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INTEREST GROUPS IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS:
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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To the memory of Sophie Benkoff Babbitt
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| DEDICATION | ................................................................. | 11 |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS | ................................................................. | 111 |
| VITA | ................................................................. | iv |
| LIST OF TABLES | ................................................................. | vii |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Organized Interests and the Policy-Process</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Studies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Theory and Policy Implementation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Research Design</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions and Hypotheses</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Dissertation</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Private Sector Initiative Program</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The National Urban League</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Urban League: Structure and Organization</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Urban League's Involvement in Employment and Training Programs</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. AFL-CIO</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AFL-CIO: Structure, Organization and Function</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The AFL-CIO's Involvement in Employment and Training Programs</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The United States Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Government, Policy-Making and Organization</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chamber’s Involvement in Employment and Training Programs</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Comparative Perspective</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Evaluations of PSIIP</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Resources</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-Local Communications</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Goals and Group Participation</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Findings</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Research</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. National and Regional Interviews</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Mail Questionnaire</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Level of Activity by Agreement with PSIP Goals - Urban League</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Level of Activity by Adequacy of Staff Size - Urban League</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Level of Activity by Perceived Quality of Communication - Urban League</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable Level of Activity in PSIP - Urban League</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Level of Activity by Agreement with PSIP Goals - AFL-CIO</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Level of Activity by Adequacy of Staff Size - AFL-CIO</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Level of Activity by Perceived Quality of Communication - AFL-CIO</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Level of Activity by Levels of Direction - AFL-CIO</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Level of Activity by Agreement on Goals for Participation in PSIP - AFL-CIO</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable Level of Activity in PSIP - AFL-CIO</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Level of Activity by Agreement with PSIP Goals - U.S. Chamber</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Level of Activity by Perceptions of Local Influence - U.S. Chamber</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Level of Activity by Quality of Communication - U.S. Chamber</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Level of Activity by Frequency of Communication - U.S. Chamber</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Level of Activity by Level of Direction in PSIP - U.S. Chamber</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable Level of Activity in PSIP - U.S. Chamber</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Mean Scores by Group for Staffing Levels</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. Levels of Activity by Adequacy of Staff Size .......................... 190
19. Mean Scores by Group for Perceived Influence .......................... 191
20. Mean Scores by Group for Amount of Technical Assistance .......... 194
21. Mean Scores by Group for Frequency of National Communication ... 194
22. Mean Scores by Group for Quality of Communication Between the National and Local Offices ........................................ 196
23. Level of Activity by Quality of Communication .......................... 200
24. Mean Scores by Group for Amount Solicited for Opinions on Title VII ................................................................. 204
25. Level of Activity by Amount Solicited by National Staff .............. 205
26. Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable Level of Activity in PSIP ................................................................. 215
CHAPTER I

ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND THE POLICY-PROCESS
Introduction

In 1835 an observer of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that Americans were a nation of joiners. According to Tocqueville, "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations." In contemporary American politics the situation is still much the same. Voluntary associations make up much of the political landscape with a variety of public and private groups involved in all aspects of governmental life. Currently, groups are active participants in the legislative arena where they are often recognized as sources of expertise and information and where their participation is considered important to the legislative process. Additionally, groups are also active in the executive branch where they have become partners in the bureaucratic and administrative arena helping to formulate and implement public programs. And, in the arena of judicial politics, public interest groups have become active in shaping judicial decisions through class action suits and test cases. In addition, groups continue to be active in a number of program areas including health care policies, education programs, the congressional budget, and even more recently, in women's issues as well as religious issues.

Despite the ubiquity of interest groups in American politics and the large volume and variety of interest group studies, relatively little attention has been placed on the internal working of interest groups. Instead, political scientists have focused primarily on group activity in the political process or, said somewhat differently, on what groups do in politics. It is only recently that a literature focusing on interest groups as organizations has developed. My research in this dissertation has been
influenced, to a significant degree, by this newer organizational approach. Specifically, this dissertation looks at three interest groups, the National Urban League, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce and their participation in the national level formulation and national and local implementation of the Private Sector Initiative Program (PSIP). The goal of the dissertation is to examine variations in group organization and group strategies for participating in PSIP to determine if these factors explain group activity in the program. I will examine independent factors such as group communication strategies, group resources, and agreement on group goals for participation in the program to determine first, whether there are variations in these factors among the three groups and; second, to what extent these factors explain group activity in PSIP.

In the context of the organizational approach, the dissertation also explores the relationship between national and local level actors. In each of the selected interest groups, national leaders and their staff were involved, in varying degrees, in policy formulation and implementation at the national level. At the local level, affiliated organizations were responsible for carrying out PSIP in their jurisdictions. As a result of the federated structure of these interest groups as well as the fact that PSIP was a program developed in Washington, but implemented in 495 local communities, it became clear that the relationship between national level actors and their counterparts at the local level was potentially important in explaining local level participation in PSIP. As a result, I relied not only on interest group studies for insights into the behavior of these groups, but also the more policy-oriented literature, or more precisely, the implementation literature. In this regard, the national and local levels were viewed
theoretically in a superior-subordinate relationship with national actors responsible for articulating and promoting PSIP and local actors responsible for carrying out the program consistent with group goals.

The implementation literature also provided a framework in which to study the group's activity in PSIP. By looking at the relationship between the national and local levels and by viewing this in an implementation framework, I was able to test a number of important relationships. For example, I hypothesized that aggressive national communication strategies including promotion of PSIP would lead to local participation in the program. Additionally, I was able to explore whether or not local affiliates, acting as subordinates and implementors, agreed with the goals of PSIP and whether this level of agreement was related to local participation in PSIP. In short, by employing the implementation framework I was able to develop a more accurate and rich picture of interest group behavior in PSIP.

Interest Group Studies

The primary emphasis and concern political scientists have brought to the study of interest groups has been on what groups do in the political arena. As such this work has emphasized group activities in the legislature or other arena of politics, the relative influence of groups in determining public policies and the extent to which groups determine both the agenda and substance of politics. These works beginning with the publication of Bentley's, The Process of Government, and Truman's landmark book, The Governmental Process, and continuing today with a number of studies on group activities, should be considered by the serious student of interest group
politics. However, for the purposes of this dissertation and its research focus, these works are only tangentially related and thus, will not be included in the following review of the literature.

In this dissertation the primary focus is on interest groups as organizations. Studies emphasizing this facet of interest group life have, as their primary purpose, the analysis of the internal structure of groups. Scholars concerned with this phenomenon are interested in the origin of groups, their growth or decline, and the internal structure of groups including goals and leadership strategy. As Robert Salisbury points out, this is not an enterprise interested in developing an interest group theory of politics, but rather an effort to develop a theory of interest groups. In other words, according to Salisbury, the interest group itself is the primary unit of analysis or the dependent variable and not the independent variable related in some way to policy outcomes. The lack of systematic knowledge about groups and group formation and maintenance over time is, according to Terry Moe, a serious deficiency in our ability to explain interest groups. Moe asserts that we lack a certain sense of balance between what groups "do" in politics or how they affect public policies and what he terms the "deeper" aspects of group behavior.

The seminal work on the nature of groups as organizations is Mancur Olson's, *The Logic of Collective Action*. Olson has applied the tools and approach of the economist to the study of collective goods and group membership. His major concern is a relatively simple one, why do people join voluntary associations? He advances the thesis that the traditional theory of interest group membership is based on the incorrect assumption that participation and the reasons for participation are the same in small groups...
as they are in large organizations. Olson employs public choice theory to show that rational, self-interested individuals will not necessarily come together to achieve levels of a public good that would be of benefit to society at-large. The costs of membership and the free rider problem, according to Olson, make it profitable for each individual to abstain from participating. In terms of group size, Olson suggests that large organizations will generally not succeed because there is no incentive for people to participate. Olson explains the existence of enduring large organizations by showing that either private benefits or coercion in the case of a union shop, for example, form the basis for participation.

Perhaps most significant, at least for political scientists, is the claim that Olson makes about group affiliations. He argues that group affiliations are not necessarily based on political or ideological positions, but rather on non-political benefits that are supplied only to group members. However, this claim deserves careful scrutiny. As Moe and others point out, the Olson approach relies exclusively on selective economic incentives and thus discounts the potential importance of other incentives, including the role of political inducements. In fact, Moe argues compellingly that both Olson and his exclusive focus on economic incentives and political scientists or more specifically, advocates of pluralism, and their preoccupation with common political interests have both overstated their respective cases. Moe provides a uniquely comprehensive look at both the economic and non-economic reasons for joining interest groups. According to his empirical analysis involving five Minnesota interest groups and a theoretical reexamination of other interest groups, Moe concludes that both types of explanations account for why people join interest groups.
Moe's analysis indicates that selective economic incentives appear to be somewhat more important than political incentives in terms of relative inducement value. However, the data also indicate that "the potential for political participation is present in group constituencies in the form of purposive motivations and perceptions of efficacy, and that, for most members, politics plays a pivotal role in their decision to join."

Marsh also provides an empirical test of Olson's theory by looking at the reasons firms give for joining the Confederation of British Industry. His analysis, based on elite interviews, attempts to uncover whether firms join this economic interest group for its services or to have an impact on public policies. The data indicate that collective benefits and attempts to alter public policies seem to be major incentives for membership especially in the case of larger firms in the sample. Marsh concludes that Olson seems to have limited theoretical ability in the case of this particular interest group.

Ronald Manzer argues that both the sociological and economic theory of interest groups provide complementary explanations for the formation and growth of Canadian teachers' associations. According to his historical analysis, the rapid formation of associations is consistent with Truman's proposition that severe disturbances lead associations to stabilize group relations. As a result of wartime inflation and growing dissatisfaction, Manzer reports that a significant portion of the teachers' associations were either formed or reorganized. However, there is also substantial evidence suggesting that selective incentives in the form of protective services, professional exchange, and social incentives contribute to the establishment
and maintenance of these associations. In one instance, Manzer attributes the failure of an organization to its lack of any positive, selective inducements offered to members.

Aside from the criticism that Olson overemphasizes the role of economic selective incentives to the exclusion of other goals, some have argued that the economic approach taken by Olson underestimates the importance of group leadership. In his review of Olson's book, Chamberlain points out that "what to Olson seems unlikely if not absurd that some will work for free for others is sometimes the case; it is the activists and the cause-fighters who accept disproportionate expenses and may ask nothing much more than that latent members approve their initiative, that is provide nominal (cost-free) support." In addition, Manzer, in his elaboration of the Canadian Teachers Association makes a similar point suggesting that the economic theory fails to take into consideration the pivotal role of enthusiastic leadership.

Robert Salisbury strongly acknowledges the importance of group leadership in interest group formation. As his intellectual focus, Salisbury applies exchange theory to the origin, formation and growth of interest groups. The exchange theory posits that the leader or entrepreneur provides benefits to the group in exchange for a price, that is group membership, which may cost as little as a supportive signature or as much as the heavy dues attached to some trade association memberships. Salisbury contends that conceptually, the entrepreneur's reward can be viewed as profit. Where there is a surplus of profits as in the case of long-standing stable groups, the leader may actively express positions he thinks desirable, but independent of members' views. This leads Salisbury to contend that lobbying demands and public policy positions by group leaders do not
necessarily derive from the group membership, but rather may be the personal choice of the leader. This conception would explain a broad spectrum of data which show group leaders taking public policy positions at variance with those of their members.

James Q. Wilson in his analysis of political organizations also stresses the importance of the leader in an interest group setting.\(^\text{13}\) In a similar manner as Salisbury, Wilson argues that members are often indifferent to positions taken by staff. He goes on to claim that in many organizations, especially those with a federated or caucus structure, the staff frequently takes positions that are either more militant or more liberal than those preferred by the membership. As Wilson points out, the distinct political positions between leaders and the mass membership is consistent with a considerable body of empirical evidence which finds leaders to be more ideological than followers. Luttbeg and Ziegler, in a study of the Oregon Education Association, indicate that leaders are more active, more liberal and more willing than followers to expand the activities of the organization. Leaders are also more inclined to support organizational involvement in a wide range of political activities such as endorsing candidates and taking sides on specific public issues.\(^\text{14}\)

Wilson also goes on to examine the social and political structure of organizations and raises the question of whether it is possible to organize large numbers of poor and lower-income persons without immediate material rewards. Wilson claims that the poor tend to be especially interested in the provision of services rather than adopting a strategy that would lead to possible changes in political institutions. Consequently, this means that the poor are not likely to form large-scale organizations emphasizing major
public policy decisions. Moreover, at this level of analysis one is compelled to argue that the poor will be systematically under-represented due to the potential groups' inability to supply material incentives, at least those capable of producing a large and enduring organization. Moving one step further, Wilson's claims reflect the economic view offered by Olson and together they offer validity to the upper-class bias theory presented by Schattschneider. And, more critically, the reality of the pluralist thesis must be questioned. Low income people presumably have collective interests that are amenable to political actions, but are not yet organized to bring about change in the political system. Any organization they do have, according to the data referenced above, indicates that the poor come together for what are largely immediate material needs and little if any long range political position is central to this organization.15

The intellectual focus presented by Salisbury emphasizing the exchange relationships between organizers and members and the similar, expanded perspective offered by Wilson emphasizing the requirement of tangible and intangible incentives has yielded a typology of organizations stressing the importance of benefits. Salisbury refers to material, solidary and expressive incentives while Wilson discusses material, specific solidary, collective solidary, and purposive incentives. According to Wilson, these incentives vary in the extent to which they define the stated purposes of the organization. Both Salisbury and Wilson do make some generalizations about these rewards and the organizations in which they are dominant. For example, Wilson argues that the chief consequence of the use of material incentives is that the organization pays relatively little attention to stated purposes and to a large degree, public policy is of minor significance. In comparing
business organizations with labor unions, Wilson argues that because of the relationship between political position and membership incentives, business organizations have somewhat less freedom in articulating a political course than do labor unions. Wilson makes the point that labor union members rarely join the organization for its position on national issues and thus, legislative positions serve little value as either an incentive or disincentive for members. Salisbury notes that among groups stressing material benefits, leadership tenure over the years has been secure while in the case of expressive groups, leadership has been much the opposite, yielding short tenure and much divisiveness. Moreover, Salisbury contends that the entrepreneurial-exchange hypothesis accounts for the high incidence of schism in the ideological or expressive groups and the low incidence of fractionalism among material benefit groups.

These works discussed above have sensitized me to the importance and significance of studying groups as organizations. And, although a good portion of this literature has been concerned exclusively with aspects of group formation and maintenance, which are not directly related to my research focus, I have gained valuable insights into interest group behavior. However, these works fail to address what I think is perhaps the most interesting and important question with regard to interest group behavior: What is the relationship between these internal group characteristics and what groups do in politics? Asked somewhat differently, what difference, if any, do these internal factors make in public policy-making? This dissertation is designed to shed some light on this question.

There are a number of ways one might determine the effect of internal group characteristics on public policy-making. I have chosen to focus on a
cluster of internal characteristics. This cluster or grouping relates to the internal organization of each interest group and has to do with how the group was set up both to make policy in PSIP and to carry it out. More specifically, I have chosen to look at those group characteristics most likely to explain the group's implementation of PSIP. As I pointed out earlier, the dissertation explores the relationship between national and local level actions and looks at the level of activity in implementation at the local level. As it turned out, organizational theory as it is applied to the implementation process seem to provide a framework for analyzing the implementation of PSIP; it also provided a source of concepts and hypotheses in which to view the behavior of national and local actions. Thus, I began to draw on the organizational theory and implementation literature to determine more specifically which group organizational factors to focus on in explaining local implementation of PSIP.

Organizational Theory and Policy Implementation

In one of the first attempts to provide a conceptual framework of the policy implementation process, Van Meter and Van Horn claim that students of organizational theory have provided valuable insights for those wishing to understand and explain policy implementation. They explore the relevance of organizational change and innovation, organizational control and compliance and the monitoring of subordinate behavior by superiors. Citing the work of numerous organizational theorists, Van Meter and Van Horn develop a theoretical perspective and model in which to view the implementation process. Their model directs attention to six clusters of variables: 1) it points to the relevance of policy standards and objectives; 2) policy
resources; 3) interorganizational communication and enforcement activities; 4) the characteristics of the implementing agencies; 5) the economic, social and political organization; and, 6) the disposition of implementors for the carrying out of policy decisions.

For the purposes of my research, Van Meter and Van Horn provide a framework for understanding the implementation of PSIP in each of the three selected interest groups. Their theoretical perspective allows us to view the implementation of PSIP as it occurred from the national level to the local affiliates. Equally important, their work provides a source of concepts and hypotheses within the implementation framework. For example, the authors claim that one important characteristic of policy implementation is the extent to which there is goal consensus among the participants in the implementation process. Citing the work of Dolbeare and Hammond, Van Meter and Van Horn suggest that the extent or degree to which implementing officials agree on the goals of the program will affect policy implementation. And they go on to identify several factors that affect goal consensus and ultimately, policy implementation. One of these factors, according to research by Gross and Associates, suggests that the extent to which subordinattes (or implementors) have participated in the making of the policy decision will affect implementation.

In addition to these points made by earlier students of policy implementation, Van Meter and Van Horn present several other relationships. They claim that effective implementation requires that a program's objectives be understood by implementors. This means that clear, accurate, and consistent communication of program objectives be made by superiors. Additionally, in the context of what Van Meter and Van Horn refer to as
interorganizational communication and enforcement activities, they claim that successful implementation requires institutional mechanisms, procedures, or actions forcing mechanisms to increase the chances that implementors will act in accordance with policy objectives. Here, higher level officials can facilitate implementation by providing technical assistance to implementors.

In two additional categories of their model, the characteristics of the implementing agencies, and the disposition of implementors, the authors offer several other factors that may influence implementation. They suggest that the competence and size of an agency's staff as well as an agency's political resources will affect implementation. Finally, they also claim that implementors may choose not to implement public policies because they disagree with the goals of the policy. Hence, policy agreement is essential to effective policy implementation.

Baum applies the organizational theory approach to the implementation of judicial decisions. According to him, "if the relationship between a court issuing decisions and the agencies responding to those decisions is conceived as one between superior and subordinate officials within a complex organization, the process of implementation may be examined in organizational terms." Baum claims that in judicial implementation, as is the case with implementation more generally, subordinates possess an independent role in policy-making and they exert influence as well as shape the policy implementation process. He also claims that the implementation process can be conceived of as involving two stages: transmission of directives by superiors and the response to those directives by subordinates. In each of these stages he identifies a set of variables that is expected to play a
significant role in the degree to which appellate decisions are implemented.

In the first stage, transmission of directives, Baum applies a similar framework as Van Meter and Van Horn. He finds evidence to support the assertion that clarity of appellate decisions is most important in implementation. He also finds evidence for his second hypothesis: The greater the accuracy with which decisions are communicated to subordinates, the more faithful will be their implementation.

In terms of his second category, subordinates' responses to directives, Baum finds evidence for the theory that subordinates can be expected to implement policies faithfully when they possess positive motivations to do so. He posits three types of motivations: personal advantage or interests; policy agreement; and, obligation. In discussing policy agreement as a motivation, Baum finds evidence for the claim made by Van Meter and Van Horn: If a directive accords with a person's values, he has reason to carry it out; similarly, one who disagrees with the policy is less likely to implement it. This is a point made frequently by students of program implementation. From the early case studies by Derthick and Pressman and Wildavsky to the later, prescriptive offerings by Sabatier and Mazmanian, the principle of policy agreement and commitment to policy objectives by implementors has been widely acknowledged.

In addition to the work of Van Meter and Van Horn and Baum, Richard Elmore offers four organizational models of the policy implementation process. According to Elmore, organizational theory does not support a single analytic model. Instead, Elmore claims that there are at least four distinct models, each emphasizing different features of organization and thus, providing a different view of the implementation process. In terms of his models,
implementation as bureaucratic process and implementation as organizational development, competing views of organizations are presented. Both, although somewhat contradictory, can be applied to interest groups. In implementation a bureaucratic process, Elmore makes two propositions that are relevant to my research: First, he claims that one of the central attributes of organizations is discretion. Second, he argues that along with this discretion comes fragmented and dispersed power. This means that these fragmented units exercise strong control over important tasks, or as Michael Lipsky refers to it, street-level bureaucrats exercise control over important decisions. And, according to Elmore, a large part of the implementation process focuses on ways high-level administrators attempt to structure the behavior of subordinates. Van Meter and Van Horn refer to this as sanctions and compliance methods. To a certain degree, interest groups can be viewed in similar terms. Each of the local offices act much the same as street-level bureaucrats in the sense that they have discretion. They may or may not choose to participate in nationally-endorsed programs. It is an empirical question whether or not they can be sanctioned or coerced into following national policy. Thus, it is useful, at least theoretically, to view interest groups as operating in something akin to a hierarchy with local offices having the discretion to make local decisions.

On the other hand, it is equally compelling to view the implementation of public policies and specifically the involvement of interest groups in this process in the way that Elmore describes implementation as organizational development. According to this model, local autonomy is viewed in positive terms and the putative advantages of hierarchical structured bureaucracies are minimized. Instead, the implementation process is conceived as one in
which consensus-building and accommodation between policy-makers and implementors occurs throughout the process. According to Elmore, in this model, "the central problem of implementation is not whether implementors conform to prescribed policy but whether the implementation process results in consensus in goals, individual autonomy, and commitment to policy on the part of those who must carry it out." The explanation of implementation failure in this case suggests that problems arise when those who implement programs are not included in decisions that determine the context of those programs. Hence, the participation of implementors in the substance of the program is expected to lead to a commitment among implementors and consequently, more effective and faithful implementation.

In this chapter, I have presented a brief overview of the organizational theory literature as it has been applied to the policy implementation process. These works provide a framework in which to view the implementation of PSIP as it was carried out by the three interest groups. The organization theory literature provides a rich source of concepts and suitable hypotheses of the factors leading to effective implementation. This literature, in combination with the interest group literature provides the framework and direction for this dissertation.
End Notes


CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN
Part 1. Research Design

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore interest group participation in the Private Sector Initiative Program (PSIP). Broadly, the central research question asks what are the consequences of organizational factors on group behavior in the policy process. My research is designed to determine what internal group factors explain participation in the policy process. However, the policy process is quite broad and expansive and could realistically involve any activity from agenda-setting to policy termination. As should be clear from Chapter 1, the dissertation will focus on policy formulation at the national level and policy implementation at both the national and local levels. Thus, a more precise rendering of the research question would be, what factors explain group participation in the implementation of PSIP? Aside from the more general question, this study is also comparative in nature and seeks to determine if the three groups act in a similar manner and whether the same factors explain implementation in all three groups.

For the purposes of this study, I will focus on three interest groups and their participation in PSIP during policy formulation and policy implementation. The three groups, the National Urban League, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the United States Chamber of Commerce are major, well-known, and important interest groups in American public policy. These groups were chosen for two important reasons: First, they represent varying constituencies and each offers its membership a different set of selective incentives. Much of the literature dealing with groups as organizations notes the Salience of selective
incentives as a factor not only in group formation and maintenance, but also collective public policy-making. Thus, I thought it reasonable to choose three groups that differ significantly in these areas. Wilson, for example, in his book *Political Organizations*, deals specifically with civil rights groups, labor groups and business associations.

Aside from these differences, the varying constituencies and the differing selective incentives offered to members, I also chose these groups for a second, major reason: All three were publicly involved in and supportive of the program that will be the focus of this research. From 1978 to 1983 the Urban League, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber were involved in PSIP, an add-on program to the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Two of these groups, the Urban League and the AFL-CIO received substantial sums of money from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to become involved in PSIP and the Chamber of Commerce was important in PSIP because this program represented the first employment and training program to mandate the participation of the business sector. Therefore, for these two reasons, the varying type and purpose of each group as well as the expectation that each group was to be involved in PSIP (all had at least pledged some support for PSIP), I included these groups in the analysis.

**Research Questions and Hypotheses**

I will examine the behavior of these three interest groups during policy formulation and policy implementation. I will compare and contrast group behavior at these two stages and will attempt to explain local implementation of PSIP by looking at a series of internal group characteristics and dynamics.
I will focus on the national offices' role in the formulation of PSIP. This will include its degree of support for PSIP, its position on the program, its aggressiveness in promoting its position on PSIP to relevant national actors, and the extent to which it obtained what it wanted from the PSIP legislation and regulations. Data on each group's involvement in PSIP formulation comes from extensive personal interviews with national staff and phone interviews with regional members (conducted in early 1983), and to a much lesser degree, internal documents from the Mershon Center CETA Project* (Appendix A lists the national actors who were interviewed for this study). Next, I will look at the national office's effort at implementing PSIP and this, more specifically, will include the national office's promotion and marketing of PSIP and the degree to which it provided technical assistance to its local counterparts (data for this section will also come from these national interviews).

* The Mershon Center CETA Project conducted a formative evaluation of the implementation of PSIP for the U.S. Department of Labor from 1978 to 1981. Project staff traveled to 25 prime sponsor locations throughout the country at least 3 times a year. In each site, staff spent 3 or 4 days interviewing local PSIP actors and members of the private sector to determine how the local area was implementing PSIP. Throughout this evaluation period the Mershon Center produced reports and a final evaluation of PSIP's progress to the Department of Labor. I was a member of the staff.
At the local level I will focus on the actual implementation of PSIP in the nation's cities and counties or as they are referred to in the jargon of PSIP, prime sponsor areas. To obtain this data on the activity of local groups I sent a mail questionnaire to 118 Urban League affiliates, 118 local central labor councils, and 118 local chambers of commerce. There are 118 Urban League affiliates and I wanted to send questionnaires to the same prime sponsor location for each group. Thus, I sent mail questionnaires to 3 local affiliates in 118 prime sponsor areas. Each of them had an Urban League, AFL-CIO central labor council, and local chamber of commerce.

The mail questionnaire (presented in Appendix B) contained a variety of questions designed to determine: 1) how the local office evaluated PSIP; 2) how the local office evaluated its national office's efforts to communicate to them about PSIP; 3) the extent to which the national office provided technical assistance to the local affiliates; and 4) the amount of agreement between local and national levels or goals for participation in PSIP. In addition, I asked the local groups a variety of questions about their internal workings. For example, I asked if they felt they had adequate staff to participate in the implementation of PSIP and whether or not they perceived themselves to be influential with important PSIP policy-makers.

These questions were designed to shed light on one of my basic research questions: what explains group activity in PSIP at the local level? Before presenting a discussion of the hypotheses it might be useful to clarify the term, group activity. Group activity is the dependent variable in this analysis. I have three measures of group activity: First, and most important, the mail questionnaire asks the local affiliates to assess their level of activity in PSIP. Specifically, I asked them if they were very
active, active, somewhat active or not active in PSIP. Affiliates were also asked in a follow-up question to list the specific activities in which they had participated. Second, I have some corroboration of local activity from national staff. However, the quality of these data vary. In the case of the Urban League affiliates, national staff conducted a survey of all 118 affiliates and their level of activity in PSIP. Staff were able to provide data on levels of activity, the types of activity and, where appropriate, actual funding amounts. The AFL-CIO also conducted a survey of its local labor councils, but its return rate was low and the survey was somewhat incomplete. Nevertheless, these data were partially useful and estimates by staff provided further confirmation of levels of labor council activity.

The Chamber of Commerce did not conduct a systematic analysis of local chamber participation in PSIP. National staff were willing to make informed estimates of local activity based on informal discussions with chamber executives. I was able to get a bit more information from regional staff, but this too was sketchy and impressionistic. My final source of information on group activity came from the Mershon Center. Early reports of PSIP implementation documented the role of local actors including community-based organizations, unions and local business groups. From my fieldwork and the fieldwork of Mershon staff, I was able to get a picture of interest group activity in PSIP.

My first hypothesis is derived directly from the work of organizational theorists and has recently been offered by students of policy implementation. The expectation of these researchers is that compliance with a program, or implementation of that program is more likely when those expected to carry out the program agree with its goals. My expectation is that local affiliates
that agree with PSIP will be more likely to implement PSIP than those affiliates that disagree with the goals of the program. In the case of the three interest groups chosen for analysis, each is a federated organization and each local office has discretion and autonomy in deciding whether or not to participate in programs. Given that discretion and the resultant variation in local program mix, it would seem that one essential condition for participation in PSIP would be goal agreement. In other words, freedom of program choice at the local level would suggest little coercion at the national level and would indicate that local decisions were based, to a great extent, on goal agreement. Thus, for the purposes of my research:

\[ H_1 \] If local groups agree with the goals of PSIP, they will be more likely to participate in the implementation of the program.

I asked a variety of questions to get data on policy agreement: First, the questionnaire asked local affiliates to indicate their level of goal agreement with PSIP. It also asked them to rate their agreement with the philosophy of PSIP. These two questions may ask the same thing. However, goal agreement might be limited to the goals of PSIP - to train the unemployed for jobs in the private sector. Philosophical agreement might also encompass the strategy of PSIP - to include the business sector in planning actual training programs. I also asked the local groups to provide a summary assessment of how well they thought PSIP operated and served the disadvantaged.

I also asked local group officials a variety of questions about the role of their national office in PSIP. The purpose of these questions can be understood, once again, in the context of interest group autonomy and discretion. Given that each local group office had discretion to make
program choices, it is possible that the national office played an important role in shaping local decisions or providing cues for participation in PSIP. For example, if the national office had a position in favor of PSIP and it communicated this to the local level, local group officials might be swayed or influenced and hence, willing to participate in PSIP. Conversely, it might also be the case that national staff that did not communicate with local affiliates or that communicated a neutral or negative position might have influenced local actors to shy away from PSIP implementation. These points suggest that given the freedom to choose, local officials are likely to be influenced by a variety of factors. I expect one source of this influence to come from national actors. This seems reasonable given the fact that local affiliates are members of the larger organization and thus must possess a certain degree of ideological agreement with the national office. As a result, the national office may play an important influencing role. Thus, I hypothesize that:

H2 - If the national office had a position in favor of PSIP and it communicated this to the local level, local affiliates would be likely to participate in PSIP.

I asked groups at the local level three questions to provide data on this hypothesis: First, whether the national office had a position on PSIP (I was able to corroborate these responses in interviews with national actors); second, how the local office would characterize that position, i.e. in favor or opposed and; third, whether or not this position remained fairly consistent throughout PSIP. I also wanted to be aware of any inconsistencies in the national position that may have created confusion for local implementors. As students of policy implementation point out, changes in
policy direction on inconsistencies in signals to implementors may lead to confusion and possibly non-implementation at lower-levels.

In addition to determining whether there is a relationship between the existence of a national position and local implementation of PSIP, I was also interested in the relationship between national communication strategies and local implementation. Here, I was guided by the following expectation: Groups that communicate often about PSIP will be more likely to be active in PSIP. Specifically, I hypothesize that:

\[ H_3 \ - \ \text{Active national promotion of PSIP through aggressive communication strategies will increase the likelihood of local implementation.} \]

This hypothesis is similar to \( H_2 \). However, it is a bit more specific and measures the extent to which national actors communicated with local affiliates. It also provides the opportunity to look at the effect of varying communication strategies to determine if aggressive communication from the national office to the local offices is related to local implementation. To measure this hypothesis I asked a variety of questions: I asked local officials if the national office provided technical assistance; how often they provided such assistance; what method of communication they used; how clearly this advice and technical assistance was communicated; how frequently national staff communicated with local affiliates on PSIP; how adequate the quality of communication between the national office and the local office was; and finally, how satisfied local officials were with the level of direction in PSIP provided by the national office. Collectively, these questions were designed to determine the amount and quality of communication from the national level to the local level as perceived by local officials. My major concern with these communication questions is to test
the hypothesis that aggressive national communication strategies in organizations with autonomous local affiliates improves the likelihood of local implementation.

It is also possible to claim that not only is communication from the national level to the local level important in explaining local implementation, but also that communication from the local affiliates to the national staff may be related to local implementation. My hypothesis here is one that suggests that the more aggressive national staff are in soliciting local opinions, the more likely local offices would be active in the program. Organizational theorists have argued that the participation of local implementors on subordinates in program decision-making would enhance the chances for local implementation. According to Elmore, for example, the implementation process is one in which policy-makers and implementors strive for consensus and ultimately, a commitment to the program on the part of those who must carry it out. Applied to the group setting, I would expect that communication from the local affiliates to the national staff would lead the local offices to feel efficacious and more involved in the program and consequently, would lead to their participation in it.

\[ H_4: \text{The greater the communication from local affiliates to national staff, the greater the chances for local implementation.} \]

To provide data to test this hypothesis I asked local groups two questions: First, how often they were asked by national staff to give their opinions on PSIP and second, to what extent the local affiliates participate in policy-making at the national level. These two questions in addition to the earlier questions dealing with communication from the national level to
the local affiliates were designed to provide information on group communication strategies and to test these major hypotheses.

In addition to obtaining data on how the local offices evaluated PSIP and the dynamics of group communication strategies, I was interested in a variety of other relationships. One expected relationship was between the adequacy of local staff size and the affiliate's level of involvement in PSIP. I asked local officials if they felt they had adequate staff to carry out PSIP and I expected that those who reported they had adequate staff would be more likely to participate in PSIP than those who indicated they were either a few members short or were seriously understaffed. Many of the early case studies of policy implementation failure documented the importance of adequate staffing for successful implementation. As Sabatier and Mazmanian claim, one of the most critical conditions for effective implementation is adequate resources. It seems reasonable to expect that staff already spread too thin would be less able to be active in PSIP.

**H5 - Affiliates with adequate numbers of staff would be more likely to implement PSIP than those with inadequate staff resources.**

In addition to staff resources, I was interested in local affiliates' degree of influence with relevant PSIP actors. In a few cities I had conducted fieldwork, groups complained that they were being excluded from PSIP decision-making and that the private sector emphasis of the program precluded their meaningful involvement. This was also a point made by national actors. To get some measure of this issue I asked the local offices how they would characterize their influence with important PSIP policymakers, both elected and non-elected, at the local level. This question was directed at the National Urban League affiliates and the AFL-CIO central
labor councils as they expressed concern with the business domination in PSIP. This suggests that participation might be related to self-perception of influence. Specifically:

$$H_6:$$ Affiliates that perceived themselves as influential would be more likely to participate in PSIP than those who perceived they had little influence.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are individual case studies of the three interest groups. These case studies will begin with a description of each group organization and structure. Following this will be a discussion of each organization's involvement in past federal employment programs. There will also be a detailed discussion of the group's involvement in PSIP. Specifically, this will entail a description of the national office's participation in the formulation and implementation of the program. I will then move to a discussion of the local affiliates' participation in the local implementation of PSIP. This last section will be an analysis of the data collected from the mail questionnaire and will focus on the independent factors that explained local activity in PSIP.

Following these case studies I will analyze group participation in PSIP comparatively in Chapter 6. I will look to see where the groups share characteristics and where they differ. Specific comparisons will be made of each organization's level of activity in PSIP at the local level in relation to those independent variable I hypothesized to be important in explaining PSIP activity. Chapter 7 will include the summary and conclusions of the dissertation and will provide a discussion of the contributions of this work as well as future research questions.
Part II. The Private Sector Initiative Program

The Private Sector Initiative Program (PSIP) was an amendment to the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). PSIP (Title VII of the 1978 reauthorized CETA, which had first become law in 1973) was passed in October of 1978. The program was first made public in President Carter's State of the Union speech in January of that year, at a time when CETA was the object of much public criticism. Dubbed a wasteful program that failed to adequately train the disadvantaged by some and criticized by others as a program fraught with fraud and abuse, CETA was a program looking for new ideas and sources of support. Members of Congress, the Administration and other national actors in the employment and training subgovernment knew, as Representative David Obey remarked, "CETA was the second most unpopular program to welfare."5

CETA had been part of President Nixon's special revenue sharing package. The program was based on a decentralized service delivery system and was created to give local communities the authority to design and operate their own employment programs. However, throughout the 1973-1978 period, CETA was used primarily to finance public service jobs and the program became synonymous with Public Service Employment (PSE). This reflected changed congressional intent. The CETA program was first enacted just as the country entered its most serious economic downturn since the Depression and as it turned out, CETA public service jobs became one of the prime tools to help large numbers who were unemployed. These jobs and this primary use of CETA was not without its critics. Public service jobs quickly gained a reputation as make-work employment lacking both in adequate training and long-term
employment. And, in addition, public service employment programs throughout the country were tarnished with scandals and fraud. Political officials were accused of awarding CETA jobs to friends and family and examples of this sort of behavior were commonplace in the nation's newspapers. Congressional supporters, as well as other supporters of CETA training programs for the disadvantaged, were aware of the critical need to "turn CETA around" and improve its public image. PSIP was intended to be the antidote to CETA's perceived illnesses.

PSIP was developed by the Carter administration with the support of the business community. The Committee for Economic Development (CED), the National Alliance of Business (NAB), as well as other business organizations, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, were instrumental in providing the initiative and ideas for PSIP. Each of these groups claimed that PSE failed to encourage business participation and that this was inconsistent given that most of the jobs were in the private sector. A CED study documented cases of successful involvement of the private sector in training programs in a number of local communities. The study emphasized the importance of a business intermediary group that worked with public agencies and allowed employers to avoid much of the day-to-day administrative detail. The Carter administration was receptive to the idea of local business intermediary organizations and was interested in creating a program within the CETA framework that would emphasize business participation. The administration wanted a separate title in CETA with a new organizational structure in order to emphasize this new commitment to the private sector.6

This organizational structure eventually became the Private Industry Council (PIC) and its adoption was not without substantial controversy.
Business groups favored a PIC structure with broad powers and responsibilities to implement PSIP. Some business groups advocated that the PICs become independent and entirely separate from the traditional prime sponsor and NAB, throughout the existence of PSIP, strongly endorsed PIC incorporation. On the other side of the coin, community based organizations like the Urban League feared strong, autonomous PICs since they anticipated that business dominated PICs would circumscribe traditional CETA participants including their own League affiliates.

PSIP required that PICs have a majority membership (51%) of representatives from business and industry. In addition, representatives of community based organizations, organized labor, and educational institutions were mandated PIC members. While the PIC had a number of important responsibilities - including the opportunity to go beyond advising prime sponsors on the mix of programs; the right to incorporate; the chance to look at employment and training programs beyond this one CETA title and; a PSIP budget separate from other CETA titles - the prime sponsor remained responsible for the expenditure of money and for appointing PIC members. In short, local prime sponsor staff could ultimately ignore all that the PIC recommended with regard to the expenditure of money, the choice of training program, or the choice of service deliverers.

PSIP was a new program designed to include the private sector in making employment and training decisions at the local level. It was intended to generate fresh, innovative approaches to training the nation's disadvantaged and structurally unemployed. The program had three major goals: 1) "To increase the involvement of the business community...in employment and training activities." (sec. 701); 2) "To increase private sector employment
opportunities for unemployed or underemployed persons who are economically disadvantaged." (sec. 701) and; 3) To test and demonstrate the effectiveness of a variety of specific program activities in pursuing the first two purposes (sec. 701, with 15 activities listed in sec. 705).

To reach these goals the law authorized earmarked money be given to prime sponsors. Each prime sponsor was required to create a PIC in order to receive Title VII funds. The PICs were required by law to have a majority of members from business and industry with additional members coming from more traditional CETA participants. PSIP was a fairly modest program, at least in terms of resources. In relation to total CETA funds PSIP's share was 5 percent in FY 1980, and 12 percent in FY 1981. PSIP's total estimated expenditures from 1978 to 1983 amounted to $825 million. When we compare those expenditures to other major federal programs to aid the unemployed it is clear that PSIP was a relatively modest program. For example, the Local Public Works Program, which existed only between 1976 and 1977, had estimated expenditures equaling $6 billion. And, the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act, which existed for a similar time period as PSIP (5 years, 1977–1982), amounted to $5.1 billion. These relatively modest funding amounts along with at least two additional factors, the relatively short existence of the program (1978-1983), and the negative reaction to CETA and government programs in general on the part of the nation's private sector, made the expectation that PSIP would turn CETA around mere hyperbole.

The choice of the PSIP program for this dissertation was made for three particular reasons: First, as a member of the Mershon Center CETA Project I felt comfortable with the intricacies of the program and with the many actors involved in PSIP. Second, CETA was a controversial program and PSIP was
launched to put out or at least dampen the CETA fires. However, PSIP created its own flames. It too was controversial and interest groups that have been traditional players in employment and training programs were ever present in PSIP. This gave me a good opportunity to observe interest group behavior in policy formulation and policy implementation. The involvement of a relative newcomer to the employment and training scene, the private sector, altered significantly the competition for CETA/PSIP resources. This put traditional players including the National Urban League and the AFL-CIO Human Resources Development Institute in potentially vulnerable and precarious positions. It gave me the opportunity to view interest groups in a competitive environment. And while PSIP was no doubt modestly funded, it was taken seriously, both for itself and especially as a harbinger of the future. Many hoped that PSIP's emphasis on private sector participation would be the future direction in employment and training. Others feared and opposed such a development.

A third and final reason I have chosen to study PSIP had to do with my ability to generalize from the program. PSIP, as a part of CETA, represented a major federal block grant program. Like other block grant programs including the Housing and Community Development Act, for example, CETA and PSIP served large numbers of clients and cost the government millions of dollars. But more importantly, these programs represented the format of decentralized service delivery systems; programs that were broadly defined in Washington and specifically tailored and carried out at the local level. In short, what I learn about the activities of interest groups in the formulation and implementation of PSIP may not be specifically appropriate for other groups in other programs. The groups may very well vary. However,
I believe this program and the three interest groups represent fairly typical pictures of intergovernmental programs and thus, PSIP is indeed a program from which we can not only observe but also make generalizations about interest group behavior.
1. I sent two waves of questionnaires to the local groups. In some cases I made follow-up phone calls to those groups that did not respond by the second opportunity in the hopes of convincing them to complete the questionnaire. The response rates were as follows: Urban League affiliates, 60 of 118 or 50%; labor councils, 36 or 118 or 31%; local chambers, 60 of 118 or 50%.


CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE
INTRODUCTION

The National Urban League (NUL) was founded in 1911. The League began as a consolidation of three earlier social welfare organizations, each of which stressed the education and training of newly urbanized Blacks. League founders agreed that social work and educational programs were important strategies to treat urban problems and it was this thrust that made the NUL the nation's first Black national social service agency.

Throughout the years, the League emphasized social work and community organization. In contrast to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the NUL refrained from direct political action as a means to achieve political equality. Instead, the League continued its social service function by promoting employment opportunities for Blacks through vocational education, job training, and counselling programs. The more modern day League, beginning in 1961 with the appointment of Whitney Young as its Executive Director, shed its conservative political image and embraced a more activist and aggressive political stand. However, it still maintained its primary role as social service provider and continued to emphasize employment opportunities for urban Blacks. For the purposes of this dissertation, what is most relevant and significant is that the NUL, from its inception, was involved in a variety of programs to train and employ the nation's Blacks.
PART I: THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE: STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The National Office

The Urban League is an organization with national headquarters in New York City, two field offices in Washington, D.C., four regional offices and 118 affiliates. The national office, made up of the field offices, regional offices and New York staff have approximately 350 employees. The two field offices in Washington perform distinct functions. The Washington Operations Office provides testimony to Congress and works with congressional staff and committees to present the Urban League's position on proposed legislation. This office also keeps the regional offices and affiliates up to date on legislative matters. The second field office, the Research Department, provides data and information in a variety of program areas to both the national headquarters and its regional offices.

The national office articulates the direction and general policy positions of the Urban League. Through the years, the League has emphasized a number of different programs and staff claim that, broadly speaking, NUL policy is based on needs as expressed by the local affiliates. Thus, national priorities reflect dominant local concerns and consequently there is a high degree of program consistency between the national office and the local level. Also significant and reflective of this level of program consistency is that annually at the Urban League national convention, considerable effort is made to determine which issues and programs will be highlighted by both the national office and the local affiliates. What this suggests is that a good deal of collaboration and planning takes place between these two levels.
The national office does have a number of specific responsibilities set forth by the League By-Laws or "Terms of Affiliation" adopted most recently in 1971. Briefly, the NUL is required to provide each affiliate with a manual on structure, program, and general League operations. The "Urban League Manual" is a short introduction and orientation describing the management practices, programs and fiscal policies which should govern each affiliate. For example, the "Manual" makes recommendations to the affiliates on how to select and recruit board members and how to prepare memoranda and reports. The "Manual" also discusses the types of services the National Office provides for the affiliates including consultation, field visits and workshops. Overall, the "Manual" is intended to be used by new staff and Board members. It is not particularly specific with regard to a set of strict standards of performance criteria. One Executive Director, whose copy I borrowed, quipped that "I was free to borrow his only copy for a few years." The National League also has the responsibility to evaluate local affiliates, make recommendations where necessary, assist affiliates in recruitment, provide in-service orientation, develop and distribute research materials for local programming, design and promote nationwide projects, and guide local affiliates on fiscal management and local fund-raising efforts. (Most of these activities are carried out by the regional offices and will be discussed shortly.)

In sum, the national office does have a number of explicit responsibilities, many of which it delegates to the four regional offices. Despite the existence of these By-Laws and the League "Manual," one does not come away with a clear sense of how meaningful and strict these standards are. Essentially, what these documents do provide is a sense of the areas in which
the national office is to be involved. Thus, for example, we know the national office is supposed to take the lead in developing nationwide programs and assisting the affiliates in the areas of fiscal management and funding. We do not know, however, if local affiliates must implement all national programs or only some of them and we are not quite sure what constitutes fiscal mismanagement or poor local fundraising efforts. The NUL is required to "supply continuous consultation for each of its affiliates for the purpose of helping them reach and maintain high standards of management, program planning and performance." Yet, neither document describes what constitutes adequate performance. However, interviews with regional staff members have provided some clarification of what actually is expected in the relationship between the NUL and its affiliates.

The Regional Offices

The four regional offices are the Eastern Regional Office in New York, the Central Office located in Chicago, the Southern Regional Office in Atlanta, and the Western Office in Los Angeles. Generally speaking, the regional offices are the primary link between the national office and the 118 affiliates. One of the most critical functions of the regional staff is to provide technical assistance to the local affiliates. In many cases this assistance is relatively informal. For example, local affiliates may telephone the regional office and ask for advice, or they may ask regional staff for some ideas on how other affiliates are participating in a program. According to regional staff, there is frequent communication of an informal nature. More formally, regional staff visit affiliates, provide newsletters and memos, and hold regional conferences. Formal communication with
local affiliates is also frequent. On the average there is usually one regional conference per year, three to five newsletters, and affiliates can expect field visits from regional staff every other year.

The regional offices also serve the important functions of monitoring and evaluating the local affiliates. Formally, regional staff have the responsibility of insuring that the affiliates comply with a set of standards specified in the "Terms of Affiliation." Perhaps most important, regional office staff conduct evaluations of local affiliates. While the "Terms of Affiliation" specify these evaluations to be "periodic," regional staff said that these evaluations were actually monthly reports submitted by the affiliates on their activities and programs. In addition to these evaluations, the regional office performs an audit of each affiliate on an annual basis. Affiliates are also required to report any changes in their local Board of Directors to the regional office and it is the responsibility of the regional office to approve the local affiliate's choice of an executive director. In fact, the League has a formal certification process which calls for minimum qualifications for the position of executive director. These qualifications include minimum levels of education, employment, and management experience. Regional staff explained that, in practice, these qualifications vary from one affiliate to another. The League takes into consideration a number of factors including the size of the city and its local needs. Therefore, for example, the level and type of experience of an executive director may reflect local conditions rather than explicit League standards. Both recruitment for the position of executive director as well as the formal certification comes from the Board of Directors at the local level.
In addition to monitoring the affiliates, the regional office may begin action to decertify a local affiliate. They may place an affiliate on probation, suspension, or may recommend disaffiliation. These sanctions, however, are not used frequently. Problems that have come up include: consistently poor attendance at Board meetings; inability to pay dues for an extended period of time; and serious deficiencies in program operations. In many instances, the affiliate is usually not sanctioned and at most, is placed on probation. In typical cases, the normal course of action is for the regional office to make a field visit and subsequently make substantive recommendations for improvement to the affiliate. Historically, the Urban League has not placed an affiliate on probation because of one deficient program, but rather for poor performance in an overall programmatic sense.

The Affiliates

There are presently 118 local affiliates of the National Urban League, each of these local offices must maintain certain standards in order to be affiliated with the national organization. These standards, specified in the "Terms of Affiliation" have remained virtually unchanged throughout the history of the League. In fact, when comparing the recent set of standards in the "Terms of Affiliation" and the Urban League "Manual," with earlier requirements, one is struck by the high degree of similarity between them. Once again, in these sections on the roles and responsibilities of the affiliates, it is clear that while the "Terms of Affiliation" call for close national-local collaboration, it is expected and encouraged that the individual affiliates maintain a substantial degree of local program independence.
As mentioned earlier, the local affiliate must appoint "its Executive Director only from nominees who have been certified as meeting standards set by the National Urban League." In addition, each affiliate must select a Board of Directors that is "representative of the total community—racially, religiously, economically, politically and socially—with no less than 25 percent of youth, 30 years and under of both sexes." The affiliates are also required to pay annual dues to the national organization (dues are presently 4 percent of the affiliates budget). The local affiliates are expected to participate in "periodic evaluations as to its program and performance" and these evaluations are to be based on "criteria established by the Urban League." Evaluation of each affiliate includes an examination of the performance of the Executive Director, the Board and other components. The affiliates are also expected to participate in training programs and "periodic workshops" for staff and volunteers and finally, they are called on "to cooperate in nationwide projects as they are developed from time to time by the National Urban League." 

The "Manual for Affiliates of the National Urban League" is a somewhat more expanded discussion of the affiliates responsibilities. It is meant to be a guide to the affiliates and to assist local staff, volunteers, and Board members on local operations. The "Manual" provides some discussion and explanation of the sections and articles in the "Terms of Affiliation" discussed above. For example, there is a general discussion of the types of funding that might be utilized by the local affiliates. As the "Manual" states, adequate financing is both necessary and important to the effective operation of an affiliate. To this end, the National Office recommends the concept of federated funding through the local United Way. In fact,
according to national staff, most of the affiliates (90%) are member agencies of their local United Way agency. The "Manual" also suggests additional funding sources including contributions from labor unions, government agencies and other local organizations. The "Manual" also provides a more detailed discussion of how the affiliates are to be evaluated, how the national staff might be useful in providing counseling, technical assistance or other general services. There is also a short description of the purpose of a field visit, what affiliates might expect and why affiliates might request such a visit from the regional office.

The affiliates are, as one League staff member put it, "the heart of the Urban League movement-they are where the action is." In the local communities, they run a variety of programs, offer direct client services and provide advocacy services for their constituents. In describing the affiliates in a general sense, national staff paint a clear picture of independent, autonomous affiliates. As one staff member in the New York office put it, "the NUL is a parent organization with independent affiliates. Our organization is loosely woven and the affiliates are autonomous." In fact, the affiliates are quite autonomous: they are incorporated entities, chartered under state law, with their own Boards of Trustees selected locally. The link that ties the affiliates to the national structure is the "Terms of Affiliation," which essentially establishes broad policies, procedures and relationships for the national office and the local affiliates. But, clearly this is not the entire story. As it turns out, the national office has fairly extensive communications with local affiliates and there is considerable sharing of information, ideas, and policies between that national and local level.
PART II. THE URBAN LEAGUE'S INVOLVEMENT IN EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

Historically, the NUL has been involved in employment, educational and vocational training efforts. Since its inception, the League has been dominated by educators and others who stressed the critical importance of job training and job preparation skills. As early as 1930, the League sponsored programs not only to train young blacks in the skilled and semi-skilled trades, but also to work with employers in an attempt to convince them to hire these newly trained workers. Over the next decades, the League expanded its support for employment, job training, and job placement programs.

In the 1960's, the NUL showed its support for employment and skills training for urban blacks. In 1963 the League, along with a coalition of other civil rights groups, participated in the "March on Washington for Jobs." This was a demonstration of support among both blacks and whites for increased job opportunities for black Americans. The March was considered by many to be a success especially in that it elevated, quite dramatically, civil rights groups' demands for improved and expanded job opportunities. It might also be argued that the March and the civil rights movement in general led the federal government to become increasingly involved in federal job training programs. The League was involved extensively in a number of these federal programs.

One of the first of these 1960's War on Poverty programs, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and its Office of Economic Opportunity financed Project ENABLE in cooperation with the Child Study Association of America and Family Service Association. ENABLE, or Education and Neighborhood Action for Better Living Environment was an experimental, grass-roots program in
over 60 cities. Local Urban League offices participated in the program in a number of cities. ENABLE concentrated its efforts in the employment and education areas and it did so by recruiting social service agency depending on their particular needs. Thus, ENABLE served as a referral program, attempting to match client needs with available services and resources.

In 1964 while Project ENABLE was referring clients to various services, it could rely on two additional employment programs in which the NUL was actively participating. Beginning in 1963, the League was involved in a job placement program called the "National Skills Bank." The Skills Bank began as a demonstration project in 26 cities and was developed to obtain and place job profiles of qualified blacks from all over the nation in a "Bank." Employers could then recruit from the Bank. In the first year, the program spread to 56 local League affiliates and for years to come it served as a national clearinghouse for black employment.

In addition to ENABLE and the Skills Bank, the League participated in one of the first major federal employment and training programs, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA). In 1964, the NUL was awarded an $8 million contract from the MDTA to train unemployed blacks for jobs in industry. Throughout the program 38 affiliates participated in MDTA, an on-the-job training program designed for the hard-core unemployed.

Shortly thereafter in 1965, the League obtained an additional contract with the Department of Labor and its Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training. The League's role in this contract was to assist eight local affiliates to become on-the-job training prime contractors. Two years later, the NUL received a second national contract for an apprenticeship outreach effort called the Labor Education Advancement Program.
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA) represented a significant departure from earlier federal manpower programs. The new legislation called for decentralized manpower planning. Under CETA, local and state government prime sponsors became major decision-makers in determining local funding patterns. For the most part, this meant that national organizations, including the Urban League, would no longer directly receive master contracts from the Department of Labor. Instead, local prime sponsors (cities and counties) and their planning advisory councils obtained the federal monies and they, in turn, made local funding allocations. Thus, community-based organizations, including local League affiliates, would now compete for employment and training funds at the local level. Despite this change from centralized to decentralized decision-making, the Urban League and its affiliates remained consistently active in training programs. The League continued its emphasis on on-the-job (OJT) training programs. It increased its contracts for OJT from 1975 to 1976 by 1 million dollars and by the 1978 fiscal year, 51 affiliates had OJT contracts of their own with prime sponsors. In addition, the NUL's staff in the New York headquarters, which ran the national on-the-job training program, became the core for an Office of Program Development and Training. The office provided training and technical assistance to local affiliates for a number of CETA activities. As a result of this link, League affiliates were involved in a variety of CETA programs such as classroom training, counseling, and job development. Finally, aside from these provisions in the 1973 legislation, the Urban League also received funding directly from the Department of Labor under Title III of CETA. Title III permitted the Secretary of Labor to award discretionary funds in the form of national contracts to "special" national
organizations so that they might provide technical assistance and support locally. These awards are made in special categories or areas in need including native Americans, the handicapped, and disadvantaged blacks, for which the League obtains money. The League used Title III money to provide assistance to local affiliates in carrying out local training programs. (Title III was subsequently reauthorized in the 1978 amendments to CETA.)

The Urban League and the Private Sector Initiatives Program

The Urban League maintained its involvement in employment and training programs under the CETA Amendments of 1978. The League continued to receive Title III discretionary funds for technical assistance to local affiliates. These funds were used to staff an office in the New York headquarters, which had primary responsibility to help implement the Private Sector Initiatives Program (PSIP). The Career Training and Economic Resources Department was one of two major program areas within the national office. The department was subdivided into three areas: Economic Development, Education and Career Development, and Employment Training and Development. The Employment Training and Development Program dealt generally with CETA programs, while a smaller division within the department, the Community Based Organization Partnership Program, had specific program responsibility for PSIP implementation. The Community Based Partnership Program was a technical assistance unit funded directly by the DOL under the discretionary funding program.

The Community Based Organization Partnership Program (CBOPP) was an eight person staff with primary responsibilities in the areas of PSIP program development and technical assistance. The staff had close contact with the local affiliates. They provided assistance on substantive and administra-
tive PSIP matters, conducted program assessment, and, at various times, sponsored training conferences and workshops. The CBOPP was not limited to the New York office and, in fact, each of the regional offices had comparable staff members also funded through Title III monies. The New York staff had considerable contact with regional staff members and thus, technical assistance for PSIP was conducted at both levels.

Technical assistance at both these levels, the national and the regional, was conducted on a continuous basis. On the average, the regional and national offices collectively sponsored one conference per year and national staff told me they tried to meet with each affiliate that was involved in PSIP either individually or at least in small groups. The CBOPP also provided bulletins, newsletters and digests to the affiliates and they made an effort to highlight important and topical issues in the employment and training area. The CBOPP defined itself as providing implementation assistance to the affiliates. As such, once an affiliate decided to become involved in PSIP, it was able to seek advice from national and regional staff. In addition, the New York CBOPP office staff characterized themselves as the major link between the affiliates and the Washington office. In this regard, CBOPP staff considered it their responsibility to analyze, interpret and digest legislation and subsequently, pass this information along to the affiliates. In the same vein, CBOPP staff, because they had close contact with the affiliates, were also in a good position to communicate local concerns to the Washington office.

In sum, the CBOPP staff in the national office and at the regional level had two related concerns: to aid the implementation of PSIP and; to communicate with local affiliates, generally, on employment and training
issues. They did this by providing technical assistance to the affiliates. They prepared newsletters, conducted training sessions and workshops, and generally, stayed in touch with the affiliates. In some instances they provided specific and direct technical assistance. For example, the CBOPP Deputy Director assisted the Milwaukee Urban League in responding to a Request for Proposal for an on-the-job training program. In other instances, the CBOPP staff provided more descriptive information to the affiliates. Any changes in the regulations for example, would be communicated from the CBOPP to the affiliates. Thus, Title III discretionary funds were used by the NUL to staff an eight member department at the national level with the intention of providing on-going technical assistance to the local affiliates. In addition, the regional offices also obtained Title III funds for staff members to provide assistance to affiliates in their region.

The Urban League's Involvement in the Formulation of PSIP

The Urban League's official policy position on the Private Sector Initiatives Program was supportive. Staff members in the New York office along with legislative staff in the Washington Operations office indicated quite clearly that the League took a strong position in favor of PSIP. They had, many believed, a long standing and positive relationship with the business sector and as a result, expected continued success.22 Most staff members indicated that the League welcomed the participation of the private sector in employment and training decisions. Some even managed to echo the old familiar line, "four out of five jobs are in the private sector," and
because of this, we ought to make better use of business when choosing training programs. In essence, the League agreed in principle to PSIP.

According to the Washington Operations staff, it was clear that PSIP was to be a part of the 1978 Amendments. The Carter Administration seemed to like the idea and equally important, the political winds made PSIP likely. According to Washington staff, two things were most central in understanding PSIP's formulation and the League's position: First, PSIP seemed especially attractive to Congress and the President after the negative press of CETA's Public Service Employment Jobs Program. After a number of years of highly negative media coverage which included a number of charges of corruption, inefficiency, and inadequate or nonexistent training, many in the NUL believed that political officials, even those largely supportive of federal training efforts, wanted to "turn the tide" and begin to reverse CETA's poor image. One way of doing this was to support a program tied directly to permanent, gainful employment, and to encourage the input and direct participation of the business community. According to League officials, especially those involved in legislative matters, this was very much a part of the Administration's rhetoric on the reauthorization of CETA. Clearly, the new Private Sector program was designed to serve that purpose.

The second factor which seemed to contribute to the political support for PSIP was the involvement of an influential business group, the National Alliance of Business (NAB). NAB played an important role in the formulation of PSIP. NAB, a largely volunteer organization was set up at the urging of President Johnson shortly after the urban riots of 1968. The organization's mission was essentially to persuade private employers to make special efforts to hire the disadvantaged. And, in the last few years NAB itself conducted a
variety of jobs programs for the disadvantaged. In 1978, during the formulation of PSIP, NAB was quite active and aggressive in pushing for private sector involvement in CETA. As testimony of NAB's political strength, it received a $2.9 million contract in 1979 with the Department of Labor to help implement PSIP by promoting and marketing it to the business community.\textsuperscript{24} It was the feeling of many in the Urban League the NAB's influence was strong and that coupled with CETA's largely negative image, PSIP was to be a feature of the CETA Amendments.

Thus, it would be accurate to characterize the League's position as being both politically realistic as well as generally supportive of private sector participation in employment and training decisions. However, it should also be emphasized that while the League endorsed business participation, it also clearly wanted to insure a level of community-based organization (CBO) involvement in PSIP. Simply stated, the Urban League did not want to be excluded from PSIP. And, according to League staff in Washington, early proposals for PSIP did not include CBO involvement on the Private Industry Councils (PICs). The League pushed aggressively to include CBO representation on the PICs. Staff at the Washington Operations office highlighted the importance of this issue and how, in their assessment, it was clearly the major issue with regard to program formulation. At that time the Vice President for Washington Operations spent most of her time and effort on watering down the original PSIP proposal which did not include CBO participation. In addition, a member of the Urban League Board of Directors also served on the NAB Board of Directors and was able to persuade NAB officials of the need to include community groups in the program.

In addition to the actual participation issue, the League also strongly
endorsed the position the CBO's be considered as service deliverers in PSIP. The initial plans for PSIP, according to League Washington staff not only limited PIC representation, but also defined PSIP as a business dominated program which would contract exclusively with private sector vendors for training programs. This meant that local Urban League's would not be considered for training programs under the entire program. This prohibition was another aspect of early PSIP proposals with which the League took issue. The basic argument that the League used was the CBO's had extensive experience in training minority clients and that it was critical that clients be trained and counseled in agencies that understood their needs. The League's position was not that all minority participants be trained by CBO's, but rather that programs be available to those who needed them, and thus, that PSIP not exclude from consideration CBO training programs.

Still another set of issues that concerned the Urban League during the formulation of PSIP had to do with the specific role of the Private Industry Council. Early on, NAB advocated that PICs be encouraged, in the PSIP legislation and regulations, to go beyond their planning role and administer and operate training programs. In addition, NAB, according to Washington staff, pushed to be PSIP program operators at the local level. The position of the NUL with regard to these two related issues reflected their concern that traditional service deliverers like themselves would be "squeezed out" of running training programs and therefore, effectively uninvolved with PSIP. More to the point, League official in both New York and Washington indicated that they saw PIC operation of training programs as creating a conflict of interest. Their position was quite simple and direct: It was unfair and exclusionary to have a planning body choosing its own programs and
excluding traditional participants in employment and training programs. Moreover, according to League staff, the point or the rationale of PSIP was to encourage PIC and business input, not to have that same body administering and operating programs. On this particular issue in PSIP formulation, the NUL did not succeed in convincing political officials and PICs were allowed to administer and directly operate employment and training programs.

A final issue which disturbed the Urban League had to do with the issue of PIC incorporation. The National Alliance of Business, throughout the short history of PSIP, strongly advocated incorporation of the PIC body. Briefly, NAB claimed that legally incorporated or independent PICs could shed the negative CETA/government program image by distancing the PIC from the CETA prime sponsor and its staff. Incorporation would lead to PIC autonomy, it would eliminate reliance on CETA staff, and it would allow them to be more flexible, no longer under rigid local government procedures. On the other side of the coin, CBOs like the Urban League viewed incorporation with both skepticism and fear. Incorporation would surely lead PICs away from the CETA system and from CBO training programs. My observation confirms this. In fact, the rhetoric for incorporation included the above reasons, in addition to the freedom (on the part of the PIC) to bring new blood into the training arena. Whether or not incorporation did have the effect of eliminating CBO's from Title VII programs is well beyond the scope of this dissertation; the point is that during the early stages of PSIP formulation in 1978, the NUL was concerned about the effects of NAB's aggressive involvement in PSIP formulation. League officials were not hesitant to point out to me that they were fearful that PSIP would go beyond a business advisory program and that business groups, especially NAB, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Business
Roundtable had more than "advice and input" in mind. Consequently, the League and its Washington legislative staff felt they had to "water down" some of the earlier proposals in PSIP. As one staff member told me, "we found ourselves mostly to be taking positions that were largely reactive to NAB's proposals."

In summary, the NUL was active during the formulation of PSIP. Philosophically, the League expressed support for PSIP. As staff told me repeatedly, the NUL had a long and successful history of working with the private sector and it believed that business input into employment and training decisions was a good idea. Yet, the League's support for PSIP was, to some degree, tempered by their concern that the program would emerge as one dominated entirely by business. The League, along with a number of other grass-roots and community-based organizations called for greater CBO participation in Title VII. In a Joint Statement submitted to Congress and the Department of Labor, the Ad Hoc CETA Coalition, which represented over a dozen CBOs and public interest groups including the Urban League, registered its concern with the lack of CBO participation in Title VII as it was proposed in the early part of 1978. It was this specific concern that dominated the NUL's agenda during the formulation of PSIP.

The Urban League's Involvement in the Implementation of PSIP

The National and Regional Offices

Both the national office in New York and the regional offices throughout the country were involved in the implementation of PSIP. Their involvement was limited to encouraging local affiliates to participate in PSIP and
assisting those who chose to do so. As I have described, the national and regional offices were staffed by people whose responsibility it was to provide technical assistance to the local affiliates. These staff were given the responsibility to direct, counsel, and assist local affiliates to carry out PSIP. They did this through a variety of communication strategies including: newsletters, memos, training conferences and, in some instances, direct field visits to the local affiliates. My impression of the League's communications from the national and regional offices to the local affiliates is that there was considerable interaction between these offices. League staff provided me with ample evidence of their written communication to the affiliates. Moreover, in my interviews with national and regional staff, it was clear that assisting the affiliates in PSIP was a major goal of the Community Based Organization Partnership Program.

Although it is clear that the focus of the national office's implementation effort was aimed at providing technical assistance and advice to the local affiliates, it remains to be seen whether the local affiliates recognized that effort. More precisely, it is necessary to determine first, the extent to which local affiliates perceived national efforts and second, whether an extensive communication strategy is related to local affiliates participation in PSIP.

Urban League Affiliates

Before moving to a discussion of the affiliates perceptions of the national effort at implementing PSIP through an extensive technical assistance program, it is necessary first to get some idea of just how active the affiliates were in implementing PSIP at the local level. Data from the
mail questionnaire show that of the 60 responding affiliates, 50 (83%) indicated they were either very active or active in PSIP. Close to half the affiliates were involved in running Title VII programs; 72 percent were active members of local Private Industry Councils and; 25 percent provided screening and referral services for Title VII programs offered by other subcontractors. Only a relatively small number of affiliates (1%) indicated that they had not been active in PSIP. Additional data provided by the NUL confirms these findings. According to a mail questionnaire conducted by the national office, 94 of the 118 affiliates (80%) were participating in PSIP. Almost all (92) had representation on the PIC and more than half were operating Title VII programs. 27

Ninety percent of 60 responding affiliates agreed with the philosophy of the Title VII program while 95 percent of (57 of 60) the local Leagues agreed with the goals of PSIP. As Table I shows, 77 percent of the affiliates agreed with the goals of PSIP and were participating in implementing the program at the local level. However, given the almost unanimous agreement with PSIP's goals among the affiliates, it cannot be argued that there is a positive association between level of activity and agreement with PSIP goals.
Table 1: Level of Activity by Agreement with PSIP Goals*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement with PSIP Goals</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=44</td>
<td>n=3</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=13</td>
<td>n=0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57 3 60

95% 5% 100%

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In addition to asking affiliates if they agreed with the philosophy and goals of PSIP, I was also interested in whether they were equipped organizationally to participate in PSIP. The affiliates were split on the question of whether they had adequate staff to carry out their Title VII responsibilities. Forty percent of the affiliates reported adequate staffing; 38 percent said they were a few members short; and a smaller proportion or 22 percent of the affiliates indicated that they were seriously understaffed. What impact did staffing have on local activity? Our data indicated that staff shortages had only a moderate impact on the local implementation of PSIP. While it was the case that affiliates who felt they had adequate staffing levels were more active than those who said they were either a few members short or were seriously understaffed, the data showed that almost half of the seriously understaffed category were still active in PSIP. Nevertheless, it is at least worth mentioning that according to the data, the less serious the staff problems, the more likely it is that affiliates will be active. The following declining percentages will illustrate the point: Ninety-one percent of the adequately staffed affiliates were active in PSIP; 82 percent of the moderately understaffed participated in PSIP; and only 54 percent of the seriously understaffed were active in the program. Thus, staffing levels do relate to local implementation, but we should take care not to overstate this relationship. (Table 2 presents these results.)
Table 2: Level of Activity by Adequacy of Staff Size*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequacy of Staff Size</th>
<th>Few Staff Adequate</th>
<th>Few Staff Short</th>
<th>Few Staff Understaffed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Activity</th>
<th>n=2</th>
<th>n=4</th>
<th>n=6</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40% 38% 22% 100%

*This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In addition to staff as an important internal organizational resource, I was also interested in how the local affiliate perceived its influence with PSIP policy-makers at the local level. As I suggested in Chapter 2 and as should be clear from my discussion of the position of the national office during PSIP's formulation, the League was concerned about losing its traditional base of support with the entrance of the private sector into employment and training decisions. I asked local officials to "characterize their influence with important PSIP policy-makers (elected and non-elected) at the local level." This question was designed to see how the affiliates perceived their influence and also to determine what effect this might have on their level of involvement in PSIP. The results show that a majority of the affiliates saw themselves as "influential" (47 affiliates or 78%), while 22 percent said they were "not influential." Bivariate analysis indicates that of the 47 respondents who said they were influential, 80 percent were active in PSIP. And, although one might expect those affiliates lacking in influence to be less likely to participate in PSIP, this relationship does not emerge uniformly. The results show that of the 13 affiliates who said they were not influential, 69 percent were nonetheless active in PSIP. These data and correlations suggest that self-perceived local influence is related to local activity, although it is possible for affiliates to consider themselves less influential and still participate in the program.

National-Local Communication

I have pointed out, national staff promoted Title VII and they made a considerable effort to encourage local League participation in the program. This was, according to staff, the most salient aspect of the national effort
to implement PSIP. The League by no means mandated local activity, instead they distributed information and materials to all the affiliates and provided technical assistance and more specific advice to those who requested it. In general, the League affiliates reported a high degree of awareness of national communication strategies and of their efforts at providing technical assistance. Additionally, the local offices indicated that they were satisfied with the frequency and quality of communication. Specifically, 95 percent of the affiliates confirmed that the national office provided advice or technical assistance to them. Of these, 53 percent reported that the national office provided this assistance often, while an additional 40 percent said they received technical assistance at least sometimes. Urban League affiliates, in responding to the question, "How clearly was this advice and technical assistance communicated," indicated overwhelmingly that the national office provided this assistance very clearly.

Data from the mail questionnaire also confirmed much of what national staff told me in our interviews. Eighty percent of the affiliates indicated that they received newsletters; 77 percent reported that they had communicated with national staff at conferences; and 60 percent said they had some form of personal contact with national or regional staff. In making a summary assessment of the quality of communication of Title VII between the national office and the local offices, 88 percent of the affiliates rated the quality of communication as either very good or good. In addition, 90 percent of the League local affiliates claimed that they were either very satisfied or satisfied with the level of direction on Title VII provided by the national office.
In correlating this set of communication variables with the level of activity of League affiliates, a number of important relationships emerged. For example, the relationship between frequency of communication and activity is significant. Of the 39 affiliates reporting frequent communication from the national level, 34 or 87 percent were active in PSIP. A similar relationship emerged when I looked at the crosstabulation of level of activity in PSIP and the quality of communication provided by the national office (Table 3 reports these results).

**Table 3: Level of Activity by Perceived Quality of Communication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Communication</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=46</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=6</td>
<td>n=6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                    | 52   | 7    | 59   |

| Total                    | 80%  | 12%  | 100.00 |

*This table is not significant at the .05 level.*
This table clearly indicates that the perceived quality of communication is related to the level of activity. It is also interesting to note that while only a small number of affiliates assessed national communication strategies as poor, almost all were not participating in PSIP. One additional relationship relating to League communication strategies bears discussion. The data indicates there is a strong relationship between the level of activity of the affiliates and their satisfaction with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national office. Of the 55 affiliates who said they were satisfied with the level of direction, 89 percent were active in PSIP.

Aside from simply asking the affiliates to judge the quality and frequency of national communication and assistance efforts, I also asked them directly if they were aware of a National Urban League official position on the Title VII program. Since national staff did clearly indicate to me that they strongly endorsed PSIP, that they encouraged local participation, and they did communicate frequently with the affiliates, it seemed reasonable to assess whether or not the affiliates were aware of such a position and the extent to which that awareness might be related to local activity. The data show that more than half the affiliates knew the League had an official position on PSIP. Specifically, 58 percent of the affiliates said the League did have a position on Title VII; 5 percent said the League did not have a position; and, a fairly large group (37%) said they were not sure. All of the affiliates who claimed the NUL had a position on the program characterized it as strongly in favor of PSIP. Equally important, all said that this support had remained consistent since the program's enactment in 1978. Of the 35 respondents who did think the national office had a position on Title VII, 28
affiliates or 80 percent were active in PSIP at the local level. In the same vein, of the 35 respondents who indicated that the national office was strongly in favor of PSIP, 83 percent were active in the program. In summary, both these relationships seem to suggest that activity is somewhat correlated with perception of a national position strongly in favor of the program. Clearly, the relationship is far from perfect since some affiliates remained unaware of an official League position and were still active in PSIP. Nonetheless, the correlations do provide modest evidence and speculation suggesting that local implementation is related to national articulation and communication of a policy.

In addition to the question of whether or not there was communication from top to bottom, or from the national office to the local affiliates, I asked about the extent to which the affiliates gave their opinions on Title VII to national and regional staff. Here I was interested in learning about whether or not the affiliates were participating in some amount of Title VII decision-making and the extent to which national staff solicited their opinions. It might be claimed that the more aggressive national staff were in soliciting local opinions and concomitantly, the more active the affiliates were in providing their opinions, the more likely local offices would be in participating in Title VII. In other words, this sort of communication from bottom to top would lead affiliates to feel efficacious or more active and involved in the program and consequently, would lead to their participation in it.

According to the questionnaire results, 60 percent of the local affiliates reported that they were asked to give opinions on Title VII either often (12 percent) or occasionally (48 percent) and less than 36 percent of
the affiliates said they were seldom solicited by the national office. Along these same lines, a second question specifically asked the affiliates to make a judgment on the extent to which they participated in policy-making at the national level. A similar frequency distribution emerged with 60 percent of the affiliates reporting at least a moderate level of participation in national policy-making. Crosstabulating these variables, the extent to which affiliates were solicited by national staff and the degree of involvement in national policy-making, with the amount of activity at the local level in PSIP yielded interesting results. In both cases it was more likely that affiliates who reported a high or moderate level of involvement at the national level were active in PSIP at the local level. For example, of the 35 affiliates that reported they were often or at least occasionally asked for their opinions on PSIP, 89 percent were active in the program. On the other hand, 16 affiliates who were seldom contacted by national staff were nonetheless active in PSIP.

A final question to determine whether the local affiliates felt adequately represented by national leaders and staff yielded similar responses. In this case, local affiliates said overwhelmingly that local needs were well represented. The data showed that 95 percent of the affiliates were at least moderately represented with a majority indicating that local needs were well represented.

In addition to painting a picture of the national-local relationship with regard to both the degree of local involvement and the extent to which local needs were represented, I was also interested in the level of agreement between the national office and the local affiliates on goals for the League's participation in PSIP. Here I hypothesized that strong agreement on goals
for participation in PSIP would promote local activity, while a high amount of disagreement would inhibit local participation. League affiliates perceived substantial agreement between the national and local offices with 79 percent reporting very strong or strong agreement. An additional 16 percent claimed moderate goal agreement while an insignificant number (3) of affiliates reported only little agreement or dissension in the Urban League. The overall relationship between local League who reported strong goal agreement and who were active in PSIP was quite strong. However, it is difficult to infer much from this correlation since there was little variation in the distribution of affiliates perceiving any degree of goal disagreement.

Up to this point I have presented a series of relationships looking at correlations of League activity at the local level. I have, for example, been able to establish that a relationship exists between the frequency and quality of communications from the national and regional levels and the level of affiliate activity. Additionally, those affiliates that were aware of a specific League position on PSIP were able to identify that position as strongly in favor of PSIP, and were also more likely than other affiliates to participate in the program. While these relationships are important and begin to paint a picture of why League affiliates have implemented PSIP, they provide only a broad brushed canvas. Crosstabulation does not help to determine what independent variable or set of variables is most salient in explaining participation in local implementation. At this point it is not possible to discriminate between relationships and the strength of relationships.28
In an effort to explain affiliate activity at the local level and to get a sense of the relative strength of the independent variables I conducted regression analysis. A number of interesting findings emerged: First, in the regression equations it became clear that certain independent variables I expected to be related to each other were—and as a result, I was able to create a composite index of these variables; second, these indices explained much of the variance in local activity and; third, an additional few independent variables added to the proportion of variance explained. More specifically, I was able to create two indices. The first, EVAL, was the addition of three variables, all of which provided an evaluation of PSIP. Included in this index was: 1) agreement with the philosophy of Title VII, 2) an assessment of the job PSIP has done in serving the disadvantaged and, 3) agreement with the goals of Title VII. The second index, COMM, was a composite of several communication variables including: 1) how often the national office provided technical assistance, 2) how clearly that advice was communicated, 3) the frequency of national communication, 4) the adequacy of this communication, and 5) the affiliates satisfaction with the level and direction provided by the national office.

These indices, EVAL and COMM, explained a substantial amount of the variance in our equation, although it should be pointed out that the total variance or $r^2$ was fairly low and amounted to only .32. Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis.
Table 4: Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable

Level of Activity in PSIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>(B)</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence with Policy-Makers</td>
<td>(.560)</td>
<td>.448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall EVAL of PSIP</td>
<td>(.193)</td>
<td>.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in National Policy-Making</td>
<td>(.289)</td>
<td>.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Assessment of COMM</td>
<td>(.457)</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League Position Characterized</td>
<td>(.165)</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of Urban League Position</td>
<td>(.328)</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MULTIPLE R .567  R² .32

The regression analysis provides a more trenchant explanation of local affiliate activity. Among the more interesting findings is the relative importance of the influence of affiliates with local policy-makers and its explanation of local activity in PSIP. The earlier bivariate crosstabulation showed that affiliates who characterized themselves as influential were quite likely to be active in PSIP and the regression analysis suggests that self-perceived influence is significant in explaining local activity. This is a particularly interesting finding as it suggests that the perceptions of local actors and their perceived stature in the local political community is significant in explaining local activity. Moreover, it is all the more interesting and finding in the context of the Urban League and its affiliates and the Title VII business dominated program. It indicates and confirms that
the League had a long history of participation with employment and training programs and more specifically, with the business sector, and that these experiences were, according to national staff, both positive and fruitful. The regression finding underscores this positive business-NUL relationship and suggests that in the larger business and political context, League affiliates perceived themselves to be influential and this facilitated their participation in PSIP. In other words, despite the possible tension between business and community-based organizations in PSIP, the League demonstrated significant local influence and support and maintained its involvement in employment and training programs.

It is also clear that a positive evaluation of the program or more precisely, agreement with both the philosophy and goals of Title VII along with a favorable assessment of the way in which the program served the disadvantaged proved to be important in explaining affiliate involvement in PSIP. This finding is consistent with earlier crosstabulations showing that affiliates who agree with the goals and philosophy of the program were quite likely to implement it at the local level. This indicates that a positive evaluation of the program is important in explaining participation and confirms the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2.

The regression analysis also reports that frequency and clarity of both national communications and technical assistance is important in explaining local implementation. And also related are two additional communication variables, an awareness of a national position on PSIP and an assessment of that position as strongly in favor of the program. Quite clearly there are important and significant findings in that the national office emphasized strong support for PSIP and they encouraged local participation in the
program through an aggressive and apparently successful communication network. The data show that more than half of the affiliates knew the national office had a position or stand on PSIP and that it was one which strongly favored the goals of the program. This was communicated to them through newsletters, conferences, and personal contacts from national or regional staff and affiliates ranked these strategies as relatively frequent and clearly presented. Consequently, it might be concluded that the entire set of communication variables proved to be significant in explaining affiliate activity in PSIP. Moreover, it suggests that the national communication strategy highlighting support for PSIP and encouraging participation filtered down to the affiliates.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to present a picture of the National Urban League and its involvement in employment and training programs generally, and PSIP specifically. An historical look shows the NUL has been involved extensively in a variety of employment and training programs both at the national and local levels. This is perhaps not particularly surprising given the fact that the League is dedicated to serving an urban black population and, more generally, a disadvantaged clientele in need of federal and local training programs. However, the Private Sector Initiative Program represented a departure from traditional employment programs as it mandated significant input from the business community. Despite this and the possible political and ideological differences between business groups and black community organizations, the NUL continued, at the national level, to support PSIP and its redefined goals and strategies for training the
unemployed. At the local level the data show the vast majority of local affiliates participated in PSIP and by their own evaluation, agreed with the goals of the program.

In providing an explanation for why the League remained active in PSIP even though it represented a threat to its traditional powerbase and its potential to obtain employment and training dollars for its special clientele, a number of factors emerge as important. First, as League officials in Washington and New York told me, PSIP was perceived to be the wave of the future in employment programs. The political failure of earlier CETA programs, the popular slogan that 4 out of 5 jobs were in the private sector, and the rise in prominence of the National Alliance of Business in the employment and training subgovernment, presaged a new emphasis in federal programs. Second, League officials were not totally opposed to business participation and, in fact, some welcomed it. Some League officials told me they were disappointed with past federal program results and they believed that real and permanent employment opportunities were in the private sector. Therefore, business participation was necessary and desirable. Third, the League had a long history of productive employment and training experiences with the business community and as one League official put it, "we weren't afraid of business input." In summarizing these points the remarks of another New York staff member seem appropriate: "PSIP is here to stay and the NUL at the national and hopefully the local level will ride the PSIP wave. It might even be good for us."

Thus, the NUL supported the PSIP concept and it was quite active in the formulation of the original program. In subsequent years, the League encouraged local implementation of PSIP through a communication system made
up of newsletters, regional conferences and personal discussions with local affiliates. It also provided technical assistance to the affiliates from both the national and regional offices. However, the League in no way mandated local participation as local affiliates are independent of the national office. Although they pay dues to the national office and carry the League affiliation, nothing in any formal League document of local charter requires local affiliates to carry out specific nationally endorsed programs. And, as has been shown, it is unlikely the local offices be sanctioned for failing to carry out nationally supported programs. Yet, as national staff pointed out, there is considerable participation in national programs at the local level because much of the impetus for national priorities comes from the affiliates. In short, the League strategy is to base support for national programs on needs as expressed at the local level. This explains, according to national staff, why there is considerable congruence on goals and priorities at the national and local level. Our data support this point as League affiliates said they felt well-represented at the national level and that they did participate in national policy-making.

Aside from national implementation of PSIP the data showed that the local affiliates were active in the program. Most important in explaining the level of activity was the degree to which affiliates perceived themselves as influential in the local community. Also significant in explaining activity was the affiliate's evaluation of PSIP—that is whether they agreed with the goals and philosophy of the program and the extent to which they thought PSIP was successful in serving the disadvantaged. Finally, a series of related communication variables also helped to explain local implementation of PSIP.
in short, a composite picture of the NUL and its involvement in the formulation and implementation of PSIP suggests an integrated organization. While the organizational structure of the League is federated and the 118 affiliates are autonomous, there was considerable agreement on goals and priorities for League involvement in the Title VII program.
End Notes


3. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 2, Sections A through J.

4. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 2, Section B.

5. The information presented in this section comes from discussions with: Jacqueline Patterson, Director, Eastern Regional Office; Kin St. Bernard, Assistant Director for Economic Resources, Eastern Regional Office and; Clarence Thomas, Director, Southern Regional Office.


7. Interview with Jacqueline Patterson, Director, Eastern Regional Office. May 26, 1983.

8. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 3, Section D.

9. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 3, Section H.

10. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 3, Section J.

11. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 3, Section G.

12. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 3, Section K.

13. "Terms of Affiliation," Article 3, Section L.

14. This recommendation for close ties with the United Way dates back to the original affiliates who were required to maintain affiliation with local Community Chests. It should be noted that the Community Chest was an earlier variant of the United Way. The Community Chest began the concept of unified funding; it obtained funds from the business community and the community at-large and then disseminated these contributions to social service agencies like the Urban League.


16. Ibid., p. 452.

17. Ibid., p. 453.


22. For purposes of space I have not included all of the earlier employment programs in which the League participated. The League did make an effort to involve the business sector in its employment decisions. For example, as early as 1949, the NUL formed its Commerce and Industry Advisory Council which solicited the input of high-ranking officers of major corporations. This council became the nucleus of business support for the League. As part of the Pilot Placement program, corporate members agreed to hire blacks and to encourage other corporations to do likewise. For an expanded discussion of League involvement with the private sector see, Guichard Parris and Lester Brooks, *Blacks in the City: A History of the National Urban League* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), pp. 335-343.


25. As a member of the Mershon Center CETA Evaluation staff I conducted field work in two sites that were incorporated. In one in particular, the PIC was openly critical of the CETA prime sponsor. They were also quite critical of CBOs and the "old ways of doing business in CETA." Their decision to incorporate was based on political reasons and they chose to disassociate themselves from CETA.


27. Special Project Analysis of the Title VII, Private Sector Initiatives Program, Career Training and Economic Resources Department, Spring, 1981.

28. I have chosen throughout this section not to report measures of association such as tau b or gamma due to the fact that in almost all the tables the distributions are heavily skewed and the data is bunched in one cell. A more accurate and realistic assessment of the relationship is represented by the frequencies.
CHAPTER IV

THE AMERICAN FEDERATIONS OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO)
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in 1886 after a number of years of turbulence and discord in the American labor movement. Later, in 1935, internal division and conflict caused the Committee for Industrial Organization to disassociate itself from the AFL and form a rival federation of unions named the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). For twenty years labor remained largely disunified until the merger in 1955, of the new federation, the AFL-CIO.

While the primary goals of the AFL-CIO have been to improve the conditions of working people and to organize the unorganized, it has not pursued these ends exclusively. The organization has sought, in the words of its first president to make a "full contribution to the welfare of our neighbors, to the communities in which we live, and the nation as a whole." In pressing to make this contribution to society, the AFL-CIO emerged from the early days of a narrow pressure group into an area of broader interest in the general problems of the nation and the larger community. In fact, in 1956, the AFL-CIO executive council adopted a statement of principles emphasizing the mutual responsibilities of the union member and the community. Included in these principles were an affirmation of the importance of social service agencies and government's role in meeting the broad health and welfare needs of the people.

In short, organized labor from 1955 to the present has embraced issues that are national in scope. During this time the AFL-CIO has moved to establish itself in the words of George Meany as a "people's lobby." In this time it has lobbied for a variety of national legislation including, for
example, employment and training legislation, consumer legislation and a federal occupational health and safety law. The AFL-CIO was also involved in successful efforts to defeat the confirmation of two Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court.

Part I. The AFL-CIO: Structure, Organization and Function

The AFL-CIO is a federation or an association of unions. Individual workers are not technically members of the AFL-CIO, but members of individual unions, with the unions themselves being, in turn, the members of the AFL-CIO. Today, to this federation belong 130 international and national unions. Not affiliated with the AFL-CIO are the United Auto Workers and the Brotherhood of Teamsters, the two largest international unions. Yet with 14 million members, the AFL-CIO claims allegiance from over 70 percent of the American labor movement. The federation maintains Washington headquarters only a short walk from the White House and in the field, subordinate federations (city central bodies and state federations) have been created to represent the AFL-CIO in every state and major community.

Membership

The membership of the AFL-CIO consists of: the affiliated international unions; the directly affiliated unions; state and local central bodies; and trade departments. The central bodies and trade departments constitute two types of subfederation. Central bodies in the cities and states are composed of the locals of federation-affiliated national unions in...
the respective states and local areas. The trade departments include, for example, Railway Employees, Metal Trades and Building and Construction Trades and they bring together national unions affiliated with the federation by a common interest in the trades or industries as indicated by the name of the department. The departments in turn charter subordinate local councils and these local councils are made up of locals of the national unions affiliated with the national department.

The "directly affiliated unions" are locals not attached to a national union; thus, the federation functions in place of a national union. This is generally regarded as a transitional stage until the directly affiliated local union is brought into an established or newly formed national.5

The central body (also known as state or local labor councils) is concerned primarily with political and legislative functions in its territory. They also provide limited aid to local affiliates in collective bargaining instances. It is also possible that a well-established local labor council would be involved in resolving jurisdictional difficulties.

Finally, the trade and industrial departments have pursued three broad objectives: 1) protection of the department's jurisdictional interests through pressure group activities in government and within the federation; 2) coordination of activities of affiliated unions in organizing, collective bargaining, legislation and information; and, 3) for two departments - building trades and industrial union - adjudication of rivalry among affiliates.6
Formal Government

The supreme organ of the AFL-CIO federation is the biennial convention, composed primarily but not exclusively of delegates from the affiliated national unions with voting weight determined by the national unions' per capita payments to the federation. The convention provides a national spotlight for the federation and serves as a meeting ground for the labor movement's top leadership. It also serves as a plebiscitary body.

Effective authority in the AFL-CIO is exercised by an executive council composed of twenty-seven vice-presidents and the president and secretary-treasurer. An executive committee of the executive council functions as an agenda or steering committee. The president, secretary-treasurer, and executive council are elected by the convention at-large. On political, not constitutional grounds, council members are likely to be chosen to represent: 1) the very largest unions; 2) strategic industry groupings, such as the building trades; 3) the balance between former AFL and former CIO unions; and 4) most recently, black trade union interests.

The constitution provides for specified committees including, for example, Legislation, Civil Rights, Political Education, Community Services and Education. Additionally, the constitution calls for staff departments which include formal departments such as Civil Rights, International Affairs and Legislation. Appointment to the staff of the departments and the membership of the committees is the prerogative of the president. The committee is, in general, a policy advisory group, and the staff department is a headquarters administrative unit.
Representation: Political and Legislative

The AFL-CIO as a federation provides for union collaboration and solidarity on the part of its constituent units. Affiliation has historically been justified as conferring public legitimacy for union groups that have traditionally been outside the mainstream of accepted political organizations. The federation undertakes to exercise seven classes of function: 1) administering personnel and finances; 2) representing the labor movement's interests in public policy and the international labor movements; 3) organizing the unorganized; 4) policing the observance of "ethical practices" and civil rights standards by the affiliates; 5) resolving jurisdictional conflict among affiliates; 6) servicing affiliates in their research, education and industrial engineering needs; and, 7) communicating federation policy to the union membership and the public at-large.

One point that is continually made in the literature and often made by union spokespersons is that over the last few decades, the AFL-CIO has become more and more involved in broad legislative and political action. If one looks at the history of the AFL-CIO, it is quite clear that the outlook of the federation has changed in regard to its activity in the legislative arena. In the early history of the AFL, the main emphasis, legislatively and politically, was defense against specific obstacles and injustices, such as the labor injunction and the "yellow dog" contract. Even after 1933, the serious political efforts of the labor movement, except for a few national unions, were aimed at specific labor objectives such as repeal of the Taft-Hartley Law and "right-to-work laws."
The change in the AFL-CIO's legislative and political program has been profound. Issues of broad public policy now occupy a central place on its legislative agenda. To union spokespeople, today's issues are complex and interrelated and only the federal government is capable of dealing collectively and comprehensively with these problems. The labor movement has become a major force in support of welfare and social legislation in the federal and state legislatures. The AFL-CIO has a Legislative Department located in the Washington headquarters made up of a large group of technical specialists in economics, civil rights, labor law, education and international affairs. In addition, an integral part of the staff is made up of lobbyists who promote the federation's positions in congress and the executive agencies.

The AFL-CIO has been active in promoting legislation in a number of areas that reflect this broad commitment to social welfare and civil rights issues. The AFL-CIO's support for these issues reflects a liberal philosophy and commitment to reforms sometimes only indirectly related to the union worker. For example, in the 1960s, the federation played a key role in passing a bill against racial discrimination in employment, it strongly supported President Johnson's War on Poverty program, and it lobbied in favor of Medicare. In the 1970s, the AFL-CIO endorsed categorical federal programs in favor of revenue sharing, provided key support for increased education appropriations, worked to create a consumer protection agency, and lobbied extensively for a Legal Services Corporation designed to provide free legal assistance to the poor.10

One of the most interesting and vexing questions about the AFL-CIO's broad policy stance on these social welfare and civil rights issues is the extent to which this characteristically liberal national position accurately
reflects rank-and-file political attitudes. A number of scholars have raised the question of whether or not national labor leaders are truly representing the views of their members when they take, as the often do, liberal positions advocating increased government spending or involvement in a number of issue areas. Most notably, James Q. Wilson has raised this point arguing that leaders in the AFL-CIO, among other organizations, are more ideological and more likely to take stands on political issues than followers. More to the point, followers or the rank-and-file may be mostly indifferent, while leaders feel strongly about certain political issues. Wilson claims that this latitude given to leaders is more likely in bureaucratic organizations with expert, professional staff and hierarchically arranged offices with a clear division of labor. In citing evidence gathered by others, Wilson claims there are many organizations, especially those of the caucus form or with a federated structure, in which the staff consistently takes positions that are either more militant or more liberal than those preferred by the membership. One study has shown that as the AFL-CIO became more bureaucratic, they became more liberal and reformist. In 1931, the AFL had a single staff person; by 1972, there were sixteen departments of the national AFL-CIO, each headed by a staff professional who had many associates. This increase, it is speculated, caused the emergence of a "more politicized approach, involving an expansive and self-conscious progressivism" in the positions taken by the national AFL-CIO on civil rights and social welfare policy.11

Still other studies confirm Wilson's point about the AFL-CIO. Bok and Dunlop report that in a survey conducted in a large international union, the higher the position of white respondents in the union, the more likely they
were to give a liberal answer to a question asking whether racial
discrimination in schools, housing, and job opportunities was proceeding
fast enough: sixty-nine percent of the international staff, 35 percent of
the convention delegates, 25 percent of the local officers, and 21 percent of
the rank-and-file members said that desegregation was proceeding "too
slowly." And in still another study the authors found considerable
divergence of opinion between official union positions on a number of social
welfare issues and the attitudes and political preferences of union
members.

Whether or not the national federation accurately reflects the
preferences of the members and affiliates is of some interest in this
dissertation. Since this is an investigation of a nationally endorsed
social welfare program on which the union took a liberal, pro-government
stand, it is important that the phenomenon of union divergence be noted.
This study will investigate the possibility that the national office did not,
in their official support for PSIP, reflect the local position and that it is
plausible that local labor councils did not support the program to the same
degree as national labor staff.

Part II. The AFL-CIO's Involvement in Employment and Training Programs

One of the points I have tried to make in this last section is that the
AFL-CIO has supported a number of social welfare programs that may only
indirectly affect or benefit the union member. The general explanation for
these expansive positions has been straightforward: The AFL-CIO has chosen
not to confine itself to entirely narrow and selfish pursuits; instead it has
made a commitment to the larger community with the expectation that it can
serve as the people's lobby. As AFL-CIO staff in Washington told me, unions
have traditionally been viewed with skepticism and in some cases, disdain.
"If we are to survive and to flourish, we need to do more than push our own
self-interested goals." In essence, the message is clear: The AFL-CIO,
despite its political clout and its membership size, has traditionally viewed
itself as politically fragile and it has chosen to build support even from
non-members by moving beyond an entirely self-interested position to one that
is larger in scope. However, it would be naive to assume that the AFL-CIO is
entirely altruistic. As one moderately sarcastic central labor council
official quipped, "what's good for the community is good for organized labor."
And still another union official in St. Louis said, "most of my members and
even my counterparts throughout the country fail to see that programs like
CETA are good for us. The more people out there working, the healthier the
economy. A healthy economy means better opportunities for union members.
Full employment has always been endorsed by the AFL-CIO."

It is not particularly important in this research whether the AFL-CIO
has chosen a broad legislative agenda for altruistic reasons or more self-
interested reasons. Labor officials make compelling arguments on both sides
of the issue. What is central in this investigation is that the AFL-CIO has
chosen to pursue this legislative course. More specifically, the AFL-CIO at
both the national and local level has been involved in fashioning a program
dealing with widespread urban ills including unemployment and underemploy-
ment, education and training, housing and community services.
The federation has a Community Services Activities Department whose major purpose, according to its Director, "is to work for a community which is more representative of the people and which is more responsive to the people's needs." In 1958 the Community Service program articulated five priorities, one of which was to help the unemployed through training and social work. By 1960, 75,000 labor union representatives were serving on boards and committees of voluntary community welfare agencies. Many others had completed voluntary eight-week union counselling courses in a variety of subject areas including employment and training, and in a number of major cities across the country, more than 125 labor representatives served on the staffs of community health and welfare organizations, providing liaison between the agencies and labor.14

In the 1960s, as the urban crisis evolved, the union's earlier commitment to full employment was supplemented by a push to provide public employment to the jobless and to enroll minority youth in apprenticeship programs. Union leaders argued that without full employment virtually all other programs for urban ills would fail to achieve their objectives. Further, they claimed large numbers of unemployed are dangerous to the economy and when such unemployment is concentrated in minority, racially segregated communities the stability of society is threatened. In its push for full employment the AFL-CIO advocated an expanded public employment program. In a resolution adopted at its Constitutional Convention the AFL-CIO claimed:

Many of those who live in the inner city have few skills, are poorly educated or have other handicaps which keep them out of the job market. It is essential, therefore, that the federal government make possible job training programs, coupled with
essential educational and social services, to equip these disadvantaged workers with marketable skills. For those who cannot be absorbed into jobs by private industry, we urge the federal government to develop and finance a program of public service employment which would permit these workers to perform necessary and useful work. We urge that jobs in essential public services be made available to the unemployed and underemployed.  

In 1967 the AFL-CIO officially endorsed a National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress report which saw public employment as a stepping stone to other careers. The AFL-CIO Executive Council resolved that:

long-term unemployed and under-employed persons, including those who have given up seeking jobs should be given the opportunity to work in local, state, federal and non-profit public services that would not otherwise be done. Jobs of this type, with wages not less than the federal minimum wage, could provide services for which society has growing needs—such as parks, recreational facilities, day-care centers, schools, and libraries.

In addition, at this time the AFL-CIO spoke in bold terms about the need to integrate the unions. Labor emphatically rejected "colored capitalism," arguing that non-whites can not find a way out of their economic plight by turning to black or brown capitalism. In a 1969 statement of the Executive Council the AFL-CIO claimed that only a small number of people can move into the nation's economy through self-employment and small business. They argued further that a major emphasis on this type of policy would undermine or kill the jobs-skill-education-housing measures that were essential for the overwhelming majority of blacks and other minorities.

This focus on the common interest of racial minorities and organized labor is of recent development in the unions. In the 1900s, union membership was almost all white. While this reflected the composition of the labor
force in the skilled trades, in many unions, this was a result of discrimination as many union constitutions forbade non-white membership. Major changes in these practices began to take place around the period of the New Deal. It was at this point that unions moved into the manufacturing sector where non-white employment was significant. And, as the constituency of the labor movement changed, so did its conceptions. From within the movement came the pressure to end "white only" clauses and then to end "white only" practices.17

The movement toward the integration of blacks into the unions was speeded up by the organization of public employees, many of whom are drawn from minority groups. On the other hand, the greatest difficulty has been to get non-whites into the apprenticeship trades, common primarily in the building and construction industry. For a variety of reasons including the restricted number of openings and the existence of tests for apprenticeship which assume pre-apprenticeship schooling, minority groups have been slow to break into the ranks of the building and construction trades.

In the mid-1960s a major new program was initiated to move minorities into the apprentice trades. Operation Outreach, backed by the AFL-CIO, funded by the Department of Labor, and operated by a number of labor and civil rights organizations was able, by 1968 to report that close to ten percent of new entrants were non-white.18 The program, as its name implies, was an effort to recruit in minority communities and to establish direct contact with unions for admission and job-placement. By 1971, 28 cities had programs that were sponsored by building trade councils.19
Under the Manpower Training and Development Act (MDTA), a number of unions agreed to recruit, train and place the hard core unemployed. Under the MDTA On-the-Job-Training program (OJT), there were 13 national contracts with 7 national unions covering more than 15,000 training slots. The largest were those held by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, which provided for the training of close to 5,000 persons. In addition, many local unions had individual contracts with MDTA to provide OJT for the disadvantaged in their communities.\(^\text{20}\)

The AFL-CIO also participated in the Job Opportunities in the Business Sector program (JOBS). In response to a request from program sponsors, the National Alliance of Business and the Department of Labor, the AFL-CIO designated a staff member to serve in the national office of the National Alliance of Business. Shortly thereafter, the AFL-CIO appointed a labor representative in each of the 50 communities in which the program was operating. Under the JOBS program the AFL-CIO set up a "buddy system" to help keep workers on the job. The system first trained union workers and then assigned them to a newly-hired worker during his probationary period in the plant. The "buddy" assisted the new worker with his job-related as well as personal problems.

Organized labor also supported the Jobs Corps and its concept of residential training for hard core disadvantaged youth. The Operating Engineers, Carpenters, and Painters were the first unions to participate in the Jobs Corps program. Each developed joint union-industry training curricula for their apprentice slots. Not only were the unions responsible for training young clients, but they also agreed to place all trainees who completed the one-year cycle of training.
To coordinate union involvement in the many different kinds of employment and training programs, the AFL-CIO established the Human Resources Development Institute (HRDI) in 1968. Under a contract signed with the Department of Labor, HRDI was created to provide trained AFL-CIO manpower representatives in 50 metropolitan areas with significant hard core unemployment problems. In its first two years, staff worked with the JOBS program, the Model Cities program, and served as a local link to the state employment services.

In 1973 when CETA was first enacted, HRDI metropolitan field offices, which were already decentralized and operating in local areas, became involved in coordinating labor's manpower activities with local labor bodies and the local planning councils. HRDI, under CETA, began to offer to labor and community organizations help with programs on job creation for special target groups. In addition, it was during this time that HRDI staff began an education program for all labor organizations on the structure and use of CETA in order to make labor a more effective participant in the program. HRDI continued this education function through CETA and PSIP.

Under the CETA program, HRDI sponsored a national youth program called the Vocational Exploration Program. The program, operated jointly with the National Alliance of Business, was designed to provide high school students with a glimpse of the world of work. Program participants, who were paid the minimum wage for their efforts, were exposed to the requirements of work and careers through a variety of projects which included field trips and classroom sessions. Students were encouraged to seek union jobs and in a number of areas, labor-related organizations served as subcontractors for the program.
Local programs developed with HRDI assistance were produced through field offices around the country. In 1977 these programs totaled $12 million in federal funding and an overwhelming number of them were CETA programs. In addition, under CETA, HRDI encouraged local union members to be represented on the various local manpower-related planning and advisory councils and it endeavored to ensure that the legal requirements for labor participation were taken seriously by local officials. More specifically, CETA mandated labor representation on the CETA planning council and organized labor also had to be represented on the youth council which served an advisory role on CETA Title IV youth programs. In addition, CETA regulations mandated that labor review and comment on prime sponsors' annual CETA plans. Finally, CETA called for union consultation on program plans which meant that whenever a funded CETA program involved jobs similar to union jobs in the area, the appropriate union had to be consulted on program plans. And, in cases where the training or subsidized jobs were in occupations covered by collective bargaining agreements, CETA mandated union concurrence with the plan.

The AFL-CIO and the Private Sector Initiatives Program: The Actors

The AFL-CIO maintained its involvement, both nationally and locally, in employment and training programs under the CETA Amendments of 1978. The Human Resources Development Institute (HRDI) located in the Washington headquarters and in metropolitan areas throughout the country, was responsible for providing technical assistance and education programs to local labor councils to carry out the Private Sector Initiatives Program (PSIP). Simply stated, labor's role in the national implementation of PSIP was carried out by the HRDI. At the local level, the implementation of PSIP
and the activity of organized labor was provided by local central bodies or councils. These are the subordinate federations of the AFL-CIO whose primary role is to function politically at the local level. Responsibility for fashioning the AFL-CIO's national legislative position of PSIP rested with the Department of Legislation of the AFL-CIO in consultation with HRDI staff.

The Human Resources Development Institute

The employment and training arm of the AFL-CIO is the HRDI. The main thrust of HRDI's effort is directed at increasing the participation of labor unions at the community level in employment and training related programs. Specific objectives of the HRDI include the following: 1) to mobilize the labor movement to plan, develop, and operate manpower programs with emphasis on developing necessary support services to obtain and maintain good jobs at decent pay; 2) to develop programs that reach into the minority community and to prepare minority groups and disadvantaged youth to enter apprenticeship skill training and where possible, upgrading programs; and, 3) to bring about an awareness and understanding of the problems of the hard-core unemployed in order to provide meaningful job opportunities with career progression. 22

HRDI staff at both the national level in Washington and at the local level in the 60 area offices located in metropolitan areas served as a link between organized labor and the CETA prime sponsors and Private Industry Councils in the implementation of PSIP. In addition, HRDI had ten area representatives assigned special regional PSIP responsibilities in cities where HRDI did not maintain offices and there were seven regional offices located throughout the country. HRDI's annual budget throughout the PSIP
years ran approximately $9 million dollars, of which $1.7 million was provided annually by the DOL under CETA Title III discretionary funds. In fact, HRDI has served as a national contractor since its existence in 1968. Collectively, at the national, regional and local levels, HRDI staff totaled about 250 employees.

HRDI's role in the implementation of PSIP rested primarily on its technical assistance and related educational function. Within the HRDI national office in Washington, the Field Service Division had responsibility for direction of technical assistance efforts in support of PSIP. The Field Service Division was a staff of 5 professionals and 2 support personnel. These staff developed and disseminated technical assistance materials to the HRDI area staff who were based in the prime sponsor areas.

The Field Service Division developed a number of newsletters, brochures and slide presentations to be used by regional and local HRDI staff. The HRDI also sponsored conferences designed to train labor representatives to participate in PSIP. In the period of 1980 to 1981, the HRDI Field Service Division, in conjunction with the regional offices of the DOL, sponsored 7 conferences to acquaint the labor movement with PSIP. These conferences were 2 day workshops serving approximately 600 labor members.

In terms of disseminating information about PSIP, the Field Service Division sent out its correspondence to all the central labor bodies at both the state and local level. The national office published an "HRDI Advisory" which was a 3 or 4 page newsletter dealing with employment and training issues. The "Advisory" published vignettes on local labor participation in PSIP. In addition, the Executive Director of the Field Service Division and the President of HRDI co-authored a letter to all the central labor bodies
encouraging participation on the Private Industry Councils. The AFL-CIO newsweekly also carried several short articles about PSIP and labor involvement in the program and its "Legislative Alert" column detailed the AFL-CIO's support for the Title VII program.

HRDI also published a number of more specific, more technical material to distribute to the local labor councils. HRDI prepared a brochure entitled, "PSIP-The Role of Organized Labor." The brochure provided an overview of labor's potential role in PSIP and more specifically, discussed various aspects of the program. Additionally, HRDI disseminated two "White Papers," one summarizing PSIP regulations and another called "Assessing Local PICs," which was designed to guide labor representatives on their role on the PIC as well as to help them formulate goals for labor participation. Finally, HRDI prepared a PSIP Handbook designed for use by HRDI area staff engaged in PSIP activities. The Handbook contained information about the CETA system and specific, in-depth information on PSIP.

At the regional level, each of the 7 offices had one staff member who was designated a "PSIP specialist." This staff member was on hand to provide technical assistance to local labor representatives and to encourage labor participation on the Private Industry Councils (PICs). In areas where HRDI did not have an area office, the regional office stepped up its efforts to facilitate labor participation. And again, in local areas where HRDI was not represented, the regional office attempted to make sure that legal requirement for labor participation be met in the local prime sponsor areas.

For the most part, the HRDI local area offices, located generally in metropolitan areas, completed much of the technical assistance at the local level. HRDI staff, made up of former labor officials, conducted the day-to-
day technical assistance for PSIP. In the first place, HRDI's primary responsibility was to encourage officials from the local labor councils to serve on the PICs. Once this was accomplished, HRDI worked with that representative to help him provide meaningful participation on the PIC. In reality, technical assistance took two distinct forms: First, HRDI area staff provided help with the details of PSIP. Staff helped labor representatives understand their role on the PIC and trained them to be familiar with the content of PSIP and the PSIP regulations. Second, HRDI area staff usually were familiar with the metropolitan area in which they served, and thus, they could provide site specific technical assistance to the labor representative. For example, the HRDI area staff helped in preparing labor market projections in occupational areas and in assisting local labor unions in developing training, upgrading, or apprenticeship programs. In short, technical assistance was both procedural and substantive.

One of the most interesting technical assistance efforts conducted by HRDI involved HRDI staff at all three levels. In 1979, HRDI conducted an extensive review and assessment of local involvement in PSIP. The assessment was designed to provide HRDI with a clear sense of how much labor participation there was in PSIP and, in addition, was used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of labor's role in PSIP. Findings from the survey were used to improve and expand HRDI technical assistance efforts. Most importantly, HRDI shared these findings with the Employment and Training Administration in the DOL and subsequently, in early 1980 Regional Administrators of the DOL received a Field Memorandum emphasizing ways in which labor organizations should be involved with CETA programs. The
general scope of the memorandum requested that regional offices provide
guidance to prime sponsors to increase the involvement of organized labor.
In doing this, regional office staff were asked to work closely with HRDI area
offices.23

HRDI offices at all levels were well prepared to provide assistance to
local labor organizations. Their flow of communication was hierarchical:
The national office prepared the technical assistance materials and set PSIP
policy by encouraging local participation; the regional offices provided
site specific technical assistance to local labor bodies and they encouraged
PSIP participation especially in areas without HRDI area representation; and
HRDI area offices provided technical assistance in the metropolitan areas in
which they served. Interaction rarely occurred between the central labor
bodies and the HRDI national office. Instead, labor at the local level
communicated with regional or area HRDI staff. There was considerable
variation in the frequency of communication between the regional offices and
the labor councils. Regional staff said that they tried to encourage labor
participation in PSIP, that they served to guide local labor organizations on
ways to participate on PICs, and that they circulated whatever printed or
visual materials that national HRDI provided. In some cases, the central
labor bodies were responsive to these efforts and in other cases, labor at the
local level was not interested in PSIP. It was clear that while HRDI was
making an effort to educate, assist and improve its marketing of PSIP to the
local central bodies, it was disappointed at the results of its campaign.
The Central Labor Bodies

The second group of labor actors involved in PSIP were the local central labor bodies or councils. Labor representation on the PICs came, for the most part, from the local labor central bodies since, in the case of PSIP, the prime sponsor was required to consult with local central bodies, major local unions and HRDI for PIC representation. Because the central bodies are made up of many local unions, often a designate of this body was chosen to represent organized labor on the PIC.

The labor councils are subordinate federations or branches of the AFL-CIO. The council functions in an almost parallel fashion as the AFL-CIO. The city central bodies are concerned primarily with municipal legislation, political action and community relations. Like the main federation, these councils are organizations of unions, not individuals. Local unions whose parent national unions are affiliated with the AFL-CIO are eligible for membership in their respective local central bodies (as are directly affiliated locals), but membership is neither automatic nor compulsory. Currently, each union must pay 15 cents per capita, per month to the local central labor council.

Local central bodies are of all kinds: some cover city jurisdictions, some cover metropolitan areas, and some cover several counties. There is some variation in the way these councils conduct their affairs. Some local bodies have delegate meetings more than once a month, some have them monthly. However, each central body elects a president to what is generally a three year term and this elected member represents the labor council in community affairs, issues and disputes involving labor. This, usually, was the official who served on the PIC. Each of the separate bodies draws up its own
By-Laws.

There are over 700 local central bodies. Of the 700, only between 125 to 150 have a full-time officer or office (with a part-time or full-time secretary and office services). These are the larger city central bodies located in metropolitan areas. Local central bodies have an affiliate membership of about 50 percent of the available AFL-CIO membership across the country.

One particularly significant point about the central labor bodies is made by Bok and Dunlop. In discussing the question of political influence they assert that perhaps the most serious weakness in the AFL-CIO is the lack of influence the national office has over the subordinate federations. While the local (and state) federations bear the brunt of lobbying and political affairs, they are probably least able to perform these functions effectively. Bok and Dunlop contend that because the central labor bodies are financed by contributions from affiliated unions, they are influenced by the locals—not by the national office in Washington. Moreover, as I have pointed out, affiliation with the local council is not compulsory and only about half the unions join. These councils continually face the threat of losing member locals and thus, will be influenced by those organizations that currently pay dues.24

The most recent rules governing the AFL-CIO local central bodies were written and approved by the Executive Council in 1973. Included in these rules are provisions governing annual dues, membership, By-Laws and discipline of local central bodies and their officers. Local central bodies are not disciplined for failure to participate in local employment and training programs. These bodies are autonomous and are more likely to take
their cues from local constituents rather than the national federation. As one HRDI national staff member said, "the unwillingness of local councils to be involved in nationally endorsed, local programs would never warrant suspension or expulsion - it would not even warrant a slap on the wrist. The AFL-CIO is a loose federation, you cannot force the labor councils or any affiliate to get involved in PSIP."

Department of Legislation

The Department of Legislation is located in the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington. It is made up of over thirty professional staff members, some of whom testify and lobby members of congress, and congressional committees, and work with staff in the executive agencies. Other department staff have a substantive knowledge and expertise in a particular legislative area. In any given year, the Department of Legislation provides testimony on 50 to 60 pending bills. During the formulation of the 1978 CETA Amendments and the creation of Title VII, the Legislative Department provided testimony to House and Senate committees, talked individually with members of congress and worked with the Employment and Training Administration in the DOL.

The AFL-CIO's Involvement in the Formulation of PSIP

The AFL-CIO's position on PSIP was supportive. It was not, however, particularly enthusiastic about the program and while it acknowledged PSIP as a positive step in employment and training programs, it by no means presented effusive testimony on its behalf. Its support both publicly and in testimony was muted.
In testimony, the AFL-CIO suggested the PSIP first be conducted on an experimental, pilot project basis in 25 metropolitan areas. This position was derived from the fact that funding for PSIP was fairly low especially in the context of the entire CETA budget. Generally speaking, Legislative Department staff tended to see PSIP as a demonstration program amounting to only 5 percent of the entire CETA budget. They supported the concept and agreed that private sector training had its merits, but they also said privately that they did not take PSIP too seriously. As one member of the Legislative staff said, "we did not see this program as we should have, a step in a beginning - a push for more private sector involvement. In a sense, we blew it. We missed its significance."

The point that was made by this staff member is significant. For the most part, the AFL-CIO was, in a real sense, out of step with the prevailing political and legislative climate in 1978. Labor was still playing the "full employment, public service jobs program" tune. Essentially, what this meant is that a good portion of labor's involvement in the CETA reauthorization process was directed at promoting its policy for full employment. Simply stated, the AFL-CIO has consistently emphasized a full employment policy as prerequisite to a health economy and further, has looked to the federal government to provide full employment through public service efforts and subsidized employment. While the AFL-CIO supported private sector training, it did not make a major effort to become involved in the concept. Very little time and effort was put into developing a full statement or position on PSIP. The AFL-CIO generated few written materials on PSIP and they spent a minimal amount of time fashioning a policy with regard to private sector
training. And, while there were reams of paper dealing with full employment programs, there was, by contrast, very little from 1978 to 1982 about the private sector program.

During the formulation of PSIP, the AFL-CIO, much like the Urban League and other non-business groups, expressed concern that it would be excluded from private sector decision-making. The AFL-CIO pushed for labor representation on the PICs arguing that councils dominated entirely by business would fail to protect unions as well as the newly trained workers. Labor representatives argued that they should be members of PICs just as they were members of other CETA Advisory councils and that their participation was critical to successful training programs.

More critically, labor claimed that a program dominated by business would damage the labor movement at the local level. Of concern to the AFL-CIO were two related issues. In the first place, during the formulation of PSIP and later in 1980 when it was reauthorized and new regulations were written, a number of business groups called for a sub-minimum wage bill designed ostensibly to create more jobs at lower wages. As it was originally proposed, the bill was directed at minimum wage service jobs in fast food industries and aimed at minority, summer employment. The AFL-CIO flatly rejected the idea calling it a threat to unions and to all workers throughout the United States. The labor organization claimed that the theory and logic behind the proposal was pure "bunk" and the mere mention of the idea to a union member created anger and fear. Second, staff in the Legislative Department claimed that early in the formulation of PSIP, and then again in 1980, in a stepped up effort, the United States Chamber of Commerce mounted a campaign with other members of the business community to eliminate from the CETA
regulations labor consultation and concurrence provisions. Needless to say, consultation and concurrence were both near and dear to the hearts of labor unions throughout the country. These two issues, the sub-minimum wage proposal and the flap over the concurrence regulations, caused the AFL-CIO to push for representation on the PIC. In fact, it is interesting and somewhat ironic to note that later in 1980 and even in 1981 when new proposals were being discussed and CETA and PSIP were in the process of dying, AFL-CIO Legislative staff were pushing for more than one labor representative on the PIC.

Aside from urging representation on the PIC, the AFL-CIO also shared an additional concern with the National Urban League. The AFL-CIO argued that the PIC should not be allowed to incorporate and become a separate entity. The unions, much like the League and other community organizations viewed incorporation as dangerous to their interests believing that once PICs were separate non-government entities, they would exclude them from significant decision-making. The AFL-CIO claimed that PICs must be closely linked with the prime sponsors to assure labor’s involvement as well as protection of its interests. The AFL-CIO argued that funding for Title VII should come through the CETA system and program decisions should be made jointly by PICs and prime sponsors.

According to Legislative Department and HRDI staff, labor “got more with it” as PSIP developed and grew. Labor sat back early in the formulation of PSIP and pushed only for the minimum it needed to protect its most obvious and vital interests. Then, as PICs began to make more significant employment and training decisions, the labor movement became more interested. As indicated earlier, HRDI stepped up its efforts in early 1980 and even enlisted the power
of the Employment and Training Administration of the DOL to encourage union participation. At about the middle point of PSIP, in mid-1980, it appeared as though HRDI became more influential in PSIP decision-making at the national level. The Title VII regulations written in May of that year expanded labor's mandated role in planning and the AFL-CIO became more involved in PSIP. Specifically, the May 1980 CETA regulations extended labor consultation to include labor participation in planning activities and services provided by the prime sponsor. And, in instances where training or subsidized employment was proposed for an employer with a collective bargaining agreement, the union had to be given 30 days to respond and give written concurrence. This concurrence applied to wages, benefits and working conditions. Essentially, this regulation strengthened union inclusion in program planning and provided an opportunity to respond to proposals for training in unionized companies.

In summary, the AFL-CIO was fairly low-keyed in the original formulation of PSIP in 1978. While it supported the concept of private sector participation in employment and training, it was by no means enthusiastic about the program and at one point had suggested that PSIP be limited to a selected number of cities on a demonstration basis. National staff admitted that PSIP was not taken too seriously. The AFL-CIO still seemed interested in employment issues not quite related to the newer concept of private sector training and it was not until 1980 that the AFL-CIO became more involved in national policy-making in PSIP.
The AFL-CIO's Involvement in the Implementation of PSIP

The Human Resources Development Institute

The HRDI at national, regional and local levels was involved in the implementation of PSIP. In general, HRDI involvement was limited to encouraging local labor bodies to participate in PSIP and assisting those who chose to do so. The HRDI was staffed by men and women whose responsibility it was to provide technical assistance to local labor participants. These staff were funded in part by CETA Title III national discretionary funds and it was their primary purpose to encourage and assist local labor representatives to carry out PSIP. The HRDI maintained a hierarchical technical assistance and communication system with the national office having responsibility for setting an overall labor policy, developing materials for distribution, and organizing conferences; regional office staff were concerned with distributing these materials and meeting with local labor representatives to try and persuade them to participate in PSIP; and at the local level, HRDI area staff worked most closely with labor council representatives to develop labor participation on the PIC and to offer site specific recommendations for training programs.

In assessing the HRDI's technical assistance efforts and communication strategies two points must be made: First, the real impetus for the implementation of PSIP did not occur immediately after the program was enacted. In fact, a concerted push for labor participation in PSIP did not actually occur until the results of 1979 HRDI sponsored survey were analyzed by staff. Shortly after that time, the HRDI sponsored a series of regional conferences in conjunction with the DOL to familiarize labor with PSIP and to
breathe some life into labor participation on PICs. Broadly speaking, the survey data showed limited labor participation on PICs and the assessment of HRDI was that efforts needed to be greatly expanded and improved. In short, the bulk of HRDI's implementation effort was late in coming to the local labor councils and their representatives. The second point that bears mentioning is one that was made consistently by HRDI staff at all levels: There was considerable variation in the reception and responsiveness HRDI received from local labor representatives. HRDI staff especially, at the national and regional levels, were moderately disappointed in how their efforts to encourage PIC participation among labor organizations were received.

**Local Labor Councils**

Before moving to a discussion of the local central labor councils' awareness and perceptions of the HRDI effort at implementing PSIP through its technical assistance program, it is necessary first to get some idea of how active the labor councils were at implementing PSIP at the local level. Beyond this, I assessed the extent to which local labor councils agreed with the goals and philosophy of Title VII and the extent to which they felt they had the resources to implement PSIP. Data from the mail questionnaire showed that of the 36 responding central labor councils, 28 (78%) indicated that they were either very active or active in PSIP. Only a small number of labor councils (11%) were involved in running Title VII programs which included apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs; 86 percent were members of the local PICs and; 14 percent provided screening and referral services for Title VII programs offered by other subcontractors. Twenty-two percent of the responding councils said they were not active in PSIP.
Before moving to a more detailed discussion of labor council participation in PSIP one critical point needs to be made: While the data from the mail questionnaire reports that 78 percent of the councils were active in PSIP, I would argue that this figure is not entirely accurate. My judgment is that this 78 percent figure is inflated and that it is more likely that considerably fewer labor councils were active in PSIP. This judgment is based on three factors: First, the return rate from the mail questionnaire was low: 31 percent of the labor councils responded (see footnote 27). This makes it difficult to generalize about the councils and it also raises the possibility that most of those councils that responded were more likely to be active in PSIP than those who chose not to respond. Second, in interviews with HRDI staff, estimates of labor council participation in PSIP ranged from 55 to 65 percent. As I have indicated in this chapter, HRDI staff repeatedly maintained that they were disappointed with labor council participation in the program. It would be unlikely that HRDI staff would have complained if over 75 percent of the councils were active in PSIP. Finally, I am skeptical of this 78 percent figure because it is inconsistent with observations made by the Mershon Center CETA Project staff. The Mershon data consistently found the local AFL-CIO offices to be relatively inactive in PSIP.28

Despite the fact that the data on labor council activity in PSIP was most likely inflated, I continued to conduct further analysis of the implementation of PSIP. The mail questionnaire reported that eighty percent of the responding labor councils agreed with the philosophy of PSIP while 92 percent (33 of 36) of the councils agreed with the goals of Title VII. As Table 5 shows, 79 percent of the labor councils agreed with the goals of PSIP and participated in implementing the program at the local level. However, given
the wide amount of agreement with PSIP's goals, it cannot be argued that there is a positive association between level of activity and agreement with PSIP's goals.

**TABLE 5: LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BY AGREEMENT WITH PSIP GOALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement with PSIP Goals</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=26</td>
<td>n=2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=7</td>
<td>n=1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In addition to asking the local labor councils if they agreed with the philosophy and goals of PSIP, I was also interested in whether or not they were equipped organizationally to participate in PSIP. The local labor councils were equally distributed in responding to whether they had adequate staff to carry out their Title VII responsibilities. Twenty-seven percent of the councils reported adequate staffing; 35 percent said they were a few members short; and a larger proportion or 38 percent of the labor councils said they were seriously understaffed. The data indicated, however, that staff shortages had little serious impact on the local implementation of PSIP. Thus, there was no significant decline in local activity with greater staff shortages. (Table 6 presents these results).
**TABLE 6: LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BY ADEQUACY OF STAFF SIZE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequacy of Staff Size</th>
<th>Few Staff</th>
<th>Seriously</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Understaffed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=6</td>
<td>n=10</td>
<td>n=10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Active**

| | |
|---|---|---|---|
| n=6 | n=10 | n=10 | 26 |
| 67% | 83% | 77% | 76% |

**Level of Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=3</td>
<td>n=2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Not Active**

| | |
|---|---|---|---|
| n=3 | n=2 | n=3 | 8 |
| 33% | 12% | 23% | 24% |

**TOTAL**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=9</td>
<td>n=12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 28% | 35% | 36% | 100% |

*This table is not significant at the .05 level.*
In addition to staff as an important internal organizational resource, I was also interested in how the local labor council perceived its influence at the local level and what effect this might have on its level of local involvement in the program. I asked local labor council officials to "characterize their influence with important PSIP policy-makers (elected and non-elected) at the local level." Sixty-nine percent of the local central labor councils perceived that they were influential at the local level (25 of 36 councils), while 31 percent (11 of 36) did not see themselves as influential in the external environment. Bivariate analysis shows that of 25 labor councils that perceived they were externally influential, 20 or 80 percent were active in PSIP. Yet, of the 11 councils that indicated they thought they lacked local influence, 8 or 73 percent were active in PSIP. These data suggest that self-perceived influence does relate to PSIP activity, but that the relationship is not uniform. More to the point, the evidence indicates that it is possible for local labor councils to see themselves as not particularly influential, but still participate in the program.

Perceptions of National Communication Strategies

As I have indicated earlier national HRDI staff, along with their counterparts in the regional and area offices in the 60 metropolitan areas throughout the country, were intended to be key participants in the implementation of PSIP. Their jobs were to promote PSIP and to encourage and assist local labor representatives to participate in program decision-making. The AFL-CIO by no means mandated local PSIP activity, it endorsed it and did so by distributing information and materials to the central labor
councils. In general, the local labor councils reported a high degree of awareness of national technical assistance efforts. Eighty-six percent of the councils reported that the HRDI provided advice or technical assistance on Title VII; however, the councils indicated that this advice was not provided frequently. Fifty percent of the local labor councils claimed that staff communicated infrequently with them. In addition, the local councils reported that the advice and technical assistance provided to them was not communicated clearly. Here, only 39 percent of the respondents claimed that advice and technical assistance was communicated very clearly, while 61 percent reported it was communicated somewhat clearly.

Data from the mail questionnaire confirmed what HRDI staff told me in our interviews. It especially highlighted the one particular point made by them regarding the variation in receptivity of labor councils to HRDI communication efforts. Specifically, almost all the local labor councils (87%) reported that they had received newsletters containing information about PSIP; but only slightly above half or 55 percent reported that they had communicated with staff through conferences; and 48 percent said they had some form of personal contact with HRDI staff. Thus, while most of the local labor representatives received printed materials, fewer seemed to make the effort to attend conferences or to contact their relevant HRDI staff member.

In making a summary assessment of the quality of communication of Title VII between HRDI and the local labor organizations, a majority of labor councils indicated that the quality of communication was good. On this question, 72 percent of the respondents said that the quality of HRDI communication was good, while 22 percent were less positive and indicated
that communication was poor. In addition, in an overall or general sense, 69 percent of the local councils reported that they were satisfied with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national AFL-CIO office.

When these communication variables were crosstabulated with the level of activity in PSIP some contradictory findings emerged. For example, of the 26 local labor councils that reported HRDI communication was either good or very good, 85 percent were active in the program. However, as Table 7 shows, of the 10 councils that reported communication was poor, 60 percent were active in PSIP. While the cluster of respondents in the first cell suggests a relationship between the quality of communication as it is perceived by local councils and the level of activity, it is nonetheless significant that more than half of those who claimed poor communication were active in PSIP.
### TABLE 7: LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BY PERCEIVED QUALITY OF COMMUNICATION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Communication</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Level of Activity | n=4 | n=4 | 8 |

**TOTAL**

|             | 26  | 10  | 36 |

|             | 72% | 28% | 100% |

*This table is not significant at the .05 level.*
Much the same relationship emerges when we look at the crosstabulation of level of activity by frequency of communication. Of the 18 councils that said the AFL-CIO provided frequent communication, the vast majority or 83 percent were active in PSIP. On the other hand, of the additional 18 councils that reported infrequent communication, a majority or 72 percent of these councils were active in the program. To further corroborate the findings that the overall frequency or perceived quality of AFL-CIO communication is not uniformly related to levels of participation in PSIP, I looked at the relationship between level of activity and the degree to which councils were satisfied with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national office. And again, a similar relationship is found (see Table 8 for results). Of the 25 labor councils that indicated they were satisfied with the level of direction, 84 percent were active in PSIP and only 16 percent were not active. Yet, of the 11 labor councils that expressed dissatisfaction with the AFL-CIO's level of direction, 64 percent were still active in PSIP.
## TABLE 8: LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BY LEVEL OF DIRECTION*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Direction in PSIP by AFL-CIO</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Not Satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=21</td>
<td>n=7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=4</td>
<td>n=4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In summary, these crosstabulations relating to the set of communication variables suggest some important findings. In general, the more positive the local labor councils were about the quality, frequency and level of direction provided by the AFL-CIO, the more likely they were to be active in PSIP. In all three of the relationships presented, the majority of local labor councils have reported good communication from the AFL-CIO HRDI staff and have been active in PSIP. Yet, it is significant that in all three relationships a number of labor councils have expressed dissatisfaction with the communication strategies of the AFL-CIO, but were still active in PSIP. This suggests that for some of the labor councils, the overall quality of communication or the direction provided them by the AFL-CIO did not figure into their decision to participate in PSIP.

In addition to asking the local labor councils to judge the quality and frequency of national communication and assistance efforts they were also asked if they were aware of a national AFL-CIO official position on the Title VII program. National AFL-CIO and HRDI staff did support and endorse PSIP, they did encourage participation of local labor organizations, and they did provide technical assistance and informational materials to the local labor councils, albeit as we have pointed out, these efforts were not consistent and were stepped up only in 1980. The data showed a high percentage of local labor councils acknowledging that the national AFL-CIO had an official position of PSIP. Eighty-six percent of the labor councils (31 of 36) said that the national office did have a position on PSIP; 3 percent said they did not; and 11 percent were not sure of an official position. Eighty-eight percent of those local councils that reported to the national had a position of PSIP characterized it in favor of PSIP, while 12 percent said the position
was neutral—not in favor of it, but not opposed to it either. And, all the respondents who had indicated the existence of a national position said this position had remained consistent throughout the program. Thus, it does not appear as though local labor representatives were aware of any increased support or aggressiveness on the part of the AFL-CIO during the later stages of PSIP.

Of the 31 respondents that indicated the national office had a position on Title VII, 25 or 81 percent were active in PSIP. Similarly, of the 28 who identified that official position as being in favor of PSIP, 23 or 82 percent were active in PSIP. While these crosstabulations do not offer overwhelming evidence or strong relationships, they do seem to indicate that those councils that perceived the existence of a national policy in favor of the program were more likely to be active at the local level. It is also possible to speculate, based on these relationships that local implementation is somewhat related to the perception of a nationally articulated policy in favor of the program.

Aside from discerning whether or not there was communication from top to bottom, or from the national office to the local labor representatives, I was also interested in the extent to which the local labor councils were asked to give their opinions on Title VII to national, regional or HRDI area staff. Here, I was interested in learning about whether or not the local councils were involved in Title VII decision-making and the extent to which HRDI staff solicited their opinions. My hypothesis guiding this question was that the more aggressive staff were in soliciting local opinions, the more likely local offices would be active in PSIP. In other words, this type of
communication, from the local councils to the AFL-CIO staff would lead the local labor councils to feel efficacious or more involved in the program and consequently, would lead to their participation in it.

According to the questionnaire results, the local labor councils were not solicited often by the AFL-CIO staff on their opinions of PSIP. Thirty percent of the councils reported that they had been asked occasionally to give their opinions on Title VII; 53 percent claimed they were seldom solicited and; 17 percent said they never were asked by national staff to give their opinions on Title VII. An additional question specifically asked the labor councils to provide a judgment on the extent to which they participated in policy-making at the national level. A similar frequency distribution emerged with the majority of councils reporting that they did not participate in policy-making at the national level. According to the data, 17 percent indicated a moderate level of participation; 42 percent of the councils said there was not a very high level of participation of councils in national policy-making; and another large group (36%) reported there was no participation on the part of labor councils in policy-making at the national level. Crosstabulating these variables, the extent to which councils were solicited by national staff to give their opinions on PSIP and the degree of involvement in national policy-making, with the amount of activity at the local level in Title VII suggests the following conclusion: The lack of participation of local labor councils in national decision-making had no bearing on their participation in PSIP. Additionally, the minimal or limited opportunities the councils had to voice their opinions of PSIP had little relationship to their level of activity in PSIP.
An additional question was put to the local central labor councils: "Do you feel that national leaders and staff adequately represent the interests of the local labor councils?" The councils reported that they were adequately represented by national staff. Thirty-six percent said they were well represented; 53 percent reported they were moderately represented; and only about 10 percent felt poorly represented by national leaders. Thus, while the labor councils indicated little involvement in direct policy-making at the national level, they seemed generally pleased with the job their national leaders and staff were doing for them.

A final question had to do with the level of agreement between the national office and the local labor councils on goals for the AFL-CIO's participation in PSIP. Here I hypothesized that strong agreement on goals for participation in PSIP would promote local activity, while a higher amount of disagreement would inhibit local participation. The local labor councils perceived a good deal of agreement between the national and local offices. Forty-four percent reported strong agreement between the two offices; 42 percent said there was moderate agreement; and only 6 percent claimed there was not very strong agreement between levels. The relationship between local labor councils who reported strong agreement and who were active in PSIP was quite strong. Of the 16 councils reporting strong agreement, 15 or 94 percent were active in PSIP. Those labor councils who perceived moderate agreement were less likely to be active in PSIP. (Table 9 shows these results). Unfortunately there were only 2 councils that reported not very strong agreement between the national and local offices and this is too small a number from which to generalize. Nonetheless, it is important to note that
within the two categories, strong agreement and moderate agreement, there is more variation in the level of activity for those councils that report moderate agreement than those that report strong agreement.
TABLE 9: LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BY AGREEMENT ON GOALS FOR PARTICIPATION IN PSIP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Agreement on Goals</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Not Very Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=15</td>
<td>n=10</td>
<td>n=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=1</td>
<td>n=6</td>
<td>n=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL                        | 16     | 16       | 2               |
|                             | 47%    | 47%      | 6%              |

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
Up to this point I have presented a number of relationships and crosstabulations describing labor council activity at the local level. It has been shown that a majority of the councils agreed with the philosophy of PSIP, that local councils were aware of the AFL-CIO's technical assistance efforts, and that they were generally satisfied with the quality of communication provided by the HRDI. Equally important is that a large number of local labor councils were aware of an official national position of PSIP and that this awareness was related to the amount of activity at the local level. As in the case in the previous chapter on the National Urban League, these relationships are important in painting a picture of why local offices have implemented PSIP, but they provide only a broad canvas. In short, they do not give us a sense of what independent variable or set of variables is most salient in explaining participation in local implementation. Specifically, I am unable to claim that, for example, to explain local participation in PSIP it is more significant to know the extent to which local councils agreed with the philosophy of PSIP than to know whether they were aware of a national position on PSIP.

In an effort to explain local labor council participation in PSIP and to get a sense of the relative strength of the independent variables I conducted regression analysis. A number of interesting findings emerged: First, as was the case with the National Urban League affiliates, a number of independent variables I anticipated would be related to each other were, and as a result, I was able to create a composite index of these variables; second, these indices explained a considerable amount of the variance in local activity; and third, several other independent variables added to the proportion of variance explained. Specifically, two indices were created:
The first, EVAL, was the addition of three variables, all of which provided an evaluation of PSIP. Included in this index was 1) agreement with the philosophy of Title VII, 2) an assessment of the job PSIP has done in serving the disadvantaged and, 3) agreement with the goals of Title VII. The second index, COMM, was a composite index similar to the one we created for the National Urban League, but marginally different because there was a good deal of variation in how the local labor councils assessed each of the communication variables. In some instances the local labor councils were overwhelmingly positive about an aspect of national-local communication and in others they provided more negative responses. In this case it made little sense to combine contradictory findings which would have masked the very variations I was attempting to explain. The COMM index included: 1) how often the national office provided technical assistance, 2) the adequacy of AFL-CIO communication and technical assistance, and 3) the local labor councils' satisfaction with the level of direction provided by the national office.

The regression analysis provided a more decisive explanation of local labor council activity in PSIP (see Table 10 for results). A large proportion of the variance (.26) is explained by the first variable which is an overall assessment of AFL-CIO communication strategies. It is also clear that the councils' awareness of an official national position was important in explaining levels of local activity. As reported earlier in the presentation of our bivariate relationships, the local councils indicated that they were, for the most part, satisfied with the quality of communication from the national office to the local councils. And, although a number of councils said that this communication and technical assistance was not
provided frequently, (this variable was not significant in the regression equation) in making an overall assessment, the local councils indicated that communications were good. In addition, a large majority of the local labor councils were aware of a national AFL-CIO position in favor of PSIP. The HRDI was given the responsibility to inform, educate and assist the local labor councils on PSIP matters. The HRDI offices did encourage participation in PSIP and it does appear as though they were able to communicate to the local councils that the AFL-CIO supported the PSIP concept. It is also important to note that although HRDI communication and technical assistance efforts and their support for PSIP was somewhat delayed, their later efforts, which were by their own admission more aggressive than earlier ones, seemed to be adequate in passing along the PSIP message to the local labor councils.

**TABLE 10: MULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN PSIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>(B)</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Assessment of COMM</td>
<td>(.187)</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of AFL-CIO Position</td>
<td>(.263)</td>
<td>.620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall EVAL of PSIP</td>
<td>(.356)</td>
<td>.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Between Local-National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels on Goals for Participation in PSIP</td>
<td>(.186)</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MULTIPLE R .727 r² .52
It is also clear that a positive evaluation of the program or more specifically, agreement with both the philosophy and goals of Title VII along with a positive assessment of the way in which the program served the disadvantaged proved to be important in explaining local labor activity in PSIP. This finding suggests that local implementor's evaluation and assessment of a program will have an effect on their willingness to participate in it.

The regression analysis also shows that the amount of agreement between the local labor councils and the national AFL-CIO on goals for participation in PSIP is significant in explaining the level of activity chosen by the local labor councils. As the frequency distributions and crosstabulations indicate, there was considerable agreement between the two levels as perceived by the labor councils, but where the labor councils indicated only moderate agreement on goals for participation in PSIP, there was a decline in the level of activity at the local level.

In summary, the regression analysis provides us with a more detailed and clear picture of local labor participation in PSIP. As was the case with the National Urban League affiliates, the level of participation in implementing PSIP at the local level was explained by three variables: assessment of national-local communication strategies; awareness of a national position on the program; and, an overall evaluation of PSIP. In the case of the labor councils one additional variable, agreement between local and national levels on goals for participation in PSIP, proved to be a significant explanation of local activity.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has presented a discussion of the AFL-CIO and its involvement in employment and training programs generally, and PSIP specifically. The AFL-CIO has demonstrated its support for full employment legislatively and likewise, has professed its concern for the disadvantaged, unskilled, and underemployed worker. Despite the departure from traditional employment and training programs that PSIP represented with its emphasis on majority input from the business community, the AFL-CIO maintained support for the program. Moreover, the AFL-CIO was awarded a national contract from the DOL to staff the Human Resources Development Institute (HRDI) to help implement PSIP by providing technical assistance and education functions at the national, regional and metropolitan levels. And, at the local level the data showed that the vast majority of local labor councils alleged they were participating in PSIP by at least serving on the Private Industry Councils and by their own evaluation, were in agreement with the goals and purpose of the program.

The AFL-CIO's role, involvement and participation in PSIP during the formulation and implementation of the program was considerably more complicated than the above description makes clear. In the first place, early on in the formulation and development of PSIP the AFL-CIO, by its own admission, was cool to the PSIP concept. And, consistent with this tempered enthusiasm was a fairly unaggressive technical assistance effort on the part of the HRDI. In fact, it was not until the results of the HRDI sponsored survey, which indicated little local participation in PSIP and little awareness of HRDI communication efforts, that HRDI stepped up its efforts. Simultaneously, in 1980, the AFL-CIO took a more active role in PSIP
programmatic changes and it also appears as though the labor councils became more active in PSIP at the local level. Toward the end of the program when I conducted the research, local labor councils were generally aware of HRDI efforts and were aware of national support for the program. However, there may have been some remnants of HRDI's slow start in pushing PSIP as half the councils said that HRDI communicated and provided technical assistance infrequently and a similar divided distribution emerged when we asked the councils if they were satisfied with the level of direction provided by the AFL-CIO. In short, what is most significant about HRDI's slow start and the AFL-CIO's early muted support for PSIP is that, in general, it did not profoundly affect local labor council involvement in the implementation of PSIP.

To some degree, labor's involvement in the implementation of PSIP is unexpected. In the first place, labor has traditionally had a somewhat antagonistic relationship with business and I anticipated that a program legislatively mandating business participation might circumscribe labor's willingness to be involved in PSIP. However, the AFL-CIO has historically joined forces with the business sector, especially the National Alliance of Business, in implementing employment and training programs. The JOBS program and the Vocational Exploration Program were two examples of the partnership between labor and business in carrying out employment and training programs for the disadvantaged. More generally, the AFL-CIO has had considerable involvement in a variety of employment and training programs, especially CETA, and since 1968, has contracted with the Department of Labor to ensure labor participation in these programs.
Related to this is the argument made by students of organizations and interest group behavior claiming that groups like the AFL-CIO may be less representative that anticipated. Here, some argue that leaders may not fully mirror the attitudes and political views of the membership and may, in fact, be more liberal and more militant than the rank-and-file. As a result, I expected to find less support of PSIP on the part of the local labor councils as compared to national level staff. This was not the case. The data showed that the labor councils agreed with the goals of PSIP and they were participating to some degree in the implementation of the program. The data also showed that the local labor councils felt adequately represented on PSIP matters by their national staff. Clearly, I do not intend to claim that my data proves that Wilson and others are wrong about the divergence of views and attitudes between union leaders at the national level and their members in the subordinate labor councils. My study was not designed specifically to address that issue and I am aware of the low response rate on the mail questionnaire and thus, am careful to put my findings in a context confined to employment and training issues. However, the claims and observations made by these scholars did guide my expectations and I expected national level staff and HRDI to be more supportive of PSIP than the local labor councils. This was not the case.

Finally, the data and conclusions in this chapter are problematic. The low response rate from the mail questionnaire makes it difficult to generalize about labor council activity in PSIP. Moreover, HRDI estimates of local labor activity and findings from the Mershon Center study of PSIP implementation indicate that local activity was considerably below 78 percent. An accurate assessment of labor participation in PSIP would indicate that PSIP was more marginal to the AFL-CIO than my data showed.
End Notes


3. Constitution of the AFL-CIO, Article III.


5. Ibid., p. 102.

6. Ibid., p. 103.

7. Constitution of the AFL-CIO, Article VIII.


17. Gus Tyler, Labor in the Metropolis, p. 119.

18. Ibid., p. 121.

19. Ibid., p. 123.


23. U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Field Memorandum No. 134-80, p. 3.

24. Bok and Dunlop, Labor and the American Community, p. 201.


27. The response rate to the mail questionnaire was 31%. Two rounds of questionnaires were distributed and, in selected cases, follow-up phone calls asking for cooperation were made. The national HRDI was unable to endorse this research project officially, but it did, in response to calls from concerned councils, sanction their participation. The low response rate may be due to the small staffs in the central labor council offices.

28. In early reports to the Department of Labor a section describing the participation of local actors was presented. It was clear that the AFL-CIO was not particularly active in PSIP. In later reports this emphasis on local actors was dropped. However, from our observations, the AFL-CIO remained relatively inactive in PSIP throughout the program. See Randall B. Ripley and Associates, A Formative Evaluation of the Private Sector Initiative Program: First Interim Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Program Evaluation, MEL 79-14, May, 1979, pp. 23-24 and; Ripley and associates, A Formative Evaluation of the Private Sector Initiative Program: Second Interim Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Program Evaluation, MEL 79-21, October 15, 1979, pp. 24-25.
CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
INTRODUCTION

The United States Chamber of Commerce was established in 1912 with the encouragement of President Taft and his Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The Chamber was founded to establish closer relations between business and commercial interests and the Federal government. Today's Chamber of Commerce has not deviated substantially from these earlier aims. Its mission is "to advance human progress through an economic, political and social system based on individual freedom, initiative, opportunity and responsibility." The Chamber claims to represent the views of American business on national issues ranging from primarily economic and business issues to broader social issues including health care, community redevelopment, and employment and training.

The Chamber operates as both a leadership and service organization representing individual businesses, firms and organizations. The organization functions as a federation composed of over 4,000 members including local, state and regional chambers of commerce; American chambers of commerce abroad; and trade and professional associations. In addition, the Chamber has a membership of more than 150,000 business members representing, for the most part, small businesses and firms with less than 50 employees.

The Chamber's main emphasis has been to promote the existence of a free market economy with a minimum of government interference. It has also stressed the importance of including the private sector in solving a variety of national problems. As such, the Chamber has been largely critical of past...
federal efforts to train and employ the disadvantaged. For the Chamber, PSIP represented a positive departure from earlier federal employment and training programs and as a result, the national office endorsed and supported the program.

Part I: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce:
Government, Policy-Making and Organization

The National Office

At the national level the Chamber is governed by eleven principal officers and a Board of Directors. All positions except the President are elected. The leadership is responsible for directing the affairs of the Chamber, for keeping the Chamber's policies and activities current and for obtaining financial support for the organization. In addition, the Board of Directors has the responsibility to study national and international issues and trends and to advise the staff on strategy in carrying out programs and policies. As such, each of the Chamber's eighteen policy committees is chaired by a member of the Board of Directors.

In terms of Chamber policy-making, the Board of Directors has considerable responsibility. Proposals for policy adoption, most of which originate from the specific policy committees, are subject to Board approval. More specifically, in connection with a proposed policy declaration, the Board of Directors has two basic responsibilities: First, to determine the eligibility of the proposal and; second, to determine whether the policy proposal is one on which the Board itself should take action. If they do take
action they may approve, reject or amend the proposal. Adoption of a policy by the Board of Directors requires a two-thirds vote.

The Chamber, located in Washington D.C., across from the White House, employs about 400. The Washington headquarters is organized into six functional elements: (1) Program and Federation Development; (2) International; (3) Legislative and Political Affairs; (4) Economic Policy; (5) Communications and; (6) Corporate Relations. Program and Federation Development is organized into staff units that develop policies and actual programs dealing with current problems and legislative issues on the national agenda. Included in this division is the Human and Community Resources Division, which in turn includes the Education, Employment and Training Committee. The other division most relevant to our interests is Legislative and Political Affairs, which has a Legislative Action Department designed to gain support for the Chamber's recommendations to Congress. Department staff coordinate testimony to congressional committees and subcommittees, obtain information from the Congress and its staff, and keep members of the Chamber apprised of legislative developments.

In addition to Washington staff, the Chamber also has regional staff located in six regional offices. Regional office staff serve two functions: First, they provide services in the form of technical assistance and advice to the membership and second, they are the liaison between the national office and the local and state chambers. In this sense the regional offices may try and mobilize grass roots support for national policies and issues of central concern to business. Each of the regional offices has at least four Program Managers who deal in specific policy areas which would include employment and training issues and relevant legislation.
The Local Chambers of Commerce

The membership structure of the Chamber of Commerce includes 2600 local chambers of commerce located throughout the United States. These local chambers can be found in large metropolitan areas, in middle-sized and small cities, in counties and in rural areas across the country. Local chambers are made up of businesses located in the community each paying a minimum amount in dues to the local chamber. In Columbus, Ohio, for example, 3100 businesses belong to the Columbus Area Chamber of Commerce and each pays a minimum of $190 in dues. Dues are calculated on a graduated scale based on the number of employees and the amount of business generated by the firm. By way of another example, the Waukegan-Lake County Chamber of Commerce in Illinois has a membership of slightly over 500 businesses and professional organizations and assesses a minimum fee of $100 per year for each of its members.

There is considerable variation in the size of the community represented by the local chamber. This means, in part, that local chambers pursue a variety of objectives and programs tailored to their local community and, while they each belong to the national association in Washington, each local chamber clearly perceives its main interest and purpose to be directed at local affairs. Local chambers concentrate almost exclusively on local issues and on establishing local priorities. Staff at the national level consistently reminded me that the United States Chamber was a federation of independent businesses as well as independent local chambers. At the local level, Chamber staff and Executive Directors asserted that there was a "weak" or "loose" relationship between the national Chamber and the local chambers. As one local chamber Executive Director said, "the local chamber receives
information on legislation and the national focus through newsletters and action reports. I look at it, but I don't necessarily follow it. Policy at the local chamber is made by our Board of Directors."

The local chambers are autonomous and independent from the national Chamber. Policy at the local level is determined by the local Board of Directors and generally, they rely on input and advice from a variety of standing committees. The vast majority of local chambers have a well-developed committee system which might include committees focusing on community policy including issues such as land-use, zoning, and community redevelopment; economic policy committees including, for example, the promotion of tourism or the encouragement of foreign trade opportunities; small business policy committees, which often encompass employment and training opportunities and programs for employers; and, committees formed to promote high technology in the region.

The national Chamber of Commerce does not require each local chamber to adopt a standard or uniform set of By-Laws. However, according to national as well as Regional Chamber staff, most of the local chambers follow a fairly similar By-Law format. The Chamber publishes a compilation of the "best" examples of established association By-Laws. The booklet emphasizes that By-Laws "should establish democratic, voluntary membership organizations with adequate authority to the chief staff executives so they can carry out their responsibilities."2 In general, the By-Laws include: the purpose of the organization; the membership; membership meetings; the size and election of the Board of Directors; establishment of committees and task forces; and financial requirements including dues and other budget matters.
In 1964 the Chamber instituted a national accreditation program. The program was developed to provide local chambers with a method of voluntary self-analysis. Individual local chambers must apply for accreditation and then begin a period of evaluation. The evaluation is based first, on a self-study conducted by the local chamber and then an overview or verification visit is made by U.S. Chamber representatives. Approval and final accreditation is made when the self-study and the assessment by the chamber representatives is reviewed by the Accrediting Board and the Board of Directors of the U.S. Chamber. Accreditation lasts for a five year period and after that time, local chambers must complete the same process for reaccreditation. During the five year period of accreditation, local chambers must submit annually: a program of action, financial report (audit), policy manual, a current annual report, plus a report of any changes in the By-Laws, structure, procedures, job descriptions and new materials. Executive changes and staff educational advancements must also be reported. To date, only a relatively small number of the local chambers have chosen to pursue accreditation. According to national staff estimates, 470 chambers are currently accredited. The general explanation for choosing to be accredited has to do with the prestige it offers local chambers in recruiting new and maintaining old members to its organization. Not only is the local chamber affiliated with the national Chamber in Washington, but it also has its highest stamp of approval.

The 2600 local chambers of commerce are, then, quite independent from the national office in Washington. The local chambers are not required to adopt uniform By-Laws, and they need not be accredited (and there is no evidence suggesting that they are at all pressured to choose accreditation).
The local chambers are required only to pay dues to the national Chamber association. The national office seems to ask very little, at least in the way of mandated requirements or standards, of the local chambers. Additionally, the local chambers are free to pursue any choice of programmix and to determine local priorities. National staff may encourage local participation in particular programs, but as one staff member said, "we don't have the right to expect them to get involved." Thus, national staff recognize local independence. And, national as well as Regional staff members could cite no instances where a local chamber had been reprimanded or sanctioned for not pursuing nationally endorsed programs. Nor did staff believe that action would ever happen. In fact, most staff members looked at me with a certain amount of incredulity for even asking that question. Clearly, the local chambers are independent programmatically. They look to the national Chamber to represent business and to promote a collective business interest at the national level. Moreover, they look to the national office for leadership and information provided in publications that include Nation's Business and the weekly Washington Report. Aside from these links, the local chambers are locally-based organizations reflecting a variety of local priorities.

Part II: The Chamber's Involvement in Employment and Training Programs

In contrast to the National Urban League and the AFL-CIO, the national Chamber does not have extensive involvement in federal employment and training programs. While some affiliated and non-affiliated local chambers were, in varying degrees, involved in local employment and training efforts, the U.S. Chamber has traditionally eschewed federal manpower programs.
Moreover, the Chamber has been critical of past federal efforts designed to train the disadvantaged and unemployed population.

Generally speaking, past federal employment and training programs such as the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) and CETA have relied on government funded and government administered training programs. Some have involved giving subsidies to trainees while others have provided public service jobs where the private sector has been unable or unwilling to absorb the unemployed. These strategies have not been endorsed by the U.S. Chamber and by business more generally. In fact, they are particularly critical of government administered employment programs for which, Chamber staff claim, people were trained for jobs that never existed. In addition, the Chamber criticized these federally-sponsored programs as being overly expensive and inefficient. In short, according to the Chamber, these past efforts were "boondoggles" for local government and bureaucrats and little if any serious attempt was made to train clients in a cost-effective manner and to match training programs with available positions. Perhaps more to the point is the fact that business has been traditionally skeptical of government bureaucrats and government programs and thus, has chosen not to participate in them.

Some of these criticisms of CETA specifically and government programs more generally are presented in a systematic fashion as results of a 1978 survey of personnel directors throughout the country. The survey was conducted jointly by the U.S. Chamber and the Gallup Organization. It indicates that a large number of businesses had serious or very serious problems with the red tape and bureaucratic delays associated with CETA on-the-job programs. Other survey data show that a significant portion of
those responding were largely dissatisfied with the quality of CETA trainees. They reported serious problems with erratic attendance, poor motivation, low job performance, and excessive red tape. And finally, perhaps most significant is the survey finding that business relies primarily on direct sources of hiring new employees and very seldom do they employ from CETA agencies.

While the Chamber does have an Education, Employment and Training office in the Human and Community Resources Division in the national office, it has a particularly small staff that has never attempted to expand concomitantly with the growth in federal employment efforts. For example, this office did not apply for federal funds under the Title III discretionary funds provision in CETA. Business was not directly involved in CETA or employment and training; it did not have a "special clientele" nor did it care to expand or increase its involvement in this area. And to the extent that business did choose to be more aggressive in employment programs, the Chamber took a back seat to the National Alliance of Business (NAB), which was funded ostensibly to deal with a variety of urban problems including training the disadvantaged and structurally unemployed. It was NAB, not the Chamber, that co-sponsored the Job Opportunities in the Business Sector Program (JOBS) with the AFL-CIO and the Department of Labor. In many crucial ways, the Chamber relied on the National Alliance of Business to market and promote PSIP to local chambers and businesses.

Thus, broadly speaking, the U.S. Chamber was not involved extensively in employment and training programs throughout the 1960's and 1970's. However, the Chamber was aware of the need to match workers with jobs and to deal in some way with the unemployment problem. For example, in 1964 the national office
issued a publication that described how selected local chambers solved employment problems. The booklet details the experiences of 36 local chambers and provides a discussion of the national effort to deal with unemployment. It describes the functions of its Education Committee, which had responsibility for "analyzing the relationships between employment and education development, including vocational training and retraining" and presents some of the findings of its Special Committee on Unemployment. It should be noted that the examples reflect only private sector attempts to deal with unemployment and none mentions government involvement at either the local or national level.

*Nation's Business*, the Chamber's widely circulated monthly magazine has published a small number of articles on selected employment and training programs. Some have been critical of these programs while others have promoted and endorsed these efforts. In 1970, for example, *Nation's Business* carried an article that was largely critical of federal manpower efforts for their lack of comprehensiveness and fragmentation. Citing the experience of Cleveland businessmen and their efforts to hire the unemployed, the article claimed that job training efforts were made with little regard for business needs and they resulted, consequently, in alienating business and job seekers. The article goes on to point out that job seekers were frustrated even though there were 12 programs costing $13 million dollars available to train them. As a result of fragmentation, duplication and excessive waste, the article urged broad and meaningful reform and more specifically, urged support for President Nixon's efforts at eliminating a number of separate, categorical manpower programs and replacing them with one consolidated, comprehensive program. Finally, a discussion of a successful
local employment committee with significant business input was presented as a model for other cities to consider and adopt.

An example of the Chamber's promotion of business input in employment programs can be found in a 1975 article describing local chamber involvement is a state-wide effort to match workers with available jobs. The Texas Job Creation Campaign was financed with CETA funds. It was designed to promote unsubsidized employment throughout the state by locating areas and industries undergoing expansion and matching workers regardless of their current residence to these openings. All Texas Employment Commission offices displayed lists from all around the state. The Chamber endorsed the Texas plan and in its show of support, approximately 150 of the state's local chambers of commerce sent representatives to talk with employers and persuade them to list job openings with the Employment Service.⁶

Additionally, the Chamber endorsed two programs aimed at training and hiring Vietnam-era veterans. The first was the National Alliance of Business sponsored JOBS program, and the second, the HIRE (Help Through Industrial Retraining and Employment Program), a part of CETA.⁷ The HIRE program was designed to find jobs for veterans in either the private sector or in public service. HIRE funds were earmarked to assist companies with the cost of training for the veterans they employed. NAB was involved in promoting the HIRE program throughout the late 1970s and in recruiting veterans to participate in it.

There are two distinct, but related themes in the Chamber's participation or endorsement of employment and training programs: First, the Chamber flatly rejects federal efforts that it saw as profligate, duplicative or overly bureaucratic. Second, it unequivocally endorses
business participation in these programs. The Chamber position is simple and straightforward: It believes that the private sector can articulate its needs and that government-sponsored training programs that fail to include significant business input invariably miss the mark. This philosophy is illustrated in a recent 1982 article in Nation's Business describing the efforts of the founder of the Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America (OIC), a minority-run job training organization. The Chamber endorsed OIC programs mainly because its chairman "turned to the business community for a solution" to a number of ghetto problems. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the OIC is "to operate entirely with private funds." Its founder serves on the President's Task Force in Private Sector Initiatives, is "an outspoken advocate of the free enterprise system, and believes that voluntary action and the private sector can provide the best long-range solutions to the problem of jobs for minorities."8

In summary, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was not directly active in federally-sponsored employment and training programs. No doubt there are examples of local chamber participation in employment programs, but for the most part, the Chamber and its affiliates avoided the various manpower programs of the 1960's and 1970's. The Chamber was, however, aware of these programs. In some cases the Chamber supported these programs, albeit there is little evidence that they eagerly participated in them, and in still other instances the Chamber was critical of such efforts. In the case of CETA the Chamber was most critical. The Chamber claimed that CETA excluded private sector participation, was a massive public jobs or make-work program, was poorly administered, and most of all, symbolized wasteful government spending. According to one assessment, "the program ran up a bill of $53
billion in nine years but provided either short-term public jobs or training that failed to prepare participants for existing opportunities in the private sector."9

The Chamber's Involvement in the Private Sector Initiatives Program

The Private Sector Initiatives Program (PSIP) represented the Chamber's first serious involvement and participation in federally-sponsored employment and training programs. PSIP, of course, was the first program to legally require significant private sector input, and for the most part, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce embraced the PSIP concept. After years of criticizing the strategies of past programs, the Chamber was given the opportunity to help shape new employment and training policy. While no one in the Chamber believed that PSIP would revolutionize local decision-making overnight, many were sanguine about the possibility for PSIP's long-term success.

The Chamber national office in Washington had an Education, Employment and Training office within its Human and Community Resources Division. This office, during PSIP, was staffed by no more than two people, and in fact, throughout the later years of PSIP was staffed by only one person, its Director. The Director was also the staff member assigned to the Education, Employment and Training committee of the Chamber, which is responsible for developing Chamber policy in related issue areas. The members of this committee as well as the Director of the Education, Employment and Training office endorsed PSIP. This office, with the support of its committee and the rest of the U.S. Chamber, was responsible for promoting PSIP to state and local chambers throughout the country. The six regional offices aided in
endorsing PSIP by educating and informing interested local chambers about it and the Private Industry Councils (PICs). Finally, the National Alliance of Business which had local offices in many metropolitan areas, helped promote PSIP among local chambers. In fact, because NAB obtained money from the Department of Labor, it was able to promote PSIP more aggressively than the Chamber.

The Chamber's Involvement in the Formulation of PSIP

The U.S. Chamber vigorously supported the PSIP concept. After all, PSIP, represented a significant departure from traditional employment programs. It called for majority business representation on PICs, and thus had the potential not only to alter local decision-making councils, but to change the mix of programs as well as the strategies for training the disadvantaged.

The Chamber's position with regard to PSIP emphasized two major points: First, the Chamber strongly advocated eliminating what it considered to be expensive, inefficient and ineffective CETA training programs. This encompassed both public sector job programs, which the Chamber argued could only generously be called training, as well as other local training programs such as on-the-job training which provided clients with skills that were no longer in demand. Thus, the Chamber strongly urged that training under PSIP as well as other CETA programs be cost-effective and relevant. Second, the Chamber asserted that business had an interest in employment and training programs both from a moral or philosophical perspective as well as from a corporate perspective. They claimed that business was concerned about high unemployment and other related problems that plagued the nation's cities and
its disadvantaged population, and that there existed a corporate responsibility to try and solve these problems. Equally salient to the Chamber and to business generally is that the nation's business sector could benefit from highly skilled workers and that small businesses especially could eventually expand with these skilled workers. As a result, the Chamber argued forcefully that private sector input into local employment and training decisions would only enhance these possibilities. In short, both the disadvantaged client as well as the business sector would benefit from private sector input.

The Chamber promoted its positions to government officials. In late 1977 and early 1978 the Chamber was part of an informal coalition of business representatives which included the Business Roundtable and the Committee for Economic Development. This coalition had a number of meetings with the President's Domestic Policy Staff in which it promoted its message: make employment and training programs more relevant to business needs and involve the private sector in programmatic decisions. In 1978, President Carter's State of the Union message did include mention of the need to encourage private sector initiatives in a number of domestic policy programs.

In addition to meeting with White House Domestic Policy staff, Chamber officials lobbied members of the House and Senate to include substantial business input into employment and training programs. Fortunately for the Chamber and business in general, the mood of the Congress was favorable to their position. Coming on the heels of Public Service Employment (PSE) scandals and documented waste in these programs, Congress knew only too well that CETA had a poor reputation among the American public and it needed an infusion of new and innovative ideas. House and Senate committees and
subcommittees seemed to embrace the private sector initiatives concept for employment and training programs. The support of the President and his call for the inclusion of the private sector in domestic policy programs added to the favorable environment. In testimony to the Subcommittee on Employment, Poverty, and Migratory Labor in the House the Chamber endorsed PSIP. More specifically, in testimony to this committee, the Chamber supported CETA's reauthorization based on the expectation that it made "increased efforts to place CETA clients in private-sector jobs." The Chamber spokesman added that PSE should be deemphasized and that there ought to be increased emphasis on efficient, cost-effective methods of training provided by private sector employers.

More specifically, it was estimated that on-the-job training programs with the private sector supplying the training facility and its accompanying machinery and equipment, trained supervision and other extras, would cost approximately $1,200-2,000 per client. In addition to these claims, the Chamber endorsed Title VII. It noted in its testimony that since four out of five jobs in our Nation's economy are in the private sector, it is critical that CETA alter its efforts and priorities accordingly. Finally, the Chamber recommended to Congress that PSIP be "designed to increase private-sector involvement in all employment and training programs, and not simply to designate a portion of CETA funds which will be spent on private sector placement." In other words, the Chamber advocated that the PICs should have broader responsibility than just in Title VII, thus enabling the private sector to have an input into local CETA's total manpower program.

In addition to meeting with the White House Domestic Policy staff and providing testimony to Congress, Chamber as well as NAB representatives met
with Department of Labor (DOL) staff in the Employment and Training Administration to hammer out the details of PSIP policy. Here, business representatives expressed their concern that PSIP did not go far enough. In essence, the Chamber argued that PSIP was still fundamentally a government program since the public sector received the PSIP dollars. In this regard, the Chamber claimed that business input would by definition be diluted and additionally, that as long as PSIP was perceived as being under the aegis of the public sector, it would severely limit local business participation. In short, CETA had a bad reputation in business circles and the Chamber wanted a more radical PSIP such that business would clearly dominate local decision-making. As a result of this line of reasoning, the Chamber and NAB strongly advocated that PICs be encouraged to incorporate, to become legal entities and receive PSIP funds directly. To the extent that the DOL and the PSIP regulations did not strictly encourage incorporation and that relatively few PICs did incorporate through the PSIP years, the Chamber continued to be disappointed. As a former Chamber staff member reflected, "We recognized from the very beginning PSIP had problems. We were discouraged that incorporation was not pushed and we believed all along that was a major flaw in the program. In fact, to the extent that PICs were government controlled, most of the money still went to public training programs."

Both the Chamber and the NAB continued to encourage PIC incorporation. NAB President William Kohlberg made PIC incorporation virtually a top priority and on the few occasions I heard him speak at local conferences he invariably listed the advantages of PIC incorporation. At the local level NAB communicated this view to business members and in some locations PICs did in fact incorporate. The Chamber, according to its staff, did not actively
promote incorporation to its local affiliates in large part because NAB was carrying that message. In 1980 during the reauthorization hearings on Title VII, the Chamber chose two local chamber representatives to testify in support of an expanded private sector program. Both were members of incorporated PICs and they represented highly successful programs.

The Chamber's Involvement in the Implementation of PSIP

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce

The Chamber in Washington and the six regional offices did not aggressively promote PSIP. Because of an unusually small staff in the Education, Employment and Training office it was not possible for the U.S. Chamber to develop and implement a particularly comprehensive or wide-reaching promotional effort. Moreover, as the Director of that office pointed out, the Chamber, generally speaking, does not feel obliged to promote programs to its affiliates because these local chambers are independent of the national office and "we (at the national office) don't have the right to expect their participation."

Despite the generally modest nature of the national office's effort, PSIP was still promoted to the local chambers and the national office did encourage local implementation of the program. For example, early on in PSIP the Chamber published a comprehensive and informative pamphlet entitled, "The New Private Sector Initiative Program." Included in this publication was a strong endorsement of PSIP by the Chamber president as well as sections describing the program and how local businesses might attempt to participate on the local PICs. Also included were descriptions of some early PSIP
efforts in selected cities. For example, one program tried to grapple with ways to market PSIP to the local business community and other more general examples described ways in which communities attempted to link federal employment and training programs with the private sector. Finally, local chambers as well as other consumers of this Chamber publication were encouraged to contact representatives of the National Alliance of Business (NAB) for additional assistance with PSIP.

In addition to this publication the Chamber periodically described successful PSIP efforts in their other Chamber publications. These included Nation's Business, the Chamber's monthly magazine and "Washington Report" its weekly newspaper. In addition, the Chamber did provide two newsletters dealing solely with PSIP. These newsletters, circulated in 1979 and 1981 described PSIP, focused on relevant aspects of the regulations, and noted the latest congressional action on the Title VII program. These Chamber publications as well as the newsletters encouraged local business implementation of PSIP by describing exemplary programs.

The national office in Washington provided virtually no technical assistance to the local chambers. The regional offices were responsible for providing some measure of technical assistance. Each office had one person on its staff who was designated as a PSIP specialist and could provide such assistance to local chambers. Although the regional offices were available to give technical assistance they were not particularly active in urging local chambers to participate in PSIP. The regional offices reported that they were asked to provide technical assistance to the local chambers infrequently. As one regional staffer put it rather succinctly, "we really didn't push PSIP very much and only a small number of local chambers called us
for help and ideas on how to get involved on the PICs."

Finally, with regard to the promotion of PSIP it is important to acknowledge the role played by the National Alliance of Business. NAB, unlike the Chamber, was involved in promoting business participation in a variety of federal programs in urban areas. It received Title III discretionary funds to assist business and local chambers to participate in PSIP. The Chamber, in its major publication on PSIP encouraged local chambers to contact NAB offices (it published a list of NAB offices in an appendix) and fieldwork conducted by the Mershon Center indicated that NAB was somewhat active at the local level. However, this activity was variable and there was little evidence that NAB was uniformly promoting PSIP or providing technical assistance to local chambers. It is important to note, however, that NAB was available to the local chambers to provide assistance.

The Local Chambers of Commerce

Data from our mail questionnaire show that of the 60 responding local chambers of commerce, 41 (68%) indicated they were either very active or active in implementing PSIP at the local level. Twenty-five percent reported they were involved in running a Title VII program that consisted exclusively of on-the-job training ventures; all 41 of the active chambers had members on the local PIC and almost none of the chambers had any involvement in screening or referring applicants for Title VII programs offered by other subcontractors. Thirty-two percent of the responding local chambers said they were not active in PSIP.

A vast majority of the responding local chambers agreed both with the philosophy and goals of Title VII. Eighty-six percent (51) of local chambers
agreed with the philosophy and 90 percent (52) agreed with the goals of Title VII. As Table 11 shows, 73 percent of the local chambers agreed with the goals of PSIP and were participating in the implementation of the program. However, given the wide agreement with PSIP's goals, there is no association between levels of activity and agreement with PSIP goals.
TABLE 11: LEVEL OF ACTIVITY BY AGREEMENT WITH PSIP GOALS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement With PSIP Goals</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=38</td>
<td>n=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=14</td>
<td>n=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52   6   58
90%  10% 100%

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In addition to asking the local chamber affiliates if they agreed with both the philosophy and goals of PSIP, I was interested in whether or not they had adequate numbers of staff to participate in the program. The local chambers reported overwhelmingly that they were adequately staffed to carry out their Title VII responsibilities. Fifty (86 percent) of the local chambers reported that they had adequate levels of staff, while only 8 (14 percent) indicated they were a few staff members short. None of the chambers indicated that they were seriously understaffed. Clearly, bivariate analysis correlating staffing levels and activity in PSIP would yield fairly meaningless results with data this skewed. What is interesting to note, however, is that 26 percent (13 local affiliates) reported that they had adequate staff to participate in PSIP, but instead chose not to be active in the program. Local chambers that chose not to participate in the program, did so for reasons other than staff shortages.

In addition to staff as an important internal organizational resource, I was also concerned with, first, how the local chamber of commerce perceived its influence at the local level and, second, what effect this might have on its level of local involvement in the program. I asked local chamber officials to "characterize their influence with important PSIP policy-makers (elected and non-elected) at the local level." Ninety-five percent (56) of the local chambers perceived that they were influential at the local level. Only 5 percent (3) of the chambers did not see themselves as influential in the external environment. As was the case with the previous variable, these data present little variation and thus are inappropriate for meaningful bivariate data analysis. However, as was the case with the adequacy of staff variable,
despite perceptions of local influence among important PSIP actors, 30 percent of the chambers were not interested in being active in PSIP. Table 12 presents these results.
Table 12: Level of Activity by Perceptions of Local Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions of Local Influence</th>
<th>Influential</th>
<th>Not Influential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=39</td>
<td>n=2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=17</td>
<td>n=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In each of the independent variables presented the data is quite skewed and indicates little significant variation in chamber opinion. Ninety percent of the local chambers agreed with the goals of Title VII and 73 percent of them participated in PSIP. Additionally, 86 percent of the chambers indicated they were adequately staffed to participate in the program; 74 percent of them participated in the implementation of PSIP. Finally, 95 percent of the reporting chambers characterized themselves as sufficiently influential and 70 percent of them participated in PSIP. These data suggest that the chambers in our sample were generally active in PSIP. However, a quarter of the sample did not participate in PSIP despite reports that they agreed with the goals of the program, had adequate staff, and characterized their external influence in the local community as sufficient. Two explanations for the behavior of this consistently inactive group are plausible: First, it is likely that despite agreement with PSIP goals and other positive assertions, PSIP was not a local priority. Each local chamber is independent of the national office and, therefore, each sets its own particular agenda. In addition, some local chambers were not aware of a vigorous national push for PSIP implementation. This fact, coupled with a generally low level of interest in employment and training programs in the past, left them indifferent to PSIP.

Perceptions of National Communication Strategies

The local chambers reported a moderate degree of awareness of the modest national and regional technical assistance efforts. Just over half, (52 percent) said that the Chamber did provide advice or technical assistance on Title VII to the local level. Of those chambers who indicated that the
Chamber did provide this assistance, 50 percent reported that this advice on technical assistance was given "sometimes" while an additional 38 percent indicated such assistance was provided "not very often." Finally, these same respondents were asked how clearly this advice and technical assistance was communicated to them: thirty-three percent reported that this advice was communicated very clearly; 58 percent said it was provided somewhat clearly and 10 percent indicated this assistance was not very clearly communicated.

Data from the mail questionnaire confirmed much of what Chamber national and regional staff told me in our interviews. More specifically, almost all of the local chamber offices (94 percent) reported that they had received newsletters and other printed publications containing information about PSIP; virtually none of the chambers indicated that they obtained any information about PSIP through conferences; and a relatively small proportion (27%) said they had some form of personal contact with national or regional Chamber staff. These data corroborate what national staff told me: the bulk of their efforts to communicate with local chambers was through printed materials, which included special PSIP publications, as well as the more traditional forms including their monthly and weekly publications. The Chamber did not sponsor special PSIP conferences.

In making a summary assessment of the quality of communication on Title VII between the national office and the local chambers, respondents were evenly divided. Forty-nine percent reported that the quality of communication was good; 51 percent said it was poor. In addition, a similar distribution emerged in local chambers' responses to whether they were satisfied with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national
office. Fifty-nine percent of the chambers were satisfied with the level of direction while 41 percent reported dissatisfaction.

The quality of communication as perceived by the local chambers was not necessarily related to their level of activity in PSIP. As Table 13 shows, of the 27 chambers that reported poor communication from the national level, 63 percent were active in PSIP while 37 percent were not active. This suggests that the overall quality of communication was not central or critical to a number of local chambers. Thus, despite poor communications from the national level, a number of chambers chose to be active in PSIP.
Table 13: Level of Activity by Quality of Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Communication</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>39</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=22</td>
<td>n=17</td>
<td>85% 63% 74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=4</td>
<td>n=10</td>
<td>15% 37% 26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
This relationship and explanation of chamber activity is further underscored when we look at the crosstabulation of level of activity by frequency of communication. Of the 47 chambers that said the national office provided infrequent communication, 32 (68 percent) were active in PSIP and 15 (32 percent) were not active. Again, these data suggest that the amount of communication, which according to the majority of chambers was infrequent, did not affect the participation of local chambers. A significant number were active in PSIP. Table 14 presents these results.

Table 14: Level of Activity by Frequency of Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Communication</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Not Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=9</td>
<td>n=32</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=1</td>
<td>n=15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is not significant at the .05 level.
To further corroborate the findings that the quality of communication and the frequency of communication is not systematically related to levels of participation in PSIP, I looked at the relationship between level of activity and the degree to which local chambers were satisfied with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national office. In this table the data showed that of those chambers that expressed satisfaction, 77 percent were active in PSIP. On the other side of the coin, of those chambers that reported they were not satisfied with the level of direction from the national office, 68 percent participated in PSIP. This bivariate analysis seems to confirm much of what has been said earlier: despite low ratings of national communication strategies, local chambers were active in PSIP. In short, local satisfaction with the level of national Chamber direction made no apparent difference in local chamber program choices. Table 15 present these data.
Table 15: Level of Activity by Level of Direction in PSIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Direction</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Not Satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=24</td>
<td>n=15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=7</td>
<td>n=7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Level of Activity | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|
|                   | 31 | 22 | 53 |
|                   | 58% | 42% | 100% |

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.
In summary, these crosstabulations relating to the set of communication variables suggest some interesting and significant findings in regard to the participation of local chambers in PSIP. I have hypothesized that the more positive the chambers were about the quality, frequency and level of direction of communication provided by the national Chamber, the more likely the local chambers would participate in PSIP. This relationship was generally the case for Urban league affiliates and local labor councils. It is not valid, however, for the local chambers of commerce. The data indicated that despite the local chambers' perceptions that the national office did not communicate with them on a frequent basis, they were active in PSIP at the local level. This is quite consistent with much of what I have said about the relationship between the national Chamber and the local offices. As I said earlier, the national office represents the local chambers on Capitol Hill and other national government offices and they are not active or aggressive in promoting programs like PSIP. They do not necessarily expect local chambers to participate in PSIP. Their efforts at promoting PSIP and providing technical assistance were, by design, fairly limited. For many of the local chambers, the overall quality and frequency of communication or direction provided them by the national office did not figure into their decision whether to participate in PSIP or not.

In addition to asking the local chambers to judge the quality and frequency of national communication and assistance efforts I also asked them if they were aware of a national Chamber position on Title VII. National Chamber staff including the Chamber president as well as the Education, Employment and Training Committee did support and endorse PSIP, they did support and to a modest degree, encourage local participation in the program,
and they did provide informational and promotional materials to the local chambers. Fifty-eight percent (34) of the respondents indicated the U.S. Chamber had an official position on PSIP. On the other hand, 41 percent (24) of the local chambers said they were "not sure" if such a position existed. Almost all of the 34 respondents who said the national office did have a position on PSIP indicated that this position was strongly in favor of the program. And finally, over 90 percent of these respondents said this position in favor of Title VII had remained consistent throughout the program.

Of the 34 respondents that indicated the national office had a position on Title VII, 28 (82 percent) were active in PSIP. Of the 24 local chambers that were uncertain about such a national position, 50 percent participated in PSIP at the local level and 50 percent did not. This crosstabulation does not lead me to claim significant findings in the relationship between level of activity and local awareness of a national position on PSIP. Instead, once again, a significant number of local chambers were not plugged into the national communications network and half of them were active in implementing PSIP, while half were not. This finding seems consistent with earlier ones which suggest that national efforts appeared to be relatively unimportant in explaining local decisions to participate in PSIP.

In addition to asking whether or not there was communication from top to bottom, or from the national office to the local chambers, I was also interested in the extent to which the local chambers were asked to give their opinions on Title VII to national and regional staff. I also asked local chambers whether or not they were involved in some degree of Title VII decision-making and the extent to which national and regional staff solicited
their opinions. These questions were designed to obtain more information about the Chamber’s communication network or more explicitly, whether local chambers communicated their concerns and preferences to the national and regional offices. Additionally, I have hypothesized throughout this study that the more aggressive national staff were in soliciting local opinions, the more likely local offices would be active in PSIP. Said somewhat differently, this type of communication, from the local chambers to the Chamber staff would lead the local chambers to feel efficacious or more involved in the program and consequently, would lead to their participation in it. However, in the case of the Chamber of Commerce, unlike the Urban League and the AFL-CIO, I feel less certain in offering this hypothesis. In fact, the information I now have on the relationship between the national and local levels and their expectations for each other’s participation in programs like PSIP, suggests that we would not expect much solicitation from the national level. These expectations were confirmed by the data. Fifteen percent of the local chambers reported that they were “occasionally asked by national staff to give their opinions on Title VII; 44 percent said they were seldom asked and; 39 percent reported that they were never asked.

An additional question specifically asked the chambers to provide a judgment on the extent to which they participated in policy-making at the national level. As expected, a similar frequency distribution emerged with the vast majority reporting they did not participate in policy-making at the national level. According to the data, 27 percent of the chambers reported a moderate level of participation; 44 percent of the chambers said there was not a very high level of participation of chambers in national policy-making; and another fairly large number of chambers (24%) indicated there was no
participation on the part of chambers in policy-making at the national level. Crosstabulating these variables, (the extent to which local chambers were solicited by national staff to give their opinions on PSIP and the degree of involvement in national policy-making), with the amount of activity at the local level in PSIP leads to the following conclusion: The lack of participation of local chambers in national decision-making had no bearing in their participation in PSIP. In addition, the Chamber's limited opportunities to articulate their opinions on PSIP had virtually no relationship to their level of activity in PSIP.

I also asked the local chambers if they felt that national leaders and staff adequately represented the interests of the local chambers. The majority of the chambers (67%) reported that they were at least moderately well represented by the national Chamber. However, 17 or 29 percent said they felt poorly represented by national leaders. Therefore, in general, while the local chambers indicated little direct involvement in policy-making at the national level, most seemed satisfied with the job their national leaders and staff were doing for them.

A final question had to do with the level of agreement between the national office and the local chambers on goals for the Chamber's participation in PSIP. My hypothesis is that strong agreement on goals for participation in PSIP would promote local activity, while a higher amount of disagreement would inhibit local participation. The local chambers of commerce perceived a good deal of agreement between the national and local offices. Thirty-one percent reported strong agreement between the two offices; 41 percent said there was moderate agreement between the national and local offices; and a smaller number, 14 percent claimed there was not very
strong agreement between levels. The difference between local chambers that reported strong agreement and their levels of activity and those that reported moderate agreement and their levels of activity was insignificant. I expected that local chambers that reported strong agreement would be more likely to be active in PSIP than those who reported moderate or little agreement between the national and local offices. However, that relationship did not emerge and in fact, there was little variation in the amount of local PSIP activity in either of the three groups, those that perceived strong agreement between the offices, those that claimed moderate agreement and those that claimed little agreement.

Up to this point I have presented a series of relationships and crosstabulations looking at correlates of local chamber activity. The data showed that on a number of variables including agreement with PSIP goals, adequacy of staff and influence at the local level, the frequency distributions are skewed. This suggests that there is widespread agreement on PSIP's goals; that most chambers had adequate staff to carry out PSIP; and that an overwhelming majority of chambers perceived themselves to be influential at the local level.

The data also show that the national office's modest attempts at promoting PSIP did filter down to many of the local offices. Most chambers received some printed material from the national office, but this was generally their only form of communication. Additionally, local chambers were divided on their assessments of the quality of the national office communication strategies. However, the quality of communication as perceived by the local chambers was not related to their level of activity in PSIP. Finally, the questionnaire data showed that a number of local chambers
were not sure if the national office had an official position on PSIP, but again, this did not seem to be particularly significant in explaining local chamber participation in PSIP. In short, these crosstabulations do not give us a clear picture of what independent variables or set of variables is most salient in explaining participation in local implementation.

In an effort to explain local chamber participation in PSIP and to get a sense of the relative strength of the independent variables I conducted regression analysis. A number of important findings emerged: First, as was the case with the National Urban League affiliates and the AFL-CIO local labor councils, a number of independent variables I anticipated would be related to each other were, and as a result, I was able to create a composite index of these variables; second, these indices explained a considerable amount of the variance in local activity and, finally, three additional independent variables added slightly to the proportion of variance explained. Specifically, two indices were created: The first, EVAL, was the addition of three variables, all of which provided an evaluation of PSIP. Included in this index was 1) agreement with the philosophy of Title VII, 2) an assessment of the job PSIP had done in serving the disadvantaged and, 3) agreement with the goals of Title VII. The second index, COMM, was a composite index which included 1) how often the national office provided technical assistance, 2) how clearly that advice was communicated, 3) the frequency of national communication, 4) the adequacy of this communication, and 5) the local chambers satisfaction with the level and direction provided by the national office.

The regression analysis provides a more precise explanation of local chamber activity in PSIP (see Table 16 for results). First, I was able to
explain a significant amount of variance with the four independent variables. However, a considerable amount of variance (.52) is explained by the first variable, the overall EVAL of PSIP. This suggests that the local chambers overall positive evaluation of PSIP or their agreement with the philosophy and goals of PSIP and their assessment of the job PSIP did in serving the disadvantaged are most likely to explain local participation in the implementation of PSIP. Earlier in this discussion of local chamber activity in Title VII, I was unable to report significant findings in the crosstabulations presented as the data was skewed. The regression analysis provides an opportunity to conclude that of all the independent variables and relationships described, this overall evaluation of PSIP was most important in understanding local activity. Does this seem consistent with what we know about the chambers of commerce? For the most part, the relative strength of the EVAL index is quite consistent with much of what has been reported about the Chamber and PSIP. Clearly, the Chamber supported and endorsed PSIP and as I reported, worked hard in formulating the original PSIP proposal. There is little doubt that the Chamber agreed with the goals of PSIP, to provide skills training for jobs in the private sector; and they agreed wholeheartedly with the philosophy of PSIP which called for private sector participation in planning these training programs; and finally, they provided a positive assessment of PSIP. In fact, in 1980 during PSIP's reauthorization the Chamber advocated the PSIP concept and called for increased funding for the program. And, in later years, the Chamber endorsed an expanded version of PSIP in the form of the current Jobs Training Partnership Act. Thus, it should be clear that the Chamber strongly supported PSIP. It also appears to be the case that the local chambers
supported PSIP and their overall evaluation of PSIP is most important in understanding their level of activity in the implementation of the program.

Table 16: Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable

Level of Activity in PSIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>(B)</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Eval of PSIP</td>
<td>(.405)</td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement Between Local-National</td>
<td>(.477)</td>
<td>.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels on Goals for Part. in PSIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of Staff</td>
<td>(.481)</td>
<td>.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Assessment of Comm.</td>
<td>(.625)</td>
<td>.268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MULTIPLE R .786  r² .61
The three additional variables, agreement on goals for participation in PSIP, adequacy of staff, and the overall assessment of national communication strategies collectively explained 9 percent of the variance. It is interesting to note that the overall assessment of national communication strategies, COMM, was relatively unimportant and explained only 3 percent of the variance. This is also consistent with much of what we have reported in that the national office made only a modest attempt to promote PSIP to its local chambers; consequently, the local chambers reported mixed assessments of the national office's efforts. It is also the case that the national Chamber office did not see its function as aggressively promoting programs to its local affiliates and consistent with this, the local chambers were not expected to implement PSIP. In short, the finding that communication strategies explain little variance is not surprising given what we know about the relationship between the Chamber national office and the local chambers of commerce.

In summary, the regression analysis provides a clearer picture of local chamber participation in PSIP. As was the case with the National Urban League and the AFL-CIO, the level of participation in implementing PSIP at the local level was explained by an overall evaluation of PSIP. Three additional variables collectively explained 9 percent of the variance. Perhaps most salient is the fact that national communication strategies, which were quite significant in explaining local activity in the Urban League affiliates and the AFL-CIO local labor councils, were not particularly important in the case of the local chambers of commerce.
Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has presented a discussion of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its involvement in employment and training programs generally, and PSIP specifically. The Chamber has been considerably less involved and committed to employment and training programs at both the national and local levels than the Urban League and the AFL-CIO. The Chamber has not been involved extensively in federal employment and training programs and as it turns out, PSIP was the first concerted effort made by the Chamber to participate in such efforts. For the Chamber, PSIP represented a significant and positive departure from traditional federal manpower programs, programs which they claimed were inefficient, ineffective and wasteful.

This new direction in employment and training programs was endorsed by the Chamber. National staff were involved in formulating PSIP policy with members of Congress, the President's Domestic Policy staff and Department of Labor officials. However, while they endorsed PSIP and worked to develop the program and represent the needs of business, the Chamber, at the national level did not energetically promote PSIP to its local affiliates.

The local chambers seemed to be in considerable agreement with national officials. They too endorsed PSIP, agreed with its goals and provided a positive assessment of the program. A significant portion of our respondents were active in the program - all the active chambers served on local PICs and a small number were involved in running their own training programs. Most significant in understanding local implementation of PSIP is a group of independent variables that collectively form an evaluation of the
program. This evaluation of PSIP is most salient in understanding local chamber participation in PSIP.

It is also possible to argue that aside from the chambers' positive endorsement of PSIP, their stature and political position in the local community added to their opportunity for involvement in the program. The local chambers represented a prestigious and well-respected business group and it is likely that their participation was welcomed by local political actors. In three of the sites I studied for the Mershon project, political officials including the mayor and county executive strongly encouraged the participation of the local Chamber of Commerce. Equally significant is the fact that local chambers perceived themselves to be influential in their communities. These points suggest that the chambers were welcomed into the program and that they were comfortable in participating in it. PSIP's emphasis on the private sector presented a natural entrance for Chamber participation in employment and training decisions. This is in contrast to the diminished status of the League affiliates and the labor councils.
End Notes


2. Association By-Laws. Published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, p. 2.

3. A Survey of Federal Employment and Training Programs conducted by the National Chamber Forecast and Survey Center. Published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. September 1978, p. 15.


11. Ibid. p. 885.

12. Ibid. p. 886.

13. Ibid. p. 886.
CHAPTER VI

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
This chapter provides a comparative perspective on interest group activity in PSIP. The Chapter begins with a discussion of local activity in the National Urban League, AFL-CIO, and Chamber of Commerce. The next section of the Chapter contains a more specific discussion of the independent variables and presents a comparison of these independent factors among the three interest groups. An additional goal of Chapter 6 is to offer a more broadly focused discussion of group activity in PSIP. As such, I review the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 and present relationships for the combined interest group population. This provides an opportunity to make generalizations about the independent factors that explain local group activity in PSIP.

**Level of Activity in PSIP**

Throughout this research project, activity in PSIP has served as the dependent variable and I have sought to explain the level of activity in the program with a variety of independent variables including the local office's evaluation of PSIP; group communication strategies; the level of agreement between the national and local levels for participation in PSIP; and the adequacy of staff size. This measure of local activity is based on local respondents' assessment of their level of activity. In addition, I do have some corroboration of these data from national staff who were asked in interviews to provide an indication of local activity. In some cases national staff provided actual data on local activity and in other instances, national staff offered rough estimates of local activity in PSIP. In the
case of the Urban League, national staff presented fairly extensive data on local affiliate activity based on an internal questionnaire and series of site visits. Data from the mail questionnaire closely parallels League data. According to my sample, 83 percent of the affiliates said they were active in PSIP. Data from the League survey of all 118 affiliates claims that 94 of the 118 affiliates (80%) were participating in PSIP.

In the case of the AFL-CIO central labor councils the data showed that 78 percent of these local bodies indicated that they were active in PSIP. There is reason to have less confidence in this measure of local activity than in either the Urban League or the Chamber of Commerce. As I discussed in Chapter 4, these data appear to be inflated and therefore, not representative of labor council activity in PSIP. In fact, HRDI staff estimated that it was more likely that labor council participation ranged from 55 to 65 percent.

Data from the mail questionnaire showed that 68 percent of the local Chambers of Commerce were active in implementing PSIP. These data appear to be an accurate reflection of Chamber participation. They are consistent with estimates made by Chamber staff at the national level and additionally, are supported with observations made by Mershon Center Project staff.

What can be said about these levels of activity? In the first place, the data showed that there are not great or substantial differences in levels of activity in each group in PSIP. The mean responses to the question, "how active would you say your local office has been in Title III," suggest that each group had a mean score indicating they were somewhat active in PSIP. Analysis of variance shows that the Urban League was the most active with a mean score of 1.8 (1 equals very active, 2 equals somewhat active and 3 equals not very active). The AFL-CIO local central labor bodies and the local
Chambers of Commerce had mean scores of 2.1. It is clear from these data that significant differences in levels of activity did not emerge. However, as I pointed out, I believe that the AFL-CIO local labor councils were less active than the data showed and that a revised figure more in line with HRDI estimates and Mershon Center CETA Project observations would suggest some differences in PSIP participation. I cannot simply pick a number randomly and decide that it accurately reflects labor council participation in PSIP. Instead, I can speculate with some measure of support that there were differences in levels of participation. It can be claimed that the Urban League, which reported that 83 percent of its affiliates were active in PSIP, was, in fact, active. The League has prior employment and training experience, it worked in the past with the private sector in these areas, and it was designated by the DOL as having a special clientele and as such, awarded a contract to implement PSIP. The group also had an extensive communication strategy that included marketing PSIP and providing technical assistance to its local affiliates. Many in the Urban League saw PSIP as the new trend in employment and training programs and despite some ideological as well as institutional differences and priorities, the Urban League, both at the national level and the local level, seemed eager to participate in the implementation of PSIP.

The AFL-CIO shared some of these characteristics with the Urban League, but there were some salient differences. The AFL-CIO also had previous employment and training experience and they, too, worked with the business sector in employment and training and other social service areas. They were also awarded a special contract from the DOL to implement PSIP. However, the HRDI did not have a well-developed and extensive communication strategy at least compared to the Urban League (especially in the first two years of PSIP)
and this reflected the fact that they were muted and somewhat cool in their support of PSIP. AFL-CIO staff in Washington admitted that, in retrospect, they missed the boat in PSIP and that they did not foresee the PSIP concept to be as important as it turned out to be.

It can be argued that the AFL-CIO and the local labor councils were less active in PSIP than the League affiliates in part because the national office did not promote the program and because it did not provide extensive technical assistance, at least in the formative years of PSIP, to the local labor councils. Additionally, it is also reasonable to speculate that at the local level the AFL-CIO did not see many opportunities or payoffs for participation in PSIP and instead their efforts were defensive in nature. That is to say that union officials in times of high union unemployment were concerned about CETA trainees replacing union workers as well as the more traditional concerns of union consultation and concurrence. In terms of the AFL-CIO's participation in PSIP, one final point is in order: The data from the mail questionnaire as well as from observations indicates that the labor councils were active in PSIP. However, it is most unlikely that 78 percent of the councils participated in PSIP.

The Chamber of Commerce offers an interesting contrast to both the Urban League and the AFL-CIO. The Chamber had little if any prior employment and training experience, it was not singled out for DOL discretionary money to implement PSIP and it did not have the staff to promote PSIP to its local chambers. In fact, as the data showed, the local chambers were divided in their assessment of the national Chamber's communication and technical assistance efforts. Yet, despite these factors which would seem to point in the direction of local inactivity, the chambers were active in PSIP at the
local level. It appears likely that local chambers, much like the staff and membership at the national level were pleased to see the sorts of changes in employment and training programs that PSIP represented. As I suggested in Chapter 5, the Chamber consistently criticized CETA and earlier training programs that failed to link job training with business opportunities. PSIP, to the Chamber, represented a new chapter in employment and training programs. The data supported this proposition. At both the national level and the local level there is substantial evidence that the Chamber endorsed PSIP and evaluated it in a most positive light. A second point I might make with regard to the local chambers' participation in PSIP has to do with the political context and perceived opportunities in PSIP. Here, we have little quantitative data, but our observations at the local level provide reasonable evidence for our claims. Broadly speaking, it seems likely that local chambers were able to become involved in PSIP easily. Mayors and other local officials were quick to realize the payoffs associated with involving the local chamber of commerce in PSIP decision-making. By the same token, the local chambers were quick to realize that they had something to gain from their participation on PSIP. PSIP participation represented an opportunity for chambers to promote good citizenship, to help government solve its problems, and to help minorities and the disadvantaged. And, if the program succeeded it also meant an expanded role for business in employment training in the future (a NAB message). In short, PSIP at the local level, represented an opportunity for both local political officials and the local chambers to get involved in a mutually beneficial situation. Both would benefit from the local chambers' involvement in PSIP and in the end, the expectation was that the community at-large would benefit too.
Group Evaluations of PSIP

Generally speaking, each of the groups evaluated PSIP positively. As I reported in the case studies, national staff who were responsible both for formulating PSIP as well as helping to implement the program by promoting it to local officials, were supportive of the PSIP concept. There were some variations in this level of support. The Urban League and the Chamber of Commerce strongly supported PSIP from its inception. Both advocated changes in PSIP; the League wanted to diminish the role of the PICs and the Chamber wanted to strengthen the PIC role. Despite these differences in PIC direction, both groups at the national level strongly endorsed the program throughout its existence. The AFL-CIO provided something of a contrast, although not striking. At the national level, AFL-CIO staff admitted that their support and overall agreement with the PSIP program was not enthusiastic. This lack of enthusiasm for the program lasted, according to staff estimates, for the first two years of the program. After this period, the national office warmed to the PSIP concept.

At the local level there existed an almost universally positive evaluation of PSIP. In the Urban League, 90 percent of the affiliates agreed with the philosophy of Title VII and 95 percent agreed with its goals. In the case of the local labor councils, 80 percent agreed with the philosophy of PSIP and 92 percent agreed with the goals of the program. Local chambers reported that 86 percent agreed with the philosophy of PSIP and 90 percent agreed with its goals. These data reflect virtually no difference in evaluations of PSIP. However, some differences emerged when a comparison of each group's level or degree of agreement with the philosophy of PSIP was made. The AFL-CIO labor councils had a mean score of 2.2 (1 equals strongly agree, 2 equals
agree and 3 equals disagree); the Urban League affiliates had a mean score of 1.9; and, the Chambers showed a mean score of 1.7. (These data are significant with 2 degrees of freedom the level of significance is .008.) These mean scores do not represent major differences in agreement with the philosophy of PSIP, instead they indicate that local chambers agreed more strongly with the philosophy of the program than the local labor councils.

A similar distribution emerged when I looked at the level of agreement with PSIP goals. The AFL-CIO had a mean of 2.0 (1 equals strongly agree, 2 equals agree and 3 equals disagree); the League affiliates showed a mean of 1.8; and, the Chambers had a mean of 1.7. (These data were not significant.)

Unfortunately, I can say very little about whether there is a relationship between level of goal agreement and participation in PSIP. Looking at the three groups together, 92 percent (142) agreed with the goals of PSIP. Only 8 percent disagreed. These data are not distributed in a way conducive to bivariate analysis. However, it is clear that there was a high degree of goal agreement in PSIP. Small differences did emerge when a comparison of means was presented. The local chambers of commerce agreed with the goals and philosophy of the program more strongly than their Urban League of AFL-CIO counterparts. Aside from these slight differences that did show up in the mean scores, it is also possible to offer a qualitative analysis of PSIP activity and goal agreement. Fieldwork conducted by Mershon Center staff did uncover different levels of enthusiasm and activity in PSIP. Discussions with local PSIP actors and observations of the implementation of PSIP in the 25 sites indicated that Chamber representatives and Urban League officials were actively participating in PSIP decision-making. By contrast, labor participation was less enthusiastic and less active in PIC substantive decision-making.
Group Resources

I asked two questions about group resources. Each of the groups was asked whether they had adequate staff to carry out their Title VII responsibilities. In the case of the Urban League affiliates, 40 percent said they had adequate staff; 30 percent said they were a few members short; and 22 percent indicated they were seriously understaffed. The local labor councils were less well off than the League affiliates: 27 percent reported adequate staffing; 35 percent indicated they were a few members short; and 30 percent said they were seriously understaffed. Local chambers of commerce were clearly in the best shape to carry out PSIP responsibilities. Eighty-six percent reported they had adequate numbers of staff and only 14 percent said they were a few staff members short. None of the local chambers said they were seriously understaffed. There are clear differences in staffing levels. If we look at the mean levels of staff we see these disparities quite well (see Table 1). As Table 17 shows, the local chambers have the lowest mean scores (1 equals adequate staff, 2 equals a few members short, 3 equals seriously understaffed) while the local labor councils report the highest mean scores.

Table 17: Mean Scores by Group for Staffing Levels*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These mean scores are not significant.
These data are consistent with the frequency data presented above and in this case, there is variation in responses. However, bivariate analysis finds little relationship between adequacy of staff and level of activity in PSIP. More specifically, there is no relationship between adequacy of staff and level of activity in any of our three groups. There is only a slight decline in participation among Urban League affiliates who report they are seriously understaffed and there is virtually no relationship in either the local labor councils or the local chambers of commerce. This finding is surprising. I expected to find a relationship between adequacy of staff and levels of activity in PSIP. More to the point, I expected to find declining levels of participation in the program with more serious staff shortages. Many of the case studies as well as the more theoretical literature documenting implementation failures point to staff shortages as one explanation for implementation problems. However, the aggregate data showed no relationship between these two variables (Table 18 presents these data).
Table 18: Level of Activity by Adequacy of Staff Size

(All Groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequacy of Staff Size</th>
<th>Few Staff</th>
<th>Seriously</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>n=64</td>
<td>n=32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table is not significant at the .05 level.

In addition to staffing as an element of group resources, I looked at how each group characterized its influence with local actors (elected and non-elected) involved in PSIP. Here, I was most interested in whether each of the organizations perceived that they were equally influential or if there were differences in their perceptions. If there were differences, then I ex-
pected that those local offices that perceived themselves to be less influential would be less likely to be active in the program.

In looking at all three groups, I expected that if differences did emerge the labor councils and the League affiliates would be less likely to have local influence compared to the local chambers of commerce. This claim can be made for two reasons: First, because PSIP was a business dominated program, I expected labor and community-based organizations to have less influence; and second, in a more general or community-wide sense I expected that a local business group should have more influence politically than either the Urban League or the local labor councils. There is some evidence for this claim. Ninety-five percent of the local chambers reported they were influential; 78 percent of the League affiliates said they were influential; and a smaller number or 69 percent of the local labor councils perceived themselves as having local influence. Mean scores also indicate some differences in the groups' perception of influence. As Table 19 shows, the local chambers perceived themselves to be more influential than League affiliates or local labor councils (1 equals very influential, 2 equals sufficiently influential, 3 equals insufficient influence).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These mean scores are significant. With 2 degrees of freedom the level of significance is .008.
Despite the findings that there are differences in the way groups perceive themselves externally, there is little evidence that these perceptions are related to group activity. In both the Urban League affiliates and the local labor councils I found only an insignificant decline in PSIP participation in those local offices that indentified their influence as insufficient. And in the case of the local chambers, there was virtually no variation in perception of influence and thus, correlational analysis was not appropriate. Consequently, it is fair to conclude that there are noticeable differences among the three groups in their perceptions of local influence, but that these dissimilarities do not explain variations in local activity in PSIP.

National-Local Communications

As indicated in Chapter 2, I hypothesized that group communication strategies would be an important explanation of group activity at the local level. More specifically, I asserted that in groups with autonomous local affiliates, as is the case with these three groups, efforts by the national office to promote PSIP to the local offices as well as the provision of technical assistance functions, would increase the likelihood of local participation in PSIP. My discussions with national staff led me to conclude that there was variation in the amount and quality of national communication efforts throughout PSIP. In the case of the Urban League, national communications were consistent and staff aggressively pushed for affiliate participation in PSIP. The League had adequate staff to provide these functions; these staff were funded partly through CETA Title III discretionary monies. The AFL-CIO and its HRDI office at the national level
proved to be a somewhat different story than the Urban League despite the fact that they too were funded by the CETA discretionary funds. HRDI did not eagerly promote PSIP for the first two years of the program and it was not until early 1980 that the HRDI began marketing and promoting PSIP to the local labor bodies. In contrast to both the Urban League and the AFL-CIO, the Chamber did not promote PSIP to local chambers of commerce. The Chamber did not have the staff in its national office to promote PSIP, but perhaps even more to the point, the national Chamber did not see its role as emphasizing communication with local chambers.

At the local level I was interested in local affiliates' perceptions of national communication efforts. I expected variation in light of what national actors told me about their communication strategies in PSIP and I also hypothesized that these efforts would be related to local activity in PSIP. Groups that promoted PSIP to local affiliates were expected to be more likely to participate in PSIP at the local level. The data confirmed the variations I expected to find. Ninety-five percent of Urban League affiliates indicated that the national office provided advice on technical assistance on Title VII matters to the local level; 86 percent of the local labor councils reported that HRDI provided this advice to them and; 52 percent of the local chambers reported receiving this advice from their national office. These differences can be seen by looking at the mean scores indicating how often the national office provided this technical assistance. As Table 20 shows, the Urban League affiliates received assistance from their national office more often than the other two groups (1 equals often, 2 equals sometimes, and 3 equals not very often).
Table 20: Mean Scores by Group for Amount of Technical Assistance*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These mean scores are significant. The level of significance with 2 degrees of freedom is .0001.

In a more general fashion I asked the local offices how frequently national staff communicated with them on PSIP related issues. This encompassed both the promotional and technical assistance functions. Here, the differences in the group means are striking. League national staff communicated more frequently than the AFL-CIO or Chamber national staff. Most striking is the difference between the Urban League and the Chamber of Commerce (1 equals very frequently, 2 equals frequently, 3 equals not very frequently). Table 21 reports these results.

Table 21: Mean Scores by Group for Frequency of National Communication*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These data are significant. The level of significance with 2 degrees of freedom is .0001.
I also found clear differences in each group's summary assessment of the quality of communication on Title VII between the national office and the local offices. Eighty-eight percent of the Urban League local affiliates rated the quality of communication as good and 90 percent of these affiliates indicated that they were satisfied with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national office. In the case of the local labor councils, 72 percent of the respondents said that the quality of HRDI communication was good and 69 percent reported that they were satisfied with the level of direction provided by the national AFL-CIO office. The Chamber, again, provided the least positive overall assessment of national efforts. Forty-nine percent of the local chambers reported that the quality of communication was good and 59 percent indicated that they were satisfied with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national office.

These contrasts in overall assessments of national communications can also be seen by comparing group means. As Table 22 shows, League affiliates rate national communication efforts more positively than their counterparts in the labor councils and the local chambers (1 equals very good, 2 equals good, 3 equals poor). The contrast between the Urban League affiliates who rated these efforts between very good and good and the local chambers that rated the quality of communication between good and poor was anticipated and confirmed what I learned in my discussion with national staff members in each group.
Table 22: Mean Scores by Group for Quality of Communication Between the National and Local Offices\

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These mean scores are significant. The levels of significance with 2 degrees of freedom is .0001.

Broadly speaking, when I looked at the relationship between group communication strategies and local participation in PSIP, I found a mixed bag of results. Specifically, in the Urban League I found a positive relationship between the quality of communication provided by the national office and the level of activity in PSIP. A positive relationship between affiliates’ satisfaction with the level of direction in Title VII provided by the national office and their level of activity also emerged. However, one must be cautious in claiming that these relationships are particularly significant because, for the most part, there is only a small amount of variation in the independent variables.

The AFL-CIO local labor councils represented a similar situation to the League affiliates. There is a positive relationship between those local councils that reported good communications from the national HRDI office and local activity, but the relationship is not as strong as in the Urban League. In fact, more than half of the councils that claimed poor communication were
active in PSIP. A similar relationship emerged when I looked at the labor councils' satisfaction with the level of direction in PSIP and their activity at the local level. Of the 25 labor councils that indicated they were satisfied with the level of direction, 84 percent were active in PSIP. Yet, of the 11 councils that expressed dissatisfaction with the AFL-CIO's level of direction, 64 percent were still active in PSIP.

In both cases, the League affiliates and the AFL-CIO labor councils, it can be concluded that the more positive the local offices were about the quality and level of direction provided by their national offices, the more likely they were to be active in PSIP. In the bivariate relationships that have been presented, the majority of affiliates and labor councils reported good communications from national staff and they have been active in PSIP. In the case of the labor councils, where there is more variation in these independent variables than in the Urban League, a number of labor councils expressed dissatisfaction with the communication strategies of the AFL-CIO, but still maintained their activity in PSIP. This suggests that for some of the labor councils, the overall quality of communication provided them by their national office did not figure into their decision to participate in PSIP.

This last point that suggests that the overall quality of communication was not related to local activity is underscored in the Chamber of Commerce. The overall quality of communication was not critical to a number of local chambers in their decision to be active in PSIP. The data showed that of the 27 chambers that reported poor communication from the national level, 63 percent were active in PSIP while 37 percent were not active. And much the same finding emerged when I looked at the relationship between level of
activity and the degree to which the chambers were satisfied with the level of direction provided by the national office.

The hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 which stated that the more aggressive national offices were in promoting PSIP, the more likely local offices would be active in the program was partially borne out by the data. The relationship was generally the case for Urban League affiliates and to a slightly lesser degree, the local labor councils. It is not entirely valid, however, for the local chambers. Chamber activity at the local level was, for a number of local offices, not related to the overall quality of national communication efforts. As pointed out in Chapter 5, it is not surprising that the local chambers participated in PSIP independently of national communication efforts to promote PSIP or to provide technical assistance. The national office did not see marketing, promotion and extensive technical assistance as its role or function in PSIP. And, the local chambers did not expect extensive communications with national or regional offices. In short, their decision to participate in PSIP was entirely local in nature.

The Urban League and the AFL-CIO represent different cases. Both organizations had long-standing contracts with the DOL to implement CETA programs. They were more involved at both the national and local levels with past employment and training programs and had established large, well-developed organizations at the national level to participate in these federally sponsored programs. They also had well established networks between the national and local levels. In the case of the AFL-CIO, the HRDI at the national level worked with HRDI metro offices to protect and develop labor's interests in employment programs. In the Urban League, the national office was aware of the importance of employment and training to its clientele
and it made substantial efforts to encourage local affiliates to maintain their involvement by participating in PSIP. The national and regional offices had an established network with the local affiliates, they had frequent contacts and, in many cases, national or regional staff made site visits to the local affiliates. This suggests that in these the AFL-CIO and the Urban League the local offices were more likely to expect national pronouncements on the program and to obtain information and assistance for them. In short, national efforts were far more important in explaining local decisions in the Urban League and the AFL-CIO than in the Chamber of Commerce.

Before leaving this topic of group communication strategies and their relationship to local activity it is worth looking at an earlier hypothesis in light of aggregate group data. Again, I have hypothesized that the more positive local offices are about national communication efforts, the more likely they are to be active in PSIP. Then all three groups are combined there is some evidence for this hypothesis. In three bivariate analyses I found a relationship between a positive assessment of national communication strategies and local activity in PSIP. For example, there is a relationship between frequency of national communications and local activity in PSIP (contingency coefficient = .26). Finally, a somewhat stronger relationship emerged between an overall measure of the quality of national communication efforts and the level of activity in PSIP (Table 23 shows these results).
Table 23: Level of Activity by Quality of Communication*
(All Three Groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of Communication</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=90</td>
<td>n=24</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=14</td>
<td>n=20</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contingency Coefficient = .33

In all three bivariate analyses there is a relationship between a positive assessment of national communication strategies and local activity in PSIP. In each of these tables the contingency coefficient is moderately strong representing some measure of association between the two variables. These relationships provide some evidence for the hypothesis. However, this assertion cannot be made too strongly and without one important caveat: the
amount of variation in our data is limited and thus, the bivariate analysis is somewhat impaired. Table 22, by way of example, shows this limited variation. Relatively few local offices report they were not active in PSIP and similarly, few rate the quality of communication as poor. This lack of variation limits the analysis and leads me to be careful in asserting the existence of strong relationships.

**Group Goals and Group Participation**

In addition to exploring the national-local communication system in the three interest groups, I was also interested in how much agreement existed between these two levels on goals for the group's participation in PSIP. I expected this to be an important relationship and hypothesized that strong agreement between both levels would increase the amount of participation at the local level. I did not expect variation between the Urban League and the Chamber of Commerce, but did consider the possibility that the AFL-CIO would be less likely to claim group agreement than the other two groups. The reason for suspecting less goal agreement between the national and local levels in the AFL-CIO is derived from theories offered by political scientists, including Wilson, claiming that in unions, leaders tend to take positions that fail to reflect rank-and-file positions. In PSIP, I expected that AFL-CIO leaders and staff at the national level might be more supportive of PSIP than local union members in the labor councils. One way of testing this theory was to look at the perceived level of agreement on goals for group participation in PSIP. In looking at the group means, I found slight differences in goal agreement but they were not as expected. The groups were clustered around two responses: strong agreement and moderate agreement.
The Urban League affiliates perceived strong agreement between the national office and their offices; the local chambers indicated moderate agreement between levels; and the local councils perceived the level of agreement between strong and moderate. These differences appeared to be marginal, indicating that the groups shared a fair amount of goal agreement on goals for participation in PSIP. The data also indicated that the expected relationship between level of goal agreement for participation in PSIP and the level of activity in PSIP was not strong. There is a slight decline in the level of activity in PSIP as we move from strong to moderate to not very strong agreement between levels. However, once again, our analysis is impaired by a lack of variation in the independent variable.

Along these same lines in trying to determine the internal dynamics of each group, I was interested in contrasting the extent to which local offices participated in policy-making at the national level. I expected that the Urban League affiliates would have a fairly high level of participation in national policy-making and that both the local labor councils and the local chambers would be less inclined to be involved in national decision-making. These expectations were based on information obtained from interviews with national actors as well as local officials. In discussions with Urban League staff at both levels it was clear that national staff made a concerted effort to obtain feedback from local affiliates and to involve local officials in some measure of national policy-making. To a certain extent, I also expected that local officials that were involved in national policy-making would be more likely to be active in nationally endorsed programs like PSIP. This is similar to the claim made by a number of students of policy implementation that emphasizes the need for subordinates to have some measure of involvement
in determining policies that they will eventually implement. Applied more specifically to my research questions, I asked the local offices how often they were asked to give their opinions on Title VII. Therefore, I have two measures of the degree to which local offices were involved in national policy-making. The first measure is more broad, the second is specific to PSIP.

The data show first, that there were differences in the extent to which the local office's participated in policy-making at the national level and second, that the Urban League affiliates participated to a higher degree than the other interest groups. League affiliates reported a moderate level of participation in national policy-making; local councils and local chambers both reported a low level of participation in policy-making at the national level. In terms of the more specific question about how often local offices were asked by national staff to give their opinions on PSIP, the data indicated significant differences in the groups. As Table 24 shows, League affiliates were asked occasionally for their opinions, while the local labor councils and to an even greater degree the local chambers, were seldom asked for their opinions in PSIP (1 equals often, 2 equals occasionally, 3 equals seldom, and 4 equals never).
Table 24: Mean Scores by Group for Amount Solicited for Opinions on Title VII*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban League</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These mean scores are significant. The level of significance with 2 degrees of freedom is .0001.

There is virtually no relationship between the level of activity and the extent to which local offices participated in policy-making at the national level for our three groups combined. There was, however, a stronger relationship between local activity and the extent to which local offices were asked by national staff to give their opinions on PSIP. Of the 56 local offices that reported they were asked either often or occasionally for their opinions on Title VII, 91 percent were active in PSIP. In contrast, of the 98 local offices that reported they were seldom or never asked to participate in PSIP, 65 or 66 percent were active in PSIP, while 33 or 33 percent were not active in the program (Table 25 shows these results). These data suggest that there is a relationship between level of activity and the extent to which local offices were solicited by their national office to provide feedback in PSIP. The relationship is not strong, but it does seem to indicate that such a relationship exists.
Table 25: Level of Activity by Amount Solicited by National Staff*
(All Three Groups)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount Solicited</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>n=51</td>
<td>n=65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Activity</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Active</td>
<td>n=5</td>
<td>n=33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contingency Coefficient = .29

* This table is significant at the .05 level.

The next goal in this chapter is to look more intensively at the three interest groups and compare the set of independent variables that explain local implementation in each case. The final task is to look more generally at interest group activity in PSIP by exploring the independent variables that explain activity for the combined interest group population.
In each of the case studies group activity at the local level was explained by conducting regression analysis. This allowed not only the opportunity to determine the relative strength of the independent variables, but also to present a more parsimonious explanation of group activity in PSIP. In all three groups two indices were created that explained significant portions of the variance in local activity. These indices, EVAL and COMM were important in varying degrees, in providing an explanation of local activity in all three of our interest groups. EVAL was a composite of three variables, each of which provided an evaluation of PSIP. They included: 1) agreement with the philosophy of Title VII; 2) an assessment of the job PSIP had done in serving the disadvantaged; and 3) agreement with the goals of Title VII. COMM, was a combination of number of communication variables including: 1) how often the national office provided technical assistance; 2) how clearly that advice was communicated; 3) the frequency of national communication; 4) the adequacy of this communication; and 5) local office's satisfaction with the level and direction provided by the national office.1

The Urban League

In the case of the Urban League affiliates, the overall evaluation of PSIP and the overall assessment of the group's communication strategies were both significant in explaining the level of activity in PSIP. These findings are consistent with earlier analyses of the affiliates. Clearly, they were positive about PSIP; they agreed with both the goals and philosophy of the program; and most claimed that PSIP was doing a good job in serving the disadvantaged. The League affiliates also provided a positive assessment of national communication efforts both in terms of the national office's efforts
to promote PSIP and to provide technical assistance. Thus, it is not surprising that the indices are important variables in explaining affiliate activity in PSIP.

The regression analysis also shows that the affiliate's perceptions of their influence with local policy-makers was important in explaining local activity. As reported in the Urban League case study, the local affiliates perceived themselves to have sufficient influence at the local level. This variable explains the most variance in the regression statement. It suggests strongly that the Urban League perceived itself as having influence at the local level in PSIP and more generally, in employment and training programs. This finding is also consistent with earlier reports about the Urban League in the context of past employment and training programs. The affiliates viewed employment and training programs as part of their local program mix and whether they operated their own training program or provided screening and referral services to other service deliverers, it was clear that these programs were very much a part of their local efforts. More to the point, the League's clientele was in many ways the very group that CETA, PSIP and other federal programs was intended to serve. In addition, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, the League had considerable prior experience with not only government in the context of employment and training programs, but the private sector as well. Their attitude about the private sector was not hostile or skeptical. They seemed, generally speaking, open to PSIP and to the idea of involving the business sector in planning employment programs at the local level. No doubt the League attempted early on in the development of PSIP to protect its turf and to defend its position, but it nevertheless seemed to welcome business as a partner in local training decision-making.
These two factors, the League's extensive involvement and expertise in employment programs and its friendly relationship with business and government, made the League affiliates influential in PSIP at the local level.

In addition to these variables, the regression analysis shows that two additional variables which relate to League communications, proved to be somewhat important in explaining local activity. Here, the affiliates were aware of a national position in PSIP and accurately described that position as in favor of the program. This suggests that League affiliates were influenced by the national position in support of PSIP and that, in addition to other factors, led them to be active in PSIP. The National League has been characterized as having fairly extensive communications with local affiliates. They sponsored a number of regional conferences, provided frequent newsletters and written communications on PSIP, and, in many cases, made site visits to local affiliates. The national office supported PSIP and they encouraged local affiliates to be active PIC members and to provide training under Title VII. These data suggest that the national staff was successful in its efforts to communicate the League's official support of PSIP to the local affiliates.

To sum up the Urban League: I have described a tightly-knit organization that was active in PSIP. The League affiliates perceived themselves to be influential at the local level and my expectation that the affiliates might lose some of their influence or power in this program because it made business a more dominant force than prior programs, was not a perception shared by the affiliates themselves. In fact, it is possible to argue that the affiliates, because of their prior experience in employment
and training programs as well as their then current involvement in other CETA titles, were expected to participate in PSIP, despite the private sector emphasis in the program. Additionally, the affiliates agreed with the program and at both levels the evaluation of PSIP was positive and supportive. The League's national staff, funded primarily by DOL monies, was well-developed and capable of spreading an encouraging word about PSIP. They had an extensive national and regional communication network designed to promote PSIP and encourage affiliate participation. The data indicated that the affiliates were aware of a national position, they were satisfied with the level of direction provided by the national office, and they recognized frequent communication efforts from the national office. And, although the national office could not and did not demand that local affiliates participate in PSIP, they seemed to be able to encourage local activity. Finally, the League affiliates in comparison to our other two groups, appeared to be more involved in policy-making at the national level. They reported a moderate level of participation in national level policy-making and were asked occasionally to give their opinions on Title VII. This suggests that the national office attempted to solicit local opinions and to incorporate local needs into national policy-making.

The AFL-CIO

In the case of the local labor councils, the two indices, COMM and EVAL were critical in providing an explanation of council activity in PSIP. It is surprising that the COMM index is as significant as the data indicate because as I have pointed out, the HRDI failed to provide an aggressive promotional campaign to the local level until 1980, close to two years into the program.
However, the data indicated that the local councils were satisfied with the level of direction provided by the national office and, despite the fact that a number of councils said that communications and technical assistance were not provided frequently, the councils indicated that communications were good. In addition, the data showed that a large majority of the labor councils were aware of a national AFL-CIO position on PSIP corroborating the claim that national communication efforts were substantial enough at least to inform local councils of a national position on PSIP. And I might add that although HRDI efforts at promoting PSIP were delayed, they did make a concerted attempt to push PSIP and encourage labor participation at a later time. In fact, as reported in Chapter 4, the HRDI was instrumental in getting the DOL to issue a special memorandum to encourage labor union participation in PSIP. Thus, it appears as though these later efforts were substantial and proved to be adequate in passing the AFL-CIO's support for PSIP to the local labor councils.

In addition to the local councils' assessment of national communications and their awareness of a national position on PSIP, the regression shows that the overall evaluation of PSIP (EVAL), was important in explaining local activity. This is consistent with what we learned about the AFL-CIO and its prior involvement in employment and training programs. The AFL-CIO at the national level and the unions at the local level have been involved in employment and training programs since the early 1960s. Discussions with national labor staff led to the conclusion that while PSIP was a departure from earlier employment programs and HRDI was slow to endorse PSIP, labor basically supported the program. It supported the fundamental goals of PSIP to train the disadvantaged and to do so by involving the very people who would
eventually hire these newly trained workers. Thus, the local labor
councils' positive assessment of PSIP is consistent with labor's support for
employment and training programs. Nonetheless, as I have pointed out
earlier, I believe that the questionnaire data represents an inflated and
biased view of labor councils. I believe that labor was less involved in PSIP
than my data show and that despite HRDI's attempts to encourage labor activity
in PSIP and labor's agreement with the goals of PSIP, the local councils were
more marginal in PSIP than these statistics indicate.

In summary, it should be clear that the AFL-CIO and its local labor
councils present a more problematic case in this research than the other
organizations. It can be said that the local labor councils were active in
PSIP. Observations at the local level indicated that many unions served on
PICs if for no other reason than to protect union jobs: PSIP existed in a
period of high union unemployment and many union officials expressed concern
that local training programs might train workers in areas already saturated
with unemployed union members. Yet, whatever the reason for union
participation, local councils participated in PSIP and supported the
program. There also seemed to be considerable evidence that the HRDI did
eventually push for greater union involvement at the local level, and despite
its delayed attempts it was able, towards the latter part of the program, to
encourage union support for PSIP. Finally, one salient difference between
the AFL-CIO and the Urban League must be acknowledged: Clearly, while the
AFL-CIO may have supported PSIP it must be pointed out that the disadvantaged
and structurally unemployed population is not the union's clientele. Again,
this is especially the case in times of union unemployment. And while the
union has both philosophical and political reasons for being concerned about
this population, its commitment to PSIP must, by definition, be less strong than the Urban League. I believe that this is one reason why the HRDI was more muted in its support for PSIP, at least early on in the program, and why we observed less union participation throughout PSIP at the local level.

The Chamber of Commerce

In the case of the local chambers, the regression analysis indicates that the two indices, EVAL and COMM were important in explaining local activity in PSIP. Unlike the Urban League and the AFL-CIO, EVAL is most important and COMM is least significant in the regression statement. The data showed that the local chambers clearly agreed with the goals and philosophy of PSIP and they reported that PSIP had done a good job in serving the disadvantaged. In short, the local chamber's expressed agreement with PSIP and it is consistent that this overall agreement or positive evaluation of PSIP explain local activity. However, what is most outstanding in the case of the Chambers is the relative strength of the EVAL variable. The regression statement presented in Chapter 5 reported and r² of .61 and the first variable, EVAL, explained .52 of the total variance. This shows clearly that the evaluation of PSIP is most significant in explaining local chamber activity. The other three independent variables, agreement between the national and local levels on goals for participation in PSIP, adequacy of staff, and an overall assessment of national communication strategies (COMM) together explained the rest of the variance.

In comparing the local chambers to the League affiliates or local labor councils, the relative insignificance of COMM is striking. As I pointed out in the case study of the Chamber, the communication strategies of the Chamber
were less important than in our other two groups. The Chamber did not have the staff to carry out a promotion of PSIP, but perhaps more importantly, it did not have the inclination to provide this function to its local chambers. At the national level, the Chamber did endorse and support PSIP and they did, to a modest extent provide some materials to the local chambers. However, it was clear from interviews with national staff, that the Chamber's promotion of PSIP did not compare in scale or scope to the Urban League or even to the HRDI.

In terms of the local chambers of commerce, we are left, for the most part, with a single explanation of local activity in PSIP. I feel comfortable in claiming that the local chambers' overall evaluation of PSIP explained their level of activity in the program. Clearly, the chambers provided a positive evaluation of PSIP and while they had little previous involvement in earlier employment and training programs, it seems reasonable that PSIP be the Chamber's first attempt to participate in such federally-sponsored programs. PSIP represented a departure from earlier employment programs. It called for majority private sector input and spoke directly to the need to link training programs to actual jobs and demonstrated local needs. Thus, the PSIP program was a good beginning for the Chamber of Commerce as the program's goals were in line with those of the private sector. There is, however, one additional, plausible explanation for the local chambers' participation in PSIP: I believe that not only did the Chamber agree with PSIP, but also that the Chambers were comfortable in the local political context and were easily welcomed into participating in PSIP. The local chambers represent prominent business leaders in most local communities and they carry influence in local decision-making. Local
officials turned to the Chambers for business participation in PSIP. In addition, the National Alliance of Business, which was given money from DOL to implement PSIP and to help local prime sponsors establish PICs, worked closely with the Chamber of Commerce, and as a result, pushed for local chamber involvement in PSIP. My claim is simply that not only did the Chamber at the national level, and the local chambers throughout the country agree with PSIP, but that this was a business dominated program and the local chambers were easily and naturally called upon to participate. Unlike other groups that might have felt their minority status diminished their role in PSIP, the private sector was given a substantial opportunity to provide its opinions.

All Three Groups

It is interesting and useful to provide a discussion of local activity in PSIP looking at the three organizations collectively. This provides the opportunity to make some generalizations about what factors contributed to local participation in PSIP. As was the case with the three separate case studies regression analysis was chosen. Table 26 presents these results.
Table 26: Multiple Regression with Dependent Variable

Level of Activity in PSIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(B)</th>
<th>BETA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall EVAL of PSIP</td>
<td>.262</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Influence</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Position on PSIP</td>
<td>.335</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Assessment of COMM</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>.156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MULTIPLE R = .625  \( r^2 .40 \)

As Table 26 shows, four independent variables appeared to be most important in explaining interest group activity at the local level in PSIP. Most important was the composite index, which provided an overall evaluation of PSIP. This variable explained over half the total variance in the regression and represents a significant factor in local participation in PSIP. As pointed out in the individual discussions of group activity, the overall evaluation of PSIP has been consistently important in explaining local activity. The regression also shows that self-perceived influence explained activity at the local level. However, the relative influence of this variable is due almost entirely to its strength in only one group, the Urban League. Thus, it is not possible to make a generalization that self-perceived influence explains local activity in PSIP for the combined interest group population. The third variable that explains local group activity in PSIP is the existence and awareness of a national position on PSIP. In two of
the groups, the Urban League and the AFL-CIO, this variable provided an explanation for local activity. It suggests that local offices were influenced by their national office in its support for and endorsement of PSIP. In both these groups there was an expectation that the national office would take the lead in providing information on PSIP and consequently, one might expect that local offices would be influenced by national positions. The final variable that explains local activity for the combined population is the composite index of group communication strategies. This variable was important in varying degrees in all three of the groups and it seems possible to generalize about the importance of national communication efforts, no matter how modest, in explaining local activity in PSIP. This leads to the claim that national efforts that promoted PSIP and attempted to provide information and assistance to local offices were important in explaining local participation in PSIP.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has compared the National Urban League, the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce in PSIP. Specifically, I have determined each group's level of activity in PSIP and have provided a comparative exploration by focusing on the factors that are related to local activity. The chapter began with a discussion of the dependent variable, level of activity, and provided a short description of each group and its involvement in PSIP. I then presented the independent variables in the context of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 and compared the three groups on these dimensions. Where appropriate, I included a broader discussion of group activity by combining the groups and presenting bivariate relationships between the
dependent variable and selected independent variables. And, in an effort to offer a more precise and parsimonious explanation of group activity in the three groups, I compared the set of independent variables that explained group activity. Finally, this chapter looked at group activity more generally by presenting regression analysis of the combined interest group population.

Two types of conclusions can be offered. First, it should be clear from this chapter as well as the individual case studies, that each of the interest groups was active in PSIP, but that there were varying explanations for their activity. Moreover, each of the individual interest groups exhibited contrasting internal group dynamics and behaviors, some of which seemed to be related to PSIP local activity. However, I also discovered that some differences among the groups did not seem to explain local activity in PSIP. Here, for example, I found variations in the degree to which groups perceived themselves to be influential at the local level, but this did not seem to be strongly related to activity at the local level.

The second set of conclusions are more general in scope. More broadly, I have attempted in this chapter to make generalizations about the factors that relate to or influence interest group activity at the local level. Here, I have made an effort to follow some of the more theoretical claims made by students of policy implementation. Thus, for example, I have looked at whether or not group resources at the local level, including staff levels, are related to local activity. In addition, I have tried to determine how important agreement with program goals is in influencing group participation. And, I have also attempted to uncover whether local level participation in national policy-making is related to group activity at the
local level. The findings indicate that group evaluations of PSIP were critical to understanding local decisions to participate in PSIP and that, to a lesser degree, active national efforts that promoted PSIP and assisted local offices with the program also explained local decisions to participate in the implementation of PSIP.
End Notes

1. There is a slight variation in this index for each of the groups. Each of the case study chapters, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present the exact index. This is the most general index for all three groups.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has focused on interest group activity in PSIP. I have chosen three interest groups that have been participants in the program from its early stages of program formulation through the actual implementation of PSIP. Each of these organizations, the National Urban League, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce have national, regional, and affiliated local offices located throughout the United States. Like many other federal programs of the 1960s and 1970s, PSIP, which was one title of the 1978 CETA program, was conceived primarily in Washington and carried out in the nation's cities and counties, or prime sponsor areas. Each of these groups was involved, in varying degrees, in the formulation of PSIP as each appeared to have access to national PSIP policy-makers in Congress, the President's Domestic Policy Office, and the Department of Labor. And, each was given a role to play in the actual implementation of the program as members of newly formed PICs.

The Urban League, a long-time participant in the nation's employment and training programs since the early part of this century, was given money from the DOL to help implement PSIP to its local affiliates across the country. These funds went to staff offices at the national and regional levels to provide promotional, informational and technical assistance on PSIP to the 118 local Urban League affiliates.

The AFL-CIO, much like the Urban League, participated in past federal and local employment and training programs. It too, received DOL monies to help implement PSIP among its local unions and central labor councils throughout the country. Its funding from DOL was used to support the AFL-CIO's Human Resources Development Institute (HRDI), located in the Washington Headquarters and in metropolitan areas throughout the country.
HRDI was developed to promote employment and training, and its national, regional and metro offices were responsible for promoting PSIP and providing technical assistance to the local unions. HRDI metro offices were expected to help local unions and central labor bodies participate effectively in PSIP.

In contrast to both the Urban League and the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce had neither extensive prior employment and training experience nor money from the DOL to implement PSIP. However, the Chamber was clearly expected to play a significant role in PSIP implementation. The Chamber, along with a number of other influential business groups, had long complained about CETA and other federal employment programs. They perceived CETA to be wasteful and inefficient and to train people for jobs that were either short-term or non-existent. As such, the Chamber pushed for the development of a program that would overcome these shortcomings and to do this, they argued that the private sector should be involved in making local decisions about training programs. PSIP was, in many ways, a product of business initiative aimed at changing traditional employment programs. Clearly, the Chamber of Commerce was expected to play a part in the implementation of the program.

Thus, each of the interest groups picked for this analysis was involved in the formulation of PSIP and was expected to participate in the implementation of the program in prime sponsor locations throughout the country. I expected that each of these groups would be somewhat active in PSIP. Observations of PSIP implementation gained through fieldwork led me to conclude tentatively that interest groups were participating in PSIP. The question that remained was why? More specifically, what factors explained the level of activity of interest groups in PSIP?
The hypotheses and general expectations about what factors might explain local interest behavior were influenced by two separate bodies of literature. First, the newer scholarly research on interest groups derived primarily from the work of Mancur Olson influenced my theoretical framework and guided the approach. This literature looks at interest groups as organizations and explains group behavior as a function of internal group processes. Some elements of this organizational approach were appropriate for my research purposes and consequently, I looked at interest groups as political organizations. This meant that each group was viewed internally with particular emphasis on the relationship between the national and local level, the expectations each level had for participation in PSIP, and the extent to which the national office could require local participation in PSIP. These factors provided an assessment of the differences internal group dynamics and characteristics made in group behavior in the policy process. The organizational approach made it possible to see if there were differences in the ways in which each group handled PSIP.

In addition to the interest group literature, I derived a number of concepts and hypotheses from the recent implementation literature. Much of this literature has applied aspects of organizational theory to the study of policy implementation. And, a number of case studies detailing implementation problems and in some cases, implementation failure, have added an empirical perspective verifying the utility of these concepts. From these works I have been able to offer a variety of hypotheses leading to an explanation of local activity.
Summary Findings

In answering the question, what factors led to interest group activity in PSIP, it is useful to look at both the interest group and implementation approach and the implementation focus. In terms of this first approach, this research has demonstrated that the three groups did exhibit differences in the way they were involved in PSIP. Internal group dynamics and the nature of the group did have an effect on the levels of activity in PSIP.

The Interest Group Approach

Despite some reservations and concerns, the National Urban League strongly supported PSIP. The national office endorsed business involvement in employment and training decisions and early on in PSIP, it began an aggressive and extensive national campaign to involve the affiliates in local implementation of PSIP. National and regional staff were organized to provide information and technical assistance to the local offices and for some staff in these offices, the promotion and provision of information in CETA and PSIP, was their primary responsibility. Responses to the mail questionnaire showed that affiliates had a high degree of awareness of national communication strategies.

In addition to national communication efforts, other aspects of League internal dynamics were important in explaining local participation in PSIP. The research for this dissertation leads me to conclude that the League is an integrated and closely-knit organization. League affiliates were more likely than the other groups to indicate that they participated in national decision-making and that national staff solicited their participation in programmatic decisions. Moreover, NUL staff pointed out that national
endorsements and priorities were based primarily on local input. In addition to the tightly-knit character of the League, is the fact that the NUL, compared to the AFL-CIO and Chamber, is considerably smaller. This means that national staff are more easily able to communicate with local affiliates and provide assistance and individual attention. Finally, in concert with these factors is the claim I have made throughout this dissertation that PSIP, despite its private sector emphasis, was a program aimed at the League's clientele. It should be underscored that the League, a social service organization, maintained its involvement and participation in PSIP because the program was aimed directly at its clientele. The AFL-CIO and the Chamber did not share this natural involvement in PSIP.

The AFL-CIO, in contrast to the League, did not support PSIP enthusiastically. Early on, the AFL-CIO national office recommended that PSIP play only a minor role in CETA and it was not until the middle portion of PSIP that the national office jumped on the PSIP bandwagon. The HRDI reflected this muted support for PSIP. Its early technical assistance and promotional attempts were modest and it too, later stepped up its support for PSIP. Equally important is that the local labor councils did not seem to support PSIP with the same degree of enthusiasm as the League affiliates. Estimates indicated that slightly over half the councils were active in PSIP at the local level.

Two organizational factors may help to explain the AFL-CIO's involvement in PSIP. First, despite labor's support and participation in employment and training programs throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this is not its major goal. Labor officials at the local level told me that they could not seem to drum up support for CETA and PSIP among their rank-and-file. Part
of the explanation for this lack of interest among union members may have been the high union unemployment in the manufacturing and construction sectors during the time PSIP was in existence. Another possible explanation has to do with the widespread claim that labor has lost some of its power and clout in the last decade. This would also make training the disadvantaged an even lower priority than in the past. It might also mean that for those local councils that did participate in PSIP, their involvement may have been largely symbolic and protective of their political position at the local level.

In addition to the claim that employment and training is not a major goal or purpose of the AFL-CIO is the fact that the AFL-CIO is a large, diverse and highly decentralized organization. Despite HRDI's attempts to communicate with the local labor councils, the sheer size of the organization makes technical assistance efforts difficult. The data from the mail questionnaire indicated that labor councils received some form of written communication from HRDI, but that far fewer councils had any type of direct contact with HRDI staff. These internal factors paint a picture of an organization less integrated and less concerned with PSIP than the National Urban League.

The Chamber of Commerce provides a contrast to the NUL and the AFL-CIO. It supported PSIP vigorously, but unlike the Urban League did not have a mechanism or strategy for translating this support to the local chambers. The Chamber national office was ill-equipped to provide promotion of PSIP or technical assistance to the local chambers throughout the country. Only one staff member in the national office was assigned to PSIP and she did not see her role as a provider of information to the local offices.
The Chamber like the AFL-CIO is not concerned with employment and training for the disadvantaged as a primary goal or purpose of the organization. However, unlike the AFL-CIO, the Chamber had a more direct reason for involvement in PSIP in that it lobbied extensively for private sector participation in training programs and it was one of the likely organizations to promote PSIP to the business sector. Despite this, the Chamber did not promote PSIP extensively and although one-third of the local chambers were active in PSIP, the national Chamber hoped for more extensive local involvement. In fact, to avoid embarrassment the national office did not endorse my research and when contacted by local offices, told them not to answer my mail questionnaire. This suggests that organizationally the Chamber was not set up to promote PSIP and in its first attempt to push private sector involvement in employment and training it was unable to reach many of the local chambers. Here too, size was a factor. Like the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce is a far larger organization than the Urban League and promoting PSIP would have taken a greater effort and staff than the Chamber had available.

It is possible to offer some general conclusions about the organizational approach as a way in which to understand local activity in PSIP. First, the goals and purpose of the organization can help us understand activity at the local level. The League was more active than the AFL-CIO and the Chamber and I would argue one reason for this was its commitment to employment and training for the disadvantaged. This has been its clientele since its inception in 1913. Second, I would argue that the way in which the organization was set up was also important in understanding local activity in PSIP. The Urban League was able to promote PSIP to its local affiliates; the
Chamber on the other hand, was not. Had the Chamber had a more extensive staff and more of a promotional program at the national level, I would speculate that more chambers would have been active in PSIP at the local level.

These two points are important. Federal programs like PSIP and CETA that expect and encourage interest group participation in implementation should take into account these points. It makes little sense to expect that groups with little interest in the program or with inadequate staffs will be actively engaged in implementation. Lowi's claims about interest group liberalism are relevant. The DOL expected that these groups would implement PSIP and it encouraged this participation by funding the Urban League and the HRDI. They also funded the NAB, which was supposed to assist local chambers. However, these expectations may have been fallacious. The AFL-CIO failed to endorse PSIP for the first two years of the program and it only later supported the program when it realized private sector participation was a serious goal of the Administration. The Chamber, on the other hand, supported PSIP, but it failed to get this message across to a wide number of local offices. The Urban League was the only group in the sample both to endorse PSIP and to promote the program to its local affiliates. It was also, according to my data, the most active in PSIP.

The Implementation Approach

The implementation approach also served to provide an understanding of what factors explained local activity in PSIP. In all three groups, agreement with the goals and philosophy of PSIP was most important in explaining local participation in PSIP. It was clear from the data that a
positive evaluation of PSIP was most important in understanding the local offices' decision to participate in PSIP. These data confirm the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2. In addition to goal agreement as an explanation of local activity, the data for this study also showed that communications from the national office to the local office were important in explaining local participation in PSIP. The composite index of communication variables proved to be especially important as an explanation of local activity in two of the groups and was less important in the case of the Chamber of Commerce. Overall, it can be argued that active national promotion of PSIP through aggressive communication strategies was important in explaining local decisions to participate in the implementation of PSIP. However, the hypothesis that communications from local offices to the national office would lead to local implementation of PSIP was not supported by the data from the mail questionnaire. In addition, the expectation that adequate staff would lead to local activity was also not supported by the data. Staff shortages did not affect local decisions to participate in PSIP.

Future Research

This has been an exploratory study of interest group activity in PSIP. Some of the findings and conclusions have been tentative and in some cases, the data base has been insufficient. In this final section of the dissertation my focus will not be on what I found or what approaches I did take, but rather on paths not taken. The purpose of this section is to put the dissertation in perspective and to discuss future research strategies, strategies that would enhance future research efforts on this topic.
In the first place, research on interest group participation in cities and counties should pay greater attention to the local political environment and local political conditions. Simply put, in the case of PSIP it is likely that there were a variety of local political factors that were relevant to and important in gaining a complete picture of local interest group decisions to participate in the program. For example, it would be reasonable to argue that a group's position or stature in the local community and its relationship to the mayor, county executive or CETA office would be critical in assessing its willingness and ability to participate in PSIP. The mail questionnaire sent to the 118 prime sponsor areas did not ask local officials to describe political factors that might have affected their decisions to participate in PSIP. One question did ask respondents to note their perceptions of their organization's local influence in the community, but this question did not tap the full range of political conditions in the local area. Moreover, there was little variation in the responses on this question. Even more significant, however, is that a closed-ended mail questionnaire is not the proper instrument for obtaining data about variations in local political conditions. Closed-ended questions do not provide adequate opportunity for respondents to describe subtle and sensitive political factors. In addition, these sorts of questions require probing and follow-up questions that are not possible to include in closed-ended mail questionnaires.

These points lead me to conclude that in-depth personal interviews with a sample of local group officials as well as local political actors (elected and non-elected) in selected sites would have enhanced the findings of this study. These open-ended discussions would have provided a richer and more accurate assessment of local decisions to participate in PSIP and would have
given me a clearer sense of whether certain groups were restricted or less likely to be effective participants in PSIP. For example, in Milwaukee County, political factors and the dominance of the business community made it difficult for labor and community-based organizations to participate in a meaningful way in PSIP. In fact, even the Executive Director of the CETA Office complained that his organization was given little opportunity to participate substantively in PIC decisions. The County Executive, working closely with the Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce, encouraged the PIC to incorporate and to be aggressive in making local training decisions. In this instance it was clear that the incorporated PIC, dominated by the Association of Commerce and other prominent business leaders, controlled the PSIP dollars, made the ultimate decisions on what training programs to run, and chose the vendors. Groups other than business were consistently omitted from the decision-making process.

The Milwaukee County situation can be contrasted with the experiences of the St. Louis PIC. In St. Louis the PIC was multijurisdictional, consisting of four counties and the city of St. Louis. The size and scope of the PIC was unwieldy and as a result, the PIC and especially business representatives proved to be weak and only marginally involved in PSIP decision-making. In contrast to Milwaukee, community-based organizations and labor representatives, the traditional CETA participants, were able to remain active in PSIP. These groups also continued to receive training contracts and to further their interests in the community.

While Milwaukee and St. Louis are only two examples of the way in which PSIP was administered in local jurisdictions, they serve to illustrate the critical nature of local political conditions on group levels of activity in
the program. In the case of Milwaukee, clearly the activities of the Urban League affiliate and the county labor council were no doubt circumscribed by political decisions. The mail questionnaire used in this study was not able to uncover these situations and my suggestion for future analyses would be to obtain this sort of background information in a more systematic fashion. A small sample of prime sponsor locations could be chosen on the basis of size of community, region, amount of industry, racial composition, and type of PIC (incorporated, multijurisdictional) and face-to-face interviews with local PSIP actors could be used to reveal variations in political factors and their possible effects on local activity. These interviews would not generate quantitative measures; instead, they could provide insight into local participation patterns and add a deeper understanding of group levels of activity in PSIP.

A second recommendation for future research adds still another reason to conduct a small sample of personal interviews with local PSIP actors. The data analysis in this research project suffered from a lack of variation in the dependent variable, level of activity in PSIP. This lack of variation occurred for two reasons: First, as has already been discussed in Chapter 4, low response rates most likely led to biased results. In particular, in the case of the AFL-CIO, responses from the mail questionnaire indicated that a vast majority of labor councils were active in PSIP. Yet, data from Mershon Center fieldwork as well as national AFL-CIO estimates, showed different results. These sources indicated that the labor councils were considerably less active in PSIP.

While low response rates created possible inaccuracies in local activity levels, I would argue that the group activity measure had a second
problem: The questions in the mail survey designed to measure activity did not pick up actual substantive differences in levels of activity. Instead, the data measured respondents subjective, summary measures of activity. To be more specific, respondents were asked first, to indicate how they were active in PSIP (i.e. serving on the PIC, providing training), and second, asked to rate their level of involvement in the program. Results showed that there was little variation on the first question with most local officials reporting that they served on the PIC and only a small number reported serving as subcontractors or screening applicants for other programs. On the second question, again, significant variations in levels of activity were also not found. And additional problem with the summary measure is that it appeared to be highly subjective. To be precise, there was no objective definition or measurement of the various categories, very active, somewhat active, or not very active. Thus, one respondent might have viewed attending PIC meetings every few months as very active, while another viewed it as somewhat active. Also, once the PIC representative was at the PIC meeting there was no way of knowing whether he was an active participant, frequently making suggestions or offering criticisms of prime sponsor plans, or instead was a more passive participant.

Two suggestions for future research can be offered: First, more precise and sensitive questions for a mail survey can be designed. For example, instead of only asking respondents how active they were, it would be possible to ask them to rate their levels of activity on a numerical scale. This would yield more meaningful differences in levels of participation. It is also possible to devise a question designed to tap levels of PIC activity. This would also provide an objective measure of activity. For example,
respondents could check off the sorts of activities they engaged in as PIC members, including reading prime sponsor plans, suggesting new training programs, helping to design training programs, serving on PIC committees, and having direct contact with prime sponsor staff. These choices would furnish a more accurate sense of actual amounts of interest group participation. In other words, not only could respondents say they were active, they would have to describe their activity.

In addition to incorporating more precision into the mail questionnaire, it also seems likely that discussions with local actors, especially prime sponsor staff, could offer some important information about interest group activity. As I suggested earlier, these discussions with a small sample of local actors would not be useful for generating quantitative data, but rather would be helpful in providing background and additional information about group activity. It might have been interesting for prime sponsor staff to have rated levels of interest group activity. It is likely that had I talked with even a small group of local actors, I would have found further evidence that labor councils were less active than their responses indicated.

In addition to the above discussion of future research strategies, it is useful at this final juncture to put the dissertation and its findings in perspective. I began this study emphasizing two research approaches both of which pointed to the importance of the national-local relationship in explaining local participation decisions in PSIP. The implementation approach and my decision to view interest groups and their national offices and local affiliates as similar to the superior-subordinate structure of other organizations led to a clear national-local focus. This framework,
coupled with the research approach stressing the salience of group organizational factors and internal group dynamics, may have overstated the significance of national-local relations as an explanation of local activity in PSIP.

While it was clear in the case of the National Urban League and, to a lesser degree in the AFL-CIO, that national level actions had some impact on local decision-making in PSIP, the findings of this dissertation show that this relationship was less significant than I hypothesized. In fact, the factor that emerged as most important was an index of local evaluation of the program and agreement with its goals. These findings seem consistent with the politics and the nature of the federal system in the United States. To be more specific, while it was valuable and interesting to view each of these groups in a unified and coordinated organizational structure, the reality is that the national office and the local affiliates are quite independent and autonomous. One reason for this independence has to do with the fact that affiliates must compete for power and position at the local level. This makes their relationships with local political officials and issues of local concern more important than broad national programmatic goals. In short, the federal structure and the fact that local affiliates operate in the local political environment necessitates that groups make decisions on the basis of local, rather than national factors. This study has demonstrated that the focus of PSIP decision-making was at the local level and that national efforts to promote the program were less important than expected.
End Notes

APPENDIX A

National and Regional Interviews

The Urban League
Ms. Jacqueline Patterson, Director, Eastern Regional Office
Ms. Kim St. Bernard, Assistant Director for Economic Resources, Eastern Regional Office
Mr. Jim Reed, Staff Associate, Community Based Organization Partnership Program
Mr. George Dawson, Director, Community Based Organization Partnership Program
Mr. Vince Austin, Deputy Director, Community Based Organization Partnership Program

The AFL-CIO
Ms. Jane McDonald Pines, Special Assistant to the Executive Director, Human Resources Development Institute
Mr. Mike Arnold, Executive Director, HRDI
Mr. Markley Roberts, Department of Economic Research
Mr. Robert McGlotten, Lobbyist
Mr. John Clark, HRDI, St. Louis

The Chamber of Commerce
Mr. Michael Romig, Director, Human Resources Division
Ms. Madeleine Hemmings, Associate Director, Education, Employment and Training Office
Ms. Millicent Woods, NAB, formerly chamber staff in Education, Employment and Training Office
Ms. Mary Ann Donovan, NAB, formerly chamber staff in Human Resources Division
Mr. Mark Herriott, Program Manager, Education and Employment, Northern Central Region

237
APPENDIX B

DIRECTIONS: Please check the responses that most closely reflect your opinions and positions on the following items:

SECTION I. Title VII Program and Communication Strategies

1. How has your local been involved in the Private Sector Initiatives Program? In other words, how has your local participated in Title VII?

_____ running Title VII program as subcontractor (what kind of program ___________).

_____ membership on the Private Industry Council

_____ screening and referring applicants for Title VII program offered by other subcontractors

_____ we have not been active in PSIP

_____ other (please specify)

2. In general, how active would you say your local has been in Title VII activities?

_____ very active

_____ somewhat active

_____ not very active

_____ not at all active

3. Do you agree with the philosophy of the Title VII program?

_____ strongly agree

_____ agree

_____ disagree

_____ strongly disagree

238
4. How well do you think PSIP has operated and served the disadvantaged?
   ____ very good job
   ____ good job
   ____ fair job
   ____ poor job
   ____ very poor job

5. How strongly do you agree with the goals of Title VII?
   ____ strongly agree
   ____ agree
   ____ disagree
   ____ strongly disagree

6. Does the national office of the Title VII program have a position on the Title VII program?
   ____ yes
   ____ no
   ____ not sure
   (If no, skip to question 10)

7. How would you characterize that position?
   ____ strongly in favor of Title VII
   ____ in favor of Title VII
   ____ neutral
   ____ opposed to Title VII
   ____ strongly opposed to Title VII
8. Has the position of the on the Title VII program been fairly consistent since the program's enactment in 1978?
___ yes
___ no

9. (If no to above question) Have these changes in position been adequately communicated to local?
___ yes
___ no

10. Is your participation in the Title VII program, here at the local level, governed by specific standards or expectations set by the national office?
___ yes
___ no

11. (If yes to above question) Are national office standards and expectations for Title VII clearly communicated to the local?
___ yes
___ no

12. Does the national office provide advice or technical assistance on Title VII matters to the local level?
___ yes
___ no

(If no, skip to question 16)

13. How often does the national office provide advice or technical assistance for participation in Title VII?
___ often
___ sometimes
___ not very often
14. What method of communication has been used? (Check more than one if appropriate)
   ___ newsletters
   ___ conferences
   ___ personal contacting
   ___ other (please specify)

15. How clearly was this advice and technical assistance communicated to the local?
   ___ very clearly
   ___ somewhat clearly
   ___ not very clearly

16. Generally speaking, how frequently do national leaders or national staff communicate with local on Title VII?
   ___ very frequently
   ___ frequently
   ___ not very frequently
   ___ not at all

17. In general, how adequate is the quality of communication on Title VII between the national office and your local?
   ___ very good
   ___ good
   ___ poor
   ___ very poor
18. In general, would you say that you were satisfied with the level of
direction in Title VII provided by the national office?

___ very satisfied

___ satisfied

___ not very satisfied

___ not at all satisfied

19. Do you feel that you have adequate staff to carry out your Title VII responsibilities?

___ yes, we have adequate staff

___ no, we are a few members short

___ no, we are seriously understaffed

20. How would you characterize your influence with important PSIP policy-makers (elected and non-elected) at the local level?

___ we are very influential

___ we are sufficiently influential

___ we have insufficient influence

___ we are not influential at all

SECTION 2. Group Goals, Participation and Activities

21. How much agreement is there between the local and national levels on goals for the participation in PSIP?

___ very strong agreement between levels

___ strong agreement between levels

___ moderate agreement between levels

___ not very strong agreement between levels

___ no agreement between levels
22. Do you feel that the national leaders and national staff of the
adequately represent the interests of local
? In other words, how well are local needs
represented?

_____ well represented
_____ moderately represented
_____ poorly represented
_____ not represented at all

23. To what extent do local participate in policy-
making at the national level?

_____ high level of participation
_____ moderate level of participation
_____ not very high level of participation
_____ no participation on the part of the local labor councils

24. Have you or anyone in your office been asked by the national office
to provide testimony to Congress on PSIP?

_____ yes
_____ no

25. Have you or anyone in your office had contact with House or Senate
committee staff members?

_____ yes
_____ no
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