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METAPHOR, SYMBOL, AND UTTERANCE: THE REALITY OF RELATION IN
SUSANNE LANGER AND MIKHAIL BAKHTIN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of
Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

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Theory and Practice
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DEDICATION

To My Parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

If we are to improve the teaching of English, the nature and relation of thought and language must be better understood. Sound pedagogy must proceed from clear theory. This is the rationale for the theoretical discussion which follows.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature and function of metaphor and its relation to symbolism and utterance in human thought and language. While considerable interest has been shown by scholars concerning the nature of metaphor and, to a lesser degree, its role in thinking, little has been noted regarding the connection between metaphor and symbolism while the relation between metaphor and utterance has only been touched upon. The study will argue that the organic process of metaphor characterizes symbolism, utterance, and finally thought and communication.

The study shows that theories of metaphor cleave into classical (mechanical or systematic) and romantic (organic or dynamic) theories. Insights from the latter approach will illuminate the relation between thought and language in this study. Romantic or interactive theorists see metaphor as consisting of vehicle and tenor which interact creating a new insight into reality through the pattern of relationships between image and context in the mind. A radical fringe of interactive theory puts the burden of the creation resulting from metaphor on reader or perceiver. This insight will prove useful in the present study since it discards the standard communication model and suggests the interactive nature of the creation of meaning. Owen Barfield's notion that a metaphor is an abbreviated symbol also is helpful in providing a bridge between literary theorists' discussions of metaphor and Susanne Langer's penetrating insights into symbolism and its role in thought and language.

This study will show how Susanne Langer's work, when traced developmentally, suggests a theory of language and mind as symbolic (i.e., metaphorical) and organic. This study will show that Langer's thought illuminates how the mind creates an image in perception and in thought representing its conception of reality. Thus the image is a symbol (i.e. implied metaphor) in perception, thought, and language. Langer's distinction between presentational symbolism and discursive symbolism will clarify the mind's mode of mental activity when creating and perceiving symbols. Perception, knowing, and expression in art and in ordinary discourse will be seen to involve this presentational symbolism or logical intuition, as Langer calls it.
developmental approach to Langer is necessary since as her thought progresses we'll see how presentational and discursive symbolism, which early in her work are often discussed as distinct ways of knowing, finally are presented as interdependent aspects of an organic and metaphorical process. The symbol that results from this process will be shown to represent the pattern of relationships between image and context. In Langer, then, reality for the mind consists of such relationships.

The study will further show how Langer's study of the mind as a symbolic or metaphorical process presents organicism as its identifying characteristic revealed also in its products of language and art. This organicism or vital process, it will be shown, involves parts which imply the whole, transformational exchange between organism and context, and continual dialectical process.

This study will next relate metaphorical or symbolic process to Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of utterance. It will be argued that although Bakhtin doesn't discuss metaphor or symbol explicitly in his theories, he, nevertheless, presents a view of utterance and communication that implies such activity is an organic and metaphorical process. For, it will be shown, Bakhtin's theory sees mind, language, and art, not unlike Langer, as organically interfused and interdependent constituting a vital continuum. Bakhtin sees utterance as symbolic of relations between author, other authors of the language (whose voices embody its words), and responsible listeners. Author and listener together create the meaning of an utterance, which embodies their relationships just as the author and perceiver of a metaphor together create or co-author its meaning. The less context-specific a given utterance, therefore, the more metaphorical, symbolic, or artistic it is. This rhetorical slippage characterizes the human and the artistic in both Langer and Bakhtin.

The final chapter of this study will suggest some practical implications for the teaching and studying of writing and literature that follow from viewing mind, language, and communication as metaphorical process. Some insights from the work of Paul Ricoeur will prove useful there.

This study employs critical analysis and synthesis as its methodology. Traditional empirical methods have not been used.
Chapter One:  
Metaphor: Classical, Romantic, and Modern Views

The greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor.  
--Aristotle
..metaphor allows us a glance at the general procedure by which we produce concepts.  
--Paul Ricoeur

A metaphor implies a kind and degree of artistic success.  
--Donald Davidson

We shall soon no doubt have more metaphoricians than metaphysicians--or should that be metamorticians, the embalmers of dead metaphor? I have in fact extrapolated with my pocket calculator to the year 2039; at that point there will be more students of metaphor than people.  
--Wayne C. Booth

These diverse thinkers all agree that metaphor is important. What it is, what it does, how it works, and its importance in understanding thought and language continues to be an ongoing concern of literary critics, philosophers, scientists, theologians, and linguists. Aristotle claims that metaphor is important and powerful. Ricoeur states that metaphor is central to thought. Davidson implies that metaphor is a creative activity related to art. And Booth suggests that the serious study of metaphor is increasing, perhaps alarmingly or absurdly. This study will show that metaphor is indeed a process central to thought, language, as well as communication, and that a better understanding of its dynamics provides us with a powerful grip on important language and communication issues which we regularly fumble.

In the first of this four-chapter study we'll consider the concept's history, the meaning of the term, what it refers to, and some of the issues involved in the study of metaphor. In the second chapter we'll see that the work of aesthetician Susanne Langer helps us to penetrate the dynamics, in quite specific ways, of what is a pervasive process of the mind. In the third chapter
the theoretical implications of the process for a theory of mind and communication will be elaborated with special emphasis on literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogical principle, and Lev Vygotsky's notion of inner speech. And finally, in the fourth chapter, the practical importance of this study regarding interpretation and the teaching of writing and literature will be suggested.

Terence Hawkes on the first page of his study, Metaphor, provides us with a clear definition of the term:

The word metaphor comes from the Greek word metaphora derived from meta meaning 'over', and pherin, 'to carry. It refers to a particular set of linguistic processes whereby aspects of one object are "carried over" or transferred to another object, so that the second object is spoken of as if it were the first. (1)

Hawkes in this historical study details the handling of figures of speech as a matter of ornamentation and style until the advent of romanticism. He notes that at that time Wordsworth and Coleridge stressed the "unifying process" of metaphor in the normal language spoken by men (42) in language's "primary form," the human utterance (51). He adds that Shelley similarly stressed that "reason respects the differences and imagination the similitudes of things" and that imagination is manifest in the connections made by the metaphor (37). Hawkes pays special tribute to I.A. Richards for his understanding of the romantic break with classical tradition regarding metaphor in his Coleridge on Imagination and his Philosophy of Rhetoric. More recently Max Black in "More About Metaphor," representative of several such articles written in the 1970s, cites Richards as a watershed in the modern discussion of metaphor. Very recently, in The Metaphoric Process Mary Gerhart and Alan Russell similarly observe that the study of metaphor was "cut off from philosophy" (99) and treated as a stylistic matter of rhetoric until the appearance of I.A. Richard's Philosophy of Rhetoric in 1936.¹ Note that although we have to wait until the twentieth century for philosophy to deal with metaphor, we don't have to wait that long for artists to deal with it philosophically. Such thinking begins with the organicism of the romantic movement where artists saw the organic nature of language and the vital role that metaphor played in it. Before looking into Richard's work then, we'll very briefly consider romanticism, in order to better understand organicism as a key to its conception of metaphor.

A. O. Lovejoy in his 1924 essay "On the Discrimination of Romanticisms" denied the existence of a singular definition of romanticism and instead discussed the many "romanticisms" that constituted the movement. Morse Peckham, however, in his powerful essay, "Toward a Theory of Romanticism" challenged Lovejoy and offered organicism as the unifying idea behind the movement.
What then is romanticism? Whether philosophic, theologic, or aesthetic, it is the revolution in the European mind against thinking in terms of static mechanism and the redirection of the mind to thinking in terms of dynamic organicism. Its values are change, imperfection, growth, diversity, and the creative imagination, the unconscious. (11)

This sense of reality as a living organism has many implications as Peckham goes on to show. This already suggests the importance of metaphor in movements of thought, and it introduces a notion of reality as an organism, a view shared by the central thinkers in this study. According to Hawkes, in *Metaphor*, "organicism" is Coleridge's "fundamental principle" (44).

Hawkes goes on in his study to show how the older, classical view of metaphor persists today in what he calls neo-classic linguistics while the romantic approach with its organic emphasis continues in what he calls neo-romantic anthropological approaches to language. After a review of Richard's illumination of Coleridge's view of the mind, Hawkes concludes that the neo-romantic view of metaphor, with its organic sense of language is the one, and he quotes Richards here, "capable of opening to us new powers over our minds" (57). Hawkes includes with Richards the modern work of Max Black, Owen Barfield, Phillip Wheelright, William Empson, and Claude Levi-Strauss. In the context of the present study Richards and Black are most helpful and will be reviewed after a brief look at a few concurring classifications of twentieth century studies of metaphor.

Hawkes' division of the study of metaphor into classic and romantic approaches, based on Richard's, is encountered repeatedly in modern accounts. Paul Ricoeur, for example, in his *Interpretation Theory* divides the study of metaphor into "classical rhetoric" and the "modern semantic treatment" (49). Classical rhetoric, he tells us, was based on six propositions:

1) Metaphor is a trope, a figure of discourse that concerns denomination.

2) It represents the extension of the meaning of a name through deviation from the literal meaning of words.

3) The reason for this deviation is resemblance.

4) The function of resemblance is to ground the substitution of the figurative meaning of a word in place of the literal meaning, which could have been used in the same place.

5) Hence the substituted signification does not represent any semantic innovation. We can translate a metaphor, i.e., replace the literal meaning for which the figurative word is a substitute.
6) Since it does not represent a semantic innovation, a metaphor does not furnish any new information about reality. (49)

"These," Ricoeur says, "are the presuppositions of classical rhetoric" going back to Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintillian "which a modern semantic treatment of metaphor calls into question" (49). Regarding the first, classical tenet, Ricoeur says that metaphor must be considered in the organic context of the utterance (50). As regards the second point, he says that a metaphor is a phenomenon of predication, not, as the classicists and neo-classicists thought, a deviation of the meaning of individual terms. Regarding the third and fourth points, Ricoeur says that metaphor does not simply highlight pre-existing resemblances but establishes new relations (51). The tension caused by differences is just as important as the similarities. As a result of the newness of this creation, metaphors cannot, says Ricoeur, be translated as the the classicists' fifth tenet suggests (52). And finally, new relations do, as the classicists' sixth point denies, provide new information about reality (53). These ideas of Ricoeur are derived from Richards' as we shall see, but the most obvious point here is that Ricoeur is elaborating the same dichotomy in the study of metaphor as Hawkes. Ricoeur makes an important further point in this part of his book about metaphor that the study of it has the "advantage" of providing insight into the phenomenon of symbolism, a point that anticipates Susanne Langer's philosophy of symbolism and my major interest in her work regarding metaphor (see Ricoeur 53).

Andrew Ortony in his Metaphor and Thought similarly classifies theories of metaphor in his introductory essay, "Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem," where he distinguishes "constructivist" from "non-constructivist" approaches noting that the non-constructivist view sees reality registered upon the mind of the thinker with language a somewhat neutral medium for sending and receiving messages. Conversely, the constructivist view sees reality constructed in terms of "language, perception, and knowledge" which are "inextricably interdependent" (I). This non-constructivist view derives from the neo-classic eighteenth century and Newtonian classical physics. The constructivist view derives from the philosophical idealism of Hegel and others which inspired the romantic movement. He too cites Richards as a major "contemporary influence on the theoretical study of metaphor" (3). He notes Richard's useful delineation of terms "tenor" or "topic" and "vehicle," "the now familiar and still useful components of a working metaphor as originally indicated by Richards (3). In addition, Ortony characterizes Richard's concern with differences as well as similarities in a metaphor as a "tensive view" or concern with the contribution of "tension" in the metaphor (3). Ortony associates Chomskian linguistics with the non-constructivist view and the opposing "pragmatic" concerns of speech-act theorists with the constructivist view. Paul de Man in his article "The Epistemology of Metaphor," appearing in Sheldon Sack's On Metaphor, also uses this dichotomy characterizing the
classical view as "empirical British philosophy" and the romantic as the "continental" (i.e., idealistic and existentialistic) view.

Max Black also classifies theories of metaphor into a similar dichotomy. Black, in "More About Metaphor" which also appears in Sack's book, calls classical views of metaphor "comparison" theories and views stemming from I.A. Richards' insights "interactive" theories of metaphor. He sides with the interactionists arguing that the meaning of a metaphor is not the sum total of similarities shared by tenor and vehicle but rather the result of a tensive interaction between the terms.

According to these theorists and many others, then, romantic-derived views of metaphor, articulated by theorists in the twentieth century and first by I.A. Richards, view language, thought, and reality as organically interdependent as well as view metaphor as an important aspect of the organic process that is language and thought. And it is among these theorists that the relation between thought and language, and specifically the function of metaphor in knowing and expression, may most likely be found.

Since I.A. Richard's Philosophy of Rhetoric is repeatedly hailed as seminal in these studies of metaphor, we must now turn briefly to that work.

I.A. Richards begins The Philosophy of Rhetoric with the advice that

We shall do better to think of a meaning as though it were a plant that has grown—not a can that has been filled or a lump of clay that has been moulded. (12)

On this introductory and organic note which continues advising us to "avoid mechanical analogies" promoted by "associationism" when trying to understand the relation between thought and language, Richards builds a philosophy of language. Before considering his crucial "Metaphor" chapter we would do well to attend to some of Richard's preliminary remarks. This can be done briefly.

Richards tells us that the words of language are organically related to thought, meaning, and to context (51). Thus, words do not "contain" meaning (54). As he puts it, he is substituting an "organic" for a "mosaic" (56) view of meaning and interpretation, and "...a phrase may take its powers from an immense system of supporting uses of other words in other contexts" (65). Thus "a word is always a cooperative member of an organism, the utterance..." and cannot be "thought to have a meaning of its own, a fixed correct usage, or even a small limited number of correct usages unless by 'usage' we mean the whole how of its successful cooperations with other words" (69). He adds, "a completely isolated word would be meaningless" (71). And again, "...our principal terms incessantly change their meanings with the sentences they go into and the contexts they derive from" (72). Therefore, "words must shift their
meanings" (73). We must, he says, "learn to follow" these shifts of meanings" (73) when we understand human discourse.

The final two chapters of the work, "Metaphor" and "The Command of Metaphor" explicitly address our immediate subject. He tells us that the "omnipresent principle of all (language's) free action" is metaphor. He admits that he is "echoing Shelley's observation" that

Language is vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their apprehension, until words, which represent them, become, through time, signs for portions or classes of thought instead of pictures of integral thoughts: and then, if no new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganised, language will be dead to all the nobler purposes of human intercourse." (92)

Richards adds that "metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language" (92) and "is omnipresent in speech (93). Thus "when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (93). And there we have Richard's explanation of the dynamic of metaphor. It is a case of "co-present thoughts" (93)\(^5\). Finally, he tells us that traditional, classical theory

made metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom. To improve the theory of metaphor we must remember this.

After introducing tenor and vehicle as component terms of a metaphor Richards notes that it is a "double unit" of interacting ideas. He suggests that a transformation occurs in the successful metaphor: "...the co-presence of the vehicle and tenor results in a meaning ...which is not attainable without their interaction" (100).\(^6\) But precisely what tenor and vehicle are, even to Richards, is not totally clear. In his final pass at the concept in the concluding lecture of the book, he does conclude that "the mind is a connecting organ," and when we are interpreting anything we are "filling in connections" (125). Its basic function is to connect, to relate.

What Richards ends with is a sense of metaphor as involving a topic under consideration, which is the tenor, talked about in terms of something it is not, which is the vehicle. The reader or listener encounters these terms presented in relation, and the reader or listener must determine, with the crucial aid of the context of the discourse (125), what the relations are.\(^7\) This,
he reminds us, is not an analogy. Analogy rests on similarities and "is not a whole" (133), for "there is no whole to any analogy, we use as much of it as we need...if we take an analogy too far, we break it down" (133).

Many questions arising in Richards' Philosophy of Rhetoric remain unanswered: what is the relation between symbol and metaphor? What besides the connective power of the imagination is involved in the cognition of a metaphor or symbol? How does time enter into the perception of the relations realized in a metaphor? What does "organic" mean, specifically, other than living? And what light does metaphor shed on the larger issue of human meaning and communication? Richards' followers, such as Max Black, attempt to extend his ideas, but mainly rephrase Richards' ideas and formulate some of the questions he implicitly raises and that I have just highlighted. Later we shall see how Susanne Langer's philosophy in the new key of symbolism goes a long way toward answering some of these and posing other relevant and illuminating questions. M.M. Bakhtin, discussed after Langer in this study, will extend these dynamics of metaphor in his translinguistics into a theory of communication and meaning that encompasses both the insights of Richards and Langer, and answers many of their questions.

One of these questions, however, is approached in Hawkes' final chapter in Metaphor when he quotes critic Owen Barfield as noting that symbolism involves stating a vehicle but only implying the tenor (64). Paul Ricoeur also attempts to distinguish metaphor and symbol somewhat less successfully in his Interpretation Theory on the grounds that metaphors are made and symbols are given (see his chapter "Metaphor and Symbol"). Barfield's, as Hawkes calls it, "breezy remark" (66) throws intense light on something many of these theorists imply but do not say: that metaphor and symbol involve very similar dynamics and perhaps are identical in ways that we will have to wait for Susanne Langer to identify and suggest. For now let's hold on to the insight that a symbol is an implied metaphor (vehicle given, tenor implied). It will usefully connect Richards and Langer.

A final observation of some of the Richards-inspired interactionist theorists provides us with a convenient bridge into the work of aesthetician Susanne Langer, that is the relation between art and metaphor. All of these theorists agree that metaphor is found in all forms of human discourse, even science where it is often unwittingly present. However, a few of the theorists explicitly attribute the qualities of art to the metaphor. Regarding this view of metaphor as artistic creation, Paul Ricoeur in his Interpretation Theory agrees with and quotes Monroe Beardsly in the latter's Aesthetics where Beardsly calls a metaphor "a poem in miniature" (46).

Similarly Ted Cohen in his essay "Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy," which is also found in Sack's On Metaphor, raises the same point when he says "I subscribe to the opinion that metaphors are peculiarly
crystalized works of art" (5). And Nelson Goodman in the same volume of 

essays declares that metaphors bring us "new worlds" (175).

Davidson in his article appearing in Sacks' On Metaphor volume 
similarly states that "metaphor implies a kind and degree of artistic success" 
(29). He provocatively calls metaphor "the dreamwork of language" (29). He 
says that "understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as 
making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules" (29). His claim that artistic 
operations go on in creating a metaphor is interesting and raises a compelling 
question: what is the relation between art and metaphor? For Davidson, 
metaphor, like art, does not package an idea as a proposition and send it to 
the receiver. He implies that the maker of a metaphor packs only the literal 
proposition of the metaphor and anything else that the receiver gets out of it is 
created by the receiver.

Stephen Davies, in a recent essay, appearing in the Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism "Truth-Values and Metaphors," calls Davidson's 
article a "radical" one (292). Davies agrees with and stresses Davidson's 
notion that the only proposition contained in a metaphor is the literal one 
which we accept but cannot believe (e.g. for example, that literally my love is a 
rose). Anything else gotten out of it in the way of insight or truth, he says, is 
created by the receiver of a metaphor. In other words, a metaphor directly 
effects experiences rather than understanding. Understanding may derive 
from it, but is not delivered by it (294).

It is worth noting here that Davies' article begins by noting the 
comparison versus interactionist views of metaphor, but he lumps them both 
together as content-oriented "traditional theories" and places himself and 
Davidson together as "radical" in their non-content approach (292). While this 
is troubling in that, as we have seen, interactionists like Richards, Ricoeur, and 
Black do imply that the interaction of the metaphor's terms occurs actively in 
the receiver's mind, Davies, I believe, is compelling in that he rejects the 
communication model of linguists such as Chomsky and even Jakobson who 
see human communication in terms of coded and packaged meaning that is 
unpackaged and decoded by the receiver. And in rejecting it he exposes most 
of the metaphoricians who still accept it, despite their fascination with 
metaphor. Davidson and Davies both point out that paraphrasing a metaphor 
is like explaining a joke: in both cases the point of the original utterance is lost, 
so the point of a metaphor must not be to transmit a propositional truth, but 
rather to effect a meaningful experience. Davies, for example, notes that

Metaphors are evaluated as successful or unsuccessful, convincing 
or unconvincing, revealing or unrevealing, appropriate or 
inappropriate. The fact that these are the terms in which, normally, 
we do evaluate live metaphors supports the view for which I have 
argued. (298).
Furthermore, he notes that when we gain an insight or truth as a result of a metaphor, we agree "to a truth to which (we were) led by...appreciation of the metaphor (298). And again, he tells us that "the fact that metaphor-makers do not usually go on to paraphrase their live metaphors suggests that they are more directly concerned with evoking experiences than with imparting beliefs" (298). Yet he insists that his view allows for more than emotional experiences and admits of cognitive activity in the experience of a metaphor (299). He says that metaphors "express experiences rather than state beliefs" (301). When a metaphor transmits a belief, it is dead (301).

While Davidson and Davies succinctly shift the burden of meaning in a metaphor to the listener or reader and liken it to art, they leave many questions unaddressed or at least unanswered: What kind of activity occurs in the minds of creators of metaphors and receivers of them when they occur? How is it rational if it isn't simply emotional? What are the parameters or determiners of such meaning? If such activity has to do with symbolism and art, what precisely is the latter in relation to mental activity and especially knowing?

It is here that we need an epistemologist and an aesthetician with a central concern for the relation of symbol, mind, art, and knowing. Susanne Langer and her philosophy of art and mind addresses these and other already evoked questions in the next chapter of this study.

1 These are a few of the historic glosses of the treatment of metaphor that display a very similar view of a split between a classical, atomistic view of metaphor and a romantic, holistic view of it. Meyer Abrams in The Mirror and the Lamp is another who maintains this classical-romantic distinction. The real issue here, as we shall see, is mechanical versus organic views of the subject.

2 Mechanical metaphors, such as the ladder of being central to Medieval and Renaissance thought, predominated in the pre-romantic mind, (see E.M.W. Tillyard's The Elizabethan World Picture and A.O. Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being)

3 It is also a conception of reality common to current thinking recently reviewed by Marylyn Ferguson in The Aquarian conspirators. Fritjof Capra's Zen-related approach to physics in his The Tao of Physics and David Bohm's sense of indivisible reality in his Wholeness and the Implicate Order also come to mind.
This contextual and interactive sense of word meaning is one that is characteristic of this romantic, constructivist view of metaphor, is found in Susanne Langer's sense of language and symbolism (Chapter 2), and is the hallmark of Mikhail M. Bakhtin's and Lev Vygotsky's dialectical sense of meaning and language (Chapter 3). Additionally, the sense of utterance as the working unit of language, rather than the word, is found here in Richards, elsewhere in Paul Ricoeur's *Interpretation Theory* (*Metaphor and Symbol chapter, especially*), and finally in the work of Soviet literary and language theorist Mikhail Bakhtin.

This sense of "co-present" thought is an analog of M. M. Bakhtin's sense of "co-being" (for which see Chapter 3, below of this study) that permeates his dialogical principle of communication. Bakhtin, as we shall see, believes that meaning is not transmitted from one person to another, but rather is mutually created by the communicants (i.e., existence and meaning is co-being for humans). Specifically, meaning is created by the terms of the metaphor in an analogous way, and metaphor is therefore a microcosmic instance of a dynamic characteristic of language, thought, and meaning, the macrocosmic instance of which we will have to wait for Bakhtin to discuss.

Note again this sense of simultaneity in the prefix co- which pervades this study (see above note) and is addressed in Chapter 2 in Langer's epistemology of the symbol (and metaphor) where she will suggest it involves presentational meaning, by which she refers to a meaning that is perceived not linearly or discursively in time, but rather simultaneously as form is perceived in a painting. This idea will be developed in Chapter 2 but a nudge of anticipation will, I hope, enhance the continuity of this study.

This sense of meaning as context-based, as a result of shifts in context that precipitate transformations will characterize Langer and Bakhtin (in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively), as well.

Thomas Kuhn, historian and philosopher of science, has an essay in Ortony's collection and is, of course, famous for his paradigm theory of the history of science, which, I would suggest, discusses science in terms of predominant metaphors, but uses the term paradigm where students of interactionist or constructivist views of metaphor would use the phrase "root metaphor" as does Lakoff and Johnson in their recent study *Metaphors We Live By* and Gerhart and Russell in their recently published *Metaphoric Process*. 
Chapter Two
Metaphor and Symbol in the Works of Susanne Langer

Susanne Langer derived her thought from the philosophical idealism of Ernst Cassirer. His philosophy of symbolic forms provided the key insight for her into the nature and function of the mind, language, and reality. Her particular interest in art and epistemology led her to the symbolic nature of imagery and knowing. While our concern is not primarily that of art, what she says about the symbol, its function in the mind and in human expression will reveal the central role that metaphor plays in thought, language, and expression.

In her work Langer tells us epistemology, the philosophy of knowing, is the central issue in contemporary philosophy and what she calls symbolic transformation is its key. She tells us that symbolism pervades human activity, especially language and that it is found, most fundamentally, at the level of the image in perception, thinking, and expression. Symbolism for Langer is necessary for consciousness, integral to conception. The brain here is not a computer, but rather a transformer abstracting sense data, forming concepts as images that are symbolic and captured, in thought, through language. Meaning is rooted in relationships, not essences, with thought depending on language. The human mind transforms, therefore, sense data into imagery that is symbolic, and these symbols are implied metaphors (i.e. they are images that function as vehicles of the metaphor, and the tenor in the metaphor is the concept or idea that they convey, which is created in the mind. This latter point is the central focus of my study.

Metaphor, as Langer will demonstrate here, is the crux of language, thinking, and expression. Its essence is relation. Form, Langer shows, is intrinsic to conception and amounts to the pattern of relations that exist between sense data. To see or conceive of form requires abstractive seeing, according to Langer. She calls metaphor the vital principle of language and all symbolism. Images conceived by the mind present connotations; later these are reified discursively by the mind and become denotations. The word, then, in the mind involves both presentational and discursive symbolism, both discursive logic and what she calls intuition. Metaphor, as Langer will then show, is the organic connection between intellect and sense, image and thought, self and other, reason and emotion, presentational and discursive rationality. In language's crucible, as she calls it, metaphor, the relational nature of language and knowing is revealed. And the stock of this activity is symbolic transformation. Envisagement, the conception in the mind of sense data, is the result of symbolic transformation, and its natural termination is, she will show us, speech.
Despite the unifying sense of metaphor, however, that Langer consistently touches upon in her earlier work, when she discusses poetry, we shall see, she retreats into a disappointing structuralism or formalism that is not worthy of her organic sense of the mind and language. Nevertheless, as her work develops her insights into symbolic transformation through metaphor and language reveals the organic and dialectical nature of human thought and language. She finally presents in *Mind* an organically unified sense of presentational and discursive symbolism.

In her magnum opus, *Mind*, as we shall see, Langer will show how feeling is an organic process that at its most complex includes thought. We will see how she describes it as a process of sensing the relations between things, and finally I hope to show how this registering of the relational nature of human awareness is captured in the metaphor.

Having glimpsed our path through her work, we can now move through it focusing on metaphor in connection with thought and language as Langer builds her theory of mind.

Susanne Langer in the beginning of *Philosophy In a New Key* makes it quite clear that for her symbolism has to do with the large issues of knowing.

A new philosophical theme has been set forth to a coming age: an epistemological theme, the comprehension of science. The power of symbolism is its cue, as the finality of sense data was the cue of a former epoch. (29)

She suggests that her key idea, symbolism, is not a theory but a generative idea that will transform issues and result in new theories.

The limits of thought are not so much set from outside, by the fullness of poverty of experiences that meet the mind, as from within by the power of conception, with which the mind meets conceptions....a new idea is a light that had no form for us before the light fell on them ....Such ideas as identity of matter and...value, virtue...outer world and inner consciousness, are not theories; they are the terms in which theories are conceived....one may call them generative ideas; in the history of thought. (p 19)¹

In Langer it is also clear that the structure perceived in nature as sense data is really created symbolism: "sense data are primarily symbols and laws...are their meanings." A conventional definition of imagery in literary criticism is a sense impression (not limited to visual ones) communicated through language. Therefore, for "sense impression" we can substitute "image," and then the organic connection between image and symbol in Langer, I think, begins to come clear.
Early in *Philosophy in a New Key* Langer distinguishes sign from symbol. An image as a sign indicates a thing, whereas a symbol represents a conception of something. As Langer notes, animals can know signs, but only human beings can use symbols. It takes a profoundly different kind of intelligence to symbolize reality and respond to symbols of it.

At this point, early in the work, Langer introduces an extraordinary insight into the genesis of the sign in the human condition, an insight that later we will see elaborated by Vygotsky and the Soviet language theorists: "The passage from the sign function of word to its symbolic function is gradual, a result of social organization" (38). She then quotes Frank Lorimer in *The Growth of Reason*, where he distinguishes apes and humans on this very point (a distinction that separates vocal and verbal activity).

Langer goes on to distinguish the human mind from the computer on this basis: computers receive, store, and transmit information whereas, she says, magic, ritual, religion, art and dreams have belied the simile of the mind as a computer made of meat. She concludes that

...the moral of this critique is, therefore, to reconsider the inventory of human needs...I propose to try, therefore a new principle: instead of assuming that the human mind tries to do the same thing as a cat's mind, ...I shall assume that the human mind is trying to do something else....(43)

She then delivers the theme of the book:

...there is a primary need in man, which other creatures probably do not have....which certainly is obvious only in man...the need of symbolization....the fundamental process of his mind. Symbolization is the essential act of the mind.... the brain is following its own law: it is actively translating experience into symbols....For the brain is not merely a great transmitter, a super-switch board: it is better likened to a great transformer....The current of experience...is sucked into the stream of symbols which consitutes the human mind. (46)

In this organic detail of the powerful stream and the notion that transformation is the essence of human mentation is a note that Langer will reiterate and extend throughout her magnum opus, *Mind*. In *Philosophy in A New Key* Langer then moves naturally to speech.

Speech is, in fact, the readiest active termination of that basic process in the human brain which may be called symbolic transformation of experiences....Speech is the normal terminus of thought...the mark of humanity. (48)
Langer then notes the expressive nature of human speech and moves to the next section of her study resolving to come to terms with the "logical" nature of symbolization and the transformations that create it. In Chapter 3, therefore, she penetrates the subject of naming and logic by noting,

There is in fact no quality of meaning: its essence lies in the realm of logic, where one does not deal with qualities but only with relations....Meaning is not a quality but a function of a term. A function is a pattern viewed with reference to one special term round which it centers; this pattern emerges when we look at the given term in its total relation to the other terms about it. (55)

Her examples, at this point in her argument come from music. For example, how a note in a score has meaning only relative to the others in the chord. However, the implication for language, even here, early in the book, is clear: a word is a symbol and its meaning results from its relation to other works in a sentence, in the paragraph, the entire piece of discourse, and all other discourses by the author.2

Langer says, "meaning is a function, not a property of terms" (57). Since logic deals with relations, she must clarify the relation between a sign and its referent. This, she says, is a "one to one" correlation where the sign simply stands in the mind in the place of the object. Symbols are not "proxy" for their objects, "but are vehicles for the conception of objects." And then she gives us the crucial implication, symbols directly "mean" the conception of things, not things themselves: "signs announce their objects to humans, whereas symbols lead humans to conceive of their objects" (61).

Now we have arrived at the dependence of thought on language. For if the human mind's thinking is to bear relation to the world, it needs language with its names and grammatical conventions for expressing relationships. Meaning in Langer's newly keyed philosophy will necessitate, she says, "an analysis of the relational patterns in which meaning may be sought as a picture." Words put in relation through the conventions of grammatical structure constitute propositions (67). She calls them "constellations of connotations" whose "meaning is a special constellation of all the connotations involved" (66). What the meaning of the special constellation is, depends on the syntactical relations within the complex symbol of the proposition. Here Langer delivers the crux of her message concerning meaning: "A Proposition is a picture of a structure--the state of affairs. The unity of a proposition is the same sort of unity that belongs to a picture" (67).

And for Langer, a picture is "essentially a symbol, not a duplicate, of what it represents. She goes on to say, "all that it shares with the reality is a certain proportion of parts." (67) This relation of parts is what is "fastened upon" in forming a conception of anything. This relation of parts constitutes the form of the object, she goes on to say. To form a concept requires what
Langer calls "abstractive seeing" (70). She tells us that "the power of understanding symbols, of regarding everything about a sense-datum as irrelevant except a certain form that it embodies, is the most characteristic mental trait of mankind" (70). Here this form appears as a static shape in the structuralist tradition. Later, in Mind, it will take on the dynamic quality of a pattern of relationships.

This abstractive seeing is for Langer "the foundation of our rationality." It appears, she says, "long before any conscious generalization or syllogism" (70).

Regarding language, she notes that

- a temporal order of words stands for a relational order of things.... When pure word-order becomes insufficient, word endings and prefixes "mean relationships"; from these are born prepositions and other purely relational symbols.... A sentence is a symbol for a state of affairs, and pictures its character. (71)

Langer finishes off this first pass at language by noting at the end of the chapter that

- the assignment of elaborately patterned symbols to certain authority (is) the basis of all interpretation and thought. These are, essentially, the relationships we use in weaving the intricate web of meaning which is the real fabric of human life. (75)

The next step in her argument reveals, in chapter four, that the relations that exist between things that language expresses is eventually misconstrued in our sense of language as things. Thus, as she puts it, if A kills B in a series of actions, A relates to B in a certain way, then the actions and relationship so designated becomes a thing in the mind because "The transformation which facts undergo when they are rendered as propositions is that the relations in them are turned into something like objects" (85).

This tendency of language and the mind, she says, to reify relationships and to string out experience sequentially in a conscious sense of linear time is known as discursiveness (77). She says that, like Wittgenstein, she believes "the relations between word structures and their meanings is one of logical analogy." She goes on to show that logical positivism and other static philosophies perceive language and thinking as constituting all that is knowable. All else is relegated to "unreason," "mysticism, and irrationalism" (85).

To date, I think, every serious epistemology that has regarded mental life as greater than discursive reason, and has made concession to insight or intuition has just so far capitulated to unreason, mysticism, and irrationalism. Every excursion beyond
propositional thought has dispensed with thought altogether and
postulated some inmost soul of pure feeling in direct contact with
a Reality unsymbolized, unfocussed, and incommunicable. (86)

Such idealism Langer disagrees with. The bodily senses "abstract" in a
nondiscursive, presentational way characterized by a simultaneous grasp of
relationships, but this is rational activity. The senses

...do not present their constituents successively but
simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual structure
are grasped in one act of vision. Their complexity of discourse is
limited, as the complexity is dilimited, by what the mind can
retain from the beginning of an apperceptive act to the end of it.
(86)

Symbolism "furnished by ...sensory appreciation of forms is a
nondiscursive symbolism." Sense data have a symbolical character, therefore.
This insight will prove crucial as we continue to piece together a philosophy of
language in Langer's new key as well as the nature and role of metaphor in it.

In the chapter "Language" we see these issues further clarified. Langer
tells us that "language is conception, and conception is the frame of
perception" (113). Language shapes the mind and plays a creative role in
determining the form of our perceptions and conception of reality. She says
the "symbolic system" of the mind interactively "interpenetrates" with "direct
experience" of the senses. Here there is a "transformation of experience into
concepts, not the elaboration of signals." And this is the "motive of language"
(114). The "key to language" is symbolic activity (116).

Langer next moves explicitly to the topic of central concern in this study.
She notes that "...metaphor is another topic that cannot be understood without
symbolic rather than a signalistic view of language" (118). Metaphor, for
Langer, is the "vital principle" in language (and perhaps all symbolism)...." (123).
It is the creative means whereby novelty can be introduced into
expression:

...where a precise word is lacking to designate the novelty which
the speaker would point out, he resorts to the powers of logical
analogy, and uses a word denoting something else that is a
presentational symbol for the thing he means: the context makes
it clear that he cannot mean the thing literally denoted. (123)

So a word such as rage in the context of comments about a person must refer
to the idea of a fire raging. These metaphors, as they fade, become, she says,
general, abstract words. In other words, the presentational dimension of
language is reified and absorbed into the discursive dimension over the
course of time in social discourse.
We have seen, so far, that the symbolic image entails an idea about an experience; it is a conception of experience formed by the mind. Also, we have seen that when discussing metaphor or symbolism the context of relationships is a determining factor in their meaning. An image, therefore, symbolizes the relation of inner mind and outer world; a metaphor is only a metaphor when the context demands it. Langer pushes on in Philosophy in a New Key to discuss the rationality of presentational symbolism, the forms of feeling.

These symbolic materials given to our senses, she says, "belong to the presentational order." This type of knowledge, though, is "perfectly rational," and is read by the mind "in a flash" (90). It is an aspect of the power of reason, the "power of the whole mind at its fullest stretch and compass" (91). Clarifying this broader sense of rational activity she goes on to say that "Rationality is the essence of the mind, and symbolic transformation its elementary process. It is a fundamental error, therefore, to recognize it only in the phenomenon of systematic, explicit reasoning" (91).

The point here is that for Langer consciousness is intrinsically rational, there is no such thing as a thoughtless impression registering on it. Rather, the mind constantly abstracts, perceives and creates form as it interacts with reality. There are two kinds of forming that occur in human mentation: discursive and presentational. As she says, feeling itself must participate in knowledge and understanding (92). In a phrase, "feelings have definite forms" (93). The denotational aspect of language is discursive, the connotational aspect of it is presentational.5 Language in both respects is "vocal actualization of the tendency to see reality symbolically" (99). This, she says, is the point to be stressed here, the real keynote of language. The essence of language is the formulation and expression of conceptions (109). She notes that "the mind...grasps analogies...fuses sensa" and "projects feelings into outer objects" as a way of "conceiving those feelings" (109). She will later tell us that this is what art amounts to, the conception of feeling through the presentation of the forms of feeling.

The point to be made here, in relation to language, is that rational activity is intimate with language and in its symbolism goes beyond the discursive and includes the presentational. This latter type of symbolism involves feeling as well as discursive reasoning; intellect involves feeling as well as thought. And language involves both. Throughout this section of Philosophy in a New Key Langer displays keen interest in metaphor and its role in language. She notes, for example, that

Metaphor is our most striking evidence of abstractive seeing, of the power of human minds to use presentational symbols. Every new experience, or new idea about things, evokes first of all some metaphorical expression. As the idea becomes familiar, this expression "fades" to a new literal use of the once
metaphorical predicate, a more general use than it had before. (125)

She suggests here a transition from presentational to discursive meaning in the history of every word. And she proceeds to relate the use of metaphor to the dynamics of the mind:

...metaphor can hardly be called a conscious device. It is the power whereby language...manages to embrace a multimillionthings; whereby new words are born and merely analogical meanings become stereotyped into literal definitions. (125)

A reification process is here suggested in language where connotation becomes denotation. She adds parenthetically that slang is almost entirely far-fetched metaphor, and she notes the relational nature of language rooted in metaphor:

if ritual is the cradle of language, metaphor is the law of its life. It is the force that makes it essentially relational, intellectual, forever showing up new abstractable forms in reality, forever laying down a deposit of old abstracted concepts, an increasing treasure of general words. (125)

Like Emerson in the 19th century, she links our most intellectual, abstract language to sensual and symbolic perception of the image in metaphor and thus suggests the essence of metaphor resides in the intellectual apprehension of relationships. She concludes this section with an insight into what she considers the misconception of language as utility.

Speech becomes increasingly discursive, practical, prosaic, until human beings can actually believe that it was invented as a utility and was later embellished with metaphors for the sake of a cultural product called poetry. (125)

Langer's final comments in this section warrant direct quoting as they summarize her key insights into language and mind:

The general theory of symbolism here set forth, which distinguishes between two symbolic modes rather than restricting intelligence to discursive forms and relegating all other conception to some irrational realm of feeling and instinct, has the great advantage of assimilating all mental activity to reason, instead of grafting that strange product upon a fundamentally unintellectual organism. It accounts for imagination and dream, myth and ritual, as well as for practical intelligence....The parent stock of both conceptual types...is the
basic human act of symbolic transformation. The root is the same, only the flower is different. (126)

And, I would add, if the root is the same, the flowers are different only in degree relatively, not in kind absolutely. The absolute distinction between the presentational and discursive, finally, does not hold. They are aspects of a unified, dynamic and organic activity as Langer will intimate in *Mind.*

Langer moves into the next major section of her study, which deals myth and dream, and comments on how images become symbolic in the mind, thus transforming in its evolution subhuman into human consciousness. This further clarifies the root, organic connection between presentational and discursive thought and language. She tells us that "...the sense image is not a direct copy of actual experience,...but a unity and lasting identity that makes it an object of the mind's possession rather than a sensation" (127). And then she adds, "images have all the characteristics of symbols....We do not take them for bona fide sensations, but attend to them only in their capacity of meaning things, being images of things--symbols whereby those things are conceived, remembered, considered but not encountered." She continues, connecting symbol and metaphor: "The best guarantee of their essentially symbolic function is their tendency to become metaphorical" (128). She notes that

Metaphor is the law of growth of every semantic. It is not a development, but a principle. This is strikingly attested by the fact that the lowest, completely unintentional products of the human brain are madly metaphorical fantasies, that often make no literal sense whatever; I mean the riotous symbolism of dreams. (130)

She says, images connote things which our senses associated with them, but also have "an inalienable tendency" to "mean"things with which they have"only a logical analogy" (128). Thus, images to the mind are symbols, the abbreviated metaphors that Owen Barfield called them.

Langer, in the remainder of *Philosophy In a New Key* goes on to sketch the development of symbols in religion and then in art, stating along the way that symbolism phylogenetically, for humankind, is first expressive and then later practical, just as, ontogenetically, for the individual, conception is at first impractical in dreams, but later becomes practical in daily life. These matters will be precisely formulated by Langer later in *Mind.* Art for Langer is a way of knowing; "aesthetic pleasure, via presentational symbolism, is akin to discovering truth" (220). The meaning of literary art, poetry for example, depends upon "the way the assertion is made" (220), the precise relations that constitute the form of the poetic utterance determine its meaning. And those relations are distilled and exemplified in the metaphor, as we shall see. She tells us that "artistic truth does not belong to statements" but rather to "its
structure and meanings as they are used, its statements as they are made...to...significant form" (221).

As she discusses poetic form she moves closer to metaphor and finally deals with it explicitly. Poetic form, she says, has "implicit meaning...something that cannot be apprehended apart from the work. It is context-dependent because it is relationally-dependent on the linguistic details of structure around it" (221).

Langer ends Philosophy In a New Key with "The Fabric of Meaning," and we must pause here to elaborate a cluster of insights that we'll be crucial to this study's concern with metaphor. She begins this section reiterating that ideas begin in images exploited in metaphors where their possible symbolic significance is realized. Here, she says, "A mind that is very sensitive to forms is apt to use its images metaphorically to exploit their possible significance for the conception of remote or intangible ideas..."(224).

This "dual operation of a datum as sign and symbol together is the key to realistic thinking"; it is the "envisagement of fact" the "root of practical intelligence," (225) conception anchored in reality. She hurries to add, however, that fact is not a simple given, it is an "intellectually formulated event" (227).

She notes, then, that Francis Bacon's Renaissance concern with putting notions by and attending to facts really was poor advice, (227), and that facts, as such, were really never the issue. Rather, the issue was how facts were put together (i.e. related) that distinguished one idea from another:

...great scientists were never distracted by the fact-finding rage; they knew from the first what they were doing. Their task was always to relate facts to each other, either as current cases of the same general fact or as successive transformations of an intial fact according to some systematic principle...(229)

She next suggests that metaphor is at the base of knowing when she tells us that the modern mind is an incredible complex of impressions and transformations; and its product is a fabric of meanings "...amounting to an elaborate tapestry, the "warp" of which consists of data, "the signs to which experience has conditioned us to attend...without any conscious ideation. The woof is symbolism. Out of signs and symbols we weave our tissue of 'reality'" (236) In a characteristic flash of insight Langer tells us that words symbolize things in language, as nouns do in a sentence, but they also relate to each other by virtue of verbs and also relate to the world through the "assertion" of the verb (the verb has the double function of combining the elements named into one propositional form, and asserting the proposition, i.e. referring the form to something in reality." (23) The verb, the relater, determines the truth or falsity of a proposition. "Sign and symbol," for Langer, "are knotted together in
the production of those fixed realities that we call facts, as I think has been shown through this whole study of semantic" (237).

For Langer "the whole creative process of ideation, metaphor, and abstraction that makes human life an adventure in understanding" (237) is summed up in her sense of meaning as a tapestry: It is the woof thread that creates the pattern of a fabric....The meanings that are capable of indefinite growth are symbolic meanings: connotations, not significations" (237). So images are transformed into metaphors (vehicles that convey tenors or ideas), and the ideas that result are patterns or networks of relationships. And both discursive and presentational modes of thinking are involved in this process.

...for discursive symbolism is always general and requires application to the concrete datum, whereas non-discursive symbolism is specific, is the given itself, and invites us to read the more general meaning out of the case. Hence the exciting back-and-forth of real mental life, of living by symbols. (240)

In Feeling and Form Langer turns her idea of the mind as symbolic transformer into a full-blown aesthetics, specifically applying it to each of the major arts. Such ideas as the mind as symbolic transformer, a sense of rationality that includes imagination and intuition and art as the expression of the forms of feeling are applied in this work to each of the various arts. Much of Feeling and Form, therefore, does not directly relate to our specific concerns; yet, a few key ideas do further clarify the dynamic relationships that exist between metaphor, symbolism, thinking and language.

Langer tells us earlier that "a symbol is understood when we conceive of the ideas it represents" (26) and that the forms of sentience or feeling are the ideas conveyed by the arts (28). She interestingly relates this dynamic of symbolism to rationality and language:

The prime purpose of language is discourse, the conceptual framework that has developed under its influence is known as 'discursive reason.' Usually, when one speaks of 'reason' at all, one tacitly assumes its discursive pattern. But in a broader sense any appreciation of form, any awareness of patterns in experience, is the basic process of all understanding, just as operative in discursive thought as in clear sense perception and immediate judgment....But it is no substitute for discursive logic in the making of any theory, contingent or transcendental. (29)

This at once extends the notion of reason to include the aesthetic sense of pattern or "intuition" of pattern or form and at the same time lays claim to a presentational or intuitive dimension intrinsic to all understanding and discursive thought. It is precisely the symbolic dimension of the image in all language that involves presentational symbolism. Images in language, come
to represent ideas, that is to say, they come to stand for ideas or conceptions (i.e. become symbolic as they become metaphors).

The import of sentience, the image of feelings is the "pattern of life itself, as it is felt and directly known" (31). This is the content that all the arts share and the major thesis of Feeling and Form. But the implications for language, in part just suggested regarding symbolism as metaphor, bear looking into as Langer touches on them mostly in the early chapters of this book.

In her discussion of semblance, for example, she notes, in Chapter 4, the "true power of the image lies in the fact that it is an abstraction, a symbol, the bearer of an idea" (47). This is how an image works in any metaphor according to I. A. Richards (see Chapter One of this study) and Langer (above). The image symbolizes an idea which is abstracted from its appearance in the material order. As Langer puts it, we abstract its appearance from its material existence. What we see in this way becomes simply a thing of vision--a form, an image. It detaches itself from its actual setting and acquires a different context" (47). She also says that an artist creates this image. Perhaps she implies, or should, that the artist provides the context as well, and the perception of the resulting relationships transforms the image into a symbol.®

This leads Langer, though it need not lead us, into a discussion of the necessarily "virtual" character of imagery in all of the arts. Regarding language, as we have just seen, it further clarifies how image becomes symbol and how they relate in the metaphor. It also suggests the essential role that presentational symbolism plays in discourse.

The function of semblance is to give forms a new embodiment in purely qualitative, unreal instances, setting them free from their normal embodiment in real things so that they may be recognized in their own right and freely conceived and composed in the interest of the artist's ultimate aim--significance, or logical expression. (50)

In this sense "art expresses not actual feeling, but ideas of feeling; as language does not express actual things and events but ideas of them....Art is a hundred per cent symbolic" (59). What art does express, she adds, is "living form" (65), . Presentational symbolism always involves this vitality through its form.

This term ("living form"), again, is justified by a logical connection that exists between the half-illusory datum, and the concept of life, whereby the former is a natural symbol of the latter; for "livingform" directly exhibits what is the essence of life--incessant change, or process, articulating a permanent form. Permanence of form, then, is the constant aim of living matter....for the permanence is a pattern of changes. (66)
Art throughout *Feeling and Form*, then, has a metaphorical dimension. Collectively, art is a metaphor for human feeling. I would add, and will try to further demonstrate, later in this study, that language, and thinking in terms of language and intrinsically involve the creative transformation of image into symbol that she associates with art, and that this transformational activity maintains the form of organic life and consciousness, the essence of human thinking and knowing. Presentational symbolism, therefore, permeates ordinary life and experience. Art has no monopoly on it.

Although later in the book she says that the laws that govern the making of poetry "are not those of discursive logic...(and) are, in fact, the laws of imagination"(234), it should be added that there can be no discourse without the imaginative transformation of image into symbol that occurs in metaphor. Just as imagination and intuition are essential to rationality, presentational symbolism and the awareness it engenders is essential to discourse.

In *Feeling and Form* Susanne Langer also approaches a definition of organic nature that will be substantiated and further elaborated in *Mind*. As she does so she also identifies the nature of those relationships which are considered living. This sense of life, of course, is crucial in this book because it, according to Langer, is precisely the quality that the art object has and that is derived from the mind of the artist. It is a quality of living organisms, and it is, she says, symbolized in art, characterized by maintenance of dynamic form, "self-preservation, self-restoration, functional tendency, purpose" (328). She notes that

...to maintain the pattern of vitality in a non-living universe is the most elementary instinctual purpose. An organism tends to keep its equilibrium amid the bombardment of aimless forces that beset it, to regain equilibrium when it has been disturbed, and to pursue a sequence of actions dictated by the need of keeping all its interdependent parts constantly renewed, their structure intact...the basic biological pattern which all living things share: the round of conditioned and conditioning organic processes that produces the life rhythm. (328)

The point here, I think, relevant to metaphor is that this is the quality of consciousness, the quality perceived in human consciousness in the image that becomes a symbol within the metaphor. Of course, neither a work of art nor a metaphor is a living organism, as Langer will presently note. Still, something of this living quality is suggested in the successful work of art, and I would add, the expressive metaphor. That something is the complex of relationships within the dynamic structures. In *Feeling and Form* Langer suggests that "only in art" (366) do we find the life of feeling expressed. Here, I disagree. The essence of art is, I'd say, in the metaphor, and metaphor is ubiquitous in discourse. Still, Langer has put her finger on the pulse of the
living quality in human expression. This quality, I suggest (and Langer will later in Mind) is a pervasive mental trait in ordinary discourse as well as in the extraordinary events of art.

Something like the connection that I am suggesting, however, seems to be Langer's point in the final section of the book, "The Power of the Symbol." There she tells us that

language, spoken or written, is a symbolism, a system of symbols; a work of art is always a prime symbol....it can never be constructed by a process of synthesis of elements, because no such elements exist outside it. They only occur in a total form (369)

This means the whole manifests the form of an organism as its parts interrelate dynamically to suggest living form. In metaphor, also, the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Another idea that is important here and that Langer develops in elaborate detail later in Mind concerns the "life of feeling" in human consciousness:

That life of feeling is a stream of tensions and resolutions. Probably all emotion, all feeling tone, mood, and even personal 'sense of life' or 'sense of identity' is a specialized and intimate, but definite interplay of tensions--actual, nervous and muscular tensions taking place in a human organism. This concept;...is quite properly called 'inner life' (372).

At this point in the book another slippery idea holds still for a moment. She says that "expressive activity whereby impressions are formed and elaborated and made amenable to intuition is, I believe, the process of elementary symbol making, for the basic symbols of human thought are images ...it is on this level that characteristically human mentality begins."
And she continues here noting that

no human impression is only a signal from the outer world; it always is also an image in which possible impressions are formulated, that is, a symbol for the conception of such experience. The notion of "such" bespeaks an elementary abstraction, or awareness of form. (376)

This "awareness" Langer calls intuition. On the next page she concludes quite bluntly, "There is, I think, no formulation without symbolic projection" (i.e. expression).
For Langer, "formulation, representation, abstraction" are the characteristic functions of symbols. It is here that Langer ties together image production and perception as incipient thought.7 Langer, though, insists that

...comprehension of form itself, throughout its exemplification in formed perceptions or 'intuitions,' is spontaneous and natural abstraction; but the recognition of metaphorical value of some intuitions, which springs from the perception of their forms, is spontaneous and natural interpretation. Both abstraction and interpretation are intuitive, and may deal with non-discursive forms. They are alike at the base of all human mentality and are the roots from which both language and art take rise. (378)

Intuition and logic operate in tandem for Langer in thinking and speech. The perception of the image and presentational symbol intrinsic to this act must occur for there to be any reasoning at all, for "...emergence of meaning is always a logical intuition or insight," as Langer here points out. As she says, "All discourse aims at building up, cumulatively, more and more complex logical intuition....In discourse, meaning is synthetically construed by a succession of intuitions" (379). Thus, presentational symbolism and discursive symbolism form a whole in discourse, and reason and intuition function in tandem in understanding.8

Here we have the key terms of the discussion meaningfully linked. Thought begins with the perception of the image which to be perceived requires the intellectual act of abstraction; this perception she equates with intuition insisting that it is a logical act (i.e., a rational one because it involves understanding pure form). When this occurs we have a symbol which is expressive of the mind that perceived it. Also, the "metaphorical value of some intuitions" is acknowledged as arising from "their forms" spontaneously and naturally or organically.

Langer ends this section with a comment intended to explain the expressive nature of perception and that will later in this study be recalled: "All knowledge goes back to experience; we cannot know anything that bears no relation to our experience" (390). This is truly a key to understanding the dynamic of the metaphor and the mind: we understand the present in terms of its relation to our past perceptions. Each metaphor, each image within a metaphor, microcosmically incarnates this idea, and macrocosmically this relating is the pattern of the mind both individually and collectively.9

In Feeling and Form, therefore, Langer develops her aesthetic theory and applies it to the major arts. In the process she relates presentational and discursive symbolism and the thinking, both intuitive and discursive, that creates and understands it. These different but organically related aspects of the mind form for Langer a cognitive whole.
In Problems of Art, a collection of Langer articles and lectures presented by the aesthetician in the fifties, Langer repeats her definition of art as presentation of the forms of feeling through imagery and semblance. She also further articulates her notion of feeling.

The word "feeling" must be taken here in its broadest sense, meaning everything that can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling tones of a conscious human life. (15).

Again we see at the outset of these lectures that for Langer feeling is a rational activity. She further hone\es related ideas in this lecture entitled "Expressivenes." While she is discussing similarity of form in two lampshades of different size and color, she says

...what is the same in the big violet shade and the little green one? Nothing but the interrelations among their respective various dimensions. They are not 'the same'...Their spacial factors are put together in the same way, so they exemplify the same form. (17)

In other words, the mind perceives a congruency of relationships between two distinct things; the perception of form is an intellectual event.

She goes on to consider things or substances that have no definite shape, such as gases, mist, and water that when put into motion exhibit visible forms. Such form, she says, is "dynamic form." A waterfall, she notes, has such form, and living things have such form which their processes maintain as long as life continues (18). She notes that static shapes, like that of a river bed, are capable of expressing dynamic form. Here, she says, "...we have two congruent forms that hold between a dynamic form and a static one. That relation is important; we shall be dealing with it again when we come to consider the meaning of "living form" in art" (19).

Such a relationship is also important and present in metaphor, I think. The figure of speech expresses a dynamic relationship perceived between tenor and vehicle, where the image as vehicle in relation to a given context embodies the living form, to use Langer's phrase, of an idea. Again, in this lecture, she circles over the same idea, it seems, when she defines "expressive form, and this also could be a gloss on the dynamic structure of metaphor:

An expressive form is any perceptible or imaginable whole that exhibits relationships of parts, or points, or even qualities or aspects within the whole, so that it may be taken to represent some other whole whose elements have analogous relations. The reason for using such a form as a symbol is usually that the
thing it represents is not perceivable (to the senses) or readily imaginable. (20)

Pondering this definition of expressive form, and having seen that for Langer the image as perceived by a human being is such a form, we are nearing a description of the dynamic structure of metaphor in terms of Langer's key ideas of expression, presentational symbolism, perception of form, and living form as the dynamic content of artistic form. What she hasn't said directly, and I would like to add, confident that she has implied it, is that the perception of the relationship is the insight or meaning in a metaphor, as the Soviets Vygotsky and Bakhtin will also suggest in the context of the meaning of discourse.

In this lecture Langer addresses language directly, calling it "the most astounding and developed symbolic device humanity has evolved...." (21), for language embodies ideas, she says, and the 'equally inostensible elements of our perceptual world that we call facts." By virtue of language we can"think, remember, imagine, and finally conceive a universe of facts." Through language we reason as well as communicate with others, she tells us (21). This, she says, involves the "discursive form" of language.

Whatever resists projection into the discursive form of language is, indeed, hard to hold in conception, and perhaps impossible to communicate, in the proper and strict sense of the word....But fortunately our logical intuition, or form-perception, is really much more powerful than we commonly believe, and our knowledge--genuine knowledge, understanding--is considerably wider than our discourse. (21)

Here she directly addresses our central concern in this study, metaphor, and its function in cognition:

Even in the use of language, if we want to name something that is too new to have a name...or want to express a relationship for which there is no verb or other connective word, we resort to metaphor; we mention it or describe it as something else, something analogous. The principle of metaphor is simply the principle of saying one thing and meaning another, and expecting to be understood to mean the other. A metaphor is not language, it is an idea expressed by language, an idea that in its turn functions as a symbol to express something. It is not discursive and therefore does not really make a statement of the idea it conveys; but it formulates a new conception for our direct imaginative grasp (23, my emphasis)

Here we see Langer acknowledging quite directly how metaphors are symbols that present their significance for "direct imaginative grasp" Here, I
believe, we also have the essence of the creativity of thought and a sense of metaphor as the crux of both presentation and discursiveness in thinking.

Langer interestingly theorizes that metaphors extend language through their "wordless insight" communicated through the symbolic image while, at the same time, the discursive expression inevitably supersedes the "non-discursive pristine symbol." She says this is "the normal advance of human thought and language in that whole realm of knowledge where discourse is possible at all" (24). Although Langer goes on to emphasize in the essay the uniqueness of art in its emphatic presentational symbolism, the point has been made earlier that presentational symbolism is intrinsic to the ubiquitous metaphor, found in discursive prose as well as in poetry. This leitmotif of the essay illuminates the nature and function of metaphor in language revealing, I believe, the dialectical and organic interrelatedness of presentational and discursive expression in language. It is important to keep this insight clearly in mind as we proceed to another lecture entitled "Living Form."

In this lecture Langer is concerned with the content of art. She sees art as expressing sentient life, the life of feeling that is otherwise incommunicable. This life of feeling is organic, and art is a metaphor for it. She says "One of the most widely used metaphors in the literature of art is the metaphor of the living creature applied to the artistic product. Every artist finds 'life,' 'vitality,' or 'livingness' in a good work of art" (44). And again she notes that "Another metaphor of the studio, borrowed from the biological realm, is the familiar statement that every art work must be organic" (44).

An important qualifier, however, comes on the heels of this: "Certainly works of art are not really organisms with biological functions" (45). They are metaphors for life and sentience, in other words, not life and sentience themselves. Yet they have analogous properties, the most important of which is dynamic form. "An organism," she says here...is really not a thing at all. Its individual, separate, thing-like existence is a pattern of changes; its unity is a purely functional unity" (47). Its form is not static, it is what Langer calls "a form of motion, or a dynamic form" (48).

Vital form is always dynamic. An organism, like a waterfall, exists only while it keeps going. Its permanence is not the endurance of a material, but of a functional pattern. The most elementary feeling, therefore— one might say, the sheer sense of life—is a sense of that dialectic of permanence and change that governs the existence of every cell. That is the foundation of what Henry James called "felt life." (48)

After noting that a "waterfall is not an organism," she adds the missing dimension, transformation:

...an organism is always taking in material that is not of its own system, splitting it up, and transforming some of it into living
matter. Concomitantly, some living matter is always breaking down and resigning from the total activity. The one process is growth, and the other decay. Every organism is both growing and decaying. (49)

After calling this "the law of organic function" she gives the summary definition of living form that the essay has been leading to:

Living form, then, is in the first place dynamic form, that is, a form whose permanence is really a pattern of changes. Secondly, it is organically constructed; its elements are not independent parts, but interrelated, interdependent centers of activity--that is, organs. Thirdly, the whole system is held together by rhythmic processes; that is, the characteristic unity of life....And finally the law of living form is the dialectic of growth and decay, with its characteristic biographical phases....dynamism, inviolable unity, organization, rhythmic continuity, and growth. (53)

For Langer, art, then, is the "expression of human consciousness in a single metaphorical image" (53). For our purposes, the metaphor in literary art or in discursive prose symbolizes this at the level of image-as-vehicle presenting to the mind in relation to a given context a complex network of organic relationships. Metaphor has the property of symbolism embedded within it. Metaphoricity is the essential quality of art and an essential one in ordinary language.

In a later lecture, Langer focuses our attention on the human faculty that grasps presentational symbolism, intuition. This essay, "Artistic Perception as Natural Light," while furthering Langer's philosophy of art is important here in revealing an essential part of the intellectual activity that occurs in the perception of metaphor. For, as has been suggested above, the perception of metaphor involves the grasping of presentational symbolism. That is, the image as symbol functions in the metaphor as vehicle communicating a pattern of relationships presentationally to the mind of the perceiver. And, as has also been implied, the grasp of a single word prototypically depended directly and now depends latently, at least, on the perception of the root as symbolic image. Literary artists accentuate this latency.

Langer tells us that traditional notions of intuition in philosophy see it as irrational or mystical (e.g. Henri Bergson) whereas she sees it as intellectual since it involves what is fundamentally an intellectual activity, abstraction. Art, she says, presents an abstraction via the presentational symbol of "felt life" (60). Abstraction, for Langer, is the earmark of rationality, and intuition comprises all acts of insight or recognition of formal properties, of relations, of significance, and of abstraction and exemplification. It is more primitive than belief, which is true or false. Intuition is not true or false, but simply present (66).
Here we have a major clarifying point. Intuition grasps specific relationships simultaneously and directly through form. Intuition and discursive logic as rational powers interact dialectically to generate meaning in the mind. The "crucible" for this interaction is the metaphor. The metaphor is a unique and organic whole where the terms of the metaphor logically relate to generalizations about the world which the terms conjure up and to which they refer, as well as the reader and the reader's world whom they address.10

Langer concludes this lecture with a series of ideas about language and mind. She sees discursive logic and symbolism as having to do with "our awareness of things about us and our own relation to them." She sees imagination as dealing with "our subjective reality, feeling and emotion" and as giving "inward experiences form," making "them conceivable" (71). She implies in the use of "literal" (above) regarding language that in the metaphorical use of language, where the image as symbol presents form to intuition, we have what is normally associated with the arts, "the inward experience of form" associated with "feeling and emotion." And since metaphor is ubiquitous in discourse and presents images as symbols to the imagination, the individual felt life that Langer associates with art must also be a part of social discourse via the metaphor. Similarly, in literary art which uses real language as its medium, we find discourse involving "our relation to things about us and our own relation to them."11

Now we have a clearer sense of metaphor as the crucible of not only language, but of mind. The dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity is microcosmically present in the metaphor as it is macrocosmically in the arts: "The arts objectify subjective reality, and subjectify outward experience of nature" (74). Language with its metaphors is the link between self and society, the locus of inner/outer transformations.12

In the lecture "Imitation and Transformation in the Arts" Langer touches directly on metaphor in her discussion of the function of art. As before she sees art as expressive and abstractive representing not what the artist feels, but what the artist knows (91). She notes that "the aim of art is insight" (92), and "all understanding requires abstraction." (93). Further recapitulating the ground that we have already covered, she tells us that "there is no understanding without symbolization and no symbolization without abstraction" (93). From here she leads us directly to our prime concern: The abstractions of language, which govern most of our normal thinking, arise from a very fundamental, widespread but little recognized phenomenon inherent in the very nature of speech--the use of metaphor" (94).

An important idea that Langer discusses in this chapter is that of transformation. She notes that it occurs in art when the technique of the artist transcends or goes beyond simple imitation (98). Transformation she says, "consists in the rendering of a desired appearance without any actual representation of it, by the production of an equivalent sense-impression
rather than a literally similar one....such practices involve a transformation of
the idea...."(98). Langer states that such "treatment is the essence of art" (102).

From here it is a short step to metaphor. For this essential nonliteral
aspect of art is present in the metaphor

...metaphor is more familiar, more common and more obvious
than..."transformation" in art. In the history of language, in the
growth of human understanding, the principle of metaphorical
expression plays a vastly greater role than most people realize.
For it is the natural instrument of our greatest mental
achievement--abstract thinking....it makes us conceive things in
abstraction (Langer's emphasis, 104)

She continues directly relating the essence of art to metaphor discussing the
expression of the "genuinely new": "The normal way of expressing such a
conception is to seek something which is a natural symbol for it, and use the
name of the symbol to 'mean' the new idea" (105).

From here she drives deeper to the roots of words that have the same
symbolic function as the symbolic work of art, the image as symbol in the
metaphor, and the buried image in the root meanings of words. She notes
that "when we use words like "brilliance," "enlightenment," and other
expressions literally referring to light, to denote intelligence.... all are
metaphors directly conveying an image; and it is the image that expresses the
new insight, the nameless idea that is meant" (105). In a phrase, the essence
of art is found in the metaphor, the presentational symbol, and it is found not
only in works of art where image becomes symbol but also in metaphors
where it conveys insight symbolically and even in individual words where the
root can convey a buried image. Langer's work flashes with these insights, but
she does not always follow the paths that such illuminations provide.

Returning to Langer, however, she does conclude here that as a result of
transformation brought about in art and also in the metaphor, whether in
literature or in normal social discourse, meaning is "intuitively perceived...in
language" (106).

In a following lecture Langer continues to address the image as symbol
in human perception without claiming arts exclusive right to it. This occurs in a
discussion of the nature of symbols in art and their function entitled, "The Art
symbol and the symbol in Art." Here she tells us that the whole work of art... a
symbol, and its "import" is the quality of organic life (129). At the same time
she discusses the problem of defining symbolism. In one use of the term it
means using the convention of language to signify something, as words
signify concepts of things which in turn refer to things (130). Such words and
their concepts exist in relation to other words and their concepts in discourse
(130). Thus symbols in discourse have a "further function" which is to express
"ideas about things" (130). This, Langer says, is "the great office of symbols" which is not to refer to things and communicate facts, but to express ideas"
involving "a deeper psychological process, the formulation of ideas, or conception itself....the beginning of all rationality (131). So words as symbols refer to concepts of things (one of their symbolic functions) and also ideas about things involving the dynamic of conception itself, "the first requirement for thought," that is "conceiving things in connection" (131). She adds that this "is the level where imagination is born....symbolic presentation is the beginning of human mentality, 'mind' in the strict sense. As speech develops, so does the "supreme talent of envisagement," perceiving images as symbols. Langer tells us here that "...the popular notion of an image as a replica of a sense impression has made epistemologists generally miss the most important character of images, which is that they are symbolic" (131). Such symbols in consciousness "articulate ideas" (132). By way of this dynamic whatever is named through words, their images, and their relations becomes "an entity of thought" (132). She goes on to say that the art symbol rarifies this pristine function of symbols to articulate and present feeling (the highest form of which is thought).

Such articulation and presentation is the main thrust and importance of art in Langer's aesthetics raising it, philosophically in her thinking, to the level of thought. For our purposes, however, she provides important insights into the symbolic nature, via images as symbols, of language and thought.

In the final lecture of the book, "Poetic Creation," Langer deals with poetry as fine art where its chief importance is to articulate or present the forms of feeling. In this lecture she sounds very much like a formalist critic or theorist as she seems to pay exclusive attention to the entire work of literary art as presentational symbol and distinguishes it from the discourse-like images as symbols that it contains. We need not, for our purposes, concern ourselves much with these issues, other than to note that her fundamental denial of poetry as discourse ("poetry is not a kind of discourse at all," (139) has, I think, been carefully and systematically refuted by discourse theorists, such as Mary Pratt in Toward a Discourse Theory of Literary Art. We can, however, reject Langer's non-discursive sense of a poem and retain her penetrating insights into the image as symbol and the role of language in thinking. We need only stop at this lecture to note that she tells us at the conclusion of it that language has the power to "formulate the appearance of reality, a power fundamentally different from the communicative function, however involved with it in the evolution of speech" (160). It is this involvement that we must keep in mind and that is microcosmically present in the metaphor.

In the Appendix to this volume of lectures there appears a reprint of Langer's article, "Abstraction in Science and Abstraction in Art." This essay is of particular interest because of its concern with the dynamics of thought and the role that imagery and symbolism play in it. It is clear from the outset that Langer intends to make a qualitative distinction between the kind of thinking that characterizes science (discursive) and the kind that characterizes art (presentational). What they have in common, she says, is abstraction and
symbolism. Abstraction, she says, "is the recognition of a relational structure, or form, apart from the specific thing (or event, fact, image, etc.) in which it is exemplified. The difference lies in the way the recognition is achieved in art and science." (163).

A key word in this definition is "form." For Langer "artistic form is a perceptual unity of something seen, heard, or imagined...the Gestalt, of an experience." She continues, "the basic principle of "form" determines that close relation between apperceptive unity and logical distinctions" (165). This is the ancient notion of unity amid diversity, but, she says, the ancients might have "called it 'diversity in unity.' For this principle can relate many things to a whole or differentiate aspects of a whole (165). Form, according to Langer, is perceived in both discourse and art.

In discourse Langer tells us "certain relational factors in experience ...are either intuitively recognized or not at all, for example distinctness, similarity, congruence, relevance." The recognition of these relationships is what she means by logical intuition. For Langer, "all discourse is a device for concatenating intuitions, getting from one to another, and building up the greater intuitive apperception of a total Gestalt, or ideal whole" (166). The kind of intuition involved in art, she notes, "is a similar protological experience, but its normal progress is different. It begins with a total Gestalt and proceeds to distinctions of ideal elements within it" (166).

Therefore its symbolism is a physical or imaginal whole whereof the details are articulated, rather than a vocabulary of symbols that may be combined to present a coherent structure. That is why artistic form is properly called "organic" and discursive form "systematic," and also why discursive symbolism is appropriate to science and artistic symbolism to the conception and expression of vital experience....(167)

While this is a tidy distinction, it is troublesome in its absoluteness. For the artistic mode of intuition, according to Langer's earlier and compelling remarks, must be operating when the mind perceives the image as symbol (see above), and the distinction, as a result, must be a relative one (i.e. in science the discursive dominates, and in art the presentational does--the scientist primarily moves from part to whole while the artist primarily moves from whole to part). Artistic perception is integral to the grasping of a metaphor, and the metaphor is ubiquitous in science as well as art. The difference, I suggest, is one of degree, not of kind. The "organic" quality that she rightly attributes to art also characterizes all human thought at the level of metaphor.

She rightly notes, however, that "This instinctive mental activity (abstraction) is the process of symbol-making, of which the most amazing result is language. Symbolization depends on abstraction of form from
experience (167). "The abstraction of formal elements....permeates all thought and imagination...."(168).

At this point in her article she focuses on language noting that it has "two essential functions, which may be called, somewhat broadly, 'connotation' and denotation' (169).

Connotation belongs to all symbols; it is the symbolic function that corresponds to the psychological act of conception. Denotation accrues to symbols in practical use, for the applicability of concepts to 'reality' is...their constant pragmatic measure. Both conception and denotation through language are natural activities, instinctive, popular, and therefore freely improvisational and elaborative; and both involve a constant practice of abstraction from the pure experience of this, here and now. (169)

A word, says Langer, "designates any quality that can symbolize a certain feeling." This, she says is "the law of that metaphorical extension whereby whole groups of words arise out of one 'phonetic 'root,' or 'root metaphor'" (171). She shows here how logically opposite denotations associated with words like high and deep derive oftentimes from single words, like the Latin, altus, meaning both high and deep because the root of that Latin word originally symbolized the feeling associated with both height and depth (171). Here denotation organically derives from connotation, thought from feeling, discursive thinking from presentational thinking, and discourse from artistic intuition. We see again Langer undercutting her absolute distinctions and demonstrating the organic unity that is the foundation of human feeling and thinking.

We see her here carefully qualifying remarks as relative notions rather than the absolute distinctions presented earlier in her "Poetic Creation" lecture. For example, she notes that: "The attachment of verbal labels to things is the major purpose of words in social use" (my emphasis, 172). She admits it is not the only purpose.

She notes here that metaphor requires abstraction of form in order to justify "the substitution of one image for another (173). This requires a sense of the general, a necessary prerequisite to science as well as poetry! As she puts it, "we find that both art and science constantly tend toward the maximum revelation of abstract elements...for the same purpose....(173). And again, "art and science spring from the same root, namely, the impulse to symbolic expression--of which the richest, strongest, and undoubtedly oldest manifestation is language (though) they separate practically from the beginning" (177).

She concludes that "the expanded metaphor of feeling" that is art is "invented and recognized by the same intuition that makes language grow
from the 'root-metaphors' of fundamentally emotive significance" (180). While saying here that "science is general and art specific" though both are equally abstract, she also has clearly suggested that they are cognitively one in their derivation and suggested in spite of herself, perhaps, that each mode of knowing, latently, at least, involves the other. She tells us "...science moves from the general denotation to precise abstraction; art, from precise abstraction to vital connotation...." (180)

And the "crucible" or dynamic and organic basis of both is metaphor. Langer sets out to establish the organic nature of mind, its symbolic processes, and its symbolism in her magnum opus, Mind. There she develops incompletely the biological basis of mentation. For our purposes, most of her insights into the metaphorical basis of the mind are never completed since the third volume of the work stops short of rendering explicit the organic nature of human knowing. Yet metaphor, I believe, would have played a major role in Langer's epistemology. Especially in the first volume of that incomplete work do we see metaphor's importance touched upon as Langer launches forth on her study of the organic development of the human mind.

Susanne Langer says in her introduction to the three-volume work Mind that it is an attempt to construct "a biological theory of feeling that should logically lead to an adequate concept of mind, with all that the possession of mind implies" (xviii). Her theory of the biological life of the mind entailing a dynamic entity characterized by symbolism, as in art, is, she says, a new way of seeing the mind (xxii). The work, then, is an attempt to develop a theory of the mind as biological phenomenon. The three volumes must be gleaned for the insights they provide concerning the relationships between feeling, thought, metaphor, and organicism. It is in these areas that this work, though incomplete, advances thoughts and insights presented earlier in her work.

Early in Volume One Langer tells us that "Feeling" is a verbal noun expressing a process, like the word "heat." Such verbal constructs psychologically suggest things, though in fact they refer to processes. This "reifying tendency of our grammar" (21), presents us with a challenge, she says, to reconstruct a sense of feeling:

...for the thesis I hope to substantiate here is that the entire psychological field--including human conception, responsible action, rationality, knowledge--is a vast and branching development of feeling. This does not mean that all reasoning is "really" rationalization, all judgment "really" emotional....There is not some primitive form of feeling which is its "real" form, any more than a bird is "really an egg or water is "really" a vapor. Emotion as we know it is not even a primitive form of feeling....Human emotion is phylogenetically a high development from simpler processes, and reason is another one; human mentality is an unsurveyably complex dynamism of their
interactions with each other, and with several further specialized forms of cerebral activity, implicating the whole organic substructure. (23)

This sense of human mentality as a "complex dynamism" of interaction of the forms of feeling, including emotion and reason, which implicates "the whole organic substructure," suggests human mentality as a highly differentiated organic process characterized by wholeness and interaction. These characteristics, we have seen already, are found in metaphor: both presentation, via the symbolic image that is the vehicle, and discursiveness, the fate of the metaphorical insight, interact there as vehicle and tenor strike a dialectical relationship in their interaction that transforms the organic whole. Metaphor, we might suspect from these opening remarks, plays an important role in the dynamic of the mind.

Dynamic interaction is emphasized from the beginning of this work. Langer tells us that the living organism "and its environment may be looked upon as two interacting systems....the vital process is essentially a special type of mutual interaction....constant interchange...."(25). The interaction, she adds, is not symmetrical, but it is a constant process involving dialectical interaction and transformation of matter exchanged.

The organism, in toto and in every one of its parts, has to "keep going." Every act of a living unit transforms its situation and necessitates action under the impact of that new development as well as of any fortuitous changes coinciding with it. This is what Whitehead called the "creative advance" of nature. It is certainly the pattern of life. (26)

The concept of feeling, then, is Langer's starting point for her philosophy of mind. She sets about showing how the mind is a sophisticated instance of this dynamic and organic interaction, feeling. And what we always feel, she says, are organic processes (24), either as action or impact, from this arises a sense of subjectivity and objectivity, respectively. This "proposed new concept of feeling,...permits a new way of construing the greater concept of mind....one may hope to describe 'mind' as a phenomenon in terms of the highest physiological processes." And, she adds, "That is the purpose of this book" (29).

The intrinsic relative nature of mentation according to Langer can be seen in a closer look at her early sense of subjective and objective that was just touched upon. These terms, she notes, are "derived...from the traditional dichotomy of subject and object, perceiver and perceived...." (31). In Langer they denote "modes of feeling" and "any felt process may be subjective at one time and objective at another, and contain shifting elements of both kinds all the time" (31). They are terms denoting "functional transient properties."
Since organic functions have dynamic forms, which they build up and melt down again constantly, their identifiable properties are transient. The properties in question are two possible modes of feeling, i.e., of psychical phases of activity. (31).

Langer goes on to denounce the "fetish of objectivity" which she attributes to the social sciences which is evidenced in their "jargon" (38). Such jargon is, she says, the result of slavish imitation of the laboratory terminology of the natural sciences. Other "idols of the laboratory" that Langer points out are physicalism, methodology, and mathematization. It is here that Langer chides behaviorists for their failure to come to terms with their real subject. She notes that behavioral scientists have created a metaphor for the mind that filters the reality to a sterile "behavior" (46). To look at human mentation and psychical activity this way, she says, is like considering human speech as sound waves without acknowledging that it means something. Such behavioristic attempts to understand mind are doomed to foolishness regarding the mind (51). A philosophical phase of scientific development has been missed that properly "lies at the very inception of research" (53). It is this philosophical phase of inquiry into the mind that she hopes to provide.

In the chapter "Prescientific Knowledge" Langer presents the function of the image in mental activity. She says that an image "abstracts" the "phenomenal character" that organizes and enhances impressions (59). These images, furthermore involve all the senses, not just visual. Such imaging is the fundamental abstracting process of the mind: "...we apprehend everything which comes to us as impact from the world by imposing some image on it that stresses its salient features and shapes it for recognition and memory" (59). These images have "high intellectual value" because they are imposed on new perceptions, and, as a result, we "tend to see the form of one thing in another". This gives rise to concepts, for "all the things which one image roughly fits are gathered together as instances of one conception". Such an image presentationally expresses, therefore, an "interpretation" of impressions in terms of such conceptions (60). Metaphor, she adds, occurs when traits of an image resemble those of images associated with other conceptions. Such connections can be either essential or relational, she points out, as in the expressions "leaves of a book" or the "flow of time" (62). Although these insights, she adds, have been noted by several philosophers of this century, they

...generally assume that here is a clear distinction between the literal meaning of a work or a statement and its metaphorical extensions. This assumption, which is almost a premise of common sense to civilized human beings, may nonetheless be unsafe in reconstructing the part language has played in the articulation not only of ideas, but of perception....The primitive use of words may have been much less bound to specifiable objects than its present use, much richer in connotation and therefore more elastic in denotation, so that literal and
metaphorical meanings were not distinguishable, but the same word simply meant a variety of things which could all symbolize each other. (62)

She then points out how many words originally referred to a range of impressions, such as high and deep, bright and dull, clear and obscure, as can be seen in their etymological roots. Like Emerson, she roots all abstractions, also, in sense impressions (see footnote 13 above). She also notes that

the light of reason or of joy were named by the same word because they were charged with the same feeling, and consequently taken as the same thing, ...their distinct characters only showed up in language in the course of its logical development. The physical meaning became the literal one because it was the most public and therefore socially the most negotiable one. (63)

This "process of seeing things as exemplifications of subjectively created images gives us the original, objective phenomena that theoretical reasoning seeks to understand in causal terms, often with the help of highly abstract working models (64). It is from here that she recommends the study of art for insight into the nature of feeling, since it is its objectification (65).

To circle back to our subject of metaphor, the image in the metaphor functions in the same presentational way, via intuition, that it does in art as she describes it here in Volume One of Mind. Thus, the mind's handling of metaphor intrinsically involves presentational symbolism and intuition. We need not follow Langer further here through the intricacies of her analysis of the import of art as feeling. Suffice it to say, as Langer does at the end of this lengthy middle chapter on art, that it is a symbol and thereby relational. In this light art "is the objectification of feeling, and the subjectification of nature," (87); my point here is that metaphor is too. Metaphor in a microcosmic way does what art does macrocosmically: it relates the subjective world of feeling (including thought) to the objective world of nature. What Langer says about the epistemological significance of art applies also to metaphor:

The intuition of artistic import is a high human function which so far both psychology and epistemology have completely bypassed. Yet its roots lie at the same depth as those of discursive reason, and are, indeed, largely the same. (89).

And although Langer goes on to discuss art as a separate and unique instance of human knowing, she has already established its ubiquitous basis, in metaphor, throughout human discourse. She congratulates the New Criticism, for example, in this chapter for concentrating on artistic form, and in so doing seems to align herself with a view of literary art as distinct from normal discourse. Yet, as I have tried to show and as Langer continually
intimates, the organic substance of human discourse is made of metaphor with its symbolism and presentational address to the mind's logical intuition of form.

So much is the metaphorical process intrinsic to human thought, and human thought a vital, biological process, that Langer pushes on in this dense chapter to compellingly define vital process itself as a dialectical one sharing the dynamics of feeling. She tells us that

...the primary function of images is representation (which is to say that they are essentially and originally symbolic), and ...their formation is a living process....(94)

...the work of art is not a 'copy'of a physical object at all, but the (presentation)...of a mental image (95)

The art image has an irresistible appearance of livingness and feeling, though it may not represent anything living....It is this sort of vitality and feeling that constitutes the import of art (96)

...the forming of a mental image is an act, a vital process, as ramified and complex as all functions of living things are. The product of that act, i.e., the image itself,...still bears the stamp of the thing it really is--part of the cerebral process itself, a quintessence of the very act that produces it, with its deeper reaches into the rest of the life in which it occurs. (98)

And finally, she tells us that "a work of art is like a metaphor....One might well call a work of art a metaphorical symbol" (104). The vital tension that she says is the import of art is distilled in the metaphor.

She then adds that "symbolic projection is a transformation" (105) because the feelings projected are transformed and inhere in an image the substance of which is virtual: "...the import of art inhere in the symbol...because it is an image...its substance is virtual, and the reality it conveys has been transformed by a purely natural process...." (106). Thus, the metaphor, like the art symbol, presents an image to the mind that is virtual in substance, the result of transformation, and that by virtue of its relations with nature and the tenor (another image or idea) conveys meaning to the mind.

This sense of human mentality, not in terms of "sensations and associations," but rather in terms of "the principles of symbol and meaning, expression and interpretation, perception of form and import" constitutes what Langer calls the "revolution ...in philosophical thinking" (108), and the concept of the metaphor as suggested by Langer's theory of art and rendered, I hope, more clear by this commentary, is the crux of it.
In the chapter "The Artist's Idea" Langer makes the claim that the "essential function of art is not communication" (115). However, in the same chapter she says that the "prime function of art is to make the felt tensions of life stand still to be looked at" (115). My point here is that felt tensions amount to the relations between things, and such relations are not necessarily beyond the pail of language or thought. What at a glance appears, and perhaps consciously intended by Langer, to be a formalist statement, need not be. What Langer's statement today might mean is something like T. Todorov's interpretations of M. Bakhtin's dialogical principle: human reality (including thought and meaning) resides in the relationships between things.

A good example of Langer's hedging of her formalist bet appears in this "The Artist's Idea" chapter. After claiming that the artist is only interested in projecting a "quality" of feeling, not an idea or conclusion about life, in his or her work, Langer admits that in discursive reasoning there are flashes of insight that really amount to the same thing. In which case, I would add, the content of art, if it is quality, is feeling in the broad and radical way in which she earlier defined it. The quality expressed in a work of art is a relationship between thoughts, emotions, and nature. It is not discursive thoughts, not moods, not the representation of nature, but the complex of organic (in Langer's sense, dialectical and processive) relationships that exist and are felt in the artist's mind.

There is some analogy to this (quality) in our discursive, speculative thought, in that a thinker often sees a promise of new ideas, a potential use, in a general proposition he has not analyzed and deductively exploited or even safely established yet. (121)

Langer goes on to remind us of ideas already suggested or developed: that "it is this quality that constitutes beauty in art" (127), that "intuition is the basic intellectual function" involved in the creation and appreciation of art (128), and that such "intuition is the basis of intellect" (141) because the grasp of symbolism requires it (an idea well developed in Philosophy In A New Key).

In this same chapter Langer turns to some interesting speculations about the ontology of speech. Her point here is that logical intuition and presentational symbolism play an intimate role in the development of thought and speech.

A highly developed mind grows up on the fine articulation of generally strong and ready feeling, both subjective—and objective, aroused by peripheral impacts. Where the process of interpretation is constantly elicited both by sensory impacts and by an active central production of images, inward verbalizing and variable emotional tone....Symbolic activity begets its own data for constant interpretation and reinterpretation, and its characteristic feelings, especially of
strain and expectation, vagueness and clearness, ease and frustration, the "sense of rightness" that closes a finished thought process, as it guarantees any distinct intuition (147)

All of this reminds us that feeling is part of the thought process. As Langer notes, "the wide discrepancy between reason and feeling" is unreal, for "intellect is a high form of feeling--a specialized, intensive feeling about intuitions" (149). That the image in the human mind is a symbol and the basis of intellecutive activity causes Langer to wax lyrical:

...(the) image seems to be capable of encompassing the whole mind of man, including its highest rational activities. It presents the world in the light of a heightened perception, and knowledge of the world as intellectual experience. Rationality, in this projection, is not epitomized in the discursive form that serves our thinking, but is a vision of that thinking itself. (150)

The image, of course, as symbol is the image in a metaphor. Thought is basically metaphorical, therefore. She concludes this chapter noting that the mind captures in its process the relationship between the subjective and the objective:

...so human experience is a dialectic of symbolic objectification and interpretive subjectification.... An image of mind is that of a living process, and therefore entails the projection of 'living form' in a symbolic transformation. (152)

In "A Chapter on Abstraction" Langer tells us that "tension and resolution" are the fundamental vital qualities of any successful work of art. The same, I would add, is true of a metaphor, therefore. The tension between tenor and vehicle must be resolved in the integrity of the figure, and such integrity is immediately perceivable to the intuitive aspect of the mind as carefully elaborated by Langer. In this chapter Langer intends to explain the artistic process. What she does, for our purposes, is clarify the mental activity involved in the perception and understanding of the metaphor.

That relationships are what art, metaphor, and thinking are about is further stressed in Langer in this middle section of Mind in terms of her emphasis on tension. Tension is the relational force existing between aspects of form in a work of art, between things in the mind, between images and ideas in a metaphor. She identifies form with polarities that exist as tensions in a work of art, for example:

...most of the different creative processes are just the many ways of building up and elaborating and resolving tensions......tension, perhaps, (is) the original fact, the deepest source, which produces the polarities in the first place....(163)...in all the arts...organization of tensions is the basic technique in
projecting the image of feeling, the artist's idea, in any medium.
(164)

I might add here that although Langer doesn't mention it explicitly, there is an important insight here into metaphor. For what metaphor does is establish tension between vehicle and tenor, that is they come into relation as their contexts merge effecting new insight through transformation.

Langer's elaboration of the tensional aspects of artistic form need not detain us here, but before leaving her discussion of abstraction we must consider a fleeting, but telling reference to language and word meaning that again takes us to the heart of language and thought in terms of metaphor. Here she notes "the shift of meanings in words denoting sensory qualities, which seems to be based on a principle of truly spontaneous sensuous metaphor, and finally to take a turn which reveals a mode of abstraction developed only in works of art" (191). Here once again she reveals the entire dynamic of art, including presentational symbolism, logical intuition, and organic process of normal language as it exists in the world of human discourse. Words are often times "ambiguous and unstable" in their histories exhibiting "shifts" of meaning. For example, the word "purple" in English means a color resulting from a mix of red and blue, whereas in German the "cognate word purpur" means deep dark red color. In this case, she shows with much etymological documentation, the real meaning of the word is really majesty, "richness, dignity, power, also the vital warmth of blood, form the connotation of the word" (192). This meaning is the connotation of the word that precedes the denotation of a specific hue; it is sensed and presented symbolically entailing presentational symbolism, logical intuition, and feeling. And since we know that a symbol is an abbreviated metaphor (i.e. vehicle presented, tenor implied), she has touched on the metaphorical basis of word meaning. Similarly, "clear" is derived from the Latin "clarus" originally meaning "shining" and later meaning loud and pure sound (192). These are, she tells us, "only a few examples of the unconscious use of sensuous metaphor by which language expands as expansion is needed." And "all these words either have direct application to mental states and acts, or have close cognates that are obvious extensions to psychical phenomena." These words, then, are "natural symbols" of feeling (193). What she calls the "virtual dimensions of art are at work here, being created by the imaginative mind to express symbolic impressions."

"sensuous metaphor is public enough to be a creative force in language, and secondary illusions can be deliberate achievements.... Whatever the context evokes will probably clinch the emotive abstraction. (195)

The "conceptual processes," says Langer, "of which the metaphorical extensions of words are manifold," are "basic forms of subjective feeling" that "relate objectively disparate sensations." This is, she says, only one of the discoveries that philological investigation reveals:
There is another abstractive principle that comes to light if the study of sensuous metaphor is pushed just a little further... (195)

Many words or 'roots' denoting qualities give rise not only to all sorts of derivative terms involving those qualities, but by further departure produce cognates wherein the original connotation is more and more attenuated, ending up in its exact opposite... (e.g.) 'gloom,' which means darkness, from 'glow.'... 'wan' (as)... pale, and derives from the Anglo-Saxon 'wann'... meaning 'dark.' Latin 'altus' means both 'high' and 'dee' (195)

She concludes this discussion noting that

The guiding principle of such changes is an aspect of conceptual thinking which no conventional symbolism can express; the fact that every primitive concept arises and exists in an area of relevance, ranging from its own logical domain to its converse domain, and including all conceptions lying between these extremes. The roots of language usually convey ideas of felt experience.... In every sensory experience there is the threat of evanescence and the threat of intolerability, and the precarious balance between them is implicit in every moment of perfection. A sensible quality, therefore, gives into the artist's hand the whole range of feeling it can express, even the existence of that range itself. (197)

Here, then we have a conclusion about feeling that includes sensation in an organic continuum with thought, connotation in an organic continuum with denotation, presentational symbolism in an organic continuum with discursive symbolism, and also an implicit if not explicit declaration that the symbolic perception associated with art is found in the phylogenetic development of language.

The remainder of Volume One deals with Langer's concept of living form and act. Her purpose is to ultimately show that human acts are organically derived, context-related events sharing all of the traits of an organism, and to show that art as the result of being symbolic of such acts must share the same traits of organic form ("if feeling is a culmination of vital process, any articulated image of it must have the semblance of that vital process..." (199). For our purposes, this sense of human act is important not to prove, necessarily, any point about art as Langer intends, but to reveal some very important features of language and, finally, metaphor.

Briefly, Langer shows in the chapter "Living Form in Art and Nature" that organic reality is indivisible forming a processive whole, that its elements are not things but acts which "emanate" from the context or web of relations in terms of which it exists, that it is characterized by dialectical phase rhythm (a
tension-release pattern where the resolution of tensions sets up new tensions, etc.), and that it is characterized by constant, processive growth or becoming. She will show that art, which symbolizes such organic reality, must virtually embody it and its rhythm. My point here is a similar one about language and metaphor. Language embodies the thought process and shares its organic quality; metaphor is a symbol of thought and virtually presents its organic quality in the relations that the metaphor embodies.

For Langer the act concept is a meaningful unit of vital process, for "elements in art have not the character of things, but of acts." She says they are "active-act-like, even where they are not 'acts' in the dramatic sense..." (202):

> All acts, including purely cerebral ones, are elements of a life. They arise in it and take shape and have some sort of termination, either in processes propagated outward beyond the organism, or else by spending themselves internally, reaching their own point of rest, or being taken up into other acts as constituents. This means that acts have characteristic dynamic forms; and one of the first revelations gained from works of art is that "living form" in art has those same characteristics. (200)

Thus, we can now say, though Langer is speaking of art and not specifically language here, that metaphor is an act of the mind symbolically presenting its vital characteristics of indivisibility and relational process. Regarding art, however, Langer says that it is always the presentation of images of acts or virtual acts, as in drama (204). A key trait of the organic act, according to Langer, is "the principle of diclectic," a "phase principle" where "the consummation of one phase is the preparation for another, which in its own consummation prepares its successor, often a replica of the predecessor" (204). This is "the basis of rhythm" in life processes, both cosmic and microcosmic. It is characterized by interaction and transformation. She notes that "The unity of a work of art stems primarily from the interdependence of its elements, and is further secured by this dialectical pattern of their relations" (204). Although she speaks here of art, these same statements apply to the metaphor, I believe, in that the metaphor effects a transformation that is the new insight delivered by the process. Moreover, neither the vehicle nor the tenor can be isolated; they exist in the metaphor only in terms of one another, in terms of the relation that they strike with one another that effects the unity of the metaphor and its insight. Furthermore, as Langer has suggested, a metaphor begins a process that does not end with itself but continues in several ways. The process involves the movement from presentation and connotation to discursiveness and denotation if we consider what happens to a metaphor in social discourse as it moves from fresh insight to cliche or dead metaphor and what happens in philology when a word arises from the interaction of root meanings.
In this chapter, "Living Form in Art and Nature," Langer says that the semblance of organic life in art is the result of a complex of dialectical rhythms creating the "quality" or feeling of vitality or life (209). I would suggest that the fundamental dialectic of relationship between tenor and vehicle in a "live" (as opposed to "dead") metaphor is a source of vitality in human expression in normal discourse and this dialectical principle is present, structurally, throughout the forms of discourse wherever it is vital and expressive, certainly not only in art. I will return to this point in the next chapter of this study, but perhaps another connection between what Langer says about art and what I am saying about metaphor in relation to thought and metaphor is in order. She notes in this chapter that human perception depends on sensations and conception (this, of course, is a point we saw her make in earlier works, especially Problems in Art, but here it takes a new twist). Not only art, but also perception of the image involves the subjectification of nature and the objectification of subjective feeling. Here she says that the gradients in sensation for humans correspond to the gradients of feelings, and she says that the range of feelings is really an undivided continuum that presents itself as degrees to the mind as it corresponds to specific sensations. It is this relation between inner and outer worlds that the symbolic image captures in art, as she says, but, I would add, such a relation is also in the living metaphor occurring in any human being's speech. The metaphor is by virtue of the symbolism inherent in it an "objectification of subjective realities," and the perception of a metaphor in discourse is what Langer calls, with respect to art, the "appreciation of projected living form" (219). I'd suggest here that the difference between literary art and normal discourse is one of degree not of kind. Langer expresses this continuity in this chapter as she says, "this dynamic pattern belongs to art itself, because it is an inescapable pattern of life" (219). Notice that as she moves art closer and closer to the organic, she increasingly undercuts the formalist purity that she, from time to time, tries to claim for it.

Langer finishes this chapter with a series of correspondences that she proposes exists between art and organisms that need not concern us here. She ends the chapter with an insight relevant to the metaphor, however. She notes that "a symbol always presents its import in simplified form, which is exactly what makes that import accessible for us." In fact, she says, it is "incomparably simpler than life" (244). She touches here, I believe, unwittingly upon the editing or abstracting function of the image. The image which we perceive and mentally conceive simplifies the suggestiveness of reality so that the mind may grasp it. The image as symbol in the metaphor also does this.

Next Langer moves into a chapter entitled "The Act Concept and its Derivatives." This concept of act springs from her notion of living activity as a "continuous process" so that "any division into phases or stages is entirely artificial" (260). These are not "material parts of a living thing" but rather they are "elements in the continuum of a life" (261). The point relevant to metaphor here is that she will eventually show that events in the mind, including the symbolic image and metaphor itself, are acts in this sense. So it is important to
gain a clear sense of what constitutes an act as well as what its properties are in order to enhance our notion of what a metaphor is as a mental event.23 She tells us that the "act concept is a fecund and elastic concept" (261):

An act may subsume another act, or even many other acts. It may also span other acts which go on during its rise and consummation and cadence without becoming part of it. Two acts of separate inception may merge so that they jointly engender a subsequent act. These and many other relations among acts form the intricate dynamism of life which becomes more and more articulated, more and more concentrated and intense, until some of its elements attain the phase of being felt, which I have termed "psychical," and the domain of psychology develops within the wider realm of biology, especially zoology. (261)

We see here a bold attempt to see vitality as an organic continuum ranging from the physical to the psychical. Such activity (i.e. vital acts concatenated) is the "basic phenomena" (264) characterizing all living processes. Langer further gives us a description in terms of dialectical tension of the act:

What gives every act its indivisible wholeness is that its initial phase is the building up of a tension, a store of energy which has to be spent; all subsequent phases are modes of meting out that charge, and the end of the act is the complete resolution of the tension. (268)

This description, I suggest, applies to the metaphor with its dialectical interaction of tenor and metaphor creating a felt tension in the mind as the import of the metaphor is grasped thus resolving the tension. However, Langer never applies the notion to metaphor explicitly. In other words, metaphor is a mental act, an emblem of a living process carrying out the dialectically rhythmical pattern of life.

I should add that Langer does stress the essential difference between machine and organism here. She says that acts do not occur in mechanisms (272 f.n.), they are found exclusively in organisms. She adds that they are "reflected in the art symbol" and "are relational" (275) as well. It is precisely in this way that her act concept applies to the metaphor. Like the art symbol, the metaphor as elaborated symbol embodies the dynamics of the mind that created it.

In this chapter Langer squares off against mechanical "computer psychology, as she calls it, "where machines, people, societies, brains and camera films exchange places, and where values, consciousness, will and autonomy are defined so that computers may have them" (276 f.n.). In opposition to such views of the mind she agrees with Maslow about the complexity of causes for human acts, not the least of which, for our concern
with metaphor, is his idea that human behavior is motivated by individuals but also determined by biological, cultural, and situational matters as well (276 f.n.). Such motivational complexity, she says, is not characteristic of machines. A point is made by Langer with implications for grasping the dynamics of meaning, metaphor, and language when she notes that

Every act arises from a situation. The situation is a constellation of other acts in progress....the substance of a situation is always the stream of advancing acts which have already arisen from previous situations punctuated by previous impacts; centripetally proceeding acts...impinge on that continuous integral process, differentiating and developing its myriad possible forms. All distinguishable acts arise from this matrix, which is their situation. (281)

This description of organic acts in its dynamism, I suggest, applies to the process of thought and language both psychologically and culturally. Finally, as I see it, the metaphor is a distillation and emblem of the relational basis of thought and language.

It is precisely, says Langer, this dialectical interaction of inner and outer that behaviorist versions of human activity miss. As a result they flee from the essence of their study, relational process (286). It is important, further, to realize that for Langer

The dynamism of life lies in the nature of acts as such....Every act...has an initial phase, a phase of acceleration and sometimes increasing complexity, a turning point, or consummation, and a closing phase, or cadence. The initial phase is its impulse. (291)

She further adds that "acts are the lowest terms of the study of all life" (298) and that "out of this matrix all mental and behavior acts arise" (304). According to Langer, acts in their abstractable forms are "actions" and sequences of acts make up "activity" (306). And vital activity is characterized by rhythms, concatenated (not necessarily periodic) patterns of acts (323)

Dialectical rhythms...play such a major role in vital functions that their importance in the activity and even the physical existence of organisms makes them an essential mark of living form in nature, as their virtual image is of 'living form' in art. (324)

Organic activity according to this "act concept" provides the constituent terms act and situation, motivation and actualization (369), and the "class of relations which obtain between situations and acts" is "pression" (370). This coined term, for Langer, identifies the relationships between acts and situations that "determine the form of an act" (370).
In these terms Langer proceeds to build a theory of the evolution of vital activity that results in mental acts or mind. However, only certain aspects of her elaborate argument that occupies the last part of this lengthy first volume of Mind and the remaining two volumes of the work remain to be commented upon as they shed further light on the function of language in thought and particularly the role of metaphor in this process.

Consciousness, she says, arises out of feeling, and "the first felt acts were sensory" incurring "...the division into what is felt as impact and what is felt as autonomous act: objective feeling, or sensibility, and subjective feeling or emotivity" (425) Another characteristic of organisms is growth, and Langer points out that "growth--in nature as in art--is not always expansive," for "acts may grow in intensity" where they "finally break over into the purely intraorganic phase of being felt" (443). She concludes the volume announcing the birth of consciousness:

This is not a shift of functions, but the emergence of an entirely new phenomenon, 'feeling' in the broadest sense, or consciousness. It is a crisis in natural history as great as the emergence of life from physico-chemical processes; the emergence of a novel quality in the evolutionary course of life....As it did so, however, 'life' in another than physical sense originated with it--"life" as the realm of value. For value exists only where there is consciousness. Where nothing ever is felt, nothing matters. (444)

Here we have consciousness in terms of feeling.

Early in the second volume of Mind Langer distinguishes animal and human consciousness. Human agents, she says, "hold our acts together by a conception of purpose and means..., which holds us to our original intention.....An imaginative presentation of the conditions we hope to effect is contained in the purposive concept." Whereas, "In animal acts, the over-all tension is preformed in the impulse, and the act is apparently not controlled by an image of external conditions to be achieved, but by a constant internal pressure (instinctive drive) toward its consummation" (66). The distinguishing human trait, therefore, is conception via the symbolic image, the same symbolic image found in perception, metaphors, and art, created and perceived by the symbolic imagination as discussed in her earlier works. Such creation, perception, and symbolism involves high order feeling, human presentational and discursive thought dialectically entrained to effect human understanding. Instinct and empathy determine, in the context of situation, animal acts while symbolic perception and conception, in the context of situation, guide human activity.

Langer notes that the development of human brain (larger than any other animal in proportion to the length of its spine) subjected it to being "overloaded with stimuli" and as a defense, she theorizes, stimuli responses
were stored by means of envisagement rather than acted out. Dreaming and the unconsciousness were some of the offshoots of this process (262). This theory of the "vicarious completion of impulses" begins the development of imagination in the human species and "becomes the groundwork of symbolization, conception, and all other peculiarly human forms of cerebration" (264). And with the beginning of symbolism we have the implied metaphor.

According to Langer, envisagement or image-making, which is necessary to the metaphoric process, probably began as involuntary self-defense (as nocturnal dreams function today, she says) but eventually came under conscious control.

The transition from the automatic completion of started acts ...to the deliberate envisagement of things not present and situations not actually given is another major move in the shift from animal mentality to mind...which involves the genesis of the decisive humanizing process, symbolization. (288)

Langer calls the appearance of symbolism "the mark of humanity"

...and its evolution was probably slow and cumulative until the characteristic mental function, semantic intuition--the perception of meaning--emerged from the unconscious process Freud called the dream work into conscious experience. (This)...generation of symbolic forms may have had a long history, making images that departed from their sensory originals to draw in older, forgotten experiences and gather up their emotional values, until the cathexes they carried were out of all proportion to whatever manifest object-character they had (289).

She notes that "once the pure form is abstracted and remembered (from dream), it may be suggested by actual perceptions of waking life...." This "recognition of sameness or similarity is an intuition, as form perception itself is." This "logical intuition of similarity, which involves sameness and difference, seems to occur only in non-dreaming states" and "the whole development of logical thought and semantical insight to which it ultimately leads belongs to our waking hours" (291). This "momentous step from form perception to the sense of significance," remembering that a symbol is an abbreviated metaphor, marks the advent of metaphor in human thought beginning as a sense of "vague import" and finally leading "to the development of a high symbolic form, the metaphorical symbol...." (295). She then conjectures that long utterances associated with physical actions preceded words (307). While she admits that the exact origin of speech is a moot point that linguists like Otto Jespersen (speech arose from song) and Noam Chomsky (his formal analyses "throw no light on the beginnings of speech") disagree upon, she is quite emphatic that "surely the catalyst which precipitated the new and unique power of speech was symbolic conception,
the intuition of meaning" (310). Since we know that the symbol is an abbreviated metaphor (i.e., vehicle with tenor implied), we can say that the advent of the metaphor marks the great shift and that it is intimate with uniquely human speech, language, and thought.

In the last chapter of this volume, "Symbols and the Human World," Langer states that "language makes every speaker...a thinker," and "the influence of language on human life goes much deeper than communication; it is intrinsic to thinking, imagining, even our ways of perceiving" (318). She continues in this vein with an insight very relevant to the importance of metaphor to thought:

Conception, far from being abstracted from sensory experience, has grown up in constant interaction with the latter....A concept is born of words, its exemplification found in the perceptible world....The part played by imagery in the formation of concepts shows the intimate relation of perceptual and intellectual processes at all levels of human mental action.

Images, metaphors, and metaphorical symbols do not decorate our thoughts; they embody and shape them. She adds, "...communication, no matter how great its role in human society, is only one of the functions of language, and probably one which became more and more important as speech developed" (324). Language, therefore, transforms humankind's world or ambient giving it almost limitless dimension, for language permits the bringing to one's attention of any object or event no matter what the separation or circumstances of distance and time. Memory and our sense of time also depend on language, she points out (334). Thus language with its metaphors is the medium of the "dialectic"

which makes (human) ...life...a real and constant cerebral process, the interplay between the two fundamental types of feeling, peripheral impact and autonomous action, or objective and subjective feeling. (342)

In fact, Langer concludes that

The whole mental shift of the Hominidae away from the rest of the primates is epitomized in the evolution of symbolic activity.... There is so much mentation involved in language that to think of it as a "signaling system" or a social habit encouraged by survival value is worse than superficial, it is simplistic, not to say silly. Language...is not only acquired for communal purposes, but even as it is learned penetrates the entire system of cerebral activities, so that perception and fantasy and memory, intuition and even dreaming take their special human forms under its continual and increasing influence. (345)
In every tongue, she concludes, "there are metaphorical words and expressions which are understood as readily as literal designations ... they give the language its richness and vivid quality long after their metaphorical status is no longer noticed." The language of a people, "reflects the tempo and emotional base line of the population that speaks and thinks in it; and thought that rises far above that level is apt to employ unusual words and metaphors" (351). And finally, "A language fully possessed is a system of conception; its figures of speech are figures of thought" (353). She tells us that "Communication is, indeed, the driving force in language-making; but it is communication of ideas, beyond the realm of a present situation, that builds up the human world" (354). The necessary social context of the development of language, thought, and intellect is stressed by Langer as she closes the last completed volume of her magnum opus. With this touch she acknowledges that it is only in terms of the other or another that we could have developed the mind:

It is in society and more particularly in the verbal intercourse called conversation, that men have acquired what the most intelligent other animals have never developed--intellect....Society, like the spatio-temporal world itself, is a creation of man's specialized modes of feeling--perception, imagination, conceptual thought and the understanding of language. (355)

The creation and perception of metaphor, I'd like to add, involving the experience of an idea in an image, is the central example of such a transforming mode of feeling.

In the incomplete third volume of Mind Langer speculates on the development of magic, religion, and culture. Here she attempts to apply her theory of mind to the findings of modern anthropology. While these ideas are not as convincing, and more overtly conjectural, than the ones developed in the first two volumes, a few of them do shed further light on some of the implications of symbolism and metaphor in human thought and expression. It is important to add here that Langer seems to sense the need to relate the individual mind to the social context of thought. In addition, when she does so, we see the individual and the society at potential odds where the individual represents a threat to the social order and must be, in effect, constrained. Nevertheless, the impetus of these ideas is understandable even if her conclusions are not very convincing. As we shall see in the next chapter, there are other, more dynamic and creative ways of seeing the relation between mind and society. But for now let's consider some of Langer's ideas that emerge in the context of this problem.

Langer, for example, in "The Spirit World," contrasts the "world picture" of the primitive human with that of modern, "scientific man" who views actions in terms of Aristotelian, scientific causality. In discussing primitive human's ritual and magic she notes that
People whose thought still runs freely and naturally in the mythic mode do not change to the scientific mode when they employ practical techniques....they handle the material as something active, not passive. (p.8)

This "act form is the natural form for primitive conception of events to take" (p.9). She also calls this a "motivational view of the external world" (p.18). She admits that

The difference between the two modes of interpretation, which I have called the motivational and the causal...is not enough to meet all the problems which the beliefs and practices of wilderness dwellers pose for the anthropologist. (p.20)

Yet man's world is "mind-made" (p.26). To the primitive

...time is a stream of acts, like mixing and branching currents in a river, and unlike metrical units, have forms, proportions, interrelations, so the time they define has a complicated flow: it eats into the future and builds up a past, and those two components meet in an ever-present "Now." (p.26)

Although Langer does not refer to the artist explicitly, this conception of time in its organicism is close if not identical with that of the artist. At least any artist that uses time as medium (e.g. dancer, musician, creative writer) implicitly conceives of and uses time in this way. Nevertheless, she says, the dominant mode today is the scientific, "causal" one that "has transformed the spirit-world into a mechanical world of impersonal progressive events" (p.34). And it is largely what in her final chapter she claims our modern culture has "blasted."

In the chapter "The Dream of Power" Langer explains magic and ritual as attempts by the primitive to attain power in the face of the forces of nature and the inevitability of death. The dynamic involved, however, is the same as that of the creation of the artistic image or symbol:

The objectification of the subjective sense of balance--and, perhaps, of physical tensions generally--has a natural counterpart, the subjectification of the protosymbolic object as an image....On the same principle all other kinesthetic, thermal, tactual, in short: corporeal feelings are "seen" in the shapes that meet our eyes....The recognition of characteristics like form, relation, and every sort of meaning is the lowest denominator of intellect, the function of intuition. (p.49).

We heard this espoused in Feeling and Form and in Problems in Art, but now it is the human characteristic of primitive man. She relates such seeing with the "conceptual seeing" which Coleridge attributed to the primary imagination (p.49). She adds that "today, when that first dawn is fairly far behind us, man's
entire way of perceiving is shot through and through with intuition." This dialectic of subjectification and objectification embodied in human activity from common perception to the creation of art "is the dynamism of experience" (p.49) for all human beings.

Weeping willows drop no tears and heave no sobs, yet look mournful; swift little brooks laugh, robins sound happy, .... Above all, the skies may look benign or angry...trees loom and shake their branches, and all the individuated forms of nature appear as so many potential agents which have the attitudes and impulses they display symbolically. (p.50)

In this chapter she also tells us that in "motivational thinking...every eventuality, in nature as in society, is conceived in the act form, it is imagined as beginning in an intention, which gives shape and direction to a venture" (p.63). This, she says explains the logic of mimetic rites among primitives, but, I would add, also has much to do with human activity today.28

This "conception of magic as a reification of meaning and consequent wielding of symbols as effectual instruments of will..." she says, "readily explains the extraordinary power attributed to words..." in magic ritual. She notes that the "feeling that words embody some efficacious force is not peculiar to primitive thinking..." (p.81), for "speech is the essence of symbolism" with its symbolism in its words and metaphors (p.82). Greek tragedy, she claims, is in its language and action the "first conscious presentation of the tragic rhythm of life" (p.109). Here again art and life, the metaphor and its meaning, organically merge.

In the chapters "The Ethnic Balance" and "The Breaking" we find Langer trying to place the individual mind in a social context. She portrays a dialectical process between individual and society mediated through symbolism. Here rites of passage insure a balance between individual development and social stability. Throughout this volume she stresses the "dialectical form" (p.194) of human life and its "progression through qualitative shifts" (p.196). The relation, however, that she suggests is basically or potentially a hostile one in the nineteenth century romantic tradition where the two must check each other.29

In the final chapter, "The Open Ambient," Langer concludes that "the evolution of man" is "the evolution of his brain, known by its incredible functional complex, the mind" (p.203). And although the concept of fact, she says, is "the foundation of our natural science" it is, nevertheless, "a highly interesting cognitive construct" (p.205). And our interest in this study has centered around language and metaphor. That this is also central to Langer's thought is evidenced in her concluding remarks regarding language, symbolism, and (implicitly) metaphor:
...words do organize our thinking around centered conceptual symbols, however vague those central images or other carriers of meaning may be, and define a context in which that core of meaning is embedded; it is the contexts which are not at all a logician's ideal. Each word...immediately determines its own transitory context....(p.207)

And meaning, then, is a function of context, the meaning of a word and/or an image is always embedded in context. Symbolism, as I hope has been made clear earlier, is inherent in metaphor. Her description of the function of words in our thinking and her sense of word meaning and symbolism suggested here and throughout her work by logical implication holds true for the metaphor. The vehicle in a metaphor is an image associated with a context, yet in expression the normal context cannot hold, tension results, the context shifts, and new insight is born.

My point here as before is that the symbolism is inherent in perception and thought, language is present from man's beginning to today, and that our view of reality, indeed, our very reality, is a function of this dynamic process which manifests itself in the metaphor and metaphoric symbol. Langer's rather existentialist point in this volume that the motive of its development is humankind's sense of life as tragic is at best moot, but not essential really to her argument that symbolism (i.e. metaphor) permeates the human condition and embodies the mysteries of human development. My argument that metaphor and its symbolic process is central to thought and language appears, I hope, more plausible.

Langer has given us many insights along the way of her work. Chief among them is the pervasiveness of symbolism in thought and language. Related ideas such as the presentational basis of symbolic perception in the artistic realm and, in spite of her formalistic tendencies, the ubiquitous presence of this kind of symbolic activity in ordinary discourse (not just in art) will enter into the development of the next chapter. The next chapter will put Langer's insights into the social context of the utterance. To do this we must move into the realm of language theory that has developed with little concern for the problems of metaphor and symbolism explicitly; rather, these ideas have developed from a concern with the relation between the individual and society. But, as we shall see, the dynamics of the metaphor with its interaction, transformation, presentational symbolism, immediacy, and non-discursive logic plays an integral part in a far larger drama than that of the individual mind or any system of language. For the individual mind and language, as interdependent as Langer has shown them to be, can only exist in the context of other dynamically engaged minds uttering language. For these ideas we must move to the next chapter and the ideas, primarily, of Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin.
We’re reminded here of Thomas Kuhn’s book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, written some twenty years later in which his term “paradigm” substitutes for Langer’s “generative idea.” Kuhn’s paradigms are really dominant metaphors that shape thought until they dissipate.

This notion will be made explicit in M. M. Bakhtin’s notion of the dialogic imagination and heteroglossia. Bakhtin will extend it to include all discourse within a society.

Two points bear noting here looking ahead to Chapter 3 of this study. Langer touches here on what will be Bakhtin’s notion that the utterance as a whole is symbolic and also that what Langer calls “temporal relationships” in a sentence or utterance (i.e. spatial-temporal relationships or what Bakhtin will call context and situation) bear the burden of much of its meaning.

We already saw such an insistence on the creative aspect of metaphor in the last chapter among such metaphoricians as Cohen and Ricoeur. Bakhtin, in Chapter 3, will also speak of the utterance (which Langer has already defined as a symbol) as individual, creative, and unique. He will also tell us that its uniqueness comes from its never to be duplicated relations that it has in time and space to other utterances and discourses.

Language, then, according to Langer seems to contain, even at the word level, a dialectic between the presentational symbolism of the root image and the discursive symbolism of the denotation.

Reader response critics, for example in Jane Thompkins’ *Reader Response Criticism*, emphasize the determining effect of context on meaning. This determining effect will be emphasized throughout this study.

Vygotsky will say much the same thing in his theory of inner speech as will be discussed in Chapter Three of this study.

This idea will enable us to better grasp what Vygotsky is getting at in his theory of inner speech. It is a good example of Langer’s philosophy clarifying the Soviet language theorists ideas about thinking and the cognitive function of language.

This point will be approached by Vygotsky and Bakhtin as they relate the pattern of the individual mind to the patterns of social thought.
Karsten Harries discusses art, in a recent article, "Metaphor and Transcendence," as pure presence in the spirit of Heidigger where art presents man as being-in the world. He seems, like Langer, to attribute to art and its mode of knowing the simultaneous presentation of humankind's relationships in the world for our apprehension. Such symbolization and understanding invokes Langer's notions of presentational symbolism and logical intuition necessary for the simultaneous grasp of multiple relationships (as opposed to the linear, one by one grasp of relationships characteristic of discursive reasoning).

Langer is reticent on this point. In fact, she seems to want to have it both ways. She is explicit about the metaphor being the crucible of language and the presentational nature of the image as symbol within it, as has been discussed above. However, she does not follow through on this in the details of her aesthetic theory claiming, as she does in these art lectures, an almost exclusive domain that art has of presentational symbolism. This, I think, is an important shortcoming since because of it Langer leaves herself open for criticism that the formalists deservingly reaped, namely that in formalist theory art is alienated from life. There art has little to do with normal social discourse instead of being a distillation of the essence of it. The point of this study that I hope is coming clear is that the metaphor has within its essential nature the essence of art, the presentational symbol (the image as vehicle and symbol that suggests the tenor or general drift of the entire metaphor). And this presentational symbol is found everywhere in human discourse.

Vygotsky and his followers show in Chapter 3 how the language of discourse reflects the relations humans have with one another and things, and also how those relations structure and engender the mind.

Emerson makes the same point, interestingly, in his romantic treatise Nature and even uses the same example of anima meaning wind and later spirit. Langer extends Emerson's notion of the sensual image being buried in abstract words as she insists that such root images are symbols.

In Vygotsky we will find a similar notion in his portrayal of consciousness.

Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, for example reveals the crucial role that metaphores play in the development of scientific theory. Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live By also show how metaphor pervades all thinking. And Mary Pratt as well as Barbara Hernstein Smith have shown how discourse (which Langer denies is involved in poetry in the final lecture of this volume) permeates the very structural dynamics of all literature in ways similar, though less apparent, to their omnipresence in everyday discourse.
Tzvetan Todorov's study of Mikhail Bakhtin, the Soviet Literary theorist is more succinct on this point than anyone else. In *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle* he saturates the work with brilliant insights from Bakhtin regarding the essentially relational nature of human reality. For example, human knowledge of other humans, he notes, is really knowledge of one's relation with the other: "it is impossible to conceive of any being outside of the relations that link it to the other" (94). This is, according to Todorov, the "fundamental principle" of Bakhtin's philosophical anthropology.

Lev Vygotsky in his *Thought and Language* presents a theory of inner speech that interestingly offers similar insight into the relational and interactive nature of imagery and thought. Langer is more clear about the symbolic and intuitive dimension of the process of thought and language. Vygotsky, like Bakhtin and other Soviet theorists to be discussed in the third chapter of this study, is much clearer about the necessary social dimension involved in thought. All are clear about the dialectical base of it.

A great many works today in history of science, theoretical physics, Zen related psychology and theories of learning and writing, literary theory, and cultural criticism, as will be touched upon in this study, share, wittingly or unwittingly it seems, this processive and romantic sense of reality. The works of Thomas Kuhn, Fritjof Capra, Erich Fromm, Martin Buber, Peter Elbow, Ken Macrorie, Morse Peckham, Marilyn Ferguson, David Bohm, Lev Vygotsky and his school, Mikhail Bakhtin, Paul Ricoeur, to name but a few, all posit a reality in terms of their immediate subjects that is relational and relative, processive, and vitalistic. Langer's work, it seems to me, is central to this body of thought.

There is an interesting correspondence here between Langer's insistence on act as a dynamic and processive way of conceiving of the elements of vital activity and the Vygotsky school of developmental psychology that centers its theory of mind, language, and human behavior around the notion of "activity." A. N. Leontiev's *Activity, Consciousness, and Personality* is, I think, an excellent example of the central role that the concept plays in Soviet psychology of the Vygotskyian school. Discussions of the notion can be found in James Wertsch's *The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology*, B.F. Lomov's "The Problem of Activity in Psychology", and P.Y. Galperin's "Stages in the Development of Mental Acts."

Mary Gerhart and Allan Russell in their recent book, *Metaphoric Process*, see metaphor as intrinsic to what they call "the knowledge process" which is a theory of the advance of knowledge very similar to what Thomas Kuhn presents in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Paul Ricoeur's *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*, particularly in his chapter, "Metaphor and Symbol," also sees metaphor as central to thought and as having large social and cultural implications. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in *Metaphors We Live By* provide yet another example of
recent thought that sees in metaphor a dynamic principle that is the essence of social and cultural concepts.

21 Tzvetan Todorov in his commentary on Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogical principle, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, shows how Bakhtin's concept of the ever present dialog in human discourse reveals that what is really meant in any human utterance is the relation that the utterer has with the other (the real or imagined listener). This sense of meaning as the relation that one has with subject and listener is very close in its insight and dynamics to Langer's sense of the dialectical interrelationships that exist between components of any organic entity and process. Neither Todorov nor Bakhtin deal with metaphor specifically. However, on a macrocosmic level (if we take Langer's concern with individual thought and expression for a moment here as microcosmic) they suggest on a social level some of the implications of Langer's thought. This will be addressed directly in the next chapter of this study.

22 Let me reiterate here what was mentioned in an earlier note above. The formalist conclusion that Langer draws about literary art (in *Feeling and Form*, for example) earlier in her work and occasionally here in *Mind* does not compellingly follow from what she has said all along about the image and the symbolic imagination. In bending her thought to a then current formalist aesthetic she has, I believe, inadvertently reified the dynamic symbolic (and metaphorical) process that she herself presents as process. Recent work by ordinary language philosophers John Searl and John Austin as well as work specifically dealing with literary art by Mary Louise Pratt and Barbara Hernstein Smith convincingly and constructively exposes the quasi-scientific, heavily reified and mechanized nature of formalistic thinking. Pratt's *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse* and Smith's *On the Margin's of Discourse* both emphasize the context based and activity or act-basis of normal human utterances and the illusion of them in literature. Also, I believe folklore studies (such as Victor Turner in *The Ritual Process*) and mythic criticism of literature (such as Wayne Shumaker in *Literature and the Irrational*) attest to the continuity of what is culturally labelled ritual or art and what is practical behavior and discourse.

23 An interesting parallel begins here between A.N. Leontiev's concept of act in his activity theory and Langer's sense of act in her theory of the mind as symbolic transformer. They certainly did not read each other or have a common influence that I can ascertain. What they share fundamentally is a sense of reality as a relational process which exists by virtue of relationships that can transform essences. Leontiev sees activity of human beings carrying out a Marxist dialectical pattern; Langer sees vital activity as dialectically rhythmic within itself and in relation to its situation. Leontiev sees activity as motive and goal based and consisting of actions that in turn consist of operations (context determines whether an event by an agent is operation or action. Leontiev's activity theory is presented in detail in his
Consciousness, Activity, and Personality. B.F. Lomov also nutshells Leontiev's ideas on activity nicely in "The Problem of Activity in Soviet Psycholinguistics." In a phrase, both Langer and Leontiev see vital activity as processive and relational (Leontiev limits his analysis to human activity, but Langer speaking here of organic life in general ultimately intends to relate these ideas to the human mind).

24 This is the kind of dynamic that characterizes the insights of ordinary language philosophers John Searle and J. L. Austin as well as literary theorists Barbara Hernstein Smith and Mary L. Pratt as they discuss the problem of meaning in language and the organic oneness of literary discourse with ordinary social discourse, respectively. Also, Lev Vygotsky and his followers as well as literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in contemporary Soviet thought make very similar remarks about the culturally rooted and socially dependent nature of human discourse.

25 Again, the metaphor implicitly involves both types of understanding, if not simultaneously, then eventually. Langer, as we have seen, stresses the former in the context of art, but when we realize, as I have urged, that the metaphoric process permeates human discourse and therefore thought, it becomes clear in the light of philology and developmental psychology that both types of understanding interact dialectically, the presentational mode at first dominates while the discursive is in relief and then in time the discursive dominates as the presentational becomes latent. P.Y. Galperin is a Soviet developmental psychologist who in his "The Stages of The Development of Mental Acts" shows how different types of understanding (though his sense of the types is different than Langer's) interact dialectically to effect human understanding.

26 David Bohm in Wholeness and the Implicate Order and Lakoff and Johnson in Metaphors We Live By both show the same thing: that language is intrinsic to thought. Lakoff and Johnson show how metaphors affect our conception of things, the very nature of our thoughts. Such insight flies in the face of the practical and utilitarian view of metaphor, for example, that sees it as adornment or at most a clarifying tool that helps deliver the message.

27 While her point is to characterize a primitive sense of reality, and although she never gets to the epistemology she promised as a conclusion to Mind, this is the sense of time she attributed to music and dance, that of organic, symbolic, and expressive living time. I think of Thoreau in Walden telling us "Time is but the stream I go a-fishing in." And also Faulkner's sense of time which implicitly contains the past and the future as in the climactic passage of "The Bear." Henri Bergson's work also posits a sense of time as unanalyzable duration as does the work of the existentialists. Also, David Bohm's sense of the implicate order applies to such a sense of time, for each moment of the living now for a human has within it, he says, via the implicate order, the past and future.
28 The Vygotskyian school of Soviet psychology has elaborated a theory of activity that sees it as organically involving intention, motivation and goal, and in general context-rooted both psychologically and socially (e.g. A. N. Leontiev and B. F. Lomov).

29 There are other possibilities with more fertile implications as we shall see in the work of Bakhtin and Vygotsky in the following chapter of this study.
Chapter 3: Fresh Air From the East: Bakhtin and the Reality of Relation

It may do us well to consider for a moment the ground that we have so far covered. Our initial investigation in Chapter One concerned the nature and function of metaphor in thought and language. There we saw that the romantic tradition referred to in the present century as the constructivist or interactionist theory of metaphor gave us our best lead into the subject as it relates to language and thought. We also saw that, according to interactionist theories, the essence of metaphor resides in the relationship struck by its terms and that a new whole, more than the sum of its parts, resulted from the transformational shift of meaning effected by the metaphor. We also saw that a symbol was an abbreviated metaphor, and that metaphor was declared by a variety of its students to be ubiquitous and essential in thought and language.

In the lengthy second chapter that traced the implications of metaphor in Susanne Langer's work we saw a dogged attempt by that philosopher to grasp the dynamics of symbolism (i.e., metaphor, a la Owen Barfield's equation that a symbol is an abbreviated metaphor) as it functions in the processes of the mind. Her notion of presentational symbolism, which grasps patterns of relationships simultaneously and reveals meaning through logical intuition, goes a long way toward explaining the mental dynamics involved in the cognition that results from symbolization. Additionally, her notion of the image (and fact) as a creative construct detailed in each of the works we have examined, and the corollary notion that the image is a symbol which means the relation of the perceiver and the perceived again locates human meaning in relationships. Although Langer stresses the role of presentational symbolism in art, she clearly attributes it, as I hope I have shown, to ordinary discourse as well, particularly as it is found in the ubiquitous metaphor where the vehicle is always a presentational symbol and the metaphor itself is a creative activity and process. She has shown that discursive logic takes place, necessarily, in linear time, whereas the simultaneous grasp of patterns of relationships requires presentational symbolism. Finally, she has stressed the transformational nature of the insight that results from the grasp of such symbolism. What Langer hasn't successfully shown is the meaning of such symbolism. Nor has she successfully placed the individual mind's processing of the symbol in its social context which is necessary to pursue the relational nature of meaning which she and other students of symbolism and metaphor have detailed in a microscopic way (even in their dealings with root metaphors). For the macroscopic, or larger view of the metaphorical dynamic of cognition in the context of society and social intercourse, Mikhail Bakhtin looms large on the horizon of this study. We now approach him.
Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin biographically is an enigma. In their recent biography, Mikhail Bakhtin, Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist elaborate in great detail the theorist's problematic life. He published relatively little during his life. He lived much of it in exile for his religious convictions. His friends published most of his work under their names (and today they are published as jointly authored works). He believed that authoring was always a joint, authoring/answering activity; perhaps this was a contributing factor in his approach to publishing while in exile. And his ideas have been edited by translators who did not understand them, according to Tzvetan Todorov in the introduction to his commentary, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle (translated by Wlad Godzich).

To clear the air of unnecessary speculation, I should note that Bakhtin and Langer apparently never read each other although one of Bakhtin's friends, Hermann Cohen, heard Ernst Cassirer lecture and probably discussed this with Bakhtin (Todorov, 3), and, of course, Langer was a student of Cassirer. Moreover, Soviet clinical psychologist and learning theorist Lev Vygotsky, though a contemporary of Bakhtin, never knew or read him, nor did Bakhtin read Vygotsky. This disclaimer needs to be made since there is amazing continuity in their thinking. For example, Langer in Mind insists on, we'll recall, a functional unit of behavior, which she calls "act," in order to discuss the symbolization of the mind, a term and concept which focused on relationships and processes instead of essences of living organisms. Similarly, the Vygotskian school of psychologists (see note above in Chapter Two) posits the concept of "activity" to enable them to talk about the dynamic of thought and behavior. Likewise, Bakhtin, we shall presently see, can conceive of language and meaning only in terms of the activity of the "utterance," a term that for him dynamically bridges the relatively static Sassurian concepts of parole and langue and means self in relation to other in terms of language in use or authoring/answering. In each case what the theorist is positing is what Langer has called a functional unit of behavior (see above) that will allow one to see the major principles in the discussion dynamically in process and in relation to one another.

Before we can see clearly the connection between Bakhtin's thought and the larger issues of metaphor and symbolism as detailed thus far in this study, we must consider carefully, a few of his key ideas. As we do so, some connections between him, Langer, and students of metaphor will be highlighted. Others must wait until we survey his thought. As we proceed, it will become clear that the evolving subject of this study is not a construct of language or a characteristic of thought, but rather a process that pervades language, thought, and reality: the metaphorical process.

According to Caryl Emerson's recent article on Bakhtin entitled "The Outer Word and Inner Speech," Bakhtin's ideas grew out of his response to
Sassure's linguistics which split language into parole and langue (246ff). Sassure, she says, thought language as system (langue) was the proper study of linguistics while language as spoken (parole) was unsystematic and not subject to scientific analysis. Such a dichotomy hopelessly split society and the individual (language here is a social institution upon which raids are made by individuals as they forge their completely unique expressions). This view places individual and society in an antithetical, hostile relation. Bakhtin set out to construct a bridge that would reveal the creative and positive nature of the relationship between individual and society. That bridge is his dialogical principle and corollary notions of utterance and heterology.

In order to review Bakhtin's key ideas it will be necessary to rely heavily on Tzevetan Todorov's commentary, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle which presents a running commentary on Bakhtin's few published books, articles, unpublished manuscripts, and notes as well as the very recent critical biography, Mikhail Bakhtin by Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist which also analyzes Bakhtin's key ideas in the context of the details of his life.

The utterance for Bakhtin is the result of dialogue: self interacts with other in terms of language in the utterance. It is a social act linking inner and outer (to utter is to, etymologically, render inner outer). Todorov calls this the "dialogical principle" in the title of his commentary. It is the essence of thought and speech, or discourse for Bakhtin. Todorov tells us in the introduction to his commentary, moreover, that for Bakhtin

all discourse is in dialogue with prior discourses on the same subject, as well as with discourses yet to come, whose reactions it foresees and anticipates. A single voice can make itself heard only by blending into the complex choir of other voices already in place. This is true not only of literature but of all discourse, and culture: culture consists in the discourses retained by collective memory....(x)

To study discourse, Todorov tells us, requires taking a position on a plane of analysis that bridges the Sassurian split between langue and parole: it requires, therefore, a meta-linguistics (remembering that the proper study of linguistics is langue, the abstract system of language), or what Bakhtin called a translinguistics. From this viewpoint we can study utterance, dialogically engaged and chronotopically rooted minds that are necessarily socially connected (the "chronotope" is a Bakhtinian neologism for the unique space-time context of any utterance, an important source of meaning for any utterance).¹ In his commentary Todorov further clarifies this point:

...the utterance is the product of a working up, in which linguistic matter is but one of the ingredients; another is all that is brought to a verbal production by the fact of it being uttered, that is its
unique historical, social, cultural, context. The decisive role of the context of the uttering in the determination of the overall meaning of the utterance, and the fact that this context is, by definition, unique..., leads to ...utterances. (26)

Thus, a sentence can be repeated by a speaker or writer, but an utterance cannot since at least the temporal element changes and along with it the angle of its meaning. The utterance is what Bakhtin in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, as quoted by Todorov, calls a "nonreiterative whole" that is social and that implicates speaker/listener and listener/speaker and the culture (embodied in the language) simultaneously in the complex of relations that is any utterance in discourse (26). Thus, as Todorov puts it, "...the domain of speech belongs to the social order (in Bakhtin), and not merely to the individual" (27). Todorov quotes Bakhtin here:

No utterance in general can be attributed to the speaker exclusively; it is the product of the interaction of the interlocuters, and, broadly speaking, the product of the whole complex social situation in which it has occurred. (30)

Todorov further clarifies Bakhtin's point:

It is not necessary then to be actually addressing someone else: even the most personal act, becoming conscious of oneself, always already implies an interlocutor, the other's glance upon us. (30)

Bakhtin's idea of utterance is further defined in Todorov's chapter "Theory of Utterance." Todorov tells us that the utterance for Bakhtin involves both language and context. This, he says, is original with Bakhtin: context is an integral part of the utterance, not just an environment for it (41). Such context is the "situation" as Bakhtin in his notes and unpublished manuscripts, according to Todorov, called it. Situation consists of the particulars of time and space, the "theme" or subject of the discourse, and the "relation" of the interlocutors (42). Thus utterance is always rich in social relationships and time-space context. Context or situation, in other words, is implicate in the utterance. Even in apparent monologue, Todorov quotes Bakhtin as saying in the latter's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, "utterance is contructed between two socially organized persons, and should there not be present an actual interlocutor, one is presupposed" by the speaker as "a representative, so to speak, of the social group to which the speaker belongs" (43). Todorov adds, "...there is nothing individual in what the individual expresses" (43). Social relations and voices are, in other words, implicate or symbolized in the utterance.

Since linguistics studies the relationships of signs with signs within a language system, translinguistics studies the relations between utterances,
thereby involving not only the system of language but also the context of its use, as Todorov notes (51). This context involves the persons of the speaker, the intonation of the language used, the utterances implicit in the language as used in a social context, the intentions of the speaker, etc. Intonation here, by the way, is that quality of used language that reflects, as Todorov says, "the relation between speaker and listener" (52). Another relevant point here is made in a quote used by Todorov from a little known, untranslated essay by Bakhtin: words contain voices once they are used in a culture and these voices inhabit words (48). The result, according to Bakhtin's essay is that "discourse is a three-role drama (it is not a duet but a trio" where the third party is the social group whose voices "resonate" in its language (52).

Discourse, then, is a complex activity involving a myriad of relationships perceived, if understood, at once. The relation between speaker and listener (and culture) is always what the discourse is and is about. This rich sense of context of an utterance largely determines its meaning as we shall see. Todorov reveals some of Bakhtin's notes here in an attempt to further clarify the intricacies and complexities of the utterance. There are five basic points in the notes:

1) Speakers are implicit in their utterances (i.e., utterances symbolize speakers).

2) Utterances have "an interior completion" according to subject to be covered, intention of the speaker, and genre of the utterance (i.e. they are organically rooted in speaker and context).

3) Utterances refer to objects in reality, but also to speakers and their relationships through tone (i.e., relationships largely constitute meaning).

4) The utterance "enters in relation with past utterances that had the same object, and those of the future, which it foresees as answers" (i.e., an utterance implicates or enfolds time and space, as Bohm says consciousness does, relating through utterances horizontally to others in social relationships and relating vertically, at the same time, the self to the outer world).

5) Utterances are "always addressed to someone" explicitly or implicitly: they are always relational, their function is to relate (53).

The concrete utterance, Todorov then observes, relates a "world of values unknown to language" as system (53). The utterance is, therefore, a symbolic event, an organic process, not a mechanical, rule-bound product.

I'd like to invoke Langer's sense of presentational symbolism here to explain how such complex patterns of relationships can be simultaneously grasped by the mind in communication. Moreover, the bulk of the meaning of an utterance, we see from above, is rooted in the context which is made up of such relationships. If relations between contexts creates the tenor in a
metaphor, defines its meaning in other words, then utterances can be viewed as metaphorical, at least implicitly: they are symbolic of, are a metaphor for, relationships the domain of which has been swept in Bakhtin's five points, paraphrased above. They are of the implicate, symbolic order. This is strongly suggested by Todorov when he says, for example, that "Discourse does not maintain a uniform relation with its object; it does not 'reflect' it, but it organizes it, transforms or resolves situations" (55). In other words, utterances are not signs but rather symbols, remembering Langer's distinction), vehicles that implicate other utterances and relationships. This also sounds very much like Langer discussing how the mind, for example, transforms sense data into symbolic imagery, and it also sounds very much like Richards, Black, and others discussing the dynamics of interaction in the metaphor. In Langer's theory of perception sense data is analogous to the vehicle of a metaphor that is organized and transformed by the mind so that it (the vehicle) symbolizes something more--and a shift in context makes this happen, according to the metaphoricians. We will return to this point, the metaphorical or symbolic basis of the utterance, several times in what follows.

Next we need to consider Bakhtin's communication model as schematized by Todorov to further distinguish Bakhtin's translinguistics from more traditional linguistics (Todorov uses Roman Jakobson as an example of the latter, 54). In Jakobson's linguistics communication occurs when a sender transmits a message to a receiver. The message is coded according to the language and cultural conventions, and it refers to what Jakobson calls the context of the message (i.e. its referent). Contact must be made for this to occur.

Regarding Bakhtin's view of the communication process, the speaker and listener interact in the utterance, both in an active manner creating an intertext as language is transformed in the utterance. The "object," as Bakhtin calls it, of the interaction corresponds to the traditional referent in communication theory. This view contrasts with the communication model of Jakobson's linguistics where the active speaker codes a message through language and sends it to a passive listener or receiver and contact is made through language. The context in this system corresponds to the context in Jakobson's terminology. To summarize, then, Bakhtin sees communication as an interaction between two participants who are both speakers and listeners (writers and readers) where the system of language that is rooted in the context of participant's intentions and the heteroglossia of society (as it inhabits language in use) is transformed into intertext, a highly symbolic (i.e., metaphorical) tissue of meaning.

With this summary contrast in mind, then, some of Todorov's comments in his commentary on Bakhtin come clearer. For example, Todorov tells us, paraphrasing Bakhtin, that "In linguistics, one begins with words and grammatical rules, and one ends with sentences. In translinguistics, one starts with sentences and the context of enunciation and one obtains utterances"
Todorov quotes Bakhtin on this matter where in *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*, Bakhtin criticizes the formalists, a group to which Jakobson subscribed:

What is transmitted is inseparable from the forms, manners, and concrete conditions of the transmission. The formalist presupposes...(that) there are two members of society, A (the author) and B (the reader); the social relations between them are, for the time being, unchangeable and fixed; we also have (here) a ready-made message X, which must simply be handed over by A to B. In this ready-made message X there is distinguished the "what" from the "how"....

In reality, the relations between A and B are in a state of permanent formation and transformation; they continue to alter in the very process of communication. Nor is there a ready-made message X. It takes form in the process of communication between A and B. Nor is it transmitted from the first to the second but constructed between them like an ideological bridge...in the process of their interaction (56).

The sense of language as inhabited or intoned, implicating many voices (what Bakhtin calls heterophony) and many languages (what Bakhtin calls heteroglossia) is also nicely captured by Bakhtin in a passage of his essay, "Discourse in the Modern Novel" which Todorov quotes:

...all of language turns out to be scattered, permeated with intentions, accented. For the consciousness that lives in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but a concrete heterological opinion on the world. Every word gives off the scent of a profession, a genre, a current, a party, a particular work, a particular man, a generation, an era, a day, and an hour. Every word smells of the context and contexts in which it has lived its intense social life; all words and all forms are inhabited by intentions. In the word, contextual harmonies (of the genre, of the current, the individual) are unavoidable. (106)

Such a view of language in its dynamics is reminiscent of Langer's view of the symbolic mind that organizes and transforms sense data as it creates the mental image which is symbolic of the self in relation to the other (see Chapter 2, above). Here, In Bakhtin, the utterance is symbolic of that relation. As Todorov quotes Bakhtin from "Discourse in the Novel": "For the consciousness that lives in it, language is not an abstract system of normative forms but a concrete heterological opinion on the world" (56). Thus there "is no utterance without relation to other utterances" as Todorov notes, and this relation "of every utterance to other utterances is dialogism" (60). Susan Stewart, in her article "Shouts on the Street: Bakhtin's Anti-linguistics" thus calls Bakhtin's work a "radical rejection of abstraction, system, and the ideology of bourgeois"
individualism" (276). The utterance is intrinsically social, yet as Stewart says of Bakhtin, for him "identity is produced by speech...." (275).

This relation of every utterance to other utterances is what Bakhtin calls dialogism, as Todorov points out (60). Another term that arises is that of chronotope which comes up in Todorov's book in relation to literary history where it represents "the set of distinctive features of time and space within each literary genre" (83). Although we are not concerned directly here with Bakhtin's theory of the novel, it is necessary early on to stress the importance of time-space context in his theory of meaning. Meaning for Bakhtin is a direct function of time and space relations. Todorov notes that "time and space are fundamental categories of every imaginable universe" and are the basis of the organization of entire worlds (83).

We now move to the psychological and philosophical basis of Bakhtin's work: the concept of otherness. Todorov's final chapter entitled "Philosophical Anthropology," based on untranslated articles, notes, and a published article on the Dostoevsky project. Todorov calls this concept of otherness that is presented here the "key" to Bakhtin's "whole work" (94). Holquist and Clark discuss this matter in a chapter entitled "Architectonics" based on an unpublished manuscript for which they suggest that title.

According to Todorov, the concept of other "plays a decisive role" in Bakhtin's "conception of human existence" (94). The "fundamental principle" is that "it is impossible to conceive of any being outside of the relations that link it to the other" (94). Otherness is a "transgradient," an element of consciousness "external to it but nonetheless absolutely necessary for its completion...." (95). It is necessary because "we can never see ourselves whole...." (95). Holquist and Clark begin by pointing out that "answerability" and "authoring" are dialectically engaged aspects of human consciousness, for each of us must (this is an existential and ethical imperative) answer (be able to respond, be responsible) and relate our uniqueness to the world (64). The result is a performance or event that is shaped by and expresses "the relation between me and the other" (64). Human consciousness "registers and shapes" the "transformations" that are the exchanges "between 'I' activities and all that is 'not-I-in-me':"

The self/other distinction is thus the primary opposition on which all other differences are based: the highest structural principle of the actual world of deeds is the architectonic and epistemological opposition between I and the other. (65)

This Bakhtinian self is never simply whole. It is always engaged in the process of relating to the other. The self "celebrates alterity" (65). Thus, as Holquist and Clark put it, for Bakhtin "The other is in the deepest sense my
friend, because it is only from the other that I can get my self" (65). The "self is an act of grace, a gift of the other" (68).7

Another point needs to be made here regarding the quality or nature of the relationships which the self forms with the other. These relationships of the self and other are always organic and are always described in organic terms in the Bakhtin excerpts which saturate both works. For example, Todorov quotes Bakhtin in the latter's notes as writing:

Just as the body is initially formed in the womb of the mother (in her body), so human consciousness awakens surrounded by the consciousness of others. (96)8

In this same organic vein Holquist and Clark relate the situation of the self and its vital relationship with the other to lower life forms in a way reminiscent of Langer in volumes one and two of Mind:

...the capacity to react to or interact with the environment is the test of life, much as when a person fails to respond to any stimuli, that person is said to show no "signs of life" and is pronounced dead. The protozoan could not long survive without the nourishment provided by its environment; it needs what lies outside the oozy borders of its integral shape to ensure continuation of the internal, reactive capacity that is defined as its life. Responding to the environment, being able to answer it, is life itself....Conceived in this (organic) way, self is less a metaphysical abstract than the basic fact of life. Self also has no meaning "in itself" for without the environment to engage and test its capacity to respond, it would have no living existence. (66)

Just as the lowly protozoa need the solution in which they swim to nourish themselves, so, at a higher level, selves need a stimulation from the alterity of the social world to sustain their responsibility. (67)

Another important point is made by Holquist and Clark regarding the function of context or the self's place in meaning:

Bakhtin, in arguing that the particular place from which something is perceived determines the meaning of what is observed, was attempting to do for conscious mind what Einstein was seeking to do for the physical universe when he too, at almost the same time, emphasized the determining role played by the locus from which phenomena are observed. Einstein's first paper of 1905 asserts that every statement about the "objective time of an event is in reality a statement about the simultaneous occurrence of two events.... (69)9
Regarding meaning and language, Todorov notes elsewhere in his commentary that "The existence of...context (in connection with meaning) has not been unknown before Bakhtin, but it had always been looked upon as external to the utterance, whereas Bakhtin asserts that it is an integral part of it" (41). He quotes Bakhtin in an article to be published in a forthcoming anthology of the Bakhtin "circle":

In no instance is the extraverbal situation only an external cause of the utterance; it does not work from the outside like a mechanical force. On the contrary, the situation enters into the utterance as a necessary constitutive element of its semantic structure. The quotidian utterance endowed with signification is therefore composed of two parts: 1) a realized or actualized verbal part, and 2) an implied part. (41)

This "implied" part of the utterance implicates contextual relationships as an organic part or aspect of the utterance, just as art and consciousness does in the symbolism of the mind. In fact, the utterance is a symbol, or an abbreviated metaphor that implies a tenor or idea. I might add here, as Todorov does, that the text of an utterance, then, cannot be "reduced to its materiality" as the structuralist or formalist are prone to do in psychology or criticism, nor can it "be dissolved into ... psychic states" as subjective idealists are prone to do in philosophy, psychology, and criticism (19). The reality of the text, instead, resides in the living and processive relationship between mind and other characterized by exchange and resultant transformation.

We are now, of course, in the realm of art and life. We spent much of our time here with Langer in Chapter 2 chasing the creative symbol in the symbolic imagination. But Langer never placed her concept in the context of social activity or, especially and more specifically, in the context of social utterance. As a result, the substance of the relationships which she implied time and again never materialized as she repeatedly threatened to fall into the solipsisms of formalism or psychic phenomenalism. With Bakhtin, I believe, we are on solid, if moving, ground. He renounces the unified self and with it the unified aesthetic event. In their place he offers dynamic relation and simultaneity. In the final chapter of his book Todorov proclaims that for Bakhtin "Aesthetic events are therefore irreducible to the one" presupposing "two consciousnesses that do not fuse" (99). Again, he says, "...the expression of self in art is impossible; only a relation to the other can be expressed" (99).

To circle back now on the difficult notion of the implicate or symbolic presence (when we consider utterance as metaphorical) of situation in utterance, Holquist and Clark in "The Architectonics" chapter provide help for us. For them, Bakhtin's thought testifies to a "surplus of seeing" (71) that each individual, by virtue of his or her uniqueness, contributes to the social order by uttering. As they put it, "What results is a paradox that says we all share uniqueness" (71). This uniqueness interacts with the given of a culture's
language and the resulting utterance that dynamically interrelates people is the transforming "wine and wafer" of meaning for humans. As Holquist and Clark put it, for Bakhtin "The world in essence is without meaning. People in essence are nothing but creators and consumers of meaning" (75). Being in the architectonics of Bakhtin's thought can only be "co-being" (77). And "this emphasis on simultaneity and sharing characterizes all Bakhtin's work" (77). They note that for Bakhtin "The other is completely here, insofar as I equate his self, his body, and his environment as a unified whole--insofar as I architectonically complete him (79). Self and other "are characterized by a different space and a different time" (they each have their unique surplus of seeing). Each needs the other to complete them: "In order to be me, I need the other": "...we get our selves from others" (79).11

From here Holquist and Clark enter territory that Todorov doesn't: Bakhtin's religious ideas. Bakhtin saw human authoring (uttering a text in which voices and characters are created) as a paradigm for God's creative relation to human beings.

Bakhtin notes, "The Word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant." Discourse is a communal engagement, and "God Himself has engaged us. He has oriented His Word, incarnate and material, to us...It is God's relation to creation... (which He has authored)....The Father orients His Word, His Son (Logos), to us. (86)

Further on, they note, "The author-creator is in the text, but he is on a different plane from the characters who are in the text" (89). In this way God is in His creation but not of it. Thus, Bakhtin's thought is a "philosophy of creation" (80).

The self for Bakhtin must "live on the borders between...subjectivity for myself and my status as object for others" (93). Reality for humans is, therefore, necessarily relational. Langer would say symbolic. Metaphoricians would say metaphorical.

We are now in a position to draw some more specific conclusions regarding Bakhtin's philosophy of language and its relation to art and life. According to Holquist and Clark, Bakhtin's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language sets out to address two topics: "the role of signs in human thought and the role of utterance in language" (212). It will do us well to remember here that, as Susan Stewart points out in her aforementioned article on Bakhtin, sign for Bakhtin is very different than sign for pragmatic theorists like Saussure and C.S. Peirce. For these latter the sign is characterized by monovocality and signals. For Bakhtin, she says, signs are "polyvocal," functioning organically in a culture (271). In other words, Bakhtin's sign/signal distinction corresponds to Langer's symbol/sign distinction where the signal or sign has a one to one univocal correspondence with its meaning (relatively mechanical), and the symbol or sign (for Bakhtin) has a polyvocal and
polyvalent (William Empson would say ambiguous) connection with its meaning (relatively organic) which depends at any given time or place on context for determination.\textsuperscript{12} Thus "sign" in Bakhtin corresponds to Langer's sense of symbol.

We have already seen the "two-sided" quality of the meaning of words in this philosophy of language where meaning is determined by both speaker and listener. The further point to be made here is that, therefore, since words implicate or embody a personal relationship, they are symbols whose meaning is "context bound" and whose "context is boundless" as Holquist and Clark point out (216 and 218). The meaning of words only comes clear in the context of what they call a "speech whole" (219). Language achieves its "actual reality" in "speech" (221). Words require contexts of words to realize meaning just as the self requires others to realize identity. As Holquist and Clark point out, the real subject of Bakhtin's philosophy of language is communication (222).

Consciousness in this philosophy, as in Langer's, "can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs" says Bakhtin in his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, as quoted by Holquist and Clark (226). But going beyond Langer Bakhtin continues that "Signs (symbols) can arise only on inter-individual territory (Bakhtin's emphasis, 226). Holquist and Clark underscore Bakhtin's organicism with their remark that for Bakhtin "Language is not a prison house; it is an ecosystem."

Such self-contained ecosystems constitute a metaphor for the use of words, which are the vehicles that permit people to move from one meaning of the same word to another and from one stratum of the cultural system to another. (227)

As we saw earlier in the Langer section of this study, symbolism requires abstraction of form, the patterns of relationships. Bakhtin, like Langer, notes, according to Holquist and Clark, that such reasoning requires language as a mediating means whereby images can be shifted from one context to another (228). And this too is what happens, as we have seen in Chapter One, in the metaphor where images become metaphors or symbols as they become relatively less dependent upon one context. Words are necessary for thought; images are necessary for thought; metaphors are necessary for thought. Holquist and Clark quote Bakhtin in his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language regarding the crucial role played by language in consciousness and its development:

This has determined the role of the word as the semiotic material of inter life, of consciousness (inner speech). Consciousness could have developed only by having at its disposal material that was pliable and expressible by bodily means. And word is
exactly that kind of material. The word is available for...inner employment. (228)

The mentioning of inner speech invokes Lev Vygotsky here, the Soviet clinical psychologist whose ideas about mental development closely parallel that of Bakhtin. Vygotsky saw the development of the individual as a result of the internalization of social relationships voiced in language. In his Thought and Language this development of mind and inner speech (which Bakhtin equates with consciousness above) is carefully explained, couched in the details of ingenious laboratory experiments. In the last chapter of that work, Vygotsky corroborates Bakhtin (as well as Langer and the thesis of this study) when he says that "The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process. He continues

Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into existence through them. Every thought tends to connect something with something else, to establish a relationship between things. (125)

Thought, then, is a process of connection or relating dependent upon language. Vygotsky continues in his work distinguishing between the inner semantic aspect and the outer phonetic aspect of speech (125). He says that they develop dialectically and interrelatedly in opposite directions: phonetic, outer speech from part to whole (from word to sentence) and semantic inner speech from whole to part (from sentence to word, 126). They are distinctly different, but still interdependent upon one another in their development. Invoking Bohm's implicate/explicate terminology once again we can say that in inner speech context is implicate (Langer's term would be symbolized) in the word in consciousness, while in outer speech context is explicate in the self's relations to the social order. The meaning (or this pattern of relations) of the self in society, therefore, is symbolized in the word within the mind. As Vygotsky says:

Thought undergoes many changes as it turns into speech. It does not merely find expression in speech; it finds its reality and form. The semantic and the phonetic developmental processes are essentially one, precisely because of their reverse directions. (126).

This complex dialectical development of thought via language bifurcates, according to Vygotsky, when childish egocentric speech "goes underground" and becomes silent speech to oneself (131). At this point the "fusion of the two planes of speech, semantic and vocal, begins to break down as the child grows older, and the distance between them gradually increases" (129). Vygotsky also points out that "signification independent of naming, and meaning independent of reference," are later stages in mental development (130). Remembering Langer, we can say that what Vygotsky is noting here is that for mental development to occur, a word's status in mental functioning
must change from sign to symbol. A child's use of a word to name an object or refer to something present is a sign function of the word. But for a word to mean something or signify something requires that it acquire the status of a symbol, that is become less dependent on the physical presence of what is referred to. When thought becomes less dependent on a single context, it comes into its own. This could not happen without the word as symbol that can implicate (to use Bohm's useful idea once again) or symbolize (to use Langer's term) relationships and contexts. Words as symbols are, to use Bakhtin's organic analog, ecologically adaptive, altering meanings as they are used in new contexts.

We can gain a clearer sense of the linguistic basis of consciousness (remembering that Bakhtin equated the two) by considering what Vygotsky called "the three main semantic peculiarities of inner speech" (145): "the preponderance of the sense of a word over its meaning" (146), "agglutinization" (146), and "influx of sense" (146). The first point involves the crucial role that context plays in meaning. Context contributes to and focuses meaning in inner speech; the sense of the word is context bound in consciousness. The second characteristic, agglutinization, involves the implicative aspect of symbolism where language can infold whole chains of relationships or meanings. As a result, a word or group of words can assimilate, organically, the meaning of words around it. The word in inner speech tends to designate or symbolize all of the "separate elements" contained in a complex idea. And the third peculiarity is that a word in inner speech, as a part of an utterance, comes to symbolize the entire utterance, where the part contains the whole. Langer pointed out how in an organism the part, say a cell, implied the whole; Vygotsky shows how a word in an utterance implies the whole utterance. Running through these "peculiarities" of inner speech or consciousness are the common organic filaments of language and symbolism.

When Bakhtin says in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language that "Psychic experience is the semiotic expression of the contact between the organism and the outside environment...what makes a word a word is its meaning" as he is quoted in Holquist and Clark, he identifies the word as symbolic mediator, relater of inner and outer, as Langer did earlier. Holquist and Clark quote Bakhtin as saying that "the reality of the inner psyche is the same reality as that of the sign (i.e. symbol)," and that the

locus of consciousness, the psyche, is found somewhere on the border between the individual organism of the body...and the workings of the exterior world. But because the operations of the mind and the operations of the world are so different, the encounter between them needs to be mediated. The sign is the means for translating between the two. (228)
As Susan Stewart says in her aforementioned article on Bakhtin, "(he) advances the concept of inner speech: through inner speech, all consciousness is social in its formulation" (273). Langer helps us restate the advance in terms of this study: consciousness symbolizes social relationships; through language and its metaphorical process, the mind implicates its relationships with society.

A few more details of Bakhtin's philosophy of language are in order here. The meaning of the utterance, say Holquist and Clark, is in Bakhtin called its "theme" which, as we earlier noted is unique and unreproducible. What is reproduced when we repeat an utterance is its "meaning" (231). Since attitude or evaluation and reference cannot be separated, Bakhtin's view of language, unlike Langer's, does not admit of the denotation/connotation distinction (232). Meaning, in the more common sense of the word with reference to communication is produced by speaker and listener as a result of interaction as we saw earlier regarding utterance(232). As Bakhtin is quoted from his Marxism and the Philosophy of Language in the Stewart article, "Existence reflected in sign (symbol) is not merely reflected but refracted" (277). Existence is transformed and embodied in language. Style, says Gary Morson in his Critical Inquiry special issue essay on Bakhtin, belongs to at least two people. So does existence. Finally, so intimate is language with consciousness that Caryl Emerson points out in her article on Bakhtin, "unconscious (in Bakhtin) is consciousness not yet articulate" (251).

In "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art" Holquist and Clark tell us that Bakhtin applies his philosophy of language to the problem of discourse in art. A few points here will conclude our discussion of Bakhtin. The relation of art and life in Langer, we saw, suggested in her work from time to time something of a formalist direction although the main lines of her thought, led to a union of art and life in symbolization. Bakhtin sees formalism as mechanical and what he calls idealism (autobiographical views of art) naive about the social basis and process of meaning and discourse (201). The work of literary art "is a special form of interrelationship between creator and contemplator fixed in a work of art" (202). Viewing the utterance as a metaphor, as we did above, highlights this relational view of a work's locus and meaning. Art for Bakhtin cannot exist, as the formalists would have it, in a rarified realm of super-normal language; nor can it exist in the void of the "individual" conceived of as apart from society. Art is of ordinary language and social relationships for Bakhtin.

Bakhtin's thought about the utterance includes the notion that what is not said is as important as what is said. The "simultaneity of what is said and what is not said" in the speaking and hearing of an utterance must be grasped by self and other for meaning to be realized (205). Tone has much to do with delivering the unsaid. There is "both a vocally realized text and an intonationally created bridge to context," Holquist and Clark tell us in Bakhtin. Through intonation "categories of space and time are turned into specific interpretations of reality." Such categories are "transformed," say Holquist and
Clark, "when they are particularized in the sound patterns of actual utterances" (205). Similarly Holquist and Clark note that relations between self and other are transformed into "relations between what is said and what is unsaid in any actual utterance." And "intonation is the immediate interface between said and unsaid" (207).

Utterance is, according to Holquist and Clark, "the simultaneity of what is actually said and what is assumed but not spoken" (207). Since the individual is rooted in the "social and the objective," as Bakhtin says in the essay "Discourse in Art and Life," what is assumed can only be what is shared, what is socially available (207). Assumed value judgments "are therefore not individual emotions but regular essential social acts" (207), as Holquist and Clark summarize the social basis of the unsaid. And intonation, they say, "clearly registers the other's presence, creating a kind of portrait in sound of the addressee whom the speaker imagines...." (207). Intonation is a dramatic example of what Holquist and Clark call the epistemological imperative of a speaker of assuming the being of his or her listener as the speaker utters. This otherness is symbolized in tone (208). A spoken word is necessarily and simultaneously heard in the mind of the speaker.

And finally, it is in this "totality," as Holquist and Clark put it, of "author/text/reader relationship" that Bakhtin finds the aesthetic (208). Thus the "difference between art and nonart" is one of degree and not of kind when we compare and contrast ordinary language with literary language. Specifically, for Bakhtin, "aesthetic difference is found rather in the degree to which a text depends on the context in which it is perceived" (209).

The relative independence of aesthetic texts from the immediate contexts in which they are experienced, such as the mood of a single reader on a particular occasion, makes them more open to contexts of greater scope. They can continue to intersect with a multitude of new historical and cultural environments because they are not, like other kinds of utterance, as locally dependent on any one context. Aesthetics is a special instance of communicating in which the text makes a minimal appeal to its environment for help in constructing its meaning. (209).

What this means in the context of the present study is that as a text becomes metaphorical it becomes increasingly aesthetic. This adds new meaning to Langer's insistence that art is thoroughly symbolic, completely charged with symbolism. Paul Ricoeur's notion with regard to the metaphor's surplus of meaning and Bakhtin's corresponding idea of the utterance's surplus of seeing (above) similarly take on new meaning as aesthetic touchstones. For where there is rhetorical slippage between an utterance or text and its immediate context, we have a metaphor, a symbol, artistic expression that reveals for the perceiver new meaning and vision, the aesthetic experience.
The metaphorical process is involved in any utterance, but when the utterance takes on new meaning in new contexts (as any utterance must, to some degree, for any kind of communication to occur), then something artistic or symbolic has occurred. My utterance is rooted in my context, my angle of existence. As I call to another, for it to be meaningful, it must root in the context of another. As it does, its meaning, if ever so slightly, must change, must be created anew. Thus utterance is metaphorical. Now when an utterance has unusual accessibility, it enters the relative realm of the artistic. Metaphor and symbolism characterize art and life.

Holquist and Clark note that "this text/context relation parallels Bakhtin's self/other relation...." (210). Style then is not a means of enhancing meaning (just as metaphor isn't). It is the existential angle of a person in relation to others. As Holquist and Clark nicely put it, "the less subordinate to local conditions of expression a text becomes, the more aesthetic it becomes (210). They continue, for Bakhtin, "aesthetics constitutes a version of liberty" (211). As utterance can take on new contexts creating new meanings, self can realize itself in as much as it can become for another a way of being. Such an utterance in its creative surplus of meaning, in its metaphoricity, is not just a statement about writing, but also a statement about being and about other events characterized by transformation. It is artistic, of the aesthetic.

1 Todorov points out that the Russian word slovo, somewhat like the Greek word logos means both "word" and "discourse" and thereby the English "utterance" is as close as we can get to its meaning (25).

2 Note the importance of simultaneity here and in what follows. Langer's presentational symbolism, I believe, operates in such a simultaneous grasp of patterns of relations, as does symbolism--the utterance is symbolic, i.e., metaphorical. Although Bakhtin, apparently only occasionally speaks of sign, meaning, I believe, Langer's symbolism, he is speaking all along of symbolization, the metaphorical basis of thought and language in discourse. David Bohm's sense of the implicate order, that order of being where time and space are collapsed leaving a formal distillation of meaning as mentioned in Chapter Two, above, also enhances our sense of what Bakhtin intimates here.

3 Walter Ong in "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction" makes essentially the same point.

4 Caryl Emerson discusses the "horizontal" and "vertical" matrices of the utterance in her article "Outer Word and Inner Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language" appearing in the 1983 special issue of Critical Inquiry, 249) featuring several articles on Bakhtin's thought.
This organic, rather than mechanical and rule-bound aspect of utterances distinguishes Bakhtin from speech act theorists like John Searle. Although like speech act theory, Bakhtin insists on examining language in use in particular situations, he sees language in use as completely processive and relative, i.e., unpredictable and definitely not rule-bound, like evolving life itself. Susan Stewart's essay on Bakhtin in the above-mentioned special Critical Inquiry issue makes this point claiming speech act theory is monovocal while Bakhtin sees speech acts as polyvocal (272).

Context was also a key idea in the work of the students of metaphor reviewed in Chapter One. As contexts changed, in other words, shifts of meaning occurred. For example, context determined whether an image and statement was to be taken literally or metaphorically. Bakhtin has a similar but more expansive sensitivity to the importance of context in the meaning of an utterance.

Note how positive and vital is the paradoxical situation of the self in Bakhtin. Whereas certain existentialists (Heidegger and Sartre, for example) and literary theorists (the deconstructionists) evoke despair at the lack of wholeness and simple coherence of the self. Martin Buber's work (e.g., I and Thou), of course, would be an important exception, as well as the work of other theistic existentialists such as Karl Jaspers (e.g., The Way to Wisdom). The mystic vitalists, like Henri Bergson in Creative Evolution are also upbeat about endless becoming and never finalized being, always incomplete being. Bakhtin, by the way, according to Holquist and Clark, was very interested in vitalistic philosophy and read much existentialist philosophy (see Chapters 1 and 2 of their book for repeated references to these interests of Bakhtin).

Langer's pervasive organicism and the romantic organicism of Coleridge and I. A. Richards when writing about Shelley and Coleridge come to mind suggesting again a common vital, evolving, and processive reality shared by our principle subjects in this study.

Fritjof Capra in The Tao of Physics and The Turning Point and also David Bohm in Wholeness and the Implicate Order are theoretical physicists working today with Einstein's ideas of relativity and problems in quantum physics. They see reality as processive, relative (relational), and organic in order to make sense of the findings of post-Einsteinian physics. Bohm's ideas of the implicate order where time and space are collapsed and are relative as in consciousness, art, and (we have observed) symbolism has already been referred to several times in this study. Marylyn Ferguson and her notion of the Aquarian Conspiracy with its application of such notions as a paradigm to practical matters of education, applied science (e.g., medicine), and political systems should also be mentioned here as a relative
extension of relativity or, perhaps I should say, relational theory to better suggest the real subject of this study.

10 See Todorov, p. 104 where he notes that such a "renunciation" also transforms the other from object to process.

11 Paul Ricoeur in his book Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning uses the similar term "surplus of meaning" to discuss the problem of meaning in metaphor. He says in his chapter "Metaphor and Symbolism" that metaphor is characterized, as is literature, by a surplus of significance or meaning. This identifying quality, he notes, is also characteristic of the metaphor which, sounding somewhat like Bakhtin, he says must be studied not as a phenomenon of word meaning (as classicists did and empiricists today do) but rather as a quality and property of the sentence or utterance (p. 49). He says a metaphor is a miniature poem characterized by the creation of the new. Despite his similar thoughts there is no evidence in his book that he has read Bakhtin or students of Bakhtin Todorov, Holquist, Clark, Caryl Emerson, James Wertch, et al. Nevertheless, he teaches in Paris as does Todorov, so there is some possibility of influence. Or, we could be dealing here with independent but corroborative parallel development of thought.

12 The reference to Empson, of course, is to his Seven Types of Ambiguity where he discusses the creative and constructive multiple meanings that characterize language use in literature. Ricoeur's idea in his Interpretation Theory that metaphors (or symbols) are characterized by a "surplus of meaning" could also be used to get at the same distinction between mechanical signs and organic, context-dependent symbols.

13 The relevant implication here is that in inner, semantic speech the word initially symbolizes the entire utterance or sentence, to use Vygotsky's term; whereas, in outer or phonetic speech the development is from sentence to word.

14 Randall Smith, in a recent dissertation that relates Langer and Vygotsky in a historically based study of writing theories, stresses as his central thematic point the idea that both Langer and Vygotsky show in their work that the movement from thought to language involves a transformational process and is not simply a clothing of thought in the garments of language (pp. 90-106). Smith's study carefully discusses the history of product theories of rhetoric and composition and claims, I believe rightly, that Langer and Vygotsky's ideas lend themselves to a process theory of writing which would take into account the transformations (detailed best by Vygotsky) that thought undergoes as it becomes writing. Smith, however, doesn't deliver
the theory specifically but calls to others to do so at the end of his study. He stresses Langer's point that humans have a need to objectify through symbolism their subjective life (114) and that writing, properly conceived, can help satisfy this need. In Smith's dissertation, as in Langer, the "need" is simply a given; whereas, after Bakhtin we can see the psycho-social (architectonic) basis or reality of it. In fact Bakhtin shows that it is a process of evolution of the self, grounded in biology, continued in the psychological development of the self in terms of the other.

15 Vygotsky's idea of mind developing as a result of the intrapersonal development of interpersonal relationships is highly elaborated in his Mind In Society.
Chapter 4: Implications--Theory Into Practice

We come now to the practical implications regarding the metaphorical process of the dialogical utterance sketched in the preceding chapters as it can influence the study, teaching, and administration of English. A sense of the real subject we are teaching and its nature is, perhaps, the first implication that requires highlighting. The traditional division of subject matter of English into reading and writing or literature and composition simply will not do. Instead the symbolic, organic process that this study suggests is human knowing, and expression is that of composing (etymologically, placing together, connecting), realizing relations. My suggestions regarding the study, teaching, and administration of composing and composing programs follow from this study's central theme: the discourse and composing involved in writing and interpretation, is an organic, metaphorical process characterized by the presentation of relationships. The following thoughts are intended to suggest beginnings. Certainly they are not presented as complete or final.

The fad of referring to mechanical models and warmed-over traditional theories as "process" approaches seen everywhere in current writing textbooks and developed thinly in tables of contents stressing the "stages" of writing has not resulted in the organic, dynamic approach I am trying to suggest, but such an approach built on the ideas of the theorists discussed in this study could transform practice. My suggestions, I believe, could amount to initial steps in that direction.

The activity of composing should be the central concern and subject of classes in writing and literature (reading). Conceived as an organic process (i.e., dialectical, dynamic, transformational) writing/reading, authoring/answering or authoring/listening must be taught as a living interactive process inherent to literacy and literate activity on all levels. Composing is not a rule-bound product to be taught by means of mechanical models. Discourse, the essential act of composing, is a context-bound process (involving writing and reading) whose context is boundless, and it must be taught as a process. This emphasis must be more than a buzz phrase or a concern with "stages" based on mechanical models. At the center of the composing process is the self and its relation to the other. This relation is the subject and subject matter of writing and its meaning. It must also have a central place in the teaching of composing--meaningful, creative writing and reading should be the result.

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The artificial and mechanical distinctions in our field must be overcome in our thinking if they are to be overcome in our study and teaching of composing. We must come to realize, and it can begin with theoretical understanding effected by studies such as this one, that our subject as composing, for example, follows from the insights of Langer and Bakhtin regarding organicism, metaphor and symbolism, and the relational nature of knowledge and expression. The mind, knowing, and expression cohere in the organic, metaphorical process that is the human mind collecting, connecting, and transforming as it composes reality.2

French literary theorist Paul Ricoeur can conveniently be invoked here to suggest useful implications of our theory. He seems to agree with Langer and Bakhtin on several key points, as I will shortly note. His ideas were apparently derived independently of Langer or Bakhtin. Nevertheless, he agrees with the metaphoricians that symbolism and metaphor are closely allied if not identical. He agrees with Langer that symbolism (and metaphor) are crucial to thought and language. And he agrees with Bakhtin that utterance (and he equates this in writing with the sentence) is the organic unit in terms of which discourse must be analyzed. Finally, though he does not call an utterance a metaphor, in his Interpretation Theory he weaves back and forth between metaphor and utterance as twin keys to the mysteries of human discourse. His book will be useful in formulating some of the implications for the teaching of composing in what follows. The conclusions in his book are not the conclusions of this study, however. In that regard, he takes a structuralist turn in his book.3 And he seems to accept Jakobson's one-way model of the communication process (44). Nevertheless, his insights along the way will be very helpful where he emphasizes dialectical process, transformation, and the importance of context in meaning.

To see and teach composing as a metaphorical process is to see and teach it as an activity ranging from intention to goal with operations and acts and transformations along the way.4 These phases of the process must be explained and presented to students in order to change the way composing is conceived and practiced. The relation of a particular action to the overall activity determines what plane we are on in the overall process. This emphasis on meaning in terms of relations and context is the essence of metaphor and metaphorical processes. As Elliot Eisner puts it in The Educational Imagination, "The metaphors and images of schooling and teaching that we acquire have profound consequences for our educational values and for our view of how schooling should occur" (261).

More specifically, the teaching of composing as discourse and metaphorical process entails stressing the two-fold, double-sided nature of composing: it is both uttering and listening, both writing and reading. When we focus on one side of the process, the opposite side must always be a leitmotif in our thinking and accordingly influence our statements and conceptions about it. We read as we write, as Bakhtin would say, we answer as we author.
Meaning is the result of the complex of relations that we as composers strike with ourselves, others, the world and that we symbolize in our texts as writers. The symbolic text that necessarily results, no matter how practical or artistic the piece, must be created, criticized, and evaluated accordingly. The term "composing," rather than "composition," could suggest a fresh approach with such an emphasis on relations. Discussions, texts, and exercises could render students conscious of the reality of such relations.

The voice and its tone which reflects, as we have seen in Bakhtin, the relation of self and other, utterer and listener, must be a central and basic concern in composing and communication instruction. Back to basics, then, will mean back to the fundamental fact of any kind of writing: it always involves the creation of the illusion of the voice. To approach, for example, writing this way in a classroom will involve reflection on the voice, its relation to feeling as it is reflected in tone, and its parameters (i.e., the things or circumstances that influence and reflect it). Students of composing must learn to think clearly about their relation as writers (and readers) to the other that they address (or to the voice that they hear as readers), their relation to their subjects (experts, explorers, novices, etc.), their relation to their own voice (self image), their relation to their purpose (primarily entertaining, classifying, persuading, etc.). Above all they must learn to pay attention to tone as the symbolic image (i.e., metaphor) of these relations that is central to style or the character of the process. When students produce writing they can be asked to explain, discuss, and even write about, the relations that the piece symbolizes.

Matters of grammar can also be seen in a relational way. For example, the sentence may be seen and discussed in terms of utterance as Paul Ricoeur does in his Interpretation Theory where he equates sentence with utterance (50 ff.). If we see writing as developing discourse and the sentence as utterance as its functional unit, then fundamentals of grammar make a new kind of functional sense. Discourse in such an utterance-based, relational light becomes, as Paul Ricoeur calls it in Interpretation Theory, clusters of sentences forming "bundles of relations" (83). He also declares a relational approach to the sentence when he speaks of the meaning of its "elements" as their "...ability to enter relation with other elements and with the whole work" (84). This idea connects with Langer, of course, who discussed the sentence in terms of its relations (Chapter Two, above) declaring it a web of relations determining the meaning of the words which constitute it. Bakhtin also emphasized the relational aspect of meaning the other way, outwardly, as it determined the meaning of discourse (Chapter 3, above).

Paul Ricoeur discusses the sentence in terms of relations in the opening chapter, "Language as Discourse," to his Interpretation Theory. There he notes that the subject of a sentence "picks out something singular" and the predicate "in contrast, designates a kind of quality, a class of things, a type of relation, or a type of action" (11). This "polarity of singular identification and universal predication gives a specific content to the notion of the proposition
conceived of as the object of the speech event" (11). Such an entity can never be analyzed as a system of discrete parts. It is a structure "not in the analytic sense of structuralism...,(but) is a structure in a synthetic (organic or creative) sense" (11). Such a sense of the proposition or sentence or utterance is one of dynamic relation characterized by: the interplay of the functions of identification and predication..." (11). The sentence is, therefore, always, even in its grammatical dynamics, an "event" (11). Such a rooted sense of the sentence as utterance could revolutionize the pedagogy of grammar.

A discourse approach to composing should deal with language, therefore, in a functional way where language as system (what Sausegue called langue) transcends itself, as Ricoeur says (20). This, by the way, echoes Bakhtin's insistence that his discourse-based view of language transcends linguistics in what he calls "trans" or "meta-linguistics" (See Chapter Three, above). Ricoeur also suggests how pronouns can be seen as "shifters" that root utterances in contexts in the sentence, emphasizing again the relational nature of grammatical elements (13).

Writing, then, in the context of such an approach to composing is what Ricoeur calls "a way of being in the world" (37). Discourse projects this way. Another emphasis that will follow in such an approach is that of writing as narration. Writers such as Ken Macrorie and Peter Elbow have introduced many to the generation, almost therapy, of narrative-based writing. In the light of Bakhtin and related ideas in Ricoeur all writing can be seen as narration. The writer always tells of his experience of relationships, no matter what he is writing. Macrorie and Elbow in their books Telling Writing and Writing Without Teachers, respectively, noted that their approaches, which emphasized the voice and the possibilities of personal truth-telling, unlocked and unblocked student writers and got them interested in writing. Yet they did not delve into the theoretical implications of what they had discovered and, as a result, the popularity of their texts waned with the subjectivism of the early 1970s. I suggest that the voice and narrative-based nature of their personal experience approaches make sense as logical applications of this study's theme: that writing is projected, symbolic discourse that relates self and other, where that other is manifold and "polyvocal" to use Ricoeur's Bakhtin-like word (60). This is not to limit assignments or projects in student writing to personal experience papers in the normal sense of that phrase, but rather to ask teachers and students to conceive of writing as a presentation of the self's relationships to subject, addressee, and situation. Narration, then, is what all writing does in varying degrees is always to present the network of relationships perceived and created in experience.

Vygotsky makes a distinction between "sense" and "meaning" in Thought and Language that is relevant here. He notes in discussing inner speech (147) that the sense of a word is unique and its meaning general. This corresponds to Bakhtin's distinction between the uniqueness of the utterance
and the generality of language's meaning as well as corresponds to Langer's presentational symbolism that grasps meaning intuitively and discursive symbolism that grasps it according to linear logic. In other words, the mind consists of a flow of symbolic images that collide with language resulting in the metaphorical utterance. A dialectical relationship obtains between the personal and the public self resulting in the transformation of both the self and the other. Instructors of writing must be sensitive to this transforming, creative and constructive relationship which they can nourish and encourage in their composing classes. The outworn and destructive sense of "creative writing" involving only highly personal fiction and poetry and "expository writing" involving public and informational writing must be discarded by enlightened teachers who clearly sense the creative nature of the mind as it engages with language and creatively relates self and other in the utterance. Just as metaphor embraces both presentational and discursive symbolism and knowing, and as the utterance embraces self and other, so too does writing wed sense and meaning in the creative classroom. We'll return to this point again when we consider style in writing instruction.

Regarding the teaching of literature and interpretation, our key theorists are also suggestive. There is no absolute, qualitative difference between expository writing and literature. It is a difference of degree, not of kind, that distinguishes the two. In all cases we have the created illusion of the voice projecting a network of relations as a self interacts with other. Moreover, the core, creative ingredient is found in both: the metaphor. As Paul Ricoeur puts it:

...the relation between the literal meaning and the figurative meaning in a metaphor is like an abridged version within a single sentence of the complex interplay of significations that characterize the literary work as a whole. (46)

And of course, as we have seen, the metaphor is ubiquitous in literary and non-literary modes of discourse. The dialectic between the literal and the figurative, between the explicit and the implicit is the locus of the relationship that is the meaning of meaning. This meaning according to Bakhtin, as we have already seen (Chapter Three), and Ricoeur, in his Interpretation Theory, occurs in the "semantic space" as Ricoeur succinctly puts it rather than psychological space.7 This semantic space is the symbolic, relational world of the utterance. It is not to be identified with the text as object or with the intentions of the writer. Rather it is to be found in the dialectical relationship that embodies the utterance and its image in the text. It is to be found in the metaphor that is the utterance in the text. It is organic and processive as Langer described those terms. It is personal relationship with other in terms of uttered language as Bakhtin described that event. Finally, it is semantic, of the sentence as utterance which we see in Ricoeur.
In such a view, form that has been ignored by traditional biographical and historical criticism and reified by formalists, can now be seen as a relational event, a patterning of dynamic form (a la Langer’s waterfall) that embodies the exchange between organisms, selves and others. As Ricoeur puts it, form must be seen as the "interplay of relations" (83).

Students must learn to recognize and engage with such forms, to see themselves as active determiners of form, creators of relations in their writing and their reading. Ricoeur speaks of creative reading as involving guess and reasoning, Langer would say presentational and discursive reasoning. Like her, he sees both in dialectical relation with one another in interpretation (86). Students might be asked for narrative accounts of their readings preceded by provoking discussion of their situations, relations to the text, etc. In this way the text is something of a musical score to be encountered and interpreted and realized by the reader, actively and creatively. The teacher here might be something like a conductor who coaches soloists (students as writers and readers) but gives them appropriate interpretive range.

The object of interpretation in the study of writing, whether it be exposition or literature, is "the disclosure of a possible way of looking at things" as Ricoeur nicely puts it (92). The text mediates a "fusion of horizons" between writer and reader (93). The study of composing is active relating, oneself to another. The text is the intermediary, its context shifts from mind to mind, from time to time, from space to space. As Langer says its dynamic form as a pattern of changes is constant in a well-formed work. It is a metaphorical process of becoming, as is thinking. Metaphors create new ways of looking at things, new ways of being in the world. Thought, language, and their embodiment in the dynamic form of writing symbolizing the dialogical utterance is, as Langer would say, shot through with symbolism, is itself a metaphor.

Regarding the process of writing, much attention is finally being given to teaching students how writing is produced. We must remember, however, that the activity is an organic one necessitating regard for and expression of relations, the real content and process that is the subject of writing. In this light writing is always (and reading too) composed narration, interpretation, and evaluation of experience. Such a view can be a liberating view of the writing process for our students where all composing is creation and discovery.

The concept of style is transformed when we consider it in terms of the major theorists of this study, especially Bakhtin. Charles Schuster carefully considers this matter in his article, "Mikhail Bakhtin as Rhetorical Theorist." His point is that Bakhtin's dialogism reveals the relevance of aesthetics in composition instruction. Matters of style that are traditionally taught as surface niceties and applied to writing only at the very end of composing, if at all, in composition classes must give way in light of Bakhtin's thought to a basic concern for tone and voice (597, 598). As he puts it, "...what really matters in
writing is immanent. We attach "metaphors to such concepts in order to understand them--metaphors such as voice, style, tone, image" (603). He adds that teachers "tend not to pay attention to such elements probably because we are afraid of their elusiveness" (603). He further shows that "resonance" of voice in writing is the aesthetic in writing as he demonstrates in his commentary on non-fiction writers Robert Pirsig and John McPhee (604-607). His article is an excellent example of what critics and teachers of writing can do with Bakhtin's insights.

As Elliot Eisner puts it in The Educational Imagination we must "examine our metaphors," our way of conceiving our subject of composing.

Knowing, like teaching, requires the organism to be active and to construct meaningful patterns out of experience. At base, such patterns are artistic construction, a means through which the human creates a conception of reality....This sense making is...an artistic act. We function as the architects of our own enlightenment.... (271)

We are teaching a metaphorical process, and the teaching itself and the learning is a metaphorical process. Writing, for example, must be envisioned by the teacher, seen and experienced by the students as the creation of a successful illusion of a human voice telling of details which generate images that in turn are symbols of the pattern of dynamic relationships presented to the mind in experience. Writing must be interpreted and evaluated in terms of the quality of voice (coherence, clarity, and truthfulness), of metaphor (clarity and suggestiveness), expressive form (its function, coherence and significance), and meaning (forms of feeling). Moreover, students must come to a conscious awareness of the dynamics of meaning as it evolves through the dialectic of living utterances embodied in social and then psychological relations perceived, retained and expressed by the mind in symbols. As James Moffett puts it in his Coming on Center: "Children have been comprehending and composing all their lives....They are two sides of humanity's chief talent, which is to make sense of things by selecting and ordering experience into useful symbols" (21). If students see and realize writing as a natural, living, process of discovery, they can transform the activity giving it personal meaning. Writing, then, can become, as Moffett says, "...an opportunity to find out who I am and what I am to do with my life." Along these same lines in his recent article "Liberating Inner Speech" Moffett equates thought with inner speech and says that writing can "loosen obsession and redirect inner speech." Writing is an abstraction of the mental connecting going on in any living human consciousness, as Moffett, like Langer and Bakhtin, observes (141).

In his refutation of formalism in The Formal Method in Poetics Bakhtin himself noted that meaning was always unique, individual almost fragile in its transience. The utterance is the "organic connection" that reveals it for those
sensitive enough to realize it (121). Teachers of writing and literature, teachers of composing can transform the teaching of it and in so doing transform their own minds. Bakhtin in The Dialogical Imagination notes also that style is the "fundamental and creative (triple) relationship" of object, speaker, and another's discourse that characterizes a living utterance (378). Teachers must engage in this creative relationship with our subject and our students. A meaningful transformation of all aspects of the relationship will be the result.

To teach composing is to engage in and teach the metaphorical process of knowing, involving the conception and expression of the relations between self and other. Letting the self of the student encounter the other, internalize that relationship, and express it in creative utterance is the crux of our mission.

1 Flowers and Hayes model ("A Cognitive Process Theory of Writing") is such a mechanical elaboration: essentialistic, atomistic, machine-like, neither relational nor transformational, devoid of any sense of the relational and contextually determined nature of meaning. The ideas of Langer and Bakhtin amount to (or can be elaborated into) a substantive critique of mechanical models of communication and composing. Linda Flowers and John Hayes, for example, gather "data" from protocols (oral explanations by writers as they write). Such an "experiment" rips writing from its context and relationships. Their model is built on this misconceived data. The Flowers and Hayes method, I might add, does not take into account the social relationships that the protocol method creates. Bakhtin, for example, criticized Freud's psychoanalytic method for failing to take into account the social relationships that were part of the content of the sessions (see Holquist and Clark, p. 179).

2 Donald Murray, literary artist and teacher of writing, describes the process of writing as collecting and connecting in his article "Writing as Process: How Writing Finds Its Own Meaning." Here he stresses the reading/writing collecting/connecting dynamism of the activity of writing. His description of the writing process and his suggested class experiences flow from a Langer and Bakhtin compatible sense of the mind and knowing.

3 Especially in his final chapter where he proclaims "anti-historicism" in his theory of the text as symbolic mediator (91). This pristine objectivity is not compatible with Bakhtin's (and this study's) view of the rootedness of language and meaning in the chronotope.

4 A.N. Leontiev's activity theory (mentioned earlier and elaborated in his Consciousness, Activity, and Personality) elaborates the process of activity in these terms. Teachers and researchers of writing could apply this concept to writing (e.g., spelling and grammatical practice constitute
operations, completing thoughts in sentences constitute acts, connecting thoughts to develop ideas constitutes composing, etc.). Donald Bateman in an application of Leontiev's activity theory to the teaching of foreign languages, for example, notes that "learning occurs when new tasks are intimately related to the motivations embodied in the structure of activity" (2). Such suggestions follow from an organic sense of human activity, in this case language learning, in our case composing.

5 Nancy Sommers has convincingly discussed the need for theory to ground pedagogy of composition in "The Need for Theory in Composition Research." The nature and the fate of Macrorie's *Telling Writing* text and Elbow's book, too, are instances of this need.

6 Barbara Hardy in her "Narrative as a Primary Act of Mind" takes a similarly larger view of narration suggesting that it is "...not ...an aesthetic invention used by artists to control, manipulate, and order experience, but... a primary act of mind...."(12).

7 William K. Wimsatt called the search for the writer's intention in literary interpretation the intentional fallacy in his classic, new critical work The Verbal Icon. The new critics or formalists (and structuralists, for that matter) fall into the opposite fallacy: that of the absolute text (see Ricoeur, p. 30).

8 Reader response criticism has taken this tack, and in particular Barbara Herstein Smith discusses Nelson Goodman's use of this analogy in the opening chapter of her book, On the Margins of Discourse, where she suggests it not only applies to literary art, but to all discourse.

9 Mark Schorer in "Technique as Discovery" uses the experience of discovery while writing as a touchstone for gauging when he is writing well. William Stafford in "A Way of Writing" also describes his successful writing as discovery.
Works Cited


