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Tanaka, Aiji

LEGITIMACY IN A MATURING DEMOCRACY: THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ON SYSTEM SUPPORT IN JAPAN

The Ohio State University

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LEGITIMACY IN A MATURING DEMOCRACY:
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL CULTURE AND
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ON SYSTEM SUPPORT IN JAPAN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Aiji Tanaka, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1985

Reading Committee:  Approved By
Bradley M. Richardson, Ph.D.
Giacomo Sani, Ph.D.
Goldie A. Shabad, Ph.D.

Bradley M. Richardson, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
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VITA

November 17, 1951 ........ Born in Tokyo, Japan

1975 ................. B.A. in Political Science, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

1981 .................. M.A. in Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.

1978-1985 .............. Graduate Research Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University

Autumn 1984 ............. Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University

Conference Presentation

Fields of Study

Principal Instructors

Major Field: Comparative Politics

Comparative Political Behavior and Political Parties ............ Bradley M. Richardson

Politics in Postindustrial Societies (West Europe and Japan) ........ Goldie A. Shabad

Political Development (Southeast Asia; The Third World) ........... R. William Liddle

Theories and Methodology in Comparative Politics ............. R. William Liddle

Minor Field: American Politics

Voting Behavior and Political Participation ............. Herbert B. Asher

Public Opinion and Political Socialization ............ Kristi Andersen

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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION: THEME AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The problem of the survival of a democratic political system has long been one of the major concerns of political scientists. Since the end of World War II, Japan has attracted much attention from many political analysts as a test case of a new democracy in the non-Western world. While the test appears to have been passed because her young democratic system has survived for nearly four decades, there has been persistent suspicion about the foundation of the legitimacy of Japan's democratic system. One source of pessimism about the fragility of system legitimacy in Japan is the traditional Japanese political culture, which is believed to generate blind obedience to political authority but to suppress such values of liberal democracy as participation or expression of diversified interests. (1) The other source is a postwar subculture which has generated a negative image of politics and government. (2)

-----------------------

(1) This pessimistic view of Japanese political culture can be found in writings of Japanese social and political commentators and scholars as well as some Western scholars. For example, see Fukutake (1949, 1964), Fukuda (1974), Baldwin (1975), Herbenar (1975), Kitazawa (1976).

(2) A high level of distrustful or cynical attitudes toward politics has been reported to exist among the Japanese by several studies based on survey researches. For example, see Nakamura ed. (1975), and Flanagan (1984b). The submissive political orientation and cynical orientation toward politics are well captured by Richardson's (1974) thorough examination of Japanese political culture and by Massey's (1976) concise discussion of the typology of contemporary Japanese political culture.
This potential problem in the cultural foundation of system legitimacy in postwar Japan presents a broad and significant question for comparative democratic theories: Can a democratic political system whose political culture is infavorable of democratic values survive? While this question has serious implications for such European nations as West Germany or Italy that were empirically judged to have non-democratic political cultures (Almond and Verba, 1963), it has even more serious implication for democratic political systems in the non-Western world. Because the concept of democracy derives from Western culture, those non-Western countries which have adopted or are trying to adopt a liberal democratic political system face a serious problem of survival if a certain type of political culture is a necessary condition for liberal democracy.

However, the above argument, which suggested that a certain type of political culture is necessary for the survival of any democracy, has encountered many challenges from European studies. West Germany and Italy have offered good examples for the contention that democratic systems can survive although they have been judged to lack democratic cultural climate in The Civic Culture. Some recent empirical studies (Condradt, 1978, 1980; Sani, 1980) show that political culture of West Germany or Italy itself has changed and have become somewhat closer to the civic culture. Similarly, Japanese democracy has survived since 1945 despite of undemocratic characteristics of her traditional political culture. Particularly, because Japan has enjoyed phenomenal economic success since the late 1950s, one may expect that Japan as a political system may have obtained greater support from its members because of her positive economic performance in the period. If this speculation has some validity empirically, it can be said that the performance of a political system may be able to compensate for the fragile cultural foundation of the legitimacy of that political system.

Thus, this dissertation is concerned with two vital theoretical questions in comparative politics: (1) Can a democratic political system with a non-democratic political

(3) It is evident that the concept of democracy was born and fostered in the Western world; the prototype of democracy originated in ancient Greece, and liberal democratic political systems were developed in Western Europe. Even the concept of political culture, particularly the concept of democratic culture (or the civic culture concept), stems from the Western culture, as clearly demonstrated by Almond (1980) in tracing back the intellectual history of the concept.
culture survive? and (2) Can performance of the political system compensate for the lack of a democratic political culture? These questions are obviously concerned with democratic survival, which is a long-standing problem in comparative politics. However, it is intended in this dissertation to bring a somewhat new perspective to this traditional problem.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine these two questions against the Japanese case. Although the scope of the dissertation is confined to the political reality of postwar Japan, these two questions can be set within the broader theoretical framework of cross-national democratic systems. In other words, Japan is believed to provide an excellent case for investigating those two macro-political, systemic questions.

### 1.2 System Legitimacy and Democratic Theories: Macro-Theoretical Framework

While the problems presented earlier are broadly concerned with democratic survival, this dissertation specifically focuses on the concept of system legitimacy (especially, democratic legitimacy) rather than system survival in general. In explaining the reason for this limitation of the scope of this dissertation, it will be useful to clarify the concept "system legitimacy".

#### 1.2.1 Conceptualization of System Legitimacy: The Dependent Variable

It is important to distinguish two concepts, both of which are closely associated with democratic survival; they are 'stability' and 'legitimacy' of a democratic system. Although democratic stability is generally synonymous with democratic survival,(4) the legitimacy of the democratic system should be conceptually distinguished from the stability of the democratic system.

---

(4) In a strict sense, the concept of democratic stability is not exactly the same as democratic survival, because some unstable democratic system may nevertheless survive for some time, and because some stable democracies may collapse due to external reasons such as invasion of foreign forces. However, as far as the discussion is confined to internal conditions of democratic systems, democratic stability and democratic survival are likely to coexist.
Although some scholars regard system legitimacy as a part of the definition of system stability (Eckstein, 1966), others consider system legitimacy to be a cause of system stability (Beer, 1974; Lipset, 1959, 1960; Linz, 1978).(5) This dissertation takes the latter position on the concept of system legitimacy. Samuel Beer (1974) explicitly states this view as follows:

Structures of political domination owe their stability and continuity significantly to the support they receive from systems of belief, values, and expressive symbolism. Such supportive cultural patterns can be called conceptions of legitimacy (p.39).

This conceptualization of system legitimacy as a cause of system stability leads to a normative argument which suggests the choice of the dependent variable of this investigation. In a non-democratic political system, the stability of the system is not necessarily derived from the legitimacy of the system, because coercive means can possibly maintain stability without any legitimacy of the system being provided by the system members. However, in a democratic political system where coercive means are by definition not available to the political leaders of the

---

(5) This contrast in conceptualization of system legitimacy was made by Brian Barry (1970, p.65, fn.14) by comparing Eckstein and Lipset.

(6) While many good parsimonious definitions of democracy have been offered by scholars including Lipset (1959;1960), Eckstein (1966), Dahl (1971), Lijphart (1984), and so forth, Linz (1978) provides a definition of democracy which is longer but was directly relevant to the above argument that coercive means should not be employed by (or available to) the leaders of democratic systems. Linz (1978) summarizes the criteria for a democracy as follows:

Legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free associations, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and non-violent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process; and provision for the participation of all members of the political community, whatever their political preference (p.5) (emphasis added).
system, (6) the legitimacy of the system almost always guarantees stability of the system. Accordingly, when considering political systems in general, system legitimacy is almost a sufficient condition of system stability, (7) whereas the presence of system stability does not necessarily indicate that system members perceive their system as legitimate, because coercive means can also lead to system stability. Assuming that coercion is not desirable for system members and that democratic political systems should not resort to coercive means to maintain the regime, system stability should not be set as a goal for any democratic system, but system legitimacy should be a goal for a democratic polity. (8) Therefore, system legitimacy, not system stability, is the dependent variable to be investigated in this dissertation. This does not mean that stability of a democratic political system is not an important topic to study in the field of political science. Also, system stability is naturally an important concern for political leaders. However, this dissertation simply takes a different normative position, because this dissertation is concerned with the views, beliefs, and attitudes of the mass.

Dahl (1971) also provided essentially the same list of criteria of democracy as Linz's inventory, except that Linz included the explicit words, "nonviolent competition" in the criteria. See Dahl (1971), p. 3.

(7) However, because any political system is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate by all system members, some segments of the system members may seek to alter the system, although the system is perceived as legitimate by a majority of its members. In such a case, system instability may emerge even though the system generally receives support from the members. Therefore, Linz argues that system legitimacy is not a sufficient condition for stability because stability still depends to some extent on the armed forces' approval or disapproval of the system's legitimacy, although the armed forces are unlikely to alter the regime unless they share a view of lack of legitimacy of the system with other system members (Linz, 1978, p.17). Accordingly, note the word almost as a reservation.

(8) In this context, a negative normative connotation is given to the term "coercion". Accordingly, this dissertation takes the stand that system stability is not necessarily a desirable normative concept for a democratic system, while system legitimacy is always a desirable normative concept for a democratic system. This argument implicitly assigns positive normative values to "democracy".
Another aspect which distinguishes system legitimacy from system stability is that system legitimacy is concerned with psychological attitudes or beliefs held by the members of a political system, whereas system stability is concerned with objective state or conditions of the political system itself. System stability can be defined as a state of a political system in which any political upheavals, mass protests or radical movements do not constitute a possibility of alternating the political institutional arrangements of the system. On the other hand, system legitimacy can be defined as the belief held by the members of a political system that the existing political institutional arrangement of their system is a more appropriate one for the system members themselves than any other institutional arrangement. (10)

Because system legitimacy is now regarded as a type of belief or attitudes toward the political system, the term "system legitimacy" can be equated to the term "system support". In other words, a question of how legitimate the political system is perceived by its members can be translated into a question of how much the system members support their political system. Therefore, in this dissertation, the term "system legitimacy" will be used interchangeably with the term "system support".

(9) For the relevant discussion on psychological attitudes of the mass public as the subject of this study, see the following paragraph.

(10) This definition of system legitimacy is directly drawn from the definitions by Lipset and Linz. According to Lipset (1959),

Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society (p.86).

Linz (1978) defines legitimacy as:

the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failure, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience (p.16).
Finally, it is useful to clarify the concept of "system legitimacy" that this dissertation has adopted in one other aspect. Some scholars may argue that the absence of protest behavior, subversive activities, or revolutionary attempts indicate the legitimacy of the political system (Easton, 1965; Barnes, Kasse, et al., 1979). However, such behavioral indicators actually suggest presence of the stability of the political system not necessarily the legitimacy of it according to the conceptualization discussed above. If one conceptualizes system legitimacy as an aspect of system stability, then these behavioral indicators or other objective indicators of the peaceful and orderly state of the political system can be appropriately used as measures of system legitimacy. But, since this dissertation takes the position that system legitimacy leads to system stability, it will be tautological to use behavioral indicators (the absence of protest behaviors or actions) as empirical evidence of system legitimacy, because the absence of protests, etc. is actually an indicator of system stability.\(^{(11)}\) Therefore, the absence of protest or other forms political actions against the political system is excluded from the definition of system legitimacy in this dissertation.

1.2.2 Formulation of Hypotheses

So far the dependent variable of this dissertation has been determined and briefly examined in terms of macro-systemic theories. Now, the question is what would be major independent variables which explain the dependent variable, namely system support. To answer this question, two major hypotheses will be formulated in the following discussion.

As Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba pointed out in The Civic Culture (1963), political culture is an important source of the legitimacy of a political system; in other words, there is link between certain types of political culture and the perceived degree of legitimacy of the corresponding political system. Almond and Verba (1963) found that British citizens had firm confidence in their political system and were proud of it in 1959, while the citizens of West Germany were much less certain about the legitimacy of their new democratic political system. A major source \(^{(11)}\)

Loewenberg (1971) points out this problem of the tautological argument of Easton (1965). My criticism of Easton's tautological argument focuses on a different problem, and will be discussed at some length in a later section of this chapter.
of the high level of system legitimacy perceived by the Britons was believed to be Britain's "civic culture", which is a combination of subjective orientation and participant orientation. On the other hand, the Germans' lack of confidence in their political system was attributed to the historical experience and political culture of Germany.

However, recent reexaminations of the political cultures of those nations by Conradt (1980) and Kavanagh (1980), in The Civic Culture Revisited (Almond and Verba, 1980), has identified some changes in the perceived system legitimacy and has suggested sources of system legitimacy other than political culture. By the mid 1970s, the West Germans' confidence in their political system had increased, and this change seems to be attributable to the phenomenal economic performance of the Bonn regime (Conradt, 1980). In contrast, the legitimacy of the British political system appears to have eroded, gradually but considerably, from 1959 through the mid 1970s. One source of this erosion of system legitimacy in Britain is considered to be the continuous decline of her economic performance (Kavanagh, 1980).

These considerations lead to two competing hypotheses concerning system legitimacy or system support. The first, which will be referred to as the political culture hypothesis, is:

Supportive attitudes toward a political system largely depend on the values and norms of the political culture into which members of the political system have been socialized.

The other hypothesis, which will be referred to as the system performance hypothesis, can be stated as follows:

If members of a political system are satisfied with the performance of their political system in a generalized sense for a relatively long period of time, those members will develop supportive attitudes toward the political system (or perceive the political system as a legitimate one).

These two hypotheses are clearly placed within the framework given by a series of contemporary empirical democratic theories. Although these works were predominantly concerned with stability of democratic systems as the dependent variable, they offered a great many insights into relationships between system legitimacy, on the one hand, and political culture and system performance, on the other.
It was already mentioned that the pioneering work of Almond and Verba (1963) provided the core theoretical as well as empirical ground for the political culture hypothesis of this dissertation. Still, it may be worth introducing another concept of theirs which is relevant to system legitimacy and political culture. Almond and Verba (1963) introduced the concept "system affect" which was a generalized psychological attachment to the political system as a whole and therefore could be translated as affective system support attitudes.

Though Almond and Verba view this concept as an aspect of political culture, their idea inevitably suggests that political culture provides a source of system support. Similarly, Samuel Beer (1974) offers the view that system legitimacy was a part of political culture; he also considered system legitimacy to be a cause of system stability, (see his statement above, p.5). In this respect, this dissertation does not take the view of Beer or Almond and Verba that system legitimacy is a part of the political culture of the system. Instead, in this dissertation, system legitimacy and political culture are considered to be two separate concepts for an analytical purpose so that the latter can be hypothesized to cause the former.

Actually, the political culture hypothesis is more directly drawn from Lipset’s and Easton’s conceptualization of system legitimacy than from the conceptualization of Almond and Verba or Beer in the sense that Lipset and Easton consider political culture to be a source of system legitimacy rather than regarding system legitimacy as an aspect of political culture. Lipset (1959) implicitly indicate his view on this matter by stating that "(a) major test of legitimacy is the extent to which given nations have developed a common 'secular political culture,' national rituals and holidays... (p.89)." Easton (1965; 1975) explicitly attribute system support attitudes to childhood and adult socialization into the dominant political and social norms of the political system or the society, though he does not use the term "political culture". Linz (1978) also briefly acknowledges that political socialization into democratic ideals and other social beliefs is a major source of system legitimacy, while he also adds a zeitgeist as another source of legitimacy.

The system performance hypothesis is also derived from the same set of empirical democratic theories, although the emphases of those works is more often placed on political culture or socialization than on system performance. The basic theme of this hypothesis is clearly found in the works of Lipset (1959; 1960) and Linz (1978). Lipset (1959) asserts that:
Prolonged effectiveness which lasts over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system; in the modern world, such effectiveness mainly means constant economic development (p.91).

Considering "effectiveness" of the political system to be equal to "performance" of the political system, the above argument clearly provides a ground for the system performance hypothesis. Linz's argument is essentially the same as Lipset's.(12)

Although Almond and Verba (1963) did not include any empirical data analyses of the effects of system performance (or effectiveness) on system support in *The Civic Culture*,(13) they were actually aware of the interaction between system performance and system stability, for they stated that:

(12) Of course, both Lipset and Linz are mainly concerned with system stability as the dependent variable, and they view system legitimacy and system effectiveness as major sources of system stability. However, they, especially Lipset, clearly assert that system legitimacy could change according to system effectiveness. Linz's view is a little more complex, which shall not be discussed here because such a detailed discussion is irrelevant to the point of the current discussion.

(13) Although it is easy to criticize *The Civic Culture* twenty-five years later for not having empirically tested a hypothesis of the relationship between system performance and system affect, it is unfair to demand afterward that such a pioneer work should have done everything. In fact, Verba (1980) himself retrospectively states that "a more explicit concern with performance levels would have been useful (p.407)," but he also reminds us that their work and concerns were "products of their times (p.408)." Hence, it is not my intention to evaluate *The Civic Culture* critically, but it is intended to move forward on the basis of what *The Civic Culture* suggested then.
engendered by participation and effective performance (p. 484).

David Easton (1965; 1975) offers one of the most explicit theoretical assertions that system performance is a major source of system support. Making a conceptual distinction between specific support and diffuse support, Easton argues that the perceived performance of the political authorities would foster the attitudes of specific support among the system members toward the authorities. He also asserts that if system members are satisfied with outputs and performance of the authorities for a long period of time, such satisfaction would probably be developed into diffuse support. In other words, specific support could be transformed into diffuse support over time, given such persistent satisfactions of the system members over time. Thus, his theory of political support has some common ground with the system performance hypothesis of this dissertation. However, his distinction between specific support and diffuse support is not applicable to an empirical survey data analysis, or at least not to the empirical examination of two hypotheses of this dissertation, for reasons which will be discussed at greater length in the following section.

1.3 MICRO-THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SYSTEM SUPPORT

The discussions so far have focused on the macro-theoretical scope of the problem of system support and how meaningful the study of system support is from the perspective of the democratic theories. Now, the discussion turns to more micro-level conceptualization of system support. First, Easton's conceptual distinction between "diffuse" political support and "specific" political support will be examined in terms of its applicability to empirical research. Second, the discussion will turn to another topic.

Easton distinguishes "diffuse support" from "specific support", and he regards legitimacy as one form of diffuse support. First, the distinction between diffuse support and specific support will be discussed later (1.2.1). Second, this dissertation does not take the stand that legitimacy is a form of diffuse support, because such a distinction introduces excessive complexity at the abstract level and makes empirical operationalization of each concept impossible. In this dissertation, perceived system legitimacy is simply equated with diffuse system support, as was mentioned earlier.
dimension of conceptual distinction of political support, namely, the well-known distinction between incumbent government support and system support. Finally, similarities and differences between system support and other related concepts, such as political alienation, trust and efficacy, will be discussed.

1.3.1 Critique of Eastonian Conceptualization of Political Support

The theoretical contribution of David Easton (1965, 1975) to studies of legitimacy of democratic political systems is important. One unique aspect of his conceptualization of political support is the distinction between "diffuse" support and "specific" support. Easton (1965; 1975) views diffuse political support as generalized psychological attachment toward the political regime, the political authorities and the community; he regards specific political support as support toward the political authorities based on system members' satisfaction with the authorities' performance and the policy outputs. In the latter case, Easton argues, the object of specific support is limited to the political authorities alone. On the one hand, this distinction between diffuse support and specific support is useful in terms of heuristic values. For instance, the system performance hypothesis of this dissertation partly derives from Easton's concept of specific support, although he is neither the first nor the only one to have discussed the influence of system performance on system support.

On the other hand, this distinction is not applicable to empirical research of system support for the following reasons. One very compelling criticism of Easton's distinction between diffuse support and specific support is that this distinction is empirically unfeasible. Gerhard Loewenberg (1971) clearly pointed out that the distinction between diffuse support and specific support rests on "differences of motives for supportive behavior (p.184)," and

(15) There are very few political science works on system support which do not refer to Easton's work (1965, 1975) in some way. Whether the researcher is positive toward or critical of Eastonian theory of political system, it is hard to ignore Easton's work on this subject. However, it should be also noted that there are a considerable number of criticisms of Eastonian theory of political support, as we will see shortly.

(16) For example, see Lipset (1959).
he charges that Easton's distinction raised "what would appear to be insuperable problems of measurement (ibid.)." (17) Easton (1975), responding to Loewenberg's charge, maintains that survey techniques are already capable of distinguishing these two kinds of support, by citing an example (Patterson, Wahlke, and Boynton, 1970) in which the authors measured diffuse and specific support separately. However, a serious flaw in Easton's conceptualization should become apparent when one attempts to explain specific and diffuse support by introducing independent variables.

Because Easton (1965, chapter 17) defines specific support as a type of political support which the system members develop when they are satisfied with outputs from the system, specific support has to be operationally measured by the system members' satisfaction with system performance. This means that the dependent variable of this dissertation (i.e., system support) can only be operationally defined by an independent variable (i.e., system performance). This situation will inevitably cause a tautology when the researcher attempts to explain specific support by hypothesizing system performance to be an independent variable.

Diffuse political support is defined by Easton (1965) as a type of political support which is "the strong bond of loyalty (p.273)" and is composed of "a reservoir of favorable attitudes (p.273)." In order to separate diffuse system support from specific support on empirical grounds, one has to define diffuse support in terms of the people's motivation to support the political system. This forces the researcher to measure diffuse support in terms of the citizens' predispositions and values, namely, in terms of political culture. Then, when the researcher tries to explain diffuse support by hypothesizing political culture as an independent variable, as in this dissertation, he will find himself in a circular reasoning.

Therefore, Easton's distinction between specific support and diffuse support is not only empirically difficult (Loewenberg, 1971) but also leads into tautology in an empirical explanation. (18)

(17) See also Davidson and Parker (1972), for a similar argument.

(18) Loewenberg (1971, pp.83-84) points out a problem of the tautological argument of Easton in a different respect; to argue that system legitimacy leads to system stability and at the same time to measure system legitimacy by observing instability of the system is
Easton (1975) rebuts the same criticism from another perspective, that is, theoretical significance. Easton (1975) maintains that "without discriminating in some way between specific and diffuse support (p. 443)" it would be impossible to separate serious threats to the regime from mere discontents with the system or with the authorities.

However, it is not impossible to separate them without Easton's specific-diffuse distinction of political support. There seem to be two solutions. The first solution is to shift the analytical focus from types to objects of support, as Kornberg, Clarke and LeDuc (1978) suggest. If one makes a distinction between the incumbent government and the political system as an object of support, then he will be able to tell if protest and/or the absence of political support is a serious threat to the regime. As Jack Citrin (1974) argues, distrust or discontent with the incumbent administration (i.e., absence of incumbent support) does not constitute a serious threat to the political system itself. This distinction between system support and incumbent government support will be further discussed in the next subsection.

Second, by focusing sources of support instead of types of support, the researcher will be able to determine if the absence of political support is a resolvable problem or a problem that is not to be resolved in the short period. If the source of the absence of system support is system performance, then improvement of system performance will solve the problem; therefore, this does not seem to present an insurmountable threat to the system. On the other hand, if political culture in a deep sense—not in a sense of pop-culture to which Citrin (1974) refers, and which could change over a relatively short period of time—is the source of the lack of system legitimacy, then the problem may be a serious one for the system's survival. Distinction of sources of system support thus serves well for the purpose of differentiating casual political discontents—

**tautological. This problem falls outside the range of the current discussion. For the discussion on this problem of tautological argument, see Footnote 11.**

(19) However, Kornberg et al. (1978) actually measured system support by variables which tap incumbent support attitudes (e.g., feeling thermometer scale about the incumbent cabinet in Canada) as a surrogate measure of system support. This seems to defeat their own argument because they essentially did not separate the incumbent government and the political system as objects of support, at least in this 1978 article.
from serious threats to the political system, without using Easton's specific-diffuse distinction of support.

Two objects of political support (i.e., the incumbent government and the political system) can be empirically separated to some extent through a careful analysis of survey data with appropriate variables, although clear-cut distinction between incumbent support and system support is impossible, as will be discussed in the next subsection (i.e., 1.3.2). Two sources of system support (i.e., political culture and system performance) can be fairly well measured independently by survey data with appropriate questions. Therefore, given the measurement difficulty of distinguishing specific support from diffuse support, it seems wise to abandon the specific-diffuse distinction of political support and to treat political support as a single concept with some dimensions, such as incumbent support, system support, and so on.

Once the specific-diffuse distinction of political support is dropped, then the Eastonian conceptualization of political support will be reduced to three kinds depending on objects of support, not on types of support. Easton (1965) conceived the regime, the political authorities, and the community as objects of political support. These are useful distinctions and seem to be amenable to the operationalization for an empirical research. In fact, the operationalization of system support in this dissertation empirically separated these three kinds of political support and therefore confirmed Easton's conception of three objects of political support, as we will see in chapter 4.

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(20) One could measure specific support and diffuse support separately only when he includes system performance in the operational measure of specific support, and includes political predispositions and socialization experiences (i.e., political culture orientation) in the operational indicator of diffuse support. If he does this, he will be able to calculate the correlation between specific support attitudes and diffuse support attitudes as Patterson, Wahlke, and Boynton (1970) did, but he will not be able to explain specific and diffuse support by system performance and political culture without circular reasoning. Therefore, although Easton (1975) claims that measuring the correlation between specific support attitudes and diffuse support attitudes ensures the empirical feasibility and usefulness of his conception of specific-diffuse support distinction, his claim is not valid when one attempts to explain those types of support.
1.3.2 Conceptual Distinction between System Support and Incumbent Government Support

Most political scientists have generally agreed that the concept of system support should be distinguished from the concept of incumbent government support (Easton, 1965, 1975; Citrin, 1974; Muller and Jukam, 1977; Linz, 1978). In other words, it has been argued in political science that in any democracy there will be some people who do not support a particular administration of government but still support their political system. This distinction between system support and incumbent support is perhaps the most basic analytical conceptualization of political support, as stated by Muller and Jukam (1977, p.1561).

However, in reality there may be some problem in making this conceptual distinction. Although political scientists are capable as well as fond of making this sort of analytical distinction, many ordinary citizens are not necessarily aware of the distinction between supporting the political system and supporting the incumbent government. Especially, it is very difficult to do so where a single party occupies government office for a long time. While he maintains the conceptual distinction between them, Linz (1978) concisely points out this problem as follows:

There is clearly an interaction between the support for the regime and that for the governing parties, which in the absence of other indicators leads to the use of electoral returns and public opinion responses as indirect evidence of the legitimacy of the system (p.17).

Accordingly, it is apparently difficult to distinguish system support from incumbent support in Japan, where a single political party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has been in power for a long time.(21) However, it is reasonable to expect that some Japanese do distinguish support for the incumbent from support for the political system. For example, some supporters of an opposition party may still support Japan's political system, while they do not support the incumbent government led by the LDP. This

(21) The LDP has been incumbent since 1955, when two conservative parties merged into the LDP. Even from 1945 to 1955, these two conservative parties occupied the executive office and the majority of seats in the legislature except for a short-lived socialist coalition government with some conservatives in 1948. In short, the conservative political camp alone has dominated the national political arena of postwar Japan.
seemingly complex relationship between incumbent support and system support can be clearly understood by utilizing a Venn diagram to present this conceptual relationship, as is depicted in Figure 1.

As Figure 1 shows, four different combinations of incumbent support and system support are logically possible and are actually conceived to exist in postwar Japan. In the figure, the smaller (left) circle indicates the concept of incumbent government support, while the larger (right) circle represents the concept of system support. First, the shaded area in which two circles overlap (Area A) represents those people who support the incumbent government and support the political system. These people naturally constitute a core of system support, and many of them are probably supporters of the LDP, the long-standing incumbent party.

Second, the left crescent of the smaller circle (Area B) represents those Japanese who support the incumbent government but do not support the political system. Although it is counter-intuitive to imagine an individual who supports the incumbent government but does not support the political system, such a peculiar combination of political preference is possible in postwar Japan. Some conservative people who have retained some orientation of prewar ultra-nationalism may not have yet accepted postwar liberal democratic political system but may support a particular incumbent administration because of conservative orientation of that particular Prime Minister from the LDP, which still contains some ultra-nationalistic elements today. Their incumbent support may be volatile, because they would withdraw their support from the government if a moderate liberal new Prime Minister were to replace their favorite conservative Prime Minister. The population size of this group is probably quite small; moreover, this group is expected to diminish gradually as the prewar generation dies off. For these reasons, this category will receive little attention in the subsequent data analysis.

Third, the right crescent of the larger circle (Area C) indicates those citizens who do not support the LDP-led incumbent government but still support Japan's democratic system as such. As was previously mentioned, some opposition party supporters must be included in this category. Many of the middle-of-the-road party supporters and some of the socialist party probably fall into this category, whereas very few communists are expected to do so because of the anti-system nature of the communist party. Of course, no LDP supporter is theoretically included in this group.
A.: Incumbent Support and System Support
B.: Incumbent Support but No System Support
C.: No Incumbent Support but System Support
D.: Neither Incumbent Support nor System Support

Figure 1: Conceptual Relationship between System Support and Incumbent Support (Venn Diagram).
Fourth, the area which falls outside either of the circles (Area D) represents those citizens who support neither the incumbent government nor the political system. These citizens are in the pure non-political support category, which is diametrically opposite of the pure political support category (Area A). Many members of this pure non-support category (Area D) are believed to come from the socialist and communist party supporters, and fewer from the moderate middle parties. Also, Area D perhaps contains some extreme right-wing elements who never support any LDP incumbent administration nor the democratic system. In this sense, these elements are even more extreme right-wing oriented than the people of Area B. Again, no LDP supporter is considered to belong to this category.

Thus, there is considerable overlap between the concept of incumbent support and the concept of system support. However, some discrepancy between these two concepts is logically expected, as the Venn diagram shows. On the one hand, the people in Area A are theoretically expected to support the present political system even when the incumbent government is taken over by parties other than the LDP. In reality, however, some of them may have had system support as mere extension of their support for the incumbent government. If this is the case, this kind of people may withdraw their support for the system when the incumbent government is replaced by a non-LDP party, although they indicate supportive attitudes toward the political system under the present LDP administration of the government. On the other hand, Area C, which represents those people who do not support the incumbent government but support the political system, is the most interesting category, because this group enables the political system to survive even when a change of the government takes place.

Finally, the discussions above has suggested that partisanship of each individual can to some extent predict what kind of system support attitudes he has. For example, the LDP supporters are expected to fall into Area A or B in Figure 1, the supporters of central parties probably fall into Area C, while the socialists or communists are more likely to belong Area D. These expectations are intuitively made and crude, but these intuitive expectations suggest that partisanship should be added as an explanatory (independent) variable of system support, in addition to political culture and system performance. Therefore, this dissertation presents three explanations of system support in Japan, though the first two derive from the major theoretical concerns of this investigation: (1) political culture explanation; (2) system performance explanation; (3) partisan explanation.
Chapter II

MODEL BUILDING AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 SOCIO-CULTURAL APPROACH VS. ECONOMIC-RATIONAL APPROACH

Contrasting the political culture hypothesis with the system performance hypothesis reflects a long standing disagreement, in explaining political behavior and/or attitudes, between the socio-cultural approach and the rational-economic approach within the discipline of political science. Brian Barry (1970) offers clear descriptions of distinguishing characteristics of the two approaches in their methodologies, ideas, and theoretical scopes. He calls the former the "sociologists' approach" and the latter the "economists' approach." (22)

According to Barry (1970), the two approaches can be characterised as follows. On the one hand, the sociological approach attempts to explain political behavior of a group of individuals in terms of their social environment, the social and cultural norms of the environment into which they have been socialized, and those norms and cues to which they are currently exposed through their social networks. Accordingly, this approach inevitably uses an inductive process to generalize relationships between individuals' behavior and the causes of their behavior. This approach, which originated in the discipline of sociology, was tremendously enriched by the knowledge and methodology of social-psychology as far as political behavior studies are concerned. (23) On the other hand, the economic

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(22) Of course, the term "sociologists" or "economists" by no means implies the academic department of the scholars; neither does it imply the field in which the scholars publish or received their academic degrees. Rather, these terms indicate types of scholarly approach that each researcher takes in explaining human behavior (Barry, 1970).

(23) The American Voter (Campbell, et al., 1960) best exemplifies the type of work which has reinforced the
approach attempts to explain human political behavior deductively with a strong assumption that individuals must behave rationally in order to pursue their goals. (24) Since the economic approach is thus based on the assumption of a rational political man who is assumed to be capable of making a political decision as a result of rational calculation, this approach is often called the rationalistic approach, or the rational-choice approach.

This distinction between the socio-cultural and rational-economic approaches appears to be parallel to the contrast between the political culture hypothesis and the system performance hypothesis of this dissertation. The political culture hypothesis is based on an assumption that individuals' political attitudes, particularly toward their political system, are formed according to their socialization experiences and the values dominant in their social groups, such as their community, region, social class, or occupational group. This is exactly the core assumption of the socio-cultural approach. In contrast, because the system performance hypothesis assumes that individual members of the political system are rational enough to evaluate the performance of the political system, this hypothesis clearly shares the core assumption of the rational-economic approach.

According to this distinction between the two approaches, one may view the political culture and system performance hypotheses as two competing hypotheses in explaining the political legitimacy of a democratic system. For sociological approach to political behavior and attitudes by introducing the social psychological approach.

(24) Goals of individuals can be defined in several ways; The most common definition of the goal of a rational man is to maximize the expected utility for a given input he makes (Downs, 1957). One alternative definition is to minimize the possible maximum regret or damage he will receive (Ferejhn and Fiorina, 1974, 1975). The former is called "maxi-max utility" principle because one with this principle tries to maximize the possible maximum utility or merits by his action. The latter is called "mini-max regret" principle. If the researcher assumes one principle as the way in which the ordinary citizens set their goals as opposed to the other principle, the researcher will logically reach a different conclusion from one he would reach with the other principle. For example, see Ferejhn and Fiorina (1974, 1975).
instance, Ronald Rogowski (1974) has sharply contrasted political culture explanations of political legitimacy with rationalistic explanations of political legitimacy. Essentially, Rogowski considered the cultural approach and the rational approach to be mutually exclusive; in other words, he believes that if one approach is correct then the other approach must be rejected and vice versa. Rogowski has simply rejected the political culture theory as an explanation of political support, which was represented by the work of Almond and Verba (1963), for the reason that he found some evidence contradictory to the political culture explanation of system support (1964, pp.4-17). He has chosen to take the rationalist approach to explain system legitimacy. But, he never empirically tests the assumption of the rationality of ordinary system members in his book. (25) In contrast, Almond (1980), in responding to Rogowski's criticisms, argues that empirical evidence has indicated disproof of Rogowski's argument that "the structure of political institutions and their legitimacy can be explained by simple reference to rational self-interest" (Almond, 1980, p.30).

However, this dichotomy between the socio-cultural approach and the rational-economic approach is not so fruitful in explaining political behavior or attitudes, because there are some aspects of human political behavior which cannot be fully explained by the rationalistic approach and other aspects which cannot be totally accounted for by the socio-cultural approach. (26) As far as one

(25) Rogowski (1974) refutes the account of West German political culture provided by Almond and Verba (1963), by pointing out some published results of public opinion polls and some historical facts in West Germany that are contrary to the arguments of Almond and Verba. However, all the information Rogowski has used is presented at the aggregate level, not at the individual level. Since Almond and Verba's account of German political culture is based on extensive analysis of individual-level data, simple aggregation of published results of opinion polls and collection of some historical facts which Rogowski uses do not seem to provide very convincing evidence for rejecting the entire political culture theory. In addition, Rogowski (1974) does not test the rationality assumption empirically but merely argues against criticisms of the rationalist approach in a logical fashion, not in an empirical fashion (pp.24-34).

(26) Monroe (1984) notes that this dichotomy in the scholarly approach to explaining political behavior has
holds a view that these two approaches are diametrically opposite and mutually exclusive, these two approaches present a situation similar to the tension between two different paradigms, in the sense that they are incommensurable (Thomas Kuhn, 1970). But, the division between the socio-cultural and rational-economic approaches should not be considered to be the same as the tension between two paradigms in Kuhn's term, because the socio-cultural and rational-economic approaches can actually be communicated through a common methodology. For instance, the assumptions both of the socio-cultural and the rational-economic models can be empirically tested through individual-level data.

A more constructive approach for explaining political behavior or attitudes will result from an effort to combine the socio-cultural and rational-economic models of a political man rather than a view which supports one model and rejects the other. Kristen Monroe (1984) explicitly proposes such an integrated approach that attempts to combine "the economists' emphasis on rationality as a conscious calculation of costs and benefits with the social psychologists' emphasis on behavior derived from preconscious and subconscious impulses" (p.203). According to Monroe:

> empirical analysis that gives sufficient attention to these differing approaches to integrate both economic and sociological factors ... will do much to minimize needless and often trivial empirical debate (1984, p.186).

Although she originally came from the discipline of the rational-economic approach to political behavior and maintains that the basic assumption of a rational man is essentially correct, she has come to evaluate the approach critically and to offer a warning that the rational-economic model "blinds us to those aspects of behavior that it does not adequately explain" (1984, p.189). Almond (1980), once a major proponent of the socio-cultural approach to political behavior, originally came from the other direction but has similarly reached the integrated view of the socio-cultural and rational-economic approaches. Almond admits the contribution of the rational model to an understanding of some political phenomena, such as political movement, conflicts etc., whereas he still maintains that the socio-cultural variables should "enter into the explanation of

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reflected a sharp epistemological division, and argues that such division has limited theoretical advances in this area.
political structure and legitimacy" (1980, p.30).(27) Now, it is clear from the discussion above that the integration of the socio-cultural and rational-economic models is essential to obtain more a comprehensive understanding of system support or other types of political attitudes than what has been offered by the approach strictly based on either the socio-cultural model alone or the rational-economic model alone.

This dissertation attempts to employ an analytical approach which combines the socio-cultural model and the rational-economic model in order to explain system support attitudes in Japan. In other words, in this dissertation the political culture hypothesis and the system performance hypothesis are not considered to be mutually exclusive but to complement each other. However, it is important at this point to emphasize that the methodological and analytical approach employed in this dissertation is what has been developed and traditionally utilized by the socio-cultural approach, that is the survey research approach. Although the system performance hypothesis is based on the assumption of rationality of ordinary system members, the analytical approach of this dissertation does not attempt to infer some conclusions logically from the rationality assumption but tries to examine their rationality itself through testing of the system performance hypothesis. Therefore, it is not at all intended in this dissertation to utilize the formal modeling approach or the rational-choice approach, which normally develops analyses on the basis of the assumption of rationality in human behavior.

A major reason for not employing the formal modeling approach is simple. As Morris Fiorina (1975) points out, "formal models are not so usefully applied where little is known about the behavior of interests" (p.147). Not much empirical evidence has been cumulated on system support. Neither has the concept of system support itself been clearly defined yet; at least the field of system support studies has not yet reached the point in which most political scientists agree on any single definition or common understanding of the system support concept. For example, the conceptual distinctions between system support, political trust, political efficacy, political cynicism, and political alienation have not been universally established nor agreed upon by most political scientists, as we shall see in chapter 5.

(27) Of course, Almond and Monroe are not only the ones who have advocated the integration of the two approaches. They are cited here simply because their works are directly related to this dissertation.
Given this lack of agreement by political scientists concerning system support, it is necessary to explore how system support attitudes are formed and what are the sources of development of such attitudes. While the socio-cultural variables are firmly expected to have effects on formation of system support attitudes due to the cumulation of considerable empirical knowledge about the impact of sociological and cultural factors in this area, the role of rational thinking in the formation of system support attitudes has remained uncertain and unexplored. Therefore, if one attempts to explain system support, he first needs to examine the role of rationality before any attempt is made to build a formal model for the formation mechanism of system support attitudes. Thus, in studies of system support, it seems premature to utilize explicit formal models as analytical tools.

Although the concept of system support is closely related to the concept of incumbent government support, as was discussed earlier, the studies of incumbent government support are much more amenable to the formal modeling approach or the rationalistic approach than are the studies of system support. This difference stems from the fact that incumbent government support can be unambiguously defined as voting for the incumbent office holder or the incumbent party in any democratic system. (28) Because studies of voting behavior have accumulated an enormous amount of empirical knowledge, the field of voting behavior studies is close to an ideal situation for applying formal models (Fiorina, 1975). Therefore, the formal models are applicable to the studies of incumbent support as well, and in fact many rational theorists (or formal modelers) have studied incumbent support. (29)

(28) In a presidential democracy, voting for the office holder (e.g., the president) is a valid operational indicator of incumbent government support. Voting for the incumbent party is a legitimate operational definition of incumbent government support in a parliamentary democracy as well as in a presidential democracy.

(29) But, strictly speaking, explicit formal models have been applied to the incumbent government support studies far less frequently than they have been applied to pure voting studies, such as voter turnout studies (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974 and 1975, etc.) or vote choice studies (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Weisberg and Fiorina, 1980, etc.). Actually, many of the incumbent support studies have employed the general framework of the rationalistic (or rational-economic) theory rather
These incumbent government support studies based on the rationalistic approach have attracted much attention in recent years not only in American Politics but also in Comparative Politics. These studies are all based on the assumption of rationality of voters. In this respect, these studies are, at least covertly, based on the empirical works which have examined rationality of average voters through individual-level data (i.e., survey data). This is exactly the area in which the work of the socio-cultural approach and the work of the rational-economic than explicit formal models, and have often substantiated their rationalistic theoretical models with either aggregate or survey data (Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975; Kernell, 1977; Fiorina, 1978; Weatherford, 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981; and so on).

(30) For examples of these studies in non-American or cross-national settings, see Miller and Mackie (1973) and Hibbs (1982a) on Britain; Lewis-Beck (1980) and Hibbs with Vasilatos (1981) on France; Frey and Schneider (1980) and Hibbs (1982b) on comparative cases, and so on.

(31) There is a long series of American voting studies which examined the rationality of voters and their level of ideological conceptualization through survey data, and those studies shaped the biggest controversy in the history of American voting behavior studies, namely the "issue voting" controversy. Though I have no intention of tracing this controversy, a few points should be mentioned. First, the pioneering work by the University of Michigan scholars (Campbell et. al., 1960; Converse, 1964) revealed that the average voter was not able to relate candidates with their policy/issue stands and therefore he did not determine his vote choice on the basis of rational calculation. Then, a series of revisionist works, beginning with V. O. Key (1966), challenged this view and suggested that the rationality of the average voter in vote decision and/or attitude formation was higher than had been thought. These revisionist works include RePass (1971), Pomper (1972), Page and Brody (1972), Boyd (1972), Nie with Andersen (1974), Stimson (1975), Nie, Verba and Petrocick (1976), and so on. For an extensive bibliography on this controversy up to 1972, see Kessel (1972). The issue voting controversy, after these revisionists' challenges, developed into many layers. For the structure and chronological development of this controversy, see Niemi and Weisberg (1976, chapter 9) and Asher (1980, 1983).
approach share a common ground. The former can inductively examine the rationality of average voters through survey research, while the latter begins with the assumption of the rationality of average citizens and deductively develops specific hypotheses derived from that assumption.

Although these two approaches are opposite and sharply contrasted, they still share the same methodology; the socio-cultural approach can employ survey data and may turn out to confirm the rationality of citizens inductively (e.g., Nie, Verba, and Petrocick, 1976), whereas the rational-economic approach can also employ survey data to test hypotheses which are logically deduced from the rationality assumption (e.g., Fiorina, 1978, etc.). Thus, those incumbent government support studies suggest some ground where the socio-cultural and rational-economic approaches can be integrated. This implies that we can also integrate those two approaches in an attempt to explain system support as well. (32)

The state of the discipline in empirical studies of system support, incumbent government support, and voting behavior in the field of Japanese politics reflects the state of discipline in those three areas in American Politics. Although the number of empirical works on each of these three topics in Japanese Politics is respectively far fewer than the number in American Politics, the ratios between the number of system support studies, of incumbent support studies, and of other voting behavior studies in Japanese Politics are somewhat similar to those ratios in American Politics. First, only a handful of empirical studies focused on or included examination of system legitimacy and/or stability in Japan. The works of this small group include Watanuki (1975), Flanagan and Richardson (1980), Miyake (1980), and White (1981). Therefore, it is clearly premature to utilize the formal modeling approach in the study of system support in Japan.

Second, the major approach for explaining incumbent government support in Japan was the socio-cultural approach based on survey research, just as was the case in the United States. Since this area is a small subfield within the field of voting behavior studies, only a few empirical works can be identified; those are Richardson (1974, 1980).

(32) Some studies which employ survey data and at the same time take the rational-economic approach to system support have already emerged in recent years. For example, see Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart (1984) for a more socio-cultural oriented work, and Weatherford (1984) as a more rational-economic oriented work.
These works suggest that socio-cultural factors are important in explaining incumbent support. Empirical studies of Japanese incumbent support based on the rational-economic theory have just begun to emerge in the past five years. Since Takashi Inoguchi (1980; 1981; and 1983a) pioneered this subfield in Japan, some Japanese economists (Fukuchi and Koh, 1981) and American political scientists (Reed and Brunk, 1984) followed. The growth of this rational-economic approach to incumbent government support in Japan suggests that the rationality of the average citizen plays at least some significant role in shaping his political attitudes or making decisions of his political behavior in the Japanese political setting. Thus, the state of the discipline in studies of incumbent support in Japan shows that both the socio-cultural approach and the rational-economic approach are effective in this area.

Third, Japanese voting behavior studies have accumulated a good deal of empirical knowledge through both aggregate data analyses and individual-level (i.e., survey) data analyses due to pioneer efforts of a relatively small number of political scientists, sociologists and social psychologists. (33) As a result of those pioneer efforts in

(33) The very early survey research efforts for Japanese voting behavior studies were made at the regional level; those were conducted by Masamichi Royama and his associates from 1949 on, by Kikuo Nakamura and his associates from 1954 on, and by Ichiro Miyake, Tomio Kinoshita, and Juichi Aiba (1967) in 1961-62. A few nation-wide surveys were conducted in the early years: a series of the National Character Study surveys were conducted by Chikio Hayashi, Shigeki Nishihira and associates (The Institute of Statistical Mathematics) from 1953 on; a series of election studies by Fair Election League (Komei Senkyo Renmei) from 1958 on; and a nation-wide survey, as a part of seven-nation participation study project led by Sidney Verba, was conducted by Institute of Journalism Research of the University of Tokyo (Hajime Ikeuchi, 1974) in 1966. In addition to these scholars, other scholars made pioneering efforts in analysing these survey data as well as aggregate data in the 1960s; scholars such as Junichi Kogoku (1958, 1960, 1967, etc.), Joji Watanuki (1962, 1967a, 1967b, 1972, etc.), Mitsuru Uchida (1962, 1968, 1972, etc.), and Hiroshi Akuto (1968, etc.) exemplify this group of scholars. For a comprehensive list of Japanese voting behavior studies through the early 1970s, see Richardson and Flanagan (1979). American political scientists who pioneered voting
voting behavior studies and survey research studies in Japan, the state of the discipline in this area is now mature enough to allow survey research to probe any type of political behavior or attitudes, including system support attitudes.

The state of the discipline in Japanese political behavior studies, as described above, suggests that survey research is an appropriate method for scrutinizing such unexplored political attitudes as system support. Therefore, the state of the discipline favors the survey research approach over the formal modeling approach as a method for studying system support in Japan. However, it also suggests that the rational-economic theory should enter into the scope of this research. Furthermore, the development of rational-economic studies of incumbent government support in Japan as well as in American or European settings contributes to the survey research approach to system support in the sense that the rational-economic studies can suggest what kind of explanatory models are available and appropriate to an examination of the system performance hypothesis. Those models suggested by the rational-economic studies will be discussed at the beginning of chapter 7.

2.2 MACRO-CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF SYSTEM SUPPORT

2.2.1 Basic Structure of the Macro-Conceptual Model

The macro-theoretical framework discussed in chapter 1 can be depicted as a conceptual model in a diagram, as shown in Figure 2. Although this diagram shows the behavior studies in Japan are: Robert Ward and Akira Kubota (1970) then of the University of Michigan replicated the SRC format of nation-wide survey in Japan in 1967. But much of efforts to advance Japanese voting studies in the United States were made by two others, namely, Bradley Richardson (1967a, 1967b, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977) and Scott Flanagan (1968, 1971) including their joint project (1977). These pioneer efforts of Japanese and American scholars resulted in the prosperity of Japanese voting behavior studies in the 1970s and the 1980s, including the JABISS study of 1976, from which a major body of data analyzed in this dissertation will be drawn.

(34) This type of conceptual model of a political system is
linkages between systemic concepts involved in the macro-theoretical framework, the scope of the actual empirical analysis of this dissertation focuses on only a part of this model, which is the micro-individual-level relationships between political culture, perceived system performance, and system support. This narrowly confined scope is represented by the segment circumscribed by the broken line in Figure 2.

In this figure, the expected linkage between political culture and system support (i.e., the arrow from POLITICAL CULTURE to SYSTEM SUPPORT) represents the political culture hypothesis, and the expected linkage between system performance and system support (i.e., the arrow from PERCEIVED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE to SYSTEM SUPPORT) represents the system performance hypothesis. In order to test these two hypotheses, the three key concepts (i.e., system support, political culture, and system performance) have to be defined in more concrete terms. Because system support is conceived of as the perceived legitimacy of the political system held by system members,(35) the concept of system support must be defined in terms of the system members' attitudes toward their political system. Since this dissertation is thus concerned with the people's (i.e., system members') psychological attitudes, the other two key concepts should also be defined in terms of the system members' attitudes.(36)

not uncommon in political science, especially among the works of system theorists, such as Lipset (1959), Easton (1965), or Linz (1978). Although this macro-conceptual model is certainly influenced by the works of those system theorists, this model is particularly designed for examination of the political culture and system performance hypotheses, and therefore includes some conceptualization of its own. For example, the diagram of Figure 2 as a whole is considered to be a political system, because the concept of political system, in my conceptualization, includes system members and their political culture in addition to the government, other political institutions and the political elites as the components of the political system. On the other hand, Easton (1965) considers the government, the political parties, and the political elites as the components of the political system but separates the mass system members from the political system concept (pp.29-33).

(35) For this conceptualization, see the second section of chapter 1.
(36) This point will be discussed at length in the next
Figure 2: Macro-Conceptual Model of Sources and Consequences of System Support
The concept of political culture has been successfully measured in terms of psychological attitudes by Almond and Verba (1963) with reference to five nations as well as by Richardson (1974) with reference to Japan. (37) Following these pioneering works of empirical analysis of political culture, the political culture of Japan will be operationally defined in terms of Japanese psychological traits regarding their cultural values. (38) Similarly, the concept of system performance will be operationally defined in terms of the system members' perceptions of actual system performance. (39)

Because all three key concepts are to be operationally defined in terms of the psychological attitudes of system members, individual-level data will be employed as the major body of data to test the political culture and system performance hypotheses. (40) The methodological reasons for choosing individual-level data to examine these two subsection.

(37) For other examples of this approach to political culture, see Pye and Verba (1965), Almond and Verba (1980), and so on; for this approach applied to Japanese political culture in addition to Richardson's work (1974), see Nakamura (1975), and Flanagan (1984b).

(38) For a conceptual definition of political culture, this dissertation follows the definition by Almond and Verba (1963). They define the concept of political culture as:

the specifically political orientations --- attitudes toward political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system (p.13).

(39) Note that the distinction between actual system performance and perceived system performance is important for the subsequent data analysis. For a further discussion on this point, see the next subsection.

(40) Concrete procedures of operationalization of these key concepts through the survey data will be discussed at greater length in the later chapters: system support attitudes in chapter 5, political culture traits in chapter 6, and perceived system performance in chapter 7. The survey data which have been analysed for this dissertation and other data utilized for this dissertation will be discussed later in this chapter.
hypotheses will be discussed in the following subsection (i.e., 2.2.2).

One additional note should be made with regard to the relationship between political culture and system performance within the narrowly confined scope of the empirical analysis of this macro-conceptual model. Here, it is expected that perceived system performance is under the influence of political culture. While perceived system performance has been defined as the system members' evaluative attitudes toward actual system performance, such attitudes are expected to be easily affected by the system members' psychological predispositions and value orientations which stem directly from the political culture of their society. Therefore, as Figure 2 shows, it is expected that there will be linkage from POLITICAL CULTURE to PERCEIVED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE. The discussion of the types of linkages between these two variables will be elaborated in a later subsection (i.e., 2.4.3) of this chapter.

While the linkages between the three key concepts within the broken line in the figure will be empirically examined through individual-level data, other linkages depicted in the macro-conceptual model of Figure 2 are theoretically assumed but will not be empirically examined in this dissertation; those theoretically assumed linkages are linkages (1) from SYSTEM SUPPORT to SYSTEM STABILITY, (2) from SYSTEM STABILITY to EFFECTIVENESS of the policy-making entity, (3) from its EFFECTIVENESS to ACTUAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, and finally (4) from ACTUAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE to PERCEIVED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE. Although these assumed linkages are actually empirically testable, such an empirical examination of any one of those linkages could form the subject of another, very ambitious, research. Therefore, such examinations of these theoretically assumed linkages simply fall outside the scope of the empirical analysis of this dissertation. (41)

(41) Although some background information to show the overall performance of the Japanese postwar political system will be presented in chapter 4, no explicit effort will be made to relate actual system performance to perceived system performance in a rigorous manner; some sort of association between them will be implied and assumed. Similarly, some historical and societal descriptions of Japan will be also presented in chapters 3 and 4 in order to suggest the known characteristics of Japanese political culture, but again the cultural environment and known cultural characteristics will be only loosely connected to the measured political culture orientations.
However, it would be well to discuss these assumed (i.e., unexplained) linkages here, because this macro-conceptual model as a whole shows the theoretical implications of this dissertation as well as indicates the way in which those key concepts are conceptualized in this study of system support. First, the linkage between system legitimacy and system stability was assumed in the earlier discussion of system legitimacy and democratic theories (especially, in 1.2.1).

Second, system stability as well as system support are, according to some empiricacl democratic theories (Lipset, 1959; and Linz, 1978), believed to provide effectiveness to the political authority of the political system (i.e., the government and the political elites and parties).

Third, the linkage between the degree of effectiveness of the policy-making entity and the quality of actual system performance is also assumed. Special attention should be paid to this process, because the way in which the policy-making entity as well as actual system performance are conceptualized will to some extent dictate the way in which perceived system performance should be operationalized and will accordingly suggest the selection of operational indicators of perceived system performance.

In this regard, political authority (or the policy-making entity) of the political system is conceptualized to consist of three elements: the government, political parties, and political elites. The reason for this distinction between the government, the political parties, and the political elites is that system performance is considered to have the policy aspect of system performance and its behavioral aspect. The policy aspect of system performance originates from the government and includes not only the economic aspect but also the non-economic policy aspects, such as pollution control or social welfare policies. (42) The behavioral aspect of system performance is clearly attributed to the behavior of political elites and parties. The behavior of political elites and parties in the public arena, such as involvement in scandals or corruption, is clearly perceived as an aspect of system performance by the system members. The behavioral aspect also includes attentiveness and responsiveness of the political parties and the political elites to the demands of citizens. For these reasons, the government is conceptually distinguished from

(42) For a study which focuses on the effects of this wide range of policy performance on system support attitudes or on protest orientation, see Barnes, Farhar, Heunkes (1979).
the political elites and parties, although all these elements belong to the same policy-making entity. Subsequently, both policy performance and behavioral performance will constitute actual system performance.

Fourth, the linkage between actual system performance and perceived system performance is assumed to exist. As was discussed above, perceived system performance is believed to reflect actual system performance. Therefore, perceived system performance is now expected to include both the policy aspect and the behavioral aspect. This suggests that the operationalized measures of perceived system performance should include both the policy and behavioral aspects of performance of the political system. The actual operationalization process of perceived system performance will be discussed at some length in chapter 7.

In addition, two more linkages can be conceived in the model; they are indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 2. These linkages indicate the long-term feedback effects which are assumed to exist between two pairs of concepts in the model. First, the dotted arrow from PERCEIVED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE to POLITICAL CULTURE in Figure 2 implies that perceived system performance is theoretically expected to affect the shaping of political culture as the long-term feedback effects---for example, accumulated negative perception of system performance will probably shape cynical political subculture. But this linkage will be very difficult to detect empirically even if one has long-range longitudinal survey data available. Second, by the same token, system support attitudes are also expected to reshape political culture as the feedback effects over a long period of time (i.e., the dotted arrow from SYSTEM SUPPORT to POLITICAL CULTURE in Figure 2). This view is particularly compatible with a certain political culture theory which regards system support as a part of political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966). Nevertheless, this theme is almost impossible to disentangle empirically. (43) Although the two long-term, less tangible linkages discussed above should be theoretically conceived in the macro-conceptual model, they are clearly excluded from the scope of this dissertation because of the difficulty of empirical measurement.

At this point, it is important to clarify the scope of the empirical data analysis in this dissertation. While the scope of data analysis focuses on the political culture

(43) This is a practical reason that system legitimacy is regarded as a separate concept from political culture for an analytical purpose (see chapter 1).
explanation and the system performance explanation—which are represented in the area confined by the broken line in Figure 2—these two explanations by no means exhaust all possible explanations of system support formation. Particularly, partisanship is expected to offer a powerful explanation of system support especially in a political system where a single party remains in the office as long as in Japan. Therefore, as was noted in chapter 1, the partisan explanation of system support will be included in the scope of the subsequent empirical analysis of this dissertation, although this is not included in Figure 2.

In addition, citizens' ties with social organizations and/or their involvement in a social network have been revealed to affect system support attitudes in general, or more specifically a sense of political trust in the Japanese social setting (Richardson, 1974, chapter 3, and 1978; Flanagan and Richardson, 1980). Therefore, social network involvement can be hypothesized to influence system support. However, this hypothesis is not included in this dissertation for the following reasons.

The first reason is a practical one. Individual ties with a social network (either primary social groups or secondary social organizations) are interrelated with individual cultural orientation (Richardson, 1974). Although the subsequent data analysis will look to some extent into individuals' ties with their community, it will be difficult to disentangle relationship between individuals' social network ties and their cultural orientation. As Richardson's work (1974) amply shows, this topic well deserves the full attention of a large-scale scholarly work.

Second, a more theoretical reason is that this dissertation is primarily concerned with the normative implications of system support stemming from political culture and those implications deriving from system performance. Hence, the social network hypothesis will fall outside of the scope of this dissertation. In other words, this dissertation's primary goal is not to explain Japanese system support fully but to examine the two hypotheses which are relevant and important to the theoretical framework established in

(44) Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) also have demonstrated in their cross-national study that social network involvement or social organization ties are one of the most important sources of high level political participation. This indirectly suggests a possible strong impact of social network involvement on the formation of system support attitudes.
chapter 1 (see particularly, 1.2).

2.2.2 Consideration on Levels of Analysis: Structure of Inference

As was discussed above, the scope of the data analysis of this dissertation is confined to the relationships between system support, political culture and system performance, or to an examination of the political culture and system performance hypotheses. The most appropriate methodological approach to test these two hypotheses is the approach of individual-level data analysis, for the following methodological reasons.

First, a danger of committing the individualistic fallacy exists in examining the relationship between political culture and system legitimacy. The individualistic fallacy is committed if one incorrectly infers the condition of higher-order systems from observations on lower level units (Erwin K. Scheuch, 1969, p.138; Arend Lijphart, 1980, p.45). As this dissertation follows the conceptualization of political culture by Almond and Verba (1963; see Footnote 38), political culture is to be measured in terms of psychological attitudes and value orientation of the members of the society whose political culture is being studied. This conceptualization of political culture leads to individual-level measurement of the concept. Then, in order to avoid the individualistic fallacy, the dependent variable, system support, must also be measured at the same level of analysis as the level of analysis for political culture. If one measures political culture with individual-level data and measures system legitimacy with data of another level, such as aggregate data regarding the stability of the political system, he will commit the individualistic fallacy. In other words, if both the independent variables and the dependent variable are not measured at the same level of data, an inference regarding the causal relationship between them may be incorrect. For, even if a correlation is observed and consequently a causal relationship is inferred to exist between the independent variable and the dependent variable, such a relationship may be due to mere coincidence (e.g., due to an unobserved third variable in the case of spurious correlation), because a third variable cannot be controlled in such a research owing to the dependent and independent variables being measured at different levels.

The problem of the individualistic fallacy can be fully understood when deliniating the structure of inference employed in The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba, 1963).
Erwen Scheuch (1966, 1969) argues that Almond and Verba committed the individualistic fallacy by inferring stability of democratic systems from individual responses to the survey questions. Although Scheuch's warning against the individualistic fallacy is well taken, his charge against Almond and Verba unfortunately misses the point, as it has become clear in the reevaluations of The Civic Culture by Lijphart (1980) and by Verba (1980) respectively. Since both sides of the argument in this debate help us to understand the pitfalls of the individualistic fallacy in using the survey data approach to a macro-systemic question (e.g., system legitimacy), let us briefly trace this debate.

Scheuch (1969) charges that Almond and Verba used the between-nation differences in responses to the survey questions (such as what one is proud of in one's country) as "expressing stability of political institutions" (p.141). However, as Lijphart (1980, pp.45-47) argues in dismissing Scheuch's charge, Almond and Verba actually measured the political stability of the five democracies independently of political culture. They measured the five political cultures with their survey data, while they observed and measured the stability of the five political systems according to the expert judgment based on the historical facts and the aggregate data (Almond and Verba, 1963, p.74; Lijphart, 1980, pp.38-41). Only then, did they relate political culture to democratic stability across the five nations. Contrary to Scheuch's criticism, they did not infer democratic stability from individual-level data. Actually, Almond and Verba moved "from a macrocharacteristic (the set of attitudes found within the public) to another macrocharacteristic (the functioning of the political system)" (Verba, 1980, p.402). Here, it should be noted ---although neither Lijphart (1980) nor Verba (1980) makes it very clear---that the unit of analysis was shifted from individuals to political systems at this point of the inferential process in The Civic Culture. Once the unit of analysis is set to political systems (or nations), then the research has to be either cross-national or time-series in its design, because now the researcher has to relate a macro-systemic characteristic (i.e., political culture) to another macro-systemic characteristic (i.e., democratic stability) across political systems (either across nations or over time within a single nation). Therefore, it can be concluded that The Civic Culture, which was a cross-national study, did not commit the individualistic fallacy.

However, the above argument suggests that any study (including this dissertation) which is concerned with both
individuals' attitudes and macro-systemic characteristics (e.g., system legitimacy or system stability) faces the danger of committing the individualistic fallacy, unless the design of the study is either cross-national or time-series. If the study focuses on a single nation, then the unit of analysis cannot be political systems but must be individuals; consequently, such a single nation study will commit the individualistic fallacy if the dependent variable is measured at the macro-systemic level, not at the individual level. In order to avoid the individualistic fallacy, this dissertation chooses system support (i.e., system legitimacy), not system stability, as the dependent variable, because system support can be measured with individual-level data whereas system stability is most appropriately measured with objective, aggregate data. This is a methodological reason for choosing system support over system stability as the dependent variable, in addition to the normative theoretical reason discussed earlier in chapter 1 (i.e., 1.2.1).

Second, in examining the relationship between system performance and system support, one may be prone to commit the well-known fallacy of ecological inference. The ecological fallacy is committed when one incorrectly infers generalization of behavioral, attitudinal, or other properties of individuals from observations on the conditions of higher-order systems, such as groups, regions or nations (W. S. Robinson, 1950; Allardt, 1969, pp.41-45; Alker, 1969, p.69). In this regard, conceptualization as well as operationalized measurement of system performance requires special attention. System performance can be conceptualized either as actual performance of the political system or as the perception of the system members concerning the system's performance. The former conceptualization leads to measurement of system performance in terms of objective indicators (i.e., aggregate data), such as macro-economic indices or pollution reduction rate, etc., whereas the latter leads to measurement in terms of system members' subjective evaluation of the system's actual performance. If one uses aggregate data of a system's performance and if he relates these aggregate data to system support expressed in terms of individual-level data, he is likely to commit the ecological fallacy, in that he is trying to explain individual attitudes in terms of macro-systemic data. In order to avoid this type of fallacy, system performance should be measured at the same level of data as system support; that is, individual-level data.

This is not to say that aggregate data analyses are always inferior to individual-level data analyses in study.
ing political attitudes or behavior. (45) In fact, many incumbent support studies employed aggregate data to demonstrate that macro-economic conditions affect incumbent government support in the United States as well as in Japan (Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975; Inoguchi, 1980). (46) It is important to note that these studies must use time-series data so that they actually compare several political systems across time, even though they focus a single nation. Therefore, they are actually treating both the macro-economic conditions and the aggregate voting behavior patterns as properties of political systems. Then, they are not committing the ecological fallacy.

However, the survey data analyses are still believed to be more effective in investigating the economic impacts on incumbent support, for the following reasons. Since these incumbent support studies either explicitly or implicitly posit a rational economic voter, the central question here is the role of rationality in forming attitudes of political support, which is best detected with the individual-level data (Asher, 1983, pp.365-368). Also, as Fiorina (1978, P.430) argued, if the economic performance of the incumbent government (or simply economic conditions) influences the voters' political support for the incumbent, some cognitive connection must exist between the voters' perception of economic conditions and their vote decisions in their minds; this is best detected by the individual-level data. Therefore, if the researcher, such as Kramer (1971), infers a conclusion that the voters are rational from his aggregate data analysis of the relationship between macro-economic conditions and aggregate voting records, he is likely to commit the ecological fallacy, because rationality of the voters can be, strictly speaking, measured by the individual-level data only. He only can maintain that the economic conditions affect voting patterns, but cannot attribute that relationship to rationality of the voters according his aggregate data analysis. (47)

(45) In response to the compelling criticism of Robinson (1950) against the use of ecological or aggregate data to infer individual behavior, some social scientists (Menzel, 1950; Allardt, 1969; Linz, 1969; etc.) have argued that aggregate or ecological data can be used very effectively, sometimes even more effectively than individual-level data. For a recent empirical example of this type of work, see Kramer (1983).

(46) These studies will be discussed at length later in this chapter (or in chapter 7).

(47) Although Kramer (1983) rebutted in his recent article
Similarly, the system performance hypothesis of this dissertation is better tested with the individual-level data than with aggregate data, because this hypothesis has the same inferential structure as the hypothesis of economic influence on incumbent support at least in two aspects. First, the system performance hypothesis of this dissertation also assumes, as the rational-economic studies of incumbent support do, rationality of the average citizen in his formation of system support attitudes. Second, the system performance hypothesis also posits that some cognitive connection must exist in the minds of the average system members in order for actual system performance to affect their system support attitudes.

In short, the discussion thus far suggested that conceptualization of system legitimacy, political culture and system performance, and the hypothesized relationships between them(48) lead us to choose the individual-level data approach over the aggregate data approach. When one measures political culture in the way that Almond and Verba (1963) did, he needs to measure system legitimacy and system performance in the same manner. Also, if a major concern of the research is the people (i.e., the system members) of the political system, as is the case in this research, then the individual-level data are desirable because the unit of analysis in such a research is individuals. Thus, the level of analysis and the type of data, which have been judged to be theoretically as well as methodologically appropriate for this research, are the individual-level data.(49)

(48) These were discussed in the earlier section (i.e., "1.2 System Legitimacy and Democratic Theories: Macro-Theoretical Framework").

(49) This point concerning the importance of "correspondence between theories, levels of analysis and data" derives from Asher's (1983, p.367) critique of the series of aggregate data studies on the economic influence on incumbent support.
2.3 METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY

The discussion has thus for suggested that the individual-level data are more appropriate than the aggregate data for examining the efforts of political culture and system performance on system support. The individual-level data employed in this research are the Japanese public opinion survey data which were collected by Joji Watanuki, Ichiro Miyake, Shinsaku kohei, Scott Flanagan, and Bradley Richardson in Japan in autumn 1976 under the JABISS Election Study project. As the JABISS Study data are very rich and contain effective measures to examine the two major hypotheses of this dissertation, most of data analysis and empirical information to be presented in this dissertation are based on the JABISS Study data. Much of the discussion of the data analysis chapters (i.e., chapter 4 through chapter 7) are based on statistical analysis of the JABISS data.

However, some other types of data will be utilized as supplementary information. First, published results of public opinion surveys are at times used. These aggregated results of opinion surveys are employed in this dissertation to show tendencies of Japanese political attitudes over time as well as to compare Japanese political attitudes with their counterparts in other democratic

(50) The JABISS Election Study was conducted in conjunction with the House of Representatives Election in autumn 1976 in Japan. The JABISS Study was a panel survey, having consisted of the pre-election and post-election waves, and drew a national sample of 1921 respondents (1,796 respondents on the first wave, 1,556 respondents on the second wave, and 1,334 respondents on both waves), who were selected by the multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure. The JABISS Study data were made available to this dissertation with special permission of the principal investigators arranged by Professor Bradley Richardson of the Ohio State University. I should appropriately acknowledge their generosity (see also Acknowledgement of this dissertation). For the full and formal report of the JABISS Study, see Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson, and Joji Watanuki, The Japanese Voter, (forthcoming).

(51) The most useful source of the longitudinal opinion surveys in Japan is the National Character Study which has been conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in every five years since 1953. Other important time-series opinion polls have been pub
These longitudinal and cross-national survey data provide essential information to understand two fundamental points as the points of departure for this dissertation research: first, what is the general tendencies of the Japanese system support attitudes over time, and were there any changes across time?; second, what kind of patterns do the Japanese hold in their system support attitudes in comparison with other democracies? In addition to this purpose, the Japanese longitudinal data will be utilized whenever a consideration of attitudinal changes over time is necessary, in such a case that a question is whether the life-cycle effects, the generational effects, or the period effects count for the attitudinal changes in Japan. Similarly, the cross-national comparison will be drawn when such a comparison with the Japanese data clarify the discussion in focus.

The second type of data employed in this dissertation are the aggregate data concerning economic conditions, demographic characteristics, and social structures of modern Japan. The longitudinal aggregate data of the economic conditions will be presented in chapter 3 in order to demonstrate the over-all patterns of performance of the post-war political system of Japan. The demographic or social indicators will be presented in chapter 3 in order to demonstrate non-economic aspects of system performance. They will also provide background information to understand changes and continuity of Japanese political culture as well as emergence of contemporary political subcultures in postwar Japan in conjunction to the discussion of political culture in chapter 3.

lished by Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), Asahi Newspaper, Jiji Press, and the Fair Election League (Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai, formerly Komei Senkyo Renmei). The Euro-Barometer Studies of the Commission for European Community provide useful longitudinal, cross-national survey data for European democracies from 1967 on, while the Center for Political Studies (CPS, formerly SRC — Survey Research Center) of the University of Michigan provides the time-series survey data (the National Election Studies) in the United States from 1954 on.

Note that no explicit effort to infer a linkage between these objective data of system performance and the perceptual data of system performance will be made. See the previous Section (i.e., "2.2.2 Consideration on Levels of Analysis"), for the further discussion on this.
Chapter III

POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN MODERN JAPAN

While the conceptualization of the impact of system performance on system support was discussed in the previous chapter, the impact of political culture on system support has not been well conceptualized yet. The purpose of this and the following chapter is to present a conceptualization of political culture which is amenable to empirical data analysis as well as compatible with present explanatory models for the impact of political culture on system support. The present chapter will first examine different aspects of contemporary Japanese political culture by suggesting a typology of three political subcultures, and then will discuss the interaction between political institutional changes and political culture changes in modern Japan. The next chapter will first delineate the effects of socio-economic changes on political culture changes in the post-war period, then finally will present analytical models for the socio-cultural explanations of system support for the purpose of testing the political culture hypothesis empirically.

3.1 NATURE OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF POSTWAR JAPAN

3.1.1 Typology of Postwar Japanese Political Culture

As Bradley Richardson's (1974) thorough empirical examination of the political culture of postwar Japan shows, Japanese political culture has great complexity. Whereas a comprehensive examination of Japanese political culture falls outside the scope of this dissertation, at least some understanding of her political culture is necessary in order to measure the impact of political culture on system support. Some simplified but clear conceptualization of the different dimensions of the complex structure of Japanese political culture is required for the purpose of operationalizing the concept of political culture in concrete terms.
Joseph Massey's (1976) typology of three political subcultures well captures some typical dimensions of postwar Japanese political culture, and is quite effective as well as useful in simplifying the complex picture of her political culture. Massey presents three political subcultures: (1) the traditional political culture, (2) the formal democratic culture, and (3) the structural-oppositional counter-culture.

First, according to Massey's typology, the traditional political culture is, of course, based on Japan's traditional main culture and, naturally, has the richest complexity of value structure among the three political subcultures. Indeed, the traditional Japanese political culture is too rich to summarize in a few pages, but some of the politically relevant characteristics should be briefly discussed. Since traditional cultural values have long influenced the way in which the Japanese behave in political life (Watanuki, 1967a; Ishida, 1970; Richardson, 1974; Dore, 1978; Flanagan, 1979, 1982a), the distinction between the components of the traditional main culture and the components of the traditional political subculture is not clear. Although some cultural values may appear to be parts of the traditional main culture rather than those of the political subculture, many have been found empirically to have effects on Japanese political behavior. The major value components which are relevant to political behavior include deference to authority, conformity with group (Flanagan, 1979, 1982a), personalism, and localism (Richardson, 1974; Flanagan, 1984a).

(53) This conceptual typology of Japanese political subcultures by Massey (1976) focuses only on the political culture of the mass public in contemporary Japan but excludes the elite political culture from its scope. Similarly, since this dissertation focuses only on the mass political culture of Japan as an independent variable, any discussion or empirical examination of her elite political culture falls outside the scope of this dissertation. For a study of the elite political culture of Japan, see Wakata (1980). There is a recent comparative study focusing on a particular aspect of elite political culture (i.e., value of equality) with an explicit cross-national framework, which includes the United States, Japan and Sweden; for an American study, see Verba and Orren (1985), and for a Japanese study, see Miyake, Watanuki, Shima and Kabashima (1985).
The traditional values of deference to authority and group conformity have immediate relevance to political behavior in the sense that the former exercises the pressure of political obedience to authority on individual Japanese and the latter similarly commands them to follow the political decisions of their group or of their nation (Massey, 1976; Flanagan, 1982a, 1984a and b). It has often been often argued (Fukutake, 1964) that these Japanese traditional cultural values were impediments to democracy, because these values stress obedience, harmony and consensus and consequently suppress values of interest articulation, political participation, and a sense of political efficacy, all of which are important pluralistic, democratic values. However, these political values of the traditional Japanese culture are assumed to have generated acceptance of the existing political system regardless of whether the existing system is an authoritarian political system or a democratic political system. Therefore, these traditional cultural values are expected to be sources of positive attitudes toward the present Japanese democratic system, although these traditional values are less favorable for the core values of democratic principles.

It should be noted that this argument of Japanese blind obedience to political authorities is the very reason that many observers of Japanese politics have been doubtful about the foundation of the legitimacy of Japan's political system. If Japan's democratic legitimacy is actually based on the traditional values of deference to authority or group conformity but not based on democratic orientation such as political participation, then her democratic legitimacy may be eroded when the traditional political values fade away. Because Japan's traditional political culture is in fact on the wane,(54) those observers of Japanese politics have reason to be suspicious about the future of Japan's democratic legitimacy. The political culture hypothesis was formulated precisely in regard to this problem. However, as Almond and Verba (1963) argued, an ideal type of the civic culture also includes some elements of submissiveness to political authority in addition to participatory orientation and other typical democratic values. Moreover, the values of Japanese traditional political culture are, in my opinion, not necessarily incompatible with democratic values. This point will be further discussed in the next subsection (3.1.2).

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(54) For changes in the traditional cultural values in Japan, see Watanuki (1967a, 1976), Flanagan (1979, 1980, 1982a and b), and Inglehart (1982).
While the values of deference and conformity have obvious political implications, it may be less clear that personalism and localism have relevance to political behavior. First, according to Richardson (1974), the Japanese often relate themselves to politics through local notables or other politically influential people whom they know personally in their community or at their work place. They are often mobilized to support a particular political party by such people through patron-client type personal relationships (Curtis, 1971). Flanagan summarizes that "personalism attaches primary importance to face-to-face relations in the exercise of authority" (Flanagan, 1984a, p.121). Richardson (1974) found that the Japanese were much more likely to feel closer to and efficacious about local politics than national politics. This type of political orientation is clearly fostered by the "localism" and "parochialism" cultural traits of the Japanese. These cultural traits in Japanese political life, such as "personalism" or "localism," tend to foster warm feelings toward political figures whom each individual know personally.

Now, it is necessary to examine two questions empirically: (1) To what degree does Japan's democratic legitimacy is rely on the traditional political culture, and (2) How much have the other two political subcultures have fostered system legitimacy among Japanese citizens. These empirical questions will be examined through data analysis in chapter 6. Now, let us briefly discuss the characteristics of the remaining two political subcultures which Massey presented.

The formal democratic political subculture of postwar Japan includes values of participation in the political process, the importance of a feeling of political efficacy, trust in democratic institutions as well as in democratic rules of decision-making (e.g., majority rule with respect for the rights of the minority), and pluralistic values (i.e., acceptance of the competition of different political ideas and interests). Thus, the Japanese formal democratic political subculture is clearly based on the Anglo-American model of liberal democracy. This political subculture unquestionably began to penetrate into the attitudes of ordinary Japanese as a large scale mass orientation only during the postwar period, when the Allied Occupation began to implement democratization policies which introduced the present democratic political institutions, the constitution, and the new civic education curricula.

The third political subculture in Massey's typology is the structural-oppositional counter-culture which is said to work against the development of system support in postwar Japan. The structural-oppositional counter-culture is
based on a Marxist view of Japan's society and political system; it has generated progressive criticism of the capitalist economic system and the conservative forces which have dominated the political system and its process in postwar Japan (Massey, 1976).

One of the purposes of testing the political culture hypothesis is to probe the magnitude of the impact of the traditional political culture on system legitimacy in contemporary Japan. But at the same time it is necessary to measure the effects of the formal democratic subculture and the oppositional-structural political subculture, since the former is another source of positive system support attitudes and the latter is a source of negative attitudes toward the political system.

At this point, few caveat should be offered with regard to the conceptual relationships among the three political subcultures discussed here, the traditional political culture, the formal democratic political subculture, and the structural-oppositional political subculture. The typology of the three political subcultures in contemporary Japan has been posited for the purpose of analysis, but the three types of political subcultures are not necessarily mutually exhaustive or mutually exclusive in the real world of Japanese society.

First, those three political subcultures are not mutually exhaustive. While those three political subcultures are the most representative political subcultures in contemporary Japan, there are some other political subcultures that are either small in terms of the number of people oriented toward them or insignificant in terms of their implications. Accordingly, those less typical or less dominant political subcultures are for analytical purposes excluded from the scope of the conceptualization of political culture as well as from the scope of the empirical examination in this dissertation.

Neither are the three political subcultures mutually exclusive. Although the three political subcultures discussed above appear to be incompatible on the surface,(55)

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(55) For example, the traditional Japanese political regard for group harmony are in apparent conflict with the articulation of diverse interests within a group, which is a core principle of democracy. The traditional political culture's emphasis on hierarchical authority and its value for submissiveness to authority are incompatible with the egalitarian value of democratic subculture and with the structural
many values of the three different political subcultures are in reality held by the same person and by the same group of people. Richardson (1974) calls this psychological peculiarity the "ambivalence" of Japanese political attitudes. The "ambivalence" in Japanese political and cultural orientation itself is a unique characteristic of Japanese political culture. The cultural trait of holding an ambivalent orientation may be an important factor through which the Japanese could adopt Western liberal democracy to their idiosyncratic political culture that is in many respects different from Western European political culture. (56) This point will be elaborated in the following discussion, which focuses on an aspect of the ambivalent cultural orientation.

3.1.2 Reconsideration of the Traditional Japanese Political Culture as Impediment of Democracy

As was discussed in the previous section, the traditional Japanese political culture has been believed to be by and large functioning as an impediment to the democracy of postwar Japan. However, it is important to clarify two points in this discussion on the nature of the traditional Japanese political culture. As noted above, because of the emphasis on deference and obedience to authority, those traditionally oriented Japanese are expected to give acquiescent support to political leaders, to political authority, and consequently to the political system itself regardless of the form of the political system. Therefore, those Japanese who are attached to the traditional political culture can be expected to give at least passive (or acquiescent) support even to the democratic political system.

Second, one can challenge the standard argument that the emphasis of the traditional Japanese political culture on oppositional subculture's orientation against authoritative suppression of the interests of ordinary people by the privileged.

(56) It is not appropriate to treat all European and American political cultures as a single homogeneous political culture, as is done here. However, the amount of communality between Euro-American political cultures is much greater than the amount of communality between Japanese culture and any of its European or American counterparts. Therefore, this statement, while not strictly accurate, can be permitted for the sake of simplicity.
values of harmony and consensus,(57) which have been widely recognized by many scholars as typical traits of Japanese culture, work as an obstacle to the pluralistic operation of a democratic political system. However, the scope of the values of harmony and consensus seems to be limited to the inside of a group, and is extended to relationships between groups.(58) For example, Japanese historians and ethnologists often call attention to the severe conflicts which often occurred between two villages over the right to use water resources or forests (Ishida, 1970; Dore, 1978; and so on).(59) On the one hand, each village was strongly unified in the context of these conflict situations. On the other hand, disagreements among people of the same village were commonly found over village-wide decision-making issues such as selection of a village head, and such disagreements often divided the entire village into a few factions which came to confront one another antagonistically. Analogously, even in the present days, two or more divisions of a single company are often involved in severe competitions for higher sales or production, or several factions of a company are often engaged in severe confrontations for better allocation of resources and positions for their own faction members, whereas that company as a whole can show enormous unity and conformity when the company competes against another company. Similarly, factions of a political party, particularly those of the LDP, often show intensified competition and even hostility within the party, while the party as a whole usually demonstrates unity and strong party discipline in legislative voting in the National Diet (Fukui, 1970; Flanagan and Richardson, 1984; Richardson, 1984).(60)

(57) A standard version of this interpretation of Japanese culture is presented in Flanagan (1984a), although he indicates alternative views as well.

(58) The word "group" in this context refers to a wide range of units of decision-making at various levels from a family, a small organization, a community, a large organization over several regions, and even to a nation or state. Hereinafter, the word "group" or "groups" always refers to this wide range of decision-making units as far as the discussion of the traditional Japanese culture is concerned.


(60) This combination of intra-party factional conflicts and strong external party discipline is not unique to
Therefore, it should be understood that those traditionally oriented Japanese are less likely to tolerate the situation in which their own group is perceived by outsiders to contain internal disagreements or conflicts. At the same time, they do recognize and often accept the existence of internal disagreements within their group, although they may not want to admit publicly that such internal disagreements exist. (61)

In short, the traditional Japanese political culture emphasizes values of harmony and consensus within a group as a "formal principle" or as a "formal position" of the group, on the one hand. On the other hand, the traditional Japanese political culture includes implicit acceptance of the realistic view that differences of opinion or conflicts of interests inevitably exist in any kind of political situation whether between groups or within a single Japanese political parties. A similar pattern can be found in Italy, too, as Zariski (1972) and Zuckerman (1979) point out. In the case of Italy, LaPalombara (1958) argues that the strong party discipline of the Christian Democrats (DC) is in part due to an external threat from the Communist Party, which makes the DC more cohesive despite its internal factional conflicts.

(61) Moreover, even those traditionally oriented Japanese may sometimes wish to ignore the norm of group harmony in their private thinking when their own interests could be better served by violating the norm of group harmony. But, pressure of conformity with other group members, as the group norm, often exceeds the individual desire to violate group harmony, because a long-term calculation usually suggests that any individual member can be better off in the long run by conforming with the group than by deviating from the group for short-term benefit, or such a calculation suggests that one may be an outcast if he violates group harmony.

(62) Note that there is a significant distinction between a formal description about the internal state of a group and informal or realistic understanding of the same internal state of the group. The former is closer to a "formal position (tatemae)", namely what it ought to be or what the insiders want it to be; the latter is closer to "true feeling (honne)", namely what it is or what the insiders admit it is. Even within a single group, the latter, or the realistic view, is not allowed to be expressed publicly or formally ---in
The above argument implies that some modifications are necessary for the standard argument that the values of internal harmony and consensus in the traditional Japanese political culture are major obstacles to Japan's liberal democracy. According to the stereotyped argument, since those values of internal harmony and consensus are thought to create strong pressure of conformity for the people, those values are consequently believed to suppress the free expression of opinions and the articulation of interests. The suppression of expression of diverse interests is clearly in conflict with a pluralistic political process, which is an assumed prerequisite for a liberal democratic system. However, given the argument that the traditional Japanese political culture implicitly recognizes the existence of disagreements and conflicts in political reality, the pluralistic political structure of any decision-making unit (e.g., in a community, or a nation) is not entirely foreign even to the traditionally oriented Japanese's understanding of political reality. Although they may not be comfortable with the pluralistic principle of democracy that publicly encourages competition between different political actors, they can certainly accept such political competition and conflicts as an inevitable aspect of political life.

such an occasion as a formal group meeting---but it is expressed only in private conversations between individual members of the group. Only the formal position is appropriate and allowed to be presented in a formal in-group situation. Thus, there is tension between the "formal position" and the "true feeling" even within a single group, and even within the same individual.

The formal description of the internal state of the group is often close to the perception that the insiders want the "outsiders" to have about their group. Thus, tension exists between the sense of "they" and the sense of "we". Therefore, the tension between the "formal position" and the "true feeling" held by the insiders largely overlaps the tension between the "view for the outsiders" projected by the insiders and the "realistic view" of themselves held by the insiders. These two types of tension are, in my opinion, among the key factors for understanding the traditional Japanese culture. For a different but related view of the Japanese group behavior, see Ishida's (1970) argument on conformity and competition.
Therefore, those Japanese who subscribe to the values of traditional political culture are not expected to be entirely lacking in support for the democratic political system. They probably have some support for the democratic political system and its institutions (e.g., the Diet, the election system, or the political parties) for two reasons, even if they do not cherish democratic values. First, the main reason for their system support is that they perceive those democratic political institutions as symbols of political authority to which they were socialized to give their respect. Second, they accept the political system and its institutions, which facilitate political conflicts (rather than harmony), as necessary devices for politics from a realistic viewpoint.

It is possible to examine empirically this interpretation that the traditional Japanese political culture orientation is not contradictory to a formal democratic orientation or to system support attitudes. In fact, the interpretation argued here will be examined through data analysis in chapter 6.

3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL CULTURE CHANGE

It is now generally accepted by comparative political scientists that political culture and political institutions interact. Brian Barry (1970) and Carole Pateman (1971, 1980) argue, in their critical evaluation of The Civic Culture, that political culture changes according to changes in political institutions, and therefore claim that the civic culture (or democratic culture) may be a product of their democratic institutions, rather than democratic institutional stability always deriving from the civic culture. Almond (1980), Verba (1980), and Lijphart (1980) independently respond to these criticism by arguing that The Civic Culture actually suggested the possible interactions between political culture and political institutions but choose to focus only on the effects of political culture on stability of democratic institutions. Although these responses are valid, the points which Barry and Pateman raised are very important. Actually, these exchanges between the empirical democratic theorists (i.e., Almond, Verba, and Lijphart) and the critical theorists (i.e., Barry and Pateman) reveal that they all agree on at least one point, that durable political institutions influence transformation of political culture, and at the same time certain kinds of political culture have effects on the operation of political institutions. In short, political
culture and political institutional arrangements influence each other. Therefore, it is appropriate to review, at least briefly, the path along which Japan's democratic institutions developed as a source for her political culture change.

3.2.1 The Prewar Period

In 1868, Japan began transforming herself from a feudalistic state into a modern state. The warrior-led feudalistic political system, which had endured since the late twelfth century, ended in 1868 when her political system was restructured to a semi-absolute monarchy. The power and status of the Emperor were firmly established by the Imperial Constitution(63) which was promulgated in 1889. From then on, Japan began to consolidate the foundations for her prewar political system, which was characterised by the strong authority of the emperor, a strongly centralized government system, and limited democratic or representative devices of the government.(64)

The Imperial Constitution provided the basis for the authoritative, oligarchical, and centralized features of the prewar Japanese political system. The sovereignty of the state resided with the emperor.(65) In theory the emperor possessed unlimited power and authority, though in practice his authority was diffused to a complex array of civilian as well as military offices and officials. The supreme command of the military forces belonged to the emperor and was independent of the authority of the executive or legislative office.(66) While the authority of the

(63) While it is formally named the "Constitution of Great Japan Empire", it is often called the "Meiji Constitution" because it was promulgated by the Meiji Emperor and during the Meiji Era.

(64) Although representative and democratic features of the political system were minimal, it should be noted that "the Meiji Constitution and governmental system were not notably illiberal in terms of prevailing practice in 1880" (Ward, 1978, p. 11).

(65) In other words, he was "the sole ultimate of all state powers---executive, administrative, legislative, and judicial authorities" (Ward, 1978, pp. 11-12).

(66) This feature substantially gave autonomous decision-making authority to the military commanders who became in turn free from civilian control. This military
judicial branch was independent of that of the executive branch, legislative authority was shared by both the legislative branch (i.e., the Diet) and the executive branch (i.e., the cabinet), the latter being empowered to issue executive orders or decrees in case of emergency. The entire governmental system was so highly centralized that local governments had no significant autonomous authority, and governors were appointed by the central government. Thus, the Imperial Constitution was clearly "not intended to establish democratic government in Japan" (Ward, 1978, p. 13). These features of political institutional arrangement under the Meiji constitution were compatible with the traditional Japanese political culture which emphasizes the values of hierarchical order and submission to political authority.

However, this prewar constitution had contained to a limited extent "concessions to popular rights and representative government" (Ward, 1978, p. 13). The most important feature of these concessions was the establishment of a bicameral national parliament, the Diet, which consisted of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives (Ward, 1978). The House of Peers, the upper house, had appointed members from the aristocratic class, whereas the House of Representatives, the lower house, had popularly elected members. Popular elections were first held in 1890, although suffrage was limited to those males who were age twenty-five years or older and who paid a certain amount of national tax.

Although the concessions that the constitution made to popular representative government were minimal, these concessions provided a potential foundation for the subsequent development of political liberalism in Japan, at least until the early 1930s. For example, the enfranchisement rate evolved gradually from 1.1 percent (0.45 million) of the total population in 1890 to 20.0 percent (12 million) of the population in 1925, when all male adults who were

autonomy later led the entire nation into disastrous militaristic expansionism and to the tragic war in Pacific region.

(67) This was aimed to placate domestic political opposition from non-central ex-warrior class elements, and to convince European as well as American superpowers that Japan was becoming a modern state for the purpose of correcting unequal items of her treaties with those superpowers (Before the Meiji Restoration, Japan under the Shogunal Government had signed unequal treaties with American and European nations in the mid 1800s).
age 25 years or older were enfranchised, as shown in Table 1 (Richardson, 1974, p.9, Table 1-1). Similarly, the prewar constitution allowed political parties to grow to such an extent that those parties could function as interest articulation devices, though to a limited extent, as well as providing competition and alternative policies for the central political arena in prewar Japan. In short, the prewar Japanese political system was slowly evolving toward a more liberal democratic oriented political system, although the constitutional restrictions were severe.

However, the gradual movement of the Japanese political system toward democracy was sharply curtailed by the emergence of ultranationalistic movements that were led by military forces and right-wing activists. While some military commanders as well as ultranationalistic activists had strong interests in expanding Japan's territory in China in the 1920s, a strong reinforcement for militaristic expansionism came in the 1930s from a series of terrorist acts by young, radical military officers. Subsequently, parliamentary politics and party politics, which had been gradually growing prior to 1932, were devastated by those ultranationalistic movements and were finally suspended by the formation of a single national political party in 1942.

(68) For universal suffrage, Japanese women had to wait until after World War II, namely the alteration of the entire political system.

(69) Political parties in Japan had emerged even before the promulgation of the constitution in 1889 and had pressured the central government to establish a popularly elected parliament as a national lawmaking body. Those parties in the early stage were led by ex-warrior class elites who were liberal oriented and were among the non-central factions in the political arena.

(70) The first incident of the series took place on May 15, 1932, when then Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated by young military officers. This incident triggered the ultranationalistic movement in Japan prior to World War II.

(71) The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), as an all-inclusive national party, was formed for the purpose of absorbing all existing political parties. This organization was later reorganized and transformed into the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association (Yokusan Seijikai) in 1942, and was subsequently renamed the Great Japan
Table 1
Percentage of Enfranchised Voters in Japan:
1890-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enfranchisement Rate</th>
<th>Electorate Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
<td>450,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>984,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3,228,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Male Universal Suffrage Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>12,408,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>14,594,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Universal Suffrage Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>36,878,417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Richardson (1974, p. 9, Table 1-1).

1940. (71) Thus, the Japanese prewar political system was transformed from a hybrid of an oligarchical and a parliamentary system into a militaristic authoritarian system during the period between 1932 and 1945 (Ward, 1978).

Given this prewar development of Japan's political system, it is difficult to argue that a formal democratic political subculture was formed in prewar Japan. However, it can still be argued that the seed of an orientation toward the democratic principles was born and some positive mood for democracy was shared by some Japanese intellectuals, as was reflected in the popular movement for democracy in the Taisho period. (72)

Political Association (Dainihon Seijikai). See Fukui (1970, Chapter 2) and Mackie and Rose (1982).

(72) This is called the Taisho Demokurashii. According to
3.2.2 The Postwar Period

During World War II, the gradual movement of the Japanese political system toward liberal democracy was severely curtailed, if not completely halted. Transformation of Japan's political system into a liberal democratic system resumed after the end of the war.(73)

After Japan was defeated in World War II, the Allied Forces, mainly the United States, began their attempts to transform Japan into a peaceful and democratic nation. Toward this end, various demilitarization and democratization programs were implemented by the Allied Occupation Forces under the leadership of General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the early postwar period, until the occupation of Japan formally ended in April 1952.

3.2.2.1 Constitutional Changes

Among various policies aimed at democratizing Japan, the revision of the old Imperial Constitution was the most important attempt and had a far-reaching impact on the rest of the reform programs of the Allied Occupation.(74)

the imperial era name system (naming each era after the reigning emperor), there are three periods in Japan during her modern age. the Taisho period (1911-1926) is a period following the Meiji period (1868-1911) and is one preceding the Showa period (1926-present).

(73) It should be again noted that postive normative values are implicitly assigned to liberal democracy in this discussion. However, this does not necessarily mean that the movement toward a liberal democratic system is the same as the movement toward a Western or Anglo-American model of liberal democracy. This issue involves a complex and normative argument concerning political development, which is clearly outside the scope of this dissertation though this is an important issue. For a strong conceptualization of political development, see Huntington and Dominguez (1975). For a normative argument that political development toward the liberal democracy does not necessarily coincide with development toward a Western model of liberal democracy, see Liddle (1978). For a work which shows that there are variations of liberal democratic models, see Lijphart (1984).
Compared with the prewar constitution, the postwar counterpart provides totally new political principles for the relationship between the state and the people, a substantially different type of governmental structure, and a new and unique pacifist concept of national security. These features of the postwar constitution fostered the formal democratic political subculture and somewhat encouraged the emergence of the structural-oppositional political subculture, as will be discussed shortly.

First, according to the new constitution, the sovereignty of the state of Japan is to reside in the people of Japan instead of with the Emperor. Although the constitution maintained the monarchy, it was transformed from the semi-absolute monarchy of the prewar system to the present constitutional monarchy by making the emperor a symbolic figurehead of the nation and the state. Similarly, much respect is now given to individual civil rights.

For example, freedom of speech and of the press as well as freedom of assembly and association, freedom of thought, and freedom of religion are guaranteed by the constitution. These constitutional changes served as a source of the formal democratic political subculture. Also, the rights of workers to organize and to bargain collectively are guaranteed. These changes encouraged the growth of values associated with the structural-oppositional political subculture. These constitutional changes encouraged the labor union movements which have fostered the structural-oppositional subculture; they were also directly contradictory to traditional political values in the sense that the traditional political values tended to suppress, for the sake of internal harmony, articulation of different interests or bargaining. Thus, the postwar constitution is much more people oriented than state oriented, and it is very egalitarian in nature compared with the prewar

Because the contents of the new constitution were so drastically different from the old one, and considering the actual process by which the new constitution was drafted, it should be said that the postwar constitution was newly drafted rather than revised. Though a committee of the Japanese Cabinet worked on revision of the Meiji Constitution in 1946, the entire draft for the new constitution was drawn by the SCAP staff under MacArther's supervision. For further details, see Ward (1978) and Reischauer (1974). Robert Ward (1978, p.145) noted that the postwar constitution of Japan became so democratic that it is considered to be even more democratic than that of the United States.
Secondly, the present postwar constitution provides many more democratic and popular representative features of government structure than does the prewar constitution. The independence of the judicial, the executive and the legislative branches is clearly established by the postwar constitution, and the legislature becomes a truly popular representing organ which is also bicameral as before. The National Diet, the legislature, consists of a House of Councilors and a House of Representatives, both of which have popularly elected members. For the election of the National Diet members, the constitution together with the Public Office Election Law stipulates universal suffrage: all the Japanese men and women who are twenty years or older are eligible to vote. The percentage of enfranchised voters became 51.2 percent of the total population in 1946 (Richardson, 1974, p.9, Table 1-1).(75)

It is important to note that the top national executive office, namely the prime ministership, is not directly elected by the popular vote, while all the prefectural and local executive officers are popularly elected in the postwar system. As the Japanese governmental system is a parliamentary system, like that of Great Britain, the leader of the party that occupies the majority of seats in the legislature holds the national executive office as the prime minister, who selects his cabinet members.(76)

(75) Universal suffrage is of course applied to elections for local legislative and executive offices as well as to national elections. Also, the autonomy and authority of local governments are much more honoured in the postwar political system than in the prewar system, although the degree of political decentralization in the postwar Japanese system, which is a unitary system, is still considerably weaker than in countries with federal systems such as the United States or West Germany.

(76) In Japan, the prime minister and his cabinet members are in formality appointed by the Emperor, who however "shall not have powers related to government" (Article 4, the Constitution of Japan). In a sense, the Japanese government structure can be regarded as an amalgam of the American system and the British system. The Japanese prime minister has in theory a stronger power over his cabinet than his British counterpart; and he is therefore more similar to the American president in this respect, although the Japanese prime ministership is basically modeled after the British one.
Thus, the present government system is drastically more democratic, representative, and decentralized than the pre-war system. These participatory oriented constitutional provisions fostered fairly strong attitudes favoring the liberal democratic political system in a formal sense among the postwar Japanese (Richardson, 1974). These formal opinions facilitated the formation and development of the formal democratic political subculture.

Thirdly, the present constitution has a unique feature in its concept of national defense. Article 9 of the constitution renounces war and inhibits Japan from using or possessing any military forces. This constitutional provision has had a clear impact on contemporary Japanese political culture. The Japanese have been very pacifist since the end of the war, and this constitutional provision, together with bitter memories of war and their deep reflection on their past, may have helped the Japanese to remain pacifist. This pacifist orientation has been more visible among progressive intellectuals than among the traditionally oriented people in postwar Japan. Accordingly, Article 9 of the present constitution has been a symbolic goal to cherish among those progressively oriented Japanese who tend to subscribe to values of both the formal democratic political subculture and the structural-oppositional political subculture. This point will be referred to later in operationalization of the political subcultures and in a dimensional analysis of value orientation toward such political subcultures in chapter 6.

(77) This is what the Japanese concept tatemae refers to. For a detailed discussion of the concept tatemae, see Footnote 62 of this chapter. Their formal opinions favoring the democratic institutions and their actual distrustful orientation toward political reality presents one aspect of what Richardson (1974) calls "ambivalent" attitudes of the Japanese.

(78) This clause became controversial within Japan especially when the National Defense Force and Defense Agency were created in 1954. Since then, the government has claimed that the Defense Force shall be used solely for defensive purposes and for the protection of Japan but not for aggression, whereas critics and many opposition parties have charged that possession of the Defense Force itself is a violation of the constitution. Despite the controversy, Article 9 contributed to the successful demilitarization of Japan after World War II and provided Japan's unique status as the first and the only country which prohibits herself from having any military forces.
3.2.2.2 Transformation of Political Party System

Any discussion of the political and institutional changes from prewar Japan to postwar Japan which focuses only on changes within the scope of the constitution would be insufficient. In addition to the many other political and institutional changes that took place during the period of the Allied Occupation, the resumption of the interrupted political party system and its change from the prewar period, are too important to ignore. The reemergence of Japanese political parties has two different aspects. One is the underlying continuity with the prewar political parties, and the other is a changed or newly emerging aspect of the party system.

On the one hand, Haruhiro Fukui (1970) suggests that organizational characteristics as well as behavioral patterns of the conservative parties of prewar Japan were carried over to the postwar parties in the conservative camp, although party politics and the party system were clearly interrupted by the dissolution of the political parties and the creation of a single national party in 1940.(79) The two major conservative parties(80) of the early postwar period preserved organizational structures as well as other traits of intraparty dynamism (e.g., recruitment patterns, factional relations, etc.) very similar to those of their prewar counterparts.(81) Especially, strategies and

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(79) This was creation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai) in 1940 as was discussed in Footnote 71 (Fukui, 1970).

(80) The two major conservative parties in the early postwar period, namely the Japan Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party (formerly the Japan Progressive Party), merged into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. The LDP was the only conservative party from 1955 until 1976, when the New Liberal Club split off from the LDP.

(81) Actually such transmission of party traits had been made before those party leaders of the prewar era, such as Ichiro Hatoyama, were purged from the public office. Moreover, many of these were later allowed to come back to the public arena. For example, Hatoyama was purged in 1947, and came back and became a prime minister in 1954. Accordingly, the postwar purge of older party leaders, who had been active until the end of the war, did not critically hinder the transmission of prewar party characteristics to the postwar conservative parties (Fukui, 1970).
patterns of voter mobilization of the prewar conservative parties were transmitted to their counterparts in the postwar period. The postwar conservative parties still depend on "Jiban" (well entrenched mobilizational networks in constituencies) for their votes, especially in rural areas, just as the prewar conservative parties did (Richardson, 1967a, 1967b; Thayer, 1967; Curtis, 1971). This continuity of the traditional elements of party politics has been a source of stable and continuous support of the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) among the traditional oriented Japanese who are the core constituents of the traditional political culture (Watanuki, 1967a; Richardson, 1974).

On the other hand, a new aspect of the Japanese party system developed after the war. The Socialist and Communist Parties were banned in 1924 when they came to be regarded as threats to the prewar imperial regime. After the war, the SCAP office reinstated both the socialists and communists as legitimate parties, as well as setting political prisoners free in 1945. This lift of political suppression of those anti-system parties transformed the Japanese party system from a monolithic system to a more pluralistic one. After several splits and mergers had occurred among the leftist parties as well as the conservative parties, the basic structure of the party system in the early postwar period was consolidated in 1955, when the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the LDP were formed.(82) Now, the LDP established itself as the dominant conservative party, and both the JSP and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) solidified their organizational strength. These two leftist parties have undoubtedly played a major role in fostering the structural-oppositional political subculture. This process will be discussed further in the next chapter (particularly, in Section 4.1).

The Japanese party system after 1955 is characterized as a bipolar party system with clear conservative (LDP) dominance or as a "dominant party system."(83) However, this

(82) In 1955, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was formed as a result of merger of the Left Socialist Party and the Right Socialist Party. Subsequently, the two conservative parties, namely the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, were unified under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the same year, as a response to this socialists' unification (Fukui, 1970).

(83) The Japanese party system after 1955 is often called a "one-party dominant system" or a "one-and-one-half party system" instead of a "two-party system," because
dominant bipolar party system began to undergo a gradual transformation in the 1960s, as demonstrated by the longitu-
duial changes in vote shares of parties in the general elections (Table 2).

However, the transformation of the LDP dominant structure of the party system into a multi-party system was not
completed until the early 1970s. First, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) split from the JSP in 1960 because of
an ideological conflict regarding their policy toward the
Communist bloc and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Then, the
Clean Government Party (CGP) was formed in 1964 using Soka
Gakkai as its mobilizational basis. While the DSP was
originally somewhat more conservative than the JSP,
throughout the 1960s the DSP moved even further toward the
centrist position and further away from the leftist posi-
tion on the ideological continuum. As the CGP emerged in
the mid 1960s, both the DSP and CGP came to be regarded as
middle-of-the-road (centrist oriented) parties. Despite
these new additions of centrist parties in the first half
of the 1960s, the dominant party system established in 1955
(the so-called "1955 Party System") remained until the ear-
ly 1970s. The LDP's share of seats in the Diet remained in
a majority (Table 3) and the LDP dominated the national
political scene without any serious threat from the opposi-
tion parties until the early 1970s, although the opposite
parties' collective share of votes exceeded that of the LDP
in the late 1960s (Table 2).(85)

the LDP's share of votes at the national elections and
its share of seats within the National Diet overwhelm-
ingly exceeded those of the JSP, which was the major —
and indeed the only — viable counter-force to the LDP
in that period (Flanagan and Richardson, 1984). The
reason for using the term "bipolar" party system is
that the LDP and the JSP obtained most of the vote
share from 1958 (96.7%) to 1967 (74.3 %) at the House
of Representatives Elections (General Elections),
counting the conservative independents' votes (varying
from 2.8% to 6.0%) as the LDP votes (see Table 2).

(84) Soka Gakkai is a relatively young, huge Buddhist
organization which grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s
as a subsidiary organization of a Buddhist sect,
Nichiren-Shu. For further information about Soka Gak-
kai and its political movement, see James White

(85) Due to the complex electoral system of medium-size
districts with multiple number of seats allocated to
each district, the LDP has managed to retain a majori
Table 2

Votes Shares between Parties: Over-Time Patterns

(percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>NLC</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>CGP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>JCP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures for the LDP from 1947 through 1955 are combined vote shares of the Combined Vote Shares of the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party.

Source: Flanagan and Richardson (1984, p.76, Table 3.1).

However, it is generally agreed on that the 1955 party system collapsed in the early 1970s when the total number of seats gained by all opposition parties became close to the number of seats held by the LDP (The Japanese Political Science Association, 1979). This transformation of the Japanese party system from a dominant party system to a new multi-party system was clearly completed in 1976 when the LDP has lost a majority of votes quite often at the national elections since 1967. For a thorough and updated account of the contemporary Japanese election system with explications of its dynamic aspect, see Flanagan and Richardson (1984).
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>NLC</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>CGP</th>
<th>JSP</th>
<th>JCP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures for the LDP from 1947 through 1955 are combined vote shares of the Combined Vote Shares of the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party.

Source: Flanagan and Richardson (1984, p.78, Table 3.2).

New Liberal Club (NLC) split from the LDP, in the sense that this split of the NLC symbolized the end of the single unified partisan movement of the conservatives of postwar Japan. This split of the conservatives signified the emergence of a multi-party system in a substantive sense.(86)

(86) Through the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the LDP increased its share of votes at the national elections as well as its seats within the Diet. At the same time, the NLC became closer to the LDP in its policy positions. However, it still holds true that after 1976 the LDP's dominance in the national political arena became substantially less visible and its power in relation to other parties became considerably weaker in the national decision making process after 1976 than in the late 1950s and
This transformation of the Japanese party system and the decline of the LDP's power appears to reflect the wane of the influence of the traditional political culture values among Japanese citizens throughout the 1970s (Watanuki, 1976; Miyake, 1979; Flanagan, 1979, 1980, 1982a and b). The rise of concerns about quality of life and the emergence of post-material values in the 1970s appear to have taken place parallel to the decline of traditional political culture. Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977) suggested that new non-materialistic oriented values (i.e., "post-material values") emerged and became prevalent among the citizens of postindustrial societies, particularly in Western European countries, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. He then argued that those new values were more compatible with the policy orientation of the leftist or new centrist parties than the traditional conservative parties, and therefore that those value changes eroded the mass support base of the traditional conservative parties in those postindustrial societies. Although there have been some disagreements between Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1982) and Flanagan (1979, 1980, 1982a and b) regarding what kind of value changes have taken place in Japan, they agree that Japan underwent a significant degree of value changes (i.e., transformation of political culture) from the 1960s through the 1970s. Accordingly, their arguments suggest that the traditional political culture has declined and some new political subcultures have become more prevalent in the 1970s than before, and that this transformation of Japanese political culture coincided with the transformation of her party system.

The transformation of political culture and value changes as well as their political implications will be further discussed in the following chapter.

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the 1960s. But the period after 1976 is outside the scope of the empirical data analysis of this dissertation.
Chapter IV
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES AND SOCIO-CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

Changes and emergence of the three political subcultures have been facilitated not only by changes in political institutions but also by changes in the socio-economic structure of postwar Japan. Accordingly, in addition to the changes in political institutions discussed in the previous chapter, socio-economic changes in postwar Japan should be examined in order to capture the socio-psychological impact of socio-economic transformation on the political culture changes and also on system support attitudes.

This chapter will attempt to delineate the process in which Japan's traditional political culture has been transformed and new political subcultures (i.e., the formal democratic and the structural-oppositional subcultures) have emerged in the postwar period. The first section of this chapter (4.1) will focus on the process of the socio-economic changes in postwar Japan and its implications for the political culture changes. The second section of this chapter (4.2) will present some explanatory models for Japanese system support which are based on the socio-cultural approach. This discussion of these socio-cultural explanatory models (section 4.2) will of course be based on the discussion of socio-economic changes and their impact on political culture changes, and the explanatory models will hypothesize some linkages among the three political subcultures and system support attitudes.

4.1 TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CULTURE CHANGES IN POSTWAR JAPAN

The range of socio-economic changes extended from changes in economic and industrial structure to changes in general social aspects which involved not only macro-sociological changes, such as demographic and social structure changes, but also changes which penetrate more

- 68 -
into private life, such as changes in educational structure or family structure. The following discussion will focus separately on each of these aspects of socio-economic changes.

4.1.1 Economic Development and Emergence of Material Affluence

In the postwar period, Japan, just like West Germany, has achieved an "economic miracle" by recording the highest growth rates ever marked by any country. This rapid economic growth has significant implications for both the system performance hypothesis and the political culture hypothesis of this dissertation. First, Japan's postwar economic success has an obvious impact, as positive system performance, on system support attitudes of Japanese citizens. Second, her enormous economic growth also has effects on the transformation of the traditional political culture, as well as on the emergence of new political subcultures. Those political culture changes are, in turn, expected to have influenced the formation of Japanese system support attitudes in a particular way, which will be further elaborated later in this chapter.

A simple but fundamental way to capture Japan's postwar overall economic performance is to look at the general growth pattern of the postwar Japanese economy. Estimates of gross domestic products (GDP) across time indicate very well the path which Japan's economy has taken (Table 4). In 1938 Japan had a level of GDP almost comparable to that of Italy. (87) Japan's industrial production of course fell sharply to a minimal level in 1946, immediately after the war. Japan's GDP was only one-sixth of that of Italy, which was also devastated by the war, and was almost one to 130 when compared with the American GDP level in 1946 (Table 4). However, Japan did not simply recover from a devastated economy to its prewar level, but by 1970 Japan had become the third largest economic power in the world, after the United States and the Soviet Union.

The speed of Japan's postwar economic growth, especially after 1950, was phenomenal, even when compared with that of other major economic powers. In 1950, the GDP of the

(87) In this sense, Japan was unique among the non-Western countries in that it became one of the major industrialized nations in the world before World War II. Japan produced four and half million tons of crude steel and was one of the leading nations in textile production (Richardson, 1984b; Keiji Nagahara, 1970).
Table 4
Gross Domestic Products: A Cross-national Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>W.G.</th>
<th>G.B.</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>240.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>341.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>506.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>694.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>204.6</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>185.5</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>981.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>564.0</td>
<td>170.8</td>
<td>447.0</td>
<td>220.7</td>
<td>1,695.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


United States was twenty-four times as large as that of Japan. Over the next two and half decades, Japan's GDP had grown to one third of her American counterpart's by 1976 (Table 4). (88) Japan's rate of economic growth accelerated

(88) Because the data in Table 4 are not standardized for inflation rates, it cannot be said that Japan's GDP has grown 560 times from 1946 to 1976. Moreover, GDP estimates from the United Nations Statistical yearbooks changed the method of measurement of GDP figures, from GDP at factor cost to that in purchaser's values or market prices over time. Therefore, longitudinal comparison is not very reliable nor is it encouraged. It is thus appropriate to read the table for the purpose of comparison of GDP levels across nations, and
particularly from 1960 on. Following West Germany's pattern of an economic miracle, Japan exceeded even West Germany itself in GDP in the late 1960s, by marking a faster growth rate than any other nation during the quarter of a century from 1953 to 1978 (Keidel, 1981). As Table 5 suggests, the average growth rate of Japan in any of the three periods (1950-1960, 1960-1970, and 1970-1976) was higher than that of any other major economic power. Thus, Japan has become one of the world's major economic powers in the latter half of the postwar period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950-60</th>
<th>1960-70</th>
<th>1970-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ryutaro Komiya (1975, p.6, Table 1-3). Lawrence Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi (1976, p.386).

the table accurately indicates changes of relationships in GDP level between those nations over time. However, conversion of all the figures into U.S. dollars makes longitudinal comparison deviate less from comparison of standardized GDP figures than the figures expressed in the national currency unit of each country, due to the more stable price changes in U.S. dollars than in Japanese, German, or Italian currencies.
Thus, Japan's economic development in the postwar period was characterized by its high achievement level and by its high speed. These two characteristics have implications for changes in people's political attitudes and their political culture in two respects.

First, the speed of Japan's economic growth has an implication for political generations in contemporary Japan. The generational differences in political attitudes are certain to be greater in a rapidly changing society than in a slowly changing society (Manheimm, 1954; Inglehart, 1971). Social stimuli which the people receive during their formative years are in general deeply instilled into their stable attitudes (Jennings and Niemi, 1972; Zeitline, 1966). The social, economic and political stimuli in the 1960s are very different from those in the 1930s in a rapidly changing society, whereas the changes of stimuli over that time span are not as great in a slowly changing society as in a rapidly changing society. Accordingly, in Japan, the generational gap in political attitudes must be at least sizable between the "prewar" generation (i.e., the generation who spent their formative years in the prewar period) and the "postwar" generation (i.e., the generation who spent their formative years in the postwar period), because the younger "postwar" generation have been exposed, during their formative years, to different kinds of social, economic, and political stimuli from those that the older "prewar" generation received.

Second, a high level of economic growth is usually accompanied by material affluence for individuals. (89)

(89) Strictly speaking, high economic growth is actually accompanied by material affluence for individuals across different social strata, only as far as wealth or income is evenly distributed. Ikuo Kabashima (1984) points out that Japan achieved even distribution of income during the high economic growth period without concentrating a large amount of wealth among the top strata. Similarly, an index for equality in income distribution (Gini coefficient) indicates that Japan's income distribution structure appears to be as egalitarian as, or more so than, other postindustrial nations, such as the United States, Great Britain, or West Germany. The Gini coefficient shows 0.316 for Japan in 1969, 0.318 for Britain, 0.383 for West Germany, and 0.381 for the United States in 1972 (Gini coefficient is designed such that 0.0 indicates perfect equality in income distribution and 1.0 means perfect inequality, namely complete monopoly of income by one person. Accordingly, the lower the coefficient
Considering the argument of Inglehart (1971, 1977), the wide diffusion of material affluence in postwar Japan is believed to have had an impact on the formation of new values and new political attitudes. Ronald Inglehart (1971, 1977) asserts that new non-materialistic oriented values (i.e., "post-material values") emerged and became prevalent among the citizens of postindustrial societies, particularly in Western European countries, in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. He then argues that those new values are more compatible with the policy orientation of the leftist or new centrist parties than with the traditional conservative parties, and therefore that those value changes eroded the mass support base of the traditional conservative parties in those societies. (90) Although there have been some disagreements between Inglehart (1982) and Flanagan (1979, 1980, 1982a and b) on what kinds of value changes Japan has undergone, they agree that Japan underwent a significant degree of value changes (i.e., transformation of political culture) from the 1960s through the 1970s. Accordingly, their arguments suggest that the traditional political culture has declined and some new political subcultures have become more prevalent in the 1970s than in the earlier part of the postwar period.

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is, the more equality in income distribution exists in that society). (Economic Planning Agency, 1977, p. 7 and p. 77).

(90) Before Inglehart's (1971) work came out, the affluent-worker theme was common in Western Europe, which suggested that the working class people who became materially more affluent tended to defect from a leftist oriented working-class party to a more conservative oriented middle-class party (Goldthorpe, Bechhofer, and Platt, 1968; Butler and Stokes, 1969). In contrast, Inglehart explained the subsequent trend of the defection of middle-class voters from the conservative parties in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. In the case of Japan, the affluent worker theme does not seem to hold, as Watanuki's (1967a) empirical examination suggests. Although the number of the "post-materialism" oriented citizens was small (Watanuki, 1976c), the trend of middle-class defection from the conservative political camp, which Inglehart has suggested, seems to fit Japanese pattern of electoral changes better, despite the possibility that such a pattern of electoral change may be due to reasons other than those Inglehart has suggested.
One indicator of individual material affluence is gross domestic products (GDP) per capita. Estimates of per capita GDP can portray changes in the affluence level of the Japanese in comparison to other nations more clearly than do the straight GDP estimates. As Table 6 indicates, Japan's per capita GDP in 1950 was about seven percent of the American per capita GDP, but that of Japan by 1976 had become approximately 64 percent of her American counterpart's. Japan's per capita GDP began to grow in 1950, being nearly half that of Italy, and one-sixth that of Great Britain. Japan nearly caught up with Italy in 1966, and with Britain in 1970, and had clearly exceeded both by 1976. Of course, Japan had not caught up with West Germany by 1976 but was approaching it. (91) Thus, the Japanese had clearly become as affluent as, or even more affluent than, the peoples of the major industrialized nations in an aggregate sense.

The affluence level of Japanese individual life can be even better illustrated by the diffusion rates of some material goods, such as television sets and other electric appliances, telephones, and automobiles. The diffusion rate of television sets per 1,000 inhabitants is shown in Table 7, and the diffusion rates of other material goods indicate very similar patterns of changes over time. As Table 7 suggests, compared with the Germans or English, Japanese living standards were considerably lower in the prewar period, and that holds true even when comparing Japanese figures with the German standards in the aftermath of World War II. Japan and Italy appear to have had a comparable level of material living standards from the 1930's through the 1950's, excepting automobiles, for which the Japanese have never had a comparable level of ownership with any of the advanced nations throughout the modern period. However, the Japanese began enjoying a level of living standards comparable to that of the Britons or the West Germans in the late 1960s and the 1970s, as Japan's per capita GDP became comparable to their figures. Although American living standards and their level of material affluence have been beyond comparison of their Japanese counterparts throughout the postwar period, the differences between them had been tremendously reduced in

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(91) "Some observers even claimed that Japan's economy passed that of the United States in per capita income some time in 1978 or 1979" (Richardson, 1984b). Also, it should be noted that Japan's sharp increase from 1970 to 1976 in Table 6 is due to changes in the exchange rate in favor of the Japanese yen against U.S. dollars.
Table 6
Per Capita GDP: A Cross-National Comparison
(in U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>W.G.</th>
<th>G.B.</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>1,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>2,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>2,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>3,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>4,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>5,002</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>7,267</td>
<td>3,949</td>
<td>7,878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


many aspects of material life by the mid 1970s. (92)

Moreover, when shifting our focus on the diffusion level of material goods from per capita to per household, by the mid 1970s the Japanese standards often exceeded those of their European or even American counterparts in some aspects of material life, as the diffusion rates of electronic appliances indicate (Table 8). (93) The percentages of Japanese households that have color television sets,

(92) For example, the Americans were 227 times more likely to have television sets than were the Japanese in 1955, whereas Americans were only three times more likely to own television sets than were the Japanese in 1976 (Table 7).

(93) Clear exceptions are the automobile diffusion rate and various housing conditions (e.g., proportion of house ownership, size of houses, etc.), where the Japanese level have not reached the European or American standards and probably never will due to the limited land available for roads or housing in Japan.
Table 7

Television Sets Diffusion: A Cross-National Comparison

(Number of TV Sets per 1,000 inhabitants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>W.G.</th>
<th>G.B.</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The figures of the United States indicate numbers of television receivers; those of the other nations indicate numbers of licences issued for television.


refrigerators or washing machines became comparable to American figures, and became higher than any of the other advanced nations by the late 1970s. (94) Actually, Japan has become almost saturated with those electric appliances, as Table 8 shows. Therefore, the conditions of material life of the Japanese in the 1970s certainly became similar to their West European counterparts and somewhat similar to

(94) The discrepancy in diffusion rates of TV sets between Table 7 (figure per 1,000 inhabitants) and Table 8 (figure of households owning color TV sets) is probably because many American households have multiple numbers of TV sets although a considerable number of households do not own any. Considering this point, the material living gap between the poor and the rich may be generally greater in the United States than in Japan, as the Gini coefficient suggests (see Footnote 89).
those of the Americans.

Table 8

Diffusion of Electric Appliances Among Households: A Cross-National Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color TV Sets</th>
<th>(Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>98 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refrigerators</th>
<th>(Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>99 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Washing Machines</th>
<th>(Percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>98 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In short, the living standards and the material affluence of the Japanese were drastically improved from the prewar period to the present, and they became comparable to those of West European and North American nations. This emergence of material affluence as well as its sheer speed in the postwar era must have imprinted strong marks on Jap
anese minds in two aspects, as was discussed earlier: (1) generational effects on attitudinal changes of the postwar Japanese; and (2) formation of new social and political values among the postwar Japanese.

First, as was discussed earlier, generational differences are expected to exist between the younger (i.e., postwar) generation and the older (i.e., prewar) generation in their orientation toward those three different political subcultures, because the society and its material affluence changed so drastically and so quickly in postwar Japan. This will be examined empirically in chapter 6.

Second, considering the fact that Japan became comparable to Western European nations in material affluence, it is quite plausible that the post-material values found in Western Europe (Inglehart, 1971, 1977) may have emerged in postwar Japan (Inglehart, 1982), or that different but still new social values, such as libertarian and modern values, may have emerged in postwar Japan (Flanagan, 1979, 1982a and b). If so, then those Japanese who are post-material oriented or libertarian and modern oriented are expected to have a weak orientation toward the traditional political culture. Although this dissertation will not empirically examine the Inglehart hypothesis (1971, 1977) or the Flanagan hypothesis (1979, 1980, 1982a and b), (95) it is assumed here that some kinds of fundamental value changes, namely transformation of the political culture, have taken place in postwar Japan. This dissertation will then move directly to an empirical examination of the effects of the new aspects of political culture (i.e., the formal democratic and structural-oppositional political subculture) and the impact of the traditional political culture on system support attitudes, which will be discussed in chapter 6.

4.1.2 Changes in the Industrial Structure and the Emergence of a Postindustrial Society

Japan's economic development was of course accompanied by industrialization. But, industrialization generally has not only an economic impact on a society but also sociological and political effects on it. The first half (4.1.2.1) of the discussion in this subsection will briefly trace the process by which Japan's industrialization has

(95) An obvious reason for not examining these hypotheses is that both Inglehart (1982) and Flanagan (1982a and b) have empirically examined their hypotheses well themselves.
progressed, which focuses on an economic aspect of industrialization. The second half (4.1.2.2) of this subsection will discuss the sociological and political implications of industrialization for political culture changes and for the formation of system support attitudes.

### 4.1.2.1 Transformation of Industrial Structure

Japan was primarily an agrarian society when her modernization began in 1868 (i.e., the end of feudalistic warrior-led regime), as 78 percent of the total workforce was engaged in agriculture (Nagahara, 1970 p.187). However, Japan industrialized very rapidly. First, throughout her wars against China (1894-1895) and Russia (1905-1905), Japan needed to industrialize. Then, taking advantage of the increased demands of goods due to World War I, Japan became a major country in textile production, as her production of cotton threads and fabric became the second largest in the world after the United States by 1935 (Nagahara, 1970, pp.298-300). Approaching the Pacific War (World War II), Japan transformed her industrial structure from a textile and light industry oriented structure to a heavy and chemical industry oriented structure. The production share of the heavy-chemical industry jumped from 35.5 percent in 1930 to 63.2 percent in 1940, whereas the share of the textile and other light industries combined dropped from 64.5 percent in 1930 to 36.8 percent in 1940 (Nagahara, 1970).

Although the Pacific War devastated Japan's economic and industrial foundations, Japan recovered from the aftermath of the war to a point where she was able to resume her industrialization by the early 1950s, owing to American economic aid and the sharp increase of export demands by the war on the Korean peninsula. During the Korean War period, "a number of economic indicators reached a normal prewar (1934-1936) level" (Keidel, 1981, p.78). Thus, Japan industrialized to a somewhat competitive level in the international market by the mid 1950s.(96)

Japan's continuous high economic growth in the 1960s and 70s transformed the nation from an industrial society to a postindustrial society. Daniel Bell (1973) suggests that the predominance of the tertiary sector in the entire workforce is one of the major characteristics of a postindus

(96) This happened to coincide with the formation of the 1955 party system (see chapter 3, subsection 3.2.2.2), where the LDP became a dominant party in Japan.
Japan's postwar economic history shows the following changes in proportions of workforces among three economic sectors (Table 9). The proportion of the primary economic sector's workforce sharply declined throughout the 1960s and 70s. The secondary sector gradually increased its share of the workforce during the 1960s, although the expansion of the secondary economic sector slowed down and almost stopped in the 1970s. The tertiary sector increased its size of workforce continuously throughout the postwar period and finally exceeded the 50 percent level in the 1970s, as Table 9 indicates. The tertiary sector of Japan thus became the dominant economic sector and came to enjoy a greater share than the rest of the two sectors combined in the mid 1970s. This holds true even compared with other postindustrial nations, as shown in Table 10.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Compositions of Three Economic Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Average Growth Rate Based of GDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sector (Agriculture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(97) Other characteristics of a postindustrial society include increase of technical (i.e., engineers) and professional workers, and stronger emphasis on knowledge industries and information industries over manufacturing industries (Bell, 1973). These will be briefly discussed below.
### Table 10

Changes in Size of Tertiary Sector Workforce across Nations

(Percentage to the Entire Workforce)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>W.G.</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>33 %</td>
<td>38 %</td>
<td>53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>43 %</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>41 %</td>
<td>60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>47 %</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45 %</td>
<td>62 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>55 %</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>66 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Bell's (1973) other standards for a postindustrial society, professional workers and engineers must increase sharply, and knowledge and information industries must form the core industries of the society, as well being more important industries for the society than are manufacturing industries. In fact, the center of gravity in Japan's industrial structure shifted from heavy industry to knowledge industry in the 1970s. For example, Japan was losing her competitive edge in textile and ship-building industries by the end of the 1960s, whereas she was becoming more competitive in electric and electronic products, such as color televisions and computer chips in the 1970s. In addition, Japan's rate of increase of professional workers and engineers became comparable to the American and German figures in the 1970s. (98) Therefore, as far as the

(98) Professional workers in Japan increased by 3.3 percent between 1970 and 1975 and by 4.6 percent for the 1975-1980 period. West Germany has a 3.2 percent figure for both periods, and the American figures were
industrial structure is concerned, Japan has been clearly moving toward a postindustrial society, as the United States, West Germany, and a few other nations have. (99)

4.1.2.2 Implications of Transformation of Industrial Structure

Industrialization of a society generally has some direct and indirect implications for system support. Similarly, the shift from industrialism to postindustrialism also has some implications for system support. While at least one of these implications is directly concerned with system support, other implications are indirectly related to system support in the sense that the industrial structure changes cause some changes of political culture which in turn have a direct impact on system support.

The indirect political implications of the industrial structure transformation will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs on the following points: (1) change in workforce composition between three different economic sectors (as was discussed in the first half of this subsection); (2) urbanization, or geographical mobility of the population; (3) expansion of education opportunities; and (4) increase of mass media information. Since urbanization, educational change, changes in mass media, and their implications for system support will be discussed in the following subsections (urbanization in 4.1.3, education in 4.1.5, and mass media in 4.1.6), the discussions here will be limited to the transformation of workforce composition and its implications.

As was discussed earlier (in 4.1.2.1), the rapid industrialization of Japan in the first quarter century of the postwar period brought about a quick increase in the workforce of the secondary economic sector. Similarly, the shift of the industrial structure to the postindustrialism in the 1970s was accompanied by the sharp expansion of the

3.9 percent for the 1970-74 period and 3.8 percent for the 1975-79 period (Ministry of Labor, 1982, Appendix p.109). Actually, the real number of those professional workers as well as their percentage of the entire workers are still considerably lower in Japan than in West Germany or the United States.

(99) Other characteristics of the postindustrial society will be discussed later in conjunction with cultural aspects of postwar Japan, such as educational changes (4.1.5) and media development (4.1.6).
tertiary sector into the largest economic sector of Japan. These changes in workforce composition have the following four implications for the political culture changes in postwar Japan.(100)

First, the diminishing proportion of the primary sector's workforce (Table 9) implies the wane of the traditional Japanese political culture. Because Japanese farmers have been core constituents of the traditional political culture (Fukutake, 1964, 1980), and because the agricultural sector's workforce has occupied approximately 90 percent of the primary sector's workforce (see Table 9), the number of Japanese who strongly subscribe the traditional political culture must have declined as the number of the primary sector workers has declined.

Second, as the secondary sector's workforce expanded along with Japan's industrialization, the number of people who subscribe the structural-oppositional political subculture must have increased. Because those workers, who are engaged in coal mining, factory manufacturing and so on, have been often unionized, and because many of those unions are affiliated with one of the socialist parties, namely either the JSP, the DSP, or the JCP (Richardson, 1984c), the increase of the secondary sector's workforce implies the rise of the structural-oppositional political subculture.(101)

(100) For a clear delineation and account of the complex relationship between different economic sectors (i.e., different occupations) and political and cultural orientation, see Watanuki (1967a, 1974, 1976a).

(101) The labor unions have also been publicly advocating for the values of the formal democratic subculture because they have been cherishing Article 9 (the war renunciation clause) as well as other democratic features of the postwar Constitution as symbol which denounces the prewar authoritarian regime. Accordingly, the postwar Japanese labor unions generally support the values of both the structural-oppositional political subculture and the formal democratic subculture. This point will be further discussed in conjunction with the Japan Teachers Union (JTU) in a later section on postwar educational change (subsection 4.1.5). For a clear account of political value orientation of the labor unions in postwar Japan, see Watanuki (1966, 1967a).
Third, the sharp increase of the tertiary sector's workforce suggests enhancement of the formal democratic subculture orientation as well as the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation. The tertiary sector workers are generally better educated than workers in other sectors.\(^{102}\) Also, the tertiary sector workforce is mainly composed of white-collar workers, and the white-collar workers are generally believed to have a higher level of ideological and political conceptualization than do other workers.\(^{103}\) Considering these two points, it is plausible that the tertiary sector workers are more weakly oriented toward the traditional political culture.

In addition to these two characteristics, the tertiary sector workers are also extensively unionized, as many Japanese white-collar workers are unionized.\(^{104}\) The white-collar union members are exposed to political information which are oriented toward the structural-oppositional political subculture values, although the white-collar union members tend to be more conservative or moderate than the blue-collar union members because the white-collar workers are more likely to have higher income and higher status in the society and consequently tend to identify themselves with the establishment segment of the

\(^{102}\) The higher education is related to orientation toward the formal democratic subculture as well as the structural-oppositional political subculture. For a further discussion on this, see subsection on education (4.1.5).

\(^{103}\) Here, the term "levels of ideological conceptualization" refers to Converse's work (1964), and see also this pioneer work on mass belief system for the empirical examples on the relationship between types of occupations and levels of ideological conceptualization. For an elaborated examination and account that only a certain types of white-collar occupation motivate the people to participate in political process, particularly voting, than other types of occupations, see Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, particularly chapter 2).

\(^{104}\) The white-collar unionization is one distinguished characteristics of Japanese labor movement from its American counterpart, although some segments of civil servants have recently been unionized even in the United States (Huntington, 1975). The similar white-collar unionization to Japan is also found in Scandinavian countries (Watanuki, 1967a).
Therefore, the rapid increase of the tertiary sector workforce in postwar Japan implies that the influence of the formal democratic and structural-oppositional political subcultures has relatively enhanced while the influence of the traditional political culture has declined.

Fourth, the sharp transformation of industrial structure in postwar Japan suggests that many younger Japanese adults have different occupations from their parents' occupations. For example, as a result of the industrialization, many farmers' or fishermen's sons or daughters have gotten jobs in manufacturing factories. Similarly, many children of the factory workers as well as those of farmers or fishermen have gotten jobs in the tertiary sector, as the postindustrialism progressed in postwar Japan. Hence, many young Japanese are now exposed to different nature of political information at work from the political information which they have received from their parents. This implies that inter-generational transmission of the traditional political culture orientation, through the common occupational experience, must have been weakened on the process of political socialization in postwar Japan. Therefore, this inter-generational (or parent-child) difference in their occupation also facilitates the wane of the traditional political culture.

Thus, the transmission of the industrial structure of postwar Japan has effects on the political culture changes and therefore has indirect implications to system support in those four aspects. But, the shift of the industrial structure, particularly the emergence of the postindustrial society, also has direct implications to system support.

Samuel Huntington (1973) argues that it will be increasingly difficult for a political system to satisfy its system members as the socio-economic structure of the political system is being transformed into the structure of the postindustrial society, because the burden and demands from the system members will be greater on the political system and its government in a postindustrial society than in an

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(105) For a clear account of the postwar Japanese union members' political and value orientation, see Watanuki (1967a) who disentangles this complex and paradoxical structure of the white-collar union members' attitudes.

(106) For the relationship between the occupational mobility and the parent-child disagreement in political attitudes, see Butler and Stokes (1969, 1974).
industrial or an agrarian society. A dominant group of workforce in a postindustrial society is the tertiary sector workers, particularly those workers who are engaged in management, administration or research. They are reported, in several political behavior studies, to be better educated, more ideologically sophisticated, more participatory, and more politically informed. Therefore, the democratic political system in a postindustrial society will be overloaded by the demands from those more informed, sophisticated and better educated citizens. As a result, it becomes increasingly difficult for the political system to satisfy its system members' expectations (Huntington, 1973, 1975).

One other factor which makes the democratic political system harder to be accountable to the demands from the system members is the expansion of the scope of the government's activity and the democratic system's activity. As Suzan Berger (1979) suggests, the postindustrial democratic state has been moving to the direction of welfare state as well. And, this inevitably increases the scope of the activity to which the government and the political system are responsible. As a result, the postindustrial democratic system inevitably faces the "crisis of governability" (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, 1975).

This implication of the postindustrialization is not related to the political culture changes but is directly related to the question of system support. Particularly, the difficulty of a postindustrial democratic system to satisfy the system members is directly relevant to the system performance hypothesis rather than to the political culture hypothesis. However, it should be noted that this above discussion is concerned with actual performance of the political system. As was discussed in chapter 2 (particularly, 2.2.1), the scope of the empirical analysis of this dissertation does not include the examination of the actual performance of the political system but only includes the citizens' perception of system performance.

Thus, the transformation of industrial structure has implications to both the political culture hypothesis and the system performance hypothesis. However, the full implications of the postindustrialism to political culture changes, system performance evaluation, and system support will have to be examined not only in terms of the industrial structure change, but will have to be examined through at least a consideration of the impact of educational changes, media development, urbanization, and political socialization changes. These will be discussed in the following subsections.
4.1.3 Urbanization: Decline of Traditional Socialization Force (1)

The rapid industrialization of postwar Japan, that was discussed in the previous subsection (4.1.2), brought about a rapid urbanization among other things. The urbanization in postwar Japan transformed traditional community structures and interpersonal communication networks in those communities. The transformation of the traditional community structures and the interpersonal communication networks must have eroded the traditional political culture, because intergenerational transmission and interpersonal reinforcement of the traditional political cultural values have been undermined by those community structure changes. This subsection will review the transformations of community structure and the accompanied changes of the traditional political socialization pattern in conjunction of urbanization in postwar Japan. (107)

The increase of population in Japanese cities was explosive in the 1950s and 1960s. The percentage of population living in cities increased from 37.5 percent in 1950 to 63.5 percent in 1960, and to 72.7 percent in 1971, whereas the percentages of inhabitants in towns and villages declined from 62.5 percent in 1950, to 36.5 percent in 1960, and to 27.3 percent in 1971 (Uchida, 1972). There were two factors that contributed to the rapid increase of city population in postwar Japan. One factor that undoubtedly contributed to the expansion of city population was a series of mergers and reorganizations of small cities, towns and villages, which was facilitated by Town-Village Merger Promotion Law (Uchida, 1972).

The other cause for the expansion of city populations was clearly immigration into cities parallel to the industrialization of Japanese cities (Uchida, 1972). This is confirmed by the further increase of urban population even after most mergers of cities, towns, and villages had been completed by 1960, as Table 11 shows (Economic Planning Agency, Kokumin Seikatsu Hakusho, 1978). According to Table 11, the share of population in the smallest towns with less than 50 thousand inhabitants declined from 55.6 percent in 1960 to 32.6 percent in 1975. But large cities grew very little in their population share after 1965.

(107) For full implication of the urbanization to the political process in postwar Japanese democracy, see a series of works by Mitsuru Uchida (1972, 1975, 1978). For the impact of urbanization particularly on political participation, see Richardson (1973) and Uchida (1975).
Instead, the medium size cities expanded more rapidly especially between 1965 and 1970.

Table 11


(Percentage as to the entire national population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Cities, Towns and Villages</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>55.6 %</td>
<td>21.2 %</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
<td>19.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Planning Agency (1978b, p. 84).

This trend in data suggests that the large cities reached the ceiling of their population capacity and could not absorb additional immigrants into their city limits after a certain point. But, those large cities, as industrial and commercial centers, continued to attract a large number of incoming people. Consequently, those newcomers were forced to settle into the suburban sattelite cities in the outskirt of those large cities. These phenomena emerged especially in such regions as Tokyo, Osaka, or Nagoya in the late 1960s, and these areas thus developed into metropolitan areas. In fact, the medium size cities, many of which were the suburban sattelite cities of the large cities, increased their population most sharply, whereas the population of the large cities themselves
almost stopped expanding after 1965. (108)

This pattern of population mobility can be better illustrated by looking into different sections of large cities (i.e., downtown sections, or residential sections) rather than looking at aggregate population changes of the large cities. Changes in the number of registered voters in electoral districts serves well for this purpose, (109) by focusing on four different types of electoral districts: (1) downtown or old residential areas of large cities; (2) suburban residential areas of large cities; (3) newly growing medium or large cities in non-central regions; and (4) remote rural areas. Such data are presented in Table 12.

The first category of electoral districts (i.e., Tokyo 1 and Osaka 2) in Table 12 represents central sections of metropolises, namely downtown areas and old residential areas of large cities. Eligible voters, namely the adult population, of those districts increased from 1960 to 1969, but they decreased from 1969 to 1976 in both districts. In fact, the number of registered voters of Tokyo 1 in 1976 dropped below that of 1960. This pattern clearly suggests that populations in Japanese metropolises were saturated by the end of the 1960s.

In contrast, the second category of electoral districts, which represent suburban sections of metropolises, continuously marked an extraordinary rate of population increase throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. Suburban districts of Tokyo metropolitan area (i.e., Tokyo 7 and Chiba 1 in Table 12) and of Osaka metropolitan area (i.e., Osaka 3) approximately tripled their eligible voters, namely adult population, from 1960 to 1976. Furthermore, slopes of the increases in those districts are all linear.

(108) In fact, 41.5 percent of the entire Japanese population, or 46 million people, lived in within a fifty kilometer (or about thirty miles) radius of each of the three largest metropolises (i.e., Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) in 1976, while these three cities themselves account for only 11.7 percent of the entire population (Ministry of Home Affairs, Zenkaoku Jinko Setai Hyo, 1976).

(109) In Japan, all eligible adults are automatically registered in their residing districts by the Election Management Commission with the cooperation of Ministry of Home Affairs. Because the eligible voters are not required to register themselves, the number of registered voters reflects the adult population without any significant bias.
Table 12

**Electorate Size Changes in Different Types of District**

(Proportion of Increase of Registered Voters Based on Figures of 1960 as 100 percent.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral District</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo 1</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>113 %</td>
<td>99 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka 2</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>121 %</td>
<td>115 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo 7</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>213 %</td>
<td>269 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba 1</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>220 %</td>
<td>319 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka 3</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>247 %</td>
<td>319 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido 1</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>159 %</td>
<td>198 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka 1</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>145 %</td>
<td>176 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehime 3</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>94 %</td>
<td>93 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima 3</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>96 %</td>
<td>96 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Increase ratio was calculated by the author based on actual numbers of registered voters in each district, which are reported by Shigeki Nishihira (1978).

Source: Shigeki Nishihira (1978).
The third category of electoral districts, namely Hokkaido 1 and Fukuoka 1, represents growing large cities in non-central regions. These two districts contain Suppuro City and Fukuoka City, which respectively became the seventh and the tenth most populous cities in Japan in 1976, with approximately one million people each. These two districts doubled their number of eligible voters, namely the adult population, from 1960 to 1976, but they did not increase their populations nearly as much as the suburban districts of Tokyo or Osaka.

Two districts of the fourth category in the table (i.e., Ehime 3 and Kagoshima 3) are examples of the most sparsely populated areas, where the adult populations have declined in a linear manner since 1960, presumably due to emigration of younger people to larger cities for jobs or higher education. It should however be noted that the declining trends in these two districts in Table 12 slowed down or almost stopped in the 1970s after the sharp decline from 1960 to 1969. This pattern seems to suggest the so-called "U-turn phenomenon" in which younger people began to return to their home towns after they had worked in larger cities (Ministry of Labour, Rodo Hakusho, 1982, pp. 129-131). The "U-turn phenomenon" began to attract public attention in the early 1970s, although the number of these U-turning workers was still very small.(110)

These patterns of population mobility described above suggest that "urbanization" sharply developed mainly in the 1960s but clearly slowed down in the 1970s. After urbanization reached a peak in the largest Japanese cities, like Tokyo or Osaka, "suburbanization" emerged in those metropolitan areas when surrounding areas of those large cities began to attract more population than did the large cities themselves.

These population mobility patterns influenced transformation of the traditional community structures, which in turn must have facilitated change of the traditional political culture. The degree of community transformation varies from one type of community to another. First, traditional community structures in the metropolitan areas were considerably eroded in an aggregate sense, although some

(110) The U-turning workers counted only seventy to ninety thousand annually between 1971 and 1975, and that figure even declined further to about fifty thousand a year after 1975. But as those U-turning workers often move with their families, the actual population mobility due to U-turning is somewhat higher (Ministry of Labor, 1982, p. 130).
particular old sections within large cities preserved their traditional community structures. Second, the traditional community structure has been almost wiped out in the newly developing suburban cities in the outskirt of the metropolises, due to the extremely rapid immigration of a large population to those cities. Third, the newly expanding non-central large cities, such as Sapporo or Fukuoka, also greatly changed their community structures and interpersonal communication networks, and therefore must have undergone considerable erosion of the traditional political culture.

Although rural areas tended to maintain their traditional social networks, they also transformed the traditional communal networks because many younger people moved out and did not succeed roles which they would have played in their communities. Although the U-turn phenomenon brought some younger or middle-aged people back to the communities, the returners from urban cities probably brought back urban life-styles with them. They would therefore have not succeeded their roles to play in their communities but facilitated transformation of the traditional community structures, rather than preserving the traditional structures of the communities.

4.1.4 Changes in Family Structure: Decline of Traditional Socialization Force (2)

The previous subsection (i.e., 4.1.3) has discussed that interpersonal networks of traditional communities could play an important role of transmitting the traditional political values across generations in Japan. In addition to this, family has an important role in maintaining the traditional political culture. Generally, family has been known as an important agent of political socialization (Greenstein, 1965; Easton and Dennis, 1969; Jennings and Niemi, 1974, 1981). Particularly in Japan, family was recognized as an agent of transmitting the traditional political values across generations (Fukutake, 1949, 1964, 1974).(111)

(111) Massey (1976) points out that this is one stereotypical hypothesis of family influence on political attitude formation in Japan. His empirical analysis did not support this hypothesis strongly, but suggested that this hypothesis would require some modification. His findings will be briefly discussed in a short while.
The roles of family and traditional community tie as agents of socialization of the younger generation into the traditional political culture became, compared with other socialization forces, relatively more significant in the postwar period, because postwar school education and mass media, as other major socialization agents, came to emphasize the values of the formal democratic subculture or the structural-oppositional political subculture much more than the values of the traditional political culture in the postwar period. However, the nature and role of Japanese family have been changing in the postwar period, as family structure has undergone transformation in the postwar period.

In the prewar period, a typical family structure was the "extended family" where normally three generations with a large number of family members lived together. As lifestyle of urban Japanese became more Westernized, young urban married couples have been increasingly choosing not to live together with their parents. As a result, the "nuclear family" became a dominant mode of family structure in urban areas. Even in rural areas, where the extended family was a dominant mode of family structure, as postwar industrialization and urbanization proceeded, younger people increasingly emigrated from rural areas to urban areas for jobs and for higher education and stayed there to start families. This means that rural families that had had a large number of family members began to lose their younger members. Thus, not only the new families in urban areas but also the former extended families in rural areas have become nuclear families. Evidently, the slope of the decline became steeper in the period in which urbanization and industrialization proceeded more sharply.

(112) These changes will be discussed at some length in the following two subsections (i.e., 4.1.5 and 4.1.6).

(113) Another factor that facilitated this trend toward the nuclear family was a sharp decline of the average number of children in a family; "average children expectancy had dropped from over five <per family> in the prewar period to two <per family> by 1979" (Susan Pharr, 1981, p.273). This trend of transformation of family structure from the extended family to the nuclear family is also reflected in some demographic data. For example, the average number of persons per household declined from 5.0 in 1940, to 4.97 in 1950, 4.54 in 1960, and 3.69 in 1970 (Jinko Mondai Shingikai, Nihon Jinko no Doko, Ministry of Finance Printing Office, 1974 p. 92).
As the nuclear family has increasingly become the dominant mode of family structure in postwar Japan, the postwar youth has not been receiving as many traditional values from the older generation as his prewar counterpart did, because grandchildren do not live together with their grandparents and therefore are not exposed to their grandparents' values so much in the nuclear families. Thus, inter-generational transmission, particularly from grandparents to grandchildren, of traditional values has been weakened within family in the postwar period. (114)

Similarly, the changes in women's roles in postwar Japan have been curtailing the inter-generational transmission of the traditional Japanese political values within family. As the number of working mothers increased, (115) their children naturally came to spend less time with their mothers than did their prewar counterparts. Consequently, the children of working mothers would receive less influence from their mothers in the formation of their social and political attitudes and would probably receive more influence from schools and the media. Therefore, inter-generational transmission of the traditional values has been weakened in families in which both parents work.

This type of family is more likely to exist among working class families or young middle class families with highly educated wives in urban areas. Even if both parents work in farming families in rural areas, grandparents usually take care of their grandchildren in such cases, given the tendency of prevalence of extended families in rural areas. Therefore, the erosion of family socialization process again should be found more in urban areas than in rural areas. In other words, the inter-generational transmission of the traditional political culture within family must have been weaker in urban areas than in rural areas in postwar Japan. However, this urban-rural difference in socialization of the traditional values has also been

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(114) The division between the nuclear family and the extended family somewhat coincide with the cleavage between urban areas and rural areas, though some cross-cutting patterns do of course exist.

(115) In the early postwar period, many wives needed to go out to work for living. In more recent years, particularly since the early 1970s, the number of career oriented women has been gradually growing, and an increasing number of those career oriented working women have stayed in their occupation after their marriage and even after their delivery of children (Pharr, 1981).
gradually diminishing, as urbanization and industrialization have proceeded throughout Japan in the postwar period.

While these changes in the patterns of family socialization, which resulted from the family structure changes, have important implications in inter-generational transmission of the values of the traditional political culture, it should be noted that the nature and contents of these values transmitted themselves have changed. The social and political values that were considered to be important in the prewar period have received much less attention at home in the postwar period. Because postwar children have not been as much taught to respect and obey their parents as prewar children were, the authority of parents and their influence on the children's political attitude formation have been weakened in the postwar period. (116)

In the postwar period, Japanese youth have begun to reject, or have stopped making efforts to preserve, many social and political values that were considered to be closely associated with the traditional Japanese hierarchical social structure, which has been often referred to as the "Japanese feudalistic social structure." In fact, Massey (1976) found, in his political socialization study, that a clear majority of Japanese youth did not feel too much pressure to disagree with their parents' decisions but feel able to influence the decisions within their families (pp.170-174). (117) At the same time, Massey found that, these perceptions of the Japanese youth respondents were confirmed by their parents. These Massey's findings suggest that the role of Japanese family as a socialization agent of transmitting the traditional political values to Japanese youth has significantly declined in the postwar period, because the weakening of the submissive attitude to

(116) Of course, criticism has been raised against the proponents of "national character" studies with regard to the validity of speculative linkage between authoritative family structure or social values and authoritarian oriented political attitudes. However, as Massey suggests, various traditional values have still been widely considered to be major obstacles for development of democracy in Japan. For further discussion on this issue, see Massey (1976, chapter 1).

(117) It should be noted that those family decisions which the children think they can influence are only concerned with those children themselves, according to the question wordings of Massey's (1976, pp.170-174) study.
political authority is considered to reflect the decline of the traditional Japanese political culture if we accept the argument that prewar Japanese's attitude of "submissiveness to political authority was forthcoming as a result of submissiveness learned in the family toward parental authority" (Massey, 1976, p.156).

However, this does not necessarily mean that the postwar Japanese family is not transmitting the traditional political values at all. Although postwar Japanese youth may be much less submissive to their own parents within their family than their prewar counterparts, they may still have learned to be submissive to authorities in outer world, such as their community leaders or bosses at work, by observing their parents' attitudes toward the community leaders or toward their bosses.(118) Another set of findings of Massey (1976, pp.127-129) support, though indirectly, this view. He found that a significant proportion of the youth and parental respondents showed orientation toward conformity with others in situations of making their decisions.(119) If the orientation toward conformity is a typical aspect of the traditional Japanese political culture (Ishida, 1972; Flanagan, 1984a), Massey's findings about the agreement between the youth and their parents in their orientation toward conformity suggest that the postwar Japanese families still have been to a considerable extent transmitting some of the traditional cultural values across generations.

In short, the transformation of family structure from the prewar period to the postwar period implies that the inter-generational transmission of the values of the traditional political culture have been eroded in postwar Japan. Particularly, Massey (1976) found that postwar Japanese youth's attitudes toward parents were much less deferential and more liberal than what the previous

**(118)** Psychological theories of socialization suggest that attitude learning within family derives not only directly from parents' teaching of particular values but also derives from emulating the roles played by the parents or the attitudes demonstrated by the parents. This is generally called a "role theory" (Schwartz and Schwartz, 1977).

**(119)** While the conformity oriented responses were sizable in all questions and were majority responses in many questions which Massey asked, the autonomous oriented responses also reached to the comparable level in each corresponding question. For details, see Massey (1976, p.129, Table 6-1).
national character studies on the prewar Japanese had suggested (Fukutake, 1964, 1974). If we accept the arguments that family socialization of learning attitudes toward parental authority is a primary source of the authoritarian characteristics of the people in a political and social context, then the postwar Japanese's political attitudes of "deference to authority" must have been weakening. On the other hand, Massey (1976) also found that postwar Japanese youth's attitudes toward "conformity with other people" in decision-making situation were not so different from their parents attitudes. This suggests that "conformity" orientation of the Japanese are still being transmitted across generations and probably have not been weakened in the postwar period. Thus, it is fair to speculate that some values of the traditional political culture (e.g., "deference to authority") have declined their influence on attitude formation of the postwar Japanese, whereas other aspects of the traditional political culture (e.g., "conformity orientation") have retained their influence on the formation of political attitudes in the postwar period. Since the value of deference to authority is the aspect of the traditional Japanese political culture which has been often recognized as the strongest impediment to democracy, the expected decline of this value implies the favorable transformation of the traditional political culture for the democracy of postwar Japan. This is clearly an empirical question, and this will be examined through a data analysis in chapter 6.

4.1.5 Changes in the Education: An Agent of New Socialization (1)

Changes in Japanese educational system from the prewar period to the postwar period took place in two aspects. One aspect of changes is quantitative in nature, namely an expansion of educational opportunities in postwar Japan. The other one is qualitative, namely a shift of nature and orientation of educational curricula. Also, the relationship between teachers and students was drastically changed from the prewar era to the postwar period. While the qualitative educational changes have more significant impact on transformation of the traditional political culture and emergence of new political subcultures, the quantitative educational changes amplified the impact of the qualitative educational changes on political culture changes.

First, let us briefly review the expansion of educational opportunities over time (see 4.1.5.1). Then, we shall see the process in which the qualitative educational changes in postwar Japan facilitated transformation of the tra
ditional political culture and encouraged emergence of the formal democratic and the structural-oppositional political subcultures (see 4.1.5.2).

4.1.5.1 Expansion of Educational Opportunities

For more than a century, Japan has enjoyed an extensive diffusion of education. Even before Japan embarked on modernizing herself in the Meiji period, more than 40 percent of Japanese males and about 15 percent of females were literate (Hall, 1965, p.386; Passin, 1965, pp.274-276). These percentages are considered to be very high literacy rates for a premodern nation.(120)

Upon this foundation, literacy and formal education spread among the Japanese very quickly as Japan was modernizing herself. John Hall (1965) notes that "by the end of first decade of the twentieth century, Japan had passed beyond 95 percent mark in literacy" (p.386).

(120) In fact, by 1868, the end of Tokugawa period, virtually all the males in the leading warrior class were literate, and were likely to have learned rhetoric, philosophy, and the Chinese classics as well, through approximately 1,700 official and private schools. At the same time, some of the common people, especially merchants and their sons, had become literate through the "parishioners" schools (i.e., terakoya) that numbered about 1,500 throughout Japan in the late nineteenth century (Passin, 1965).
Even before the Pacific War broke out, virtually all Japanese children were enrolled at elementary schools. (121)

This high educational level in aggregation of the prewar Japanese implies that the Japanese as a whole were fairly ready to participate in political process even before World War II, because most Japanese were literate and could have casted their ballots, although the prewar electoral law hardly granted the suffrage to all the literates. Also, the high level educational attainment among the prewar Japanese could have developed some understanding of ideas of democratic institutions and democratic political process, if some democratic education had been given or if democratic political institutions had been implemented. However, such understanding was actually severely limited to a small number of highly educated and liberal oriented Japanese. While this high degree of educational diffusion might have been a seed of the liberal democratic movement of the Taisho period, democratic political orientation was never developed among the mass public in prewar Japan. In short, the prewar Japanese as a whole might have been fairly ready for the democratic political system if it had been tried, but the prewar political institutions hindered any significant development of democratic value orientation among the ordinary citizens.

(121) This point is well illustrated by the percentage changes of elementary school attendance of pupils in modern (but prewar) Japan, as below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Percentage</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>28 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
<td>15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Herbert Passin (1965, p. 272, Table 1).

The leap from 59 percent in 1893 to 94 percent in 1903 in the table was due to the enforcement of four years of compulsory education by Elementary School Ordinance that was issued in 1886 and revised in 1900. Compulsory education was further extended to six years in 1907 (Passin, p. 273).
The diffusion of formal education among the Japanese continued in the postwar period, while the educational system was greatly changed after World War II. First, compulsory education was extended from six years to nine years in the new postwar educational system. The first nine years of schooling, namely both elementary and junior high school education, are required by law for all Japanese children in the postwar system. Accordingly, the junior high school education came to be taken for granted by virtually all Japanese youngsters. And even the senior high school education became more common as the Japanese generally became wealthier as a result of the economic growth.

These trends are clearly seen in percentages of young people enrolled at different education levels as shown in Table 13. Since nearly 100 percent of Japanese youth began to receive a junior high school education immediately after the war, these figures are omitted from the table. The enrollment in senior high schools increased drastically after Japan entered into the high economic growth period in 1960, as the percentage jumped from 57.7 percent in 1960 to 72.3 percent in 1966. By the mid 1970s, more than 90 percent of the corresponding age Japanese youth entered senior high schools. Similarly, the university enrollment ratio increased quickly as Japan completed the high economic growth by the early 1970s and she was turning to the stage of postindustrialism. In 1970, less than a quarter of

(122) The prewar educational system included six years of elementary school, five years of middle school, three years of high school, and four years of university education, though only the first six years of elementary school education were compulsory. On the other hand, the postwar educational system has six years of elementary school (first through sixth grade), three years of junior high school (seventh through ninth grade), another three years of senior high school (tenth through twelfth grade), and four years of college or university. In the postwar education system, elementary school and junior high school (i.e., the fifth through ninth grades) became compulsory education.

(123) The spread of higher education in Japan of the mid 1970s is another sign that Japan was becoming a postindustrial society. Japan's percentage of higher education enrollment in 1976 (38.6 %) was way above West Germany's 23.2 percent in 1978 and Britain's 22.1 percent in 1977, though it was considerably lower than the American figure of 45.2 percent in 1975 (Ministry of Education, Monbu Tokei Yoran, 1981,
Japanese high school graduates entered colleges or universities, while more than a third of them did in 1976.

Table 13

School Enrollment Ratio at Different Level in Postwar Japan

(Students Enrolled: Percentage of the Corresponding Age Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Senior High School(10-12th)</th>
<th>University, College (Total) (Male) (Female)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>51.3 9.8%</td>
<td>14.7% 4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>57.7 10.3%</td>
<td>14.9% 5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>72.3 16.1%</td>
<td>20.2% 11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>82.1 23.6%</td>
<td>29.2% 17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>92.6 38.6%</td>
<td>43.3% 33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>94.2 37.2%</td>
<td>41.3% 33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.1.5.2 Shift of Educational Orientation and Political Culture Change

Change from the prewar educational system to the postwar educational system involved not only expansion of school education but also drastic changes in the content of formal education. The shift was particularly clear in civic education curricula. In prewar schools, strong emphasis was

p.319). However, college enrollment reached a peak in 1976 and has not exceeded the 1976 level since then, as has been the case in the United States.
placed on the authoritarian oriented political values, which were later replaced by the democratic political values in schools of the postwar period. In the prewar period, Japanese school children were indoctrinated to be patriotic, to obey orders or decisions from political authorities, and to sacrifice themselves for the sake of a public cause. These doctrines were obviously compatible with and supportive of the militaristic authoritarian regime of the prewar Japan.

However, in the prewar period, the transmission of more general social values introduced by teachers may have had equally important, or even more profound, effects on the formation of political attitudes, compared with the formal civic education curricula. In prewar Japanese schools, school children were taught, particularly in moral education classes, to respect their parents, elders, teachers, and the leaders of their community, organization or country. Children also learned to be deferential and subject to opinions of those people who are more highly ranked in the society. These social values undoubtedly fostered attitudes that tended to accept any political authority acquiescently. Thus, the prewar moral education or teaching of general social values was probably as influential upon the formation of Japanese political attitudes as, if not more influential than, were the civic education curricula.

Postwar education shifted diametrically from prewar education both in terms of the civic education curricula and the teaching of general social values. The curricula of civic education were, along with SCAP's

(124) However, it should be noted that all the Japanese were not acquiescent to political authorities all the time. In fact, there were demonstrations and riots in the prewar period and even in the pre-modern period, as was mentioned earlier. But, no mass level political protests were known to have occurred at the peak of Japan's militaristic authoritarianism between 1932 and 1945.

(125) The course title "Komin (Civic Education)" was not used from 1946 until the mid 1970s, but the course title "Seiji, Keizai, Shakai (Government, Economy, and Society)" was used during those postwar years. The course title "Civic Education" was dropped in the earlier part of the postwar period, because it had been used during the prewar era and reminded many Japanese of their bitter memory of the authoritarian regime oriented education.
democratization programs, tailored to instill democratic values in the new Japanese generations during the occupation period, namely between autumn 1945 and spring 1952. The principles of the new constitution, such as the right to participate in politics, freedom of speech, equality among the people, were stressed as new important political values in postwar classrooms. This trend has persisted up to the present, even after the American occupation ended in 1952, because most teachers have cherished the principles of the postwar constitution as well as egalitarian and democratic values in postwar Japan.

In fact, the Japan Teachers Union (JTU), to which most public school teachers in Japan belong, has publicly determined to maintain and to protect the postwar constitution as the "peaceful constitution" or "democratic constitution."(126) The Japan Teachers Union (JTU), like the Japan Socialist Party with which the JTU has been affiliated, has been strongly against any movements that aim for constitutional revisions and has been very critical of the postwar Japanese political reality that has been dominated by the conservative camp. In addition, because many of university faculty members in Japan are Marxists or Marxist-oriented scholars, the majority of Japanese college and university students have been exposed to somewhat critical views of the Japanese political system.

Consequently, Japanese students have been exposed to two kinds of evaluative information about politics in the postwar period. One is information of an ideal model of democracy that the students receive as formal curricula in classrooms. The other is information about political reality that the students also receive in classrooms, but as personal opinions of their teachers. The students, as their teachers do, tend to judge the political reality against the ideal model of democracy; as a result, they are more likely to be frustrated by the gap between their idealized expectations of democratic political system and its institutions (e.g., roles of elections and the parliament), on the one hand, and their perception of political reality, on the other hand (Massey, 1976).

(126) This is not to say that the JTU has been without criticism of its teaching of civics and other social studies. Some critics state, for example, that JTU activist teachers politicize the classroom so much that young students cannot acquire objective knowledge of the subjects.
Negative evaluation of the Japanese political reality, of which the school teachers and mass media hold and to which the students are exposed, derives from the structural-oppositional counter-culture, which is in turn based on the progressive ideologies of such leftists as the JTU or the JSP activists. Thus, the progressive camp is, according to Massey (1976), often considered to be a major source responsible for creating political distrust among the contemporary Japanese. However, very few Japanese adults seem to be completely satisfied with the political reality of the postwar period, regardless of ideological camp to which they belong to, whether the progressive camp or the conservative camp. This may be simply because anyone who judges the political reality of any democratic system against the ideal democratic model would be dissatisfied with the political reality or become distrustful of the system. The Japanese are, in my opinion, so much pressed by the ideal democratic model that they tend to be disaffected with politics.

Of course, it is not to say that Massey's argument is wrong. Indeed, the structural-oppositional counter-culture has been clearly one source of the negative evaluation of the political authority or political system among the Japanese, as Massey (1976) argues. The point is that political cynicism in Japan is not attributable solely to the progressive camp's oppositional counter-culture, but also to the broader contemporary political culture (i.e., including the formal democratic subculture) which makes the Japanese aspire to their very idealistic model of democracy.

This is one aspect of ambivalence in Japanese political attitudes which Richardson (1974) has pointed out. On the one hand, Japanese citizens support the ideals of democracy strongly. On the other hand, they are very negative toward political reality, toward the way in which politics is run, and toward the politicians in general.

The changes in the civic education curricula and the shift of political orientation which the teachers provide to the students were parallel to the changes in the priority of social values in postwar schools. Postwar Japanese teachers are much less authoritative than their prewar counterparts, and postwar Japanese students are not nearly

(127) Moreover, his conceptualization of three models of political subcultures prevalent in postwar Japan clearly simplifies the complex structure of contemporary Japanese political culture and is useful for an quick and good understanding of it.
as submissive to their teachers as were their parents who went to schools in the prewar period.\cite{128} In addition, classes of "moral education" were abolished in the Japanese public school after the war, whereas "moral education" classes in prewar schools placed strong emphasis on traditional social values, such as obedience to one's elders, not questioning decisions of an authority in an organization, in a community, or in a nation, many of which are related to political attitudes toward the authoritarian political system. In other words, the social milieu of primary and secondary schools in postwar Japan have also shifted from an authoritarian oriented atmosphere to an anti-authoritarian or democratic oriented atmosphere.

These changes in educational orientation and in educational opportunities must have a clear impact on the transformation of Japan's political culture. The political culture changes in turn are expected to have effects on the formation of system support attitudes, as has been repeatedly mentioned.

\section*{4.1.6 Changes in Mass Media: An Agent of New Socialization (2)}

Changes in mass media of postwar Japan are parallel to the changes in her educational system in both the quantitative aspect and the qualitative aspect, namely both in terms of increase of amount of media information and in terms of shift in political orientation of mass media.

\section*{4.1.6.1 Expansion of Mass Media in Postwar Japan}

The degree of proliferation of mass communications media in postwar Japan easily qualifies her as one of the world's most developed information societies in the late 1970s \cite{129}(Edelstein, Bowes, Harsel, 1978). While the mass

\begin{enumerate}
\item \cite{128} Massey (1976) also found the difference between the student respondents and the parent respondents in their attitudes toward their teachers. The parents had been more submissive to the teachers in prewar schools than were their children in postwar schools.
\item \cite{129} Japan's development in mass media in the postwar era was not as sharp as her economic growth, simply because Japan was already one of the world's leading publishing countries even before World War II. In the early twentieth century, books, magazines, and newspapers had already become mass oriented in Japan,
media growth in the postwar period has been very rapid, its growth in the 1970s actually contributed most to transforming Japan into an advanced information society. For example, the copies of magazines published annually increased from 1.8 billion in 1970 to 2.5 billion in 1976, while that figure for books jumped from 514 million copies in 1970 to 858 million copies in 1976. The increase rates were 38 percent for magazines and 60 percent for books in this period (Donovan, 1981).(130)

There are two more indicators of the degree to which the contemporary Japanese receive information from mass media. One is newspaper circulation, and the other is television set diffusion rate. As Table 14 shows, Japan's figure of newspaper circulation per 1,000 inhabitants was 539 in 1976, far higher than the figures for any of Western industrial or postindustrial nations.(131) The diffusion rate of television sets in postwar Japan increased very sharply, as Table 7 indicated in an earlier section of this chapter (i.e., 4.1.1). Although the diffusion rate of television sets does not directly measure the amount of political

and the market had begun to expand even before World War I. The number of books published annually reached 31,996 in 1936, and 13,268 magazines were published in the following year (Donovan, 1981).

(130) This high level of proliferation of printed media in Japan is usually accounted by two factors. One is the early development of a high literacy level in Japan, as was discussed earlier; the other is a national passion for knowledge (Donovan, 1981). The following figures further illustrate the latter explanation. "The per capita publication rate is roughly 25 weekly and monthly magazines and 10 books a year. That is 100 magazines and 40 books a year per family of four" (Flanagan, op. cit.).

(131) This may be attributed to the fact that the major Japanese newspapers are national papers and the fact that 95 percent of all newspapers sold in Japan are delivered to homes (Donovan, 1981). Also, the major Japanese newspapers are huge in size, circulation, and capital, even compared with world's largest newspapers. For example, the largest three newspapers in Japan --- namely, the Yomiuri, the Asahi, and the Mainichi --- are ranked first, second and fourth respectively in terms of circulation size in the non-communist world. Though Pravda and Izvestia in the Soviet Union have larger circulations, they are not much larger than the Japanese papers (Donovan, 1981).
information that the Japanese receive from mass media, it at least indicates to what extent Japanese citizens are potentially capable of receiving political information broadcasted on TV.

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>W.G.</th>
<th>G.B.</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These patterns of mass media expansion in postwar Japan suggest that evaluative information regarding politics transmitted by mass media must have had strong impact on the formation of political attitudes of the public, because the exposure of the public to mass media has been enormous. Then, two questions are naturally raised: (1) What kinds of orientation postwar Japanese mass media have had in their political evaluation?; and (2) What types of political orientation those mass media have fostered among Japanese citizens as a socialization agent? These questions will be examined below.
4.1.6.2 Political Orientation of Mass Media in the Postwar Period

Political orientation of Japan's mass media clearly shifted after World War II. At the same time, some underlying continuity exist in Japanese mass media's political orientation throughout the modern period. While the formal democratic orientation and the structural-oppositional political orientation were newly added to characteristics of the media in the postwar period, most prewar Japanese media established political objectivity and partisan neutrality in the early stage of Japan's modernization, namely in the early twentieth century (Passin, 1965). Prewar Japanese news media, particularly newspapers, often criticized the government and its policies as a result of their devotion for political objectivity and partisan neutrality in the period prior to the rise of authoritarian militarism.

This political objectivity of prewar Japanese media, which were emulated the ethics of Western journalism (Passin, 1963), set the tone of postwar media which has been often critical of the government. But, it is also important to note that this critical tone of media's political reports was also due to the traditional Japanese values which set high standard for political leaders' quality that include willingness of "self-sacrifice on behalf of the community or an ideal" (Richardson, 1974, p.79). Thus, the ethics of political objectivity was accepted early on and is a relatively long-standing principle of Japanese mass media.

Despite this tradition of political objectivity and partisan neutrality of Japanese mass media throughout the modern period, shift in political orientation of the postwar media was still very clear and important for the

(132) Of course, the rise of militaristic authoritarianism in the 1930s and 1940s severely jeopardized the continuity of political objectivity of Japanese media. At the peak of the militaristic authoritarian rule, particularly between 1932 and 1945, all Japanese media were censored by the government (Yamamoto et al., 1981). Furthermore, editorial policies of many media also complied with the policies of the military leading government. However, this trend was relatively short and rather exceptional in the light of the political objectivity and non-partisan orientation of the prewar media for about forty years prior to the rise of the oppressive militaristic regime (Passin, 1965).
transformation of political culture in the postwar period. The postwar shift of political orientation of Japanese media is twofold. First, the ideals of new democratic political system, which was introduced by the American-leading allied occupation forces (i.e., the SCAP office), together with the tradition of political objectivity of the media, generated strong orientation toward the formal democratic political subculture among the postwar Japanese media.

Second, this strong orientation toward the formal democratic values are often found to be accompanied by the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation among the postwar Japanese media, particularly among newspapers (Massey, 1976). According to Herbert Passin (1963), the experiences of Japanese newspapers in the oppressive atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s made them "acquire a fundamentally oppositional posture toward government" (p.121). This posture is maintained by the Japanese media even when the government is not oppressive. From the viewpoint of postwar Japanese media which combine orientation of the formal democratic subculture and the structural-oppositional political subculture, "it seems more progressive, modern, and liberal --- in short, more chic --- to oppose the government than to support it" (Passin, 1963, p.121). Thus, the postwar Japanese media have often been under the influence of the structural-oppositional political subculture, and in turn they have been diffusing and fostering orientation toward the structural-oppositional political subculture among the Japanese citizens.

This structural-oppositional orientation of Japanese media seems to be contradictory to their traditional policies of partisan neutrality. However, their critical comments of, or opposition to, the government may be partially reflecting their critical attitudes toward the incumbent administration rather than partisan preference. On the one hand, many of the postwar journalists have been and are expected to be continuously critical of the LDP, partly because the LDP contains some authoritarian oriented ultranationalistic elements, who often advocate ultranationalistic policies and values. But, the postwar Japanese media have been critical of the LDP mainly because the LDP has been the incumbent party and the media have

(133) This corresponds to exactly what Jack Citrin (1974) calls "ritualistic distrust" in the context of American Politics. And, this media orientation is in parallel to what Huntington (1973, 1975) describes American media's orientation.
tendency to oppose the incumbent government. The postwar Japanese media generally apply the principles of an ideal model of democracy to their evaluation of political reality, and actual behavior of politicians. Consequently, the tone of their analyses and evaluations often becomes negative. This also shows how values of both the formal democratic political subculture and the structural-oppositional political subculture can be held simultaneously by the media in postwar Japan. (134)

Although this interpretation about political orientation of the postwar Japanese media is speculative and intuitive in nature, this interpretation is confirmed by casual (not longitudinal) observation of the political tone in political reports of media in the postwar period. The above interpretation logically leads to an expectation that if a coalition of the left parties takes the incumbent government office over, Japanese media must be as critical of the new administration as they have been of the LDP administration, because postwar media are now supposed to be critical of the incumbent government regardless of which party holds the office according to the above interpretation. On the contrary, if postwar Japanese media's criticisms have been heavily based on the leftist orientation, the media are not expected to be as critical of the new leftist incumbent administration (in a hypothetical situation) as they have been of the LDP administration. Actually, in the recent years, Japanese media have been as critical of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) as of the LDP, especially at the times when the JSP faced actual, though small, possibilities of taking over the incumbent office from the LDP but failed to do so. (135) This tendency

(134) This somewhat contradictory but actually existing combination between the formal democratic orientation and the structural-oppositional democratic orientation is another aspect of what Richardson (1974) calls "ambivalence" of Japanese political culture. See Richardson (1974, chapter 3) for a thorough delineation on this ambivalence in the context of both mass political culture and media's political orientation.

(135) Two incidents can be named as the occasions in which the opposition parties' coalition could have taken over the incumbent office from the LDP. One was the General Election in December 1976 after the former Premier Kakuei Tanaka was arrested for his alleged involvement in Lockheed scandal (The JABISS Study was in fact conducted at the time of this general election). The other was the time when the vote of
suggests that Japanese media's critical attitudes of the incumbent government derive from the formal democratic political subculture more than from the structural-oppositional political subculture. (136)

Of course, it would be misleading to assert that all postwar Japanese media have been proponents of the formal-democratic ideals and maintained political objectivity and partisan neutrality with subtle orientation toward the structural-oppositional political subculture. There have been clear political bias or partisan preference found in some postwar Japanese media, particularly among magazines. (137) On the one hand, some intellectual magazines have traditionally been publishing Marxist oriented critical view of Japanese politics. (138) On the other hand, the right-wing oriented journals exists throughout the postwar period, and the number of such magazines appear to have increased as time goes by and as the people's immensely bitter memory of the wartime regime fades away.

Nevertheless, the influence of those media with clear political color are not as strong on the formation of public attitudes as the impact of major newspaper or television news. Those readers who read a politically partial nonconfidence was passed against Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (then) of the LDP in the House of Representatives in June 1980 (Asahi Shinbun, June 1976, June 1980).

(136) This claim can be empirically examined by a longitudinal content analysis of major Japanese newspapers in the postwar period. However, such an examination clearly falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, the argument here remains an intuitive one.

(137) Although media are considered to be politically neutral and generally fair in Japan, Japanese magazines show their political colors much more clearly than newspapers or television news. A considerable number of monthly and weekly magazines can be classified as oriented toward either progressive or conservative, though some magazines still maintain political neutrality.

(138) Passin (1963) points out that "the dominance of left-wing views among journalists virtually entrenches a leftist bias in much of Japanese journalism" (p.122), and he also claims that many leading journals are under the leftist control through trade unions in the journalistic world.
journal are most likely to have political predispositions which correspond to the particular political orientation of that journal. Therefore, as a psychological theory of "selective exposure" suggests (Mills, Aronson, and Robinson, 1959; D. Smith, 1968), those who do not have particular strong political orientation are usually not exposed to those journals with particular political bias, although those who have strong political orientation may reinforce their attitudes by reading journals with their favorable political orientation. On the other hand, most Japanese citizens are exposed to major newspapers and television news regardless of the people's political orientation or intensity of it. Therefore, the formal democratic orientation accompanied by somewhat progressive criticism of the government, which derives from the structural-oppositional political subculture, are more likely to penetrate into the mass public in postwar Japan than are the strong left-wing or right-wing political orientation.

In the discussion so far, no distinction in political orientation or in quality of newscast between the postwar newspapers and the postwar television news has been made. However, it appears that television news are more politically objective and neutral than are newspapers. Political reports in newspapers contain evaluative comments, whose tone is usually negative, on political affairs more frequently than do television news. In other words, newspapers are more strongly oriented toward the structural-oppositional political subculture than are television news. Therefore, newspapers have been playing a larger role, than television, in diffusion of values of the structural-oppositional political subculture, while both newspapers and television have been playing equally important role in diffusion of the formal democratic political subculture values.

This leads to an expectation that newspaper reading is empirically related to orientation of the structural-oppositional political subculture. Since this is an empirical question, this will be examined in the subsequent data analysis in chapter 5. The formal-democratic political subculture orientation are expected to have positive relationship with the amount of individual's exposure to both newspaper and television news. This too can be empirically tested in chapter 5.

(139) This process is analogous to the psychological process know as "filtering of information" or "selective perception" which blocks undesirable information out of one's mind, as a theory of "cognitive dissonance" suggests (Festinger, 1957).
These postwar characteristics of Japanese media lead to some considerations for an empirical examination of media's influence on political culture of postwar Japan. The impact of mass media, particularly newspapers and television news, on the citizens' political attitudes varies from a type of the citizens to another, depending on their sociological attributes.

First, urban residents are believed to receive the media's influence of the formal democratic orientation and the structural-oppositional political orientation somewhat more strongly than do rural residents, because mass media penetrate into urban life more deeply than into rural life. However, this difference between urban and rural areas has been rapidly diminishing since the mid 1960s, when diffusion ratio of newspapers exceeded 50 percent (Table 14) and that of television sets exceeded 20 percent (Table 7) in these years. More direct evidence for the diminishing urban-rural difference in penetration of mass media is diffusion ratio of newspapers across different regions of Japan (Table 15). As Table 15 shows, the number of newspaper copies published daily per household in remote rural prefectures (e.g., Akita, Ehime, etc. on the table) were less than half of the corresponding figure of metropolitan prefectures (i.e., Tokyo and Osaka) in 1955, but the difference between them was reduced more than 50 percent by 1975.

The urban-rural difference in television diffusion ratio was much smaller than the urban-rural difference in newspaper penetration throughout the same period (1955-1975), and

(140) Because magazines often have clear political colars which are not necessarily confined to the scope of the formal democratic political subculture or the structural-oppositional political subculture but sometimes associated to the right-wing or strong left-wing political ideologies, as was mentioned earlier, an individual's exposure to magazines' political reports is excluded from the current discussion and from the subsequent data analysis.

(141) Those prefectures in between these two categories were adjacent prefectures to metropolitan areas (i.e., Chiba, Hyogo on the table) and semi-rural prefectures (e.g., Nagano, Shizuoka, etc.), and their corresponding figures fell in between the figures of the metropolitan prefectures and those of the remote rural prefectures. The figures of these middle categories were more stable than those of the metropolitan or remote rural prefectures, as Table 15 shows.
Table 15
Newspaper Distribution by Different Regions of Japan: Overtime Changes
(Number of Copies per Household per Day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefectures</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Prefecture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjacent Prefectures to Metropolitan Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiba</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Rural Prefectures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shizuoka</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Rural Prefectures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akita</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ehime</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kochi</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the former gap eventually became nil. Although the degree of television's penetration into rural areas was still behind that of urban areas up until the early 1960s, the difference between them diminished by 1965 (Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha, 1980; Yamamoto et al., 1981).

Furthermore, nationwide networks of private television broadcasting, in addition to a long-standing nationally owned broadcasting's (i.e., NHK's) nationwide network, began to develop in the late 1950s and reached remote rural areas by the early 1970s (Yamamoto et al., 1981). This also indicates that rural residents' exposure to television came much closer to that of urban residents in the 1970s.

Considering the stronger structural-oppositional political orientation in newspapers than in television news, the fact that the urban-rural gap in newspapers' penetration is greater than the gap in television's penetration suggests that urban Japanese have been more exposed to the structural-oppositional oriented political reports than have been rural Japanese. Given the equally strong formal democratic orientation of television news to newspapers, urban Japanese and rural Japanese are equally exposed to the comparable degree of formal democratic oriented political information.

Second, different generations are not believed to have different levels of media exposure. Because both the older and younger generations of Japanese adults are equally exposed to political reports of mass media, the degree of exposure to both the formal democratic oriented reports and the structural-oppositional oriented reports through mass media does not differ from the older generation to the younger generation. Unlike the influence of postwar education, all Japanese adults have been equally receiving similar kinds of evaluative information of politics and political leaders regardless of whether the individual received his education before or after the end of World War II. In other words, the postwar mass media play a greater role as an agent of adult socialization than of youth socialization. (142)

Third, the level of each individual educational attainment, however, makes difference in the extent of exposure to mass media's political reports. Many political behavior studies in various nations, including Japan, have suggested that those people who have higher education are more likely

(142) In addition to a role of socialization agent, media also has a role of generating the period effects on formation of political attitudes.
to receive and seek information from mass media (Campbell et al., 1960; Almond and Verba, 1963; Watanuki, etc.). Given this argument, it is generally expected that the better educated Japanese are more likely to have stronger orientation toward the formal democratic and the structural-oppositional political subcultures.

4.2 THE SOCIO-CULTURAL EXPLANATORY MODEL OF SYSTEM SUPPORT

We have so far seen the socio-economic changes in post-war Japan and the possible impact of those changes on the three political subcultures. However, the discussion so far has not yet specified the hypothetical linkages between those three political subcultures and system support attitudes. It is now necessary to speculate and hypothesize how those political subcultures have affected the formation of system support attitudes in postwar Japan.

The discussion in the previous section (i.e., 4.1) often suggested that the postwar changes in Japan's socio-economic structure must have transformed socialization patterns (or patterns of inter-generational transmission of political and social values), and that the transformation of socialization patterns consequently must have changed the people's orientation toward the traditional political culture as well as toward the other two political subcultures. However, an empirical examination of the effects of those different patterns of socialization on the postwar transformation of political culture (i.e., changes of the traditional political culture and emergence of two political subcultures) falls outside the scope of this dissertation. These linkages are assumed here, on the basis of cumulated knowledge on these subjects thanks to a number of the previous works (Almond and Verba, 1963; Jennings and Niemi, 1974 and 1981, etc.).

Similarly, the empirical analysis of this dissertation also excludes an analysis of the effects of socialization patterns on the formation of system support attitudes from its scope.

There has been a substantial number of empirical studies that examine the effects of political socialization experiences on attitudes toward political authority (Dennis, 1974; Iyenger, 1980, 1981; Massey, 1974), monarchy of the state (Greenstein, 1975), political institutions (Dennis, 1973, 1977), and the political system as a whole (Easton and Dennis, 1969). They have demonstrated some linkages exist
Based on this cumulated knowledge of political socialization, this dissertation assumes that political and cultural orientation of the system members is largely derived from their socialization experiences. Therefore, the scope of the socio-cultural explanations in this dissertation will not include an empirical examination of the socialization effects on the formation of system support attitudes or any particular political culture orientation. But, this dissertation solely focuses on the examination of effects of political culture orientation of the system members on their formation of system support attitudes, as Figure 2 indicates.

4.2.1 Effects of the Traditional Political Culture on System Support

Although some aspects of the traditional Japanese political culture have been considered by some researchers to be unfavorable of democracy, as was argued earlier (see 3.1.2), they are not totally incompatible with the democratic principles. The two aspects of the traditional political culture that have been considered to be incompatible with democracy are the orientation of "deference to authority" and the "conformity" orientation (i.e., the value of "internal harmony" within a group or a nation).

As was discussed earlier (i.e., 3.1.2), the value of deference to authority or the submissive attitudes to authority among the traditionally oriented Japanese are considered to generate support, rather than distrust, toward the postwar democratic institutions and the politicians as symbols of authority which they feel they should respect. Therefore, the orientation toward deference to authority is hypothesized to be positively related to system support attitudes. The direction of causality here must be from the deference orientation to system support, because the orientation of deference to authority is much more fundamental value and the traditionally existing attitude than is an attitude toward the present political system.

The value of "group conformity" has often been considered to be incompatible with the principle of interest articulation which is a core principle of liberal democracy, because the conformity orientation tends to suppress articulation of diversified interests. This traditional ori
entation is not believed to create strong objection to the democratic political system, because the Japanese have traditionally had realistic understanding and acceptance of conflict of interests in political life, as was argued earlier at some length (see 3.1.2). But, the conformity orientation, unlike the authority deference value, may not particularly facilitate the supportive attitudes toward the democratic system. Rather, it can be stated that the conformity orientation just does not hinder the development of supportive attitudes toward democracy.

This function of the conformity orientation which does not hinder development of system support attitudes but only weakly facilitates such attitudes becomes clearer, when considering the process on which a traditionally oriented Japanese citizen develops his system support attitude. For instance, if a conformity oriented individual finds that the people of his community or his colleagues at work support a particular politician strongly, he may develop warm feeling toward that politician and his party, and consequently he may develop some kind of identification with the political system through the psychological bond with that politician. This could happen even if the politician is an opposition party member (not the LDP politician) because such a personal tie with a politician usually enhances the individual's sense of political efficacy regardless of the politician's party and consequently can make him feel supportive of the political system. (143) Therefore, the conformity orientation is believed to generate two contrasting evaluative political attitudes; one is negative attitudes toward inter-partisan and intra-partisan conflicts, and the other is positive attitudes toward particular politicians and toward the political system itself.

The above mentioned pattern of development of positive orientation toward the democratic political system through a particular individual politician is not only derived from the conformity orientation but also from the "personalism" orientation, which is another distinctive aspect of the traditional Japanese political culture (see 3.1.1). Since the personal influence from an opinion leader, a local notable, or a politician himself has stronger impact on the formation of political attitudes, the personalism orientation of the traditional Japanese political culture is an important source of political attitude formation. Regardless of the camp or party to which the influential person (e.g., an opinion leader, a community leader, or a politician) belongs, those personal ties must generate the

(143) For a further discussion on this point, see the following argument on the "personalism."
feeling of responsiveness of the political system (i.e.,
external efficacy) because those citizens can have channel
to input their demands and can feel feedback from the
political system through those politically influential peo-
ple. Consequently, those citizens with personal ties with
the political elites are expected to develop positive atti-
tudes toward the political system more often than would
those citizens without such personal political connections.

The "localism" is another distinctive aspect of the tra-
ditional Japanese political culture. The strong attachment
to local politics obviously facilitates positive system
support attitudes deriving from the personalism orienta-
tion. In other words, the influence of the personalism
orientation in generating system support attitudes is more
clearly operative in the context of local politics in a
community than in the context of national politics. There-
fore, both the "personalism" orientation and the "localism"
orientation are expected to be related to system support
attitudes positively.

In short, those four distinctive aspects of the tradi-
tional Japanese political culture (i.e., "deference to
authority," "conformity," "personalism," and "localism")
are expected to foster positive attitudes toward the polit-
ical system. One possible exception is that the "conformi-
ty" orientation may generate negative perception of party
politics and partisan behavior of politicians. However,
because even those conformity oriented Japanese have often
accepted existence of such conflict-prone political behav-
ior of politicians as the reality of political life, even
the conformity orientation is not believed to have strong
negative impact on the formation of attitudes toward the
political system. Therefore, the traditional political
culture orientation is hypothesized to have effects on the
formation of positive system support attitudes.

4.2.2 Effects of the Formal Democratic Political
Subculture on System Support

The orientation toward the formal democratic political
subculture seems, on the surface, to be positively related
to system support attitudes, because the formal democratic
subculture is essentially composed of positive values about
the democratic principles as well as democratic institu-
tional arrangements, and because Japan's political system
is a democratic political system. However, the relation-
ship between the formal democratic subculture and system
support is in reality more complex than the straight one-
to-one positive relationship. Because the concept of sys
System support is not a simple unidimensional concept but an elusive multidimensional concept as was discussed in chapter 1 (see subsections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3), the relationship of the formal democratic subculture to system support varies depending on which dimension of system support attitudes is in focus.

On the one hand, the formal democratic subculture unquestionably generates supportive attitudes toward the democratic institutions, such as the election system, the legislative system (i.e., the National Diet, the prefectural assemblies, etc.), and the political party system. Because these democratic institutions are direct products of the democratic constitution of postwar Japan, and because the formal democratic subculture orientation is derived from the democratic principles which are clearly documented in the present constitution, there must be some linkages between the formal democratic subculture and support for the democratic institutions. Hence, the formal democratic subculture orientation is hypothesized to be positively related to the institutional dimension of system support attitudes.

On the other hand, those citizens who subscribe the values of the formal democratic subculture tend to be the citizens who have a highly idealistic model of democracy in their minds (see the subsection 4.1.5 on "Educational Change"). They are very likely to be disappointed with the political reality, the way in which politicians behave, or the way in which the political system actually works. Then, the strong orientation toward the formal democratic subculture may not necessarily foster the attitudes of diffuse system support (i.e., generalized, positive attitudes toward the way in which the political system actually operates), but it may generate the feelings of frustration with the gap between the ideal democratic model and the political reality, and consequently may weaken the attitudes of diffuse system support.

Actually, considering this complex relationship between the formal democratic subculture and diffuse system support, it is difficult to hypothesize the directional causal relationship between the formal democratic subculture and the diffuse support dimension of system support. Answering to this question should be left to an empirical data analysis in chapter 6.
4.2.3 The Effects of the Structural-Oppositional Political Subculture on System Support

The relationship between the structural-oppositional political subculture and system support is not a simple unidimensional relationship, as it is also the case for the formal democratic subculture (see 4.2.2). Three types of relationships between the two concepts are conceivable.

First, the orientation toward the structural-oppositional political subculture is expected to have negative effects on system support attitudes in postwar Japan. As was discussed earlier (see 3.1.1), this political subculture consists of the Marxist oriented economic values and the progressive political values. The former economic value orientation generates negative attitudes toward the way in which Japan's political system allocates its resources and distribute commodities according to the capitalistic economic principles --- according to this view, Japan's politico-economic system concentrates wealth only to the big business leaders, the government leaders (i.e., the top LDP politicians) and the top elite bureaucrats. The latter political values generate progressive criticisms of the LDP-led incumbent government and the way in which politics in general is run or the political system generally operates --- according to this view, the national decision-making and policy-making process is totally dominated by the LDP, by the top government officials with assistance of the elite bureaucrats, and by the big business leaders. Therefore, it is hypothesized that those Japanese citizens who have the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation are less likely to have positive generalized attitudes toward the political system, namely positive diffuse system support attitudes.

Second, the structural-oppositional political subculture, on the other hand, may not necessarily foster negative attitudes toward the democratic institutions of Japan's political system. As was discussed earlier (especially in 4.1.5 on "education" and 4.1.6 on "media"), the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU) and the postwar newspapers, both of which are clear proponents of the values of structural-oppositional political subculture, are also advocating to protect and preserve the postwar democratic constitution as well as the democratic institutions. They are more often opposing to the operation of some of the democratic institutions (e.g., the way in which electoral campaigns are conducted or political parties are managed) than opposing to the democratic institutions as such (e.g., the election system, or the political party system). Hence, it is not certain to what extent those citizens who
have the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation are feeling negative toward the democratic institutions of Japan's political system. Actually, it is quite possible that some Japanese citizens who have fairly clear orientation toward the structural-oppositional political subculture simultaneously have fairly strong orientation toward the formal democratic subculture.

The above speculation suggests the third type of relationship between the structural-oppositional political subculture and system support. If the Japanese are supportive of the institutional arrangements of their democratic political system, their overall negative orientation toward political reality may be something similar to what Jack Citrin (1974) called "ritualistic opposition," which refers to the Americans were very negative toward the government while they still held their support of the political system as a whole in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. However, this attitudes of ritualistic distrust may not only be directed against the incumbent authority but also may be directed against the way the political system works in general. In other words, there may be some Japanese who have negative orientation toward the way in which politics works while holding a fair degree of support for the democratic political institutions. If this is the case, the ritualistic distrust is not only psychological orientation regarding the incumbent government alone but it is also psychological orientation concerning diffuse system support. (144) This suggests that the structural-oppositional political subculture generates some "ritualistic system disaffection" as well as "ritualistic government opposition," while the structural-oppositional political subculture is fostering some support for the democratic institutions.

(144) It is an empirical question to examine whether the ritualistic opposition is only directed to the incumbent government (in this case, "ritualistic government distrust") or is also directed to the political system in general (in this latter case, "ritualistic system disaffection"). However, it is very difficult to determine which interpretation is correct even with good individual-level data, as the debate between Miller (1974a and b) and Citrin (1974) reveals. Furthermore, the answer will vary from a political system to another. I am inclined to take the position that the ritualistic distrust (or opposition) includes both system disaffection and incumbent disaffection in postwar Japan. This will be empirically, though briefly, examined in chapter 6.
Chapter V

STRUCTURE OF SYSTEM SUPPORT ATTITUDES IN JAPANE:
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

5.1 CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF SYSTEM SUPPORT: A
MICRO-THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION

It has been believed that system support is related to
political trust, political efficacy, and political aliena­
tion (Finifter, 1970; A. Miller, 1974a, 1974b; Citrin,
McClosky, Shanks and Sniderman, 1975; Muller and Jukam,
1977; Muller and Williams, 1980; Abramson and Finifter,
1981; Miller and Listhaug, 1984). However, it has not been
clear how and to what degree they are related. For exam­
ple, whereas Arthur Miller (1974a, 1974b) argues that the
decline of political trust in the United States from 1964
to 1970 suggested the decline of system support among
Americans, Jack Citrin (1974) disagrees with Miller in
arguing that the decline of political trust Miller found
reflected a mere withdrawal of support from incumbent
office holders. While this wellknown debate have inspired
many following studies on this problem (Citrin et. al.,
1975; Muller and Jukam, 1977; Miller, Golderberg, and Erbr­
ing, 1979; Abramson and Finifter, 1981), any definitive
answer to this question has not been offered yet, partly
because of a lack of measures "that more clearly separate
evaluations of incumbents from those of the political sys­
tem (Abramson and Finifter, 1981, p.306)."

However, some of the disagreements and confusion in
studying the relationship between system support, political
trust and political efficacy appear to be partially due to
a lack of clear conceptualization, or at least a lack of
agreements by the political scientists on the conceptuali­
ization of each term. Therefore, it is worth trying to elu­
cidate what scholars have agreed on and what they have not
agreed on for the purpose of understanding the elusive
nature of the concept "system support" and for the purpose
of defining it in operational terms.

The concept of system support seems to be best conceptu­
alized from the negative side of this concept, namely
"political alienation" (Finifter, 1970; Citrin et al., 1975; Muller and Williams, 1980, etc.). The definition of political alienation offered by Citrin and his colleagues (1975) well encompasses the meanings of system support, as they define "political alienation as a relatively enduring sense of estrangement from or rejection of the prevailing political system" and emphasize "the importance of distinguishing this attitude from disapproval of incumbent officeholders (p.31)." In other words, absence of system support means alienation from the political system. Similarly, it is appropriate to regard "political alienation" as alienation from politics in general including the political system.

Ada Finifter's (1970) empirical examination of political alienation has found that "powerlessness" and "normlessness" are the two most important dimensions of political alienation, by examining four of five dimensions proposed by Seeman's (1959) theoretical work. The feeling of "powerlessness" and the perception of "normlessness" are later identified with the sense of "political efficacy" and the sense of "political trust" respectively (Miller, 1974a; Abramson and Finifter, 1981; Miller and Listhaug, 1984).(145) The sense of "political efficacy" or "powerlessness" refers to the people's perception of their own capability of understanding politics and competence to influence political process and policy output (Finifter, 1970; A. Miller, 1974a; Miller, Miller and Schneider, 1980). This definition of "political efficacy" refers only to what is later called "internal political efficacy" as opposed to "external efficacy" which is virtually responsiveness of the political system, the government, and the political authorities (Miller, Miller and Schneider, 1980). The sense of "political trust" or "normlessness" refers to the people's affective orientation toward the government and political authorities as well as their perception that the government and political authorities are functioning and producing outputs in accord with the people's expectations (Finifter, 1970; A. Miller, 1974a, p.952).

The efficacy dimension and the trust dimension of political alienation can be conceived to be independent of each other, but there is little reason to believe them to be mutually exclusive (Finifter, 1970; Miyake, 1977, 1982). If so, four different types of political support (or political alienation) are logically possible from the combina

(145) Almond and Verba (1963) regard political efficacy as "input affect" and political trust as "output affect".
tion of these two dimensions, as shown in Figure 3.(146) First, in this figure Cell A represents those citizens who feel politically efficacious and trust politics and the government. This category is labeled "positive support".

![Table](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL TRUST</th>
<th>POSITIVE (+)</th>
<th>NEGATIVE (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust (+)</td>
<td>A. Positive Support (++)</td>
<td>B. Passive Support (+++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynicism (-)</td>
<td>C. Dissent (Protest Orientation) (-+)</td>
<td>D. Apathy or Total Alienation (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Relationship between Political Trust and Political Efficacy

Second, Cell B shows the concept of "passive support" (or "acquiescence") because those people who fall into this category are politically trusting but not efficacious. Many ordinary citizens are probably included in this group; few citizens are expected to have much self-confidence in their competence in political life, but at the same time few are totally alienated from politics either.

(146) This conceptualization or the 2X2 box figure is not novel or my original at all. See, for example, Finifter (1970, p.407), Miyake (1977), and White (1981, p.382).
Third, the citizens in Cell C are politically efficacious or motivated to do something, but do not trust the government or political authorities. This category can be called "dissent" (or "protest orientation"). This group is generally considered to constitute a threat to the government and to the political system (Muller and Jukam, 1977). This group must be smaller in a political system where no anti-system party exists (e.g., the United States) than in a political system which has some anti-system parties (e.g., Japan or Italy). This is because those politically efficacious supporters of an anti-system party clearly belong to this "dissent" category (Cell C) in a political system which includes anti-system parties whereas it would be harder for a person who is politically distrustful to be politically efficacious or be involved in politics in a system which excludes anti-system parties, or which excludes any apparatus to mobilize political movement critical of the system.

Fourth, Cell D is the category of "political apathy" and "total alienation" from politics. While the people in this category are all neither feeling efficacious about politics nor trusting politics, these people can be further divided into two types. One is "apathetic" people who have no interest in politics nor trust in politics, yet they accept the status quo and do not even have resentment toward politics. The other type is those people who are indifferent to politics but have latent resentment against politics, while they feel inefficacious and distrustful of politics; this type of people are "totally alienated" from politics. Whereas the former are somewhat "acquiescent" and closer to category B ("passive support"), the latter are closer to category C ("protest orientation").

(147) However, recent empirical studies (Barnes, Farah, and Heunks, 1979; White, 1981) suggested that the combination of distrust and efficacy would not be a threat to a democratic system, because they found that conventional political behavior and protest potential are correlated each other.

(148) However, these distinctions do not have any significant implications for this research, although these conceptual distinctions will be important for a study which is focused on protest movement or similar political actions.

(149) Miyake (1977), and White (1981) who adopted Miyake's typology, presented the same typology of four different combinations of political efficacy and trust. They named "active conformists" for those people
5.1.1 System Support vs. Political Efficacy: Conceptual Relationship

So far, many experts in this area seem to have agreed on the dimensionality (two dimensions) and nature of political alienation and system support. However, from this point on, confusion and disagreements among scholars begin. One of the confusions is the relationship between political efficacy and political trust. Although some scholars treated both political trust and political efficacy as components of system support (Miller, 1974a, 1974b; Miller, Golenberg, and Erbring, 1979; Miller and Listhaug, 1984), in this dissertation, only political trust is considered to be one of major components of system support. This position is expected to encounter two kinds of strong criticism. First, some scholars, such as Miller and associates (Miller, Golenberg, and Erbring, 1979), would argue that efficacy and trust are strongly related although they may be conceptualized as independent dimensions of alienation. Second, other scholars, such as Citrin (1974), would charge that political trust is merely an indicator of incumbent support but not that of system support. The following discussion should answer these charges step-by-step.

First, whereas Miller and associates (1979) empirically found an intimate relationship exists between political trust and political efficacy in the United States, Japanese data have suggested that a very weak empirical relationship between these two concepts (Richardson, 1978; Miyake, 1977, 1982).(150) This discrepancy seems to be due to different emphasis that the American study and the Japanese studies place on aspects of the concept of political efficacy. Miller and associates (1979) emphasize external political efficacy, which is the responsiveness of the political system and its institutions to the people's demands. In contrast, Richardson (1978) and Miyake (1977, 1982) respectively emphasize internal political efficacy, which is the people's perception of their ability to falling into Cell A, "entrusters" for Cell B, "potential protesters" for Cell C, and "alienates" for Cell D. Although Finifter (1970) presented a similar typology, her conceptualization of the nature of each combination and interpretations are different --- she also used the concepts of "powerlessness" and "normlessness" --- from my typology and from Miyake's (1977).

(150) But, note that White (1981) found fairly strong correlation among trust and efficacy among the citizens of Tokyo.
influence governmental process, as the important aspect of the political efficacy concept.

Miller and associates (1979) define a sense of political efficacy as "the feeling that an individual and the public can have an impact on the political process because government institutions will respond to their needs" (p.67). Accordingly, they conceptualize both internal efficacy (i.e., personal competence) and external efficacy (i.e., system responsiveness) from a single perspective, that is, the extent to which the ordinary citizen can influence the political process and outcomes. However, internal political efficacy and external political efficacy have different objects of focus. While internal efficacy is concerned with the citizen's competence as an object, external efficacy is concerned with incumbent office holders, political institutions, and the political system itself. The latter objects of concern are the same objects of concern for political trust. Therefore, it is possible that external political efficacy (i.e., system responsiveness) and political trust may have empirically closer relationship each other, and that internal efficacy may have remote relationships with external efficacy or with political trust in an empirical analysis.

Accordingly, in this dissertation, system responsiveness (i.e., external political efficacy)(151) and political trust in incumbent government are conceptualized as two major components of system support, but internal political efficacy is excluded from the concept of system support. Taking a close look at the typology of political alienation in Figure 3, those people who are located in either cell on the upper row (i.e., Cell A or B) do have political trust whether they are feeling politically efficacious or inefficacious. Hence, internal political efficacy does not seem related to the question of whether or not the people have the feeling of political trust. Given a contention that "political trust" is the leading indicator of diffuse political support (Miller et al., 1979), trust in political authorities and system responsiveness can be assumed to be two major components of diffuse system support.(152) This

(151) The term "external political efficacy" is interchangably used with the term "system responsiveness" in this dissertation.

(152) Here, the concept "diffuse system support" simply refers to relatively durable positive psychological orientation toward the political system, and the term "diffuse" here departs from the connotation of the term given by Easton in contrast to his term "specif
assumption will be empirically tested later.

5.1.2 System Responsiveness vs. Political Trust: Two Components of Diffuse System Support

Of course, the above conceptualization encounters another charge that political trust is merely an indicator of support for the incumbent but not an indicator of diffuse system support --- such a scholar as Citrin (1974) would argue this. However, the above mentioned concept of diffuse system support includes both the incumbent trust aspect and the system responsiveness aspect. While system responsiveness constitutes the "system affect" component, incumbent trust constitutes the "incumbent affect" component. Thus, the disagreement between Miller and Citrin seems to be due to two different views in which each scholar places emphasis on a different component; Miller emphasizes the system responsive component, whereas Citrin emphasizes the incumbent trust component of the political trust concept. Therefore, the concept which consists of the "incumbent affect" component (i.e., incumbent trust) and the "system affect" component (i.e., system responsiveness) can be plausibly called "diffuse system support." The two components of diffuse system support can be depicted in Figure 4.

The above argument leads the following empirical question: Isn't the system responsiveness component independent of the incumbent trust component? In other words, can system responsiveness be inseparable from incumbent trust in the average citizen's mind? If system responsiveness and incumbent trust can be perceived independently by ordinary citizens, then the typology of political trust (i.e., diffuse system support) will be as depicted in Figure 4. In this case, two separate indicators for diffuse system support will be necessary according to these two components. If the incumbent trust component is empirically inseparable from the system responsive component, then a single operational measure of diffuse system support should be composed of both variables that tap incumbent affect

(153) Miller's (1974a) original political trust index includes at least one item which taps the respondents' perception of system responsiveness (i.e., external political efficacy in Miller's term). His later works with his associates (1979; 1984) use more items which explicitly tap perception of system responsiveness.
orientation and variables that tap system responsiveness evaluation. This empirical question will be examined and answered later in this chapter.

### 5.2 Dimensionality of Political Support Attitudes

Because the legitimacy of a democratic political system has been, in this dissertation, conceptualized as the supportive attitudes of the system members toward their democratic political system (see 1.2.1), the individual-level data are appropriate here, as was discussed at greater length in chapter 2 (especially 2.2 and 2.3). In operationalizing the system support attitudes in Japanese context, it is first necessary to probe the structure of the system support attitudes of Japanese citizens through

#### Figure 4: Two Components of Diffuse System Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Trust in Authorities</th>
<th>Perceived System Responsiveness (External Political Efficacy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust (+)</td>
<td>A. Strong Support (++)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynicism (-)</td>
<td>C. Moderate Support (-+)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

System Affect Component = System Responsiveness  
Incumbent Affect Component = Political Trust in Incumbent Government
individual-level data, as the system support attitudes are complex and believed to be multi-dimensional (see 5.1). For this purpose, the JABISS Study provides excellent survey data, which are individual-level data.

5.2.1 Exploration of Dimensions of Political Support and System Support

The following empirical examination of system support attitudes through the JABISS Study data will proceed along with the conceptualizations discussed in the previous section. The JABISS Study data include a series of survey questions that probe general political support attitudes toward the three different objects, namely, the political regime, the political authorities, and the community. These question items are designed to measure the following attitudes: (V4) pride in the political system of Japan, (V5) the representatives of the National Diet stop thinking about the people after elected, (V6) Japan's politics is run for big business and large unions not for people's interests, (V7) capable people run national politics, (V8) many dishonest people in national politics, (V9) Japanese politicians and parties neglect people's interests, (V10) trust in national politics, (V12) trust in politics of the respondent's prefecture, (V13) trust in local politics, (V14) political parties help people's voice be heard in politics, (V15) elections help people's voice be heard in politics, and (V16) the National Diet helps people's voice be heard in politics. (154)

(154) While there are thirteen survey questions concerning political attitudes in the JABISS Study data set, one of them (V11) was excluded from the initial factor analysis. Because that question (V11) was asked only for the respondents who provided valid answers (not DK, NA), the number of valid cases for V11 was reduced to approximately the half of the other questions of this battery. Also, this variable (V11) is intuitively judged to tap a slightly different kind of attitudes from the other variables, as V11 is concerned with the respondent's belief in the possibility of improvement of the source of his/her distrust of national politics in Japan. Another factor analysis with V11, which was later performed to justify the exclusion of V11 empirically, indicated that V11 all by itself belonged to an independent dimension of all the other dimensions constituted by the other variables, and clearly showed that the inclusion of V11 dramatically reduced the interpretability of all the factors. Hence, the results of this factor anal
In order to identify the structure of political support attitudes, these variables of political support were factor analyzed. As a result of the initial factor analysis of the twelve variables, the variable regarding the respondents' opinion about "capability of government officials" (V7) was excluded from the following factor analysis of the political support variables for both contextual and empirical reasons. First, the respondents' perception about the capability of politicians seems to be a different type of political attitude from those attitudes of political support or political trust in terms of the political and social context. Second, the initial factor analysis with V7 indicated that this variable (V7) particularly had a lower level of communality and a lower level of factor loadings than the other variables involved in the initial factor analysis. (155)

Accordingly, the remaining eleven variables regarding political support or trust have been factor analyzed. (156) The results of this factor analysis, which provides the final factor solution of political support attitudes in this dissertation, are shown in Table 16. This table clearly demonstrates that the political support attitudes have a three-dimensional structure. (157) The visual image analysis clearly suggests to exclude V11 from the subsequent data analysis of the political support variables.

(155) V7 was omitted after the initial factor analysis which showed that V7 had a lower communality level than 0.1 and a lower factor loading level than 0.3 on any of the factors. These two standards are normally used as the cutting points to determine the number of factors to be extracted in a factor analysis (Kim and Mueller, 1978a and 1978b; Rummel, 1970).

(156) The factor solution on these eleven variables was obtained by the common factor analysis method with orthogonal rotation. In order to maintain a sufficient number of cases for the factor analysis, the DK responses were recoded as the middle category (either added to an existing middle category, or recoded as a new neutral category when the original coding did not have a middle category). This treatment of the missing cases (DK responses) avoided the pair-wise deletion of missing data in calculating the initial correlation matrix, and thus avoided the risk of obtaining a distorted correlational structure between the variables.
of this three dimensional factor solution is shown in Figure 5, which demonstrates the three dimensional structure of Japanese political support attitudes even more clearly than does Table 16.

As Table 16 shows, all three factors extracted from the JABISS Study data are straightforward and very easy to interpret. First, Factor I can be interpreted as the "local political support" dimension, for the two variables that tap supportive attitudes of local politics (V12 and V13) have extremely high loadings on Factor I. Second, Factor II can be easily identified as the "democratic institution support" dimension, because Factor II receives very high loadings from all three variables concerning evaluative attitudes toward democratic institutions, such as the Diet (V16), elections (V15), or political parties (V14). Third, Factor III can be considered to represent the dimension of "diffuse national system support", since the variables that have higher loadings on this factor are concerned with generalized attitudes toward the way in which politics is run (V5, V6, V8 and V10) or generalized feelings toward the national political system (i.e., pride or trust in it, V4 and V10 respectively).(158)

However, since the major concern of this dissertation is support for the national political system, the local political system as an object of political support will be excluded from the scope of the data analysis of this dissertation. Hence, of these three dimensions of political support, which have been detected by the factor analysis (Table 16), only two of them represent support attitudes toward the national political system on which this research focuses. The democratic institution support dimension (Factor II) and the diffuse national system support dimension (Factor III) clearly represent two different aspects of the system support concept, whereas the local political support dimension (Factor I) is not normally regarded as a

(157) The factor analysis extracted only factors which have a 1.0 or higher eigenvalue. Accordingly, three factors were extracted, and these three factors account for 54.3 percent of the common variance.

(158) Although this dissertation abandon the Eastonian conceptual distinction between diffuse support and specific support (see subsection 1.3.1 of chapter 1), the term "diffuse" political support or "diffuse" system support is used throughout the data analysis chapters, because the term captures the meaning of generalized attitudes toward the political system as a whole and toward the way in which politics is run.
Table 16

Factor Solution of System Support Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V4. Pride in Pol System</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5. Politicians Care People</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6. Politics Run For People</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8. Politicians Not Dishonest</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9. Parties Not Neglect People</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10. Trust National Politics</td>
<td>.373</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12. Trust Prefecture Politics</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13. Trust Local Politics</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V15. Elections Help People's Voice</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16. The Diet Help People's Voice</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>.119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Total Variances Explained

- 30.8 %
- 14.0 %
- 9.3 %

Label of Factor (Interpretation)
- Local Institutional Support
- Diffuse System Support

Data Source: The JABISS Study, 1976. N = 1,768
Figure 5: The Attitudinal Structure of System Support: A Visual Image
dimension of the system support concept. While the democratic institution support dimension is clearly considered to represent people's support for (or acceptance of) institutional arrangements of Japan's democratic political system, the diffuse national system support dimension reflects much more complex system support attitudes of the Japanese citizens.

The dimension of diffuse national system support, which Factor III represents in the factor analysis (Table 16), can be considered to encompass two different components of diffuse system support, because the six variables which belong to this dimension ---i.e., which have high loadings on Factor III--- tap the following two different aspects of the diffuse system support attitudes: (1) political trust in political authorities and the incumbent government; and (2) belief in political system's responsiveness. First, two of those six variables ---i.e., the variables concerning "many dishonest people in national politics" (V8), and "trust in national politics" (V10)--- clearly probe the aspect of political trust. While V8 has clear objects of trust which are political authorities (e.g., incumbent legislators, incumbent executive office holders, national-level bureaucracy, political parties, and so on), V10 does not have a clear object of trust but can be interpreted to be directed toward the way in which those political authorities run politics. These two variables (i.e., V8 and V10) can be interpreted to tap the generalized attitudes of political trust.

In addition to V8 and V10, V5 ("The Diet members stop thinking about the people after they are elected.") and V9 ("Politicians and parties neglect the people's interests") can be considered to tap an aspect of political trust in political authorities or politicians, although the latter two are mainly concerned with the responsiveness of the political system in an actual political process, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. Considering all these meanings, this "political trust" component of diffuse system support may be called the "incumbent affect" component, as opposed to the "system affect" component.\(^{159}\)

---

\(^{159}\) Strictly speaking, the concept "trust in political authorities" includes trust in non-incumbent political leaders as well as opposition party members in the national political arena. However, the term "incumbent affect" is used here as an equivalent concept to the term "trust in political authorities," because trust in political authorities are political attitudes that are normally directed toward the incumbent political authorities.
Second, three variables are considered to probe another aspect of diffuse system support, that is the political system's responsiveness: (1) "the Diet members stop thinking about the people after elected" (V5); (2) "politics is run for the interests of big organizations but not for the people's" (V6); and (3) "politicians and parties neglect the people's interests" (V9). While two of them, namely V5 and V9, somewhat tap the political trust aspect as well as the system responsiveness aspect, the other variable, namely V6, is exclusively probing the responsiveness aspect of diffuse system support attitudes. Although these three variables (i.e., V5, V6, and V9) are thus concerned with slightly different attitudes, all of them can be interpreted to tap the respondents' perception of the political system's responsiveness to the people's demands. Therefore, this aspect of diffuse system support conceptually corresponds to the "system responsiveness" component which was discussed in the previous section of this chapter. In addition, V4 ("Have pride in Japan's political system") can be added to this group, because V4 is concerned with the political system in general. Since Almond and Verba (1963) used a question about "pride in political system" to probe the attitudes of "system affect," V4 is clearly considered to tap system affect of the respondents.(160) Considering the meanings of these four variables (i.e., V4, V5, V6, and V9), this component of diffuse system support can be called the "system affect" component.

Thus, in the JABISS Study data, these six variables which have high loadings on Factor III (the diffuse system support dimension) are interpreted to encompass the two components that were presented in the previous section (see Figure 4). Then, an important question for the data analysis here is whether these two components of the diffuse system support attitudes (i.e., the political trust component and the system responsiveness component) empirically constitute a single dimension of political support attitudes. If the attitudes of the political trust (or incumbent affect) component is empirically independent of the system responsiveness (or system affect) component, then the former is simply probing political support for the incumbent administration not for the political system, as Jack Citrin (1974) argues.

(160) The wording and format of the question which Almond and Verba used in their Five Nation Study of 1959 differ from those of the corresponding question in the JABISS Study of 1976. However, both probed the respondent's affect for their democratic political system.
However, as the factor analysis of the eleven political support variables indicates (Table 16 and Figure 5), all the six variables concerning political trust and system responsiveness constitute a single dimension (i.e., Factor III) which is interpreted as the diffuse system support dimension. Thus, the incumbent affect component and the system affect component are empirically inseparable. Therefore, the empirical data from Japan suggest that diffuse system support encompasses both support for the political authorities and support for the political system.(161)

This argument, which is based on the empirical analysis of the dimensionality of diffuse system support, refutes Citrin's (1974) claim that some attitudinal measures which detect weak trust in government (or political distrust) merely indicate disaffection with the incumbent administration but do not indicate disaffection with the political system; the ground of this refutation is that the political trust indicators are inseparable from the indicators of system responsiveness and system affect in the dimensional analysis of Japanese political support attitudes. However, this does not necessarily mean that Miller (1974a and b) was right and Citrin (1974) was wrong, although the above argument and findings on dimensionality of political support attitudes are somewhat supportive of Miller's (1974a and b) claim that the decline of political trust suggests the increase of disaffection toward the political system itself.(162)

(161) This suggests that the two-dimensional conceptual model presented in Figure 3. of chapter 1 can be empirically reduced to a unidimensional conceptual model, in which Cell (A) "strong support" is located on one end of the unidimensional continuum, Cell (D) "disaffection" is located on the other end, and Cells (B) and (C) "moderate support" fall in between Cell (A) and Cell (D) (see Figure 3 of this chapter).

(162) Of course, the question as to if the decline of political trust in the United States actually reflects the decline in system support is an empirical question, and examination of such an empirical question in the American context clearly falls outside the scope of this dissertation. Therefore, what I have argued in this section with the JABISS Study data only suggests an alternative way of conceptualization of the relationship between system support and political trust. Accordingly, it should be noted that the argument here does not directly support Miller's conclusion.
However, the argument and the conceptualization regarding the relationship between political trust and system support in this dissertation actually suggest an alternative conceptualization of system support and political trust which clearly differs from Citrin's and slightly differs from Miller's as well.\(^{(163)}\) In other words, the point emphasized in this argument is that Miller and Citrin respectively emphasize two different components of diffuse system support which is a unidimensional concept.

Finally, one more point needs to be clarified. One may argue that the variables concerning democratic institutions (V14, V15 and V16) should be grouped together with those variables which tap belief in system responsiveness (V5, V6 and V9), because the institutional support variables (V14, V15 and V16) also probe the respondents' perception of the responsiveness of those typical democratic institutions (i.e., political parties, elections, and the national legislature). However, empirically speaking, the factor analysis of the political support variables clearly suggests that the people's supportive attitudes toward the democratic institutions belong to a different dimension from the dimension of diffuse system support which includes the aspect of belief in the system's responsiveness. From a cultural and theoretical viewpoint, the belief in the democratic institutions derives from the idealistic formalism orientations toward democracy, whereas the perception of the system's responsiveness as a component of the diffuse system support attitudes stems from the realistic evaluation of actual political operations. Accordingly, the dimensionality of political support attitudes which has two independent dimensions concerning system responsiveness can be easily considered to exist on both an empirical ground and a theoretical ground.

5.2.2 Dimensional Analysis of the Relationship between Diffuse System Support and Internal Political Efficacy

In the previous section (5.1.1), internal political efficacy was conceptualized as a separate concept from diffuse system support, which has been argued to encompass external political efficacy (i.e., system responsiveness) and political trust. Although both internal political

\(^{(163)}\) The point in which my conceptualization of system support in Japanese context differs from Miller's conceptualization in American context will be discussed at length in the following section (i.e., 5.2.2).
efficacy and external political efficacy refer to the degree of the citizens' confidence that the citizens themselves can have an impact on the political process, the object of their confidence in internal political efficacy differs from the object of their confidence in external political efficacy. Internal political efficacy is directed toward the citizens themselves, while external political efficacy is directed toward the political system.

Therefore, external political efficacy (i.e., belief in system responsiveness) is regarded as an aspect of the system support concept, while internal political efficacy is not considered to be any part of the system support concept. However, the above conceptualization that internal political efficacy is an independent concept of system support cannot be sustained if internal political efficacy empirically belongs to the same attitudinal dimension as system support in an empirical data analysis (e.g., a factor analysis). In other words, the above conceptualization requires, as a necessary condition, that the internal political efficacy feelings are empirically independent of any dimensions of the system support attitudes. In order to examine the dimensionality of internal political efficacy attitudes and system support attitudes, six attitudinal variables concerning internal political efficacy and the eleven variables of political support attitudes have been factor analyzed.

The six political efficacy variables are concerned with "useless to vote if the respondent's party will not win" (V341), "does not matter vote or not because of so many other voters" (V342), "Voting is simply a citizen's duty" (V343), "People like me do not have any say in politics" (V344), "Politics is too complicated to understand" (V345), and "One can do something against a bad Diet bill"

(164) Internal political efficacy can be conceptualized as an explanatory variable of system support, because those citizens who feel by themselves capable of understanding politics and influencing political process are expected to feel positive toward the political system.

(165) The response choices (categories) are (1) "Agree," (2) "Slightly agree," (3) "Can't say," (4) "Slightly disagree," and (5) "Disagree," for each of these six variables. The order of these response categories in some variables are recoded so that categories of all the variables are ordered in the same contextual direction -- i.e., Category (5) means the most positive attitude of political efficacy and Category (1)
Of these variables, some variables (V341 through V343) are more concerned with the respondents' sense of civic duty than purely concerned with feeling of political efficacy. Other two variables (V344 and V345) are clearly tapping internal political efficacy feelings. But, the last one (V346) probes not only internal political efficacy but also external political efficacy, because this variable, "One can do something against a bad Diet bill" (V346), is tapping the respondent's self-evaluation of his capability as well as his perception about to what extent the mechanism of the political system can be accountable to system members' demands.

The results of the factor analysis of these six political efficacy variables with the eleven political support variables show a clear five-dimensional structure (Table 17). Of five factors extracted here, the first three factors represent the same three dimensions detected by the previous factor analysis of political support variables (Table 16) - i.e., the local political support dimension (Factor 2 in Table 17), the democratic means the most negative attitude of political efficacy for all the six variables (V341 through V346).

The factor solution of these 17 variables was obtained by the common factor analysis method with orthogonal rotation. The common factor analysis method was chosen over the principal component analysis for two reasons. First, the purpose of this factor analysis was to explore clearly separated dimensions among the political support-efficacy attitudes rather than maximize the common variance of a single dimension. For a further discussion which provides the methodological ground for this choice, see Weisberg (1984).

Second, since the factor analysis of eleven political support variables (Table 16) was performed by the common factor analysis method (see Footnote 156), the common factor analysis method was prefered for the examination of dimensionality among those political support variables (V4 through V16, except V7 and V17) and the political efficacy related variables (V341 through V346), for the purpose of maintaining consistency across those factor analyses.

In this common factor analysis, five factors which have a 1.0 or higher eigenvalue were extracted. This standard has been applied to all factor analyses performed for this dissertation's research.
institution dimension (Factor 1 in Table 17), and the diffuse system support dimension (Factor 3 in Table 17). The remaining two factors are respectively interpreted as the political efficacy dimension (Factor 4) and the civic duty dimension (Factor 5); the variables regarding internal political efficacy (V344 through V346) have high loadings on Factor 4, and two of the variables regarding civic duty (V341 and V342) are heavily loaded on Factor 5 in Table 17.

The five-dimensional structure of political support and efficacy attitudes displayed in Table 17 clearly suggests that internal political efficacy (Factor 4) is independent of any dimension of system support --- i.e., the diffuse system support dimension (Factor 3) or the democratic institution support dimension (Factor 1) --- and also independent of local political support (Factor 2). Hence, the results of this factor analysis satisfies a necessary condition for the conceptualization that internal political efficacy is a separate concept from diffuse system support or from institutional system support. (167)

Further examinations of the data concerning political support and efficacy also supports the above contention. Since the earlier theoretical discussion of the concepts of system support and political efficacy in is mainly concerned with the relationship between diffuse system support and internal political efficacy, the examination of dimensionality of the political support-efficacy attitudes should be focused upon those variables concerning diffuse system support and internal political efficacy alone. Accordingly, the six variables which probe diffuse system support attitudes (V4 through V10 except V7) and the two

(167) Of course, this does not provide a sufficient condition for the above conceptualization, because internal political efficacy can be an independent of the diffuse system support dimension as well as of the democratic institution support dimension but can still be a dimension of the broader multi-dimensional system support concept. However, as was argued earlier, internal political efficacy is not regarded as a dimension of the system support concept or the political support concept on a theoretical and contextual ground, because the object to which internal political efficacy feeling is directed differs from the object to which any dimensions of political or system support attitudes are directed. Therefore, as far as the necessary condition for this argument is empirically satisfied, this argument can be sustained even if the sufficient condition is not empirically satisfied.
Table 17

Political Support-Efficacy Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>F-1</th>
<th>F-2</th>
<th>F-3</th>
<th>F-4</th>
<th>F-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.351</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.434</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.446</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.562</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.806</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14</td>
<td>.608</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V15</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V341</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V342</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V343</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V344</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.833</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V345</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V346</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explained Variance (%): 20.6% 11.3% 9.3% 8.2% 5.9%


N = 1,415
variables which are exclusively concerned with internal political efficacy (V344 and V345) were factor analyzed, and the results are shown in Table 18.

Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V344</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V345</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proportion of Explained Variance: 26.5% 18.3%

Interpretation of Factor (Labels): Diffuse System Support Internal Political Efficacy

Data Source: The JABISS Study, 1976. N = 1,425

Table 18 as well as Figure 6 shows a clear two-dimensional structure in which the diffuse system support
The dimension (Factor 1) and the internal political efficacy dimension (Factor 2) are strongly orthogonal each other — i.e., therefore these two dimensions are almost totally independent of each other. This pattern also satisfies the requisite for the conceptualization presented earlier (i.e., 5.1); that is, internal political efficacy is a separate concept from diffuse system support. Consequently, since the concept of diffuse system support includes "political trust" aspect as well as other aspect, this conceptualization refutes the argument held by Miller and his associates (Miller, 1974a; Miller, Golenberg, and Erbring, 1979) that political trust and political efficacy are intimately close to each other and constitute the concept of system support and political support. Furthermore, the strong orthogonal pattern between the diffuse system support dimension (Factor 1) and the internal political efficacy (Factor 2) suggests that sense of internal political efficacy will have little explanatory power for diffuse system support attitudes because these two dimensions are almost not correlated at all (see Figure 6).

(168) Actually, three factor analyses of political support-efficacy variables were performed between the first factor analysis of 17 political support-efficacy variables (Table 17) and the last factor analysis of 8 variables on system support (V4 through V10, except V7) and internal political efficacy (V344 and V345) (Table 18), for the purpose of tracing changes in dimensional structure of these political support-efficacy attitudes. Each factor analysis perfectly fitted to each contextual expectation drawn from (interpreting) the question wordings of the variables involved in each factor analysis. First, the factor analysis of 17 variables showed the five-dimensional structure. Second, dropping the variables regarding local political support (V12 and V13) and democratic institution support (V14, V15 and V16), the factor analysis of 12 variables extracted three factors which respectively fit to the dimensions of diffuse system support, sense of civic duty, and sense of internal political efficacy. Third, dropping the variables about civic duty (V341 through V343), the factor analysis of 9 variables showed a two-dimensional structure in which diffuse system support (V4 through V10 except V7) and political efficacy (V344 through V346) represent two dimensions. Finally, dropping the variable tapping both external political efficacy and internal political efficacy (V346), the clear orthogonal two-dimensional structure appeared (Table 18).
Figure 6: Dimensionality of Diffuse System Support and Internal Political Efficacy
5.3 NATURE OF THREE POLITICAL SUPPORT DIMENSIONS

It has so far been argued that the Japanese system support attitudes have a three-dimensional structure, as the factor analysis of eleven political support variables is shown in Table 16. Now, two questions are raised concerning political support attitudes in Japan: (1) what is the level of support for each dimension of political support? and (2) what is the general characteristics of each dimension?

A frequency distribution of the eleven political support variables reveals the level of political support in each dimension as well as some general characteristics of each dimension, when those variables are grouped by the three political support dimensions according to which factor (i.e., dimension) each variable has high loadings on in the final factor solution (see Table 19). Table 19 shows an interesting contrast between the three dimensions and strong similarities within each dimension. The variables which represent the diffuse system support (V4 through V10, except V7) dimension have highly frequent negative responses, while the variables concerning local political support (V12 and V13) and democratic institution support (V14, V15, and V16) have highly frequent positive responses.

Table 19 reveals two different contrasting patterns in Japanese political support attitudes: (1) the contrast between weak diffuse national system support (V4 through V10) and relatively high local political support (V12 and V13), and (2) the even sharper contrast between weak diffuse system support (V4 through V10) and very high democratic institution support (V14 through V16). These contrasts between different dimensions of Japanese political support attitudes are parallel to what Richardson (1974) calls "ambivalent" political orientation of postwar Japanese citizens. Furthermore, the former contrast between diffuse system support and local political support is derived from the "localism" orientation by which Richardson (1974) refers to the Japanese's warmer feelings toward local politics as well as stronger involvement in local politics than their feelings toward national politics.(169)

All these factor analyses were performed by the common factor analysis method with orthogonal rotation in order to keep consistency.

(169) Richardson (1974) demonstrates contrast between Japanese citizens' evaluative attitudes toward local politics and their corresponding attitudes toward national politics in various aspects, using the pub
Table 19

Frequency Distribution of Political Support Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Supportive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIFFUSE SYSTEM SUPPORT DIMENSION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>10.3 %</td>
<td>38.2 %</td>
<td>51.4 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL POLITICAL SUPPORT DIMENSION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION SUPPORT DIMENSION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V15</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: DK, NA responses are excluded.


lished results of several opinion polls. He reports
The latter contrast stems from the "formalism" orientation by which Richardson (1974) refers to Japanese political attitudes that are torn between strong support for political participation (or democratic principles) in abstract thinking, on the one hand, and weak inclination to actual political involvement (or weak support for such actual democratic institutions as political parties) in realistic thinking, on the other hand. (170)

Particularly, the sharp contrast between the high level of democratic institution support and the low level of diffuse system support (Table 19) has a significant implication to the legitimacy of Japan's present political system. This pattern suggests that the Japanese accept their democratic political system in principle, whereas they are distrustful of political reality or the way in which politics is run in their nation. This interpretation of the attitudinal patterns is supported by other public opinion polls.

Table 20 shows the attitudes of the Japanese toward methods to reform their society in comparison to the attitudes of their German and British counterparts in 1978. Those Japanese who would like to see a revolutionary change of their society were as few as those in West Germany and even fewer than in Great Britain. If these extremely weak inclinations toward revolution are interpreted as rejection of ideas to alter the present political system drastically, that survey results drawn from Kumamoto prefecture in 1961 showed 41 percent of "satisfaction with methods of one's city or town politics" and 34 percent of dissatisfaction with it (Richardson, 1974, p.69, Table 3-1).

(170) For example, approximately 80 percent of the respondents in the JABISS study held positive attitudes toward the democratic functions of the political parties (V14) as shown in Table 19, whereas only 60 percent of the same respondents had warm feeling toward at least one of the six major political parties (The latter percentage was computed by making an index of negative feeling toward political parties based on feeling thermometer scales of six major parties, namely V61 through V66). Moreover, an further examination of crosstabulation of V14 by the negative partisan feeling index shows that 72 percent of the respondents who did not have warm feeling toward to any of the six parties actually perceived the function of political parties positively in a formal sense (i.e., agreed with the statement "political parties help people's voice be heard in politics").
Table 20 suggests that as many the Japanese think that institutional arrangements of their political system are legitimate as do the British or West Germans. (171)

On the other hand, only 4 percent of the Japanese respondents answered "firmly defend the society" in the table, whereas 44 percent of the West Germans and 25 percent of the Britons agreed on this statement. This suggests that they do not wish to alter their democratic society, but at the same time that they are not completely satisfied with the way the political system works. This interpretation is supported by the results of another survey question (Table 21). According to Table 21, Japanese citizens are much less satisfied with the way politics works (18%) than West German (79%) or British (51%) citizens.

(171) In Table 20, the percentage of Category (3) "Defend the system firmly" in Japan is much lower (4%) than that figure in West Germany (44%) or Great Britain (25%). One may argue that the Japanese were much less supportive of their present political system in 1978 because only 4 percent of the respondents want to defend their political system. However, the Japanese figure on the table must be deflated compared with the West German or British figure due to the question wording difference between the Japanese National Character Study VI (1978) and Euro-Barometer X-XI Study (1978). The wording of Category (3) of this question in this Japanese survey was "(3) The present establishment (or regime) of our society must be firmly maintained by any means" (Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, 1982, p.346), while the wording of the corresponding category in Euro-Barometer X-XI survey was "(3) Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces" (Commission of the European Community, 1983, p.38). Since the former wording clearly gives the respondents an impression that this category solicits the attitude which favors no reform or no progressive improvement of the political system, the Japanese percentage for this category must be deflated. Many of the Japanese respondents who choose Category (2) (i.e., "Defects of our present society must be gradually reformed") would have favored Category (3), if the wording of Category (3) had been the same wording as that of Euro-Barometer survey. Therefore, the extremely small percentage of responses to Category (3) in Japan is not considered to be an important difference of the Japanese sample from their West German or British counterparts.
Table 20

Attitudes toward Different Methods to Change Their Society

Comparison of Japan, West Germany, and Great Britain in 1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Change by Revolutionary Action</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Change by Gradual Reform</td>
<td>89 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
<td>63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Defend the Society Firmly</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td>25 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) DK, NA</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (N)</strong></td>
<td>2,032</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>1,339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The question wording of category (3) of Japanese study differs from that of European study. See Footnote 171.

Source: For Japan, Tokei Suri Kenkyujo (1982); For West Germany and Great Britain, Commission of European Community (1983).

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(172) The question wording for the Japanese survey (i.e., Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai's 1976 survey) used the term 'politics,' whereas the wording of the Eurobarometer X-XI survey used the term "democracy" (i.e., "Are you satisfied with the way politics/democracy works in this country?"). One may argue that the Japanese respondents might have responded more positively than actually they did (Table 21) if the question wording had used the term "democracy" instead of "politics," because the term "democracy"
zens are with the way democracy works. (172) Therefore, Table 20 and Table 21 indicate that the Japanese accept the democratic institutions of their political system as much as the Germans or the British, although Japanese citizens are much less satisfied with political reality than are their German and British counterparts. These contrasting attitudes of Japanese system support are parallel to the attitudinal patterns revealed in Table 19.

One may question if this pattern of the low level of diffuse system support holds truth in years other than 1976 in Japan. This question is legitimate because the year of 1976 is strongly marked by the prevalent public mood of political cynicism due to the reveal of Lockheed scandal in which high ranking government officials, such as ex-prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, were involved. Hence, one may suspect that the low level of diffuse system support, particularly the extremely low level of positive responses in the variables of trust in political authorities (V5, V8 and V9), may be specifically attributed to this particular period effect of prevalent political cynicism due to the

has positive connotation but the term "politics" almost always carries negative or "dirty" image. Indeed, this argument appears to be valid especially when considering the Japanese political climate, because Japanese political culture has positive "formalism" orientation toward democratic ideals (Richardson, 1974) and strong political cynicism is prevalent in Japan (Richardson, 1978; Flanagan and Richardson 1978). However, the discrepancy between Japanese response (18%) to this question and German (79%) or British (51%) response is so substantial that the difference does not seem to be solely due to the question wording difference between the two different surveys. Moreover, if a Japanese respondent faces the survey question, "Are you satisfied with the way in which democracy works in this country?", he is very likely to think of the gap between the ideal principle of democracy in his mind, on the one hand, and the political reality of Japan which he is likely to perceive negatively, on the other hand. As a result, this respondent is more likely to come up with a negative evaluation of the way in which democracy works, because he probably thinks that democracy of Japan is not working in the way it is supposed to be. Therefore, it can be considered that the low level of satisfaction in Japan is not particularly caused by the question wording (or the term "politics") of this Japanese survey.
Table 21

Satisfaction with Political/Democracy

Comparison of Japan, West Germany, and Great Britain, in 1976.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Category</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>West Germany</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Satisfied</td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>79 %</td>
<td>51 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Very + Fairly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Not Satisfied</td>
<td>73 %</td>
<td>19 %</td>
<td>43 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Not Very + Not At All)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) DK, NA</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>2 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N)</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>1,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The question wording of Japanese study differs from that of European study. See Footnote 172.

Source: For Japan, Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai (1977); For West Germany and Great Britain, Commission of European Community (1983).

However, the low level of political trust, or diffuse system support, is not a temporal or unique phenomenon in 1976 alone. The longitudinal data of public opinion polls clearly demonstrate that the low level of political support (or satisfaction with the way in which politics is run) persisted throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, as Table 22 clearly demonstrates. (174) Therefore, the level

(173) The negative impact of the Lockheed scandal on Japanese political trust was probably comparable to that of the Watergate scandal in the United States.

(174) This trend is not limited only to the 1970s or the
of diffuse system support in Japan has been low not only in 1976 but also in other years.

Richardson (1974, p.69, Table 3-1) reports that the 1960 and 1962 surveys conducted in Kumamoto prefecture showed the equally low level of satisfaction with the way in which politics is carried out (10 percent and 17 percent respectively) and high dissatisfaction level (65 percent and 60 percent respectively).
Table 22
Longitudinal Pattern of Political Support in Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>DK/NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19.7 %</td>
<td>71.9 %</td>
<td>8.3 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>1,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The question wording is the same as that for Japan in Table 21: "Are you satisfied with the way in which politics works?"


5.4 OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CONSTRUCTION OF FACTOR-SCORE SCALES OF SYSTEM SUPPORT

We have so far seen a dimensional structure of Japanese system support attitudes, that is the dependent variable of this dissertation. Now, it is necessary to construct operationalized indicators of the system support attitudes according to the three dimensions that were empirically
detected by the factor analysis (Table 16). For this purpose, factor-scores can be computed according to the factor solution of the eleven political support variables (i.e., V4 through V16 except V7 and V11), and three factor-score scales can be built as the operationalized dependent variables. Since there are three factors corresponding to local political support (Factor I), democratic institution support (Factor II), and diffuse national system support (Factor III), those three factor-score scales have been built.(175)

However, the local political support scale is excluded from the scope of data analysis in this dissertation, because local political support is not regarded as a part of the concept of national system support, which is the dependent variable as well as the major concern of this dissertation. Thus, exclusion of the local political support scale from the operationalized dependent variables is based on the way in which system support is conceptualized in this dissertation, as was discussed earlier in this chapter.

In addition, there is a practical reason to exclude local political support as the dependent variable from the scope of data analysis. As the incumbent office holders in local or prefectural governments often belong to political parties other than the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has dominated the national political arena. Considering the contention that incumbent support and system support are conceptually overlap to a great extent in the ordinary citizens' attitudes toward their own political system (see Figure 1), support for the incumbent government administration at the local level and support for the local political system are also assumed to overlap greatly in the citizens' minds. Therefore, the supportive attitudes toward the local political system may be positively or negatively correlated with the diffuse system support attitudes, depending on whether the LDP or an opposition party occupies the incumbent government in each citizen's community or prefecture. Assuming that the local political support attitudes have interactive influences on and from the diffuse system support attitudes, an explanation of local political

(175) Three factor-score scales were computed from the factor-score coefficient matrix which were in turn based on the factor loading matrix in Table 16. For the factor-score coefficient matrix and the formula to compute factor-scores from the matrix, see Appendix A. For further discussions on this statistical technique, see Kim and Mueller (1978a and b) and Rummel (1970).
support will inevitably be very complex. This is a practical reason for excluding local political support from the scope of the dependent variable concept.

Actually, it is feasible to separate the respondents of the JABISS Study survey into two groups: (1) those respondents who reside in a community in which the LDP or the conservative camp controls the local government, and (2) those respondents who live in a community where an opposition party or the progressive camp occupies the local government office. This can be done by categorizing the JABISS Study sample into these two groups according to information about which parties occupied each local and prefectural government office in 1976. This information can be provided by Chiho Jichi Sogo Kenkyujo (1976).

However, even this categorizing the sample into the two groups still encounters another practical problem. In some cases, the political camp which controls the local government differs from the political camp which occupies the prefectural government. Because the local political support scale places equally heavy weights on "trust in local politics" (V12) and on "trust in prefectural politics" (V13), it will be very difficult to explain the local political support attitudes of those respondents who live in a city under the control of the progressive camp (e.g., a socialist mayor) and in a prefecture under the control of the conservative camp (e.g., the LDP governor) or vice versa.

Therefore, only the factor-score scales for democratic institution support and for diffuse system support will be examined as the operationalized dependent variables through the JABISS Study data. It is important here to note that these two factor-score scales are statistically independent of each other, as the corresponding two factors are clearly orthogonal (or right angle) each other (Figure 5). Hence, it is assumed that the democratic institution support scale has little statistical effects on the diffuse system support scale and vice versa.

Consequently, the following data analysis will focus the democratic institution support scale and the diffuse system support scale separately. Thus, interactions between these two dimensions of system support are assumed not to exist for an analytical purpose.(176)

(176) If one attempts to measure the interactive effects between the three dimensions of political support (i.e., diffuse system support, democratic institution support, and local political support), the three factor-score scales have to be constructed according
to a factor solution with oblique rotation instead of orthogonal rotation; for, a factor analysis with oblique rotation method assumes inter-correlations between factors to exist, whereas a factor analysis with orthogonal rotation method assumes no inter-correlation between factors (Kim and Muller, 1978a and b; Rummel, 1970).

However, a factor analysis of the same eleven political support variables with the oblique rotation method actually shows very weak inter-correlations between three factors which respectively correspond to the three factors in Table 16. Therefore, it is safe on an empirical ground to assume that there is little mutual effects between democratic institution support and diffuse system support.
Chapter VI

THE SOCIO—CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF SYSTEM SUPPORT

6.1 SPECIFICATION OF THE SOCIO—CULTURAL EXPLANATORY MODEL: AN OVERVIEW

The socio-cultural explanations presented in chapter 4 can be summerized into a single explanatory model based on the socio-cultural approach to system support, as is shown in Figure 7. In the figure, the solid lines indicate the linkages (relationships) that are clearly hypothesized by the socio-cultural explanations to be fairly strong. The broken lines in the figure show the relationships which are expected to be weak or whose causal directions are uncertain or two ways.

Two concepts on the right column in Figure 7 are the two dimensions of system support (i.e., diffuse system support and institutional system support), which are theoretically expected to exist. As was discussed in chapter 5, diffuse system support (i.e., support of the way in which the political system generally works) and institutional system support (i.e., support of institutional arrangement of the political system) are the two major dimensions of the system support concept with regard to the national political system. The local political support dimension is excluded from the scope of the empirical analysis of this dissertation, because this dissertation is concerned with the legitimacy of the national political system of postwar Japan.

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Figure 7: Socio-Cultural Explanatory Model of System Support in Japan
6.1.1 The Linkages between Political Subcultures and System Support

The three political subcultures in the middle row in Figure 7 are presented as the endogenous explanatory variables of system support. Following the argument of chapter 4 (4.2), the relationships of three political subcultures with the two dimensions of system support vary slightly from one to another.

First, the traditional political culture is hypothesized to have positive effects on the diffuse system support attitudes, because the traditional political culture fosters deferential and submissive attitudes toward political authorities. The impact of the traditional political culture on the institutional dimension of system support is mixed and somewhat uncertain compared with diffuse system support because of the two paradoxical traits of the traditional political subculture with regard to the democratic institutions. The democratic institutions were foreign to the traditional Japanese political culture, whereas the traditional deferential attitudes toward political authorities can still be extended to supportive attitudes toward those political institutions which are perceived as something given by the political authority. It is hypothesized in this dissertation that the traditional political culture has positive effects on institutional system support, because the incompatibility between Japan's traditional political culture and the democratic principles can be challenged as was discussed in chapter 3 (see 3.1.2), and because the argument of the spill-over effects of the orientation of deference to authority for democratic institution support seems to be more plausible.

Second, the formal democratic political subculture is obviously hypothesized to have the impact on the formation of supportive attitudes toward the democratic institutions of Japan's political system. But, its effects on the formation of diffuse system support attitudes are expected to be mixed or negative. For, those citizens who have the formal democratic orientation must be frustrated with the gap between the formal democratic ideals and the political reality, and they consequently develop negative diffuse system support attitudes in spite of the positive orientation toward democracy deriving this political subculture.

Third, the structural-oppositional political subculture is clearly hypothesized to foster negative diffuse system support, because this political subculture generates pro
gressive criticisms toward the way in which politics is run and the political system operates in postwar Japan. However, the impact of this political subculture cannot be expected to be negative on the attitudes toward the democratic institutions in a simple manner, because the structural-oppositional political subculture includes some strong attachment to the present constitution as a symbol which denies the prewar authoritarian political values. Hence, the influence of the structural-oppositional political subculture on diffuse system support is expected to be mixed, or negative for some people and positive for some other people.

6.1.2 The Linkages between the Sociological Attributes and the Political Subcultures

As was discussed in chapter 4 (4.2), the three political subcultures of postwar Japan have some particular patterns of social attributes. The relationships between the political subcultures and their sociological attributes are indicated in Figure 7, where those sociological attributes are in the left column. The discussion chapter 4 (4.2) suggests that the following four sociological variables are important attributes of the three political subcultures: (1) urban-rural difference, (2) generational difference, (3) education level, and (4) amount of media exposure.

First, the urban-rural difference makes some differences in orientation toward the traditional political culture. As the traditional political values have been better preserved and better transmitted across generations in rural communities, in which the personal communication networks are more cohesive and the extended family structure remain more often than in urban or suburban communities, the traditional political culture values are expected to be found more in rural areas than in urban or suburban areas. But, the urban-rural difference is not theoretically expected to be related directly to other political subcultures except some indirect effects through media exposure or age differences.

Second, as the first section (4.1) of this chapter repeatedly points out, generational differences in political orientation exist among the postwar Japanese. Especially, the attitudinal difference must be clear between the prewar generation and the postwar generation for several reasons. As the previous discussions suggested, since the postwar generation spent their formative years under
the postwar educational system (see 4.1.5) and under the affluent social milieu (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.2), this generation must be less oriented toward the traditional political culture. Moreover, the postwar generation did not receive as much the traditional values from their parental generation as did the postwar generation, because the family structure as well as family socialization pattern changed in postwar Japan (see 4.1.4), and because the traditional community structure as well as its traditional communication networks changed in the postwar period (see 4.1.3). Hence, the older prewar generation is expected to be more strongly oriented toward the traditional political culture than is the younger postwar generation. In contrast, the postwar generation is expected to have stronger orientation of the formal democratic political subculture (see Figure 7).

Third, the level of education which each individual citizen has attained is expected to be positively related to both the formal-democratic political subculture and the structural-oppositional political subculture. As Samuel Stouffer (1955) suggests, those who have the higher level education are more likely to accept or tolerate the different opinions or ideologies from their own. Accordingly, even the older Japanese of the prewar generation who have higher education are expected to accept the democratic ideals better than those Japanese of the prewar generation with lower education. As the postwar generation with higher education has had longer exposure to teaching of the democratic ideals than their lower educated counterpart, the educational level difference within the postwar generation is expected to have some effects on the formal democratic cultural orientation, although the entire postwar generation is expected to be fairly strongly oriented toward the formal democratic political subculture regardless of their educational attainment level. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the level of educational attainment has positive effects on the formation of the formal democratic orientation while holding the age (or generation) constant.

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(177) The generation differences in political attitudes are logically believed to be based on whether an individual received his education under the prewar system or under the postwar system. This distinction based on educational experience is theoretically independent of which level of education he received (the level of educational attainment).
The level of educational attainment is also expected to have effects on orientation of the structural-oppositional political subculture regardless of the generations, although the impact of the educational level on the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation must be greater for the postwar generation than for the prewar generation. In the postwar Japanese universities, there are many professors who are marxist oriented and therefore provide progressive criticisms of the government as well as of the political system in their classrooms. Therefore, the citizens of the postwar generation with higher education are expected to be more strongly oriented toward the structural-oppositional political subculture. Even the prewar generation Japanese who are highly educated are expected to have stronger orientation of the structural-oppositional political subculture than their lower educated counterparts would do, because the prewar universities still provided more liberal values and critical evaluation of the government than the government itself wished then. However, the impact of higher education on the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation among the prewar generation citizens is, of course, not as strong as among their postwar counterparts.

One may expect that the educational level may be negatively related to the orientation toward the traditional political culture because the higher education can be considered to foster modern and liberal attitudes. However, the question of whether an individual is politically traditional oriented or modern oriented must depend to a greater extent on whether he spent his formative years in the traditional social milieu (i.e., the prewar period) or in the modern social milieu (i.e., the postwar period) than whether he received higher education or not. Therefore, the impact of the educational level on the traditional political culture is expected to be weak, though it may be negative if any exist.

Fourth, the amount of exposure to mass media is expected to be positively related to the structural-oppositional political subculture, because the postwar media, especially newspapers, have been critical of the government and of behaviors of politicians and political parties according to their code of political objectivity (see 4.1.6). At the same time, the media exposure is also expected to be positively related to the formal democratic subculture orientation, since both newspapers and television news have been cherishing and have been diffusing the democratic principles and values in the postwar period (see 4.1.6).
6.1.3 The Direct Effects of the Exogenous Explanatory Variables on System Support

As we have seen, those sociological variables (i.e., the exogenous explanatory variables on the left column in Figure 7) have indirect influence on the formation of system support attitudes through the three political subcultures. However, some of these exogenous variables have direct effects on system support as well as indirect effects on it through the political subcultures. The generational difference has direct impact on system support attitudes. When a nation has undergone total alternation of its political system, political attitudes (particularly, the attitudes toward the political system itself) of one generation have become different from those attitudes of another generation, because each generation formed their system oriented political attitudes under a different political system and under a different set of prevalent political values. Maurice Zeitlin (1966) has empirically demonstrated in his Cuban study that three different generations, which respectively spent their formative years under different political regimes, had clearly different attitudes toward the present regime. Similarly, in Japan, those people who spent their formative years under the prewar political system (i.e., the prewar generation) are expected to have different system support attitudes from those attitudes of the Japanese who spent their formative years under the postwar political system (i.e., the postwar generation).

This generation difference in system support attitudes in Japan is possibly independent of the influence of the three political subcultures.

If the generational difference has the direct impact on system support attitudes, then the generational effects are possibly independent of the impact of the three political subcultures. For example, there may be some Japanese of the postwar generation who may not have any diffuse system support attitudes, although they are not particularly oriented toward the structural-oppositional political subculture. Although such a possibility theoretically seems to be small, it is an empirical question whether the generational difference has effects on system support independently of the impact of any of the three political subcultures. (178)

(178) This can be empirically examined by utilization of the causal modeling technique (i.e., path analysis).
The Relationships between system support attitudes (i.e., the dependent variable), on the one hand, and the political subcultures (i.e., the endogenous variables) as well as the sociological attributes of them (i.e., the exogenous variables), on the other hand, have been so far specified and hypothesized. These specified linkages between them are depicted in Figure 7, as was mentioned earlier, and these relationships will be empirically examined in chapters 6 and 7.

6.1.4 Exclusion of Other Exogenous Sociological Variables from the Socio-Cultural Explanatory Model

One may note that two types of the sociological variables are excluded from Figure 7 and from the discussion so far. The first type of variables excluded here is the variables concerning the citizens' social networks and organizational ties as well as their involvement in organizational activities. This type of variables have been empirically confirmed to have significant effects on political attitudes. For example, Liepelt's (1971) comparative study of Austria and West Germany and Sani's (1974) study on Italy have respectively demonstrated that individuals' involvement in Catholic church activities and their exposure to labor union communications had clear effects on their partisan attitudes. (179) The Second type of variables excluded are variables which tap social class or social stratification, such as subjective self-identification of class, income, or occupation. Since the reasons for the exclusion of the first type of variables are different from the reasons for the exclusion of the second type variables, they will be discussed separately below.

6.1.4.1 The Variables of Organizational Ties and Involvement

(179) One of the strongest manifest of this sociological approach of "organizational involvement" is a work by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978), although their dependent variable was political behavior (i.e., political participation, to be specific) rather than political attitude. Another important study which focuses on the importance of the impact of "social networks" on voting behavior is a voting behavior study in Japan by Flanagan and Richardson (1977).
It is important to examine the effects of the social network variables as well as the organizational involvement variables (e.g., union membership, membership of business organization or retail store association, religious group membership) on the political subcultures as well as on system support. However, such an examination goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. As was discussed in chapter 1 and chapter 2, this dissertation confines its scope to the examinations of the political culture hypothesis and the system performance hypothesis. While these two hypotheses are theoretically concerned with normative implications of the sources of system legitimacy to the relatively young democracy in the non-Western culture, the impact of the organizational involvement on the survival of Japanese democracy has not been conceptualized within the theoretical framework of this dissertation. In order to include the organizational involvement variables in the empirical explanations of system support in this dissertation, and in order to retain normative implications of the theoretical framework of this dissertation, the theoretical framework itself will have to be changed. Such expansion and revision of the theoretical framework as well as such empirical analysis of the organizational variables should deserve a full attention of another dissertation or a scholarly investigation. Therefore, the organizational involvement variables are excluded from the scope of the empirical examination of this dissertation.

6.1.4.2 The Social Class Related Variables

Second, the class related variables are excluded from the explanatory model because the concept of "social class" or "social stratification" has very complex structure in postwar Japan and because their relevance to political

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(180) Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) demonstrated the normative implications of organizational involvement for political participation, therefore for the operation of democratic political systems. But, the implications of organizational involvement to democratic legitimacy is not discussed there either.

(181) For example, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) have beautifully demonstrated the richness of the effects of those organizational involvement variables. Similarly, Flanagan and Richardson (1977) also have clearly demonstrated the significance of the social network variables on voting behavior and on partisan attitudes. Either one demands a thorough empirical research.
attitudes is not clear. If one tries to use class (or social stratification) as an explanatory variable for any political attitudes, he assumes the variable of class (or social stratification) to represent a unidimensional hierarchical continuum of individuals. However, according to a large-scale longitudinal sociological study of Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Japan ---hereinafter, will be referred to as the SSM Study, conducted in 1955, 1965, and 1975--- (Tominaga, 1979a), the structure of social stratification in Japanese society has complex multidimensionality and therefore is not amenable to the construction of a unidimensional scale of class (or social stratification) in contemporary Japan.(182)

Another source of conceptual and measurement problem exists for using the concept of class or social stratification in an empirical data analysis of Japanese political attitudes is the absence of clear distinctions between classes in postwar Japan. The contemporary Japanese citizens hardly possess a clear notion about exactly which class or social stratum they themselves belong to or any notion about who are the members of a particular class or stratum (Tominaga, 1979b).(183) Therefore, a survey question which probes the respondent's social stratification (or his social class) does not match with objective indicators of his class, such as income, properties, occupation, or education (Naoi, 1979). Moreover, the subjective self-identification of one's own class or social stratum varies from one survey question wording to another, because each individual does not have a certain clear-cut standard to judge himself as a member of any specific class (or social stratum).(184)

(182) Michiko Naoi (1979) argues that the attitudes of self-identification of class and self-perception of social stratum have two different dimensions which are to a great extent independent of each other.

(183) In contrast to Japan, European societies and some Asian societies have clear boundaries between social classes, and the members of each class are well aware of those class boundaries as well as general attributes of the members of each class (in other words, some notion of who would be the members of each class in that society).

(184) According to Michiko Naoi (1979), the pattern of frequency distribution between different social strata or classes varies from one question to another depending on the question wording. For example, the question wording of the self-perception of social
Considering both the multi-dimensionality of the class (or social stratification) related attitudes among the contemporary Japanese and the absence of clear notion of boundaries between classes (or social strata), it is very difficult to hypothesize any linear relationship between either class or social strata, on the one hand, and particular political subculture orientation or system support attitudes, on the other hand. The reason for this difficulty is obviously that any operationalized indicator of social class or stratification cannot be assumed to have the ordinal-level or interval-level scale in postwar Japan, as was discussed earlier.

The social stratification of contemporary Japan are very complex, and their political implications are to some extent uncertain. According to Yasusuke Murakami (1982), the "new middle mass" citizens emerged as a group in Japan in the 1970s, while the "middle class" in a classic sense has diminished in recent years. The former group are hypothesized by Murakami to have both the "status quo maintenance" orientation and the attitudes that are "critical of the status quo of the political system," because the new middle mass do have some resources to protect and, at the same time, have participatory oriented new values.(185) Because these two political attitudes are contradictory each other, the use of the survey variable that taps on class or social stratification is inappropriate for an empirical analysis of system support attitudes without a careful, thorough treatment of the concepts of class and social stratification.(186) Unfortunately, such a

stratum in the SSM studies (1955, 1965, and 1975) dichotomizes the middle stratum into the "upper middle" and "lower middle" categories (Noai, 1979), whereas the question wording of the same question the National Life Study by the Prime Minsiter's Office (in 1958, 1965, and 1975) trichotomizes the middle stratum into the "upper middle," "middle middle," and "lower middle" categories (Prime Minsister's Office, 1958 1965, 1975). The former wording recieved 77 percent of the respondents falling into the middle stratum in 1975, while the latter had 89 percent for the middle stratum in the same year.

(185) These "participatory oriented new values" are similar to what Inglehart (1971, 1977) calls the "post-material" (or "post-burgeois") values.

(186) If one treats Japanese social stratification structure as a multi-dimensional concept and attempts to construct several different social stratification
treatment deserves a full attention of an empirical examination as a separate topic. Therefore, the variable of class or social stratification will be excluded from the major scope of the subsequent empirical examination of system support attitudes.

6.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Three political subcultures have been identified, in chapters 3 and 4, as typical aspects which capture the characteristics of present Japanese political culture: (1) the traditional political subculture, (2) the formal democratic political subculture, and (3) the structural-oppositional political subculture. Since these three political subcultures are expected to have different effects on system support attitudes, particularly different impact on each of the two dimensions of system support attitudes (i.e., the democratic institution support dimension, and the diffuse system support dimension), these three political subcultures needed to be operationalized separately.

Since capturing structure of these political subcultures should suggest good ideas about how to operationalize those three political subculture concepts, dimensional structure of each political subculture orientation has been probed by a factor analysis. Structures of three political subcultures can be explored as well as can be operationalized through the JABISS Election Study data, which include a set of variables that tap traditional cultural values, a set of variables that capture the attitudes of civic duty or the orientation toward formal democratic principles, and a set of variables that probe ideological orientation toward the structural-oppositional political subculture.

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scales which respectively correspond to the different dimensions of Japan's social stratification ---as Imada and Hara (1979) did with the 1975 SSM Study data, it is meaningful to utilize the concept of class or social stratification as exogenous variables. However, this will result in several additional exogenous variables, and construction of such scales will require tremendous amount of data analysis and labor.
6.2.1 Operationalization of the Traditional Political Culture

There are fifteen questions which tap the respondent's orientation toward traditional Japanese cultural values in the JABISS Study. Those fifteen variables tap the following cultural values: (V417) "to preserve neighbourhood harmony, donate money to the community even if not agree the goal," (V418) "cut discussion short to save hard feelings in a meeting," (V419) "domestic work not men's work," (V420) "such old morals as 'respect one's seniors' are still important," (V421) "it is proper to respect opinions of one's leaders or superiors," (V422) "entrust things to outstanding political leaders to improve the country rather than have the people debate over," (V423) "it is proper for politicians (e.g., Diet members, governors) to command respect," (V424) "must take great care of personal relationships at work and in community," (V425) "personal connections are important for good job or business," (V426) "need a politician's help as a go-between when requesting something to a government office," (V427) "it is fine to give gifts to government officials who take care of you," (V428) "cherish such values as 'save one's face' or 'avoid embarrassment'," (V429) "individual rights and freedom are more important than traditional morals such as filial piety or the repayment of favors," (V430) "local events are more important than national events such as the Lockheed scandal," and (V431) "give important posts in a community to oldtimers than newcomers."

Because a very complex relationships are expected to exist between these fifteen cultural variables, on the one hand, and the two system support dimensions (i.e., democratic institution support, and diffuse system support), on the other hand, it is necessary to construct a simpler operationalized indicator of the traditional political culture orientation than what the fifteen different variables represent. For this purpose, it is essential to capture some dimensional structure of the traditional political culture attitudes, and therefore it is appropriate to factor analyze those fifteen variables.

As a result of the initial factor analysis of the fifteen variables, two variables, "domestic work not men's work (V419)" and "individual rights and freedom important (V429)," were dropped from the analysis because neither variable had a communality level of 0.1 or higher in the initial factor analysis. Also these two variables are hard to interpret as belonging to any of the six dimensions extracted in the initial factor analysis.
After excluding these two variables, the second version of factor analysis of the remaining thirteen cultural variables again extracted six factors. (187) Those six factors identified here (Table 23) are: (1) deference to political authority (V421, V422, V423), (2) attitude toward personal connections in public affairs, (V425, V426), (3) concern with personal relationships in private life (V420, V424), (4) attitude toward traditional morals (V427, V428), (5) concern with group/community harmony (V417, V418), and (6) parochialism (V430, V431).

While these six dimensions of the traditional political culture appear to be divergent, (188) all six factors share

(187) These six factors were obtained by the principal component analysis method with oblique rotation. Because the principal component analysis method "seeks to locate a first component dimension in the space that accounts for a maximum proportion of the variance of the variables" (Weisberg, 1984, p.349), this factor analysis method is appropriate for this set of cultural variables, among which one common underlying dimension (i.e., tradition vs. modernity) is assumed to exist.

Although the term "component" is conventionally used in principal component analysis, the term "factor" is used throughout this dissertation in order to establish the common concept of dimension regardless of whether common factor analysis or principal component analysis was employed. For further discussions on these two different methods of factor analysis, see Rummel (1970), Kim and Mueller (1978b), and Weisberg (1984).

This second version of factor analysis of the thirteen cultural variables indicated that the six factors together accounted for 68.9 percent of the total variances.

(188) In fact, six factors seem to be too many, because only thirteen variables were involved in this principal component analysis. One standard to determine the number of factors to be extracted is the scree-test (Kim and Mueller, 1978b). According to the scree-test, only one or three factors need to be extracted. However, the three-factor solution is less interpretable than the six-factor solution described here. Still, combining the scree-test and interpretability considerations does support extracting just a single factor (i.e., the first principal
Table 23

**Factor Analysis of the Traditional Japanese Cultural Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>F-1</th>
<th>F-2</th>
<th>F-3</th>
<th>F-4</th>
<th>F-5</th>
<th>F-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V417</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>-68</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V418</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>-08</td>
<td>-08</td>
<td>-54</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V420</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-00</td>
<td>-09</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V424</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V421</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-03</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V422</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-05</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V423</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-03</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V425</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-07</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V426</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V427</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>02</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-02</td>
<td>05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V428</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V430</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>-01</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>-04</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V431</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>-03</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Factor Labels**
- Deference
- Pol
- Person-
- Old
- Group
- Local-
- Harmo-

**Explained Variances**
- 36.0%
- 10.5%
- 8.3%
- 5.9%
- 5.5%
- 2.6%

the common underlying dimension of traditional vs. modern orientation. (189) This single common underlying dimension of tradition-modernity is simpler to use as the operational variable to represent the traditional political subculture, rather than use six separate subtypes of tradition-modernity orientation. For this purpose, a scale of component scores based on this common dimension is appropriate as an operational measure for the traditional political subculture. (190)

6.2.2 Operationalization of the Formal Democratic Subculture

The formal democratic political subculture can be operationalized through seven variables that measure attitudes regarding democratic values. The first six variables (V341 to V346) were originally designed as one group of variables to measure sense of civic duty and political efficacy, which are the same variables that were used to test the dimensionality of diffuse system support and internal political efficacy (see 5.2). A seventh variable, the orientation toward individual rights and freedom (V429), can also be considered to tap attitudes toward formal democratic values. Since this variable (V429) was excluded from the previous factor analysis of the traditional cultural variables, it is legitimate to use it for the factor analysis of the attitudes toward the formal democratic political subculture.

In the factor analysis of these seven variables, as shown in Table 24, three factors were clearly identified and easily interpreted. (191) The first factor represents component alone), as will be done shortly.

(189) Because the first factor accounts for 26.9 percent of the total variances in the cultural variables, it can be said that these variables share a fairly large proportion of the common dimension.

(190) The component scores were calculated from the loadings on the unrotated first principal component (the first factor extracted initially) in principal component analysis. For the formula used to compute the component score (Kim and Mueller, 1978b, pp.72-73), see Appendix B.

(191) The principal component analysis method with oblique rotation was employed as the factor analysis method, because we expected that a single dimension component
The internal efficacy dimension. The second is the dimension of "sense of civic duty" which is composed of variables to tap negative orientation toward civic duty. The third factor is interpreted as the dimension of the democratic political subculture. Three separate factor-scores were computed corresponding to each of these three factors.

Thus, the internal efficacy scale, the civic duty scale, and the formal democratic ideology scale are to be used as the operationalized explanatory variables. While all three scales are concerned with formal democratic ideals, the third scale is of particular interest from the perspective of the formal democratic subculture in postwar Japan. The first, or the internal efficacy scale, is assumed to probe the respondents' attitudes toward their own capability of influencing and understanding the political process (V344 of the formal democratic orientation underlies these seven variables (see Footnote 187, for the relevant discussion of this methodological choice). Three factors account for 62.4 percent of the total variance in the seven variables.

This was also suggested by the earlier factor analysis of diffuse system support and internal political efficacy variables in Chapter 5 (i.e., 5.1.2).

This dimension actually represents the reverse of "sense of civic duty". Loading high on the second factor are two items about voter turnout attitudes (V341 and V342). These two variables tap the respondent's attitudes about voting turnout, which may derive from both an apathetic attitude toward elections and rational thinking on the impact of his vote on the outcomes of elections. If the respondent decides not to turn out to vote because he thinks his vote will not affect the election outcome, this thinking is clearly rational thinking (Downs, 1957). At the same time, his decision to abstain from voting may be simply based on his apathetic attitude toward elections and/or politics. For related arguments on rationality and civic duty in voting turnout, see, for example, Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974, 1975), and Strom (1975).

The procedure for building factor-score scales for these three factors is exactly the same as the procedure described in the section on the system support factor-score scales (see Appendix A).
Table 24

**Factor Analysis of the Formal Democratic Subculture Orientation**

Principal Component Analysis of Variables which tap Feeling of Political Efficacy and Democratic Values with Obliqu Rotation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Labels</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V341 Not Vote If Not Win</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td></td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V342 So Many Votes Need Not Vote</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>.862</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V343 Have No Say in Government</td>
<td>.837</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V344 Politics Too Complicated</td>
<td>.778</td>
<td>-.182</td>
<td>-.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V345 Voting Is Merely Citizen's Duty</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V346 Can Stop Dangerous Bill in the Diet</td>
<td>-.410</td>
<td>-.211</td>
<td>.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V429 Individual Right More Important Than Old Values</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explained Variance 26.5 %  21.0 %  14.9 %

N = 1,552

Internal Political Efficacy
Negative Civic Duty
Formal Democratic Subculture

Note: The term "Factor" is used here even in principal component analysis. See Footnote 187.

and V345), rather than their attitudes toward formal principles of democracy. The second, or civic duty scale, measures attitudes toward the equilibrium of rational thinking and formal democratic ideology. But, the third, or formal democratic subculture scale, is considered to measure the degree of faith in the formal democratic ideals, which include feelings of external efficacy, i.e., feelings about the responsiveness of the political system (V436), and orientation toward democratic values such as individual rights and freedom (V429). Therefore, the third factor-score scale can be regarded as the operationalized variable of the formal democratic subculture of postwar Japan.

6.2.3 Operationalization of the Structural-Oppositional Political Subculture

The structural-oppositional political subculture can be operationalized through those variables that were designed to measure political issue orientation. Although these variables tap attitudes concerning policy issues somewhat, the variables do not directly measure orientation toward specific current policies but probe attitudes toward longstanding, general ideological issues, such as a left-wing (or progressive) ideological orientation, or its right-wing counterpart. Those political and ideological issue related variables are: (V377) "strengthen the emperor's voice in politics," (V380) "strengthen the Japan-US security system," (V383) "conclude the peace treaty and have friendship with China (i.e., the People's Republic of China)," (V386) "have more friendly relationship with North Korea," (V389) "demand return of northern territories more strongly from Soviet Union," (V392) "strengthen Japan's Defense Forces," (V395) "check big business's oppression on the people," (V398) "enhance social welfare even if tax goes up," (V401) "recognize the rights of public employees to go strike," (V404) "stimulate business activity even at the risk of inflation," (V407) "reform money-power politics (i.e., political corruptions)," and (V410) "prohibit political contributions by business corporations."

For the purpose of capturing the structure of the ideological orientation which is closely related to the structural-oppositional political orientation, these twelve variables were factor analyzed. However, two variables, namely the variables on "recognize the right of public employees to go strike" (V401) and "stimulate business activities even at the risk of inflation" (V404), were excluded after the initial factor analysis of the twelve ideological issue variables, for both statistical and
The second factor analysis of the remaining ten ideological issue variables identified three factors, as Table 25 shows. The first factor (Factor I) is interpreted to represent the "structural-oppositional political subculture", because four variables which are assumed to represent this subculture (i.e., V395, V398, V407, and V410) have high loadings on Factor I. These four variables tap anti-big-business feeling (V395 and V410), feelings of resentment against an intimate connection between big-business and politicians (V407 and V410), and supportive attitudes toward the protection of ordinary citizens (V395, V398). These four variables clearly share a common dimension which can be labeled the "anti-business", the "anti-political power", or the "pro-ordinary-citizen" dimension. This is exactly what the structural-oppositional political subculture represents in the political context of postwar Japan.

The second factor (Factor II) is labeled the hawkish or postwar-militarism orientation factor, because the variables which measure hawkish attitudes as well as authoritarian attitudes (V377, V380, and V392) have high loadings on Factor II. The three variables that form a core of this dimension are all related to the postwar constitution of Japan, in the sense that the postwar constitution prohibits Japan from arming herself or engaging herself in any war as well as prohibits the emperor from intervening in the political process. While "to strengthen the emperor's voice in politics" (V377) is clearly against the present constitution, the opposition parties also perceive both "possession of the self-defense force" (V392) and "signing the security treaty with the United States" (V380) to be violations of the constitution because the opposition

(195) The common factor analysis method was employed to extract the initial factors. The statistical reason for dropping the two variables (V401 and V404) from the final version of the factor analysis is that neither variable had a 0.1 or higher communality level in the initial factor solution. Theoretically, these two variables cannot be easily interpreted to belong to any of the three dimensions of ideological orientation which underline the remaining ten variables.

(196) Please note that the variable concerning "prohibit political contributions by business corporations" (V410) is interpreted here to probe both the anti-business feeling and the resentment against the close businessmen-politicians connection.
Table 25

Structure of Politico-Ideological Subculture

Common Factor Analysis of Ideological-Cultural Orientation (Oblique Rotation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V395 Should Check Big Business</td>
<td>.592</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V398 Increase Welfare Even If Tax Goes Up</td>
<td>.576</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>-.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V407 Reform Money Power Politics</td>
<td>.711</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V410 Prohibit Political Contributions by Business</td>
<td>.642</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V377 Strengthen Voice of Emperor in Politics</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.527</td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V380 Strengthen US-Japan Security System</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>-.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V392 Strengthen Japan's Defense Forces</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>.602</td>
<td>-.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V383 Conclude Peace Treaty with China</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>-.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V386 Have Friendly Relation with North Korea</td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>-.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V389 Demand Return of Northern Territory from USSR Strongly</td>
<td>.203</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>-.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained Variance (%)</td>
<td>36.1 %</td>
<td>16.1 %</td>
<td>8.3 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor Labels (Interpretations)

Oppositional Political Integralism

Data Source: The JABISS Study, 1976.    N = 1,539
parties maintain that both are military actions. Because the opposition parties have accused the ruling, conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of violating the constitution on these points, some elements of the LDP have attempted to revise the constitution unsuccessfully. Therefore, this dimension can be labeled the "constitutional-revisionist" dimension as well as the Hawkish or postwar-militarism dimension.

The third factor is a little more complex than the other two but can be interpreted as the "regional integration" factor, because the variables which have high loadings on Factor III are all concerned with either national integration (V389) or the regional integration of East Asia (V383 and V386). The complex nature of this factor lies in the Japanese political context; the demand for the return of northern territory from the Soviet Union (V389) is considered as a right-wing ideological orientation, whereas the desire to have friendly relationship with China (V383) and North Korea (V386) can be regarded as a left-wing ideological orientation because these two nations are both socialist countries.

However, the factor analysis suggests that the Japanese public does not perceive these ideological issues in terms of the left-right continuum. One interpretation of this pattern is that a majority of the Japanese think of these three issues as the "right things to do", because for them it is morally right to be friendly with neighboring nations and it is fair to demand the return of the old territories, which they believe originally belonged to Japan, regardless of whether or not the other party in each issue is a socialist country. The other interpretation is that the Japanese feel closer to the East Asian nations than to the Soviet Union, which is perceived as a predominantly Western nation by the Japanese. Whichever interpretation may be correct, the data at least reveal that the Japanese public looks at these three political issues from a different perspective than do the Japanese political analysts, politicians or journalists.

\[\text{(197)}\] In the factor analysis, these three variables have equally positive loadings on the third factor; this suggests that they belong to the same dimension.

\[\text{(198)}\] Although this finding is itself intriguing, the underlying factor of regional integration is not expected to have strong explanatory power for the dependent variable, or system support, because the variances in a newly constructed variable based on this factor would be very small due to the almost
Thus, the third factor can be labeled as a dimension of "right-stuff" (or "nation's morality") according to the former interpretation; on the other hand, the latter interpretation leads to the label of "regional integration". The term "right-stuff" (or "nation's morality") appears to be too general to represent any substantive or contextual meanings attached to this factor. In contrast, the term "regional integration" reflects some concrete political orientation existing in Japan's political context, "regional integration" is the label to be used in this dissertation.

According to these three factors of the ideological issue orientation, the following factor-score scales were constructed: \(199\) (1) the "structural-oppositional political subculture" scale from Factor I, (2) the "hawkish political subculture" scale from Factor II, and (3) the "regional integration" scale from Factor III. The first scale could be called the "progressive" subculture, while the second scale could be named the "conservative" subculture. However, these labels would probably lead to an impression that the progressive subculture and the conservative subculture are at opposite ends of the same dimension. Since it is suggested empirically that these two subcultures are located on different dimensions (i.e., different factors), the terms "progressive" and "conservative" may be misleading and therefore are not used in this dissertation.

6.2.4 Summary of Operationalized Indicators of Political Subcultures

Thus far, three different sets of variables have been factor analyzed separately in order to determine the structure of Japanese political culture. From the first factor analysis, one composite scale was built as an operationalized variable of the traditional political subculture. This clearly corresponds to the traditional political culture discussed in chapter 3.

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unanimously positive attitudes toward all three issues.

\(199\) The procedure for building factor-score scales for these three factors is exactly the same as the procedure described in the section on the system support factor-score scales (see Appendix A).
Second, three factor-score scales were created from the factor analysis of the second set of variables. These three factor-score scales are operationalized variables for (1) internal efficacy, (2) negative sense of civic duty, and (3) the formal democratic political subculture. The last scale, the formal democratic political subculture scale is considered to measure what is called the formal democratic subculture in chapter 3.

Third, the factor analysis of the variables of ideological orientation identified three political subcultures: (1) the structural-oppositional political subculture, (2) the hawkish political subculture, and (3) the regional integration political subculture. From this factor analysis, three factor-score scales were built corresponding to the above three political subcultures. Of these three political subcultures, the structural-oppositional political subculture scale clearly taps the attitudes of the structural-oppositional political subculture discussed in chapter 3.

6.3 EMPIRICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE SOCIO-CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS

According to the earlier discussions of the socio-cultural explanatory models, this section will examine the following hypothesized linkages: (1) the relationships between political subcultures and system support; (2) the relationships between the sociological variables and system support; (3) the linkages between the sociological variables and political subcultures.

However, the following data analyses in this section will be mainly confined to bivariate examinations of those expected relationships, which will simply examine a hypothesized relationship between a pair of variables at a time, as opposed to a multivariate analysis (e.g., multiple regression analysis), in which the relationships of multiple number of variables with a dependent variable will be examined simultaneously. Such multivariate analyses will be performed in the analysis based on causal modeling (chapter 8). For it will be more meaningful to utilize the multiple regression analysis in taking a larger theoretical spectrum of the explanation into account than in focusing on only a certain group of explanatory variables (e.g., political culture variables), as will be done so in this section.
6.3.1 An Examination of the Relationships between Political Subcultures and System Support

As we have just seen in the previous section, the operationalization procedures of the political subcultures have created seven factor-score scales, each of which represent political subculture orientation or other political orientation. Those seven scales, all of which reflect prominent politico-cultural or politico-ideological orientation of the contemporary Japanese, include: (1) the traditional political culture scale; (2) the internal political efficacy scale; (3) the sense of civic duty scale; (4) the formal democratic culture scale; (5) the structural-suppositional political subculture scale; (6) the hawkish political subculture scale; and (7) the regional integration sentiment scale. The relationships between these seven operationalized politico-cultural or politico-ideological orientations and the two system support scales (i.e., the diffuse system support scale and the democratic institution scale) were statistically examined by calculation of Pearson's product moment correlation (Pearson's r), and the results are shown in Table 26.(200)

According to the table, the traditional political culture, the structural-suppositional political subculture, and the hawkish political subculture have moderate statistical association with diffuse system support, but the remaining four scales have very weak and statistically not significant correlations (at the .05 level) with the diffuse system support scale. Especially, it is worth noting that the formal democratic political subculture orientation does not indicate any meaningful relationship with diffuse system support. Instead, the hawkish political subculture orientation has the strongest correlation with diffuse system support. This is plausible; because the hawkish political subculture contains some positive sentiments toward the prewar political values which are still cherished by some elements of the LDP, it is not surprising that the incumbent affect component of diffuse system support is correlated with the hawkish political subculture.

(200) Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients are appropriate here, because both the two system support scales and the seven political subculture scales were built as factor-scores or factor-component scores, which are interval level scales. Since any divisions of each scale's score into a few categories would be based on somewhat arbitrary decision about the dividing points, cross-tabulation does not seem to be suitable for this analysis.
Table 26

Relationships Between Political Subcultures and System Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Subcultures</th>
<th>System Support Scales</th>
<th>(Pearson's r)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Political Culture</td>
<td>DIFFUSE SYSTEM SUPPORT</td>
<td>.140 .079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkish Political Subculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>.208 .076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Integration Political Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.039) (-.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Democratic Political Subculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.020) (-.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Civic Duty</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.041) .099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of Internal Political Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.007) (-.014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Those correlation coefficients in parentheses are statistically not significant at the .05 level. The Sense of Civic Duty Scale was originally designed to measure negative orientation toward civic duty, but in this analysis this scale is reversed so that the positive sign indicates positive relationship between the sense of civic duty and system support.

Data Source: The JABISS Study Data, 1976.

The relationships between democratic institution support and political subcultures are generally weak, except only the traditional political culture has moderate correlation with democratic institution support. It is intriguing that even the formal democratic political subculture orientation...
does not have any statistically meaningful correlation with democratic institution support, although the formal democratic political subculture was originally expected to be a source of democratic institution support.

The reason for the weak relationship that the formal democratic political subculture has with both diffuse system support and democratic institutional support is not clear. But one speculative scenario is as follows. The formalism political orientation, which Richardson (1974) found, of the Japanese is based on highly abstract bookish knowledge. Therefore, the formal democratic subculture orientation of the Japaese may also remain at the abstract level, and therefore they do not relate such orientation to their actual evaluation of the political system.

According to this analysis of correlations between the politico-cultural or politico-ideological scales and the two system support scales, the traditional political culture, the structural-sppositional political subculture, and the hawkish political subculture have some relationships with diffuse system support. Since all these three political orientation are considered to be formed preceeding to the formation of diffuse system support attitudes, these three political subcultures are hypothesized to have effects on diffuse system support. These three operation-alized political subculture scales, but not the formal democratic political subculture, will be included in the causal explanatory model of diffuse system support, which will be discussed in chapter 8.

Similarly, the same three political subculture variables will be included in the causal analysis model of democratic institution support ( chapter 8). First, the traditional political subculture is expected to have a positive impact on democratic institution support. Second, the formal democratic political subculture will be excluded from the causal model, because it has no meaningful statistical association with institutional support of the democratic system, although theoretical and contextual considerations strongly suggest that the formal democratic political subculture could be a major source of democratic institution support. Third, although the structural-sppositional political subculture, the hawkish political subculture, the regional integration orientation, and the sense of civic duty have comparable level of weak association with democratic institution support, only the first two will be included in the causal analysis model.

This decision is based on the following grounds. According to the discussion of Japanese political and
social context (chapter 4) and the explanatory model presented earlier in this chapter, the structural-sppositional political subculture and the hawkish political subculture are theoretically expected to have effects on the formation of democratic institution support. But the regional integration orientation is not theoretically expected to have an impact on support democratic institution, because this variable is mainly concerned with Japanese foreign relationship with the neighboring countries (i.e., the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea) but not with the domestic political or democratic process. Whereas the sense of civic duty scale has slightly stronger association than the three variables above, it is theoretically considered that an individual actually forms the sense of civic duty (i.e., duty of voting) after he has developed the attitudes of democratic institution support (or trust in the democratic institutional arrangements). Therefore, the sense of civic duty will be excluded from the causal model of democratic institution support (chapter 8).

6.3.2 Examinations of the Impact of Sociological Attributes

As chapter 4 delineated at length, several socioeconomic changes of postwar Japan have caused new formation of some political subcultures and transformation of the traditional political subculture. Accordingly, it is expected that some sociological attributes of the Japanese citizens have effects on system support attitudes through those political subcultures.

6.3.2.1 Conceptualization of the Meanings of Sociological Attributes

According to the discussion in chapter 4, differences in four sociological factors are related to different degrees of orientation toward those political subcultures in postwar Japan: (1) generational difference, (2) difference in communal ties between urban and rural areas, (3) educational level difference, and (4) media exposure difference. Now, these four sociological constructs have to be operationalized through the JABISS Study data.

Generational Difference:

Generational differences in political attitudes and political culture orientation are clear between the prewar generation and the postwar generation. The prewar generation has predispositions of the traditional political cul
ture, while the postwar generation possesses the structural-oppositional counterculture cynicism and/or the formal democratic aspiration.

In conceptualizing political generations, it should be clearly understood that the most important stage of one's life-cycle for formation of political attitudes is the "formative years," (201) during which he develops some political orientations and instills them into his stable attitudes (Manheim, 1954). Accordingly, three political generations can be identified in contemporary Japan, which are illustrated in Table 27.

Table 27
Political Generations in Japan: Across Historical Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Age in '76</th>
<th>Age in '56</th>
<th>Age in '45</th>
<th>Formative Years (13-20yr)</th>
<th>Primary Education (7-12yr)</th>
<th>Birth Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prewar</td>
<td>50+ or older</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>19+</td>
<td>1939-46</td>
<td>1933-38</td>
<td>1926 or earlier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1940-47</td>
<td>1934-39</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1949-56</td>
<td>1943-48</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1950-57</td>
<td>1944-49</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1969-76</td>
<td>1963-68</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(201) The formative years are operationally defined as ages between thirteen and twenty in this research. The period of formative years, in my opinion, varies slightly from one society to another, because the life-cycle stage during which the youth forms political attitudes must be bound to a particular educational system and particular social and political institutions in each society.
First, as Table 27 shows, the prewar generation consists of those Japanese who were born in 1926 or earlier, or were fifty years or older in 1976. Even the youngest members of this generation spent their formative years during World War II, and they were therefore socialized into the prewar and wartime political system.

Second, the postwar generation is composed of those born between 1937 and 1956, or those between twenty and thirty-nine years old in 1976. This generation spent its formative years after World War II had ended, and mostly after the Allied occupation had ended in 1952 (Table 27). Before the oldest members of the postwar generation received voting suffrage, the LDP-dominant political system had emerged. Hence, most members of this generation know only the present political system of Japan.

In addition to these two generations, the "transitional" generation should be added, because the attitudinal change from the prewar generation to its postwar counterpart cannot be observed within a single year; rather, the shift must have taken place gradually over at least a period of ten years. In my operational definition, the transitional generation consists of those Japanese who were born between 1927 and 1936 (Table 27). They spent their formative years during World War II and in the aftermath of the war, and received at least a part of their primary education before the end of World War II. Unlike the postwar generation, because most of the Japanese in this transitional group had reached adulthood before the present LDP-dominant political system was established in 1955, they have been exposed to more than just the present political system. In short, the Japanese of this age group (age 40-49 in 1976) did not totally lack experiences of the prewar or wartime political system, but at the same time did not fully spend their formative years under the prewar system; on the other hand, they had gone through their formative years before the present political system was fully established in Japan. Thus, a variable that measures political generations should be composed of the above three generations.

(202) Since the three generations are operationalized for the purpose of analyzing the Japanese survey data of 1976, the age range of each generation is based on ages in 1976, and is defined, for example, as "ages between forty and forty-nine years old in 1976." Similarly, the youngest age in the scope of this research is limited to twenty years old in 1976, because the youngest respondents of the sample of the JABISS Study were twenty years old.
The discussion so far has assumed that differences in political attitudes among Japanese citizens are attributed to generational differences. However, the age differences of the system support attitudes may not be attributed to the generational changes but due to the life-cycle changes. In other words, one may argue that the younger generation at any historical stage would show the similar attitudes, and that as the people of that generation get older their attitude would be similar to the attitudes of the older generation of any historical period. This argument raises a question as to whether attitudinal differences across generations are due to the generational changes or whether they are due to the life-cycle changes.

In order to separate the generational effects from the life-cycle effects, cohort analysis of longitudinal survey data on political attitudes is desirable. Although the survey data on the system support attitudes across time would be perfect for this research, such longitudinal data for the Japanese are not available. However, large scale survey researches on the Japanese social attitudes have been conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics in Japan every five years since 1953. This series of opinion surveys, namely the Study of the Japanese National Character (Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, 1961; 1970; 1975; 1982), has included in every survey a question measuring attitudes toward traditional, authoritarian political value. This question is to tap whether the respondent either prefers a strong political leadership or prefers the democratic decision making process. The cohort analyzed data of this question are shown in Table 28.

In Table 28, the data suggests that the attitudinal differences across age cohorts are attributed to the generational changes rather than the life-cycle changes or the period effects.(203) If the attitudinal changes were due

(203) The "period effects" refers to attitudinal changes that are due to temporary effects of particular social or political phenomena during a particular period. Because all the age cohorts receive the same effects of the phenomena in that period, all the age cohorts show similar attitudinal changes in that period, and the attitudes of almost all the cohorts are supposed to return to the former state after such period effects are gone. But, the cohorts of the formative years are susceptible to such period effects and consequently tend to retain the changed attitudes due to the period effects even after those period effects are gone. In this sense, the period effects are potentially a source of generational
Table 28
Cohort Analysis of Anti-Traditional Political Attitudes

Question: Do you agree on the following statement? "If we get good political leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them, rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves."

Response: (1) Agree.  (2) Depends on Circumstances and person.  (3) Disagree.  (4) Can't imagine there being such an outstanding politician.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total   38   40   47   51   51

to the life-cycle effects, a certain age group (e.g., 20-24 years old age group) should have the same or similar level of responses regardless of the year of survey (i.e., the data in each row should be uniform). If the period effects were operative in a particular period (i.e., in a particular year of survey), the response pattern in that year would be uniform across the age cohorts and would be distinguished from the data of the other years (i.e., the data in a particular column should be uniform). But, neither one is the case in Table 28. Instead, uniformity of the data is apparent on every diagonal line from the upper left hand corner to the lower right hand corner. This means that the level of responses on this question within an age cohort does not change so much over time.

For example, the age cohort of 20-24 years old in 1953 indicates approximately the same level of negative responses to this question from 1953 through 1973. The range is only between 50 percent and 55 percent. Also, the age cohort of 45-49 years old in 1953 shows some consistency over time. But, this cohort is much less likely to disagree on the question than is the previous cohort. Thus, the data demonstrate that the older cohorts are more inclined to the traditional political values than the younger cohorts regardless of which year the question was asked. Therefore, the political attitudes appear to change from one generation to another, but not from one stage of life-cycle to another.

This argument is confirmed by Shigeki Nishihira (1982), one of the principal investigators of the Study of the Japanese Character, who has examined the enormous data of the study over the twenty-five years. According to Nishihira (1982, pp. 179-184), the differences in political attitudes are attributed to the generational changes, although other types of social attitudes undergo the life-cycle changes or receive the period effects. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that if any age differences in the political attitudes (including both political culture orientation and system support attitudes) are found such age differences are in fact attributed to the generational changes.

Another point to note in Table 28 is that the older cohorts appear to increase the percentage of negative responses over time. This implies that the older generation has become a little more democratic oriented and less traditional oriented than before as the postwar democracy stays over three decades. In other words, the slight period effects for the democratic political values have been

changes of attitudes.
operative in the postwar period, but they have been operative only on the prewar generation but not on the postwar generation though some older members of the transitional generation might have been under this type of period effects.

Urban-Rural Difference in Strength of Communal Ties:

As was discussed in chapter 4 (4.1.3), there are clear differences in political attitudes between urban residents and rural residents (Richardson, 1973, 1974; Uchida, 1972, 1975, 1978). The urban-rural differences in political attitudes stem from the fact that the traditional Japanese political values have been better preserved in rural areas where more cohesive interpersonal communication networks and tighter community structures exist as opposed to urban areas where those networks and community structures have collapsed (Richardson, 1974; Dore, 1978). In this argument, a key factor to differentiate the traditional political culture from the modern postwar political culture is the degree of communal ties. However, a conventional measure of urban-rural differences in political attitudes do not seem to capture the strength of network ties of each community accurately.

The conventional measure of survey research for the urban-rural difference is designed to measure the population size of a city, town, or village where each respondent lives. This measure assumes that the urban oriented people live in larger cities and the rural oriented people live in smaller towns or villages. According to this measuring method, small suburban cities on the outskirts of metropolises are categorized as rural cities, although most male residents of such suburban cities commute to the metropolises and they, as well as their spouses, are most likely to enjoy urban lifestyles. In other words, these residents of suburban areas are not bound to the traditional communal structures or do not have strong communal ties. However, the conventional urban-rural measure often does not regard these suburban residents as the urban oriented people but as the rural oriented people.

On the other hand, population density of the administrative units reflects urbanity or ruralness of their communities better than population size of the administrative units. Therefore, an alternative operationalized index of the urban-rural difference has been constructed, based on population density, and it will be used in this research as the urban-rural index. (204)

(204) This alternative urban-rural index, based on popula
The traditional Japanese political values have been better preserved in rural areas where more cohesive interpersonal communication networks and tighter community structures have collapsed (Richardson, 1974; Dore, 1978). In this argument, a key factor which differentiates the traditional political culture from the modern postwar political culture is the degree of communal tie strength. The extent to which an individual has psychological as well as communication ties with his community involves at least two more factors.

One is how long he has lived in his community. Other things being equal, the longer he has lived in the community, the stronger psychological ties with the community he develops as well as the stronger his communication network in the community becomes (Richardson, 1974; Michio Yanai, 1981). Therefore, ceteris paribus, those residents who have lived in the present locality for a long time are assumed to be traditional oriented and are consequently expected to be more supportive of the political system when compared with those residents who have lived in their areas for a short period. Because population mobility rate is lower in rural areas than in urban areas, rural residents are expected to have lived in their community for longer period and therefore more traditional oriented.

The other factor in determining the strength of communal tie of an individual is the amount of time that he spends in his own community. Even though one has lived in the same community for a long time, he may not have developed strong communication or psychological ties with his community because he works outside his community all day long and spends little time there (Yanai, 1981). On the contrary, a person whose work is closely associated with his community, such as owning a retail store, probably develops

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...tion density, was constructed by Professor Richardson's initiatives as a part of his research project to which I assisted. Professor Miyake also provided a helpful suggestion to overcome technical difficulty on the process of index construction. A Japanese demographic document (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1976) provided necessary information about area and population size of each location, in which the interviews for the JABISS Study were conducted, as of autumn 1976. Those documents were made available with help of Professor Richardson of the Ohio State University, Ms. Maureen Donovan of the Ohio State University Library, Mr. Saito of the University of Michigan Library, and Mr. Kaneko of Yale University Library. Their kind help has been accordingly appreciated.
communication networks with other community members very quickly and often gets involved in communal activities even if he has lived there for a relatively short period. Hence, those residents who commute out of their community are assumed to be more isolated in their community, have weaker communal communication networks, and are consequently susceptible to political information from mass media. Since this type of people tend to be more modern and less traditional oriented, cetris paribus, they are expected to be less supportive of the political system than are those who work in their own community, as the political culture hypothesis. Accordingly, length of residence and length of commuting time should be added as the measures of the strength of communal ties of the respondents.

Educational Level Difference:

The differences in educational attainment among different individuals are expected to influence differences of their political orientation and attitudes. As Samuel Stouffer (1955) argues, the higher education generally makes individuals be more liberal and more tolerant to political opinions other than their own. In addition, the Japanese higher education has been known for having some Marxist oriented faculty members, and therefore it has tendency to foster some progressive criticisms of the LDP-leading government (chapter 4).

However, it should be noted that differences in the formal democratic subculture orientation are not so much expected to be caused by the differences in educational levels. The formal democratic political orientation is more dependent upon whether the individuals took the elementary and secondary education in the prewar period or in the postwar period.

The variable of educational level in the JABISS Study (V158) was designed to differentiate respondents who had compulsory education only, from those who had the middle level education, and from those respondents who had the higher education, regardless of the number of years they were at schools. This operationalization is sensitive to the difference in meanings of the higher education and the middle level education between the prewar educational system and the postwar educational system. The higher school education in the prewar system carries the same prestige and socio-economic status as the university education in the postwar system. Political orientation between them are also comparable. Then, the prewar middle school is equivalent to the postwar high school, and the prewar upper elementary school is comparable to the postwar middle school.
Mass Media Exposure:

As was discussed in chapter 4, the degree of mass media exposure is believed to have influence on the structural-spositional political subculture orientation and the formal democratic orientation, and therefore they may have effects on system support attitudes. First, the amount of watching TV news (V305) is a more important measure for this research than is the amount of TV watching general which includes entertainment programs as well. Second, similarly, the number of newspapers that each respondent reads a day is not important for political attitude formation, but what kind of newspapers each respondent reads is more relevant information to this research. Hence, a composite index of newspaper reading (PAPER READ) was built for differentiating the respondents who read major national newspapers (e.g., Asahi, Yomiuri, Mainichi, Sankei, Nihon Keizai), those who read only local newspapers, and those respondents who read only sports or entertainment papers.

6.3.2.2 The Effects of Sociological Attributes on Political Subcultures

The bivariate statistical relationship of the operationalized sociological variables with political subcultures have been examined, and the results are shown in Table 29. The table includes only four political subculture scales out of the seven scales created earlier, because three variables that have weak relationship with the two system support scales are omitted. The formal democratic subculture is included in the table despite of its weak relationship with system support attitudes, because it is theoretically important and relevant. The sociological variables in the table are seven operationalized measures discussed in the preceding subsection.

An overview of Table 29 immediately reveals a few points. First, the traditional political culture and the hawkish political subculture show remarkable similarities in terms of their relationships with the sociological attributes. This means that the politico-ideological conservatism (i.e., hawkish or prewar authoritarian orientation) and the traditionalism are based on the same kind of social background.

Second, the structural-spositional political subculture indicates exactly opposite orientation to the traditional and hawkish political subcultures, as the sign of the correlation coefficients of the structural-spositional political subculture are exactly reverse of the previous two
Table 29

Relationships Between Sociological Attributes and Political Subcultures

(Pearson's r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociological Attributes</th>
<th>A.</th>
<th>B.</th>
<th>C.</th>
<th>D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.270</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>-.078</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.249</td>
<td>-.196</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>-.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>-.122</td>
<td>-.139</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Watch</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>.171</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuting Time</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td>-.149</td>
<td>(-.021)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. = The Traditional Political Culture
B. = The Hawkish Political Subculture
C. = Structural-Oppositional Political Subculture
D. = The Formal Democratic Political Subculture

Note: Correlation coefficients in parentheses are not statistically significant at the .05 level.


political culture variables in the table. Accordingly, the people who subscribe the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation are sociologically at the other end of the spectrum compared with the traditional or hawkish oriented people.
Third, the formal democratic political subculture again does not have any meaningful relationship with any of the sociological correlates in the table. It is interesting that the formal democratic subculture orientation neither has any influence on system support attitudes (see Table 26) nor receive any influence from any of the sociological attributes. Therefore, whether the Japanese are oriented toward the formal democratic principles or not has nothing to do with what kind of social background they have or the degree to which they support for their political system. The reason for this is unclear, but this empirical finding is based on the same speculative scenario as one presented in the discussion of the effects of political subcultures on system support.

A closer look at the data in Table 29 a few more points. First, age and educational level have the strongest associations with the political subculture variables. Hence, the differences in generations and educational levels appear to be the most important sources of different orientation toward these three political subcultures. The patterns here are in accordance with our earlier expectations; the younger and better educated Japanese are more strongly oriented toward the structural-spositional political subculture, while the older and less educated Japanese are more hawkish and traditional oriented.

Second, the three indicators of communal ties (i.e., Population Density, Length of Residence, and Commuting Time) are positively correlated with the traditional political culture scale and hawkish political subculture scale but are negatively correlated with the structural-spositional political subculture.

Third, newspaper reading and TV news watching have slightly different patterns of associations with political subcultures. The former has negative associations with the traditional and hawkish political subcultures but has positive relationship with the structural-spositional political subculture. The latter has no relationship with the first two political subcultures but has positive association with the structural-spositional political subculture. This implies that TV news do not work against the traditional or hawkish political orientation but newspapers do while both TV news and newspapers foster the structural-spositional political subculture orientation.
The Direct Effects of Sociological Attributes on System Support

The direct linkages between these sociological attributes and system support attitudes are also examined, and the results are shown in Table 30. The table shows the following points. The correlation between them are generally very weak and weaker than the associations of the sociological attributes with political subcultures. A few exceptions are age, population density, and length of residence. Age has moderate relationship with diffuse system support, and its relationship with democratic institution support is weaker but still strongest among the sociological variables. Population density and length of residence have some weak relationship with diffuse system support alone. Mass media exposure or social class has no effects on either diffuse system support or democratic institution support.

According to Table 30, the relationships between those sociological attributes and system support attitudes are generally weaker than the associations of the sociological attributes with political subcultures. Only the generational difference (age) has moderate effects on diffuse system support.

These patterns suggest that many of sociological attributes of Japanese are not so influential in the formation of system support attitudes, but they certainly have effects on the formation of political subculture orientation. Since those political subcultures have impact on system support, these sociological attributes do have indirect influence on system support attitudes through political subcultures.

One technical point is noteworthy here. Age has been used as an operational definition of political generations in the above analysis. However, the Japanese adult population, according to the earlier discussion of political generations is categorized into three generations: (1) the prewar generation; (2) the transitional generation; and (3) the postwar generation. Since age is a continuous interval level measure, the relationship between generations and system support may be seen more clearly when the three generational categories are crosstabulated with the system support scales. This is shown in Table 31. This categorization of political generations in Japan will be utilized when the sample is divided into three political generations, as we will see in chapter 8.
Table 30

Relationships Between Sociological Attributes and System Support

(Pearson's r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Support Scales</th>
<th>DIFFUSE SYSTEM SUPPORT</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>(-.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Watch</td>
<td>(-.011)</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Residence</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commuting Time</td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td>-.044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlation coefficients in parentheses are not statistically significant at the .05 level.

### Table 31

**System Support by Political Generations:**

*Crosstabulation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM SUPPORT SCALES</th>
<th>GENERATIONS (Column Percent)</th>
<th>Diffuse</th>
<th>National Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Prewar (50 +)</td>
<td>(2) Transitional (40-49)</td>
<td>(3) Postwar (20-39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0 %</td>
<td>29.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Political Institution Support | | | | |
| Positive                     |                                | 52.9 %  | 50.4 %           | 40.2 %           | + 12.7              |
| Neutral                      |                                | 17.5    | 21.1             | 23.9             |                      |
| Negative                     |                                | 29.6    | 28.5             | 35.9             | - 6.3               |
| Total                        |                                | 100 %   | 100 %            | 100 %            |                      |

\[
\begin{align*}
n & = 571 & 393 & 804 & N = 1768 \\
\% & = (32.3) & (22.2) & (45.5) & (100.0)
\end{align*}
\]

*Data Source: The JABISS Study Survey Data (1976)*
Chapter VII

THE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EXPLANATIONS AND THE PARTISAN EXPLANATION

7.1 EXPLANATORY MODELS OF SYSTEM SUPPORT: DERIVATIONS OF THE RATIONAL-ECONOMIC EXPLANATION

In the earlier presentation of the conceptual model of system support (see Figure 2), the scope of actual data analysis was confined to the relationship between perceived system performance, political culture and system support attitudes in Figure 2. However, no explanatory models or hypothesized scenarios have been offered concerning how actual system performance is perceived by the citizens, how perceived system performance affects system support attitudes, or how political culture affects perception of system performance and system support. This section will present several possible explanatory models for the system performance explanation of system support formation. Some hypothetical scenarios to explain how political culture affect perception of system performance will be discussed in the third subsection of this chapter (see 7.1.3), based on the discussions of the political culture explanations of system support in chapters 4 and 6.

A several of rational-economic studies of voting behavior have developed several different models to explain the relationship between the economic performance of the government and political support for the incumbent government. Although all of these models are primarily concerned with incumbent support, these models have some useful implications for explaining the relationship between system performance and system support. Their usefulness lies particularly in the fact that these models suggest different hypothetical scenarios to explain how the performance of the political system affects the citizens' attitudes of political support. These different scenarios suggest different kinds of operational indicators of the perceived performance of the political system.

In this section, the following four different models of political support will be introduced in two separate pairs:
(1) the prospective model vs. the retrospective model; (2) the self-interest model vs. the sociotropic model. As these pairs of models conceptually belong to two different dimensions, each pair will first be discussed separately; and then they will be integrated later. Since two models in each pair appear to be opposites (though they are not mutually exclusive), the following discussions will focus attention on which one of two models in each pair is more suitable for explaining system support in Japan. The discussion of each pair of models respectively starts with the theoretical implications of each model in studying political support of incumbent government (or simply voting), and then the discussion will turn to the case of system support.

7.1.1 Prospective Model vs. Retrospective Model

In the recent development of studies of economic influence on incumbent support, the retrospective voting model (Fiorina, 1978 and 1981) and the prospective voting model (Kuklinski and West, 1981) have been resubmitted and empirically tested, although the origins of these two models go back long before the publications of those empirical works. Morris Fiorina (1981, chapter 1) makes a clear distinction between prospective judgment and retrospective judgment of the citizen about the performance of a candidate, a party or other political actor in voting situation. Fiorina points out that the theoretical implications of the two models are quite different although these two models are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, the prospective voting model posits that the average voter is able to understand what the possible general (if not specific) consequences are of each proposed policy of each candidate. But, a majority of the American electorate failed to show such cognition of policy consequences in the 1950s, as

Although these four models are representative among the rational-economic literature on economic influence on incumbent support, they probably do not exhaust the possible scenarios. Neither are they mutually exclusive. Even two models of the same pair may not be mutually exclusive; for example, prospective judgment and retrospective judgment of the incumbent performance may take place in the same person's mind at the same time.

Fiorina (1981) himself states, "The proponent of the retrospective voting interpretation need not deny that prospective voting takes place (p.8)." On this point, see also Footnote 205.
Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964) found. On the other hand, the retrospective voting model does not require the average voter to understand implications of policies proposed by his candidate or by other candidates. Retrospective voting only assumes that the average voter is able to judge whether the past performance of the incumbent candidate or party is good or bad. Accordingly, "retrospective voting requires far less of the voter than prospective voting (Fiorina, 1981, p.10)."

Therefore, if most members of the electorate retrospectively evaluate the past performance of the incumbent government and vote accordingly (i.e., if retrospective voting takes place), the average voter does not have to be well informed politically, to maintain a high level of ideological conceptualization, or to be very rational. In other words, the retrospective voting model makes the "issue voting" controversy almost irrelevant; it does not matter to the retrospective voting proponent whether the authors of The American Voter or the revisionists were correct, because the retrospective voter is rational but does not have to be as rational as the authors of The American Voter or the revisionists wished. Similarly, if most citizens of a given democratic system develop their system support retrospectively, those citizens do not have to be so sophisticated ideologically even if the system performance hypothesis of this dissertation is empirically supported.

Considering which model of these two, namely the prospective model and the retrospective model, is suitable to the study of system support in Japan, one should look at two factors. One is the time period on which the study focuses in the history of the political system in question. If a study focuses on Japanese system support in the early postwar period (e.g., the late 1940s or the 1950s) when Japan's democratic system was quite young and no one was really certain that the new political system was going to work well, the researcher may want to assume that Japanese citizens must have prospectively evaluated their political system in terms of what the present system or the alternative political system could offer to them in the future, because there had not been much performance of the political system to evaluate by that time. In contrast, if the study (like this dissertation) focuses on system support in the 1970s or later, by which time Japan had become a stable democratic system and a major economic power in the world, it seems reasonable to assume that Japanese citizens tended to evaluate their political system in terms of what their system had achieved in the past. Therefore, in this regard, the model of retrospective performance evaluation is considered to be more appropriate to this study than is the prospective model.
Contrary to the above contention, one may point out that some empirical studies have found that prospective voting took place in the case of incumbent support. For instance, Kuklinski and West (1981) found prospective voting in the United States by analyzing the survey data of the 1972-74-76 SRC/CPS National Election Studies. Inoguchi (1983b), analyzing the recent Japanese survey data, found that prospective voting took place more often than retrospective voting among Japanese voters. However, one should pay attention to the difference between the nature of incumbent support and that of system support, when he tries to choose between the prospective model and the retrospective model on a priori theoretical ground. This leads to the following discussion.

The second factor to consider, in choosing between the prospective and retrospective models, is how demanding the assumption of each model would be for the average citizen's capacity. Prospective evaluation of system performance (i.e., expecting the future performance of the political system) is a very demanding task for the average citizen of any society. That is even more demanding than prospective evaluation of the policy consequence of each party or candidate in an election situation. For prospective evaluation of the future performance of the political system involves fundamental questions concerning ideological belief in a certain problem-solving approach of the political system, such as a choice between the capitalist approach and the socialist approach to economic problems.

(207) The survey data were collected by Joji Watanuki, Ichiro Miyake, Takashi Inoguchi, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, and Ikuo Kabashima in June and July 1983 as a national election study (see Inoguchi, 1983b). Inoguchi's work cited here was a part of his analysis in the study.

(208) Actually, Inoguchi (1983b) examined three types of voting models rather than just the prospective and retrospective voting models; evaluation of the present economic conditions was added in addition to judgments of the past (retrospective) and future (prospective) economic conditions. Then, he later regarded judgment of the present and future economic conditions as prospective judgment. This operationalization may lead to a different conclusion from an analysis which regards judgment of the present and past conditions as retrospective judgment. This point will be further discussed in conjunction with the operationalization of system performance for this dissertation in chapter 6.
or a choice between the liberal democratic approach (with emphasis on egalitarian procedure) and the democratic socialist approach (with emphasis on egalitarian outcomes) to national decision-making. That is not just a choice between two sets of proposed policies by political parties or candidates. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that the average citizen will be capable of making such a decision concerning the choice of political system in prospective terms. However, the retrospective model only demands that the average citizen judges whether the past performance of the political system has been good enough to keep the system or bad enough to abandon it. Therefore, this dissertation assumes that Japanese system members generally form their attitudes toward the political system retrospectively.

7.1.2 Self-Interest Model vs. Sociotropic Model

Another pair of contrasting models of political support includes the self-interest model and the sociotropic model. The original self-interest voting model stems from the classic Downsian notion of economic rational man (Downs, 1957). This model rejects the classical notion of a rational democratic citizen, who is postulated by classical democratic theories to be able to collect information on political parties' and/or candidates' issue positions and policy proposals, to evaluate them in terms of his own interests, and then to make his vote decision (Kramer, 1971; Monroe, 1984). The self-interest voting model, according to the Downsian theory, posits a rational economic man who uses his personal economic situation as the major information source for judging the general economic condition of the outside world and the economic performance of the incumbent government, in order to reduce his time, cost and energy in acquiring the information about the national economy (Monroe, 1984). Therefore, the self-interest voting model, like the retrospective model, relaxes the requisites of rationality for the electorate in order for the economy to influence individual vote decisions (or incumbent government support).

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(209) The self-interest voting model has also been labeled as the "pocketbook" voter model, which refers to the average voter's concern about his own pocketbook as an indicator of general economic condition (Tufte, 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Monroe, 1984; etc.), or as the economic personal grievance model (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979).
Studies of aggregate data analysis based on the self-interest voting model (Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975; etc.) has demonstrated a convincing relationship between the economic performance of the incumbent government (which was measured by the macro-economic conditions) and support for the incumbent government (which was measured either by votes for the incumbent party or by popularity of the office holder). However, the survey data analyses with the same model (Fiorina, 1978; etc.) has found little supporting evidence for this relationship. As Niemi and Weisberg (1985, chapter 11) suggest, this discrepancy between aggregate data studies and individual-level data studies can be reconciled by the sociotropic voting model, which has been proposed by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979; 1981).(210)

The sociotropic model proposed by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979; 1981) assumes that most American citizens evaluate the economic performance of the government according to their judgment of the collective economic conditions of the nation, not according to their personal economic situation. Accordingly, Kinder and Kiewiet argue that Americans are less likely to blame their political leaders or the government for their personal economic difficulties (e.g., loss of income, unemployment and so on). Kinder and Kiewiet empirically have found evidence supporting the sociotropic model by analyzing the survey data, but have not found any empirical relationship between voters' personal economic conditions and their votes for the incumbent party, which could have been supportive evidence for the self-interest model.

The sociotropic voter model (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981) explains why there is no relationship between voters' personal economic condition and their votes at the individual level (Fiorina, 1978) although a clear relationship has been found between macro-economic conditions and vote outcomes at the aggregate level (Kramer, 1971; Tufte, 1975). The sociotropic voter is hypothesized to evaluate the performance of the incumbent government according to national economic well-being, whereas they are believed not to blame

(210) The term "sociotropic" judgment, concerning the economic performance of the incumbent administration or simply economic conditions, has been popularly used since Kinder and Kiewiet used the word in their article (1981), though their earlier article (1979) did not use the term and Meehl (1977) first used the term "sociotropic." The sociotropic voting model has been used interchangeably with the collective economic judgment model (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979) and with the global judgment model (Reed and Brunk, 1984).
the government or the incumbent president for their own economic difficulties, unlike the self-interest (or pocket-book) voter. Accordingly, when the economy is in a downturn, sociotropic voters are less likely to vote for the incumbent, and when the economy is in upturn, they tend to vote for the incumbent, regardless of their own personal economic conditions. The sociotropic model thus explained the discrepancy between the earlier aggregate data findings and the individual-level data findings.

One may question whether the sociotropic voter model may demand that the average voter obtain too much information and possess an unreasonably high level of conceptual sophistication in order to make judgments regarding the collective economic conditions, especially in contrast to the self-interest voter model. In responding to this question, Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) maintained that this was not the case, by arguing the following.

It is not necessary for the sociotropic voter to undertake a sophisticated analysis of the economy, or to entertain subjective probabilities of the consequence of economic policies pursued by rival governing teams. Rather, voters must only develop rough evaluations of national economic conditions, and then credit or blame the incumbent party accordingly (p.132).

Now, the question is how plausible and useful the self-interest model and the sociotropic model will be for an application to a study of system support. Considering that the performance of the political system must be evaluated by system members from a long-range perspective compared with the relatively short-term perspective to evaluate the performance of the incumbent government, it seems reasonable to expect that the average system member sociotropically judges system performance and forms his support for the political system, rather than evaluating system performance in terms of the self-interest judgment and developing his incumbent support accordingly. In addition, the performance of the political system is, as was discussed earlier, conceptualized to include not only economic performance but also non-economic performance (e.g., pollution control, political corruption handling, etc.) in this dissertation. When the scope of citizens' evaluations of system performance includes such non-economic performance as well, the self-interest judgment model is not an appropriate model to explain how citizens evaluate the overall

(211) Weatherford (1983) agreed with Kinder and Kiewiet on this.
performance of the political system, because the self-interest model defines the scope of the average citizen's motivation for their political behavior too narrowly to include the range of aspects associated with the system support concept. (212) Particularly, the self-interest model fails to include any less tangible aspects of performance (of either the government or the political system), such as handling of political corruption, which are relatively remote from the average citizen's direct interests in his life; the model focuses only on the short-term material well-being of the average citizen. Therefore, the sociotropic model of political support is more suitable to an examination of the impact of system performance on system support.

The next question is which of the two models will be more appropriate to Japanese citizens, as far as system support, not incumbent support, is concerned. To answer this question, the nature of Japanese political culture should, in my opinion, be taken into consideration. In this respect, Feldman's work (1982) which examined the connection between political culture and economically motivated voting in the United States is very suggestive, because his work demonstrated the importance of the role of political culture or socialization experiences in the formation of rational political preference and political support. Explaining why Kinder and Kiewiet (1979; 1981) found empirical evidence for the sociotropic voting model but against the self-interest voting model through the individual-level data, Feldman (1982) emphasized the role of political culture in forming sociotropic attitudes among American citizens. He argued that the American dream of "economic individualism," which was a distinguishing aspect of their political culture, prevented the majority of Americans from blaming or rewarding their government for their personal economic hardship (e.g., unemployment) or improvement (e.g., income increase). (213) Feldman (1982) thus demonstrated that American political culture produced more the sociotropic voters than the self-interest voters. This

(212) Sears et al. (1980) argue that economic self-interest is too narrow a concept to account even for vote choice. Given this contention, economic self-interest is surely much too narrow to account for system support.

(213) Feldman's (1982) empirical work was in part based on earlier works on the relationship between economic individualism and political behavior (Brody and Sniderman, 1977; Sniderman and Brody, 1977; Verba and Schlozman, 1977; Schlozman and Verba, 1979).
argument has an implication which extends beyond the American case; Feldman's argument can be extended to the universal statement that a particular political culture may determine whether the citizens under that political culture judge political performance of their government (or political system) sociotropically or in terms of self-interest.

Japanese political culture is not known to have economic individualism as one of its distinguished feature. Rather, the Japanese are known to be economically interdependent within a social unit (a family, a farming community, a company). Therefore, contrary to the American case economic individualism, cannot be the reason that the Japanese judge political performance retrospectively. However, Japanese political culture has some aspects which are believed to be compatible with sociotropical thinking and incompatible with self-interest thinking. First, Japanese political culture is known to emphasize values of public interest (or public utility) over individualistic self-interest. This value of Japanese political culture is logically expected to prevent Japanese citizens from translating their personal economic grievances into their political preferences for public leaders. Second, the Japanese are also known to have an acute sense of distinction between private life (uchi) and public life (soto). This aspect of Japanese culture is also considered to prevent the Japanese from translating their personal feeling (honne) into their formal opinions to be presented in public (tatemae). Therefore this value probably prevents most Japanese citizens from blaming or rewarding their government (or political system) for their personal problems whether economic or

(214) See chapter 3, for a more detailed account of Japanese political culture. But, for the discussion related to the economic interdependence in Japanese life, see Dore (1967; 1978).

(215) This argument is of course much simplified version of a complex reality of Japanese political culture, especially comparing with the richness of the writings on this aspect of Japanese political culture and the complexity of the subject. See, for example, Richardson (1974), Curtis (1971), Krauss (1984). This argument as well as some relevant points will be elaborated in chapter 3.

(216) Again, this argument is based on a complex argument regarding Japanese political culture, which was discussed at some length in chapters 3 and 4. Although I personally prefer not to use words from the Japanese language, such as uchi or tatemae, in my writ
Hence, the sociotropic model of political support is believed fit to the Japanese value orientation better than does the self-interest model.

Thus, an important question is whether the sociotropic model or the self-interest model is more suitable to the Japanese. This is actually an empirical question, because each model can be empirically tested. In fact, there are some empirical evidence supporting the sociotropic model in Japan. Inoguchi (1983b), analyzing Japanese national survey data,(217) found that Japanese citizens supported the incumbent government sociotropically, and found weaker evidence for the self-interest model explanation. Also, Reed and Brunk (1984), through their unique analysis of aggregate data on Japan, argued that the sociotropic model fitted to the Japanese aggregate data of economic influence on incumbent support better.(218)

While these two previous studies of incumbent support in Japan favor the sociotropic model over the self-interest model, it is still worth examining the two models in application to system support, not incumbent support. Since the JABISS Study data include variables that enable us to test these two explanatory models of political support, the two

(217) see Footnote 207.

(218) Although it is generally understood that an empirical comparison of the self-interest model and the sociotropic model has to be done with the individual-level data, Reed and Brunk (1984) uniquely utilized the aggregate data and developed their argument. They argued that the self-interest model "implies that economic conditions should be a predictor over the entire time period," but that the sociotropic model should predict such economy-vote relationship "only after the onset of economic difficulties (p.57)." Because their data analysis demonstrated that the economy-vote relationship was detected only after the first oil-shock of Japan in 1973 but was not found before then, they concluded that the sociotropic model fitted better to the Japanese data. Although their argument contains the "ecological inference," they do not seem to have committed any fallacy, because their conclusion is in accordance with Inoguchi's findings from the individual-level data analysis.
models will be actually tested with the JABISS data in chapter 6. Also, as background information, chapter 6 will also discuss what proportion of the Japanese population agree with the sociotropical thinking and what proportion of it favors the self-interest oriented thinking.

7.1.3 Integration of Explanatory Models: Direction of Operationalization

These four explanatory models based on the rational-economic approach are useful in examining the system performance hypothesis in the sense that they suggest different hypothetical scenarios concerning the way in which citizens evaluate the performance of the political system. Accordingly, these explanatory models respectively suggest different operational measures of system performance.

Of these four explanatory models, the first pair and the second pair belong to two different dimensions, which are conceptually independent of each other. The relationship between the four explanatory models is shown in Figure 8. In the figure, the horizontal dimension represents the time dimension of a citizen's judgment of system performance; namely, (1) expectation of future performance (prospective judgment) vs. (2) evaluation of past performance (retrospective judgment). The vertical dimension indicates that dimension of the breadth of a citizen's concern with regard to system performance; namely, (1) personal domain as a standard of his judgment (self-interest) vs. (2) global domain as a standard of his judgment (sociotropic judgment).

As Figure 8 shows, four different combinations of explanatory models are conceived along with two dimensions: (I) prospective self-interest model, (II) retrospective self-interest model, (III) prospective sociotropic model, and (IV) retrospective sociotropic model. These four combined models contain slightly different assumptions and therefore suggest different operational hypotheses. First, the prospective self-interest model (I) assumes that citizens evaluate system performance according to their expectations for their own well-being in the future. This model therefore hypothesizes that those citizens who expect their future well-being (whether economic or otherwise) to be satisfactory or improved are more likely to support their political system. Second, the retrospective self-interest

(219) The term "locus of concern" was used by Brody and Sniderman (1977) and later by Feldman (1982) for this dimension.
model (II) assumes that citizens judge system performance according to their past personal well-being. Hence, this model hypothesizes that those citizens who are satisfied with their past and present personal material livelihood tend to support the political system. (220) Third, the prospective sociotropic model (III) assumes that citizens develop

(220) I do not distinguish the present condition from the past condition, but I consider a citizen's perception of both the present and past conditions to form his retrospective judgment of system performance. In a survey interview, a respondent refers, in my opinion, to the past condition as well as the present condition, when he is asked his assessment of his personal condition or general system performance even in a present tense. This point will be elaborated later in this section.
their system support attitudes according to the expected future overall condition of the society as a whole, not their personal condition. This model then hypothesizes that if system members assess the future overall condition (whether economic or otherwise) of the system positively, they are more likely to support the political system. Fourth, the retrospective sociotropic model (IV) assumes that people form their system support attitudes retrospectively according to the general past performance of the political system, and therefore hypothesizes that the citizens' perception of past and present general conditions (whether economic or otherwise) of the political system will determine the degree to which those people support their political system.

It is not possible to judge empirically from the JABISS Study data, whether the prospective judgment model or the retrospective judgment model fits Japanese citizens better, because the data do not contain questions to tap prospective judgment but have only questions to measure retrospective judgment. However, this question can be settled on a priori grounds, especially when system performance and system support are in question, not incumbent performance or incumbent support. Three reasons for choosing the retrospective model over the prospective model for the examination of Japanese system support were given on a priori grounds in an earlier subsection. Given those arguments, the prospective models—both the prospective self-interest model (I) and the prospective sociotropic models (III)—will be excluded from the scope of the subsequent data analysis.

Therefore, the empirical test of those rational-economic models will focus only on the retrospective self-interest model (II) and the retrospective sociotropic model (IV)—the right half the box shown in Figure 8. However, operationalization of perceived system performance in concrete terms will require a consideration of one additional concept to distinguish two types of people's perceptions of system performance—namely, direct perception and mediated perception. Fiorina (1981), in his operationalized retrospective model to explain vote choice, proposed a conceptual distinction between mediated retrospective evaluation (MRE) of incumbent performance and non-mediated or simple retrospective evaluation (SRE) of incumbent performance.

(221) According to Fiorina (1981), in the context of incumbent performance evaluation in the United States, simple retrospective evaluations reflect a "citizen's more or less direct experiences or impressions of political events and conditions (p.80)," and accord
performance. This distinction between direct perception (i.e., non-mediated or simple evaluation) and mediated perception (i.e., mediated evaluation) of incumbent performance can be easily applied to perceived system performance. The discussion between mediated judgment and simple (or non-mediated) judgment is based on the object of concern of an individual --- whether the object of concern is direct experience of his own or someone else's (e.g., the president's) handling of a particular problem (e.g., unemployment) --- but not based on the breadth of concern; the breadth of concern is a ground for the distinction between self-interest and sociotropic evaluations.

Adding the dimension of simple-mediated distinction in system performance evaluation, the typology of the explanatory models will become a little more complex, as shown in Figure 9, but the left half of this figure which represents the prospective judgment models will be excluded from the concern of the current discussion for the reason mentioned above. Thus, the right half of Figure 9 will receive full attention here, as shown in Figure 10 with greater details. In Figure 10, four different variations of the retrospective models are shown, and this new typology of explanatory models can suggest a more precise operationalization of the concept "perceived system performance" in concrete terms. Those four variations of the retrospective models in Figure 10 are, following the order of subsequent discussions on each model (moving counter-clock-wise in the figure), (II-A) simple retrospective self-interest model, (IV-A) simple retrospective sociotropic model, (IV-B) mediated retrospective sociotropic model, and (II-B) mediated retrospective self-interest model.

These four different explanatory models suggest different operational variables to measure perceived system performance. First, the simple retrospective self-interest...
model (II-A) posits that a survey question asking the respondent's "satisfaction with his material livelihood" (V413 in the JABISS Study original data set) be the right indicator to measure the respondent's perception of system performance, because this question taps the respondent's direct experience and non-mediated perception of his own personal well-being as the indicator of his perception of system performance.

Second, according to the simple retrospective sociotropic model (IV-A), the operational measure for perceived system performance is a survey question which asks the level of satisfaction that the respondent thinks the people like himself are entitled to with regard to their material livelihood (V414). Because this question taps non-mediated assessment of the respondent about other citizens' material satisfaction, this question fits the simple retrospective sociotropic model.

Third, the mediated retrospective sociotropic model (IV-B) hypothesizes that a citizen's mediated evaluation of
### Retrospective Judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scope of Citizens' Concerns with System Performance</th>
<th>A. Simple</th>
<th>B. Mediated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Interest</strong></td>
<td>I-A.</td>
<td>II-B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Simpel</td>
<td>Mediated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prospective</td>
<td>Retrospective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Interest</td>
<td>Self-Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>Judgment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Sociotropic**                                 | III.      | IV.         |
|                                                 | Simple    | Mediated    |
|                                                 | Prospective | Retrospective |
|                                                 | Sociotropic | Sociotropic |
|                                                 | Judgment   | Judgment    |

Four Explanatory Models of Retrospective System Performance Evaluation.

**Figure 10:** Typology of Performance Evaluation Models (III)

Collective system performance is important in the development of his political support or preference. Therefore, this model suggests that the operational variable of the concept "perceived system performance" should be an indicator to measure mediated evaluations of system performance held by the respondents. The respondents' mediated evaluations of system performance in the JABISS Study data are, for example, the respondents' evaluations of the system's (as well as the government's) handling of welfare (V22), pollution (V24), political corruption (V26), inflation (V28), and so on. According to Fiorina's (1981, p.80) definition of mediated evaluation, as far as an individual's evaluation is based on a mediated object such as the LDP's handling of unemployment ---as opposed to a simple object of concern such as his own unemployment problem---his evaluation is mediated evaluation. Therefore, the
above variables of the JABISS Study, which are concerned with the system's, the government's or the local government's handling of particular problems, can be considered to measure mediated sociotropic judgment of system performance.

Also, the distinction between system performance and incumbent performance can be theoretically made, depending on who is the actor of performance (Fiorina, 1981, p.80, fn.15). If the actor who is responsible for handling these problems is the government, then political performance in these problem areas should be regarded as "incumbent performance." If the political system is the responsible actor, such political performance can be labeled "system performance." Thus, the distinction between the government and the system, with regard to who is the responsible actor, appears to be important in theory. However, in the Japanese political context, such a distinction would not matter so much, because the distinction between the incumbent government and the political system as the responsible actor of political performance must be very vague in the minds of Japanese citizens due to the fact that a single party (the LDP) has been in power for almost the entire postwar period.(222)

Fourth, the mediated retrospective self-interest model (II-B) is a logically possible combination, but it is not straightforwardly acceptable to our intuition. Mediated retrospective self-interest judgment means that a citizen evaluates system performance according to his retrospective assessment of his own personal situation which must have been mediated by mass media, opinion leaders, his peers, or by his own predispositions. For example, mediated retrospective self-interest judgment refers to psychological evaluation process of "an individual who feels the government is at fault for his personal employment problems" (Fiorina, 1981, p.80, fn.15).

Although Fiorina (ibid) points out that no question item to tap directly mediated retrospective self-interest evaluation appears on the survey of the National Election Study in the United States, the JABISS Study survey contains one question item that directly taps this type of judgment of

(222) However, some conceptual distinction between system support and incumbent support, unlike the relationship between system performance and incumbent performance, may exist in the minds of some Japanese citizens, as was discussed earlier. For further discussion and some empirical arguments on these points, see also chapters 4 and 6.
the respondent; this question asks the respondent's evaluation of the performance (of the government or the political system) for the interests of occupation of the respondent's or his/her household head's (V32). Thus, the mediated retrospective self-interest model (II-B) can be tested with this single variable. However, it is still necessary to examine a question as to whether the ordinary citizens make a distinction between mediated sociotropic evaluation of system support and mediated self-interest evaluation of it. This is an empirical question, and it will be empirically examined in the next section.

The empirical tests of the mediated retrospective self-interest judgment model (II-B) or the simple retrospective sociotropic judgment model (IV-A) do not seem to be crucially important for the theoretical implications which the system performance hypothesis has. For the other two models—the simple retrospective self-interest judgment model (II-A) and the mediated retrospective sociotropic judgment model (IV-B)—seem more significant for empirical democratic theories, for the reason discussed below.

Of the four models, two of them are pure ideal model and the other two of them are hybrids, according to democratic theories. On the one hand, the simple retrospective self-interest model (II-A) presents an image of a citizen who is inward oriented and tends to use his direct experience or observation as the information source for his assessment of the outer world (e.g., the political system, the incumbent government, national economy, etc.). On the other hand, the mediated retrospective sociotropic model (IV-B) posits an image of a citizen who is outward oriented and tends to evaluate his outer environment according to the information he receives from outside sources (e.g., media, opinion leaders, etc.) not according to his personal experience or direct observation. These two models of citizens can be considered to stand at opposite poles in the conceptual

(223) Fiorina (1981, p.80, fn.15) suggested that operational measures for mediated retrospective self-interest judgment of political performance could be constructed from the kinds of survey question items used by Brody and Sniderman (1977). Not all types of items used by Brody and Sniderman are included in the JABISS Study survey. Accordingly, no index for measuring mediated retrospective self-interest judgment will be constructed in the later data analysis. Also, the construction of such an index or an empirical test of this model seems not to be a central issue with which this dissertation is concerned, for the reason discussed in the following paragraphs.
world of political life. The former as a self-oriented individualistic citizen, and the latter is a socially-oriented and public-minded citizen. These two models are pure ideal types.

The mediated retrospective self-interest model (II-B) and the simple retrospective sociotropic model (IV-A) are both hybrids of those two pure types. The former model (II-B) posits a citizen who is basically self-oriented but also concerned with the outside object (e.g., the government) and uses the information mediated by an outside source to make judgments about his personal problems, while the latter model (IV-A) holds an image of a citizen who is basically public-oriented but only uses the information from his direct environment to make a judgment about the public or social condition. Naturally, these hybrid models do not fit the models of a political man postulated by the democratic theories as well as the two pure models do. Hence, the theoretical implications of these two hybrid models are expected to be not as far-reaching or universally generalizable as the theoretical implications of the pure models.

The two pure models (II-A and IV-B) present two different images of the average citizen, which respectively fit two different models of the citizen postulated by two different streams of democratic theories. While the image of a citizen in the simple retrospective self-interest model (II-A) fits the model of a rational-economic man posited by the Downsian theory of democracy, the image of a citizen held by the mediated retrospective sociotropic model (IV-B) fits the model of a rational-democratic man embraced by the classical democratic theories. (224)

It may be a normative question to ask whether the citizen posited by the simple retrospective self-interest model (II-A) or the citizen postulated by the mediated retrospective sociotropic model (IV-B) is more desirable for the liberal democratic political system in Japan. Although this dissertation does not seek answer to such a purely normative question — which seems to be a task for a work of normative democratic theory —, at least it is hoped that the empirical analysis of this dissertation will be able to suggest which model of political man the Japanese

(224) For a brilliant discussion on theoretical implications of the original "sociotropic model," see Monroe (1984, pp.196-198). The ideas of my argument above partly stems from her discussion, although my emphasis differs from hers and my argument does not agree with her position.
citizens are closer to. Such empirical findings, providing a picture of what kind of model of a democratic citizen a majority of Japanese fit, may imply the way in which the political system of Japan has fostered its legitimacy among its system members or can foster it in the future. Thus, the empirical inquiry of system support in Japan --- particularly, the examination of what type of democratic citizens in Japan support to which degree the political system for what reason --- may imply normative as well as prescriptive directions. (225)

7.2 EMPIRICAL EXAMINATIONS OF THE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE EXPLANATIONS

7.2.1 Operationalization of Performance Evaluation Models

In order to test the system performance hypothesis, operationalizations of the concept of perceived system performance. The four different explanatory models, which are presented in the previous section, suggest four different types of operationalized variables for perceived system performance.

According to the discussion of the four models of system performance evaluation, first, the variable which taps the respondent's satisfaction with his material livelihood (V413) can be used as an operational measure of the simple retrospective self-interest evaluation of system performance (II-A). Second, the simple retrospective sociotropic judgment of system performance (IV-A) can be operationally measured by the variable concerning to which degree the respondent thinks other people are satisfied with their material livelihood (V414). Third, the JABISS Study includes a battery of variables concerned with the respondent's evaluation of performance of the government or the political system (V18, V20, V22, V24, V26, V28, V30, and V32; see the four paragraphs below, for the variable labels); these variables can be used as the operationalized measures of mediated retrospective sociotropic evaluation of system performance (IV-B). Fourth, however, one of the above battery of variables (V32) can be considered to tap mediated retrospective self-interest evaluation (II-B), because this variable (V32) taps the respondent's

(225) Of course, the actual prescriptive argument lies outside the scope of this dissertation. This study will only suggest some conditions which can be used for such a normative and prescriptive argument.
evaluation of the government's handling in protesting the interests of his (or his/her household head's) occupation. However, a question remains whether this variable can be clearly separated as a variable concerning self-interest oriented judgment from other variables in the battery, which are concerned with sociotropic judgment. This is an empirical question, and will be examined through the following factor analysis.

All the four integrated explanatory models which have been discussed here are under the general category of "retrospective judgment." However, the survey question items which have been suggested to be used for operationalization of the four models all ask the respondents' judgment at that point in time. One may question that these question items do not tap the respondent's retrospective evaluations but tap his or her present evaluation. However, there is a logic behind this usage of the question items concerning the respondents' present evaluation for the measures of retrospective judgment. When an individual is asked about his evaluation of the present personal material condition or the present performance of the political system, he inevitably refers to the past condition as well as the present condition, and therefore the question which asks the respondent's present evaluation is considered to tap implicitly the retrospective aspect of his or her judgment.

On the other hand, Fiorina (1978) and Inoguchi (1983b) measured retrospective evaluations of American and Japanese respondents respectively by using survey questions with wordings that explicitly ask the respondent's past evaluation; for example, the wording generally goes as below:

During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, getting worse, or has it stayed the same?

(226) The following examples are the wordings used in those JABISS Study question items that will be used as operational measures of those retrospective models. For the item to measure simple retrospective self-interest judgment (II-A), "To which degree (on the 0-10 scale) are you satisfied with your material livelihood?" is the wording. For seven question items to measure mediated retrospective sociotropic judgment (IV-B), the similar wording to the following example was used: "How well the government or local authorities handling the problem of inflation and economic stability?"
This kind of wording indeed does refer to the past condition; however, the major focus in this type of question is comparison of the present condition with the past condition, or improvement of the condition. Then, the focus of this type of question may not capture purely retrospective judgment of the respondent, because an individual who answers "better now than a year ago" may still consider the present condition to be unsatisfactory. Actually, the JABISS Study data include two question items --- "compared with a year ago (V415)," and "compared with five years ago (V416)" --- which use the same type of wording as the items used by Fiorina (1978) and Inoguchi (1983b). Accordingly, it will be possible to compare the effectiveness of the question item focusing on present evaluation (V413) with the effectiveness of the question items focusing on improvement or worsening of the condition (V415 and V416) in terms of explanatory power for the dependent variable. (228)

The eight performance evaluation variables are respectively concerned with the following aspects of system or incumbent performance: (V18) local development, (V20) providing local services, (V22) providing social services, (V24) pollution control, (V26) eliminating political corruption, (V28) handling inflation and maintaining stable economy, (V30) maintaining social order, (V32) protecting

(227) Fiorina (1978) used the American National Election Study data from 1956 to 1974, which in some years asked whether the respondent was better off or worse off than a year ago.

(228) These two items (V415; V416) are to tap simple retrospective self-interest judgment (II-A) only. The JABISS Study data do not have any questions that use "improvement" or "worsening" oriented wording for mediated retrospective self-interest judgment (II-B), for simple retrospective sociotropic judgment (IV-A), or for mediated retrospective sociotropic judgment (IV-B). Therefore, it is not possible to compare questions using "present" oriented wording with questions using "improvement" oriented wording for the latter three models.

However, it is amazing that the JABISS Study included variables which tap four different kinds of retrospective judgment of system performance, because all the literature relevant to those different explanatory models emerged only after 1976 when the JABISS Study was conducted. This shows how well the JABISS Study was theoretically designed.
These performance evaluation variables cover a wide range of aspects from more specific aspects of policy performance by the national or local incumbent government to more generalized political performance aspects. Although evaluation of specific policy performance is considered to be directed toward the incumbent government rather than the political system, evaluation of more generalized political performance is directed toward the system as well as the incumbent government. For example, evaluative attitudes with regard to political corruption control (V26), social order maintenance (V30), or the general economy (V28) are not only concerned with the incumbent government's administration but also the political system, or the social mechanism, by which political corruption is prevented, social order is maintained, and economic stability is achieved.

Furthermore, since ordinary citizens are generally believed not to differentiate political concepts very well (Converse, 1964), they can be considered less likely to differentiate which political actor is responsible for a particular policy or political performance area. Ordinary Japanese are particularly believed to be less able to do so, simply because the same party (i.e., the Liberal Democratic Party) has been in power for almost the entire post-war period. If a single party is incumbent for a long period, system members are naturally less likely to differentiate the incumbent government from the political system. Although many later works challenged Converse's argument (1964) using data from the 1970s, the major point of the revisionists' work is that the general electorate can differentiate political issues to a higher sophistication level when those issues are more salient (Nie with Andersen, 1972; Pomper, 1972; Stimson, 1975, and so on). (229) Because the eight aspects of political performance in the JABISS Study are not salient issues but more general day-to-day concerns of the Japanese political process, the Japanese general public was believed not to differentiate clearly who is the actor of which policy or political performance. (230)

(229) This question on the Japanese electorate has not been decisively answered. For example, Shinsaku Kohei (1979) found that voting behavior based on policy issues was clearly visible in the 1960s but such a trend declined in the 1970s. NEED Elaboration with MIYAKE etc.

(230) An exception is the item on the evaluation of performance in eliminating political corruption. Polit
Another reason to believe that the eight performance variables of the JABISS Study measure the respondents' evaluative attitudes toward the political system as well as the incumbent government is that these performance variables focus only on domestic issues not foreign policy issues. Foreign policy is the area in which differences between the incumbent LDP and the opposition parties are clearest to ordinary citizens, because political stands on foreign policy issues are often clearly divided by a left-right ideological cleavage and/or a dove-hawk cleavage. For instance, those Japanese, such as the socialist supporters, who do not approve of the way the LDP administration handles foreign affairs but nevertheless support the system may more clearly separate the performance of the incumbent government from that of the political system. But, because the performance variables in this study exclude aspects of foreign policy, the conceptual distinction between incumbent performance and system performance becomes unclear. In short, the eight performance variables are thus assumed to measure not only incumbent performance but system performance.

A factor analysis of the eight performance variables indicated that the Japanese evaluative attitudes of system performance have a two-dimensional structure, as shown in Table 32. (231) The first factor can clearly be interpreted as national system performance, and the second factor as...
local system performance. Two factor-score scales were built: (1) the national performance scale corresponding to Factor I, and (2) the local performance scale corresponding to Factor II. These two performance scales were used as the explanatory variables to test the system performance hypothesis.

The results of this factor analysis clearly suggests that V32 (handling in protecting occupational interests of the respondents) belongs to the same attitudinal dimension as other five variables concerning national system performance (V22, V24, V26, V28, and V30). V32 was earlier considered to measure mediated retrospective self-interest evaluation (II-B), and other five variables were considered to measure mediated retrospective sociotropic evaluation (IV-B). However, this distinction was not made by the Japanese respondents. Therefore, V32 is now included in the national dimension of mediated retrospective sociotropical evaluation of system performance.

(232) The procedure for building factor-score scales for these two factors is exactly the same as the procedure described in the section on the system support factor-score scales (see Appendix A). For the matrix of the factor score coefficients for
Table 32

Factor Analysis of System Performance Evaluation Variables

Common Factor Analysis of System Performance Evaluation Variables with Oblique Rotation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V18. Local Development</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V20. Local Services</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V22. Social Services</td>
<td>.367</td>
<td>.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V24. Pollution Control</td>
<td>.542</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V26. Eliminating Corruption</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>-.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V28. Economy</td>
<td>.699</td>
<td>-.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V30. Social Order</td>
<td>.562</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V32. Occupational Interest</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Common VariancesExplained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>42.8 %</th>
<th>11.3 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Label of Factor (Interpretation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Performance</th>
<th>Local Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


7.2.2 Examinations of the Effects of System Performance on System Support

Of the four models of system performance explanations discussed earlier in this chapter, now, three of them will be tested, because the mediated retrospective self-interest model (II-B) has been dropped as a result of the
factor analysis. The operational measure of those three models are as follows: (1) V413 for the simple retrospective self-interest model (II-A); (2) V414 for the simple retrospective sociotropic model (IV-B); (3) the national system performance scale (NATIONAL PERFORMANCE) for the national dimension of the mediated retrospective sociotropic model (IV-B); (4) the local system performance scale (LOCAL PERFORMANCE) for the local dimension of the above model (IV-B).

The results of a bivariate correlational analysis (based on Pearson's product-moment correlation analysis) between several operationalized variables of system performance evaluation and two scales of system support provides a simple test of these models. Table 33 shows the results of this correlational analysis. The table clearly shows that the two scales of mediated retrospective sociotropic evaluation of system performance (i.e., NATIONAL PERFORMANCE and LOCAL PERFORMANCE) have the strongest relationship with the diffuse system support scale and with the democratic institution support scale, compared with other variables' associations with those two dependent variables.

It is also worth noting that the table includes two variables (V415 and V416) which tap the respondent's explicit retrospective evaluation of system performance, both of which are concerned with mediated retrospective self-interest evaluation but not with any other models. The explicit retrospective wordings in these variables are respectively "are you satisfied with your material livelihood compared with a year ago (V415)" and "compared with five years ago (V416)." The very weak correlation of these two variables suggest that these explicit retrospective wordings do not particularly improve the explanatory power when compared with another variable (V413) regarding simple sociotropic evaluation with implicit retrospective focus. Therefore, it is not of much merit to utilized these two variables with explicit retrospective focus (V415 and V416) as the operationalized measures of simple retrospective self-interest evaluation.

A further examination of the three performance evaluation models can be achieved a regression analysis, which is to sow relative effects of these explanatory variables (performance evaluation variables) on the two system support scales. The results of regression analyses on diffuse system support and democratic institutional support clearly demonstrates that only NATIONAL PERFORMANCE and V413 have meaningful effects on DIFFUSE SUPPORT as well as on INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT (Table 34). Therefore, as was theoretically expected, two pure types of performance evalua
### Table 33

**Relationships between System Performance and System Support**

(Pearson's r)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6 Different System Performance Measures</th>
<th>DIFFUSE SYSTEM SUPPORT</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V413 Satisfaction with Material Life</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V414 Perceived Material Satisfaction of Other People</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V415 Life Is Better Off Than 1 Year Ago</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V416 Life Is Better Off Than 5 Years Ago</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ( ) Statistically not significant at the .05 level.


...tion models are relevant to the formation of system support attitudes. These two pure models are the simple retrospective self-interest evaluation model and the mediated retrospective sociotropical evaluation model.
### Table 34
Comparison of Four Explanatory Models of System Performance

Regression Coefficients of 4 System Performance Evaluation Measures on 2 System Support Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Performance Evaluation Measures</th>
<th>DIFFUSE SYSTEM SUPPORT</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.28 ***</td>
<td>.10 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>(-.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V413 Satisfaction with Material Life</td>
<td>.10 *</td>
<td>.11 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V414 Other People's Satisfaction (R's Perception)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(-.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *** P < .001  Coefficients in parentheses are not Statistically significant at the .05 level.


### 7.3 Empirical Examinations of the Partisan Explanation

The psychological attachment to a particular party --- i.e., what some may call party identification --- has been known to affect support for the incumbent government. (233) Because affective orientation toward the incumbent government (i.e., incumbent affect) has been conceptualized as one of the two major components of diffuse system support attitudes in this dissertation, partisan attachment is logically expected to have an impact on diffuse system

(233) The empirical evidences for this connection are numerous in voting behavior studies in Japan, the United States, and other democracies.
However, it is important to note that support for the party which occupies the incumbent government office is not equated to support for the incumbent government itself in the above conceptualization. In other words, partisanship (or party identification) is not regarded as a component of the dependent variable (i.e., system support) but is considered to be an independent variable which has effects on the incumbent affect component of diffuse system support attitudes. Although this conceptual distinction between support for the incumbent party and support for the incumbent administration seems to be difficult in such a political system as Japan where a single party controls the incumbent administration for a long time, still the following longitudinal public opinion data from Japan suggest that Japanese citizens conceptually differentiate incumbent party support from incumbent government support.

The results of monthly opinion polls on political party support and the incumbent Cabinet support over time (Jiji Press, 1981) in Figure 11 clearly demonstrate that there are considerable discrepancies between the level of cabinet support and the level of support for the ruling LDP at times. According to Inoguchi's (1981b) longitudinal analysis, partisan attachment is not particularly expected to affect democratic institution support, because one's partisan attachment is not theoretically influencing his acceptance of the democratic institutional arrangements.

These public opinion data were provided by Jiji Press (1981), which has been conducting monthly opinion polls focusing on party support and the incumbent Cabinet support since 1960.

Asahi Newspaper's Office of Public Opinion Survey has been conducting public opinion polls at the time of national elections and at the time of formation of a new cabinet (Asahi Shinbun, Yoron Chosa Shitsu, 1976). These time-series data show the pattern parallel to the pattern depicted by the Jiji Press data in Figure 11. Since the JABISS Study does not include a question concerning support for the incumbent Cabinet (i.e., Prime Minister Miki's Cabinet in 1976), it is not possible to test the current argument directly through the JABISS Study data. However, given the similar patterns found between the Jiji Press data and the Asahi data, it is safe to conclude that Japanese citizens conceptually distin...
analysis of the Jiji Press data, the average correlation between the LDP support and the incumbent Cabinet support is 0.72 in the period of 1960-1980. This strong but not near-perfect correlation suggests that the LDP support and the incumbent Cabinet support are measuring two different attitudes but that the incumbent party support statistically has strong effects on the incumbent Cabinet support. (237)

According to the conceptualizations discussed thus far, partisan attachment now enters into the scheme of explanations of system support attitudes as an independent variable. Although partisan attachment is expected to have stronger effects on the diffuse system support dimension than on the democratic institution support dimension, the effects of partisan orientation will be examined for both dimensions of system support attitudes.

The expected relationship between partisan attachment and diffuse system support is delineated below. It is generally understood that those who have close psychological attachment to the incumbent party (LDP) would be more likely to have diffuse support for the system than opposition party identifiers. In particular, the socialist or the communist party supporters are expected not to have strong diffuse system support, because these two parties are very critical of the way the Japanese political system works, although even these socialist or communist identifiers are expected to support the democratic institutions. The supporters of the middle-of-the-road parties are naturally expected to be somewhere in between the LDP and the Left party identifiers (for the relevant theoretical discussion, see section 1.2 and Figure 1 of chapter 1).

Table 35 shows the results of crosstabulation of party identification by system support attitudes. For the purpose of simplicity in the data analysis, party identification is categorized into three political camps: (1) the conservative LDP camp; (2) the central parties (the NLC, the DSP, and the CGP); (3) the leftist camp (the JSP and the JCP). The table demonstrates that partisanship plays an important role in explaining system support attitudes.

(237) Here, party identification is assumed to preceed and cause the incumbent government support. This assumption derives from the cummulation of behavioral studies of incumbent support, including Monroe (1984) and Inoguchi (1980).
Figure 11: Longitudinal Patterns of the Cabinet Support and the LDP Support
(more so for diffuse system support than democratic institution support).

### Table 35

**System Support by Party Identification: A Crosstabulation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM SUPPORT</th>
<th>PARTY IDENTIFICATION (Column Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Support</td>
<td>(1) LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>43.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Political Institution Support | | | |
| Positive | 57.4 %  | 54.8 % | 50.0 % | + 7.4 |
| Neutral  | 18.0    | 23.3  | 20.8   |        |
| Negative | 24.6    | 21.9  | 29.2   | - 4.6 |
| Total    | 100 %   | 100 % | 100 %  | Tau-B= .06 |

n = 540 146 346 N = 1032

\%

(52.3 \%) (14.1 \%) (33.5 \%) (100.0 \%)

Data Source: The 1976 JABISS Election Study
However, party identification is a variable whose level of measurement is nominal, not interval nor even ordinal. This is even more problematic in a multi-party system than in a two-party or three-party system, because it becomes more difficult to build a partisan preference index of ordinal level measurement when the number of parties increases. In Japan during 1976, there were six major parties in the national political arena. Hence, it is better to build an interval-level measure of party preference than to use a party identification variable.

In order to create this index, feeling-thermometer scales of the six parties were used. With the thermometer score of the LDP as a baseline, the new "partisan feeling index" measures the psychological distance of each respondent from the LDP in relationship to the other parties. (238) Since the LDP is a long-standing incumbent party, the partisan feeling index based on the distance from the LDP is an appropriate measure to explain the system support attitudes.

The correlation between partisan feeling score and the diffuse system support scale is .318, and its correlation with the democratic institution support scale is .120. Compared with the correlation coefficients of other variables which have been discussed in chapter 6 and this chapter, partisan attachment (or the psychological attachment to the incumbent party) clearly provides the strongest explanatory power for system support attitudes in Japan.

(238) In other words, each individual score for this partisan feeling index was calculated by subtracting the mean score of the five opposition parties' feeling thermometer scales from the feeling thermometer score for the LDP. For the procedure for constructing the partisan feeling index, see Appendix C.
Chapter VIII
SYNTHESIS OF TWO EXPLANATIONS OF SYSTEM SUPPORT:
CAUSAL MODELING

Chapter 6 has examined the effects of political culture and perceived system performance on system support. Although some relationship between those independent variables and the dependent variables has been revealed, the entire causal mechanism between them cannot be clearly understood through a series of examinations of a pair of variables at a time (i.e., bivariate examination between an independent variable and a dependent variable). It is necessary to examine effects of several important explanatory variables on the dependent variable simultaneously in order to comprehend the whole structure. Even a regression analysis, performed in the previous chapter, still focuses only on one segment of the entire causal mechanism. For the purpose of obtaining an entire picture of a causal mechanism of formation of system support attitudes, it is appropriate to utilize a causal modeling technique. Furthermore, not only will causal modelings enable us to examine the relative importance of the political culture and the system performance hypotheses, but causal modeling will also help us to comprehend the roles of the political subcultures and system performance in the socio-economic as well as the political context of postwar Japan, as we will see in the following discussion.

Causal analyses of the two dependent variables, diffuse system support and democratic institution support, will be discussed separately, because these two dimensions of national system support are independent.(239) In fact, because the factor-scope scale of diffuse system support and that of democratic institution support (i.e., two operationalized dependent variables) have been built according

(239) The factor analysis of political support variables (V4 through V16 excluding V7 and V11) showed that the factor of diffuse system support (Factor III) was strongly orthogonal to the factor of democratic institution support (Factor II), as Table 16 and Figure 5 in chapter 5 showed.

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to the factor solution with orthogonal rotation, these two operational scales of system support are not correlated at all. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyse these two dimensions of system support separately.

However, the causal explanatory model for the diffuse system support scale and that for the democratic institution support have the same basic structure. The discussion of the basic structure of the causal explanatory model for both diffuse system support and democratic institution support follows.

8.1 THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS OF SYSTEM SUPPORT

The basic structure of the causal model of system support in Japan can be specified theoretically according to the discussions of the socio-economic and socio-cultural context of postwar Japan (chapter 4) as well as empirically according to statistical relationships between the dependent variables and the explanatory variables (chapter 6). The basic structural specifications of the causal modeling for both diffuse system support and democratic institution support are depicted in Figure 12.

As Figure 12 shows, this recursive causal model includes one dependent variable, five endogenous (explanatory) variables, and two exogenous (explanatory) variables. The dependent variable is diffuse national system support and is referred to as DIFFUSE SUPPORT in the figure. Of the five endogenous variables, three variables represent political subcultures, the traditional political subculture, the oppositional political subculture, and the hawkish political subculture. These three endogenous variables are referred to respectively as TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE, OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE, and HAWKISH SUBCULTURE in the figure.

(240) The endogenous variables are independent variables of the dependent variable in a causal model (i.e., diffuse national system support in this paper), while they are at the same time dependent variables of the exogenous variables because the endogenous variables are expected to be explained by the exogenous variables. Accordingly, the exogenous variables are expected to explain both the endogenous variables and the dependent variable (Asher, 1976, pp.12-14). As the exogenous variables are not explained by any other variables in the model, they are regarded as pure independent variables of the causal model.
**Figure 12:** Basic Structure of Causal Model of System Support
model. Another endogenous variable is the national system performance scale, which is referred to as NATIONAL PERFORMANCE. The last endogenous variable measures partisan preference attitudes and is referred to as PARTISAN FEELING in Figure 12. The two exogenous variables are age and education, which are not explained by any variables in this model.

From this recursive path model (Figure 12), some independent variables are excluded. First, three variables that represent the urban-rural orientation, or more specifically measure the respondents' strength of communal ties ---- i.e., the population density index, the variable of length of residence (V159), and the variable of commuting time (V173) have been excluded, because they statistically do not have important effects on diffuse system support attitudes or political subculture orientation.

Second, since the major purpose of this research is to examine the political culture hypotheses and the system performance hypothesis, the scope of the causal modeling here is accordingly confined to an examination of the relative magnitudes of the impact of political subcultures and system performance on system support. Therefore, the causal model retains only those endogenous (explanatory) variables that represent political subcultures and system performance evaluation. An exception here is partisan attachment (i.e., the partisan feeling score index) which is included in the model although this is an independent concept of political subcultures and of perceived system performance. The reason for including partisan attachment in the causal model is that it has the strongest effect on the dependent variable (chapter 7) and is closely interrelated with perceived system performance as well as with political subcultures.

Thus, the endogenous variables included in the causal model represent the socio-cultural explanations, the system performance explanations, and the politico-partisan explanation of system support respectively. According to

(241) The variable for local system performance (LOCAL PERFORMANCE) was excluded from the model, because a regression analysis (for DIFFUSE SUPPORT) indicated that LOCAL PERFORMANCE does not have significant effects on DIFFUSE SUPPORT (the standardized regression coefficient not significant at the .05 level).

(242) However, some operationalized variables which tap political subculture orientation have been excluded from the causal analysis, because empirically they
these criteria, two types of explanatory variables must be excluded from the model.

One is political interests and/or media exposure. As the variables or scales of these variables are to be endogenous variables in the model (because they are determined by exogenous variables), these endogenous variables have been excluded from the model. They also have weak statistical association with the dependent variables.

The other type of endogenous variables that have not been included in the causal model are the variables of involvement in social networks or organizational ties. It was argued earlier (chapter 4) that these social network variables are to be excluded from the scope of this dissertation. This is because they represent another separate theoretical hypothesis that the citizen's involvement in a social network has positive effects on the formation of system support attitudes and because such a hypothesis clearly falls outside the theoretical concern of this dissertation.

Of the five endogenous variables, the traditional political subculture is assumed to precede and influence the other endogenous variables, because the traditional political subculture includes political values which are assumed to be developed in an early stage of one's political socialization process and, therefore, are more deeply rooted in people's political attitudes. Hence, the oppositional political subculture and the hawkish political subculture, both of which contain more ideologically oriented political values than value orientation related to basic behavior, can be clearly assumed to be affected by the traditional political subculture orientation.

It should also be noted in Figure 12 that partisan preference (i.e., PARTISAN FEELING) precedes the oppositional and the hawkish political subcultures. The reason for this is a complex. These two political subculture scales (i.e., OPPOSITIONAL and HAWKISH SUBCULTURES) are composed of variables which measure the respondents' issue orientation, although these variables tap long-standing ideological issue orientation and not current policy issue orientation.

have very weak statistical relationships with the dependent variables, namely, the diffuse system support scales or democratic institution support. Those dropped operationalized political subculture scales are the formal democratic subculture scale, the sense of civic duty scale, the internal political efficacy scale, and the regional integration scale.
Hence, these two types of political subculture orientation are assumed to be formed at a relatively late stage of the adolescent socialization process. On the other hand, the partisan feeling index is based on a feeling of affect (i.e., thermometer feeling scales) toward the six political parties. Given the argument that partisan attachment begins to form in a relatively earlier stage of one's political socialization process, the orientation toward the long-standing ideological issues (i.e., orientation toward the oppositional and the hawkish subcultures) are assumed to be developed after partisan preference or attachment has been formed.

The evaluation of system performance is clearly assumed to be formed after cultural or partisan orientation has been formed. Furthermore, because the system performance evaluation is believed to reflect changes in the actual performance of the system over time, the system performance scale should enter into the causal model as the last explanatory variable. It is also believed that such an evaluation is often affected by other cultural or partisan predispositions, although performance evaluation should be based on rational judgement of the actual performance of the system.

This hypothesized causal link between the traditional political culture and perceived system performance is theoretically important, considering the earlier argument that Japanese citizens tend to evaluate system performance sociotropically because of their traditional cultural orientation (see 7.1 of chapter 7). Since the traditional Japanese (political) culture is believed to affect Japanese citizens' sociotropical evaluation of their system's performance, the direction of causality can be assumed to go from the traditional (political) culture scale to the perceived national system performance.(243)

A causal link is also assumed to exist from partisan attachment (PARTISAN FEELING) to perceived national system performance (NATIONAL PERFORMANCE). This linkage has an important implication for the causal mechanism of 

(243) Here, the perceived national system performance scale (NATIONAL PERFORMANCE) is based on the mediated retrospective sociotropical judgment model (see Figure 10 of chapter 2), as was discussed in chapter 7 (7.1). The perceived local system performance scale has been omitted from the causal model because the scale has a very weak correlation with either the diffuse system support scale or the democratic institution support scale.
explaining system support. One compelling argument against the assumed direction of causality from system performance evaluation to system support is that those citizens who support the political system may consequently develop a positive evaluation of the performance of the political system rather than developing system support attitudes because of their positive evaluation of the performance of the system.

One way to disentangle this possible interaction between perceived system performance and system support is to introduce partisan feeling toward the incumbent party. When correlation exists between system performance evaluation and system support, and if one argues that the direction of causality may not go from perceived system performance to system support for some citizens, the greatest chance is that support for the incumbent party causes both positive perceptions of system performance and positive orientation toward the political system. This is because the incumbent party is often recognized as a responsible actor of system performance and because system support attitudes are often mingled with incumbent support attitudes where a single party remains in office for a long time, as in Japan. In the figure, the causal linkage from system performance evaluation to system support is real for some citizens, while that linkage may disappear after introducing incumbent party attachment as the third variable for some citizens. But, the possibility of a causal flow from system support to system performance evaluation becomes small after controlling for incumbent party attachment, and therefore this direction of causality is assumed not to exist here for analytical purpose.(244)

Following the above argument, the possible mutual causation between system performance evaluation and system support is more likely to occur in the case where diffuse system support is the dependent variable than in the case of democratic institution support as the dependent variable. The reason for this is that diffuse system support contains the incumbent affect component and that the incumbent government is often perceived as the major actor responsible for system performance. In contrast, democratic

(244) However, I am aware of the possibility that some citizens actually do form system performance evaluation based on their attitudes toward the political system. Although I cannot ultimately solve this problem but have chosen here to ignore this possibility, this problem will be considered further in a later section (7.2.2) where the sample is physically divided into three different partisan groups.
institution support is not considered to generate positive evaluation of system performance to any great degree, because system performance is judged by the citizens according to system outcomes and outputs, and because democratic institution support represents the citizens' perception of responsiveness of the democratic institutions, which is their perception of democratic process rather than outcomes. (245)

8.2 CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF DIFFUSE SYSTEM SUPPORT

8.2.1 A Recursive Path Model for the Entire Sample

Recursive path modeling techniques were employed here for the causal analysis of diffuse national system support. (246) Figure 13 shows the recursive path model which depicts expected causal linkages between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable (i.e., diffuse national system support) as well as between the explanatory variables. (247)

In Figure 13, the recursive causal model suggests that the system performance hypothesis is better supported by the JABISS data than is the political culture hypothesis. This conclusion is reached because NATIONAL PERFORMANCE has stronger direct effects (.18) on DIFFUSE SUPPORT than either OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE (-.07) or HAWKISH SUBCULTURE (.07). The negative effects of OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE on DIFFUSE SUPPORT mean that those Japanese who are more strongly oriented toward the oppositional political

(245) In fact, the system performance evaluation scales (i.e., NATIONAL PERFORMANCE) tap the respondents' evaluations of outcomes of the system not the democratic process of the system.

(246) For the path analysis technique used in this paper, see Asher (1976).

(247) In this model, standardized regression coefficients were used as the estimates of path coefficients. Only those coefficients that were statistically significant at the .05 level or better were included in the arrow diagram of the model. Therefore, some causal linkages between the variables which were not significant at the .05 level were excluded from the model even though they were theoretically expected to exist.
All residual paths are eliminated.

N = 1,322

Data Source: The 1976 JABISS Study

Path Coefficients are significant at the following level:

*** P < .001
** P < .01
* P < .05

Figure 13: A Recursive Path Model of Diffuse System Support: Entire Sample
subculture are less likely to support their national political system in a diffuse sense.

The weak explanatory power of political culture for diffuse system support is also indicated empirically by the fact that the traditional political subculture does not have a direct impact on diffuse system support, although the causal linkage between them is theoretically expected to exist because traditionally oriented Japanese are assumed to be deferential to any given political authority and, consequently, are expected to have diffuse system support attitudes.

The system performance evaluation is theoretically assumed to have only direct effects on diffuse system support attitudes but no effect on any other explanatory variables in the model. On the other hand, the three political subculture scales (i.e., TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE, OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE, and HAWKISH SUBCULTURE) precede and influence the system performance variable; they have accordingly indirect effects as well as direct effects on the diffuse system support scale. In order to compare the impact of system performance on diffuse system support with the total impact of political culture on diffuse system support, we need to examine their indirect as well as their direct effects. Even when combining the direct effects and indirect effects, each of the three political subculture scales still has a weaker impact on the diffuse system support scale than does the system performance scale, as Table 36 shows.

(248) The estimated coefficient for the path from TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE to DIFFUSE SUPPORT turned out to be insignificant at the .05 level.

(249) It is important to distinguish theoretically meaningful compound paths from non-meaningful compound paths. The theoretically meaningful compound paths are regarded as an indirect effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable (Asher, 1976). This paper follows the above definition of indirect effects.

(250) TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE has indirect effects of .11 magnitude but has no direct effects on DIFFUSE SUPPORT. OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE has direct effects (-.07) only. As HAWKISH SUBCULTURE has both direct effects (.07) and indirect effects (.01), its total effects on DIFFUSE SUPPORT become .08.
Table 36

Direct and Indirect Effects of Explanatory Variables on Diffuse System Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Direct Effects</th>
<th>Indirect Effects</th>
<th>Total Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWKISH SUBCULTURE</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTISAN FEELING</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL CULTURE</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (V158)</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (Age: V157)</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculations of indirects and total effects are based on the path coefficients in Figure 13.


Therefore, it can be tentatively concluded that system performance evaluation is a more important source of diffuse system support attitudes than is political culture.
orientation in postwar Japan, if the impact of system performance and that of political culture on diffuse system support are strictly compared without considering other explanatory variables. However, the political culture hypothesis can not be easily rejected either, as the three political subcultures have some impact on diffuse system support.

In addition, it is important to understand that contemporary Japanese political subcultures do not all generate the same positive attitudes toward the political system. Whereas the traditional political subculture and the hawkish political subculture foster positive attitudes toward the political system, the oppositional political subculture generates negative orientation toward the system.

In addition to the political subculture variables and the system performance variable, the remaining three variables also have important implications in explaining diffuse system support. First, the partisan feeling index has the strongest direct effect (.24) on the diffuse system support scale. If the indirect effects (.03) are added, PARTISAN FEELING has stronger total effects by far on DIFFUSE SUPPORT than any other variable, as shown in Table 36. This is in a sense natural, given that the LDP has been in power so long that it is hard for the Japanese to separate it from the political system. This point will be discussed in greater detail below.

Second, of the two exogenous variables, age has a direct impact (.13) on diffuse system support. This itself is weaker than the direct effect of system performance (.18) on diffuse system support; however, the total effects of age (.21) exceed that of system performance (.18), as shown in Table 36. This implies that generational differences are substantial in the traditional political subculture orientation, in partisan preference, and in diffuse system support attitudes; i.e., the older the respondent, the more supportive he/she is of the traditional cultural values, the incumbent party (LDP), and the political system. However, it should be noted that age does not have significant direct effects on the oppositional political subculture or the hawkish political subculture. These patterns can be interpreted in the following way. Age differences, or generational differences, reflect tension between the traditional value of deference to political authority and the modern value of being free from the pressures of conformity and obedience. In other words, older Japanese tend to accept or support whatever is given by political authority; for example, they tend to support the long-standing ruling party (LDP), to approve the policy performance by the
political authority, and consequently to support the political system.

Third, the other exogenous variable, educational level, has direct effects on both the oppositional political subculture (.13) and the hawkish political subculture (-.11) in addition to the traditional political subculture (-.18). These patterns imply that attaining higher education encourages the development of critical attitudes toward political conservatism (that is, toward the HAWKISH SUBCULTURE) and a favorable orientation toward the anti-business and anti-establishment subculture (that is, toward the OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE). Accordingly, education has something to do with ideologically related political subcultures, and educational level differences have weak indirect effects (-.04) on diffuse system support through these political subcultures.

Thus, age has little to do with political attitudes on ideological dimensions but is related to deferential attitudes toward political authority. In contrast, education is more closely related to the ideological political subculture than is age.

This causal model contains a problem with regard to the relationship between partisan preference attitudes and diffuse system support attitudes. Since support for the incumbent Liberal Democratic Party may not be clearly separated from political system support for some Japanese citizens, one may argue that the linkage between PARTISAN FEELING and DIFFUSE SUPPORT is not unidirectional but that there may be mutual causation between the two variables. In other words, it may be that not only do LDP supporters tend to support the political system but also those who support the political system and wish to maintain the system may tend to support the ruling LDP for the sake of system maintenance. Similarly, it may be that not only do those who hate the LDP tend to reject the political system but that those Japanese who disapprove of the political system may come to dislike the LDP.

Since the major purpose of this research is to test the two hypotheses which offer explanations of diffuse system support as the dependent variable, it is not appropriate to revise the recursive causal model to a non-recursive causal model by designating both DIFFUSE SUPPORT and PARTISAN FEELING as the two dependent variables. Instead, controlling for partisanship in the original recursive model should solve the problem of possible mutual causation between partisan preference and diffuse system support, because this method should control for interaction between partisan preference and the other variables.
In so doing, party identification, instead of the partisan feeling index, was used to control for partisanship. (251) For the sake of simplicity and for the purpose of retaining a sufficient number of cases in each partisan subsample, the sample was divided into three partisan groups (instead of six parties): (1) the LDP identifiers, (2) the Left party identifiers (i.e., the socialists and the communists), and (3) the central party identifiers (i.e., the NLC, the DSP, and the CGP supporters). (252)

8.2.2 Recursive Path Models Controlling for Partisanship

At this point, an examination of the recursive path models for the three different partisan groups is in order. These recursive path models controlling for party identification retain the same structure as the original recursive path model except they exclude PARTY FEELING.

First, the recursive path model for the incumbent party (LDP) identifiers is presented in Figure 14. (253) The subsample for this LDP model includes the LDP identifiers who support the political system because they support the LDP and those who support the LDP because they support the political system. Although we cannot distinguish between these two types in this subsample, we are now able to examine the effects of other explanatory variables on diffuse system support, holding the interaction between partisanship and diffuse system support constant. According to Figure 14, the effects of age on DIFFUSE SUPPORT are stronger than other explanatory variables; the direct effect of age is .20 and its indirect effect is .01, as shown in Table 37. While TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE does not have a direct path to DIFFUSE SUPPORT, HAWKISH SUBCULTURE has moderate effects (.10). However, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE has a still stronger impact (.14) on DIFFUSE SUPPORT than

(251) Dividing the sample into different categories according to partisan feeling scores would inevitably be arbitrary. Party identification, however, provides substantively meaningful categories.

(252) Though the NLC in the 1980s is perceived as a conservative party which is very close to the LDP, the NLC was clearly perceived as a new central party because of its sharp criticism of the LDP for its members' involvement in the Lockheed scandal in 1976 when the JABISS Study was conducted.

(253) The leaning party identifiers are not included in each partisan group.
HAWKISH SUBCULTURE.

The causal patterns in Figure 14 suggest that generational differences and the hawkish political subculture have a chain of positive effects on diffuse system support. In contrast, system performance evaluation has an independent impact on diffuse system support. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the LDP supporters' diffuse system support is under the influence of the generationally related attitudinal differences and the ideologically related political subcultures. However, they do not always support the political system no matter how bad its performance might be; rather, to a considerable extent they develop their supportive attitudes toward the system according to its performance.

Second, the recursive path model for the Left party (JSP and JCP) identifiers is presented in Figure 15. The figure shows that OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE has the strongest impact (-.18), although a negative impact, on DIFFUSE SUPPORT (see Table 37). But NATIONAL PERFORMANCE has a comparable but positive impact (.16) on DIFFUSE SUPPORT. Education and TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE have only indirect effects on DIFFUSE SUPPORT, and both are negligible. Age or HAWKISH SUBCULTURE does not have any significant effects on DIFFUSE SUPPORT or on any other explanatory variables.

These patterns suggest the following points. The traditional political subculture or the hawkish political subculture means little to the Left party supporters in determining whether they should support the political system. Their education or generation (age) also has little to do with their system support attitudes. Their system support attitudes depend considerably on whether they subscribe to the values of the oppositional political subculture which provides progressive criticism of the way the political system works. System performance still plays an important role for the supporters of the socialist or communist party in forming system support attitudes.

Third, the recursive path model for the central party (i.e., NLC, DSP or CGP) identifiers is shown in Figure 16. As the path analysis clearly demonstrates, the system performance evaluation almost solely determines the diffuse system support attitudes of the central party supporters. While NATIONAL PERFORMANCE exerts the strongest impact (.34) on DIFFUSE SUPPORT, only TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE has

\[
(254) \text{ The total effects of OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE are:} \\
\text{total effects} = \text{direct effects} + \text{indirect effects} \\
-.18 = -.15 + (-.18 \times .16)
\]
HAWKISH SUBCULTURE

Education $\rightarrow -.10^*$

TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE

NATIONAL PERFORMANCE

DIFFUSE SUPPORT

N $= 418$

Path Coefficients are significant at the following levels:

- *** $P<.001$
- ** $P<.01$
- * $P<.05$

Source: The 1976 JABISS Study

The $R^2$ of DIFFUSE SUPPORT on all predictor variables is .00

Figure 14: A Recursive Path Model for the LDP supporters: Diffuse Support
Table 37

Direct and Indirect Effects of Explanatory Variables: For 3 Partisan Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variables</th>
<th>Direct Effects</th>
<th>Indirect Effects</th>
<th>Total Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LDP Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWKISH SUBCULTURE</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL CULTURE</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.006 = .007-.001</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left Party Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL CULTURE</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Party Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL CULTURE</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some indirect effects (.07) on DIFFUSE SUPPORT through
The R^2 of DIFFUSE SUPPORT on all predictor variables is .06.

Path Coefficients are significant at the following level:
- *** P < .001
- ** P < .01
- * P < .05

Source: The 1976 JABISS Study
N = 273

Figure 15: A Recursive Model for the Leftist Party Supporters: Diffuse
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE. This seems intuitively correct because those who are more strongly oriented toward the traditional political subculture are presumably more deferential to political authority and would thus tend to evaluate performance of authority more favorably. Age also has an indirect effect on DIFFUSE SUPPORT through TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE and NATIONAL PERFORMANCE, but its indirect effect is very weak (.02).

Thus, the third model suggests a few interesting points. Unlike the LDP identifiers who have positive feeling toward the incumbent government and probably have extended such affect to the political system, and unlike the Left party supporters who have negative predispositions toward the incumbent government and probably toward the political system, the central party identifiers are assumed not to have any particular predisposition for or against the political system or the incumbent government. Similarly, their evaluations of system performance are also assumed to be free from the influence of their predisposition for or against the incumbent administration. Therefore, the supporters of the central parties shape their diffuse system support attitudes according to system performance. They are thus ready to withdraw their diffuse support for the political system when the performance of the system continues to be unsatisfactory for them to an unbearable degree and for an unbearable period. On the other hand, these citizens probably form their supportive attitudes toward the political system to the extent to which the political system's performance continues to be satisfactory to them.
Figure 16: A Recursive Path Model for the Central Party Supporters

--- Dashed lines indicate estimated path coefficients that have sizable magnitudes but are not significant at the .05 level.

Source: The 1976 JABISS Study

N = 111

Path Coefficients are significant at the following level:

** P < .01
*** P < .001
* P < .05

The R² of DIFFUSE SUPPORT on all predictor variables is .14.

HAWKISH SUBCULTURE

.29**

TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE

.20*

NATIONAL PERFORMANCE

.34***

DIFFUSE SUPPORT

(-.18)

-25**

EDUCATION

(.14)

Age

(.14)

OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE

(-.12)
8.3 CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION SUPPORT

Now the causal explanatory model turns its focus from diffuse system support to democratic institution support as the dependent variable. While the basic structure of the model for democratic institution support remains the same as that for diffuse system support, the actual results of this causal analysis show a different pattern of the effects of explanatory variables on democratic institution support from the pattern for diffuse system support, as the following discussion indicates.

8.3.1 A Recursive Path Model for the Entire Sample

Figure 17 shows the recursive causal path model and its causal paths which were actually measured to exist.\(^{(255)}\) The arrow diagram in Figure 17 suggests that neither the political culture hypothesis nor the system performance hypothesis is very strongly supported by the data; nor does even partisan attachment toward the incumbent party have a great impact on democratic institution support. While both TRADITIONAL CULTURE (.10) and OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE (.10) respectively have relatively weak effects on INSTITUTION SUPPORT, HAWKISH SUBCULTURE does not have any effects on it at all. Similarly, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE (.09) and PARTISAN FEELING (.10) also have weak effects on the dependent variables. No exogenous variable, neither the level of education attainment nor age, has a meaningful impact on democratic institution support.

This pattern has some interesting implications for the causal explanations of democratic institution support, especially in contrast to the results of the causal analysis of diffuse system support. First, the traditional culture has a direct impact on democratic institution support (.10), while it was not observed in the case of diffuse system support. This suggests that the democratic institutional arrangements of Japan are to some extent accepted by the citizens who are inclined toward the traditional Japanese culture. Although the magnitude of the positive impact of the traditional culture on democratic institution support is weak, it is not a negative impact. Therefore, this causal linkage suggests that traditional Japanese cultural values, such as deference to authority and value of group harmony, probably generate some supportive attitudes.

\(^{(255)}\) The standard regression coefficients that were statistically significant at the .05 level or better are used as path coefficients in this model, just as in the models for diffuse system support.
All residual paths are eliminated.

N = 1,322


Figure 17: A Recursive Path Model for Democratic Institution Support

The $R^2$ of INSTITUTION SUPPORT on all predictor variables is .05

Path Coefficients are significant at the following levels:

*** $P < .001$

** $P < .01$

* $P < .05$
toward democratic institutional arrangements. One may argue that some traditionally oriented Japanese may accept political institution given by the political authority regardless of the nature of the institutions. However, the traditional Japanese culture is not necessarily incompatible with democratic institutions although it is not a Western culture. Instead, it emphasizes the subject orientation which Almond and Verba (1963) regarded as an important aspect of the civic culture.

Second, HAWKISH SUBCULTURE has no statistically significant effect on INSTITUTION SUPPORT in Figure 17. This means that Japanese citizens can be supportive of their democratic institutions regardless of their orientation toward the hawkish political subculture. This is in contrast to the pattern that the causal analysis of diffuse system support shows; the hawkish political subculture orientation had a weak positive impact on diffuse system support (see Figure 13).

Third, and more importantly, the effect of the structural-oppositional political subculture on democratic institution support is positive, whereas its effect on diffuse system support was negative (Figure 13). The positive impact of the structural-oppositional political subculture on an aspect of system support may be counter-intuitive on the surface, because the structural-oppositional political subculture is believed to include a negative orientation toward the way in which the political system is operated. However, it should be recalled that the left-wing parties and labor unions, which have been the major proponents and sources of structural-oppositional political subculture values, have proclaimed their intention to defend the present constitution firmly against any revisions of the constitution (chapter 4). This suggests that those citizens who subscribe to the structural-oppositional political subculture values and/or support the left-wing parties are likely to have positive attitudes toward democratic institutions. Therefore, the positive effect (.10) of OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE on INSTITUTION SUPPORT is not contradictory to the political and socio-cultural context of present day Japan.

The fourth point to note in Figure 17 is related to the third. Figure 13 shows that partisan attachment toward the incumbent party has a weak but positive effect (.10) on democratic institution support. This positive causal linkage from PARTISAN FEELING to INSTITUTION SUPPORT is logically contradictory to the positive causal path (.10) from OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE to INSTITUTION SUPPORT, because PARTISAN FEELING has a negative impact (-.10) on
OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE. (256)

This logical contradiction implies that there are probably two different politico-cultural sources of democratic institution support: one is the structural-oppositional political subculture which is negatively correlated with partisan attachment to the LDP as well as with the traditional culture, and the other is a cluster of attitudes that are warm toward the incumbent party, namely, the traditional cultural orientation and the attachment to the LDP. On the one hand, democratic institutional support is equated to the idealistic democratic principles by the structural-oppositional political subculture oriented citizens. On the other hand, democratic institution support is also equated to support or acceptance of the political reality, in which those democratic institutions actually work in the political process that the LDP has dominated, by the LDP followers or by the traditionally oriented Japanese who are deferential to the authorities. (257) As a result, in the causal analysis of democratic institution support in Figure 13, the former (i.e., OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE) and the latter (i.e., PARTISAN FEELING and TRADITIONAL CULTURE) are negatively related to each other, while each of them has a positive impact on democratic institution support (i.e., INSTITUTION SUPPORT). The effects of partisan attachment to the incumbent party does not have to be physically controlled --- i.e., the sample does not have to be divided into three partisan groups for controlling the effects of PARTISAN FEELING, as was done for the diffuse system support model. The total effect of partisan attachment on democratic institution support (.10) (258) is much weaker than its total effects on diffuse system support (.27), and the differences in the democratic institution support level between three partisan groups are clearly smaller than the partisan differences in the

(256) In general, if an explanatory variable \( X \) has a positive effect on the dependent variable \( Y \) and a negative impact on another explanatory variable \( Z \), then \( Z \) is logically expected to have a negative impact on \( Y \). However, this logical expectation is not sustained by the causal analysis of democratic institution support here.

(257) These two contrasting sources of democratic institution support are another sign of the "ambivalent" political attitudes which Richardson (1974) found.

(258) The total effects are calculated as follows:

\[
\text{Total Effects} = \text{Direct Effect} + \text{Indirect Effects} \\
.103 = .10 + (.15 \times .09) + (-.10 \times .10)
\]
diffuse system support level (see Table 35 in chapter 7). Hence, it will not be meaningful to divide the sample into three partisan groups as far as the causal analysis of democratic institution support is concerned.

Furthermore, there is little theoretical reason to worry about the possible mutual causation between partisan attachment and democratic institution support. The democratic institution support scale is mainly composed of three variables that tap the responsiveness of the democratic institutions, and these variables are concerned with the responsiveness not only of the incumbent party but of all parties. Accordingly, the democratic institution support attitudes are not theoretically believed to influence the attachment toward the incumbent party. If the direction of causality goes from PARTISAN FEELING to INSTITUTION SUPPORT but does not go in the other direction, then there is little reason to hold the effects of PARTISAN FEELING constant.

Sixth, for a similar reason, no effect of democratic institution support on the evaluation of national system performance is expected to exist. Because the democratic institution support scale probes the respondents' attitudes toward the responsiveness of the democratic institutions, namely the process of the political system, these attitudes are not theoretically believed to influence the formation of the respondents' evaluation of national system performance. Therefore, unlike the case of diffuse system support, the direction of causality is assumed to go only from NATIONAL PERFORMANCE to INSTITUTION SUPPORT in the causal explanatory model (Figure 17).

Finally, the causal explanatory model of democratic institution support should be examined for each different generation. Because democratic institutions were implemented in Japan after World War II, the Japanese who spent their formative years before the war (i.e., the prewar generation) must have different attitudes toward democratic institutions from those Japanese who spent their formative years after World War II (i.e., the postwar generation), as was discussed in chapters 4 and 6. There is thus good reason to suspect that the prewar generation may support democratic institutions for reasons different from those for which the postwar generation support them. Although age does not have any direct effect on democratic institution support in Figure 17, the cross-tabulation of three generations with democratic institution support (Table 31 in chapter 6.) shows some differences in the level of support across three generations. Therefore, it is theoretically meaningful as well as empirically worthwhile to examine the
causal explanatory mechanism of democratic institutional support by dividing the sample into three different generations. The discussions of these examinations follow.

8.3.2 Recursive Path Models Controlling for Generation

Three political generations are identified in the discussion in chapter 6 of political generations in postwar Japan: (1) the prewar generation (50 years or older in the JABISS Study's sample, or in 1976); (2) the transitional generation (between 40 years old and 49 years old in 1976); (3) the postwar generation (39 years old or younger in 1976). According to these three definitions of political generations, the sample has been divided into three groups, and the causal explanatory model has been examined for each generational group.

The recursive path model for the respondents of the prewar generation (i.e., the respondents who are 50 years or older) is presented in Figure 18. The figure shows a fairly similar pattern to the recursive path model for the entire sample. However, there are a few points worth noting in this figure.

First, the effect of NATIONAL PERFORMANCE on INSTITUTION SUPPORT is weaker (.10) than other explanatory variables in the model. For example, PARTISAN FEELING (.13) or OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE direct (.16) has slightly stronger impact on the dependent variable. Although TRADITIONAL CULTURE has only a level of direct effect (.10) comparable to that of NATIONAL PERFORMANCE (.10), TRADITIONAL CULTURE has greater total effects (.16). Thus, for the prewar generation, performance of the political system is not a particularly important reason to support the democratic institutional arrangement; rather, cultural values and partisan performance play more important roles.

Second, HAWKISH SUBCULTURE, however, has neither direct nor indirect effects on INSTITUTION SUPPORT. This pattern will be found in the following two other generations as well, and a similar trend was revealed even in the entire sample (Figure 17).

Third, the variable of the level of education attainment (V158) has a direct effect (.13) on democratic institution support. This pattern is found only for the prewar generation but not found for the entire sample or for the other two generational subsamples. This pattern leads to the following interpretation. Those Japanese of the prewar generation who received a higher level of education than
All residual paths are eliminated.

$N = 451$


The $R^2$ of INSTITUTION SUPPORT on all predictor variables is .10.

Path Coefficients are significant at the following levels:

*** $P < .001$

** $P < .01$

* $P < .05$

\textbf{Figure 18: A Recursive Path Model of the Prewar Generation}
others are more likely to support democratic institutions than their lower educated counterparts, although even those higher educated people still received their education in the prewar era and spent their formative years before the war. (259)

The recursive path model of democratic institution support for the transitional generation (i.e., those who are 40 years or older but younger than 50 years old) is shown in Figure 19. As the figure shows, this causal model for the transitional generation does not have any statistically significant path from NATIONAL PERFORMANCE to INSTITUTION SUPPORT (the dependent variable). Since OPPOSITIONAL SUBCULTURE (.12) and PARTISAN FEELING (.13) respectively have a direct path to the dependent variable, the orientation toward the structural-oppositional political subculture and support for the LDP, two endogenous variables which are negatively correlated, are two major sources of democratic system support for this generation.

This pattern is rather intriguing, because the causal analysis here suggests that the respondents of the transitional generation do not form support for democratic institutions based on perceived performance of the political system but form support based on their orientation toward the incumbent party or toward the structural-oppositional political subculture. One speculative interpretation regarding the absence of the influence of system performance evaluation is as follows. The transitional generation was the one generation which experienced the strongest psychological shock from the end of war and from the alternation of the political system because those drastic changes took place when the members of this generation were in their formative years. Accordingly, one may speculate that the people of this generation reacted strongly against the prewar political values and moved ideologically either to the other direction, which was the structural-oppositional political subculture, or to the new central authority of the political system, which was the LDP. (260)

Japanese citizens of the transitional generation, therefore,  

(259) It should be noted that the level of education attainment (V158) does not measure whether the respondent received prewar civic education or postwar civic education, but measures what level of education the respondent received. When controlling for generation, we can specify the time when each respondent received his/her highest level of education as well.

(260) For a similar account, though not quite as concrete in context, see Reischauer (1974).
The $R^2$ of INSTITUTION SUPPORT on all predictor variables is .03.

Path Coefficients are significant at the following levels:

- *** $P < .001$
- ** $P < .01$
- * $P < .05$

**Figure 19:** A Recursive Model for the Transitional Generation
may be more strongly inclined toward a particular ideology.

Figure 20 shows the recursive path model for the postwar generation (i.e., the respondents who were 39 years old or younger). It is clear from the figure that the postwar generation has a different causal mechanism for generating support for the democratic institutions from those of the previous two generations. First, the structural-oppositional political subculture does not have any direct effect on democratic institution support. Second, the partisan feeling score scale has no direct path to the dependent variable either. Thus, only two endogenous variables have direct effects on democratic institution support: (1) the traditional culture (.14); (2) perceived national system performance (.13).

This pattern suggests that the citizens of the postwar generation develop their support for the democratic institutions according to their evaluation of national system performance and their orientation toward traditional Japanese culture.
All residual paths are eliminated.

N = 575


Figure 20: A Recursive Path Model for the Prewar Generation
Chapter IX

CONCLUSIONS

The discussion in the above chapters has examined Japanese attitudes toward their democratic political system, namely, the perceived legitimacy of the political system, through the opinion survey data drawn from the JABISS Election Study in 1976. In so doing, this dissertation has hypothesized political culture and system performance to be two major sources of system legitimacy in Japan (Chapter 1). The reason for confining the scope of this dissertation to examinations of the two hypotheses (the political culture hypothesis and the system performance hypothesis) is two-fold.

First, the traditional Japanese political culture has often been considered to be a major obstacle to the implementation of a democratic political system in Japan. Some have argued that the strong orientation of submissiveness or deference to political authorities, as a distinctive feature of Japan's traditional political culture, generates blind obedience to a given political system regardless of the nature of the political system or its type of institutional arrangements, and therefore that Japan's political system has a fragile cultural foundation although her political system has been stable and seems to have been accepted by system members in the postwar period. In contrast, others argue that the prevalence of political cynicism, as a distinctive contemporary Japanese political sub-culture, causes negative attitudes toward the present political system of Japan and therefore constitutes a threat to the legitimacy of her democratic system. (261) A common characteristic of these two contrasting interpretations is that both tend to consider Japanese political culture to be impeditive to, if not incompatible with, democracy because her political culture is not a Western political culture. (262)

(261) Again see Chapter 1, for a further introduction to this argument. For example, see Nakamura (1975) as an example of a proponent of this pessimistic view.
Therefore, it was important to probe the role of political culture or subcultures in the formation of system support attitudes in Japan. In other words, the question here is how Japanese political subcultures facilitate or jeopardize the development of the perceived legitimacy of Japan's democratic political system. While this is an empirical question, it has some normative implications for Japan's political system as well as for other democratic political systems which are also based on non-Western political culture or on political culture which has been judged to be not the civic culture. These are the reasons for having formulated the political culture hypothesis.

Second, in light of the recent development of scholarly interest in the role of the rational judgment of ordinary citizens in their formation of political attitudes, particularly in the field of political behavior studies (Monroe, 1984; Niemi and Weisberg, 1984), system performance evaluation, which is based on rational judgment, was hypothesized to have some impact on the formation of system support attitudes. This hypothesis (the system performance hypothesis) also derives from some normative and theoretical concerns. If system performance evaluation contributes positively to the development of system support, one way for a political system to obtain its legitimacy from system members is to improve its performance and gain a good evaluation of its performance from system members. This simple but prescriptive implication is important for a country which has a relatively, or very, short tradition of democracy and particularly for a country whose political culture has not been judged to foster democratic legitimacy yet or has been judged to be unfavorable for democracy. Whether or not perceived system performance fosters system support in a given political system is an empirical question. But knowing the answer to this empirical question has a prescriptive implication for that political system.

Thus, this dissertation has confined the scope of its empirical data analysis to examinations of the two major hypothesis, both of which have normative implications for Japan, and some implications even for a young democratic political system whose political culture is not particularly equivalent to the civic culture. Therefore, it is not intended in this dissertation to explain Japanese system

(262) Note that there are several scholars who do not agree with either of the above interpretations. For example, Richardson (1974) does not equate deference to authority or cynicism with threats to the democratic system of Japan, although he empirically observed those political attitudes among the Japanese.
support attitudes fully by examining all possible explanatory variables. In this respect, the scope of the empirical analysis of this dissertation is rather limited; some possibly powerful explanatory variables have been excluded from the explanatory models presented in earlier chapters when they are not relevant to the two major hypotheses (chapter 6).

However, there has been an exception; another variable outside the scope of the two major hypotheses has been introduced as the third explanatory variable. That is partisanship of system members. The reason for including partisan attachment (or party identification) was twofold. First, partisanship is very closely related to incumbent government support in Japan, because a single party (the Liberal Democratic Party) has stayed in power for a long time (chapter 1), although support for the incumbent party (LDP) and support for the incumbent government are conceptually and empirically two separate variables (chapter 7). Therefore, partisanship was theoretically expected to have a strong impact on system support. Second, partisanship was theoretically expected to be related to other explanatory variables which were to be used for testing the political culture and system performance hypotheses. For instance, partisan attachment was expected to influence evaluation of system performance, while the traditional political culture orientation was expected to affect partisan preference. Because partisan attachment was expected to be to such a great degree interrelated with those important endogenous variables in the explanatory models, which were presented in the data analysis chapters (chapters 6 through 8), partisan attachment needed to be included in the scope of the empirical data analysis.

Thus, this dissertation has presented three explanations: (1) the socio-cultural explanations, which specified the hypothesized linkage between system support, political subcultures, and sociological attributes of the citizens (chapter 6); (2) the system performance explanations, which presented four different explanatory models based on the theories of rational-economic decision-making of the ordinary citizens (chapter 7); (3) the politico-partisan explanations, which hypothesized partisan attachment, especially attachment to the incumbent party, to have an impact on system support. These three explanations were first examined separately; then these explanations were later integrated into a single explanatory model, the causal model of system support (chapter 8). The summary of the results of these empirical examinations will follow.
9.1 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

9.1.1 Properties of System Support Attitudes

As the first step in the empirical data analysis of system support, the attitudinal structure of system support of Japanese citizens was explored. The factor analysis of eleven political support variables identified three dimensions of Japanese political support attitudes: (1) local political support; (2) democratic institution support; (3) diffuse system support. Of these three types of support attitudes, the latter two were brought into the focus of the data analysis, having excluded local political support from the analytical scope of this dissertation, because support for the national political system was the major concern of this dissertation.

Then, a conceptual model of diffuse system support was empirically tested for the purpose of clarifying a controversial question, which stemmed from the debate between Miller (1974a and b) and Citrin (1974), regarding the relationship between system support and political trust in the incumbent government. A closer examination of the same factor analysis of eleven political support variables (see Table 16) revealed that the dimension of diffuse system support was composed of the incumbent affect (or incumbent support) component and the system affect (or system responsiveness) component (chapter 5). This examination thus confirmed the way in which system support was conceptualized in this dissertation (see chapter 1, especially Figure 1).

According to the results of the above factor analysis of political support variables, three factor-score scales were built, as operationalized variables, respectively for local political support, democratic political support, and diffuse system support. The latter two factor-score scales have been used as the operationalized dependent variables in the subsequent empirical explanations of system support.

The contrast in the level of support between democratic institution support and diffuse system support was so strong that system support attitudes of the Japanese are best described as being "ambivalent." This contrast was found not only in the JABISS Study data in 1976 but also found in other public opinion survey results in other years. Therefore it is safe to conclude that Japanese citizens have been supportive of the institutional arrangements of their democratic political system, but they have been very skeptical of the national political process in
reality or the way in which politics is actually carried out in the national political arena.

This ambivalent political orientation of the Japanese is not easy to explain. However, attempts to explain diffuse system support and democratic institution support may offer some clues to the possible sources of this ambivalence, or this paradox, in system support attitudes in Japan. The results of empirical analyses which sought to explain diffuse system support and democratic institution support will be summarized in the next two subsections.

9.1.2 Results of the Analysis of Diffuse System Support

The causal analysis of diffuse system support revealed that partisanship had the strongest impact on diffuse system support, and that perceived national system performance had the second important impact, but that the political culture variables only have weak or indirect effects (Figure 13 of chapter 8). Particularly, the traditional political culture did not even have a direct impact on diffuse system support. Reading from these patterns, the system performance hypothesis was better supported by the JABISS data than was the political culture hypothesis. While this implies that the legitimacy of Japanese political system is more heavily based on system performance than on political culture, we cannot simply so conclude, for the following reasons.

First, the strongest impact on diffuse system support actually came from the psychological attachment to the incumbent party (LDP) but not from perceived system performance. Moreover, while partisan attachment was influenced by the traditional political culture, this partisan feeling in turn had positive effects on the hawkish political subculture but negative effects on the structural-oppositional political subculture. Partisan feeling was thus interconnected with different political subculture orientations. These patterns suggest that a politico-cultural as well as an ideological division among the Japanese citizens tend to determine whether each citizen is supportive or non-supportive of the political system in a diffuse sense. Those Japanese who belong to a group characterised by the traditional political culture orientation, warm feelings toward the LDP, and the hawkish politico-ideological orientation, tend toward diffuse system support. In contrast, those Japanese who belong to a group marked by a weak orientation toward the traditional political culture, negative feelings toward the LDP, and the structural-oppositional political subculture orientation,
tend to have weak diffuse system support. This division fits well the division described by Watanuki (1967a) as the "cultural politics" of postwar Japan. Therefore, the influence of political culture on diffuse system support may not be as weak as it appears in the causal analysis shown in Figure 13, although perceived system performance certainly has a significant impact on the formation of diffuse system support attitudes. This point can be better recognized when dividing the sample into three different partisan subsamples for the purpose of controlling for the possible interactive effects between partisan attachment and diffuse system support, which will be discussed later.

Second, while a positive perception of system performance fosters diffuse system support attitudes, system performance perception itself is influenced by political subcultures (the traditional political culture and the hawkish political subculture as shown in Figure 13) and by partisan attachment. This implies that the impact of perceived system performance on diffuse system support itself is under the influence of the forces of political culture.

This point is relevant to the earlier speculative argument that Japanese citizens probably evaluate system performance sociotropically because of their cultural traits (see chapter 7). The orientation of group harmony (or the orientation known as "collectivism") of the traditional political culture was earlier considered to facilitate sociotropical thinking more than self-interest oriented thinking which is clearly based on the individualism—in fact the lack of individualism has often been regarded as a weak trait of the Japanese traditional culture (Flanagan, 1984a). (263) The causal linkage from the traditional political culture to perceived system performance at least indicates some empirical support for this speculative linkage between the traditional Japanese political culture and sociotropic judgment of system performance.

The causal analysis of each of the three partisan groups (i.e., the LDP identifiers, the central parties supporters, and the supporters of the JSP or JCP) demonstrates interesting differences between those groups in terms of the emphases of different political subcultures. First, among the LDP supporters (Figure 14), the hawkish political subculture alone, of the three political culture variables, has a direct impact on diffuse support, although age and

(263) Actually, this position that the Japanese traditional culture totally lacks individualism can be refuted. For relevant discussions, see Sugimoto and Mouer (1982).
perceived system performance have stronger effects. Second, for the leftist party (JSP or JCP) supporters (Figure 15), the structural-oppositional political subculture has the strongest total effect on diffuse system support, while perceived system support has a comparable impact as well. Third, among the supporters of the central parties (Figure 16), only perceived system performance has a direct impact on diffuse system support. These differences in the patterns of causal linkages across three partisan groups clearly suggest that the leftists (JSP or JCP follows) and the conservatives (the LDP identifiers) are under the influence of the political subculture, with which their respective partisan preference is compatible, as well as under the influence of perceived system performance. In contrast, the middle parties identifiers develop their diffuse system support attitudes solely on the basis of their evaluation of system performance.

This pattern across the three partisan groups has some implications for the political system. It is generally understood that the central party identifiers often play a key role in determining the distribution of Diet seats among the political parties at the time of national elections (Richardson and Flanagan, 1984), and that the central parties often play a crucial role in influencing the direction of national policy making. Although this group is small in number (only 14 percent of the total number of the Japanese respondents), the central party identifiers are considered very important in determining the direction in which the political system works in Japan. Therefore, given the finding of this dissertation that system legitimacy greatly depends on system performance, especially for the central party identifiers, it can be concluded that the future of Japan's system legitimacy depends on how responsive the system is to the demands of Japanese citizens and how satisfactory its performance is. Hence, the Japanese political elite, who are assumed to be responsible for the performance of the system, have significant responsibility for the future of the political system.

9.1.3 Summary of the Causal Analysis of Democratic Institution Support

(264) For a discussion of how the different patterns of seat distribution in the Diet reflect different tendencies in policy making in postwar Japan, see Richardson and Flanagan (1984).
The structure of the causal explanation for democratic institution support is fairly similar to that for diffuse system support. However, an important difference is that the hawkish political subculture does not have any direct effects on democratic institution support. Similarly, partisan attachment has a weaker effect on democratic institution support than on diffuse system support. These patterns suggest that democratic institution support is not fostered by the conservative oriented hawkish political subculture but is more likely to be generated by more idealistic democratic orientations, such as some aspects of the structural-oppositional political subculture, although the formal democratic political subculture itself does not have any effects. The importance of the structural-oppositional political subculture in the formation of democratic institution support was even more clearly demonstrated when comparing the causal models of each subsample of three different generations, namely, the prewar, the transitional, and the postwar generations.

Comparisons of the causal analyses of democratic institution support across the three generations revealed a few noteworthy points. First, the structural-oppositional political subculture and partisanship were the only two explanatory variables that had direct effects on democratic institution support for the people of the transitional generation. This is probably because they are more susceptible to the influence of the structural-oppositional political subculture, which includes an explicit hatred of prewar authoritarian political values. The particular susceptibility of this generation to the structural-oppositional political subculture is probably due to the fact that the transitional generation experienced the shift from the prewar authoritarian political system to the postwar democratic political system during their formative years. This generation also witnessed the total denial of prewar political values when they were forming their political predispositions (see chapter 4). Some other members of this generation moved in the other direction, toward the central authority of the new political system, namely the LDP. Thus, this generation appears to be the most polarized

(265) One possible reason for the absence of the effects of the formal democratic subculture may be as follows. Those respondents who have agreed on the idealistic principles of the formal democratic subculture do so according to their abstract thinking of bookish ideals of democracies but not really think about the real political process, and therefore that they may not relate the formal democratic subculture orientation to any of their ideological orientation.
ideologically, and system performance was observed to play no important role in the formation of democratic institution support.

Second, the structural-oppositional political subculture likewise, had the strongest impact on democratic institution support for the prewar (older) generation. However, for this generation, many other explanatory variables contributed to the formation of democratic institution support attitudes. Of these variables, both the traditional political culture and partisanship are somewhat related to positive attitudes toward the political authorities — i.e., the "subject orientation" in Almond and Verba's term (1963). The presence of the impact of educational level difference suggests that those well educated older Japanese had a broader capacity to accept new democratic values than did the less educated older Japanese; but the educational difference was not a factor with the younger generations. Also, the evaluation of system performance played some role in developing democratic institution support for the prewar generation.

Third, for the postwar (younger) generation, only two variables directly accounted for the development of democratic institution support. One was perceived system performance, and the other was the traditional political culture. Although partisan attachment had some indirect effects through perceived system performance, partisanship did not directly contribute to the formation of institutional support. An important feature of this causal explanation for the postwar generation was that neither the hawkish political subculture nor the structural-oppositional political subculture played any role in the formation of democratic institution support. These patterns suggest that Japanese citizens in the postwar generation are less ideologically polarized, and that they foster supportive attitudes toward democratic institutions according to their perception of system performance and their orientation toward the traditional political culture rather than for reasons associated with other variables.

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(266) This pattern supports Stouffer's (1957) argument. For the relevant discussion, see chapter 4.
9.2 IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

An overall assessment of the political culture hypothesis and the system support hypothesis does not particularly favor one over the other, for the formation of diffuse system support and democratic institution support were under the considerable influence of political culture forces in Japan of 1976, while perceived system performance played an important role in fostering these two support attitudes.

Comparing the patterns revealed in the causal explanations of diffuse system support with those patterns for democratic institution support, the contributions of two explanatory variables were stronger in the model for diffuse system support. One was perceived system performance, and the other was partisan attachment. Although this may be due to the fact that diffuse system support considerably overlaps with incumbent government support, the importance of perceived system performance and partisanship for diffuse system support seems to imply that the performance of the political elites, both the incumbent party leaders and the elite national bureaucrats who play very significant roles in national decision-making and policy-making, is a key factor in the development of diffuse system support for the Japanese political system.

Although partisan attachment has been conceptualized to have an impact on evaluation of system performance, the psychological attachment to the incumbent party may well be fostered by retrospective evaluation of the previous performance of the incumbent party elites and of the central elite bureaucrats in Japan, where the same party has been in office so long and has been very close to the elite central bureaucrats. This argument is more plausible when considering Fiorina's (1981) argument that one's party identification at one time can be formed according to his retrospective evaluation of the past performance of the party. Therefore, from the patterns of the causal explanations discussed earlier (see the previous section and chapter 7), it can be argued that Japanese political elites have a significant responsibility for the development of diffuse system support for, or the legitimacy of, the political system in Japan.(267)

Moreover, the performance of the political system includes performance and behavior (e.g., the political elites' non-involvement in political corruption, or legislators' accountability to the demands of their constituencies) of political parties other than the incumbent party (LDP). Therefore, indeed Japanese political elites in general have a significant
On the other hand, for the formation of democratic institution support, political culture (particularly, the traditional political culture and the structural-oppositional political subculture) played relatively important roles compared with its impact on the development of diffuse system support. Although both perceived system performance and partisanship had effects on institutional support as well, the relative importance of system performance and partisan attachment in this model were weaker than those two variables' importance in the causal model of diffuse system support. Therefore, it can be concluded that a Japanese individual's experience of socialization into some political culture values which are favorable for democratic principles is an important factor in his development of support for the democratic institutional arrangements of the Japanese political system, although it should be added that the performance of Japanese political elites is by no means an insignificant factor in forming democratic institution support.

A comparison between the causal analysis of diffuse system support and that of democratic institution support suggests an ironic conclusion. Because diffuse system support includes the incumbent affect component, which is support for the incumbent administration as well as the political authorities in office, one may have expected that political culture variables would have stronger effects on diffuse system support. Conversely, one may have expected that the evaluation of system performance, which is based on rational judgment, would play an important role in forming democratic institution support. The reason for this is that this support is believed to be formed through learning of democratic principles and ideals at the level of abstract thinking but not at the level of deeply instilled behavioral norms, and therefore that this support can be expected to be based on rational judgment.

However, the empirical analysis of the JABISS Study data turned out to suggest just the opposite. According to the causal analyses of diffuse system support and democratic institution support (chapter 7), the evaluation of system performance and partisan attachment proved to be more important variables in accounting for diffuse system support, while socialization into a certain types of political subculture turned out to be as important as partisanship and system performance in explaining democratic institution support.

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responsibility for the legitimacy of their political system.
The above argument has interesting implications for the legitimacy of the Japanese political system, especially recalling the sharp contrast between the low level of diffuse system support and the high level of democratic institution support. If socialization into some political subculture is actually among the important factors that shape democratic institutional support, as was indicated by the data analysis, then it can be concluded that Japanese citizens' support or acceptance of democratic institutional arrangements must be stable because the sources of such support include stable forces such as political culture. On the other hand, the other side of democratic legitimacy, namely, diffuse system support, encounters a severe challenge in Japan. According to the data analysis, partisan feeling toward the incumbent party and system performance evaluation were the major sources of diffuse system support. Consequently, Japanese citizens may be ready to withdraw diffuse system support if the political elites' performance is not trustworthy or if the political elites demonstrate that their political system and their decision-making process are not responsive to the citizens' demands. This is because the level of diffuse system support, which consists of trust in the incumbent government and beliefs in system responsiveness, is already low. At the same time, it is possible for Japanese political elites to enhance the level of diffuse system support by improving their performance.

A comparison of the causal explanatory model of diffuse system support for the central party supporter subsample with the causal explanatory model of democratic institution support for the postwar generation subsample yields intriguing similarities. Neither model indicated any influence of either the hawkish political subculture or the structural-oppositional political subculture on the dependent variable, but showed that perceived system performance played a major role in forming diffuse system support and democratic institution support respectively. The only substantive difference between the two is that the traditional political culture did not have a direct impact on diffuse system support but had an indirect impact through perceived system performance in the former model while the traditional political culture directly affected democratic institution support in the latter model. The presence of partisanship's effect on system performance in the latter model alone is simply due to the fact that the former model controlled for the effects of partisan attachment and therefore that naturally no effect of partisanship appeared in the former (diffuse system sup
similar causal structures of these two models have impor-tant implications for the future of the legitimacy of Japa-nese political system.

First, among three partisan groups of the diffuse system support models, perceived system performance made the most significant contribution in explaining diffuse system support in the subsample of the supporters of the central par-ties. In other words, central party identifiers, who are not strongly attracted toward one ideological direction or another, tend to form diffuse system support according to their judgment of system performance. Because the Japanese political party system has begun to show some signs of the depolarization since the early 1970s (Flanagan and Richard-son),(269) the number of Japanese citizens who are not ideologically polarized may increase. If this trend continues, then more Japanese citizens will be more likely to form diffuse system support according to the performance of the political system in the future (or to withdraw their diffuse support for the political system because of poor system performance).

Second, among the three generational models for demo-cratic institution support, the Japanese of the postwar generation tend to form their institutional support attitudes according to their evaluation of system performance. This implies with the inevitable decline in the numbers of the prewar and transitional generations, the number of Jap-anese citizens who develop their support for democratic institutions will increase.

These two arguments based on the causal explanations of diffuse system support and democratic institution support imply that Japanese citizens may now be gradually coming to form their system support according to their rational judgment of system performance. If such rational judgment is a necessary condition for a democratic citizen, as the classical democratic theories have stipulated, then the Japa-nese political system may have begun to show signs of maturity as a democratic system.

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port) model.

(269) In fact the LDP has become more moderate in its poli-cy orientations and the JSP has moved its positions slightly from the idealistic rigid opposition party posture to a more central oriented realistic posture (Flanagan and Richardson, 1984).
But the influence of political culture is still present, and moreover the rational judgment of system performance (system performance evaluation) itself is affected by the traditional political culture. The meanings of this causal linkage from the traditional political culture to system performance evaluation will be explored in the following paragraphs.

The rational judgment of system performance in the above discussions refers to the mediated retrospective sociotropic judgment of system performance (chapter 7), because the operationalized variable for the mediated retrospective sociotropic evaluation of system performance alone had a significant effect on the two system support variables in the causal analyses (chapter 8). In chapter 7, it was argued that sociotropic judgment would be likely to be adopted by many Japanese citizens because the collectivism orientation (or the value of group harmony) could facilitate sociotropic thinking rather than self-interest oriented thinking. The existence of a causal link from the traditional political culture to perceived system performance suggests the possibility of the above argument.

As chapter 7 discussed, a political man who employs sociotropic judgment is closer the model of the democratic citizen depicted in the classic democratic theories, while a political man who adopts self-interest oriented judgment is closer to the model of rational man portrayed by Downs (1957). Thus, some of Japanese citizens, who were portrayed by the JABISS Study data as developing system support through sociotropic judgment of system support, are actually closer to the democratic man assumed by the classical democratic theories. As the earlier speculative argument in this concluding chapter suggests, if the number of Japanese who form their system support according to rational judgment (i.e., mediated retrospective sociotropic judgment) of system performance increases, then the Japanese political system itself will be closer to a democratic polity which the classical democratic theories have postulated. It can be concluded that Japanese democracy may now be maturing, if one accepts the classical democratic theories.

Ironically, however, if the traditional Japanese political culture facilitates sociotropic thinking, then the decline or transformation of the traditional political culture (see chapter 4) suggests that rational judgment held by the Japanese will shift sociotropic judgment to self-interest oriented judgment. This also implies that the nature of the Japanese democratic system may be transformed into what Downs (1957) describes as a democratic system.
One sign of such a change is that the opinion favoring lower tax and the fewer social services from the government became popular in the 1980's in Japan as a result of the diffusion of America's Reganomics and California's taxpayers revolt. This type of self-interest oriented thinking may not be compatible with the values of the traditional Japanese political culture; but if the younger Japanese generation adopts this rational thinking, change in the nature of the democratic system of Japan may actually take place. This clearly suggests the need for longitudinal study of the questions which were investigated in this dissertation.
Appendix A

FACTOR-SCORE SCALE BUILDING FOR SYSTEM SUPPORT ATTITUDES

Factor-score scales for system support attitudes are built by calculating factor scores for each case (respondent). The factor scores are calculated by the following formula:

\[ \text{FACSCORE}_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \text{FSC}_{ji} Z_j \]

where FACSCORE\(_i\) is factor score for \(i\)-the Factor, FSC\(_{ji}\) is the factor-score coefficient for Variable \(j\) on Factor \(i\), and \(Z_j\) is the case's standardized value on Variable \(j\). The factor-score coefficients for three dimensions of system support attitudes are shown in Table 38.
Table 38

Factor-Score Coefficients of System Support Variables

Factor-Score Coefficients based on the Common Factor Analysis of the System Support Variables with Varimax Rotation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V4. Pride in Pol System</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5. Politicians Care People</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6. Politics Run For People</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8. Politicians Not Dishonest</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V9. Parties Not Neglect People</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V10. Trust National Politics</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V12. Trust Prefecture Politics</td>
<td>.585</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V13. Trust Local Politics</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V14. Parties Help People's Voice</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V15. Elections Help People's Voice</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.365</td>
<td>-.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V16. The Diet Help People's Voice</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>.462</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: The JABISS Study, 1976. N = 1,768
A component-score scale was built as an operationalized measure for the traditional cultural orientation. Calculation of the component scores for each case is based on loadings on the first principal component (i.e., first factor) in the principal component analysis of the traditional culture values. The formula to calculate component scores are shown below:

\[
\text{COMPONENT SCORE} = \sum_{j} \left( \frac{B_{ij}}{\lambda_{i}} \right) X_j
\]

where \( B_{ij} \) is the component loading for the \( j \)-th variable on \( i \)-th component, \( \lambda_{i} \) is the eigenvalue of the \( i \)-th component, and \( X_j \) is the case's value on Variable \( j \). The loadings on the first principal component are shown in Table 39.
Table 39

Loadings on the First Principal Component for the Traditional Culture Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Loadings on First Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V417</td>
<td>.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V418</td>
<td>.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V420</td>
<td>.497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V421</td>
<td>.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V422</td>
<td>.545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V423</td>
<td>.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V424</td>
<td>.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V425</td>
<td>.455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V426</td>
<td>.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V427</td>
<td>.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V428</td>
<td>.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V430</td>
<td>.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V431</td>
<td>.542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigenvalue for the 1st Component ( ) is: 3.499

Proportion of Total Variance Explained is: 26.9 %

N = 1,542

Appendix C

PARTISAN FEELING SCORE INDEX

Individual score for the partisan feeling index is calculated by subtracting the mean score of the five opposition parties' feeling thermometer scales from the feeling thermometer score for the LDP. The formula to calculate individual score of the partisan feeling index is:

\[
\text{Partisan Feeling Score} = \text{LDP} - \frac{\text{NLC} + \text{DSP} + \text{CGP} + \text{JSP} + \text{JCP}}{5}
\]

where LDP is the thermometer score for the Liberal Democratic Party, NLC indicates the score for the New Liberal Club, DSP does for the Democratic Socialist Party, CGP for the Clean Government Party, JSP for the Japan Socialist Party, and JCP for the Japan Communist Party. Thus, the scores of the partisan feeling index are the interval-level data.

The partisan feeling score should accurately indicate the respondent's psychological distance from the LDP, regardless of which party he may support. For example, a respondent who identifies with the JCP would give the highest score to the JCP and the lowest score to the LDP, and his party feeling score would be negative.

If a respondent who supports the DSP gives the highest score to the DSP (e.g., 90), moderate scores to the LDP (e.g., 60), the NCL (e.g., 70), and the CGP (e.g., 70), but lower scores to the JSP (e.g., 40) and the JCP (e.g., 20), he would have a moderately positive mean score for the five opposition parties (i.e., 58) and would mark a relatively low but probably positive score (i.e., +2) for the partisan feeling index. In this case, the partisan feeling score (PFS) is:

\[
PFS = \frac{\text{LDP} - (\text{NLC} + \text{DSP} + \text{CGP} + \text{JSP} + \text{JCP})}{5}
\]

\[
= 60 - \frac{(70 + 90 + 70 + 40 + 20)}{5}
\]

\[
= 60 - 58
\]

\[
= +2
\]
On the other hand, if another DSP identifier gives the highest score to the DSP (e.g., 90), but gives moderate scores to the JSP (e.g., 60), the NLC (e.g., 70) and the CGP (e.g., 70), and lower scores to the LDP (e.g., 40) and the JCP (e.g., 20), then he would have a fairly high average score for the five opposition parties (i.e., 62) and would mark a moderately negative score (i.e., -22) for the partisan feeling index. In this case, the partisan feeling score (PFS) is:

\[
PFS = LDP - \frac{(NLC + DSP + CGP + JSP + JCP)}{5}
\]

\[
= 40 - \frac{(70 + 90 + 70 + 60 + 20)}{5}
\]

\[
= 40 - 62
\]

\[
= -22
\]

Thus, even the same opposition party supporters would have different scores on this index according to how warm or cold they feel toward the LDP. Needless to say, the construction of this partisan feeling score index is based on an assumption that six major Japanese political parties are aligned from the LDP to the communist party (JCP) on a unidimensional ideological continuum, of which the LDP is located at the conservative end and the JCP is located at the opposite, progressive end.

This unidimensionality of Japanese party system and the locations of the LDP and the JCP on the hypothesized ideological continuum have been empirically confirmed by a factor analysis of feeling thermometer scales of those six parties, which are included in the JABISS Study data. (The results of this factor analysis are omitted here, because this would be too a detailed point, and because the point of the above argument is well accepted intuitively by any observers of Japanese politics).


-------------------------- (1975). "Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing,"


Fukutake, Tadashi (1949). Nihon Noson no Shakaiteki Seikaku (Social character of Japanese Farming Village), (Tokyo, Japan: The University of Tokyo Cooperative Publishing Division, 1949).


