoreticians and researchers the "crisis" consists most significantly of a threat to the prevailing values of the organization (Simon, H., 1977). Others view crises, such as coping with financial cutbacks, as leading to more centralized decision-making (Hamblin, 1958; and Hall & Mansfield, 1971).

While much has been written concerning the impact of financial scarcity upon the teaching and research functions of higher educational institutions, the impacts upon the off-campus educational public service function appears not to be well understood. The provision by the Ohio Cooperative Extension Service of
Ohio State University of R and E training is viewed by some as a university sponsored off-campus educational program. Others, including Cooperative Extension Service Personnel, regard their work as teaching assignments. Research into the R and E process could help educational administrators decide whether, how and to what extent they should engage educational institutional resources in such off-campus development activities as R and E.

Given the generally declining U.S. farm economy in the mid-1980's, the Cooperative Extension Services in various states may be experiencing increasing fiscal austerity. How the sponsorship of local R and E programs is viewed as affecting the flow of resources into the Cooperative Extension Service may be useful to know for both those in state programs that do not sponsor such programs and others evaluating the impacts of these programs.

5. Organizational Theory

The nature of decision-making, in educational and other kinds of organizations, has received considerable attention in organizational theory and research. Pfeffer and Salancik found in 1974, for example, that the perceived power of an organization's department was the most highly correlated, among many factors, with the budget allocation that department was awarded. In 1980, Pfeffer and Moore found that this perception of the power of a department was more important in retaining that department's budget level in times of financial decline than in increasing its proportionate share of organizational resources during times of increasing organizational financial resources (cf. also Hills & Mahoney, 1978).

Richard J. Bates, an Australian critical theorist, has described another dimension of organizations concerning how the professionalization and specialization of work affects the flow of power, and therefore of decision-making, within an organization (1981). In viewing the decisions made by professional
versus non-professional R and E personnel, do these personnel differ in the degree to which they feel they need to or should involve others in making key R and E decisions? If the relative power of an organizational unit and its personnel in part determine how effectively a given service objective is implemented, then an understanding of the relative power of the R and E training unit and its personnel within a given land grant university or private utility company would be useful.

As these citations suggest, organizational decision-making may be—and by many is—viewed as a political process. Juxtaposed with this perspective is the "rational model" which describes decision-making in organizations as rational and objective (Daft, 1983). Among the many criticisms to which this model has been subjected are that it ignores how organizations are composed of people, each having her or his own goals; and it overlooks how no one may be purely rational, given human biases and perceptual limitations (e.g., Simon's view of rationality as being "bounded").

Critical theorists have inveighed against the rational model for viewing decision-making in organizations. Friere (1973, 1985), Apple (1970, 1979), Giroux (1981) and others hold, as did many community educators active in the 1970's, that decision making is highly political, but should be made more democratic. "Democratic" decision making would allow both a far broader set of constituencies to participate in decisions as well as a more equal level of participation by these constituencies (cf. esp. Friere, 1970). The critical theorists call for more participatory decision making because they believe it would lead to greater socioeconomic equity.

Many critical theorists disagree with the perspective, rooted in the structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons (Parsons & Shils, 1951) and in logical positivist philosophy, that views organizations as predominantly value-neutral vehicles for achieving social goals. The critical theorists hold the minority view in this debate. To an extent the "orthodoxy",...
which sees formal organizations as apolitical, is acknowledging some of the critical claims. For example, the view of organizations as "rational systems" has been modified to a "contingency theory" perspective. The former saw organizations as apolitical, guided by rational goals which were pursued in mostly rational ways. This view tended to view simplistically the environment in which such organizational "rationality" is purported to exist. The latter recognizes that environments may be more or less "turbulent", more of less complex or uncertain. Contingency theory suggests that the most "effective" organizational design depends upon such environmental contingencies (Daft, 1983). This theory also suggests that there are a number of external "domains" from which it is important for organizational managers to acquire resources and information. In addition, the theory holds that managers should seek to control, or at least stabilize, the relations between the organization and the individuals and other organizations of these other domains.

Critical theory suggests that this "contingency" view is correct in seeing organizational performance as influenced by external conditions. However, contingency theory does not address sufficiently how there may exist conflict in organizations concerning how "effectiveness", with regard to such extra-organizational contingencies and domains, should be defined. Whose definition of effectiveness should be accepted?

Case study research of the ways in which different local organizational representatives define the effectiveness of their collaboration in an R and E program should provide some insight regarding a variety of factors which shape how effectiveness is defined intra- and inter-organizationally.

6. Implementation and Evaluation

As with many social service policies, implementation of R and E policy involves many different "stakeholders" who may hold different or competing
values and interests.

Each of the public and private "players" involved in the distribution and consumption of health care have different goals. Public funders may have partisan motives. Private sector providers are generally profit-oriented. The consumer of a medical service is presumably health-oriented. But the distribution of "health" is not necessarily the actual objective of the funders and suppliers. And the acquisition of "health" by service recipients is not always the outcome of a health care program (Brown & Wildavsky, 1984).

The authors above suggest that the different "stakeholders" need to be identified and their respective, perceived values and interests determined. The qualitative research strategy conducted for this study was designed to gather precisely this information concerning R and E program activities.

Dunn's "decision-theoretic evaluation" similarly suggests that program evaluation involve the comparison between the explicit and the hidden goals of stakeholders (Wildavsky & Pressman, 1984, p. 196). Such decision theory suggests that these hidden and explicit goals may conflict, and that this conflict may influence program outcomes. Mazmanian and Sabatier suggest other variables may influence outcomes significantly: "socio-economic conditions, public support, attitudes and resources of constituency groups, and the commitment and leadership skills of implementing officials" (Brown & Wildavsky, 1984).

Another stream of relevant literature concerns the need for social service delivery personnel to learn ongoingly from program successes and failures.

We need the capacity to learn during implementation. Implementation, rather than being a static subject, its ends safely tucked within the prescribed means, needs to become
dynamic, with implementors learning how to overcome unforeseen obstacles. These obstacles (lack of knowledge, power, etc.) cannot be entirely avoided by prospective, anticipatory policy design: they cannot be assumed away (Argyris & Schon, 1978).

Schon and Argyris make the related point that learning through continuous self-evaluation allows a service organization to adapt to a complex, changing ("turbulent") environment. Perhaps the relevance to this research of literature concerning implementation and evaluation is best illustrated by the following:

Comprehensive evaluation is the ideal form...combining analysis of process and of program impacts as they relate to the previously specified goals....There are many fields, however, in which it is difficult to identify significant process variables and their relationships to outcomes, because the multitude of factors affecting implementation have yet to be delineated....Comprehensive evaluation is only as comprehensive as the understanding of the [service delivery] process (Brown & Wildavsky, pp. 191-192).

In Effective Evaluation (1981), Guba and Lincoln describe the chronology of the evolution in thought regarding program evaluation. In the early 1900's, evaluation was conceived and conducted in a highly rationalized manner, whereby one assessed—usually quantitatively—the extent to which pre-formulated program goals were achieved. The rationalistic approach to evaluation held that program goals were "objective" and scientific criteria against which one could measure the relative success of the program. Evaluation science then was conceived as a matter of developing the "right technology" by which to make those criteria quantifiable and to create the appropriate instruments for quantifying actual program "outputs."

By the early 1960's, this once prevailing paradigmatic perspective was being challenged
increasingly. According to Guba and Lincoln,

Cronbach made three major points. First, if evaluation were to be of maximum utility to the development of new [educational] courses, it needed to focus on the decisions that those developers had to make during the time that development was occurring. This meant that evaluators, rather than asking about the objectives the developers had in mind and testing to see whether those were achieved, would instead ask: Who are the decision makers? What kinds of decisions do they make? What criteria to they bring to bear in making those decisions?...Second, Cronbach argued that evaluation needed to focus on the ways in which refinements and improvements could occur while the course was in the process of development. As Cronbach put it, 'Evaluation used to improve the course while it is still fluid contributes more to improvement of education than evaluation used to appraise a product already on the market' (p. 8).

By the late 1960's, many joined Cronbach in criticizing the rationalistic approach to evaluation. As Guba and Lincoln state,

In his introduction [to his 1967 paper, "The Methodology of Evaluation"] Scriven [suggested making] a distinction between formative evaluation and summative evaluation or between improving and judging the evaluand; distinguishing professional from amateur evaluation...distinguishing
evaluation from mere assessment—
evaluation is concerned not only
with whether goals are achieved but
also with whether the goals are, in
the first instance, worth achieving;
distinguishing intrinsic or process
evaluation from payoff or outcome
evaluation; and contrasting the
utility of comparative evaluations
with that of noncomparative
evaluation (p. 9).

The field of evaluation became, by the early
1970's, an arena in which there was much controversy.
Again citing Guba and Lincoln,

Guba (1969) pointed to certain
'clinical signs' of [rationalistic]
evaluation's failure: that it was
avoided wherever possible; that it
produced anxiety in the persons
exposed to it; that the field was
characterized by immobilization
rather than responsiveness to
evaluation opportunities; that the
very agencies that mandated
evaluation were unable to provide
reasonable and understandable
guidelines for doing it; that
evaluation consultants consistently
provided misadvice to clients who
sought their aid in designing or
carrying out evaluations; and that
evaluations consistently failed to
provide useful information.

By the mid-1970's conceptual approaches to
evaluation began to gain in acceptance as alternatives
to the orthodox, rationalistic method. Stake proposed a
"countenance model" which in a sense constituted only a
minor departure from evaluation orthodoxy. "Stake,"
wrote Guba and Lincoln (1981, p. 13), "expanded the
concept of objectives to include contextual factors, as
well as objectives for teachers and other agents. He
provided a basis, however incomplete, for the evaluation of the objectives by requiring a justification for them in terms of some explicit rationale." Thus, for Stake evaluation should address the two "countenances" of performance vis-a-vis rational criteria and of performance relative to the agents' subjective rationales for using the subjectively derived criteria.

Stufflebeam (1970) proposed the "context-input-process-product model" which organized the performance of evaluation with principal reference not to objectives but to decision types. He recommended the systematic examination of intended ends, intended means, the context in which decisions are made, inputs (resources) used, actual means, actual ends, and the processes by which inputs are employed.

During the remainder of the 1970's, further alternative conceptions of evaluation were developed which could be seen as nearly diametrically opposed to the rationalistic orthodoxy. Scriven (1974) proposed a "goal free" model of evaluation. "All that should be concerning us, surely, was determining exactly what effects this product had (or most likely had), and evaluating those, whether or not they were intended" (p. 1). In other words, evaluation should address and assess what happened rather than determine only to what extent the intended outcomes actually occur. As Guba and Lincoln (1981) summarize Scriven's concern, "if a product had an effect that could be shown responsive to a need, that product was useful and should be positively evaluated."

The proposed case study assessment of the effectiveness of a local R and E program, it was felt, would provide an opportunity to assess the extent to which the stakeholders differed in their notions of that program's intended outcomes. Thus, it was anticipated that there probably would be no completely shared set of criteria by which to assess the local program's effectiveness. Equally, case study research was expected to provide an opportunity to determine whether new or modified effectiveness criteria became endorsed by various stakeholders. The researcher would conclude
by assessing the local program not only in terms of the objectives prescribed by the state training organization and the aims to which local participants adhered before and during the program, but also with respect to actual local program outcomes—whether or not anyone intended them.

These research aims were consistent with an evaluation model which Stake described in 1975 as the "responsive" approach to evaluation.

There are different ways to evaluate programs and no one way is the right way. I prefer to think of ways that evaluation can perform a service and be useful to specific persons. For an evaluation to be useful, the evaluator should know the interests and the language of his audiences....To emphasize evaluation issues that are important for each particular program, I recommend the responsive evaluation approach....An educational evaluation is responsive evaluation if it orients more directly to program activities than to program intents; responds to audience requirements for information; and if the different value perspectives present are referred to in reporting the success and failure of the program" (pp. 13-14).

Stake and many of the sternest critics of the purportedly value-free, rationalistic approach to evaluation advocate the employment of qualitative research methods to generate program evaluation information. The essential implication of this literature stream for the proposed study is that evaluation increasingly is seen to entail inquiry regarding much more than the matter of whether program goals are realized. The researcher, in fact, hoped that the proposed study might demonstrate the usefulness of a
"responsive" approach to program evaluation. Literature regarding the qualitative methods used to conduct such an evaluation are considered next.

7. Qualitative Research Methodology

A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply imbedded in the socialization of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell us what is important, legitimate and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological consideration. But it is this aspect of paradigms that constitutes both their strength and their weakness — their strength in that it makes action possible, their weakness in that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm (Patton, 1978, p. 203).

As has been demonstrated from the preceding discussion on bodies of literature relevant to research on the implementation and evaluation of R and E programs, there are many possible "lenses" through which these programs can be seen. These different, sometimes contradictory, theoretical perspectives capture certain aspects of reality with particular clarity, while simultaneously imposing limits beyond which the theorist or researcher sees little or not at all. There is a large literature on the merits and limitations of the numerous research methodologies and their underlying philosophical frames (cf. Bogden & Biklen, 1978; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

This researcher maintains that each research paradigm has its own unique strengths and weaknesses. The hypothetico-deduction strategy of the logical positivists is well suited to those phenomena that are
understood and readily susceptible to quantification or when in-depth qualitative study would not be practically feasible. The qualitative research approach, however, is appropriate where one is averse to quantifying about human attitudes, values or perceptions; the situation under study is sufficiently complex that factorial analysis would yield little information of substantive value and extant theory has not yet suggested which factors are most salient; there is insufficient theory from which to generate empirically testable hypotheses; the researcher wants to be particularly explicit about the values, assumptions and biases that are usually only implicit in the operationalizations and identifications of variables in "objective", quantitative studies; or when one wants to understand what meanings persons attach to the phenomena in question.

The primary weaknesses which the qualitative methodology sometimes is alleged to have are that results are not "valid" or "reliable". The following speaks to the concern for "external validity".

Some qualitative researchers do not think of generalizability in the conventional way. They are more interested in deriving universal statements of general social processes rather than statements of commonality between similar settings such as classrooms. Here, the assumption is that human behavior is not random or idiosyncratic [emphasis added]. They therefore concern themselves not with the question of whether their findings are generalizable, but rather with the question of to which other settings and subjects they are generalizable...Another way some qualitative researchers approach generalizability is to think that if they carefully document a given setting or group of subjects, it is then someone else's job to see how it fits into the general scheme of things. Even a description of a deviant type is of value because theories have to account for all types (Bogden & Biklen, pp. 41-42).
Concerning the "reliability" of qualitative findings, the authors of the above, Bogden and Biklen, state:

In qualitative studies, researchers are concerned with the accuracy and comprehensiveness of their data. [They] tend to view reliability as a fit between what they record as data and what actually occurs in the setting under study, rather than the literal consistency across different observations... Two researchers studying a single setting may come up with different data and produce different findings. Both studies can be reliable. One would only question the reliability of one or both studies if they yielded contradictory or incompatible results (p. 44).

Patton has indicated three hallmark characteristics of qualitative research: it is holistic, uses induction, and involves "naturalistic inquiry". "The holistic approach to research design is open to gathering data on any number of aspects of the setting under study in order to put together a complete picture of the social dynamics of a particular situation or program" (p. 40).

"Inductive" reasoning involves open-ended empirical observation, and the discernment of and attention to emergent patterns or themes. The quality of such reasoning depends on the researcher's ability "to allow the important dimensions to emerge from analysis of the cases under study without presupposing in advance what these important dimensions will be" (p. 41).

The essence of "naturalistic study" is that the research setting is a naturally occurring phenomenon which the researcher does not seek to shape or control. Lasswell said: "The point of using qualitative methods is to understand naturally occurring phenomena in their naturally occurring states" (Sloanaker & Burgess, 1985). This is therefore clearly not an "experimental" approach to knowledge generation, whereby the scientist seeks to "control" certain variables while permitting or making
others to vary.

For qualitative research to meet the three criteria above—holism, induction and naturalistic inquiry—the researcher needs to establish trust with the research subjects and considerable familiarity with the subjects and their setting. This requires that the researcher stay at the site over a period of time. Time on-site is needed in order also for the researcher to reach the point of "theory saturation", wherein the observations and insights of the ongoing research are simply reinforcing the findings already achieved.

C. Summary

Several streams of theoretical and research literature have been examined. Literature on the R and E process indicates important gaps in understanding, particularly with regard to why the level of local program effectiveness varies so considerably. The R and E process has been distinguished from other approaches to local economic development by virtue of its being an apparently low-cost development strategy; emphasis on assisting existing firms; use of volunteers and public-private cooperation; and investment in the skills and knowledge of these volunteers so that they may sustain their own development efforts after the program has been completed.

Literature describing changes in theories and philosophies concerning economic development was examined. It was found that only in recent years has the term "development" been used in a "transitive" or proactive sense—i.e., to connote the active effort by individuals and societies to shape the direction of future economic change. In recent years, the literature of development has evidenced a growing awareness that human skills, attitudes and other attributes need to be factored into development plans and policy making.

One expression of this awareness has been the development of human capital theory, which views human skills, knowledge, attitudes, values and other
attributes as needing to be invested in if development projects are to succeed. This theory, it was noted, has been influential in shaping the policies of major international development institutions, such as the World Bank. This and other development institutions have noted in recent years the importance of coordinating and integrating the efforts to develop different sectors of a society. Consistent with this, many development projects have begun to form interprofessional teams to formulate and implement third world development policy. This literature is relevant to the proposed study in that it suggests that local R and E programs might constitute an innovation in American development practices, by which such an interprofessional team approach is now being applied in American communities.

Even more recently, development institutions such as the World Bank have begun to advocate the necessarily active role which third world governments must play in their nations' development. Such calls for self-help may be problematic, however, to the extent that the poor in these developing countries remain excluded from participation in setting the development policies which affect their lives so profoundly. Explicit in the literature which prescribe how to conduct local R and E programs is the suggestion that local community leaders take the initiative in conducting the programs in order to achieve a "local strategic economic planning" capability. Possibly implicit in this prescription is that R and E programs constitute a way of encouraging local self-help. It was hoped that the research could shed light on whether this goal was intended, though implicit, and on if greater self-help may be facilitated through R and E, regardless of whether participants actually intended it to be.

Problematic, it was considered, may be the way in which human capital theory advocates a utilitarian view of poor persons and communities as "resources" to be invested in and used for development purposes—purposes about which their views have not been sought. On the other hand, it was recognized, human capital theory may serve to provide development professionals with a means to legitimize humane desires to deliver desperately
needed health, educational, sanitation and other services to the poor.

The R and E program prescription literature shed no clear light on whether local participants do or are supposed to view persons as ends-in-themselves or as means to economic ends. The proposed research, it was felt, could provide indications regarding this matter.

The growing awareness among international development economists of the need to invest in education then was contrasted with the apparently decreasing interest among educational administrators in the United States to consider how their institutional resources might serve domestic development aims. Forced into a "cutback management" posture by various converging forces, many administrators are aggressively seeking funds from new sources, in novel ways. Such "entrepreneurship" may be leading many administrators, paradoxically, toward greater caution with respect to educational initiatives that would facilitate equitable local economic development.

Many colleges and universities, to sustain their research capabilities, have begun aggressively to seek sponsored project funding. Within academic circles increasing concern has been voiced regarding the potential threat to academic freedom and to the broad mission of such institutions that increased reliance on corporate support may represent. While public service is an important component of many higher educational institutional missions, the threat to fulfilling off-campus public service responsibilities of declining resources and greater reliance upon sponsored project funds has not been addressed sufficiently. Thus, by examining the risks and benefits, for one land grant university, of sponsoring statewide training for local R and E programs, the researcher hopes to shed modest light on whether and how universities may fulfill off-campus educational and public service commitments.

A review of organizational theory literature suggested several lines of inquiry appropriate for this research, concerning the potential impacts which various
organizational factors may have upon local (and state) R and E program effectiveness. These factors include the level and stability of training program and local program funding; the degree to which program personnel possess professional qualifications and skills; the power of the training unit relative to other units within the organization; the extent to which stakeholders and program participants actually participate meaningfully in the setting of program policy; and the kinds of environmental factors which can influence the organizational performance of the program.

Theory and research concerning policy formulation and implementation processes then were considered. Many authors, it was found, recognize the importance of understanding that different stakeholders frequently possess differing, sometimes competing, values, attitudes and interests, and thus may be expected to define the "effectiveness" of a given policy or program in varied terms. Such conflicts themselves may influence heavily the kinds of outcomes achieved by a policy or program.

It also was recognized that program evaluation may be done most appropriately while a program is in progress, so that participants can learn and, if deemed necessary, shift direction and practices in mid-stream. The performance of such evaluation is based in considerable measure on the utilization of qualitative research methodologies.

Such methodologies eschew, to the extent human possibly, the testing of a priori hypotheses. Rather than seeking to apply one theoretical "lens" to gain understanding, qualitative researchers seek to approach the subject of their inquiry open-endedly, with as few preconceptions as possible. Clearly, it was recognized, both the researcher and his or her respondents have biases, cognitive limitations, and varying degrees of willingness to describe and report upon the phenomenon in question.

The methods employed by qualitative researchers tend to vary considerably, not only from one research
setting to the next, but even from one research event to another within the same setting. Such human "imperfections" and methodological variations mean that qualitative research necessarily faces certain validity and reliability threats. Nevertheless, where adequate theory concerning a given phenomenon does not exist, where the meanings which respondents imbue the phenomenon with are important to understand, or where the researcher feels an ethical aversion to reducing the experience of respondents to quantitative descriptors--where any of these conditions holds, qualitative methodologies may be appropriate.

Certain procedures have been developed to compensate for the inherent threats to reliability and validity. Typically a tremendous mass of data is gathered, upon which generalizations and "emergent hypotheses" may be grounded. The research findings are then presented to the research respondents, to test for the plausibility (internal validity) of the findings. This research approach is often able to generate novel understandings and grounded theory, because the researcher has eschewed preconceived conceptual lenses. This approach also recognizes explicitly, and through careful data recording (e.g., field notes) accounts for, the extent to which the researcher's very presence in and "intrusion" upon the research setting has altered the interrelationships extant in that research setting. By becoming immersed in the research setting, one may attain a level of "intimate" familiarity and empathic understanding which quantitative research alone could not possibly accomplish. Finally, where the manner in which respondents perceive and define the reality of a phenomenon is itself problematic and important to comprehend, such intensive qualitative research may be particularly effective.
CHAPTER III.
RESEARCH METHODS

A. Introduction

Data collection began in early August, 1986 and ended in April of the following year. During this time a variety of data collection procedures were employed: participant observation, non-participant observation, interviewing, and the review of written documentation. Telephone interviews were conducted with statewide R and E training program coordinators from several states. At least one local program coordinator from each of those states were contacted. Personal interviews were conducted in several communities in Ohio, with a variety of R and E program participants and stakeholders: state R and E training personnel, state development officials, personnel of state development-related agencies, local R and E program coordinators, local R and E task force members, local R and E program volunteers, and those business representatives who had been interviewed by the volunteers.

Most of the latter data gathering, however, took place in an Ohio county which we shall call "Heartland" and involved the various participants and stakeholders of Heartland's R and E program. Heartland's program began shortly after the study started, so that it was possible to witness the program's evolution from initiation to completion and interpretation of its business visitation survey. Through in-depth scrutiny of this local program the researcher hoped to identify the ways in which program effectiveness was defined and to determine the kinds of factors which enhanced or impeded effectiveness as it was variously defined.

It was to determine both the ways in which Heartland's program was unique and the extent to which
findings from the Heartland case study are generalizable to R and E programs elsewhere that retrospective interviews were conducted with several coordinators of "mature" local programs in Ohio and elsewhere. "Mature" programs are those which have completed at least one cycle of business visitations, tabulated the aggregate results of the visitation survey, and drafted and publicized written recommendations based, at least ostensibly, on those aggregate survey data.

Data from the Heartland program case study thus were complemented by information drawn from a variety of other settings to facilitate the development of theory about the R and E process which would be generalizable across settings. All but two of the local programs investigated are in rural settings. Heartland County and the counties of the two other local program coordinators from Ohio who were interviewed are rural. As we will see, in other states only the local programs of "Northern County" and "Southeastern City" occurred in urban settings.

The researcher sought external grant support for this research because of the anticipated expenses for materials, lodging and meals on-site, and the storage and processing of voluminous data. A grant of $5,441 in U. S. Department of Agriculture funds was awarded by the North Central Regional Center for Rural Development and of $5,000 in Ford Foundation Rural Poverty and Resources Program funds by the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. Both grants stipulated that the study focus on the proposed research questions as they relate to rural settings. Both grantors agreed without reservation to the proposed research design and questions, requiring only that they receive a written final report and that the findings be applicable to R and E programs in rural areas.

In this chapter we will examine how this research design was implemented including: sampling procedures involved, the steps taken in interviewing and observation, the evolution of the research questions, and the procedures used to analyze the data. The chapter will include commentary assessing the adequacy
of these research activities.

B. Phase One

The aims during this initial phase were to obtain a general sense of the nature of local R and E programs and to determine the extent to which local programs vary nationally. To this end the researcher conducted long-distance telephone interviews with six local R and E program coordinators. To identify and gain access to these coordinators, in five of the six cases, the researcher needed to contact the coordinators of the statewide training programs which had sponsored these local programs. In the course of these conversations with state coordinators they themselves expressed a willingness to be interviewed, affording an opportunity to gain insights into variations of R and E programs at the state level.

1. Sampling Decisions

George Morse, an associate professor specializing in community resource economics at the Ohio State University, coordinates the provision statewide of training for local R and E programs in Ohio. This training has been sponsored by the university's Cooperative Extension Service and the Ohio Department of Development. He is one of the nationally recognized proponents of R and E as a local development strategy. The researcher wanted to examine the nature and causes of local program effectiveness and, therefore, planned to sample persons involved in programs generally regarded as "effective". The researcher sought Morse's guidance in identifying this purposive sample of "effective" local programs.

Morse selected several statewide organizations, in states other than Ohio, as having "effective" training programs. The criteria for deeming a statewide program as substantially involved in R and E training included
the provision of training to local groups; the use of standard, written training materials; and the involvement of at least 25 local program volunteers. He indicated that these criteria distinguish organizations making intensive, formalized R and E training efforts from those seeking to support the retention and expansion of single firms directly through their own process of business visitation. In the former, the training programs enable local groups to form and develop their own local capability to retain and expand existing firms in the community. In the latter, the organizations seek to retain and expand existing businesses but does so without assisting local groups to do this for their own communities.

Once Morse had selected these states, he and the researcher decided also to sample local coordinators whose program participants had been trained by one of the three types of statewide training organizations: land grant universities, state development agency, or utility companies. He drafted and sent a letter to each of these coordinators introducing the researcher and explaining his interest in interviewing coordinators of the most effective local programs in their respective states.

By the time that the researcher began to contact these state program coordinators by telephone, one state training official had already written, providing the name and telephone number for a local program coordinator his state. As grant funding had not been secured yet the researcher did not contact that state training official, seeking to minimize telephone expense. To ensure that the sample, though purposive, represented the three kinds of training organizations, it was decided to include at least one local coordinator whose participants had been trained by one government agency, a land grant university, and a private utility company. The exact identity of these state training organizations and the local programs they supported is withheld in this report, due to the occasionally sensitive nature of the information discussed regarding them.
George Morse had another purpose for the data gained from the telephone interviews. He was developing a book to promote the use of R and E in local development and to explain how and why such programming could be implemented. He felt he needed a chapter which explained, in the words of local program participants themselves, the potential advantages and strategies of R and E. He requested that the researcher write this promotional chapter, based primarily upon quotations from these first phase interviews, but asked if the effort to write a primarily "promotional" piece might bias the research. The researcher believed that eliciting from interviews examples of the "success stories" from local program experiences would not preclude inquiring about the more problematic aspects, and that the researcher could frame a "positive slant" for the chapter without becoming necessarily enamored personally with the R and E approach. The reader should note the possible bias introduced into the research and discern, based on the presentation of findings in Chapter IV, whether and to what extent such bias may have proven problematic.

One important way in which the preparation of this chapter influenced the research was that the researcher requested of the first phase interviewees that the conversations not be kept confidential. Morse saw the proposed chapter as potentially pivotal, as it could be of considerable interest to local development officials and community leaders who were inclined to trust the tangible experiences of others in similar roles. Other portions of the book were of more academic interest. Morse hoped that readers could contact the phase one interviewees mentioned in the chapter in the event that what they were reported as saying proved of particular interest. The researcher, therefore, requested that the first phase interviews be non-confidential, realizing, however, that care must be taken to detect and note any biases this request would introduce into the interviews.

The researcher contacted each of these training organizations' coordinators. When asked to provide permission and access to interview one coordinator of a local program for which they had provided training and
whose program they regarded as among their "most effective", all five wanted more than one local coordinator from their state to be interviewed—perhaps because each felt there might be positive public relations value in having coordinators of their local programs interviewed. Each, without prompting, also said he wanted to contact potential local coordinator interviewees to ask if they would be willing to be interviewed, and to explain why the researcher wanted to do so. Within forty-eight hours each state coordinator contacted the researcher and suggested the names of at least two local coordinators.

The researcher then interviewed one local coordinator in Idaho, Iowa, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, and two local coordinators in Georgia. Two telephone interviews were conducted with Georgian coordinators because that state's training organization representative felt that one program, in an urban setting, was particularly effective while the other was in a rural setting and thus consistent with the predominantly rural sampling focus.

2. Interviewing Techniques

Early in the interview you try to briefly inform the subject of your purpose, and make assurances (if they are necessary) that what is said in the interview will be treated confidentially ...Interviewers need not fear silence. Silence enables subjects to get their thoughts together and to direct some of the conversation. It is a poor habit for interviewers to interrupt subjects and change the direction of the conversation ....Most important is the need to listen carefully. Listen to what the people say. Treat every word as having the potential of unlocking
the mystery of the subject's way of viewing the world....If you ask people to share parts of themselves with you, it is important that you not be evaluative or else they will feel demeaned...You are not there to change views, but to learn what the subjects' views are, and why they are that way. (Bogden & Biklen, pp. 135-8).

In preparation for the phase one telephone interviews two lists were developed: one concerned the protocol which needed to be established with the interviewees, and the other the basic questions which needed to be posed. The next narrative section will describe the questions developed. Here the aspects of the protocol that were conveyed are listed. These aspects were discussed within the first five minutes of each phase one interview. They were not necessarily presented in the sequence presented here; typically the sequence was altered as respondents made comments or queries concerning the points of protocol. However, none of the interviews would have proceeded past these introductory remarks had the respondent declined to accept the proposed interview protocol.

The messages conveyed in the introductory remarks included

1. Posing the question of whether this was a good time to be calling, and if not when the researcher could call again;

2. Briefly explaining who had referred the researcher to the interviewee as "a good person to speak with about your involvement in retention and expansion" whose R and E program was regarded as "particularly effective";

3. Indicating the researcher's name and status as a graduate student at Ohio State University;

4. Explaining that the researcher was working
under the supervision of George Morse of Ohio State University, who was coordinating the provision of training statewide for local retention and expansion programs in Ohio;

5. Stating that George Morse was developing a book for which the researcher was writing a chapter intended to describe, "in the words of the participants themselves, the ways in which your program was effective, and what factors you think enhanced or hindered its effectiveness";

6. Asking permission that the interview be non-confidential, so that readers of the book "could contact you directly if they found something you had done particularly interesting, and therefore wanted to learn more about it by contacting you personally";

7. Explaining also that the interviews would constitute the first phase of the researcher's dissertation research, so that if they wanted anything they said to be kept confidential, such comments might further the research, but that such confidences would not be mentioned in the chapter and, if discussed at all in the dissertation, would not be attributed in any way to them;

8. Asking permission to tape record the interview, on the condition that no one else would have access to the tapes, explaining that the purpose of the recording was to facilitate accurate transcription;

9. Proposing that within a month the researcher would send the interviewee a rough draft of the chapter, so that he or she could indicate by letter if anything written was inaccurate or incomplete or needed to be kept confidential; and

10. Explaining that the researcher planned to pose broad, open-ended questions so that the interviewees could discuss in their own words what they felt was "important to understand about your program and how it worked".
Once these messages were conveyed and agreement with the proposed terms indicated (which in every case were), the interviews could proceed. The reader should note certain "affective strategies" which the researcher sought to employ. The researcher began this first research phase with the concern that the interviewees might interpret the interviewer as wanting to "evaluate effectiveness". The researcher wanted to avoid or minimize the distortions in communication that can occur when one feels one's words or actions are being judged. To minimize such distortion, the researcher sought to convey the impression that he hoped not to judge, but "to understand the potential benefits of R and E". Additionally, he tried to convey throughout a tone of appreciation for their insights as well as for their valuable assistance to the research as interviewees.

Qualitative interviews vary in the degree to which they are structured...Even when an interview guide is employed, qualitative interviews offer the interviewer considerable latitude to pursue a range of topics and offer the subject a chance to shape the content of the interview. When the interviewer controls the content too rigidly, when the subject cannot tell his or her story personally, in his or her words, the interview falls out of the qualitative range of interviewing (Bogden & Biklen, p. 136).

Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe qualitative interviewing as being on a structured-unstructured continuum:

The structured interview is the mode of choice when the interviewer knows what he or she does not know and can therefore frame appropriate questions to find it out, while the unstructured interview is the mode
of choice when the interviewer does not know what he or she doesn't know and must therefore rely on the respondent to tell him or her (p. 269). [Original emphasis]

The interview schedule employed during the first phase was toward the unstructured end of this continuum, because the researcher was unsure of the nature and extent of his lack of knowledge. A number of points concerning a less than knowledgeable (or "naive") interviewer and his correspondingly rather unstructured interview strategy require enumeration.

1. The "naive" interviewer brings to qualitative research fewer a priori notions concerning which aspects of a situation are salient and the nature of the causal interplay between them. This means that, on the one hand, the interviewer may develop novel insights and explanations and may identify hitherto undifferentiated but nonetheless salient factors. On the other hand, the better informed researcher can frame questions more intelligently, efficiently and in a manner more readily intelligible to respondents.

2. The terms which respondents use to convey their reality constructions often may be foreign to the naive interviewer. So they may have fresher impact upon his or her mind than upon that of a researcher who is already more informed about the research topic. The latter may assume, often mistakenly, that he or she understands the meaning which respondents confer upon a given term, because one has used that term oneself and therefore believes one's familiarity with the term necessarily ensures one shares a "common language" and meanings with the respondent. This mistaken conclusion may be drawn particularly where interviewer and respondent share similar roles, such as professional affiliation. The employment of shared technical terminologies often accompanies shared meanings, but may easily obscure divergent interpretations. The qualitative interviewer needs to avoid assuming that meanings are shared.
3. A naive interviewer can be viewed by respondents as badly uninformed or unintelligent, a phenomenon to which this researcher's experience can attest. This "stupidity factor" is not mentioned in the qualitative research literature and so merits brief consideration here. There is the danger that respondents may take the interview less than seriously, with clear costs in terms of the quality of information they provide. To reduce the potential costs of naivete, several steps may be taken by the researcher. First and foremost, resolve not to be offended personally by being seen as slow-witted. Second, convey that one's primary concern as researcher is to "get your story, not tell you mine." Third, convey one's belief that the respondent's story is important, in its own right as well as for the benefit of others.

4. The more naive interviewer should conduct a correspondingly unstructured interview, at least initially and until more precise (therefore more structured) questions can be framed (Bogden & Biklen, 1982; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Guba & Lincoln, 1982). This however means that such research is less easily replicated by others, and therefore that those who interpret the trustworthiness and credibility of a qualitative account by an initially naive researcher should consider the relative quality of the researcher as a research "instrument". The qualitative research literature repeatedly distinguishes the reliance in logical positivist research upon the use of replicable external instruments from the reliance in qualitative research upon the individual as a data collection instrument. Some attention will be given in Chapter IV, therefore, to depicting the quality of the researcher's interactions with the respondents, as one indicator of the quality of the researcher as instrument.

3. Questions Asked

The questions listed below were posed to each first phase interviewee. In every interview additional questions emerged in conversation, which fostered the
pursuit of new ideas or the clarification of meanings.

1. What did your (statewide training or local) R and E program do?

2. What did you hope it would accomplish?

3. What kinds of benefits did your program foster?

4. Can you give examples of such benefits? Can you provide some "success stories"?

5. Who was involved in making the program happen?

6. What advice would you give to others thinking of starting up such a program?

7. What resources were provided for your program?

8. Who provided these resources?

9. What was the sequence of events in your program?

10. What groups did your program target to serve?

11. Where do you hope your program will go from here?

12. Given that it may be very hard to say that retention and expansion efforts "cause" certain net changes in local employment and income, what do you look for to tell you that your program is progressing as you want it to?

13. How would you describe the economy in your community (or state)?
4. Data Analysis

Because of the extensive time and expense involved in transcribing interviews, people working without research funding often take short cuts. One short cut is to type trans and be more of self, but leave out a lot of the material that does not address your concerns. While there are some dangers involved in this short cut, the risks are often worth the gains. Another alternative is to transcribe some of the first interviews more or less completely (when we say completely we mean it would be all right to leave out long discussions of recipes and baseball), and then narrow what you transcribe in later interviews. As the study goes on, you should have a better idea about your focus and be more sensitively selective in what is typed (Bogden & Biklen, 1982, p. 96)

The researcher drafted full transcripts which included discussions on seemingly trivial or utterly irrelevant matters. As both a substantively naive interviewer and an inexperienced qualitative researcher, the researcher did not presume what would or would not prove later to be pertinent to a full understanding of the complex social process of R and E. Throughout these first phase interview transcripts "observer comments" were embedded regarding the respondent's tone of voice, the apparent quality of the interviewer-respondent interaction and any hypothesized impacts of this upon the discussion. The transcripts also included comments concerning any "emergent hypotheses" which came to mind during the interview or the transcription process.

During the laborious transcribing many comments "leapt" off the page, insights and unexpected hypotheses were catalyzed, and a greater degree of intimate
familiarity with the respondent's reality constructions was fostered than would have occurred had another transcriber been employed. These values readily became so apparent that when funding became available subsequently, the researcher continued to produce his own transcriptions of second and third phase interviews and dictated field notes.

Analysis of the interview data thus occurred during the interview, as new questions were framed to pursue a respondent's unique story, as well as in its transcription. On some days as many as three interviews were conducted, leaving little time from one interview for the next for deliberate, conscious data analysis. Some researchers, both quantitative and qualitative, maintain that data analysis may occur even when one is not engaging in it systematically. Stake comments:

In statements fundamental to the epistemology of social inquiry, Polanyi distinguished between propositional and tacit knowledge. Propositional knowledge...was seen as composed of all interpersonally shareable statements, most of which for most people are observations of objects and events. Tacit knowledge...is knowledge gained from experience with them, experience with propositions about them, and rumination...Tacit knowledge includes a multitude of unexpressible [sic] associations which give rise to new meanings, new ideas, and new applications of the old. Polanyi recognized that each person, novice or expert, has great stores of tacit knowledge with which to build new understandings (Stake, p. 6).

The research strategy employed throughout this study sought to strike a balance between periods of intensive immersion in data gathering and periods of
lengthy reflection. During the former, the researcher may be inundated with data, and where much of it is unfamiliar or whose potential meanings are opaque, novel insights and newly perceived connections may come to mind. During the latter the researcher does not wait for tacit insights to "emerge" but instead scans the data to discern the existence and nature of patterns in them. Qualitative research differs from quantitative study in its effort to report explicitly on the development of tacit knowledge that frequently occurs during data collection.

Once a given day's interviews were completed, they typically were transcribed that evening. Reflections were noted; data analysis proper had begun. The research employed an analytic approach that was inductive, generative, constructive and subjective, as these terms are defined by Goetz and LeCompte (1981). Summarizing their terminology, Lincoln and Guba (1985) state

Inductive analysis...begins not with theories or hypotheses but with the data themselves, from which theoretical categories and relational propositions may be arrived at by inductive reasoning processes...The second dimension is generation-verification. Verification inquiry attempts to verify or falsify...propositions that have been arrived at elsewhere, while generative inquiry attempts to discover constructs (which may lead to propositions or hypotheses) using the data themselves as a point of departure....The third dimension is construction-enumeration. Constructive analysis is a process of abstraction whereby units of analysis are derived from the "stream of behavior". In enumerative analysis previously defined units are "subjected to
systematic counting or enumeration" (pp. 333-334).

Goetz and LeCompte (1981, p. 54) state concerning the fourth dimension of subjectivity-objectivity:

The goal [of the subjective approach] is to reconstruct the categories used by subjects to conceptualize their own experiences and world view. This contrasts with an objective approach, which applies conceptual categories and explanatory relationships, readily visible to external observers, to the analysis of unique populations.

One of the ways in which induction, generation, construction and subjectivity may be combined in a research design is to employ an analytic strategy known as "constant comparison". This approach was used in this study.

This strategy combines inductive category coding with a simultaneous comparison of all social incidents observed. As social phenomena are recorded and classified, they are also compared across categories. Thus...hypothesis generation begins with the analysis of initial observations, undergoes continuous refinement throughout the data collection and analysis process, and continuously feeds back into the process of category coding (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981, p. 58).

This form of research thus involves the simultaneous collection and analysis of data. To prepare the chapter for Morse's book on R and E, the data were categorized into the following:
1. Description of the local community's economy and demographic composition; which organization(s) sponsored the local program;

2. Strategies which the program used to conduct the survey of local firms;

3. Generic types of program outcomes the respondents reported;

4. Specific examples given of these generic outcomes; and

5. The chronology of events in each program from inception to the time of the interview.

These categories were a priori in that Morse had requested that the researcher write a chapter which addressed these categorical concerns. However, in addition to the a priori categories, others emerged concerning:

6. "Business-government cooperation";
7. "Labor-management relations";
8. "Development of a local leadership corps";
9. "Other networking ideas"; and
10. "Special programs or projects" which respondents had said were catalyzed by their R and E efforts.

The latter categories were created to reflect the unsolicited comments of one or more respondents that these were categories which were significant in their thinking about R and E. Within each category, subcategories were developed to describe

a. The rationales or explanations respondents gave for "why" a particular situation was as described; and
b. The suggested "tips" respondents had for how other program coordinators should deal with similar phenomena.

Once the researcher had interpreted which categories needed to be created, quotations and observer comments extracted from the transcripts were placed appropriately within them. The majority of the respondents provided some information which was to be kept confidential, most often where they themselves requested the confidentiality. In a few cases, sensitive information was conveyed which the researcher decided would be unethical to report publicly. Where for either reason a piece of phase one information was to be kept in confidence, it was nonetheless noted in the transcripts. There were thus levels of confidentiality: where a person could be quoted without attribution; where a quotation could not be used but the facts expressed could be cited in camouflaged form; and where neither the quotation nor the facts involved could be noted.

Every observer comment and interview statement was reviewed to determine in which categories or sub­categories it might be filed. Once this was done, the researcher then reviewed each category and sub-category to determine how to describe narratively: what the major recurring themes were; the salience of each theme; and the extent to which the respondents differed in their views regarding each theme. From this constant comparative analysis, a draft of the chapter was developed and sent to each interviewee.

Contact with each interviewee was to be made within two weeks of their receipt of the draft chapter. In all but one case, the interviewees contacted the researcher either by letter or telephone, before he was to contact them. The majority contacted the researcher by telephone, providing a rich, interactive assessment of the draft. Each indicated minor corrections that they wanted made in the draft, most often concerning such descriptors as the kinds of services their organizations provide, in addition to R and E, and when such services were first offered. The researcher made the
corrections, then sent copies of the final draft to the interviewees, with the understanding that any remaining errors they identified would be corrected. None indicated that further changes were needed. At this point the final chapter draft was submitted to George Morse for his review. He indicated that the chapter was ready for submission to the publisher.

Review of the chapter draft constituted a "member check"—a determination by the qualitative study's respondents of the extent to which the analysis reflected their perspectives accurately, saliently and comprehensively. The member check entails providing respondents (i.e., "members" of the study) with both the summary of research findings as well as examples of the data upon which such findings were based (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 236). The chapter draft comprised both elements as it described the findings narratively and interspersed their description with frequent illustrative quotations. Significantly, none of the respondents disagreed with any of the substantive findings nor questioned how they were derived.

The researcher treated Morse's review of the chapter as both a test of the credibility of the findings as well as an opportunity to learn more concerning what this stakeholder regarded as valuable to convey concerning local R and E programs. The first research phase was completed in late August, when Morse had reviewed and commented on the chapter.

C. Phase Two

It had been proposed initially to observe the beginning stages of a new local program in preparation for the third research phase. During that final data collection phase an intensive retrospective case study was to be conducted of a mature local program. The case study would reconstruct and analyze what had occurred during that program. The second phase therefore began in September, 1986 with interviews and on-site observation of a local program just beginning in
Heartland. Early in the second data collection phase Morse commented that Heartland's program participants might be able to conduct the business visitations, attempt to identify and address problems identified by the visitations, and produce a final report in a relatively short period of time. Morse and the researcher then weighed the merits of adhering to the original research design or deciding to focus the third phase of case study data collection upon Heartland's emerging program.

The latter could provide potentially more reliable information than would a retrospective case study. The latter relies heavily upon respondents' recollections and interpretations of past events, while the former allows the researcher to complement respondents' interpretations with his own direct observations of these events. There were two principal risks, however, in focusing the case study on Heartland's new program: 1) the program might prove to be an abortive or ineffective effort, and/or 2) the program might take considerably longer than anticipated.

The first risk meant that the researcher could find that he had studied intensively a program which was so "flawed" that findings concerning it would be unrepresentative of local R and E programs that most stakeholders would regard as "effective." The second risk meant that the researcher could need to extend the data collection period far beyond the time he had allotted originally, thereby incurring numerous pragmatic difficulties involving added time and expense. The research grants for this study had been awarded between the first and second data collection phases, so that significant methodological variations from the research contracts could entail legal complications.

The researcher therefore re-designed phase two to provide information to facilitate making this strategic decision. The initial stages of Heartland's program were observed while the researcher also conducted retrospective interviews with a coordinator whose local Ohio program Morse regarded as mature. The next narrative section will discuss this and related phase
two sampling decisions.

After conducting a series of interviews, observations and participant-observations, the researcher decided to perform the third phase case study by focusing upon Heartland's program. The principal rationales for this decision follow.

1) Morse indicated that Heartland's program was likely to be completed within the allotted time for data collection, an assessment he indicated was based on his experience with other local programs. Additionally, each of Heartland's program participants who had been interviewed and observed thus far said they hoped, wanted and expected to conduct the program quickly. Thus every available indication suggested the unlikelihood that the program would take place over an extended time.

2) The potential benefits of being able to witness a program while it occurred appeared numerous and compelling, and outweighed the advantages of retrospectively case studying a completed program. Analysis of a previous social process would need to rely on historical documents and the recollections of respondents. The former are problematic in that they normally provide only glimpses of the possibly complex and salient processes by which such documents were conceived. In-depth interviewing would be required to reconstruct the nature of those processes. However, respondents' recollections are problematic.

Like any interview discussion, they are influenced by such factors as the quality of the researcher-respondent interaction, and the respondent's ability and willingness to respond. These potential threats to trustworthiness of the data are compounded by the reliance upon respondents' recollections of things past. Frequently a respondent's interpretation of a process will change over time, roughly comparable to the way in which paradigms emerge in a new field of scientific endeavor. Once such interpretations have solidified, it may become difficult to view the process from other perspectives, including those from which one had seen
the matter previously. Thus the implications for the study of even such "objective" data as historical documents could be very difficult for respondents to describe, and for the researcher to interpret.

The researcher decided to conduct the case study of Heartland's program, based on these considerations and the findings emerging from the second data collection phase.

1. Sampling Decisions

During October, 1986 a variety of data collection strategies were employed to witness and assess the start-up of Heartland's program. These were complemented by efforts to study retrospectively the evolution of the mature local R and E program in another Ohio county, which we shall call "Dale County." In September, 1986 Morse had said he thought the former probably would prove to be effective, because of the enthusiasm with which Heartland had appeared to embrace its new program. Morse had indicated he saw the latter as having been effective. He cited the Dale County program's "final report" meeting which many local participants and stakeholders had attended and at which much gratification with program outcomes had been expressed. Thus phase two samples would include events and persons involved with the programs in Heartland and Dale counties. This would guide the imminent decision concerning the sampling for the third phase case study.

Greater effort was expended to witness the events in Heartland than to collect retrospective accounts from Dale program participants. The former constituted unique, never to be replicated events, whereas the latter participant reconstructions of past events were less likely to change considerably with the passage of more time than had elapsed already since their occurrence.

Having determined which programs to sample for phase two, the researcher selected the local coordinator
and at least one other program co-founder for interviewing within each sampled setting. In Dale County, presentations or discussions about the meanings and outcomes of its R and E program would be observed where possible. In Heartland County, the following would be observed where possible: pre-training orientation of the core group of persons who together had initiated the program effort; training of the volunteers; and the performance of at least one business visitation.

2. Data Gathering Techniques

In mid-October, 1986 George Morse conducted a statewide conference on business retention and expansion, at which he introduced the researcher to the coordinator of Dale County's local program, who was attending the conference. He made this introduction, while otherwise busily engaged in orchestrating the conference, to facilitate the researcher's access to Dale's program. During the introduction Morse explained the researcher's purpose as being "to look at what your program has done. He [the researcher] is developing a conceptual model to explain the effectiveness of R and E programs." After this introduction he left the researcher and the local coordinator to discuss the research arrangements.

The researcher explained briefly the research purposes and requested an interview in Dale county with the coordinator. The coordinator readily agreed. Two lengthy interviews were conducted in the coordinator's office over the next two weeks. At the encouragement of the coordinator, the researcher also attended two presentations made by the coordinator to the Dale County commissioners and to the county seat's city council. These were presentations by the coordinator and one or two other local task force members, respectively, concerning the "summary recommendations" produced by the Dale R and E program. The two interviews and the two non-participant observations of presentations provided sufficient information with which to suggest the
potential knowledge to be gained from performing the third phase case study on Dale county's R and E program.

The phase two data collection on Heartland's program began in early October, 1986 when the researcher accompanied Morse on his first visit to Heartland's county seat. As statewide provider of training for new local R and E programs, Morse was going to conduct the pre-training orientation for a "core group" of Heartland citizens. Observation of the pre-training orientation permitted the researcher to witness verbal and non-verbal interactions between the trainer, this new local program's "R and E consultant", and the core group members, and among the members themselves; and their interactions with each other and business representatives while they conducted two "practice business visitations" with two local firms. The researcher had proposed originally to observe only in a non-participatory manner. During this and several other observation events the researcher played a more participatory role than had been envisioned.

At the beginning of the pre-training orientation, Morse introduced the researcher to Heartland's core group members and asked their permission for him to observe the day's events. Before either Morse or the researcher could explain the rationale for this, two core group members agreed, indicating that this was "no problem." During the morning of this orientation day, the researcher noticed several core group members repeatedly glancing curiously and silently toward him. He interpreted such glances as curiosity, and perhaps anxiety, regarding the researcher's purpose for being present, for he had not found a non-obtrusive way of explaining this.

These curious or possibly anxious glances increased in frequency and intensity as the morning progressed, so that the researcher had to consider the extent to which his unexplained presence was becoming sufficiently obtrusive that it might alter significantly the flow of events and quality of interactions among participants. Short of disrupting the tightly scheduled events to interject regarding his research aims, the only recourse
appeared be to make comments regarding the events themselves. He made several brief comments during a mid-morning conversation when all were seated around a conference table, discussing the basic purposes and steps involved in R and E. His comments were relatively insubstantial, and made at various moments when the conversation was animated and many were participating vocally. He made these comments in a light, positive tone, seeking to allay conceivable participant fears that he was present to judge the goings-on. Non-verbal reactions suggested that curiosity about his presence remained, but that the respondents' anxiety decreased.

Throughout the morning the researcher periodically had taken notes, holding his note pad so that none could read its contents easily. This appeared to have contributed to the anxiety and curiosity, so that he took progressively fewer notes. During the luncheon to which all then adjourned, the researcher briefly explained the purposes of the research. Relief and comprehension were evident.

The incident above reflects the dilemmas qualitative researchers may face in deciding and presenting their role to respondents. Qualitative methodology permits the researcher to play either a participatory or non-participatory role in the events being studied.

To what degree and how should researchers participate in the activities of the setting?...At one extreme is the complete observer [original emphasis]. Here, the researcher does not participate in activities at the setting. He or she looks at the scene, literally or figuratively, through a one-way mirror. At the other end is complete involvement at the site, with little discernible difference between the behavior of the observer and the subjects....Over-participation can lead to "going
...a phrase used in anthropology to refer to researchers getting so involved and active with subjects that their original intentions get lost. Questions concerning how much, with whom, and how you participate tend to work out as the research develops focus. We have found that small groups where group members make a purposeful attempt to be "open" and to "share" are particularly difficult. Should [the researcher] pass when it came to his turn? How should he act if he chose to participate? How visible should he be? (Bogden & Biklen, 1982, pp. 127-9).

Bogden and Biklen indicate (1982) that there are no clear-cut rules concerning what constitutes an appropriate degree or kind of participation, but they emphasize that the researcher's abiding concern should be to decide based on what best facilitates collecting relevant and reliable information.

Near the end of the orientation day, the researcher asked for confirmation from the local coordinator of permission to "study what you're doing here in Heartland." Before he could elaborate, the coordinator interjected readily to express his assurance that "that would be fine. No problem. Why not?" Through a subsequent phone conversation with the coordinator, the researcher obtained permission to conduct interviews of the Heartland program participants and to observe various program events.

During the rest of October, 1986 the researcher observed the training of Heartland's R and E volunteers, the first meeting held by the full task force of Heartland's program, the performance of one business visitation by a volunteer, and the activities of Heartland's R and E coordinator as he responded to survey forms completed by volunteers who had conducted their business visitations. The researcher interviewed
the coordinator several times during the month, and conducted one interview with the volunteer whose business visitation he had observed and one with the business representative who had been visited.

During both the business visitation and the task force meeting, the question arose again concerning how participatory the researcher should be. During the former, the researcher was accompanied by a local volunteer. The norm in such visitations is for a pair of volunteers to attend each visitation, and for one volunteer to pose the survey form's questions aloud while the other records the business representative's comments. Either role constituted a form of participation in the visitation process, and by taking either the researcher necessarily would affect the quality of the visitation. The researcher asked for permission from the volunteer, to whom the research aims had been explained, to act as the visitation recorder. This role allowed the researcher to take fairly copious notes during the visitation without varying overtly too much from the prescribed recorder role.

During the task force meeting, the coordinator asked the task force members, seated around several tables in a conference room, to review and discuss aloud copies of completed visitation survey forms which he had distributed. There had been no chance to explain to those seated at his table, the nature of the researcher's presence. He tried to make as few substantive comments as possible regarding the surveys distributed to that table.

Over the course of this second phase, it became clear that completely unobtrusive, "objective" observation was neither feasible in this research nor, more generally, possible in any qualitative research involving researcher-respondent interaction:

[The] state of indeterminacy, while proposed by Heisenberg in relation to subatomic particles, turns out to be...characteristic of substantive theories in virtually all fields,
and at all levels. As Heisenberg himself put it, "What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning"....Observation not only disturbs and shapes but is shaped by what is observed [original emphasis] (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 98).

With the exception of the pre-training orientation and first task force meeting observations, the researcher prefaced all second and third phase interactions with respondents with the pre-interview remarks made to establish an agreed protocol with phase one interviewees. Once respondents agreed to the proposed terms for observing and interviewing, the data gathering would proceed. Because of his more participatory role than had been taken during the first research phase, the researcher adopted a correspondingly more overt "positive tone." Greater participation seemed to increase the potential for negative respondent reactions and thus the probability that they would withhold or distort information. To minimize this potential threat, the researcher periodically would comment positively about aspects of the R and E process about which the respondent would have remarked already. This "echoing" of a respondent's positive sentiments would not introduce a new perspective about the program in the respondent's mind, but could reassure him or her of the researcher's intentions not to be negatively judgmental.

As in phase one, all interviews and field notes taken during observations were transcribed. All interviews were tape recorded, but the pre-training orientation, task force meeting and business visitation were not. To complement this data collection and storage, the researcher requested and obtained copies of diverse documents:

1. The Dale County R and E program's full final report;

2. The summary report on Dale County's program;
3. Promotional brochures about Heartland County produced by the Heartland Chamber of Commerce;

4. Promotional brochure about the services available through the Heartland Chamber of Commerce; and

5. Volunteer training packet consisting of all the materials provided to Heartland's R and E volunteers at their training session.

These documents were read and comments regarding them noted. Morse also made available research and theoretical materials regarding state and local R and E programs which the researcher did not read until the third research phase. He was wary of the potential influence of such research in encouraging a more a priori approach to the data than was consistent with qualitative tenets. Instead, the phase two data gathering proceeded only very gradually from highly open-ended to somewhat more focussed questions. The findings and data from the first phase proved useful in facilitating this increasing focus of inquiry. Only toward the middle of the final research phase did the systematic testing of emergent hypotheses through focussed questions occur.

By the end of October, 1986 the researcher determined, based on these observations and interviews, that Heartland's program would be an acceptable focus for the third phase case study. This phase two study indicated that the program was likely to reach maturity within the data collection time allotted, and that its results would be deemed by stakeholders as sufficiently "effective" that findings based on its case study should prove pertinent to the understanding of effective local R and E programs.

3. Questions Asked

The schedule of interview questions employed for the first research phase was adopted for the interviews
with Dale County's R and E program coordinator. In preparation for the observation of the presentation he and other Dale County task force members made to the county commissioners and city council, the following questions were framed:

1. What events occur prior to and immediately after the presentation?

2. What respective messages does each presenter emphasize?

3. To what extent does the interaction between presenters and commissioners or council members reflect on the quality and history of their relationship? In what ways?

4. How do the commissioners and council members respond, verbally as well as non-verbally, to the messages conveyed by the presenters?

5. How do they appear to respond to the presenters themselves?

6. What rationales do the presenters articulate explicitly for their assertions of fact or recommendations?

7. What rationales do they appear to imply?

8. What do the events during the presentations tell about what outcomes the program has generated already?

9. What outcomes do the presentation interactions suggest might occur in the future?

For the data gathering in Heartland County, the retrospective orientation of the phase one interview schedule was revised so that questions were re-framed in present and future tenses. For phase two interviews of Heartland participants, the following questions were framed:
1. What have Heartland's task force and volunteers done so far? Why?

2. What have you personally done so far in your role in the program? Why?

3. What is being done now? By Whom? What are their reasons?

4. Have there been any obvious outcomes from what has happened so far? If so, what are they?

5. If you feel these outcomes are positive or negative, what are your reasons for this assessment?

6. Why did you first become involved in the program?

7. What did you hope the program would accomplish?

8. Has your sense of what the program will accomplish changed? If so, why?

9. How helpful has the training (and pre-training orientation) been in preparing you for the program?

10. Was there something happening in Heartland County that made this a particularly appropriate time for doing the R and E program?

11. Why do you think the other participants agreed to participate in the program?

12. How well do you think things are going so far? Why do you think this?

13. What do you look for to tell you how effective the program is?

14. What needs do you think the R and E program might be best at addressing? In what ways? Why so?

15. What advice, based on your experience so far, would you give to others thinking of starting up an R
and E program in their community?

16. Why did the folks here in Heartland decide to make this a county-wide effort, instead of focussing in on "Cobbletown" (Heartland's county seat)?

17. What is Heartland like economically and demographically?

The observational data drawn from the Heartland pre-training orientation, training and task force meetings also addressed these questions. These observations also permitted a modest test of the consistency between what phase two interviewees said during their interviews and what they said and did during the observed events. Inconsistencies suggested the need for further inquiry while consistencies tended to substantiate emerging hypotheses and conclusions.

4. Data Analysis

As data analysis in the first research phase occurred during interviewing and transcribing as well as in reflection thereafter, so it did in this phase. In the second research phase, both the usual observer commentaries and suggested lines of subsequent inquiry were embedded in the interview and field note transcripts.

To organize the data collected the following broad categories were identified:

1. Pre-Training
   a. Definitions of effectiveness;
   b. Chronology of pre training events;
   c. Perceived pre-training outcomes;
   d. Factors then seen as influencing effectiveness.

2. Training
   a. Where and when it happened;
   b. Technologies used to convey training
information;
c. Who plays what roles;
d. Major training messages about R and E techniques, rationales for techniques, rationales for R and E, and how R and E compares with other local development approaches;
e. Resources: who supplies them, for what reasons;
f. Promises made to volunteers, task force, state training personnel, businesses.
g. Definitions of pre-training effectiveness;
h. Perceived training outcomes: local participants' views, training personnel's views, researcher's view.

3. Business Visitations
   a. Which firms targeted;
   b. Which firms visited;
   c. Interaction effects between volunteer status and person visited; type of firm and problems identified by that firm; and, volunteer status and the problems identified by the firm(s) which volunteer visited;
   d. Qualities of relationships between task force members and volunteers; task force members and state training personnel;
   e. Types of visitation outcomes;
   f. Responses to problems of firms identified by volunteers, and by task force members;
   g. Rationales given for responses;
   h. Visitation survey process: what questions not on the survey form were asked by volunteers; what questions firm representatives were asked; how questions were perceived by representatives;
   i. What firms were asked but declined to be visited;
   j. Promises made to firms;
   k. Promises made to public;
   l. Definitions of visitation effectiveness;
   m. Perceived visitation outcomes;
   n. Factors influencing visitation
effectiveness in the views of: volunteers, firm representatives, state training personnel, and the researcher.

4. Follow-up response to the business visitations
   a. What organizations are asked to help with specific questions and/or general community problems?
   b. Who initiates the request for assistance from the organizations?
   c. To whom in the organizations requests are made?
   d. For what kinds of concerns organizations' assistance is asked?
   e. What promises are made to the organizational representatives to whom requests for assistance are made?
   f. What promises do the organizational representatives make?
   g. What promises, if any, are made publicly known?

5. Final Report
   a. What data are included?
   b. What data are excluded?
   c. What recommendations are made in the document?
   d. What promises are made explicitly or implicitly?
   e. What are the future plans?

6. Community
   a. Demographic data;
   b. Historical background;
   c. Economic data;
   d. Stakeholder groupings.

In addition to the above categories and subcategories into which field notes and interviews were filed, a separate file was developed to contain emergent hypotheses and suggested questions to pose in subsequent interviews. The development of the above filing system constituted the major product of the second research phase. This framework guided the identification of
questions posed at the beginning of the next and final phase.

D. Phase Three

1. Sampling Decisions

Between November, 1986 and April, 1987 thirty lengthy interviews were conducted with participants of Heartland County's R and E Program, three Heartland R and E task force meetings were observed, and seven telephone interviews were performed. Several interviews were conducted with the coordinators of other local Ohio R and E programs. With the permission of its members, the first, day-long meeting of the Statewide Retention and Expansion Advisory Committee was tape recorded. One staffperson with the Ohio Department of Development was interviewed, as were two staffpersons with the Ohio Technology Transfer Organization.

The persons above were sampled in order to identify, test and refine emerging hypotheses. The questions posed became progressively more focussed. Once the data substantiated definitively a particular finding, questions concerning it were de-emphasized though still explored in future interviews. Questions addressing insufficiently supported or apparently contradictory findings were posed with particular emphasis.

The sample was selected to combine breadth with depth: "breadth" in learning about the perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders concerning program effectiveness; "depth" by focussing investigative efforts upon discerning particularly how local program participants perceived and explained their program's effectiveness. The researcher had proposed to interview the stakeholders and participants of a local R and E program. Through the second phase of study it became clear that a genuinely comprehensive list of the local program's stakeholders would need to include virtually
every citizen in Heartland, as well as those who manage and staff the governmental agencies that provide services which impact upon Heartland's economic development. The researcher therefore sought to limit the final research phase's focus to local R and E program effectiveness as it was perceived and explained by each of Heartland's task force members and a small, purposive sample of program volunteers and business representatives.

The depth of understanding yielded by this focus was to be complemented by data gathered through interviews with state government officials and agency staffpersons. These interviews could provide, it was hoped, the basis for identifying questions that merited future research, while perhaps contributing to this study's theory-building effort.

Finally, field observation of local R and E program events in Heartland was planned to complement the information obtained by interviews. The researcher observed three business visitations and five meetings of the Heartland R and E task force. He observed the pre-training orientation by Morse of the local program's initiators. Two weeks later he observed the training session which Morse conducted for Heartland's visitation volunteers. Three weeks after this he observed the task force as it began reviewing the completed visitation surveys. Two weeks later he again observed the task force in its review of the surveys. Then, in the twenty-sixth week of the program, since the pre-training orientation, he observed the task force members while they considered how to prepare their final report.

2. Data Gathering and Analysis Techniques

The data collected in this final phase were sought to facilitate the identification of substantiated or reasonable theoretical propositions. The dictates of qualitative data analysis thus guided the performance of data gathering. Data gathering provided, in other words, the opportunity to test findings and propositions. In this section, criteria by which to
assess the adequacy of data gathering and analysis will be considered. The procedures actually employed then will be described. In a Chapter V section on the "Adequacy of the Research Methods," the procedures used will be measured against these criteria.

Qualitative analyses can be evocative, illuminating, masterful, and downright wrong [original emphasis]. The data, looked at more scrupulously, don't support the conclusions drawn. Researchers double-checking the site come up with different findings. Site informants, asked to provide feedback on the findings, contest some or all of them, very plausibly. The phenomenologist chuckles, reinforced in the idea that there is no single reality out there to get "right." The psychometrician, from the polar opposite stance, concludes the nonstatistical research is an albatross. The problem...is that there are no canons, decision rules, algorithms or even any agreed-upon heuristics in qualitative research to indicate whether findings are valid and procedures robust....So we need to be especially watchful in qualitative research about the multiple sources of potential analytic bias that can weaken, or even invalidate our findings (Miles & Huberman, 1984, p. 230).

Miles and Huberman (1984, p. 231) prescribe several strategies for assessing the quality of the data gathered and the findings derived from them, including:

1. "Checking for representativeness": The researcher should seek to increase the number of cases upon which a given findings is based, look for cases which invalidate the finding, and "sample randomly
within the total universe of people and phenomena under study" (p. 232).

2. "Checking for researcher effects": "The researcher is likely, especially at the outset, to create social behaviors in others that would not have ordinarily occurred. This, in turn, can lead the researcher into making biased observations and inferences" (p. 232). Miles and Huberman identify as researcher effects those the site has upon the researcher and those the researcher has upon the site. To counteract these "inherent" qualitative research threats, they suggest inter alia: staying on-site as long as practically feasible; using unobtrusive data gathering steps; providing respondents with a comprehensive, unambiguous account of one's research purposes; avoiding "going native" by spending time away from site and spreading out site visits; triangulating with "several data collection methods; don't allow talk to make sense of the setting" (p. 234); and keeping one's research questions firmly in mind.

3. Triangulating: The researcher should draw upon different, multiple sources to confirm or disconfirm a finding. Such sources could include diverse stakeholders, people with different participant roles; other researchers familiar with the setting; those with analogous roles in other similar settings; and written materials.

4. Making contrasts and comparisons: This involves contrasting and comparing how different settings, participants, or stakeholders vary with respect to a given hypothesized relationship between variables. Local coordinators, for example, might view a particular aspect of their training as having had a considerable impact upon their program's effectiveness, while state training personnel may regard this aspect as relatively unimportant. Miles and Huberman suggest that such relationships may need to be investigated and explained.

5. Looking for negative evidence: "The tactic is to say," Miles and Huberman write, "Are there any data that would oppose this conclusion, or are inconsistent
with this conclusion?" (p. 241) They propose that the researcher take pains to gather data that would invalidate emerging hypotheses.

6. Getting feedback from informants: Miles and Huberman suggest that "local informants can act as a panel of judges, evaluating singly and collectively the major findings of the study" (p. 242).

Feeding findings back to informants is a venerated but not always executed practice in qualitative research. It dates back to Malinowski's fieldwork in the 1920s, and has been used in numerous field studies since then. More recently, Bronfenbrenner classified feedback to informants as a source of "phenomenological validity," and Guba built it into his repertoire of devices for assuring the "confirmability" of findings, using the sociologists' term "member checks." Other researchers have made the case for feedback a quasi-ethical one--informants have the right to know what the researcher has found--and still others, more and more numerous, are feeding back findings because people at the site are making this a precondition for access (p. 242).

They strongly advise that providing feedback to respondents is probably most effective and least obtrusive near or at the end of the data analysis. This is because the researcher can provide the most comprehensive and accurate presentation of the conclusions, whose validity, salience and clarity the respondents then can assess. Such an assessment, many qualitative researchers contend, is crucial to the development and refinement of trustworthy theoretical claims in qualitative research.
The researcher sought to be guided by the above considerations when the final data collection phase was conducted. By concentrating his sample largely upon task force members, he hoped to develop a thick description of Heartland's program as it was perceived by the task force members. This addressed, with varying effectiveness, Miles and Huberman's concerns for representativeness, triangulation, and comparisons and contrasts. In every instance in which the researcher consciously was testing the internal validity of a finding, by presenting it for a respondent's assessment, he encouraged the respondent to "find fault with this idea" and suggest alternative explanations or descriptions.

In each third phase interview of Heartland task force members, questions were posed to gather information pertinent to the list of categories developed at the end of the second research phase. Additionally, questions that tested emergent findings were framed.

The data collection concluded when the researcher presented a summary of the research findings to the Heartland R and E task force for their assessment. (The results of that event are described in Chapter IV.) The majority of the findings had been discussed previously in one-on-one interviews with one or more task force members, so that a not overwhelming amount of novel information was presented for their consideration at this juncture. The novelty of this presentation was in how the findings were presented en masse and hypothesized interrelationships among them proposed for their consideration. Regarding such feedback presentations, Miles and Huberman counsel that the findings be presented summarily, graphically, and comprehensively. The latter quality, comprehensiveness, entails presenting not only the findings but examples of the data upon which they are based:

Providing information on macroanalytical levels of inference
(such as main factors and relationships, plus causal
determinants) has to be done very carefully, by working up from particulars. If this isn't done, informants may discount the whole exercise because the overarching findings look wrongheaded or incomprehensible. Or they may swallow these macro findings whole, because they read so "scientifically."

In preparation for the presentation, the researcher had obtained permission from Heartland's coordinator for it to be scheduled at the end of the agenda for a task force meeting. Placed earlier on the agenda was task force consideration of a report from the state R and E training program that summarized the aggregate results of Heartland's business visitation survey and that proposed recommendations for local consideration. The researcher asked that his presentation be placed after the group's consideration of that report, so that his presentation would not influence their discussion. The coordinator agreed to the researcher's request to 1) present the summary of his findings; 2) obtain feedback concerning the accuracy, validity and comprehensiveness of the findings; and 3) determine whether the task force members wanted the study report and dissertation to identify Heartland County's real identity, based on what they now knew of the study's findings. This "member check" meeting took place at the conclusion of the data gathering and lasted for approximately two hours.

E. Summary

The research involved three phases. During the first, telephone interviews were conducted with several state R and E training program coordinators and local R and E program coordinators. The primary aims were to provide the researcher with information regarding variations in local program processes and outcomes and to guide in shaping subsequent research questions. During the second phase, the researcher initiated both retrospective study of a local Ohio program that had completed its final R and E program report and a study
of another local Ohio program that was just beginning. Despite certain recognized risks in doing so, it was deemed advantageous to focus the third phase of single-site case study on the latter, new program setting.

Over the course of the study a mix of data collection methods was employed including: interviews, telephone interviews, non-participant observation, participant observation, and the review of documents. Analysis of this data took place throughout the study. Known as the "constant comparative" method, one form of "analytic induction," the analysis involved iteratively testing the worth of hypotheses and findings as they emerged. This entailed considering how these tentative conclusions withstood the test of data subsequently collected, as well as actively seeking out data which could disconfirm them.

"Member checks", or "feedbacks of findings", were presented systematically in the first and third research phases. During the first a presentation was made to the interviewees of a report, upon which a chapter for a (forthcoming) book was based. Changes which respondents suggested were incorporated into the report. During the third phase the presentation to Heartland's task force of the study's summary findings constituted an important test of credibility and trustworthiness.

In Chapter IV many findings are discussed, and numerous quotations and facts upon which the findings are based are cited. This juxtaposition of findings with the data from which they have been derived is intended to facilitate the assessment by the reader of the value of those findings.

Chapter V will state summarily the findings of the study and their potential implications for educational administrators, researchers, and local development practitioners and program participants. In addressing implications for researchers, there will be several suggestions which qualitative researchers may wish to consider. These suggestions are based upon the insights the researcher gained, often through methodological errors, through the research experience.
CHAPTER IV.

FINDINGS

A. Introduction

For more than two decades utility companies, their capacity to expand constrained by geographic boundaries, have visited and surveyed existing local firms. Their aim has been to resolve the problems and needs identified by firms, to increase the employment and income generated by these firms, thereby generating increased energy demand. Thus, the basic notion of the value of retaining and expanding existing local firms is not a recent novelty.

Nonetheless, retention and expansion, as it is being conceived and enacted now by community leaders, is qualitatively unlike any local development approach previously undertaken. It is a new local development strategy because:

1. R and E programs conducted by community leaders involve a broader range of participants than typically are involved in any other conventional community development strategy.

2. The ways in which community leaders interact with one another in R and E programs differ considerably from how they do so in other community development initiatives.

3. The emphasis placed upon helping local leaders understand their employment shifts and economic outlook are unique to the Cooperative Extension Service R and E programs.

4. The specialized training of local coordinators and economic development professionals as "R and E Consultants" is unique to the Cooperative Extension
Service R and E programs.

As this chapter will discuss, this report on local R and E efforts is as much a story of what is happening in many American communities as it as about what happens in R and E programs. The communities in which R and E programs are being conducted are generally characterized by:

1. An oftentimes costly fragmentation of efforts by diverse agencies to plan, implement and assess the locality's development initiatives;

2. A growing awareness of the political costs and negative externalities of overemphasizing efforts to attract large firms into the community; and

3. The intensifying impacts which technological innovation, changing international and financial markets, and increasingly global economic interdependence are having upon the quality of life, even and perhaps particularly in rural areas.

However, this research found nothing to suggest that the communities undertaking R and E programs are any more fragmented in their development efforts, aware of the costs of firm attraction, or affected by global economic changes than similar communities without R and E programs. In this sense, this story, as told by R and E program participants, may provide glimpses of important characteristics of the fabric of the American economy in general.

The research posed three basic questions to R and E program participants: "What are you doing?", "Why are you doing it?" and "What factors help and hinder what you hope to accomplish?" In some ways the dialogue between the researcher and program participants proceeded as would that between a precocious child and a patient parent.

"Why are you doing that?"

"Because it will accomplish A."
"Why do you want to accomplish A?"
"A is important because it means that B will happen."
"Why does A lead to B?"
"Because of C."
"What happens when B happens?"
"D."
"Is it good that D happens?"
"Why sure."
"How come?"
"Well er...'Cause it is...I mean, that's what everybody should want."
"Oh." Long pause. "Why?"
Sigh.

Given a sufficiently persistent child and a parent of saintly patience, such dialogue must lead eventually to the articulation of fundamental values. Values often are expressed after we run short of instrumental explanations for why we do what we do. "A" is done for the instrumental purpose of accomplishing "B". "B" is an overt or ostensible goal, and is worthy of accomplishing for the instrumental reason that it supposedly results in "D". "C" is expressed as an assertion of perceived causality. "D" is regarded as a self-evident "good", whose worth constitutes an end-in-itself.

This research, consisting as it so often did of such dialogistic elements, therefore elicited the articulation by program participants of their instrumental rationales, causal explanations and values.
Many were uncomfortable and reluctant in expressing value assertions. The researcher had not begun this study intending to discover the respondents' most deeply held values. But it became clear, early in the Heartland County case study, that the local R and E participants' efforts were rooted deeply in values.

The story of R and E programs is about how program participants "make connections", in several senses of the term. "Making connections" involves the processes by which participants interact with one another, with the business representatives they visit and survey, with the state and local agency officials whose help they solicit in resolving firm needs, and with other local citizens. "Making connections" is a phrase often used colloquially to refer to informal processes by which one gains access to and political support from powerful persons, as in "she has made the right connections" or "he is well connected, so he can help you." R and E entails such informal processes. In this chapter, such connective processes shall be considered to be of a "social" variety.

"Making connections" also involves the ways in which participants gain new insights regarding the causal interplay between important local phenomena. These are "epistemological" connective processes. As participants enact R and E activities, new information is generated, and existing information is circulated to new parties. The researcher witnessed the occasional accompaniment of such altered information flows by shifts in paradigmatic perspectives and values. Such re-orientations occurred in Heartland County with respect, for example, to community development in terms of who should engage in it, how they should do it, and the ends for which it should be done.

In this chapter, the Lasswell-Cunningham "decision phase analysis" schema (Cunningham, 1979, and Sloanaker & Burgess, 1975) regarding eight phases through which a social policy process proceeds will be used to organize the reporting of research findings. The seven sequential phases through which Lasswell perceived social decision making as tending to proceed are
intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, appraisal and termination. Cunningham (1979), a student of Lasswell's work, maintains that one other phase through which social decision making progresses is that of "initiation", and that initiation occurs before the intelligence phase. The eight phase schema will be adopted in this chapter. Since the focus of the research was the local R and E program process conducted in Heartland County, the bulk of this chapter will concentrate on describing what happened there in each of these eight phases.

To assess what happens during each phase, the following questions are posed (Sloanaker & Burgess, 1975; Cunningham 1979).

Initiation: Who initiates the decision process?

Intelligence: How is the information that comes to the attention of decision makers gathered and processed? How do they study the problem, gather data, and analyze the proposed solution(s)?

Promotion: How are decisions and recommendations made and promoted to those who are in a position to endorse the solution?

Prescription: What general guidelines for implementing policies or recommendations are developed? How are they developed?

Invocation: How do the decision makers prepare for implementation?

Application: How are the guidelines implemented?

Termination: How are the prescribed efforts brought to conclusion?

Appraisal: How is the implementation assessed?

Regarding each phase there will be a description of who participated in what roles, what they wanted to
accomplish, and what they did. The initiation and intelligence phases will be discussed together, because the processes by which the initiators of Heartland County's R and E program learned about the R and E strategy and began efforts to implement it were closely interwoven. Similarly, the prescription and invocation phases will be addressed in one narrative section, as the prescriptive guidelines for action were presented to participants chiefly during the invocation, or volunteer training, process. The termination and appraisal phases also will be discussed together, in that the decision by participants of whether to terminate Heartland's R and E program were made in the course of appraising whether and in what ways the program had been successful.

Once the events in all phases of Heartland's program have been discussed, comparable information then will be provided, as appropriate, regarding three other local R and E programs in other states. The differences in the design and conduct of local R and E programs will be analyzed briefly. By discussing what participants hoped and expected to occur at each phase of their involvement, the reader can discern the extent to which effectiveness criteria may have changed or evolved over time. One of the benefits of employing the Lasswell-Cunningham schema to organize this report is that it facilitates noticing the extent to which effectiveness goals and measures in fact changed over time, in Heartland County.

The outcomes which local program participants in Ohio and elsewhere reported and which the observer witnessed will be discussed. Three types of outcomes will be considered: programmatic, social and epistemological. Once the kinds of R and E program outcomes determined by the research are identified, the "effectiveness" of such programs can be assessed.

The assessment of effectiveness will be addressed in two ways: 1) by discussing how local programs, particularly in Heartland County, fared vis-a-vis participants' expectations; and 2) by assessing the programs in terms of their unanticipated consequences. This research underscores the need to define
effectiveness as consisting of both such a priori and emergent evaluation criteria. In discussing the latter criteria, several important themes are emphasized regarding information flows, service delivery fragmentation, public-private sector partnership, norms and methods of accountability, role fragmentation, convergent versus divergent thinking, program ownership and empowerment, and embarrassment. After these themes are discussed, a summary of findings and commentary regarding local R and E program effectiveness and related concerns are provided in Chapter V.

Before discussing the initiation and intelligence phases of Heartland's R and E program, however, some "pre-initiation" background information is provided concerning the evolution of Ohio's R and E training program. This necessarily will entail discussing the professional background, orientation, and values of the training program's coordinator.

Of course, a sketch of Heartland County's basic demographic, geographic, socioeconomic and historical characteristics provides important contextual information with which to understand how and why the local R and E program was initiated there. Thus, the second element in the narrative concerning "pre-initiation" will pertain to portraying life in Heartland County, prior to the R and E program there.

B. Pre-Initiation

1. The Ohio R and E Training Program Coordinator

The various states in which R and E programs are conducted differ slightly in the kinds of participants involved and the manner of their involvement. As noted previously, the identity of the organization providing training in R and E throughout a state differs from one state to another. In Ohio, the Ohio State University's Cooperative Extension Service and the Ohio Department of Development sponsor the training. The description of Ohio's statewide R and E training program is largely a depiction of the efforts of the program's coordinator,
George Morse.

Given his substantial impact upon local R and E efforts in Ohio, Morse's values, evolving involvement in R and E training, and what he hopes and believes local R and E programs accomplish will be described in this section. A comprehensive understanding of R and E programming in Ohio is probably not possible without addressing these matters.

"[The retention and expansion idea] stems back to the '60s," Morse explained. "We picked it up in the early '80s. Sam Crawford, a district [cooperative] extension specialist, took the lead and wrote a bulletin that focussed on the creation, retention and expansion of industries. He discussed entrepreneurship as well as R and E, and his booklet put in print basically what the utilities had been doing.

"I don't know where [R and E] originally started. Our knowledge of it came through the utility companies here in Ohio. They had programs which date back to the mid-sixties. They didn't have a lot of depth in their programs. They encouraged local volunteers to do the visitations, they had a one-page survey form. The ethic of confidentiality [i.e., volunteers not revealing businesses' sensitive information publicly] was heavily stressed. So many of the outward signs were the same.

"When I first heard about [R and E], it was in 1980 or 1981. Through the article authored by Sam Crawford. My initial reaction was kind of negative. It had to do with a number of small things. I didn't feel that the Birch data had been interpreted correctly...even though the general point [that most new jobs are created by existing firms] was probably valid...I don't remember being downright hostile to the [R and E] idea, just skeptical....Up to that time, most of the work in economic development had focussed on [business] attraction. But, the more I looked at [the R and E idea], the better it looked. At about the time of Sam [Crawford's] publication, Glen Pulver's article came out. Pulver didn't call it 'R and E', he called this development strategy 'helping firms become more
efficient.' That's really one of the major thrusts of our program," Morse stated.

"I became involved in [R and E training]," he noted, "in late 1982. Sam [Crawford] and I prepared a slide set. The initial idea was to distribute this without much further involvement on our part. We thought 'This is a concept which, if you just pass the word, can be almost entirely a local self-help project, [that would] require no other help than providing the conceptual background.'"

The response to the educational slide set on the potential values of R and E was surprisingly positive in Morse's view: "It was very well received." He attributes the "popularity" of the R and E concept to:

1. "The growing understanding that the majority of new jobs in a community are created by existing local firms. Research conducted and reported by David Birch (The Job Generation Process, 1979) has been cited often," Morse said, "by other R and E training sponsors, including the Bell Companies of Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin." Birch emphasized that approximately 70% of new jobs are created by existing firms, and therefore that communities may want to shift their priorities from emphasizing business attraction to retaining and expanding the firms already in place. Based on Birch's thesis, Morse said, "I argue that we ought to go with the flow and give [the retention and expansion of existing firms] an extra nudge. If that's where most of the action is, then push that component."

2. There is relatively minimal cost involved in local R and E activities. The effort to retain and expand existing firms, "because you're talking about volunteer time," Morse explained, entails a "low capital cost. [Business] recruiting programs take quite a bit of money to do effectively."

3. There is "the fact," Morse maintains, "that most communities have tried recruiting rather extensively in the last ten, fifteen, twenty years—and they've been rather unsuccessful."
4. The R and E programs have the capacity to generate good public relations for the local program sponsor. Local sponsors may say, he suggested, "We're not sure [doing an R and E program] will make any difference. But, we're pretty sure our local firms will like it....If you're in a local economic development position," he added, "that's a plus even if you don't [create] any additional jobs. I wouldn't suspect," he hastened to say, "that any of them have just that as their sole motivation."

5. There is a considerable extent to which R and E is a "safe" program for local sponsors, "in the sense that you're almost guaranteed some results. I present the case that with retention-expansion, if it's aggressively done, there's going to be almost sure-fire success.

"If any firms have concerns, say with local government, [the local program leaders] don't say they're always going to take an advocacy role on the firm's behalf. But, they do promise they'll look into it, play a third party role to try to work something out," he explained.

6. The R and E programs may address, if not necessarily resolve, the problems of local firms. "Hopefully, the local government, the public interest and the firms' interests can be accommodated, [so that] everybody's happy. In part, just the fact that these [business] problems are being seriously addressed, rather than shuffled aside, helps [in terms of] public relations. Now and then, they actually can help find substantive solutions, or can provide that personal contact to make a solution that's been thought of before finally work."

When asked if another reason for R and E's apparently growing popularity might be connected to technological and international economic changes, Morse stated: "Yes, it's very accurate to say that [U.S. firms increasingly are concerned with retaining what they have, rather than pursuing perpetual growth]."
There's the speed of the changes in technology and financing to consider. Financial markets now have become international, rather than national or, as they were 10 or 15 years ago, local. This makes the competition for funds much tougher. It means that companies look at their branches in a much tougher fashion, because they've got to show very high rates of return and compete not only locally but internationally.

"The technological change is moving at a much faster pace, so that's going to throw some plants into a real rapid growth phase, and it's going to threaten others...Some firms are gonna win big, and others are gonna lose big."

Providing information to local firms concerning such technological and economic changes "is an important element in R and E," Morse stated. "[The program participant's] role is to chase down where that information can be obtained for firms that are really receptive. I mean, they can't force [business] people to want to avail themselves of such information, he feels.

When the researcher asked if economic changes were impacting upon American cultural values so that people valued stability more and "growth-growth-growth" less, Morse responded: "I don't know. but I suspect not. I think that the people, at least, who participate in the R and E, if they had a chance to grow-grow-grow, would take it in a minute. What I suspect is that in many of these communities, they've found they haven't been that successful in pushing the growth strategy...They would agree that they'd rather stay stable than decline, but there's still that continuum where more is better: more jobs, more employment, more income. A number of communities look at R and E as something they've been a little slack on, something they need to push more, but they're not going to drop their attraction [efforts].

"In some communities, they're planning to use the [business visitation survey] information they gather...to bolster their attraction efforts, in a couple of ways: If existing industry is happy with a
number of facets of the community, they're going to brag about those, and point out the statistics: '93% of firms found this county a good place to raise a family.' This sort of thing.

"The ones that come out negative—well, I don't have evidence, but I'm pretty confident that they're not going to broadcast those...Generally, they're scared to death to have anything negative come out [publicly]. The ethic in the chambers of commerce is [that] you emphasize the positives. However, what I think [local R and E program sponsors] are realizing is that if they can identify those negatives and do something about them, they may improve their odds of attracting new firms."

From late 1982 until 1984, the slide set was the focus of the educational efforts by Morse and Crawford. In 1984, Morse worked with one county in two local R and E training sessions. In 1985, he tested a new approach in four counties. Then, five sorts of information were examined in order to improve the effectiveness of the programs: 1) the experiences of the four local programs in 1985; 2) the survey of 33 existing programs; 3) the experiences in Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin; 4) the literature on strategic planning; and 5) regional economic theories. Based on these, the current program, the "New Ohio Business Retention and Expansion Program", was developed.

Morse said that he defines his role as a teaching and research endeavor. "We are teaching community leaders how to implement local economic strategic planning. They are learning by doing it successfully. They are also learning the fundamentals of encouraging economic development. The ultimate goal is to increase the capacity of a network of local leaders to handle economic development problems more effectively.

Morse's research objectives, meanwhile, are to

1. Evaluate the final reports from R and E programs as strategic planning documents;
2. Evaluate the impacts of R and E programs after one year;

3. Measure the degree to which four criteria of local economic strategic planning are met in a sample of R and E programs;

4. Evaluate the influence of the four local economic strategic planning criteria on the development of final reports and the program's accomplishments; and

5. Analyze the factors influencing volunteer participation in the R and E program and in its local economic strategic planning counterpart.

On the research side, Morse said that he will be using the data from the business visitation interviews to examine a number of basic questions. "From a research perspective, we are still in the data collection phase. The analysis will occur in 1988 and beyond."

Morse saw three major unresolved concerns in the R and E process:

1. The lack of attention to the problems of the unemployed;

2. The lack of a well organized state level educational system for assisting R and E teams in the design of specific implementation plans; and

3. The lack of educational systems for helping R and E teams to design public policy educational programs regarding controversial local issues.

Until mid-1986, Morse's R and E training program was a one-person operation. Having conceived the program's aims and methods, he promoted its value to various publics; recruited local leaders to form local R and E task forces and programs; conducted the training of the volunteers recruited by local leaders; processed the results of the business visitation surveys; and drafted a final report summarizing the aggregate survey
data and suggesting recommendations for local implementation.

To extricate himself gradually from administrative responsibilities at a time when they were intensifying, Morse devised two tactics. One involved acquiring grant support with which to hire and train an administrative assistant, who, he hoped, eventually would assume most if not all of the daily administrative burdens. The second was the creation of a non-credit University certification program for "Certified Retention and Expansion Specialists."

Through one-year grant support secured in mid-1986 from the Ohio Department of Development (ODOD), a full-time R and E staffperson, Ellen Hagey, was hired. Ms. Hagey's training in both economic geography and journalism provides both the analytical background for examining the local data and the writing skills for preparing the final reports and program promotional materials.

Under the ODOD grant, Morse contractually committed to train 20 certified R and E coordinators and consultants and their local volunteers throughout Ohio during 1986-87. The grant covered about half of the costs of providing training and technical support for the new programs and reflected, Morse said, the state government's growing interest in R and E as a potentially promising development strategy.

Parentnetically, Dr. Marnie Shaul, assistant director of the Ohio Department of Development, affirmed the state government's interest in R and E. She spoke briefly at the October 15, 1986 conference sponsored by ODOD, the Ohio State University, and the Ohio Cooperative Extension Service, on "The New Ohio Business Retention and Expansion Program."

"Building healthy communities--that's what I think R and E is all about," she said. "You might wonder, why is it that the State's been so interested in what OSU's been doing [in R and E]. The State has 8 staffpersons in industrial development. Because of the number of
industrial firms we have, it would take them—if they did nothing else but visit one firm per hour—at least four years to visit every one of those firms. This doesn't even count allowing for travel time, let alone for doing anything about what they learn in those meetings." Towards the end of Shaul's presentation, she commented: "This partnership program has a lot of partners: OSU, the State, local leaders, development officials..."

In another strategic step to devolve administrative duties to others, Morse initiated the Certified R and E Specialist program in mid-1986. The aim was to recruit experienced, paid economic development professionals into a program which would train them in how to facilitate the conduct of local R and E programs. He saw the Specialists as donating their time to work closely with one or more local R and E program coordinators. They would draw upon their certification program training and professional experience to advise coordinators on the handling of existing businesses' problems and concerns. The Specialist training would be brief and intensive, and trainees would be recruited from among the ranks of several populations: local development professionals, private utility companies' "existing business representatives", and Cooperative Extension Service field office personnel.

Within a few years, he hoped, enough trainees would have been trained and certified to serve as R and E Specialists that a "network" would be created throughout Ohio. In this way, whenever a new local program was created, there would be at least one experienced Specialist within reasonable proximity to the community. A perhaps equally compelling benefit for Morse of such a network of (unpaid volunteer) consultants would be the substantial reduction in administrative demands upon his time and provide a strong political base for the program.

Morse obtained approval from Ohio State University's department of agricultural economics and rural sociology to have the department's community economics program sponsor the Certified R and E
Specialist program. Morse designed the certification program to provide trainees with hands-on experience in and observation of new local R and E programs. Under his tutelage trainees assist the participants of a new program as they proceed through the eight steps above. The experiential learning is complemented by the reading of various articles, and the performance of several written exercises. The cost to certification program trainee was $200 per person in 1986-87.

Morse, the Specialists themselves, and other program participants tended almost universally to refer to the Specialists as "Consultants." This eventually became the term by which these development professionals were known formally. Throughout the remainder of this narrative, this latter appellation will be used.

During this study's data collection period, Morse expressed pleasure several times about "how [his administrative assistant] is really coming along." He also articulated increasing confidence that the Specialist certification program would prove "successful," a prospect he found particularly gratifying.

Observation of Morse's leadership in Ohio's R and E training provides a valuable study of empowering leadership. Many of his actions could be taken, at first glance, as controlling. He frequently made strategic decisions to delay providing information, to use his offer of training support to influence local decisions, and to constrain the extent to which local program participants deviated from the prescribed program design. However, this state R and E training coordinator appears to possess a view of empowerment as a dialectical process in which ostensibly controlling actions are sometimes necessary to achieve empowering results. He often spoke of a "teachable moment" as a time in which one is ready to learn. Implicit in the teachable moment concept is the idea that teaching something before the student is prepared to absorb it and its implications would be counterproductive at worst, and inefficient and ineffective at best. Morse appeared consistently to apply this notion to the
process of transferring information, skills and the leadership of a local program to local program participants over time. Thus, he appears to have perceived initially controlling actions as necessary to prepare for subsequently more empowering ones. This transference of leadership will be discussed during the description of subsequent phases of local program implementation.

2. Heartland County

The respondents in the Heartland County case study gave consent to reveal the county's identity. However, some of the information generated from the study is sensitive and relates to personalities and personal values. It was determined that, for ethical reasons, it would be most appropriate to conceal the county and its R and E program participants' identity. Therefore, discussion of the county's various demographic, socioeconomic, geographic and historical traits is vague and, in some regards, purposefully though harmlessly misleading, to protect anonymity.

Located in the rolling hills of central Ohio, Heartland County is a rural area. Blessed with good soil for farming, Heartland County also possesses recreational attractions. The county's crisscrossing streams and a large lake provide good fishing and boating opportunities. Many visit Heartland County because of its recreational attractions, and one senses that they are leaving the cares of cities and suburbs behind when they arrive. When one enters Heartland County, one feels that the pace of metropolitan life is at a far remove.

Yet, various forces stir beneath the tranquility. Studies show that from 1970 to 1980 the population of the county both grew as well as aged faster than did those of either adjacent counties or of Ohio as a whole. A very slight percentage of the county's citizens are non-white; this small proportion has remained constant during the past 15 years.

While the county's per capita income grew by more
than 50% from 1974 to 1979, the Ohio per capita income grew at a comparable rate and remained nearly 20% higher than Heartland's during that period. In 1980 Heartland County's median family income was more than $3,000 below the state median figure. Corresponding to these income differentials, the distribution of occupations in Heartland County differs from that typical of the state as a whole. There are significantly higher percentages of farm and blue collar workers and significantly fewer white collar jobs. Unemployment has tended to be consistently higher than the Ohio average during the 1980s. As recently as September, 1986 Ohio Bureau of Employment Service statistics placed the county's official unemployment rate at almost 10%, up from 8.0% in 1980.

Despite the moderately lower average income and higher unemployment figures, Heartland County provides no evidence of poverty, either in its principal town and county seat, Cobbletown, or in the small municipalities and farming areas. The cost of living is very likely less there than in the rest of Ohio on average. Housing costs, for one, are substantially lower than the state average. The majority of the county's residents own their homes, so that many can be assumed to have low housing costs. The architecture of these homes, like the manner of their residents, is frugal, unpretentious, straightforward.

Heartland County is conservative. Most comfortably proclaim aloud an allegiance to the Republican party. Such conservatism should not be mistaken for a fear of innovation nor should it obscure the county's historically progressive roots. Settled and traversed by pioneers well over 200 years ago, the county saw brief Indian wars and a longer period of peaceful Indian-white co-existence. During the Civil War, several locally prominent first, second and third generation families provided their homes as way stations for the underground railroad. Local newspaper accounts and other historical documents, over the intervening years, consistently speak of this anti-slavery sentiment with evident pride.
Heartland County also has been the birthplace of several technological innovations over the years. These firsts are common knowledge among local citizens, who are eager to speak of the area's distinctiveness. Perhaps the development of such innovations can be attributed partly to the area's having been, first, a stop along the way for early westward bound settlers and, later, a crossroads for railroads heading both north-south and east-west. Though rural, in other words, Heartland County has not been isolated. Some residents feel that living in a rural area, yet enjoying the fermentation regularly introduced by the outside world, offers the best of both worlds.

Such fermentation continues today. The downtown Radio Shack now sells personal computers, cable television provides umpteen channels to county residents—and more significantly, there have been changes in recent years in the ownership of several large local firms, together with the attraction of a major Asian plant, "Asiatic Limited." Since the late 1970's, two non-locally owned plants, each employing more than 500 persons, closed their doors. One closed, its owners said, because they could no longer compete internationally in the market for which their local plant specialized. Another large, locally owned plant went through a cycle of layoffs and re-hiring, as the owners sought to improve plant efficiency.

The successful recruitment, by officials in an adjacent county, of Asiatic Limited, brought an influx of Asian nationals to the area. This, together with the closing of a large non-locally owned plant due to international competition, has made Heartland County citizens generally aware of the extent to which their lives may be altered by global forces.

The response of many citizens and civic groups to the influx of Asiatic's foreign employees suggests an open-heartedness in Heartland County. Farmers, bankers, lawyers, secretaries, housewives and others in recent years have donated considerable time to providing English language training and in helping their guests, as the orientals sometimes are referred to, to adapt to
the American culture. This welcome may be rooted in instrumental rationales, as when one respondent said: "Their doing well here helps us. Asiatic provides a lot of jobs. Since Asiatic came, other smaller Asian firms have been started, and these create more jobs....We can help each other."

The researcher believes that such hospitality may also be viewed by many local citizens as an end-in-itself, for it is much in keeping with the character of Heartland County's people.

C. Initiation and Intelligence

In the discussion of these and subsequent decision phases, the names of program participants in Heartland County have been obscured. In their stead, the participants' job titles and/or fictitious names are indicated. In many cases, the job titles themselves are fictitious and only roughly comparable to the positions held by these respondents. These measures are intended to protect the anonymity of respondents.

The decision phases of initiation and intelligence concern how the decision process is begun, and what information is involved and processed prior to implementation of the decision, respectively. As will be shown, the four members of the group which initiated Heartland County's R and E program were frequently alternating between initiating and intelligence gathering activities, during the program's early stage of development.

The notion of the initiation phase is the modification which Cunningham contributed to Lasswell's decision phase schema. Where Lasswell's schema begins with a discussion of the intelligence phase--i.e., "the intensive study of the problem, data gathering, and analysis of a proposed solution" (Cunningham, 1979)--the addition of the initiation phase emphasizes that a social decision making process begins with preparation to conduct the intelligence activities.
For the purposes of this report, discussion of the two phases in Heartland's R and E decision process is combined because the two forms of activity occurred virtually simultaneously.

1. The R and E Training Coordinator

"How has Heartland County's task force been put together? Who initiated the process in the county? And how were the volunteers selected—what criteria were used, do you think?" the researcher asked.

"I don't know the answers to most of those questions," George Morse said, smiling. "The impression I have is that [one of the Heartland County Chamber of Commerce executives] originally heard about the program. Then the R and E Consultant [later assigned to work with Heartland County's program] showed a slide set that her employer, involved in local development had developed on R and E. The slide set's patterned 90% after the one we did. The Consultant showed this slide set to a local group in Heartland County. And with that combination of things they started to get interested.

"Then," Morse explained, "our county [Cooperative Extension] agent knew we had something going [i.e., that OSU was providing R and E training]. And the Chamber executive knew we had something going. And the Chamber executive asked the county agent to have us share something [with that informal local group]....

"From there, the next step that I know of was that we said: 'Hey, if your group wants to get to know more about it...there's going to be a meeting down at Dale County. They're going to be training the volunteers for their [R and E] program at that meeting. I don't see why they'd mind your sending a group down.

"So they [the Heartland County group] sent five or six people down there. And they sat in on the slide set, the question and answer session [portions of Dale County's volunteer training]. And it may be pretty much that same group [that later actually got the R and E program going in Heartland County]."
"I know Heartland's county agent was there, the Chamber executive too. I think DT was there but I'm not positive. They didn't stay for the full dose [i.e., the full training session]. They stayed through the slide set and the Q and A, and then they said: 'We're going to do it. We'll be in touch with you."

"Then, I didn't hear from them for a month or two. Then they said, 'Okay, what are our next steps?' I said, 'You've got to pick your coordinator.' I uh, encouraged them to pick somebody in the Chamber, but said: 'doesn't have to be.' Like a Chamber executive, a staffperson in the Chamber.

"Well, they responded that they were going to have LS, a retired corporate executive [be their coordinator]. And they asked what their next steps were."

As will be discussed shortly, several Heartland County citizens attended the Dale County R and E training session, and returned to Heartland County determined to conduct an R and E program. They next contacted Morse, asking what steps would be involved in creating an R and E program in Heartland County. He told them there were "several stipulations they had to meet" before he would agree to provide R and E training for them:

1. They had to identify a coordinator.

2. They had to get written endorsements from county commissioners, city council, municipal governments, local development agencies and other related groups. Morse explained that he did not, and typically does not, require that local groups get endorsements from all of these organizations. However, he said, "I do insist they get these [endorsements] because one, it shows they're serious, that they're really interested in doing the R and E...And it helps them too, 'cause [once they've got the endorsements] they've now got local support for doing it."
3. They had to come to the Ohio State University campus to meet with Morse. This, he explained, was another test of the extent of the initiating group's commitment. He reasoned that his time and training resources were valuable and limited, so that he did not want to commit himself to providing training for a group that was "not really serious about" R and E. This informal meeting with Morse also, he said, "gets them a little better acquainted with what would be involved."

4. They had to "come up with $500 to help cover the costs of the training." He explained that this amount "doesn't cover really all the costs, but again, the fact that [the initiating group members] raise it tells you they're committed." He also noted that $500 does not reflect the "going market rate" for providing the range of services entailed in his support to a local R and E program.

5. They had to identify who they wanted to serve as members of the Heartland County R and E program's task force.

6. They had to identify, similarly, those they wanted to serve as business visitation volunteers.

7. Finally, they had to arrange a date for his coming to Cobblestown to provide what here is termed "pre-training orientation." Such orientation, Morse told the initiating group, would involve more orientation to the purposes and methods of R and E, examination of the interview/survey form to be used during the visitations, and performance by him and the initiating group of two practice visitations.

RF assured Morse that the initiating group would agree, as in fact they did, to these stipulations.

2. The Local R and E Coordinator, "LS" or "Larry"

"How did you get involved in R and E?" the researcher asked this Heartland County non-native who had spent most of his life there.
"Well, I understand that [the county agent] volunteered my name [to serve as the local coordinator]...The fact that I had retired, and he knew I had, and thought I wasn't backward," LS said, smiling.

"Why did you want to become involved?"

"I think it was [because of] the welfare of the community," LS explained. "If you're going to be part of the community, if you can do something to better the community--I know I'm interested in it. I don't want to sound like a do-gooder, but still, I'd rather have a positive attitude than a negative one...And well, there really isn't any ulterior motive, because I'm doing it on a volunteer basis.

"But, I like to have a speaking knowledge of the business people, the leaders and so on--and this [being local coordinator] is one way of getting to work with them. And, I find it enjoyable.

"I'll certainly know a lot more about [what the program entails] after we get the interviews back and see what we can do about them," LS concluded.

"What happened after the county agent recommended you be the local R and E coordinator?" the researcher asked.

"I had lunch with DT, he's on the Chamber board, and with RF--up at the Holiday Inn. They gave me some kind of an idea, and set tentative dates. We had to go to Columbus and see one of the video tapes [George Morse's slide set on R and E]. And they [DT and RF] gave me some literature to read [about being the R and E coordinator], and then we set the date for the first two [pre-training, practice business visitation] interviews with [Firm A] and [Firm B]. And then we set the date for the [volunteer] training session."

3. Chamber Executive, "RF" or "Rick"

"We heard about R and E," RF, a Heartland County native, explained. "And we talked to George Morse. He
mentioned something about what was going on down in Dale County. A group of us got together, here at the Chamber, and decided to go down there."

And what he and the others heard at the Dale County meeting, RF said, "Just seemed to make a lot of sense. A lot of sense... How so? Well, I mean, here's a program that tells the business people that there's people who care about them, appreciate what they're doing. It says, 'Here's a community that appreciates what you're trying to do.'"

RF was a man of few words, reserved and apparently reluctant to discuss his personal values directly. His interest in participating in R and E, and the importance of his role in the Heartland County R and E program may be inferred, in part, from what other participants said regarding him.

"Since he came on [as a Chamber executive]," one participant said, "he's really turned things around there. For years, the Heartland County Chamber didn't do much, it was losing members and it just wasn't very active. But since he's been in, they're active. He's gotten people excited about the Chamber." These sentiments, spoken in tones of respect, appreciation and admiration, were echoed by more than a dozen other participants.

These remarks and RF's personal comments make clear the depth of this Chamber executive's commitment to making the organization genuinely responsive to local business concerns.

4. Outgoing Chamber Board Member, "DT" or "Don"

DT, a local business owner, was on the Heartland County Chamber of Commerce board when the program was initiated, but left its board of directors and was replaced by a new board member shortly after the R and E program began. Parenthetically, though he has lived and owned a business in Cobbletown for many years, he described himself as "an outsider."
We first heard about the [R and E] program,” DT explained. "Basically through what Dale County was doing. "Rick" [the Chamber executive, RF] approached me about it, and I said 'Let's go down and see what it's about.' So we picked a core group from the Chamber to go on down to listen to their training session."

"What criteria were used to select who should be asked to observe Dale County's training session?" the researcher asked.

"I think, basically, at that point it was just natural to take the directors, the executive board, of the Chamber--because these are very aggressive business people.

"So that if it made sense to them--?" the researcher queried.

"Yes, that's the very people that you're going to be interviewing, as I understood it. So it made sense to take these people down there and ask what they thought. And to see, also, if [R and E] was something the Chamber wanted to be involved in. The Chamber leadership--it wasn't going to do any good for me, as one Chamber board member, to say it made sense. The board needed to say it makes sense."

"What were your thoughts when you sat in on their training?" the researcher asked.

"I've thought for a long time that we [the Chamber] need to make contact with our local industries, I felt, on a regular basis. This just needed to be done. And I didn't know who should be doing it, or what group should be doing it, or how it should be done, it was just something needed. Because we're too fragmented when it comes to local issues, we're too fragmented.

"We just haven't had the communication," DT elaborated, "between the politicians, the agencies, local businesses, to get all of those people working together....Everybody goes about their own little business, and there's never a reason for those people to
be gotten together. There is no reason. Why would they? It just doesn't happen. Where with this, the reason for this [R and E program] is to go out and do this survey. It gives us the excuse to call you on the phone and say, 'Bob, I'd like to come over and visit with you about this little survey.'

"It gives us an excuse--I need that. I'm not going to call somebody and just go in and chit-chat," DT noted. Being labelled an R and E program volunteer, he explained, provides one with the legitimacy to call on business owners and managers. Without such legitimacy, DT felt one could not gain access to these business people.

"What's led up to the Chamber's involvement in R and E?"

"This will be my last year on the Chamber board," DT explained. "When I first got involved, they had to beg people to be on the board. Now people are actually coming to us and saying, 'We want to run for the board' [in the Chamber elections]. You're talking about some very prominent people wanting to be on this board. Which means we've made an almost unbelievable turnaround." DT then discussed in some detail the means by which the Chamber had sought and obtained the increasingly enthusiastic political support of the county's Industrial Growth Committee, area development agencies, and similar business-related organizations.

"So then the Chamber leadership started to develop," DT continued. "It's been one of the most fun things I ever did in my life. You know, during my years on the [Chamber] board. I had never been involved before, and was busy in my own little business. I had never had the opportunity to be involved with people who make decisions all the time. I mean, in my own business, I basically end up making all the decisions."

Being a Chamber board member, DT explained, "was just great. There I've got people around me that," he said, then snapped his fingers loudly three times in rapid succession. "Wow! You throw out an idea, and
they either throw it out for good reasons or else it turns into something really dynamic. Boy, that's wonderful to be involved in something like that. I'd never been afforded that."

"I was brought up," DT later explained, "where you were taught to serve on the school board, to do that as much as pay taxes. You had a responsibility to do that. I don't care if you're a janitor or whatever you are, there are some talents you have that you give back free to that community. And," he said, smiling, "I've got two brothers who've been school board members [in another community]." DT preferred, he said, to become involved in business and local development.

Then DT made a comment which helps to explain what happened in later phases of Heartland County's program: "I had trouble in the first few [pre-program] meetings, not to jump right up front and try to get the program rolling. Toward where I was seeing it could go. I set back and let Larry [the local coordinator] do that. It's much easier for me to jump right up and start pounding away at it," he said, laughing.

He explained that LS had been chosen as coordinator based on his having retired recently, and therefore having "free time in which he could run the program." DT, the county agent, and the Chamber executive expressed impatience concerning both the initiation and implementation of the program. They each explained without prompting that their impatience was based on the concern that volunteers are needed to make the R and E program succeed. And, each said, the "best volunteers" tend to be "the busiest people in town." As DT said, "they're the ones you know you can count on to get things done."

But, if these "best" volunteers are busy, DT reasoned aloud, "they're gonna lose interest fast if you don't get the [business visitation] interviews over and done with quickly. You gotta keep their interest. So the thing's got to move."
George Morse had reinforced this impatience both in the initiation-intelligence stage, when he counseled the initiators to conduct the program in "a short time frame", and in the invocation phase, when he advised volunteers to conduct their visitations "quickly."

The researcher hypothesizes that such impatience led initiators to overemphasize dysfunctionally the extent to which a coordinator should be selected because she or he had "free time". Initiators, starting from the premise that impatience was warranted, heard from George Morse how program implementation entailed a significant commitment of time by the local coordinator. They therefore concluded that, to conduct the program quickly, they had to select as coordinator somebody with the ability and willingness to devote a concentrated period of time to program coordination. They therefore selected LS "because he had the time," both DT and RF confirmed.

DT recommended strongly in retrospect, that in helping a local group form new R and E programs elsewhere, the R and E training organization should have that group meet with "a couple of experienced local [R and E] coordinators. To kind of give an idea of the total picture." The training organization should make more efforts, he stressed, to orient the new local program's coordinator in particular, to where the "tough points" in conducting a local program are likely to be. George Morse later commented, however, that he had provided fairly considerable training and orientation to the local coordinator and other program initiators, and that DT probably was simply not aware of these efforts.

"Are the tough points when you first start out? Or is it when you try to get everybody involved? Or is it on down the road, once [the coordinator] is working with the task force? Is that when the tough problems occur? Where are the highs and the lows?" DT said, "These are the kinds of things coordinators need to know, and [experienced coordinators] are the best ones to tell them."
MK had been appointed to serve as Heartland County's Ohio Cooperative Extension Service county agent in 1981 so that he is, he says, "an outsider." "My first concern," in becoming involved in the R and E program, he explained, was "that the county and the city [Cobbletown] have a unified game plan. That they could have a long term plan to follow so that growth is not haphazard. So that they don't run into these problems and then, after the problem's already here, try to solve these problems.

"As with too rapid growth, or having industry situated in areas where the community didn't really want them, or where the new industry wasn't really conducive for the whole community. I think that they should have a master plan for the whole community. For the whole county," MK said.

"Do you think that the R and E program will lead to that?" the researcher asked.

"Oh, I think that [the program] is a vehicle [by] which these problems can be brought to the surface. And you also have your united leadership working together--from all factions. And it brings your industrial relations and the Chamber and all the other areas together, working together for a common goal. I think that's one of the things that so good [about R and E]."

When asked what problems can arise when such groups do not work together, MK said: "I would say the biggest thing would be to provide a favorable climate for industry" which, he explained, is much harder to do when such groups are not "working together."

One of the benefits MK saw in his participation in such a multi-organizational group was that, "this has given me an opportunity to work with the Chamber of Commerce and also to work with the different industries. We in Extension work with basically a different clientele, with farmers and agribusiness." In addition
to serving as a local R and E task force member and member of the program's initiating group, MK wanted to serve as a business visitation volunteer. This kind of participation would enable him, he explained, to work "with several people that I normally don't come in contact with. Like [the car dealership owner]," who was his partner on the visitation interviews. "I'd never really had an opportunity to talk to him. I'm in Kiwanis and he's in Rotary, that sort of thing. But it's good to work with several people that I don't normally come in contact with."

The benefit of his program participation, in terms of his role as Extension county agent, he maintained, is that such participation "is an additional contact both ways. Myself learning about their business or organization, and them learning about the Cooperative Extension Service. And see, there's 50 different individuals that will know about the Extension Service that, normally, might not have had the opportunity. So I think, in a selfish way, that's one advantage for me. And also that [they'll learn] that the Extension Service is associated with the Ohio State University, and that the university is caring enough to come out into the community and help em. And to offer their resources and expertise."

"Would you recommend that other land grant universities become involved in R and E training, like Ohio State has?" the researcher asked.

"I think it's good--to get out in the community. It's amazing the lack of knowledge of the Extension Service from the main campus. They, a lot of times, don't even know we exist and the amount of good work we do. I feel that we're the right arm of the university. In other words, we're touching the people. And they really don't realize how much input we do have--and it could be good or bad [input]. [They don't realize] how people perceive us as being part of the university. If we're doing a lousy job," he explained, then the impact on the university's image in the community will be negative.
If local Cooperative Extension Service participation in R and E programming reflects well upon the Service, then, MK maintained, it would reflect positively upon the university. He went on to say that the local county agent did not have to coordinate or initiate the local R and E effort for the agent's participation to have such positive outcomes.

Concerning how best to initiate a local R and E program, MK said: "Well, of course, if your chamber [of commerce] is strong, then the chamber is the ideal area to start it. To be the sponsor. In other words, it should be the chamber and not some individuals. [It should be sponsored by] some unbiased source, which the chamber would be."

When the researcher mentioned that utility companies often sponsor local R and E efforts, MK said: "I think people perceive the utility company as having a product to sell. In effect, they probably don't—oh sure, they're gonna sell electricity, but they're going to sell electricity regardless, because," he smiled, "it's a monopoly item. There's only one [power] line going into your place." In other words, MK was maintaining that while he saw utility companies as legitimate local R and E program sponsors, he felt that others might perceive them as less legitimate.

6. The R and E Consultant, "MD" or "Mary"

"You have to try [R and E] and you have to develop a plan that everyone in the community knows about," MD maintained. "I mean, so many people, they have this plan just within their one organization. Therefore, no one else is aware of it, and so [the plan] just doesn't happen."

One of the benefits of conducting an R and E program, she indicated was that it could be done for a larger geographic area than just one community. "You used to look at developing communities. Now I think we're going to have to look at developing regions...within a state," because firms looking to
relocate think first in terms of appropriate regions, before they will select a particular community site, she explained. "We, as communities, have to start looking at more than just our own immediate community."

"And, I think too," she elaborated, "[communities] have to start understanding that there has to be cooperation within a community. They have to show a unity in the community; that people work together and do so successfully. If you're going to attract someone into that community, this is important. That's where I think R and E comes in. I mean, here you're out there talking to business, and demonstrating a pro-business attitude. There isn't an organization that can find fault with it.

"Doing an R and E program—when you introduce this—it helps to start getting your community together, to work together and have unity. To develop a community [in the] right [way]. The R and E program is an excellent place to start. It helps communities realize where they have to go."

"So you're saying that the R and E is really good for recruitment as well as for the retention and expansion of existing firms?" the researcher asked.

"If you don't have a successful group of industries in the community," she explained, "you're never going to attract new firms. If I go into a community and see that the ones that are there are not too successful, I certainly wouldn't [move my business] there. [For a community to attract new firms] what you have to develop are community unity and pride in the community.

The researcher asked her why her employer was interested in R and E. She described how the company's executives perceived a very real synergy between the economic vitality of their marketing region and the firm's own financial success. Her firm, she explained, sells much of its products to existing local businesses throughout Ohio, so that there was a very real linkage between the expansion of existing firms and an increase in demand for her employer's products. Her superiors
were sufficiently committed to this perspective that they agreed to subsidize her participation as an R and E consultant, she noted. She explained that her employer also had financed her preparation of an educational slide set describing the aims, methods and potential benefits of engaging in local R and E programming.

MD then noted that she had promised in 1985 that her efforts, as a marketing representative facilitating local R and E programming, would generate at least 5,000 additional jobs per year in the region. In 1986 nearly 10,000 jobs were created by existing and new firms regionally. While she does not attribute this job generation solely to R and E programming, or the efforts of the firm's branch managers to support R and E in their localities, she believes that these efforts have played an important role: "I knew we had contributed to it...I knew that we could [meet our quota]."

The literature she has read about R and E, she said, indicates that: "Eighty percent of your new jobs are going to come from your existing industry. That's what I see in these figures [concerning the jobs created in 1986]."

MD said that one strength of R and E programs are their capacity to identify local firms' problems. The researcher asked if she felt that such problem identification might be "risky," in that it could be possible to raise expectations that such problems would be solved.

"I've sold this program, so I hope it's going to be successful" MD smiled wryly, adding more seriously, "Yes, there is a risk. But, you can't do anything without a certain amount of risk. But, I'm sold on it, I guess, that's all. I think that anyone who's in local or area development would be too. And they're right to take a risk. If you find out that things are bad, you report them, and [say that] you're going to correct them, if you can. No one will object to that." R and E program participants, she explained, just need to be careful not to "promise" to resolve a problem: "They should only say they'll look into it and 'see what can
be done."

When asked to discuss her personal reasons for wanting to initiate her company's involvement in promoting R and E, she like most other participants, discussed these reasons rather indirectly. She responded by describing the kinds of development-related activities in which she has been engaged over the years. She spoke with evident pride. One can only infer that she enjoys development related activities, such as are involved in R and E, and that she cares very much that her efforts produce "positive results."

7. Conclusions Regarding Initiation and Intelligence in Heartland

What can be said analytically regarding the chronology of initiation and intelligence phase activities described above? The chronology itself constitutes a "finding" in that a surprising amount of research was needed to put the puzzle pieces in place. The researcher posits that this difficulty in ascertaining how the program was initiated and by whom reflects the diffuse nature of local program leadership. The diffuseness of program leadership is inferred from the facts that no one person had a comprehensive picture of the program's history, that decisions regarding basic program aims and procedures were never imposed unilaterally by any participant, and that interactions among participants were characterized by reciprocal deference.

Relevant to an assessment of R and E programs is a summary of the diverse reasons for which the initiating group members wanted to launch the local R and E program in Heartland County. This chronology and the following chart (Table 1) were presented to the four initiators as part of the member check report to the Logan County R and E task force. They confirmed the accuracy of these inferred participant rationales.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Reasons for Participating</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator &quot;LS&quot; or &quot;Larry&quot;</td>
<td>For the &quot;welfare of the community.&quot; One &quot;should do something for the community.&quot; Being coordinator will be &quot;enjoyable.&quot; Being coordinator will &quot;give me a speaking knowledge of local business and community leaders.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Executive &quot;RP&quot; or &quot;Rick&quot;</td>
<td>R and E &quot;tells business people that the [community] cares...appreciates what business is doing&quot; for the community. R and E can help solve business' problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Agent &quot;MK&quot; &quot;Mark&quot;</td>
<td>R and E facilitates creating a &quot;unified&quot; or &quot;master&quot; plan for local development. R and E helps identify development problems &quot;before&quot; they occur. Local leaders need to be &quot;working together.&quot; More cooperation among local leaders will lead to a more &quot;favorable climate for business.&quot; Being a task force member, &quot;get to work with groups I don't usually meet.&quot; Being a task force member and volunteer, can learn what others do while informing them about what Extension Service and Ohio State University &quot;have to offer.&quot;</td>
</tr>
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Table 1 (continued)

| Outgoing Chamber Board Member | The community is "fragmented", people never "work together," in "dealing with local issues."
|                             | There is too little "communication" between politicians, public agencies, and firms.
| "DT" or "Don"              | R and E provides a "reason" for people to "come together."
|                             | Personally wanted "for a long time" to have "regular contact" with local firms occur.
|                             | Participating allows opportunity to realize personal values of responsibility, being responsibily "involved," using one's "talent," "contributing" to community well-being.

| R & E Consultant "MD" or "Mary" | R and E helps solve business problems.
|                                | R and E helps develop community "pride" and "unity".
|                                | Pride, unity and successful local firms are need to best attract new firms.
|                                | Good to express thanks and pro-business attitude to firms.
|                                | R and E good in creating regional cooperation in development efforts.
|                                | Benefits her employer by expanding existing firms, thereby increasing demand for her employer's products.
|                                | Personally meaningful because she enjoys development related work, takes pride in facilitating development effectively, and believes R and E is an important development strategy. |
The reasons given by the initiators for their participation in Heartland's program are of the following general kinds:

1. Altruistic: Each of the initiators appeared to be motivated, in part, by a desire to be of service to others.

2. Organizational: Each of the initiators also seemed to be motivated by a desire to further the aims of the organizations by which they were respectively employed. They each perceived their employers as potentially benefitting through their own involvement in the R and E program.

3. Philosophical: The initiators all believed in the values implicit and explicit in the R and E program as it was initially presented for their pre-program consideration.

4. Affective: The initiators indicated they expected their participation to be "enjoyable" and "a real learning experience."

The importance of these initial motivations for participating in the local R and E program is addressed in later narrative sections. In the next section, the efforts of the initiators to recruit others into the program and to gain external endorsement of the program's aims are discussed. Through the processes of initiation and intelligence, the initiators learned enough about the program to determine that they wanted to make this promotional effort.

D. Promotion

The promotion phase concerns the way in which the decision to enact a local R and E program was promoted in Heartland County. After the initiating group members learned of Morse's stipulations regarding what was required of them in order to launch an R and E program in Heartland County, the group met to develop lists of
task force members and volunteers. This promotion phase also includes the ways in which those asked to volunteer responded to the request to do so. "Promotion," Cunningham (1979, p. 3) wrote, "is the detailed review of the preferred solution [i.e., in this context, to conduct the R and E program] by persons who are in positions to support and endorse the solution." Thus, narrative concerning this decision phase will consider how those who determined to conduct the R and E program endeavored to solicit the support and participation of others.

As one attendee said at the meeting to develop the lists of those who would be asked to participate, there was very little disagreement about whether a particular person should be asked to serve on the local task force or volunteer to interview the local firm representatives. The initiating group members suggested people they each felt would be appropriate. Together they developed a composite list of all those whom they would invite to attend the volunteer training.

When asked who he felt should be involved in a local R and E program, MK said: "I would pick individuals who were 'influentials': shakers that, number one, would legitimize the program. Number one: get those that would legitimize it, that wouldn't fight against you, that would recommend the program. And then, of course, get the 'captains', those that would do the work and [ensure] that the visitations were going to get done. And then, of course, also have those individuals on the core group [i.e., the initiating group] that you know could influence these individuals. Those that are respected."

Noteworthy was the consensus expressed by the initiating group members concerning whom they should invite to participate, particularly as local task force members. Three basic kinds of criteria were used to select task force members, apparently with complete consent among the initiators, according to comments noted previously and in other interviews:
1. **Positional:** Task force members should be high level representatives, drawn from local governments, local public service agencies, area development organizations, local educational agencies, locally owned firms, and prominent Chamber members and board members.

2. **Political:** Those asked to become task force members should be "movers," "shakers," "influentials"—people whose "support will be needed" to ensure that recommendations arising from the program in fact will be enacted.

3. **Personal:** Task force members should be people who are "respected" and "committed to doing R and E." They should be, in the outgoing Chamber board member's words, "busy people, whose time is valuable—the kind of people you can count on to get things done. Because they don't have time to waste."

As significant as the consensus among initiating group members is regarding whom to invite to join the R and E effort is the striking match between these criteria and those prescribed by Morse. Morse consistently recommends that the above criteria be used to recruit program participants, a message he conveys in his presentations to initiating groups and volunteers and in the documents he drafts describing how local programs do and should proceed.

Once the initiators determined what qualities to look for in recruiting task force members and business visitation volunteers, each proceeded to present the aims of the R and E program to targeted individuals and groups and to solicit their participation. A variety of tactics was employed to recruit participation.

DT and RF presented the R and E program concept to the Heartland County Commissioners, seeking their endorsement and encouraging their participation on the task force. Two of the three commissioners were named to the task force. DT and RF also asked members of the Heartland County Chamber of Commerce board of directors, the local Community Improvement Corporation and the Industrial Growth Committee to serve on the R and E task
force. Several offered to serve also as visitation volunteers.

Many of those recruited from these organizations themselves then recruited others into the task force. An administrator in the Cobbletown city government, a member of the Industrial Growth Committee, sought the endorsement of the R and E program from the city council. In the process, the council appointed one councilman to sit on the task force "as their representative," the administrator explained. Several visitation volunteers mentioned they were first asked to participate by other Industrial Growth Committee members.

One local school superintendent described how he asked three of his school's teachers to serve as volunteers. Of several school administrators asked to participate in the task force, he was the only one to agree. While the other principals and superintendents said they could not "find the time," the local coordinator explained, this superintendent expressed very enthusiastic support for the program's purposes.

Importantly, not all of those asked to serve as task force members or volunteers agreed to participate, and not all of those who agreed in fact participated. Those who chose to become involved actively had been recruited primarily through face-to-face communication. Not all persons targeted for recruitment into the program were contacted in this manner.

One volunteer said he had read a "press release" in the Cobbletown newspaper about the imminent formation of the local R and E program and then asked the local coordinator if he could "sign on as a volunteer." Another task force member said she "first heard about [the R and E program] when I read my name in the newspaper.

"Maybe they just needed a token woman. Are any women involved in the program?" she asked. The researcher told her that several were participating. She explained she was not attending the task force
meetings because she was "very busy." It appeared that she resented how her participation was sought in such an oblique fashion that she "had to hear about it" through a newspaper account.

Nearly half of those asked to volunteer for the business visitations did not attend the training session. Two factors may account for what one participant said was "a surprising number of no-shows" at the training session. First, those who appeared most actively committed to implementing program activities had been recruited through face-to-face communication. Second, they had been recruited by one of the initiators or another task force member.

The recruitment process took place such that the "first generation" of recruits themselves asked others to participate. This second generation in turn sought to recruit still others. The researcher was able to identify at least three such "generations." The first generation constituted an inner circle of persons highly committed to the program. With each successive generation a new circle was formed at the periphery of the previous circle.

The initiators and inner circle members became the task force members who participated most actively in that task force. It was those recruited by the inner circle members who conducted most of the efforts to recruit visitation volunteers. The researcher speculates that had leadership of the program been less diffuse, more centralized, and had the inner circle themselves conducted most of the recruitment of the volunteers, a considerably higher percentage of those asked to participate would have done so. Those recruited by second and third generation participants tended to be more peripherally committed to and involved, if at all, in the program.

Many of the inner circle members said, when asked, that they "had no idea" or "weren't sure" how and by whom those who did not participate had been recruited. This suggests that there had been little communication within this "core group", as they came to call
themselves, as to how recruitment efforts were proceeding. Such dialogue, the researcher speculates, would have helped participants to diagnose ineffective recruiting procedures and to take corrective measures. The woman "asked" to participate by hearing of her involvement in the newspaper clearly felt alienated toward the local R and E effort. Other recruiting activities may have generated similar ill feeling.

The virtual absence of dialogue concerning the recruitment process meant that core group members were surprised when many of those recruited second and third generation recruiters did not materialize in the task force or training session. One skeptical interpretation could be that the core group members were not sufficiently committed to the program to invest the energy to monitor recruitment. However, during each phase of the program core group members displayed and articulated considerable enthusiasm and commitment. The best explanation appears to be that the lack of recruitment monitoring reflects, again, the diffuseness of program leadership.

Those successfully recruited as task force members and volunteers consistently expressed considerable enthusiasm for the goals of the proposed R and E program. There was, in fact, a noteworthy degree of consensus among participants regarding those goals. This consensus is remarkable in that it appears not to have been the product of socialization and participant interaction—for, other than during the task force meetings, there was little regular interaction between program participants. The researcher concludes that the consensus resulted from what was the intrinsic appeal, for each participant, of the R and E concept.

Interview excerpts below indicate participant consensus that:

1. It is safe to participate in the R and E program.

2. At worst, the local program would generate positive feelings and public relations among government,
business, and other participating organizations.

3. Any positive findings identified by the survey of local firms could be used to attract new firms and to enhance local civic pride among the general populace.

4. The program would meet a widely recognized need to "bring people together" to address matters of specifically local concern.

5. One has a civic duty to participate in this volunteer effort to "benefit the whole community."

6. Solving the problems articulated by local firms should help these firms to remain and grow in the community, thereby creating more jobs and a better local tax base.

7. Helping existing local firms, through one's program participation, would result in indirect economic benefits to oneself.

8. Participating in the program probably would be educational as it would give the participant the opportunity to learn about who is conducting business in the community and what goods and services the firms provide.

9. Program participation should prove enjoyable, participants predicted because they could socialize with other influential community members, participate in making important decisions affecting community well-being, learn about innovative ideas, and tell others about what one's own organization does and one's role in it. Nearly every participant described the enjoyment they anticipated experiencing in the program.

10. Participating in the program would allow one the opportunity to promote one's own organization—to community leaders during task force meetings, and to business executives during business visitations.

11. Most owners and managers of existing local firms were seen as probably feeling neglected and
unappreciated. Participants wanted them to feel more appreciated, both for the pragmatic reasons of retaining and expanding existing firms as well as because they felt the business representatives did not "deserve to feel this way," as one respondent put it.

1. County Commissioner

"This is just the type of program where you can see nothing wrong with it," one county commissioner said. "This is a can't-lose type of thing. At worst, we're out only our time. It's to provide help to the businesses in the community, to get a lot of people together to identify and solve the problems that they have. With the format that this program provides, hopefully it can result in retention and expansion."

Local businesses, the county commissioner explained, "don't know where to go [for assistance or information]. Then there's the hubbub of everyday business. There's just not much opportunity [for local government and business representatives] to sit down together... When these companies respond to questions in the interview, it suggests some areas they may be concerned with. They probably have never had an opportunity to express those needs any other way.

"You know, dialogue really helps. Before this program, firms might pick up and leave and nobody might know quite why. And quite frankly, community acceptance [of that firm] gets to be a crucial factor oftentimes.

From his perspective as a county commissioner, he explained, "a healthy economy is a growing economy. This is part of what I think the [R and E program] objectives are here. And the other thing is that, of course, helping the economy certainly simplifies local government, because with more local [tax] revenues you can provide better services...When unemployment's down, law enforcement's down, and so are taxes--it all kind of goes together."
"I think [the Heartland County Commissioners] feel strongly enough that this is an educational opportunity for us, so that we're better able to address the kinds of problems that come to us. We become more informed as to what their concerns out there are. I think that probably government's going to be in least favor when people think 'the government doesn't want to hear anything from you.' I think we're here [in the R and E program] to learn.

2. Lawyer

"I'm a businessman," one volunteer said. "And I had an interest in prospering, thus in expanding our tax base. So it just struck me as a good civic thing for our chamber of commerce to be undertaking. My business is a law practice, and that's one of the reasons why I was interested in the program, other than just as a civic idea. Interested enough, at least, to ask some questions...My only expectation initially was that I thought it was a good public relations move, on the part of the chamber, to keep good relations with our existing industries. And I thought, if nothing else, that we should expect some good public relations and improve our image with existing businesses, by just going out and making the contacts. And saying: 'Is there anything we can do to help you?'

This volunteer hoped, he said, "that good rapport with our old-line industrial base might help head off problems in the future, problems of relocating or expanding somewhere else and not here. At least, [the program] would give them something else to think about before they made that kind of move. Just to give them a better taste in their mouth about doing business in Heartland County."
3. Employment Service Administrator

"Personally, to me," a local Ohio Bureau of Employment Services administrator said, "I thought it was a great idea. I don't know if everybody felt that way. To me it's the community working together for the community...It can't solve all problems, but yet it still can help solve some. I think the fact that you're willing to do something [in itself] is helpful."

4. Local Utility Company Executive

The R and E program, said the local utility company executive, a Industrial Growth Committee and program task force member, "is something to build on. If you have negative results [identified by the business visitation survey], then you've got the opportunity to change them. And if you find out something positive, then you can go out and blow your horn. So, I don't see how you can lose.

"We've had some very good industries that have supported this community, some of them for fifty years. So let's don't forget them. Let's don't make them feel they're not appreciated."

5. School Superintendent

"I guess our selfish interest is to see if we're on track with the kinds of services we're providing to business and industry. So my interest is really aligned with our adult [education] program, which provides custom programs for business and industry....As a public school system, we need to be involved in the community and making contacts, and I saw this as a vehicle for us, for me, to be involved. To provide community services we need to have those community contacts. Our goal is to place every student [in a job]. To do that we first have to sell ourselves as people, sell our programs, build the rapport, build the trust. Put those adult
students into jobs.

"What we want," he elaborated, "is to establish those working relationships, broaden the community contacts and working relationships, make people more aware of what we can do. That's our personal goal that we want to get out of [the program]. But I think, for the process, I'd like to see community members--be they government agencies, government personnel, chamber members, local service clubs--for them to realize how important their attitude is in attracting business, which ultimately benefits the community through an improved economy.

"That's the community side of it. From the business side, [I hope there will be] a realization that their doing business is appreciated. For those businesses that aren't here, [I hope the program would] get to them the message that the businesses who operate here really like doing so. That hopefully will attract more firms and help those here to grow. You know, to retain and expand.

Other task force members and volunteers each articulated the blend of motivations for participating discussed above. These motivations may be classified as being of three principal kinds:

1. Organizational: to promote the goals of the organization by which one is employed.

2. Personal: to benefit directly and indirectly through one's participation in the program.

3. Altruistic: to benefit other community members through one's program participation.

A fourth, and more speculative, might be added, one which appeared to underlie the other three kinds of motivations for participating in the program.

4. Philosophical: to promote activities consistent with values regarding local development and economic well-being.
In addition to describing their reasons for agreeing to participate, respondents were asked whether the timing of when their participation was sought was significant in their decision to participate. In other words, they were asked, "was there anything going on that made the idea of participating in the program particularly appealing to you?" The range of responses to this question are described here because they suggest that there are diverse contexts in which R and E program participation is perceived as appropriate.

The school superintendent said he felt that "the R and E idea came along at a particularly good time for me," because he was in the process of trying to persuade his reluctant staff to survey local employers. He wanted to conduct interviews to ascertain whether and how the school's curricula needed revision to facilitate more effective job placement for the school's graduates. The superintendent also emphasized that the "community has seen some large employers leave or close down" in recent years, so that an effort to prevent further closures or relocations appeared to be of timely value.

The local utility company executive said that the R and E program was of "timely value" because of "the influx of new industries, including Asiatic and satellite spinoffs. We were showing them a lot of appreciation and a lot of noise. I guess there's been a growing feeling, as a group, that 'hey, let's not forget [existing] firms.'"

He then described how the Heartland Chamber of Commerce and Industrial Growth Committee had re-instituted in 1986 an "appreciation dinner" for local employers. The dinner had been an annual event but had not been provided since the mid-1970s.

At the dinner plaques were given "to all the industries" in Heartland County. He commented that the momentum, which had been generated in re-instituting this event, to identify and resolve the concerns of existing local firms "certainly has made it easier to get a program like [the R and E program] going."
Several other participants said that the recession and closing of several local plants in the early 1980s had made community members generally more sensitive to the need for retaining and expanding existing firms. The R and E program concept was seen as "having come along at a good time" for one or more of the following reasons:

1. The community had experienced various problems due to the recent closing of local firms.

2. Certain organizations were planning to be or already were engaged in ascertaining the problems perceived by local business executives.

3. The community had benefitted from an influx of new firms, and of Asiatic, Ltd. in particular. However, the concessions and attention given to the new firms had stirred resentment among the community's existing employers.

A few respondents cited each of these three reasons for perceiving the R and E program as timely. Some respondents cited only one of these reasons. Yet, a number of participants indicated that:

4. The R and E program is "always appropriate," as one respondent said, "because you always need to know what the businesses are thinking, what their concerns are."

E. Prescription and Invocation

These phases in a decision process, according to the Lasswell-Cunningham schema, concern what rules are developed to guide participant conduct and how they are developed and conveyed to participants. Once the phases of initiation, intelligence and promotion are completed, those who have decided to endorse or participate in the decision process (i.e., the R and E program) need to know how to proceed. As Lasswell and Cunningham imply,
these prescriptive rules need to be invoked by authoritative individuals and institutions if they are to be heeded by program participants.

The invocation phase involves "persons essential to the implementation [being] given directions regarding the solution [i.e., in this context, the decision to conduct the R and E program]. They are informed about what is to be done and why. Often persuasion is required..." (Cunningham, 1979, p. 3). With respect to Heartland County's R and E program, the rules for guiding program action were developed and prescribed by George Morse. These rules then were discussed by Morse with the initiators during the initiation and intelligence phases. In fact, Morse said it was his goal that the coordinator and consultant, through the Certified R and E Training Program, would understand these rules well enough to help conduct the volunteer training program. Morse then organized and conducted the volunteer training in early October, 1986. The training constituted the major means by which Morse's prescriptions were transmitted to volunteer firm visitors.

The phases of prescription and invocation are discussed in a single narrative section because the content of the prescriptions and their communication to participants became clear to the researcher during the R and E pre-program orientation and training events. Discussion of these events will permit consideration of both phases.

During the initial orientation of the local program initiators, Morse discussed prescriptions concerning the sequence of local efforts, and the various means by which each prescribed activity should be conducted. The activities to be conducted in sequence were to

1. Select additional task force members. Morse did not discuss this activity in much detail, suggesting only that the initiators recruit into the task force "community leaders" from business, development agencies, local government and education. Prior to this meeting, Morse had discussed this in detail with each of the key
actors and viewed task force member selection as one of the more important decisions the group would make.

2. Select and recruit the volunteers who would conduct the business visitations. He said the volunteers should be those who are "busy...influential...not shy about interviewing business people...people you know will follow through and do the interviews." He did not prescribe how the initiators were to implement or oversee the recruitment of volunteers.

3. Conduct the volunteer training. Morse and the initiators arranged for two consecutive training sessions to be held during an afternoon and evening so that those whose schedules would not free them for one session probably would be able to attend the other session. By the time of the training, Morse prescribed, the initiators should have developed a complete list of which volunteers were to be paired with one another, and which firms the volunteer pairs would visit. At the training, he explained, the R and E Consultant would be responsible for showing a slide set promoting R and E and explaining the steps involved. In addition, Morse would arrange for a teleconference call to be conducted at the training, during which the volunteers could communicate by telephone with the experienced local R and E coordinator in Dale County.

4. Conduct the business visitations. Morse prescribed that, prior to the training, the initiators would send out a standard letter to each of the firms targeted for visitation, explaining that a volunteer team would soon contact them to arrange for the visitation interview. The letter, he said, should explain who the local R and E program sponsors were and what the basic aims of the visitation would be. The letter should be accompanied by a blank copy of the visitation interview form (or "survey" as it came to be called), so that the business executives would better understand the aims of the visitation and prepare their answers, if they wished, in advance of the visitation.

At the training, Morse told the initiators, he
would advise the trainees to contact as soon as possible the firm representatives they had been assigned to interview. The volunteers would be told to conduct their interviews at the earliest possible moment convenient to both themselves and the business representatives.

5. Identify and respond to short term problems identified by the visitations. Morse told the initiators that the volunteers would be instructed at the training to fill out the survey forms completely, and immediately after conducting each visitation. The volunteers then should return their completed survey forms to the local coordinator. The coordinator, in turn, should make two copies of each completed form. He should deliver one to the R and E consultant assigned to support Heartland County's R and E program. The other should be sent to him.

The coordinator and consultant then would read each survey form, at which point any needs or problems warranting action should be identified and prioritized. Morse prescribed that the two review the forms separately then communicate with one another on a regular basis to discuss their interpretations of actions that should be taken. Where a survey firm indicated that the business representative wanted information, Morse explained, that concern should be treated by passing on to the relevant public agency a request that this information be supplied. Either the coordinator or the consultant, he said, could handle this kind of concern.

Where a survey form indicated that a firm was planning to leave or close, or where one could infer from the firm's survey responses that firm relocation or closing was a real possibility, the coordinator was to treat this as an "urgent problem," he counselled. In this event, the coordinator should confer quietly with those local officials who could "take action to encourage the firm to stay, or at least to find out more about why they want to leave [or close]," Morse said. He was not specific in prescribing or suggesting with which persons the local coordinator should confer.
Morse then suggested to the initiators that task force meetings should be held during and after the visitation process. During the visitation process, the coordinator "could bring up" for group discussion problems which either were identified in the surveys or which the coordinator was not sure was in fact a problem.

Morse prescribed to the initiators, in a manner which he did not connect with such task force consideration of survey concerns, the need for the coordinator to treat all survey information as confidential. Had this connection either been prescribed by Morse or interpreted by the initiators, the Heartland County R and E task force might not have conducted its review of every completed survey form. The task force read the completed survey forms during their meetings, a process which will be discussed in a subsequent narrative section concerning the "application phase."

In no instance did the researcher observe the program participants to contravene any prescription which Morse had clearly specified, let alone emphasized. The researcher speculates, therefore, that had he made an admonition precluding task force review of each survey form, the task force would not have done so. In none of the local R and E programs that he had facilitated previously had a task force conducted such a review. Instead, in observance of the concern for confidentiality, the local coordinators would present to the task force specific problems identified in particular surveys, but without indicating the identity of the firm or other parties involved. It was probably because such task force survey review had not occurred before that Morse had not thought to advise the initiators against it.

On the other hand, he did prescribe that the task force members could and should play an active role in making sure that the problems identified by the visitation process were resolved.
6. Prepare the final report. Once the visitation interviews had all been conducted and the coordinator had sent all the completed survey forms to him, Morse said, he would compute the aggregate survey results and suggest "final recommendations". He would send this "final report" to the task force. The task force then should "review the [aggregate] data and my suggested recommendations. Then, you should keep or change my recommendations, as you see fit, and add any of your own." The task force then should indicate the changes and additions it wanted made in the final report. Morse would then make these changes and have copies of the final report sent back to the task force for its local distribution.

Three respondents indicated, during interviews, that terming the report "final" was misleading. They each expressed anxiety that Morse might be preventing local participants from having significant input into the content of the report disseminated locally. The researcher suggests that the report be termed "preliminary" when referring to the document which Morse sends to the task force for its review and modification. Only when the modifications have been made should the report be termed "final." The concern which the three respondents—one of whom was the local coordinator—expressed, about just how "final" the preliminary report draft would be, is consistent with the desire articulated by virtually every local participant that their program be locally "owned" and conducted.

Morse did not prescribe, either to the initiators or to volunteers, what the local program participants should do once the final report was completed and disseminated. Interestingly, he indicated no need to make such prescriptions, nor did the initiators then ask for advice concerning post-report activity.

During the training session, Morse fulfilled the roles which he had prescribed for himself, as told to the initiators. Training packets were prepared and distributed to each volunteer. These included U.S. Industrial Outlook information that described predicted market trends and forces in the fields in which operated
the firms which the volunteer would visit. Short
descriptions were provided in the packets to describe
Morse's R and E training program, its organizational
sponsorship, and the general R and E program objectives.
Blank survey forms were included.

Morse had designed and conducted the training such
that several basic messages were conveyed to the
volunteers in various, complementary ways. That is, the
slide set which the consultant showed, the answers which
Morse sought from Dale County's R and E program
coordinator during the teleconference question-and-
answer session, and the training literature tended to
reinforce these themes:

1. Volunteers should enthusiastically express a
"pro-business attitude" and "appreciation" for the
contributions which the firms being visited were making
to the community's general well-being.

2. Volunteers should ask the business interviewees
to answer every question, but should not try to "force"
them to answer. Where the interviewee asked that a
particular comment be considered "off the record," the
volunteer interviewer should not report this
information.

3. The volunteers should arrange with their
assigned businesses to conduct the visitation interviews
as soon as possible. They should complete the recording
of interview responses on the survey forms immediately
after conducting the interview. Then, as soon as
possible, they should return the completed forms to the
local coordinator.

4. The visitation process should help the local
task force identify and resolve many of the problems
which would be identified during the interviews.
However, volunteers "should not promise," Morse
emphasized strongly, that any given problem would be
resolved. "You should promise only that their concerns
will be looked into and that, if anything can be done,
they [the task force, presumably] will try to help."
As has been seen, one of the features of the R and E concept most attractive to local participants is that it is seen as "safe." The admonition not to "promise anything" is probably, as several respondents indicated, central to this perception of the program as a "can't-lose" proposition.

The completion of the certified training program by the coordinator and consultant is absolutely essential for the successful conduct of the training," Morse stated. "This allows these local leaders to actively participate in the question-and-answer periods, reinforcing the information I'm providing."

Morse, as has been noted, recognized the value of the concept of a "teachable moment," a time in which one is ready to learn something. The bulk of the messages conveyed during the volunteer training appear to have been presented at such a teachable moment for most, if not all, of the volunteers. All of the volunteers interviewed appear to have grasped each of the above messages fully. Equally, during participant observation in three business visitations, the researcher observed the volunteer with whom he had been paired demonstrate awareness and endorsement of these messages.

Figure 1 on the following page shows the flow of information which Morse prescribed as needing to take place during the Heartland County R and E program. (During the discussion on the "application" or implementation phase, the flow of information actually observed will be depicted by Figure 2).
FIGURE 1
FLOW OF INFORMATION
PRESCRIBED

FIRMS CONCERNS

WHAT I HEARS

WHAT I HEARS

WHAT I HEARS

SURVEY FORM

LOCAL R & E PROGRAM COORDINATOR

STATE TRAINING COORDINATOR

R & E CONSULTANT

COORDINATOR DETERMINES WHAT TO DO

- CONFER WITH TASK FORCE
- CONFER WITH FIRM REP. TO GET MORE INFORMATION
- PROVIDE INFORMATION TO FIRM REP.
- REFER PROBLEM TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR
- DO NOTHING BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROBLEM

COORDINATOR GIVES COMPLETED SURVEYS FORMS TO STATE TRAINING COORDINATOR

STATE R & E PROGRAM STAFF AGGREGATES THE SURVEY DATA

STATE PROGRAM COORDINATOR DRAFTS FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS REPORT AND IDENTIFIES CONTENT OF FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

R & E CONSULTANT IDENTIFIES ANY SHORT AND LONG TERM PROBLEMS REQUIRING LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

INDIVIDUAL SURVEY RESULTS

COORDINATOR IDENTIFIES ANY SHORT AND LONG TERM PROBLEMS REQUIRING LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

R & E CONSULTANT

Short Term Local Program Outcomes

Long Term Local Program Outcomes
The portion above the dividing line across Figure 1 shows the prescribed flow of visitation interview information from the business representative to the survey form recording. The portion below the line indicates how the information recorded on the survey form is processed. This depiction of the flow of information is useful in demonstrating the extent to and ways in which the coordinator plays a crucial role in the processing and transmission of information. The coordinator's role, at least as it was prescribed by Morse, was supposed to involve the collection and interpretation of information from the recorded surveys, and of the advice of the consultant.

The local task force was supposed to serve, in effect, in an advisory capacity to the coordinator. Incumbent upon the coordinator were the responsibilities to assess the accuracy of the information recorded on the survey forms, to interpret the meaning of that recorded information, and to determine what action needed therefore to be taken, based on this interpretation.

Given the importance, therefore, of the coordinator's responsibilities in shaping the quality of local program outcomes, it is not surprising that Morse and experienced local coordinators elsewhere in Ohio recommend that the person selected to serve as local coordinator be one who can devote sufficient time and energy to the coordinating role. As will be considered in the next narrative portion, the decision made by the initiators of whom to ask to serve as coordinator had a considerable impact upon the quality of that community's R and E program.

This preceding narrative section, by discussing the prescription and invocation processes, has indicated the ways in which the task force members, volunteers and various program endorsers prepared for the process of program implementation. An important element in this preparation for implementation, as has been seen here, is the way in which participants in a social decision process strive to develop a relatively well shared understanding of 1) program purposes, and 2) program
implementation strategies.

In the discussion next of implementation dynamics in Heartland's R and E program, it will be noted that the fairly well shared understanding of program purposes soon became accompanied by norms which served to mediate, in effect, between the purposes and the implementation techniques, in a way compatible with pre-existing and emergent local values.
F. Application

This phase, according to the Lasswell-Cunningham schema, refers to the implementation of the decisions made. For this study, application pertains to the processes by which the local R and E program were enacted. These processes chiefly include the interviewing of local business representatives by volunteers and the interaction of R and E task force participants. In this narrative section, these processes as they occurred in Heartland County will be the focus of attention.

1. Heartland County R and E Task Force Interaction

The first full task force meeting was held on October 23, 1986. As noted previously, many of the task force members had met prior to program implementation. This meeting, however, constituted the first for the local task force as a recognized group. By the time of this meeting three weeks had passed since the volunteer training and slightly more than 20 of the 53 targeted business visitations had been conducted by the volunteers.

Immediately prior to the first task force meeting LS and DT decided to have the group review each completed survey document. The decision that the task force members read and discuss together the completed survey forms: 1) constituted a significant variation from the manner in which other local task forces, in Ohio and elsewhere, had conducted the review of surveys; 2) appears to have had a significant influence on the ways in which members of the Heartland County task force interacted with one another; 3) makes it difficult for the researcher to determine whether and to what extent many of the outcomes of that task force interaction could be attributed to this apparently unique approach.
to task force survey review. Regarding the latter concern, it may be that the task force interaction outcomes may be found in many, if not most, of the local R and E programs, and that the approach to survey review only modified or accentuated certain of these outcomes.

There is no doubt that the decision for the entire Heartland County R and E task force to review each survey document influenced the extent to which: 1) the local coordinator directed the flow of local program information; 2) task force members shared the responsibilities for identifying, interpreting and determining how to respond to problems suggested by the survey documents; and 3) there was a likelihood that the confidentiality of business information obtained through the visitations might be breached. For these reasons, the decision regarding task force survey review merits understanding. Why did it happen? What specifically happened in the aftermath of the decision?

The decision to ask all task force members to assist in the survey review was seen as a means of assisting the volunteer coordinator, LS. Through their contacts and experience, the task force could suggest ways of navigating some of the problems through a complex, politicized environment. Further, the active participation of the task force provided a means of dealing with influential volunteers that were not completing their business visitation assignments.

The researcher grew increasingly impressed, in fact, both by the extent to which diplomatic experience is required and the extent to which each of the R and E programs possessed individuals with such experience and skill. The researcher believes that the task force members as a whole, and the initiators in particular, gradually became more ostensibly supportive of LS's taking an increasingly assertive role. The process by which LS became somewhat more confident appears to have been connected to the way in which the quality of task force interaction changed over the course of the program.
Before discussing how and speculating why the task force interaction changed over time, Morse's contribution to the decision for the Heartland County task force to review the survey documents merits consideration. In reviewing the prescriptions Morse made to the initiators and the volunteers, one notes that he counseled 1) that the volunteers deliver the completed survey forms to the local coordinator; 2) that the coordinator review the completed surveys to identify any business concerns or needs; 3) that the coordinator discuss these problems with the local task force; and 4) that the coordinator, assisted by the advice of the R and E consultant and task force, determine how and by whom such business problems should be resolved. Morse's prescription concerning how the coordinator is to discuss the surveys with the task force is inexact.

The researcher speculates that Morse's inexactness may have been the result, at least in part, of an ambivalence about how local task force members should interact. "I had earlier," Morse said, "encouraged each one" of the task force members in a previous Ohio R and E program "to report on the surveys [at the task force meetings]. And I got battered down by the confidentiality folks," meaning, he later explained, by those who feared that open task force discussion of each survey form would increase the likelihood that the confidentiality of survey information would be breached. "And then I just never came back to [making this suggestion] and pushed it."

"In Heartland County," the researcher noted, "I'd say that at least one of the task force members went on the majority of these [business] visitations, as it's turned out." In other words, the researcher implied, if the task force members often individually already know confidential business visitation information, then the threat to confidentiality of open task force discussion is a matter of the degree to which confidentiality may be breached, not of whether it may be.

"Okay," Morse acknowledged, "sometimes they will [already know the visitation information] and sometimes they won't." Morse then indicated the potential value
of task force discussion of survey results as being that this could lead the task force members to become a "close knit" group. "By having the closer knit group, you get the results [i.e., benefits] of a small group. You get the benefits of their talking it over."

Implicit in this and other comments is that Morse values close knit-ness in itself, as well as for the qualities of interaction which accompany it. On the other hand, he expressed pragmatic concerns not only that 1) the wider the network of those knowledgeable about confidential information the greater the possibility that the information could be revealed with damaging results, but also that 2) those task force members who conduct visitations might not indicate in writing on the survey document all of the concerns mentioned by the visitation interviewees. "If," Morse explained, "they just came in [to the task force meeting] and told what happened on the visits, you wouldn't hear the same quality of information because--I could hear some of them say, 'Hey, everything's going great out there, really. No problems. It's a nice little place.'" Morse appears to have been saying that he thinks visitation interviewers are more likely to provide a fuller, more incisive report of the visitation discussion if they complete the survey form regarding that discussion than if they relied upon oral discourse in a task force meeting.

Perhaps because, it appears, Morse perceived there to be both advantages and disadvantages to task force discussion of the survey forms, he did not intervene in Heartland County's program to discourage such discussion. The inexactness of his prescription and his subsequent non-interference allowed Heartland County's R and E program participants to determine and sustain the way in which they reviewed and responded to the visitation survey forms. His non-interference certainly, and very possibly his inexactness, might be rooted in the way in which Morse appears to prize highly the value of local self-determination.

Morse, the researcher wonders, also may have avoided intervening in the Heartland County program
participants' practice of task force survey review because he did not want to intervene in the local program which the researcher chose for his research site. This is an irony that may often occur in qualitative research, where efforts taken to minimize "intervening in the natural course of events" actually alter their course.

The factors above led to the decision for the task force members to review the survey forms. What happened once that decision was made?

LS formally began the first task force meeting by saying, "Don and I had a short meeting a little while ago and we've agreed that we should spend awhile in small groups of two or three, to go through some of the surveys. Then we'll come back together [for full group discussion]." He then distributed the nearly two dozen surveys that had been completed so far among the groups. Each group, as it happened, was comprised on those two or three persons who happened to be already seated together at a given table.

It appeared to the researcher that those who had chosen to sit together were, for the most part, friends or at least acquainted with other another. Several participants indicated in interviews later that they had known only a few of the other task force members prior to their task force membership. Field observation notes taken during this first meeting indicate that conversation appeared to be more open and directly pertinent to the survey forms shared among those tables at which the small group members knew one another than at those tables where such familiarity was lacking.

Several respondents also indicated, as mentioned previously, they had been motivated to participate in the program because they wanted to meet persons representative of other sectors of the community than the one in which they themselves were employed. However, some said that they experienced interaction between representatives from business, education, government agencies and political bodies as initially "difficult," "awkward," and "something I'd really not done before."
Those tables where small group members discussed the survey forms less openly and fully, the researcher speculates, therefore may be those in which the members either did not know one another well and/or were from different community sectors.

Approximately thirty minutes after the small group discussion had begun, several groups began to disperse, some to get cups of coffee, while others began to chat about non-survey matters. Ten minutes later, LS asked the full group to reconvene and then directed that each table discuss aloud what they had learned from the surveys they had read and discussed. With his arm outstretched, he pointed to the first table at the front right of the room, and nodded.

A woman, representing the local office of a state government agency, said: "I have a problem here with [X organization]." For a brief moment, there was absolute silence. A representative of that organization was on the task force and attending this meeting. The process of negotiating the identification, interpretation and resolution of local business problems had begun.

A banker seated to her right then said: "Several problems with local government have been mentioned." Over the next five minutes, the groups spoke of these problems in general terms and, as a bird approaching its nest in gradually narrowing circles, approached only cautiously matters about which any task force members or the organizations they represented might be held accountable. During this stage of group interaction, none of the specific complaints which volunteers had recorded business interviewees as having raised about X and local government were discussed. Instead, the banker mentioned how one of the surveys recorded a complaint about the high cost to local businesses of worker's compensation in Ohio.

Several of the task force members appeared to seize onto this issue as a diversion, the researcher sensed, from more sensitive issues. Over the next five months, in fact, state government and state-level politicians were safe targets for blame by local participants. In
private interviews, local politicians were another safe, generic target. However, blame, specific complaints and accusations were never related to the researcher about specific local politicians but only, if at all, about local politicians as a class. In addition, even generalized disaffection with local politicians was never articulated or implied in the task force meetings. This suggests that the more distant the target, the safer it is to judge it harshly. Distant targets, after all, seldom are seen responding in kind.

After several minutes in which a county commissioner, the banker, the chamber executive, and local state agency representative discussed worker's compensation insurance in Ohio, the latter task force member raised a more specific survey recorded complaint. For the second time this member took the group through a significant barrier by saying, "Another firm said it's difficult to get skilled help. He said the [local] school doesn't--" she paused, "put out people who are employable. And," she added hurriedly, "he's concerned about their work ethics."

The room again became momentarily very still. Several heads began to turn towards that school's superintendent, seated to the researcher's immediate left. However, each stopped before their gaze met his. The researcher sensed very strongly that many were sympathetic to the superintendent's position, and did not want him to feel or be embarrassed.

The school superintendent appeared to sense the uneasiness among the group about this overt, direct complaint. "That's okay," he smiled, speaking clearly. "Go ahead and say it." His face grew more serious. "We might be able to help--the company may need more specialized training, so specific that something needs to be customized for them." His tone was not defensive, but instead open and encouraging.

"People just don't learn good work values in our public schools," the state agency representative persisted, in an angry tone. She expanded on this theme for a full minute, but in a generalized way that was not
targeted, at least directly, to the superintendent and his school. This representative well may have been launching this attack, the researcher speculates after having interviewed her, because she seemed to be very concerned that her own agency, which works with the indigent and unemployed, might eventually become the target of serious complaints.

In what next happened, the tone for how complaints and accountability concerns would be handled in the task force was first established. The coordinator interjected, concerning work ethics, "Forgive my bias, but I think that begins at home." He said this with a smile and shake of his head, appearing to convey sympathy with the representative's anger, respect for her view, disagreement with her view, and implicit adherence to the value that such tension among task force members should be experienced as among friends.

The county commissioner then chimed in, "Some firms say they're impressed with the work force here." DT then added loudly and with a touch of wryness, as though subtly mocking his own tone of pronouncement, "A community's got your very good workers who've got the best jobs. Then it's got less good ones who get the so-so jobs. But then you've got your incapable workers who can't hold any kind of job." Three others, hitherto quiet during the full task force discussion, voiced agreement with DT. "Every community will have its unemployables," DT concluded.

Another task force member, a local development planner, said: "It's very hard to recruit professionals, to get them to move in to town...One person said he had difficulty finding a house here, that he'd had just a terrible time with the realtors, with all the realtors around here."

"I knew someone," DT said loudly, "who had a really bad time--it's worse than a bunch of women trying to build a kitchen." There was much laughter about this, during which the superintendent said with a quick grin: "Your chauvinism is showing!" The room erupted in laughter.
DT proved to be the most articulate and intellectually inclined of participants interviewed. The researcher suspects that DT is in fact profoundly concerned about the unemployed and the discriminated, but that he does not know what to do about these concerns. It is further speculated that DT is, at times, self-mocking because of this sense of not knowing quite what to do, and that the image of unconcern he presents is a thin disguise. DT's personal dilemma—wanting to "help" and nurture but not knowing how to go about it, wanting to catalyze intimate small group discussion yet fearful of asking for it outright—is noteworthy in this research account. It is noteworthy inasmuch as DT was not alone in expressing imprecisely the hope that the R and E program could provide a vehicle by which strong desires, as they are characterized here, may be realized. This theme will be reinforced at later points in the narrative.

One consequence of the dialogue after the state agency representative's complaint was the defusing of the tension her rather direct judgement of the local school had generated. Both the superintendent's response to her and DT's response to his smiling jibe demonstrated humor, friendliness and respect. A number of messages were transmitted during these exchanges, and they appeared to have helped to establish the generation of norms that were increasingly to guide task force interaction during the program. The researcher, not wanting to alter task force interaction in subsequent meetings, did not prompt respondents to assess the accuracy of the norms he perceived as operant, until near the end of the application phase. In those later interviews and in the post-implementation member check presentation of findings to the initiators, respondents expressed their agreement that the following norms operated in the task force:

1. Each of the completed survey forms should be analyzed thoroughly to identify any local business problems which either the business interviewee mentioned in the visitation, or which the task force members could discern as an unexpressed need.
2. Task force time should not be taken to discuss very straightforward requests by interviewees for information. It appeared to be assumed generally that it was the coordinator's responsibility to ensure that these requests should be identified and their fulfillment catalyzed and monitored. Several of the task force members expressed, in interviews, their perception that LS was being assisted in these responsibilities by the R and E consultant, the initiators and one or two other task force members. Observation supports this perception.

3. Task force members should discuss each completed survey form. In small groups at the task force meetings, every survey was read. Then at least one person in each small group would discuss with the whole task force the problems they perceived as identified or implied in each survey form. In other words, there appeared to be no bias operating such that any one firm's concerns were ignored.

4. Task force members could express even strong disagreement with problems or complaints mentioned by business interviewees, but they should never express disrespect for the interviewee or even implied disdain. Interestingly, while the task force members did not have the right to articulate specific or personalized complaints, the business representatives did have this right. Volunteer interviewers, in fact, were supposed to encourage businesses to exercise their right. This encouragement constituted a fundamentally important aspect of the prescription for volunteers to "express a pro-business attitude."

5. Task force members could, and in fact should, bring to the group's attention complaints or perceived business needs concerning an organization represented on the task force.

6. However, task force members were not supposed to blame one another, for at least two immediate reasons. First, task force members were supposed to treat survey information as raising the possibility, but
never the certitude, that the problem was as it appeared in the survey document. Task force members generally recognized, as several said in interviews, that business interviewees "could have their own biases too." To treat a survey-based complaint as necessarily true would be unfair, it was felt, to the task force member about whose organization the complaint was made. This rationale thus had the instrumental element of not wanting to make incorrect assessments as well as the ethical component of not wanting to be unfair.

Second, there was a usually only implicit, but apparently widespread, appreciation among task force members for how the allocation of blame would put the organization's representative in a defensive posture. Once again, there were both instrumental and ethical components to this rationale. Several respondents said that a defensive organizational representative was less likely to act constructively and cooperatively than one who felt free from blame. Thus, blaming was regarded as ineffective. Ethically speaking, blame appeared to have been regarded generally as unkind.

7. While task force members were not supposed to blame one another, they were expected to hold one another accountable for doing as much as they could to resolve the given concern. In other words, while task force members tried to remove from one another pressure about what had happened in the past to lead to the perceived problem, they indicated indirectly that they would exert pressure, if needed, to ensure that future efforts would be taken, as possible and where appropriate. Interestingly, task force members did not say directly to others in task force meetings that they would hold the latter accountable for future action. This norm instead is inferred from the way in which task force members indicated in the meetings that they expected themselves to be held accountable by the others.

The inference regarding intra-group accountability is supported by the way in which several task force members articulated, in private interviews with the researcher, that they a) were waiting to see what
specific other members were going to do in response to an alleged problem; b) would accept without protest a reasonable explanation for why the organization could do little or nothing about the problem, if this was the case; c) would accept without protest a reasonable explanation to the effect that the complaint was unfounded; and d) would quietly and unostentatiously approve of efforts taken to resolve the problem.

The latter (d) is an important point. Where problems in fact were mentioned in a task force meeting and then subsequently resolved through a member's organizational activity, neither the representative nor his or her organization received overt praise in a subsequent task force meeting. The researcher hypothesizes that this observation indeed supports the speculation that the norm of accountability was a potent and shared norm. Implicit in the mostly silent acknowledgement of successful problem resolution may be that such resolution is regarded as unremarkable. As one respondent said, "we're all leaders ... responsible. We should be doing our jobs."

8. Task force members should not embarrass one another. This norm operated analogously to that of accountability above, in that while no one should embarrass another task force member, the threat of future embarrassment would serve as a useful way of enforcing compliance to R and E objectives. The researcher developed the impression that only under exceptional circumstances would the Heartland County task force members ever seek wholeheartedly to embarrass a fellow member. There appeared, in fact, to be such a deep and shared dread of being embarrassed that the possibility of it was probably a more potent influence on individual behavior than its actual employment would be. For, one who has experienced embarrassment enough may tend to become inoculated against the threat of it.

Seven of the task force participants employed the term, without having been prompted by the researcher. They spoke of embarrassment with respect to themselves and, more commonly, to other program participants. Several mentioned that the final report of visitation
survey results should not disclose information that would prove embarrassing or damaging to the business interviewees or their firms. In another example, two task force members separately told the researcher that they felt a particular volunteer "should feel embarrassed" about not having completed either of his two assigned visitations. When interviewed, the volunteer in fact did appear defensive regarding his unfulfilled commitment. Despite the articulated feelings that this volunteer should feel embarrassed, there is no evidence to suggest that anyone took definitive steps to embarrass this person.

However, there were two occasions in which the researcher intuited that task force members were seeking to facilitate the embarrassment of another person by their mentioning how this person ought to feel embarrassed. The researcher speculates that embarrassment typically takes place when such quiet, indirect statements are made about a person to other persons in non-public forums.

Ordinarily, embarrassment appeared to involve an implied or understated form of collective disdain towards a person who fails to fulfill a promise. It appears that the employment of embarrassment in Heartland County predated the initiation of the R and E program there and may reflect upon the character of that community. Sociologists including Ferdinand Toennies, Max Weber and Georg Simmel have typified small, rural societies as gemeinschafts in which forces such as disdain, shunning and "shaming" are used to ensure adherence to stable social norms (Coser, 1977).

Heartland County may be such a "gemeinschaft" in which such forces operate, but participation in the R and program clearly created new circles by which flows of information were altered and social connections established or strengthened. Indeed, one measure of the degree to which Heartland County is not a gemeinschaft, in the ideal-typical sense of the term, may be the extent to which the R and E program created new arenas in which embarrassment could take place. In the ideal typical gemeinschaft such arenas already would have been in place.
Let us examine indications that new arenas emerged. Prior to the program, even though this was in a county of less than 20,000 persons, many participants did not know one another well or, in some cases, at all. Many participants also spoke, with and without prompting by the researcher, of their discomfort regarding, as one respondent said, the "considerable" extent to which local leaders in business, education, government and politics "don't know what each other is doing." The outgoing chamber board member spoke of the "fragmentation in the community", by which different leaders and organizations pursue their respective interests and aims in an uncoordinated and "therefore unproductive" fashion.

After the researcher heard several other respondents articulate a concern regarding fragmentation, he began to solicit perceptions regarding it in subsequent interviews. Prompted and unprompted remarks repeatedly underscored the degree to which local participants were troubled by fragmentation. The initially diffuse concentration of local program leadership provides another reflection of it, the researcher posits, in that a more cohesive community (i.e., one approximating the gemeinschaft) would have provided a tighter knit group of recognized leaders for the program. By the time that the task force was preparing its final recommendations the task force members began to articulate concerns about being embarrassed with respect to this group. As will be considered, many of those respondents who had voiced concerns about fragmentation now began to express their pleasure with the degree to which the R and E program had helped to alleviate it.

The researcher therefore theorizes that participation in a local R and E program may create new arenas in which embarrassment can operate. Embarrassment, or even the implied threat of it, facilitates the creation and enforcement of collective expectations and norms. Where a community is somewhat fragmented, embarrassment helps to reinforce new norms of accountability by which representatives from
different circles and organizational segments of the community may hold one another accountable.

This account of the role of embarrassment in the Heartland County R and E program might suggest that it is a repressive force. However, the researcher observed another facet of it. The researcher speculates that the reluctance to embarrass another person is also rooted in the way in which participants empathize with one another. Knowing how painful a given experience is for oneself, an empathizer tends to avoid inducing that experience for another. The researcher suggests that the Heartland County task force participants became increasingly empathic with one another as the program progressed. An important dynamic, here called empathy, appeared to have been at work in this task force, and the researcher hypothesizes that it is probably generalizable to most other local R and E task forces.

One well-known aphorism says that "familiarity breeds contempt." The researcher suggests that there are two basic types of familiarization, that the Heartland County task force progressed from one toward the other during its program, and that most R and E task forces and small groups generally tend in this direction. The first kind of familiarization may be termed identification of. Here the researcher refers to a coming-to-know that is characterized by detachment from and analysis of that which is becoming known. The second kind, toward which the task force progressed, is here termed identification with, a knowing characterized by empathy and intuition. Table 2 below suggests distinctions between the two forms of familiarization.
The researcher posits that there is a continuum of accountability such that, at one extreme, stakeholders utilize identification-of to assess the extent to which a given party complies with the stakeholders' expectations. At the other extreme, the stakeholders employ identification-with to make this assessment. The former is associated often with the use of quantitative measures, regulations, laws and similar rationalistic assessment and enforcement measures. The latter, the researcher proposes, tends to involve non-rationalistic means to assess and enforce accountability, particularly the use of embarrassment.

The strength of the rationalistic approach to accountability is that it may be applied rather uniformly (and, some say, objectively) across different settings. Its weakness is that it tends to ignore the unique factors which make the application of standard accountability criteria and enforcement procedures unfair in a given setting. The strength of the empathetic approach to accountability, conversely, is that it provides richer qualitative data with which to assess

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<td>Anonymous review of performance</td>
<td>Performance review by significant</td>
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<td>others</td>
<td>Empathy</td>
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<td>Detachment</td>
<td>Personalization</td>
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<td>Objectification</td>
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<td>Quantitative evaluation criteria</td>
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<td>decisions</td>
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<td>Reference to laws and regulations</td>
<td>Embarrassment</td>
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and respond to accountability concerns.

Yet, as many disadvantaged Americans might claim, the danger with relying upon empathic identification-with accountability methods is that those excluded from participating in the accountability assessment may find themselves not identified with. As suggested earlier, the researcher determined that the recruitment criteria by which volunteers and task force members were selected proved of considerable importance in shaping the kinds of outcomes that participants achieved. The task force members and volunteers undoubtedly achieved progressively greater empathic understanding of one another and of the business representatives they interviewed. This, in fact, is perhaps the most powerful and beneficial outcome of the entire local R and E process. Yet, the range of persons with whom the participants came to identify did not extend to include the unemployed in Heartland County. DT's comment above, explaining one's employment status as a kind of natural law whereby one's skills determine whether and how one is employed, reflects this. Thus, while a new circle or network of accountability was formed, it was not all inclusive in that few, if any, of its members felt the task force should be held accountable to the unemployed.

This last point merits elaboration. While the identification-of accountability strategy normally occurs in public arenas, the identification-with accountability dynamics which emerged in Heartland County took place in a largely private arena. This arena was private in the sense that, per Morse's prescriptions and those subsequently expressed by task force members, care was to be taken in determining which program generated information was to be released to the public. Also, those prescribed and chosen to be privy to the information comprised a group limited to community leaders from business, education, government, and politics.

However, insofar as the product of the R and E program is supposed to be a final report, one obvious programmatic aim therefore is to increase the extent to which private information becomes public. In this and
several other regards, the R and E program thus utilizes identification-with strategies as well as rational identification-of decision making procedures. The latter are employed in gathering and interpreting the survey data obtained through the business visitations. The gathering, interpretation and selective reporting of quantifiable information regarding the concerns of local firms appeared to rationalize somewhat the ways in which task force members made decisions.

In task force meetings during the early stages of the program, interactions among task force members had a high proportion of messages that were affective in content. In later meetings, task force members articulated messages that employed more instrumental rationality, and decisions more and more commonly were made with explicit reference to quantified objectives. This trend should not be viewed strictly as the outgrowth of an identification-of accountability process. The detachment, and sometimes contempt, which the researcher theorizes as typically attending this form of accountability, were noticeably absent from the task force interactions, even as identification-of means of information gathering and interpretation were employed. The researcher maintains that this is because the R and E program, as it is prescribed in Ohio and actually employed in Heartland County, involves a blend of identification-of and identification-with familiarization and accountability processes.

The researcher suggests that local programs which elicit the participation of leaders from various community sectors and which incorporate both kinds of familiarization procedures can be unusually effective in enhancing rapport among leaders across sectors while simultaneously increasing the rationality of their public decision making. Through identification-with, participants in Heartland County's R and E program developed empathic familiarity with one another and with their respective organizations. Through this subjective process participants developed fuller understanding of what each other's organizations could and could not do. This facilitated a more realistic set of criteria by which to assess the effectiveness of one another's
organizations.

At the same time, the gathering of quantifiable survey data, and the discussion and decision-making based on the data within the private arena of the task force permitted participants to assess organizational effectiveness against quantitative measures. The surveys posed questions to business interviewees such as regarding whether and to what extent they were satisfied with various public agencies. The aggregation of survey responses permits participants--and other community members--to identify a base from which to chart progress or regress in satisfaction levels over time.

The performance of case studies of R and E programs in communities which are experiencing a greater degree of internally generated conflict might be useful. The researcher hypothesizes that the effectiveness of R and E programs in more internally conflicted communities will depend, even more so than it did in Heartland County, on the capacity of participants to identify with one another. Narrative concerning R and E programs in other communities provides some basis for this hypothesis.

Though Heartland County was not convulsed by internal conflict, internal tensions did exist. Consistent with the concern regarding fragmentation, tensions were found in how representative leaders from business, education, government agencies, and politics viewed one another. Summarizing field notes, explicit articulations by participants in interviews, and attitudes inferred through observation, Table 3 below describes the negative and positive attributes which members of a given community sector were viewed by those of other sectors as embodying.
TABLE 3
Perceived Community Sector Attributes

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<th>Business</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Politics</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Negative</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfish</td>
<td>Impractical</td>
<td>Unresponsive</td>
<td>Conniving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not instill good values</td>
<td>Incompetent Lazy</td>
<td>Partisan Aloof, distant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>Service-oriented</td>
<td>Service-oriented</td>
<td>Able to get things done</td>
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<tr>
<td>Productive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creative</td>
<td>Idealistic</td>
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<td>Risk-taking</td>
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As previously noted, the criticisms expressed with regard to negative attributes were almost never made concerning specific community members or sectors, and never openly in the task force meetings. Prior to and in the early stages of program initiation, task force members indicated consistently that the local business sector had significantly more credibility than the other sectors. One might expect, a priori, that a program prescribed as expressing a "pro-business attitude" might exacerbate the differences in degree of sector credibility. However, it was asserted earlier that the identification-with dynamic provides stakeholders with qualitative information with which to make more personalized, less detached and alienated assessments of the performance of those with whom they identify. By prescribing that local task forces consist of representative leaders from the four sectors, one increases the likelihood that less objectifying, more tolerant (if not always more positive) assessments will be made regarding the attributes of those in other sectors.
It was not until late in the application phase that the hypothesis concerning inter-sectoral credibility emerged. When it did emerge, the researcher queried several task force members: "Do you think it could be that through the task force interaction of representatives from business, education and government they develop a more realistic notion of what each other's organizations can and can't do?"

The responses varied from "I suppose so, I hadn't thought of it that way," to "definitely." In the aggregate, the data suggest several findings regarding inter-sectoral relations in an R and E program.

1. Most participants, as discussed previously, were consciously concerned about the phenomenon of fragmentation in which the efforts of organizations in the different community sectors, and even of those in the same sector, are uncoordinated.

2. These respondents hoped that the R and E program would alleviate the problem of fragmentation.

3. None of the respondents said, when asked, that they previously had viewed the development of more realistic expectations of other organizations per se as valuable in reducing fragmentation.

4. Yet, all respondents agreed, when the researcher inquired, that increased knowledge of what organizations in other sectors could and could not do leads to more realistic expectations, which decreases inter-sectoral tensions (such as defensiveness and criticism), which in turn facilitates alleviating inter-sectoral fragmentation.

5. Many respondents indicated that they did not feel they themselves had had or taken sufficiently the opportunity to describe to other task force members what their own organizations can and cannot do. Yet, they all agreed that some communication regarding organizational capabilities and constraints undoubtedly occurred in the task force meetings.
6. When asked if they would recommend to new R and E program participants that they allow time explicitly for such communication, respondents agreed this would be, as one said, "a good idea. It certainly couldn't hurt. And, it sure could help. It could help a lot."

The identification-with dynamics within the task force, to summarize, have the potential of significantly improving the means by which organizational effectiveness is assessed. Task force members have at least occasional opportunities during their meetings to describe what their respective organizations can do both with regard to specific businesses' problems as well as more generally. Through such dialogue consensus may emerge concerning the criteria by which task force members assess one another's and their own organizations.

By engaging in dialogue regarding one's organization's constraints and capabilities, one increases the likelihood that the criteria by which one assesses one's own organization's effectiveness will converge with those employed by others to assess the organization. In other words, a fragmented community is one in which the leaders of local organizations will tend to have divergent perspectives regarding what other organizations should and should not do, based on a typically very incomplete understanding of their capabilities and constraints. Where organizational leaders discuss the organization's capacities more convergent thinking will emerge.

Consensus will not necessarily result regarding the criteria by which to assess an organization's effectiveness, yet it clearly is more likely to occur through such dialogue than without it. However, this consensus is by no means value neutral.

As has been considered, it appeared that during initiation of the R and E program in Heartland County the initiators readily grasped and endorsed Morse's prescription that the task force and volunteer group should be comprised of representatives from business, education, government and politics. It was as though
this prescription precisely coincided with the initiators' pre-existing perspectives concerning the conventional constitution of business development related programs. What bears emphasizing now is that the initiators equally readily grasped Morse's prescription that these representatives express a "pro-business attitude." This attitude is not value neutral, nor were the criteria for assessing organizational effectiveness about which consensus appeared to have emerged during the program.

The researcher brought into the research certain experiences and values regarding how community development should proceed. He had expected, for example, that participants in an R and E program, one of whose central ostensible purposes was to generate and retain local employment, would express awareness regarding the relationship of this purpose to the concerns of the presently unemployed. To the researcher this seemed, because of his rather unusual local development experience, a fairly obvious connection to make. Yet, as noted previously, few participants spoke, without prompting by the researcher, at all regarding the unemployed. (In fairness to Heartland County program participants, none of the coordinators of local programs elsewhere articulated a concern for the unemployed.) Those few who did initiate comments about the unemployed spoke either in judgement (as in "they don't even try to get a job") or in justification of their situation (as in DT's comments that the unemployed are without jobs because they are, essentially, without employable skills).

Had the researcher further elaborated upon his a priori expectation, he would have anticipated also that the degree to which the various sectoral organizations served the unemployed would have been incorporated into the convergent inter-organizational accountability criteria. The researcher would have been quite wrong. The supply-side economic philosophy, which holds that the benefits of concentrated capital trickle down, was common wisdom among the participants.

There were two basic kinds of comments made by
Heartland County program participants regarding the unemployed, of which roughly 10% of the county's residents were, according to official statistics. First, there were unsolicited comments, such as those made by the state agency representative and DT during the first task force meeting. Then there were comments which the researcher solicited during later interviews and the member check presentation of findings to the initiators.

Regarding the local unemployment figures one native politician on the task force said in an unsolicited comment, "I'm not real big on figures, because I don't know how many of those people actually want to work out there. I've been involved in a couple situations where there's been an opportunity for a job and people just--I don't think they want to work. I really think that the people who really want to work in [town]--I know that there are people who can't work, and in some places you can't afford to take a $3.35 an hour job and support your family on that. But ah," he sighed. "I realize that Asiatic hasn't hired everybody and [a spinoff of Asiatic] hasn't hired everybody. But, I think realistically [that] the majority of our work force has a pretty good job in this town."

Another task force member said in an unsolicited remark, "I'm not sure about [Alvin Toffler's thesis in The Third Wave]. I'm not sure that we are going to be the first major country to go to service and information, to the exclusion of manufacturing. I think that there will always be a mix of population.

"I don't want to sound like a highbrow, but [I think there is] a mix of abilities and skills. In order for us all to benefit from the economy, [there is] a need for some manufacturing jobs, [for] people who can learn low skill and semi-skilled occupations. [People] who value their time away from the job and that's where they want to put their growth and their recreation. [People] who want to be productive, contribute to that work operation, and then punch out and go home. Completely different from those people--say some like myself--who get totally involved in the job, who work
long hours and they're involved in the evenings in associated activities. [Where] that's both their work and their recreation. But," he concluded, "we need some basic manufacturing jobs."

Through the exercise of considerable restraint, the researcher was able to refrain from inquiring directly regarding participants' perspectives on unemployment and the local unemployed until well into the application phase. This restraint was exercised because the researcher sensed that direct inquiry concerning this matter might introduce a confounding and obstructive dynamic. That is, it could lead participants to modify their perspectives and program behaviors, thus altering the "natural" flow of events that would have occurred had the researcher not been present. It proved fortunate that the researcher withheld inquiry regarding unemployment, for he might not have heard and observed indications that participants were nonetheless often actively concerned about local disadvantaged and unemployed persons.

Many of the participants, especially those in the task force, "wore many hats." In addition to serving as a county commissioner or chamber board member, for example, participants might serve as local church leaders, counselors of delinquent adolescents (as with the Buckeye Boys Ranch), school board members, cub scout troop leaders, and the like. When asked to describe their involvement in these public service capacities, respondents generally spoke in affectionate, concerned and committed tones regarding the clienteles of these service efforts. It became quite clear that they identified closely with the clients, many of whom were distressed, economically or otherwise.

One unusually expressive task force member articulated, perhaps only more directly, the strong sentiments which most participants appeared to share regarding such service. "I believe we're in very deep trouble in the community if people don't see themselves as in service to the people in the community they have chosen to live in. [We're in trouble] if they give nothing."
"How so?" the researcher asked.

"Well, then it's just money. We make money our God....'How much are you going to make this year? How much profit can I squeeze out of the public this year?' That's not what it's all about," this person, a local chamber of commerce leader, emphasized.

When the researcher asked whether and how this chamber leader had brought concerns regarding altruistic service to bear on R and E efforts, the response was, "Oh. I'm not sure really that I have. Oh dear, I feel really bad about this. You know, you get into the task force and--well, I just ignored those concerns." This local chamber leader indicated that the way in which the program had been prescribed had contributed to the concerns of the disadvantaged not being discussed openly (or empathically).

As noted at several points previously, the way in which the local program was prescribed had a significant effect on what participants did and how they defined and assessed their involvement. As a consequence of the above interview dialogue the researcher explored, in subsequent interviews, whether participants 1) would be more likely to express identification-with sentiments and perceptions regarding the disadvantaged if they were asked to discuss insights about them gained through public service roles, and 2) would agree that prescriptions to future R and E program participants to "bring knowledge gained through their service when wearing these 'other hats' would increase the extent to which concerns about the disadvantaged would be included in the R and E task force agenda."

When the researcher posed these questions, the response tended to be a resounding affirmation both that in their "other hats" they were concerned about the local disadvantaged and that prescriptions to integrate this concern with their pro-business concerns would be desirable. However, several subtle and important distinctions need to be made.
1. Respondents indicated that explicit value assertions made in task force discussions that the concerns of the unemployed be addressed would be counter-productive, at best. "The program is about helping businesses...It gets too complicated when you try to solve everything in a program like this. No, it wouldn't work" to deal with the problems of the unemployed directly. This perception was reiterated by virtually every respondent save the chamber leader quoted earlier.

2. Interestingly, while trying to introduce value assertions about the unemployed would, as DT said, "probably be a disaster", introducing knowledge gained about the unemployed and the reasons for their predicament "might be" acceptable.

3. However, such knowledge regarding as task force members could provide, gained through their experiences in other hats, would be acceptable only insofar as it was seen as being directly applicable to the task of resolving the needs and demands of local employers and managers. In other words, the concerns of local firms came first and foremost.

4. Most respondents had difficulty even seeing how their self-admitted understanding about the disadvantaged and unemployed could help to better address the concerns of businesses. The researcher suggested to one respondent that, in his role as a school board member, he probably "know(s) that the capacity of the local schools to instill 'good work ethics' is very limited, and that the work ethics of young adults is also influenced at least as much by the person's family, neighbors, adult role models and so forth." The respondent agreed without hesitation.

"Would you say that other task force members, through their involvement in other sorts of community service groups, have similar insights about kids and their work ethics?" the researcher asked.

"I'm sure, yeah they probably do."
The researcher then recalled aloud his observation that, in a recent task force meeting, task force members had discussed the "bad work ethics" of recent high school graduates and had suggested the schools "were to blame." The respondent affirmed this interpretation of the task force conversation.

The researcher then asked if the task force members, especially those who "knew, when wearing their other hats, that the reason kids have the work ethics that they do is really more complex" might have provided a more accurate and useful explanation "if they had discussed that knowledge." In other words, the researcher was suggesting that many participants had fragmented sets of knowledge, and that they tended not to integrate what they knew, in one role, about a particular concern, with how they addressed and perceived that concern when acting in another role. The researcher thus was proposing that an integration of these fragmented insights would be useful. Without hearing the researcher explain what he meant by describing the "usefulness" of such knowledge integration, the respondent grasped and endorsed the implication immediately.

Summarizing several conversations with various participants during interviews near completion of the application phase, there was consistent agreement that such integrated knowledge could help task force members more comprehensively, and therefore more effectively, diagnose the reasons underlying the concerns expressed by business interviewees or inferred from the completed survey forms. The researcher presented this thesis to the initiators at the member check meeting and they agreed unanimously that it would be "a good idea" to suggest that future program initiators and state training personnel advocate efforts by participants to "bring what they know when wearing their other hats" into the task force dialogue.

This finding has significant implications for those who consider how concerns regarding equity might be infused into community programs which otherwise are unlikely to address equity matters. It is well
understood in the social psychological literature that
how a situation is defined has a powerful influence on
the perspectives and behaviors of participants in that
social situation. As sociologist W. I. Thomas wrote in
1928, "if men define situations as real, they become
real in their consequences." As noted before, the
prescription by Morse for how to conduct the local R and
E program in Heartland County advised the display of a
"pro-business attitude," a prescription which appeared
largely to reinforce pre-existing sentiments.

When participants were asked why they did not bring
knowledge gained from the totality of their diverse
roles, most seemed genuinely puzzled as to why they had
not done so. Several suggested, as one said, that they
"just hadn't thought about it...I mean, the program was
to help business." In the aggregate, the data suggest
that the participants had not seen knowledge sets
generated through experience in other roles as related
to that which would be applicable in the R and E
situation. The researcher posits that the participants
tended to have mostly discrete sets of knowledge, that
rarely would they seek to apply more than a few of their
available sets of knowledge in a given situation, and
that the selection of which sets to apply depended
largely upon how the situation was defined.

In other words, because the R and E program was
defined as being about existing local businesses many
felt that their knowledge sets which were not
conventionally defined as business-related were largely
irrelevant. Fragmentation therefore may be said to have
existed in Heartland County not only with respect to
inter-organizational relations, but also in terms of
intra-personal role and knowledge segmentation.
Additionally, as has been noted, a person who identified
with a disadvantaged or distressed group when operating
from one role and knowledge set may utilize a
predominantly identification-of mindset when viewing the
group through another lens.

Most of the participants selected themselves or
were recruited by others, as has been seen, because of
their political, personal and organizational
characteristics. In the aggregate, observation field notes and interview data suggest that these selection criteria for program participation tended consistently to favor the involvement of persons because they were employed in and representative of top-down (i.e., hierarchically arranged) local organizations. In addition, there was no prescription to select at least some participants to represent employees, the unemployed, or the underemployed. As has been noted, the prescribed participant recruitment criteria were very compatible with the pre-existing ideas of the initiators regarding recruitment. These criteria were obvious to them.

These pre-existing notions, Morse's prescription regarding recruitment, and the definition of the program as a predominantly business-related situation together made it difficult for the participants to consider applying any but their own more obviously business and local development related knowledge sets to the R and E process. To reiterate an earlier point, the data clearly support the conclusion that, when operating from their business-related roles and knowledge sets, most participants tended to employ identification of when viewing the local disadvantaged. Thus, the three dynamics together made it difficult for participant identification with the unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged to emerge.

To increase the likelihood that equity-related local issues are addressed in R and E programs, the researcher suggests, trainers and local program initiators could recommend that task force members and volunteers "wear all their hats" when they participate. Of all of the conclusions presented to the initiators in the member check presentation, this suggestion generated the most surprise and interest. Two of the four indicated that they were "troubled" and "dismayed" by the indications regarding participant role and knowledge segmentation.

One initiator, DT, said in a telephone follow-up interview after the member check presentation that he would "really look at that. Over the next year, I want
to watch myself as I sit in these different boards and
groups, and see how I act and think. This really—you
know, this really disturbs me. I'd like to think I'm a
whole person, but now you've got me thinking. And
wondering."

The indications available from the data suggest
that the majority of future R and E program participants
probably would react favorably to the recommendation
that they "wear all their hats". However, this
prescription, the researcher believes, needs to be
coupled with the articulated rationale that such role
and knowledge integration will help them better address
their foremost concern—business related matters. It is
predicted that this prescription will increase the
degree of knowledge integration, and therefore the
likelihood that identification—with regard to the
unemployed will be introduced in local program agendas.
Yet, even the prescription and the articulated
rationale, the researcher anticipates, would suffice to
increase significantly the likelihood that
identification with the unemployed will occur in the
private arenas of participant interactions. A third
element, it is suggested, is needed: brief description
of an example that demonstrates implicitly how
specifically identification—with knowledge may
facilitate greatly the resolution of important local
business concerns.

Such an example needs to make connections between
the concerns of local businesses and those of the local
unemployed. The example needs to demonstrate, in other
words, the positive connection between alleviating the
systemic problems faced by the unemployed and resolving
local firms' concerns, and the negative connection
between not identifying with the unemployed and thereby
overlooking valuable information with which to provide
more comprehensive solutions to local business needs.
Many pages earlier, the researcher suggested that the
story of Logan County's R and E program was one of
making connections. The kinds of "connections" being
considered here are epistemological.

Having considered many R and E task force dynamics,
the business visitation processes which occurred during the application phase now are addressed. At least one member of 17 of the 27 pairs of volunteers that visited the local businesses were interviewed by the researcher. The researcher acted as a non-participant observer during the two pre-training practice visitations conducted by Morse as a demonstration for the local program initiators. In addition, as a participant observer the researcher accompanied a local volunteer on three other business visitations. Two of the business representatives who had been visited also were interviewed. Several generalizations regarding the business visitation process are supported by the data that was gathered.

1. The business visitations usually began with an exchange of informal pleasantries. Often, the business representatives offered the volunteer visitors coffee. Both in the interviews in which the researcher participated as well as those which volunteers described to him, the volunteers mentioned how they were located in social space during the informal exchange with the business representatives.

In one instance, for example, a volunteer asked the business interviewee a series of "Do you know this person?" questions. When the interviewee indicated familiarity with a particular person named by the volunteer, the volunteer then expressed favorable comment regarding that person. The volunteer appeared to be trying to establish a more intimate footing on which to proceed with the interview.

In another visitation, a volunteer casually mentioned three or four recreational activities that he particularly enjoyed until settling upon one particular sport in which he and the business interviewee shared a common interest. Once again, the tacit aim appeared to be to establish some form of informal common bond.

The consistency with which such pleasantries occurred during the initial stages of the business visitation suggest that they were felt--more by the volunteers than by the business interviewees--to be
important in setting the tone for the interaction. The implicit importance of establishing such common bonds, in turn, suggests that the creation of informal, personal ties with the business representatives constituted a significant, though tacit, goal of most R and E volunteers in Logan County.

2. The next stage of the visitation, which also was observed consistently to occur, involved a process by which the volunteer initiated a transition from a dialogue about pleasantries to one of more formal interview interaction. The great majority of the volunteers displayed or mentioned moderate discomfort regarding their role as poser of the questionnaire-prescribed inquiries.

Most volunteers virtually apologized for asking pre-established questions, and in many cases articulated rationales for the transition to the more formal interview dialogue in such phrases as, "I'm supposed to ask you these questions," "It says here that they'd like to know what you think about..." and "They're hoping you can tell them what you think about..."

3. Either just before or very early into the actual questionnaire dialogue, most volunteers conveyed several program-related messages to the business interviews. These messages consisted of a) explaining that the volunteer was asked to meet with the business representative; b) indicating that the information shared by the interviewee would be held "confidential"; and c) conveying that no promises could be made regarding whether any problems identified by the business representative would necessarily be solved, but that the local R and E program participants would certainly "see what we could do to help."

The purposes in articulating these messages appeared to be a) to establish the volunteer's legitimacy as an authorized R and E program participant, entitling the volunteer to become privy to the information revealed by the business representative; b) to indicate that the volunteer saw himself or herself as having and appreciating his or her commitment to the
ethic of confidentiality; and c) to encourage the business representative to have realistic expectations concerning the inherently limited extent to which local program participants could generate positive outcomes on the firm's behalf.

The business representatives tended to respond silently to the delivery of these messages. In no case did the representative indicate he or she saw the messages as unreasonable. Instead, it appears, many of the representatives seem to have adopted a wait-and-see attitude regarding the value and outcomes of the business visitations through at least the first half of the visitation interactions. Only in the latter stages of the visitation, as will be seen, did most representatives indicate overt interest and enthusiasm regarding the process and potential benefits of the visitation.

4. The more formal interview dialogue then began. As had been prescribed by Morse at the training, and reiterated by the task force members in their pre-visitaton prescriptions to volunteers, prior to each visitation the volunteer pair decided which member would serve as question poser and which as response recorder. During the posing and response to survey questions, the inquirer was to play the dominant inquiring role, yet in almost every interview the recorder also interjected questions from time to time.

Where the inquirer's questions tended to be delivered in a formal and fairly self-conscious tone, and tended to employ the wording prescribed on the questionnaire form, the recorder's questions usually were more informal in tone and aimed at clarifying the business representative's response to the survey question. More generally, the inquirer and the recorder tended to hear different aspects of the messages articulated during the interview by the business representative. In both cases, the respective roles which the two volunteers were supposed to play interfered, in some ways, with their capacity to hear comprehensively the range of concerns mentioned by the representative.
The role of posing prescribed formal questions tended to make the inquirer feel self-conscious. Most of the volunteers had had no experience in conducting formal interviews prior to their R and E program participation. Many appeared to experience this as a stilted role. To the extent that a volunteer felt self-conscious a corresponding amount of personal attention was diverted thereby from listening to the content and tone of the representative's responses.

The responsibility of the recorder to interpret the meaning of the representative's responses similarly diverted the recorder's attention from listening comprehensively to the representative. The recorders understood that they were supposed to convert the representative's narrative into categorical responses to mostly closed-ended questions. In other words, the requirement that representative responses be made to conform to the questionnaire format meant that many recorders experienced moderate anxiety when presented with information which they did not know how to place readily into the form spaces allocated for responses. In the experience of the researcher as a participant observer and of other volunteers, it often happened that the recorder would "tune out" the representatives' comments while he or she sought to classify and record comments previously made. To some extent, the fundamental purpose of identifying threats to the continued existence or local presence of a representative's firm might have been impaired by the volunteers' efforts to adhere to the prescribed roles with which they were not fully comfortable.

In all five of the business visitations attended by the researcher, several representative comments which could be interpreted as indicative of a need for program assistance or information were not followed up by the volunteer visitors. Instead, the volunteers continued with the prescribed interview agenda, by posing and recording the next survey question. It thus appeared that the successful conduct of the prescribed agenda itself demanded considerable concentration and energy.
In the fifth of these visitations, the researcher altered the natural course of events by asking such a follow-up question. While the business representative appeared non-verbally to very much appreciate this level of consideration of his firm's situation, the volunteer with which the researcher was paired seemed non-verbally to indicate resentment. The moderate resentment appeared to be in response to his partner's disruption of the prescribed interview flow and/or to his partner's introducing a knowledge differential. A knowledge differential concerns the extent to which one volunteer is seen as demonstrably more or less knowledgeable about the firm than the other volunteer.

Many respondents indicated they had participated in visitations in which one member of the visitation pair knew a great deal about the firm or its representative while the other knew little or nothing, prior to the visitation. None of the respondents indicated that this "knowledge differential" had been problematic, i.e. had generated any significant emotional tension between the volunteers. The researcher speculates that one important outcome, therefore, of the initial visitation phase of pleasantries may be to explain that the knowledge differential extant in that visitation is the result of differential experience, not of differential intelligence or ability.

In other words, if one volunteer knows the business representative more familiarly or understands more about that particular firm's line of work, it is because the volunteer is a friend of that representative or the representative's firm, for example, had been a client of the volunteer's organization. During the pre-interview pleasantries, such information is conveyed. The researcher reasons that the pleasantries therefore not only serve to identify the ways in which the visitation participants share common social space but also to explain such knowledge differentials as reasonable and, thus, not embarrassing.

By having interjected a follow-up question—in order to assess the effect of such inquiry—the researcher appeared to have violated an implicit norm
regarding differential knowledge. He had not provided any information prior to the formal interview dialogue to explain his level of knowledge regarding the visited firm's line of work. His partner, who was playing the visitation role of inquirer, appeared to feel embarrassed as well as resentful. The researcher wanted to alleviate this perceived embarrassment by explaining how he had come to know enough to ask the substantive follow-up question, but found no easy way to interject this explanation into the interview dialogue. This, again, affirms the importance of utilizing the pre-interview pleasantries to convey sufficient information that the possibility of such embarrassment during the interview is minimized.

5. During the pre-interview exchange of pleasantries and roughly halfway into the formal interview dialogue the volunteers tended consistently to indicate enthusiastic interest in the representative's firm and its line of work. Particularly during the middle of the interview the volunteers, usually the inquirer, began to express implicit admiration for what the representative's firm was doing. The volunteers also often then began to articulate explicit appreciation for "the fact," as one inquirer said, "that your firm is creating jobs for us here in Cobbletown." By this phase in the visitation, it seemed, the volunteers were sufficiently certain that they could satisfy the interview process prescriptions that they felt they could afford to be more informal and relaxed.

The business representatives normally responded warmly and in a tone of voice that became more modulated, implying they appreciated this affective recognition. One business representative who had been visited seems to have expressed a common reaction to this recognition when he said, "I've been here, my company, in this town for [many] years, and this is the first time someone's ever come to me and said they appreciate what we've been doing here."

"What did that make you feel?"

"Well, [it] makes you feel pretty good, don't you
Virtually all of the volunteers indicated they were highly conscious of the impact of their expressions of appreciation and admiration. The pro-business attitude which the volunteers were prescribed as needing to convey in the visitations was one which the volunteers expressed considerable pleasure in demonstrating.

"From what I've seen and heard from the other interviewers so far," one volunteer said, "most of the business people that we talked to were very interested in hearing what we had to say. And more particularly, it satisfied them by knowing that somebody out there was at least thinking about their business, that they had taken the time to go there, visit their business, talk to them and have their input. 'What are your problems?' And they had a tendency to just spill everything out--because they've never had an opportunity to do that before. Never, around here.

"I mean nobody had shown them that kind of interest...And I think, I think they like that--that somebody out there is thinking about them."

Many volunteers said they saw the expression of a "pro-business attitude" as important as accomplishing the identification of the targeted firm's needs and problems. The conclusion which most respondents articulate is that the expression of this attitude is valuable both for its own sake as well as because it leads business representatives to discuss their concerns more openly and comprehensively.

6. Even those respondents who said they had expected the business representatives to be open and frank said they were "astonished," "amazed" or "really surprised" by the considerable degree to which the business interviewees more than fulfilled this expectation. Several respondents indicated that they had experienced such a rapport and sense of trust with the business interviewees that the latter revealed information that, as one said, "could be really damaging [to the interviewee's firm] if it ever became publicly
known."

7. In instances where such sensitive information was disclosed during the visitation, the volunteers typically withheld it even from the local task force members and, in every case, made no written record of the information on the survey forms. Such information was withheld, in certain cases, even where it indicated that a given firm might leave or close its doors. This discretion provides perhaps the strongest evidence of the considerable extent to which the program participants really did want the business representatives they interviewed and their firms to succeed.

8. Every volunteer interviewed said that in at least one of his or her two assigned interviews much new knowledge was gained regarding what the visited firms produced. "One guy I interviewed," said one volunteer, "had these real neat organs like those you see in a circus. Pipe organs that play like 'Nadia's theme.'

"And I was up there [visiting his firm for] like an hour--and it's just amazing. Something like this, I knew even knew this existed in our community."

9. On average, the representatives of smaller firms expressed more appreciation and enthusiasm for the R and E visitations than those of the larger firms. "The two industries that we visited," one volunteer said, "one was a partnership, a small firm. They were really interested. They had a lot of enthusiasm and questions. And the interview took two hours.

"The other was a larger industry, where their home office was in [another state]. [The interview] took a half hour, and every answer was pat. They had it written down [beforehand]. And they weren't quite as concerned, because they had the resources at their touch, whereas the smaller firm was really pleased that someone was interested in them, and could possibly provide training to their employees...You could tell the difference between the two."
10. A few volunteers also distinguished, without prompting, between those local firms that were locally owned and those non-locally owned. The representatives of non-locally owned firms tended to be plant managers who lived within the county. Participants speculated, after they had conducted their interviews, that these plant managers would "probably want their company to keep its plant operating in our community," as one respondent said.

"So, the R and E visit may help give him some ammo to use with his corporate [headquarter] people to try to convince them not to shut their local plant," the respondent continued. But, this and other respondents emphasized, the capacity of the local R and E program to discourage non-locally owned plants from leaving the area was severely limited because

a) Most non-locally owned plants were subsidiaries of large firms which, because of their size, tended to be able to provide for themselves the services which the local R and E program sought to offer. These firms therefore were correspondingly less interested in and affected by the efforts of local R and E participants.

b) Decisions about plant closure and relocation tend to be made by corporate directors and managers, not by plant personnel. While many participants saw increasing the extent to which local plant managers felt appreciated as advantageous, none felt this would in itself prove sufficient to ensure that the local plant was retained or expanded.

However, encouraging the managers of local firms, whether locally or non-locally owned, was regarded as always valuable. In the case of larger, non-locally owned firms, some respondents speculated that R and E efforts "to make the local manager feel welcomed," as one respondent said, "could make the difference in keeping that firm here--where the firm's corporate people aren't sure whether or not to keep it here."
11) In addition to distinctions between large and small, and locally and non-locally owned firms, an important differentiation can be made between "indigenous" and "outsider" local business managers. One hypothesis which emerged late in the application phase was that if the R and E visitations made firm representatives feel more appreciated and welcomed, then this might be even more so for business representatives who were not indigenous to the local community. Several respondents thought this hypothesis "might be" true. One respondent, however, felt it was "definitely" accurate. Further research regarding the differential impacts of R and E visitations with indigenous versus "outsider" business representatives is warranted.

12) Having a mix of volunteers was regarded widely as important in facilitating the success of the visitations. That is, it was believed fortunate that the Heartland County program's visitations were conducted by volunteers drawn from a variety of organizational affiliations--i.e., from business, education, government and politics.

Respondents reasoned that this admixture was valuable in that a) it permitted volunteers representative of a particular line of business to be paired with business interviewees who operated firms in other industrial fields, so that no business interviewee would be visited by a business competitor; b) educators and politicians who volunteered, it was said, could be paired to conduct business visitations with the more practical volunteers drawn from the business sector; c) sometimes an educator or politician could tell a business interviewee during the visitation about an educational or governmental program suited to the firm's needs; and d) "you always want to have at least one of your volunteers [in the visitation pair] to be from business," one respondent said, "because the [interviewee] is going to trust another businessman before he'll trust an educator or a politician."

13) Articulations of appreciation for the firm's contribution's to the community's well-being reflect the volunteers' considerable readiness to identify with the
firm representative. The consistently positive response of the business representatives to these articulations suggests not only that they appreciated being identified with, but also perhaps that they may, as a rule, be unused to being identified with. The latter is a significant, though highly speculative finding, which may or may not be generalizable to American business leaders generally.

The researcher posits that an important outcome of local R and E programming may be the creation of a kind of gemeinschaft, or close-knit community, in which the detached and anonymous, market-driven bonds of an impersonal society are supplanted by the more intimate, personal bonds of a community. In the impersonal society, or gesellschaft, as Toennies termed it, one makes identifications of other actors and stakeholders, including even those who control access to the resources upon which one's survival in fact depends. In the gemeinschaft one makes identifications with those upon whom one depends.

In the gesellschaft resource dependencies are experienced as being linear such that Actor A depends on Actor B, who depends on Actor C, who in turn depends on...and so forth. While these actors may articulate an abstract notion that, ultimately, they and the other actors are interdependent, the actors in a gemeinschaft are more viscerally aware of their shared interdependence. In the latter, interdependence is experienced as being with respect to significant others and, therefore, as palpably real. The interdependence that appears to be more abstractly and dimly perceived in the gesellschaft is experienced with respect to generalized others.

By bringing task force representatives from the four sectors together for a fairly sustained period of time, and by bringing together such representatives and local business leaders, one increases significantly the likelihood that the community will benefit from the maintenance of operation of informal, inter-sectoral networks. Some communities, it is speculated, may not require the initiation of programs like R and E in order
to experience such networking. But, in all of the communities studied in this research, fragmentation and the lack of such community linkages was a recurring and significant theme.

Through such networks, these representatives may become significant others for one another. As will be discussed later, with respect to local program outcomes both in Heartland County and elsewhere, the R and E programs studied tended to result in efforts by which local businesses that furnished a particular good or service could be matched with other local firms that hitherto had purchased such goods or services from companies outside the local area. It is hypothesized that such efforts result from an affectively motivated desire to establish new and firmer intra-local interdependencies, as much as they may have resulted from the pragmatically motivated desire to increase the demand for locally produced goods and services.

All the available evidence indicates that both program processes as well as post-program activities increase the extent to which a hitherto fragmented community becomes a gemeinschaft. The one major caveat to be made with respect to this significant finding, as indicated previously, is that some persons and groups, particularly the economically disadvantaged, tend to be excluded from direct participation in the emerging gemeinschaft. Nonetheless, those social critics who are dismayed by a loss of a sense of community in American life may note the R and E program concept's potential benefits with considerable interest.

Equally, there are those who discern a common thread underlying Wall Street scandals, the often perceived insensitivity of businesses to local community needs, and the increasingly common experience that American communities have of being abandoned by businesses that close their doors or leave the locality having provided little or no advance warning. The common thread is that businesses, as one respondent in this study said, "don't seem to be bound by any code of ethics or honor. They just seem to do what they please—while we're left here to pick up the pieces after they
The R and E program helps to make this perceived corporate irresponsibility understandable as well as it suggests a way in which to at least somewhat alleviate it. Rather than decry the irresponsibility of firms which leave the community or close their doors, without apparent regard for the impact on that community, one might consider the extent to which the community's apparent indifference towards that firm's leaders has facilitated the apparent indifference of those executives and owners. The data suggest, it cannot be overemphasized, how hungry many local business owners and managers appeared to be for recognition and appreciation. But, the recognition for which they expressed or intimated occasionally profound gratitude was for their being regarded by others not as effective business leaders so much as important contributors to the community's well-being.

To a moderate degree, observable in Heartland County was a vicious cycle that appeared to predate the R and E program there. Business leaders were regarded as somewhat selfish or "only out for themselves." (One suspects that this opinion may have been held more strongly by those excluded from R and E participation than by those sectoral representatives who participated in the program.) This undercurrent of negative regard appears to have discouraged some business leaders from taking active service roles in the community, to the extent that they did not feel welcomed or appreciated. Such non-participation in community service efforts would only reinforce the belief of those who saw business leaders as uncaring.

One program participant, who served as both visitation volunteer and task force member, suggested the proposition that a positive R and E visitation could do much to encourage local business leaders to participate more actively in local community service endeavors. "I would hope that the results [of the R and E program] would be more participation, input provided by these people [the business representatives visited]."
"The first contact has been made and they know that we're out here. I would like to see more input from them, more involvement from them. The main thrust of all this has been to keep those people here. And I think getting them involved and getting them to understand that somebody out there cares about them is going—again, that's going to improve the entire relationship. That's going to make them feel wanted...

"Most of these people we've talked to," he continued, "I've never--you know, I've been on the chamber of commerce, I've gone on youth center boards, and on the PIC [Private Industry Council]. On all kinds of things—and I don't see these people. By more involvement [I mean that] maybe we can get them—nobody's ever asked them to serve on these. Their ideas are important. Just as important as mine. It's just that I'm more visible, and I'm used to doing that kind of thing.

"The county, I guess like any other place, has a certain number of people, has the same core people that serve on a lot of different things. Once they find out you're going to serve on this committee, then it snowballs into this and this and this [other commitments]. Well, it leaves all these other people out. If we can get those people involved in this type of thing, they've got important things to say too....

"That retention and expansion, I guess there's a lot more meaning there than what we've been assigning to it. When I first thought of that it was 'keep the industry we've got and help the ones that are going to stay here, let's expand them.' But [now] I go on to say that we need to get them more involved. Again, that's the way to do it." He then mentioned a number of local firms whose leaders had been involved in local service activities. "But," he added, "we've left out a lot of those older firms. We should make them feel more wanted, tell them that we value their opinion."

14. In an unrelated vein, another finding was that the employment by the R and E program of volunteers, as opposed to paid development professionals, to make the
business visitations may greatly increase the extent to which diverse knowledge sets are brought to bear on the processes of soliciting and interpreting comments regarding local business concerns. To establish the abovementioned informal or "intimate" common bond with business interviewees, the volunteers typically discussed their personal hobbies, recreational interests, friends they had in common with the interviewee and the like, in addition to indicating the formal organizational roles in which they were employed.

In the process of providing such information to the interviewees, the volunteers were articulating a variety of the roles which they filled in the community, many of which were not directly related to business or local development. At least at the outset then, the volunteers presented themselves as relatively whole persons, whereas paid development professionals would be more likely to seek legitimacy in the interviewee's eyes by discussing primarily only their role as a development professional.

These volunteers were seeking, in other words, to define a basis on which they could share an identification-with interaction with the interviewee. As the visitation progressed, however, the volunteers were confronted by the aforementioned awkwardness of needing to adhere to the prescribed and more strictly business development-related roles of visitation inquirer and recorder. However, once the prescribed portion of the visitation (i.e., the formal interview) was completed, both the volunteers and the business representatives quickly returned to the informal dialogue. In much of this end-of-interview dialogue the actors responded to facets of one another that were quite apart from their R and E visitation-related roles.

15. After the visitation was completed, there was considerable variance in the extent to which the recorder and inquirer debriefed one another regarding either the affective or substantive content of the interviewee's comments. In some cases, there was considerable dialogue between the volunteers regarding the kinds and severity of problems suggested or directly
stated by the interviewees, and regarding the extent to which positive affect was generated by the visitation. In other cases, such dialogue did not occur at all.

The extent to which such debriefing occurred is important in at least two regards: a) It influenced the degree to which the two volunteers developed a new or stronger bond with each other, based on having both experienced as well as discussed a shared event; and b) it decidedly influenced whether and to what degree the written survey document regarding that visitation provided an accurate and comprehensive portrayal of the visited firm representative's concerns and needs.

Observation and respondent comments provided strong evidence that the absence or insufficiency of such debriefing significantly limited both the quantity and the quality of the visitation information recorded on the survey form. In most cases where debriefing occurred, the dialogue led the volunteers to identify concerns which the business representative had expressed but had not emphasized, or which the representative had not expressed but could be inferred indirectly from what the representative did say.

Interestingly, sometimes such debriefing was not intended to improve the extent to which the survey form recorded accurately and comprehensively concerns raised in and by the visitation. Thus, the prescription that volunteers should always, where possible, debrief after a visitation is needed, but should be accompanied by an exhortation that such debriefing be made in order to improve the recording process.

16. Through observation of debriefing discussions it became clear that the volunteers typically heard rather different sets of concerns as being mentioned in the interview. Where, perhaps due to wide knowledge differentials, the two volunteers had very divergent interpretations of the nature and severity of the firm's concerns, the version recorded tended to be that of the volunteer who believed that there were fewer or less severe concerns. Given that one of the more fundamental, ostensible purposes of the R and E program
was to identify and prevent firm closings or departures, one might expect the volunteers to be inclined to record the less conservative version.

However, it appeared that where the volunteers' versions were widely divergent, the recording of the more dire version might embarrass the volunteer who adhered to the more conservative interpretation. There is no record of an instance in which anything approaching an overt debate developed during the volunteer debriefing.

17. A variety of indications, however, suggest that many volunteers spoke informally with task force members or the local coordinator, regarding their post-interview impressions. There is, in fact, a solid basis on which to conclude that such dialogue served as an important means by which to convey volunteer interpretations of business concerns. It therefore may be assumed that volunteers with more "dire" versions that went unrecorded in the completed survey forms had recourse to this means of conveying their perceptions of the firm's concerns.

However, it appears that information about the visitations transmitted outside of the survey record sometimes were not conveyed by the coordinator or task force member either to the task force as a whole or to a local organization whose responsibility it was to address the given kind of business concern. In other words, the written recording of volunteer perceived business concerns was considerably more likely than informal communication to result in the appropriate referral of that concern.

18. Just as there were gaps between what the volunteers heard as constituting a business interviewee's concerns and what the volunteer pair indicated on the survey form, so were there between what the volunteers believed they had recorded and what those reading the completed survey regarded as recorded. Several task force members and the local coordinator said that they were "confused" by the wording or "distressed" by the illegibility of several completed
Some care should be taken in future R and E volunteer training sessions to emphasize the usefulness of making legible and understandable, let alone comprehensive and accurate, survey recordings.

19. There is evidence to suggest that some volunteers may have used the recording of visitation interviews as a vehicle for getting their personal concerns placed on the R and E task force agenda. Given access to photocopies of all of the completed survey documents, the researcher noted that two surveys, completed in the same handwriting, indicated that the visited firms both wanted to see "more coordinated planning" done with respect to local development. The identity of that volunteer recorded was determined, and this person then was interviewed.

During this interaction the volunteer said that he felt that an absence of coordination in local development planning was a major problem in Heartland County. No conclusive proof was generated that the volunteer had added this concern in the survey record of concerns otherwise expressed by the business representative. The volunteer could have been recording accurately concerns which he had asked the business interviewees whether they shared, in which case the recording is accurate yet nonetheless altered by the volunteer's values. Yet, this suggests that recorders can add their own issues to the program agenda simply by listing them on the survey document.

When this tentative finding was presented for consideration by the program initiators in the member check presentation, they each expressed considerable dismay. This suggested that a norm of honesty in recording and representing the businesses' concerns was very important to these and other local participants.

It is recommended that providing the volunteers with a forum explicitly intended to elicit and legitimate their own perceptions regarding local
business and development-related concerns might minimize the temptation to consciously or unconsciously alter the survey documents.

There is a direct parallel between the temptations faced by the R and E visitation volunteer and those confronted by the social researcher. Through the experience of conducting this research, the researcher realized the extent to which social research, whether qualitative or quantitative, allows the solicitation of statements from respondents that are intended not only to test but also, and perhaps insidiously, to advance hypotheses which the researcher hopes to be true or not true. The best defense against the exploitation of qualitative research as a vehicle for legitimating the researcher's values appears to require that the researcher: a) recognize that a respondent's willingness to disagree with a given hypothesis is an indication of the extent to which a healthy rapport and honesty between the respondent and the researcher has developed; and; b) seek to frame and pose a wide range of questions, including those that answers to which have the potential to invalidate the hypotheses one hopes shall be confirmed.

It is recommended that, when audits of qualitative studies are conducted by disinterested evaluators, the auditors review sampled interview transcripts to discern the extent to which the researcher appears to have responded positively to the invalidation of tentative hypotheses, and to have sought energetically to test a variety of hypotheses before settling upon one as the most explanatory.
2. Observed Information Flows

Figure 2, on the following page, summarizes the influences of volunteer biases, emergent norms and other factors as described previously upon the actual, as opposed to prescribed, flow of program information. The reader may compare Figure 1 (page 160) with Figure 2, in order to identify some of the various ways in which the actual flow of information diverged from that prescribed by Morse and the local program's initiators. A number of conclusions become readily apparent regarding the application of the R and E program concept when one compares the observed with the prescribed information flows.

1. The prescription does not acknowledge the extent to which the information about firm concerns articulated by business interviewees is filtered, distorted and reduced by a variety of factors including: the speaking skills of the interviewee; the extent to which the interviewee is willing to entrust the volunteers with accurate, especially sensitive, information; the listening skills of the volunteers; the capacity of the volunteers to become sufficiently comfortable in their prescribed visitation roles that they can be fully attentive to the interviewee; and the knowledge and experience that the volunteers may draw upon in interpreting the interviewee's articulations as indirectly indicative of an important business problem or concern.

2. What one volunteer of the visitation pair hears as a business concern only somewhat overlaps with what the other volunteer hears as a concern. If the two volunteers do not debrief one another after the visitation interview, it is unlikely that the two will have a convergent understanding of the business representative's concerns.

3. The quantity and quality of the visitation information that is recorded on the survey form will invariably be at least somewhat less than that which the business representative feels he or she has conveyed and is of direct program relevance.
FIGURE 2

FLOW OF INFORMATION OBSERVED

[FULL DIAGRAM OF INFORMATION FLOW]

- CONFIDENTIALLY
- VOLUNTEERS TELL COORDINATOR
- SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL R & E PROGRAM COORDINATOR

- RECORDING SKILLS
- PERSONAL AGENDA
- VALUES & IDEAS
- INPUT FROM VOLUNTEER
- CHOICE OF WHAT TO RECORD
- WHETHER VOLUNTEERS DECIDE CERTAIN ITEMS SHOULD NOT BE RECORDED

- SPEAKING SKILLS
- LISTENING SKILLS
- ATTENTIVENESS
- VALUES & IDEAS
- INPUT FROM VOLUNTEER
- HOW MUCH VOLUNTEERS TRUST EACH OTHER
- HOW MUCH VOLUNTEERS TRUST GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
- Whether VOLUNTEERS ENCOURAGES REP. TO FEEL COMFORTABLE SPEAKING FREELY

- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS EACH SURVEY TO IDENTIFY ANY FIRMS PROBLEMS
- STATE COORDINATOR REVIEWS EACH SURVEY TO IDENTIFY ANY FIRMS PROBLEMS
- STATE R & E PROGRAM STAFF AGGREGATE THE SURVEY DATA
- STATE PROGRAM COORDINATOR DRAFTS FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS REPORT AND IDENTIFIES CONTENT OF FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
- LOCAL COORDINATOR REVIEWS SHORT TERM LOCAL OUTCOMES WITH STATE TRAINING COORDINATOR
- SHORT TERM LOCAL PROGRAM OUTCOMES
- FINAL REPORT

- WHAT VOLUNTEERS TELL COORDINATOR
- LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL R & E PROGRAM COORDINATOR

- WHAT COORDINATOR TELLS WHAT VOLUNTEER
- WHAT VOLUNTEERS TELL COORDINATOR
- WHAT COORDINATOR TELLS WHAT FIRM REP.
- WHAT VOLUNTEER TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

- WHAT COORDINATOR TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- WHAT COORDINATOR TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
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- WHAT VOLUNTEER TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
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- WHAT COORDINATOR TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
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- LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- WHAT COORDINATOR TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

- WHAT LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE TELLS LOCAL TASK FORCE
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM

- WHAT VOLUNTEER TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- WHAT VOLUNTEER TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE
- WHAT VOLUNTEER TELLS LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

- WHAT LOCAL PROGRAM ASSISTANCE TELLS LOCAL TASK FORCE
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
- LOCAL TASK FORCE REVIEWS SURVEY FORM
4. Fortunately, many business interviewees may interact with the local program coordinator or another task force member, thereby increasing the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the information on which the task force makes its decisions and recommendations. This interaction may be initiated by the business representative or, as when the task force member senses that the completed survey form may be incomplete or misleading, by the latter.

5. To the extent that the representative and coordinator or task force members lack pre-program familiarity with one another, the likelihood that the business representative will initiate contact with them depends largely on the degree to which the representative trusts the aims of the program and the persons he or she knows to be involved as central participants.

6. The information that the R and E consultant may draw upon in determining what problems needed to be addressed in which ways is taken almost exclusively from the completed survey forms. Thus, the consultants need to be informed of the inherent limitations of the accuracy and comprehensiveness of this information.

7. In local R and E programs where program leadership is relatively concentrated, as opposed to diffuse, it has been considered, the responsibility for interpreting the completed survey forms will likely be largely in the hands of the coordinator. From a review of Figure 2 it becomes clear the coordinator, even in a program with relatively diffuse leadership such as that of Heartland County, plays a crucial role as the conduit through which the bulk of information regarding business concerns must pass.

8. Because the Heartland County task force adopted the unusual strategy of reviewing each of the completed survey forms themselves, the task force did not rely exclusively upon the local coordination's discretion in determining what survey-indicated problems merited its review. In programs that do not adopt this strategy,
the values and skills of the coordinator in determining what constitutes a relevant business problem or concern are correspondingly more important in shaping the quality of program outcomes.

9. In Heartland County, the influence of the task force was perhaps uniquely direct in determining what were seen as business concerns, how they should be addressed, and to which agencies the responsibility for addressing them would be assigned.

10. As in the other R and E programs in Ohio that have utilized R and E consultants, both the task force and coordinator of Heartland County's program were aided in problem identification by the program's consultant. The consultant reviewed each completed survey form, and had contact with the local coordinator to discuss specific and systemic problems which they perceived as possibly indicated by the surveys.

11. The main source of information, however, from which the state training coordinator drew in drafting post-program recommendations in the final report, as will be discussed later, was the data compiled from the written survey documents. Both the state training coordinator and the consultant had only limited opportunities in which to gain knowledge of the outcomes of short-term efforts to resolve business concerns.

12. Once the state training coordinator has drafted the final report it is submitted for consideration by the local task force. As will be discussed, Heartland County's task force probably already had more comprehensive familiarity with the concerns of local firms than would those task forces that had not reviewed each completed survey form. It is likely that Heartland County's task force members were in a better position than most task forces, therefore, to ascertain the extent to which the recommendations that state training coordinator determined as warranted were in fact appropriate.

In other words, Heartland County's task force members probably had access to an unusual quantity and
quality of information with which to review and amend the state training coordinator's recommendations. It is hypothesized that local programs that do not employ task force review of the completed survey forms would require a high degree of rapport and trust between the local coordinator and task force members if they are to achieve a comparable capacity to assess the state training coordinator's recommendations knowledgeably.

Discussion of such post-application processes as program self-evaluation, final report preparation, and recommendation formulation will be presented in the next two narrative sections, concerning termination and appraisal.
G. Termination and Appraisal

Termination implies the end of a program or social decision process. "Termination" often "cancels a prescribed solution if the solution is ineffective. It occurs after good faith attempts have been made to apply the solution and after sufficient time has passed to allow an adequate judgement to be made" (Cunningham, 1979, p. 4). As will be shown, the Heartland County R and E program was and was not terminated. The local participants concluded the visitation process with the targeted local industrial firms. They reviewed the aggregate statistical results of the visitations. However, in assessing the worth of the R and E program, they determined that the program process should be continued. The Heartland R and E task force, in fact, did recommend in its final report the performance of annual business visitations.

The appraisal process, as Cunningham (1979) notes, "requires the aggregation of information regarding the solution whether terminated or continued. Such data then are available to the body politic for inspection. When the solution is continued, judgement are then made about policy or procedural modifications required to make the solution even more effective" (p. 4). Because the process of ending the local industrial firm visitation process took place during the period in which the participants appraised the program and deemed it worth renewing with non-industrial firms, these two decision phases will be discussed together.

There is an important reason for addressing both the termination and appraisal phases in one narrative portion, beside the simple fact that these decision functions were enacted simultaneously in Heartland's program. With respect to termination, the participants assessed the extent to which their initial and emergent perspectives were realized. Regarding appraisal, the participants determined which parties were to be held accountable for acceptable and unacceptable decisions. However, insofar as the local R and E program prescription was for participants to improve the quality
of business and local development related decisions through business visitation data gathering and interpretation, these two decision functions merged.

In other words, the implicit central prescription for local R and E programs in Ohio is that participants develop and improve their appraisal capabilities. In many decision processes, the appraisal function is highly politicized and fraught with interpersonal and interorganizational tensions. Exceptionally little of this tension was witnessed during the study of Heartland's R and E program. One of the most significant findings to emerge from this study is that the decision process was designed, consciously or not, so that the tensions which typically attend appraisal would be resolved in an amicable, almost intimate manner.

The state training coordinator did not once articulate, during the course of several hours of interviewing, the resolution of interorganizational tensions as a central programmatic aim. Yet, he often spoke of the importance of tension reducing strategies as important means by which to facilitate the basic programmatic purposes. As will be seen, however, local program participants consistently expressed considerable gratification with the way in which peaceful, constructive interorganizational decision processes developed over the course of the program. This positive outcome had been neither initially prescribed nor expected by the participants. Yet, many expressed such pleasure with the improved decision making process by local leaders that they came to view this improvement as an important end in itself. However, a more explicit prescription initially that program participants try to reduce interorganizational tensions would have been perceived, as one Heartland participant said, as "too touchy-feely."

The community education movement of the 1960's and 1970's endeavored explicitly to strengthen the affective bonds between community members and among local leaders. The R and E program concept certainly is capable of achieving this end, but without making it such an overt
purpose. The passing of the community education movement may be attributed in large part to the way in which many probably felt threatened by the overt affective challenge to be "open" and "vulnerable," two buzzwords of that movement. One strength of the R and E program prescription may be that the local program process is one in which an ostensibly pragmatic, unemotional yet non-judgmental private arena is created. In such an arena, as participants in R and E programs in Heartland and elsewhere have noted, many feel safe enough not only to listen openly to the complaints of others, but also even to encourage and solicit such complaints.

These findings have potentially important implications concerning the design of appraisal processes and of organizations and organizational units that are intended to assess the performance of other persons and groups. Such implications shall be considered in Chapter V. Data which substantiate the findings are presented below.

"My biggest disappointment is definitely all the things—there was just a handful of things that I could take care of right away. I—it is within my power," said Cobbletown's city manager near the end of the application phase, "to set the street department or the water department or whatever department [on a problem identified through the R and E visitations] and say 'take care of this, do it right now.' So we could prove to this community that this [R and E] program will work, that it's a good investment." He then elaborated that he felt the program indeed had been effective in identifying and resolving specific firms' problems, and that he felt "disappointment" only because more problems had not been identified for the city government to address. Some might regard the desire for more complaints to be unearthed as a distinctly counter-intuitive finding.

Said Heartland's county agent, "Yeah, it [R and E] has helped. Even if it did not go any further than where it is right now. I think it has definitely helped. It has addressed several problems in the
community that those individuals [responsible for the problems] probably were not aware of...I think it's good. Like I say, I'm working with individuals that I would never have had an opportunity to get together with and they also are working with different individuals."

"Even after the [task force] meeting's over," one Heartland task force member said, "they're standing around talking. They're still talking about it. Sometimes there's been guys standing out here in the parking lot about an hour after the meeting's over. They're still," he laughed, "hashing that over. That's at least something. At least they're communicating."

Concerning the quality of the Heartland task force interaction, the R and E consultant said, "The program's a lot better than I thought it would be. It's a lot better than I thought--the people really opened up--I thought. And at the interviews too. And when we were meeting [in the task force] to make those responses [to the visitation surveys]. Now Larry [the local coordinator], you know, separated those [surveys] and let everybody look at them. Some people questioned that. But still, that opened up the city manager, the county commissioner--and let them see that everything wasn't just as good as they thought it was. They had places where they needed to improve--so I wondered how the honesty would be. But I thought it was better than what I had expected it would be."

Many respondents echoed such characterizations of the program as those above, employing terms like "honesty," "openness," "cooperation," and "everybody pulling together." Some volunteers and task force members said that they had expected the R and E process of identifying and resolving local businesses' problems to be a cooperative endeavor. Most participants, however, expressed surprise with the degree to which the process was constructively collaborative, and all expressed a desire that such cooperation among local organizational leaders would continue after program termination.

The tasks concerning which these local leaders
cooperated are typically sensitive ones in most complex social settings. That is, the processes of identifying and resolving the problems which firm owners have entail determining which individuals and organizations are responsible, by commission or omission, for these problems. The determination of role responsibilities with respect to problems often may be undertaken in American society through an adversarial process, in which the agents deemed responsible for a given problem are blamed and punitive and/or regulatory corrective actions are imposed to discourage or prevent the guilty party from continued unacceptable performance.

As noted previously, in a task force interaction characterized by identification-with accountability strategies, the responsible parties a) are not blamed for past errors; b) are given the opportunity to explain why expectations concerning their performance may be unrealistic; and c) are expected to perform in the future in a manner consistent with newly realistic expectations. Implicit in the dynamic process which led to this new manner of inter-organizational accountability in Heartland's program was: d) the promise that the leaders would bear their individual role responsibilities with the encouragement, counsel and assistance of the other task force members. Without these emergent task force norms, Heartland's R and E participants might not have approached the task of identifying business problems with such openness.

Reflecting the openness with which problem identification was conducted, one task force member stated when asked whether Heartland County had ever been or was now experiencing labor problems, "I don't know that union problems here are worse than anywhere else. Overall, I think we've got a good labor force--but this is one thing we may find out from our survey...As an individual, you hear certain things, but the overall picture--to know the magnitude a problem, I don't think any of us has that degree of exposure and awareness. I guess that's one of the things that the interviews with this R and E program will tell us."

When asked what a local R and E program should do
if it identified significant labor-management relations problems, this task force member responded, "I think you'd have to bring union rep's in. If we found that that's a major problem here, somehow this core group or someone is going to have to sit down with the union leadership. Set down and cards laid out on the table. And say, 'these are the problems that we have seen. We weren't aware of it, maybe you weren't aware of it.'

"As individuals maybe they didn't feel they had this major problem. The only way you can resolve it and make it workable is to set down and talk to them. What are their suggestions? How can we solve it? Because, if it's a major problem, then eventually the bottom line is these places [local businesses] close--they've [the unions] lost too. Everybody loses--so you got to work together. So, I think R and E is just a way of pinpointing the problem."

Asked subsequently how well he thought the problem identification process had been implemented, this task force member said he was "very pleased. Very pleased...Because we've managed to find out about some problems. Some of them the people [responsible] already knew about them. But you get all those heads together figuring how to solve a problem, that's got to be good..."

"There were a few complaints about us [his employer's organization, which he represented on the task force]. A couple of these we'd known about before, thought we'd solved, and it turned out the business hadn't understood that we'd done all we could. Then there were a couple problems we hadn't known about before...And they all, each of these businesses, appreciated our contacting them and putting in a lot more time with them, doing what we could for them, and helping them find out some more information that can help their businesses." In each case, he indicated, he was pleased that a problem had been identified, even where his organization could offer no tangible resolution to that concern.

A recurring theme in the participants' appraisal of
the Heartland program was that they had succeeded in attaining a balanced interpretation of business problems. The task force member above could have been upset by the way in which one of the complaints regarding his organization had been raised openly in a task force meeting. This particular complaint by a business visitation interviewee proved to be unfounded, upon further investigation by the organization. Sufficient informal interaction seems to have occurred outside of the task force meetings in which to convey information regarding the legitimacy of that complaint that this member, and those other task force representatives generally about whose organizations complaints had been aired, felt an accurate, honest portrait of their organizations' effectiveness had emerged.

One task force member, a local politician, felt that another significant outcome of the business visitation process had been the way in which "the lines of communication were opened so that, a lot of times, you solved a lot of problems before they get too big to be solved." Interestingly, it was only toward the end of the program that participants began to mention that the local R and E process helped to anticipate problems and solve them prospectively. This emerging expectation that the program would facilitate prospective problem solving and policy development will be considered in more detail in a subsequent narrative portion concerning strategic planning.

Another respondent, a local newspaper editor, felt that the business visitations helped to generate information with which to prioritize the problems that were identified. However, he and the other participants felt that it was the qualitative information transmitted informally rather than the quantitative aggregate survey data that would enable effective problem prioritization. Participants in fact often remarked about the suspect nature of quantitative information.

"You can get statistics of what businesses are doing--but, as you know, you can get statistics to say anything you want them to say. And I can prove it to
you. So why bother!" this task force member, representing a small community's chamber of commerce, laughed. "This program seemed to make me feel that we were getting beyond statistics, and that we were beginning to deal with the reality of what was taking place...It's back to the people. People--it's not numbers that explain what's happening."

On the other hand, this task force member and others eagerly awaited the distribution of the final report draft generated by the state training coordinator, in which the aggregate survey results were presented. Several findings regarding the use of this quantitative information emerged.

1. The data would be used by program participants to legitimate pre-existing demands that corrective measures to resolve local firms' problems be taken by responsible parties not represented on the task force. "This is what the community can do from the interviews," one task force member explained. "Get the information to the proper places, where maybe when it was only an individual before going to complain. Now you can say, 'there's eight companies out here, existing businesses, concerned about this.'" Many mentioned that the aggregate data would be particularly useful in renewed efforts to lobby for state government resolution of a long-standing local transportation concern.

2. The data would be employed to indicate new, hitherto unidentified problems. The data, said one participant, "give us some direction. Because going into this, we had no idea what the scope of the needs are. What are they? As individuals, you may know one or two, you may know none of them. Because in our particular business we're not exposed to that [given] problem." Another respondent said, "when we get the results of the interviews back and get them compiled, that will give us some direction."

3. The task force discussion about the aggregate data provided a means by which task force members could develop a convergent interpretation of the nature and importance of local business problems. As noted above,
many respondents said they felt they each saw only limited aspects of the total picture. The final report document was interpreted by task force members as suggestive, rather than conclusive, evidence regarding the nature and magnitude of local problems. Several task force members, in their first meeting to discuss the final report draft, expressed surprise regarding the number of times in which a given problem had been mentioned by survey respondents. A number of those who had articulated surprise then indicated that they would seek to find out more about those surprising data.

Thus, while the quantitative figures were not interpreted as decisive proof, they were treated seriously as indications that, as one task force member said, "something must be going on. You get these kind of numbers—well, something's going on, that's for sure." As task force members discussed ways in which to secure additional information with which to ascertain what the "something" was, they appeared to develop a shared understanding concerning the total array of problems facing their community's businesses.

4. While the aggregate figures were regarded as inconclusive and suggestive only, and therefore imperfect, they were supposed to be as honest a reflection as possible of the concerns articulated by the business interviewees. As noted before, the initiators were aghast when presented with the possibility that even one volunteer could have introduced personal biases into the survey record of his visitations.

Several respondents said that it was not the volunteer's role to introduce his or her own concerns regarding local business and business development into the R and E task force agenda. Instead, the volunteers were to solicit and record as accurately as possible the complaints identified by the business interviewees. Using this criterion, the task force members felt that the program had been effective.

Another major purpose regarding the business visitations by volunteers was to express to the local
firm representatives that they were "appreciated by the community." One of the initiators, the local chamber executive, said he was pleased by how the volunteers had made "direct contact with so many local firms." This contact conveyed the message, he believed, that the "community cares enough to find out what their needs are." The contact itself, in other words, provided evidence of a pro-business attitude.

The volunteers that were interviewed unanimously expressed the belief that they had been successful in expressing appreciation and this pro-business attitude to the firms. Repeatedly, they too said that simply their effort to visit and interview the business representatives conveyed the "community's appreciation" sufficiently to the firms. None of the respondents referred, however, to other ways in which their positive regard for the firm representatives had been conveyed. During observation and participant observation in the business visitations, volunteers often were seen trying fairly overtly to develop rapport with the representative. These efforts have been noted already, as regarding the way in which volunteers normally initiated the visitation by seeking to identify a shared social bond with the firm's official.

The volunteers appeared to be successful in establishing rapport with the visitation interviewees. The volunteers seemed quite sincere in expressing curiosity regarding what the firms marketed, and in conveying the desire that problems preventing the firm from continuing to operate in the community or from expanding there would be resolved if possible. The business representatives were not seen to acknowledge directly the volunteers' positive regard. Yet, considerable evidence suggests they were warmed by the concern.

Respondents spoke often of how they or another volunteer they knew had experienced at least one visitation in which the business interviewee began the interaction in a gruff or emotionally distant manner but ended by hoping the volunteers would return. Several business officials indicated openly their initial
skepticism regarding the worth of the visitation. Most of these officials warmed to the volunteers over the course of the visitation. One respondent, who had participated in such a visitation, speculated that it is those local business owners and managers who least feel they are appreciated or that they would gain from being appreciated who "can most benefit from this program...That's just exactly who we should be reaching."

One of the firms visited, one volunteer said, "was a local firm that is a division of a larger corporate operation, one plant of many. The guy said, 'I got your questionnaire [form in the mail]. You can come down if you want to, but I'm not going to answer any of your questions.' Why would he not want to do that? We went in and we chatted for awhile, and he's there with his personnel director and his purchasing agent. He's the local CEO. We sat and we talked awhile, and he ended up not only answering all the questions, but gave us a whole lot of information that we hadn't requested.

"You pick up a lot of other things," the volunteer continued, "about their feelings. And the issue was that in some of the divisions within the corporation, people had been quoted—and the corporate [leadership] level was saying, 'you are not going to quote. You're not,'" he laughed, "'going to say anything to anybody, that's our corporate policy. You don't say anything to anybody because it's gotten us into trouble.' Well, we were able to go in there and build that trust and get that information and assure them that what they were saying—that there was no need to track [i.e., trace] that back to the company."

From the above it is clear that the volunteers must have done something more than the simple act of conducting the prescribed visitation interviews to have contributed to the experience that most of the business representatives had of being sincerely appreciated. Why, then, do the volunteers rarely mention what they did and said during the visitations? Humility in not claiming personal credit for a success may be partly responsible for their silence on this matter.
Additionally, to a probably considerable extent, many volunteers may employ verbal and non-verbal means of expressing appreciation without being conscious of how they do so. The knowledge of how to do this may be so tacit that its articulation proves very difficult. However, there may be a third partial explanation, and one which is particularly worth considering.

In two interviews with participants with whom rapport had been well established through prior interaction, the respondents were pressed to discuss what they might have done "specifically and concretely to express appreciation" to the business representatives. Both respondents replied with expressions of uncertainty, in phrases such as "I don't know". The question was clearly discomfiting. Consistent with the thesis of Robert Bellah et al in Habits of the Heart (1986), they appeared to lack a ready lexicon and grammar for articulating about affective and tacit processes.

The difficulty in discussing such processes openly and comfortably is itself consistent, in turn, with the way in which an initial prescription that participants should attain various affective outcomes would be regarded as too sentimental. Even when the respondents agreed that affective outcomes such as trust, friendship, non-judgmental accountability norms and the like did emerge in Heartland County and were perhaps the best program outcomes, they felt that having been told to expect or seek such outcomes overtly would have been counter-productive. Those who wish to foster the conditions by which decisions are made based more on identification-with information, a positive sense of community is fostered, or positive interpersonal affect engendered, may want to consider the possibility that such aims may, in certain settings or cultures, be best achieved when they are not billed as the central overt purpose. Some may need to experience such affective ends as safe and intrinsically rewarding, before they trust promises that they will be. While the study concludes that a number of positive affective outcomes have been achieved through the R and E programs in Heartland and elsewhere, it is not recommended that
state R and E training personnel and other promoters of the R and E concept prescribe or predict that such outcomes will be achieved in future programs.

The conclusion, in other words, is that exhortations that local leaders become more open-minded or that community members strive to re-create a sense of communally shared responsibility for the quality of local life are likely to be less effective than efforts to create the conditions in which local leaders can experience for themselves the intrinsic appeal of such aims. These aims may be regarded typically as too idealistic or removed from "pragmatic" issues and concerns. The genius of R and E is the way in which it brings leaders together to solve pragmatic issues and creates an arena in which shared responsibility and openness can demonstrate their practical usefulness.

One dynamic of the R and E program that facilitated as well as itself represented a significant change in local information flows, accountability strategies and decision processes was the way in which those in more central power positions were acknowledged while others in more peripheral power positions were allowed greater access to and input in local decision making. This dynamic materialized at three levels: a) in the task force; b) among the volunteers; and c) among the existing local businesses. Participants seemed to become aware of this dynamic just before the program ended.

As participants began to reflect, in the termination phase, upon whether and to what extent their program expectations had been realized, many began to speak approvingly of the way the task force provided an arena for "outsiders" and young "future leaders", as one respondent said, to participate in local decision making. The data drawn from this one case study are not sufficient to support a clear generalization regarding whether the widening of the circle of local leaders is somehow inherent in the R and E process or is dependent upon certain local environmental factors. It may be that elements of the local R and E program prescription facilitate widening of the leadership circle but that
other, environmental dynamics need to be operant as well. Comparative case studies should provide further insights regarding this question.

A number of local environmental factors have been discussed as having contributed to a diffuse leadership approach to the Heartland program's initiation and promotion. One important outcome of this manner of program initiation, already mentioned, was that those who were recruited into the program were themselves allowed the discretion and implicit authority to recruit others into the program. The prescription by the state training coordinator, readily endorsed by the program initiators, was for persons to be recruited into the program on the basis of political, positional and personal qualities. This prescription encourages but does not guarantee that participant recruitment will lead to a widening of the circle of local decision makers.

The interaction of the recruitment prescription and diffuse leadership dynamic appeared to foster an interesting phenomenon. In the early stages of program implementation, virtually all of the respondents spoke of program participants as "they" rather than as "we." It was as though each felt that he or she was standing at the periphery of the program and imagined that others were more central to the program efforts. Most of the visitation volunteers who did not also serve as task force members tended to refer to the program's participants as "they" throughout the duration of the program. However, after the second task force meeting, many task force members suddenly began to speak in "we" terms. By the third task force meeting, virtually all of them referred to the participants as "we."

This suggests the task force members were experiencing an increased sense of personal ownership of and central participation in the program process, and that this sense was fairly equally shared among most of the task force members. This finding merits further explanation:

1. Heartland's four program initiators appeared to
view themselves as having fairly equal decision-making status and authority.

2. The initiators also viewed those whom they personally recruited as having comparable status and authority.

3. Three of the four initiators appeared to prefer a consensual, non-hierarchical approach to decision-making. The fourth initiator demonstrated a preference for hierarchical decision-making but felt, for a variety of reasons, he did not have ethical or practical justification to himself adopt or encourage others to employ a hierarchical approach.

4. Among the persons who had been recruited by an initiator were those who preferred hierarchical decision-making and those who tended to decide by consensus. Yet, they all appeared to feel that insofar as they themselves had not initiated the program, they were constrained from making or encouraging hierarchical decisions because they did not "own" the program.

5. Those who had been recruited to participate by other non-initiators appeared to experience a similar constraint.

6. Thus, as the program was carried out, there were both constraints upon efforts by individuals to assert the primacy of their own decision preferences as well as a relative lack of will to do so.

7. As a result, there did not emerge in Heartland's program a readily discernible factionalization between those who were perceived and saw themselves as rightfully more influential. This lack of factionalization permitted the task force members to experience themselves as sharing fairly equally in the ownership of the program.

9. The relative lack of an ownership differential in the task force group allowed each person to have a voice in task force decisions, problem identification and problem interpretation. Over time, the opportunity
to contribute tended to give each member an increasing sense of owning the program, thus the movement from "they" to "we" referents.

10. Because of the prescribed division of program role responsibilities, however, volunteers tended not to experience a sense of program ownership equal to that of the task force members. Volunteers clearly identified with the program's aims and viewed themselves as having made an important contribution to what they came to regard as their accomplishment. When appraising the program's effectiveness, they consistently mentioned how they "enjoyed" and "learned from" their participation in the business visitations.

However, due both to the division of program role responsibilities as well as to the prescribed information flows (cf. Figure 1), there was no formal mechanism by which volunteers could hear about let alone systematically contribute to program decision making. The extent to which a given volunteer knew what problems and issues had been identified as requiring program resolution or what recommendations had been considered to resolve them was highly variable. The volunteer's knowledge of these matters depended largely upon whether and to what extent he or she participated in informal information networks that predated the program's initiation.

When asked whether he felt review of each completed survey document by the whole task force was a good strategy, one volunteer said, "I don't know, because I haven't had any feedback. I did two initial interviews and sent in my report and I haven't heard from them since. My understanding is that we're going to have a follow-up meeting--but, ah, I don't know what's happened to my report since I sent it in."

11. Thus, as noted before, the R and E program prescription and the way in which it was manifested in Heartland County suggest that these programs generally widen the circle of those who participate in making decisions regarding the local businesses and the community's economic welfare and climate, but that the
circle tends not to be widened so far that volunteers or
the disadvantaged are permitted to play central decision
making roles.

12. Nonetheless, as several task force members and
volunteers alike noted, service as a volunteer provides
useful leadership development experience. It was
particularly the older participants, interestingly, who
noted and approved the way in which volunteer service
permitted young adults to "contribute," "find out what
makes the community tick," and "make useful contacts
with local businesses."

One participant, a local business owner and task
force member, contributed an especially interesting
insight regarding the R and E program and the process of
youth leadership development generally. This respondent
happened to mention his pleasure in finding that program
participation provided him with an arena in which to
advise young people. He spoke in what then seemed a
tangential vein regarding the process of counseling
youths.

"I think the older you get, the more you look back
on the passage of your life. You know, one of the
things when I'm looking back is, I wish I had done this
or that. And I'm glad of how it's been. But when
you're young, there are things that seem more important
to you right at that time. When you get older they
don't seem so important. Friendship, over the years,
will mean more to you than anything else. And any time
you take the time to help somebody else--I, believe me,
I don't always have the right answer."

He and several other respondents later mentioned,
during the termination and appraisal process, a concern
that there was not "enough for young people to do around
here." One value of the R and E process, not central in
or unique to but nonetheless apparent in it, is that it
provides opportunities for young adults to participate
in community decision making, and to interact with
elders in an arena where important insights and
information are being communicated as a matter of
course.
One last finding regarding the role of volunteers in the program bears noting. A few respondents suggested that the volunteers were perceived by business visitation interviewees as more legitimate interviewers than would those soliciting information who came in their roles as local politicians or official organizational representatives. Even where a volunteer also held a position as politician or organizational official, they noted, because they approached the business representatives as volunteers, they were more likely to be regarded as altruistically motivated.

The volunteers, one respondent said, are not seen as "politicians...[They] aren't in an organization—an organization looks out basically for what they can do to promote that organization. Here you're not promoting, you're here for the community—and working on this [R and E program]."

The legitimacy bestowed upon volunteers facilitated the process by which young adults, non-natives and others not inside the existing community leadership circles gained moderately greater access to local decision making responsibilities and obtained leadership development experience. Thus, R and E program participation widened the access for both volunteers and task force members to community decision making responsibilities. As noted, a third group, local business officials, appeared to experience similar benefits, though perhaps to a lesser degree.

Many respondents, task force members and volunteers alike, maintained that the program had been effective in benefitting the local business owners and managers generally, and especially those who own or manage smaller firms. This has been noted at numerous points, drawing upon a variety of indications. The leaders of larger firms typically were seen to possess the resources with which to resolve their own problems with local and state government. The larger companies, particularly those with plants operating in numerous communities, also were found to be less susceptible to appeals by a particular community to retain or expand
their operation in that locality. Even the information which local plant managers provided to the R and E visitation volunteers often was determined by non-local corporate personnel.

The smaller firms, as has been discussed, tended to have a larger stake in making their operations successful in that one community. However, many managers and owners appeared to feel, according to the accounts of task force members and volunteers, that they had been under-appreciated. Most respondents felt that community leaders had, prior to the R and E program, given much more attention and recognition to new businesses' officials rather than to those of firms that had existed in the community for many years. Thus, at the beginning of the program there appeared to be a considerable difference between the new and existing business leaders, and between those of large and small firms, in their access to community decision making.

When the participants began to assess the extent to which the program had succeeded in making the long extant businesses' officials feel welcomed, many spoke enthusiastically of the new networks that had been formed between these officials and leaders in the chamber, local government, and public agencies. The local school superintendent commented that the R and E visitations had served as a "great beginning. We're not going to stop here. This has helped [the existing business representatives] know that we're here and willing to meet their needs."

The recurring theme regarding these changes in the access for task force members, volunteers and business owners to local decision making circles is that local social networks have been altered significantly through the R and E process. Many of those who had been peripheral to the various local decision making circles began to feel more central. This movement appears not to have been accompanied by resistance from those who have been traditionally at the center of these circles. The explanation given by respondents for this apparent lack of resistance was that the traditionally central decision makers began to appreciate that their own the
and the community's general well-being depended to a significant extent on the well-being of the more peripheral decision makers.

During the initial stages of the program, participants spoke in abstract terms of this interdependence. By the time the program was terminated, participants had acquired a considerable volume of anecdotal, concrete and therefore generally identification-with information regarding this concept of local inter-organizational interdependence.

Regarding the role of social networking in a community, one local business owner who had been visited observed, "If I pick a down side to it, it's that if the circle's too tight, too enclosed, then it may become an impediment. But I mean, to some extent, in the world that happens. That might be the down side. The upside is definitely that networks are needed for good decision making. It's only downside if you have the wrong players. There's a little bit of exclusiveness here, not a lot, but it's got that potential. If you've got a good group, that's open, you're kind of protected. Hey, anywhere you can establish networks is good." He concluded by saying he felt the Heartland task force members were sufficiently open-minded and willing to invite others to participate in the group's ongoing decision making that the problem of exclusiveness was not likely to become a significant concern.

"I think," he said, "this [program] will lead to a much more progressive approach" to local development problems. "It's the fact," he explained, "that if you've got a community that's got the key leaders in the community searching for better ways to do things--you've got a community that's going to be more attuned to development and expansion...To me, this says, 'we're going to help you, help you grow.' Instead of just go out there and survive."

This business manager was implying that expanding the network of local decision makers in itself would not ensure the responsiveness of that network to important local concerns. Such networking needed, he indicated,
to be accompanied by active dialogue among the network's members and between them and others in the community. One potent advantage of the R and E prescription, therefore, appears to be that it legitimates and compels such dialogue.

"I think it's a very good mix here," one participant said of the task force. "We're a rural, county-wide body, and a little more hesitant about change. So we're not going to try to ram something down someone's throat. You've got to work within the existing circles to keep people happy. I think you have to have that mix," of peripheral and central decision makers, "to give you outside ideas plus the people who have been here. You don't rock the establishment that much that they won't accept the change."

The above reinforces the notion that networking and dialogue are important in revising the manner and mechanisms of local change. However, networking and dialogue, per se, are also not sufficient to ensure that the network is dynamic, non-exclusionary and responsive. The dialogue must be oriented not to the transmission of facts or assertions of one's own legitimacy, but to inquiry. Inquiring dialogue is a manner of communicating that is open-ended, dynamic, and probably more conducive to fostering equal status among dialogic participants than is the communication of declaratory utterances.

The prescription in R and E programs is for participants to inquire, to survey, to learn. Many participants commented without prompting that they found the dialogue in the business visitations and task force meetings to have been "refreshing," "educational" and "insightful." Thus, the dialogic processes appeared to have been sufficiently rewarding that the changes in local decision making networks may prove not to be a temporary outgrowth of the program.

When asked how the participants would proceed now that they had completed the visitation process, many respondents indicated they hoped the process would be repeated. "No, this is not an overnight thing. It's an
ongoing thing. Years," one respondent said.

"Five years from now, do you think there'll be any kind of R and E going on?" the researcher asked.

"There should be," this task force member, a local politician, said. "It's not just a one shot thing. You don't just do it one year and forget about it."

"I think," a task force member said, "you ought to have the same visitation group as before. If they can do the industry [sector], they can do the service [sector]. Because a lot of them [volunteers] are known people, respected people--and I think that means something to the small companies too. You need to ask different questions because their needs, their businesses, are different. Now the original survey is geared just towards industry. I think maybe you would have to enhance that, with just some different questions. Some of them are general questions, that to any business operation would be relevant. I think there are some [survey questions] that you would need to make specifically for service-related businesses or for retail [firms]."

The desire to conduct business visitations on a fairly regular basis appeared to be held most strongly by the initiators, task force members and Heartland chamber leaders--i.e., by those who had been more central in coordinating the R and E effort.

A chamber board member who had conducted two visitations said, "I look at this survey thing as a good starting point to build a continuing program" that the Heartland chamber would continue to coordinate. "I haven't given much thought yet to what the next step really is," said a county commissioner and task force member, "but I think that this thing should be repeated.

"As long as you don't run it into the ground. And particularly if [the business interviewees] are given some information back." They should be told, he continued, "for example that here are the numbers who are concerned about a specific problem, and that this
information is being passed along. I think they're going to be more receptive again and feel this is something worthwhile."

"After they get these fifty-three surveys," LS, Heartland's program coordinator commented, "they ought to go around to include the other people--several have suggested [surveying] the service [sector]. I mean--well, we had [interviewed] some of the service sector. But, you could focus on the rest of the service area the next go round."

"Oh I think," the chamber executive said, "it's a very good program. Mainly because we're making direct contact with all these industries...Once we get into this, being able to help the industries, once we get the final report [done] and get a final listing of the needs of the industries, why we're going to dive in heavier than ever...We're going to have this [as] an ongoing program so [that] hopefully, in the next six months [after the final report is presented to the community], why we'll be following up, making another visit" to the firms that had been visited already. "We'll basically dc the ones that we've done, to make sure we've touched base with them [regarding] all the things we could possibly do for them."

"The task force," one task force member explained, began talking near the end of the program "about going out to service organizations, service type businesses, let's say. We could survey them and retailers. Because they're probably different from an industrial firm--and they're all part of the community. All part of the system that makes the whole thing work. Because if they're [i.e., the service and retail firms] not here, servicing industry, then how's the industrial side of it going to stay healthy?"

Task force members and other program participants may have perceived interdependencies between the local retail, service and industrial sectors prior to the R and E program, but these interconnections were not mentioned until the termination and appraisal phases. Thus, the R and E program experience either generated
new insights regarding the interconnections or, through the social dynamics of the program, it had become important to develop a convergent understanding of them. During the task force meeting scheduled to review the draft of the final report, the task force members for the first time mentioned various specific ways in which the well-being of one of the various local economic sectors depended upon one that of the other sectors.

The local coordinator, LS, began the meeting by (fairly assertively) assigning the task force members to one of three small groups. He then apportioned a third of the final report draft to each group. After twenty minutes of silent reading, each group began to talk about the recommendations they felt should be formulated, on behalf of the program, based on the final report statistics they had been assigned to consider. The small groups then reconvened in the full task force forum to discuss their proposed recommendations.

Several recurring themes were mentioned.

1. The ability effectively to attract new firms to the county depended to a large extent on assuring that existing local firms were satisfied with the county's "business climate."

2. The ability to attract new firms also would be enhanced by improving the county's ability to offer a variety of amenities. "We need restaurants," DT emphasized. "We don't have any classy restaurants...You've got to drive for a half an hour to get to a nice sit-down type restaurant."

Several then mentioned, during the ensuing conversation, that a greater diversity of retail stores and service firms need to exist in the county in order to attract professionals.

3. The county needed to encourage more professionals to reside there, the group agreed, because a) having a sizable presence of professionals in the community improved the community's perceived status and stature, and b) executives and employees of new firms
would be attracted by a community that offered good access to a wide range of professional services.

4. Better and more affordable housing needed to be built—and somehow financed—to encourage professionals and the executives of new firms to move into the community.

A long series of such interconnected recommendations were discussed during this two hour task force meeting, most of which are not mentioned because they might reveal the identity of Heartland County. The importance of the discussion for this report is that the task force now become a forum in which generalizations began to be made regarding the patterned nature of specific problems that had been identified through the business visitation surveys.

These generalizations were typically expressed as perceived interrelationships between the well-being of one group or local economic sector and that of other groups or sectors. As the discussion progressed, the task force members tended to move back and forth between consideration of tentative generalizations and articulation of specific survey-identified problems. They appeared to be enacting precisely the same process by which qualitative generalizations emerge and are tested.

"I think we've already seen," one task force member said, "well, almost every interview has identified [X problem] as a concern. We feel, for the community to grow, something has to be done about [it]." The group then discussed and decided upon specific strategies for remedying that generalized concern. In other words, a tentative generalization was posited, then compared with the specific data to determine whether that generalization adequately characterized and summarized the data. Once the group appeared to feel the generalization had been substantiated, they considered how to frame recommendations to resolve the generalized problem.
The task force also examined the "Recommendations For Business Retention and Expansion in Heartland County" which Morse had conceived and appended to the draft of the final report. Thus, the group conducted two sorts of analyses during this meeting: a) of the aggregate quantitative data tables in the draft report, and b) of the recommendations which Morse had viewed the data as warranting. Interestingly, their preference and the course of action they took was to examine and interpret the quantitative data before reviewing Morse's recommendations.

The way in which this meeting proceeded revealed a tension which participants seemed to feel, on one hand, they respected Morse as an expert and appreciated how his program concept had made their local endeavor possible. Thus, when they reviewed his tentative recommendations in the three small groups and then in the full group, they appeared not to want to offend the state training coordinator or weigh his recommendations insufficiently. On the other hand, their small and whole group discussion made clear that they felt equally, if not more, entitled to designate the recommendations that would guide post-program initiatives in their community.

Several findings may be drawn from the task force discussion of the state training coordinator's recommendations:

1. These recommendations were framed in terms that were perceived as more assertive, less tentative, than Morse had intended them to be. Over the course of several interviews, Morse had discussed the process of proposing recommendations to local participants as one in which he would offer "guidance" and "suggestions" to them, "but the final decision [as to what recommendations the task force would propose] should be theirs." Several task force members discussed his recommendations for Heartland's program as though they were inviolate, i.e. as not subject to modification by them, unless there were very compelling reasons to amend them.
2. A similar problem concerned how the report on aggregate survey data was termed by Morse as a final report though he clearly conceived of this document as a rough draft which should be considered by local participants as decidedly modifiable. It is strongly recommended that the document be labelled prominently as a "rough draft" and that the "recommendations" attachment be entitled "tentative recommendations." These tentative recommendations should be worded in much more explicitly tentative terms than they were in the case of the Heartland program.

3. While the participants displayed a considerable reluctance to contravene what they interpreted to be the Morse's mandated recommendations, they nonetheless felt equally entitled to frame and propose their own recommendations. As noted, their dialogue tended to move rapidly back and forth between the discussion of aggregate findings, concrete manifestations of these aggregate statistics, and possible recommendations warranted by the data.

4. Because the state training coordinator's recommendations seemed to be regarded as inviolate, the group's analyses appeared to proceed on two separate, unintegrated tracks. The task force discussed Morse's recommendations after they had discussed and come to consensus on their own. During the discussion of their own suggestions, the group tended to consider how each succeeding one might interrelate with those previously discussed. However, when discussing the state training coordinator's recommendations, they rarely articulated any interrelationships between each successive one and those that preceded it. Thus, the perhaps over-assertive language in which the state training coordinator's recommendations were framed appeared indirectly to discourage integrative analysis by the task force.

5. Also because Morse's recommendations were framed in over-assertive language, when these suggestions were unclear to them the task force members appeared reluctant to seek clarification. Several times, one or more participants commented in such
phrases as "I don't know what this means, do you know what this means?" and "What's this one about?" Almost as frequently, task force members indicated they understood the intent of a given recommendation but were unsure of how it could be implemented. "How do we do this?" In each case of uncertainty regarding intent or implementation, questions were raised, but in no instance did the task force members articulate an intention to contact the state training coordinator for clarification.

6. The substance of the Morse's recommendations clearly had not been conveyed to any of the task force members, including the local coordinator, prior to this task force meeting.

Given the importance of this (termination) phase of the program, it is strongly recommended that time be allotted for the state training coordinator to discuss the substance and wording of each draft report recommendation with the local coordinator prior to the local task force's consideration of them.

The discussion should clarify not only the intent, but also the tentative nature of these recommendations. In this case study, the state training coordinator evidenced a desire that his recommendations be taken seriously and not be countermanded without "good reason." If the respect with which Heartland's task force members regarded him is generalizable to local participants and their state training coordinators generally, then assertive wording is not required to ensure that the latter's recommendations are taken seriously.

Though the wording of the "final" report draft and the recommendations appendix sent by Morse to Heartland's task force was generally assertive, Morse had sent a month prior to that task force meeting a memorandum regarding the tentativeness of those recommendations. This memorandum reads in part, "In a few days I will send you a copy of our suggestions for recommendations. The task force should use these only as initial suggestions for their final recommendations."
The report will clearly list the task force as the authors of the chapter on recommendations.

"This means that the group might wish to toss out some of our recommendations and add others. That is ok. In fact, they can completely ignore our recommendations if they wish. The only constraint is that the recommendations should each be supported by data from the [aggregate] survey [results].

"The two major reasons for having the task force write the final recommendations are as follows. First, the survey data, while detailed, can not give us the background on local values and opinions that will influence the degree to which each recommendation can be implemented...Second, we don't have to live with the recommendations or push them through to implementation. The task force will. The task force has to understand the recommendations and believe in them if they are to push for their implementation..."

This memorandum states with considerable clarity how and why the state training coordinator hoped the Heartland task force would take ownership of the final recommendation process. Every indication is that the task force members never saw this memorandum. One clear implication is that the state training coordinator who seeks to foster local ownership of the R and E program process should communicate this intent in oral or written ways to the task force group, and not rely on the local coordinator to communicate this to the task force.

In any event, the moderate tensions observed concerning the ownership and intent of recommendations provided a context in which the discussion of specific survey results occurred. Once again, however, the task force demonstrated resilience and persistence in responding to uncertainty. The group frequently appeared unsure of how to resolve several local problems, due to their complex interrelationships. One portion of the group dialogue illustrates this well.
"We've never hired that many professionals [in the community] in the past," the chamber executive said.

"It's a problem here. But if you can get professionals to move in, they purchase certain services," DT said,

The R and E consultant then commented, "you need restaurants here."

"A good sit down restaurant," the county agent said, reiterating DT's earlier comment.

"But it's hard for a good restaurant to make money here," the local coordinator noted.

"I'll pay," DT said, "for good atmosphere. But restaurants can't come before the management and professional people to support them."

"We'll have people come in," RF suggested, only when "more jobs and retail [stores] come in. Here, industry came then the retail and people came."

Rather than being daunted by the complexity of these interrelationships, the task force members seemed to be girding themselves to do battle with them enthusiastically. "When you start thinking positive," the R and E consulted suggested, "things start happening."

"People say 'this is a small town'," DT said. "And they talk about what's typical about small towns. But we can do what we want... We used to be a railroad town. Now we're not, but we're still making it. We can change again if we have to."

Perhaps because the R and E process had been experienced as enjoyable, even the problems and complaints identified through the process were now regarded as "positives" and "grist for the mill," as one respondent termed them. Their comfort in considering and discussing these specific problems appeared to
facilitate the process by which they developed generalizations and pragmatic recommendations concerning them. By the end of this task force meeting, the group's members appeared to have achieved consensus that comprehensive planning would be needed to take the community "where we want to go."

Planning was needed to foster the development of industrial sites, attraction of new firms, in-migration of professionals, and expansion of retail and service sectors. Not only was planning needed to ensure that the efforts to achieve one goal would reinforce, not contravene, efforts to realize other aims, the task force members agreed, but also the planning had to be done by community leaders acting and brainstorming in concert. "A coordination of effort would really help," the county agent urged. "With the chamber and the industrial commission working together, where they make a concerted effort."

In interviews during the termination and appraisal period, respondents repeatedly recommended that the R and E task force be the agent for catalyzing such a coordinated local economic planning effort. "I think part of the problem with some of the businesses, and in our [visitation] interviews certainly, is that when they started working with some of those government agencies [prior to the R and E program], you know, they may as well have been talking to a brick wall. And they couldn't get anywhere.

"They felt that they as an individual can't deal with the Ohio Department of Insurance or the worker's compensation people. That's one of the reasons maybe they opened up to us. 'Cause here's a group of local individuals willing to help them, willing to make the contacts. And I think that as long as the local people stay involved--as a middleman--don't in other words identify the problem and then say 'here's the agency you need to contact'. That way you just end up back where you started. I think the local group has to follow through on these things. And come up with some answers for the people. That's what they're sort of expecting."
Another task force member commented, "If we could become so aware of the facts, we could just find the solutions...I see [R and E] as the wedge opening the door. There's just so much awareness out there to be had. [R and E] is a beginning...The Heartland chamber's doing a fantastic job with this R and E—without funding—Can you beat that!" she smiled. "Without funding. It's fantastic what you can do without funding." She went on to suggest that the chamber and the R and E task force continue this program, by conducting future business visitations as well as by seeking higher-order solutions to the problems already identified.

These comments bring to mind another oft-cited perception that the program's successful implementation was highly beneficial to the local chamber's image. One chamber board member enthused, "Our [chamber of commerce] members can't come back to us for spending a lot of money on the R and E program. And that's the first thing a lot of businessmen like to say is 'you spent $5,000. Did you get $5,000 worth of benefit out of it?' They can't say that." In fact, he felt, the chamber members who had been visited received substantial, important benefits at virtual no chamber expense.

"We may turn around and do the same thing [i.e., visitation process] later," the chamber board member said. "And we'll learn more off of the second one than we will off of this one. Because we'll be able to compare the two. This one is kind of your first time at the plate. If you strike out the first time—which we didn't—you come back to the plate the next time and may get a home run. But, you know that when you come back to the plate next time, you'll know a little bit more about that pitcher and you're going--your odds of getting a hit are much better. So, we'll learn off of this experience."

This task force member and others thus expressed a cautious optimism regarding future, post-program efforts. They were wary of predicting or promising
certain positive outcomes, but were nonetheless enthusiastic and committed to resolving the more generalized local economic concerns.

Before the program had ended, a matter that itself will be discussed shortly, the process of coordinating efforts to resolve the concerns of the various local economic sectors had already begun. Several weeks before the task force met to discuss the final report draft, Cobbletown's downtown merchant association voted to join the Heartland chamber en masse. The chamber, one board member explained, "set up a new retail division and they're [the merchants association] going to be part of that."

As suggested by the comments in the task force meeting concerning the final report draft, Heartland's R and E program did not appear likely to end. A subsequent case study of the events that take place after the final report's public dissemination in the early summer of 1987 would prove valuable in determining the precise forms in and means by which the program actually continues. Every available indication was that the program would continue, due as much to the benefits for the program sponsors as to those for the program's clientele, the existing local firms' owners and managers.

The Heartland chamber was not the only sponsoring organization whose members perceived themselves to have benefitted substantially. The Ohio State University and Ohio Cooperative Extension Service appeared to gain in terms of public relations. "The community's going to say," DT commented, "that [the R and E program] came out of the university, for our local area. I think there's a lot to be gained by it for them. But, I think if we'd gotten a bunch of charts shown to us that show how we're doing national average-wise, and all that type of thing, and that's all we ended up with, then we'd have fallen asleep," he laughed.

"I'd like to talk with [the university representatives]," he said, "to see if there--if they've done some projecting out, whether they think there's
some more programming--do they think [this R and E process here] should be continued? If so, how should it be? What should it be?"

The county agent, as an official of the Cooperative Extension Service, agreed that having co-sponsored the local R and E program in Heartland and elsewhere in Ohio was beneficial for it and the state university. "The number one [benefit]," as he was noted before as saying, is that local people now say, "'yes, my chamber and my university are interested in me, and is going to help.' That's number one. And number two of course is that there is going to be some training and teleconferences on various [state government] programs, [this information is going to be] coming here to provide help so that they will know where to turn. And where to get--go to the right agency, or if a grant is available, which they might not have been aware of before, that there's money available for [employee] training. And three, I think it's good for community relations and developing a feeling of unity."

The state training coordinator, as a university and Cooperative Extension Service official, also felt that R and E program sponsorship in Heartland and generally was beneficial. "In terms of continued financial support for the Extension Service, this kind of thing--they [Extension Service officials] can see something going here." Sponsorship of R and E programs, he felt, provides the visibility and positive local regard needed to continue generating the local funds that constitute one-third of each local Extension Service office's budget. In other words, the Extension Service needs to demonstrate responsiveness to local community needs, and R and E program sponsorship, he believed, is an excellent vehicle for making this demonstration.

Based on the state training coordinator's comments regarding the criteria by which he assessed local program effectiveness, it would appear that Heartland's program was probably going to prove successful. One of the evaluation criteria that appeared most central to him was whether the local program results in the development of what he termed a "local economic
strategic planning" capability. This capability consisted of being able without assistance from outside the community to a) gather data identifying specific and aggregate existing local firms' concerns; b) resolve specific short-term, simple and especially business closure or relocation related problems in a prompt fashion; c) identify information that firms need, such as regarding existing state government programs, and furnish it to firms who request or need such information; d) determine the nature and salience of problematic, systemic local economic forces (such as concerning local labor market trends, shifts in market forces, etc.); e) identify and prioritize long-term strategies to address these problematic local economic forces; and f) mobilize the local political support and resources required to effect these strategies.

The state training coordinator believed that effective development of this local economic strategic planning capability would lead to a) the retention and expansion of existing local firms; b) the resolution of local firms' problems with local and state government; c) the reduction in the cost to firms of doing business in the community; d) greater and more effective use of government programs; e) a generally improved local business climate; and f) "early warning" of and "rapid adjustment assistance" for when local plants will or might close or relocate.

An end-of-program survey was not conducted to assess systematically the extent to which the Heartland program was successful in terms of the participants' and the state training coordinator's goals concerning tangible outcomes. Tangible outcomes include the number of jobs actually saved or added, the number of local firms that were prevented from closing or relocating, and the like. However, such outcomes were mentioned by participants. One Heartland firm mentioned a serious and complex problem during its visitation by volunteers. As a result, the problem was referred to the county commissioners. According to one county commissioner, the problem was resolved through a quick, energetic response by municipal and county governments. As a result, he said, "Seventy jobs were saved. They [this
firm] were going to leave the county. So yes, I think this program has been successful, even if it only got this one thing to happen. And that's just one problem that the program identified and ensured would be addressed. This particular firm, he explained, had not thought to bring its concern to local government, until the visitation process had led government officials to approach them.

Five other local firms, most of them small, were experiencing rapid growth in sales and production, and were identified through their visitation as more or less urgently needing to find larger facilities into which they could relocate. "These," the chamber executive said during an informal conversation near the end of the program, "are clearly businesses that we could lose, if we didn't know that we needed to find bigger facilities for them in the county. We may still wind up losing them. But, at least this gives us a chance at keeping them here.

"I've talked to each of [these five businesses' owners], and they all say they want to stay here. So, we've just got to come up with a way to see that they do," RF smiled, with an otherwise serious expression. "We've just got to see that they do."

H. Local R and E Programs Elsewhere

As noted earlier, telephone interviews were conducted during the first phase of the study, with the local coordinators of R and E programs in six communities outside Ohio. Information about those local programs and the training to support them was acquired through telephone interviews with the state training coordinators of five of those six local programs. These initial research interviews were exploratory and intended to provide the researcher with an introductory understanding of the processes involved in local R and E programs. The interviews were conducted also to assist the researcher in gaining a general sense of the extent to which local program strategies and outcomes might
differ across settings.

Because the interviews were exploratory, findings with respect to a phenomenon found in one local setting should not be considered as firm or as necessarily generalizable to other settings. Additionally, some generalizations regarding R and E phenomena which appear from the available data to be generalizable across settings will be proposed here. However, these should be regarded as highly speculative and as warranting in-depth, comparative case study and/or quantitative survey research.

The six local coordinators interviewed gave permission for their telephone conversations to be recorded and quoted unanonymously for publication in a forthcoming book regarding local R and E programs. However, they were promised anonymity for purposes of the dissertation report so that more sensitive information might be discussed confidentially and therefore benefit the dissertation research. For this reason, the identity of the interviewees and their communities is obscured in this report.

Two of the six coordinators interviewed, in a midwestern town and a southeastern county, described programs that proved in fact to be oriented heavily towards business attraction and which did not draw upon volunteer assistance. Additionally, these two coordinators indicated that he and she were the only person endeavoring to make local business visitations, thus unaided by volunteers, and that they did so without employing a standard set of interview questions with which to gather data regarding local business concerns. Thus, their efforts to retain and expand existing local businesses did not constitute a local R and E program in the operational sense used in this study. For these reasons, data regarding their R and E efforts, which they said were few, are not considered relevant for this study.

Of the remaining four coordinators, one did provide information that depicted the existence of an R and E program, as understood here, in his community. He had
coordinated an effort by volunteers to visit local firms, using a standard interview questionnaire. However, though he appeared sincerely willing to assist with the research, he explained that he was busily engaged in several urgent projects which would not permit him to devote much time for a telephone interview. During this otherwise rejecting conversation, however, the coordinator did provide some information regarding his community's program. Thus, information regarding his community's R and E program was partial, and insufficiently detailed upon which to base a composite picture or generalizations.

The coordinators of the three other local programs, however, provided significantly more extensive information regarding their R and E efforts, during interviews that ranged from one to two hours. One of these programs was conducted in a southeastern state, one in a north central state, and one in the northwest. The southeastern one was conducted in a mid-sized metropolitan area. The northern program took place in a county which included a mid-sized metropolitan area as well as its surrounding suburbs and smaller municipalities. This county thus included urban, suburban and semi-rural areas. The northwestern program was conducted in a rural town, with a population of roughly 20,000.

The three local communities are referred to here as Southeastern City, Northern County, and Northwestern Town. Each of the local programs will be discussed in turn. In describing a given local program, the following will be considered: a) descriptors about the community context in which the program took place; b) what strategies the coordinator mentioned as having been employed; c) rationales the coordinator offered for use of these strategies; d) tangible and intangible outcomes mentioned as resulting from the program; and e) explanations the coordinator provided for why those outcomes were achieved. Following such narrative regarding each of the four local programs, implications will be suggested regarding R and E program effectiveness.
Before describing the data and findings regarding these local programs, however, it should be noted that several coordinators of local R and E programs in Ohio have provided, in some cases, quite detailed descriptions in interviews about their program experiences. While this data has contributed to the formulation of a number of findings regarding R and E across local context, the understanding was that this information was confidential. As it would be difficult to camouflage the identity of these Ohio programs, they are not directly described in this report. Having said this, consideration now may be directed to the experiences of R and E participants in programs in other states.

Approximately one-quarter million persons live in the metropolitan area of SE (Southeastern) City. The local economy is highly diversified so that, as the local R and E coordinator said, "two or three of our industrial sectors could be having a hard time and our economy would still be resilient, strong." SE City's economy is not only diversified but also thriving. The local economy's health, however, was not viewed by the city's R and E coordinator as a reason for complacency.

The "R and E idea first came out of the northeast [region of the United States] where industries were dying and moving to the south and the sunbelt. They started retention and expansion programs to see the kinds of things they could do to persuade the companies to stay. Well, we used that tool also...[because] we're basically concerned with providing a service to our companies, to our membership. And that just naturally flows into a kind of natural retention process." In other words, a chamber of commerce, this R and E coordinator felt, tends to be oriented toward providing services for its member firms, and such services have the "natural" consequences of encouraging these firms to stay and expand in the community. Thus, he explained, the conduct of a formal R and E program seemed to be a logical extension of the chamber's pre-existing orientation toward local business retention.
"Everything you do in your chamber, if you tally it up, should be adding marks in the retention category—in the sense that every program that we do will hopefully enter into someone's mind if they're thinking about relocating a plant. We hope they'll think 'the community atmosphere here's very good, competitive.'"

The city's chamber of commerce is a well-funded organization with a substantial and active membership. Chamber members volunteer to serve on a variety of committees concerning such functional concerns as transportation, education, and labor-management relations. "We've got a staff with expertise," the R and E coordinator said, "but we do rely on volunteers to a great extent to get the word out [and] to make decisions [regarding what types of services to provide to chamber members]."

"The reason the employer-employee relations workshops go so well is that the committee that puts them together are all [volunteer] personnel executives. They know what kinds of programs are needed in the community. And we use volunteers to make contacts with other community leaders, to get support on an issue. Or, you'll see them out making phone calls, saying 'hey, we've got this coming up.' We use them to sell memberships in the chamber, of course. We use them as a retention tool to 3o cut to existing members. So, we use a lot of volunteers. If it weren't for those volunteers, we would not be--I couldn't put a percentage on it, but it's the volunteers that make us truly effective."

In this chamber program, he and a "Diplomatic Corps" of chamber volunteers regularly visit member firms, to identify any concerns with which they might need chamber assistance in resolving. The R and E coordinator say the formal R and E program therefore as a more systematic and intensive approach to "what we already do on an ongoing basis."

Under the auspices of the state government, local chambers in the state were recruited to participate in R and E programs. SE City's chamber was one of the first
to participate. Most of this southeastern state's other urban chambers of commerce had not yet participated in the program, whereas "I've talked more and more to smaller chambers [in the state] that are more interested in starting programs for existing industry. Because a lot of them have run so long to recruit new industry that they were perhaps neglecting some of the other [firms] that were already there. Or, at least they were starting to feel like they were doing that."

SE City's chamber, the local R and E coordinator said, was "divided into two sides...I handle existing industry but I don't handle the economic development portion of what we do." As director of the chamber's Existing Industries Program, he was selected as the "logical" coordinator of its new R and E program.

SE City's chamber utilized an innovative strategy for recruiting volunteers to conduct the prescribed visitation interviews. The chamber drew from participants in the city's Leadership Program to solicit volunteers for the visitations. Leadership program participants are mostly young adults currently in mid-management positions in business, education, government and political office who have been identified as demonstrating "significant potential to become future leaders in the community." The criteria for selection for participation in the leadership program are remarkably consistent with those observed as operant in recruiting volunteers for Heartland's business visitation. SE City's R and E coordinator described the leadership program's participants as "ideal for doing the business visitations," because they were "articulate," "respected," and "confident enough to conduct interviews with top business officials."

The R and E coordinator felt that the program concept was consistent with the chamber's focus on providing assistance to smaller firms. In SE City, he said, "some ninety to ninety-five percent of [the city's] companies would be small business. Then, when you also realize, depending on which article you read, somewhere between seven and eight out of every ten new jobs come not only from existing industry, but small
business—you have to be responsive to the needs of small business. There's no way that you can not be, because that's where the bulk, that's where the backbone, of your community lies." However, the chamber targeted for the visitations manufacturing firms that employed more than 25 persons.

He explained this targeting as necessary to limit the number of firms that the limited number of R and E volunteers would have to visit. Given the thousands of firms located in SE city, the chamber "couldn't visit them all. So we had to narrow it down to the larger firms," which are fewer in number.

The results of the visitations by the Leadership Program's volunteers were unsurprising to the R and E coordinator. "I'll be honest with you, we pretty well had predicted the results of that survey before we ever took it. We knew what we would get back. For us it was more of a confirmation tool, because we did not have a lot of areas that came back as troubled or problem areas. And, anything that came back as a weakness, there's a [chamber] program, already in place to address it."

Although the aggregate, statistical survey results were unsurprising, the coordinator indicated that several benefits had been realized through the visitation survey process:

1. The aggregate data could be useful in legitimating chamber proposals for local government action.

2. The visitation process gave the firm representatives visited the feeling that they were appreciated. This expression of appreciation improved the positive regard with which the chamber is held by its members.

3. Positive findings from the survey, such as that certain local public services such as fire protection were regarded by all interviewees as "excellent", may be useful in promoting the attraction of new firms into the
area.

4. Several firms were identified as not planning to leave the metropolitan area, but as needing to expand their facilities. "We turned the potentials for expansion, the firms that said they might expand, over to our [chamber's] economic development department. I can't tell you if, offhand, they called all of [these firms] up."

5. The volunteers, in addition to conducting the visitations, served as a working committee to interpret and decide how to respond to the visitation survey results. This working committee provided an effective arena in which to mobilize for effective and concerted local governmental responses to problems identified by the visitations. "We had the city manager in the interviewer group, he was on the working committee. See, what we did, any time we had any problems, say like a pothole or something like that, we would just say 'here' to him." He laughed, "you know, that was something that the local government signed off on from the start. That's very important with a program like this, because you've got to have that kind of cooperation up front from the local government."

6. The review and response to problems identified by the visitations demonstrated the value of chamber-local government cooperation, as both entities gain in credibility through their cooperation. "The mayor signed off, along with the president of the chamber, on the original letter that went out" notifying local firms that they would be visited by the chamber's R and E program. "The credibility that that gives the program is so important." Thus, the credibility of the chamber's effort was enhanced through the mayor's promise of local governmental support. However, participation in the program enhanced the stature of local governmental officials among local business leaders, because government was seen as "responsive" to their concerns.

When asked to provide specific examples of how the R and E program had resulted in business retention or
expansion, the local coordinator was disconcerted. "Oh, it's really hard to come up with an example off the top of my head," he said uncomfortably.

"I'm liable to—you know, it isn't very likely that someone will come up to me and say 'well, because of this we're going to'—well...," he paused. "There was one—see, it is soft [evidence of program effectiveness].

"We had one firm that was trying to decide whether to expand here or to do a relocation. And I'm not sure whether it was because of our efforts or not because—I know that we got, we were able to get some of their VP's down here, we were able to meet with the chief executive officers. And, you know, I can't possibly say that's the reason" that the firm in fact remained in the community. "But, it certainly didn't hurt."

In the future, the coordinator mentioned, SE City's chamber intends to repeat the visitation process. "This program is geared specifically to manufacturing. Now we're pushing to get it going again, but geared to white collar, to find out the same type of things about white collar industries." The rationale he gave for wanting to repeat the process was that the first program had been effective in the regards mentioned above. He attributed the program's success to the use of volunteers, the public-private sector cooperation, and the program's orientation toward providing rapid responses by local government and the chamber to problems identified through the visitation process. The researcher would add to this explanation of program effectiveness the considerable extent to which the chamber, as the local program's sponsor, was accustomed already to making retention efforts and to utilizing volunteers extensively to deliver and promote chamber services. Thus, the chamber was comfortable with the prescribed program strategies and aims.

Northern County, meanwhile, represents a context similar to SE City, but different in important respects. Like SE City, Northern County enjoyed a very healthy and diversified local economy, experiencing one of the
fastest economic growth rates in its state. Unlike SE City however, Northern County experienced a fairly sharp recession in the early 1980's, which underscored "for us," the R and E leader said, "the need to be doing more to keep our industries healthy. We were probably a little harder hit than in the past recessions. So, it kind of made people think a little bit more."

Constituting another important contextual difference, while SE City was one of a few metropolitan areas studied that had one consolidated government serving both the city and the county, Northern County was comprised of a city government surrounded by a fair number of rural and suburban municipal governments. In Northern County, one of the two principal administrators of the chamber's R and E program said, "we have [the city] and then we have several municipalities that are directly surrounding [it], and everyone was working on their own.

"We are all part of Northern County, and that is the area that [this] chamber of commerce covered. So, what we decided would work best is to put together a public-private partnership. Because, when people, when prospects would call us, we were finding we would have to refer them to several different municipalities. Now, all of these municipalities border on [the city], and actually where a lot of the growth in our area is happening is in the surrounding municipalities. A lot in [the city] also, though. And we have seven or eight industrial parks and there was no one person that could give someone information on all those parks--they would have to go to seven or whatever different municipalities."

Thus, the impetus for the municipal governments to work together came from those, mostly local chamber leaders, who were concerned about the problems in attracting new industries that local jurisdictional fragmentation generated. The county chamber took the unusual step of creating an operating foundation, to conduct research aimed at improving the county-wide economy. The R and E visitation effort constituted just one, albeit important, facet of this effort to spur
county-wide cooperation.

Like SE City's chamber, Northern County's is well funded. The latter's chamber foundation is supported by the local governments and by "probably over 90 or 100 different private investors," whose investments are tax-deductible. The chamber foundation was created in 1984 and its orientation, like that of the SE City chamber, has been predominantly toward the retention of existing firms rather than toward firm attraction.

"We've found that because eighty percent of our community's growth happens from within the existing industrial base, then those are the people and those are the type of things that we're going to pay particular attention to--the retention of what's already here." Although the chamber foundation's focus is predominantly on business retention, research is conducted to facilitate firm attraction, through industrial park feasibility studies and the like. One example was a study conducted to determine "what types of products are needed by our area firms [that] are being imported from outside.

"What we'll do with this information," she continued, "is first go to our local firms and let them know that there is a need for products, in case they might like to expand their product line. And then secondly, to go actually outside our area and look for firms in other states" to provide the locally needed products, "if that niche can't be filled within our existing industrial firms." Thus, this R and E program leader said, even efforts to encourage firms to relocate into the area give highest priority to supporting firms already there.

While SE City utilized leadership program participants once to conduct the R and E visitations and now plans to use chamber member volunteers for future visitations, Northern County's chamber foundation has a standing committee of 12 volunteers who ongoingly conduct the visitations. "We have a group of volunteers, called our 'retention committee'. They make a personal call to this company, and go through a survey
which is about five pages long," the R and E leader explained. "This group will be pretty much handling the load [of conducting all the targeted visitations]. We have about 230 firms that we plan on contacting on a yearly basis."

Where SE City's R and E volunteers were drawn from various community sectors, Northern County's were drawn almost exclusively from business. One notable exception was that the director of a local technical institute served on the retention committee, suggesting the importance given by R and E participants to the linkage between business development and educational and training programs.

"The make-up of the [retention] committee is pretty much through our chamber membership and mainly it's private firms, the key management people in those firms that are making these calls. We have a lot of people with that background--sales-type background, financial institution people, business people, people who deal a lot with other people, that find it easy to relate, to get that appointment, and so on.

"So, it's important that you have [volunteers] who work well and deal with people, that can in conversation pull out this information. They actually go through a survey sitting with the CEO...It's almost like a sales call." This R and E program leader's comments echo the SE City R and E coordinator's suggestion that the volunteers need to be selected on the basis of serving as legitimate or credible representatives of the R and E program, and that they need to be articulate and confident in interview settings.

"The types of things that we're looking for in that survey are to find out, first of all, general statistical information --size, products, address--just to keep our files updated. And [the volunteers] also acquire [the firms'] annual reports. And we set up a file on each of our companies...Then, what we hope to find out is whether this company is expanding. If they are, is there anything that we could help them with--whether it be financial programs, finding an existing
building, a site available in the area?...If they're having any particular problems, we want to find that out and track that down."

Thus, while the contexts in which the SE City and Northern County R and E programs emerged differed, the basic program aims were very similar. Like SE City's effort, Northern County's was aimed at facilitating public-private sector cooperation, retaining and expanding existing firms, and improving and consolidating relationships between the chamber and its business members. Just as SE City's R and E program involved substantial efforts to catalyze quick responses by local government to problems that the visitations identified firms as having with them, so did Northern County's program.

However, because of the latter program sponsor's status as a non-profit foundation, "we're prohibited from any lobbying activities. Through the foundation or through any of the staffpeople who work with it. But, we do have a department in our chamber [i.e., not in the chamber foundation, a legally separate entity], that is working on governmental affairs. All of the local government related problems, questions, concerns, et cetera are passed on to that department."

The foundation's legal status enables it to secure funding with which to conduct research regarding the local economy, but also precludes foundation staff and volunteers from lobbying. In most of the local R and E programs studied, those who conduct the visitations are themselves leaders in the various community sectors. Thus, in most instances, there is a an integration whereby those who identify R and E-related information can and do also initiate local policy and action in response to that information. The foundation's legal status, however, precludes this local program from achieving that integration. The R and E survey information is generated by one group, supported by the foundation, then transmitted for action to another group, supported by the legally less constrained chamber. This local program should prove an excellent site in which to conduct a comparative case study, to
determine the extent to which the role differentiation affects the extent to and means by which business-government cooperation is fostered by the R and E program.

It would appear that the Northern County program in fact is improving the degree of such cooperation. In addition to citing each of the benefits that SE City's R and E coordinator mentioned as resulting from the program, Northern County's program leader noted "much better communication" among the previously uncoordinated local governments. She also described how the visitation survey results led to the formation of a county-wide "taxpayers association" whose task is to monitor local governmental budgets and expenditures. The survey results had cited significant concern in the local business community about possibly excessive government spending and taxation.

Thus, Northern County's program, like that of Heartland County, appears to have resulted in important changes in local accountability dynamics. However, while the latter's methods of ensuring local governmental accountability became more informal and identification-with, the former's appears to have become more formal and identification-cf. The creation of a taxpayers association may be interpreted as constituting the initiation of a relatively adversarial means by which to assess and enforce appropriate local governmental action. If this interpretation, which only a case study could substantiate, is accurate, then it may be that such adversarial accountability dynamics are one cost of differentiating the role of R and E information gathering from that of data analysis and response initiation. Such a case study merits implementation, as it could have significant policy implications.

Where Heartland County's and SE City's R and E generally participants could cite few specific examples of tangible, positive outcomes, Northern County's program leader cited several. A number of firms indicated a need for and were assisted in finding larger
local facilities into which to relocate their operations. Several firms had problems with various local governmental agencies that "in some cases were costing them a lot of money. One company was being flooded out every few months because of overflow from a drainage ditch. The company had complained many times" to the local municipality, "without any satisfaction.

"But, when the chamber contacted [the government agency]," the program leader explained, "a crew was out there two days later. They corrected the problem." She could and did cite several other such examples. It is posited that the role differentiation employed in Northern County's program facilitated the unusual extent to which that program's sponsor could cite "objective" evidence of local program effectiveness.

It may well be that R and E programs which use role specialization to assign the gathering of information and the identification and initiation of appropriate action to different organizational units have more formalized procedures for facilitating inter-departmental integration. Lacking the informal patterns of communication typically found in programs where such role and unit differentiation are absent, the role specializing programs compensate by instituting formal accountability reporting mechanisms. In other words, in most of the (admittedly few) local programs studied, those who gathered the survey information themselves knew what action the information catalyzed, because they themselves were responsible in large measure for catalyzing it. In Northern County's program, however, those who gathered the information did not have such intimate familiarity with the action-response dynamics of the program.

It may be reasonable to assume that a special flow of communication was created, from the chamber to its foundation, to inform the volunteers regarding such action dynamics. If this indeed was the case, then the unusual extent to which the R and E program leader could identify tangible positive outcomes becomes explicable: more systematic effort to obtain such information was made than is usually deemed necessary by participants.
While the program leader articulated several specific positive outcomes which benefitted this or that specific firm, several of the outcomes she mentioned pertained to the formation of new organizations, such as the county taxpayers association. This very limited information forms the basis for another hypothesis. Only representatives of three local programs mentioned the creation of formal organizations as a program outcome. Northern County and two of the several R and E programs in Ohio indicated this type of outcome.

The hypothesis is that the local R and E process leads to formalized response strategies when the process is conducted under centralized, rather than diffuse, local program leadership. When the Northern County program leader discussed the county chamber's effort to catalyze the creation of the taxpayers association, she spoke of the effort as being conducted by one chamber staffperson, rather than by a group of volunteers or a chamber committee.

The theoretical rationale for this hypothesis is that leaders who participate in a diffuse leadership process share the responsibility for initiating action with other process co-leaders. In a more centralized leadership process, the role responsibility for conceiving and initiating action is much less shared. Those who participate in the diffuse leadership process may draw readily upon their co-leaders' efforts and insights in formulating and enacting policy. However, the centralized leader compensates for his or her relative isolation by constructing formal organizations, by which to acquire and utilize the collective resources and legitimacy needed to effect new initiatives.

The discussion above might be interpreted to suggest that Northern County's R and E program eschewed the use of informal networking. This is not the case. The chamber and its foundation both employed a number of committees, comprised of chamber members who volunteered often substantial amounts of time, to research local business and economic issues and to suggest new policy initiatives. However, it was at the point where such policy recommendations were to be promoted to specific
local constituencies, especially to local jurisdictions, that formal organizations stepped in. These formal organizations, such as the chamber, its foundation, and the taxpayers association, interposed between the volunteer policy framers and the intended recipients of the policy dialogue.

This suggests another hypothesis whose substantiation will require further research. In Heartland's and several other local programs, many recommendations were promoted more through informal networks than through formal, public presentations. It may be that the Northern County R and E program tended to use formal organizations to fill the role of promoter of recommendations due to the apparently greater degree of political environmental complexity in that county. Perhaps the sheer number of hitherto uncoordinated local governments and somewhat overlapping jurisdictions would have made a more informal approach to recommendations promotion infeasible.

Most of the R and E programs studied were conducted in rural counties. SE City and Northern County were the two urban contexts in which these programs were examined. In SE City, the program was able to enjoy the advantages of a consolidated, metropolitan area-wide government. In fact, that community's R and E program coordinator indicated that there was little of the fragmentation problem often expressed by other coordinators. Thus, it may be presumed that local governmental agencies there were fairly accustomed to relatively simple strategies of inter-jurisdictional coordination—in fact, perhaps almost to the extent found often in smaller, rural communities. In Northern County, the program leader indicated that one of the reasons for initiating the R and E program had been the relative lack of such coordination.

From the above analysis it becomes clear that both the political environmental context in which an R and E program is conducted as well as the means by which it is implemented are important in determining the kinds of outcomes realized. It would appear, in summary, that rural contexts and politically uncomplicated urban
environments such as that found in SE City are more conducive to the generation of identification-with accountability dynamics than is a politically complicated urban environment such as Northern County.

The data thus far discussed suggest that the R and E process typically helps local community leaders reduce the extent to which efforts to support local development are fragmented. While this had not been a significant problem prior to program implementation in SE City, the program appears at least not to have fostered fragmentation. In Northern County, the R and E process led to formal organizational initiatives to facilitate inter-organizational coordination on development initiatives. In Heartland, as has been seen, the process led to informal networking initiatives.

It should be noted that the problem of fragmentation—i.e., of un-coordinated efforts to frame and enact local development policy—may result not only from the complexity of inter-organizational relations and the sheer number of different organizational actors who possess overlapping spheres of responsibility for such policy. The information provided by the coordinator of Northwestern Town's R and E program suggests that fragmentation also may result from local ideological conflicts.

NW (Northwestern) Town is the county seat in a rural county. The county's economy traditionally has depended predominantly on an agricultural base, on the employment and income generated by a four-year university located in the county seat, and on the service and retail sectors which support the university and farming populations. The county had approximately fifty industrial firms, few of which employed more than 100 persons. In the county seat of approximately 20,000 persons, it took the R and E program coordinator "more than three years to get the program going."

As director of NW Town's economic development commission [EDC], this respondent had first suggested the creation of a local R and E program in 1983. It was not until 1986 that the local chamber of commerce and
the town and county governments agreed to finance and endorse the R and E effort. The EDC director explained that the "delay" in program initiation was "needed to get everybody to agree that this thing should be done."

The EDC director related that there were ideological differences among various local constituencies concerning how their local economy should evolve. University-affiliated citizens were interested in maintaining the current mix of existing local firms, while the business community advocated a policy of aggressively expanding existing firms and attracting new ones from elsewhere. This bitter debate was further complicated by those farmers and environmentalists who opposed the potential ecological damage that such aggressive development could yield.

The EDC director, after apparently considerable maneuvering behind the scenes, was able to secure the agreement of local governments, the chamber and the university, to finance the hiring on a half-time basis of a recently retired university professor to serve as R and E program coordinator. The director and this coordinator then worked with the local chamber to recruit about forty volunteers to conduct a "citizens survey."

The citizens survey, which the state's R and E training coordinator "helped us with," the EDC director explained, was designed "to find out the attitudes of the citizens on business expansion and development. We structured our expansion and retention program a great deal from that survey. After we found out what the citizens were willing to accept, and their attitudes on questions having to do with business expansion, then we structured from there. And so, it's been a long process of getting everybody going in the same direction. At least we've been successful doing that to this point."

This survey affirmed what most already knew regarding the different philosophies concerning how local development should proceed. "The university faculty and staff want to lock the door after they get in," the EDC director explained. "They have this
general attitude—in other words, they want to protect the community as it is. And the business people are a little more aggressive, they want to bring in additional business and expansion...The university [here] is a large percentage of the population.

"The town is only about 20,000 and the university has about 6,000 and another 4,000 support people. So, we've got a couple of fairly equal sized groups within the community that tend to look at business development in a little bit of a different light. That's one of the reasons it took us a fairly long time and using a fairly easy, fairly comprehensive educational program, essentially, to get everybody" to cooperate and participate in the R and E effort.

The formation of a committee, comprised of appointees from the city and county governments and local chamber "gave us a good representation of the sections of the community. That also made our economic development [commission] a community-wide organization, if you will. It gave us credence within all of the diverse groups in our community." The EDC asked the city council to appoint representatives not only from city government, but also from the university's faculty and administration. "So, right at the beginning I think our committee was fairly well seen as not being a special interest group, but as a group which had the interests of the community as a whole in mind.

"Then, when we went out into the community on our [citizens] survey program," the representativeness of this committee "helped a great deal," the EDC director explained. The committee recruited the forty volunteers and had them go door-to-door throughout the various neighborhoods of NW Town, administering the citizens survey. "We got a lot of publicity in the media from that, so we made a lot of contacts. And it gave the community the feeling that they were involved in the program, because they were asked their opinions."

The survey was not only a means of building legitimacy for the R and E program, however. "We used the survey results," the EDC director said, "as a major
section of the development plan" that the state R and E training coordinator compiled. The survey concerned "mostly attitudes having to do with business development. [But] we also asked them about school expansion, things having to do with school programs, city infrastructure programs, whether they'd be willing to pay additional taxes for various kinds of improvements within the community. Feelings that were important information to have, and also related to business development."

Regarding the pre-visitation, citizens survey process, the EDC director commented that "by and large it was proof--I think surveys, if you've been in a community very long, just a lot of times back up what you already know. I think it did show that people were willing to have light business development. Obviously, this is not a heavy industrial area; so we assumed people would not be in favor of that kind of development--and they weren't....In other words, by and large, they were in favor of what we have now. They were happy to have the industry we have now expanded--if done properly."

Once the citizens survey results were compiled, the local ad hoc committee, comparable to the R and E task force in Heartland, conducted the business visitation survey. For this survey, the committee's members and a few other persons volunteered to perform the visitations. "We've just completed" the visitation survey, the EDC director said, "and the purpose of that was to flag potential cases that might need assistance. Essentially, in that case [where a particular business problem was identified], we would just form an informal incubator-type advisory group to meet the need of the individual business.

"We're just getting those survey results quantified now. We hope they will show us our businesses who need capital expansion, if they need property expansion, if anybody is thinking of going out of business because things aren't going too well. And if we flag any businesses that need information or look like they might need assistance, we'll personally contact them with one
of our committee people and then see what we can do to assist them. We have a number of resources, both in the business community and the university campus, that we can furnish just about any kind of assistance necessary."

Thus, the R and E process, not yet completed, had already eased inter-faction tensions sufficiently to permit concerted cooperation. Once a vehicle for facilitating cooperation had been created, the participants were able to conduct the survey, identify the specific concerns of existing firms, and open the doors through which access to important local resources to resolve those concerns could be provided.

As with the leaders of most of the local programs studied, NW Town's EDC director was not able to cite many specific examples of particular firms that had been expanded or retained by the R and E process. This may well be because the program had not been completed yet. However, like each of the coordinators interviewed, the EDC director noted a number of broad initiatives that had emerged from the program process. The committee catalyzed the creation of a $350,000 revolving loan fund, using state monies, which existing firms could use to expand. The respondent suggested that the R and E process enabled the community to justify being awarded the state support necessary to create this revolving loan fund.

Providing partial substantiation of the hypothesis that the degree of local political environmental complexity partly determines (or, in qualitative parlance, shapes) the formality or formality of methods used to promote program recommendations, the NW Town had opted to create the new, formal organization (the Economic Development Commission) upon completion of the citizens survey. Here, there was not the jurisdictional complexity found in Northern County, but rather the complexity wrought by factional tensions. Based on the limited data of the one telephone interview, it appears that the EDC represented a semi-formal vehicle for promoting the recommendation to conduct an R and E program. The researcher hypothesizes that a more formal
approach—i.e., one that did not use only informal "advisory groups"—would have been taken had the participants not been successful in somewhat resolving factional tensions.

Among the informal, broad outcomes of the visitation process was an initiative by which the local R and E committee now works closely with the university's research and development director. "That's one of the prime focuses we have now. That's to develop the coordination I mentioned earlier, between the research that's being done at the university and keeping those products [designed by the research] locally. The main focus of this program is essentially to keep the ideas that are generated at the university paying money into the university and to the faculty that develop them, through the development of [new or expanded existing] businesses" to market these products.

"We have also made a number of contacts [with] graduates of the university who are now presidents of various organizations throughout the country—we've met some amount of interest for that. They know the community, and they know the work force that's here. They know the research and development that's available here at the university. And we've had a number of them now that are interested either in locating a research or light manufacturing facility within the community, in the future, as needs develop. That's one of our main focuses."

The EDC director thus described a synergistic university-business partnership whereby each came to understand, appreciate and support the different but complementary interests of the other. Informal, identification-with interaction clearly facilitated this cooperation, as both parties now could anticipate what would interest and meet the needs of the other. This is a remarkable development in a community in which university and business constituencies had until recently fought openly.

In another community, whose R and E coordinator asked that its identity be kept anonymous for reasons
which should become obvious to the reader, a comparable story of the R and E process' potential healing value is found. In this community, a local elected official and his government were in such painful conflict with leaders of the local business community that bitter arguments, full of invective, commonly occurred in city council meetings.

In one such meeting, the mayor died of a heart attack. That community's local R and E coordinator said, eleven months later, that he himself had viewed the R and E process--"from the moment I first heard about the [R and E] idea"--as a "way to prevent that kind of thing ever happening again in our community. You should have heard the terrible things they used to say to each other in those meetings. Awful things, hateful, spiteful things....Now, we feel like we're working together."

Perhaps not incidentally, one of the broad outcomes of that community's R and E process was the formation of a formal development organization to promote development policies to the still somewhat factionalized local community. The hypothesis concerning the relationship between environmental tensions and the degree of formalization of the organization designed to promote recommendations thus finds further, modest support.

Perhaps we utilize formal organizations to catalyze collective action when the process of negotiating on a person-to-person basis for such change would prove too painful. Where negotiation is among amiable parties, the process of identifying with one another is probably not personally painful. However, where those parties mistrust, hate or even condemn one another as "evil", the process of identifying with one another enough to allow meaningful negotiation to occur must prove more than unsettling, even painful. Perhaps, the creation of formal organizations which in turn negotiate with other organizations allows participants to experience themselves as somewhat detached not only from the other negotiating party, but also from themselves. In other words, they may experience themselves as filling-a-formal-role and as a role-interacting-with-another-role.
Perhaps the tendency to create formalized vehicles for initiating social action is a means of protecting ourselves from the pain we sense would be accompanied by a more identification-with approach to policy negotiation and social interaction.

The power of the R and E process appears to be that it facilitates identification-with interaction, thereby lessening alienation and a blaming or adversarial approach to accountability. The strength of the process is that its essential design is sufficiently flexible that either formal or informal organizations can be created to promote the recommendations it generates. In other words, the process takes participants as close to empathic interaction as they feel safe in going.
A. Introduction

The design of this research project emerged from the posing of two basic questions concerning local business retention and expansion programs: 1) What are the criteria used by R and E program participants and constituencies for assessing R and E program effectiveness? 2) What factors appear most salient in enhancing or impeding such effectiveness as it is variously defined?

Very early in the research process it became clear that the researcher's resources were too limited to investigate the ways in which various constituencies defined and assessed effectiveness. Any program that concerns economic development, such as R and E, will have as many constituencies as there are citizens. Instead, the research focussed on the assessment of effectiveness as it was understood by actual program participants.

Over the course of several months of observation, participant observation, and telephone and personal interviews, it became apparent that R and E programs tend to yield three general classes of outcomes. More specifically, R and E programs tend to lead participants--business interviewees, visitation volunteers and task force members alike--to make three sorts of connections: epistemological, social and political. In this chapter, the nature of these connections will be explored. Various program design features implicit and explicit in the R and E program prescription have facilitated "connection" outcomes that distinguish R and E from other local development.
strategies. These design features constitute factors which enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of the program as it has been defined by program participants.

In the process of addressing the program outcomes, how these outcomes are perceived and assessed by participants, and the factors which lead to their realization, wider implications will be drawn. The findings suggest implications, for example, regarding how best to assess the effectiveness of programs and policies. Several potentially fruitful directions for future research also will be indicated. Finally, a variety of recommendations will be offered pertaining to the field of educational administration.

B. Program Outcomes

The reader's indulgence is asked concerning the remarks immediately following. Their relevance to an understanding of effectiveness will be shown. An analogy between sports and social programming is drawn in order to encourage consideration of certain aspects of program design and effectiveness assessment that ordinarily are overlooked.

Many coaches distinguish between three ingredients often deemed necessary for success in sports: proper attitude, analytic understanding of strategy, and talent. The first can be encouraged through exhortation, and reinforced by providing opportunities for experiential understanding of the rewards of proper attitude. The second can be taught through verbal instruction and experiential reinforcement. Talent, which constitutes a capacity, a potentiality, cannot be taught. Most highly successful athletic coaches understand that talent cannot be taught, nor be instilled or heightened through rational thought or discourse alone.
Talent cannot be taught directly, for there are no rationally logical recipes for behaving in a talented way. Talent can only be nurtured, by creating conditions conducive to its flowering. Paradoxically, the only proactive way in which one can force its emergence is to act concertedly to provide an environment in which talent will want to emerge, seemingly of its own accord.

Coaches in every sport understand, even if often inarticulately, that some abilities are best not thought about too consciously. In baseball, the batter who is taught or simply tends to think too much, whose awareness is cluttered with verbal "do's" and "don'ts", has not learned, or has un-learned, the value of letting go. The athlete who is overly conscious of one's own effort to perform will, more often than not, be unable to respond with requisite speed and accuracy. Thus, in baseball and in sports generally, as well as in policy and program design, there are limits to the extent to which rational prescription—which tends to channel conscious awareness—can be effective. At some point, greater levels of effectiveness can only be achieved through the elicitation of tacit knowledge.

In sports as in policy, the best coaches and leaders understand that several conditions should be created if one would elicit the reservoir of tacit knowledge which participants possess. In baseball, the best batters are invariably confident. That is, they trust themselves. They trust their innate abilities to respond quickly, accurately, and comprehensively to a rapidly changing gestalt. They not only trust their abilities, they equally importantly trust their own intentions.

Numerous students of sport have commented that perhaps the most essential "purpose" of games is to create the conditions in which participants may experience transcendence of their everyday abilities: the quarterback throwing a sixty yard pass with ineffable grace and precision; the outfielder making a leaping catch he never imagined he could make; the gymnast who performs impossible moves on the balance
beam. The sports world is replete with the stories of athletes who have said they regard the moments when they performed far beyond their expectations of themselves as among the finest and most "magical" events in their lives. Not the applause following the moment, but the wonder that it has even occurred appears to be the central source of satisfaction. It is as though doing the impossible forces the startled athlete to recognize something new--about oneself and about the nature of the world.

The human tendency is to develop rational, logical explanations for what we do. Religions are so important, in part, because they serve to explain the inexplicable, because they mediate between our need for stability and rational understanding and the literally awesome forces which lurk in the shadows of our seemingly constant, socially constructed world. Athletes who perform in previously unimaginably talented ways time and again say they "cannot explain how I did that." When the miraculous deed is done, the athlete is compelled to consider that some of these ineffable forces must surely be benign--which, in turn, encourages one to feel less anxious about whether one actually can explain how or why it happened.

Many athletes who have experienced themselves behaving magically soon discover, to their dismay, that efforts to control, command or rationally re-enact the emergence of the magical performance only prevents its recurrence. Here, coaching can play an invaluable role in facilitating the everyday performance of the "Impossible". The key seems to be for the coach to understand what is coachable and what is not. The finest athletic instructors understand that the athlete's rational mind must be led away from direct attention to one's own talent-processes. Rational cognition, in other words, needs to be occupied by other matters in such a way that tacit awareness is freed to act.

There are direct parallels between such coaching and the design of public policies and social programs. Some policies and programs, like some game plans, are
over-prescribed. Where there are too many, and too particularistic, prescriptions shaping awareness and action the participants become stilted, cautious, and afraid. Overly definitive prescription prevents participants from acting in the more spontaneous manner which latent talent requires. It therefore prevents them from experiencing the fruit of tacit ability and understanding, which in turn reinforces the pre-existing suspicion that the unexplained is not to be trusted. The stultifying atmosphere of the bureaucracy, for example, may be due essentially to the anxieties which over-rationalization engenders.

On the other hand, an absence or insufficiency of agreed upon prescriptive guidelines can foster anarchic chaos. Without some measure of order, the psyche becomes so occupied with finding ways to create and impose it that there is not enough residual energy with which to focus one's tacit awareness. And, such focussed concentration must be permitted to operate if our innate brilliance is to emerge.

Identification-with cognition is one important form of tacit awareness. Left-hemispheric rationality is simply too slow, methodical and plodding to achieve the gestalt awareness necessary to imagine oneself as being truly in the other person's shoes. Empathizing, taking-the-role-of-the-other, requires a general apperception of the other person's overall perspective (i.e., gestalt)—rather than a rational understanding of discrete, unrelated aspects of his or her view. Identification-with cognition, like tacit awareness generally, will not emerge if one must occupy one's energies in constructing a predictable explanation of the other's actions and way of being.

Thus, just as the emergence of talent will not occur without some measure of external consistency, order and logical coherence, so identification-with cannot occur if one is so unfamiliar with the other as to have not yet constructed a relatively ordered interpretation of the other. But, what is the relevance of such considerations about identification-with, talent and tacit knowledge in general?
Their importance may best be understood by imagining an environment inimicable to them. An environment characterized by the predominance of identification-with is one in which individuals feel, perceive themselves, and therefore act in ways constrained by their considerations for one another. An environment characterized by the predominance of identification-of, or detached analytic cognition, is one in which alienation of one from another flourishes. In the latter, persons regard themselves, and therefore behave, as autonomous agents.

As the authors of Habits of the Heart (Bellah et al., 1985) suggest (though they use a different lexicon), the United States constitutes a society in which identification-of cognition does and is supposed to dominate. This mode of perception is conducive to changefulness, the placement of a premium on individual over collective rights, competition, and a disordered cacophony of uncoordinated actors and policy makers who interrelate in fragmented ways. A society characterized by the hegemony of identification-of over identification-with cognition may achieve a precarious kind of dynamic equilibrium, the nature of which we need to understand in order to frame appropriate policies and program designs.

Relatively unrestrained identification-of cognition has two important tendencies. On the one hand, it fosters rapid changefulness in the social and physical environment. On the other, it seeks to impose increasingly rationalized social constructions of reality—bureaucracies, highly detailed policy and program implementation prescriptions, and reductionist, logical positivist theory.

Individuals may interact with their social and physical environment from one or the other, or some mix, of identification-of and identification-with awareness. Those whose interaction is shaped primarily by the former will view elements of the environment as discrete, as separate from each other and from their own person. Those who identify-with environmental elements will tend to see these as interrelated with each other
and themselves. The former, experiencing themselves as detached, will feel free to manipulate the environment with much less trepidation and concern than would the latter, who are likely to feel that the effects upon environmental elements are at the same time comparable effects upon themselves.

Unconstrained by empathic conservatism, the autonomous agent may foster considerable environmental change. In the aggregate, a society or community of autonomous agents may create such a rapid rate of changefulness that its members threaten their own capacity to anticipate and to respond to the changes they and their compatriots create. As Alvin Toffler noted in *Future Shock* (1970), there are biological and psychological limits to the adaptability of humans to change. Individuals are constructed to respond especially alertly to environmental change; they will consciously notice novelty long before noting sameness.

The response to change involves, biologically, the discharge by the brain stem's ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) of adrenalin, i.e. of energy to meet or flee the novel element. There are important limits on the frequency and intensity of the ARAS response to change. Over time, it will become inoculated against, and therefore unresponsive to, more subtle levels of environmental change. That is, if the ARAS is not permitted the luxury of restoration through immersion in a more stable environment, then only gradually increasing levels of novelty will awaken the ARAS response. These biological dynamics are mirrored on the psychological level. The essential outcome of unconstrained identification-of cognition, and therefore of the environmental changefulness it generates, therefore must be a corresponding desensitization of persons to the changes which they foster. This is perhaps why there is a science of advertising, through which ever more strident and abrasive stimuli are created to capture our wearied attention. It is also why it proves so difficult to mobilize social concern regarding this or that crisis. We cannot be bothered because we have not the requisite residual energy even to notice, let alone to respond.
To counteract the stresses created in a society of autonomous change agents, rational modes of social organization are needed and constructed to impose the degree of coherent order necessary for daily functioning. However, these organizations, like the individuals who inhabit them, interact with one another in competitive, uncoordinated and therefore often unpredictable ways. The paradox is that identification of rationality creates a kind of orderedness which fosters change, which in turn encourages the imposition of an intensified rational order that generates yet more change.

In the arena of economic development, with which this study has been centrally concerned, there is evidence that some American communities are recognizing and wanting to alleviate the costs of uncoordinated change. In every one of the communities in which some of whose R and E participants were interviewed, concern about such change was mentioned repeatedly. Nearly every R and E participant interviewed expressed some degree of alarm regarding the costs of fragmentation. Fragmentation was perceived as characterizing the efforts of diverse government agencies, elected officials, and business advocacy groups to foster good local development.

These local development actors were seen as often not knowing one another, as making plans which did not articulate synergistically with the other actors' designs, and as taking actions which thwarted or failed to complement those of the other actors. Significantly, the bottom line articulated by R and E participants was that such fragmentation was bad because it was not effective. This assessment may be interpreted as arising out of one or both of two different motivations. Those concerned about the costs, which they saw as increasing in many instances, may have wanted an imposition of inter-organizational coordination in order for there to be an environment conducive to more intensified, more effective, pursuit of their respective autonomous, competitive interests. On the other hand, participants could have been motivated to encourage
coordination for its own sake, i.e. as something intrinsically rewarding.

As indicated earlier, two sorts of R and E program outcomes will be considered: those which participants themselves perceived and articulated, and those which the researcher perceived. Similarly, two basic kinds of effectiveness criteria will be considered: those based on the conscious aims that motivated participation in the program, and those which the researcher suggests may be noteworthy from an "outsider", though not objective, perspective.

One central finding of the research is that the criteria that participants themselves used to assess their program's effectiveness tended to change over the course of their involvement. Initially, as noted, virtually every participant considered as a basic program aim the goal of fostering greater coordination among local development agents. When pressed to explain this interest, most said they sought coordination "because it will enable us to accomplish" this or that particular pragmatic outcome. For example, many saw greater coordination as leading to an increased capacity to retain existing local firms, to provide governmental support to firms in more responsive and comprehensive ways, and to amass otherwise disaggregated local resources necessary for larger development projects, such as industrial parks. Very few said early in their participation that they hoped to facilitate coordination for its own sake, i.e., because coordination itself was a satisfying end.

Over time, many though not all, increasingly began to express enthusiasm regarding the pleasantness of the cooperative, coordinative process itself. A majority of the participants in R and E programs in Ohio and elsewhere eventually would remark that they enjoyed "getting an overall understanding of the community," "working with other people," and "becoming involved" in decisions affecting the "well-being of the community." However, few of them, when pressed to explain their satisfaction, appeared to feel comfortable with saying they positively valued these cooperative processes for
their own sake. The clear impression was conveyed repeatedly that this aim indeed was valued for its intrinsic merit, but that most did not feel comfortable in using any other than instrumental rationalities to explain and justify their motivations.

It appears likely that certain aspects of the R and E program design, which while not unique are nonetheless uncommon, are conducive to this emergent appreciation for the non-instrumental benefits of coordination. These design aspects will be considered soon. Here, a distinction should be made between simple coordination and cooperative coordination. The latter is defined here as involving identification—i.e., empathic—interpersonal dynamics, whereas the former is seen as being driven by rationally orchestrated interaction. The notion is that participants in a simple coordinative process will say that they are motivated to facilitate coordination because it is an instrument for achieving other aims. Participants in a cooperative coordinative process, as defined here, are more likely to say they view the coordination as intrinsically satisfying.

The capacity of a social interaction process to achieve this ideal-type of cooperative coordination will be shaped or constrained by at least the following dynamics: 1) the pre-process predilection of participants toward decision making by consensus versus by hierarchical rationality; 2) the degree of environmental changefulness; 2) the degree of environmental complexity; and 4) the extent to which the prevailing culture acknowledges the worth of empathic interaction as an intrinsic good. These factors were identified through the research on R and E as influencing the extent to which cooperative coordination occurred in a given R and E program setting. Other factors could be operant, and possibly be more salient. Research is needed to assess the strength of the associations between these factors and the extent of cooperative coordination. Research also is needed to examine the nature of the possibly complex interplay among these factors.

Such research should be performed because, as
suggested earlier, the costs of not facilitating empathic (identification-with) interaction among community leaders and participants include increasingly stressful environmental changefulness, policy and program fragmentation, and other impediments to effective local development efforts.

Among the more interesting strengths of the R and E approach to local development is that several of its design aspects appear to facilitate a high degree of cooperative coordination across a variety of settings. It should be noted first that the level of cooperative coordination—as reflected by the frequency and intensity of participant comments expressing appreciation for coordination for its own sake—did vary from setting to setting. Second, this variance appeared to be associated with differences in the four variables mentioned above.

In settings where the R and E program leaders and, particularly, its initiators valued leadership by consensus (variable # 1) a greater degree of identification-with interaction among participants appeared to occur than where the leaders and initiators valued leadership by hierarchy. Second, there were some, partial indications that in more changeful community environments (variable # 2) identification-with interaction was slower to occur among program participants. Third, (variable # 3) in more urbanized settings (e.g., cities as opposed to rural county seats), identification-with was likely to occur less intensely among participants and to be experienced by fewer of the participants. Finally, (variable # 4), in each of the settings participants were seen as generally quite reluctant to justify their participation as being significantly because it would or did lead to intrinsically satisfying cooperative coordination, even though they did express considerable satisfaction about this perceived program outcome. The variable of culture is hypothesized to explain this reluctance, and to suggest that in cultures where it is more permissible to rationalize means in terms of intrinsically satisfying outcomes, R and E program participants would more freely articulate this as an important, perhaps even central,
program purpose and outcome in its own right.

The last major theoretical proposition is that programs which foster identification-with cognition have a significant potential to foster improved equity. Identification-with, it is suggested here, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for enhancing equity. It is proposed that there are two ideal-type approaches to equity: 1) through identification-of cognition, and 2) through identification-with cognition. The former is likely to employ a rational systems approach to fostering equity—i.e., the use of rules, laws, bureaucratic programs, and other rational methods of redistributing resources. The latter is likely to employ informal interpersonal resource sharing to redistribute resources.

The success of identification-of equity strategies usually is measured in quantitative terms. The effectiveness of identification-with approaches to equity, however, tend to be assessed in more affective terms. Where the former considers such variables as income, number of years of schooling, career mobility and the like, the latter addresses matters such as self-esteem, sense of ownership, and self-determination.

The philosophical stance taken here is that both identification-of and identification-with sorts of equity are important. The psychosocial factors with which the latter are concerned shape and are shaped by the extent to which the equity objectives of the former are achieved. The weakness of conventional policy approaches to increasing equity is that they seek to impose or induce quantitative gains without recognizing the importance of qualitative ones. These orthodox approaches rely almost exclusively identification-of cognition in framing policy goals, objectives, implementation strategies and effectiveness criteria.

Such policy is generally preferred by both the advantaged and the disadvantaged in the United States. The advantaged may prefer it because they do not wish to be or are not accustomed to identifying with the disadvantaged. Unfamiliar with or alienated from the
disadvantaged, they often employ causal theories to explain the existence of disadvantage. Frequently these theories impute pejorative stereotypical traits to the disadvantaged, such as that they are lazy, over-sexed, not rational, etc. These stereotypes tend to have one common thread—they ascribe non-rational traits to the disadvantaged.

Many of the equity policies legitimated by such causal explanations of disadvantage, rather than being motivated by concern engendered by identifying with the poor, are motivated by a rational utilitarianism, as in "it is in our own best interest." A majority of the poor, meanwhile, may appear to prefer identification-of approaches to equity to those driven by identification-with incentives. For, they have come to associate identification-with policy leadership with political decisions that heighten their exclusion from resources.

The problem, as critical theorists such as Paolo Friere contend, may be that the poor do not participate in those decision-making circles within which empathic relations occur. Yet, the fault lies not with policy framed by the values derived from identification-with interaction, but with "empathic circles" that simply do not include them. The disadvantaged also may distrust elites' identification-with because they understandably tend to see it expressed not as true "empathy" but as sympathy. Better the detached rationality of identification-of policies than the condescending charity of pseudo-identification with. However, once again, the problem is not inherent to identification but with a failure to really achieve it. Just what might the advantages of equity policies motivated by predominantly identification-with cognition be?

As proposed in Chapter IV, identification-of tends to be accompanied by a blaming orientation to accountability, whereas identification-with is associated with an understanding orientation. Where the former tends to emphasize causal explanations which see the disadvantaged individual as either fully determined or fully self-determining, the latter emphasizes the interdependent nature of the individual-environment
interaction. Thus, the former tends to explain poverty as reducible either to environmental factors or to individual character flaws. The latter sees poverty as resulting from an often exceedingly complex interplay between the disadvantaged individual and his or her environment.

Mainstream framers of equity policies tend to advocate the imposition of rational systems in order to achieve quantitative equity gains. The assumption is either that psychosocial gains (i.e., in self-esteem, self-determination, etc.) will accompany quantitative gains or that they are unimportant. Many critical theorists, emphasizing the importance of owning the means of one's own production, approach equity from an essentially similar position. Others, concerned about the qualitative aspects of the participatory democracy they hope to foster, argue that the essential task is to place the disadvantaged within the circle of those who make decisions affecting the quality of their lives.

Short of revolution, however, there are few very strategies by which to poor can gain significant entry into these decision making circles. The proposition here is that spurring the advantaged to identify both of and with the disadvantaged's concerns will hasten the latter's participation in decision making. Identification-of equity rationalities view fairness in terms of quantitative gains that constitute important aspects of equality. Identification-with cognition, on the other hand, usefully emphasizes the importance of psychosocial components.

In a culture dominated, as Bellah et al suggest, by utilitarian rationality, identification-with interaction is difficult to foster and sustain. The mainstream culture tends daily to suppress and delegitimate this cognitive style. However, identification-with is very much like an athletic talent—i.e., like an often latent capability. Like a coach who nurtures an athlete's talent, policy and program designers can foster greater levels of identification-with among program and policy arena participants. The R and E program design appears to have done so, and therefore its salient design
aspects merit scrutiny. By discussing design aspects hypothesized as salient the outcomes and goals as perceived by both the participants and the researcher may be considered. In discussing the design features, however, the three kinds of connections (epistemological, social and political) which R and E programs appear to foster also may be addressed at the same time. Participants indicated that these connections did occur, are among the best and most important outcomes of their involvement, and should constitute criteria by which to measure program effectiveness. Once these connection outcomes are described, the importance of understanding the contributory program design features may be appreciated more fully.

With regard to the fostering of equity, the conclusion is that the program or policy design needs to foster such epistemological, social and political connections, so that 1) participants achieve rational, identification-of awareness of the causal connections between their self-interests and those of the disadvantaged, and 2) they also achieve empathic, identification-with one another. The R and E programs studied in this research suggest that the capacity of R and E programs to foster the various kinds of equity gains conceived here is not being tapped. It is hypothesized that R and E activities may lead to the emergence of teachable moments in which 1) participants are instructed about identification-of (i.e., rational, causal) convergences between their interests and those of the local disadvantaged, and 2) they are encouraged to conduct follow-up, post-program activities in which they and the disadvantaged participate in making decisions of clearly mutual benefit. It is hoped and predicted that the latter will foster identification-with dynamics between the advantaged and the disadvantaged.
1. Making Epistemological Connections

What participants know changes, the research indicates, as a result of their R and E program involvement. There are three levels of knowledge at which epistemological changes occur, with varying intensity.

1. The most obvious level at which change occurs is at that between individual program participants. In other words, the information and knowledge that participant A brings into the program becomes, more or less, co-mingled with that of participant B.

2. Somewhat less obviously but nonetheless importantly, the interaction among organizational leaders and representatives through their program participation leads to changes in the store and quality of knowledge accessible to these organizations.

3. Less a proven outcome of program participation than a clear potentiality, R and E program involvement may lead some participants to experience a measure of integration, of cross-fertilization, between one intrapersonal knowledge set and another. For example, there is at least the undoubted potential of the R and E experience to lead participant A to integrate what he or she knows about business development with what he or she knows about the unemployed or disadvantaged. As noted earlier, there is the ethically motivated hope that this potentiality may be tapped. The research suggests that while such intrapersonal knowledge integration did not occur extensively in the programs studied, there nonetheless appear to be feasible program design modifications which could surmount dynamics which inhibit it. Facilitating intrapersonal knowledge integration should enhance program effectiveness as well as increase the likelihood for satisfying the equity-oriented intentions advocated here.

For, particularly in smaller communities, those recruited to participate in an R and E program often wear many hats in the community. That is, one may not
only be employed as a local politician, school administrator or chamber director, but also serve as boys club volunteer, Kiwanis member, and Junior Achievement League counselor. It is proposed that R and E leaders are more likely to have acquired identification-with apperceptions regarding the disadvantaged in these latter service capacities than in their service as development-related professionals.

In any event, at each of the three levels of knowledge exchange and integration, there are two kinds of knowledge content involved:

1. R and E program involvement leads participants to experience changes in descriptive knowing. In other words, their store of information about the "what's" of their community and its economic development dynamics changes. Nearly all participants, because the R and E strategy is designed to generate and disseminate information, develop revised cognitive maps of the community's development needs, and of its resources. One important kind of descriptive information, of course, which participants obtain is that concerning the economic outlook of significant local economic sectors and employers.

2. Program involvement also leads participants to revise their explanatory knowledge frames. That is, most tend to experience significant modifications in the causal explanations they employ to explain the "why's" of local development. By employing structured visitation survey formats designed by economists, participants are asked to acquire information much of which they had not regarded as causally related to factors they had used previously to explain development phenomena.

As mentioned, not only does the content of knowing change at these three levels, but so also does the mode of acquiring and validating knowledge. By creating an arena in which representatives of diverse, and hitherto often uncoordinated, local organizations can communicate their respective knowledge sets, participants are able to leap from an analytic to a synthetic mode of
Prior to involvement in such an arena, most representatives possess only very partial knowledge of the wide—some would say infinite—array of factors, needs and resources which characterize the local development milieu. Like professionals who are trained to diagnose and treat disparate aspects of a client's problem, the various development actors naturally see partial glimpses of the local development gestalt. While the dialogic arena created by R and E cannot claim to fulfill the unattainable goal of fostering truly comprehensive understanding, it undoubtedly generates discourse regarding knowledge sets with whose wide range few participants have ever become familiar previously. As a result of the sheer weight and range of this discourse about disparate knowledge sets, it becomes very difficult for participants not to make epistemological connections between the stores of knowledge offered by each set. Thus, this arena is highly conducive to a greater level of synthetic, gestalt-forming knowledge. This kind of knowledge may be distinguished from analytic knowledge, which tends to explain interacting dynamics by viewing their relational complexity as meaningfully reducible to a very limited set of independent variables.

Evident in the Heartland task force interaction over time was a noticeable increase in the reluctance of members to explain a given development phenomenon as being reducible to a very limited number of independent variables. Reductionistic, analytic reasoning was apparent and common in early task force meetings. Midway through the program process, task force members began to express reluctantly a growing awareness of the limitations of reductionistic cognitive maps and causal notions. This reluctance was evident in the form of frustration about the now perceived ineffectiveness of clinging to these notions, in tones of grudging appreciation as in, "I'll change my views, because I need to in order to be more effective—but I don't have to like it."

Toward the end of Heartland's program, there were
faint glimmers that some task force members now regarded synthetic cognition generally as more likely than analytic reduction to generate real truth. As one member said in the last meeting before the task force publicly presented its final report, when another task force member was seeking to explain a particular local economic phenomenon, "Maybe so, but I'm getting the feeling that [the reason] can't be that simple. Seems like everything's more complicated than you imagine [meaning, presumably, than any one person may imagine]."

If the R and E program experience does tend to encourage greater synthetic reasoning and perception, then a longer term program impact is likely to be that participants will be more open-minded regarding explanations of development phenomena than they were prior to the program. Those who seek to develop a sense of the overall picture are likely to appreciate that they lack sufficient knowledge with which to attain real clarity. Those with partial, reductionist perspectives may confuse their greater clarity about a given slice of the development picture with a comparable capacity to predict what will happen in that slice. Just as technologists, policy designers and scientists frequently are surprised by unanticipated consequences so are those who understand only one specialized set of situational dynamics but who lack at least a vague sense of the gestalt.

However, as suggested in the introductory remarks of this chapter, the tendency to employ predominantly identification-of, reductionistic cognition reinforces and is reinforced by sociocultural, biological and psychological dynamics. It is hypothesized that the transition will be made and consolidated over the post-program long term when certain social and political connections occur, such as those described below.

2. Making Social Connections

The motivations which R and E participants brought into their program involvement and the way in which the
program was prescribed appeared to interact to create several notable social outcomes. "Social" is understood here to refer to three important sorts of interpersonal dynamics: motivations, values, and affect. More concretely, this narrative portion regards how the R and E experience led participants to socially connect with one another in altered ways, whose alterations are reflected in changed motivations, personal value articulations, and affect.

As noted in Chapter IV, participants appeared to possess three basic kinds of motivation for participating in the R and E program: 1) organizational: to promote the goals of the organization which they were authorized to represent and/or by which they were employed; 2) personal: to benefit directly and indirectly through their program participation; and 3) altruistic: to benefit others in the community through their own involvement in the program. As was also noted in Chapter IV, the R and E program prescription—certainly as developed in Ohio, and apparently as in several other states—offers a social construction of what should be done by participants (objectives), why they should do it (goals), how they should do it (methods) and what specific outcomes they should expect from doing as prescribed (effectiveness criteria). The arena created by this prescription

1. Promises to generate outcomes which the various participants all deem worthwhile. Who, for instance, opposes the identification and remediation of the problems facing local businesses? This satisfies each of the three motivational interests, and that of altruism in particular.

2. Promises to create a group in which problems are discussed in relative privacy and confidentiality. Thus, even where problems regarding the organization one represents are identified and discussed, less harm and more benefit is perceived as likely to result than were the problems to be discussed in a public forum. In the former, one can quietly resolve problems before they become painfully public, and can choose to publicize the
"positive's" identified through the program. In the latter, publicly announced problems may become magnified, overshadow positive findings, impair the organization's credibility, and even destroy careers. This promise therefore satisfies organization-related motivations which must be addressed if organizational representatives are to commit themselves willingly to participation.

3. Promises implicitly to be informative and pleasurable for the participants, thereby satisfying personal motivations.

Just as the prescribed arena promises positive benefits through program participation, so may it be seen as implying the possibility of negative consequences of non-participation. Some participants may have decided to become involved in the R and E program more to avoid the negative consequences of non-participation than to reap the benefits of involvement. Such potential negative consequences include not being in-the-know; losing credibility by being viewed as not being altruistically motivated enough to volunteer; not being able to protect or defend one's organization against allegations, based on problems identified and discussed, of organizational ineffectiveness, and the like.

Once participants, for whatever reason, determine that their motivations are consistent with the incentives offered for involvement and decide to participate, they find themselves involved in a dynamic social process. In this process, participants come to recognize that they share certain motivations in common with each other. More fundamentally, they realize that many of their respective secondary motivations—such as that of chamber of commerce leaders who would increase their membership rolls and of school superintendents who want to place more graduates into jobs—are surprisingly complementary or convergent.

This recognition of convergent interests mirrors and tends to accompany the epistemological shift toward a convergent cognitive map and causal explanation of
local development phenomena. In terms of social connections, this shift means that participants begin to sense themselves as much more than an aggregation of discrete individuals and organizations who happen to inhabit proximate physical space. That is, they sense themselves as a community or, particularly in urban R and E program settings, as a sub-community within an otherwise anomic environment.

As participants, and the task force members especially, begin to identify problems and alternative ways of resolving them, a range of participant values are implied or articulated. Through this discourse, the extent and nature of value diversity within the participant community becomes clear. Under circumstances in which group members have not developed the degree of underlying value convergence that was found in the R and E program settings studied, the recognition of diversity might disable efforts to coordinate local development efforts cooperatively. However, it appears to become clear to participants early in their R and E involvement that they share important converging interests. In Northwestern Town, we may recall, there were sharp, bitter divisions among various segments of the local development arena. Through patient reiteration by program initiators of the convergent values and motivations which these actors shared, these former antagonists were able to co-participate in the R and E program. Through their program experience, the local coordinator noted, they were able not only to respect but also in practical ways to overcome the ways in which their values had diverged.

This suggests something very paradoxical about the R and E program prescription. In groups whose style of interaction is predominantly identification-with, it was suggested earlier, there is much more pressure upon members to conform to group norms and much less to act as autonomous change agents. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter IV, an important concomitant of identification-with pressures to conform is the role which embarrassment plays. By replacing the pre-program impersonality of relationships among different development organization representatives with the
sometimes intense intimacy found in R and E task force interaction, participants now feel they have more to lose, in affective terms, by acting out of conformity with group wishes. This is comparable to noting that one ordinarily cares much less about being embarrassed before a stranger in the city than before a small-town neighbor.

Given the pressures fostered by program dynamics to conform to group norms, one might predict a corresponding intolerance of value divergences. However, because each of the participants tends to have at least some opportunity for input into the formulation of those norms, the norm of tolerance for moderate divergence from the emergent constellation of shared values may itself become instituted. Once and to the extent that participants view themselves as having a stake in mobilizing group efforts to effect coordination, the tendency is for them to want to tolerate or resolve value tensions, i.e. to achieve cooperative coordination. Equally, because they have participated in developing the group norms, the participants tend to feel these norms are not oppressive or imposed upon them by some alien authority, but rather that they share in "owning" the norms.

To the extent, in turn, that participants share some level of commitment to cooperative coordination, the hypothesized tendency is for them to be able to distinguish which among others' values they will tolerate and which they will integrate into their own, now newly revised constellation of values. Prior to involvement in an arena in which this shared commitment is made, local development actors could have felt so aware of, and repulsed or threatened, by perceived value convergences that they did not even consider ways in which to coordinate simply, let alone cooperatively. As a consequence, the diverse development agents might act in mutually conflicting or defeating ways, resulting in a likely detriment to those development-related goals which are shared.

To the extent that the above social connection dynamics are facilitated by R and E activities, one
critically important psychosocial dynamic in particular changes the manner in which decisions are made. The R and E program experience tends, it appears from this research, to lead to new decision making processes, of such sufficient importance in their own right that they are treated as a distinct form of connective process. The next narrative portion, on political connections, addresses these processes.

3. Making Political Connections

R and E participants were observed to make political connections with respect to the following aspects of the social decision process: 1) who participates in making decisions; 2) the various ways in which they participate in decision making; and 3) the means by which they measure the effectiveness of one another’s efforts and seek to enforce compliance with shared expectations. In each of these regards, the local R and E process was seen to induce important changes in local decision making.

1. Regarding who participates in local development-related decision making, the R and E process was accompanied by the following observed changes:

   a. By creating a self-defined R and E organization participants provided themselves with the legitimate authority needed to acquire information, often extremely sensitive, from and regarding local businesses. Participants thus constructed a strategy by which they could participate concertedly in decisions previously made by the firms themselves, and by uncoordinated local development actors.

   b. Program participants who served as visitation volunteers were able to interpret local business representatives' concerns and, though not with overt approval, therefore to contribute to the identification of problems to be considered by the local R and E task force.
c. Some volunteers, often minorities and women, otherwise frequently excluded from involvement in local development decision making, were nonetheless invited to participate as visitation volunteers. This invitation afforded them to play an otherwise inaccessible contributory role in framing the nature of the problems to be addressed by decision makers.

d. Program participants who served as task force members, by discussing their respective divergent problem interpretations and values, were able often to influence one another's interpretations and values. This facilitated an at least indirect participatory role for task force members in their previously discrete organizational decision making processes. For example, a task force member may become convinced by another member of the need to factor into his or her employing organization's decision processes certain concerns which the latter regards as important. The latter therefore has, in effect, become able to play a decision influencing role previously inaccessible to him or her. To the extent that the former has come to regard the latter as a significant other, the latter's role as an influence is intensified.

e. Among the more obvious changes in who plays what development-related decision making roles, the owners and managers of local firms, frequently excluded from influencing decisions that can affect them profoundly, now play an important role. The R and E programs studied indicate that the prescription to give local business owners and managers a central role in framing the nature of their problems and desires was adhered to by participants. The visitation process was intended overtly to record expressions by business representatives about their concerns. The task force interaction was supposed to identify comprehensively the resources which could be brought to bear on these concerns, and to devise ways and to catalyze implementation of activities, applying these resources.

f. As noted in Chapter IV, some local business representatives played important, influential roles in making decisions regarding the well-being of
local firms prior to the R and E program. However, many—particularly those not native to the community and owners and managers of small firms—had not been encouraged or permitted to play such roles previously.

2. Regarding the manner in which local development-related decision process participants contributed to and influenced such decisions, important changes were seen to accompany the R and E program process. Associated with changes in who was allowed to participate in these decisions were changes in how they did so. To the extent that persons formerly standing at the periphery of those permitted to provide input into local development policy now play an at least somewhat more central role, the local policy arena has changed from one of representative democracy to one that is participatory. At least, the democracy is participatory for those now able to participate directly.

That is, where individuals and groups play a peripheral role in decision making affecting their interests, they must depend upon imperfect, representative advocacy and interpretation of these interests. Where they play a more central role, they can serve as their own representatives. The R and E program, thus, was seen to create a participatory democratic process within the context of a community and larger society that make decisions chiefly through representative democracy.

The quality and extent of participatory democracy however is influenced by previously mentioned factors such as, most importantly, the extent to which the local program's initiators and leaders are committed to leadership by consensus. While the R and E program design tends to facilitate democratic participation, the initiators' and leaders' ideological orientations to decision making may suppress this tendency. The degree of pre-existing environmental conflict also can act to diminish the program design's inclination to foster free-flowing and participatory dialogue, out of the fear that uncensored dialogue might worsen or arouse painful enmities. Northwestern town's R and E coordinator, for example, indicated that considerable caution was
exercised, in the early stages of the program, in controlling the way in which business concerns were discussed and interpreted. However, Heartland's task force members from the outset demonstrated a high degree of comfort with open, participatory input into decision making because, it is hypothesized, they were acting in an environment characterized by relatively little conflict.

3. Regarding the ways in which participants sought to assess effectiveness and to enforce compliance by one another with standards of acceptable performance on development-related tasks, R and E once again appeared to generate significant changes. Prior to the program, local development goals and the criteria used to assess whether they were being realized satisfactorily were allowed to be framed in somewhat different terms by the different actors. A variously effective system of checks and balances was relied upon to measure the effectiveness of any one development agent.

It was more or less accepted--more so in communities in which there was little overt conflict within the community--that no one individual or group possessed a total picture of the range of local development efforts and resources, and therefore of the merit of a given organization's efforts relative to those of other organizations and relative to the community's needs. The tendency, instead, was to rely upon the organizations to serve as more or less adversarial watchdogs of one another's performance, and upon the local media to provide anecdotal or quantitative evidence of organizational ineffectiveness.

The R and E process, however, tends to replace an accountability process characterized, as discussed in Chapter IV, by identification-of with one characterized by identification-with. Prior to the program, it appears from limited data, participants tended to 1) announce the criteria by which their own organization's effectiveness should be assessed; 2) seek to withhold anecdotal and quantitative information that indicated less than satisfactory organizational effectiveness; and 3) announce negative information as indicative not of
ineffectiveness but of legitimating the need for more resources.

To the extent that a community is one in which each development-related organization acts thus, one would expect there to be a corresponding degree of mistrust and skepticism among the organization's representatives towards one another. From each representative's experience, it is likely that they would regard themselves as accountable to an impersonal, generalized other. Contrast this with the experience of those who participate in identification-with accountability processes, such as appear to be encouraged through R and E.

In the R and E task force, the various organizational representatives come to know one another as "significant others," as individuals with many of which they may come to empathize. The responsibility to act in an effective manner becomes more of an ethical matter, as opposed to a more purely pragmatic matter of ensuring the continued influx of needed organizational resources. Greater empathy does not obviate the incentive to ensure this input of resources but--representing one of the more important hypotheses of this study--should incline the representative to make a more authentic commitment to provide more than the illusion of organizational effectiveness.

Greater empathy among a group's members alone does not guarantee that each shall become more committed to satisfaction of effectiveness criteria. The group could determine that it is in the best interests of each to conspire to present the illusion of effectiveness. However, at least two R and E program design aspects appear to make it unlikely that participants will seek to maintain only the fiction of effectiveness.

a. First, each of the businesses whose problems the participants have promised to address, if not necessarily resolve, will know whether and how well their concerns have been treated. The program prescription encourages business representatives to make known any perceptions they have that this expectation
has not been satisfied.

b. Secondly, each local program is expected to culminate in the well-publicized issuance of a final report. In this report, aggregate statistics regarding such matters as the level of firms' satisfaction with various aspects of the local business climate must be indicated.

Those whose view of human nature is pessimistic should expect these design features to mitigate a supposed innate inclination to evade one's responsibilities unless compelled to fulfill them. Those with a more optimistic view may believe that human nature is such that persons will want to act effectively, responsibly and altruistically if they are given a safe opportunity for doing so. The R and E program design provides apparently compelling incentives while, at the same time, creating an unusually safe environment.

4. Comments Regarding Program and Policy Prescription

The design of programs and public policies generally is regarded as a science. One speaks of the "policy sciences". The analogy, however, of a policy or program to a "game" is not entirely new. Policies, like athletic contests, have rules, players, an arena, resources, stakes and the like. Yet curiously, the likening of policy designers to athletic coaches is rarely considered. The value of this analogy will be considered shortly.

In policy analysis, design and research the usual aim is to rationalize the ways in and reasons for which decisions are made. Rationalized decision processes are intended to guide the behavior of those who design the program or policy implementation process. The policy or program designer is supposed to plan an integrated sequence of activities whose successful performance will lead to the attainment of specific, usually quantifiable, objectives. The attainment of these
objectives, in turn, should contribute to the fulfillment of ends-in-themselves.

The overwhelming tendency in the policy science field is to regard only abstractions as ends-in-themselves. Such ends usually include equity, resource distribution, stabilization, and so forth. It is in what policy makers and policy scientists regard as worthwhile ends-in-themselves that the analogy to sport ceases. And this is unfortunate. In sport, ineffable moments, grace, inexplicable feats, and a savoring of the tense drama which contests often create are all perhaps the real aim. These ends-in-themselves are anything but abstractions.

By contrasting orthodox approaches to policy making and analysis with those to sport, it becomes quite clear that the former are characterized by a high degree of utilitarian rationality. Sport spectating, on the other hand, permits one to become immersed in a world very unlike our everyday life, i.e. in one in which things are done largely for their own sake. In everyday American life, on the other hand, even enjoyment must be useful. The policy sciences reflect and reinforce this utilitarian approach to existence.

Lao Tsu, a Chinese philosopher, said that "wisdom is not an attainment, but a maintenance." This view of wisdom, and more basically of life, implies dynamism rather than stasis, process rather than product. In the policy sciences, the abstract ends-in-themselves—i.e. the goals for which activities and objectives are identified—are framed in static terms. The penchant for framing static goals is particularly paradoxical in a society as changeful as that of the United States today.

Thus, on the one hand, the implied message of most policies is that some static end-state will or should be realized. Yet, the end is framed in such abstract terms that we probably would not recognize that state were we ever to achieve it, let alone be able to agree with one another that the state constitutes realization of the abstraction. In our utilitarian rationality, Americans
are perpetually moving toward, doing today because of what will happen tomorrow.

In sports as well as in certain Eastern philosophies, there is an often explicit recognition that 1) the means must be sufficiently satisfying in themselves if the ends are to be achieved, and 2) the ends themselves are states of being to be maintained through awareness in and of the present. Dynamic terms such as balancing and persevering are used to describe and prescribe attitudes toward the ends. Whereas in the policy sciences attitudes almost always are considered epiphenomenal, in sports and those Eastern philosophies they are seen as integral to and determinants of behavior.

The policy or program designer tends to ignore the vital role which attitude—i.e., affective orientation—plays in shaping behavior. Thus, such factors as the cultural, physiopsychological and environmental psychological are rarely given explicit attention. While knowledge and assumptions about these factors may certainly shape the designer's perspective, as they do that of a purportedly "objective" logical positivist, they do not contribute directly to the design.

To restate the paradox mentioned earlier, given the focus of policy design on behavior, on action, policies tend to result in a flurry of activity. The irony is that prescriptions that have so little appreciation for and understanding of dynamic interrelationships themselves have such dynamic consequences.

Study of local R and E programs, however, provides a useful basis for formulating an alternative approach to policy design, implementation and assessment. The three ingredients identified earlier as necessary for success in sports are 1) proper attitude, 2) an analytic understanding of strategy and method, and 3) talent. The prescribed role of the statewide R and E trainer who facilitates the creation of local R and E programs appears to involve supporting local participants in these three regards.
1. Regarding proper attitude, the state R and E trainers in Ohio and, it appears from the literature, other states seek to instill a positive attitude in participants toward their participation and toward the local businesses they will serve. This is done through:

   a. Indicating that being positive will be effective, i.e. will lead to practical and affective outcomes.

   b. Exhorting or cheering the participants on, i.e. conveying the trainer's own enthusiasm for the program in a way that is hoped will be contagious.

   c. Implying the trainer's trust in the participants' willingness to embrace the program's purposes as their own.

   d. Making sure that the participants, rather than the trainer, receive credit for the achievements they accomplish.

   e. Providing a game plan that is sufficiently feasible and whose results are so likely to be appreciated that it is likely their having a good attitude will be positively reinforced.

2. Regarding an analytic understanding of strategy and method, the R and E trainer seeks to ensure that the participants understand how to do what they are supposed to do. Like a coach, and like many Cooperative Extension Service policy educators, R and E trainers appear to tend to have an at least implicit understanding of the teachable moment. This is the moment in which one is ready to learn about a given matter. Thus, the trainer is careful to:

   a. Not try to instruct about too many or complex programmatic methods all at once.

   b. Provide instruction, instead, in incremental doses. Though R and E training for volunteers, for example, ostensibly takes place in just
a single two or three hour session, trainers in most state R and E programs appear to be interacting instructively with local coordinators, volunteers and task force members periodically over a several month period.

c. Provide instruction in a manner that is alert and responsive to the indications which participants give regarding whether and the extent to which they understand and are ready to understand more.

d. Imply, if not necessarily state explicitly, that participants have the legitimate right to set the pace at which learning will occur.

e. Design the R and E learning process so that, eventually, participants will understand not only how to conduct the program, but also the range of reasons for doing so. This, in effect, equips--or empowers--the participants to repeat the program or implement it in a new, locally tailored way, without having to depend on external training support. This design also encourages participants to have the perception that their current dependence upon another's counsel, like that of a player upon a coach, is temporary and thus not reflecting any innate inadequacies which condemn him or her to perpetual dependence upon others. This encouragement appears to motivate highly the participants' willingness to learn about program strategies and methods.

f. Design the sequence of program activities so that the participants ongoingly will generate information with which they can assess their own performance. As Schon advocates in The Reflective Practitioner (1983), the design enables participants to learn from their experiences and from the consequences of their efforts, assumptions and causal theories.

g. Select methods and strategies for implementing the program that are sufficiently familiar with those which persons in their positions--as leading representatives of business, education, government and elected offices--are accustomed to employing.
3. Regarding the role of talent, it was suggested earlier that talent cannot be taught directly. It was further suggested that seeking to over-prescribe, or encourage one to over-think, how one is to perform basic tasks may actually interfere with successful performance. The batter who is thinking so self-consciously and analytically about how to swing the bat will not be able to swing it as well or timely as one who lets his or her own tacit knowledge take over. Some conscious analysis of one's tacitly derived behavior, of course, may be necessary from time to time, as in the case of a hitter who has developed a bad habit such as dropping a shoulder when swinging. The coach, or the hitter himself or herself, may direct conscious attention to this hitch and may encourage one consciously to practice swinging in a manner which compensates for that hitch.

But, eventually, it is hoped that the hitter will have become so accustomed to swinging in this new, practiced way that it seems to have become automatic--i.e., has become unconscious or tacit knowledge. The hitter now knows how to swing well even if he or she could not easily articulate this knowledge.

Coaches who respect talent often understand that there is an art to coaching talented persons. One has to know what not to teach as much as what to teach and when to teach it. Through usually tacit knowledge which coaches themselves have gained through their experience in coaching, many understand that the best way to elicit a player's talent is to create conditions conducive to its emergence, rather than by directing too much conscious attention to talent itself. Most experienced coaches also have many stories about players whose talent they would never have guessed existed, but which emerged because they had become confident of their abilities.

Thus, one important aspect of conditions conducive to talent's emergence is that they encourage participants to feel confident. Encouraging confidence entails conveying trust in the player's abilities, even
where the player lacks such trust. It also entails creating an environment in which players are asked to perform in ways of which they would not have viewed themselves as capable. This increases the probability that they will learn that they possess formerly hidden talent, which in turn encourages them to consider that they possess further, and as yet unperceived abilities.

It should be noted, however, that not all successful coaches ascribe to the above, essentially "positive" approach to coaching. Some believe that the best results are obtained by threatening players, negatively reinforcing mistakes, and generally harassing them to excellence. This indeed may produce spectacular winning teams, comprised of "stars" who thrive under such pressure. But the truth may be that most athletes, particularly amateurs and youths--like perhaps most local development-related leaders--lack the high degree of self-confidence to withstand, let alone thrive under, such pressure.

None of those R and E participants who were observed or interviewed demonstrated such a level of self-confidence about their capacity to formulate or implement brilliant local development policy. One strength of the R and E program prescription may be that it takes a positive, non-confrontational approach to eliciting effective behavior. At first glance, this may seem a not too noteworthy finding. However, while most development policies being imposed on American communities are not overtly confrontational and threatening, they are at least implicitly so.

The great majority of local development policies, and public policies generally, presume that the local actors must be cajoled (carrots) and/or threatened (sticks) into compliance with externally derived wishes. They also presume and imply either that local development actors are unintelligent and therefore must have every procedure spelled out, or are able to create and sustain highly complex, rational development service delivery programs.

The R and E program demonstrates that it is at
least feasible for a policy to succeed through reliance primarily upon the local actors' pre-existing and/or latent motivations. Where orthodox policy promises to provide resources in exchange for compliance, or to take resources (such as a person's money or liberty) for non-compliance, the R and E program promises to provide information. In the form of a blueprint for local implementation, the information is offered in exchange for the promise by local actors that they will try to identify, if not always resolve, existing local firms' concerns.

To be sure, the information provided by statewide R and E training organizations constitutes one kind of resource. However, the exchange of information through policy often may produce results qualitatively different from those generated by the policy exchange of money. The former is much more likely than the latter to be centrally concerned with enabling the resource recipients to thereafter determine their own attitudes and behavior, in terms of whether and how they use that information. The former is also more likely than the latter to be associated with an identification-with accountability dynamic. In the latter, quantitative identification-of data are gathered and interpreted to assess the extent to which the investment of money achieved the desired outcomes. Also, the investment of money through policy usually is regarded as more serious or important than that of information. The policy designers and assessors will tend to assess effectiveness more strenuously and respond to perceived non-compliance with expectations more concertedly.

Given the quality of outcomes generated by the R and E programs studied (which will be summarized in the next narrative portion), there is a basis for suggesting strongly that information-transfer policies, such as embodied by R and E, be taken more seriously by policy designers as an important strategy for achieving desired social and economic change. That is, they should be seen as an important, sometimes preferable alternative to policies based on threat, regulation, or exchange of money.
C. Assessing Program Outcomes

As noted earlier, the researcher of a program's effectiveness may usefully distinguish between the degree to which a priori and emergent participant criteria of effectiveness are satisfied and the extent to which those of the researcher, as an observer, are met. As a qualitative investigator, this study's researcher sought to bracket—i.e., to acknowledge, contain, and sift out of the findings—expectations and values he initially brought to the study. It does become a legitimate and potentially useful exercise to compare the observed findings against the expected and hoped-for findings, at the end of the data gathering and interpretation process. In this portion of the narrative, conclusions regarding the effectiveness of R and E programming, as seen by both participants and the researcher, are presented.

There will be four principal portions in this narrative section. They will concern 1) initial participant effectiveness criteria; 2) emergent participant effectiveness criteria; 3) initial and emergent researcher assessment; and 4) comments regarding effectiveness assessment.

1. Initial Participant Effectiveness Criteria

In early interviews of Heartland R and E program participants and in telephone interviews of participants elsewhere, respondents were asked: "What do you look for to tell you that the program is effective?" Based on the sometimes defensive, sometimes puzzled initial responses to this question, as well as on other data, it appears that 1) participants were discomfited by the prospect of their performance being assessed by an outside observer, and 2) they tended not to view external evaluation as very appropriate for assessing their program activities. This question was re-framed to inquire: "What do you hope the program will accomplish?" and "What advice would you give people to
When cast in these more positive, explicitly constructive terms respondents answered freely and informatively.

They explained that they hoped the program would meet a variety of specific 1) personal, 2) altruistic and 3) organizational outcomes. The majority framed these desired outcomes in terms of achieving positive consequences rather than of avoiding negative ones. It seems reasonable to interpret these statements of hoped-for outcomes as implicit evaluation criteria. (Some of the criteria below were suggested by Dr. Joseph Donnermeyer, professor of rural sociology, the Ohio State University, in a discussion with the researcher regarding research findings.)

1. The personal effectiveness criteria expressed or indicated in the initial stages of the program in Heartland included

a. Enjoyment or pleasure.

b. Learning.

c. New social contacts.

d. Gain in personal prestige among:
   i. Peers in program.
   ii. Peers elsewhere.

e. Gain of political influence.

f. Know community better.

g. Avoid loss of or decline in social contacts which could happen if one chose not to be involved.

h. Avoid missing opportunity by non-involvement for new social contacts.

i. Avoid loss of peer prestige by non-involvement.
j. Avoid loss of political influence by non-involvement.

2. Altruistic outcome criteria expressed or indicated by program participants include:

a. Create more jobs.

b. Foster the expansion of existing local firms.

c. Identify and become familiar with firms' problems.

d. Solve local firms' problems.

e. Appease existing business representatives who have felt neglected.

f. Identify good points about the community which can be used to promote attraction of new firms into the community.

g. Foster more coordination (in the "simple" sense discussed previously).

h. Avoid business relocations to sites outside the county, which could happen if the program did not take place.

i. Avoid the community's falling behind other communities that have active development programs.

j. Avoid continued or worsening relative lack of coordination between government and industry.

k. Avoid unnecessary job losses.

3. Organizational outcome effectiveness criteria expressed or indicated by participants include
a. Foster greater prestige for the organization.

b. Generate new customers, clients and/or other resource suppliers for the organization.

c. Improve access to information about matters affecting the organization.

d. Foster greater influence by the organization in local decision making.

e. Benefit from access to privileged information generated by the R and E visitation process.

f. Avoid a loss of political influence for the organization by failing to participate.

g. Avoid missing the opportunity for access to privileged information and to information regarding matters affecting the organization.

h. Avoid the loss of prestige for the organization from failing to participate.

i. Avoid losing a competitive edge, relative to other organizations, in maintaining access to resources.

Several comments may be noted regarding these initial effectiveness criteria.

1. As mentioned previously, the majority of participants appeared to conceive of their participation more as leading to positive outcomes than as averting negative ones.

2. There is at least partial evidence--and regarding some criteria it is conclusive--that every one of the above criteria were met by virtually every
participant interviewed. By the end of the program, the participants regarded the program as having met their initial desires and expectations. 3. Clearly, some criteria were satisfied more than others in the view of the participants themselves. Nevertheless, participants articulated striking unanimity that every one of the above were met.

4. There are some indications, however, that the task force members in Heartland and elsewhere generally rated the program and their participation as more effective than did volunteers and some business interviewees.

5. Data also suggest that the level of effectiveness at which business visitation volunteers depended considerably on the extent to which they found their visitation interview experience: a) affectively pleasant, b) educational. Also, the level of effectiveness assigned by volunteers was associated with: c) the extent to which the business representatives they interviewed indicated appreciation about being visited and interviewed.

6. The data further suggest, though not conclusively, that business representatives visited and interviewed rated the program as effective, and that the exact degree of perceived effectiveness was influenced by at least two factors: i) whether or not the visitation actually led to problems being addressed or resolved, and/or to information and other resources being supplied them, and ii) the degree to which the visitation itself was pleasurable.

Based on business representatives' comments related by program participants, where either of these two factors was positive, the representatives apparently tended to rate the business visitation process as highly effective. They seemed to feel that a visitation resulting in practical benefits was worthwhile, in other words, whether or not the interview session itself was pleasurable. Interestingly, however, a visitation without perceptible practical benefits also was deemed effective if the session was itself enjoyable. This
might be because the establishment of identification-
with bonds between the representative and various
program participants made the lack of tangible benefits
acceptable—as in, "at least they cared enough to try."
Additionally, the researcher is familiar with no
instance in which at least one of the two factors was
not positive.

2. Emergent Participant Effectiveness Criteria

The participants did not come to regard any of
their initial desires and expectations for program
performance as unimportant later. However, several
significant new effectiveness criteria did emerge.
Their emergence reflects the dynamic learning process
which R and E involvement facilitates. The emergence of
new criteria also results in part from the increased
degree to which participants came to identify with one
another; as they did so, they began to perceive new and
desirable potential outcomes of the program.

Many also, interestingly, began to recognize that a
wider range of negative consequences of participation
and of non-participation could have occurred than they
had imagined when they first decided to participate. A
number of participants—particularly in Heartland, where
the task force read each visitation survey form—said
that significant damage could have occurred had
sensitive, confidential business information been leaked
to the public or to persons outside the participant
circle. Many cautioned that future programs' participants be especially careful to honor the
program's pledge to keep such information strictly
confidential.

Some task force members recommended that future R
and E participants not allow the whole task force to
review survey documents. Others said that such task
force review helped to cement good intra-group
relations, and that the great majority of those asked to
serve on such task forces are probably "the kind of
person," as one said, "that you could trust to keep [confidential information] quiet."

Regarding emergent personal effectiveness criteria, many saw themselves as having enjoyed and learned from the program "a great deal" and "much more than I'd expected". Many also indicated they had not expected the program to provide them and their co-participants with the level of increased political influence they now saw themselves as having gained. Presumably, where an outcome is not considered or expected, one would not apply it as a criterion by which to measure program effectiveness. Thus, an assessment instrument to evaluate R and E program effectiveness that was based on limited theory and initial participant expectations would almost inevitably overlook the extent to which other, sometimes more important outcomes, are realized. This study constitutes an example of the ways in which qualitative research can help guide the formulation of more comprehensive evaluation strategies and instruments.

Regarding altruistic effectiveness criteria, many participants mentioned that they had not expected the business owners and managers they visited to have been "so moved...so affected...by our coming out there [to visit]." Thus, the researcher was not entirely alone in underestimating the impact of expressing a pro-business attitude.

One task force member in Heartland noted how he had not initially predicted the program as leading business leaders to want to volunteer more actively in local service organizations. Yet, by the end of the program, he now saw this as "a very important result", one which he found exciting.

Regarding organizational effectiveness criteria, where many initially hoped the program would generate greater coordination among local development-related organizations, by the end of the program they now hoped that program follow-up would lead to greater cooperative coordination. In other words, they appeared to recognize the value of coordinating in identification-
with ways. Initially, the hoped-for coordination appeared to have been understood in largely identification-of terms, such as in disseminating data more widely, sharing ideas more, connecting the strategies and objectives of one organization's plans with those of other organizations, etc. Now, they hoped and/or expected that coordination after program completion would be friendly, would instill greater trust among development agents, would involve the enthusiastic agreement to "all pull in the same direction," etc.

3. Initial and Emergent Researcher Effectiveness Criteria

The following were the primary expectations, biases and assumptions which the researcher was able to identify before initiating his inquiry, and which he sought to bracket—i.e., to preclude from contaminating the study. The researcher:

1. Was more interested in the psychological and sociocultural impacts than in the economic impacts of R and E programs.

2. Predicted that the local programs would have moderate, positive economic impacts; that is, that they would result in the retention and expansion of some local businesses, but not in dramatic improvements in local economies.

3. Was skeptical about the ethical quality of the outcomes that would be generated by a program, one of whose ostensible central purposes would be to "express a pro-business attitude" to local firms. That is,

   a. A pro-business orientation might be equivalent to one favoring competition, selfishness and, thus, more alienation among local community members.

   b. A pro-business orientation would probably tend to be elitist, discouraging overt consideration of
equity issues and the economically disadvantaged.

4. Tentatively predicted, on the other hand, that there would be some humanistic dimensions to the local program process. That is, the program prescription seemed, a priori, quite similar to that of community education programs. In the literature on the design of R and E programs, as in the researcher's experience as a community educator and educational administrator, the process involved mobilizing local citizen concern and resources in order to resolve problems which they themselves identify.

1. The first philosophical orientation framed the way in which the research was designed, and therefore shaped fundamentally the kinds of data collected and findings derived. However, over the course of the research, the researcher began to realize that he needed to understand the relationship between sociocultural and economic effectiveness. In other words, he came to appreciate that both were important to understand, from the perspective both of enhancing personal understanding as well as contributing to society's knowledge regarding this relationship.

There tends to be precious little dialogue, and therefore understanding, between social scientists and economists. The two classes of scientist, in fact, are influenced by highly divergent paradigms. The latter tend to regard the former as soft-headed, while the former tend to regard the latter as insensitive to humanistic concerns.

2. The second represented an assumption that was not held with much conviction and did not appear to influence the nature or outcomes of the study. The researcher was more open-minded and prepared to accept willingly disconfirming data about this assumption than about the three other major assumptions or biases.

In one sense, the data support the pre-research project belief that R and E program impacts on local economies are likely to be moderate. In the short term, it is hypothesized that these programs tend more toward
conservative than toward dramatic structural changes in the local economy. However, research is most definitely warranted to explore the extent to which, the researcher now strongly predicts, many programs may result in significant structural changes over the long term.

Short-term changes in flows of information, decision making processes, and development actors' motivations, cognitive maps and causal theories may be setting the stage for significant changes over the long term. These short-term changes are also, while not of direct economic significance, important in their own right and likely to have significant indirect economic significance even were no subsequent structural alterations to occur.

3. The researcher's pre-research equation of the expression of a pro-business attitude with the advocacy of values antithetical to humanism (e.g., cooperation, equity, respect) was most decidedly challenged by the data. The concern about this assumed equation was so central to the researcher's interest in conducting the study that he sought to take special pains in bracketing—and testing—this assumption.

The researcher's initial bias is particularly noteworthy, chiefly because it reflects precisely the kinds of biases with which members of the four different participating community sectors (business, education, elected politicians, and government agencies) were seen to tend to regard one another when they first became involved in the program. As noted in Chapter IV, the task force interaction and interview comments revealed patterns of bias, namely that representatives of one sector often tended to regard the motivations and inclinations of those of other sectors with skepticism, often even with cynicism. For example, politician, as a generic term, was typically treated as a dirty word, as an epithet. An educator, meanwhile, was regarded often as displaying such traits as idealism, impracticality, and "having one's head in the clouds."

Over time, as representatives came to identify-with one another, these biases dissolved considerably, as did
those of the researcher. Thus, one significant and unanticipated finding is that the R and E process helps substantially to decrease inter-sectoral tensions and suspicions.

Perhaps even more importantly, the findings suggest that the relative absence of empathic interaction across these community sectors reinforces the negative traits which sectoral participants are seen as embodying. The general failure in many communities, for instance, to ask educators to contribute to the formulation of practical solutions to local problems inhibits their ability to develop, let alone to display, their practical abilities.

Similarly, the researcher was most surprised to discover, the failure of communities to express appreciation for the contribution of local firms to "the well-being of the community" discourages many local business leaders from wanting, let alone actually being able, to contribute to the public welfare. The data indicate strongly that messages were conveyed to business owners and managers during the R and E process that they otherwise would rarely receive. Some business representatives appeared almost incredulous that someone would take the time to thank them.

Now receiving increasing attention in the media is the issue of corporate leaders who make major business decisions without regard for community well-being. Extrapolating from this study's data, albeit limited, it may be that the failure of communities to provide business leaders with an affirmative reason for responding to community concerns constitutes one important reason for their apparent disregard. Realistically, and as several respondents have suggested, even the mostconcertedly appreciative community may not be able to prevent large national or multi-national firms from deciding to shut or relocate local facilities.

However, the data appear to corroborate a causal notion which is fairly explicit in the program prescription but whose significance the researcher was
slow to understand. Expressing a pro-business attitude can have a significant impact in retaining and expanding existing local businesses. The researcher had imagined that this causal assertion, if accurate, reflected an indirect relationship mediated by several other factors. It now appears that the expression of appreciation has a much more direct and positive impact.

Numerous participants in many settings indicated that prior to their R and E programs they had rarely, as one said, "paid attention to needs and concerns of the firms that have been right here all along." When they did finally acknowledge the importance of these firms to the community's well-being, they noted, it had been in response to a threat or promise of imminent closure or relocation. At this juncture, the community response may be characterized as one of indicating negative reasons for staying and expanding in the community. That is, these firms' leaders were told of the bad consequences of closure or relocation that needed to be averted. In some cases, as when one community hurriedly passed a bond issue to construct a water treatment plant for one firm, the community is able to retain that firm. Yet, the data are replete with stories of communities that did "too little, too late" and lost the firms' employment and income.

One important suggestion, then, is that communities need to do much more in positive ways to encourage business leaders to contribute to the community. Many, perhaps those most humanistically inclined in particular, have such an abiding distrust of business leaders that they regard the latter as incapable of altruistic intentions. The wasteful irony of this is, of course, that it proves to be a rather self-fulfilling expectation. Business leaders tend to be asked to contribute to community welfare principally when this or that charity needs money or equipment. Indeed, it is interesting that so many leaders actually do contribute their time and company resources for local philanthropic purposes.

In other words, business leaders in the R and E program settings, and probably in most other American
communities, have been not often been told that they are valued for who they are as persons or for what their everyday activities create. Instead, they are asked to contribute in extra-ordinary ways, i.e. in ways not directly related to their ordinary business. Implicit in this may be the message that this daily business is not ethically valuable in its own right. Many business leaders, meanwhile, do much to reinforce the cynicism with which they, as a class, are viewed.

In the R and E process, however, business leaders are told: "What you are doing in your everyday business is good and ethical." They are told that their striving, the risks they undertake, and the occasional courage they exhibit, make possible important contributions to the community in the form of jobs and income. This changes the community-to-business communication from one of utilitarian appreciation to one of more authentic appreciation. To be sure, the data decidedly reflect elements of self-interest as partially impelling this expression of communal gratitude. Nonetheless, this expression constitutes a significant departure in the content, if not entirely or purely in the motive, of that communication.

4. There were more than sufficient indications that the R and E process might be significantly comparable to that of community education. As noted previously, community education, as conceived and enacted in the late 1960's and early 1970's in the United States, typically involved several steps: 1) mobilizing the community; 2) guiding community members in identifying and prioritizing the concerns of greatest importance in their eyes; 3) guiding community members in identifying and cataloging the resources which they could access; 4) helping community members to devise strategies for drawing upon accessible resources in order to meet their prioritized needs; and 5) helping them develop and be able to sustain ongoingly the capacity to implement their plans without further outside assistance.

The concept of empowerment immediately comes to mind as comprising the fundamental purpose underling
this approach to community change. The aim was to mobilize and enable local citizens to take greater control of their own collective local destiny. The R and E process, which has never been described by participants or in the literature as intending to empower is nonetheless very much a community educational and empowering vehicle—with two important exceptions.

First, whereas community education was intended to elicit the participation of members from the broadest range of community segments, R and E is targeted to leaders of the four development-related sectors. Second, while community education is intended ostensibly to achieve humanistic results, R and E programs are intended to be pragmatic, in the sense of yielding local economic outcomes.

One proposition suggested by this study, in the United States at least, concerns empowerment programs whose overt purpose is to foster humanistic purposes (e.g., equity for the disadvantaged, cooperative coordination, participatory democracy, etc.) and those programs which may have significant humanistic outcomes but that are not sold as doing so. The proposition is that the former will likely attain greater humanistic outcomes in the short run but that, over the long term, their effectiveness will diminish substantially. Conversely, the latter will tend not to reveal significant, positive outcomes (in humanistic terms) in the short run, but will have a remarkably higher capacity than the former for doing so over the long term.

Much like the coach who diverts a player's attention away from what he or she tacitly knows how to do, the R and E prescription diverts the local development actors' attention away from a self-critical examination of local equity concerns. It may be that in both cases this diversion facilitates success. The analogy between coaching and R and E prescription ceases at this point. For, the hitter does not ordinarily have a fear of or resistance to examining how well one hits. Many members in the four local development sectors, however, do fearfully resist examining the equity
impacts of their policies and practices.

Because the prescription does not dictate that the disadvantaged are represented as participants in the R and E decision processes, it is unlikely that their varied interests will be advocated forcefully or accurately. Furthermore, the program's purposes have no immediately obvious connection with equity concerns. As one participant said, "we're just not about dealing with that in this program." Why then the proposition that the R and E process may facilitate substantial equity and other humanistic outcomes over the long term?

Part of the answer may be found in examining why community educational efforts, so often centrally concerned about and with poverty issues, appear to have largely failed. Much of the reason for their failure may be that explicitly humanistic concerns are felt as alien, quaint, weird or hopelessly impractical in a utilitarian culture. Over the long run, a social movement whose central values the culture regards as questionable will have, as community educators discovered to their dismay, real difficulty in sustaining an influx of volunteer participants and other resources. Secondly, the society is changing so rapidly and in such fragmented ways that social change movements, to last for any period, must be able to overcome powerful disintegrating tendencies. To do so, the movement needs to be able to draw upon a sizable reservoir of readily available motivation. In other words, little effort should be required to convince prospective members that the movement's goals are compatible with their basic values and everyday customs. For these reasons, the community education movement almost had to fade into virtual non-existence.

The R and E program may be able to yield significant long-term humanistic outcomes, on the other hand, for at least two reasons.

1. The program process teaches participants very effectively about the value of developing a gestalt understanding of their community's economy.
2. The program prescription has proved itself capable of drawing very effectively upon prevailing cultural values and customs.

The second contributes to the potential for long term humanistic gains because it suggests that the inchoate R and E movement stands a very good chance of taking root across the country. But, if it takes root—and some contend it already has—will it indeed foster humanistic gains?

The first dynamic above contributes to this proposed potential for engendering long term humanistic outcomes, because the wider the range of information and causal connections one understands and considers, the greater the likelihood that they will contain information indicative of synergies between alleviating inequities and resolving less altruistic concerns.

This, of course, presumes that important convergences may be found between the interests of the enfranchised and those of the disenfranchised. This report takes the position that the dearth of examples demonstrating such convergent or synergistic relationships is not because "that's the way life is", but because we generally are so accustomed to framing equity problems in zero sum terms that we cannot, and therefore do not try to, conceive of ways of benefitting both the poor and the wealthy simultaneously. Charity, which some critics contend actually deepens the poor's impairment, is the closest that this society comes to achieving synergistic "solutions" to poverty.

If one accepts the assumption, an admittedly arguable one, that the problems with which the disadvantaged are concerned are caused by underlying factors that also create or worsen problems experienced by the advantaged, then the widening of one's gestalt understanding regarding the interrelatedness of local dynamics is a hopeful process. In Heartland, task force members demonstrated a considerable reluctance to draw connections between the need to resolve local development problems and the possible need to identify empathically and help the unemployed. As noted, they
did not regard the latter as relevant to their more narrowly defined purposes.

However, the conclusion or aftermath of the visitation process may provide a teachable moment in which to infuse causal notions suggesting specific ways in which the concerns of the disadvantaged need to be met if those needs identified in the visitation process are to be resolved to a more complete extent. R and E training personnel, for example, could discuss the drain on local resources and the costs to local quality of life—two factors important to local development agents—that are created by high levels of poverty or unemployment. Alternatively or additionally, where there might appear to be short term gains to the advantaged by sustaining current poverty and unemployment rates, the longer term costs and risks could be discussed.

The coordinator of one local program was an advocate to the group for that community's disadvantaged. He was observed to articulate just these kinds of suggested mental connections. However, he was careful not to do so in a heavy-handed or judgmental manner. Instead, he offered the information in a manner that suggested, "do we have any ideas of what we can do about this particular development issue which can at the same time also really help the unemployed?" In other words, he was careful to frame potential solutions to the concerns of the disadvantaged in terms which implied that he placed a higher priority on assisting and expanding local businesses, and therefore on the concerns of the relatively more advantaged.

4. Comments Regarding Effectiveness Assessment

we seek to design systems so perfect that no one has to be good

-- W. H. Auden

This poetic excerpt implies that a reliance upon rationally designed organizational systems is
insufficient to achieve important human ends. Organizational and programmatic designs alone do not ensure that those who participate in enacting the design will do so in an ethical, let alone effective, manner.

This research addressed the notion of effectiveness as it concerned a programmatic design. One tendency often found in literature on effectiveness has been to treat human nature—with its biases, cultural lenses and nearly infinite variability—as an epiphenomenal irrelevance. As noted in Chapter II, it has been only recently that researchers and theorists have come to view a program's or organization's effectiveness as shaped by the interaction between formal and informal dynamics among participants and their environment, and between prescribed, pre-existing and emergent human dynamics.

The quotation served as a reminder to the researcher that the R and E program design, like any programmatic or organizational design, constituted a set of formal and informal prescriptions for how program participants should act, rather than an assurance that program participants actually act in the prescribed manner. In other words, a program design prescription is not a description of how participants act and perceive, but rather an entreaty and rationale for their compliance. Implicit in the process of invoking prescriptions for concerted group action is that without them the desired collective behavior would not occur. Prescriptions are introduced to change pre-existing, patterned and idiosyncratic individual and collective behavior and perspectives.

Therefore, to research ways in which to improve the design of program prescriptions such as those for local R and E activity—a central concern of this study—one needs to know not only the degree of correspondence between a particular design feature and program outcomes, but also the qualities of the interaction between that design feature and the pre-existing and emergent behaviors and perspectives among program participants.
Thorough assessment of the effectiveness of a particular program design therefore should entail examination:

1. Of how the program's participants perceive and respond to the program prescriptions.

2. Of what the pre-existing dynamics are that shape the ways in which participants perceive and respond to the prescriptions.

The quotation further implies that clever design rationalities do not supplant the role of human will and ethical deliberation in shaping desired outcomes of collective action. What is considered rational, sane and moral in one sociocultural context may be considered irrational, inane and unethical in another. Research may find, for example, that a) a given program prescription is associated with the desired program outcomes; and b) that this association is at least partly due to the consonance of the prescriptions with pre-existing program participant values, folkways and perspectives. Because of the variability of values and the like across sociocultural contexts, however, a given set of prescriptions may be highly effective in facilitating the desired objectives only in certain sociocultural contexts.

Where a design is intended to be implemented in diverse settings, full assessment of that design's effectiveness also should entail examination of:

3. The capacity of the design to be compatible with or adaptable to varying values, folkways and perspectives—to the extent that these vary among the range of settings in which the design is to be applied. In other words, program designers could mistakenly assume, based on limited anecdotal experience and case study research, that their prescriptions will be compatible with the range of sociocultural dynamics of diverse settings in which they hope their design will be conducive to success.
Because prescriptions often diverge from how actual program activity is conducted, there may a divergence between what the prescribers and implementors hope will be achieved. A particular program design may be found to be compatible with the range of salient sociocultural dynamics operant in diverse contexts. Yet, the designers could regard this design as highly effective, while some or all of the participants in these settings regard it as highly ineffective. The design—or prescribed "definition of the situation"—might interact with local dynamics in such a way that it typically leads to the realization of the designer's objectives. However, it could well be that the participants had agreed to participate in the program with other objectives in mind, and ones which might or might not have been realized by their efforts. In this instance, the designer could mistakenly view his or her own level of satisfaction as equivalent with that of the participants. Thus, a thorough assessment of a design's effectiveness also needs to consider:

4. The extent to which the program outcomes are deemed satisfactory by participants with varying criteria of satisfaction—i.e., with varying conceptions of program effectiveness.

Finally, a given program design can perhaps never anticipate the full range of consequences that its implementation can yield in any one setting, let alone across diverse settings. Implementation of a program design could lead to the accomplishment of all of the a priori program objectives, yet have sufficiently negative unanticipated consequences as to be deemed by many participants as a failure. Conversely, the a priori objectives could be unachieved, where the program is nonetheless deemed highly effective by local participants. Thus, thorough assessment of program design effectiveness should consider:

5. What the observable, unanticipated program outcomes are and the extent of their desirability as measured by those participants with varying perspectives.
Such an assessment will provide program designers and those considering future program participation with a rich store of knowledge with which to modify the program design features. The literature on effectiveness, cited in Chapter II, contained hints that the five research components enumerated here should be adopted for this study. They are reiterated here to caution the reader (and the researcher himself) that:

1. The findings from this study, though based in certain instances on data obtained from several settings, are not necessarily generalizable to or advisable across the range of settings in which the R and E concept may become applied.

2. The discussion of findings, many of which concern R and E design features, should not be allowed ever to obscure the importance of values, folkways and perspectives in shaping the effectiveness and ethical desirability of program outcomes.

The reliance upon systems design as a means of ensuring good behavior and results may be based on a fundamental distrust of human nature--i.e., of the inclination of persons and collectivities to act in good ways. An emphasis on design may be viewed as assuming that one must employ subterfuge, manipulation, force and/or positive reinforcement in order to make others do what one wants. Much of this summary discussion has concerned various R and E program design features and their ramifications, so that it would be easy to mistake this discursive emphasis as an orientation favoring such an approach to the catalysis of collective local action.

The systems design approach may be contrasted with an empowering approach to program design. This chapter has suggested distinctions between these ideal typical approaches to program design and evaluation. These distinctions have been intended to suggest the foundation for a theoretical perspective regarding approaches to the implementation and evaluation of public policies or program designs, where those designs are prescribed for implementation in diverse community settings. This rudimentary theory
arose from the research findings which spurred reflections about what made the R and E program design appear markedly different from more conventional approaches to local development program design, and from more orthodox program designs generally.

D. Implications for the Field of Educational Administration

The business retention and expansion strategy constitutes an educational strategy for facilitating local development. As a study of one "development education" strategy, the research has several kinds of implications for the field of educational administration, regarding 1) public policy education; 2) relations between educational organizations and the community; and 3) humanistic education and leadership.

1. Public Policy Education

One of the most important outcomes of the local R and E process may be that it encourages leaders in the local development arena not only to coordinate their efforts more, but also to do so in a cooperative manner. The R and E strategy thereby proves to educate local leaders of the need to design local plans and policies in new ways. Thus, R and E represents a kind of educational program with policy educational outcomes. This local development strategy clearly 1) indicates that educators can play an important role in reshaping the manner and the ends for which local development policies are framed, and 2) indicates that the participants in this local public policy education process may very much appreciate the efforts of those who sponsor such education.

Regarding the first point, the data overwhelmingly support the contention that the R and E approach to public policy education has led to typically dramatic changes in the ways in which local development policies
are framed. The R and E program leads to a widening of the circle of those who participate directly in development decisions, and therefore of those local sectors who are represented by this wider circle of participants. Second, the program leads local policy makers to be more likely to coordinate their respective plans and policy making in a cooperative manner.

Third, the program experience changes the goals for which plans and policies are made. This latter notion merits some amplification. The R and E program seems to encourage local policy makers to identify as goals those whose attainment they share a convergent interest in attaining. Previously, the goals often were framed by uncoordinated organizational leaders and policy makers, with contradictory or mutually defeating results.

Fourth, the range and quality of information sought with which to make local development policy decisions are typically altered profoundly by R and E efforts. The R and E process educates policy makers about the value of tapping one another's knowledge sets more fully. The process also provides program participants with experiential evidence regarding the usefulness of obtaining and updating comprehensive qualitative data regarding their shared concerns. That is, through the visitation survey process, they recognize that problems can be identified more accurately, exhaustively and more problem-preventively through qualitative data than through more conventional quantitative data collection.

Fifth, the R and E process often leads participants to change the criteria by which they measure the success of their policies and service delivery programs. Where such success typically was measured by absolute and trend-related, quantitative performance figures, success now tends to be defined with qualitative, identification-with considerations at least somewhat more in mind. For example, those development organizations whose task it is to meet local businesses' needs conventionally may have defined their level of success in terms of the quantity and frequency of services used, and of the quantitative outcomes of their use. Through processes such as the R and E program, local development officials are more likely to regard
client satisfaction and appreciation as important, so that these are seen as complementary to the realization of quantitative gains. This change may be said to represent a shift from viewing clients as generalized other to regarding them more empathically as significant others. This shift, furthermore, may occur not only in terms of how leaders view and treat their clients, but also in how they view and treat their peers and other local decision makers.

Finally, this public policy education process appears to lead participants to change the means by which they enforce accountability. With the exception of "breakfast clubs" in which local leaders congregate to share their concerns and to negotiate dominant community values, most communities have few private arenas in which to negotiate their values and share information informally. The R and E program creates a semi-private arena which provides the safety of a breakfast club with the non-exclusionary advantages of a public arena.

By creating a semi-private arena in which information potentially critical of one another's organization is raised, R and E permits dangerous or sensitive information to be discussed without the fear of disastrous costs to member organizations' credibility. In this arena, participants are able to share a rich array of qualitative information that describes the constraints and capacities of their organizations to fulfill others' expectations. It is often considered impolite or unacceptably defensive in a breakfast club to describe and explain fairly thoroughly what one's organization can and cannot do.

In the breakfast club, members know one another fairly intimately. However, in the R and E prescription, many participants recruited to participate do not know one another well, and nor are they very familiar. Thus, there is a greater tendency in the latter than the former for members to want and need to explain what they do. As they do so, they directly or indirectly provide sometimes systematic descriptions and causal justifications (i.e., "explanations") regarding
organizational capabilities, resources and constraints. As a result of such communication, participants are able to develop more realistic expectations of what each other can and cannot do.

Equally, there tends to be less blame attached to the non-achievement of expectations, for at least two reasons: 1) by having come to identify with one another, participants tend to feel less inclined generally to judge one another; and 2) by having more information about the organization, one possesses more data with which to explain why non-achievement has occurred.

Finally, it is hypothesized, the very nature of responsibility itself will tend to have changed as a result of the creation of such a policy forming arena. Participants will assign organizational responsibility as more a shared phenomenon than something to be assigned atomistically to discrete individual organizational leaders. That is, they will feel that the failure of an organization to achieve emergent and pre-extant group performance standards can be neither pragmatically nor ethically assigned to that organization's employees or its leader. Rather, with a heightened gestalt understanding of the complex interdependencies which shape outcomes, participants may realize that many persons, factors and even the quality of the community as a whole may be responsible for failure.

The other major advantage to educational institutions of sponsoring such public policy education is that the beneficiaries of this education are likely very much to appreciate the sponsors as contributors to greater local self-determination.

Educational services such as R and E training are designed, like community education programs, to better enable local community members to identify and prioritize their own problems, identify resources they can access to address their problems, and plan and sustain strategies of utilizing their resources to meet these problems. Many R and E participants in Ohio expressed considerable appreciation, for example, for
the very practical service the Ohio State University had performed for them. Unlike community education programs which strive to recruit and serve a very wide range of community members, R and E targets community leaders for the public policy education program. The latter appears to constitute a very cost effective way of educating communities to change their policy making processes.

2. Relations Between Educational Organizations and the Community

Also of relevance to those in the field of educational administration are the potential gains to administrators of participation in local R and E programs. Professors of educational administration, and of educational policy and leadership generally, should note these possible gains. As participants in local R and E programs—and in similar local development and public policy education programs generally—local and state educational administrators may

1. Gain better access to information that a) casts a positive light on the educational organization's performance, and can therefore be used to secure more resources; and b) is indicative of perceived organizational failures, client dissatisfaction, and anticipated future changes in client need and demand.

2. Provide other community leaders participating in the local program with more comprehensive information regarding a) constraints which impair the educational organization's capacity to meet expectations; b) the capability of the organization to provide valuable services of which others are unaware or which they are tapping insufficiently; c) the administrator's willingness to improve the organization's responsiveness to local need and demand; d) the administrator's openness to constructive criticism; e) suggested ways in which to redefine expectations so that they are more realistic and adequately reflective of organizational resources and constraints.
3. Develop a sufficiently credible image as a local leader that she or he can influence the values underlying and the strategies used to design, implement and assess important local decisions.

4. Encourage other leaders to appreciate the value of perceiving the responsibility for educating community members: a) as one which cannot ethically or practically be assigned to the educational administrator alone; and moreover, b) as one that must be assigned much more diffusely.

5. Realize and promote the value of not assessing the local educational organization's performance in strictly quantitative terms. Through participation in such local policy decision processes, school and college administrators may realize that the reliance solely upon quantitative performance indices can only reinforce the assignment of unrealistic kinds and degrees of responsibility upon the organization and its leaders. Relying primarily upon test score trends and figures to promote continued or expanded educational funding, for example, only encourages local constituencies to view schooling as a specialized technology, and therefore to assess educators as more or less effective technicians. Those who view the qualities of the educative process as being determined by much more than the abilities of educators as technicians have a considerable incentive for urging that richer qualitative information be available to constituencies.

6. Provide experiential evidence to leaders of other community sectors that educators and educational administrators have important contributions to make to the formulation, implementation and assessment of important local policies. The R and E process could allow administrators an excellent opportunity with which to show they can frame decisions of patent value to local politicians, government officials, and business leaders. In Heartland, this potential was not tapped as fully as it might. However, the data—particularly from another Ohio R and E program—suggest that this potential exists in R and E. It certainly should be tapped.
3. Humanistic Education and Leadership

Akin to the "two cultures" of C. P. Snow, educators and leaders in other local development-related sectors appear to inhabit worlds apart. Educators, at least ostensibly, appear more inclined to be service-oriented than do politicians, government officials, and business leaders. The former, as has been seen, often tend to regard the latter as selfish while the latter see the former as unrealistic and impractical.

The breach between educators and other local leaders is quite similar to that between educational theory/research and practice. Educators are seen as dreamers who prepare children and young adults for a theoretically conceived world. Politicians and business leaders, on the other hand, view themselves as artists of the possible, the feasible. Educators and other local leaders have much to learn from one another. Interaction in which educators and educational administrators are seen contributing to the identification and solution of practical problems of importance to other leaders permits them to enjoy greater credibility needed to advance more idealistic, humanistic values. The general sense from the data is that educators, in many communities, must demonstrate their capacity to contribute to pragmatic solutions and in ways consonant with prevalent local values, if more service-oriented, empowering values are to be heard seriously.

Similarly, politicians and business leaders, and to a lesser extent government officials (who too are viewed often as impractical), are experts of the practical, of conventional feasibilities. They can and should provide educators and educational administrators with rich information with which to transform humane, equity-oriented values into practicable policies and program designs.

Humanistically inclined educators and educational
administrators can identify teachable moments, such as through R and E, in which to offer causal theories regarding the convergence of rationally defined self-interest with the interests of the disadvantaged. For these proposed theoretical convergences to be affectively palatable, they need to be framed by describing the resolution of the latter's needs as useful to the advantaged. That is, the palatability of such propositions requires they be framed in the identification-of, utilitarian rationality which predominates in this culture.

There may be a significant tendency for humanistic educators and educational administrators to regard in a very cynical or condescending manner the proposed need to base these propositions initially on the logic of utilitarian rationality. This in fact appears to be precisely the trap into which so many critical theorists and change advocates so often fall. Advocating the values of human dignity and compassion, they covertly or overtly reject the right of the advantaged to be accorded ethical dignity and compassion. While it may be comforting and self-elevating to imagine that one stands upon higher moral ground than do the advantaged, the proud, self-proclaimed humanist thereby ignores and disrespects the interwoven concrete and intangible forces which shape the world of the advantaged.

The proud humanist believes that he or she has gained some superior vantage point from which to gaze down upon the sordid practices of the unethical. But, the proudest may be those who avoid immersing themselves in the everyday world of the practical out of an inarticulate fear of their own inadequacy to act in that world in an effective, let alone ethical, manner.

Perhaps the clearly authentic joy that several R and E visitation interviewees expressed at being thanked for what they do in this "sordid" practical world suggests that the advantaged want to serve, want to contribute, want to feel themselves as meaningfully a part of some larger good. Perhaps, most critical theorists and their proud humanist brethren are missing something of fundamental importance. It may be that the
advantaged have a largely untapped and profound need to serve, to empower, others—a need which alienated judgement and blaming cannot meet. Another, more obvious reality is that the advantaged possess the resources with which the disadvantaged could come to provide for their own food, clothing, shelter and self-esteem.

4. Conclusion: Answering the Research Questions

The first of the two research questions read: What criteria do participants themselves employ to define and assess the effectiveness of local business and retention programs? The answer may be summarized as follows:

1. The criteria identified by one participant differs from criteria identified by others much more in the early stages of his or her program involvement than they do toward completion of the program.

2. When first becoming involved, participants generally tend to describe organizational and personal interests and reasons for deciding to participate in the program.

3. After participants, particularly task force members, have been involved in the program for some time, they are more likely to articulate altruistic reasons for having decided to participate.

4. After participants—and, again, task force members especially—have been involved in the program for some time, the range of motivations and expectations expressed by one participant tend to have increasing similarity to (or "convergence" with) those expressed by the other participants.

5. In the early stages of the program, participants expect or hope that the program will achieve results beneficial to this or that set of fragmented interests.
6. Over time, participants are increasingly likely to expect or hope that the program will achieve results beneficial to participant interests that are now viewed as interrelated or interdependent.

7. Over time, participants are increasingly likely to articulate the hope or expectation both that the participant group will continue its collective work after completion of the program and that these collective endeavors will redress the fragmentation that has characterized the way in which local development decisions have been made.

8. While participants, over time, are increasingly likely to mention intangible expectations as constituting criteria by which to measure program effectiveness, there is no indication that more tangible outcomes—such as resolving local firms' problems and thereby retaining employment—become less important or unimportant.

The second research question was what factors inhibit or enhance effectiveness as it is variously defined. The answer may be summarized as follows:

1. Perhaps the most important inhibitor to effectiveness identified by participants is the failure of some volunteers to fulfill their promise to conduct their assigned business visitations. This impairs effectiveness by a) potentially embarrassing local program leaders in the eyes of firm representatives who have been led to expect to be interviewed in a timely fashion; and b) potentially causing delays in completing the visitation phase of the program, thereby reducing the perceived momentum of the program.

2. Another inhibiting factor, generally not identified by participants, is the way in which information conveyed by firm representatives regarding complaints, needs or problems is imperfectly recorded by the volunteer visitors, and/or imperfectly interpreted by the local coordinator and other program participants. This imperfect flow of information—which could be
remedied at least partially by prescribing procedures by which task force members test the accuracy of visitation survey records—clearly impairs the ability of participants to identify and resolve the needs of specific firms.

3. A factor which facilitated effectiveness, as it came to be defined by participants, was the diffuse leadership style of the program initiators. This manner and philosophy of leadership encouraged other participants to feel they shared fairly equally in the ownership of the program which, in turn, facilitated the capacity of the program to foster a less fragmented approach to local development decision making.

4. Another major facilitator of effectiveness, sometimes mentioned by participants, was the way in which the entire task force reviewed each survey form. This appears to have accentuated the general tendency of local R and E programs to create an arena in which identification-with dynamics shape the interaction among the participating local leaders.

The R and E program provides just a glimmer, though an intriguing and exciting one, of ways in which to create and sustain a more equitable society. The change needs to be incremental, for this is the way in which to foster, paradoxically, sustainable quantum change. In other words, it may be that only by starting from a perspective of utilitarian rationality can the merits of compassion and civic responsibility make themselves felt and understood.

Many of the connections prescribed and fostered by R and E are of the pragmatic variety. "Making connections" is intended to refer to a dialectic in which practical change is fostered with long range humanistic intentions in mind. Fostering the making of such connections is necessarily an educational process, one which conceives of development in both qualitative (identification-with) and quantitative (identification-of) terms.
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