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INNER SPEECH AS THE BASIS FOR ARTISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION:
SOVIET PSYCHOLINGUISTICS AND SEMIOTICS OF ART

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University
1986

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INNER SPEECH AS THE BASIS FOR ARTISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION:

SOVIET PSYCHOLINGUISTICS AND SEMIOTICS OF ART

But underground nothing ran straight. All the tunnels curved, split, rejoined, branched, interlaced, looped, traced elaborate routes that ended where they began for there was no beginning and no end, for there was nowhere to get to. There was no centre, no heart to the maze.

Ursula Kroeber LeGuin,
The Tombs of Atuan
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background of the problem

Within the past two hundred years a major branch of philosophy has emerged, aesthetics, devoted largely to the attempt to define art. Understandably, definitions of what art is run a gammut of approaches and consensus is not to be found anywhere. One thing certain about the arts has been the uncertainty as to their nature. Communication of emotions, self-expression, sophisticated play, sublimation, intrinsic value - all these fall among the many ways the arts have been construed. The difficulties arise when an attempt is made to say what the various objects, events, and even concepts now called 'works of art' indeed have in common. If all the things this name is used for are really examples of art, surely it is not enough to call our attention to their 'aesthetic qualities', for to employ such a strategy is merely to say that what works of art have in common is that we call them examples of 'art'. And that, of course, is circular reasoning.

If, in our desire to overcome this impasse, we explore
the nature of creating and perceiving - the two processes which are intrinsically associated with the arts - we will inevitably be confronted with the fact that, in both cases, events involving perception are implicit. Perception, however, is a term which can, without violating conventions of grammar or commonly accepted usage, range over an incredibly large expanse of meanings. This is annoying enough when limited to philosophical applications, which bear significantly on problems of epistemology. It is extensively compounded when applied to the arts.

The problems are not totally distinct, however, and one might therefore expect contributions to the understanding of the various art forms to come from theorists who have concerned themselves with problems of a philosophical nature, whether they be professional philosophers, psychologists, art historians, linguists, artists, or scientists. In practice, however, the significant theoretical thinking on the arts seems to come almost exclusively from psychologists and philosophers. The engagement of other specialists in their own work has unfortunately deprived us of the benefit of major contributions from other sources.

Within the last hundred years, a variety of psychological approaches has brought to bear on questions concerning both the production and the appreciation of works of art. The aesthetic experience was, in fact, one of the
earliest topics to be incorporated in the discipline of experimental psychology as it began to emerge in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century and Fechner initiated the empirical approach to art through his work *Vorschule der Aesthetik*, in 1876. Concurrently, a substantial literature on aesthetics has also developed. Two generalizations may be made, at this point, with some confidence, about the corpus of research which has accumulated. The first is that there is considerable pessimism about the heuristic value of the work. Munro (1963), for example, doubted that the scientific methods of psychology were appropriate for the study of many of the processes that are inherent to art; and Child (1969, p. 856) suggested more assertively that the "coarse categorizations" and the "vigorous and broad sweep of the scientific approach" are not adequate for the study of art. The second point is that, as far as psychological research is concerned, there has been continual dispute about the proper subject matter of the discipline and about the theories and methods which should be applied to it. As a consequence, particular artistic phenomena have been selectively examined and then assimilated to preferred theories and methods, and hence have escaped broad and systematic investigation as distinctive phenomena in their own right.

The psychological schools that have made the most substantial contributions to the understanding of the nature
of art have been psychoanalysis, Gestalt theory, and experimental psychology, including behaviorism. Each is associated with a large body of research, and each has attempted to explain art in terms of more general psychological processes (Arnheim, 1956, 1966; Berlyne, 1971; Gibson, 1960; Hogg, 1969; Kreitler, H. and Kreitler, S., 1972; Spector, J., 1974). More specifically, the aforementioned body of research has mostly addressed aspects of the work of art extricated from their context. Studies, for example, in scientific aesthetics have tended to be limited to the shape relations of figure and ground, or the applications of color contrast, or the overall complexity level of compositions. To be sure these partial phenomena must be understood if we are to discuss their role in the artistic structure. But other aspects exist, which, indispensable as they are for the study of art, cannot be verified quantitatively and therefore call for a conception of science not limited to what can be proven by numbers.

In the other discipline we rely on, the theory of art, trained thinkers have worked out several neatly defined positions that face one another irreconciled. Theories of the nature of art and associated theories of the nature and function of art criticism seem to be categorizable into three types. There are theories that emphasize the effect the work of art produces in the passive spectator. Any theory concerned with behavioral responses or empathetic
affects that the work of art effects is of this type. Edward Bullough's psychical distance theory (1957), and Suzanne Langer's insistence that all art must produce sensuous or emotional effects (1953) are of this kind. The second class of theories emphasize the active creative role of the spectator toward the work of art. The significance or meaning of the art is determined by what the spectator brings to the work, his past experience, prior familiarity and previous learning. The current doyen of this approach is Ernest Gombrich (1960). As most writers who have been concerned with the symbolic character of the work of art, Gombrich has held that the spectator almost exclusively brings meaning to the work, as symbols, as opposed to signs, require the mind's active interpretation. I would also place Paul Ziff in this category. Although Ziff (1958) emphasizes that criticism must concern itself primarily with what is in the work of art, what he takes to be in it is ascertained only as a result of high level interpretive activity. Like Gombrich, he holds that what is in the work is incomplete and is in need of completion by the spectator's abilities to organize, to add and construct. The third class of theories emphasize the nature and character of the work of art itself. Their concern is to analyse what is present in the work and, as such, the role of the spectator is a factor absent from this theory. The writings of Clive Bell (1947) and Roger Fry
(1956) are reasonably clear examples of this third class of theories. The search to find sets of formal elements that yield significant form in an endeavor of the type described.

It is worth noting, however, that the above classification is but a useful way of putting some order in a body of knowledge where the multiplicity of descriptions and lack of consentience make for a problem. An in depth review of the relevant literature would give us some conception of the magnitude of the issues and diversity of approaches. Correspondingly, the concepts that are employed in an attempt to explain art represent a bewildering diversity of opinion. As I see it, although no rule requires that something must be one thing, the following list of concepts, which doesn't mean to be exhaustive, invites dismay: Reason or Intellect (Maritain, 1930), Imitation (Read, 1958), Imagination (Fry, 1956), Intuition (Croce, 1915), Freud (1943), Fulfilment of Wish or Desire (Freud, ib.), Emotion (Ducasse, 1929), Pleasure (Santayana, 1896), Meaning (Reid, 1955), Form (Bell, 1947), Distance (Bullough, 1957), Instrumentality and Context (Whitehead, 1926), Experience (Dewey, 1958).

In an attempt to get around this problem, a number of philosophers, critics, and laymen have set up rules for what should be called "art" - an enterprise that hoped at shedding light onto the original question by establishing
what could not be considered "art". It is relevant to my study that such efforts do not seem to have brought the desired clarification. If, when concerned with the nature of art, we want to avoid the impasses created by the fact that someone else, with equal justification always wants to include that which the proposed rules exclude, it may be useful to ask the following question: "What aspect of human experience does a particular word locate and inform us about?" If art is the word of our concern, the question "What is art?" will now read, "What aspect of human experience does art locate and inform us about?" At this point it seems reasonable to infer that any attempt to identify the nature of art should be supported by an explanation for the arts that would subsume all instances of art by establishing relationships with other kinds of human activity.

Recent philosophical studies along this line of thought view the arts as a result of the interaction of man with his environment. Such investigations are rooted in that philosophical tradition which defines humans as rational animals and revisit Kantian doctrine of all experience being cognitive - mediated by mind (Kant, 1951). To this conception of mind as an intermediary between humans and their environment Cassirer (1944) and in his wake Langer (1953, 1957, 1963) followed by the European semioticians, added further distinction. The conceptual instruments which
humans use to classify and explain their world - to represent it to themselves - are systems of symbols. This perspective focuses on specific differences and kinships between linguistic, logico-mathematical, pictorial, gestural, musical, and other sorts of symbol systems construed as so many ways of using one thing to refer to another (Morris, 1946, 1955). According to semiotic theory, a symbol system consists of a set of elementary units - a vocabulary - together with corresponding sets of rules or conventions governing their permissible relations.

The Arts as Language

From this perspective, in recent years a considerable number of studies have been concerned with identifying the syntactic and semantic similarities between works of art - not only between two paintings but between a painting and a poem and a work of architecture and a piece of sculpture and a musical composition. On this view, the arts are seen as a network of 'languages' - visual, dramatic, kinetic, and musical - that need never have recourse to verbalized speech, but communicate through the 'linguistic' features of the specific items being used symbolically; for example, the notes and staff and sounds and silences of a score, the gestures of a dancer and the space in which movement takes place, or the patterns of color and line in a painting and, perhaps, its frame or the wall on which
it is supposed to hang. Some thought provoking propositions about the nature of symbol use, the relationship between symbols and referents, and the modalities of communication have emerged in the course of those investigations. Charles Sanders Pierce (1931-35), master of synthesis that he was, equated language with man, man with the sign, the sign with thought, and thus thought with man, and within that network he developed his view of the difference between icons and symbols, now a classic. Significant studies did not come from linguistic circles alone. Claude Levi-Strauss' (1963) formulation of a concept of society with an integrated theory of communication consisting of the exchange of messages, of goods, and of mates, stands as a major advance in the inquiry into the nature of symbol use. Serious examination of the semiotic aspects of the arts, however, found its major contributions in the studies of Roman Jakobson (1964, 1968), Meyer Schapiro (1970), and Ernest Gombrich (1960, 1969). Gombrich, another of the twenty century giants who is rightly claimed by more than one discipline, in writing *Art and Illusion* has authored, to my mind, one of the most important 'background books' for any talk on pictorial languages. Insights regarding other languages, such as musical languages for example, came from Benveniste (1974), and Veltrusky (1976), a structuralist following in the tradition of the Prague School. Finally, Nelson Goodman's book *Languages of Art*
(1968) should not be omitted here as it is among the most rigorous and complex analysis of the arts as symbol systems.

The term 'language', begs for clarification at this point. It seems therefore appropriate and inevitable to me that a short overview of reported definitions of language be laid out before the research enterprise is taken any further.

**A Definition of Language**

It is useful to regard language as a set of abilities which allow animals to communicate, to transfer information from one individual to another. When we want to transfer information we often do it by putting it in words: we tell a story, give an impression, reprimand, or confess in words, in sentences, in spoken utterances. But often, the information we want to give is not conveyed in words. By our dress we tell something about ourselves or about the occasion. The hostess commonly shows respect to the guests by wearing a more formal gown that she would normally, when at home. An Appeals Court in New York barred a Roman Catholic priest from wearing a clerical garb while serving as a lawyer in a criminal trial (The New York Times, 1975). The court held that the clerical collar was "a continuing visible communication to the jury" and this would prevent a fair trial. The photographs of businessmen that currently cover the pages of business magazines show distinguished gentlemen
wearing their immaculate shirts and ties, with the standard expression on their faces radiating success, comfort, confidence, and reliability. These businessmen have a different look about them than the kings pictured in the classical portraits of monarchs. Here the standard expression on the face of a ruler is often pompous and does not show any curiosity, as if to convey that a discussion with him was not possible.

Examining language as an example of communicative ability, however, tends to lead one to associate it with thought - a misleading mental act, in that, although the organization of thought relates to linguistic organization (see Chapter II), human language per se is only a particular case of the set of abilities which allow animals to communicate (Chafe, 1967).

Any particular item of information which is communicated from one organism to another might be called 'a message'. If we are to focus on messages originating in animal experience a language will be the assignation of conventional signs to the entire realm of internal states and processes, cognitions and emotions, from which such messages can be assembled. But is this enough to define language?

Today, the definition of language is becoming increasingly elusive. In fact, there is no such a thing as a definition of language: there are many, as numerous as
the schools of thought that have been concerned with the study of language. Definitions of this phenomenon run the gamut from "the set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length and constructed out of a finite set of elements" (Chomsky, 1957, p. 13), to "a communication system that is capable of transmitting new information" (Lieberman, 1975, p. 6). Either of these extreme definitions would appear quite applicable to various zoosemiotic systems as well as to the output of various mechanical devices such as a digital clock... Clearly not what the majority of linguists mean by 'language'!

The standard definition confines language to a species-specific communication system and the output modality is often stressed: "Language... refer(s) to that verbal communication system developed and used by humans" (Gluckensberg and Dansk, 1975, p. 23).

Given that 1) in this formulation, 'language' and 'verbal communication system' are taken to be synonymous, but that 2) verbal communication system as language is restricted to articulate speech, the problem with using definitions such as this is that, while it is true that only humans use articulate speech to communicate, it is not true that all humans who communicate use articulate speech. So, either one defines language in such a way as to exclude humans that communicate non-verbally - not in overt speech - or one defines it is such as way as to
include all humans who communicate. However, if the latter
is chosen, one cannot claim that it is a communication
system confined to humans and spoken utterances alone.

Other views of language are less specific. For some,
the features of meaning and the situations which are re­
cognized in the structure of a language will suffice as
the obligatory categories of language (Lounsbury, 1956,
p. 159). For others, language is seen as "a system in which
semological structures, manifested in experience, are
symbolized by phonological structures manifested in sound,
or its equivalent" (Chafe, 1967, p. 59). Since semology
is the term that labels the content substance of messages,
parallel to phonology which stands for their expressive
means, this is a definition of language which already moves
away from the traditional linguistics approach in that
it explicitly identifies the content substance of a message
as manifested in experience, and suggests that its expressive
means are not necessarily restricted to sound.

For others still, the concept of language encompasses
much more than the study of verbal messages and the under­
girding verbal code enabling them - a subject matter that
should be confined to linguistics, not language (Sebeok,
1977, p. 1056). Despite all protestations to the contrary
(Chomsky, 1972) linguistics have remained essentially a
discursive discipline devoted to the study of corpora
that consist of sets of sentences, and its goal is the
structural analysis of an entity, not behavior. Until very recently, this entity has been studied in virtual isolation from the organism in which it resides and from the context in which it is produced. The isolation is reinforced by the distinction between competence and performance that separates knowledge of the structure of the language from its use. Dingwall (1980, p. 52) points out that recent suggestions for broadening the scope of linguistics to include pragmatics have certainly been steps in the right direction. Many of those suggestions, however, continue to be restricted to one output modality - speech.

Whether or not the definitions of language outlined above are appropriate for linguistics, they are certainly not inconsistent with the traditional descriptive approach of the discipline. Such definitions seem to be inappropriate, though, to study behavior bearing on communication, a study that is not limited to behaviors such as judgements of grammaticality, synonymy, etc., or speech and its derivatives, but encompasses subject matters as wide apart as the languages of art and the language of bees. The fields of psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, and sociolinguistics have been concerned with the study of a variety of types of communicative behavior focused on performance in the light of the environment in which it takes place rather than in isolation. Research in these interdisciplinary fields has shown that the definition of language proposed
by linguistics is both too narrow and too monolithic to characterize the linguistic aspects of the abstract conceptual structures and the equally abstract sensorimotor representation inherent to communicative behavior (Dingwall, 1980, pp. 53-54).

I have implied that verbal language is only one among a multitude of graphic, acoustic, olfactory, tactile, symbolic mechanisms of communication. Even Steiner (1981), who could hardly be accused of semiotic sympathies, ventures to accept the notion that to every conceivable medium and system of signs there is a vocabulary, a grammar, a semantic of colors, sounds, odors, textures, and gestures as numerous as that of verbal language (pp. 414-415). But although one can trace a continuum of levels of interorganismic communication such as the unintentional odors of the bitch in heat, or growls and tail waggings, to mention but a few, one must ask when does communication qualify as an instance of linguistic communication. Take the mule drivers and their mules, for example. There is no question that there is communication, even though the mule can only kick back when ornery. And what about Yucca plants and Yucca moths? They certainly interact for their common survival but it would be difficult to propound their interdependence as an instance of linguistic communication.

Semioticians and pretransformational linguists alike
assure us that "The configuration of language determines all semiotic systems." (Benveniste, 1979, p. 67, quoted in Rauch, 1979) Two of the best assertions of this leitmotiv are Kristeva's (1975, p. 47) conviction that "What semiotics has discovered in studying 'ideologies'... as sign systems, is that the law governing, or, if one prefers, the major constraint affecting any social practice lies in the fact that it signifies; that is, that it is articulated like a language," and Jakobson (1971, p. 703) that "The cardinal functions of language - referential, emotive, conative, phatic, poetic, metalingual - and their different hierarchy in the diverse types of messages have been outlined and repeatedly discussed. This pragmatic approach to language must lead 'mutatis mutandi' to an analogous study of other semiotic systems..." Jakobson did not suggest what this 'mutatis mutandi' would entail, which makes the statement rather obscure and, since linguists and semioticians alike do not have an adequate definition of language, it also leaves us without an understanding of language that would be necessary in order to account for the language-inlay in all symbol systems. Comparison among diverse semiotic modalities of massive scale relationships, as represented perhaps in the cardinal functions of language as outlined by Jakobson, as well as more humble comparative studies of the structural characteristics and functional properties that permit researchers to rank symbolic systems such as
music or architecture, with language categories, have both been attempted. The Danish linguist Hjelmslev (1950-51) seems to have been the first to suggest a comparative study of those language structures which are not languages in the traditional meaning of the word; he believed that this would make it possible to single out an elementary language structure without all the complications characteristic of highly developed languages.

Cybernetics offers yet a wider approach to the classification of languages. The objects of study in cybernetics are self-organized systems, specific organisms formed from a set of elements unified by a system of control. Control is effectuated by means of transmitting and processing signals, and its structure is the language of the system. Cybernetics may study both life systems (biological organisms and their combinations, encompassing communities of people and their separate groups), and inanimate objects - automata artificially created and naturally evolved systems. Finally, mixed systems are studied, such as the biosphere, where an 'informational' interaction takes place between live and inanimate elements.

Studying systems as 'organisms' instead of the traditional studying of separate phenomena occurring in the systems, may have its profound philosophical significance. But in such a broad approach to language, a notion of language proper gradually gets lost.
This is not the case with studies in which the peculiarity of the problem formulation requires the narrowing of the concept of language. An example of this is the Chomskian approach to linguistics. Here, the concept of language is narrowed to fit an approach that deals with the study of the universal grammar of a natural language as an inborn human structure (Chomsky, 1972). Other studies will focus, for instance, on the parallelism of formal theory of tonal music and Chomsky's (1965) principles of generative grammar (Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 1980), or will propose a pictorial syntax of shapes (Carter, 1976). Arranging phenomena according to a definite chosen scheme may give a view of the system that allows for seeing clearly what has earlier remained shaded. The problem is, however, that the scheme is arbitrarily chosen. As a result, generally speaking, for each study that endeavors to articulate symbol systems as exhibiting an alphabet, a morphology and a syntax, another study is generated in disagreement with that particular choice of criteria. One way to get around this problem is to isolate those elements that can be identified as universal in semiotic modalities - in other words, that allow for their assimilation into the concept of a hard language. Without trying to systematize contrasting formulations in detail, one is nonetheless able to trace two main trends in developing views on language. One of these trends views language as a very
hard structure, in some indubitable way linking the sign
with the referent. The second tendency views language as
a soft structure so complicated that the rules for ascribing
meaningful content to signs and their combinations do not
lend themselves to clear arrangements into logical schemes.

In modern times, as a consequence of scientific
development, an opinion has been formulated to the effect
that a hard language structure seemed destined to become
such a language. Following Cartesian philosophy that de­
manded that words should possess precise and unambiguous
meanings. Leibnitz tried to develop an idea of universal
symbolic and logical calculus - the rules to operate with
universal signs. In order not to overload an already lengthy
collection of different views of language I will not include
exemplars by representatives of this school.

More recently, the concept of hard structure has become
reflected in the program of the logical positivists. This
trend of thought was formulated in the 1920s almost simulta­
neously in Austria - the 'Vienna Circle' - Germany, Great
Britain, and Poland, and to a great extent had exhausted
itself by the 1960s. Its most prominent representatives
are Ayer (1946), Carnap (1959) - usually considered the
leader of the trend - and Wittgenstein (1955) as well
as Russel (1921) in his early papers; Popper (1962, 1965),
who is well known to those interested in the general
problems of the philosophy of science, was for a time close
to the positivists. The program of the logical positivists was directed at a formalization of science. It is therefore only natural that a central feature of the program was the idea of creating a universal language with ideal terms which would be clearly understood and distinct from the vague terms of speculative constructions. In accordance with this program, the scientific terms were divided into theoretical and non-theoretical. The latter, in their turn, were divided into 'primitive' terms, understandably immediately without definition, and 'precise' ones, to define which necessary and sufficient conditions are given and which of the primitive terms of the system should be used.

The concept of the hard structure of language has not faded into the background. Quite the contrary. It has come to pervade ideas of thinkers in areas less governed by rules of scientific precision and more amenable to humanistic speculations. The famous novel The Glass Bead Game, by Herman Hesse (1969) is a peculiar example of the tendency toward the construction of a universal language. In this book, an Order is described, the keeper of a specific universal language, the cryptography of the Game of glass beads. Every sign is "... really all-embracing, every symbol and every combination of symbols leads not somewhere, not to a separate instance, or experiment, or proof, but to the center, to the most secret mystery of the world, to the basis of all knowledge." The language
was indeed universal; it contained "... a formula of astro-
mathematics, the principle for composing an ancient sonata,
a dictum of Confucius and so forth - everything expressed
in the language of the Game: in symbols, cyphers, abbrevia-
tions, and signatures."

Even semioticians have not been immune to the influence
of the concept of a hard structure. In an effort to uncover
the language-inlay in nonverbal as well as verbal semiotic
modalities, Irmegard Rauch (1979) has based her provocative
analysis on language, paralanguage, music and architecture
on the universal primitives hypothesis, in its refined
version by Postal (1966), later extended by Bierwisch
(1967, 1970). These linguists hold that the input from
the 'real world' into the human organism is interpreted
in the form of universal semantic components in a species-
specific manner. In seeking the shared features of the
symbol systems she proposes to examine, Rauch identifies
the four sensory language attributes of Miller and Johnson-
-Laird (1976, p. 15), "quality, intensity, extension and
duration," as semantic primitives, and proceeds to isolate
the primitives of quality, intensity and length in the
aforementioned semiotic modalities.

The other trend of linguistic thought views a soft
structure of language not as its defect but, on the contrary,
as reflection of its variety and inner power. This idea
was quite distinctly formulated by Humbolt (1963) to whom
it was obvious that the variety in human thinking could not be expressed by any calculus construed as mathematics. The idea that the meaning of something said should be sought not in the names of things but in phrases built of words had begun to settle in. In Wittgenstein's last work, *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), one no longer comes across broad discussions of the construction of an artificial, logically perfect language - which are abundant in *Tractatus* - but one finds examples of a refined semantic analysis of separate statements in everyday language, which begot numerous subsequent studies in semantics. The word had begun to be interpreted as a symbol linked associatively with a field of meanings.

**Meaning: Semantics and Semiotics**

How meaning is carried in words is the business of semantics, a part of linguistics. Semiotics deals with meaning conveyed by any medium, not only speech, and semiotic properties are those properties from which meaning is created. Semantics is therefore one aspect of semiotics - semantic properties are those semiotic properties that belong to speech. But speech has not only semantic properties. A sentence may be long; it may contain seventy words, twenty of which are monosyllabic. These are not semantic properties per se, though they may, in some unusual circumstances, contribute to semantic properties, i.e.,
to the meaning of the sentence, especially when that is intended to be the case. Poetry is, of course, the epitome of this kind of phenomenon, but there are many examples of oratory prose in which words are chosen according to their morphological and phonetic characteristics, and are intended to produce certain effects within a particular rhetorical style. Many objects, paintings, buildings, musical compositions have meaning. But not all properties of these items have semiotic roles. A painting has length and width; it weighs a few pounds and is worth some sum of money. Some of these properties may or may not be semiotically significant. On the pragmatic level, the cost of a painting may be vital, as is its size, in relation to its viewer and prospective buyer; the length and width of a painting are syntactic features directly relevant to the space relations of the elements within the painting; but although the area of a painting has had something to do with its content, e.g., the monumental size of historical paintings, I do not think that taking into consideration, for example, the weight of the frame plus the canvas of a major historical painting is going to yield significant information toward the meaning of the work. The borderlines of what can be seen as important factors in the construction of meaning are blurred. Marantz' study (1965), *The Work of Art and the Object of Appreciation*, provides an insightful appraisal of the problems facing the beholder when
engaging in the appreciation of a work of art. In pointing out relationships between the art object and specific aspects of appreciation extrinsic to the work of art itself he calls into question the view that disclaims differences in the viewing conditions as playing a role in the process through which the ultimate effect of the work is achieved.

When considering the symbol systems that make up art objects as fields of analysis, one other major difficulty regarding the construction of meaning is due to the fact that a semiotic approach may abstract from the aesthetic elements and values in the object, a fact which seems to be one of the main reasons for confusion. When observing both a work of art and an ordinary object, the conceptual patrimony in aesthetics has conditioned us to look for some specific types of qualities in its structure: expressive, and formal qualities, accountable for some of the object's impact on its observer, often accountable also for its being judged successful or unsuccessful.

From all the discussions regarding the construction of meaning - and there have been many from Plato on - it is clearly naïve to think that parts of a picture represent various things and that the meaning of the picture is the sum of the meaning of its parts. More specifically, it has not proved very useful to consider that a picture has symbols which stand for some entities, and that there are equivalences to be unveiled between these and some
structural elements found in verbal discourse. An attempt to reveal the linguistic structure in a painting, or in a building, or even in a poem, is a dangerous enterprise. Philosophers - Dufrenne, Goodman and Langer - are skeptical about treating painting as a language on the grounds that either paintings lack syntactic elements and rules (Dufrenne, 1970; Langer, 1963, 1967), or that paintings are ordered differently from language units or, still, that paintings and languages belong to different kinds of symbol systems (Goodman, 1968; Langer, ibid.). Other reputable scholars such as Margolis (1980) reject outright any relationship between verbal language and the arts: "... there is no viable sense in which the materials of the arts may be construed as exhibiting semantic and syntactic features that compare favorably with the systematic features of true languages." (p. 217)

But let us look at how meaning is inferred in natural language. The meaning of an utterance in natural language is, roughly speaking, the set of its consequences. This is to say that the meaning of any utterance arises from the consequences we were able to draw because we were aware of other previous utterances, which we either knew existed or we assumed were implicit at some point in the discourse. One does not draw consequences from an isolated utterance, but from an utterance in conjunction with a lot of other prior utterances, in a context one is aware of - utterances
which often remain tacit and are never articulated external-
ly, not spoken, not heard. Sokolov (1972) refers to this
particular phenomenon when discussing colloquial turns
of speech, known in philology as ellipses, and he gives
the following example, from Ivanov's Parkhomenko:

"I wish you," said Alexander, touching
the horse and moving off. "I wish you,"
replied Ivan, and everyone present under-
stood what it was that the brothers were
wishing each other; and the peasants
said with one voice, "We wish you!" (p. 120)

Sokolov points out that entire links have been left
out of the chain and yet meaning is carried, through active
participation from the person to whom speech is being ad-
dressed (p. 120).

If we want to be more precise still, we can say that
the meaning of an utterance in verbalized speech is the
difference between what one can infer with the new utterance
and what one can infer without it - a conclusion compatible
with Chafe's (1974, 1976) notion of 'given' and 'new'
information, which he defines as follows:

Given (or old) information is that
knowledge which the speaker assumes to
be in the consciousness of the addressee
at the time of the utterance. So-called
new information is what the speaker
assumes he is introducing into the ad-
ressee's consciousness by what he says.
(1976, p. 30)

It is possible to demonstrate that my conclusion
regarding the meaning of an utterance (above) is logically
correct. In the essential steps of my reasoning I have
followed Tarski's (1956) demonstration which is carried out in a series of propositions in logical notation used in model theory, that part of logic which deals with the relations between formal languages and their possible interpretations (pp. 31, 32, 63, 64). I will not reproduce here the formalized sets of logical propositions as I think this would unnecessarily burden an already lengthy discourse with material to be piled on the rack reserved for excess baggage.

Let us now look at how meaning is inferred in the case of artworks. Here, we want to infer consequences, not from an externally verbalized utterance plus a set of implicit utterances, but from an art object plus a set of utterances, some of which may also not be expressed in oral speech but only assumed as possible steps in a certain line of thought. In a painting, for example, I will therefore consider meaningful elements both the visual elements in the painting and the linguistic elements of possible speech utterances - words, clauses, sentences - related to the topic, because in a painting, the 'scene' is larger than it is shown by the canvas. There are some facts and many hints at facts, as well as thoughts and feelings experienced by the artist in connection with the subject matter of the work which are conveyed by the picture but are not in the picture. There are, therefore, many utterances in natural language which can be inferred from
a picture. And because linguistic elements are meaningful elements in any instance of speech whether or not it be externally verbalized (see my discussion of acommunicative speech, Chapter II), the linguistic elements pertaining to the utterances that can be inferred from the picture are meaningful elements, just as its visual elements are meaningful, in another convention, in another symbol system.

If one generalizes the concept of linguistic consequence to the concept of semiotic consequence, one will find that for any consequence to be inferred from a set of assumptions, 1) that consequence is necessarily an utterance in a language, and 2) every member of the set of assumptions is either an utterance in that language or a meaningful element in a convention. This much can also be deducted from the logical literature by Tarski (ibid. pp. 409-420). One can however carry reasoning further. Since speech utterances in any language are a particular case of conventions, in which meaningful elements are words, clauses, sentences, we can rephrase the above generalization: semiotic consequences are utterances in a language, inferable from meaningful elements - visual elements in a drawing or a painting, auditory in a piece of music, visual and auditory in a ritual or a dance; plus linguistic, in the speech utterances assumed possible in connection with any of those phenomena. However indirectly, there is a link between an event or an object - a dance, a building
and logical connectives materialized in language, in a sentence, or in a clause, sometimes in a word. For example, from a building may follow a negative consequence, or a positive one, or a conjunction of both: a Renaissance palace tells us that the landlord is not afraid of military attack in that many Florentine palaces have relictish corbels and minute machinolations which make an affirmative allusion to military architecture; a Roman palace, on the other hand, makes a negative allusion to a castle, as there are no corbels supporting a machinolation.

Does all construction of meaning, then, ultimately return to language? From the above discussion it appears that the reading of a text and the understanding of somebody's point in a conversation, or the understanding of a painting, all consist in drawing consequences from the meaningful elements immediately available to the eye and the ear, plus an appropriate set of linguistic meaningful elements.

Statement of the Problem

Generally, investigations that have been concerned with discussing differences and similarities between the structural or the formal characteristics of some chosen artistic output modalities and the characteristics of verbal language have been attacked vehemently, as one would Quixotic windmills.
Verbal language, however, is itself only one speech-rooted output modality, one among many. This position almost demands to be overstated so that the very point at issue will not be missed out or the substantiation with which it has been put forward by many a reputable scholar (Leont'ev, 1981; Gal'perin, 1969; Teplov, 1947) underestimated.

For, on the one hand, then, it is assumed that any human output modality starts out as a mental mechanism which is subsequently projected onto the external world (Leach, 1985). Projections, Leach stresses, can take all sorts of manifest forms: verbalized speech utterances and written texts, yes, but also musical compositions, functionally useful material constructions such as bridges and houses, performative constructions such as ceremonials, plays, rituals, and symbolic material objects such as carvings, paintings, and so on. And, on the other hand, it is generally accepted that speech, in its multiple forms (Piaget, 1955; Vygotsky, 1962; Leont'ev, 1978a; Zivin et al., 1979) plays a major role in the organization of the mental mechanisms that support all higher mental functions and particularly plays a role in the elaboration of sign systems.

However, no studies have investigated the role played by speech in the psychological mechanisms inherent to art making. Are not the arts, though, the human output modality
symbolic 'par excellence'? It is in order, therefore, to investigate whether the arts are rooted in speech and, if so, which speech form is directly engaged in the art making process.

**Purpose of the Study**

This study examines the role played by the symbolic functioning process identified by L.S. Vygotsky (1962) as inner speech in the internalization process undergone by the artist as he reflects his experience of the world at large in his work. The process accountable for the generation of both verbal and non-verbal instances of artistic output will be identified as one that engages a covert speech function - inner speech.
CHAPTER II
INNER SPEECH

Introduction

At any particular moment during our waking hours there are certain images, words, fragmentary phrases, that we would intuitively say are in our consciousness. These bits and pieces appear to be part of the total range of material to which our minds have access - the great ongoing inner panorama that William James (1893) dubbed the "stream of consciousness." We might ask someone suddenly to say what she's thinking in one of those hazy moments out of dreamland, and thereby learn the subject matter, the order or disorder of reveries, and perhaps some mood or vein characterizing this material; but until asked to tell us, that person may not even have been aware of her stream and, even if aware, may not have put it into words. And the selection, wording, and emphasis with which she verbalizes the material to us may not be the same as she would have verbalized it to herself.

In thinking over silently some question, in comparing and generalizing the data of the problem being solved,
we often notice that we mutter to ourselves separate words and, occasionally, fragmentary phrases. At times, especially when solving difficult problems, we enter into a kind of discussion with ourselves: we formulate mentally a number of propositions, criticize them from various points of view, and finally select one of them, rejecting the rest. The speech arising in such cases usually is in the form of 'mental' talking, but sometimes it is accompanied by overt articulation, thus making its individual components perceptible for another observer as well.

The mechanism arising at the instant we think about something, plan or solve problems in our mind, recall books read or conversations heard, read or write silently, is known in psychology as 'inner speech' or 'endophasy'. (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 130). In all such instances, we think and remember with the aid of words which we articulate to ourselves. Inner speech is speech to oneself - concealed verbalization - which is instrumental in the logical processing of sensory data as well, in their realization and comprehension within one's own system of concepts and judgements. Sokolov (1972), one of the leading Soviet investigators of inner speech after Vygotsky's death, vigorously claims that the elements of inner speech are found in all our conscious perceptions, actions, and emotional experiences, whether they manifest themselves in silent rumination, instructions to oneself, or as verbal
interpretations of sensations and perceptions. To say, therefore, that inner speech is a rather important mechanism would be somewhat of an understatement. The universal mechanism accountable for most, if not all, of the properties that differenciate humans from other species, would be more likely. In fact, according to the major Soviet investigators in the area, inner speech seems to be present in all thought processes, specifically in those processes accountable for the relationship between image and word, concept and word, proposition and sentence, train of thought and structure of discourse, instructions and their execution in terms of action.

Early Research on Inner Speech

Although inner speech is largely associated today with Soviet research in psycholinguistics, the first investigators of this mechanism, interestingly enough, were not the Soviets but the French - V. Egger (1881) and G. Ballet (1886), who were researching on the relations of thought to speech. They noted that inner speech, though always accompanying our thinking, is far from being identical to it. They also noted a perceptible time interval between the instant of appearance of a thought and the onset of inner speech, particularly when something new and difficult was the object of thought. Subsequently, representatives of the Würtzburg school - Bühler (1907), Külpe (1914),
and others - attempted to establish experimentally the independence of thinking from pictorial images, including the "independence of thoughts from the signs by which we express them," (Külpe, 1914, p. 59), i.e., from words and language in general.

On the grounds of their experiments, the accuracy of which is today more than questionable (Sokolov, 1972, p. 35), the Würzburg school denied the necessity of the presence of images as a foundation for thought. And, although any current analysis of their legacy will show that inner speech was very much in evidence in their experiments, they also denied the necessity of inner speech for thought processes to take place.

In divorcing thinking from images and sensations, the researchers of the Würzburg school arrived at the idealist doctrine of 'pure thought', later adopted by some American psychologists such as Woodworth (1915). Even at that time the findings of the Würzburg school gave rise to grave doubts since such findings could not be confirmed by other researchers who, though performing analogous experiments, detected no trace of any 'pure' thoughts. Instead they found consistent references in their subjects' reports to the appearance, at the moment of thought, of various visual, auditory, or kinesthetic images linked with the objects of thought, or with the internal enunciation of words. The chief critic of the Würzburg school was
Titchner (1909) who arranged for a verification of their experiments in the psychology laboratory at Cornell. The most interesting of the experiments were those of E. Jacobson (1911) which focused on the perception of individual letters and on the comprehension of words and sentences. The findings indicate that the associations of a given word do not remain constant; thus, a visual image of a plant and a greenhouse, for example, associated with the word 'botany', an instant later makes way for the verbal-motor articulation of the phrase 'study of plants'. The inference was that since they are apprehended, the meanings of words undergo changes similar to those of associations.

The identification of thinking and speech on the one hand, and their complete divorcement on the other, became the two extreme viewpoints concerning the relationship between thought and speech. In contradiction to the Würtzburg school, the Frenchman Binet (1903) did not exclude the possibility of fragmentary internal speech being in operation in the course of thought processes, even in those cases when the articulatory organs were enunciating phrases of some kind at the same time. He further offered that "to understand, compare, correlate, assert and negate, are in fact intellectual acts... it is always the internal language which expresses so well the ways of our thought." (p.105)
Piaget's Social and Egocentric Speech vs. Vygotsky's Social Speech

By the time Piaget's (1955) book-length work on childhood, first published in 1923, established two totally different, functionally defined speech categories which he characterized as 'socialized' and 'egocentric', the problem of acommunicative speech (Zivin, 1979) had been around for a while.

Piaget is the father of the label 'egocentric speech' and he was the first investigator to fully identify and examine the speech form that was to play such an important role in Vygotsky's (1962) thinking and in all theoretical and empirical investigation of verbal regulation developed by the Soviet school of psycholinguistics in his wake.

The fact that Vygotsky wrote the introduction for the Russian edition of *Le Langage et la Pensée chez l'Enfant* does not mean that he agreed with Piaget's account of egocentric speech. Quite the contrary: the two authors disagreed not only about the role of speech in development but about the development of human cognition in general. However, in turning to Vygotsky's criticism of Piaget's conception of egocentric speech it is worthwhile entertaining the thought that Vygotsky did not recognize an important difference in his use of 'social' and Piaget's use of 'socialized' (Vygotsky, 1962, pp. 14-20). In contrast to his own approach, which argues for the priority of social
forces, Vygotsky sustained that Piaget's approach argued for the priority of individual functioning. But it is not really a matter of what comes first - the social (or socialized), or the individual. Rather, it is a matter of what is meant by social and socialized, and how these terms fit into the general theoretical framework of each theor- etician. The term 'socialized' used by Piaget properly belongs to the realm of the psychological characterization of the individual. It is a notion that is in fact consistent with Vygotsky's account of the ontogenesis of higher mental functions (Vygotsky, 1981). For example, in his account of the development of generalization of word meaning (1981, p. 162) it would have been appropriate to use the term 'socialized speech' to refer to individuals' speech behavior that reflects social norms, i.e., that reflects socialization into the speech community. In this sense it is clear that Vygotsky's analysis dealt with socialized, as opposed to unsocialized speech.

In contrast, the term 'social' speech as used by Vygotsky refers to a phenomenon that is not analysable within the realm of the psychology of the individual. He was reaching into the realm of social interaction when he wrote of social speech. This fundamental assumption, that one must go outside of psychology if one wishes to carry out a complete analysis of the psychology of the individual, is a crucial issue over which Vygotsky and
Piaget disagree. The difference between the two is that Vygotsky searched for the beginning of development in social life, whereas Piaget did not.

When one compares Vygotsky's and Piaget's accounts of egocentric speech one finds even more important differences. While recognizing the credit that was due Piaget for outlining the phenomenon of egocentric speech, Vygotsky disputed his interpretation of its function and fate. He argued that a natural consequence of Piaget's assumption that egocentric speech "does not fulfill any realistically useful function in the child's behavior and that it simply atrophies as the child approaches school age" (1962, p. 16), was that Piaget would conclude that it simply disappears or dies away with progressive socialization. Conversely, Vygotsky argued that egocentric speech plays an important role in the regulation of action and that it continues to be part of the child's psychological functioning; that it is eventually internalized, "...turns into inner speech" (1962, p. 18) but remains functional throughout one's life.

**Inner Speech Functions**

Vygotsky's account of social, egocentric, and inner speech, is to be found in his book *Thought and Language* (1962) in which the concept of inner speech plays a prominent role. It is worth noting that James V. Wertsch
(1979, 1985) consistently stresses that Thought and Language is an inappropriate translation of the original Russian title. Current researchers and interpreters of the Vygotskian school quote directly from the Russian edition of 1956 and refer to the work as Thought and Speech (Sokolov, 1972) and Thinking and Speech (Wersch, 1985). Either choice seems to be a more suitable alternative than the current English title since Vygotsky discussed various speech categories in his book but never dealt with language as such.

For Vygotsky, then, inner speech is an advanced stage in a child's acquisition of verbal and intellectual skills. Emerging from infancy, or speechlessness, the child usually starts to exercise these skills by addressing the mother or other nearest adults. After first engaging in interpersonal communication in a social setting, the child gradually gains mastery to both motor and verbal skills in the course of solitary play, during which it speaks to itself assuming the roles of both the addresser and the addressee. Egocentric speech, best observed in children's pre-sleep soliloquies, is the transitional stage between overt, vocal or outer speech, and inner, non-sounded speech. It is usually between the age of 3 and 7, Soviet theoreticians agree, that the child begins to transfer social and collaborative forms of verbal behavior to the domain of private, intrapersonal communication. By the
time the child enters school, the process of internalization has reached the level of inner speech where the child will engage in self-with-self mute dialogue. Here, the linguistic operations which were originally performed in public, in exchange with adults, become appropriated for personal purposes. Inner speech, in short, develops on the basis of outer speech and becomes its private version. From the perspective of the full development of language acquisition, oral speech precedes inner speech which, in turn, is followed by written speech. Indeed the act of writing presupposes a translation from inner speech (Moffat, 1979, 1982), a translation which is a complex operation since the syntax of inner speech is, as we shall see, the exact opposite of that of written speech, while the syntax of oral speech stands somewhere between the two.

**Soviet and Western Research on Acommunicative Speech**

The interplay between the various forms of acommunicative speech and external speech, acommunicative speech and action, and acommunicative speech and concept and symbol formation is the unifying theme of a voluminous body of work by researchers from both East and West, indexed under 'verbal regulation'.

His research is well known in the West where he is usually interpreted as spokesman for Vygotsky's position. Verbal regulation is the process through which some component of the speech apparatus monitors, controls, organizes, structures, or plans behavior arising in some nonverbal system in the individual (Harris, 1979). It therefore encompasses phenomena such as inner speech (Vygotsky, 1962; Sokolov, 1972), egocentric speech (Piaget, 1955; Vygotsky, 1962; Luria, 1961), inner speech in the strict sense, inner speaking, and inner programming (Leont'ev, 1978a), private speech (Flavell, 1964), verbal mediation (Reese, 1962), to mention but those categories which are identified by the standard definitional terms. There are possibly other narrower categorial specifications and other definitions, as research problems break down and investigators may be coining yet more precise definitional terms.

The Soviet work on verbal regulation transplanted to North America has been incorporated in the standard paradigms in Western psychology. The definitional terms are 'verbal self-regulation' and 'verbal mediation'. 'The verbal deficiency hypothesis' with its underlying stimulus/response framework (Miller, Shelton and Flavell, 1970), 'operant conditioning' (Meichenbaum and Goodman, 1969a, 1969b), and 'strategic behavior' and 'metacognition' (Brown, 1978; Brown and deLoach, 1978) have been the interpretive apparatus through which verbal control has been understood.
Soviet work of both Vygotsky and Luria became linked to the American study of verbal regulation by Hayne Reese in an influential article in 1962 that summarized earlier U.S. work on 'mediation deficiency'. The main strength of Reese's paper was to propose the mediation deficiency hypothesis as a result of developmental stages and to link the work by Luria with a solution to the problems of the nature of stages in verbal mediation and of verbal mediation itself. Gail Zivin (1979), in an extremely useful paper that clarifies the confusion plaguing the use of the current terminology in the area, points out that Reese never used any of the supposedly synonymous phrases (egocentric speech, inner speech, and private speech, which are not in fact synonymous), but merely wrote of 'verbal mediation'. He therefore did not specifically distinguish between overt (egocentric, private speech) and covert (inner speech, inner speaking, inner programming) forms of verbal mediation; in Reese's studies, according to Zivin (1979), the covert form is simply assumed to be a more mature stage of the same function.

Other American researchers have, however, conducted their investigations within the boundaries of specific definitional terms. Flavell (1964/66; Flavell, Beach and Chinsky, 1966) dealt with 'private speech' when testing the production of deficiency hypothesis previously studied by Reese. Flavell and his co-researchers offered that the
speech form in question is defined by its attributed function, a conclusion they came to when studying the role of acommunicative speech in strategies for memory encoding. That the form of speech being used is directly related to its function is in agreement with Vygotsky's (1962) allegations and those of his followers (El'konin, 1971, 1972; Gal'perin, 1969; Luria, 1969). That one such function is recall is also in agreement with Leont'ev's identification of 'inner programming', within the set of distinctions he proposed for inner speech as regards its function (1978a).

The last figure, historically, to promote widespread interest in the acommunicative forms of speech associated with Vygotsky and Piaget is Kohlberg (1968) in conjunction with his students, Yeager (1968) and Hjertholm (1968), and drawing on their research. The position that Kohlberg put forward suggests a hierarchical order for the appearance of the various forms of acommunicative speech, by stage of development, and, accordingly, outlines a category system for recording each different speech form.

Kohlberg's identification of six forms of acommunicative speech draws upon a close reading of the motives for speech occurrences that Piaget had suggested in 1923, as well as upon an integration of Vygotsky's and Luria's work, and upon his own observations of child speech. Kohlberg adds silent speech as a seventh and the most mature type of acommunicative speech.
Kohlberg's findings are embraced by two major concepts that have been summarized by Zivin (1979) as follows:

1) that all coded forms of acommunicative speech could be organized into a hierarchy of stages, and 2) that the whole of the hierarchy was best understood through George Herbert Mead's (1934) view that the child builds a differenciated self through conversations or gestures (or poorly articulated speech) with aspects of the self that represent the 'generalized other'. (p. 41)

Inner speech in adults has been studied experimentally in connection with a variety of problems regarding task performance, as well as auditory and speech disorders. Sokolov's book *Inner Speech and Thought* (1972) contains numerous descriptions of electromyographic experiments, usefully informative for the investigator interested on how inner speech is reflected in the brain's electrical activity. In the West, Werner and Kaplan (1963) have dealt with inner speech under a different approach. They investigated this speech form in connection with symbolization processes, which can be immediately gleaned from the title of their book, *Symbol Formation*. The chapters focusing on the nature of representation in the cases of 'self-directed' and 'other-directed' representation are particularly valuable to the researcher having to deal with symbols, mental images, and their referents.

**Syntactic Characteristics of Inner Speech**

The "first and most important" particularity of inner
speech according to Vygotsky himself (1956, p. 355), and that which is fundamental in answering the research question in this study, is its unique and abbreviated syntax. This abbreviation takes the form of a structure which Vygotsky described in terms that have been translated as predicativity:

...[it] does not manifest a simple tendency toward abbreviation and the omission of words; it does not manifest a simple transition toward a telegraphic style. Rather, it shows a quite unique tendency toward abbreviating phrases and sentences by preserving the predicate and associated parts of the sentence at the expense of deleting the subject and other words associated with it. (1956, p. 365; quoted in Wertsch, 1985)

And:

...namely omitting the subject of a sentence and all the words connected with it while preserving the predicate. This tendency toward predication appears in all our experiments with such regularity that we must assume it to be the basic syntactic structure of inner speech. (1962, p. 139)

Wertsch (1979, 1985) clarifies for us that Vygotsky's notion of subject and predicate is concerned with a level of analysis that focuses on utterances in context rather than on the formal analysis of sentence types. In other words, he was concerned with a functional, not with structural linguistic analysis of predicativity. In this regard it is important to note that Vygotsky never mentioned nouns and verbs when speaking of predicativity. It is today widely accepted among both his Soviet followers and his Western
critics and editors that Vygotsky was concerned with notions that have subsequently been developed in functional linguistics, such as 'given' and 'new' information (Chafe, 1974, 1976), 'topic' and 'subject' (Chafe, 1976), or 'theme' and 'rheme' (Firbas, 1966), rather than with the grammatical subject and predicate. Specifically, he commented on the difference between grammatical subject and predicate on the one hand and what he called psychological subject and predicate on the other.

In order to better understand the notions of psychological subject and predicate it is important to distinguish them clearly from their grammatical counterparts. The notions of grammatical subject and predicate have usually been interpreted strictly in terms of syntax and, accordingly, factors such as gender and number, and agreement between a noun phrase and a verb are generally accepted as means for identifying the grammatical subject.

However, according to recent research on this topic (Wertsch, 1979, 1985), what Vygotsky had in mind when he used the notions of psychological subject and psychological predicate was that the first refers to "what is already in the consciousness of the listener concerning the topic of conversation" whereas the latter concerns "what is said in terms of new information about the topic." (1956, p. 333; quoted in Wertsch, 1985)

In short, then, psychological subject refers to
information that was in the listener's consciousness before hearing a particular utterance which is supposed to add to that information. Psychological predicate refers to that part of the phrase or sentence that carries an emphasis and provides the listener with this new information.

Wertsch's (1977, 1985) research shows that this distinction between psychological subject and predicate is very similar to the kind of distinctions that were introduced into modern linguistic analysis by linguists of the Prague School such as Firbas (1966). The subsequent redefining of their ideas has resulted in an accumulation of terms. 'Given' and 'new' information, simple as it may sound, is today widely accepted as an appropriate terminology to define the aforementioned distinction (Halliday, 1967; Chafe, 1974, 1976). It is Chafe's terminology that will be adopted in this study rather than Vygotsky's which would demand from the reader to make recurrent distinctions between psychological subjects and predicates and their grammatical counterparts.

However, the notions of 'given' and 'new' information as dealt with by Chafe (1974, 1976) are analysed in communicative situations involving at least two people: what is 'new' involves what one person (the speaker) is introducing into the consciousness of the other person (the listener). When Vygotsky writes of inner speech becoming abbreviated by dropping psychological subjects (i.e.,
'given' information) we are faced with a different situation. We are now trying to apply a distinction developed on the basis of two-person communicative interaction to a problem in which only one person is involved. Instead of a speaker that assumes certain information to be in the listener's consciousness we are faced with a case where some factors must determine 1) what is in the consciousness of the individual experiencing inner speech, and 2) what is to be introduced as 'new' information.

When trying to understand the formation of the 'given-new' structure in inner speech it is important to keep in mind that the 'given-new' organization of an utterance in social speech is governed by the context in which it appears (Vygotsky, 1956; Chafe, 1974, 1976). In this connection Vygotsky provides the following example:

Suppose that several people are waiting for the "B" tram at a tramway stop in order to go to a certain direction. Upon seeing the tram approaching no one in such a situation would ever say in expanded form, "the 'B' tram for which we are waiting to go to a certain point is coming." Rather, the expression would always be abbreviated to the predicate alone: "It's coming," or "The 'B'." (1956, p. 357; quoted in Wertsch, 1985)

The context provides the basis for abbreviation.

'Given-new' relationships between an utterance and its context are not restricted to social speech. They also exist among utterances by a single speaker. For example, "I saw a girl at the window this morning. She...etc." Here
the context is linguistic whereas in the previous example the context was extralinguistic.

Hence, although abbreviation based on context may appear in interpersonal discourse it can also play a role in intrapsychological utterances, whether or not they are audibly verbalized, but in circumstances where only one person's consciousness is involved - questions answered by the self (Kohlberg et al., 1968), dialogue with self, soliloquies, etc. - in private speech as well as inner speech.

**Semantic Characteristics of Inner Speech**

As phonation decreases and the syntactic make-up of inner speech becomes less like that of spoken language, its semantic aspect comes to the forefront: "Inner speech is to a large extent thinking in pure meanings" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 149). The semantics of inner speech possess highly distinct characteristics, as distinct as its syntactic properties. Vygotsky (1962) identified three interrelated semantic properties:

1) The variable contextual sense of words predominates over their relatively stable dictionary meanings. That is to say that only the words' connotations, not their denotations, would make inner speech utterances at all intelligible to an hypothetical listener. An example: the childish "mommy," translated into full fledged speech,
does not mean the word 'mother' but rather an intention that could be materialized in a sentence such as "Mommy, come here," or "Mommy, give me," or "Mommy, put me on the chair," or "Mommy, help me." There are countless examples of these shifts in meaning: a child's use of 'quah' to designate a duck swimming in a pond, then any liquid, including the milk in its bottle; when the child sees a coin with an eagle on it, the coin is also called 'quah', and then the same for any round, coin-like object. Vygotsky named a similar peculiarity existing in inner speech, "preponderance of sense over meaning" (1962, p. 146).

2) Another semantic characteristic of inner speech is that word combinations are subject to an agglutination in which several words blend into a single word. This new word can then express a fairly complex idea while designating the individual part of the idea as well. In some languages this is fairly frequent. German often forms one noun by joining several words or phrases. This phenomenon is also not unknown to the individual who has given some thought to the names of American Indians.

3) The third characteristic of inner speech is known as "influx of sense" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 147). What this amounts to is that the sense of words that come first in the discourse pervades the sense of those that follow. As a result, in inner speech, a single word can be so saturated with contextual sense that whole sentences might
be required to spell it out in external speech. An ordinary, verbalized utterance would involve the transformation of both the idiomatic condensation of the words and the predicative structure of the inner speech utterance, into a regular syntactic structure supported by words with denotative meanings.

In the forties and fifties a number of theoretical and empirical studies on inner speech and related problems were published. From these studies it emerged that inner speech is not restricted to verbal components alone. Drawing on experiments in which he ascertained that inner speech did not necessarily employ a speech code, Zhinkin (1966, p. 14; quoted in Leont'ev, 1978a) offered the view that there is a special "inner speech code" in which "visual ideas and a variety of schemata" play an important role - a code that he has labelled "code of images and schemata" or "an objective pictorial code." This code functions with the inner speech intention of an utterance, through word association and is a function which attends the materialization of visual configurations.

We have seen that a communicative speech in its various forms enters integrally into the structure of mental processes and it is a powerful means of regulation of human behavior.

An attempt has been made here to provide an overview
of inner speech functions and structure for the purpose of identifying key concepts relevant to the research question of this study.

As regards its function, within the broader outline of the terminology pertaining to verbal regulation, inner speech has been revealed as an intrapsychological mediating device that arises out of interpsychological functioning. That means to say that certain features of one's enterprises that are social in nature are internalized, and abstracted and sedimented in inner speech.

In terms of the structure of inner speech one syntactic and three semantic features have been noted: the almost exclusive display of 'new' information, and, preponderance of sense over meaning, influx of sense, and agglutination.

It may be suggested at this point that all the above characteristics are implicated in the psychological processes inherent to art making because inner speech has a specific place in the process of moving "from the first sensing of a task, through the construction of meaning, to the final unfolding of the thought" (Vygotsky, 1962).
Introduction

The problem of speech and its role in the formation of mental processes occupies a special place in Soviet psychology. Soviet psychologists proceed from the position that even the most complex manifestations of mental life are formed in the process of active reflection of psychological experience at large. This means to say that higher forms of mental functioning, i.e., those which are expressed in active, voluntary, and conscious forms of activity, are the result of the work of the brain as manifested in social conditions, and are not inherent properties of the mind. Complex mental processes entail complex functional systems, and these are formed with the intimate participation of the appropriate speech forms. How social relations are developed, how language is mastered, how experience of prior generations is acquired, and how speech aids the formation of higher conscious mental activity constitutes a fundamental part of Soviet psychology.
Activity, however, is a concept that deserves some explanation. Not only is it the fundamental category from which other psychological concepts such as consciousness, internalization, and mediation are derived but it is a term that has a specific technical meaning in Soviet psychology (Wertsch, 1979).

A.N. Leont'ev, the prominent Soviet theoretician to follow in Vygotsky's footsteps defines activity as "...the unit of life which is mediated by mental reflection." (1981, p. 46) And he clarifies: "... an activity is not a reaction or an aggregate of reactions but a system with its own structure, its own internal transformations and its own development." (1981, p. 46) And further:

The analysis of activity...comprises the decisive point and principal method of scientific cognition of psychic reflection, consciousness. In the study of the forms of social consciousness it is the analysis of social life... and the systems of social relationships; in the study of the individual psyche it is the analysis of activity of individuals in given social conditions and concrete circumstances that are the lot of each of them. (Leont'ev, 1978b, p.14)

Wertsch (1979) points out that an activity is concerned with a level of analysis that is seldom included in the Western approach to cognitive psychology. Based on his reading of Leont'ev's theory he offers that an activity is not something that a human consciously does in terms
of performance that has an immediate result: this would pertain to the levels of analysis concerned with segments of behavior - actions, and operations. Rather, an activity is the broader framework of implicit assumptions and expectations within which actions and operations are carried out.

As a result of this position, Soviet psychologists have emphasized the need to study the ways in which humans interact with one another and with the physical world around them. It is important to note that this socially oriented approach is not to be interpreted, as Wertsch points out (1979, p. 16), as dealing with some special form of 'social cognition' which is separate from logical cognition about objects in the physical world. One of Vygotsky's students, D.B. El'konin (1972) has made this quite clear:

The system "child-thing" is in reality the system "child-social object." Socially evolved modes of action with these are not given immediately as physical properties of the objects. We do not find inscribed on the object where and how it originated, how we may operate with it, how we can reproduce it. Therefore, that object cannot be mastered through adaptation, through a mere "accomodation" to its physical properties. This must take place internally; the child must go through a special process of learning the social modes of action with objects... In this process, the physical properties of an object serve merely as referents for the child's orientation in his actions with that object. (PP. 237-238)

An obvious implication of this approach is that
children of various cultures and different levels of historical development will be confronted in their daily life with different activities and hence, will have different forms of intellectual functioning.

One of the most important contributions Vygotsky and his colleagues have made to the argument that individual cognition emerges out of social interaction in ontogenesis, is the notion that one and the same activity can be carried out both in interacting with others and on an individual basis. That is, their claim has not been simply that social interaction somehow results in individual cognitive functioning. Rather, they have argued that the very processes, relationships, etc., that are involved in social interaction are eventually taken over and internalized, to form individual cognitive processes. This progression is a corner stone of what Vygotsky termed "the general genetic law of cultural development." (Wertsch, 1979, p. 18) In summarizing the processes involved, Vygotsky (1981, p. 163) points out that any function of the child's cultural development appears twice. First it appears within the social realm, between people, as an interpsychological category. And then it appears within the child's individual functioning as an intrapsychological category. He further remarks that this is equally true with regard to voluntary attention, to logical memory, to the formation of concepts, and to the development of volition.
In order to facilitate the reading of the remainder of this research study and clarify what has preceded, I shall introduce the six major defining features of A.N. Leont'ev's theory of activity before I proceed to examine inner speech as a mediating device engaged in the process accountable for the generation of both verbal and non-verbal artistic output.

The first feature of the theory of activity is that activity is analysed at various levels. Examination of the components of any activity involves three levels of analysis, and different criteria are used to define the units of the various levels (Wertsch, 1981). According to A.N. Leont'ev (1981), activities are distinguished on the basis of their motive and the object toward which they are oriented; actions, on the basis of their goals; and operations, on the basis of the conditions under which they are carried out. The different levels of analysis allow the investigator to examine a single segment of behavior from a variety of viewpoints. With this approach, a segment of behavior can be analysed from the point of view of the actions involved and their various goals, and also from the standpoint of operations and their associated conditions.

Wertsch (1981) points out that Western psychologists have focused most of their research on problems that in Soviet psychology would arise at the level of operations.
and have tended to ignore issues that arise at the level of analysis concerned with actions and activities. It is worth noticing that Soviet psychologists define their levels of analysis and the units used in them on the basis of functional criteria. One result of this is that when Soviet psychologists speak of "the structure of an activity" they have in mind something very different from what has come to be known as "structuralism" in Western psychology, because the units they use are defined on the basis of the function they fulfill rather than on the basis of any intrinsic properties they possess.

The second major feature of the theory of activity is that it involves the notions of goal and goal-directedness - concepts which are directly involved with the level of analysis concerned with actions. The general approach to this feature may be contrasted with one often used in Western psychology in which the investigator is concerned with structural features common to many forms of behavior regardless of their goals. Some Soviet psychologists such as Leont'ev (1981) criticize structuralist approaches precisely on those grounds. In their opinion, by abstracting certain features of several actions and ignoring differences in their goals, the researcher overlooks the most essential characteristic that defines the goal-directed process in the first place. It might be expected that the notion of
goal-directedness would play an important role in a Marxist psychology since Marx (1906) and Engels (1940) argue that the ability to formulate and carry out conscious goals is a crucial trait that distinguishes humans from other animals.

The third main feature of the theory of activity and one which is central to this study is that activity is mediated. As is the case with other themes in this theory, one can identify the influence that Marx and Engels had on this theme. For example, in Capital, Marx (1906) referred to instruments of labor as things, or complexes of things, which the worker interposes between himself and the subject of his labor, and which serve as conductors of his activity. Engels (1940) also stresses the importance of tool use. In Dialectics of Nature, for example, he writes that the specialization of the hand implies the tool, and the tool implies specific human activity, and the transforming reaction of man on nature - therefore, production.

Notion such as these provided the basis for much of what Vygotsky wanted to say about the mediation of human activity but, having had a long and abiding interest in semiotics, he was particularly interested in extending the notion of mediation by tools to mediation by signs. In his personal notebooks he writes that the analysis of signs is "the only adequate method for investigating human
consciousness." (1977, p. 94) It is particularly relevant when examining the suitability of major ideas in the theory of activity for an analysis of the psychological processes attending art making, to note that when Vygotsky was developing this notion of how human psychological processes are mediated by sign systems he was not thinking exclusively of linguistics. Vygotsky and his followers recognized the importance of language and often stated that language was the most important sign system used to mediate human cognitive processes. But his paper on higher forms of attention (1981), shows that he was concerned not only with those linguistic signs that fall under the head of Pierce's (1931-1935) symbols but also included other sign systems in his account of mediating devices, such as body language, for example. When dealing with verbal language researchers of the Vygotskian school have tended to be primarily concerned with functional analysis (see Chapter II, p. 46).

Thus, Vygotsky was interested in the general problem of how sign systems mediate human behavior but he focused most of his attention on how speech was used in this capacity. In being concerned with functional rather than structural analyses of linguistic and non-linguistic signs, Vygotsky argued that speech, at first, has the function of indicating or pointing out objects to children, but that later it takes on the added function of helping them abstract specific properties of these objects which will
result in children understanding them conceptually. In developing this point, he proposed that his analysis of speech functions can reveal important facts about the general nature of sign systems. An extremely important point to keep in mind in connection with this is that it does not seem to be the case that sign systems simply mediate some activity that would exist without them - that is, according to Vygotsky's followers (Lucid, 1977) sign systems are not viewed as being handy tools for making an existing activity easier. Rather, as is the case with all forms of mediation, they allow and even lead to the creation of types of activity that would not otherwise exist - a point which is crucial to this investigation.

Vygotsky's reasoning pertaining to his notion of the mediating role of sign systems has been summarized by the Soviet semiotician Ivanov (1977). According to Ivanov's reading of Vygotsky, the history of culture can be described to a great extent as the transmission in time of sign systems serving to organize behavior. Semiotic systems for the programming of human behavior are elaborated due to the internalization of external signs, a process that can be traced back most distinctly to the emergence of internal speech.

It may have been noticed that much of the previous discussion has dealt with items that have evolved into their present form over a long period of human history.
This brought Leont'ev to the fourth feature of the theory of activity - its emphasis on developmental or genetic explanation. It is not surprising that a psychological theory based on Marx and Engels' historical materialism emphasizes developmental analysis. Vygotsky and his followers have utilized this theme in several ways, including the argument that the most important way of explaining, as opposed to simply describing, human mental processes is to examine their origins and development. Historical analysis played such an important role in Vygotsky's approach to the study of higher mental functions that his theory is often called the "cultural-historical theory of mind" (Smirnov, 1975; quoted in Wertsch, 1979).

The fifth feature of the theory of activity is closely tied to the fact that developmental approaches are so important. This feature is that human activity and the means that mediate it have arisen through social interaction - a notion which will greatly bear on the criteria presiding to the descriptive analyses of the exemplars of art works that were examined in attempting to answer this dissertation research problem. Soviet psychology in the Vygotskian tradition stresses that many psychological functions develop by first being carried out interpsychologically. Soviet psychologists such as Vygotsky stress the fact that during the various stages of development, humans' interaction with society requires skills and modes of mediation they
do not possess but try to acquire through social interaction. Human activity through life, then, consists of gradual transferences of information from the interpsychological to the intrepsychological realm, i.e., from the social realm to the individual.

My brief sketch of the essentials pertaining to the transition from interpsychological to intrapsychological functioning brings us to the sixth and final feature of the theory of activity: internalization. One of the major aspects of Vygotsky's view about activities is that they have a social dimension which is later internalized. Western developmental psychologists have usually become acquainted with the concept of internalization through the work of Piaget (1955). Therefore it may seem that Vygotsky's notion of internalization has nothing particularly new to offer. There is, however, at least one major difference between the two approaches. Whereas Piaget was concerned with how certain logical features of human actions belonging to the realm of the physical world are abstracted and internalized, Vygotsky was concerned with how certain features of activities that are social and cultural in nature are internalized. Here again we see the emphasis in Soviet psychology on the social nature of human activity. It is very significant that Soviet psychologists have placed such a heavy emphasis on internalizing social, rather than physical activities. Differences between Piaget and Soviet
theorists also arise in that the latter see verbalization as an important aspect of internalization, which is not surprising given Vygotsky's emphasis on speech as the most important mediating device in human behavior.

More than any other psychologist, P.Y. Gal'perin (1969) has studied the mechanisms responsible for internalization. Thus, for him, "mental activity is the result of transferring external, material actions to the plane of reflection, to the plane of perception, and concepts." (1959, p. 446; quoted in Wertsch, 1979a) He distinguishes between two basic parts of an action: the orienting aspect and the materializing aspect. He sees the orienting aspect of an action as "the most important aspect of the psychological mechanism of an action. It defines the outline of each operation and guarantees control of the action in the process of execution." (1969, p. 251) The executive aspect of the action is concerned with carrying out the plan created by the orienting basis. Gal'perin describes carrying out an action in materialized form in a way that is particularly relevant to our concern with the process of art making:

... this external form [in adults] is not the same as it was for young children. Rather, it is now any form of schema: diagrams, outlines, drawings, models, or simply written notes. All such representations accurately reproduce the characteristics and relationships of concrete things which are important for the act and permit the subject to
accomplish the act by using these substitutes. In all these cases we are speaking of a materialized representation of thought properties and the relation between things. The schema is a materialization of these properties and relationships. (1969, p. 253)

Inner speech plays the major role in this process. The original words denoting the 'concrete things which are important in the act', objects, or concepts, will function as indicators. But, according to Vygotsky (1981), in being internalized they do not bring to the individual's psyche the straightforward meaning they had before nor will they bring some new denotations. They will bring the weight of all their functions in prior social interaction processes, as perceived by the individual in the personal experiencing of those processes.

The six features of the theory of activity are listed below:

1) activity is analysable at various levels
2) activity involves the notion of goal
3) activity is mediated by sign systems
4) activity is explained by developmental factors
5) activity and the means that mediate it arise through social interaction
6) activity is internalized

We begin to see how the various features of the theory fit together into a coherent framework when we consider that in Vygotsky's School the notion of internalization
is concerned with the **ontogenesis** of the ability to carry out **socially formulated, goal-directed** actions, with the help of **mediating devices** (especially speech).

**Art Making as an Activity and as an Action**

Activities mentioned by Leont'ev and his colleagues include play, occupations pertaining to formal education, and vocational activity.

These provide an important clue to a fundamental fact about activities - they are defined by the social relations that exist in a culture. To say that an individual is engaged in a particular activity is therefore to say that such a person is part of some general context which can be defined in terms of social institutions (Wertsch, 1979). While, according to the above description, art making automatically falls under that category, it may be useful to bring forth some of the finer points of Leont'ev's discussion of activities - precisely those points that can substantiate Leont'ev's inclusion of art making in that analytical category. 1) Any activity is associated with a motive; 1@) that artists have motives for engaging in making art does not deserve to be discussed. 2) In activity objects and phenomena are transformed in their subject forms and images; 2@) correspondingly, how the world at large is transformed into subject form and image by the artist has been the concern of a voluminous body of
literature in more than one field of inquiry. And that
the outcome of art making processes are objective products
- art objects and artefacts - is self evident.

Leont'ev himself offers the following remark on this
issue:

...the activity of concrete indivi­
duals...takes place either in a collect­
ive - jointly with other people - or
in a situation where the subject deals
directly with the surrounding objects
-at the potter's wheel or at the
writer's desk. (1981, p. 46)

The second level of analysis proposed by Leont'ev's
theory is that of an action. According to him:

The basic "components" of various human
activities are the actions which trans­
late them into reality. We call a pro­
cess an action when it is subordinated
to the idea of achieving a result, i.e.,
a process which is subordinated to a
conscious goal. Just as the notion of
a motive is tied to an activity, the
notion of a goal is connected with
the notion of an action... (1981, p. 59-60)

One of the main reasons for distinguishing between
activities and actions is that entities at the two levels
can vary independently from one another. That is to say
that one and the same action can be instrumental in real­
izing different activities because the same action may
have a variety of motives. The converse is also obvious
- one and the same motive can give rise to different goals
and therefore to different actions. A third possibility
is equally true: the same action can have several goals
because different aims may be originated by the same motive.
The fundamental concept used to specify the interrelationship among those units is that of sense (personal sense). Sense is a semiotic notion to be contrasted with meaning. Vygotsky grants the linguist Paulham the original formulation of the distinction between meaning and sense:

The sense of a word...is the sum of all the psychological events aroused in our consciousness by the word. It is a dynamic, fluid, complex whole, which has several zones of unequal stability. Meaning is only one of the zones of sense, the more stable and precise one. A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears; in different contexts it changes sense. The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a stone in the edifice of sense, no more than a potentiality that finds diversified realization in speech. (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 146)

These notions evolved under Leont'ev's treatment so that they play an important role in the understanding of the relationship between activity and the action(s) that translate it into reality. For Leont'ev, meaning is concerned with what Wertsch (1979) terms 'the cognitively defined goals' that a psychological analysis might provide, whereas sense is concerned with the role that these phenomena played in an individual's stream of life, i.e., with the activities engaged in, with all their affective and subjective aspects. The following passage illustrates how Leont'ev changed the focus from meaning and sense of words to the meaning and sense of events and general psychological experience:

In some cases the lack of correspondence
of sense and meaning in consciousness is quite clear. For instance, one may be thoroughly acquainted with some historical event, one may have a precise understanding of the meaning of some historical date. However, the sense of this date may vary for an individual. It may have one sense for a youth who has not yet left his/her school desk but another for the same youth when in a position to sacrifice his/her life in battle to defend his/her homeland. Has his/her knowledge of this event, this historical date changed or grown? No. Maybe this knowledge is even less precise, maybe something is even forgotten. But somehow this event is now remembered. It enters his/her mind. And it turns out that it is elucidated in his/her consciousness somehow in a completely different light, somehow with a fuller content. It becomes different, but not in its meaning, not from the perspective of knowledge about it, but from the perspective of its sense for the individual personality. It takes on a new, deeper sense. (1972, p. 293; quoted in Wertsch, 1979a)

Aesthetic inquiry since its origins in the eighteenth century has rarely set art in the context of either motive impelled activities or goal directed actions. In one major tradition it has focused on the artist's experience of creation. In the other it has focused on the work of art itself and the aesthetic experience of the beholder. The first reflects the widespread conviction that in artistic creation man transcends the routines of ordinary social existence, transcends also the use of works of art for the carrying out of various pursuits, and experiences something of higher value. The tradition has been protean in
the forms it has assumed. But the inheritance of the Romantic approach has for some time been dominant, particularly in the field of art education. Artistic creation, so it is said, consists in expressing one's emotions. By providing us a means for expressing the inner life of Emotion it offers an alternative to the routines of Reason. References to expression and emotion are numerous in art education literature. One can trace this trend in the field back to Lowenfeld's (1949) theory of art education, which is concerned with art as expression. His view that engaging in art making per se promotes the child's mental growth is prevalent today and is reflected in the content of numerous articles - too numerous to mention - appearing in some of the NAEA publications. The lack of clarity about the nature of expression and its relationship to factors relating to the child's psychological make up does not seem to have hindered the popularity of this approach. Edmund Feldman (1970), another reputable scholar in the field, further encouraged the trend. Although his account of expression involves a representation of a concept of an emotion, in his theory of art education, he advocates the making of art objects for the sake of arousing emotions thought to be useful in promoting an effect in everyday life.

The fact that in the other major tradition of modern aesthetics the focus has been on aesthetic contemplation
is also accounted for by deep-lying cultural attitudes. For that focus reflects the conviction, first articulated in the eighteenth century, that what is of paramount importance is the realm of the contemplation of works of art. Indeed this tradition is so strong that many art educators as well as aesthetic educators would still find this research study vaguely offensive whereas others would find it strangely beside the point. Margolis (1980), for one, would probably disclaim its validity outright. His critique of semiotic theory in general and of its recent refinements as applied to pictorial semiotics (Eco, 1976), which he attacks in less than charitable terms (PP. 221-223), leaves little doubt as to his stance with regard to a semiotically based study of artistic output. The emphasis on art appreciation and criticism, on the other hand, in the writings of scholars such as Harry Broudy (1983) or Ralph Smith (1968, 1986) also determines selected estimations that are far removed from the approach to the art objects underlying this study.

By placing the art making process in the context of man as an interacting agent in society the underlying perspective of this research study allows for art making to emerge as an activity, and as an action, or even as an operation - the latter though only if our concern were focused on the conditions under which the action of painting a picture, for example, is carried out, i.e., the specific
psychophysiological mechanisms that play a role in applying paint to the canvas. Let us not forget here that, within the theoretical framework of the theory of activity, the same segment of human behavior can be interpreted as an activity, as an action, or as an operation, depending on the role that the analysed phenomenon plays in the individual's stream of life. The crucial point for distinction is what function a particular behavioral segment serves in the subject's overall unfolding of interests and deeds, i.e., whether that segment is only connected with an immediate goal, or whether it is the conditions under which the segment of behavior is taking place that are being considered. Therefore, painting a picture will be an activity for an artist or for anyone for whom painting is comprised in the process of living. It may be an action for someone who is just accomplishing a task that has a specific goal - to paint, or to produce a specific painting. It is the latter level of analysis - action and its mediational means as these relate to the process of making art - that I am concerned with in this study.

The Mental Function of the Word

Works of art reflect a particular aspect of the ability we have to synthesize human predicaments. In doing so, they record the ongoing process between the social context and the narrative of personal incident. The very essence
of discoursive engagement in the arts is the marking of human lucubrations about human wants and needs. Works of art are symbolic markings of culture which, although desperate familiar to us, are seldom looked at as the vicarious text of the discourse that follows experience. So, when looking at the work of art as an external manifestation of one or more possible inner speech utterances, thus claiming a linguistic origin for the arts, the unavoidable question is: what relationship exist between words and socio-psychological processes taking place in real spacio-temporal settings?

Vygotsky's account of semiotic mediation throws some light onto that problem as it deals with sign tokens and their unique contexts, i.e., with discourse referentiality.

**Discourse Referentiality**

When writing about discourse referentiality one is concerned with the general issue of reference, or what Quine has termed the "apparatus for speaking of objects." (Quine, 1973, p. 81) However, in the type of reference I am concerned with, the objects involved can range from being concrete to being quite abstract, and instead of dealing with the decontextualized referential potential of words as in propositional referentiality, the focus now shifts to the issue of identifying the referential value of signs "with relation to the situation...in which the sign occurs." (Silverstein, 1980, p. 1)
The notion of discourse referentiality is useful in that it provides the foundation for applying Vygotsky's concept of the psychological segmentation of inner speech (segmentation into psychological subject and predicate, see Chapter II, pp. 46-49) to my analyses of art works.

'Given' and 'New' Information

As noted in Chapter II (p. 46), the 'predicative syntax' of inner speech entails a distinction between psychological subject (the prior knowledge about the situation which is in the consciousness of the individual experiencing inner speech) and psychological predicate (that which is actually identified mentally as being new, or, a point to be made anew about the object of thought). Vygotsky gives the following example about the psychological segmentation of speech:

Consider the sentence "The clock fell." In it "the clock" is the subject, and "fell" is the predicate. Imagine that this sentence is uttered twice in different situations and consequently expresses two different thoughts using one and the same form. I direct your attention to where the clock lies and ask how that happened. I receive the answer, "The clock fell." In this case the clock was already in my consciousness, the clock is the psychological subject, what the speech is about. The notion that the clock fell emerges second. In this case "fell" is the psychological predicate, that which is said about the subject. In this case the grammatical and psychological segmentation of the sentence coincide, but they also may not coincide.

Working at a table I hear the noise caused by a falling object and ask what
fell. In response I am answered with the same sentence, "The clock fell."
In this case the notion that something fell is in my consciousness first;
'fell' is what is spoken about, i.e. the psychological subject. What is to be said of this subject, what emerges second in consciousness, is the notion of clock, which in this case is the psychological predicate. In essence this idea can be expressed as follows: what has fallen is the clock. In this case the psychological and grammatical predicate would coincide, but in our example they do not. Our analysis shows that in a complex sentence any member can be the psychological predicate. When something is the psychological predicate, it carries the logical stress, the semantic function of which is the setting off of the psychological predicate. (1956, p. 333; quoted in Wertsch, 1985)

The striking similarities of Vygotsky's distinction between psychological subject and predicate and that made by Chafe (1976) in terms of 'given' and 'new' information have been pointed out in Chapter II (p. 48). However, the central methodological concern that arises when considering 'given' information is how to examine it on the basis of objective criteria. To assert that certain information is a given, i.e., is in the background of the central piece of information being conveyed and is therefore in the consciousness of the individual experiencing inner speech, begs the question of how this is known to be the case. Fortunately, there are objective criteria for clarifying one's intuition in this case.

Specifically one can examine the elements in the art
work itself and the context in which the art making process occurred. However, as it is impossible to provide a systematic account of contextual factors and their relationship to the formal or expressive elements appearing in the work, approaches that could be outlined could leave out important aspects of discourse referentiality. What also needs to be taken into consideration is 1) the 'action' of the artist with its attending goal and 2) the relative position of the objects shown in the art work in connection with the interplay of the immanent forces in the piece.

**Attenuation**

Let us go back to Vygotsky's example of psychological segmentation.

In his analysis of "The clock fell" (pp. 75-76) nothing in the surface form (grammatical form) of the sentence changed when it was used in different contexts. However, in a real life situation some objective changes would have been noticeable. In particular, there would have been evidence of what Chafe (1976) has called "attenuation" of the grammatical elements of the sentence associated with 'given' information. According to Chafe, there is a tendency for the portion conveying 'given' information to be characterized by lower pitch or by a weaker stress. When Vygotsky argued that 'given' information (psychological subject) in inner speech is deleted or reduced to a minimum which originates grammatical nonsense,
he was, of course, referring to the most extreme case of attenuation.

Since the major assumption that underlies my choice of the methodological steps which are to follow is that evidence drawn from studies of production and comprehension of external speech is relevant to claims about cognitive and representational abilities (Wertsch, 1985), one would expect, when analysing art works, to find examples of attenuation showing in the less stressed compositional elements, or in those elements peripheral to the fulcrum of the perceptual dynamic field constituting the art piece.

It is the nature of attenuation, though, which is an important factor for my present purposes. Let us refer to one of the examples reported by Wertsch (1985) in this connection. When examining a segment of egocentric speech of a very small child who was putting together a puzzle containing animal figures he points out that while the identity of the figures is mentioned no reference is made to the puzzle frame in which the pieces are to be inserted. One could, however, expect to see utterances such as the following: "This one goes here, and now this one there." Since this is not the case Wertsch concluded that the lack of referring to the puzzle frame reflects the fact that it provides the presupposed background framework in which the 'action' is carried out. This and other similar findings show that the 'action' being executed can be instrumental
in determining what is and is not mentioned, i.e., what is 'given' information and what is 'new' information.

On the other hand, and in spite of what can be inferred from an analysis of the 'action', the determination of what is said or not said in inner speech may raise some problems for an account based on any simple notion of consciousness. To complicate matters further, 'given' information is not always mentioned in equally attended ways and therefore we might find, for example, that in some art pieces what, according to contextual criteria, would appear to be 'new' information does in fact meet the criteria for 'given' information in terms of attenuation, i.e. it does not occupy the focal position in the dynamic layout of the piece although such a position would be expected in the light of the available contextual information.

**Pragmatic Presupposition**

In order to avoid these problems I will follow in Wertsch's (1985, p. 144) footsteps and rely on the notion of pragmatic presupposition. The problems I have noted are connected with the notion of consciousness as formulated by Vygotsky and Chafe - a notion formulated such that attenuation is linked with the simple presence or absence of information in the speaker's consciousness. To avoid having to rely solely on such a notion, Wertsch argues that the general notion of pragmatic presupposition is
an appropriate tool for examining attenuation.

Pragmatic presupposition is an issue of discourse referentiality and hence it is concerned with relationships between sign tokens and contexts. An utterance is presupposing to the extent that information about the context is required in order to compute its referential value. That is to say that some aspect of the situation is presupposed by the use of the sign token for it to be interpretable at all (Silverstein, 1976). In other words, the referent of the sign token must exist cognitively for the sign token to be mentioned in the first place, because no one is going to mention something without knowing what it refers to.

In Wertsch's example that was mentioned above, information from the context was obviously necessary to identify the referent (the puzzle into which pieces were to be fitted). This is the second contextual correlate of 'attenuation', in contrast with the first contextual factor discussed earlier - the 'action' being executed. These two contextual factors, Wertsch (1985) points out, need not operate together. They can in fact vary independently of one another, which may account for the variations and seeming contradictions observed in the ways attenuation manifests itself, as mentioned before (see p. 78).

Up to this point, my examination of discourse
referentiality has focused exclusively on the relationship between possible inner speech utterances and their extralinguistic context. It has been suggested that the 'action' of the artist can play a role in determining what is and is not mentioned, and it has also been noted that the objects which are mentioned are often mentioned in an attenuated form.

However, the extralinguistic context is only one aspect of the inner speech situation that can determine what exists cognitively and therefore what can be presupposed. Intralinguistic relationships, though, also have major implications for the semiotic mediation of higher mental functions. I am referring here to objects whose existence and identity are created through speech alone - concepts that are representable only by abstract sign types, i.e., anxiety, revenge, and the like.

The 'action' of the artist, understood within Leon­tev's frame of reference, is a notion that lends itself to an analysis from which such abstract objects may emerge. The very issues which, in the light of contextual analysis, can be seen as seminal to the artist's intention in undertaking the project, give rise to internal representational mechanisms which are built into the nature of linguistic mediation carried out by inner speech - eminently synthetic and symbolic. Internal representational means of abstract objects emerge thereafter in response to the requirements
Methodological Procedures

In my brief review of the basic points relevant to functional linguistic analysis I touched on the tools at hand for developing my analyses of art works. Specifically, though, it is Mathesius' method of linguistic characterization (Firbas, 1966), known as Functional Sentence Perspective or FSP, together with a sensitive feeling for mutual relations between linguistic phenomena and the hierarchy of such phenomena, that will pave the way for the analyses developed in Chapter IV. The method sees an utterance as a field of relations, chiefly syntactic and semantic, functioning - according to the degree of contextual dependence specific to that utterance - in a certain kind of perspective (FSP). Mathesius' method entails the notions of known and unknown information which correspond to those of Chafe's 'given' and 'new' information. It will therefore be Chafe's terminology that will be used. These notions point partly to the concept of communicative dynamism - a noumenon concerned with the elements that contribute to the conveying of meaning, or, in the words of Firbas (1966, p. 270), to "the pushing of the communication forward" - partly to the concepts of contextual dependence and contextual applicability. 'Given' information suggests contextual dependence, 'new' information contextual
independence.

My analyses of the selected works of art necessitated the following steps:

1. Description of the work
2. Identification of manifestations of syntactic abbreviation
3. Identification of manifestations of predominance of sense over meaning, agglutination, and influx of sense.

When considering the first step of the methodological procedures, what was intended was a verbal account that could make the reader visualize the work without having perceived it directly. My description, therefore, purported to give an account of the local qualities of the work without any reference being made to their causes or effects and without any mentioning of what they may mean or represent.

The next methodological step - identification of manifestations of syntactic abbreviation - sought to disclose the deeper structure of the work and how the conceptualized objects come into play. It is those phenomena referred to by phenomenologists as 'thickening of the surface' (Kaelin, 1965, pp. 30-58) that were dealt with at that point. In this connection an attempt was made to detect which elements in the work of art (both explicit and implicit elements) might belong to the category of
'given' information and which, to the category of 'new' information, i.e., which elements might be seen as the psychological subject that was already in the consciousness of the artist prior to his engaging in the process of art making, and which elements might be thought to be a manifestation of the psychological predicates of an inner speech utterance associated with the artist's 'action'. A discussion of 'goal' relevant to both the extralinguistic and the intralinguistic 'action'-related objects that were identified through pragmatic presupposition was also a necessary component of this analytical step.

In the third stage of the analysis an attempt was made to determine how the interrelated semantic properties of inner speech - predominance of sense over meaning, agglutination, and influx of sense - are reflected in the potential for dynamism of meaning which is an inherent quality of every work of art.

As regards the methodological procedures for this research study it remains to offer that the choice of art works that were examined reflects an effort to focus on a broad scope of content as well as working style. Since the analyses were developed on the basis of the compositional elements available to the eye, specific factors exterior to the work itself, such as framing or viewing conditions (originals or reproductions, size of
reproductions, slides, etc.) were not deemed as influential to the findings. Black and white reproductions, however, would have been inappropriate, since color is an important compositional element to be considered.
"Nightfishing at Antibes" by Picasso

Painting is not done to decorate apartments. It is an instrument of war for the attack and defense against the enemy.

Picasso (Barr, 1946. p. 247)

1. Description

"Nightfishing at Antibes is a pretty big picture, nearly seven feet high and eleven feet across. If we cling as closely as possible to what is directly presented to the eyes, we will notice that Picasso's painting is composed of three main areas.

The top left side of the painting presents the town and medieval castle of Antibes, which link to a string of rocks forming the vertical left side of the picture and bordering the bluish green water of the seashore.

In the center of the canvas there are two fishermen in a crescent shaped boat, surrounded by lights and fish. The fisherman on the right is bent over in an upright position, about to spear a fish, whereas the other fisherman
is crouching and bending over board, merely staring into the water.

On the right of the painting, precisely at the right bottom corner and diagonally opposite the distant castle in the upper left, stand the walls of the jetty. Two feminine figures are depicted as walking on the jetty, one of them licking an ice cream and pushing a bicycle.

Warm purple shades and deep reddish browns are reserved for the surroundings in contrast with the very cool shades of blue in the center of the picture.

2. Identification of Manifestations of Syntactic Abbreviation

When attempting to identify manifestations of syntactic abbreviation it is the elements that may be thought to belong to either 'given' or to 'new' information that will be examined. In this connection it is worth pondering over what Picasso's goal oriented action may have amounted to as he undertook to paint this picture. In doing so we first have to consider the extralinguistic context in which conceptualization has taken place. We know that the painter was staying at Antibes just as Hitler was preparing to invade Poland and that this particular painting was done at that time, in August 1939 (Hilton, 1975, p. 250). We also know that Picasso believed in responding to "heart-rending, fiery or happy events in every way," coherently.
that is, with the notion that he was a political being at the same time that he was an artist. (Blunt, p. 1969. p. 56) He also believed in making public his position with regard to the latest political events, which he justifies in the following words, "I have always believed and still believe that artists who live and work with spiritual values cannot and should not remain indifferent to a conflict in which the highest values of humanity and civilization are at stake." (Blunt, 1969. p. 56)

It seems legitimate to infer that Picasso was concerned about the looming of the war, in which case, to give expression in visible form of what he saw in the world around him would be in character.

What I am putting forward here is that the 'given' information not explicitly depicted in the work but, by definition, present in the artist's consciousness prior to engaging in the process of painting "Nightfishing" was the imminence of World War II.

We come now to the theme that carries considerable weight in the picture not only because of its size and central position but also by its almost architectural stability, which makes the two men in the floating boat look almost more solidly grounded than the stone constructions of the castle and jetty. Whereas the cubes and pyramids on the left are heaped in emphatic disorder as verticals and parallels are avoided in the shapes of the
town, the two fishermen figures are displayed rather powerfully. The stability of the central scene also contrasts with the right section of the painting where the large framework of the jetty also deviates from stability in all three dimensions as it tilts obliquely toward the back.

Given the preponderant position of the two fishermen there seems to be no doubt that it's 'new' information which is embodied there. What 'new' information will this be? Part of the answer seems to lie in the focal point of the painting: the exaggeratedly long arm of the fisherman who, motionless, holds a spear in his hand, ready to kill the incautious fish. It is worth noting here that the catching is taking place by the light of a powerful kerosene lamp - a most cruel fishing practice, one which is often forbidden by the local authorities in many locations. The fish, attracted by the light, come right to the surface in full view of the fisherman who will just have to wait for the right angle to thrust the deadly weapon.

The central motif of Picasso's work, then, is an impending killing. That the killing is the 'new' information or part of it, and that it is impending and not effective as yet is further emphasized when we notice the paradoxical difference between the figures of the two fishermen. The one on the left, crouching and somewhat foreshortened, stares into the water. He stares with
undivided attention, all eyes, but looks rather contemplative and isn't moving. It is the fisherman on the right who is most actively engaged in being ready to spear the fish. However, if we now look at the shapes by which the two figures are rendered we notice that the distribution of motionlessness and motion is reversed i.e., the figure of the standing fisherman is fitted into the most static spacial frame: the horizontals of the body and head, paralleled by the left arm, and the vertical of the leg, right arm and spear constitute a very stable construction. On the other hand, the crouching fisherman who is physically inactive is in fact very much alive with the turmoil of irrational shapes: he is upside down, the feet up in the air, his body broken up into short curves that intercept one another for no apparent reason.

Paradoxical contradiction between the nature of the behavior being performed and the dynamics of the shapes representing it can often be found in the arts. Artists of all media have used it as means to call the beholder's attention to the contrast between physical behavior and spiritual meaning. There are, for example, countless Crucifixions and Resurrections where the figure of the rising Christ is fitted to a stable frontal presentation supported by a framework of verticals and horizontals, whereas the motionless sleepers, or the mourners at the foot of the cross are scattered topsyturvy in intersecting diagonals.
And in music, a sudden silence is often more pregnant with a contained roaring than a 'tutti' of the orchestra could ever be. For what purpose is this device used here? Let us not forget that the painting was done in the eve of World War II. In this ominous light, the murder of the fish by a fisherman in a frozen posture acquires a particular meaning.

The crouching fisherman serves as a reinforcement of the 'new' information provided by his companion as he carries his share of this type of information. Leaning forward, this man is not contained in the frontal plane where the other fisherman stands. He sprawls toward the viewer with scrutinizing eyes, his nose down towards the water, which looks empty but may hide anything. The prediction of violent but unknown things to come emerges as the second major 'new' information item in this painting.

It has been pointed out in Chapter III that 'given' information does not necessarily have to be absent from the perceivable elements in the work but that it can in fact be present in attenuated form. Two such examples can be found in "Nightfishing."

As we travel through the picture from left to right we are held by the company of two girls who, with their bicycle, ice cream cone and outgoing hair seem to represent the unconcerned ever-vacationing bourgeoisie. That they seem to be casually watching the imminent slaughter would
hint at the fact that the bourgeoisie has been known to be aesthetically entertained with less than humane diversions. The bicycle is quite interesting. It is not often that we find something of fixed design and more or less constant appearance in Picasso's work. This is, moreover, a mechanical object and Picasso hardly ever painted anything mechanical. More than a decorative nicety, then, this bicycle is a judiciously chosen object that purports to further convey his view of the inexorable noncommitment of the bourgeoisie in the socio-political atmosphere leading to the war - a noncommitment as mechanical and as predictable as the turning of two connecting wheels. Thus, the two girls with the bicycle on the far right of the picture emerge as an important part of 'given' information - a kind of qualifier, so to speak, of the broader and all encompassing general knowledge regarding the political issues of the day which were, no doubt, ever present in Picasso's mind.

On the bottom left of the painting we find the least stressed pictorial object of the whole picture, and another example of attenuated 'given' information: a crab, so inconspicuous in its shade of brown against the dark brown rocks that it could almost go unnoticed. A curious feature of this image is that its eyes are directed toward the center of the picture, as if what is going on in there is attracting its attention. Why should Picasso want to
to make a crab be interested in the action taking place at the center of the painting? We have seen, however, that this action is directly related with his own 'action' as an artist in choosing to take a stance and underline how he saw the imminent slaughter. What sort of identity does a crab have, though, that it may be mingled in such affairs? Answering this question may help us understand not only why has a crab been painted there but also why it is looking in that direction, which will make us come to the conclusion that, much like the bicycle on the other side of the painting, this crab is no decorative nicety.

It is the word, crab, that gives us the clue. Crab is derived from a Greek myth about a crab who fought the Greek hero Heracles, better known by his Roman name, Hercules, as he attacked Hydra, a many-headed monster that posed a permanent threat to the people of Argos. Picasso's crab, then, is reminiscent of the dark forces that in the shadow (literally, in the painting) oppose those who fight many-headed menaces.

At this stage it seems reasonable to wonder about the plausibility of the aforementioned objects (girls with a bicycle, and crab) being examples of 'given' information. Fortunately we can rely here on the notion of pragmatic presupposition. Some aspect of the situation has to be necessarily presupposed by the sign token, this because it is that sign token that has been chosen and not another.
In the case of the two pictorial objects in question it is both information from 1) the extralinguistic contextual factors identified earlier as connected with the artist's goal oriented 'action', i.e., the imminence of the war, and 2) the intralinguistic correlates of those attenuated objects, i.e., Picasso's referents for the girls and the crab, which must have existed cognitively for the artist in a prior linguistic context (Silverstein, 1980. p. 1), in other instances of discourse. Or it would not have been girls and crab that would have been depicted, but seagulls, or lovers, or some other motive.

Since the aforementioned linguistic referents can only have existed in word form it is appropriate to examine the word-names of those and other significant objects in the painting when attempting to identify manifestations of the semantic features of inner speech (preponderance of sense over meaning, influx of sense, and agglutination).

3. Identification of Manifestations of Preponderance of Sense over Meaning, Influx of Sense, and Agglutination

Maurice Raynal (1953, pp. 110, 122, 124), in his Picasso, wisely says that Picasso instinctively points to things beyond the eyes and presents a painting not merely as a way of seeing but as a way of knowing. How he paints the girls on the jetty, then, is as he 'knows' them to be, as he makes sense of them. Sense can be made in millions
of different ways. No two human beings will have the same connotations for the word 'girl'. The American College Dictionary tells us that a girl is "1. a female child or young person. 2. a young unmarried woman. 3. a female servant." Other dictionaries will have similar entries. But no dictionary will say that a girl is a female with floating hair, minuscule waist and outgoing bosom. For Picasso, though, in the context of this painting, girls are like that. The global image that is projected is one of physical energy, arch feminine grace, and eroticism, which shows evidence of preponderance of sense over meaning in accordance with Vygotsky's account of this inner speech feature (p. 50).

Picasso's rendering of the girls also manifests the presence of influx of sense. We notice this as we watch the figures more closely and we realize that each representational element, as it is further observed in detail, makes the semantic content richer and more precise. The girl on the right is not just licking an ice cream, it is a double cone she's eating. No ascetic restraint there! And her tongue, alive and pointed, reaching for the second ice cream scoop with its tip while feeling the top of the first scoop with its underneath, is the very epitome of voluptuousness. As for the ice cream cone, it is itself a straightforward phallic symbol, even if depected upside down.
Soon, the various links are fused in one indissoluble whole - a sum of the artist's intangible experiences, irritatingly lacking in proper verbal equivalents but rendered here by powerful visual signifiers. Writing about "Night-fishing," Jaime Sabartés (1948, p. 179) who was in Antibes with the painter, states, "On his after-dinner strolls through the town, Picasso had come across such scenes to which he added old impressions." What were these old impressions? The girl with the ice cream cone and her companion - because we ourselves are pointedly characterized by the company we keep - are described by Picasso as creatures of pleasure and luxury, in whom connotation of noncommitment and a certain coarseness so typical of the bourgeoisie are successfully combined.

Manifestations of influx of sense in "Nightfishing" are not restricted to the girls, however. The pregnancy of water is familiar to the student of dreams; and the crab, as we have seen, shifts attention from the indexical function of the word itself to the mythic and psychological function of its name, thus embodying in the process not what the picture literally contains but what it semantically implies.

Much like influx of sense, agglutination involves the ways in which word signification operates in an intra-linguistic context. If we recall, in agglutination separate words often undergo abbreviation, such that only part of
them becomes inserted in the insuing complex word. This resulting complex word expresses an extremely complex concept and emerges as a structurally and functionally unified word. Outside the field of psycholinguistics agglutination has been examined in literary analysis in a way that makes it immediately intelligible as well as relevant to the type of agglutination manifested in "Nightfishing." William A. Evens (1970) has called our attention to word agglutinations in Joyce's Ulysses:

Occasionally...agglutinations are portmanteau creations in the manner of Lewis Carroll, but in the main, they are not merely the arbitrary splicing of words (as in 'slithy', produced from slimy and lithe). Rather, the agglutinations in Ulysses are the welding of two or more single words to produce units with special meanings (for example, 'gigglegold'). p. 28

In "Nightfishing" it is some of the distortions - which, superficially, appear to be crude geometrizing simplifications - that endow certain details with the characteristics of agglutination: the lantern is a lantern, but also a kind of moon; the flying insects are insects, but also strange stars. Picasso's distortions correspond to a whirlpool of lost and found shapes, half-formulated thoughts, fragments of impressions, visual paradoxes, formalistic puns - a rainbow of associations and emotions. Once again we are confronted with the sediment of intangible experiences which find its processing apparatus in inner
"The Luncheon" by Manet

1. Description

"The Luncheon" (1868) depicts a young man standing before a table littered with the remains of a recent meal. Behind the table, to the right, sits a bearded older man wearing a top hat and smoking a cigar leaning on his elbow. On the left background of the picture a servant stands holding a silver coffee pot. On the white damask table cloth lay oyster shells, a half-peeled lemon, a wine bottle and a half-full glass of red wine, a coffee cup and what seems to be a sugar pot, and a knife with a gold and white handle. To the left of the servant and behind her, a rubber plant in a porcelain pot stands on a small table. Some light comes from the top left corner of the painting, through a closed window, whereas on the bottom left corner a red velvet chair supports a black cat indecorously washing itself and a heap of armor attire among which a helmet and a sword are most prominent.

The rich dark color of the young man's coat projects from the slate greys of the background wall and is further emphasized by the contrast set up by the whiteness of the porcelain vase to his right. The coat's velvet sheen is
framed between textures: glass, porcelain, and metal on
the left; china, glass, oyster shells, and the oily surface
of a lemon on the right. These are arranged in depth and
an alcove of space is thus formed for the main figure,
which is further sharpened by outline and by crisp pockets
of cast shadows. When examining the figure of the young
man we notice that the straw hat he is wearing, the necktie,
and the trousers correspond in color and in salience. The
faintly marked lapels, however, subtly lace this figure
into a series of crisscrossing diagonals into which fit
the lemon, the table knife and the arms of the man and
the woman in the background.

2. Identification of Manifestations of Syntactic Abbreviation

In "The Luncheon" the 'spot' is obviously the young
man in the foreground. But he is not the only focal point
of the work. He holds what would be the center of a sym-
metrical composition if it weren't for the helmet which
prominently reflects the light and shines conspicuously
on the red velvet chair to his right. After we have
acknowledged the impact of the central figure we are caught
and held by the bulk and shine of the helmet. Pictured
well to the side of the painting, away from the dynamic
field activated by the crossing diagonals, the helmet serves
as a 'repoussoir': it deprives the young man of a more
lasting communication with the beholder, which he would have if his central position was as uncontestedly dominant as it would appear to be at a first glance. There are two central motifs, then, in this painting, central in intention if not in location, which means that there are two visual elements, at least, connected with 'new' information. An attempt will be made to examine their connection within the conceptual frame of the artist's intended statement, i.e., his intended 'goal'. In the case of Manet this will be a particularly difficult task given that the relation between the man and his art is not altogether clear. Unlike Picasso, we know more about his outer appearance than about the inner workings of his mind. We know that he was handsome, well-dressed, and well mannered; that he moved in a restricted but respectable circle, preferring the company of his social rather than his artistic equals. (Hamilton, 1969) But there is scant evidence of a reflective mind, an inquiring intellect, or a participating will. When we look for extralinguistic contextual factors that may have played a role in the conceptualization of this painting it is, therefore, the riddle of the relationship of personality to painting that we will be dealing with mostly, rather than the socio-political environment in which Manet made his art.

That he was scornful and, to say the least, irreverent, gives us a clue. Two of his major works, "Le Déjeuner sur
l'herbe" and "Olympia" are evidence enough that he liked to provoke. But he was as quick to give as to resent affront (Hamilton, 1969), and he resented the tone of most contemporary criticism. By the time he painted "The Luncheon," "Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe" and "Olympia" had established him a reputation as someone who failed to correspond in the expected way. The insistence of his caricaturists that he was a disorderly ruffian suggests that not only was his failure to reciprocate resented but that he was perhaps reciprocating in a manner which was really hitting below the belt and difficult to handle. The rancor that pervades some contemporary criticism would be difficult to understand if Manet merely responded with an emotional negation. So, within this context, what could Manet have intended by depicting a youth standing by some armor attirement, in an environment that makes a narrative to be reconstituted from the various objects depicted radically incoherent? A plausible line of argument would be to note the significant role played by suits of armor in the Romantic revival of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. When a suit of armor occurs in this revivalist context - in the paintings of Landseer, for example - it invariably serves as a synecdoche for the resurrected life of the past. (Bann, 1984) That Manet should have used armor in "The Luncheon," therefore, seems to indicate his wish to evacuate this potent Romantic synecdoche. Here, armor is no longer a rhetorical
substitute for the chivalric glory of another epoch, but the very epitome of emptiness and dislocation. Granted though it may be that Manet was irreverent, that he would have chosen to depict a cat cleaning itself - not turning backwards over its shoulder, nor licking its belly or scrubbing its muzzle with a paw, as cats often do, but trying to get rid of the most unwanted of residues, goes beyond mere irreverence.

The young man's facial expression seems to reinforce this argument. Disdainful but detached, he totally befits the new generation where he belongs. Theophile Gautier, in his review of Manet's work in "L'Illustration" of May 15, 1889, remarks that the young man leaning against the table is "a fop, very true to type in attitude and costume." (Hamilton, 1969, p. 134) To say that the trendy elements in the new generations reject the values, the tastes, and the fads of older generations is a truism. Necessarily, then, this young man doesn't care much about the Romantic cherishing for the lifestyles of centuries past: the feeling for this movement, so dearly nurtured by his progenitors, leaves him cold. As cold as the expression on his face.

The two figures at the back - the standing maid and the bearded gentleman smoking his cigar - seem to corroborate the above inferences. As less stressed representational elements in the painting they belong to 'given'
information in attenuated form, and are part, therefore, of the global storage of extralinguistic contextual information in Manet's consciousness at the time of painting this picture. Their facial and body expressions as well as their positioning vis-à-vis the young man are what one would expect them to be in an elegant and well to do social setting of the later nineteenth century, if the inferences about the relation between the armor and the expression on the young man's face are correct. The servant seems to try to conceal her disapproval vis-à-vis the boy's detachment as if she read dissent in his indifference, and she looks ready to stand by her loyalties with regard to her masters' tastes and beliefs. Not an uncommon attitude for house staff to have. The gentleman on the right has a totally different look about himself, however, one which is appropriate to his age and social position. Poise and imperturbability are his shield as he turns toward the armor and not toward the public, like the other two figures. As if lost in thought, this gentleman doesn't look interested in the young man or in the reasons for his detachment. Again, an attitude to be expected from representatives of the beau monde who can afford to display some after-dinner tolerance vis-à-vis the mischief of their youngsters.

So far, inferences about 'given' information made relatively to the connection between the two focal points in the picture - the helmet and the young man - were based
upon extralinguistic contextual factors. 'Given' information embodied in the maid and the bearded gentleman was found to be compatible with the visual elements associated with Manet's hypothesized goal oriented action, i.e., his wish to point to the vacuity of the revivalist movement. There is, however, one other goal to Manet's action. Because of its intentional aspect the same action can have several goals (see p. 68). Such an example can be found here - one in which the intralinguistic correlates do not refer to specific representational elements in the picture, as was the case in "Nightfishing" (the crab, etc.) but to the painting as a whole.

Let us first note that Manet is engaged in a kind of antithetical play with the expectations of his public. The very refusal of the title to indicate what is there becomes an accessory to the sophisticated placing of the beholder both inside and outside the virtual space: inside, because the strategic place of the young man in front of the projecting table has the effect of incorporating us in the frontal plane of the picture; outside, because we are reminded forcibly that the pictorial space is an illusory construction. The previledged role of the armor, which is at the same time hollow and yet contains nothing, supplements the impression of narrative incoherence conveyed by an assemblage of objects that hardly go together: a half-peeled lemon and some fresh oysters on a table where
coffee has been served, a gentleman who seems to have been wearing his top hat whilst eating, and an inconvenient armor on a velvet chair. As a finishing touch, the young man is turned to us as if to say, "Now make sense of it!"

Manet's title indicates to us what we really cannot read in the painting as if the painter was attempting to forstall the expected questions. What is the young man doing? Is the meal taking place in a dining room? Why is this helmet on the chair? From the inspection of the artwork this solicitation of the public emerges as the second theme of the painting and, therefore, as a second 'new' information item.

Manet's critics often complained that nothing is happening in many of his paintings. Klee's remark some half a century later would have been a most appropriate response: art does not reproduce the visible, but makes visible.

3. **Identification of Manifestations of Preponderance of Sense over Meaning, Influx of Sense, and Agglutination**

When attempting to extract evidence of predominance of sense over meaning from the objects depicted in this painting it will be useful to remember that the context specific and indexical aspects of signification will predominate over its stable aspects. I need not dwell at length on the difference between the dictionary meaning of a word
and its signification when signification is a function of both the stream of consciousness and the intralinguistic context in which the word appears. The implication of the above theoretical tenet is that each of the objects which, in the painting, have been identified either as 'new' or as attenuated 'given' information do not carry the meaning that is assigned by dictionaries to their word-names. On the contrary, their meaning reflects the predominance of the contextual details that were brought forth earlier in this discussion, as 'given' and 'new' information were pointed out.

The other remaining properties of inner speech - influx of sense and agglutination - can be identified as following from the first, that which has just been dealt with. The fact that we have to address all three semantic properties separately may be misleading in that it may suggest separate analytical mechanisms within the mind of the individual experiencing inner speech. This is not so. We have to address them separately because, in writing, we have to use lengthy strings of words grouped in syntactical constructions. Preponderance of sense over meaning, influx of sense, and agglutination are interrelated and overlapping. Influx of sense refers to the fact that, in inner speech, the meaning of a word is influenced and changed as a function of its entering into an intralinguistic context. As such, influx of sense is concerned with the content of
signification that presides over the word's dictionary meaning. So, whereas, in "The Luncheon," preponderance of sense over meaning points to the fact that the helmet is not only a medieval armor for the head, and the young man is not only a dandy youth of the late nineteen hundreds, in the same way that the maid doesn't seem to be just a maid serving coffee, influx of sense refers to what is predominant in the depicted objects and how that happens to be the case. It was through influx of sense that the helmet and the cat became icons for Manet's statement in favor of dispensing with the revivalist trend.

Vygotsky's comments on agglutination (Wetsch, 1985) reveal that for him this word was used only as an annalogy with the notion of agglutination as it pertains to studies of language typology. This becomes outstandingly obvious when manifestations of agglutination are seeked in artworks. Agglutination does not reveal itself exclusively in the combination of two words that form a complex word (as in Joyce's *Ulysses*, see p. 97) or in ambivalent distortions which cement an incessant circulation of meanings (such as the would-be-flying-insects-come-stars, and the lamp-moon, in Picasso's "Nightfishing," see p. 97). These are instances of agglutination at a micro scale, so to speak. In "The Luncheon" we find an example of agglutination at a macro scale. Pages were necessary to designate all the separate visual elements contained in the painting and
explicate their relationships. However, after careful examination, and despite the fact that the depicted objects are not related in a coherent continuum, the painting comes together as a whole. The welding of all elements to form an indivisible finished product is inherent to any artwork, to be sure, but in this case agglutination is particularly noticeable, perhaps because the objects depicted are so disparate. Agglutination here will have entailed the formation of rather complex words in asyntactical combination, which will have embodied the abstract concepts that Manet wished to express in visual form.

"Red Balloon" by Klee

1. **Description**

Dated 1922, the canvas, small and almost square (12¾" x 12¾"), presents a field filled on its right and left sides by cubic forms in various shapes, sizes, and colors. The distribution of the colored squares, rectangles, and triangles on both sides of the painting is balanced by a large blue trapezoid on the left bottom corner, which forms the ground of the picture.

As our eyes move upwards toward the top half of the canvas we encounter a red circle, which stands out from the smudgy blue foundation of the background and elevates
itself to occupy a position close to the centroid of the inverted triangle formed by the intersecting diagonals of the canvas itself.

The oil paint on chalk-primed muslin gives the bluish overall foundation a blurred finish of varying densities.

2. and 3. Identification of Manifestations of Syntactic Abbreviation, and of Preponderance of Sense over Meaning, Influx of Sense, and Agglutination - a holistic approach

Having sketched out in the two opening sections of this Chapter the conflation of components which allow us to identify manifestations of the syntactic and semantic features of inner speech, I will now examine the manifestations of the same features in this painting, but from a different perspective. It seems useful, at this point, to introduce a new level of analysis which cuts across the predominantly semiotic emphasis of the criteria employed up to now. The fact that I will not be patiently reviewing selected elements of the work deemed appropriate to illustrate this or that inner speech feature should not be seen as a transgressive practice to the proposed analytical steps. Rather, what is to follow should be viewed as an opportunity to accommodate the theoretical tenets pertaining to inner speech features and the phenomenon of change as it attends the art making process.
"How does a picture gain access to its name?" Klee is known to have asked at one point (Marin, 1982, p.7). The singularity of the question, with its implication that the painting must grow into its title is quite in keeping with Klee’s organic and dynamic theory of the genesis of plastic art. But it seems to contradict the prior existence in the mind of the artist of elements pertaining to 'given' information, elements which would bear significantly on his mental frame as he engages in the process of making his piece.

Also, 'taking a line for a walk', which is Klee’s well known definition of the dynamics of composition, is hardly in keeping with the view of art making as an 'action' performed in response to a clearly defined 'motive' and aiming at a clearly defined 'goal', all of which are supposed to be reflected in the artwork as 'new' information. If the artist 'takes a line for a walk' can this still apply? How compatible is the notion of 'new' information as target of a 'goal-oriented action', with a working style in which compositional elements wander in search of an end result?

Two notions pertaining to mediation (see Chapter III) suggest the way out of this quandary. First, Zichenko’s (1985) notion of a tool-mediated action enables us to examine the variability of the 'action' under those circumstances and, therefore, to understand how 'new' information
may be affected. According to Wertsch (1985, p. 206), in his discussion of tool-mediated action, Zichenko does not differentiate between tools and signs but, following Vygotsky's notion of signs being intellectual tools, subsumes both tool mediation and semiotic mediation under the same heading of 'tool-mediated'. The Soviet researcher then claims that once semiotic mediation is incorporated into practical action, the action undergoes a qualitative transformation. It is not simply the same action with ever-improving means of mediation and representation: the action undergoes transformations as a result of being intertwined with a sign system.

What this means is that, when considering the type of working procedure that 'takes the line for a walk' or allows the work to 'gain access to its title', the initial 'action' is permanently undergoing transformation under the effect of its weaving together with the visual signs being depicted. As such, 'new' information will also suffer modifications and repeated adjustments as the work progresses, until it finally rests with the end result of the compositional process.

Klee's "Red Balloon" seems to epitomise the process of the work 'acceding to its title' which has been mentioned above. Out of the pulsing interplay of more or less ambiguous cubic forms, the red circle emerges with a higher degree of definition and, as it were, meets the title in
its ascent. The following example may help us understand how the process unfolds. Let us imagine a man walking with a child, pointing his arm in the air and saying, "There is a balloon." The pointing arm not only tells the child what is there but also points in the right direction. Now imagine the child asking, "What is a balloon?" and the man replying, "It is something like a circular line drawn around a patch of red pigment."

Representation of the type that Klee engages in plays upon a deliberate indeterminacy between abstract and figurative elements as the central component of the desired result: the cubic constructions on either side of the painting are almost buildings; the trapezoid on the bottom left of the picture is almost a yard or a public square, or a street seen in perspective and flanked by some edifices; and the circle that constitutes the focal point of the work is almost a balloon against a blue sky. Almost, but not necessarily.

This shifting in meaning brings us to the second notion pertaining to mediation. It is Sokolov's (1972) discussion of inner speech as a mechanism for semantic grouping that is relevant to the characteristics of the end product as explained above as well as to the shifting necessarily inherent to each stage of Klee's compositional process.

The process of abbreviation referred to both in Chapter II and in earlier sections of this Chapter, is not
dissimilar from that which, in formal logic, is accountable for 'enthymemes' - abbreviated syllogisms in which one of the premises is omitted if it is considered to be generally recognizable or evident. In inner speech, hints at a few words suffice for one to be able to follow one's train of thought in an organized fashion. In adults, inner speech is a very abbreviated verbal scheme the elements of which are carriers of both generalized meanings and subjective meanings. As a result, inner speech is capable of rapid comparisons between various word groups, which may generate, in a split second, new semantic complexes and new ideas. According to Sokolov, the suddenness and rapidity with which thoughts appear is possible precisely because of the presence in one's mind of large and varied semantic complexes, which are embodied in slight verbal hints in inner speech.

It would seem, therefore, that the meanings evoked - I would think, 'senses of words brought forth' more appropriate a phrase - by symbols formed in the progressional path of wandering lines and shapes shift rapidly because their linguistic connotations in inner speech shift rapidly also.

Semantic grouping will play a role in bringing forth connotations of both the extralinguistic and the intralinguistic elements that will intervene in the encoding of 'given' and 'new' information, whichever
the compositional process followed by the artist. For the reasons above, it will be particularly active when the compositional process is highly exploratory as it seems to have been the case with Klee. In "Red Balloon" this attribute seems to have been retained beyond the stages of compositional exploration. As a result, the indeterminancy between abstractness and figurativeness emerges as the main theme of the end product and, therefore, as 'new' information in this work.

"Secret Painting" by Mel Ramsden

1. Description

The work (1967-68) shows a black square beside which is presented the following caption: "The content of this painting is invisible; the character and dimensions of the content are to be kept permanently secret, known only to the artist."

2. Identification of Syntactic Abbreviation

As we attempt to determine what lies outside the work in order to ascertain what may be seen as 'given' information, one of the dominant concerns of twentieth century art immediately comes to mind - the ideal of purity and the constant search for a renewal of this ideal through
the breaking of former taboos. I need hardly enlarge on the quest for purity expressed in this work, a purity so perfect that it shuns contact with the tainted world of representation or any preying eyes. In attaining this purity, the artist joined the movement loosely known as conceptual art which was out to break the taboo on another kind of purity: the freedom of the image from the intrusion or indeed the contamination of words.

This work perfectly embodies the theoretical issues that were the prime concern of some conceptual artists and which are meshed together in the amalgama of rejections and contentions that will have presided to the making of this work, and which are, therefore, identifiable as 'given' information. Concurrently, a brief examination of this work by Ramsden will tell us that it is the ideal of a visual art purged of words which is challenged here. This challenge emerges as 'new' information related to the artist's intention in making this piece - related to his 'action'. The framing of the the artist's own propositions with regard to the nature of his 'action' may be clarified if we examine the semantic characteristics of inner speech as manifested in "Secret Painting."

3. Identification of Manifestations of Preponderance of Sense over Meaning, Influx of Sense, and Agglutination

To say that preponderance of sense over meaning, influx
of sense, and agglutination are all comprised in that black square plus its caption is a truism. Where else could they be if there is noting else to look at?

The black square acknowledges that all contingencies involving objects, be they real or theoretical, pose an obstacle to ideational concern. In response, whilst visual space is pushed to the terminus of the visual gradient, the fundamental role that language played in the development of art through the significance of writings in aesthetics and criticism, is being seized. On the other hand, in separating art from contextual dependency (from Duchamp's icons to Flavin's fluorescents, the 'art' depended on the art context supplied by museums, galleries, and professional journals) the art-object is no longer self-supporting but needs the intervention of language. These are points connected with the artist's 'action', points which qualify it, as it were. A black square by and in itself shows nothing. But in isolating art from material representation it proposes a functional change of art - the abstraction of art itself rather than any of its particular properties. In the 'blackness' of the square it is its sense, therefore, which is preponderant, and not the meaning of the phrase - black square - that is used to designate the material components of that part of the piece.

As for influx of sense, this inner speech feature is manifested in the dynamics that relate the black square
to its caption. The mental trips back and forth between image and words that first allowed Ramsden to move from the myriad of possible permutations of iconic hardware to a study and application of rules and conditions, reflect the particular modus operandi of influx of sense: as words return in the caroussel of the thought processes attenting the issues being examined by the artist, they carry an ever increasing condensation of sense turning the (inner) speech activity into a language of semantic complexes that have their referents in the ideational concerns of conceptual art.

Finally, the black square emerges as the highest synthesis of individual, 'agglutinated' word meaning: the art withdraws into itself; only language remains to be accounted for.
CHAPTER V
A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION

Implications

The design of this study has naturally influenced the type of discussion and implications which can be presented. The aim of the research has been to identify manifestations of the inner speech inlay in the works of art that were chosen for analysis, in order to claim a linguistic origin for the arts. The implications are an indication of what has been found and has been considered worth knowing.

To be realized is the fact that the interest of this study lies on the analyses of some exemplars of one art form - painting - and in how the theoretical material from the Vygotskian School has been used for those analyses. The analyses presented are only a first step and could be compared to the first stage in a larger research enterprise that would extend the analytical inquiry to exemplars of other art forms.

The results of the study have sufficiently confirmed, for me, that art making is inescapably linked to utterances in inner speech. A proviso regarding the findings ought to
be made at this point, however. The choice of observational
data suggest that an arbitrary content of the art works
could be the object of the analyses that were carried out.
It goes without saying that the point of view one person
has of what is going on in a picture, much like what happens
vis-à-vis a real life situation, is likely quite different
from that of another. Therefore, in assuming the right
to chose the elements deemed significant in the construction
of meaning for each of the works analysed, it was hoped
that the point of view implied would be recognized as ac-
ceptable.

The aspects covered by this investigation in examining
contextual as well as extralinguistic and intralinguistic
factors pertinent to the making of the art works covered
generally the major concepts of the theory of activity
and specifically the particulars of inner speech proper-
ties. To focus on the work of art as reflection of personal
psychological experience at large is to stress that humans
operate within a subjective semantic universe and that
this universe is socially determined. In practical terms
this amount to saying that the relationship between the
encoding of experienced phenomena and the phenomena them-
selves is arbitrary in that it is dependent upon the
symbolic processing of the experiencing being. The func-
tional unit for this processing is inner speech. As a result
of the particularities of this speech mechanism,
specifically of those pertaining to the semantic flexibility of words in inner speech, in day to day life, humans create meaning from the experience of stimuli rather than extract meaning from properties inherent to the stimuli themselves. This makes sense if one accepts that the act of experiencing necessarily involves selecting and foregrounding one particular perspective on reality - the one which relates to the individual's emotional life (James, 1893; Schutz, 1951). So, although stimuli may originate in reality that might be called 'scientific', they acquire subjectively created meanings by virtue of being apprehended by human cognitive processing.

The analyses of art works tended to corroborate what could be gleaned from any discussion of art making as an 'activity' and as an 'action' that would bear in mind the theoretical tenets attending those two notions. In making an art object the art maker seems to transcribe (I purposefully use a term unmistakably linked to the concept of 'language') some ongoing revision of inner speech - itself a peculiarly verbalized distillation of the continually flowing mixture of streams of feelings and psychological debris of inner life.

In addition, the analyses of the selected paintings revealed a variety of elements, both explicitly depicted in the work, or presupposable as having played a role in the compositional process, which met the description of
the linguistic features of inner speech.

I am aware of the implications of the fact that a considerable part of my source material was originally not written in English but in Russian. I have therefore relied on translations and I am fully aware that there are no total translations: because languages differ, because each language represents a complex, historically determined aggregate of values, proceedings of social conduct, conjectures on life. There can be no exhaustive transfer from language A to language B, no meshing of nets so precise that there is identity of conceptual content, unison of undertone, absolute symmetry of associations. Because a language is not a passive representation of reality but an active world image selecting certain possibilities of human analysis and behavior, certain ways of initiating, structuring and recording experience, even the simplest words carry a charge of specific energy, of historical association, social use and syntactic tradition. As Humboldt (1963) put it. "The differences between languages are not those of sounds and signs but those of differing world views."

Each piece of translated material that I have referred to throughout this study may therefore be no more than an approximation or a near miss. I was not concerned with this problem, however. Analyses and analogies made were based on what is conveyed by the English texts as they
are, independently of the degree of accuracy of the interpretations that were no doubt necessary in the act of translation.

It is perhaps unrealistic to make absolute assumptions about the manifestations of inner speech properties in all art works of all art forms. Examination of a larger number of selected works and the inclusion of other art forms would have added to the value of this study. The arts differ from each other most tangibly in their respective materials and the ways they are organized. These differences lie in the very center of semiotic problems because characteristics of the materials affect the art maker's decisions in how they are felt they ought to be organized. Since the unfolding of the methodological procedures in this study relied heavily on an examination of the organizational structure of the work and what could be gleaned from it, it is plausible that analyses of different art forms could yield different information. And yet that might not be the case. It is hoped, therefore, from this type of analytical enterprise further studies would be encouraged, to either reinforce or modify some of the conclusions reached at this stage.

Recommendations

Beyond the scope of this study but of my specific concern are the following points for theoretical and
empirical exercise:

Findings of this research can be seen as a vehicle for conceptualising and organizing instructional implications focusing on the two most essential elements of the art education curriculum - art, and the student.

How the work of art is perceived is one significant area of study within the domain of art appreciation. Another, equally important if not more so, is the area of study which focuses on the process of art making. The relative awareness in the field, of the influence that the social environment has on both the viewer's attitudes and the individual's creative process has produced a considerable amount of art education literature. However, although approaches reflecting this socio-cultural trend, namely McFee's (1977) research, represent an important preliminary step in the process of theory construction, they are sorely lacking in that they are not grounded on explicit assumptions concerning the nature of art and art making, or art appreciation. Another shortcoming of this trend in the literature is that it focuses almost exclusively on effects rather than underlying causes. It is noticeable that researchers who have followed in McFee's footsteps are able to cite numerous findings from research to lend support to their positions on instruction, but do not attempt to justify antecedent theoretical or methodological sources with nearly the same fluency. Much remains to be
done as regards identifying the components of art education study - uncover origins, mechanisms, and, most importantly, the causal interrelationships among components.

There are similarities to be drawn between the general orientation underlying the aforementioned art education literature as it reflects researchers' concern for the socio-cultural effects in the teaching/learning process, and the theoretical framework underlying this study. One consistent trait in the North American art education literature reflecting this trend is the notion that socio-cultural factors affect learning and creation, and thus, affect the end product of 'art in the classroom' - whether that be art appreciation or art making. It would, therefore, be appropriate to investigate through what means the students' background on the one hand, and permanent interaction with the environment on the other, influence what is included in the objects made in class, and how students perceive art objects in general.

In order to put the student/art making transaction in its proper perspective it would be useful to 1) examine the student's engagement in art making both as an 'activity' and as an 'action', as understood by Leont'ev in his theory of activity, and 2) approach the objects made as reflecting the internalization of the student's experience of social interaction, past and present, as mediated by inner speech.

That the arts are directly related to a category of
language proper holds promising educational implications. Extensive generalization of the findings of this study to other art forms would bring into question current educational practice that promotes certain symbol systems over others. And, there being a plausible connection between the capacity to create and decode symbols and a basic speech function, a whole range of cross-cultural educational issues will stand to be re-examined.

These, however, are only a few of the potential areas that can be investigated when extending Vygotsky's account of human cognitive processing to educational pursuits encompassing the arts. The issues concerning ways in which the sociohistorical milieu wherein individuals function can influence their mental processes are manifold. They also call for the investigator to examine influences of this milieu in one's own theoretical and empirical research.

The fact that I have identified the areas of inquiry which have just been mentioned does not mean that my propositions have been put forward in the most appropriate manner or that there might not be other areas. Unlike theoretical frameworks that isolate psychology from semiotically mediated, human social interaction, the Vygotskian School forges an inherent link between them. But in carrying out his enterprise, Vygotsky invoked notions and concepts from philosophy, psychology, social theory, linguistics, literary analysis, and ethnnology. One can therefore hope that
significant research pertaining to the arts will be spawned from the findings of this study, research that integrates theoretical and empirical findings within the pluralistic scope of the aforementioned body of knowledge.


Croce, B. (1915). The Breviary of Aesthetics. Houston: Rice Institute Pamphlets II.


