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The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1986

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THE EFFECTS OF LEADER ORIENTATION
AND THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT ON
AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Eric Singer, B.A., M.A., M.A.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
1986

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(well, let's not go overboard) helped me in the darkest of moments. More importantly, her typing skills and her role as devil's advocate are in large measure responsible for my finishing this draft. Thanks, I couldn't have done it without you.
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INTRODUCTION

The research performed in this dissertation emanates from my association with the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project, co-directed by Charles F. and Margaret G. Hermann. The CREON Project was born out of the need to develop multi-level, cross-national explanations of foreign policy behavior. As a consequence, the principal investigators began the task of collecting data on thirty-eight nations for the decade 1959-68. Hermann with Hudson (1983) succinctly summarizes the tenets of the project to which the data collection effort was directed:

1). The CREON Project's primary purpose is to develop multi-level, integrated explanations of the foreign policy activities of national governments. More specifically, we seek to create models of decision making that will generate statements that assess the likelihood of a government's particular foreign policy response to the problems they confront.

2). The CREON Project seeks to establish the likelihood of discrete occurrences of behavior by a government, in contrast with other efforts (e.g., Rummel's or Wilkenfeld et al.'s) that attempt to account for patterns or trends in policy across time. This
fundamentally differentiates the research concern of CREON from many other current efforts. The difference can be illustrated by a simple analogy to meteorology. One type of meteorological study involves examining the reasons for some longitudinal pattern in precipitation in a certain region. An alternative meteorological concern is forecasting the likelihood and form of any precipitation at a given location in the next 24 hours based on the configuration of expected conditions. The latter is analogous to the CREON concern.

3). The CREON model is not a closed system in that subsequent uses of the model cannot be estimated exclusively from the prior outputs of the model. Instead, a future estimate of the model for the same regime and class of problem depends upon a combination of feedback from the model's previous iterations and exogenous inputs not determined from the model's prior operation. There are dynamic feedback loops in the model that incorporate experience or "learning", but they alone are not sufficient.

4). The CREON model attempts to explicate the argument or logic for the hypothesized relationships among the model components and variables and the conditions under which they are expected to hold, this being done independent of the method of analysis. In other words, we want to have reasons for the expected relationships and
the circumstances under which they exist before we engage in empirical testing. Several other comparative foreign policy efforts have tended to depend on the revelations of a particular historical case study, or a statistical model, to establish relationships. The expected and the observed become one, and explanation is foregone or post hoc.

5). The CREON Project avoids the specification of key variables or critical relationships that we cannot imagine being able to operationalize directly or indirectly on a cross-national basis (e.g., individual preferences of all higher level policy makers in a regime). Although we try to avoid such variables, the Project makes a conscious effort to find substitutes or more generalizable variants for elements that seem important.

6). For the foreseeable future, the CREON Project is limited to modelling the foreign policy behavior of national governments. Our model recognizes, however, that national governments are affected by and respond to, other kinds of international actors.

7). The CREON Project seeks to explain a variety of governmental behavior, not just one type, such as conflict behavior. It also seeks to account for routine as well as dramatic foreign policy behavior.

8). The CREON Project, as is no doubt evident by
now, does not regard parsimony as a criterion of major concern in the early stages of model construction. We believe we are dealing with a complex system whose dynamics, at least at the present level of human understanding, may be critically affected by the interaction of a large number of factors. Concentration on one or two of these elements in isolation seems likely to produce serious distortions in the ability to account for the range of behavior of present interest.

Furthermore, we interpret the history of at least some sciences as moving from initially more complex interpretations to subsequent ones which are more elegant. (Models of the sun and planets would be an example.) We view model building of foreign policy as being at an early stage.

Building upon this framework, the development of the CREON model has provided students of comparative foreign policy a significant heuristic tool for testing hypotheses about foreign policy behavior. A brief review of the model will provide the intellectual context in which this research endeavor should be evaluated.

The first point to make in discussing the model is the important distinction between foreign policy and foreign policy behavior. According to Hermann (in East et al., 1978), the latter is the observable manifestation of the former, which in turn is the product of decisions made
by national elites with the authority to commit resources in response to perceived discrepancies between actual and desired states of foreign affairs. Given CREQN's commitment to employing the methods of science, it is the observable behavior of nations that is to be explained.

The diverse array of foreign national behaviors in the international environment necessitated the adoption of a set of constructs into which all types of behavior could be evaluated. As a consequence, CREQN regards foreign policy behavior as an act of communication, addressed to and/or designed to influence an entity outside the political jurisdiction of the acting national government. As an act of communication, all behavior can be subjected to the question, "who does what to whom, how?"; the answer to which incorporates basic elements of any foreign policy behavior:

1). **Who** is doing the behaving? Who is the **actor**?

2). **To whom** was the behavior addressed? Who is the **recipient**?

3). **What** was done and **how** was the behavior accomplished?

   a). Was it friendly or hostile? What was the direction and intensity of expressed **affect**?

   b). Was a use of resources, or pledging involved? What level of **commitment** was displayed?

   c). What means were used to implement the
behavior? What *instrumentality* was used? (E.g., military, economic, diplomatic, etc.)

A second point in introducing the model concerns the concept of foreign policy problem, the "trigger" that activates the model. A problem occurs, contends Hermann (1978), when an actor perceives a discrepancy between actual and desired states of affairs, and this discrepancy somehow involves a foreign entity. This phenomenon may alternately be seen as a problem or an opportunity. The decisions the actor makes to reduce or eliminate that discrepancy can be manifested in foreign policy behavior. In the CREON model, then, an actor acts only in response to the perception of this discrepancy.

The delineation of the concept of problem, and the specification of the attributes of foreign policy behavior to be explained, enables one to present the explanatory components of the model. Figure 1 depicts the three components and variables for each.¹

The first explanatory component, the External Predisposition component, attempts to characterize the set of circumstances embedded in every foreign policy problem. The compelling feature of the component is the assertion that actors typically choose behavior that is appropriate to the problem circumstances. External predisposition employs role analysis to sort out what entities are relevant to a problem situation, and the role
THE TRIGGER

Foreign Policy Problem

Type of Deprivation
   Whose Deprivation
   Basic Value

THE EXPLANATORY COMPONENTS

I. External Predisposition Component

   Roles
   Relationships Between Roles
   Types of Situations

II. Societal Structure and Status Component

   Nonpolitical constraints
   Available capability
   Basic societal needs

III. Political Structure and Choice Component

   Decision Unit Type
   Regime Orientation
   Regime Fragmentation
   Domestic Opposition

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Foreign Policy Behavior

   Actor
   Recipient
   Affect
   Commitment
   Instrumentality

Figure 1: An outline of the main elements of the CREON model of foreign policy behavior
location of each relative to the actor. The roles, and consequently, the situation, is determined on the basis of the actor's perception of the problem. For example, two roles that are in every problem in addition to the actor role, are the source (or cause of a problem) and a subject (those directly affected by the problem). The configuration of these roles structures the type of situation the actor is facing, and thus limits the range of appropriate behaviors. Additionally, an examination of the relationships between the actor and the relevant entities in the context of a specific type of situation allows for the generation of hypotheses about specific behavioral outcomes.

In essence, external predisposition "black boxes" the internal structure and processes of nations and examines the effects of external variables alone. It must be stressed that this "predisposition" does not correspond to some actual mental state of the national decision-makers. The external predisposition is simply a representation of the effects of factors external to the actor.

The second component of the model, the Societal Structure and Status component, is designed to explore the effects of nonpolitical properties of a national society on the response to a foreign policy problem. Specifically, three factors are considered: the
nonpolitical constraints on governmental decision-making; available capabilities; and basic societal needs. The component seeks to explain differences in behavioral responses of nations facing similar problems by reference to the variation in the human and nonhuman resources available to nations, and the manner in which societies are organized to utilize these resources. Nonpolitical constraints involve limitations on governmental action arising from difficulties in obtaining or mobilizing resources. Available capabilities provides for an assessment of a nation's supply of resources germane to the problem. The third area, perceived societal needs, enables an estimate to be made of the types of international transactions national decision-makers will conduct to fulfill their needs. A knowledge of constraints, capabilities, and needs can serve as an aid to determining the types of foreign policy behavior that are more or less likely to occur.

The third component, the Political Structure and Choice component, provides the decision-making context through which information from the other two components are filtered. It is argued that a decision unit within the actor's government will exercise the ultimate authority with respect to a given foreign policy problem. The identification of the ultimate decision unit, and the political factors affecting that unit's judgement comprise
the core of the component.

Hagan, Hermann and Hermann (1982) suggest that the ultimate decision unit can be classified broadly into three types: a predominant leader decision unit where the leader's personality and preferences are paramount; a single group decision unit where the composition of the group and their methods for reaching agreement are important; and multiple autonomous decision units where circumstances outside the units may determine outcomes. Once the type of unit has been identified, knowledge of factors affecting the decision unit provide additional insights into the foreign policy process. These factors include regime fragmentation, the degree to which the regime's power is structurally divided; regime orientation, shared beliefs motivating regime behavior; and domestic opposition, the strength and position of which may influence regime behavior.

The specification of the model components is to be followed by operationalization and empirical examination of each component in isolation, so as to gauge the merits of each before the more conceptually and methodologically complex task of integration is undertaken. At this point, only the first component, external predisposition, has been fully operationalized and subjected to an empirical examination. A full explication of the model (Hudson, 1983), and the analysis of the test (Hudson, 1983; Hudson,
Hermann and Singer, 1984) reveals, inter alia, that the model is able to discriminate meaningfully between the external environments of nations through the examination of their situational profiles.

The research presented in this dissertation attempts to build upon the CREON research presented above. As will be fully delineated in the chapters that follow, my research project incorporates factors of the external environment (the external predisposition component) and the qualities and quirks of predominant leader (one of the decision unit types examined by the Political Structure and Choice Component) in an attempt to hypothesize the likely foreign policy behavior of the leaders/nations selected for the study. As is evident, these factors emanate from separate components of the CREON model, and as a consequence, one could consider this project as a first, albeit crude, attempt at model integration. I emphasize the crude nature of the integration attempt because it is not the motivating element to this dissertation. As will be demonstrated later, the motivating force is the challenge of modelling the factors, and assessing the contribution of the factors, first in isolation, then in combination, as explanatory tools for further and more complex modelling attempts that would incorporate still other factors and components of the CREON model.
Nevertheless, the question of how one integrates these factors is an interesting one. Hermann and Hermann (1984), reflecting on integration strategies for computer simulation in honor of Harold Guetzkow, present three possible strategies.

The first strategy, labelled the Decision-maker as Modifier Approach, revolves around the notion that the effects of internal and external factors on foreign policy behavior can be hypothesized. "Decision-makers act upon, or modify, these predispositions for certain foreign policy behavior generated by the external and domestic environments." (Hermann and Hermann, 1984, p. 15)

In the second strategy, the Single Actor as Information Processor Approach, decision-makers "act as information processors employing the principles of selective perception and retention." Factors of the internal/external environment are not modified by, but filtered through the decision-maker. As the Hermanns point out, in order for this approach to be operative, one must make a major simplifying assumption – namely, that the decision-maker can be treated as a single unified actor.

The third strategy, the Multi-Actor Bargaining Approach, in contrast to the previous one, seeks to expose all the relevant actors in the decision-making process, and, similar to the bureaucratic politics framework,
attempts to incorporate facets of each participant's role in the decision unit.

This all-too-brief description of the strategies is made only to underscore the alternatives one must confront when attempting to integrate factors from different levels of analysis. The approach adopted here is really a mix of strategies one and two — the Decision-maker as Modifier, and the Single Actor Approaches. In essence, the simplifying assumption of the latter is made in order to generate hypotheses about individual influences on foreign policy behavior. In turn, information about the external environment is filtered through the conceptual lense of the individual. However, features of the first strategy are also incorporated, namely, that the hypothesized effects of external factors are modified by the individual decision-maker. These differences are reconciled by the situation confronting the actor. In some situations, the individual acts as a modifier, in others as information processor.

Before creating more confusion than necessary, let us turn to the task at hand now that the intellectual context of this research has been established.
FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

1 As of this writing, the CREON Project directors are evaluating the possibility of detaching domestic opposition from the third component and creating a fourth, Opposition (both domestic and external), which would be independent of the Political Structure and Choice component.
Chapter 1:
The Individual as Foreign Policy Decision-Maker:
An Overview

In seeking to develop explanations of nations' foreign policy behavior, it has become increasingly evident that consideration must be given to the personal characteristics of the decision-making elite. Recognizing this need, various scholars have attempted to determine the influence of, inter alia, elite motivation, perception, background, reaction to stress, and memory. Uniting these efforts is a common subscription to a micro-analytic view of politics, that is, that the roots of explanation are to be found in lower levels of analysis, as versus higher levels.

The merits of examining the individual decision-maker are now well accepted in the international relations community of scholars (see, for example, Sylvan and Chan, 1984), but it has only been fairly recently in the history of international relations (the last three decades or so), that international relations scholars have incorporated these considerations into their analytical perspectives on foreign national policy making and behavior in a systematic fashion. In international relations, this perspective began to evolve in the early
1950's with the efforts of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954). Snyder et al. felt that decision-makers' motivations and decision-making contexts were critical to understanding their actions. They were reacting to commonly held beliefs in the international relations (IR) community that treated decision-making bodies as unitary, rational actors qua nation-states; that all cultures share the same view of reality; and that constraints imposed by the international system all but determine foreign policy behavior. The research questions Snyder et al. raised are, in many respects, still the ones that scholars of decision-making are currently researching. Over the last three decades, scholars have filled volumes exploring such questions as:

- who becomes a political leader — overall and in different political contexts?
- is there homogeneity in the personal characteristics of political leaders? If not, how do we compare them, and what differences are there?
- under what decision-making conditions are personal characteristics more or less important?
- how does stress affect a leader's decision-making?
- when is a given type of leader more or less likely to misperceive or reject certain types of information?
what impact does the decision-making environment have on individual leaders' decision-making?
what impact do leaders' personal characteristics have on national foreign policy behavior?
how can researchers collect data on and typologize the characteristics of these relatively inaccessible persons?

Since the purpose of this review section is not only to demonstrate the utility of studying individual decision-makers, but also as a means of placing my own research into the proper context for evaluation, the following in depth reviews will focus on those efforts most relevant in that regard. To this end, the following research areas will be examined: operational code, national role conception, and personal characteristics. While there are several other research areas which explore the individual in the decision-making environment (see above list of research questions), these three provide an appropriate point of departure for my own efforts. Furthermore, they are more or less interrelated in terms of having a common analytic perspective - namely, how individuals' beliefs, images, motives, and decision/interpersonal style influence the policy making process and the behavior their governments are likely to manifest.

As a preface to the discussion of these three areas,
it would be careless to not point out the enormous intellectual debt that scholars of decision-making in IR owe the field of psychology. While many in IR now recognize the importance of individual characteristics on behavior, psychologists have been developing analytical perspectives on political leadership for a long time. Research on human instinct and aggression (Dollard, 1939; Lorenz, 1967), on beliefs (Leites, 1951), on dogmatic authoritarian personalities (Adorno, 1950; Rokeach, 1954 and 1960), nationalism and self-esteem (Lasswell, 1935), and on group behavior in the decision-making process (Janis, 1972), to name just a few, have influenced and shaped the development of constructs and perspectives that we find in IR research today.

In IR literature, one of the most widely acclaimed early attempts to incorporate the individual perspective into a decision-making framework was undertaken by Alexander George. Employing a framework of analysis developed by Nathan Leites (1951) in Leites' study of Bolshevism, George (1969) outlined the operational code of leaders. Simply stated, the operational code (OC) reflects the general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as they bear, in turn, on the problem of action. The central premise of his framework is that individuals must necessarily simplify and structure the complexity of the world in
order to cope with it. Further, individuals structure situations to fit past experiences and beliefs. These beliefs are resistant to change and can be studied and inferred from the elite's speech and actions. It is important to note that George excludes ethical and normative beliefs from the OC, focusing solely on beliefs about political life. To this end, he distinguishes between philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. The former is primarily concerned with the nature of politics and conflict, and the role of the individual in history, while the latter reflects means-ends strategy and the evaluation of alternatives. George constructed the OC as two sets of questions concerning these beliefs, the answers to which "can help the researcher and the policy planner to 'bound' the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action." (George, 1969, p.200)

Thus, George does not claim to be able to make precise statements about behavior using the OC, but to create margins within which one will find the likely types of action an individual is predisposed to engage in.

A number of studies have been undertaken employing the OC framework (Hermann, 1977 lists sixteen such studies performed on such elites as U.S. Senators, Secretaries of State, and heads of governments from a variety of
nations). Each has provided fresh insights into the usefulness and drawbacks of the OC approach. However, it is George himself (1977), in an article reflecting on the decade of research since the development of his 1969 work, that provides the most cogent assessment of the problems and promise of OC research.

To George, the problems of OC research stem from its application in the decision-making context. In other words, how can one assess the impact of OC beliefs on decisional choices? George correctly raises two important methodological obstacles to making such an assessment. The first is the problem of gauging whether or not apparent inconsistencies between beliefs and actions are genuine or spurious. Due to ambiguities in the OC belief system, it is difficult to introduce lawlike generalizations that can demonstrate causality from beliefs to actions. However, suggests George, by incorporating situational analysis in examining sequences of decisions over a period of time, one may derive "consistencies" that can establish beliefs as having a causal impact on decision-making. He cites the study of Kissinger by Walker (1977) as a particularly impressive effort in this regard.

The second important methodological obstacle concerns the challenge of establishing the explanatory power of beliefs. As George states, "the temptation to
regard operational code beliefs as a necessary condition when congruence has been demonstrated is often irresistible; therefore, explicit safeguards against a premature, possibly unwarranted interpretation of this kind are necessary." (George, 1977, p. 108)

In many respects this issue is of greater importance than the first, for even if one can establish "causal congruence", the importance of beliefs as a necessary (not to mention sufficient) condition may not be established, reducing one's claim of causality to wishful thinking. George outlines and illustrates a method he feels can plausibly demonstrate the explanatory power of beliefs. By replicating the procedures of a controlled experiment, the researcher can ascertain if the independent variable (beliefs) explains more than one value of the dependent variable (decision option chosen). If the former does account for more than one option, then the explanatory power of beliefs is diminished, as other factors must be employed to account for the particular choice made by the leader among the options. In other words, if belief X is consistent not only with the leader choosing option A, but also B and C, then one must question the power of X in explaining why A is chosen.

George elaborates a "process-tracing procedure" that can overcome this problem, citing studies by White (1969) on Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, and Ashby (1969) on
Schumacher and Brandt, as contrasts in terms of types of conclusions that can be drawn when process-tracing is utilized and when it is not. White's study, employing a scheme similar to the one George outlines, demonstrates how differences in Mao's and Liu's beliefs about political conflict and the nature of the enemy resulted in differences in policy preferences. On the other hand, Ashby, failing "to identify how each man's operational code influenced the formulation of his policy preferences", could not demonstrate the importance of their OC beliefs in explaining their policy-making.

Without trying to diminish the importance of these methodological obstacles, their magnitude tends to overshadow the contributions that OC research has made to the study of decision-making. OC research has provided a means of examining the role of beliefs in the decision-making process without slipping into the conceptually messy areas of norms and ethics. It has thus allowed researchers to systematically examine idiosyncratic, individual level variables, and attempt to apply them in a decision-making context that, as Snyder et al. pointed out, had previously assumed only rationality and unity. As a consequence of introducing "human" factors, our models of decision-making can better approximate reality.

A second area of research that has contributed to
our understanding of decision-making is that of national role conception (NRC). Developed by Kal Holsti (1970), NRC refers to "the policymakers' own definition of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems." (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245-246) Utilizing constructs developed by role theorists, Holsti elaborates the dynamics by which NRCs influence behavior:

ROLE PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EGO'S ROLE CONCEPTIONS</th>
<th>PO-</th>
<th>ALTER'S PRESCRIPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources of INTERESTS, GOALS, ATTITUDES, VALUES, PERSONALITY NEEDS</td>
<td>SI-</td>
<td>Sources of CULTURE, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, LAWS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Diagram of national role conception

According to role theory, the left side of Figure 2 suggests how individual decision-makers develop decisions and behavior on the basis of their own role expectations, whereas the right side of the figure represents the external environment's expectations of role and consequent behavior. Holsti points out two important hurdles to be surmounted before applying these constructs to foreign policy analysis. The first is the problem of applying the
concept of position (that is, the set of role expectations) to the foreign policy milieu. Due to the lack of a clearly defined set of "duties, right and privileges", it may be ambiguous exactly how to apply the role expectation in concrete instances. The second hurdle, related to the first, is the difficulty of establishing the "alter's prescriptions" in an international context. Precisely because the external environment of nations contains few, if any, enforceable laws, institutions, or customs, the influence of these sources is greatly diminished as a source for understanding "position".

As a means of overcoming these stumbling blocks, Holsti proposes a modification of the framework. He reduces the impact of the right side - "alter's prescriptions" - indicating that "...role prescriptions and sanctions from this source are potential and intermittent." (Holsti, 1970, p. 244) In other words, he holds it constant relative to the policy-maker's role conceptions.

In applying the framework to foreign policy analysis, Holsti developed a typology of contemporary national role conceptions by examining speeches, debates, broadcasts, communiques, and interviews of the top leadership of nations (1965-67). As a result of this empirical examination, and through consulting the foreign
policy literature, seventeen national role conceptions are elaborated (see Holsti, 1970, pp.249-273).

On the basis of his analysis, Holsti found that states fulfill many roles - an average of 4.6 per state (3.4 if one omits single references). In terms of substance, Holsti's findings suggest that important differences in national roles emerge that previous research could not divine. For example,

Differences between states which are commonly lumped together as non-aligned are even more apparent. Two extreme examples would be Burma and Egypt. Both avoided references of military commitment to major powers....The term Isolate is a much more appropriate summary of Burma's role....In contrast, Egyptian foreign policy statements are rich in themes indicating continuing tasks and responsibilities in regional affairs." (Holsti, 1970, p. 279)

This single example, one of the many provided by Holsti, suggests NRCs can be a useful analytic tool for uncovering differences in nations' foreign policy activities. In point of fact, the Burma/Egypt contrast is an example of one of Holsti's hypotheses that a relationship exists between NRCs and the activity/passivity of states. However, in developing a richer understanding of foreign policy, the generality of NRCs, in terms of types of behaviors associated with specific NRCs, reduces the framework's ability to link roles to behavior. This, in turn, renders NRCs as unlikely sources of explanation, since they are unable to generate specific behavioral
outcomes, nor demonstrate the nature of the relationship between NRCs and foreign policy behavior. Thus the NRC framework must be considered as an ad hoc typology. In all fairness to Holsti, he offers no argument for the NRC framework as anything more than that. However, he does contend that the concept of NRC can contribute to the development of foreign policy theory: "(s)een as output of decision-making, the concept can be linked to a number of general variables which have been suggested as relevant to policy, but which have not been related successfully to single decisions." He further suggests that NRCs can be used as "inputs into a ‘system’", whereby modifications in the distributions of NRCs among the member states can alter the properties of the system.

Holsti's typology and adaptation of role theory offer potentially rewarding analytic tools for the foreign policy analyst. As he has demonstrated in his literature review (see Holsti, 1970), the idea of nations' behavior emanating from role expectations and role positions is not new. However, if cast in the perspective of role theory, it affords the analyst the means of systematically examining both the changes in behavior of a single nation and the differences and similarities in behavior between nations. Further, the typology offers a plausible, even if not exhaustive, set of roles which can be applied and tested in a variety of research areas. One particularly
promising application of NRC comes to mind, namely
Walker's (1977 and 1984) articulation of a framework that
incorporates concepts from the role theory literature,
combined with the use of Holsti's NRCs to test the
relationship between role conception and role enactment.

Walker has imaginatively adapted the concepts of
role theory to foreign policy analysis. Essentially, his
framework operates on the assumption that nations (or
leaders of nations) have a repertoire of roles that are
enacted in specific foreign policy situations. His
framework, as constructed, postulates how the roles are
selected, then generates hypotheses about the relationship
between role conception and role enactment (behavior).
The emphasis in the discussion below will be on the
framework itself and not on the specific hypotheses or
empirical examination.

The construct that represents the core of Walker's
framework uses the role location process, which is defined
as an:

...inferencing process having to do with finding
which role is appropriate in a particular
situation. Such inferences are determined by the
actor from his repertoire of roles which he has
acquired from previous experience in similar
situations. If it is a novel situation, then
the actor may have to learn a new role or 'muddle
through' with an existing one." (Walker, 1977,
p. 177)

This inferencing process is a function of role
expectations, role cues, and role demands. Role
expectations refer to "a set of cognitions pertaining to performance by any occupant of a social position in relation to occupants of other positions. These cognitions are formed as a result of an interaction between prescriptions previously communicated to the actor from other actors and the actor's own perceptions, values, and attitudes." (Walker, 1977, p. 177) Role cues and demands flow from the specific situation which may influence role selection. Cues refer to the behavior of others in the situation which can "reinforce or discriminate against" the actor's initial role selection, while demands reflect other features of the situation that influence the actor's choice (Walker uses audience composition as an example of this). Walker cites Sarbin and Allen (1968) to point out that the ambiguity of the external environment suggests the role location process is not a predetermined one. Despite this ambiguity, the role theory framework provides a plausible set of variables for examining the means by which expectations and situations can influence role selection. By specifying what external environmental influences impact on an actor's set of role expectations, and how this interaction influences role selection, one may derive testable hypotheses concerning the degree to which situational and external factors impinge on an actor's role selection.

The final area of research to be examined is the
work done on individuals' personal characteristics as they influence behavioral predispositions. As alluded to earlier, while a strong tradition of research along these lines has emerged from the psychology literature, it has only been recently that personal characteristics as explanatory variables have been substantially incorporated into the foreign policy literature.

One of the influential scholars in this area of inquiry is M.G. Hermann, whose research on the impact of a leader's personal characteristics on decision-making is recognized as defining and shaping the direction of research on the role of the individual leader in the foreign policy process. Her framework is not only important enough to discuss in detail in this review, but also provides a large part of the foundation upon which my own research is based.

As Hermann's model is currently constructed, eight personal characteristics combine to form four dimensions of an individual's foreign policy personality, which in turn represents an individual's views of the world and his personal political style. On the basis of various permutations of values for the eight characteristics, six orientations to foreign affairs are postulated. It should be noted that Hermann (see 1980) explicitly states that the model was constructed on the basis of reviewing the literature on individuals in foreign policy. The
orientations were conceptualized (Holsti's national role conceptions providing some of the cues for their development, according to Hermann), after which the values for the characteristics were elaborated to conform to that conceptualization. Comprehension of this temporal sequence is necessary to unravel the implications of the conceptualization.

Hermann postulates that the model demonstrates how differing values of the eight characteristics, structured by the four dimensions (beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style) interact to produce six distinct orientations to foreign affairs. (It should be noted that the literature is rich in applications of these personal characteristics, both individually and in combination. In particular, research by Atkinson (1958) on need for achievement, Winter (1973) on need for power, and Terhune (1970) on need for affiliation, have influenced Hermann's model conceptualization). Upon careful examination, however, one could conclude that the model actually produces different facets, or variations, of a single, multidimensional foreign affairs orientation. In other words, the six orientations could alternatively be seen as six aspects of one individual decision-maker, without producing any major inconsistencies in the individual's personality. Evidence for this alternate conceptualization rests in the construction of the model,
as illustrated in Figure 3.

The model posits a relationship between pairs of personal characteristics that produce the dimensions of an individual's foreign affairs personality. As a consequence, different combinations of the values on the eight characteristics produce variations in each dimension. (See Table 1) The dimensions, in turn, describe an individual's view of the world and political style. When we examine the permutations of the values assigned to the eight characteristics in relation to the orientations, we find that, whether viewed in pairs or even in isolation, the permutations may not be diverse enough to represent substantially distinct foreign affairs personalities.

Consider the following points:

1). the expansionist and the active independent have the same beliefs, and the same can be said of the influential and the mediator/integrator.

2). the active independent, mediator/integrator, and developmentalist all have the same motives.

3). the active independent, developmentalist, and influential all have the same decision style, and the same can be said of the mediator/integrator and the opportunist.
Figure 3: Hermann's Model

(From M. Hermann, 1980, p. 62)
### Personal Characteristic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Belief in Own Ability to Control Events</th>
<th>Need Power</th>
<th>Need Affiliation</th>
<th>Conceptual Complexity</th>
<th>Self-Confidence</th>
<th>Distrust of Others</th>
<th>Task Orientation</th>
<th>Leaders Exhibiting Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Castro (Cuba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nasser (Egypt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Gandhii (India)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lin Piao (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Chou En-tai (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotsyglin (Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator/Integrator</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Diefenbaker (Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salo (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunistic</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Erhard (W. Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nehru (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Hi*</td>
<td>HI*</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>Lo</td>
<td>De Gaulle (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Franco (Spain)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These traits are weighted more heavily in determining the orientations.

Table 1: Dimensions of Personal Characteristics
(From M. Hermann, 1980, p. 59)
4). the influential, mediator/integrator, opportunist, and developmentalist all have the same interpersonal style.

5). the mediator/integrator and opportunist have the same political style, and the same can be said of the developmentalist and the influential.

The significant overlap of the values on the eight characteristics and four dimensions suggests there is more convergence than divergence. If that is the case, then it is plausible to suggest that these orientations may well capture different "faces" of one individual. Indeed, Hermann's definitions of the orientations and descriptions of their views, styles, and likely foreign policy behavior are not mutually exclusive.

It is not unreasonable to postulate that a single decision-maker can, simultaneously, have an interest in:

- gaining control over more territory, resources, or people
- participating in the international community on one's own terms
- having an impact on others' foreign policy, and playing a leadership role
- reconciling differences and playing "kingmaker"
- taking advantage of circumstances, and being expedient
- improving one's nation through useful
### Definition View of World Style Resulting Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>View of World</th>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Resulting Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Interest in gaining control over more territory, resources, or people</td>
<td>Perceive the world is divided into &quot;us&quot; and &quot;them,&quot; each intent on improving its condition at the expense of the other; thus, conflict is inherent to functioning in the international system</td>
<td>A wariness of others' moves; attempt to keep one step ahead of those considered the enemy; directive and manipulative in dealing with others</td>
<td>Generally focused on issues of security and status; behavior often hostile in tone and directed toward the &quot;enemy&quot;; favor use of low commitment actions unless perceived &quot;backed into the wall&quot;; not averse to using &quot;enemy&quot; as a scapegoat on which to blame problems; espouse short-term, immediate change in the international arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Interest in participating in the international community but on one's own terms and without engendering a dependent relationship with another country</td>
<td>Want to be self-reliant but perceive importance of other countries to one's own continued existence so are determined to maintain close control over interactions with other nations to avoid any kind of dependent relationship</td>
<td>Seek a variety of information before making a decision; examine carefully the possible consequences of alternatives under consideration for dealing with a problem; cultivate relationships with a diverse group of nations</td>
<td>Generally focused on economic and security issues; behavior is nonaligned in nature, directed toward a wide variety of governments; behavior is usually positive in tone but involves little commitment since shun commitments that limit maneuverability and sense of independence; espouse need for long-term change in International arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Interest in other nations' foreign policy behavior, in playing a leadership role in regional or international affairs</td>
<td>Perceive inability of nations to act alone, importance of acting together but such activity demands a strong leader; think time is right for such leadership; may have a particular ideology with other nations to adopt but usually this is show interest in and seek information on problems of countries wish to influence; initiate collaborative activities with such countries and meet frequently with their leaders</td>
<td>Foster friendly relations with nations wish to have influence over; make necessary commitments to secure a working relationship with such nations; act protectively toward such nations in their dealings with adversaries; behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>View of World</td>
<td>Style</td>
<td>Resulting Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>(continued)</td>
<td>secondary interest to gaining leadership role</td>
<td>Good listeners; able to see both sides of issues and raise options where few were perceived earlier; willingness to &quot;take a back seat&quot; in the policymaking process, having an impact without seeming to control or to interfere with others; uses consensus-building and group maintenance techniques effectively</td>
<td>Behavior is principally diplomatic in nature; have extensive activity in international and regional organizations which are used as practice arenas and places to develop a reputation for mediating skills; engage in collaborative activities with other nations to foster sense of mutual trust and understanding; behavior is generally positive in tone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator/Integrator</td>
<td>Concern with reconciling differences between other nations, with resolving problems in the international arena</td>
<td>Perceive some problems between other nations in international system can be resolved through third party politics and that one’s nation (and one’s self) can gain prestige by playing a “Good Samaritan” or peacemaker role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>Interest in taking advantage of present circumstances, in dealing effectively with the demands and opportunities of the moment, in being expedient</td>
<td>Perceive foreign policy situations are generally unique—times change, goals change, and the views of other governments change; to be effective in the foreign policy arena one must deal with each situation according to its own merits</td>
<td>Seek out information from a variety of sources; try to ascertain early on what alternative will secure consensus; may use &quot;trial balloons&quot; to test others’ responses; seek compromise if consensus is not possible</td>
<td>Focus of much behavior is on gaining information from the international arena, on keeping abreast of international events and attune to other governments’ actions and intentions; political resources are committed to keeping contacts open; an attempt is made to maintain a low positive profile in order to keep as much as possible on everybody’s good side; encourage face-to-face diplomacy to learn about a situation first hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Commitment to the continued improvement of one’s own nation</td>
<td>Perceive nation has deficiency that can be improved with the aid of certain</td>
<td>Develop relationships with others based on what can gain from re-</td>
<td>Behavior generally focused on economic or security issues; are quite friendly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2, cont’d
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>View of World</th>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Resulting Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developmental (continued)</td>
<td>through the development of useful and rewarding relations with other countries or organizations in the international system; an interest in building up one's own nation with the best help available</td>
<td>other countries or organizations in the international system; perceive it is important to seek out and establish relationships with other countries or organizations that can be helpful in dealing with one's deficiencies</td>
<td>relationship; constantly seeking information in areas of perceived deficiency—appear almost to have a &quot;one track&quot; mind; try to maintain controlled dependence in relationships with others, that is, getting what is desired while not becoming dominated by the others</td>
<td>toward those seeking as benefactors; can be hostile, however, if others try to dominate or control the relationship; only those political resources are committed that are necessary to establishing a beneficial relationship; active in regional and international organizations in search of benefactors and beneficial relationships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
relationships with other nations

While these interests might not be distributed with equal weight in each decision-maker, the presence of one or more does not exclude the presence of the others.

Similarly, one may argue that combinations of views and styles are not incompatible, either. For example, one can simultaneously perceive an inability to act alone and the need for third party politics; one can perceive the world as divided between "us" and "them" and also want to be self-reliant. One can also be, in different situations:

- wary of others
- seek a variety of information
- initiate collaborative activities
- able to see both sides of an issue
- develop relationships for national gain
- attempt to forge consensus

without doing harm to the integrity of one's personality.

In fact, in order to operationally derive differences, or distinctions, among leaders, Hermann has weighted some traits in particular orientations more heavily than others. The effect of attributing, for example, twice the score of a particular characteristic in calculations of a score on a particular orientation, is to create distinctions that otherwise might not arise. Hermann presents these weights (see Hermann, 1980) as a complement to the conceptualization of each orientation,
suggesting they reflect the type of personality (compared to the other orientations) that a leader who fits the orientation is likely to possess. Upon careful examination, it seems possible that these weights could be auxilliary hypotheses that should be scrutinized through empirical investigation, and not precede it. In other words, the weighting of specific characteristics should not be treated as assumptions of the model, but rather as hypotheses concerning the degree to which some characteristics are more important than others in not only determining a leader's foreign affairs "personality", but also the likely consequences of that "personality" on the behavior a leader will urge his government to take.

The significant overlap of the orientations has not gone unnoticed by Hermann herself. Research on Politburo members (1980) and African leaders (see Hermann and Singer, 1983) suggests that leaders may indeed have a repertoire_of_orientations in a manner consistent with Holsti's findings that governments utilize a variety of national role conceptions. Our study on African leaders points out that leaders' orientations may change when controlled for issue area, or for time period. These findings suggest that since orientations can be regarded as transitory to a certain extent, the characteristics themselves might not be enduring, long-term facets of an individual's personality. In point of fact, this
type of research may be tapping into a subset of the manifestations of more abstract aspects of personality, in which case this claim of "fluidity" would not be inconsistent with the widely accepted argument that individuals' beliefs are fairly consistent over time. (see George, 1969).

The preceding overview of research efforts was conducted in order to place my proposed framework in the relevant context for evaluation. Drawing from the research experience of these scholars, a number of propositions can be enumerated that serve as the foundation of this framework.

The task here is to develop a representation of how an individual's personal characteristics, mediated by the specific situation at hand, and given further context through an approximation of the individual's calculation of the relationship he has with selected entities relevant to the situation, can produce estimates of an individual's likely foreign policy response to a specific problem. It is important to note that it is the individual's, not the government's choice of behavior that is being represented. The core assumption, then, is that certain individual leaders have such an influence over their governments that their predispositions can be equated with their government's foreign policy behavior. The sample of
leaders chosen for this study - six African leaders and Fidel Castro - are postulated to have this type of influence. As Jackson and Rosberg argue (1982), the political system in most black African countries is dependent on the "...dispositions, activities, abilities, efforts, and fortunes of politicians - especially rulers...how he chooses to perform his role, how well he performs, and with what degree of fortune are crucial to the stability of the polity and the persistence of the regime." (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982, p. 22)

Furthermore, Hermann and Hermann (1979), in a study of world leaders, found that there is a correlation between a leader's influence on his government and the level of bureaucracy. The lower the level, the more influence the leader has. Thus, for the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the behavioral predisposition of the leader is likely to become the foreign policy behavior of his government. Although it is recognized that this assumption is not always consonant with reality, it is necessary to maintain it in order to conduct the analysis. This study may, among other things, suggest the degree to which this assumption is useful for further research.

A second assumption, contained in Hermann's (1980) research, is that knowledge of an individual's personal characteristics, reflected by the orientations, can be
translated into general foreign policy dispositions. Indeed, Hermann (1980, 1982) has found differences in personalities among Politburo members influences their policy recommendations on a variety of issues. Also derived from Hermann's research is the contention that the orientations, by themselves, may not be sufficient to project an individual's behavioral disposition. Hermann postulates filters such as sensitivity, interest, and training, that can dampen or amplify the influence of the orientations on behavior. While these filters will not be used in this framework, the hypothesized effects of the filters can certainly be evaluated with the data generated through the research effort herein described.

A third assumption is that the concept of "situation" is an important mediating variable for establishing the context of decision-making. Previous research conducted with co-authors Hudson and Hermann (1981, 1982, 1983) and Walker (1984) strongly suggests that situation serves as a good "sorting mechanism" in examining governments' foreign policy behavior. In this particular vein of research, situation refers to the location of the actor's role relative to other entities in a specific problem. The process of role location allows the researcher to determine, for example, whether the actor is in opposition to the other entities, involved in similar roles, or in between two disputants.
Related to the third assumption is a fourth—namely, that specific role location, in accordance with role theory as elaborated by Walker (1977), carries with it role expectations. In other words, each configuration of roles bounds the types of behavioral choices an actor can adopt.

Finally, a fifth assumption is that context is further provided by postulating three dimensions of the relationships between the actor and the specific entities occupying the other roles in the problem. The nature of the relationships also suggests behavioral expectations. Research conducted by Hudson, Hermann, and Singer (1985), Singer and Hudson (1983), and Hudson (1983) has established the plausibility of utilizing these three dimensions as part of the external predisposition of nations.

In sum, these assumptions can be presented diagrammatically to illustrate the framework:

In sum, these assumptions can be presented diagrammatically to illustrate the framework:

![Diagram](image)

Figure 4: One view of the interaction of personal characteristics and factors from the external environment

The solid lines represent an interactive process.
whereby an individual's personal characteristics, in the context of roles and relationships, suggest an orientation to foreign affairs that has a direct influence on foreign policy behavior. The broken lines indicate that the above-mentioned factors also have behavioral expectations in isolation. One of the objectives of the forthcoming empirical examination is to ascertain the relative merits of viewing the variables in isolation as versus the interactive product. The feedback loop constitutes a means of evaluating the performance of the framework. If the behavioral expectations generated by the framework do not match "reality", the creation of rival hypotheses allows for further exploration of the framework without having to abandon the assumptions. Thus, the assumptions can alternatively be diagrammed in the following manner:

![Diagram](image)

Figure 5: Another view of the interaction between personal characteristics and factors from the external environment

It is evident that the two diagrams above propose different logics, namely, that the former suggests that orientations flow not only from personal characteristics
but also from context and situation, whereas the latter indicates that orientations are mediated by context and situation. This is an important distinction. Figure 4 implies that orientations are subject to change from situation to situation, whereas Figure 5 is more concordant with Hermann's notion regarding the relative stability of orientations. In essence, the two figures reflect the different integration strategies discussed in the preceding chapter, with Figure 4 more or less corresponding to the Decision-maker as Modifier Approach, and Figure 5 corresponding to the Single Actor as Information Processor Approach. As stated earlier, the situation creates the distinction. Although this may be jumping the gun, an example of this contention is the Mediator/Integrator in collaboration situations. It is hypothesized that due to the nature of the situation, the Mediator/Integrator's behavioral predisposition is fostered not by external factors, but by the personal characteristics, whereas in Assistance Consideration situations, the nature of relations between the entities creates a predisposition modified by the Mediator/Integrator as actor in the situation.

The framework is actually an attempt to formalize and test the meta-proposition that the interaction of individual characteristics and situational, role, and external variables yields a greater understanding of
foreign policy behavior than either in isolation. The problems encountered by the researchers discussed previously may be ameliorated by the adoption of this type of proposition, which seeks to bridge the gap they themselves encountered in their research between individual level variables and foreign policy behavior.
Chapter 2:
Developing the Conceptual Framework

The development of constructs that purport to model a predominant leader's personality as they relate to the external environment, relative to projecting his/her nation's foreign policy behavior, requires an exposition and explanation of both the relevant factors and the means by which those factors interrelate to produce estimates of behavior.

As previously indicated, the essential features of this framework build upon some of the constructs developed by M. Hermann (1980). Specifically, the delineation of eight personal characteristics, and the logic for combining them into orientations plausibly suggest that what leaders think and feel, how they view themselves in relation to their environment, and how they perceive the external environment certainly have an effect on the types of actions and behavior they will urge their government to take.

The six orientations to foreign affairs postulated by M. Hermann thus represent the foundation of the framework. They are used as an approximation of a leader's personality as it relates to foreign affairs. In isolation, however, they have only marginal utility in
explaining how different facets of a leader’s personality and perceptions impinge on behavior in a discrete situation. For example, a mediator/integrator type of leader may be predisposed to mediate disputes, but that knowledge may be unhelpful in a situation in which a dispute is not the concern at hand. As a consequence, other information about a leader must be generated in order to provide a more comprehensive account of foreign policy behavior.

The task of selecting the appropriate information is indeed formidable. There are, as the previous review of the literature indicates, a variety of factors relating to leadership that can contribute to an understanding of the leadership-behavior nexus. The challenge, then, is to develop criteria that enable one to sift through the myriad of existing information.

To this end, it may prove useful to establish what we want to explain, then determine what information is necessary to satisfy that explanation.

Essentially, for the framework to be a useful analytic tool, we need to develop a series of propositions that demonstrate how a leader’s personality and perceptions shape the foreign policy behavior of his government. As the focus is on the qualities and quirks of an individual, we can eliminate a number of factors that are not relevant to this particular study. (It should
be noted that these factors may be of inordinate importance in the context of a greater scope than just of an individual):
- factors pertaining to the structure of government;
- factors pertaining to the political dynamics in a society;
- factors pertaining to the actual level of resources of a society.
It should be further noted that while these factors cannot/will not be incorporated into the framework, one may derive hypotheses regarding the mediating effect of one or more of them on the behavioral outcomes generated by the framework. That, however, must be left for future research.

Let us now turn from what is not desirable to what is. This may be best ascertained by asking a number of questions whose answers may guide us in this regard:
- Given that we have an estimate of a leader’s "foreign affairs personality", what else do we need to know about the leader in order to project his foreign policy behavior?
- Given that we need to know how the leader views the problem facing him, once we know his perceptions, how can we use the leader’s orientation to determine behavior? The orientation provides a lens for interpreting a problem from the leader’s perspective, but can only generate
generalized notions about a leader's likely response.

- Are there specific facets of the problem that may enable us to generate more refined notions about a behavioral response? Knowledge of the context for decision-making, that is, the type of situation the leader finds himself in, may be very useful. Furthermore, perhaps if we knew how a leader perceived the other participants in the problem, that information would be helpful. If we knew the leader perceived them to be stronger or weaker, a friend or an enemy, important or not, we could begin to assess the contribution of these perceptions in combination with orientation and the problem for generating estimates of behavior.

By adopting these four dimensions (type of situation, prior affect, relative capabilities, and salience), we can begin to develop a series of propositions that suggest how different types of leaders use these perceptions of the problem and its participants in shaping a behavioral response to a foreign policy problem.

A logical place to begin is with the assessment of the leader's personality. Employing the eight characteristics developed by M. Hermann (1980), and the logic for combining them to form orientations as an underlying premise for model construction, we can then elaborate the means by which the four dimensions can be utilized to derive projections of leader behavior.
As previously argued, the orientations in isolation provide only vague accounts of the types of behavior in which leaders will engage their governments. However, by incorporating the leader's perception of the problem, we can begin refining that account. A leader's perception of the problem may be defined in two ways:

1). the substantive nature of the problem - that is, the particular issue which needs to be addressed;

2). the structure of the problem, or type of situation - that is, the configuration of the other relevant entities in relation to the actor, who in this case is the leader.

Roles and Situations

Our primary concern, at least initially, is with the second interpretation, as it provides a contextual lens through which the leader assesses his options. A specific problem thus provides the means for establishing a set of roles and enables one to determine the entities occupying those roles. (The role location process is similar to that described by Walker (1977)). From the perspective of the leader as actor, every problem he recognizes will produce a "source" role and a "subject" role.

Source. Every problem has an inferred source, or a "cause". The source is that entity (or entities)
perceived by the actor to be responsible for the immediate problem (regardless of whether such perceptions are accurate). Human entities may be regarded as the source by the acting leader; so might nature or the will of God. The actor may recognize multiple entities as constituting the source. Moreover, the immediate problem might be seen as flowing from a prior problem.

Subject. Every problem also has a perceived subject. The subject is some collective entity that suffers or is deprived — or will be in the future — by the problem at hand. As with source entities, a problem as perceived by the actor may have multiple entities as the subject.

Actor. The third role in every problem is the actor, which for this dissertation is the national leader for whose behavior an explanation is sought. The leader is the policymaker from whose perspective the source and subject roles are identified.

Each role may be occupied by one or more separate entities. The same entity may also appear in several roles. For example, the actor may also be the subject, or the source, or both.

For every problem, then, the actor identifies specific entities for each role. As a consequence, one can imagine that the context of the problem provides various types of situations depending upon the actor's
relationship to the source and subject. There are four broad types of situations representing all possible configurations of roles. Each type of situation may be regarded as posing a distinctive question for the decision makers in the acting government. The question posed by, and the definition of, each type of situation are summarized below.

**Type I Confrontation:** How can I (the actor) reduce the adverse effects that the other entity in the problem creates for me and my nation?

**Type II Intervention:** Should I (the actor) intervene in this problem on one side or the other, and if so, in what manner?

**Type IIIA Assistance Requesting:** Who can give me (the actor) assistance in reducing the adverse effects of the problem we are experiencing?

**Type IIIB Assistance Consideration:** Should I (the actor) provide assistance to those who are experiencing the adverse effects of a problem?

**Type IV Collaboration:** Can I (the actor) reach a substantive agreement with those with whom I share this problem?

To introduce the classification of situations, let us postulate three entities: the leader, or actor (entity A), Nation X and Nation Y.

**Situation Type I Confrontation:** In this type of
situation, the actor also assumes one of the other roles - either source or subject. The actor, therefore, is directly affected by the problem - either having created it or being deprived by it. Another entity is in the third role. From the actor's perspective, this type of situation can be regarded as a confrontation: someone is posing a problem for the actor. It can be summarized by the following configuration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situation_Type.II.Intervention:** In this type of situation, separate entities occupy each of the three basic roles. The actor, as a third party, observes that some external entity has created a problem for another external entity. The issue for the actor is whether to become involved, and if so, in what manner. Thus, we can characterize this as an intervention type situation and diagram it as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situation_Type.III.Assistance:** Actually there are two different types of configurations involved in this category, but they are grouped together because they share a concern with assistance or support. In one situation,
the actor is also the source and the subject, that is, it has created its own problem and is seeking a solution. (In identifying the source of the problem as the actor, we are including with the actor natural or societal conditions within the actor's country that generated the problem.) A nation faced with sagging economic development would be assumed to fit this category. This subtype, Type IIIA, can be considered a situation of Assistance Requesting, and can be diagrammed as follows:

\[
\text{ACTOR} \quad \text{SOURCE} \quad \text{SUBJECT} \\
A \quad A \quad A
\]

There is a second subtype of assistance situation. A nation other than the actor is both the source and the subject of the problem, and is turning to the actor for assistance. This can be labelled Type IIIB Assistance Consideration, and is configured as follows:

\[
\text{ACTOR} \quad \text{SOURCE} \quad \text{SUBJECT} \\
A \quad X \quad X
\]

In Type IIIA, we are dealing with a situation in which the actor is looking for assistance, and in Type IIIB, an external entity is approaching the actor for assistance.

Situation_Type_IV_Collaboration: In this circumstance, the actor shares both other roles with one or more other entities. The actor jointly with another nation(s) is the source and the subject of the problem, and they are negotiating or collaborating over its
treatment. The outcome of such a situation might be a communique, or a treaty, for instance. The diagram for this situation would be:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{ACTOR} & \text{SOURCE} & \text{SUBJECT} \\
A & A+X+Y & A+X+Y \\
\end{array}
\]

As suggested by the questions above, each type of situation frames the fundamental task the actor must address. In estimating the leader's response to that task, it becomes essential to understand certain dimensions of the relationship between the actor and the other role occupants in the problem. The three dimensions that I intend to examine are prior affect, relative capabilities and salience.

**Relational Dimensions**

**Prior Affect.** As the name implies, prior affect relates the affective history between the actor and each of the entities occupying the other roles. Affect is expressed feeling ranging from extreme hostility to unequivocal friendship. The accumulated manifestations of affect in previous interactions that the actor has expressed towards a relevant other, and has received from it, comprise prior affect. An oversimplified statement of the idea that will be developed later is that if the acting leader's affective history has been positive with a given role occupant, then the leader is more likely to be
supportive of that entity whether it is the source or the subject of the current problem. If the prior affect has been negative, the leader's present disposition is likely to be nonsupportive.

**Salience.** An actor may have a record of rather negative feelings toward another entity, but be restrained from acting upon them in the present situation because of its dependence upon or need of that entity. This illustration introduces salience as a second dimension of the relationship among occupants of the set of roles in a foreign policy problem. Salience for an actor is the degree to which the explicit or tacit support or concurrence of a specific external entity is necessary for the leader, or the society, to realize basic values. In other words, the well-being of one nation is contingent upon the resources or agreement of another. Together with prior affect, salience can be understood to influence the predisposition of the actor to align with or against relevant others in the problem or to remain neutral.

**Relative Capabilities.** Prior affect and salience provide an actor with the motivation to support or oppose another entity. Calculations of how that motivation might be acted upon involve comparisons of capabilities relative to the others involved in the problem. Exactly what capabilities are applicable depends upon the nature of the immediate situation, and especially the nature of the
problem. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is sufficient to differentiate problems according to the basic values they involve. The deprivation that is part of every problem can be understood as interfering with the present or future enjoyment of some basic values by the entity being deprived. Thus, problems can be classified according to which of the following broad value areas they concern: security/physical safety, economic wealth, respect/status, wellbeing/welfare, and enlightenment. To promote these basic values, virtually all societies have developed human skills, physical resources, and institutions that collectively can be regarded as comprising the capabilities in each value area.

It is the comparison of capabilities associated with the basic values affected by the problem that form the third dimension of the relationship between the actor and the other role occupants. When the actor is motivated (by prior affect and salience) to side with one or another of the roles associated with the problem, it is the strength of the actor's capabilities relative to the others that shapes its predisposition to act.

There is empirical evidence to suggest that the above three relational dimensions and the typology of situations are indeed useful in the analysis of foreign policy behavior. (See Hudson, 1983). Let us now turn to an examination of how these factors relate to behavior,
first in isolation, then interactively.

Type of Situation and Orientations of Leaders

For each orientation, one may delineate how type of situation creates a contextual lens that differentiates the way leaders view a given problem. The first task, then, is to develop logics that suggest, within each orientation, how type of situation mediates the behavioral response to a problem.

**EXPANSIONIST**

011501 - Confrontation - In this situation, an expansionist has a natural outlet for his personality. He perceives a direct threat to himself or his nation emanating from the source. He is likely to be protective and defensive, but may under some conditions take an aggressive posture. At a minimum, he will engage in openly hostile verbal behavior directed at the source.

Behavior = Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

012501 - Intervention - In this situation, an Expansionist will make unequivocal distinction between good and evil. The good will be those entities with whom he has enjoyed a positive relationship, or who he perceives will not threaten his own position. The evil will be those who have caused problems for him in the past, or who are a potential threat to his position. It
is unlikely that an expansionist will not take some sort
of stance, which would imply that he sees both sides in
the same light. At the least, he will condemn the
unfriendly entity, or may provide support for the friendly
entity.

Behavior = Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Unfriendly Entity(s) is Recipient

013501 - Assistance Requesting - Given the fierce
pride (expressed by high nationalism) of an expansionist,
he is likely to only ask for assistance from those
entities with whom he shares a strong patron/client or
"brotherly" relationship. Any announcement of such
requests (and the granting of them) is likely to be
couched in terms not connoting charity. The expansionist
will attempt to portray the situation as one of mutual
agreement. The atmosphere will be low key.

Behavior = Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

014501 - Assistance Consideration - Similar to the
previous situation, the expansionist, if in a position to
assist someone, will only consider requests from entities
that have been unquestionably loyal to him and his
nation. Even then, an expansionist may be reluctant to
commit resources to someone else. Behavior will likely be
muted.

Behavior = Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
015501 - Collaboration - In this situation, an expansionist is unlikely to make binding commitments, especially if the issue is of little consequence to him or his nation. Thus, likely behavior will focus on "agreement in principle" or "progress in negotiations".

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

011601 - Confrontation - In a situation where an active independent leader is directly challenged by another entity, his strong sense of nationalism and his belief in his ability to control events may induce him to respond directly toward the source. His behavior is not likely to be exaggerated, in that he would be unwilling to engage in unnecessary conflict. Thus, a cautionary warning meant to alert the source to his displeasure, yet leave open the possibility of reconciliation may be a likely response.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

012601 - Intervention - An active independent, confronted with a decision whether or not to intervene, and if so, on whose behalf, is likely to opt for a conciliatory mode of behavior. Sensing a need to remain aloof from entanglement, an active independent leader is
most likely to urge the combatants towards reconciliation.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

013601 - Assistance Requesting - Need for assistance from another entity may impinge on an active independent's sense of maneuverability, but a request will be made when an active independent perceives that no future strings will be attached.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

014601 - Assistance Consideration - An active independent, lacking a strong sense of distrust, and in combination with a need for affiliation, will come to the aid of those it perceives are genuinely in need.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

015601 - Collaboration - An active independent is likely to engage in collaborative behavior only with extreme caution. Collaboration that maintains the active independent's sense of independence will succeed, whereas negotiations that are "forced" on him will not.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

INFLUENTIAL

011701 - Confrontation - In this type of situation, an influential leader, while realizing the threat posed by
the source, will attempt to circumvent the need to respond in kind. Given his belief in his own abilities and his need for affiliation, one may postulate that this type of leader will desire a negotiated settlement of differences. It then becomes a question of how such negotiations are initiated.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Facilitator or Other Third Party is Recipient

012701 - Intervention - This type of situation seems well suited to the influential type of leader. It provides an opportunity for him to extend his influence, and generate prestige. Thus, one may postulate that he is likely to urge reconciliation of the two sides by means of adopting his formula for settlement.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

013701 - Assistance Requesting - Given the influential leader's need for affiliation, low distrust of others, and affect (as versus task) orientation, it is likely that the leader will not shy away from seeking assistance from those who are willing to provide it.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

014701 - Assistance Consideration - Similar to the Assistance Requesting situations, an influential leader will seize the opportunity of wielding influence over
another entity. Therefore, those entities that make requests will be granted them providing that the influential leader sees them as pliable.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

015701 - Collaboration - This appears to be another type of situation that is well suited to the traits of the influential leader. This situation provides an arena for the leader to demonstrate his abilities and exert influence. The leader will push his own proposals and try to shut down those who offer alternatives.

Behavior #1=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

MEDIATOR/INTEGRATOR

011801 - Confrontation - A mediator/integrator leader in this type of situation is likely to seek all possible means of resolving the problem diplomatically. His lack of strong nationalist sentiment allows him to not be blinded by the rhetoric of confrontation. As one who seeks consensus and compromise, the mediator/integrator leader may request a third party to arrange an opportunity for compromise with the source.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

012801 - Intervention - This type of situation is a natural outlet for a mediator/integrator's personality.
This poses an opportunity for him to resolve the problem by offering to mediate the dispute.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

013B01 - Assistance Requesting - As with the other orientations, the mediator/integrator leader will not shy away from requesting help from potential donors. Given his interest in economic issues, this type of leader will request aid from those most able or most likely to provide it.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

014801 - Assistance Consideration - If able, it seems reasonable that a mediator/integrator leader will grant assistance to those entities who have earned his respect and trust.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

015801 - Collaboration - This type of situation poses another opportunity for the mediator/integrator leader to push for consensus. He is likely to treat all the other entities in the problem in a similar manner, trying to avoid offending anyone. He will offer concrete proposals for resolving the problem and try to persuade all sides that their gains will outweigh their losses if agreement is reached.
Behavior = Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

**OPPORTUNIST**

011901 - Confrontation - An opportunist, faced with a confrontation situation, has the capacity to respond in a number of ways. He may threaten, condemn, cajole, or plead depending on the other factors involved. However, his lack of a conviction that he can control events may suggest that in problems where he is overmatched, he may appeal to third parties to intervene on his behalf.

Behavior #1 = Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

012901 - Intervention - None of the values of the opportunist's traits suggests any strong inclination to intervene in the problems of other entities. Thus, in the absence of any overriding concern for the issue or for either entity, one may postulate that the opportunist will either condemn both disputants, or suggest they resolve their differences.

Behavior #1 = Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients.

013901 - Assistance Requesting - As with the other types of leaders, the opportunist will leap at the possibility of gaining assistance on favorable terms.

Behavior = Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient
014901 - Assistance Consideration - An opportunist may be willing to grant assistance to a requesting entity, provided it represents an opportunity for maintaining or increasing their nation's influence.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

015901 - Collaboration - An opportunist will be wary in collaboration situations of being cornered into an agreement. He is likely to press for agreement when the terms appear favorable, but is more likely to resist efforts at reducing his room to maneuver.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

DEVELOPMENTAL

011101 - Confrontation - Although developmentalists do not shy away from confrontations, they prefer to work with others. Given their high need for affiliation, and low belief in their ability to control events, it would seem plausible that their preferred course of action in this type of situation would be to seek out third parties to mediate or aid their nation.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

012101 - Intervention - In a situation such as this, a developmental leader may try to maximize gains for his own nation. He sees this as an opportunity. Therefore,
if he is in a position to intervene, he will do so, on behalf of the entity most likely to provide benefits to his own nation.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instruments, Preferred Entity is Recipient

013101 - Assistance Requesting - Developmentalists will jump on any chance to receive assistance from nations that are willing to offer or grant it without too many strings attached.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Potential Facilitator is Recipient

014101 - Assistance Consideration - Developmentalists are likely to grant assistance, if able, to those entities that can visibly offer some future rewards to his nation. Due to his reluctance to commit resources, those occasions may be few and far between.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

015101 - Collaboration - This type of situation provides a leader with this orientation an opportunity to engage in activities that can promote his own nation's interests. Leaders hope that through negotiations they may be able to win friends. They are likely to be the optimists in such situations, hoping to forge agreements (bilateral), or coalitions (multilateral).

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
Type of Situation and Prior Affect

In this section, the effects of prior affect (in isolation) in different types of situations are posited. Essentially, we are attempting to determine how past relations affect the present, all things being equal. Previous research (See Hudson, 1983; Hudson, Singer, and Hermann, 1983) suggests that prior affect makes an important contribution to the understanding of the external environment. In the context of a leader’s perception of past relations, we have to be sensitive to whether the leader’s personality predisposes him to such a consideration when dealing with present problems. While it cannot, or has not been empirically substantiated, the hypotheses regarding the effects of orientation on behavior suggest that considerations of past feelings of friendship, indifference, or hostility certainly can have an effect. Furthermore, research in other areas of foreign policy behavior (Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1973) argue for the importance of utilizing past behavior as a predictive aid.

The following hypotheses posit the likely effect on behavior for four values of prior affect—positive, negative, neutral, and mixed. Each value is discussed in the context of all four types of situations.
The arguments proposed in this section are an extension and modification of group discussions and written documents authored by Valerie M. Hudson, Charles F. Hermann, and myself (1981).

**POSITIVE_PRIOR_AFFECT**

021001 - Confrontation - In this situation, the actor is facing an entity with whom it has enjoyed a friendly past relationship. Thus, we can expect the actor to seek resolution to the problem in a non-belligerent, conciliatory manner. The actor will encourage the source entity to resolve their differences to their mutual satisfaction.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source Entity is Recipient

022001 - Intervention - In this situation, the actor perceives that two friendly entities are locked in an adversarial situation. As a friend to both parties, the actor is unlikely to step in and take sides. Rather, the actor will urge a reconciliation of differences, even offering to mediate the dispute.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

023001 - Assistance Requesting - In this situation, the actor is asking another entity or entities for help in a specific domain. Given the record of friendly relations, it seems plausible to suggest the actor will
make a request of those entities.

**Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Facilitator is Recipient**

024001 - Assistance Consideration - Here, the actor is considering a request from a friendly entity. All things being equal, the actor is likely to respond favorably to a friend in need. (This estimate is problematic because the actor could either make a statement of intention to help (moderate commitment and diplomatic instrument), or could actually provide the assistance on the spot (high commitment and diplomatic and domain instruments).

**Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient**

025001 - Collaboration - In this situation, the actor is attempting to reach agreement with other (one more) friendly entities. As a consequence of their previous relationship, it would appear likely that they may agree in some vein (they may even agree to disagree!).

**Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients**

**NEGATIVE_PRIOR_AFFECT**

021002 - Confrontation - The actor finds itself in an adversarial context with an entity with which it has experienced hostile past relations. Therefore, we would expect the actor to be uncertain of the prospects for a
quick reconciliation. As a consequence, the actor may sternly warn, threaten, or make other hostile gestures towards the source.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

022002 - Intervention - In one kind of intervention situation, the actor perceives two unfriendly entities engaged in an adversarial situation. In the second, the actor may perceive one entity to be "the good guy", and the other entity to be "the bad guy". In the first intervention situation, given the disdain the actor feels for both, it is unlikely that it will choose to become involved. As a consequence, the actor may simply condemn both for disrupting peace in the environment. In the second intervention situation, the sharp distinction in past relations between the two entities in an adversarial situation suggests that the actor will strongly support the positive entity. Other factors may mediate the intensity of support, but at a minimum, the actor will issue an intention to assist its ally.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

023002 - Assistance Requesting - This appears to be an unlikely situation, with the actor asking an unfriendly entity for help. However, if "necessity is the mother of invention" is an applicable adage, then the actor is not
likely to humble itself, but may soften its previous position.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Facilitator is Recipient

024002 - Assistance Consideration - It seems improbable that an unfriendly entity would ask the actor for assistance. However, in that unlikely event, it is equally unlikely that the actor will respond favorably.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

025002 - Collaboration - In this situation, the actor is attempting to reach agreement with an unfriendly entity. On the basis of their past hostility, it seems unlikely that a swift agreement will be reached. Negotiation in this setting can be expected to be drawn out and fraught with antagonism. The actor may seek mediation from a third party.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

MIXED_PRIOR_AFFECT

021003 - Confrontation - In this situation, the actor is confronted by an entity with which it has shared both good and bad experiences. Thus, in an adversarial situation, the history of bad experiences is likely to outweigh the good, although the fact that there has been some goodwill suggests that the actor's response may be
tempered (in comparison to a history of purely negative affect). The actor is likely to explicitly appeal to the entity for redress.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

022003 - Intervention (A) - If prior affect toward both participants in the problem is mixed, the specifics of the dispute could dramatically shape the actor's responses, causing it to align itself with one against the other. Without such knowledge, it seems plausible to suggest that the actor, having experienced both positive and negative relations with both entities, is likely to offer an evaluation of the situation - either rebuking both parties or urging them to settle their differences. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

022004 - Intervention (B) - Here the actor has enjoyed a good relationship with one entity, while experiencing a mixed relationship with the other. As a consequence, the actor may be more sensitive to the position of the positive entity, but may also want to avoid alienating the other entity. Thus, we can expect the actor's response to be tempered, perhaps urging reconciliation of differences, or if the recent experiences with the mixed entity have been negative, may tacitly support the positive.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

022005 - Intervention (C) - In this situation, the actor is faced with a problem in which one side has had hostile past relations with the actor, and one side has had mixed past relations with the actor. If the mixed entity has been positive recently, then the actor may choose to support the mixed entity as a sign of continuing good relations. On the other hand, if the relationship with the mixed entity has been negative lately, then the actor is likely to condemn both.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

022006 - Intervention (D) - In this situation, one party has had mixed prior affect with the actor, while the other has had neutral prior affect with the actor. Unless the actor has a distinct interest in the specific problem, or has had good recent experiences with the mixed entity, it is unlikely to intervene in the situation. It will simply comment on the situation — maybe urging reconciliation or mildly rebuking both entities.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

023003 - Assistance Requesting - If the actor finds itself in a situation in which an entity with whom it has shared both positive and negative experiences can be of
assistance, it seems plausible that the actor will request help from it.

**Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Facilitator is Recipient**

**024003 - Assistance Consideration -** For an actor to provide assistance to a requesting entity with whom it has had positive/negative experiences, the requesting entity would either have to be a recent good friend. More likely than not, the actor is going to decline to give aid in this atmosphere.

**Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient**

**025003 - Collaboration -** The prospects of collaborating with an entity with whom one has had mixed prior affect and reaching a substantive agreement appear even. Interest in the specific issue, and recent experiences with the entity could be pivotal factors. At a minimum, the actor will attempt to cooperate to see if agreement can be reached.

**Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients**

**NEUTRAL_PRIOR_AFFECT**

**021004 - Confrontation -** In this context, the actor has had little, if any, prior relations with its adversary. As a result, the actor may first be inclined to seek redress in a firm but conciliatory fashion -
warning the other entity to change its behavior before the problem is further exacerbated.

Behavior=Negative affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

022007 - Intervention (A) - In this situation, where both sides have shared neutral affect with the actor, the actor has little incentive to intervene in the problem. Both entities are of equal status (other things being equal) in the eyes of the actor, and the latter may simply suggest reconciliation. The presence of a third party may induce the actor to address it in order to mediate the differences.

Behavior=Neutral affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

022008 - Intervention (B) - The actor, in this context, perceives a hostile entity in an adversarial situation with an entity with which the actor has had indifferent prior relations. Given this configuration, the actor may use this opportunity to attack its enemy, but due to the nature of the neutral entity, won't become too involved. The actor will content itself by verbally assaulting the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

022009 - Intervention (C) - In this situation, the actor perceives a friend being confronted by an entity
with which it has shared neutral prior affect. The actor will attempt to intervene as a mediator. Although the position of the positive entity will carry more weight, the actor has no incentive to alienate a neutral entity. Thus, while sensitive to the needs of its friend, it will attempt to mediate a mutually satisfying resolution.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

023004 - Assistance Requesting - An actor that asks help of an entity with whom it has had little prior affect may perceive that entity to be of future value, and will make a request.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Facilitator is Recipient

024004 - Assistance Consideration - While the actor may have little incentive to aid an "unknown" entity, such aid may foster positive relationships in the future. At a minimum, the actor will declare a willingness to consider the request.

Behavior=Positive affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

025004 - Collaboration - The chances of reaching agreement with a neutral entity are ambiguous. Certainly other factors will be more pivotal than prior affect. However, on the basis of neutral prior affect alone, one may postulate that the actor will at least sit at the
bargaining table.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

**Type of Situation and Salience**

**SALIENT**

031001 - Confrontation - In this situation, the actor is facing an entity in an adversarial context. Due to the importance of the entity for the actor, it seems plausible to suggest that this will serve to prompt caution on the actor's behalf. The actor will be inclined to seek to resolve the problem in a way that does not jeopardize the important element in the actor-entity relationship.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Salient Entity is Recipient

032001 - Intervention (A) - When the two sides are both salient to the actor, the actor has a strong interest in the problem's outcome. Primarily, the actor is concerned that its own position vis-à-vis both entities is not negatively affected. As a consequence, the incentive to intervene is substantial. Without knowledge of the affective history between the actor and the respective entities, it is difficult to posit whether the actor will mediate the problem or take sides. Even so, the actor is likely to convey its intentions explicitly.

Behavior=Unknown Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
and Domain Instruments, Both or One of the Source and Subject Entities Addressed

032002 - Intervention (B) - In this situation, the actor perceives two entities locked in an adversarial context, one of whom is important to the actor, and one of whom is not. Without knowing whether it is in a positive or negative association with these entities, it is difficult to say how the actor will intervene. It does seem plausible that the actor will intervene, either condemning the one or both entities, or offering support to one entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Both or Salient Entity is Recipient

033001 - Assistance Requesting - In this context, we know the actor regards the potential helper as an important entity, and thus a likely source of aid.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

034001 - Assistance Consideration - The actor's regards the requesting entity as important, thus connoting that at a minimum, the actor will pay attention to the request.

Behavior=Unknown Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

035001 - Collaboration - The actor, attempting to reach agreement with a salient entity, is likely to devote
attention to the problem. Without knowledge of the other aspects of the relationship, there is little basis for postulating more than that the actor will address those involved in the collaboration endeavor.

Behavior=Unknown Affect, Unknown Commitment, Unknown Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

**NOT SALIENT**

**031002 - Confrontation** - When the other entity is of relatively little importance to the actor, the latter, facing such an adversary, is likely to state its conditions for resolution to the problem with little concern for the position of the other entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

**032003 - Intervention** - The actor, perceiving two unimportant entities engaged in an adversarial situation, is unlikely to expend much energy or attention to the problem. At best, the actor will call for both sides to resolve the dispute.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

**033002 - Assistance Requesting** - If the potential donor is not salient to the actor, what induces the actor to request help from it? Realistically, only at times when that entity can provide something not available anywhere else. This implies, of course, that this entity
may over time become salient to the actor.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

034002 - Assistance Consideration - The actor, deciding whether or not to assist an unimportant entity, has little incentive to do so on the basis of this variable alone. Therefore, one would expect the actor to deflect the request.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source/Subject Entity is Recipient

035002 - Collaboration - The actor’s incentive to reach agreement with inconsequential entities is certainly not high. This could be mediated by the nature of the problem. However, in the absence of any other information, one may speculate that agreement is not very likely.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, OtherCollaborators are Recipients

Type of Situation and Relative Capabilities

Inclusion of a variable that incorporates a consideration of one nation’s capabilities relative to other entities is certainly not a new idea. Within the modern era of international politics, dating back to at least E.H. Carr, theorists have persistently wrestled with the notion of power, decision-makers’ calculations of
power, and the utility or relevance of imposing rational criteria in analyzing power among states. Despite this long tradition of research, scholars have been largely unable to generate reliable measures of power, or, for that matter, develop constructs that can demonstrate decision-makers' calculations of power in their foreign policy behavior.

The problem is compounded for this project by virtue of the fact that knowledge of a leader's perception of his nation's capabilities vis a vis other entities is required. In addition, it is plausible that some leaders might act in accordance with this power calculation, whereas others might rely more on other types of information. Due to these problems, some of which can be addressed, it was deemed appropriate to develop the variable along the simplest lines possible. This was done to avoid the pitfalls of falsely imputing rationality and attempting to gauge levels of capabilities based on shaky estimates of leaders' perceptions. As a consequence, we propose two values for this variable:

1) the actor possesses greater capabilities relative to another entity, and 2) the capabilities of the actor are not greater than this other entity. A second reason for this choice is primarily theoretical. Without knowledge of how different levels of capabilities affect decision-makers' calculations, it is extremely difficult
to posit the effects it will have on behavior. Thus, while we may be able to posit behavioral differences based on a gross calculation of greater than or not greater than, the task of refining those calculations must await a more comprehensive discussion of the uses of power.

**ACTOR'S CAPABILITIES ARE GREATER**

041001 - Confrontation - In this context, the actor perceives it has the capabilities necessary to dictate the nature of the outcome. Thus, the actor will unequivocally state the steps the other entity must take to satisfy the actor. One would expect the actor to not only evaluate the other's policy, but also issue a statement of intention in which demands are made for redress.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

042001 - Intervention (A) - When the actor has a capability advantage over both the source and the subject entities, in the absence of any other information, one must assume that the actor will utilize his advantage over both entities to influence the behavioral outcome to his satisfaction. If the problem is of interest to the actor, he will address both entities indicating the means by which the confrontation can be resolved. This may range from an evaluation of others' policy to a firm statement of intent.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

042002 - Intervention (B) - If the actor is greater than one of the entities (source or subject), but not greater than the other entities, without knowledge of the actor's incentive to intervene, one may assume that, given the disparity in capabilities, the actor will proceed more cautiously than he would in the situation where he is stronger than both entities. It seems plausible to suggest that the actor will prefer a mediated outcome, and thus will appeal to the entities involved as well as other interested third parties to negotiate a compromise. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic

Instrument, Source and Subject and Third Parties are Recipients

043001 - Assistance Requesting - An actor with greater capabilities is unlikely to find itself requesting help from an entity with lesser capabilities. The most plausible scenario for this situation is a case where the actor is searching for diplomatic support for his position. Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic

Instrument, Potential Facilitator is Recipient

044001 - Assistance Consideration - The actor's capability advantage suggests that if he is predisposed to aiding the requestor, he will grant the aid. Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient
045001 - Collaboration - When an actor has greater capabilities in a negotiation setting, a logical proposition is that he will attempt to impose his views on the other participants. This is likely to generate resistance from the other entities, and thus make a successful agreement less likely initially. The actor's behavior will be comprised of statements that attempt to restrict the maneuverability of the other participants. 
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

ACTOR'S CAPABILITIES ARE NOT GREATER

041002 - Confrontation - An actor, facing an adversary over whom it has no clear capability advantage, may attempt to deflect a direct showdown by either appealing to the opposing entity for a peaceful resolution, or seeking intervention from a third party on its behalf. 
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party or Source is Recipient

042003 - Intervention - An actor, perceiving a confrontation between two other entities, both of which have greater capabilities than the actor, has a limited set of options should he choose to intervene. The actor's capability disadvantage suggests the use of resources will not be able to significantly shape the outcome of the problem. If sufficiently interested, the actor may urge
negotiation and mediation, or he may simply issue a statement commenting on the problem.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

043002 - Assistance Requesting - The actor in need of assistance will request it from an entity in a position to help.
Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

044002 - Assistance Consideration - The actor, having no clear capability advantage, is only likely to be faced with this problem when a stronger entity needs support for a position. In this context, capabilities give one little clues as to a behavioral response.
Behavior=Unknown

045002 - Collaboration - A negotiation setting, in which the actor is attempting to collaborate with other entities in which the actor does not have a clear capability advantage, suggests that the process of reaching agreement is likely to be protracted. Thus it is plausible that a series of behavioral activity will ensue, with the actor attempting to derive maximum advantage by issuing statements concerning the process, and the prospects for agreement.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
COMBINED LOGICS

An examination of the variables in isolation, and the types of behavioral outcomes derived, suggests that knowledge of a single factor alone fails to provide sufficient information to postulate behavioral outcomes in any other than a vague manner. A logical consequence, therefore, is to look at the variables together to ascertain if, when the variables are viewed interactively, one may derive testable hypotheses regarding leader personality and perceptions.

In this context, we begin with leader orientations, viewed through type of situation, and attempt to gauge the effect of specific values for the three relational variables on modifying or amplifying the leader's predispositions. That is, we begin with a leader's "foreign affairs personality", then attempt to calculate the effects of the external variables (prior affect, relative capabilities, salience, and type of situation) in shaping a foreign policy predisposition.

EXPANSIONIST ORIENTATION

According to M. Hermann (1980), an expansionist is essentially a conflict oriented individual. He perceives the environment in zero-sum terms; his gain is someone else's loss, and vice versa. He attempts to manipulate others to achieve his ends. His
low value on cognitive complexity suggests that the expansionist is less likely to differentiate objects in his environment. Therefore the expansionist will probably view other entities in terms of positive and negative affect, rather than less distinct categories such as neutral or mixed.

CONFRONTATION - The expansionist in this type of situation is cognizant of a direct threat to himself and/or his nation. Given his "us versus them" mentality, and the zero-sum attitude, his perception of the problem source will likely center around questions of power. As a consequence, the role of prior affect and salience are diminished in importance, the former more so than the latter. Thus the pivotal concern for an expansionist is the relative capability calculus. Salience or lack thereof may mute the intensity of the leader's response, but will not significantly alter the expansionist's predisposition.

In this context, four hypotheses are proposed that reflect the permutations of relative capabilities and salience:

051001 - Hypothesis 1: When an expansionist perceives the source to be salient and the expansionist has a relative advantage in capabilities, he is likely to adopt an aggressive posture. He will condemn the other entity's behavior and issue a warning to cease this behavior.
Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: The expansionist, realizing he has an advantage, will press the source to change its ways, but will stop short of issuing a statement of intent (threat) because of the source's importance to him. Affect will be negative because of the hostile nature of the situation, and the expansionist will address the source diplomatically.

051002 - Hypothesis 2: When the expansionist perceives the source to be not salient, and the expansionist has a relative capability advantage, he is likely to act aggressively, using non-verbal instruments.

Behavior=Negative Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: The expansionist, unconstrained by the source's relationship, and having a relative advantage in capabilities, will strike at the source as a means of redressing the problem. This will be undertaken in a negative context, using whatever instruments are appropriate to the domain of the problem.

051003 - Hypothesis 3: When an expansionist perceives the source to be salient and also having a relative advantage, he will attempt to marshal support from third parties to assist in modifying the problem created by the source.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient
Logic: Due to the adversarial nature of the problem, and not having an advantage over a salient adversary, the expansionist will attempt to find ways of saving face. Whether the adversary has been on good terms before or not, the expansionist will approach a third party to either broker the dispute, or provide resources for the leader to resolve the problem himself.

051004 - Hypothesis 4: When the expansionist perceives the source to be not salient and the expansionist does not have a capability advantage, the expansionist will undertake some symbolic act to indicate displeasure with the situation.

Behavior = Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: The expansionist has not the means to threaten or warn the source, but can attempt to embarrass it by making a symbolic gesture (e.g., removing diplomatic personnel) as a means of demonstrating dissatisfaction. This will be performed in a negative context, and will be directed towards the source. Some verbal/diplomatic rhetoric will accompany the symbolic act.

INTERVENTION - In this context, an expansionist perceives an adversarial situation between at least two other entities. According to C.F. Hermann (1982), any actor in such circumstances has four basic choices:

1) Support one side and oppose the other,
2). Remain neutral with respect to the problem,
3). Mediate between opposing entities,
4). Condemn both entities.

In contrast to confrontation situations, prior affect is an important dimension of an expansionist's calculus. His propensity to divide entities into good and evil suggests that his past relations with entities will provide an impetus for arriving at a behavioral response. In addition, one can postulate that this facet of his personality implies that the values of prior affect can be reduced to the two of positive and negative. Once positive or negative prior affect is established, the other variables - salience and relative capabilities - will serve to reinforce or dampen the intensity of the expansionist's response. There is one important caveat, however: when both entities have had negative past relations with an expansionist, his propensity to condemn both entities without further analysis will be strong. (See Hypothesis 4).

052001 - Hypothesis 1: When both entities (that is, the source and the subject entities) have positive prior affect with the actor, and both are salient to him, the expansionist is likely to attempt mediation regardless of the capability distribution.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients
Logic: Given the importance of both entities to the expansionist, he is likely to see this as an opportunity to increase personal and national status, as well as preserving the relationship he maintains with both entities. Consequently, he is likely to make a conditional offer to help resolve the dispute.

052002 - Hypothesis 2: When both entities are positive, but one entity is salient to the actor and the other is not, the expansionist will offer support to the salient entity regardless of the capability distribution.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Salient Entity is Recipient

Logic: The importance of the salient entity will induce an expansionist to side with it due to the expansionist's need to maintain access to the salient entity. He will not condemn the other entity in an attempt to not significantly alienate that entity. Thus one may expect quiet, behind-the-scenes support for the salient entity.

052003 - Hypothesis 3: When both entities are positive and neither is salient to the actor, an expansionist has little incentive to intervene, and one can expect a vague statement of general policy urging the sides to resolve their differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: Given the unimportance of the entities to the
expansionist, he perceives little reward in involving himself in such a problem. He may make a vague gesture implying that the behavior of the opposing entities is not conducive to international harmony, but on the whole will not devote a great deal of attention to the problem.

052004 - **Hypothesis 4**: When both entities have had negative relations with an expansionist, regardless of importance and capabilities, the expansionist will condemn both entities.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The expansionist sees both entities as evil and perceives no positive benefit from siding with one side or the other. Even if one entity is salient, the expansionist will not side with the non-salient entity as a means of protecting himself in the event that the salient entity successfully emerges from the situation. As a consequence, he will merely undertake a negative verbal evaluation of their policies, addressing them directly.

052005 - **Hypothesis 5**: When one entity has had positive relations with the actor and is salient to it, and the other entity has had negative relations regardless of the salience of that entity, and the expansionist actor has greater capabilities than the negative entity, the expansionist will offer support to the positive entity.
Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The expansionist, perceiving an important friend facing a mutual foe, and recognizing his own greater capabilities vis a vis the foe, will intervene. The importance of the positive entity provides a stimulus to act in addition to the "evil" nature of the adversary. The importance of the adversary is inconsequential, as the expansionist perceives this problem to be of good versus evil and has the capabilities to assist his friend.

052006 - Hypothesis 6: The scenario here is the same as for hypothesis #5, except that the actor does not have a capability advantage over the negative entity. The expansionist, in this context, will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The expansionist understands that he does not have the capabilities to oppose the negative entity, so demonstrates support for the cause of his ally. This will take the form of presenting the negative entity as the aggressor and condemning the aggressor’s behavior.

052007 - Hypothesis 7: When the positive entity is not salient, and the negative entity is salient (regardless of either’s capabilities vis a vis the expansionist), the expansionist will condemn the negative entity.
Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: Despite the fact that this is another good versus evil situation for the expansionist, the difference in importance between the two entities precludes the expansionist from actively supporting a friend. Given the expansionist’s propensity to stay one step ahead of the game, he is unlikely to commit himself to a course of action that could undermine his nation’s position. As a consequence, condemnation of the negative entity’s behavior is a plausible response.

052008 - Hypothesis B: When neither entity is salient, and one entity has shared positive prior affect with the actor, and the other negative prior affect (irregardless of capabilities), the actor will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: As both entities are unimportant to the expansionist, his motivation to intervene is reduced. However, because of the difference in prior affect, he is likely to condemn the negative entity.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTING - In this situation, the expansionist is faced with a problem not directly caused by any external entity. Unable to resolve it alone, he seeks assistance from the external environment.
Hypothesis 1: When a potential donor is present, the expansionist will ask for assistance, if and only if they have shared positive past relations. Even then, the request is likely to be characterized in mutually beneficial terms (i.e., not "charity").

Behavior = Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: Given his strong sense of nationalism, which suggests reluctance to cower before anyone, the expansionist is likely only to ask for assistance from entities with whom he has shared positive past relations.

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATION - In these situations, the expansionist, naturally inclined not to commit resources, will provide assistance only when tangible benefits can accrue to him or his own nation.

Hypothesis 1: If the requesting entity has had positive prior affect with the actor, and is salient to the actor, the expansionist will grant the request.

Behavior = Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Requestor is Recipient

Logic: An important friend in need will always receive a sympathetic ear from the expansionist, and if he has the necessary resources, he will grant the request.

Hypothesis 2: If the requesting entity has had positive prior affect, but is not salient, the expansionist is less likely to grant the request, perhaps
initially willing only to consider the request.

Behavior: Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The importance of the requesting entity here is pivotal. In contrast to the last scenario, here the expansionist has no strong motivation to commit resources. The one possible exception may be if he perceives he can develop a salient relationship as a result of this problem in which he has the upper hand.

054003 - Hypothesis 3: All other combinations of prior affect, salience and capabilities of a requesting entity will lead the expansionist to deflect the request.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: Naturally unwilling to expend resources on others, the expansionist, with only the exception of a positive salient requestor will deflect the request.

COLLABORATION - In this context, the expansionist is unlikely to enter into agreements unless he can derive a clear advantage. As such, the outcome of the majority of collaborative problems are likely to be nonbinding (low commitment equals "agreement in principle" or "progress in negotiations"). The one case where agreement is plausible is the following one:

055001 - Hypothesis 4: If the expansionist has had positive prior affect and salience is positive (regardless
of capabilities), that is, there is ideological affinity, then the likelihood of agreement increases.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: Salience is the key variable here. A strong positive bond between the expansionist and the other entity(s) is the pivotal determinant. This shared outlook provides the motivation for the expansionist to enter into agreement with the other collaborator(s).

Hypothesis 2: Positive prior affect of the other collaborators and any other kind of salience or lack thereof will lead to deflection.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: The expansionist, lacking motivation to agree, will be reluctant to make a binding commitment, delaying the collaboration process to assess his alternatives.

Hypothesis 3: If the prior affect is negative and the other collaborator(s) is salience and has greater capabilities than the actor, the expansionist will search for third party support before reaching any agreement.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: The salience of the negative entity introduces a note of caution. In this context, the expansionist perceives a need to marshal outside support as a means of
protecting his position. In so doing, he provides a validation of his position and develops a possible means of offsetting any advantage the other entity may have.

055004 - Hypothesis_4: If the other collaborators are negative and salient, but the actor possesses greater capabilities relative to them, the expansionist will push for agreement on his terms.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: Having the advantage in this scenario, the expansionist will attempt to forge an agreement on his own terms. Given the salience of the others, the expansionist will not couch it in take-it-or-leave-it terms, but will attempt to derive every benefit possible.

055005 - Hypothesis_5: If prior affect is negative, and the other entity is not salient nor possesses as great capabilities as the actor, the expansionist will not negotiate, but will offer a proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: This is an unlikely situation, but should it occur, the expansionist will almost demand that the outcome be that of his position.

055006 - Hypothesis_6: If the other entities are negative and not salient, but they do possess greater capabilities
than the actor, the expansionist will simply not negotiate.
Behavior = Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: The expansionist has no motivation to negotiate,
and cannot impose a solution, and therefore is likely to
dismiss the problem.

ACTIVE INDEPENDENT ORIENTATION

M. Hermann's formulation (1980) of this
orientation suggests that the active independent is open
to participating in the international community, but on
his own terms, indicating a propensity to maintain a
degree of self-reliance. In addition, the active
independent is an information seeker, one who examines
alternatives before reaching a decision.

CONFRONTATION -

061001 - Hypothesis 1: If the adversary faced is
positive, not salient and has less capabilities than the
actor, the active independent will express displeasure
with the source's behavior, warning him to reconsider
policy, either verbally or by some insignificant symbolic
action.
Behavior = Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Source is Recipient
Logic: The friendly past relations with the source
suggests that the active independent will adopt a response
that gives the source an opportunity to maintain the relationship by altering its behavior. The source’s relative unimportance, combined with the active independent’s advantage, provides the context for the active independent to press for resolution on his terms.

061002 - Hypothesis_2: If the adversary is positive, not salient, but the actor does not have a capability advantage, the active independent will express displeasure with the source’s behavior by negatively evaluating the latter’s policy, indicating how the problem can be resolved.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: Again, the friendly past relations serve to moderate the active independent’s response. Without an advantage, the active independent perceives that a comment critical of the source’s policy, combined with the means for resolution, may alert the source that the situation must be altered.

061003 - Hypothesis_3: If the adversary is positive, salient, and the actor has a capability advantage, the active independent will remind the source that their relations should not be strained by differences, and will propose resolution.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient
Logic: When an important friend poses a problem, the active independent will attempt to work it out in a non-threatening manner. By proposing the means for resolution, the active independent is attempting to maintain the relationship with the source, while insuring that the outcome will be favorable to the active independent's position.

061004 - Hypothesis 4: If the adversary is positive, salient, and the actor does not have a capability advantage, the active independent will respond in a manner similar to hypothesis #3.

Logic: The difference in relative advantage will not interfere with the active independent's desire to resolve the problem with an important friend. The active independent will once again propose a solution in order to maintain their relationship.

061005 - Hypothesis 5: If the adversary is mixed, not salient, and the actor has an advantage, the active independent will explicitly convey the intention to unilaterally resolve the problem unless the source changes its behavior.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: An unimportant entity with whom the active independent has had both good and bad prior affect has caused a problem. The active independent, with greater
Capabilities, will threaten to use them unless the source alters its policies. The unimportance of the entity sheds any motivation the actor may have to be cautious, and the mixed prior affect suggests that the active independent has, in the past, been willing to confront this entity.

061006 - Hypothesis 6: If the adversary is mixed, not salient, but the actor does not have an advantage, the active independent will seek third party mediation.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: Unlike the conditions of hypothesis #5, in which the active independent had the capability to impose a decision, here the active independent faced with a similar type entity will seek for mediation as a means of countering the source's advantage.

061007 - Hypothesis 7: If the adversary is mixed, salient, and the actor has the advantage, the active independent will engage in nonverbal symbolic behavior to express dissatisfaction, but will leave room for negotiation.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: The active independent, having experienced an up-and-down relationship with an important, but inferior (capability-wise) source, will demonstrate its displeasure, but because of the source's importance, will
not attempt to force the issue, thus providing the source with an opportunity for reconsideration.

061008 - Hypothesis 8: If the adversary is mixed, salient, and the actor has no advantage, the active independent will search for the support of an ally. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: Experiencing difficulty with an important but superior (capability-wise) entity, the active independent will search for allies as a means of countering the source's strength. Due to the importance of the source, the active independent is unlikely to engage in any behavior that will jeopardize the area of importance, and, at the same time, is unlikely to submit to the source (the active independent does not want to limit his maneuverability). Thus, enlisting the support of an ally will signal the source to the active independent's desire to keep his options open in dealing with the source.

061009 - Hypothesis 9: If the adversary is negative, not salient, and the actor has the advantage, the active independent will demonstrably threaten the source by undertaking a significant action to reverse the situation. Behavior=Negative Affect, High Commitment, diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: A hostile and unimportant entity has challenged the active independent. Having superior capabilities and
perceiving no danger to the position of his government, the active independent will respond with his greater capabilities. The active independent, like other leaders, perceives a need to demonstrate the power and the status of the nation as a means of alerting others in the external (and internal) environment to his resolve. This particular set of circumstances provides such an opportunity for the active independent.

061010 - Hypothesis 10: If the adversary is negative, not salient, and the actor has no advantage, the active independent will search for allies to offset the source's strength.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: The active independent is unlikely to face a hostile entity with superior capabilities alone. As a consequence, he will search for allies in order to preempt the source's ability to inflict any kind of damage to the active independent and his nation.

061011 - Hypothesis 11: If the adversary is negative, salient, and the actor has the advantage, the active independent will express displeasure with the source by undertaking "low cost" action while leaving room for negotiation.

Behavior=Negative Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient
Logic: The active independent will project his strength to demonstrate he has the upper hand, but because of the source's importance, will do so in a manner that provides an avenue for negotiation.

061012 - Hypothesis 12: If the adversary is negative, salient, and the actor has no advantage, the active independent will seek mediation from an international organization to resolve the problem.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, International Organization is Recipient

Logic: The active independent is confronted with a superior, important, and hostile entity. He perceives the need to act cautiously. Approaching an international organization for mediation as opposed to eliciting support from allies is preferred as it signals to the source the active independent's desire to address the problem without escalating the stakes.

The category of prior affect, none/neutral, has been excluded from analysis in this type of situation on the following grounds:

1). Nations in conflict seldom have no predisposition regarding affect towards an adversary.

2). In those instances where a new regime emerges, it is claimed (actually, inferred) that the new regime will rely on preceding affective relations in confrontation situations.
3). Newly independent states, despite their lack of interaction in the international arena, come to power with affective predispositions based on interaction with states prior to independence.

INTERVENTION –

In contrast to the expansionist, the active independent will utilize as much information as he can marshal in evaluating whether or not to intervene, and in what manner. As a consequence, all the permutations must be examined in order to accurately model the effects of the active independent’s perception of the external environment.

062001 - Hypotheses 1 thru 3: If the subject and source are both positive and salient, regardless of each’s capabilities vis a vis the actor, the active independent will offer his services as a mediator.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: Regardless of capability distribution, an active independent perceiving two important allies in an adversarial situation will attempt to mediate the dispute. The importance of both entities for the active independent and the positive relations he enjoys with them will motivate him to intervene.

062002 - Hypotheses 4 thru 6: If both source and subject
are positive, but only one of them is salient, irregardless of the relative capabilities, the active independent will urge reconciliation.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The dispute between the two allies, one of which is important to the active independent, presents a dilemma. Not wanting to alienate the salient entity, or the nonsalient entity, the active independent will choose not to become entangled in their dispute. Even an offer of mediation may be seen as a tilt towards the nonsalient entity by the salient entity.

062003 - Hypotheses_7.thru_9: If both the source and subject are positive, and neither is salient, irregardless of the relative capabilities involved, the active independent will issue a statement of general policy noting the need for reducing international conflict.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: Although two friends are engaged in a dispute, the lack of salience, plus the active independent's propensity to remain aloof will induce him not to become involved. In this context, the active independent keeps all options open as well as maintaining relations with both sides, by addressing them only indirectly.

062004 - Hypotheses_10.thru_12: If the source and the
subject are both negative and salient, irregardless of the relative capabilities, the active independent will condemn both entities.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: Since both entities are both important and have had negative relations with the active independent, he stands to gain nothing through intervention. Consequently, no calculus of relative capabilities is necessary, as the active independent will simply condemn the behavior of both entities.

062005 - Hypotheses_13_thru_15: If the source and the subject are both negative, and only one is salient, irregardless of the relative capabilities, the active independent will negatively evaluate the salient entity's policy.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Salient Entity is Recipient

Logic: The salient entity, although having a similar record of relations as the nonsalient entity is the object of the active independent's response. The active independent's attention is naturally directed toward the more important entity, and engages in a verbal "rap on the knuckles" to indicate his displeasure with an entity with whom he will have to interact in the future.

062006 - Hypotheses_16_thru_18: If the source and the
subject are both negative and neither are salient, 
irregardless of the relative capabilities, the active 
independent will condemn both.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic 
Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The active independent has no interest in a 
dispute between two entities with whom he has had an 
unfavorable relationship. The active independent will 
expend the minimal amount of energy commenting on the evil 
nature of those involved.

062007 - Hypotheses_19_and_20: If, of the source and 
subject, both are salient, one is positive and one is 
negative, and the actor is either greater in capabilities 
than both, or at least greater than the positive entity, 
the active independent will offer support to the positive 
extity.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic 
Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The combination of the active independent's 
relative advantage over the negative entity and its close 
relationship to the positive entity will induce the active 
independent to offer its support. Since the negative 
extity is salient, and if the salience is couched in 
dependent (as opposed to geographic) terms, the active 
independent may perceive this as an opportunity to reduce 
its dependence.
062008 - **Hypotheses 21 and 22**: If, of the source and the subject, both are salient, one is positive and the other negative, and the actor is either not greater in capabilities than either, or is greater than the positive entity but not the negative, the active independent will condemn the negative entity's behavior utilizing some form of symbolic behavior.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The relative advantage of the negative entity tempers the alternatives for an active independent. A demonstration of his dissatisfaction (e.g., expelling diplomatic personnel) constitutes a viable means of alerting the negative entity to the active independent's displeasure, and avoids the commitment of resources in an uncertain situation.

062009 - **Hypotheses 23 thru 26**: If, of the source and the subject, neither are salient, and one is positive and the other negative, irregardless of the relative capabilities, the active independent will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The active independent, wary of entanglements that may jeopardize his future options, and perceiving no important stake in the problem, will condemn the negative entity. This may be carried out in a variety of ways,
either a direct condemnation, a symbolic act, or through a multilateral forum.

062010 - Hypotheses_27_thru_30: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and one is negative, and the positive entity is salient, but the negative entity is not, irregardless of the relative capabilities, the active independent will offer to support the positive entity either directly or through a third party.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: In the active independent's view, an important ally is being confronted by an entity with whom the active independent has experienced negative relations. The importance of the ally outweighs considerations of capability to the extent that the active independent is willing to assist the ally either directly or through the enlistment of a third party.

062011 - Hypotheses_31_thru_34: If, of the subject and the source, one is positive and the other negative, and the negative entity is salient but the positive entity is not, irregardless of capabilities, the active independent will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: Despite the categorical difference in prior affect, the focus of the active independent's attention is
on the salient negative entity. Regardless of capability, the active independent, not one for promoting short term, high risk change, will settle on a policy of condemnation as a means of exhibiting his displeasure.

062012 - Hypotheses_35_thru_38_(A): If, of the source and the subject, one is positive, one is mixed, both are salient, with the mixed entity being salient for dependent, not geographic reasons, irregardless of relative capabilities, the active independent will issue a general statement of support for the positive entity. Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient (Note: a general statement of support can be issued in a variety of ways. The preceding behavioral projection represents but one form).

Logic: A confrontation between an important ally and an important entity with whom the active independent has had uneven past relations AND on which the active independent is dependent, will induce the active independent to tilt towards his ally. The active independent, striving to alleviate all forms of dependence, perceives this situation as an opportunity to regain a measure of control by openly opposing the mixed entity, while at the same time incurring very little cost to his nation.

062013 - Hypotheses_35_thru_38_(B): If the situation is the same as above, except that the mixed entity's salience
is geographic in nature, the active independent will urge both sides to resolve their differences. 

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients 

Logic: Despite the uneven relationship with the mixed entity, the active independent adopts an impartial stand as a means of preserving future options. His affinity for the positive entity is offset in this circumstance by his desire to project accommodation with a neighbor. 

062014 - Hypotheses_39_thru_42: If, of the subject and source, neither is salient, one is positive and the other is mixed, irregardless of capabilities, the active independent will issue a general statement indicating the need for a peaceful resolution. 

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, International Organization is Recipient 

Logic: Having no important stake in this type of problem, the active independent perceives no gain to be had from involvement, and simply calls for a general resolution. 

062015 - Hypotheses_43_and_44: If, of the subject and the source, one is positive and the other mixed, and the positive entity is salient, and the mixed is not, and the actor has greater capabilities than the positive entity, irregardless of the actor's capabilities vis a vis the mixed entity, the active independent will offer to support the positive entity.
Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The active independent will express a willingness to assist an important ally when that ally needs support to oppose his adversary. A demonstration of support can be expected due to the salience of his ally.

062016 - Hypotheses_45_and_46: If the situation is the same as the previous one, except that the actor does not have greater capabilities than the positive entity, whether or not it has greater capabilities than the mixed entity, the active independent will condemn the mixed entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: Because his ally has greater capabilities, the active independent perceives no pressing need to intervene. Thus, his demonstration of support takes the form of a verbal condemnation.

062017 - Hypotheses_47_thru_50: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and not salient, and one is mixed and salient, irregardless of the capability distribution, the active independent will condemn the mixed entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: The focus of the active independent’s attention is on the salient entity. Due to the relative unimportance
of the positive entity, he sees no gain by active intervention. Consequently, the active independent will take the opportunity to condemn the mixed entity's behavior through a verbal declaration.

062019 - Hypotheses_51_thru_54: If, of the source and subject, one is negative, one is mixed, and both are salient, irregardless of the capability distribution, the active independent will issue a general statement indicating both nations should be held in contempt for their actions.

Behavior: Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: As both entities are salient, the active independent perceives little advantage to intervening on one side. As a result, a denunciation of both entities provides a means of expressing displeasure, while not further affecting the status of his relations with either entity.

062020 - Hypotheses_55_thru_58: If, of the source and the subject, neither are salient, one is mixed and the other negative, no matter the capability distribution, the active independent will basically ignore this problem, perhaps commenting on the need for dialogue.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Indirect Object is Recipient

Logic: The active independent has no real motivation to
do anything in this type of problem. While he has experienced negative and uneven relations with the relevant entities, they are so removed from the active independent’s focus of concern, that the minimal amount of attention is directed to this problem.

062021 - Hypotheses 59 thru 62: If, of the subject and the source, one is negative, the other mixed, the negative entity is salient while the mixed is not, irregardless of the capabilities, the active independent will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: Again, due to the salience of the negative entity, the active independent will focus his attention more on that entity than on the mixed one. In this regard, the active independent takes this opportunity to harangue the negative entity as a low cost means of exhibiting his displeasure with their relationship.

062022 - Hypotheses 63 thru 66: If, of the source and subject, one is mixed, one is negative, the negative is not salient and the mixed is salient, irregardless of capabilities, the active independent will express mild support for the mixed entity either by denouncing the negative entity or by some low cost expression of support for the mixed entity, e.g., voting against the negative entity in some international organization context.
Behavior=Negative Affect or Neutral Affect, Low or Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity or Indirect Object is Recipient

Logic: Due to the salience of an entity with whom the active independent has experienced uneven relations, the active independent will be careful not to damage the positive aspects of their relationship. As a consequence, the active independent is likely to undertake some form of support either through a denunciation of the negative entity, or by a token expression of support for the mixed entity.

062023 - Hypotheses_67 thru 70: If, of the source and the subject, both are mixed and salient, irregardless of the capabilities, the active independent will urge the entities to reconcile their differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: As the active independent perceives the relevant entities in a similar fashion, he perceives little gain to be had by taking sides. Given their importance to him, he is likely to urge reconciliation so that their dispute will not interfere in his relations with each entity.

062024 - Hypotheses_71 thru 74: If, of the subject and source, both are mixed, neither is salient, irregardless of capabilities, the active independent will basically ignore this problem, issuing a general statement for the
need to resolve differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Indirect Object is Recipient
Logic: The active independent's interest in a
confrontation between two unimportant entities with whom
he has experienced uneven relations is fairly remote.
Thus, a terse, general statement is the most likely
response.

062025 - Hypotheses_75_thru_79: If, of the source and
subject, both are mixed, one is salient and one is not,
irregardless of capabilities, the active independent will
issue a mild statement of support for the salient entity.
Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Indirect Object is Recipient
Logic: Due to one entity's importance, the active
independent will be partial, but careful not to alienate
the nonsalient entity. A mild expression of support can
accomplish both objectives.

062026 - Hypothesis_79: If, of the source and subject,
one is none/neutral and the other negative, irregardless
of salience or capabilities, the active independent will
denounce the negative entity.
Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient
Logic: The active independent's past experiences with the
negative entity induce him to denounce that entity's
actions towards one with whom he has had little or no interaction. Salience and relative capabilities do not enter into the picture as the motivation to denounce can be accounted for by prior affect alone.

062027 - Hypothesis_80: If, of the source and subject, both are neutral/none, irregardless of salience or capabilities, the active independent will take no position, and thus no behavior will be forthcoming.

Behavior=None

Logic: The active independent has no incentive to even comment, so the situation is entirely ignored. This flows from the postulate that Active Independents avoid unnecessary entanglements.

062028 - Hypothesis_81: If, of the source and subject, one is none/neutral and the other is mixed, irregardless of salience and capabilities, the active independent will issue a negative comment regarding the mixed entity's behavior.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: The active independent has little incentive or motivation to intervene, however, his uneven relationship with one entity provides the impetus to negatively comment on its behavior.

062029 - Hypothesis_82: If, of the source and subject, one is none/neutral and the other positive, irregardless
of salience and relative capabilities, the active independent will express support for the positive entity. Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The active independent will support an ally, although without committing resources, because of the importance he attaches to maintaining good relations in general. The fact that he has had little interaction with the other entity indicates a reluctance to denounce that entity outright.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTING -

An active independent will seek assistance from entities that will not impose conditions for assistance. This contingency cannot be modelled using the perceptual and relational variables. As a consequence, the only hypothesis that can be generated flows from information generated by the orientation itself. (063001)

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATION -

In this type of situation for the active independent, relative capabilities will not be of importance.

064001 - Hypothesis 1: If the requesting entity is positive and salient, the active independent will grant assistance.
Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The active independent will respond favorably to a request from an important ally. The desire to maintain the relationship serves as the fundamental motivation.

064002 - Hypotheses_2_and_3: If the requesting entity is positive and not salient or mixed and salient, the active independent will state his intention to assist.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The active independent, intuitively reluctant to commit its resources, will indicate an intention to assist a friend or an important entity with a record of uneven relations, but this action is designed to see if others will assist as well, relieving the active independent from having to part with resources.

064003 - Hypotheses_4_and_5: If the requesting entity is mixed and not salient, or none/neutral whether salient or not, the active independent will indicate an evaluation of policy.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: These types of entities are not a high priority for the active independent, and he will evaluate the problem as a means of delaying action.

064004 - Hypothesis_6: If the requesting entity is
negative, whether or not it is salient, the active independent will ignore the request, and thus no behavior is forthcoming.

Behavior=None

Logic: Despite the active independent's propensity to cultivate relations with diverse groups, he will not commit valuable resources to an entity that has posed problems for him in the past.

COLLABORATION -

The key perceptual variable in this type of situation is salience. Due to the active independent's firm sense of independence, negotiations with entities on whom he is dependent are likely to proceed slowly and cautiously. Salient entities that do not hold a dependent relationship are more likely targets for agreement. Thus, the hypotheses focus on the types of entities that the active independent is more likely to enter into collaboration with and reach agreement.

065001 - **Hypothesis 1**: If the collaborators are positive or mixed, and have positive salience for the actor irregardless of capabilities, the active independent will most likely reach agreement in this setting. These entities share concerns on common problems, or have established a common ideological bond with the actor.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
and Domain Instruments, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: An active independent's reluctance to reduce his independence implies that only under the most favorable of circumstances will he commit himself to some type of agreement. This type is the least commitful, as it basically only involves a verbal commitment regarding some facet of the international environment or a common problem between the entities concerned.

065002 - **Hypothesis_2**: Regardless of prior affect or capabilities, if the other collaborators are dependence salient for the actor, the active independent will shun agreements that limit his maneuverability, but he may be pressured into an agreement due to his dependent status.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
and Domain Instruments, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: The active independent will seek to deflect any pressure to agree with entities that have the ability to shape his nation's policies.

065003 - **Hypothesis_3**: Regardless of prior affect or relative capabilities, if the other collaborators are not salient for the actor, the active independent is not liable to do much in the way of collaborating.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: It is unlikely that the active independent will agree to any binding commitment when there is no issue or
entity of great concern to himself. He may attend
congresses, summits, etc. with these types of entities,
but when there is little at stake, he is likely to do
nothing.

INFLUENTIAL ORIENTATION

M. Hermann's (1980) definition of an
influential suggests that such an individual is a
behind-the-scenes politician. While he wishes to maintain
high visibility and take credit for any achievements, the
means by which this is accomplished is through negotiation
and collaboration.

CONFRONTATION -

071001 - Hypothesis 1: If the adversary has had positive
prior affect with the actor, irregardless of salience and
relative capabilities, the influential leader will propose
to negotiate differences.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: The influential leader, seeing little advantage to
alienating friends, will attempt to resolve conflict
diplomatically. As the influential thrives on expanding
and preserving his leadership role, this constitutes
another arena in which he can demonstrate his abilities.

071002 - Hypothesis 2: If the adversary is mixed and
salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential
will initiate negotiations to resolve the dispute.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: Similar to the previous hypothesis, the influential perceives that the importance of these entities outweighs the uneven affective history he has experienced with them. He thus has an incentive to "win over" his adversary through diplomatic channels.

071003 - Hypothesis_3: If the adversary is mixed and not salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will issue a statement of general policy.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Indirect Audience is Recipient

Logic: The relative unimportance of the opposing entity reduces the influential's incentive to personally intervene. Due to the uneven history of relations between the two entities, the influential prefers a general policy statement, rather than a specific attack, leaving room for a resolution to the problem.

071004 - Hypothesis_4: If the adversary is negative, salient, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the influential will seek assistance from a third party.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: The influential finds himself facing a salient
adversary with a disadvantage in capabilities. In this context, the influential's perception that nations lack the ability to act alone (See M. Hermann, 1980) dominates his evaluation of the situation. Thus, a search for support from friendly third parties to counter his adversary's capability advantage is the preferred course of action.

071005 - **Hypothesis 5**: If the adversary is negative, salient, but the actor possesses the capability advantage, the influential will issue a conditional warning.

**Behavior**: Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

**Logic**: The influential's desire to be respected as a strong leader motivates him to issue a warning to his adversary to revise his position. This not only makes him look strong for his constituents, but may convey to other heads of state the leadership qualities he possesses. The salience of the adversary serves to temper the influential's response.

071006 - **Hypothesis 6**: If the adversary is negative, not salient, and the actor does not have a capability advantage, the influential will undertake a symbolic or insignificant nonverbal behavior.

**Behavior**: Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

**Logic**: The incentive to seek support or negotiate is
reduced by the lack of salience. However, the source does possess greater capabilities, and the influential must respond without endangering his nation's position, but at the same time not appear weak. A symbolic act, such as removing a diplomat, serves to demonstrate the influential's displeasure with little or no cost to his nation.

071007 - Hypothesis 7: If the adversary is negative and not salient, but the actor does have the advantage in capabilities, the influential will act to resolve the problem, probably using a reversible resource allocation. Behavior=Negative Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: The influential will utilize his capability advantage to resolve the problem on his own terms. In facing an adversary, the influential perceives the importance of demonstrating his firmness and strength, particularly for the domestic audience. This situation provides an opportunity to do so.

INTERVENTION -

This type of situation is tailor-made for the influential. He can demonstrate his leadership in a variety of ways - supporting his allies, mediating between allies engaged in a dispute, or calling for multilateral action by international bodies.

072001 - Hypothesis 1: If the source and the subject are
both positive, irregardless of salience and capabilities, the influential will propose the option for settling the dispute. Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: With two allies engaged in a dispute, the influential perceives an opportunity to gain status by mediating the dispute. Capabilities and salience do not figure prominently in his calculus, as the emphasis is on intervening to demonstrate his leadership skills.

072002 - Hypothesis 2: If both the source and the subject are negative, irregardless of salience and capabilities, the influential will condemn both entities.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: Perceiving no gain through intervention, the influential will simply condemn the behavior of the relevant entities. Again, relative capabilities and salience do not enter into his calculus.

072003 - Hypothesis 3: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and salient, and the other is negative (whether salient or not) and the actor does not have a capability advantage over the negative entity, the influential will issue an unconditional statement of support for the positive entity.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Positive Entity is Recipient
Logic: The influential, faced with a decision to intervene or not, in a dispute between an adversary and an ally, will demonstrate his loyalty to his ally by offering unconditional support. The greater capabilities of the adversary serve to constrain the influential from making resource commitments that may jeopardize his nation's position.

072004 - Hypothesis 4: If the situation is the same as the previous, only the actor possesses the capability advantage over the negative entity; the influential will offer resource support to his ally.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: As in the previous hypotheses, the influential will demonstrate his loyalty to his ally. However, having a capability advantage over the negative entity allows the influential to offer resource support without compromising the position of his nation.

072005 - Hypothesis 5: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and not salient, the other is negative and salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: Despite the influential's predisposition to stand by its allies, the existence of a salient adversary in
this situation, coupled with the positive entity's non-salience, shifts the influential's response from support of the positive entity to condemnation of the negative entity. The calculation of capabilities is not pivotal in this context, as the salience of the negative entity induces caution on the part of the influential leader.

072006 - Hypothesis_4: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and the other is negative and both are not salient to the actor, irregardless of relative capabilities, the influential will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: As with hypothesis #5, the influential sees no advantage through active intervention, thus finding condemnation of the negative entity a sufficient response.

072007 - Hypothesis_7: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and salient, and the other is mixed and not salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will issue a statement of intent, in conditional form, towards the mixed entity.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: Once again, the influential chooses to defend his ally. In contrast to situations where the other entity
has experienced negative affective relations, the response in this context is conditional, in order to provide the mixed entity with a signal of the influential's position without explicit threat to the mixed entity.

072008 - Hypothesis 8: If , of the source and the subject, both are salient, one is positive and one is mixed, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will offer a formula for the resolution of the problem.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients
Logic: This context provides an opportunity for the influential to demonstrate his leadership qualities. Two salient entities are engaged in a dispute, which may not only affect his nation, but could also affect his personal status. Consequently, despite the difference in prior affect, the influential chooses an intermediary role.

072009 - Hypothesis 9: If the situation is the same as above, only the positive entity is not salient, whereas the mixed entity is salient, the influential will comment on the mixed entity's policy.
Behavior=Neutral or Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient
Logic: Despite one entity having positive prior affect, the focus of the influential's attention is the salient, mixed entity. The influential's incentive to intervene is minimal, yet the salience of the mixed entity requires
some diplomatic signal.

072010 - **Hypothesis 10**: If the situation is the same as above, only neither the positive nor the mixed entity is salient for the actor, the influential will urge both sides to resolve their differences.

**Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients**

**Logic:** The absence of salience on both sides reduces the influential's incentive to actively intervene. As a consequence, an admonishment to resolve differences is a low-cost response to a situation that is not of great interest to the leader.

072011 - **Hypothesis 11**: If, of the source and subject, one is positive and the other neutral/none, irregardless of relative capabilities and salience, the influential will issue a statement of general policy.

**Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient**

**Logic:** Despite the existence of a positive entity, salient or not, the influential perceives little advantage to taking sides. Although one entity may be salient, there is little to be gained from alienating an entity with whom relations are not developed. An innocuous general policy statement leaves the door open for further action should the situation change, without alienating either side.
072012 - **Hypothesis 12**: If the source and the subject are both negative, irregardless of salience and capabilities, the influential will condemn both entities.

**Behavior**=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

**Logic**: The existence of two negative entities engaged in a dispute offers little opportunity for the influential to increase his status, as a consequence, a condemnation of both appears to be a likely response.

072013 - **Hypothesis 13**: If, of the source and subject, one is mixed and salient, and the other is negative (whether salient or not), irregardless of capabilities, the influential will issue a statement of support for the mixed entity.

**Behavior**=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: Due to the salience of both entities, the influential prefers a cautious path. Support for the policy of the mixed entity provides a cautious and low-cost means of expressing displeasure at the negative entity's behavior.

072014 - **Hypothesis 14**: If the situation is the same as the previous, only neither of the entities are salient, the influential will issue a statement of general policy.

**Behavior**=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients
Logic: The influential has no real stake or interest in this situation. Two unimportant entities, neither of whom are particularly close to the influential are at the center of some dispute. Thus, a simple statement of general policy is a sufficient response.

072015 - Hypothesis 15: If, of the source and the subject, one is mixed and not salient, and the other is negative and salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Entity, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The presence of an important adversary in the situation draws the attention of the influential. As the relationship with the other entity is mixed, the influential will not openly endorse its position, but will express displeasure, through condemnation, at the behavior of its adversary.

072016 - Hypothesis 16: If the source and the subject are both mixed and salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will propose a formula for reconciliation.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The influential perceives an opportunity to increase his status by formulating a plan to resolve the problem. Despite the mixed affective history with both entities, the influential calculates an opportunity to
increase his influence by acting as an intermediary.

072017 - Hypothesis 17: If the source and the subject are both mixed and neither is salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will issue a general statement urging reconciliation.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The lack of salience reduces the influential's motivation to intervene, thus a call for reconciliation is the extent to which he chooses to involve himself.

072018 - Hypothesis 18: If the subject and the source are both mixed, but only one is salient, irregardless of capabilities, the influential will issue a general statement to the salient entity.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Salient Entity is Recipient

Logic: The salience of one entity suggests that it will be the focus of the influential's attention. Perceiving no gain from active intervention, the influential is thus interested in continuing dialogue with the salient entity, and will issue an innocuous general statement of policy.

072019 - Hypothesis 19: If, of the source and subject, one is negative and the other none/neutral, irregardless of salience and capabilities, the influential will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: Basically not interested in this type of situation, the influential will issue a simple denunciation of the negative entity's policy.

072020 - Hypothesis_20: If both the source and the subject are none/neutral, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the influential will urge reconciliation.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic

Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: These entities may become valuable in the future. As a consequence, the influential will leave his options open by remaining neutral.

072021 - Hypothesis_21: If one of the entitites has shared mixed prior affect with the actor, and the other none/neutral prior affect, irregardless of salience or relative capabilities, the actor will urge reconciliation.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic

Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: Perceiving no gain from intervention, the influential urges the entities to resolve their differences.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTING -

The behavioral response of the influential in this type of situation flows naturally from his
Behavior = Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATION -

In this type of situation, the influential's decision to grant assistance is predicated upon the basic value in question. When the primary basic value is diplomatic, the decision to grant assistance is dependent upon salience and prior affect. However, if the primary basic value is economic and/or military, relative capabilities will also have to be considered. The distinction is made because the influential's high belief in his ability to control events finds its greatest outlet in negotiation, or diplomatic settings, but in economic or military settings the level of resources he is able to provide becomes a critical factor.

(It should be noted that relative capabilities is not really the critical factor, but rather the ability of the nation to sacrifice resources to another. This model does not incorporate such considerations, but rather assumes that if the actor has greater relative capabilities than the requesting entity, that such ability is probably present).

Assistance Requested is Diplomatic

(074001) - Hypothesis i: If the requesting entity is positive and salient, the influential will issue an
unconditional statement of support.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: When an important ally requests support in the diplomatic arena, the influential will rally to support him, and at the same time, increase his status.

074002 - **Hypothesis 2**: If the requesting entity is positive but not salient, the influential will issue a statement of conditional support.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The absence of salience reduces the influential's incentive to broadly support the requesting entity. However, because the entity is an ally, the influential is inclined to provide support, given the appropriate conditions. This can also be viewed as an opportunity for him to increase his status.

074003 - **Hypothesis 3**: If the requesting entity is mixed and salient, the influential will issue a statement of conditional support.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The influential perceives an opportunity to increase his status by transferring a mixed relationship into a positive one. Since the mixed entity has requested assistance, the influential takes this as a sign of a
willingness to improve relations. He can obtain the upper
hand by demonstrating his support.

074004 - **Hypothesis 4**: If the requesting entity is mixed
or negative and not salient, the influential will issue a
statement of general policy.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Third Party or Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: In this circumstance, the influential may wish to
test the waters before putting his prestige on the line.
While the requesting entity has had uneven relations with
the influential, the absence of salience reduces the
latter's incentive. By being noncommittal, the
influential leaves room for future support should the
situation warrant it.

074005 - **Hypothesis 5**: If the requesting entity is
none/neutral, whether salient or not, the influential will
issue a conditional statement of support.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: Since the entity has had little or no affective
history with the influential (including international
organizations), the influential will at least take into
consideration the request. By using a conditional
statement, the influential provides an opening to back out
of if conditions do not suit his interests.
Assistance Requested is Non-Diplomatic

074006 - **Hypothesis 6**: If the requesting entity is positive, salient, and the actor possesses a capability advantage, the influential will provide the requested assistance.

**Behavior**=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: An important ally in need warrants assistance to the extent that the influential can provide it.

074007 - **Hypothesis 7**: If the requesting entity is positive and salient, but the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the influential will offer diplomatic support.

**Behavior**=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: Since the ally possesses greater capabilities, the influential is inclined to lend support, but reluctant to commit resources.

074008 - **Hypothesis 8**: If the requesting entity is positive and not salient, and the actor possesses a capability advantage, the influential will issue a statement of intent to provide the assistance.

**Behavior**=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: While inclined to provide the assistance, the influential prefers to approach the commitment of
resources with caution. In this way, the requesting entity may come up with support elsewhere before the influential must make a decision to commit or not.

074009 — Hypothesis_9: If the requesting entity is positive and not salient, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the influential will deflect the request.  

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient  

Logic: Lacking the incentive and advantage in capabilities, the influential politely deflects the request by issuing a statement of general policy, empathizing with the requesting entity, but explaining its inability to provide assistance.

074010 — Hypothesis_10: If the requesting entity is mixed and salient, and the actor possesses a capability advantage, the influential will provide assistance.  

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient  

Logic: The influential perceives an opportunity to increase his status by assisting this type of entity. Although relations have been uneven, the importance of the latter provides the influential with the incentive to act boldly.

074011 — Hypothesis_11: If the requesting entity is mixed and not salient (irregardless of capabilities), or the
requesting entity is mixed and salient, but the actor does not possess a capability advantage, or the entity is negative or neutral/none (irregardless of salience and capabilities) the influential will deflect the request.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: In all three of these circumstances, the influential perceives little advantage to committing resources. In the second instance, despite the salience, the requesting entity's greater capabilities reduces his incentive. In the first instances, the lack of salience is the key. Thus, deflecting the request by issuing a statement of general policy is the preferred course of action.

COLLABORATION -

The influential, in this type of situation, will be quite active in attempting to forge agreements, propose solutions, and encourage collaboration. He perceives this as an arena to increase his status and demonstrate his leadership qualities. Relative capabilities are not an important consideration for the influential, as the focus is on promoting collaboration behavior in diplomatic settings.

075001 - Hypothesis 1: If the collaborators are positive and salient, the influential will reach an agreement.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and
Domain Instruments, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: When important allies collaborate, they have a natural inclination, or motivation, to reach agreement. This logic is no different for the influential.

075002 - Hypotheses_2_thru_5: If the collaborators are positive and not salient, mixed (salient or not), or none/neutral (salient or not), the influential will attempt to forge agreement on his own terms.

Behavior = Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: The influential perceives this as a status-enhancing situation, and attempts to present a means for collaboration/agreement that will increase his prestige. This drive of the influential cuts across prior affect and salience, given his status-seeking behavior.

075003 - Hypothesis_6: If the other collaborators are negative and not salient, the influential will issue a statement of general policy.

Behavior = Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: The influential chooses caution over boldness due to the prior relationships with the other collaborator(s). By issuing a statement of general policy, he attempts to buy time to gauge the intent of his adversary(s).

075004 - Hypothesis_7: If the other collaborators are
negative and salient, the influential will issue a conditional statement.

**Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients**

**Logic:** Given the importance of the adversary, the influential will issue a conditional statement attempting to garner a quid pro quo from the former, thus making it appear that he is exacting a concession from his adversary.

**MEDIATOR/INTEGRATOR ORIENTATION**

According to M. Hermann's discussion, the mediator/integrator takes an active role in resolving disputes in the international arena, is a consensus builder, and does not promote himself, but rather seeks to impact on resolving problems.

**CONFRONTATION—**

It seems plausible that mediator/integrators would generally avoid conflict and attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement in a confrontational situation. In this context, the calculation of capabilities becomes less important, and the affective history with the adversary is to be given greater weight. Salience may enter into the reasoning process only when the affective relations have been mixed or negative.

**O81001 - Hypothesis 1:** If the adversary has had positive prior affect with the actor, the mediator/integrator will
urge reconciliation by presenting a formula for negotiation. Behavior = Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: Disputes with friends can be resolved by mutual collaboration. The mediator/integrator will propose the means by which negotiations can take place.

081002 - Hypothesis 2: If the adversary is negative and not salient, the mediator/integrator will seek third party intervention.

Behavior = Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: In an adversarial relationship, the mediator/integrator perceives the necessity of avoiding conflict and coming to terms with the negative entity. The introduction of a third party may facilitate a reduction in hostilities, and bring the adversary to the negotiating table.

081003 - Hypothesis 3: If the adversary is negative and salient, the mediator/integrator will issue a warning to the adversary.

Behavior = Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: In contrast to disputes with unimportant enemies, a dispute with an important enemy necessitates a stern response. The mediator/integrator must deal with domestic reaction as well as maintain his leadership status.
Hypothesis 4: If the adversary is mixed and salient, the mediator/integrator will propose negotiations. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient Logic: Despite the uneven affective history, the mediator/integrator will propose negotiation as a means of blunting the confrontational nature of the problem. Due to the salience of the source, the mediator/integrator proposes negotiation himself rather than through a third party.

Hypothesis 5: If the adversary is mixed and not salient, the mediator/integrator will seek third party intervention. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient Logic: As with a non-salient negative entity, the mediator/integrator in an adversarial situation with a non-salient mixed entity will seek third party intervention as a means of bringing the latter to the negotiating table. This tack is taken (as opposed to personally proposing negotiation) for status (i.e., not putting his prestige on the line for all problems, especially with unimportant entities) reasons, and consequently domestic reasons—demonstrating his leadership to his constituents.
INTERVENTION -

This type of situation is tailor-made for the mediator/integrator foreign policy personality. As M. Hermann (1980) suggests, the mediator/integrator "perceives some problems between other nations in the international system can be resolved through third party politics and that one's nation (and one's self) can gain prestige by playing a 'Good Samaritan' or peacemaker role." Given this view of the world, once again it can be postulated that the mediator/integrator will tend not to incorporate calculations of relative capabilities, but rather focus on affective and entity salience considerations. A case can be made for this assertion by suggesting that the importance of negotiation and mediation for the mediator/integrator diminishes considerations of his relative strength in relation to other entities in the problem.

082001 - Hypothesis 1: If both the source and the subject are positive, regardless of salience, or both mixed regardless of salience, or both neutral/none regardless of salience, or one positive and one mixed, regardless of salience, or one positive and one none/neutral regardless of salience, the mediator/integrator will offer to mediate the dispute.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients
Logic: Regardless of the salience of these entities, the mediator/integrator will offer his services as a mediator in a dispute. The Mediator/Integrator offers meditation to a wide variety of entities due to his basic instinct to arbitrate disputes.

082002 - Hypothesis_2: If both the subject and the source are negative, irregardless of salience, or one is negative and one none/neutral regardless of salience, or one is mixed and one none/neutral regardless of salience, the mediator/integrator will issue a general policy statement calling on the entities to resolve their differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic INstrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: Despite the lack of incentive to intervene, the mediator/integrator's propensity for conflict avoidance suggests that he will simply call on all sides to negotiate rather than fight.

082003 - Hypothesis_3: If, of the source and subject, one is positive and one is negative, and the negative is salient, irregardless of the salience of the positive entity, or one is mixed and one negative and the negative entity is salient regardless of the salience of the mixed entity, the mediator/integrator will appeal to the negative entity to reconsider its position.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient
Logic: The mediator/integrator is caught between an ally and a salient adversary. While generally favoring the ally, the mediator/integrator appeals to the adversary in order to bring an end to the confrontation. This can be interpreted as both assisting the ally and playing an intermediary role.

082004 - Hypothesis 4: If, of the subject and the source, one is positive and one is negative and the negative is not salient, irregardless of the salience of the positive entity, the mediator/integrator will offer his mediating services to the ally.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The mediator/integrator is willing to step in and offer to mediate. However, he will only do so with the consent of his ally. In so doing, the mediator/integrator is allowing his ally to make the decision about his role in the problem so that he will not be interfering in the affairs of the ally without an invitation to do so.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTING -

The mediator/integrator will request assistance from those who are in a position to help him and his nation. (083001)

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Potential Facilitator is Recipient
ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATION -

084001 - **Hypothesis 1**: If the requesting entity is positive, irregardless of salience, the mediator/integrator will grant the request.

Behavior=(if diplomatic assistance is requested) Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient; (if non-diplomatic assistance is requested) Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain INstruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The request for assistance from an ally will receive positive consideration from a mediator/integrator. If the issue is diplomatic, the mediator/integrator will issue a statement of support. If it is a non-diplomatic case, he will provide resource support to the extent possible.

084002 - **Hypothesis 2**: If the requesting entity is mixed, irregardless of salience, the mediator/integrator will issue a conditional statement of support.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The support is conditional for mixed entities as a means of delaying a decision to commit resources. The mediator/integrator is not willing to give unconditional support to entities that he has had difficulties with in the past. This emanates from the importance the
mediator/integrator places on mutual trust.

**084003 - Hypothesis_3:** If the requesting entity is none/neutral, irregardless of salience, the mediator/integrator will consider the request.

**Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient**

**Logic:** An entity with whom the mediator/integrator has had little, if any, prior relationship will warrant attention. The mediator/integrator will issue a general statement so as to proceed cautiously in order to examine the nature of the request and its implications.

**084004 - Hypothesis_4:** If the requesting entity is negative, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the mediator/integrator will deflect the request.

**Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient**

**Logic:** The mediator/integrator perceives no reward or increase in welfare by assisting an adversary, so he will simply deflect the unlikely request.

**COLLABORATION -**

As M. Hermann points out, the mediator/integrator type leaders have a natural predilection to engage in collaborative behavior. In this type of situation, their skills at mediation and negotiation can be utilized and demonstrated. As a
consequence, one can expect, with few exceptions, that mediator/integrators will attempt to forge agreement regardless of the values of the perceptual variables. The hypothesis for this type of situation, then, is the one generated on the basis of the leader orientation alone:

**Hypothesis 1**: The mediator/integrator will attempt to forge agreement with any other collaborators.

*Behavior*= Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

*Logic*: Due to the mediator/integrator's keen desire to achieve agreement, it is difficult to postulate differing effects on the basis of prior affect. While it is plausible to suggest that other types of leaders are more or less likely to reach agreement with allies as opposed to enemies, this does not appear to be the case with the mediator/integrator. Similarly, the role of salience becomes questionable for the same reasons.

**OPPORTUNIST ORIENTATION**

The opportunist orientation is perhaps the most difficult to model. The opportunist, according to M. Hermann (1980), relies heavily on the immediate circumstances of each problem in formulating a foreign policy response. He is an information seeker, with an astute understanding of the uniqueness of each situation. With the exception of conceptual complexity, no single trait stands out as an influence on his cognitive
decision-making processes. In this context, it seems plausible to suggest that the variable of relative capabilities plays a greater role than for other orientations. By the same token, salience plays less of a role (although it certainly is not totally absent) due to the opportunist's situation-specific propensities. In other words, the context of the problem may sometimes diminish the importance of salience for an opportunist.

CONFRONTATION -

091001 - Hypothesis 1: If the adversary is positive and the actor possesses a capability advantage, irregardless of salience, the opportunist will propose a resolution of differences.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: Engaged in a dispute with an ally, but having a capability advantage, the opportunist will suggest means by which the dispute may be resolved. The opportunist's relative advantage provides the motivation to aggressively seek resolution on his own terms, even though couched in positively affective tones.

091002 - Hypothesis 2: If the adversary is positive, not salient, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the opportunist will issue a statement of general policy.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: A dispute with an ally who is stronger motivates the opportunist to proceed cautiously. Not wanting to upset the relationship, he issues a general statement of policy, waiting for a signal from the source.

091003 - Hypothesis 3: If the adversary is positive, salient, and the actor does not have a capability advantage, the opportunist will appeal to the source to resolve their differences.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic

Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: An important ally with greater capabilities has caused a problem for the opportunist. The importance of the entity, along with its greater capabilities, persuades the opportunist to make a friendly appeal to patch up their differences.

091004 - Hypothesis 4: If the adversary is negative and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, irregardless of salience, the opportunist will seek third party intervention.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic

Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: Faced with an adversarial situation with an enemy who has greater capabilities, the opportunist will seek intervention from a third party so as to blunt the advantage of his adversary.
091005 - **Hypothesis 5**: If the adversary is negative (irregardless of salience), but the actor does possess a capability advantage, the opportunist will respond in kind. 
Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient
Logic: The opportunist, with greater capabilities than his adversary, will utilize that advantage to resolve the problem. Since the adversary has had a history of bad relations with the opportunist, the latter perceives no benefit to mediation or negotiation.

091006 - **Hypothesis 6**: If the adversary is mixed and salient, but the actor does not have a capability advantage, the opportunist will seek third party intervention.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient
Logic: An entity with whom an opportunist has had uneven relations and who has a capability advantage, but is important, must be dealt with cautiously. The opportunist does not want to jeopardize his nation’s position nor worsen the already strained relations with his adversary. Consequently, intervention by a third party may delay any deterioration in the situation until the opportunist has a more clear indication of the problem.

091007 - **Hypothesis 7**: If the adversary is mixed (irregardless of salience), and the actor does possess a
capability advantage, the opportunist will issue an unconditional statement demanding that the source alter its policy.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: The opportunist, due to the uneven nature of relations with the source, and his capability advantage, will provide the source with an opportunity to eliminate the problem by altering his policy. In this way, there is still hope that the relationship won't completely deteriorate, in contrast to the same situation with an enemy, where the opportunist simply responds in kind.

091008 — Hypothesis 8: If the adversary is mixed, regardless of its salience, and the actor is at a capability disadvantage, the actor will undertake a symbolic act indicating its displeasure.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: Unable to respond to the problem due to a capability disadvantage, the opportunist will undertake a low-cost behavior to demonstrate his displeasure.

INTERVENTION —

An opportunist's propensity to keep a "low profile in order to keep as much as possible on everybody's good side" (M. Hermann, 1980), suggests that he will shy away from active intervention
whenever possible. Again, however, specific situations may warrant intervention, and when those occasions occur, the opportunist will attempt to obtain as much information as he can before acting decisively.

092001 - Hypothesis_1: If, of the source and the subject, both are positive, irregardless of salience and capabilities, the opportunist will urge both parties to resolve their differences.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: This situation is precisely the context in which the opportunist favors a low profile. By urging both parties to resolve their differences, the opportunist offends no one and preserves his relationship with both sides.

092002 - Hypothesis_2: If, of the subject and the source, one is positive, one is negative, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage over the negative entity (whether or not he does over the positive and whether or not the entities are salient), the opportunist will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The opportunist, at a disadvantage vis a vis the negative entity, demonstrates support for his ally by condemning the negative entity.
092003 - **Hypothesis 3**: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive, one is negative, but the actor does possess a capability advantage over the negative entity (whether or not he does so over the positive entity, and whether or not the entities are salient), the opportunist will offer support to the positive entity.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: Realizing he has an advantage over the negative entity, the opportunist perceives reduced risk by offering to support his ally.

092004 - **Hypothesis 4**: If the subject and the source are both negative, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will condemn both entities.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The opportunist has no incentive to intervene in a dispute between two enemies to itself, so simply condemns the policies of both sides.

092005 - **Hypothesis 5**: If the source and the subject are both mixed, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will urge both sides to resolve their differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The opportunist's desire to maintain a low
profile, and the fact that the opportunist has experienced similar affective relations with both entities, diminishes his incentive to intervene. These conditions, namely, the predisposition not to intervene, reduces the role of salience and relative capabilities.

092006 - Hypothesis 6: If, of the subject and the source, one is mixed and salient, the other is positive (irregardless of salience), and the actor does not possess a capability advantage over the mixed entity (whether or not it does so over the positive entity), the opportunist will condemn the mixed entity’s behavior.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: Despite the opportunist’s propensity not to intervene, the salience of the mixed entity, coupled with the mixed entity’s capability advantage, suggests that the mixed entity holds the upper hand in its relationship with the opportunist. As a consequence, this context provides the opportunist with an occasion to criticize the policies of the mixed entity with little cost to his own interests.

092007 - Hypothesis 7: If, of the source and subject, one is mixed and the other positive and the actor possesses a capability advantage over the mixed entity (irregardless of whether it does so over the positive entity, and irregardless of salience), the opportunist will state its support for the positive entity.
Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The opportunist's capability advantage affords him the opportunity to support his ally. The nature of the support is verbal rather than substantive due not only to the mixed (rather than negative) affective history with the offender, but also the opportunist's desire to keep his options open.

092008 – Hypothesis_8: If, of the subject and source, one is mixed and one is negative, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The existence of two entities that the opportunist has not had completely favorable relations with in the past reinforces his predisposition to maintain a low profile. The focus of the behavior is on the negative entity, because the mixed entity has at least enjoyed periods of cooperation with the opportunist. By condemning the negative entity, the opportunist maintains a position in which relations with the mixed entity may improve.

092009 – Hypothesis_9: If the source and the subject are both neutral/none, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will urge reconciliation.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The opportunist has nothing to gain through intervention on one side or the other. He appears naturally reluctant to play a broker role, so consequently urges reconciliation.

092010 - Hypothesis 10: If, of the source and the subject, one is neutral/none and the other is positive, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will urge the positive entity to resolve the dispute.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: The opportunist has no reason to alienate the neutral/none entity, yet seeks to maintain his relationship with his ally intact. By urging his ally to resolve the dispute, he perceives he can accomplish both objectives.

092011 - Hypothesis 11: If, of the source and the subject, one is none/neutral and one is mixed, and the mixed entity is not salient, irregardless of the salience of the neutral/none entity and of relative capabilities, the opportunist will urge both sides to resolve their differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients
Logic: The opportunist perceives little advantage to taking sides, and so merely suggests that they resolve their dispute.

092012 - Hypothesis 12: If, of the source and subject, one is neutral/none and one is mixed, and the mixed entity is salient (whether or not the neutral/none entity is, and irregardless of relative capabilities), the opportunist will condemn the mixed entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: The mixed entity is the focus of the opportunist's attention because the latter perceives this as an opportunity to voice his discontent with the mixed entity's policies. Regardless of the opportunist's capabilities, the mixed entity has caused problems for him in the past, and this seems to be an appropriate forum in which to criticize the mixed entity's policies.

092013 - Hypothesis 13: If, of the source and the subject, one is neutral/none and one is negative, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: The opportunist perceives not only an opportunity to condemn an enemy, but also perhaps to enlist the support of the neutral/none entity in the future by siding
with him on this problem.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTING -

The behavior the opportunist will exhibit in this type of situation flows naturally from the leader orientation. The opportunist will be receptive to accepting assistance from potential donors. (093001) Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Potential Facilitator is Recipient

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATION -

M. Hermann (1980) postulates that the opportunist is willing to commit political resources to keep his contacts open. Thus, one would extrapolate that to include committing resources to increase or maintain influence in the international environment.

094001 - Hypothesis_1: If the requesting entity is positive, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will grant the request. Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and/or Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: The request of an ally will be honored with the granting of resources in nondiplomatic issues and support in verbal ones. Prior affect is the single most important factor due to the opportunist’s desire to maintain or strengthen the relationship.

094002 - Hypothesis_2: If the requesting entity is mixed, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the
opportunist will state conditional support for the request.
Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient
Logic: Because of the uneven history of relations, the opportunist may be willing to assist the requesting entity, providing the terms are favorable to the opportunist's interests.

094003 - Hypothesis_3: If the requesting entity is none/neutral, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the opportunist will consider the request.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient
Logic: The opportunist adopts a "wait and see" posture so as to determine not only if there are other entities to assist the requestor, but also if the request suits the interests of the opportunist.

094004 - Hypothesis_4: If the requesting entity is negative, irregardless of salience or relative capabilities, the opportunist will not even consider the request, resulting in no behavior.
Behavior=None.

COLLABORATION -

Opportunists seek face-to-face diplomacy, and are not adversely disposed to compromise if consensus cannot be attained (M. Hermann, 1980). In the context of collaborative situations, we can generally expect them to
participate and seek agreement. However, in contrast to the mediator/integrator, it is unlikely that agreement per se is an overriding concern. The interests and needs of the opportunist and his constituency are still of paramount concern.

095001 - Hypothesis 1: If the other collaborators are positive and salient, the opportunist will reach agreement. Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients Logic: When collaborating with important allies, the opportunist, like other types of leaders, has a natural predisposition to reach agreement, whether it be through consensus or compromise.

095002 - Hypothesis 2: If the other collaborators are positive but not salient, or mixed and salient, the opportunist will issue a conditional statement. Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients Logic: These types of entities, important mixed and less important friends, are ones with whom the opportunist can come to terms, but he is unlikely to reach quick agreement. By issuing a conditional statement, the opportunist preserves the latitude needed to secure his interests without alienating his potential collaborators.

095003 - Hypothesis 3: If the other collaborators are mixed and not salient, or none/neutral regardless of
salience, the opportunist will consider proposals.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: In the case of the non-salient mixed entity, the opportunist's incentive to reach agreement is reduced by the lack of salience. Coupled with the uneven nature of their relations, the opportunist will initially deflect any commitment to agreement so as to seek more information before further collaborating.

095004 - Hypothesis 4: If the other collaborators are negative, irregardless of salience, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the opportunist will seek compromise. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: Faced with negotiations with an adversary who has greater capabilities, the opportunist will attempt to salvage as much as he can by pushing for a compromise. If that can be attained, the opportunist would regard it as a victory. This is likely to be the opportunist's strategy regardless of salience.

095005 - Hypothesis 5: If the other collaborators are negative irregardless of salience, but the actor does possess a capability advantage, the opportunist will seek agreement on his own proposal.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: Possessing greater capabilities vis a vis his adversary, the opportunist will press for agreement on his own terms, utilizing his advantage to secure his adversary's acceptance.

DEVELOPMENTAL ORIENTATION

M. Hermann (1980) suggests that a developmental leader has a "strong commitment to the continued improvement of his nation through the development of useful and rewarding relationships with other countries and organizations."

CONFRONTATION -

As the developmental leader prefers to build positive relations with those who can assist his nation, he will be reluctant to engage in aggressive and hostile activity with those he perceives to be important to him and his nation. On the other hand, his strong sense of nationalism may induce him to be more hostile in nature when confronted with entities who are not in a position to assist the developmental leader.

101001 - Hypothesis 1: If the adversary is positive and salient, irregardless of capabilities, the developmental leader will suggest means to resolve the dispute.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: An important ally is precisely the type of entity
the developmental leader wishes to remain friends with. Regardless of relative strength, the developmental leader will suggest the means by which their dispute may be resolved, so as to preserve their relationship.

101002 - Hypothesis 2: If the adversary is positive, but not salient, irregardless of capabilities, the developmental leader will urge a reconciliation of their differences.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: The absence of salience reduces the developmental leader’s eagerness to provide policies for resolution. However, as the source is an ally, the developmental leader will indicate that a reconciliation will serve the interests of their relationship.

101003 - Hypothesis 3: If the adversary is mixed and salient, irregardless of capabilities, the developmental leader will issue conditional policy for resolution of the dispute.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source is Recipient

Logic: The salience of the entity mediates the tone of the developmental leader’s response, but because the latter has experienced uneven relations with the entity, he will impose conditions for resolution. This can be attributed to the developmental leader’s strong sense of
nationalism.

101004 - **Hypothesis 4**: If the adversary is mixed, not salient, and the actor possesses a capability advantage, the developmental leader will demand resolution to his satisfaction.

**Behavior**=Negative Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

**Logic**: As the entity is not salient, the developmental leader no longer has the motivation to attempt reconciliation. Calculating that he has an advantage, the developmental leader will seek redress on his own terms.

101005 - **Hypothesis 5**: If the situation is the same as the previous one, except that the actor does not have a capability advantage, the developmental leader will seek third party intervention.

**Behavior**=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

**Logic**: As with the previous context, the developmental leader is not motivated toward reconciliation, but as he does not enjoy a capability advantage, he will seek assistance from a third party to mediate the dispute.

101006 - **Hypothesis 6**: If the adversary is negative and the actor possesses a capability advantage, irregardless of salience, the developmental leader will employ the necessary resources to resolve the problem to his own satisfaction.
Behavior=Negative Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Source is Recipient

Logic: Here the developmental leader's sense of nationalism reaches its zenith. Confronted by an adversary, the developmental leader, with the capability advantage, will press the issue using the necessary resources.

101007 - Hypothesis 7: If the adversary is negative, but the actor does not possess a capability advantage, irregardless of the salience of the entity, the developmental leader will seek third party intervention.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: Unable to confront his adversary head on due to a capability disadvantage, the developmental leader will attempt to marshal support from sympathetic third parties in an attempt to overcome the disadvantage.

INTERVENTION -

The developmental leader perceives this as they type of situation in which there may be opportunities to increase his own nation's status and provide for its needs. By selective intervention, the developmental may be able to develop ties with entities in such a position to assist him. The key variable here is prior affect, because the developmental leader perceives the opportunity to maintain ties where the affect has been good, develop
ties where affect has been uneven, and exploit those instances where he can assist an entity who is confronting a common enemy.

102001 - **Hypothesis 1**: If, of the source and subject, both are positive, irregardless of salience or relative capabilities, the developmental leader will offer to mediate the dispute.

**Behavior**: Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

**Logic**: As both entities are allies, the developmental leader will offer to assist them in resolving their dispute. Salience is not important because the nature of the developmentalist’s policy will not alienate one entity if it is salient. However, from the developmental leader’s perspective, a successful intervention could enhance his nation’s interests in the future with either or both entities.

102002 - **Hypothesis 2**: If, of the source and subject, one is positive, one is negative, and the actor possesses a capability advantage, irregardless of salience, the developmental leader will offer assistance to the positive entity.

**Behavior**: Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Positive Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: The developmental leader calculates that due to his capability advantage over the negative entity, he can
offer assistance to the positive entity with a reduced risk of his nation being affected by the negative entity. Furthermore, by assisting the ally, he may, once again, be cultivating future considerations for his own nation.

102003 - **Hypothesis 3**: If the situation is the same as the previous, only the actor does not have a capability advantage over the negative entity, the developmental leader will condemn the negative entity.

**Behavior**=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: Unable to challenge the negative entity, and potentially compromising the position of his own nation if he assists the positive entity, the developmental leader demonstrates his support for his ally by condemning his adversary.

102004 - **Hypothesis 4**: If, of the source and subject, one is positive and the other mixed, with both being salient, or the positive entity alone being salient, irregardless of capabilities, the developmental leader will support the positive entity.

**Behavior**=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

**Logic**: Due to the difference in affective relations, and the fact that the friendly entity in both instances is important to the developmental leader, the latter will without hesitation express support for his ally. As the
other entity in the problem has had mixed, as opposed to negative prior affect with the developmental leader, the behavior is confined to verbal support.

102005 - Hypothesis_5: If the situation is the same as the previous, only the mixed entity is salient and the positive entity is not, the developmental leader will urge the mixed entity to settle the problem amicably.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: The salience of the mixed entity motivates the developmental leader to address it, due to the latter being in some way important to the developmental leader's fortunes. However, because the other entity in the problem has enjoyed positive relations with the developmental leader, a call is made to amicably resolve the problem.

102006 - Hypothesis_6: If, of the source and the subject, one is positive and the other none/neutral, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, or if one is mixed and one is positive with neither being salient regardless of capabilities, the developmental leader will issue a general policy statement of support for his ally.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Positive Entity is Recipient

Logic: While the developmental leader may be inclined to support his ally, he sees no advantage to alienating an
entity with whom he has had little contact, but who could be of potential use to him in the future. By issuing a general statement of support he demonstrates some loyalty to his ally without foreclosing his options toward the other entity in the future.

102007 - Hypothesis 7: If, of the source and the subject, one is mixed and the other is negative, and the mixed entity is not salient to the actor, irregardless of the salience of the negative entity or of relative capabilities, the developmental leader will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: Despite the history of uneven relations with one entity, and its lack of importance to the developmental leader, the presence of an adversary, regardless of importance, induces the developmental leader to focus his attention on the adversary's behavior. Capabilities are not a consideration as the developmental leader would not be disposed to behaviors involving resources in cases that do not warrant it.

102008 - Hypothesis 8: If, of the source and subject, one is mixed, the other negative, and the mixed entity is salient, irregardless of the salience of the negative entity or of relative capabilities, the developmental leader will issue a statement of support for the mixed
entity.

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: The importance of the mixed entity, coupled with the presence of an adversary, motivates the developmental leader to side with the entity that is important to him. Due to the uneven nature of past relations, the intensity of support is fairly low, eliminating the need to calculate relative strength.

102009 - Hypothesis 9: If the source and the subject are both mixed, and they are either both salient or both not salient to the actor, irregardless of relative capabilities, the developmental leader will issue a statement urging reconciliation.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: The developmental leader has no real motivation to intervene in a problem when both entities share a similar type of relationship with him. As a consequence, the call for reconciliation is a useful policy for remaining on the sidelines.

102010 - Hypothesis 10: If the situation is the same as the previous one, only one of the mixed entities is salient, and the other is not, the developmental leader will urge the salient entity to resolve the dispute.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic
Instrument, Salient Entity is Recipient

Logic: The salience of one entity induces the developmental leader to address it, as the latter has the most impact on his nation. As the developmental leader has not really enjoyed good relations with either entity, a statement calling for a resolution to the problem is the extent to which he wishes to intervene.

102011 - Hypothesis 11: If, of the subject and source, one is mixed and the other neutral/none, and the mixed entity is not salient to the actor, irregardless of relative capabilities, the developmental leader will criticize the mixed entity's behavior.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Mixed Entity is Recipient

Logic: As the entities in the problem do not have an important effect on the developmental leader's position, the latter criticizes the policies of the entity with whom he has had uneven relations. This allows for the development of relations with the neutral/none entity, and probably will have marginal effect on relations with the mixed entity.

102012 - Hypothesis 12: If the situation is the same as the previous one, only the mixed entity is salient to the actor, the developmental leader will issue a statement of general policy. Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient
Logic: The developmental leader does not want to alienate an entity that is important to him despite the uneven history of relations. On the other hand, he sees no gain from alienating an entity with whom he has had little contact. As a consequence, a statement of general policy indicates his preference not to intervene.

102013 - **Hypothesis 13**: If the source and the subject are both negative, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the developmental leader will condemn both entities.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: With two adversaries at odds, the developmental leader is content to criticize their behavior.

102014 - **Hypothesis 14**: If, of the source and the subject, one is negative and the other is neutral/none, irregardless of salience and relative capabilities, the developmental leader will condemn the negative entity.

Behavior=Negative Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Negative Entity is Recipient

Logic: By deploring an adversary's behavior, the developmental leader is not only able to take a swipe at his adversary, but also leave open the possibility for developing good relations with another entity.

102015 - **Hypothesis 15**: If the source and the subject are both neutral/none, irregardless of salience and relative
capabilities, the developmental leader will call on both sides to settle the dispute.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Source and Subject are Recipients

Logic: This represents another context in which the developmental leader has no incentive to choose sides. He can call on both sides to resolve the dispute, or on a third party to step in.

ASSISTANCE REQUESTING -

As with the other orientations, a developmental leader will accept assistance on terms that do not compromise his maneuverability. (103001)

Behavior=Positive Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Potential Facilitator is Recipient

ASSISTANCE CONSIDERATION -

The developmental leader is prepared to commit resources that are "necessary to establish a beneficial relationship." (M. Hermann, 1980, p. ). One may go a step further by stating that he may be willing to commit resources in order to maintain a beneficial relationship as well.

104001 - Hypothesis 1: If the requesting entity is positive, irregardless of salience or relative capabilities, the developmental leader will provide assistance.

Behavior=(if diplomatic assistance is requested) Positive
Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient; (if non-diplomatic assistance is requested) Positive Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: Positive entities, whether important to the developmental leader or not, will receive sympathetic consideration, and, if possible, assistance will be granted.

104002 - Hypothesis_2: If the requesting entity is mixed and salient, the developmental leader will provide assistance.

Behavior=(if diplomatic assistance is requested) Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient; (if non-diplomatic assistance is requested) Positive Affect, High Commitment, Domain Instruments, Requesting Entity is Recipient

Logic: Although the developmental has not enjoyed an entirely positive relationship with the requesting entity, its salience, and the prospect of a quid pro quo, induce him to grant the request.

104003 - Hypothesis_3: If the requesting entity is mixed and not salient, or if the requesting entity is neutral/none irregardless of salience, the developmental leader will consider the request.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Requesting Entity is Recipient
Logic: The absence of salience, and the fact that neither type of entity is an ally, removes the incentive to grant the request. Instead, the developmental leader will delay a decision by indicating a willingness to consider the request.

104004 - Hypothesis 4: If the requesting entity is negative, irregardless of salience, the developmental leader will deflect the request.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Indirect Target is Recipient

Logic: A developmental leader will not be disposed to assisting an adversary.

COLLABORATION -

As developmental leaders seek beneficial relationships and are active in multilateral settings, one may postulate that, in general, this type of leader will be disposed to collaborate if the conditions are not too restrictive.

105001 - Hypothesis 1: If the other collaborators are positive and salient, the developmental leader will reach agreement.

Behavior=Positive Affect, High Commitment, Diplomatic and Domain Instruments, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: Regardless of relative strength, the developmental leader will be inclined to reach agreement with an important ally. The combination of salience and positive
prior affect insure that the concern of being dominated by the other entity in the problem is not present.

105002 - Hypothesis_2: If the other collaborators are positive but not salient, the developmental leader will offer terms for agreement.
Behavior=Positive Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: Due to the positive relationship between the developmental leader and the other entities in the problem, the former will attempt to forge agreement by presenting the means by which it can be obtained.

105003 - Hypothesis_3: If the other collaborators are mixed and salient, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the developmental leader will issue a conditional statement.
Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: The importance of the other entities, despite the history of uneven relations, predisposes the developmental leader to consider agreement. The relative advantage of the other entity induces conditionality, as the developmental leader wishes to avoid being "controlled" by the other entity.

105004 - Hypothesis_4: If the other collaborators are mixed and salient, and the actor does possess a capability advantage, the developmental leader will offer terms for
agreement.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: Again, due to the importance of the other entity, the developmental leader has an incentive to seek agreement, despite the uneven relations. Possessing a capability advantage allows the developmental leader to attempt collaboration on his own terms.

105005 - Hypothesis 5: If the other collaborators are mixed and not salient, and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the developmental leader will issue a general policy statement.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Indirect Audience is Recipient

Logic: At a capability disadvantage, the developmental leader wishes to preserve his options. By issuing a statement of general policy, the developmental leader conveys the impression that the other entity, who is not important or an ally, must take the next step if negotiations are to proceed.

105006 - Hypothesis 6: If the other collaborators are mixed, not salient, and the actor possesses a capability advantage, the developmental leader will consider proposals.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients
Logic: Since the developmental leader is not on the best of terms with the other entities, and does not regard them as important, and is at an advantage in terms of capabilities, he is likely to forestall agreement and ensure that his interests are maximized.

105007 - Hypothesis 7: If the other collaborators are negative and salient, and the actor does not have a capability advantage, the developmental leader will seek third party support.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Third Party is Recipient

Logic: In this context, the developmental leader is in a negotiation setting with a salient adversary that has greater capabilities. Rather than negotiate from a position of weakness, the developmental leader will attempt to marshal third party support to strengthen his hand against an adversary.

105008 - Hypothesis 8: If the other collaborators are negative, and the actor has a capability advantage, irregardless of salience, the developmental leader will specify conditions for agreement.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Moderate Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: In contrast to the previous context, the developmental leader has the upper hand in negotiations with an adversary, irregardless of salience. Given this
advantage, the developmental leader will attempt to forge an outcome on his own terms.

105009 - Hypothesis_9: If the other collaborators are neutral/none, irregardless of salience or relative capabilities, the developmental leader will consider proposals.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: Regardless of relative strength and importance, the developmental leader is likely to at least consider the issues in a negotiation with neutral/none entities. As these entities have had little contact with the developmental leader, he maintains negotiations to determine if this collaboration can provide benefits to him and his nation.

105010 - Hypothesis_10: If the other collaborators are negative, not salient and the actor does not possess a capability advantage, the developmental leader will be reluctant to negotiate.

Behavior=Neutral Affect, Low Commitment, Diplomatic Instrument, Other Collaborators are Recipients

Logic: The developmental leader perceives little reward in entering into an agreement with an adversary which possesses greater capabilities.
DISCUSSION

One of the premises underlying the development of this framework is that different types of leaders will react to similar situations in diverse ways. Now that the hypotheses and associated logics have been postulated, it may prove useful to examine the components of the framework to determine if this is indeed the case. Two important caveats should be noted before commencing the discussion. One, as the hypotheses and logics are the constructs of the researcher, the significance of the differences and similarities between types of leaders can be viewed as merely artificial. This, of course, can be said of the orientations themselves. While this is extremely important, it can be more appropriately discussed after the empirical examination, because even though the constructs may be artificial, they still may have some validity and utility for examining the empirical world. Second, there is strong evidence to suggest that regardless of the differences in leaders, or other factors for that matter, the context of some situations imposes constraints on actors to behave in similar ways (See Holsti, 1973, and Hudson, 1983).

One can find evidence of this assertion in the framework elaborated here. For all intents and purposes, this assertion, and others in the framework, constitute the "meta-hypotheses" of the model. The meta-hypotheses
serve as the link between the assumptions (or propositions) that underlie the model (see Chapter 1 for their discussion), and the hypotheses that are created to conduct an empirical examination. They are, in essence, the rules or guidelines the researcher employs to develop the logics and hypotheses. A list of some of these meta-hypotheses may clarify the discussion at this point:

Some of the meta-hypotheses that relate to the orientation variable are drawn from M. Hermann's (1980) descriptions of the "view of the world", "style", and "resulting foreign policy" she expects for each orientation:

1) Expansionsists generally have an "us versus them" mentality, and tend to focus on security and status issues, employing hostile and low-cost behaviors.

2) Active Independents seek to avoid entanglements in affairs they cannot control, and see self-reliance as a means of pursuing independence of action.

3) Influentials generally wish to be viewed as strong leaders. To that end, they attempt to encourage collaborative activities and seek out those over whom they wish to have influence.

4) Mediator/Integrators are comfortable in an intermediary role, and are willing to offer their services in that capacity. They generally use diplomacy to foster collaborative and conflict resolution activities.
5) Opportunists take their cues from the environment. The most adaptable of the six types of orientation, they seek consensus and compromise while keeping a low profile.

6) Developmentalist leaders generally attempt to improve their position through useful contacts and relationships.

The other variables of the model also provide a number of meta-hypotheses, a few of which are listed below:

7) In confrontation situations, the actor will attempt to reduce the adverse effects created by the adversary.

8) In intervention situations, the actor will decide whether or not to intervene in a problem, and if he decides to do so, on whose behalf and in what manner.

9) In assistance situations, the actor will seek help from a potential donor, or will consider requests from other entities.

10) In collaboration situations, the actor will decide whether or not to reach agreement with the other entities in the problem.

11) Past feelings of friendship-hostility are unlikely to be reversed in a discrete situation.

12) An actor with a disadvantage in capabilities is likely to turn to third parties for assistance before
responding to a problem.

13) The presence of salience tends to induce caution in that the importance of the other entity(ies) warrants a careful response.

These meta-hypotheses constitute the basic guidelines by which the logics were developed. A careful reading of the hypotheses and logics reveals the effects of their interaction.

It must be noted that the meta-hypotheses are not subject to substantiation or refutation by the empirical examination. They can only be challenged by subsequent examinations that not only create rival hypotheses, but also rival meta-hypotheses.
Chapter 3:
Operationalizing the Variables

As the explanatory variables in this dissertation have been employed in previous research projects - Hudson, Hermann, and Singer (1984), Singer and Hudson (1984), Hudson (1983) - the procedures followed here parallel those efforts. The variables to be operationalized are: relationships, roles, situation, orientation, and the four behavior attributes. It should be noted that since situation is defined by the configuration of roles, the latter's operationalization activates the situation variable. Consequently, the discussion here will focus on the operationalization of the other four variables. (See Chapter 2 for a discussion of how situation type is defined).

Orientation

The determination of orientations for leaders as developed by M. Hermann (1980), rests on the content analysis of the individual leader's interviews. The interviews are coded for evidence of the presence/absence of the eight personal characteristics outlined earlier - nationalism, belief in ability to control events, need for power, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, distrust of others, and task/affect.
orientation. These scores are then standardized, and applied to the formulae of the six orientations. The effect of this application is that each leader now has six scores— one for each orientation. These are again standardized in order to obtain comparisons across leaders, such that a leader with a score one standard deviation above the sample mean is pegged as high on the orientation, whereas a score of one standard deviation below the sample mean is scored low.

It is important to point out that the determination of orientation is carried out exclusively on a comparative basis. Orientations for leaders are not determined independently of the scores for the other leaders in the sample. Thus, when we speak of a leader's orientation being expansionist, for example, it is only in contrast to the rest of the sample of leaders. As one may well imagine, a specific individual may score high on a particular orientation with one sample of leaders, and may score low on the same orientation with another sample. For this project, the African leaders scores were determined on the basis of a sample of twelve African leaders (see Hermann and Singer, 1983). Castro's scores were determined from a sample of 53 leaders (including the six African leaders in this project) in Hermann's (1980) original study.
Role Variables

The assignment of roles, crucial to the concept of situation type, was accomplished by approximating the acting nation's perception of the configuration of roles in particular incidences. To maximize the quality of the coding, the coders performed rigorous background analysis on the nations for which they were responsible, then took part in exercises to assess inter-coder reliability. Taken every two weeks, the reliability scores averaged around .80.

The basic coding steps as outlined in M. Hermann's handbook (1979 mimeo) are:

"1). Establish the actor's identity.
"2). Decide what the immediate problem is to which the event is a response or reaction. What kind of problem is perceived by the actor? Although several long term problems may be hinted at in the event, here we are interested in the specific "disturbance" in the external world that the actor perceives is creating a deprivation for someone and is acted upon in the event.
"3). Establish which entities the actor perceives are directly and adversely affected by the problem. Such entities can include nations, subnational groups, international organizations, or coalitions of nations. These entities are the subject of the problem.
"4). Determine who or what is the source of the problem from the actor's perspective. Who does the actor believe caused the problem? The problem can result from purposeful human actions (or inactions) as well as involve acts of nature. Again, such entities can include nations, nature, subnational groups, international organizations, or coalitions of nations.
"5). Check if there are other entities identified in the event that are supporting the actions of the actor, source or subject of the problem. These entities are called facilitators. A facilitator can be a nation, subnational group, international organization, or coalition of nations. The facilitator can be facilitating at the time of the event, or can potentially facilitate in
the future from the perspective of the actor. Determine exactly which entities each facilitator or potential facilitator is supporting.

"6). Identify the basic value associated with the problem that the event is addressing." (M. Hermann, 1979, p. 14)

Relational Variables

Operationalization of the three relational variables (prior affect, salience, and relative capabilities) poses a formidable challenge - particularly relative capabilities. Social science literature is laden with criticisms of the use of single indicators to measure concepts. As Deutsch has succinctly stated, "No single indicator can be trusted. Just as words derive their meaning from sentences and sentences from language, so do indicators derive most of their meaning from the indicator system within which they are used." (Deutsch et al., 1967, p.10)

Relative Capabilities

Understanding this, is it naive to operationalize relative capabilities on the basis of four admittedly gross indicators? Before reaching a judgement, the context of their use must first be comprehended. Ideally, for this model, an understanding of a leader's perceptions of relative capabilities would provide significant insights for the reconstruction of conditions leading to a particular decision. Unfortunately, we simply have no
access to an individual's mind, and, consequently, are unable to generate estimates of how a leader views his nation's comparative advantage, equality, or disadvantage in a given situation. As a result, relative capabilities has been modified to be a researcher's tool for estimating gross differences in capabilities. Thus, the reconstruction of the conditions in a specific problem is premised on the researcher's estimates of capabilities and not on the decision-makers'.

In light of the decision to operationalize relative capabilities using rough indicators, the latter were chosen on the basis of the need to characterize the relative differences in capabilities of nations. Using the basic value scheme of the CREON Project, each event was assigned one or more basic values, which consist of military/physical security, economic wealth, diplomatic respect/status, well-being/welfare, and enlightenment (See Callahan et al., 1982, for detailed explanation). Indicators of capability in each of these basic value areas were then chosen. It should be noted that well-being/welfare and enlightenment are collapsed because they essentially point to similar indices, namely, a nation's ability to organize and provide for an increasing standard of living and education for its population.

The indicator for military/physical security capabilities is military expenditures in constant
dollars. (The source for this data is *World Military Expenditures*, USACDA, 1973) Significant differences in military expenditures imply that one nation's capabilities are roughly greater than those of another nation. Naturally there are a number of shortcomings in using expenditures as an indicator of military capabilities, notably qualitative and quantitative differences in personnel and weapons, not to mention the problem of converting all currencies into dollars. Nevertheless, for the purpose of determining gross capability differences, it was deemed a satisfactory indicator. Of equal importance is the problem of determining whether or not a nation has greater military capabilities. How does one establish a threshold whereby such a delineation can be made? Hudson (1983), confronted with the identical problem in her research, adopted a technique elucidated by Tukey (1977) for exploratory data analysis:

"Tukey conceives of "steps" within a batch of data. These steps (roughly equivalent to the notion of standard deviation in confirmatory statistics) are useful in assessing the degree of difference between one value in the batch and another. A step to Tukey is one and one-half times the midspread. The latter is the range of the inner two quartiles of a batch of ordered data....Steps are resistant to extreme values since their value is based on the midspread, not the range." (Hudson, 1983, p. 210)

The batch of data for military expenditures is divided into the categories of "significantly greater" and "not significantly greater" based on each nation's particular
position in the batch of data relative to every other
nation's.

For economic capabilities, GNP in constant dollars
is used. (Again, the source of this data is World
Military Expenditures, USACDA, 1973) Significant
differences in GNP suggest differences in economic
capabilities. The implication made from a significant
difference in GNP is that the aggregate flow of goods and
services made available to a country from current
production in a given period is unequal. Despite the many
criticisms of GNP as an indicator of economic capability -
namely, the data is often unreliable, does not consider
non-market factors, and is measured at the official
exchange rate (not the actual rate) - it can be argued
that as a gross measure it serves the purpose. It should
be noted that for this research project, the most serious
difficulty in using GNP is not due to the above
shortcomings, but due to the fact that a particular
nation, while generally poorer than another nation, may
possess a strategic resource that the wealthier nation
needs. This shortcoming is addressed through another
variable - salience. The determination of significant
differences in GNP is performed using the step technique
of Tukey's described above by Hudson (1983). Thus,
nations are coded as being "significantly greater" or "not
significantly greater" in comparison to the other nations
To estimate respect/status, the Diplomatic Importance Scores (Small and Singer, 1973) are used. Small and Singer contend that "the number of diplomatic missions found in a given national capitol at $t_1$ will be a consequence of the relative importance attached to that nation in the system at $t_0$." (Small and Singer, 1973, p. 583). They are also aware of the problems of choosing one indicator of diplomatic status:

"...Some may feel that we have taken on an impossible task: trying to reflect, in a single indicator, a complex state of affairs which emerges from a variety of background factors. It is clear that we have not produced a simple proxy indicator, with a one-to-one association between the observed phenomenon and some single unobserved condition in the empirical world. But the very diversity of factors that affect the measure and the very complexity of the decision-making processes that produce the outcome may well be viewed as an asset. When we can, by parsimoniously observing a single set of traces, tap the resultant of a very complex set of interactions, we have progressed on the measurement front. And what holds for the GNP of a nation, the IQ of a schoolboy, the earned-run average of a pitcher, or the force of a moving object would seem to hold for the diplomatic importance of a state." (Small and Singer, 1973, p.599)

The final basic value to be operationalized for relative capabilities is well-being/enlightenment. The indicator selected to estimate a nation’s capability in this regard is the literacy rate of the population, expressed in percentage of population literate. The argument for employing this indicator rests on the
proposition that higher rates of literacy reflect a
nation's ability to mobilize and distribute resources on a
large scale. The *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*
(1958-68) provides figures on the percent of the
population aged 15 or older reported as literate.

**Prior Affect**

To operationalize this variable, affect event data
had to be found that were based on discrete time points,
so that trends could be assessed. The Conflict and Peace
Data Bank (COPDAB) (Azar and Sloan, 1975) was selected
because it met the following criteria: a) it is event
based, b) affect scores were provided for each event, and
c) it provides an affect scale that is dyadically based
and delineated by issue area.

The Azar/Sloan affect scale has 15 points, with
scale point 1 being the most cooperative, and scale point
15 being the most conflictual. To circumvent the problem
of equating the points on the Azar/Sloan scale with the
points on the CREON affect scale, broad qualitative
categories such as No Prior Affect, Mixed Prior Affect,
Neutral Prior Affect, Positive Prior Affect and Negative
Prior Affect were established. Because it is not
desirable to base predictions on affect that is
contemporary with the event to which one wants to predict,
prior affect for each given year was determined by
examining the COPDAB affect to date for the previous five years.

It is important to combine this prior affect data with knowledge of discontinuities in regime posture due to irregular transfers of power (e.g., coups d'état). Examining the COPDAB affect data alone, it would be difficult to determine the differences between the relations of two countries going sour, and previously good relations reversed by the rise to power in one nation of a regime with a sharply different outlook. Thus the World Handbook's (1972) data on irregular executive transfers is merged with the Azar affect data to alert the researcher to the possibility of such occurrences. When such an irregular transfer is identified, prior affect up to that point is discarded, and affect to other entities is assumed as None/Neutral until prior affect from the new regime has accumulated for at least six months. For a complete discussion of the mechanics of constructing the indicator, see Hudson (1983, pp. 187-200).

Salience

As with relative capabilities, indicators of salience are sought that correspond to the basic values of military/physical security, economic wealth, diplomatic respect/status, well-being/welfare, and enlightenment. Again, the last two are collapsed. Recall that salience
of an external entity for an actor is the degree to which the explicit or tacit support of that entity is necessary for the actor to realize basic values. In this context, indicators are chosen on the basis of their ability to reflect whether or not an entity is salient for the actor in a particular basic value domain.

Two indicators have been selected for the military/physical security basic value. The first, geographic proximity, is utilized on the assumption that any potentially threatening turn of events in a neighboring state would always be of intense interest and importance to the acting nation. Proximity refers to nations that share common borders as well as those within 200 coastal miles of another nation. The latter cut-off was selected because it has been asserted over the years by a number of nations that 200 miles of territorial waters preserve both their security and economic integrity. Indeed, Starr and Most (1972) contend that the 200 mile limit is a part of the definition of "border".

The second indicator incorporates the concern that other entities, besides nations, have the ability to affect the security of the acting nation. To this end, a list of traditional enemies is compiled for each acting nation. M. Hermann (mimeo, 1982, p. 10) defines the term in the following manner: "The regime believes that a condition of enduring hostility exists between its country
and certain other entities. The regime perceives the continuing threat of military conflict with this opposition."

The indicator for the basic value of economic wealth is trade dependence. As we are interested in ascertaining the degree to which the realization of this basic value is contingent on the cooperation of another entity, trade dependence, in the words of Richardson (1978, p. 97), "...is an indication of the extent to which trade is important to a country's economic health." By dividing the value of foreign trade with a particular entity, one can determine whether, first of all, the nation is dependent on foreign trade. If the quotient is 10% or higher, one then looks to see with which particular entities the acting nation trades heavily. If another entity shares 3% or more of the actor's imports or exports, that entity is then deemed to be salient for the trade dependent actor.

The measurement of diplomatic salience rests on the notion that the more important the entity is to the actor, the more frequently the actor is likely to interact with it. Thus, above average frequency of interaction indicates the importance of an entity for the actor. The COPDAB data provides a means of calculating this measure, as it contains the number of interactions between dyads. One possible drawback to this approach is raised by Hudson
"From the COPDAB data it can be inductively shown that at least for the decade in question (1959-68), industrialized nations interacted with most every nation, whereas the usually newly independent nations of the Third World interacted with an extremely limited set of entities. Thus the difference between possible and actual targets for industrialized countries is very small and does not drastically alter the value of the average. However, for most Third World nations, the difference between possible and actual targets is usually quite large, and the choice of the former as a denominator virtually assures that the average interaction frequency for these countries is very small (often around 1). That has the unfortunate consequence of making nearly every nation that a Third World country interacts with salient, because any interaction at all is likely to be above average when the average is 1. That result undermines the validity of this indicator of salience. Therefore, at least when studying this decade, the denominator in this calculation of average will be the number of actual targets."

The remaining basic values, well-being/welfare and enlightenment, are not really adaptable for operationalizing salience, in that it is difficult to determine how external entities can strongly influence that attainment of these basic values. One feasible option is to calculate the degree to which outside aid is required to obtain these basic values. In an era of interdependence, the level of scientific, technical, and cultural aid by one nation to another can certainly influence these basic values. Thus one can compile a list of donors (from Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-68) and postulate, albeit weakly, that these donors are salient to the receiving actor.
Behavior Attributes

The four behavior attributes - affect, commitment, instrumentality, and recipient - are measured as behavior properties in the CREON data set. The procedures are described in Callahan, Brady, and Hermann (1982). Four supplemental observations are necessary. The original CREON eleven point commitment scale (presented below) is collapsed into three broader categories - low, moderate, and high. Low corresponds to points 1, 2, and 3 on the original scale; moderate corresponds to 4, 5, 6, and 7; and high corresponds to 8, 9, 10, and 11.

The motivation for collapsing the scale from eleven points to three rests with the nature of the model employed in this project. Due to the relatively sparse profile of leaders/nations developed by the model, it was deemed necessary to reduce the specificity of the behavioral projections. As a consequence, the broader three point scale has been adopted.

Similarly, the original CREON five point affect scale is also collapsed into three broader categories - positive, neutral, and negative. In effect, the direction of affect has been retained, but the intensity factor has been eliminated.
Table 3: CREON COMMITMENT SCALE
(from Callahan et al., 1982, p. 196)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Irreversible Resource Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Partially Reversible Resource Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Reversible Resource Allocation and No Resource Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Formal International Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Unconditional Statements of Intention by Top Policy Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conditional Statements of Intention by Top Policy Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unconditional Statements of Intention by Lower Policy Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conditional Statements of Intention by Lower Policy Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Verbal Evaluations of Own Policy or Statement of General Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Symbolic, Insignificant Nonverbal Behaviors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No Commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4: CREON FIVE POINT AFFECT SCALE

(from Hermann, Hermann, and Hutchins, 1982, p. 124)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affect_Scale_Point</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strong Expression of Positive Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mild Expression of Positive Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Neutral Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mild Expression of Negative Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strong Expression of Negative Affect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the altered version adopted here, scale points 1 and 2 are collapsed, as are points 4 and 5. The intensity of the expression of affect was eliminated because, as with the commitment scale, it was felt that the model would be unable to generate behavioral projections with that degree of specificity.

Third, CREON makes a distinction between instruments used in preparation, announcement, and implementation of the foreign policy behavior. Instrument here is defined as those involved in implementation. In addition, three categories have been constructed to fit the previously described nature of the model. The CREON Project produced eight nominal categories of foreign policy instrumentality. They are: 1) diplomacy, 2) domestic politics, 3) military, 4) intelligence, 5) economics, 6) science/technology, 7) propaganda/promotion, and 8) natural resources (see Hermann, 1982, pp. 159-161). The modified version has three categories: 1) diplomatic, 2) diplomatic and domain, and 3) domain. The term "domain" refers to the basic value jeopardized by the foreign policy problem. For example, if a problem is coded as involving the economic wealth basic value, a projection incorporating the use of an economic instrument (without diplomacy) would be coded as "domain". The obvious drawback to this approach is that the categories do not permit a prediction using an instrument that has no direct
relationship to the basic values in question, e.g., using a military instrument in response to an economic problem. Again, the model is not capable of handling that level of complexity, and thus can only realistically make the distinctions created by the three categories.

The fourth and final observation concerns the modification, or rather, the reconciling of the entities coded as recipients in this exercise, and the recipient scheme employed by the CREON Project. Briefly, the CREON coding scheme lists all the foreign entities in a foreign policy event as either targets (directly addressed or encountered) or objects (indirectly addressed or encountered). Accordingly, it is further determined whether the entity in question is a participant, facilitator, a direct or indirect policy recipient, a direct or indirect addressee, or a policy subject. In contrast, the prediction of recipient by this model is based on the set of roles in each situation (e.g., source, subject, etc.) The entity occupying the predicted recipient role is compared to the entity occupying the direct policy recipient category in the CREON scheme. If they match, the prediction is correct; if not, incorrect. It should be noted that in those events where no direct policy recipient has been coded, the model's output is compared to the direct addressee, or if the direct addressee is a domestic audience, the indirect policy
recipient, etc. (See Hudson, 1983 for a fuller explication of the matching rules).

Conducting the Empirical Examination

The variables having been operationalized and the hypotheses developed, the task of comparing the predictions of the model for each CREON event to the CREON behavioral outcomes is relatively easy. Recall that for every event a set of ten predictions is made — corresponding to the four variables in isolation (orientation, prior affect, relative capabilities, and salience) and the 6 "combined" logics. The purpose for this juxtaposition is to determine which, if any, of the prediction categories perform well for each leader. Every hypothesis is given a six digit identification number. The first two digits represent the prediction category they belong to:

01= Orientation in Isolation
02= Prior Affect in Isolation
03= Salience in Isolation
04= Relative Capabilities in Isolation
05= Expansionist + prior affect, relative capabilities and salience
06= Active Independent + prior affect, relative capabilities and salience
07= Influential + prior affect, relative capabilities and
salience
08= Mediator/Integrator + prior affect, relative capabilities, and salience
09= Opportunist + prior affect, relative capabilities and salience
10= Developmentalist + prior affect, relative capabilities and salience

The third digit refers to the type of situation in which the hypothesis is developed:
1= Confrontation Situation
2= Intervention Situation
3= Assistance Requesting Situation
4= Assistance Consideration Situation
5= Collaboration Situation

The last three digits indicate the specific permutations of the variables' values. For example, 025003 is the hypothesis for prior affect in isolation in a collaboration situation in which the collaborating entities have shared mixed prior affect. In contrast, 025001 signifies the same thing as the previous hypothesis, except that the collaborating entities have shared positive prior affect. Chapter Two identifies every hypothesis by such a six digit number. Reproduced on the next page is the code sheet employed to compare the
predicted outcomes to the CREON outcomes. Following that, Table 5 lists the meanings of the numerical codes used in conjunction with the coding sheets.

A sheet completed for each and every CREON event (882 in all) was transcribed onto a computer. A program was then run on the data that was designed to compare the predicted values of the behavior variables to the CREON output. The following discussion of the data is entertained through a comparison of these composites of the four behavior attributes. When the two sets are identical, it is referred to as a perfect match - i.e., four out of four behavior attributes were correctly predicted. If only one of the predicted values is incorrect, it is referred to as a 3 out of 4 match.
Figure 6: Sample Code Sheet for Leader Study
Table 5: List of Numerical Codes Used on the Coding Sheet

Predicted Instrument Code
1 = Diplomatic
2 = Diplomatic and Domain
3 = Domain

Predicted Commitment Code
1 = Low
2 = Moderate
3 = High

Predicted Affect Code
1 = Positive
2 = Neutral
3 = Negative

Target Match Code
0 = No Match
1 = Partial Match
2 = Match

Nation/Leader Codes
040 = Cuba/Castro
437 = Ivory Coast/Houphouet-Boigny
438 = Guinea/Toure
452 = Ghana/Nkrumah
500 = Uganda/Obote
501 = Kenya/Kenyatta
551 = Zambia/Kaunda
Chapter 4:
Results

In order to intelligently discuss the results of the empirical examination, it may prove useful to reclarify the nature of the model, the types of questions it is able to field, and the manner in which the examination may illuminate the major research questions that prompted the formulation of the model.

In regard to the latter point, the critical questions raised in this research revolve around the issue of combining variables from different levels of analysis and the utility of developing explicit logics for their interaction. This research strategy represents a departure from more conventional analyses of foreign policy behavior in that it eschews the use of statistical techniques as a means of interrelating the variables. In addition, the delineation of variable expectations in isolation as well as interactively may provide insight into the development of explanations of foreign policy behavior that employ not only multiple levels of analysis, but also multi-variable interpretations of behavior. The data generated for this analysis may provide an initial assessment of the utility of this approach.
On the more specific questions, briefly, the model is constructed to represent key factors that may influence an individual leader's response to a specific foreign policy problem. It is hypothesized that these factors, in isolation, are inadequate predictors. However, when interrelated, they may be able to provide a more complete logic for the outcome of a specific problem. Thus, the first question to be examined is the comparative predictive success for the variables in isolation versus the variables interactively. Exploration of this question may point to the usefulness of examining variables in this manner as they bear, in turn, on developing explanations of foreign policy behavior.

A second question to explore is the predicted versus the actual scores on each of the four behavior attributes - affect, commitment, instrumentality, and recipient. An examination of this sort is required in order to determine the extent to which the predictive success of the model can be attributed to statistical probability. For example, if diplomatic instrument is the prediction for all the hypotheses, and that instrument is coded for the CREON events 72% of the time, then one could conclude that the model had a success rate of 72%. For obvious reasons, this would be a misleading conclusion.

As constructed, the model is also able to generate the kind of output that allows us to discuss the
usefulness of the variable Type of Situation as a contextual dimension that aids our ability to reconstruct elements of the decision-making process. The third question, then, is how useful is type of situation for providing the context for examining and arranging the other explanatory variables.

Another area of examination revolves around the comparative predictive success for the seven individual leaders. This area of comparison provokes a number of questions that the model's output allows us to address:

4). Do any patterns emerge that suggest that the six African leaders share a common perspective or condition?

5). Are there any differences between the leaders when examining the predictive success of the variables in isolation versus the variables interactively?

It is hoped that this approach to examining the data can provide an initial evaluation of the predictive utility of the model. One must note that, at this point, the theoretical validity of the hypotheses cannot be critically examined due to the absence of any standard against which they can be compared. Successive runs incorporating the creation of rival hypotheses may establish a basis for a discussion of the validity of the model. Such an approach is consistent with Lakatos' (1970) claim that a clash of theories provides a legitimate foundation for validating the theories under
consideration.

While theoretical validity of the hypotheses is not possible at this point, a discussion of the data can suggest whether this type of approach to understanding leaders in the foreign policy milieu is worth further examination. The results may suggest the degree to which refinements in the model's logics are required, as well as the addition of explanatory variables. Finally, some interesting empirical by-products may emerge from this examination. As with other inductive results, however, it is not clear whether these by-products are generalizable beyond the scope of this study.

General Evaluation of the Model

The data in Table 6 suggests that support for the conjecture that the combined logics (columns 5-10) should outperform the isolated logics (columns 1-4) is mixed. Prior Affect in isolation (column 2) has the highest percentage of 3-4/4 matches indicating that this single variable is the best predictor of these seven nations' behavior. It is also apparent that Orientation in isolation (column 1), while not as successful as prior affect, predicts behavior more accurately than two of the combined logics (columns 6 and 8 - Active/Independent and Mediator/Integrator), and roughly as well as the other four combined logics. A third observation is that both
Salience (column 3) and Relative Capabilities (column 4) in isolation are comparatively poor predictors of behavior. This finding is not completely unexpected as many of the hypotheses, contained in their isolated logics, yielded no prediction of behavior due to insufficient information.

It would be very misleading, at this point, to discuss the comparative success of the combined logics, as one of the propositions of this research project is that individuals will exhibit different orientations on the basis of their personal characteristics. Thus, the poor showing of the Active/Independent combined logic, for example, may simply be a function of the fact that the seven leaders' personal characteristics indicate little, if any, basis for that particular orientation. However, in an aggregate sense, the data can be interpreted to mean that the seven leaders' foreign policy orientations are less likely Active/Independent or Mediator/Integrator.

Indeed, the hypotheses that emanate from the interaction of the variables emphasize the propositions developed by M. Hermann (1980) regarding each orientation. Specifically, the hypotheses for Mediator/Integrator and Active/Independent were constructed to reflect the meta-hypotheses that:

a). the Mediator/Integrator is disposed to urge negotiation and offer his services as mediator. In this
Table 6: 3-4/4 Matches by Prediction Category*

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<th>7</th>
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<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 = Orientation in isolation  
  2 = Prior Affect in isolation  
  3 = Salience in isolation  
  4 = Relative Capabilities in isolation  
  5 = "Combined" Expansionist  
  6 = "Combined" Active/Independent  
  7 = "Combined" Influential  
  8 = "Combined" Mediator/Integrator  
  9 = "Combined" Opportunist  
  10 = "Combined" Developmentalist
regard, many of the hypotheses in Intervention situations attempt to incorporate this notion by postulating that the Mediator/Integrator will usually address both source and subject in an attempt to encourage a peaceful resolution of differences. For the seven leaders in this study, this apparently was not the case.

b) the Active/Independent is disposed to avoiding entanglements in the international arena that reduce his decision-making latitude. As a consequence, the hypotheses for Active/Independent incorporated a more diverse set of targets - particularly international organizations. Again, for the seven leaders in this project, this was not manifested.

Questions about the comparative success of the combined logics will be more fully treated when the data presentation turns to the second tier of analysis.

When examining only perfect matches (4/4) in Table 7, prediction column 9 - the combined Opportunist logics, appear to be the most successful, followed by Prior Affect in isolation (column 2). This is an encouraging sign to the extent that the other explanatory variables can contribute to the predicted success achieved at the most rigorous threshold.

Before proceeding with the evaluation of the model, it should be noted that the inclusion of a non-African leader is a function of a number of considerations.
First, the addition of one bolstered the N size of the data in order to more meaningfully discuss the results of the empirical examination. Second, this was done because, unfortunately, events data on other African leaders was not available.

The choice of Castro was made because he has a similar position in Cuban government to the African sample, namely, a new leader in an emerging independent Third World nation, in which his influence dominates the foreign policy decision-making structure. Of the available events data on Third World predominant leaders, Castro was the only one that so closely matched the African context. Ideally, more than one such leader would have been chosen.

It is important to note, though, that the inclusion of Castro in the aggregate data analysis does not distort the results. As a check against such a possibility, Castro was removed from the run of the data on 3-4/4 and 4/4 matches, with only marginally altered results - a less than 2% difference in nine out of ten prediction categories. The only category with a difference of greater than 2% was the combined Opportunist category, with an increase of predictive success of 5.5%. This further substantiates the claim by both African scholars and the results of this examination, that African leaders were sensitive to conditions in the external environment.
when conducting their foreign policy activities.

Another means of examining the usefulness of the model involves exploring the distribution of predictions into the categories of three of the four behavior attributes - affect, commitment, and instrumentality. The fourth attribute, recipient, can only be examined in terms of whether the predicted target matched the actual one. It is necessary to contrast the distributions in light of the fact that the strength of the test may be diluted if one finds that the distribution of predictions is so skewed as to render the predictive success meaningless except as an exercise in probability.

Tables 8, 9, and 10 indicate the percentage of predictions in each prediction category, along with the actual distribution. A glance at the affect portion of the table suggests that while the predictions of positive, negative, and neutral affect were not heavily skewed toward any of the three values, there is a greater emphasis on neutral affect in contrast to the actual distribution. With the exceptions of predictive categories 1 and 2 (orientation in isolation and prior affect in isolation), all the others predict the use of neutral affect far more often than was actually the case.

This contrast may be an example of the fundamental obstacles researchers face in attempting to model the behavior of both individual leaders and nations. In
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 = Orientation in isolation  
2 = Prior Affect in isolation  
3 = Salience in isolation  
4 = Relative Capabilities in isolation  
5 = "Combined" Expansionist  
6 = "Combined" Active/Independent  
7 = "Combined" Influential  
8 = "Combined" Mediator/Integrator  
9 = "Combined" Opportunist  
10 = "Combined" Developmentalist
Table 8: Distributions of Predicted Values of Expressed Affect versus Actual Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 1 (Orientation in isolation)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 2 (Prior Affect in isolation)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 3 (Salience in isolation)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8, cont’d

### Category 4 (Relative Capabilities in isolation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Category 5 ("Combined" Expansionist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Category 6 ("Combined" Active/Independent Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8, cont'd

Category 7 ("Combined" Influential Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 8 ("Combined" Mediator/Integrator Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 9 ("Combined" Opportunist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8, cont'd

Category 10 ("Combined" Developmentalist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: Distributions of Predicted Values of Commitment versus Actual Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 2 (Prior Affect in isolation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 3 (Salience in isolation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9, cont’d

Category 4 (Relative Capabilities in isolation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 5 ("Combined" Expansionist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 6 ("Combined" Active/Independent Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9, cont'd

Category 7 ("Combined" Influential Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 8 ("Combined" Mediator/Integrator Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 9 ("Combined" Opportunist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9, cont'd

Category 10 ("Combined" Developmentalist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Distributions of Predicted Values of Instrument versus Actual Values

**Category 1 (Orientation in isolation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Category 2 (Prior Affect in isolation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Category 3 (Salience in isolation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10, cont'd

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 4 (Relative Capabilities in isolation)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 5 (&quot;Combined&quot; Expansionist Logic)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category 6 (&quot;Combined&quot; Active/Independent Logic)</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10, cont'd

Category 7 ("Combined" Influential Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 8 ("Combined" Mediator/Integrator Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 9 ("Combined" Opportunist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>94.3%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10, cont'd

Category 10 ("Combined" Developmentalist Logic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dipl</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipl/Dom</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
particular, as the model in this project is a representation of how factors interrelate to produce certain estimates of behavior, the logic is obviously flawed by the researcher's own predispositions. As a consequence, future representations will somehow have to wrestle with this dilemma.

A similar case can be made for the other two attributes—commitment and instrument. Predicted commitment drastically underestimated the use of high commitment, and in a few cases overestimated the use of low commitment. Keep in mind that the predictions are all made in the context of situation along with one or more of the other variables. Thus, any refinement of hypotheses has to be undertaken only through reconsideration of the logics. Perhaps the most skewed distribution is the prediction of instrument. With only one or two exceptions, the diplomatic instrument was predicted over 90% of the time, and even though diplomatic instruments were actually invoked 72.6% of the time, the over-reliance on diplomatic instrument in hypothesis construction must be reconsidered.

Table 11 exhibits the predictive success for recipient for each predictive category. Partial matches occurred when more than one recipient was predicted (e.g., source and third party, but not source and subject—the latter is considered one target). These were considered
"misses" when calculating the predictive success of the hypotheses in terms of 3-4/4 matches.

Of the combined logics, categories 6 and, to a lesser extent, 8 (Combined Active/Independent and Mediator/Integrator) demonstrated the poorest capacity to predict recipient. In the case of the latter, Mediator/Integrator, source and subject were predicted often due to the hypothesized Mediator/Integrator predilection for negotiation and mediation. Either the hypothesis is invoked too often, or the sample of leaders possess few of the characteristics of Mediators/Integrators. Prediction category 6 (Active/Independent combined logics) contained many hypotheses in which the recipient was predicted to be a third party or international organization. Once again, apparently the meta-hypothesis is not warranted, or the sample does not exhibit the characteristics associated with the Active/Independent orientation. Finally, one should note that prior affect in isolation (category 2) has the greatest success in predicting recipient, another reinforcement for the contention that prior affect is the single most successful predictor in the model.

At a level of greater specificity, it is possible to examine individual hypotheses in all ten prediction categories in order to obtain additional insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the model. In addition, an
examination of the hypotheses from different predictive categories may suggest the extent to which variables other than prior affect contribute to the predictive success of the model.

Table 12 lists all hypotheses with an N size of at least 25 events. (Twenty-five events as a cut-off point was arbitrarily chosen in order to insure that the discussion of the hypotheses would proceed with a sufficient enough N size to make meaningful generalizations.) At first glance, one can observe the wide range of predictive success (3-4/4 matches) - 0% to 80%. A comparison of the percentages in the different predictive categories suggests that the combined logics outperform the isolated ones only some of the time. For example, hypotheses 025004 and 095003 share the same situation type and value of prior affect, the former being the hypothesis for prior affect in isolation, the latter for the combined Opportunist logic. On the basis of the two logics, the only difference in the predictions is the direction of affect (025004=Neutral, 095003=Positive), yet the success rate for the combined logic is 57% compared to the isolated logic rate of 34%. Clearly, the influence of the other variables, in this case the orientation variable, contributes to the increased predictive success. A similar, though not as compelling, case can be
Table 11: Success in Predicting Recipient by Prediction Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miss</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Pred.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1 = Orientation in isolation  
  2 = Prior Affect in isolation  
  3 = Salience in isolation  
  4 = Relative Capabilities in isolation  
  5 = "Combined" Expansionist  
  6 = "Combined" Active/Independent  
  7 = "Combined" Influential  
  8 = "Combined" Mediator/Integrator  
  9 = "Combined" Opportunistic  
  10 = "Combined" Developmental
made by comparing hypotheses 021002 (negative prior affect), 031001 (salient adversary) and 081003 (negative, salient adversary for Mediator/Integrator). The combined logic 081003 predicts more successfully than the isolated ones: 41% to 37% and 20%, respectively.

On the other hand, Prior Affect in isolation performs better than the combined logics in a number of instances. A comparison of hypotheses 022007, 072020, 092013, and 102015 suggests that a single variation in the predicted behavior attributes accounts for the difference in success, namely, the addition of third parties as recipients in the case of the isolated logic. Similarly, with hypotheses 024004, 064003, 074005, 084003, 094003, and 104003, the isolated logic of prior affect fares dramatically better than the others because of a key difference in predicted affect. The isolated logic predicts positive affect, while the others, except 074005, predict neutral affect. (074005 predicts positive affect, but differs from all the rest in the level of commitment predicted.)

Two of the other variables in isolation, salience and relative capabilities, even when broken down to the individual hypothesis level, are not sufficiently descriptive to produce predictions on all four attributes. As a consequence, their level of predictive success is far below any of the other prediction
Table 12: Predictive Success for Hypotheses with 25 or More Cases

**Category 1 (Orientation is isolation, 10/30 hypotheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>011501</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>011901</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012101</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012501</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012601</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>012801</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>014101</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>014501</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>014801</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>015101</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Category 2 (Prior Affect in isolation, 8/25 hypotheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>021002</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>021003</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022002</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022007</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>022008</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>024004</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>025001</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>025004</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12, cont'd

Category 3 (Salience in Isolation, 8/11 hypotheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>031001</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032001</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032002</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>032003</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>033001</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>034001</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>034002</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>035001</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 4 (Relative Capabilities in isolation, 4/11 hyp)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>041002</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042002</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>042003</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>044002</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>0%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 5 ("Combined " Expansionist logic, 5/22 hypothee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>051003</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>052006</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>053001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>054003</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>055002</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12, cont’d

Category 6 ("Combined" Active Independent Logic, 9/48 hyps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>061008</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>061012</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>062026</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>062027</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>063001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>064002</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>064003</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>065002</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>065003</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Category 7 ("Combined" Influential Logic, 8/44 hypotheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>071002</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>071004</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>072019</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>072020</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>073001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>074005</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>075001</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>075002</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Category 8 ("Combined" Mediator/Integrator Logic, 7/14 hyp)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>081003</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081004</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>082001</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>082002</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>083001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>084001</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>085001</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Category 9 ("Combined" Opportunist Logic, 8/31 hypotheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>091004</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>091006</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092009</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>092013</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>093001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>094003</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>095001</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>095003</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12, cont'd

Category 10 ("Combined" Developmentalist Logic, 7/37 hyps)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis ID</th>
<th>N of Cases</th>
<th>3-4/4 Matches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>101003</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101007</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102014</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102015</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103001</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104003</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105009</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = no prediction made
categories.

The other variable in isolation, orientation, has to be examined from a slightly different angle than the others due to the fact that this variable is actually in six parts - one for each specific leader-orientation. Thus a comparison must be made between each isolated leader orientation and the respective combined ones. Unfortunately, the sample of national leaders in this study did not include one of the Influential orientation (as coded by M. Hermann), so the examination will proceed looking only at the other five. However, the focus of comparison must be with the specific leaders who were coded for that orientation.

In other words, for the comparison to be meaningful, the orientation in isolation predictions must be judged against the combined orientation predictions on an individual leader basis. Before delving into this area, which constitutes part of the second tier of analysis, it would be useful to discuss the third question in the first tier, namely the utility of type of situation as a mediating variable.

Table 13 provides an opportunity not only to examine the usefulness of type of situation, but also allows us to further scrutinize the success and utility of the combined logics versus the isolated ones. First, with regard to type of situation, we find that in each of the
ten prediction categories the percentage of successful predictions varies by type of situation. When compared to Table 6, which contains the aggregate successful predictions for each category, it is apparent that the hypotheses in particular situations fare far better than in others.

A second observation, illustrated in Table 14, concerns the situational profiles one may derive from examining the distribution of events by situation type. For the African nations, one’s initial presupposition that these six states, all being newly independent, relatively underdeveloped African nations, would be facing similar sorts of external environments during this decade, turns out not to be the case empirically. Table 14 points out that the nations’ situational profiles fall into three general sets. The largest set, composed of Ghana, Guinea, Uganda, and the Ivory Coast, find themselves engaged for the most part in Assistance Consideration and Intervention type events, which upon closer examination turn out to take place in multilateral settings. This is perhaps corroboration of East’s (1973) hypothesis that small, poor nations find this type of activity the least expensive and the easiest sort of diplomacy in which to engage.

Zambia, on the other hand, falls into a class of its own by virtue of its situational profile. Almost half of its events are Confrontation type situations. This
Table 13: 3-4/4 Matches by Prediction Category Controlling for Type of Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIA</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1= Orientation in isolation  6= "Combined" Active/Independent
* 2= Prior Affect in isolation  7= "Combined" Influential
* 3= Salience in isolation      8= "Combined" Mediator/Integrator
* 4= Relative Capabilities in isolation  9= "Combined" Opportunist
* 5= "Combined" Expansionist    10= "Combined" Developmental
reflects, of course, the overwhelming impact of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence on that nation, and suggests that the external environment facing Zambia was markedly different from that faced by the other nations. Kenya, too, has a unique profile, with a much greater proportion of its events (relative to the other five nations) being Intervention type situations. One possible explanation for this may be Kenya’s president’s, Jomo Kenyatta’s, active participation in issues of liberation. While the other leaders may also have been actively involved, Kenyatta devoted a great deal of attention, relative to other external matters, in the Commonwealth, OAU, and other forums to the liberation of African states still under colonial domination.

Thus we see that the model is able to discriminate between more typical and more unusual sets of external circumstances confronting arguably similar types of actors.

Going back to Table 13, it might be useful to discuss the comparative success of each prediction category in the various types of situations:

Category 1 - Orientation is isolation

The logics for this category are comparatively most successful in Assistance types of situations. It would seem reasonable to suggest that these situations are the easiest to account for using personal characteristics.
Table 14: Crosstabulation of Actor by Situation Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Situation_Type</th>
<th>N (Row Percent)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conf'tn</td>
<td>Interv'tn</td>
<td>Ass't Req</td>
<td>Ass't Con</td>
<td>Collab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boigny /Ivory Coast</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>30 (32.6%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>46 (50.0%)</td>
<td>14 (15.2%)</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toure /Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 (4.3%)</td>
<td>55 (39.5%)</td>
<td>12 (8.6%)</td>
<td>44 (31.6%)</td>
<td>22 (15.8%)</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkrumah /Ghana</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 (6.8%)</td>
<td>85 (44.9%)</td>
<td>9 (4.7%)</td>
<td>73 (38.6%)</td>
<td>9 (4.7%)</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obote /Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>8 (9.8%)</td>
<td>29 (35.8%)</td>
<td>3 (3.7%)</td>
<td>30 (37.0%)</td>
<td>11 (13.5%)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyatta/Kenya</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 (15%)</td>
<td>31 (51.6%)</td>
<td>7 (11.6%)</td>
<td>8 (13.1%)</td>
<td>5 (8.3%)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaunda /Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td>26 (42.6%)</td>
<td>14 (22.9%)</td>
<td>8 (13.1%)</td>
<td>8 (13.1%)</td>
<td>5 (8.2%)</td>
<td>622</td>
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alone, in comparison to other situations where variables encompassing more than individual preference are likely to come into play.

Category 2 - Prior Affect in isolation

When broken down by situation, it is clear that much of the overall success of prior affect must be attributed to its ability to account for behavior in Assistance Consideration situations. As the data in Table 12 pointed out, this success rate is accounted for by one hypothesis - situations where the requesting entity has expressed none/neutral prior affect with the actor. Table 13 also indicates that prior affect is a relatively poor predictor of behavior in collaborative situations, which by implication suggests that past feelings of friendship-hostility are a relatively less important factor in accounting for an actor's behavior in these situations. It should also be noted that in two other specific situations - Confrontation with an adversary with whom the actor has shared mixed prior affect, and Intervention situations where one entity has had negative prior affect and the other none/neutral (see Table 12), prior affect predicts rather successfully - 61% and 56% respectively.

Category 3 - Salience in Isolation

While the data in Table 13 does little to contradict the previously stated conclusion that salience
in isolation is unable to generate specific hypotheses, it is nevertheless clear that in certain situations, the variable is more revealing than in others. In Assistance and Confrontation situations, salience appears to be able to generate reasonable hypotheses about an actor's behavior, and its success rate, while comparatively low, is far better than the rates in Intervention and Collaboration situations.

Category 4 - Relative Capabilities in Isolation

Similar to salience in isolation, information on relative capabilities alone appears to be less able to generate specific behavioral outcomes than the other variables in isolation. In contrast to the other variables in isolation, relative capabilities fares worst in Assistance Consideration situations. This is primarily a function of the fact that in most cases for the nations in this study, they are at a capability disadvantage in this type of situation. On the basis of this information alone, the researcher was unable to postulate a specific behavioral response., i.e., predicted estimates for all four behavior attributes. As a consequence, no prediction was made.

Categories 5-10: The Six Orientations in Combination with the Other Variables

An examination of columns five through ten reveals further the usefulness of type of situation. In all six
columns, the hypotheses for specific situations predict behavior more successfully than the aggregated rate. Assistance types of situations - both requesting and consideration - figure prominently in each category. This is not unexpected as the range of behavior for the actors is limited in these situations. In the former, requesting assistance is not the issue: the manner in which it is requested is the challenge. Similarly, in considering another entity's request, while not as cut and dried as the previous case, the actor’s modeled responses are fairly predictable. In fact, as the data indicates, prior affect in isolation is a far better gauge of the actor’s likely response than any of the other variables. In fact, the results could lead one to further hypothesize that prior affect is the single most important variable (of the ones utilized in this research) in accounting for the behavior of nations in this specific type of situation. More specifically, as evidenced in Table 12, this hypothesis can be refined to state that when prior affect between the requesting entity is none/neutral, one does not need much more information to predict the actor’s response (72% 3-4/4 matches).

A more encouraging indication from columns 5-10 is the good success rate for collaboration and especially intervention situations in selected categories. With respect to the latter, given the wide latitude in
behavioral responses to this situation, a good showing among the hypotheses suggests the model has the ability to sort out more complex conditions than the previously mentioned ones. As Table 12 indicates in all categories except number 8, at least one hypothesis in each category has a success rate of over 50%. Upon closer examination of the hypotheses, though, we find that each logic relies more heavily on prior affect than any of the other variables.

This observation leads back to a discussion of the merits of the variables in isolation compared to the combined logics. With the introduction of situation, a comparison of the rows in Table 13 points to only a few instances in each row where the combined logics have a higher success rate than prior affect. It is to these instances that we must turn to find out if, as is the case of the intervention situation previously discussed, the logics rely excessively on prior affect, or if the other variables contribute to the successful prediction.

An analysis of Collaboration situations, in which categories 7, 8, and 9 (Influential, Mediator/Integrator, and Opportunist all in combination, respectively) have a higher success rate than prior affect in isolation, is a positive example of the utility of adding the other variables to prior affect. For category 8, there is only one hypothesis for the situation, and its logic is derived
exclusively from the orientation variable (in this case Mediator/Integrator) with a successful score of 41%. In the other categories - 7 and 9 - the logics, while incorporating prior affect, also utilize, in some instances, salience and orientation to differentiate conditions under which different behaviors are to be expected. The results clearly point to the predominance of prior affect in tandem with situation as predictors of these actors' behavior. Yet they also suggest that the other variables perform the vital task of further differentiating conditions within the context of the situation. It should also be emphasized that the importance of orientation should not be diminished by the data alone. The combined logics were constructed relying heavily on the descriptions provided by M. Hermann for each orientation. However, since its impact cannot be directly measured, one has to be satisfied, at least at the aggregate level, that prior affect and type of situation account for the preponderance of successful predictions.

Comparison of Leaders/Nations

Now that we have dispensed with a general evaluation of the model, an examination of the leaders is called for. The purpose of such scrutiny is two-fold:

1) to determine if any patterns emerge that
suggest the leaders share a common perspective or condition. This can be done in terms of both orientation and situation, and

2). to determine if some leaders' predictive success rates vary in terms of the variables in isolation versus combination.

Table 15 presents the 3-4/4 matches for each leader/nation by prediction category. As with the previous discussion, prior affect in isolation (column 2) is the most successful predictor overall. However, in the case of Zambia, prediction category 9 - Opportunistic orientation in combination - provides a more successful rate. For Cuba and Kenya, the success rate of prior affect is equal to the rates of prediction category 5 (expansionsist orientation in combination) and 9 (opportunist orientation in combination), respectively. These findings reflect the previously stated conclusion that the other explanatory variables can complement prior affect in deriving hypotheses about behavior.

As the data in Table 15 is broken down by nation, we are now in a position to discuss prediction category 1 - orientation in isolation. Each leader was assigned a specific orientation in concordance with the previous coding of their interviews. (See M. Hermann, 1980, and Hermann and Singer, 1983). With the exceptions of Nkrumah (Expansionist) and Kenyatta (Active Independent), whose
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Best Combined Prediction Categories for Each Nation:

5  9  7  9  9  9  9  9
8  5  9  5* 7  8* 8
10 10 10 7* 10 10* 10

* = tied

* 1= Orientation in isolation
2= Prior Affect in isolation
3= Salience in isolation
4= Relative Capabilities in isolation
5= "Combined" Expansionist
6= "Combined" Active/Independent
7= "Combined" Influential
8= "Combined" Mediator/Integrator
9= "Combined" Opportunistic
10= "Combined" Developmentalist
isolation scores fare better than their combined scores, the combined logics are more successful predictors than the isolated ones. The two deviant cases can be explained by crucial differences in the isolated logic versus the combined logics. In the case of Nkrumah, in Assistance Consideration situations, the isolated logic predicts the expansionist will consider the request (positive affect, low commitment, diplomatic instrument, requesting entity is the recipient), whereas the combined logic poses three hypotheses:

1). Positive prior affect plus salience = Grant request (positive affect, high commitment, diplomatic and domain instruments, requesting entity is recipient).

2). Positive prior affect plus no salience = Consider request (positive affect, low commitment, diplomatic instrument, requesting entity is recipient).

3). All other combinations of relational variables = Deflect request (neutral affect, low commitment, diplomatic instrument, requesting entity is recipient).

The majority of Ghanaian events fell into the third category. The isolated logic, with the higher success rate, has the same behavioral predictions as second prediction above for the combined logic. Thus it would appear that the hypothesis that Expansionist leaders will utilize neutral affect (as opposed to positive) when considering requests from entities which have not shared...
positive prior affect with his nation is not supported by the empirical evidence in this test. In fact, it is very apparent by glancing at Table 15 that in this type of situation, prior affect in isolation (category 2) is the most useful predictor of behavior for all leaders regardless of orientation. (Salience, or its absence, seems to affect the level of commitment, though it is a more inconsistent predictor than prior affect).

Turning to Kenyatta, a crucial hypothesis in the combined logic for the Active Independent orientation was erroneous. I hypothesized, on the basis of M. Hermann's conceptualization, that in Intervention situations, an Active Independent would not intervene in a dispute between two entities, both of which have shared none/neutral prior affect with the leader's nation. The hypothesis specified that such an event would not appear for an Active Independent leader. This was obviously mistaken, as there were nine such events for Kenya! As a consequence of the hypothesis, the predictions for these nine events were completely wrong (0/4 matches). Thus it seems that this hypothesis should be revised, perhaps to specify that an Active Independent leader will avoid or deflect involvement in such a dispute. An alternative interpretation of the appearance of these nine events, is that because they did appear, Kenyatta must not in reality be an Active Independent. Unfortunately, this issue
cannot be resolved by reference to the data generated by this project.

Table 15 also affords us an opportunity to compare leaders by orientation. Examining the African leaders only, we find a few fairly clear patterns. The most stark observation is the prevalence of the Opportunist Orientation as the most successful predictor for all six African leaders. Recall that Hermann’s conceptualization of the Opportunist rests on that individual’s pragmatic and situation-specific approach to foreign affairs. Stressing expediency and compromise, Opportunists generally engage in low cost/low risk behavior. It is apparent that this approach characterizes, with varying degrees of intensity, the African condition. Although many may argue (particularly proponents of economic, or political economy approaches to international politics) low cost/low risk behavior may characterize any leader who finds himself without many resources to manipulate, a glance at Castro’s profile suggests that this may not always be the case. Castro’s scores are highest on the Expansionist orientation. Furthermore, the prominence of the Developmentalist orientation for 5 out of the 6 African leaders, and for Castro, is indicative of the emphasis these leaders place on national development. Many scholars, including Rosberg and Jackson (1982), Dunn (1975), and Wilbur (1977), to name a few, argue that the
issues of economic development are of paramount importance to African nations, and the dominance of the Opportunist and Developmentalist orientations certainly does not contradict those assertions.

A comparison of the second and third tier of successful prediction categories points to a more diverse distribution of orientations. In fact, a comparison of scores reveals a few surprising observations. For example, on the basis of the results in Table 15, we find that Houphouet-Boigny and Nkrumah share similar profiles, as do Toure and Obote, and Kenyatta and Kaunda. In the case of Houphouet-Boigny and Nkrumah, this is a most unexpected finding given the impressionistic profiles of biographers (Woronoff, 1972), as well as the content analysis of their interviews (Hermann and Singer, 1983). Although Nkrumah’s expansionistic streak is concordant with both sets of research findings, Houphouet-Boigny’s comparatively high marks on the expansionist hypotheses is surprising. In fact, a comparison of the best predictors in Table 15 with the coding of the leaders by Hermann and Singer (1983) in Table 16, points to a number of commonalities and differences of note.

Perhaps most interesting of all is the profile of Obote. Table 16 indicates that in comparison to the other African leaders, he does not exhibit any particular propensity for any orientation, while in Table 15, he
exhibits the highest success rates for all the leaders on 4 of the 6 orientations. One could speculate, on the basis of both tables, that Obote is the most politically oriented of all the leaders. In essence, he is trying to embody all the facets of political life as a means of forging his political identity in the international environment. Indeed, as Mittelman (1977), Obote's biographer, suggests, Obote was consumed by the desire to establish his legitimacy through the successful conduct of Uganda's external affairs.

Another interesting contrast is the comparatively high scores in Table 16 for Kenyatta on the Expansionist orientation, and for Toure and Houphouet-Boigny on the Mediator/Integrator orientation. When compared to the results in Table 15, all three leaders emerge at the lower end of the rankings on these orientations in comparison with the rest of the leader sample. The results of the test certainly do not warrant a conclusion that the content analysis is misleading, but they do raise the issue for further scrutiny in subsequent research efforts.

An examination of Table 17 will reveal not only a more detailed presentation of the data, but also the concentration of events for each nation in a handful of hypotheses. The effect of this concentration is to reduce the generalizability of the findings about each leader's foreign policy behavior. Table 17 indicates that the
Table 16: Leader Orientation Scores from Interview Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenyatta</th>
<th>Kaunda</th>
<th>Zaire</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Iv. Coast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Independent</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator/Integrator</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmentalist</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Herrmann and Singer, 1983)

High = 1 standard deviation above mean (60 or better)

Mod = within one standard deviation of the mean (41-59)

Low = 1 standard deviation below the mean (40 or less)
spread of events across situations and hypotheses within situations is limited. For each nation, the preponderance of events fall into 3 or 4 hypotheses. In particular, two hypotheses, one in Intervention situations, and one in Assistance Consideration situations, account for about 40% of the total number of events. To compound matters, the meta-hypothesis that the effects of personal characteristics in Assistance Consideration situations where the requesting entity has had none/neutral prior affect with the leader's nation are minimal, if present at all, cannot be subject to empirical examination in this test. Thus, each leader/nation has the same or similar score for this situation type in 5 of the 6 prediction categories (a different recipient is predicted for the Active Independent because of his hypothesized unwillingness to become entangled in the affairs of unimportant entities). As a consequence, it is difficult to discuss the effects of orientation with a great deal of confidence in this particular case. However, one can point to varying success rates among the nations, and, in this example, indicate that Ghana and Uganda have more consistent behaviors in this instance than the other nations. Subsequent hypotheses may then be developed, building upon the patterns generated from this examination. As a consequence of re-evaluating the hypotheses of the model, it may become possible to subject
the "meta-hypotheses", such as the one mentioned above, to empirical examination.

Despite the concentration of events in the two types of situation, there are a sufficient number of events (10% of the total) in hypotheses of Confrontation and Collaboration situations that merit discussion. In particular, a confrontation situation in which the adversary had greater capabilities, was salient, and had a history of negative prior affect with the actor, figured prominently in the profiles of both Cuba and Zambia. As Table 17 illustrates, there are differences in the success rate for the two nations, as well as differences across prediction categories. Briefly, the hypotheses covering the six prediction categories for this case are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Hypo ID</th>
<th>Prediction</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
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<td>Expansionist</td>
<td>(051003)</td>
<td>1,1,1,3rd</td>
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<td>(071004)</td>
<td>2,1,1,3rd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med/Integrator</td>
<td>(081003)</td>
<td>3,1,1,So</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunist</td>
<td>(091004)</td>
<td>2,1,1,3rd</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Developmentalist</td>
<td>(101007)</td>
<td>1,1,1,3rd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
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As the presentation suggests, both nations adopted a variety of behavioral postures in this specific situation. One obvious conclusion is that the explanatory
variables in this model are insufficient to account for the behavioral outcomes. The introduction of other variables may be able to refine the distinctions posed by the five variables in this model. Despite the difference in N sizes for the two nations, the trends in the results suggest that Zambia is less likely than Cuba to appeal to International Organizations for intervention, and marginally more likely to condemn the aggressor. Furthermore, when appealing to non-international organizational third parties for help, Zambia is more likely to use positive, as opposed to neutral, affect when making the request. These outcomes are not what was expected. On the basis of the leader profiles, one would expect Kaunda to turn to international organizations and third parties more often than Castro, for as many African scholars have suggested, African states found that participation in international organizational forums to be the most cost-effective means of spreading influence, and participating in the international system (see Rubin and Weinstein, 1977).

In Collaboration situations, a comparison can be made between Uganda, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea. The specific situation is collaborating with an entity(ies) that has shared a history of mixed prior affect and is not salient, or of none/neutral prior affect regardless of salience, or relative capabilities:
The primary observation to be made is that there is not a great deal of differentiation among the orientations’ predictions, although even subtle differences (e.g., positive versus neutral affect) appear to account for the differences in predictive success, at least for the Ivory Coast and Guinea.

Summary

The results of the empirical examination can be summarized as follows:

1). In general, there appears to be only marginal support for the contention that the combined logics should out-perform the isolated ones. In particular, the variable prior affect, both in isolation and as a contributor to the combined logics, provides the best success rate of all predictors. One important exception is the success rate in terms of perfect (4/4) matches of the combined Opportunistic orientation logic. In addition,
### Table 17: Distribution of Hypotheses for the Nations

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the ability of relative capabilities and salience in isolation to generate specific behavioral outcomes is limited, although salience inconsistently contributes to the predictive success for the combined logics.

2). The distribution of predicted values on the four behavior attributes, with the possible exception of instrumentality, is sufficiently diverse so as to preclude attributing the predictive success of the model to probability. It is noted, though, that specific values on each variable appear to be predicted more or less often than the actual scores warrant. Neutral affect is predicted too frequently, as is diplomatic instrument, while high commitment is not predicted often enough.

3). Type of situation proves to be a useful contextual variable, both for sorting out conditions for the analysis of a foreign policy problem, and as a means of comparing the types of foreign policy activities actors engage in.

4). When examining 3/4 matches, the success rate for category 1 - orientation in isolation, performs surprisingly well. Using only situation as a contextual variable, the isolated logics for the orientations are able to provide reasonable estimates of a leader’s likely behavioral response. In fact, the isolated logics perform roughly as well as most of the combined logics.

5). The Opportunistic, and to a lesser extent,
Developmentalist, orientations are the most consistent predictors of behavior for the six African nations. Although one is unable to conclude, on the basis of this examination, that the six African leaders are first and foremost Opportunists and Developmentalists, scholarly literature on African politics indicates that the pattern of behavior associated with the conceptualizations of these orientations can be attributed to a number of African states.

6). Due to the overlap of predictions in a number of predictive categories, two specific situations that occurred repeatedly for all six nations could not be subject to comparison. The inability to compare across orientations for these two hypotheses constitutes an obstacle to evaluating the usefulness of the model as there is no means of checking the assertion that orientation is only marginally useful in these specific situations.

7). The results discussed in this chapter suggest that the research strategy adopted for this project can be applied successfully for the analysis of foreign policy behavior. The fact that a number of hypotheses had a success rate exceeding 50% for the interactive logics suggests that this approach to examining the effects of variables from different levels of analysis should be further scrutinized.
In general, the overall predictive success of the model, in terms of both 3 and 4 out of 4 matches is fairly impressive. As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, however, the success must be attributed, in large measure, to two particular hypotheses - one in intervention situations and one in assistance consideration situations. The discussion of the model, with particular reference to these two hypotheses, points to both its problems and promise.

On the one hand, the discussion of the model was severely limited by the small N size of the data, and on the other hand, by the fact that many of the hypotheses discussed could not be either substantiated or refuted by the data generated. For example, many of the hypotheses contained in the model drew upon postulates developed by M. Hermann in her conceptualization of the leader orientations. The postulates have been translated into meta-hypotheses, as described earlier. Under the conditions of the empirical examination, these meta-hypotheses could not be challenged by the data. These included, for example, the notion that the Mediator/Integrator type leader would consistently urge
negotiation and offer mediation in disputes between other entities. Since none of the leaders/nations in this study adopted such a position, are we to conclude that they are not Mediator/Integrators? Clearly, one cannot offer such a conclusion on the basis of this inquiry. Not only is a larger N size required, but more importantly, a series of rival hypotheses predicated on a different set of postulates is required to challenge the ones developed in this model. In this manner, one may begin to assess the validity of the links between the logics and the behavior.

Despite the inability to substantiate or refute the meta-hypotheses, the preceding analysis indicates a number of apparent trends. For example, entities that have shared a history of negative affective relations (meta-hypothesis #11) seldom, if ever, engage in behavior utilizing positive affect. The results of the test indicate that at best, they opt for neutral affect when negative affect is not appropriate. Another example is the contention that in assistance situations the actor will seek help from a potential donor, or consider requests from other entities (meta-hypothesis #9). Empirically, one finds that in assistance requesting situations the actor indeed requests from the potential donor, and in assistance consideration situations, the actor responds directly to the entity requesting assistance.
There are two additional areas that the model is not designed to evaluate that are relevant to the inquiry of individual influence on foreign policy behavior. The debate as to whether it is the person or the position that molds a behavioral predisposition in particular contexts is certainly germane to this research. While the output of the model cannot substantiate or refute either side of the debate, there are a number of more or less impressionistic patterns that do emerge. In the first place, a central assumption of the model is that situation provides a contextual lens through which individual orientations influence the behavioral response to a problem. Without the benefit of having successive leaders in an identical context (from the same nation, facing a similar problem), it is difficult to critically evaluate the debate. However, the model does contain individuals from different nations, but facing nearly identical problems. The fact that different sorts of behaviors do emerge suggests only that factors in addition to situation are important. Subsequent runs of the model, with a sample that contained successive leaders, may be able to provide additional insights concerning the person/position debate.

The second area concerns the previous research (Hermann and Singer, 1983) that suggests the importance of issue area to the determination of leader orientation.
through content analysis. In that study, leaders' interview responses were coded by topic (for example, "struggle for liberation", "development", "pan-Africanism", etc.) and that distinction sometimes provided different orientations for a particular leader. This important element of an individual's foreign policy profile could not be incorporated into the model because of the small N size for each leader. There were just not enough events to warrant their division into eight or nine topic categories. These categories would have than had to have been broken down even further by the hypotheses, rendering any meaningful analysis impossible. With a larger N size, it would be highly desirable to incorporate this consideration into the analysis, as the previous research findings indicate important distinctions on the personal characteristics when differentiated in this manner.

Despite this drawback, one can offer a number of observations about African leaders and foreign policy. Perhaps the most obvious one relates to the situational profile of the six leaders/nations. As is discussed in the previous chapter, one finds important distinctions as well as commonalities in the pattern of situations encountered by the leaders. On the one hand, all were involved, to significant degrees, in multilateral decision-making settings as evidenced by the high number
of assistance consideration and collaborative situations. On the other hand, there is greater diversity of confrontation, and, to a lesser extent, intervention situation profiles.

Additionally, the prominence of Opportunistic and Developmentalist orientations in accounting for the behavior of the six African leader/nations provides further substantiation of the traditional scholarly literature on Africa regarding the world view and practical concerns of African leadership. Of equal importance, however, is the incidence of behaviors associated with the other orientations. Although considerably less prevalent than the Opportunistic and Developmentalist ones, they point to important instances when these leaders may behave in a manner that is not consistent with the characteristics most often ascribed to them. In fact, further study incorporating the above-mentioned distinction of issue may reveal a more complex composite of African leadership. The results presented here certainly point to that possibility.

The development and testing of a model representing individual influences on foreign policy behavior has provided a number of additional insights that may aid future examinations of this kind:

On a more substantive vein, the prominence of the variable prior affect in tandem with the variable type of
situation in accounting for the predictive success of the model cannot be overshadowed. Successive runs of the model, incorporating revised logics, or expansion of the model to include variables from other research domains, will be able (on the basis of the research results presented herein) to evaluate the importance of prior affect and type of situation in developing hypotheses. The extent to which prior affect affects the success rate for other types of nations must, of course, be established through empirical examination. In the case of our limited African sample, however, past feelings of friendliness-indifference-hostility appear to play an important role in influencing the behavioral outcome of subsequent interactions.

The predictive success of prior affect and type of situation calls into question the meta-proposition postulated at the outset of this exercise, namely that the interaction of individual characteristics, situational, role, and external variables yields a greater understanding than either in isolation. On the basis of the results enumerated here, support for this proposition may not be warranted. The danger of rushing to this conclusion rests on the fact that the logics represent only the researcher's conception of how these variables interact. Refinement of the logics based on alternate rationales for combining the variables, or construction of
interaction logics by another researcher, may yield a different assessment.

The research concerns for the future, then, must focus on the refinement, re-testing, and creation of different hypotheses. The success of this initial empirical examination provides a clear mandate to explore further the potential of explicit logics as a means of uncovering explanations of foreign policy behavior. As this research represents a departure from the conventional use of statistical techniques as a means of developing the interaction of variables, it is important to establish such a viable alternative.

By developing explicit logics in the form of testable hypotheses, researchers may begin to better understand the complex dynamic of foreign policy behavior. Unfortunately, unlike controlled experiments, where dummy variables and control groups facilitate hypothesis testing, foreign policy research along these lines requires a more arduous and elaborate set of tests.

The preceding research has not only initiated that process, but has done so in a manner that allows for incorporating factors from different levels of analysis and that elucidates discrete variable explanations. As a consequence, further research in this area may build upon, modify, or refute the results of this examination.

There are several areas of examination that may
prove useful as a follow-up to this one. First, one concern that needs to be addressed is the N size of the data and the sample of leaders. It would be highly desirable to increase both. In the case of the former, this would allow for testing a greater number of hypotheses as well as elevate the generalizability of the results. Increasing the sample of leaders would make possible a more sophisticated discussion of African leadership, but would also begin to assess the assumption that predominant leaders' personal characteristics are critical to understanding the decision-making environments of their nations.

A second concern, and one raised earlier in this chapter, is the influence of "issue" on the determination of leader orientation. With a larger N size, this consideration may realistically be incorporated in the design of the empirical examination, thus adding a greater degree of specificity regarding leader orientation.

A third area for future research could include a revision and/or refinement of the hypotheses created for this dissertation. Reconsideration of the hypotheses and associated logics can provide an opportunity to glean a set of recurring constructs from which the development of theory can proceed. This process has already begun in this exercise. However, the constructs, or meta-hypotheses, were not subject to empirical
examination. With the adoption of subsequent tests, and the creation of refined and rival hypotheses, one may begin to assess the utility of the meta-hypotheses.

Regardless of the specific direction in which future research may lead us, researchers may now begin to establish plausible hypotheses concerning the contribution of one or more variables in accounting for the specific behavior of foreign policy actors.


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