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CABINET SECRETARIES FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON: AN EXAMINATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CABINET STUDIES

The Ohio State University

Ph.D. 1985

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CABINET SECRETARIES FROM TRUMAN TO JOHNSON:
AN EXAMINATION OF
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CABINET STUDIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Janet Marie Martin, B.A., M.A.

****

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1985

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Approved By

Herbert Weisberg
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Political Science
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Janet Marie Martin
1985
To my Mother, who urged me to stop,
and
To my Advisor, Herb Weisberg, who urged me to go on;
Both strategies succeeded.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many colleagues and friends have offered encouragement and support during the past five years since this dissertation project began. To them I offer my sincere appreciation and thanks.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The cabinet is an intriguing element of the American system of government. From the time of Washington on down, Presidents have received counsel, be it solicited or volunteered, from their Department heads, although the cabinet is not mentioned in the Constitution. And the cabinet is held in sufficient esteem to warrant corporate Presidents, Governors, lawyers, members of Congress, labor leaders, and others forsaking current responsibilities to assume membership in this body. And yet, despite its eminence, the cabinet has remained an enigma to Presidents, to researchers, even to cabinet members themselves.

It is not too difficult to find statements by Presidents or secretaries on the frustrations they have had over the role of the cabinet. Evidence can also be found as to the extent of the dilemma and of deep desires to find a solution. Yet even when a President has considered the policy advisory potential of the cabinet, at times it has been the symbolic and political role of the cabinet that the President has focused on. By way of example, in a memo to President Lyndon Johnson, Charles M. Maguire outlined his suggestions concerning the cabinet in a "guidebook for thought and action." It highlighted "some
immediate, middle and long-range methods for improving" and capitalizing on the Cabinet—to its own and Johnson's advantage. After discussing the role of the cabinet with former cabinet aides and political scientists, Maguire came up with a number of approaches, even inviting Richard E. Neustadt or Richard F. Fenno to lecture to the secretaries on "'the Vital Center: Responsibilities of the Modern Cabinet'" at a Cabinet Roundtable. To quote from his memo:

The President expressed a desire for the "novel" in Cabinet Meetings— agenda that will "make a man want to come."

It would be novel and valuable to have an expert on the Cabinet address the Cabinet. Professors Neustadt or Fenno could, with the right prompting, do more than sketch Cabinet history.

Their presentation could focus on the place of the Cabinet in the changing mainstream of American Government: the opportunity and necessity for enlarged Cabinet role and responsibilities; the new obligations to assist an increasingly over-burdened Chief Executive; the imperative for active and cross-cutting partnership, among the Cabinet, and with the President.

This forum would also provide the President with a diplomatic setting for strong presentation of his own views on Cabinet functions and flaws.

The guidebook went on to make such proposals as "Publicizing the Johnson Cabinet," given the apparent dearth of Johnson cabinet articles appearing in mass publications such as The New York Times Sunday Magazine, Life, or Reader's Digest, as compared to the large number of articles appearing during the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy years.

Thought was even given to livening up Cabinet meetings in response to Johnson's opinion that too many were "too dull." As a "change of pace and pattern...if only to break surface monotony and force alertness through the unexpected," Maguire suggested the use of short
films already produced by the Departments, on topics ranging from the Post Office's "mail avalanches and automated postal service" to the Defense Department's "documentaries of rural pacification projects in Vietnam."

As another example of some of the varied opinions on the role of the cabinet, Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, in an interview in 1953, recalled the differing opinions held by members of the Truman cabinet as to the role of that body. Acheson described a conversation that took place at a weekly luncheon meeting of the cabinet at which President Truman was not present. The Defense Secretary, James Forrestal, "began to talk about an idea which possessed his mind very strongly, which was that we should develop in the United States the Cabinet system." Acheson replied by stating that "whatever the advantages were to the Cabinet government, they grew out of a different system. Under our Constitution we had Presidential government. The President was the only person in the whole group who was elected by all the people of the United States. We were not his equals; we were his secretaries. Our function was not to try to develop a group which would have any collective effect upon the President. We could advise. We could say whatever we thought was right, but it was his decision, and we must operate on that basis."

Thus, as these examples suggest, the cabinet qua cabinet has caused debate among cabinet members and among Presidents and their assistants at various points in time. Yet rarely has it been the unique focus of a
The cabinet per se has rarely been studied by political scientists. Over the past 80 years, studies of the cabinet have been few and far between. A brief review of the literature suggests this lack of attention.

In one of the rare discussions focusing solely on the cabinet by political scientists in the past 100 years, Henry Barrett Learned, writing in 1909, provides a description of the development and use of the term "cabinet" in both the United States and Great Britain. A few years later, in 1913, John Fairlie, sensing a gap in scholarly work on the cabinet, proposed a research agenda for future scholars. In his work, Fairlie presents a comparative analysis of the President's cabinet across administrations. He also examines the appointment process and a number of variables that have remained untouched by researchers for decades. For example, Fairlie suggests studying the prestige of departments by secretary transfers from one department (e.g., War) to another department (e.g., State) in the same or later administrations. For 67 years this line of research was not pursued. It was not until 1980 that a systematic effort was made to trace such transfers and place research findings into a conceptual framework. And there were a number
of other variables Fairlie examined in looking at the appointment process (e.g., party background, occupational background) that only within the past few years have received some attention.  

Another body of literature on the cabinet appeared during the latter years of the Roosevelt administration and the early Truman years. Specifically, Don K. Price, Arthur W. MacMahon, and George A. Graham all include a discussion of the cabinet in their examination of reorganization of the executive branch. And these articles appear to have set the tone for much of the research conducted on the executive branch during the past 40 years. For the most part studies have depicted the creation and growth of the Executive Office of the President and the advisory network surrounding a President, ignoring the cabinet per se. Textbooks have noted the "swelling of the Presidency."

In the past fifteen years, it would appear as if much of the research on the President and his advisors has been channeled in two directions. First, there have been studies of the personal intimate advisory network the President relies upon. Presidential autobiographies and biographies stress the role of such advisors. Irving L. Janis, Alexander George, and Richard T. Johnson each present a conceptual framework for analyzing these advisory systems, with both Janis and George noting structural implications of these advisory networks. Second, studies have examined the growth of the Executive Office of the President. Emphasis has been given to relations
between the President, White House staff, the departments, and Congress. Hugh Heclo, Stephen Hess, and Dan Rather are three authors whose emphases have varied in their respective studies of the executive branch and the presidential advisory system. The growth of the Executive Office of the President, both in numbers and in importance, oftentimes at the expense of the cabinet department heads, is reflected in such studies. A number of studies have focused on specific staff units within the Executive Office of the President. Some studies have examined the cabinet vis a vis another branch of government. In this vein, Redfield's autobiographical account provides the perspective of one who has served in both Congress and the cabinet, although his observations are of an earlier era.

In the past 25 years, Richard F. Fenno's study of The President's Cabinet, published in 1959, remains the only book-length study of the cabinet per se. And the focus of several scholars in recent years has been on the appointment process, including works by G. Calvin Mackenzie with a broad focus—examining hundreds of top executive political appointments in his analysis—and Richard L. Schott and Dagmar S. Hamilton, focusing on the political appointments of but one administration—that of Lyndon Johnson.
In recent years, researchers of the executive branch of government have approached their studies with a number of innovative techniques. Scholars have used several different approaches to facilitate research. In doing so they have helped to alleviate some of the problems which in the past seem to have prevented scholars from studying the executive branch in the same behavioral way as is standard for other subfields of political science, such as Congress or voting behavior. For example, when one moves beyond the President himself as the object of analysis to the supporting players of an administration, the number of cases increases markedly. George C. Edwards, sympathetic to the needs of research, identifies areas of executive branch research where quantitative methods can be used, such as in viewing the presidency as a set of relationships to increase the number of cases. It would appear that by examining cabinet secretaries either longitudinally within departments, or even within an administration but across departments, one gains a number of cases that allows statements of a more general nature to be made. With the use of such an approach, the viability of a systematic examination of the cabinet becomes apparent. Nelson W. Polsby's theoretical framework, providing a classificatory scheme of cabinet secretary appointments (e.g., specialists, client-oriented, and generalists), and resulting consequences of each
type of appointment, suggests the feasibility of such an approach.\textsuperscript{26} Herbert F. Weisberg's behavioral study of cabinet transfers and the prestige of departments is further illustration of analytical techniques enhancing cabinet research.\textsuperscript{27} The recent cabinet studies by James J. Best\textsuperscript{28} and James D. King and James W. Riddlesperger, Jr.\textsuperscript{29}, although of limited focus, make use of longitudinal data in examining, respectively, background characteristics and the question of a partisan factor in recent cabinet appointments.

It is interesting to note Fenno's assessment of the merits of presenting quantitative data on the cabinet. Fenno writes,

Some attempt has been made to discover a pattern in terms of the personal backgrounds and social characteristics of cabinet members. They are found to be not literally representative of all segments of the population, and these findings are used to buttress conclusions about their elitist character. It is, perhaps, worth recognizing that whatever other factors may enter into the appointment process, those which would guarantee an accurate cabinet reflection of the census statistics do not. But the setting up of this statistical norm seems even more over-simplified, and further removed from the realities of the appointment process, than the ordinary rule-of-thumb standards by which cabinet-making is judged. To be sure, some aspects of cabinet selection can be quantified, but the problem remains as to whether anything meaningful is being measured. In any case, the bias of this study is to urge a more qualitative appreciation of the multi-dimensional recruitment process and of the cabinet as but one institution in a cohering independent system.\textsuperscript{30}

Fenno is correct in urging an "appreciation of the multi-dimensional recruitment process and of the cabinet as but one institution in a cohering independent system," yet I would suggest that a quantitative approach, including the use of demographic variables, can also lead to
the same appreciation. It is through such a systematic and rigorous approach that the foundation can be laid for independent analysis of the cabinet. Perhaps the frustration experienced by political scientists and journalists in writing about the cabinet stems from the absence of an adequate conceptual framework with which to discuss the cabinet. As a case in point, presidential scholar Edward S. Corwin, writing just prior to the presidential election of 1948, describes the problems he saw with "the cabinet."

"F.D.R.," according to Miss Perkins, tried at first to have "full Cabinet decision and expression on matters of policy"; but it was no go. In a short time the established pattern reasserted itself. Few "Cabinet agreements" were reached; and such consultation as took place was between the President and individual members of the Cabinet about their departmental problems. It would be easy to document Miss Perkins' account from the more recently published reminiscences of Messrs. Hull, Morgenthau and Stimson, or for earlier years, from Mr. Roosevelt's own book, "On Our Way."

The truth is that the Cabinet has in our day become of negligible importance in the determination of national policy. Why is this? Doubtless the personal element has often operated to depress the Cabinet's role in the policy field. But when so variable a factor repeatedly produces the same result there must be an underlying constant factor at work.

The Cabinet is of negligible influence in the shaping of broad governmental policies because it is composed of men whose principal business is that of administration and who, consequently, even when they are not administrative experts at the outset, are required to become such. Unfortunately, an expert in a particular area of governmental activity is not likely to possess the breadth of outlook which is most desirable in a political adviser, or the time or inclination to interest himself in the problems of other departments or of the country at large.

The distinction later proposed by Thomas Cronin between an inner cabinet and an outer cabinet might have helped Corwin to elucidate the schizophrenic behavior expected of a cabinet member. Unfortunately,
such a theoretical framework had not yet been proposed.

FOCUS OF THIS STUDY

Whereas Fenno, in the last study devoted exclusively to the President's cabinet, stated the purpose of his study as "mainly an attempt at understanding the operation of the Cabinet in the American political system; only secondarily is it aimed at substantiation or modifying existing ideas," the intent of my study is to assess existing ideas or ways of thinking about cabinet secretaries. What frameworks have been identified and used in describing and/or evaluating the secretaries in the President's cabinet?

In the following chapters I hope to provide such an analysis by systematically looking at the secretaries from the inherited cabinet of the Truman administration to the final cabinet of the Johnson administration. The intention is to discern patterns, both longitudinally and across departments within each administration, that have been suggested by past scholars, or which may have escaped prior detection. It is my intention to build upon previously suggested patterns and relationships by adding empirical evidence to support or refute what have traditionally been descriptive studies and commentaries on the President's cabinet secretaries. The three Chapters that follow
will examine: 1.) recruitment and background characteristics of each cabinet; 2.) role perception of respective cabinet members; and 3.) goals envisioned for each department by the secretary at the start of his or her tenure, all in the context of the frameworks or patterns that have been used in describing cabinet secretaries.

I have limited this dissertation to a focus on these administrations for several reasons. The Truman administration is a good starting point since it follows the great shift in the nature of the federal government from one of a limited role in the lives of Americans to a major and controlling force fueled by a huge executive branch bureaucracy. Although the cabinet undergoes a number of changes in the time frame of this study, all changes were of a similar nature. The creation of the Defense Department in 1947 established civilian control over the armed forces in the hopes of better management. Similarly, in 1953 and again in 1966, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, respectively, were created as a means of consolidating a number of programs and agencies into one Department.

I also want to focus this study on the secretary's perspective. This requires an examination of documents from the presidential libraries and oral histories, as well as published interviews and Senate hearings that were more readily accessible after the Roosevelt administration and prior to the Nixon administration. In addition, a study of this sort requires a finite period of time, and a data base of
manageable proportions. Given these factors the time period extending from the Truman through Johnson administrations was selected.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty with a study of this sort is the gathering of data and the reliability of sources. Chapter 2 is a straightforward analysis of background characteristics of cabinet members. Yet sources, viewed as reputable, can be in error. The task then becomes one of sifting through information and confirming information through several sources.

Another problem is the inconsistent information available on cabinet secretaries and the secretary's perspective. There is an uneven collection of oral histories and administrative histories in presidential libraries, as well as collections of papers deposited for each secretary. Some material is still closed, other material is unavailable for citation. Senate confirmation hearings could be a useful resource in examining executive and judicial appointments, but are quite uneven as to their content. (See Appendix A for a discussion of some of the problems associated with the gathering of data for this study, and in particular, the use of Senate confirmation hearings.)

It is important to provide a first attempt at testing theoretical frameworks used in describing and explaining cabinet secretaries. It is the hope of this author to begin such testing in the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
In the following section I will present a brief introduction to and discussion of the various frameworks and theoretical orientations that have been used in writings on the cabinet.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR STUDYING CABINET SECRETARIES

The Inner/Outer Cabinet Distinction

A perspective taken by recent writers analyzing the cabinet is to subdivide the cabinet into two parts— the inner cabinet and the outer cabinet— and then use the inner/outer cabinet distinction as the framework for further discussion. Thomas Cronin suggested this inner/outer cabinet distinction. He writes, "this classification, derived from extensive interviews, indicates how White House aides and cabinet officers view the departments and their access to the president. The inner cabinet includes the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, and the Attorney General. The occupants of these cabinet positions generally have maintained a role as counselor to the president; the departments all include broad-ranging, multiple interests. The explicitly domestic policy departments, with the exception of Justice, have made up the outer cabinet. By custom, if not by designation, these cabinet officers assume a relatively straightforward advocacy orientation that overshadows their counseling
This distinction of an inner/outer cabinet difference was not suggested until the 1970's. Therefore, it is a rather recent conceptualization of the President's cabinet. And it has not been subjected to much in the way of empirical testing. In part, that might be one explanation for the ambiguity surrounding the inner/outer conceptualization scheme. If the classification of the cabinet into an inner versus an outer cabinet is found not to be true in all instances, then a revision of this categorization scheme may be in order.

The inner cabinet/outer cabinet distinction is the principal theoretical orientation proposed thus far for cabinet studies per se. As such, it will guide much of the analysis that follows. But some other frameworks will also be considered.
Balance

At the start of a new administration, cabinet selections are often evaluated as a unit to see if the administration is "balanced" in its representation of interests, regions of the country, ethnic backgrounds, and so on. However, as a theoretical construct, "balance" is wanting since there is a singularity in the applicability of the term. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 2, balance only has meaning from the perspective of outsiders—that is, the President, press, or constituent groups—with little meaning from the secretary's perspective. In addition, this term really does not lend itself to much in the way of analysis and little can be said except for those appointments made at one particular point in time. In discussing recruitment and background characteristics of cabinet appointees in Chapter 2, "balance" will be evaluated for its appropriateness in discussing even the initial appointments of a President.

Issues Networks

Another conceptual framework that has been proposed in recent years is that of issue networks. However, this framework extends beyond the
cabinet per se to encompass much of the executive branch hierarchy as well as those outside the government who are interested in affecting policy. Hugh Heclo suggests that in the past 25 years, issue networks have come to "overlay" rather than replace subgovernments. "More than ever, policy-making is becoming an intramural activity among expert issue-watchers, their networks, and their networks of networks....Instead of party politicians, today's political executives tend to be policy politicians, able to move among the various networks, recognized as knowledgeable about the substance of issues concerning these networks, but not irretrievably identified with highly controversial positions. Their reputations among those 'in the know' make them available for presidential appointments."\(^\text{37}\)

Although issue networks have been suggested which include far more of the Executive Branch appointees than just cabinet secretaries, the usefulness of this concept in understanding the cabinet will be explored.

**The Partisan Factor**

A fourth framework, that of the partisan factor in cabinet appointments, has been suggested by James D. King and James W. Riddlesperger. "Political parties are omnipresent in American government--Congress is organized along party lines; representatives and
senators are more supportive of the president's programs when they are members of his party; Democrats and Republicans advocate and adopt distinctly different policies. And yet, students of cabinet recruitment and selection have failed to systematically examine the appointments of Democratic and Republican presidents. King and Riddlesperger's analysis, covering an extended period of time—that of the Truman through Reagan administrations—does suggest an area of cabinet research that may prove fruitful, yet has most likely been overlooked due to the low number of cases for selected time periods. It is, however, a framework that will not be overlooked in the analysis that follows.

The "Naive" View of the Cabinet

I want to introduce a new framework—that of the "naive" view of the cabinet. Just as students of the presidency have found it useful to consider the effects of a stereotypical view of the presidency, that is, a "textbook presidency" where the individual is viewed as all powerful, so do I want to see the effects of stereotypical views of the cabinet by cabinet members, that is, the expectation that cabinet members will serve as collegial advisors to the president. Is there a "naive" view of the cabinet shared by the press, public, and more importantly the president and his cabinet? Does this give cabinet members false views of their own role in government? Have the media and presidential scholars shaped expectations of what cabinet secretaries are to do in
office and therefore distorted the role envisioned by secretaries? These are some of the questions that will be explored in Chapter 3: Role Perception.

**Initial Versus Midterm Appointments**

Finally, the question of whether there are differences in the types of individuals initially appointed to a President's cabinet at the outset of a term of office from those subsequently appointed during the course of the administration will be examined closely in Chapter 2. If there are differences in backgrounds, does this then affect role perception or what goals one sets for a Department? Even if backgrounds might be similar, does a President select someone during the course of the Administration who will envision the job of secretary differently from the individual first appointed by the President to that position?

These are some of the questions that will be addressed in the following chapters. The next section will present a brief overview of the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

In the remainder of this dissertation, the reader will note that the emphasis of this study is on cabinet secretaries, rather than on the cabinet as a collectivity. In addition, the role of the individual secretaries or the cabinet as a collectivity in the advising process and decision-making process will not be examined. These are important areas to be researched by scholars in the future, but are beyond the limited scope of this study. The remainder of this section will present a brief overview of each of the 3 substantive chapters of this study.

In Chapter 2 the focus will be on examining recruitment and background characteristics of the cabinet secretaries selected for the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations in terms of the frameworks discussed earlier in this chapter. As mentioned, a number of studies in recent years have focused on the background characteristics of executive branch officials. Some studies have looked broadly at all executive branch appointments over a period of time. Others have focused on one administration. And some studies that have focused on the cabinet have emphasized one background factor (e.g., past Department work) or one Administration.

My focus is broader. In Chapter 2 I will examine several recruitment and background variables that have been identified in these
studies as important in understanding the nature of the President's cabinet. I will also look at the variables identified by Best, and King and Riddlesperger in their examinations of cabinet secretaries. The past experience of a secretary can greatly influence how they will perceive their position. If Hugh Heclo is right in describing issue networks, then whether one is moving about within a particular policy area from one relevant position to another (for example, from a private corporation to a position in a university and finally to a position in an executive department) can be demonstrated by examining past employment.

In Chapter 2, the variables I will closely examine include location of last employment and predominant adult employment, last employment, predominant adult employment, past federal sector experience, past department experience (including service as Assistant or Deputy Secretary), and briefly, education.

In Chapter 3, the focus will be on the role perception of the cabinet secretaries at the start of their terms of office. What is the job each envisions for himself or herself as a member of the President's cabinet and head of a department? Will they view themselves as the President's top adviser in a limited area? Is their job one that emphasizes a close working relationship with relevant congressional committees? Or, for example, will the secretary view one of their main responsibilities as keeping the public informed of policy decisions and activities in their department?
Role Perception will be studied by examining statements made by cabinet secretaries during Senate confirmation hearings, in press conferences, and in letters and memoes. (The methodological techniques and procedures will be carefully explained in Chapter 3.) I am limiting this analysis to an initial perception of the job and therefore will not be looking at how in fact the secretary does act as head of a department and as a member of the cabinet throughout their tenure.

In looking at role perceptions, several of the variables identified in Chapter 2 concerning recruitment and background characteristics will be used to help explain similarities and differences, including past employment, especially prior federal sector and department experience.

In Chapter 4, the focus will be on the initial goals the secretary envisions for his or her respective department. The goals will be identified through an examination of confirmation hearings, press conferences, and intradepartmental communications. Goals may be similar or dissimilar to the roles a secretary identifies, but the emphasis in this chapter is on what the secretary plans for the department. For example, are congressional liaison units to be set up in offices throughout the department to facilitate a close, cooperative working relationship with appropriate committees? Are offices to work on improving productivity and efficiency and design new methods to eliminate waste in their respective areas? Or are offices and bureaus to be sure to seek input from relevant clientele groups, and work to
meet the needs of these groups? Again, this analysis will be limited to the secretary's initial perception of department goals. As in Chapter 2, the past employment of a secretary will be used to explain department goal orientation.

In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, both a longitudinal analysis by administration and an analysis within an administration, but across departments, will be used to assess these variables in the context of the frameworks that have been identified as guiding writings on the cabinet.

Chapter 5 will present a summary of my findings and offer some conclusions that can be drawn from this study of cabinet secretaries. Finally, I will suggest a research agenda for future studies of cabinet secretaries.
Chapter 1: Footnotes

1 Charles M. Maguire, Memorandum for the President, August 20 (no year), Confidential File, WHCF, Box 21, "FG 100-Cabinet Departments," Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.

2 Ibid., attached outline, "Roundtable #4." In private correspondence with Richard Fenno (August 12, 1984) and Richard Neustadt (August, 1984) both indicate they were not contacted by Maguire or others for this purpose during the course of the Johnson administration.

3 Ibid., attached outline, "III. Publicizing the Johnson Cabinet." The Guidebook stated: "Unless there is some strange and invisible historical cycle at work, we should be able to prompt articles on the Johnson Cabinet....In historical perspective, the Johnson Cabinet is an exceptional story--exceptional men, challenges, achievements--met at an exceptional time in American government and life. It is your instrument. Its record as written should inevitably reflect credit on Presidential leadership." The proposals to accomplish this included: 1.) working "with Douglass Cater to sound out qualified (and friendly) authors on writing Cabinet articles. Richard Fenno, Neustadt, Stanley Hyman, Louis Koenig are possibilities," and 2.) working with Cater about a book on the Cabinet. "For quick publication, suggest Foreward by distinguished authority and essays by individual Cabinet members, ghosted if necessary."

4 Ibid., attached outline, "IV. Film Presentation at Cabinet Meetings." It appears as if Johnson did meet with some success--Ray Scherer's August 15, 1966 statement on NBC News attests to that fact: The feeling that the Cabinet was somewhat unwieldy and musty carried over into the early months of the Johnson Administration. But the more President Johnson saw at first hand the workings of his Administration, the more it occurred to him that in a big government..., Members of the Cabinet tend to become isolated from each other.... The President's counsel to his various Cabinet Secretaries was this--'think nationally and not parochially, if you are a Cabinet Member.' When the President brought Robert E. Kintner, the one time broadcasting executive, into the White House circle early this year he told Mr. Kintner he wanted the Cabinet to play a more meaningful role. The result has been more Cabinet meetings,
preparatory work for them, and a greater understanding among the Departments about the problems of other Departments. All of which is another way of saying that the Cabinet has come back to life....Reporters were given a first hand look at the workings of the Cabinet last week when the President called reporters in just as a 90 minute Cabinet session was breaking up.

One Member of the Cabinet after another, Connor, Wirtz, Fowler, Freeman and so on down the line, stepped before carefully prepared charts and with pointer in hand demonstrated both in succinct and graphic fashion what is happening to the economy....Each Cabinet Member left the room with the feeling that the problem of his particular bailiwick (sic) was a national problem and not a departmental one and that somehow they all fit together.


5Dean Acheson, Papers of Dean Acheson, Princeton Seminars, Rewrite Reel I, July 2, 1953, Box 82, Reading Copy III, pp. 7-8; Truman Library.


7John Fairlie, "The President's Cabinet," American Political Science Review (February 1913): 28-44.


(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924).


26 Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons for the Political System."

27 Weisberg, "Cabinet Transfers and Department Prestige."


33 Fenno, The President's Cabinet, p. 3.

34 As way of illustration, Robert Lovett is listed as having

35 Cronin, The State of the Presidency, pp. 188-208.

36 Ibid., p. 191.


40 Schott and Hamilton, People, Positions, and Power: The Political Appointments of Lyndon Johnson.

41 Weisberg, "Cabinet Transfers and Department Prestige."

42 Polsby, "Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons for the Political System."

CHAPTER 2: RECRUITMENT AND BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

A number of studies have been done on top executive level appointments in government, including examination of their background characteristics. However, the focus of these works has been broad, variously including analysis of agency heads, Assistant Secretaries, and White House staff assistants, as well as cabinet heads. Only by isolating these members designated as the President's cabinet from the rest of the administration can a true test of the theoretical frameworks used in describing the cabinet be made. This chapter will use two frameworks described in the last chapter—that is, "balance" and the inner/outer cabinet framework—to examine the recruitment and background patterns for the cabinet secretaries of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.

Before discussing the balance framework as an appropriate means of exploring the selection of a President's cabinet secretaries, the term "balance" will be examined extensively as it has been used in textbooks and the media. After a definition of balance has been established, this framework will then be explored for its usefulness in studying cabinet secretaries. Next, federal government experience will be examined as a factor in explaining recruitment of cabinet secretaries.
Following this discussion I will explore the inner and outer cabinet framework for its appropriateness in explaining recruitment of cabinet secretaries. The inner and outer cabinet framework has less ambiguity than balance in its common interpretation and therefore only a brief introduction of this framework will be given before analyzing its usefulness in understanding the cabinet.

Throughout this chapter, special consideration will be given to an exploration of the differences between a President's initial and midterm appointments. In addition, the work of Hugh Heclo in identifying a movement of individuals with common policy interests across job sectors (e.g., an individual interested in labor law moving into a high level position in the Department of Labor) will be drawn upon throughout the analysis of the above frameworks.

BALANCE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR CABINET STUDIES

As described in Chapter One, balance has primarily come to have meaning in the context of geographical representation and constituent representation (with some overlap—e.g., a Westerner serving as head of the Department of Interior with a concern for the interests of environmentalists.)
Balance has long been perceived as a factor in the initial configuration of cabinets, both by textbook writers and journalists. Perhaps balance has been the most common interpretation of a President's selection of cabinet secretaries. For example, within a three month period following the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman made a number of changes in the cabinet. In the replacement of Secretary of Agriculture C. R. Wickard with Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins with Lewis Baxter Schwellenbach, Attorney General Francis Biddle with Thomas C. Clark, and Postmaster General Frank C. Walker with Robert E. Hannegan, the new geographical alignment of the cabinet was duly recorded by reporters. The New York Times reported that "These shifts will alter the geographical as well as the personal make-up of the Cabinet, introducing a large representation from the West as compared with the high proportion of Easterners who sat in the Roosevelt cabinets." Similarly, the addition of Fred M. Vinson, a Kentuckian, to Truman's cabinet as Secretary of the Treasury was described as giving "border state recognition in the Cabinet." Fifteen years later, as President-elect John F. Kennedy worked to assemble a cabinet, the press was quick to note the interests "rewarded" with a cabinet seat. For example, the appointment of Governor Luther Hodges, of North Carolina, was labeled as "a decision that reassures the business community while rewarding the Southerners for hard and successful campaigning in the post-convention period."

But the press is not alone in describing the cabinet in terms of balance. Authors of introductory American government textbooks have
also identified cabinet members in terms of constituent ties. For example, Emmette S. Redford et al in their introductory textbook written in the 1960's wrote the following:

Not all the selections must be drawn from the President's party, but in fact almost all of them are. In the course of the nomination and election campaigns obligations have been incurred that have to be recognized, if only for the sake of harmony in the President's coalition....

...the Cabinet must reflect some recognition of geographical balance and of the party organizations in the larger states. North, South, East, and West must all be represented....when a Department's activities are peculiarly concentrated in one section of the country, as those of Interior in the West, its Secretary is expected to be either a resident of the area or publicly identified with it."

The use of the term balance in describing the initial cabinet members of an administration can also be found in current introductory American government texts. Richard A. Watson writes, "the President is expected to introduce some partisan balance into the makeup of the cabinet....both liberal and conservative elements of a party are usually represented." In addition, most Presidents "have considered it politic to include a southerner in the cabinet; traditionally, the secretary of Interior comes from the western part of the United States, where most of the vast public lands under the department's jurisdiction are located. In fact many of the departments have a 'clientele'--that is, particular groups they serve."6

In addition, authors of textbooks on the presidency have found "balance" to be useful in explaining initial appointments to a President's cabinet. Writing forty years ago, foreign observer Harold J. Laski, in his chapter on "The President and His Cabinet," describes
the composition of the American cabinet. The President

must have one or two men who are likely to be
influential with Congress. One, must be a person directly
expert in the handling of the party machine. There must be
representatives of the territorial sections of the country; a
cabinet constructed wholly of Easterners would be offensive to
the West and the South. There ought desirably, to be
representatives of the predominant religions of the United
States; a prominent Methodist and an outstanding Catholic
layman will always make presidential relations more easy. It
has been usual for the secretary of labor to be chosen from
the ranks of the important trade unionists. 7

And, Laski notes, the selection of Frances Perkins by President
Roosevelt to be Secretary of Labor, "may well compel a future president
to include a woman in the cabinet as a measure designed to please the
women in American, not least in view of their powerful organization in
such bodies as the League of Women Voters. . . . A President also has to pay
for his nomination and election." 8

Descriptions of a President's cabinet in terms of the balancing
done to obtain a "representative" cabinet have changed little over the
past forty years. Writing in 1974, Dorothy Buckton James states that a
President "must appoint individuals to his Cabinet for reasons quite
different from their personal loyalty to him. Especially in the initial
Cabinet appointments, he must consider factors of balance in terms of
geography, religion, and ethnic background (race and sex may soon be
added)." 9

A current textbook on the presidency, written by Robert E.
DiClerico, describes the political considerations affecting Richard
Nixon's cabinet selections.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan was his personal choice for secretary of labor, but Nixon also recognized the necessity of appointing someone who would be acceptable to the labor establishment. Accordingly, he decided against Moynihan for the job when he learned that the powerful president of the AFL-CIO objected to Moynihan's lack of administrative experience. The position was ultimately given to George Shultz, a man the president had never met. The governor of Alaska, Walter Hickel, was picked to be secretary of the interior, in part because President Nixon felt the western part of the country should be represented in the Cabinet. In an attempt to represent the liberal wing of the Republican Party in his administration, Nixon appointed his former political opponent, George Romney, as secretary of housing and urban development.

While serving as a description of cabinets, the use of the term balance by writers actually has served as a framework for explaining the role of cabinet members and the cabinet as a collectivity. There are symbolic and political considerations apparent in the President's selection of cabinet members but a more substantive role is also expected of the cabinet and its secretaries. Richard A. Watson and Norman C. Thomas write that the "selection of Cabinet members, especially at the outset of an administration, involves the president directly and entails the attempt to build support for the administration by including representatives of various constituencies in the party and in the country."  

Others have written of the importance the image of a cabinet conveys to the public. For example, Redford et al write that "a President must give general consideration to the public impression of his Cabinet. It may need socioeconomic balance or youthful vigor or solid respectability. An appearance of being above merely partisan
consideration may be important."

Although this chapter is not looking at the role of cabinet secretaries, it is important to note that the balance framework, used both explicitly and implicitly by cabinet observers, does imply a future role for cabinet secretaries. Balance is not merely of symbolic value to the President or cabinet. If a secretary is selected to "represent" the interests of farmers, then will serving as a representative for the farm clientele become a role perception the secretary will assume?

In explaining this functional importance of "representativeness" Redford et al describe Kennedy's selection of C. Douglas Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury:

...several of the departments, notably Agriculture, Commerce, the Treasury, and Labor, are peculiarly identified with distinct segments of society. The relevant organized interest groups make every effort to secure an appointment acceptable to them. Normally, they cannot force the President's choice, but the man designated is not likely to be clearly objectionable to them. This is understandable, since, for example, a Secretary of the Treasury who was regarded with hostility by the financial and banking community would find it nearly impossible to perform his statutory duties. This was presumably President Kennedy's reason for naming Douglas Dillon as Secretary of the Treasury. Though he was a Republican who had been ambassador to France and Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration, Dillon was highly respected in financial circles. Without this confidence a Secretary of the Treasury would also find rough going in his relations with Congress--where every Cabinet officer must earn his spurs. In fact, relations between key committees in the House and Senate and related interest groups are frequently so close that hostility toward a Cabinet officer from either group will almost certainly be reflected in a lack of friendliness from the other."

As can be seen by the above discussion, the concept of balance appears to be well entrenched in the perceptions of those writing about
the cabinet. The question then becomes, how useful is this perspective for understanding the cabinet?

An Illustration of Balance: Political Rewards

In looking at the balance framework there still remains a problem in perspective. In this section I will briefly identify and explain this problem.

Oftentimes political appointments are viewed in terms of rewards or payoffs for past political support. This is particularly evident in the traditional appointments of past chairs of the Democratic and Republican National Committees to the post of Postmaster General, reflected in Truman's appointment of Robert Hannegan and Eisenhower's appointment of Arthur E. Summerfield. In addition, in recent years it has not been uncommon to appoint one's campaign manager to the post of Attorney General (e.g., Truman's appointment of James H. McGrath, DNC Chair; Eisenhower's appointment of Herbert Brownell; and Kennedy's appointment of his brother Robert to this position.) Nixon's appointment of John Mitchell to the post of Attorney General illustrates the continuation of this trend.¹⁴

Although a number of examples can be mustered to illustrate the use of cabinet posts as "rewards" for past loyalties or political support in
the recent electoral contest, perhaps another interpretation might be had for political appointments. If one examines a President's electoral victory, a different interpretation is suggested—that is, an appointment may be made with an eye toward securing an electoral base for the future. The discussion that follows is limited due to the time frame of this study. I will not discuss Truman and Johnson since both ascended to the presidency with no need to develop a political coalition of support, and Eisenhower's electoral victory swept all but the southern states. What follows is a look at one case study—Kennedy's electoral victory—as a suggestion of an area that should be looked at more carefully to see if this is but one isolated case.

Past political support may garner one of the other cabinet seats instead of the Attorney General or Postmaster General. Kennedy's selection of North Carolina Governor Luther H. Hodges for the post of Secretary of Commerce illustrates such an appointment. One article described Hodges as "a soft-spoken former industrialist, who had played a key role in the Kennedy drive to carry the South and also to enlisted the political and financial backing of business and professional groups across the country." In addition, "the selection of Mr. Hodges, a Southerner and considered a follower of a middle-of-the-road political philosophy, was regarded by politicians a recognition of the important role Southerners of his political temper had played in the selection of Senator Kennedy." The significance of this appointment in terms of political recognition for North Carolina and other Southern states
supporting Kennedy in his electoral victory over Nixon is even more apparent if one holds the view that oftentimes outer cabinet posts are filled after the inner cabinet posts so as to be sure the completed cabinet is "balanced." And it is not the most difficult of tasks to find a businessman from a "desired" or "needed" state. However, in this instance, Kennedy filled this position before all others. This example illustrates the most obvious form of political reward.

A subtle additional point is that at times a President may want to work towards consolidating political strength for subsequent bids for reelection. And cabinet appointments may serve as one means of building a more solid basis of support for future electoral needs. In looking at Kennedy's electoral college victory in the 1960 presidential election, there is some evidence of such a move. The selection of J. Edward Day as Postmaster General is a case in point. In Day's autobiographical sketch of his days in the Kennedy cabinet, he reflected on the reasons behind his selection since he had not been active in the 1960 presidential campaign. Day writes, "I think it was simply that the Kennedy people wanted to include a Californian in the cabinet and I came as near as anyone to being acceptable to all of the factions of the Party in the State." It is interesting to note that Kennedy lost California to Nixon in the 1960 election. And if a Californian was desired for a post in the Cabinet, it was best to select someone who would be acceptable to all factions and help consolidate rather than mute political support for future needs. Obviously balance is a factor; how important a factor it is remains open to question. This question
will be examined further in looking at role perceptions of the secretaries in Chapter 3.

A Final Look at Balance

I would suggest that balance in traditional geographical terms is not substantively as important as has been stated in the literature and by the press. If geographical balance has any meaning, I would suggest it serves only as a surrogate for representational or constituent balance—that is, these individuals will be performing some role, envisioned by the President and/or secretary, and thereby serve to fulfill certain needs of the administration. Stating that a President has selected individuals of various backgrounds has no meaning if looked at in isolation, as most writers using this concept have chosen to do. The concept of balance only has meaning in the context of the role each secretary is to perform. It is for this reason that Heclo's identification of issue networks is important as a means of linking the backgrounds of cabinet members with role perception. Especially since 1960, "each White House staff has struggled to find new ways of becoming less dependent on the crop of applicants produced by normal party channels and of reaching to new pools of highly skilled executive manpower. The rationale behind these efforts is always that executive leadership in the bureaucracy requires people who are knowledgeable
about complex policies and acceptable to the important groups that claim an interest in the ever growing number of issue areas.\textsuperscript{17}

However, symbolically balance may have a great deal of importance, especially given the emphasis placed on this concept by the media. Geographic balance does provide a quick handle for the press in its initial efforts to assess the direction of a new administration. And, of course, the president can ward off potentially negative publicity at the start of an administration by selecting a cabinet that appears to reflect and satisfy public expectations.\textsuperscript{18}

As has been demonstrated in this example of Kennedy's use of cabinet positions as political rewards, balance as a theoretical framework can work. Yet to return to an earlier discussion, some writers have included explanations of the functional importance of a cabinet member along with geographical or constituent balance.

Yet with this functional significance that authors do identify in describing the background characteristics of cabinet members, I find it rather intriguing that geographical categorizations have proven to be the most prevalent in the literature. Perhaps scholars, media analysts, and textbook writers have helped in the constant reinforcement of this notion of geographical representation. But as the growth of government has exponentially taken off at three distinct levels—that is, local, state, and national—perhaps another background characteristic can serve to provide a more useful categorization in an attempt to understand the nature of the President's cabinet. In the remaining sections of this
chapter I will identify and explain several other considerations beyond balance that are necessary to understand the modern cabinet.

FEDERAL SECTOR EXPERIENCE

The media generally focus on the state ties of cabinet appointees, but this classification is actually more difficult than it may seem. It is easy to gain information on the place of birth of an appointee. However, is an individual who has lived and worked in an executive department in Washington for the past seven years still to be classified as, say, a Texan, or might other loyalties (national, or to a department's perspective) be more relevant?

I would like to suggest that although a secretary may have been raised and educated, and kept family and/or business ties with a home state, a less parochial outlook may have evolved in those individuals who have served in Washington, D.C. at the federal level. And his/her regional ties may actually have been replaced by a greater sense of responsibility to the federal government and its programs and policies. For example, Fred Vinson is viewed as a Kentuckian, yet served in Washington, D.C. from 1924 until his appointment as secretary in 1945. The longer one is away from the demands and pulls of state and local politics, the more removed one can get from the sense of loyalty to, or identification with, the particular quirks and needs of respective
states. (And the same can be said of an individual from the midwest who has served as legal counsel for a union or corporation with headquarters in New York City. As will be seen later in this chapter, Hugh Heclo's identification of "Four Great Estates"—academia, corporate and business law, elective politics, and the government bureaucracy—are perhaps more meaningful in understanding the functional importance of background characteristics. As a case in point, J. Edward Day, although viewed as a "Californian" from a balance perspective, actually was born and raised in Illinois and worked for Adlai Stevenson and the state of Illinois until accepting a position with the Prudential Insurance Company that brought him to California in the 1950's.20)

To consider a parallel case, it is worth examining evidence about the representational roles of members of Congress. Table 1 shows the results of a "Sample Survey of Over 140 House Members."21 A national focus predominates, along with a claimed sense of independence from district dictates.

If members of Congress, who are selected by districts with constituents of no more than 400,000 members, feel a need to follow their own conscience, and their perceptions of national needs, I would argue that individuals who have served the federal government, especially in the executive branch, also would lose a sense of state identification or loyalty. Therefore, I would question the persistence of cabinet observers in emphasizing the state/geographical representation of a newly composed cabinet. I would instead suggest
that another dimension be incorporated in this and future analyses—that is, service in the governmental sector.
Table 1: Representatives and Their Districts

The following questions were asked of 140 House Members in 1977:

"Do you feel that you should be primarily concerned with looking after the needs and interests of your own district, or do you feel that you should be primarily concerned with looking after the needs and interests of the nation as a whole?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whole nation</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both district and nation</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"When there is a conflict between what you feel is best and what you think the people in your district want, do you think you should follow your own conscience, or follow what the people in your district want?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Follow own conscience</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends on the issue</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow district</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What appears obvious is that the cabinet has been viewed as a trapping to the presidency, fulfilling an identification with interests and interest group needs as a complement to the President's image. But from another perspective, perhaps cabinet members see themselves as a balance for the President in terms of his administrative needs. Perhaps cabinet members are complements—but not in the way an outsider would define it. The presidency has often been viewed as a well-oiled piece of machinery—and cabinet secretaries can be seen as cogs that are vital to the running of the machine. It is not that an individual is from the West that makes him or her perfect for the post of Interior. Rather, it is the experiences the individual brings to the post that provides the "balance" a President may be seeking.

When a President moves to place individuals with strong loyalties and ties to the President in the number two and number three posts throughout the departments, it is then possible for a President to turn to individuals with skills desirable for the top post in each department, regardless of prior loyalties. And especially since the Rooseveltian Revolution (which greatly enlarged both federal responsibility and the volume of federal programs), it makes sense to include this new set of shared ties and experiences in attempts to explain the President's cabinet. And governmental experience may prove useful as an explanatory variable in further analysis of the cabinet.

Although looking at far more than just the cabinet secretaries, Hugh Heclo's identification of "four great estates: academia, corporate
business and the law, the government bureaucracy, and (to a lesser extent) elective politics," and the movement of individuals "in hierarchies that stretch across the estates," and therefore the emergence of "policy politicians," would seem to be far more accurate an assessment of cabinet recruitment than is geographical or constituent balance. In the following section one of Heclo's four great estates--that of the government bureaucracy--will be examined in some detail.

**Analysis of Federal Sector Experience**

An examination of the data suggests that federal government experience is an important factor at a number of different levels. As a starting point, if one looks at the location of the last source of employment for each cabinet secretary, it becomes apparent that almost half were employed by the federal government before being tapped for service in the cabinet. 34 of the 7122 secretaries included in this study, or 48%, were working in the Washington, D.C. area prior to appointment to the cabinet. That statistic in and of itself is of some interest. This geographical datum suggests that governmental experience may be a major link serving as a common denominator among cabinet secretaries. It might serve as more of an explanatory factor than do the often cited state or regional backgrounds.
Initial and Midterm Appointments

What has been frequently observed by students of the executive branch is that Presidents have come to draw from the ranks of the federal service to fill slots vacant during the course of their administration. As Stanley, Mann and Doig state, "the idea is sometimes advanced that Presidents are more likely to make political executive appointments from within the federal service late in their administrations. At the beginning they tend to appoint from outside ('fresh start,' 'new blood,' 'reward those who helped in the campaign,' and so on). As time goes on, two changes occur: (1) the administration, no longer new, loses some of its appeal to outsiders; and (2) the chief executive gains confidence in federal employees, both career and noncareer."^{23} James J. Best, in examining the cabinet appointments made from 1952 to 1976, observes that a President-elect's criteria for cabinet selection— that is, loyalty, a need to "generate legitimacy for his administration," or a need to "fulfill a pledge to bring 'new blood'" into the administration—is different from the selection criteria used by a President having served in the White House for a period of time. Best notes that only later in his administration does the President realize "that a major segment of a cabinet officer's job is the management of his department and the experience of 'insiders' becomes a primary consideration" in the selection process.^{24}
Stanley, Mann and Doig tested their assumptions. In looking at top appointments in the executive branch they found that in all the administrations examined in their study, except Truman's, "the percentage of executives appointed from inside the government rises." The relatively small decline in the percentages of executives appointed from the federal sector during the course of the Truman Administration can be explained in several ways:

(1) President Truman started high in the proportion of appointments from inside and may well have reached the limit which our political system will tolerate. Truman's low point, however, is nearly as high as Eisenhower's high point. (2) The end was in sight for his presidency, so federal employees may have been reluctant to accept such vulnerable posts. (3) The sudden beginning of the Korean conflict in 1950 may have resulted in an influx of outsiders to help with the defense effort—although World War II apparently did not have this effect in the Roosevelt administration."

Although Stanley et al are including all top presidential appointees in a time frame extending from the beginning of the Roosevelt administration to a point midway through the Johnson administration, a look at the data collected in this study, as well as the data gathered by Best, provides support for their findings. In the 1952 to 1976 time period, Best finds that 37 of 58, or 63.8% of "replacement" appointees came from the federal sector, whereas but 3 of 33, or 9.1% of initial appointees came from the federal sector. Similarly, in the time frame of my study (1945 to 1969), of 41 midterm appointments, 27, or 66%, were moving from one federal government position to another. This is in contrast to a president's initial appointments, where only 7 of 27, or 23%, had been serving in a federal post. Yet on a closer look at the
data (see Table 2), it becomes apparent that the nature of the Truman and Johnson presidencies might have more of an impact on these figures than is apparent at first glance.

Table 2: Cabinet Members from the Federal Sector  
(Immediate last employment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th># from Federal Sector</th>
<th>Total # of Appointments</th>
<th>% from Federal Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 69; Secretaries Ickes and Wallace were appointed by Franklin Roosevelt)

Since both Truman and Johnson succeeded to the presidency upon the deaths of Roosevelt and Kennedy, respectively, each inherited a cabinet. And each President dealt with his holdover cabinet in a different fashion. Truman replaced most of the Roosevelt appointees within the first few months of his administration. In contrast, Johnson retained most of the Kennedy appointees, at least through the end of 1964, when he won the presidency in his own right. (For the purpose of this analysis, all appointments made after the first six months of Truman's administration are considered midterm appointments. All appointments made by Johnson after November, 1964 are considered midterm appointments.)
Since Truman and Johnson have a higher percentage of midterm appointments in their total number of appointments, it is necessary to check if that could be affecting the results. Is it the midterm appointment, or the circumstances of the Truman and Johnson presidencies that leads to the high total of midterm appointments having just completed service in the federal sector? The data (see Table 3) suggest both possibilities.

Table 3: Cabinet Members from the Federal Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Midterm Appointment</th>
<th>Initial Appointment*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>67% (10 of 15)</td>
<td>67% (4 of 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>70% (7 of 10)</td>
<td>20% (2 of 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>33% (1 of 3)</td>
<td>20% (2 of 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>69% (9 of 13)</td>
<td>100% (2 of 2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes Initial Appointments and Heads of New Departments

Both President Truman and President Johnson, already situated in the executive branch, relied heavily on members of the federal sector in their selection of cabinet secretaries. 67% of Truman's appointments were already serving in federal posts, and an even greater percentage, 73%, of Johnson's appointments were ensconced in federal posts. And, as Table 3 indicates, they were high on selecting members of the federal sector for early as well as midterm appointments.
G. Calvin Mackenzie's observations on Truman's selection of many from within the government is also appropriate in explaining Johnson's heavy reliance on the federal sector, and also Eisenhower's and Kennedy's searching beyond the government for cabinet members. Mackenzie writes, "Because Truman emphasized loyalty and experience in making personnel selections, he chose a larger percentage of his political appointees from within the government than did any of his successors. This tendency was reinforced by several of the circumstances that conditioned his selection. Since the government had been administered by Democrats for twelve years, Truman had a sizable body of experienced co-partisans from which to choose." Mackenzie further states that Truman's dependence on the federal sector for top executive appointments was not necessarily a "matter of personal preference." World War II and years of defense mobilization had forced many into government service. After the War, many returned to their careers, with little desire "to seek or accept public service opportunities....Truman was further hemmed in by his own limited contacts among people in business, in the professions, and on university faculties. Ultimately the bulk of his personnel selections were made from among those with whom Truman was best acquainted and to whom he had greatest access: government employees."  

Similarly, Lyndon Johnson, who had served in the House and Senate for 24 years, undoubtedly was more familiar and comfortable with those already steeped in a political tradition and mind-set. In a different
vein, although John Kennedy had served in the House and Senate for 14 years, he had not become a leader, or used positions and resources within those bodies to develop the mutual support systems Johnson so ably developed and perfected. Kennedy's world did not revolve around life in the nation's capital. Similarly, Dwight Eisenhower, although a career employee of the federal government, was removed from the political side of executive branch service until enticed to run for the Republican presidential nomination in 1952.

And Eisenhower follows the pattern Stanley, Mann and Doig suggested regarding initial appointments as "rewards" and "new blood," since he draws from outside the federal sector in making his initial appointments, but when replacements are needed as cabinet secretaries resign during the course of the administration, he does draw from the federal sector in making these appointments.

Kennedy had but three midterm appointments. Had he served longer he too may have fallen into the pattern expected by Stanley et al.

A more parsimonious explanation is that both Kennedy and Eisenhower brought with them a change in partisan control of the White House. As a result, to select co-partisans for the cabinet, each would need to look outside the federal service for initial appointments. In contrast, Truman and Johnson could turn to the federal service for cabinet members since the Democrats were continuing in power. Yet these data do not permit a full test of this theory since the only cases of two successive
presidents of the same party are instances of vice presidential succession upon the death of the elected president. Whether a newly elected president of the same party as his predecessor would necessarily appoint members of the federal sector to his first cabinet or whether he would have to go to outsiders to satisfy the demands of his electoral coalition cannot be clearly answered from these data. Would, for example, Edward Kennedy, had he wrested his party's nomination from Jimmy Carter in 1980 and then gone on to defeat Ronald Reagan, have gone to the federal sector for his cabinet appointees, or would he instead have intentionally avoided promoting lower-level appointees of the Carter administration? This question cannot be answered given the available cases, but it does challenge the easy interpretation of Tables 2 and 3 as wholly explicable by partisan factors.
THE INNER CABINET AND THE OUTER CABINET

AS A FRAMEWORK FOR CABINET STUDIES

In the following sections the inner and outer cabinet framework will be examined more closely to determine the appropriateness of this framework to cabinet studies. Recall that the basic distinction is due to Cronin and it contrasts the role of the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, State, and the Attorney General (inner cabinet) as counsellors to the President on a wide variety of issues with the other Secretaries who are often seen as pleaders for the special interests they administer.
The Role of the Inner Cabinet

By all accounts, the inner cabinet members are closer to the President than the outer cabinet. When one envisions the "inner cabinet," oftentimes images of a kitchen cabinet come into mind—with the President expecting certain loyalties and kinship of thought with those placed in such positions. Disloyalty from these inner cabinet secretaries would be viewed as close to treachery. For example, consider Truman's reaction to a speech given by James Byrnes during the 1948 campaign. In spite of having left the Truman Administration the previous year, the former Secretary of State's criticisms of new Democratic proposals in Congress supported by Truman were not warmly received by the President.29 President Truman's letter to James Byrnes in response to a letter Byrnes sent concerning his resignation and speech appears to present a personal bitterness which could only be engendered after a close relationship had been established and then broken. (Truman penned in long-hand the following P.S.: "Since your Washington and Lee speech I'm sure I know how Caesar felt when he said 'Et tu Brute,'"30)

Is this closeness with the President, particularly on the part of inner cabinet secretaries, one that existed prior to appointment, or is it in the nature of the position and the expectations of that position?
Cronin, among others, has suggested the latter. Writing of the inner cabinet, Cronin notes, "a pattern in the past few administrations suggests strongly that the inner, or counseling, cabinet positions are vested with high-priority responsibilities that bring their occupants into close and collaborative relationships with presidents and their top staff."

F. David Mathews, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare under President Ford, would agree with a functional interpretation of why the inner cabinet becomes counselor to the President. Citing Edward Levi as an example of an inner cabinet member (Ford's Attorney General) whom Ford did rely on for counsel while not having that past familiar (and familial) tie that Kennedy had with his Attorney General, Mathews states "there is a far less mysterious explanation for all of that that is available, and I wonder why people haven't turned to it. The President has certain crucial advisors. One, he has got to stay legal. Secondly, he has got to have enough money. Third, he has got to defend the country. Those are the primary functions of the President. It is only natural that those four departments then have a special relationship to the presidency."

And if one looks at the members of Kennedy's inner cabinet, he personally met his Secretaries of State and Defense for the first time the week in which he announced their nominations. In announcing the selection of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State, The New York Times states, "Mr. Rusk, a 51-year-old native of Georgia, is currently president of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York. He has known Senator Kennedy
only since they had a thirty-minute chat at the President-elect's home in Washington on Thursday." And Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's selection also prompted remarks concerning the length of association with President-elect Kennedy. "Senator Kennedy and Mr. McNamara met for the first time at an unannounced session last Thursday and the President-elect was impressed with his vigor and drive. Apparently the job offer was made at once, because Mr. McNamara disclosed today that he held a two-hour session Friday with Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the retiring Secretary of Defense, who had figured earlier in speculation as a Cabinet holdover."

Cronin has written that "White House aides and inner-cabinet members may be selected primarily on the basis of personal loyalty to the president; outer-cabinet members often are selected to achieve a better political, geographical, ethnic, or racial balance. In addition to owing loyalty to their president, these people must develop loyalties to the congressional committees that approved them or those that finance their programs, to the laws and programs they administer, and to the clientele and career civil servants who serve as their most immediate jury." While I will not dispute the latter of these statements at this point I do wonder if perhaps undue emphasis has been placed on the selection of inner cabinet members for their personal loyalty to the President, especially as in the case of Kennedy's inner cabinet (excluding his brother Robert), where these members were unknown to the President prior to their final selection. It would seem that it is the nature of the position that lends itself to the fostering of close,
personal ties, if the relationship succeeds.\textsuperscript{36}

In the following section, I will examine the background characteristics of these cabinet secretaries to determine the usefulness of the inner and outer cabinet distinction. To begin this analysis, a discussion of the past work experience of an individual will be included as a means of garnering objective criteria for evaluating the inner and outer cabinet framework.
To begin an exploration of the inner and outer cabinet framework, I will analyze past federal governmental experience of the cabinet secretaries in this study. A look at the raw frequencies for each cabinet post (see Table 4), as well as an aggregate look at past experience (see Table 5) reveals a difference in the extent of past federal governmental experience for inner and outer cabinet secretaries. As indicated in Table 5, all of the inner cabinet departments had a majority of secretaries appointed from the federal sector. In the case of the outer cabinet, at most one half of the secretaries came directly from the federal sector, except in two instances—the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Transportation. And in both of those departments there is a low number of cases due to the addition of these departments to the Cabinet in the 1960's. Also, both departments had initial cabinet secretaries appointed who had been serving in related functions in other departments while assisting in the birth and development of these new departments.
Table 4: Last Source of Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Cabinet</th>
<th># Working for Federal Government</th>
<th>Total Number of Secretaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aState</td>
<td>4b</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>4c</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aDefense</td>
<td>5d</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30 (60%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer Cabinet

| Postmaster General | 3 | 7 |
| Interior          | 3 | 6 |
| Agriculture       | 2 | 4 |
| Commerce          | 4 | 9 |
| Labor             | 3 | 6 |
| HEW               | 2 | 7 |
| HUD               | 2 | 2 |
| Transportation    | 1 | 1 |
| TOTALS:           | 20| 42 (48%) |

aSecretary Marshall is included in the tallies for both posts.
bIncludes James F. Byrnes, who had just retired to his home in Spartanburg, S.C., as Director of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Board and was contemplating a return to law practice, and John F. Dulles, who left the State Department in April of 1952 to campaign for the Republican Party and serve as foreign policy advisor for presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower.
cIncludes John W. Snyder, who had just retired as Director of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Board.
dIncludes Clark Clifford, lawyer and Chair of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on a part-time basis.
Table 5: Last Employed in the Federal Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Inner Cabinet Departments</th>
<th>Number of Outer Cabinet Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over one half of secretaries drawn from federal sector</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One half of secretaries drawn from federal sector</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than one half of secretaries drawn from federal sector</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS:</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But perhaps examining federal sector experience is not the best of measures to determine what, if any, distinctions can be made between the inner cabinet and the outer cabinet. Employment in the federal sector can cover a wide range of positions—from that of civil servant in the Post Office Department, to U.S. Representative for a farm constituency. The nature of federal governmental service may yet prove useful in understanding the cabinet in terms of an inner cabinet and outer cabinet framework. In the following section, the nature of federal governmental service, as well as governmental service outside of the federal sector, will be examined.
As another means of structurally examining the composition of the cabinet and testing the distinction between the inner and outer cabinet, I have examined the past governmental experience of all secretaries.

Table 6 examines more carefully the exact nature of previous government service. As can be seen in Table 6, in all positions, a greater percentage of outer than inner cabinet members had some experience in state and local politics. This is in contrast to federal government experience, where a greater percentage of inner cabinet than outer cabinet secretaries had served in some capacity in their departments before service as secretary. The most startling contrast is that nearly half of all inner cabinet members served as Deputy or Assistant Secretary, but only 20% of outer cabinet members had similar experience.
Table 6: Governmental Experience

% having some state and/or local governmental experience:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Judge</th>
<th>State Legislature</th>
<th>Local Govt</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% having some federal governmental experience:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputy/ Assistant (U.S. House)</th>
<th>White House Staff (U.S. Senate)</th>
<th>White House Secretary (this administration)</th>
<th>Federal Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% having some experience on national boards or as agency heads:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National Board</th>
<th>Agency Head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N = 71; Inner Cabinet: 29; Outer Cabinet: 42)
Did the inner cabinet members tend more toward careerism in the federal sector? Were they thus of more generalist backgrounds, having hopped from one department to another? Were they therefore no more expert on the issues facing them as department head than would be the case for outer cabinet secretaries? While this is plausible, I found no difference between the inner cabinet and outer cabinet secretaries regarding their experience across departments. 24.1% (7 of 29) of the inner cabinet and 23.8% (10 of 42) of the outer cabinet had prior department experience in a department other than the current one in which they were serving (however, for the most part cabinet secretaries in both inner and outer departments had gained this other-department experience in the inner cabinet departments of State, Defense, Treasury, or Justice). Therefore, the federal governmental experience upon which the inner cabinet is drawing from is that of past experience in the department which they are now heading.

In looking at differences between the inner and outer cabinet for each administration the same pattern holds true across time, as illustrated in Table 7 which gives the percentages of those having served as Deputy/Assistant Secretary in the same department.
Table 7: Prior Service as Deputy or Assistant Secretary in the Same Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Inner Cabinet</th>
<th>Outer Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>54.5% (6 of 11)</td>
<td>30.0% (3 of 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>33.3% (3 of 9)</td>
<td>9.1% (1 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>25.0% (1 of 4)</td>
<td>11.1% (1 of 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>80.0% (4 of 5)</td>
<td>30.0% (3 of 10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again the differences between the Truman and Johnson administrations and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations are striking. Truman and Johnson again relied more heavily on those already in place in the government to serve as both their inner cabinet department heads as well as their outer cabinet department heads. Yet in all cases, more of the inner cabinet secretaries had served as Deputy or Assistant Secretary than did outer cabinet secretaries. But does this similarity continue when one turns to non-governmental backgrounds of cabinet secretaries?
The Inner Cabinet and the Outer Cabinet:
Non-governmental Experience

To look at two areas—that of predominant employment, and past education—one finds considerable similarity across departments. On the average, only 21% of all cabinet secretaries in this study have had extensive business backgrounds. 62% have had post graduate education, with 46% having received legal training.

However, two departments show different patterns. Indeed, a striking parallel develops between the secretaries of Defense and Commerce that is not found in common with any of the other cabinet departments over time. 67% of all Defense secretaries and 55.6% of all Commerce secretaries had business backgrounds. This pattern, with Defense and Commerce secretaries exhibiting similarities not shared with the other departments, is reinforced when the educational backgrounds of secretaries are examined.

In all departments except Commerce and Defense, over one half of the secretaries had post-college training whereas in Commerce but 22.2% of the secretaries had pursued post-baccalaureate education, and only 50% of the Defense secretaries had pursued advanced study upon college graduation. The lack of post-baccalaureate training is reflected in the absence of law degrees by many of the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense. Only 25% of the secretaries of Defense, and 22.2% of the secretaries of Commerce had received training in the law. The only other cabinet post having nearly as few lawyers is that of the
Postmaster General (28.6%). Post-graduate training is needed for law and for academic positions, but is not the traditional route for those starting out and advancing in the business sector.

This similarity in the Defense and Commerce Departments begins to suggest that some modifications of the inner/outer cabinet distinction may be appropriate. Whether these differences will persist will be determined in the next chapter as the job orientation of respective cabinet members is examined.

CONCLUSIONS

The research findings presented here do suggest the viability of the inner/outer cabinet distinction as a categorization scheme from which to begin both further discussion and analysis of the President's cabinet. The work of Heclo in identifying four great estates between which high level policy specialists travel seems valuable as a means of linking the recruitment of individuals to the subsequent role expectations in a given administration. Role perceptions will be the subject of the next chapter. In addition, the introduction of a new perspective on the composition of a President's cabinet, i.e., past federal governmental experience, seems to be far more useful than the traditional notion of balance in explaining recruitment of cabinet
secretaries.

With this dimension, I found the distinctions between the inner and outer cabinets to be significant in several ways: 1.) each of the inner cabinet departments found a majority of cabinet appointees presently in federal government service, whereas in only two of the eight departments of the outer cabinet did a majority of cabinet appointees come directly from the federal sector, and those two departments were limited in the number of cases in this study due to their recent inclusion in the cabinet. The first secretaries to head these new departments (Housing and Urban Development and Transportation) experienced a change in title and status as opposed to a shift from one set of responsibilities in the federal sector to a different set of responsibilities. 2.) there are differences in types of governmental experience for the inner cabinet secretary as compared to the outer cabinet secretary—the inner cabinet secretary's past governmental experience more likely is from the federal sector, whereas more of the outer cabinet secretaries have had substantial state and local governmental experience. And in looking at prior departmental service, and therefore assumed greater expertise (or at least familiarity with the department), 72% of the inner cabinet had served in the same department in the past, whereas but 28% of the outer cabinet had gained similar experience; and 3.) half of the inner cabinet secretaries had received prior departmental experience in the position of Deputy or Assistant Secretary, whereas but 20% of the outer cabinet had so served.
All of the above patterns are found to hold across administrations. There is also a similarity in the recruitment and selection of cabinet secretaries by Presidents Truman and Johnson. This reflects the nature of their ascendency to the presidency upon the deaths of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, respectively. Already serving in the Executive Branch as Vice President, both of these Presidents relied more heavily on the familiar federal sector for their appointments than did Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Both Eisenhower and Kennedy had to acquire a familiarity and confidence in the federal sector before drawing from that body for appointments. And since Truman and Johnson were succeeding to an already established Democratic Administration, they did not face the prospects Eisenhower and Kennedy found themselves in as each brought with them a partisan change to the White House.

The common business background of the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense is one area that can be examined more closely to see if there are further commonalities. Are there similarities in role perception, or political bases of support? Perhaps both departments are not described best in their respective inner cabinet/outer cabinet frameworks and a better fit can be had by joining these two departments in a third category. That is a question that will be examined more closely in the next two chapters.
Chapter 2: Footnotes


2 New York Times, July 1, 1945, p. 16, col. 5.


8 Ibid.


This is especially true in light of the lessening importance of the post of Postmaster General, eventually leading to a change in status from a member of the President's cabinet to the head of a semi-independent public corporation. ("Postmaster General to Remain as Chief of Postal Service," New York Times, January 14, 1971, p. 24).


see Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "Now is the Time for Cabinet Makers," New York Times, November 20, 1960, sec. 6, p. 88. Fenno writes, as the President selects his Cabinet, "he tries to choose a Cabinet which commands broad popular support. The requisite here is that the group reflect the diversity of American political life—that it be, in Cabinet vernacular, 'well-balanced.' Every President is anxious to float his Administration on an early wave of popular approval; he tries to anticipate public reactions while selecting it. If its reception is friendly he has survived a critical test of public confidence."


Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," p. 108; background information on cabinet secretaries can be obtained from Robert Sobel, Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch.

This figure includes Harold L. Ickes, appointed Secretary of Interior by Roosevelt, but serving under Truman through mid-March of 1946, and Henry A. Wallace, appointed to the post of Secretary of Commerce just prior to Roosevelt's death and serving under Truman through September of 1946.

David J. Stanley et al, Men Who Govern.


*New York Times*, December 13, 1960, p. 1, col. 1


John Kessel has suggested that the time of Cronin's research, conducted late in Johnson's term and in the post-1970 phase of the Nixon Administration, may lead to Cronin's strong statements concerning loyalty since by this time the close relationship presumably would have been established.

Although the position of Postmaster General as head of a cabinet department was abolished by the time Cronin's inner/outer cabinet classification was identified, for the purposes of this analysis the Postmaster General has been placed in the outer cabinet. Cronin writes, regarding the inner cabinet, "The occupants of these cabinet positions generally have maintained a role as counselor to the president; the departments all include broad-ranging, multiple interests." (Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975, p. 191) While the Postmaster General, especially as Chair of the National Party Committee, has had a broad advising role to the president, the interests of the Department and the Postmaster General's relationship with the Department has been more focused--that is, on moving the mail in as effective a manner as possible. Therefore the Department appears to fit more logically in the outer cabinet grouping.

Of the inner cabinet secretaries, 2 worked in the State Department, 1 in the Treasury Department, 3 in the Defense Department, and 1 in the Commerce Department. Of the outer cabinet secretaries, 2 worked in the State Department, 4 in the Defense Department, 1 in the Department of the Interior, 2 in the Commerce Department, and 1 worked in both the State Department and Defense Department.
CHAPTER 3: ROLE PERCEPTION

How the President and the respective cabinet secretary each perceive the role to be assumed by the secretary sets the stage for the either harmonious or incongruent working relationship that will mark the secretary's tenure in office. In this chapter I will first explain a cabinet framework that, although not appropriate in discussing the recruitment characteristics of cabinet secretaries in Chapter 2, may be appropriate in explaining role perception—that is, the "naive" view of the cabinet. After explaining this framework I will then discuss methodology—how were the materials and documents culled to ascertain an individual secretary's role perception? Following this discussion of methodological techniques and procedures I will then explore role perceptions of the President's cabinet by Administration and then by Department. Finally, after this longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of the cabinet I will then explore the various frameworks identified in this study in terms of their appropriateness in explaining the role perceptions of cabinet secretaries (that is, the inner and outer cabinet distinction, midterm versus initial appointments, a "naive" view of the cabinet, balance, and issue networks).
THE "NAIVE" VIEW OF THE CABINET

Before examining the role perception of cabinet secretaries it is necessary to explore another framework, not yet discussed in Chapter Two—that is, the "naive" view of the cabinet. Cronin has identified a "textbook presidency" mindframe that has influenced those writing on the presidency. As Cronin writes,

Introduction American government textbooks and related political writings in the 1950s and 1960s endorsed the activist, purposeful, power-maximizing model of presidential leadership. They often glorified the manipulative leader, and almost all of them exaggerated to some degree past and future presidential performance. Such distortion risked misleading students and leaders alike about the invention and carrying out of creative civic and political responsibilities. Moreover, these writings hardly prepared the nation for the abuses of presidential power witnessed during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Perhaps some of the distorted interpretations of what a president could and should accomplish actually encouraged some of these abuses.

.... The term textbook presidency, used here for convenience, applies not only to these formal works, most of them by professors of political science, but also to those similar images of presidential power and personality that were promulgated through the press and the broadcast media by reporters, columnists, and commentators working under the pressure of tight deadlines. The total effect, deliberate or not, was to create almost out of whole cloth a larger-than-life image of the presidency, an evocative iconolatry that has often had grievous consequences.

Does a similarly distorted view—that is, a certain naivete about the role of the cabinet and cabinet secretaries exist? If such a perspective is identifiable, for whom does it exist, and at what point in time in an administration? Have Presidents, the press, or even
cabinet secretaries as a body perpetuated the myth of an ideal cabinet, consisting of a set of collegial advisors to the President that the President will convene on a regular basis so as to gather a collective wisdom concerning the direction of his administration? Does a certain naive way of thinking tend to show up at the outset of new administrations, especially on the part of certain members? And what have authors of introductory textbooks on American government or the presidency written in describing the role of the President's cabinet? In the following sections I will examine the perspectives on the cabinet as stated by textbook writers, Presidents, the press, and cabinet secretaries.

Textbooks and the President's Cabinet

Richard A. Watson and Norman C. Thomas, in The Politics of The Presidency, describe and contrast the expectations surrounding Presidential-cabinet relationships with the actual experience of these individuals. They write,

Most modern presidents have come to office determined to make more effective use of the Cabinet than their predecessors did. The public has tended to applaud candidates' pledges that the Cabinet will play a major decision-making role in their administrations. Yet, with the possible exception of Dwight Eisenhower, presidents have not utilized their cabinets as as vehicles of collective leadership....This gap between expectations and experience suggests that there is a widespread lack of understanding of the Cabinet on the part of the public and most political leaders....
Watson and Thomas go on to explain the "misunderstanding of the Cabinet." There is a "tendency to regard it as somewhat analogous to the cabinet in parliamentary regimes, where it functions as an executive council with whom the prime minister is obliged to consult and where it shares with him responsibility for governmental actions."^3

In reviewing American government textbooks as well as textbooks focusing on the American presidency, it becomes clear that these writers have described a gap in expectations between what the President, cabinet secretaries, press, and public initially envision as the role for the cabinet versus the actual role of the cabinet during the course of the administration. Yet the authors of textbooks have not fallen into the same pattern of high expectations for a cabinet role that cannot and does not exist.

James Q. Wilson bluntly states, "the cabinet is a product of tradition and hope. There once was a time when the heads of the federal departments met regularly with the president to discuss matters, and some persons, especially those critical of strong presidents, would like to see this kind of collegial decision-making reestablished. But, in fact, the cabinet is largely a fiction."^4 The gap in expectations between what the President and cabinet initially perceive to be the role of a cabinet secretary and the subsequent reality of the actual role, although noted by scholars, still plagues Presidents and their initial appointees.
Frank Kessler also describes the strong rooted tradition of a cabinet as a collegial set of advisors to the President. He writes that tradition "has labeled the cabinet as the major collective advisors to the president, so each administration seems to feel honor bound to profess its allegiance to a 'strong' cabinet. It could well be that presidents fully intend to reinvigorate the cabinet, but find that these moves, while theoretically attractive, are practically unworkable." 5

Kessler notes that in recent years all Presidents from Truman through Reagan, with the exception of John Kennedy, entered the "Oval Office promising to cut staff and reinvigorate the advisory role of the cabinet....However, cabinet members who had been ushered in with great fanfare soon found it virtually impossible to get their views to the president." 6 Walter Dean Burnham notes that a number of presidents have worked closely with some members of the cabinet, but the cabinet itself has not been used as a decision-making body. In describing the last two administrations Burnham notes that both "Presidents Carter and Reagan started out by attempting to raise the status of the cabinet, and both came to rely on loyalists within the bowels of the White House." 7

Thomas Cronin joins those listed above in describing the failure of a President's cabinet to match expectations that it will serve "as a committee of key advisors." 8 But as Cronin indicates, scholars have long viewed the cabinet in less than idealized terms. Cronin describes "Harold Laski's 1940 description of what a good cabinet should be" as "one of the best." Laski succinctly identifies why modern presidents do
not have an idealized cabinet of collegial advisors:

A good cabinet ought to be a place where the large outlines of policy can be hammered out in common, where the essential strategy is decided upon, where the president knows that he will hear, both in affirmation and in doubt, even in negation, most of what can be said about the direction he proposed to follow. The evidence, I think, makes it clear that few American cabinets have been of this quality; they have not been a team of first-rate minds pooling their ideas in common. And until they become by deliberate construction, as near such a team as it is possible for a president to make, he will not have at his disposal the basic human resources he needs to grapple with his formidable task. 9

That Presidents have initial expectations of a cabinet serving as a set of collegial advisors is indisputable according to statements made by Presidents at the start of their term of office. And textbooks have emphasized this expectation on the part of Presidents. Robert E. DiClerico, in discussing the cabinet's role in the past 40 years, notes that during the Truman through Johnson administrations each President began his term of office with full cabinet meetings. 10 But the frequency of such meetings and attendance of the full cabinet quickly dropped. DiClerico joins several other authors in noting the abrupt transition of Richard Nixon from wanting a cabinet of independent thinkers to a cabinet of "yes-men," as recorded in Richard P. Nathan's _The Plot That Failed_. As Richard Nixon introduced his cabinet to the American public on national television on December 11, 1968, he concluded by stating, "I don't want a Cabinet of "Yes" men and I don't think you want a Cabinet of "Yes" men. Every man in the Cabinet will be urged to speak out in the Cabinet and within the Administration on all the great issues so that the decisions we will make will be the best decisions we can possibly reach." 11
DiClerico also recalls Jimmy Carter's initial comments on his cabinet, three years prior to the purges and reshuffling of cabinet members in the summer of 1979. Carter remarked, "'I believe in Cabinet administration of our government. There will never be an instance while I am President where members of the White House staff dominate or act in a superior position to the members of our Cabinet.'"12

Kessler provides further illustration of the change that occurs in a President's initial plans for the cabinet to actual cabinet performance. Kessler notes that of recent presidents only Kennedy initially had any qualms about the role of the cabinet.

Close Kennedy aide Theodore Sorensen said that the administration only held cabinet meetings because they were traditional and the public expected them....His attitude toward the collective advice role of the cabinet was plain to his staffers; as one aide remembers shortly after the inauguration in 1961, Kennedy asked, "Just what the hell good does the Cabinet do anyway?"13

Before coming to some conclusion concerning the validity of the "naive cabinet" perspective as an accurate descriptor of writings on the cabinet, I want to turn to the other half of Cronin's thesis— that is, that the term "textbook presidency" applies not only to formal works by political scientists, "but also to those similar images of presidential power and personality that were promulgated through the press and the broadcast media by reporters, columnists, and commentators working under the pressure of tight deadlines."14
The Press

James MacGregor Burns et al note the emphasis given the advising role of the cabinet as a collectivity by the press.

Cabinet members, as individuals, are often important advisers and administrators. But the cabinet as a decision-making body is not as important as press accounts would have us believe. At present it would take a leap of the imagination to think of cabinet meetings as a place where the large outlines of policy are hammered out in common, or where the essential strategy is decided upon.

The trappings surrounding cabinet appointments at the start of an administration, and as reported by the press, can be quite elaborate, fueling expectations that this President will use the cabinet as a set of collegial advisors. President Nixon's initial cabinet appointments will long be remembered for the parading of his newly selected set of advisors before a prime time television audience. A group photo of a newly constituted cabinet is bound to appear in the major newspapers. Perhaps the most consistent reporting of cabinet secretaries' ideas and goals takes place during the first few weeks following announcement to the post and subsequent confirmation by the Senate. Without fail, The New York Times, at least during the time period of this study, duly recorded the announcement of each cabinet secretary-designate on the front page. (The only variation detected being that inner cabinet secretaries were usually given p. 1, column 6 or 8 coverage, while outer cabinet secretaries were relegated to p. 1, column 1 coverage.)
Before turning to a final assessment of the usefulness of the "naive" view of the cabinet framework for cabinet studies it would seem appropriate to examine what presidents have envisioned as the expected role for their newly appointed cabinet.

The President's Perspective

Just what has been the view of the Presidents in this study as to their expectations concerning the role of the cabinet? As noted by Kessler above, only John Kennedy, of recent Presidents, did not seem to share in the idealized vision of a collegial set of advisors reviewing policy and advising the President on a wide range of topics. In the speeches or messages given by Kennedy that are included in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States series there is barely a mention of the cabinet as a collectivity (although there are references to respective members of his cabinet.) For example, during his first year of office, the only mention of the cabinet included in the index comes during the White House Swearing-in-Ceremony for the new secretaries and Kennedy's words on this occasion are quite brief. Describing expectations held for this new cabinet Kennedy succinctly stated:

Quite obviously, whatever success we may achieve will* depend in great part upon their dedication and their effort, and the success which they achieve will depend in good
part upon the dedication and effort of the hundreds of thousands of men and women of this country who serve our National Government.

Even in Kennedy's State of the Union message to Congress on January 30, 1961, there is little indication of any distinctive role envisioned for members of his cabinet that would make their role different from that of any other public servant in the Executive branch. Kennedy stated:

I have pledged myself and my colleagues in the cabinet to a continuous encouragement of initiative, responsibility and energy in serving the public's interest. Let every public servant know, whether his post is high or low, that a man's rank and reputation in this Administration will be determined by the size of the job he does, and not by the size of his staff, his office or his budget. Let it be clear that this Administration recognizes the value of dissent and daring— that we greet healthy controversy as the hallmark of healthy change.

In the remaining years of his public presidency there is no mention of the cabinet as a collectivity listed in the index to his public papers.

However, during the first year of their term of office, the other three Presidents of this study did express their belief in, and expectation of, the cabinet serving as a set of collegial advisors.

For example, although Truman made few public references to his cabinet in the first few months following his succession to the Presidency, except as concerned the continued service of his inherited cabinet, by the time he had begun to make major changes in the cabinet in the fall of 1945 he was espousing the position that the cabinet should serve as evaluators and advisors on a wide range of public policy
issues. For instance, when Truman sent a proposal to Congress recommending the creation of a Department of Defense combining the Departments of War, Navy and the Air Force, he wrote that

the Cabinet is not merely a collection of executives administering different governmental functions. It is a body whose combined judgment the President uses to formulate the fundamental policies of the administration. In such a group, which is designed to develop teamwork wisdom on all subjects that affect the political life of the country, it would be inappropriate and unbalanced to have three members representing three different instruments of national defense.20

Similarly, as has been noted above, Eisenhower is often used to provide an example of the collegial use of a cabinet. In an address to Republican loyalists early in his first term of office giving insight as to what really goes on in Washington, Eisenhower described the role of the cabinet:

If I could really bring you an accurate picture of what goes on, it would be done in this way: if I could take each American—each vote—in this country and take you down, one day, to a Cabinet meeting, and allow you to sit there while there came before that body some problem involving the welfare of the United States of America, and for you to see the honest, devoted, studious way in which that problem is pulled to pieces in all its elements. There is discussed every factor that can seemingly affect this country, and from one broad general viewpoint: what is good for the whole country.

A month later, Eisenhower reinforces this vision of the cabinet as a collegial set of advisors at another Republican gathering:

The Cabinet can be whatever kind of body the administration wants. It can, on the one hand, be a score of heads that do nothing but nod, in near array—a kind of agreeable approval of everything proposed by the President. It can be, in the extreme, a babel of discordant voices in which the prize of decision belongs to the loudest voice. The present Cabinet, I assure you, belongs to
neither of these futile extremes. It is a group of capable and purposeful individuals. They give advice candidly and thoughtfully, speaking their several minds freely and lucidly to but one purpose—to offer the best, the wisest programs within their power for all our 160 million citizens. And this applies to the Republican leaders of the Senate and the House as well as the offices of the Cabinet.22

Johnson found himself in the same position as Truman—that is succeeding to the Presidency upon the death of the President and thereby inheriting a cabinet. Although initial remarks concerning the retention of cabinet members from the previous administration were the same (Truman, when asked at his first news conference as to what he could say about the Cabinet, responded: "Of course, I asked the Cabinet to remain. That is as much as I want to say,"23 and Johnson, addressing a gathering within two months of Kennedy's assassination, similarly remarked: "One of the great legacies President Kennedy left me was the finest Cabinet that any President could assemble. They are so good that I didn't even want one of my own. I wanted all of them to stay right where they are"24) these two Presidents acted in different fashions concerning these holdover appointments. Whereas Johnson retained the bulk of Kennedy's cabinet, Truman shortly instituted an almost total turnover in cabinet composition.

But as Truman did perceive a collegial advising role for his cabinet, so too did Johnson, even for those cabinet members he did not appoint to office. In June of 1965, at a news conference, Johnson outlined the role of the cabinet in international affairs:

We will have a thorough review and discussion of the international situation, and U.S. policies. I will ask the Secretary of State to review the dozen or more diplomatic
proposals and initiatives that we have considered and received and proposed, so that all members of the Cabinet may evaluate and discuss them and be informed about them in greater detail than has been permitted before.

In addition, we will explore with members of the Cabinet certain other hopes for peace that we are evaluating and considering. The Secretary of Defense will report on the status of the men in uniform,...,the commitments that we have made to certain areas of the world. That will be thoroughly and carefully reviewed and members of the Cabinet will make--those not on the National Security Council--the Secretary of the Treasury is, and the Attorney General comes frequently, and of course, the Vice President is always there--but others will make any suggestions that they come to, and very likely will make some suggestions to new initiatives which we have already tried, and some unsuccessfully."
The "Naive" View of the Cabinet--Another Look

It does appear as if textbook writers, while not harboring expectations of a cabinet that will actually meet en masse and collectively debate and recommend policy to the President, have still helped to keep the idea of an idealized cabinet alive by stating presidential expectations and later, presidential disappointments. This "naive" view of the cabinet is analogous to the "textbook presidency" mindset Cronin has identified in that the reality of these two institutions—the presidency and the cabinet—tends to be hidden, even though textbook authors have been more accurate than new presidents and new secretaries in their descriptions of the cabinet. An important point to consider is that textbooks currently in use may present the cabinet in a different light than those of an earlier period. As Cronin has indicated, there has been a change in the coverage of the President by those writers of the 1970's and 1980's in comparison with those writers of the 1950's and 1960's. Laski, as noted above, did not envision the cabinet as serving a collective advising role to the President. But he was a foreign observer of the American political process and far more familiar with a system of government that was conducive to cabinet government—England's parliamentary system—than American writers would be. As a result, it is possible that the difficulties with a collective cabinet advisory system in the context of
the American Executive were far more apparent to Laski than to American writers.

As stated in Chapter One, Edward S. Corwin, writing on the state of the President's cabinet in the 1940's, identifies the failures of cabinet government in the United States as due to the type of individual appointed to the cabinet, suggesting that with individuals of proper "breadth of outlook" a cabinet of broad political and policy advisors could be possible:

The truth is that the Cabinet has in our day become of negligible importance in the determination of national policy. Why is this? Doubtless the personal element has often operated to depress the Cabinet's role in the policy field. But when so variable a factor repeatedly produces the same result there must be an underlying constant factor at work.

The Cabinet is of negligible influence in the shaping of broad governmental policies because it is composed of men whose principal business is that of administration and who, consequently, even when they are not administrative experts at the outset, are required to become such. Unfortunately, an expert in a particular area of governmental activity is not likely to possess the breadth of outlook which is most desirable in a political adviser, or the time or inclination to interest himself in the problems of other departments or of the country at large.

Similarly, Cronin cites Henry Fairlie's description of an ideal cabinet that could serve as a set of counsellors to the President and Fairlie's faulting of Kennedy for not making use of this set of collegial advisors:

"The criticism is not so much of John Kennedy's unwillingness to use the Cabinet but of the reasons he gave for not using it. He does not appear to have understood the qualities which are even more valuable than intelligence and competence: that political judgment—at its highest, political wisdom—is often to be found where one would least be inclined to look for it, in men who digress, or who are slow, or who
have no ready point to make, but who are feeling their way to
an unformed doubt in their minds. Above all, he appears to
have been trapped by his beliefs that he needed the advice
only of those who were directly concerned with the problem.
But those who are handling a problem, however much they
differ, have to establish very early a frame of reference
within which they can contain their differences, and that
frame of reference then becomes fixed, and those acting within
it find it hard to escape."\textsuperscript{27}

But other writers of an earlier period did not have any notion of
an idealized cabinet. For example, Clinton Rossiter, in \textit{The American
Presidency}, writes:

The Cabinet has been a problem for at least a
generation...Only tough custom and past glory have kept it
from sliding noiselessly into oblivion. It is no longer a
body upon which the President can rely for sage advice on
great issues of state; it is not even, in its formal
composition, a gathering of his most important and intimate
associates. It is at best a relic of a simple past when
department heads were thought to be men of broad interests and
held in their own hands the whole power of administration.\textsuperscript{28}

And Rossiter was not optimistic about the use of the cabinet in the
future, commenting that the "President needs conciliatory advice, in
national as in international affairs; he needs agencies to coordinate
executive policy, in the government at large as in the White House. Yet
it is clear that the Cabinet cannot serve these two high purposes as
well as other groups and agencies that exist already or could be set up
without too much difficulty."\textsuperscript{29}

While political scientists have, especially in recent years,
accurately described the cabinet as less than a set of collegial
advisors to the President, these same writers have continued to write
that public expectations, as well as expectations by the press,
secretaries, and the President, have led to disappointment when the
The cabinet has not served as a set of collegial advisors. Perhaps the best example of this dual presentation is that by Emmette S. Redford et al in their introductory textbook on American Government, written in the late 1960's. The cabinet is not a body whose members feel a strong collective responsibility and a mutual obligation and is at best of limited usefulness to the President as a source of advice; yet Presidents have, with varying degrees of regularity, retained the Cabinet meeting as part of their busy operations. The Cabinet is thus less than one's preconceptions might suggest and more than its disillusioned critics would grant. Its persistence is a reflection of certain needs of the Presidency itself, while its limitations derive from the considerations affecting the appointment of its members and from their status as departmental executives.

In his classic work, *The President's Cabinet*, Richard F. Fenno tries to emphasize the contradictory requirements placed on cabinet appointees in terms of a cabinet norm. Fenno writes,

> Though shadowy in formulation, the frequent articulation of an ideal testifies to its existence and to the ethical supervision which it exercises over participant and observer alike.

The norm has two components. First, Cabinet members as individuals should possess certain ideal qualities in order to do their particular jobs well. This involves an idea of a Cabinet of individuals equipped with political and/or administrative talents for their specific jobs....Secondly, the Cabinet should be able to work together to achieve teamwork...the ability and the willingness...of the Cabinet as a group to produce a co-operative organizational product. The ideal Cabinet, then, is made up of men who are eminently fitted to perform special tasks, yet these individuals must cohere as a unit if the name Cabinet is to have more than honorific significance.

It would appear as if little has changed in the past 27 years in that Presidents, the press, and even cabinet secretaries as a body themselves, have perpetuated the myth of an ideal cabinet, consisting of a set of collegial advisors to the President that the President will
convene on a regular basis so as to gather a collective wisdom concerning the direction of his administration. Although this norm makes less sense when the actual operation of the cabinet is examined, the ideal persists. Even Fenno did not suggest that the cabinet with a collective role was wrong. In looking at the strengths and weaknesses of the cabinet, Fenno writes,

It is weakest in performing the function of interdepartmental coordination and in making direct contributions to decisions through a well-informed, well-organized discussion of policy alternatives. It is most useful as a presidential adviser, in the sense of a political sounding board equipped to provide clues as to likely public or group reactions, and as a forum in which some overall administrative coherence can be secured.32

This idealized cabinet myth can set the grounds for the ultimate dissatisfaction, or at best, frustration—both on the part of the secretary and the President. J. Edward Day, Postmaster General to President Kennedy, in an extremely witty and insightful autobiography, describes his days as Postmaster General. In reading his description of the role of the cabinet in the Kennedy administration, I sense that however much he had gained a realistic perspective of the role of the cabinet, the longings for a "cabinet government," and a persisting belief that "cabinet government" could work, still prevailed. Day writes, "Members of the public, to the extent they think about it at all, think of the cabinet as meeting often and deliberating with the President on the whole range of government problems, domestic and international. They may even have a vague idea that votes are taken on the various issues although some will recall the story about Lincoln's
decision which was taken contrary to the unanimous vote of his cabinet: 'Seven noes, one aye—the ayes have it.' Day goes on to describe the infrequency of cabinet meetings as well as their briefness (e.g., "the most highly publicized—at the time of the Cuban missile crisis—lasted but ten minutes.") Yet, one senses an optimism that, yes, the cabinet and meetings of that body could be productive. Recalling the first meeting of the cabinet shortly after Kennedy's inauguration, Day notes that meeting lasted for 2 hours and found each secretary discussing the problems and issues they were facing. Yet it took 2 1/2 years before such a repeat performance was allowed. Day speculates as to the reasons for the disuse of the cabinet as an advisory body:

Why this dearth of dialogue? Certainly a major factor was that the men President Kennedy chose for his cabinet did not fall easily and naturally into line with his 'one man band' approach to running the Government. Three of them—Luther Hodges, Orville Freeman and Abraham Ribicoff—had been successful and forceful Governors of states. In addition, Ribicoff had served in Congress, as had Stewart Udall. Arthur Goldberg had for many years been a big name on the labor scene and in Washington...

None of us was a cigar-store Indian. Yet President Kennedy had never had the experience of being an executive among lesser but by no means subservient executives; he had been served by a fanatically devoted band of men of his own creation. His cabinet was a different run of shad. Each member was independent and quick to express his views, perhaps too much so for the President's taste. At any rate, he soon began to exhibit restlessness and impatience during cabinet meetings, which thereafter diminished in frequency....Still, I believe, the President planned to have more frequent cabinet meetings.

And, it appears as if Day, deep inside, still thought the cabinet meeting could be useful.

The atmosphere at cabinet meetings should have been right for free-and-easy, frank discussion. At the outset it had been only natural to assume that such discussion would be
encouraged. In contrast to the Eisenhower cabinet— at which the sheer number of staff members present hampered discussion— under President Kennedy there were usually only five persons in the room besides the President himself, his ten cabinet members, the Vice President, and Adlai Stevenson on the few occasions when he could attend.

The setting may have been right, but after the first two or three meetings one had the distinct impression that the President felt that decisions on major matters were not made— or even influenced— at cabinet sessions, and that discussion there was a waste of time. 36

Day was not the only cabinet member to express interest in the idea of the cabinet as a source of overall advisors. Orville Freeman, when asked by an oral historian for the Kennedy Library if he expected "the meeting of the cabinet to actually provide a consensus on policy?" replied:

No, no. I think these were pretty much perfunctory. I can't remember very many cabinet meetings that amounted to very much. I think most of the cabinet felt that the cabinet was not really used as an influential policy group. This, so far, is pretty much the case with President Johnson as well. I think there is merit in this. As a governor I started out having kind of cabinet meetings, so to speak, of administrative heads in the state government. I found that it got to be a very time-consuming kind of thing with a lot of busy people listening to a lot of minutiae from someone else that they really weren't concerned with.

On the other hand, I think both presidents miss a bet when they come down to policy questions by not putting a policy question to the cabinet and getting an expression. I don't think either one wants or should particularly seek a consensus that would be mandatory like the British system where they have to get it pretty much. I think it is quite clear both are strong men and strong leaders, and they are not going to fail to move because a majority of the cabinet might not agree. The cabinet really collectively very seldom— perhaps once or twice— sat down and bumped heads on an issue where you would have opportunity to probe a question.... In terms of overall policy, what should the budget be, what is the judgment to balance in terms of spending, services, effective national economy versus the debt, and the level of spending as political issues, how do we balance these, this kind of issue, perhaps some trade question, some others I might name where I think he could have
profited from using the cabinet. But neither president has done so. Cabinet meetings, I think, are just put on as often as they can put them on so there won't be criticism and the cabinet won't be ridiculed for not doing what in the public eye they are supposed to do. I certainly think weekly cabinet meetings would be a waste of time, but I do think cabinet meetings on broad-ranging policy issues would be useful....37

The analysis that follows is presented in the hopes of moving towards a better understanding of the role envisioned by a cabinet secretary and respective President, and the resulting harmony or dissonance in the ensuing relationship. This analysis will focus on the Secretary's perspective.38 In Chapter 4 I will examine the secretary's perception of department goals and objectives. Any confusion over role perception and department goal orientation will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter 4, but briefly, role perception reflects the secretary's behavioral orientation to this post, and department goal orientation reflects objectives for the department which need not relate to a particular role orientation.
METHODOLOGY

The analysis is based on a modified content analytic process. Oral histories, administrative histories of the Johnson administration, Senate confirmation hearings, and interviews appearing in The New York Times served as the main sources of data for this study. Information obtained from these sources was supplemented by materials found in the presidential libraries, as well as autobiographies, and other sources from which the secretary's perspective could be gleaned.

A coding frame analogous to that used by survey researchers to code open-ended questions was designed in order to categorize statements made reflecting goals and role perceptions. I realize the problems in using multiple data sources associated with consistency of data. An alternative would be to interview each secretary of this study and ask what their goals were, as well as what they viewed their role as secretary to be. However, the focus of my study is on the initial perceptions of the secretary, at the start of their tenure in office. And interviews conducted 15 to 30 years after the individual has left office would also, in all likelihood, lead to an inconsistency in reporting or recalling of this information. In addition, I have found agreement among both goals and perceived roles when multiple sources of information were available for an individual secretary. That is,
statements made during the course of an interview with a *New York Times* reporter or an oral history interviewer, or during a Senate confirmation hearing, are all similar in content. As a result, I feel reasonably confident in using this approach as a valid and reliable means to glean information that would otherwise not be obtained except via a costly interviewing process. (And this would assume that all of these individuals were still alive and in good health, which is not the case.)

I am aware of the complications of using public statements as a determination of role perception—are these true representations of thought? But I am interested in role perceptions at the start of tenure rather than after the fact, and need initial perspectives, and for an historical study these can only be gleaned from public statements or private communications that have now become public. I have found role perception agreement, for example, when looking at historical recollection in comparison with actions during the course of a term of office. Similarly, agreement is found when comparing oral histories with initial statements as will be demonstrated in looking at several examples in the next section. To demonstrate what types of statements would result in the various categorizations of role perceptions, I will go through each of the role perceptions identified in Table 8 and provide illustrations of the categorization scheme.

For each secretary I began with the Senate confirmation hearing (except in the case of the Truman administration where published
hearings were unavailable), and used oral histories, published interviews, and materials that were available in the presidential libraries to reinforce what was stated in the hearing. I also read autobiographies of the secretaries and used information available if the secretary discussed their roles and goals as secretary in that material. As Fenno writes in justifying his use of documentary materials for his study of the cabinet, "The precise relationship between presidential personality and Cabinet activity is impossible to gauge, especially given the memoir, manuscript, public, and secondary materials available for this study. The diffused, refractory, and uneven nature of the sources make an elusive subject even more slippery." Yet, "One can, however, indicate what seem to be the relevant areas of presidential behavior and suggest their likely effect on the Cabinet." Similarly, I am trying to use the data available in as systematic a fashion as possible to begin to suggest identifiable patterns and relationships.

The Categorization Scheme

I found that role perceptions of cabinet members fell into a dozen broad categories. The seven most common roles are shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Role Perceptions of Cabinet Members, 1945 to 1969

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<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering Department</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 68

Additional roles identified by several Cabinet appointees, but not included in Table 8 include: serving the Department's needs; working with other Departments; implementing programs; deferring to Congress; campaigning and protecting the President's interests; and helping states to deal with their problems. Since only a few individuals stated these goals they have been omitted from Table 8.

To illustrate what types of statements would result in the various categorizations, in the remainder of this methodology section I will go through each of the seven role perceptions identified in Table 8 and provide illustrations of how statements or writings of respective secretaries were coded into these categories. In several cases I will demonstrate how a variety of different sources would lead to the same
Policy-making

Policy-making as a role perception is meant to include the formulation of policy statements and making of policy, both department specific as well as broadly speaking. Remarks included in this category are broad pronouncements concerning the secretary's intention to have a say in policy making. The implementation of policies formulated by others, including the President, is not included in this category. As an example, during Stewart L. Udall's confirmation hearing for the post of Secretary of the Interior, a discussion ensued as to the role of those throughout the Department, and Udall distinguished between line positions and policy-making positions. In response to a question about the controversial appointment of Floyd E. Dominy as Commissioner of Reclamation, Udall responded, "In my view, this is a line office, really, and not a policymaking office and there are times when either by default or purpose, these people are made into policy officers because someone else does not want to take the rap for something, but I regard this as a largely line office. It may mean extra burdens, but I intend to make the policy and consult with my associates within the Department when necessary on it."
Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering Department

A classic counter theme to policy is management expertise. Table 8 shows this was about as common as policy as a role perception for the secretaries of this era. As an example of a management role, during J. Edward Day's confirmation hearing for the post of Postmaster General he identified his primary concern as working to reduce the deficit in the Post Office Department and working on saving money in the area of management. The same emphasis on department management and increased efficiency is re-stated throughout Day's autobiography. Conversion to the zipode system and the use of vertical conveyors are described as tools introduced to increase postal efficiency. In addition, Day wrote that:

promotions based on the spoils system exacted a heavy toll in efficiency and morale, and consequently in the rising cost of processing mail. Politically sponsored supervisors sometimes felt they enjoyed a certain immunity from disciplinary measures and performed accordingly. As supervision lagged, the productivity of clerks and carriers dropped, too. As a few persons with the appropriate political support were elevated to high-paying positions, the morale of hundreds and thousands, without that support, sank.

It was my strong belief that good supervision and good employee morale were the greatest needs of the Post Office Department. Accordingly, promotions to supervisory and technical jobs were put on a merit basis...to the everlasting horror of those who preferred to dispense jobs like plums to the politically deserving.
Follow Laws/Constitution

Rather than policy formulation or management, a secretary can just choose to enforce the laws. As an example, Arthur J. Goldberg, in his confirmation hearing for the post of Secretary of Labor, stated his intent to administer and enforce various laws. The role of the Secretary of Labor as envisioned by Goldberg at the start of his tenure was described as follows:

The Congress of the United States has given to the Secretary of Labor the responsibility of administration and enforcement of various laws. These include not only the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Walsh-Healey Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, and others, but also the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.

I wish to make perfectly clear that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Labor I shall do everything in my power to enforce these laws vigorously, fairly, and without fear or favor, and in the spirit of humanity and common sense which I believe should characterize all law enforcement.

Advise/Serve President

The second most prevalent role orientation found was that of Presidential advisor. As an example, throughout the confirmation hearing of John Foster Dulles for the post of Secretary of State he stresses the advising role he expects to have. For example, Dulles states

Now of course you understand that as a member of the Cabinet and as Secretary of State, I will not make independent
policies for the Executive. The principal job of the Secretary of State is to advise the President, and it is he who makes the final decisions about foreign policy, and whatever my own individual views in that respect would be, I would as the part of good teamwork, hope to be able to work and expect to be able to work in the closest cooperation with General Eisenhower in those respects.

Later, in discussing the role of ambassadors, Dulles identifies the differing roles envisioned for State Department personnel.

This business of having four or five ambassadors in Paris is all wrong in my opinion. It confuses the French government. They don't know whom to deal with. Various people get in conflict with each other. There is no clear line of authority.

I think that situation must be cleaned up, but I hope it can be cleaned up without throwing upon the Secretary of State and his Under Secretaries such executive and operating responsibilities that they are not able to do their first job, that of advising the President about foreign policy.

Luther Hodges, in an oral history interview conducted by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in 1964, during the course of his term of office as Secretary of Commerce, was asked what he perceived the role of the Department of Commerce to be. Hodges replied, "The Department of Commerce has a very definite role to play. It is supposed to advise the President on the economy of the nation and to do whatever it can to assist the economy of the nation."
Serving the public's needs is an attractive counter theme to serving as Presidential advisor. This role is exemplified when, in his appearance before the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, James P. Mitchell gave a statement as to his role as Secretary: "I conceive my job to be that of a public servant, devoted to the mission which is set out by Congress for the Department of Labor which is that of developing the welfare of the wage earners of the United States...." Archivists in the Eisenhower Library, who have gone through the papers of Mitchell that have been given to the library affirm the broadly conceived role that Mitchell espoused prior to his confirmation to the post: "Secretary Mitchell approached his job with the idea that the Labor Department should serve the public in general—-that is, everyone who worked and not just organized labor....At the center of Mitchell's approach to solving labor-management differences was a call for understanding, common sense, and enlightened self-interest. He asked business to curtail inflationary profit-taking and labor to moderate wage demands."
Work with Congress

The most common role orientation found was working with Congress. For example, in the Oral History conducted for the Kennedy Library, Luther Hodges describes his relationship with Congress:

...we had our own Congressional Relations people from day to day checking on this or that bill. Where there was a particularly important thing, such as the Trade Expansion Act, or the Travel Act, or ARA, or Accelerated Public Works, or big things that came into the Department, or were part of the total Administration, many times I made personal contact either by telephone or otherwise. I preferred to go and see the people. If I had time, there was nothing I enjoyed as much as going to the Congressman's office or the Senator's office. The Senate being smaller, I had a chance to know a greater number of them. I knew many of them by their first name and had a fine relationship with them. I think because I was sort of the old man of the Cabinet, and had been a Governor, and had always spoken out, and had a basic conservative tinge from the standpoint of business, I got along with them very well. Many times the President would ask, either directly or through one of his aides, if I would get hold of so and so and talk to them....One of the basic reasons we had a good relationship with Congress is that we did not take advantage of our relationships. We were careful not to overdo it. We were called in infrequently and whenever we could, we would drop by. We never would say I want you to vote for this, or I expect you to vote for it. We'd simply say, "I'd like to come and explain my point-of-view on this thing and see if you have any questions about it; naturally we would like to have your help and judgment, if the situation of your district or state would allow you to do it." We never misled them or twisted any arms. So, we always had a good relationship with them.

Throughout his confirmation hearing to the post of Secretary of Agriculture, Orville L. Freeman emphasized his plans to work with Congress in a number of ways. For example, he would seek out ideas and
recommendations from members of Congress. He would consult with members of Congress, and, in particular, seek out advice from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry in the Senate as well as other relevant committees in the Senate and House. In addition, he would work to implement the legislation that Congress did pass. Similarly, in Freeman's Oral History with the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, he described his efforts to sell Kennedy's programs to Congress in his first year. Freeman took advantage of access to the media in his first year, "which I knew would not be available consistently because agriculture isn't of that much burning interest to the great majority of our people. So I jumped at every opportunity the first year to do that. Plus I spent as much time on the Hill as I did in my office trying to develop good working relationships with the members of the committee." This working relationship with Congress persisted with the change of administrations. Freeman worked closely with Larry O'Brien and his White House Staff in trying to woo Congress. Freeman worked to get a bill out of Committee, while Larry O'Brien and his staff would work on the Rules Committee and the Speaker to win passage of a measure.

Another Kennedy appointee with strong sentiments as to working with Congress is that of C. Douglas Dillon. In his confirmation hearing for the post of Secretary of the Treasury, Dillon repeatedly stated his intent to let Congress decide policy and Treasury to follow and carry out congressional intent. Dillon stated it was the role of Congress to decide tax rates. In deciding expenditures and means by which to raise revenues, Dillon stated that "We do have a responsibility for
making recommendations, but Congress disposes of those recommendations, and then our job is to handle the management of the debt accordingly."

Later in the hearing, Dillon again stated that "I think one area certainly that should be studied is the area of incentives through the tax system to more rapid modernization of plant, and that certainly would be a prerogative of the Treasury to suggest to the Congress and for the Congress to act on...".

Serve Clientele Needs

The final role to be discussed here is serving clientele needs. As a final example, in his confirmation hearing for the post of Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson clearly indicated his intent to serve the interests of farmers. Benson stated his interest in those close to the farm.

I do not suppose there is any other group that knows so well that "As ye sow, so shall ye reap." I have always been proud to be associated with them, to serve them, and I feel very much indebted to them for what they have done for me.

I am very happy over the prospect of possibly helping to serve further this important segment of our population.

Benson also stated, in response to a question asking his interests, that the national welfare is of primary concern, but "closely related to that is the welfare of the farmers. Having been one of them, having been
closely associated with them, I think you can count on me being aggressive and helping them." Benson also promised to appoint farmers to advising positions. In reading Benson's autobiography, evidence is found to support the stated interest in serving farmers and using them in an advising capacity. In December of 1952, President-elect Eisenhower created an Agricultural Advisory Commission, which Benson used throughout his term. After several initial appointments by Eisenhower to the Commission the remainder of the appointments were made by Benson. Benson appointed a broad spectrum of farm-related interests to the Commission, including bankers, professors, and processors (since agriculture had many different areas) but insisted on a fair size contingent of farmers on the Commission. As Benson writes, the establishment of the Commission was a prompt beginning in fulfillment of the General's campaign pledge to appoint a bipartisan commission to advise the Secretary of Agriculture on farm policy and to review from time to time policy, accomplishments, and needs. Later this group was made formal as a permanent committee with a rotating membership of eighteen, at least twelve of whom were always full-time farmers."
A logical starting point in the examination of the role perception of the President's cabinet is to look at the role envisioned by secretaries in each of the respective administrations. An examination of the data suggests a number of similarities, as well as differences, in the role perceptions envisioned by the cabinet secretaries of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations (see Table 9).
Table 9: Role Perception by Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Truman</th>
<th>Eisenhower</th>
<th>Kennedy</th>
<th>Johnson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness in Administering Dept</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work With Congress</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 21 20 13 14

As a way of exploring the data, and the President's relationship with his cabinet, it seems useful to begin by examining one case—the Johnson Cabinet. The perceived roles of the secretaries of the Johnson cabinet suggest several explanations for some of the frustrations both Johnson and his cabinet are generally believed to have experienced.

Halberstam, among others, has written of the strong Johnson desire to compare and contrast his administration with that of the Kennedy's. For example, in discussing Johnson's reactions to Joe Alsop's columns in
1964 urging Johnson to take stronger actions in Vietnam, Halberstam described the question raised in his mind— "Did... (he) have as much manhood as Jack Kennedy?" Among the papers I have examined on the cabinet I found this comparing and contrasting to be the case in several instances. At one point in time the number of cabinet meetings held by each President in a comparable time period was counted at President Johnson's request. Similarly, counts were also made for the number of press conferences held by each (see Table 10).
Table 10: Comparisons of the Johnson and Kennedy Administrations
Made by President Johnson

Cabinet Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kennedy</th>
<th>Johnson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st year</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd year</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd year</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: CF FG 100/MC R. E. Kintner, Memo, for Mrs. Yates, 8-30-66, LBJ Presidential Library)

Press Conferences:
"Regular On-the-Record Press Conferences"

Kennedy: 64 Press Conferences
Johnson: 68 Press Conferences
(1st 977 days—To September 25, 1963) (1st 977 days—July 25, 1966)

Source: CF FG 100/MC Memo, Kintner for Bill Moyers, 7-22-66, attached "A Comparison of the Press Conferences of President Johnson and President Kennedy"
Efforts to "match" or "better" the Kennedy Administration are also evident in Johnson's attempts to surround himself with Ph.D's, in order to equal the intellectual climate surrounding the Kennedy presidency. Johnson's appointments of Gardner, Weaver, and Wood, plus John Gronouski's presence in the cabinet, all reflected the inclusion of academics in "Johnson's" cabinet. In an information sheet giving a biographical sketch of Gronouski released in July of 1964, the introduction starts, "Postmaster General John Austin Gronouski, who took office September 30, 1963, is the only known member of a President's cabinet ever to hold an earned Ph.D."\(^62\)

But with this emphasis on individuals possessing the credentials needed to intellectually match the Kennedy appointees, paradoxically the other side of the Kennedy appointments—that is, their loyalty to the President and desire to serve the President's needs—was overlooked by Johnson. (In contrast to the overall tone of the confirmation hearings for Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson, there is a noticeable deference to the wishes and priorities of President Kennedy by members of his cabinet. For example, in response to questions concerning enactment of the Democratic Party Platform, Arthur Goldberg responds, "I think when it comes to legislative recommendations to the Congress, I am a member of an administration. President-elect Kennedy is the leader of that administration. I will, of course, as one of his advisors, hope to give him the benefit of my views, and I'll do so in discharge of my responsibilities."\(^63\) Similarly, Abraham Ribicoff, in answering a
question asking what he has in mind in order to achieve excellence in schools, replies, "I have spent much thought on it, and I think it is my duty as a secretary-designate not to make a detailed comment until the President-elect adopts his programs and makes his decisions."  

Surprisingly, only 36% of the Johnson appointees indicated serving the President as a perceived role. It is thus less surprising that Johnson viewed his cabinet in "us" against "them" terms, or himself as "the loneliest man in the world." Even if the Vietnam War had not escalated as public sentiment turned against the war, it would appear that loyalty and service to the President's needs and desires would not have a priority among the cabinet, and hence their support might have been lacking regardless of the President's foreign policy decisions.

With nearly 2/3 of Johnson's cabinet viewing effective, and efficient management of their respective departments as a major role, unlike the secretaries of the Kennedy or Eisenhower administrations, a slightly different twist suggests itself. Johnson sought out the best individuals to run the departments—thus running the departments was a primary responsibility for these individuals. And with the Great Society programs successfully enacted, it was natural for these individuals to assume a role as implementers of the programs.

However, the traditional emphasis given to studies of the Johnson administration is the labyrinthine structure designed to effectively lobby and deal with Congress. And there is plenty of evidence to support this. Typifying the President's emphasis on seeking and
fostering congressional support of his legislative programs along with the selling of that legislative program to the public is Robert Kintner's description of a cabinet meeting held a month prior to the 1966 congressional elections. The cabinet meeting began without Johnson there to open the meeting. Larry O'Brien, Postmaster General, followed notes from Johnson and "led a discussion of priority legislation and the remaining days of the present session of Congress." After Johnson joined the meeting, following a discussion centering primarily around the Demonstration City bill, the meeting concluded with "an impromptu talk" by the President, "on the great accomplishments that have been made in the second session of the Eighty-Ninth Congress and urged that the Administration's successful record be published."66

Even in non-election years cabinet members were responsible for status reports on legislation before Congress falling under their respective jurisdictions.67

In addition, rather than allow a haphazard system of contacts between Departments and Congress to develop, the President formalized reporting procedures. By February of 1967, cabinet members were required to submit "to the President every two weeks important and informative results of their liaison with Members of Congress on Administration policies and proposed legislation under their supervision." And cabinet secretaries were personally expected to take a part in the preparation of these reports.68
Johnson was not content with merely knowing the effectiveness of Congressional liaison activities. Additionally, cabinet meetings included reports discussing the method of liaison with Congress that cabinet secretaries and their staff proposed to use in order to give support to a particular legislative measure. As part of his duties, Larry O'Brien was expected to notify cabinet members of their responsibilities in reporting on specific legislation planned for discussion at upcoming meetings.

However, in looking at the role perceptions of the Johnson administration in contrast to that of the Truman, Eisenhower, and especially the Kennedy administrations, it appears that "working with Congress" in and of itself is less important at least from the secretary's perspective. While this does rank second among the role perceptions mentioned by Johnson cabinet members, I would have expected it to rank first among secretaries in an administration which emphasized strong congressional relations. A subgovernment explanation may be appropriate in understanding this difference. Within a subgovernment there are close department ties with Congress in the program implementation stage as well as the formulation period. What with most of Johnson's appointments made after the successful 88th Congress and the enactment of much of the Great Society legislation, the job envisioned by appointees was to see that these programs were successfully carried out, hence their role was perceived as that of administering the Department.
Thus, although the Johnson administration is often viewed in terms of the expansion of the government, and the emphasis is given to the push for legislative support in Congress, the other side of the coin is the need to administer and deal effectively with this huge growth. With administrative management having so pronounced a role among his cabinet, Johnson was enabled to continue to seek additional program support. These findings suggest that the Johnson administration not solely be viewed in terms of the legislative pushes from the White House, but also with the subgovernment idea of close ties between the bureaucracy and Congress, since the cabinet secretaries were obviously dealing with Congress (or had a legislative liaison unit in their department specifically assigned that task). Yet the role perception of the cabinet members is less that of working with Congress, than of administering their departments.

The Johnson cabinet's inbred sense of working with Congress as a normal function in heading the Department, rather than as the separate role envisioned by the Kennedy cabinet, perhaps is best explained in looking at the governmental background of the respective appointees. As stated in Chapter 2, in looking at Johnson's appointments, 73% had been recruited from the federal sector. Therefore, they were bringing to the post a working knowledge of the federal government. This is in contrast to the cabinet appointments of the Kennedy administration, which finds but 23% of the appointments drawn from those currently employed in the federal sector.
However, the same argument cannot be made for the Truman appointees. Although a similarly high number of the Truman secretaries were recruited from the federal government (67%), more do express their interest in working with Congress (62%). Also, for the Truman appointees, serving the President is the second most frequently identified role, whereas for the Johnson appointees it is tied for third. But there are several problems in comparing the Truman administration with the Johnson administration. One is the time period—Truman's administration embraces two wars, with a period of de-mobilization in between, a time of bipartisan foreign policy, and the well-established programs of the New Deal, but not the establishment of new cabinet Departments to deal with government's expanded role. The "outer cabinet" as it existed in the 1940's would have been of an entirely different complexion, without the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, or the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Transportation. If there are differences in role perception between the inner cabinet and the outer cabinet and the outer cabinet has undergone changes, then it would be an unfair comparison to be looking at the Truman and Johnson cabinets as similar in nature.

However, it is interesting to note the similarities between the Eisenhower and Johnson cabinets. The data suggest that the Eisenhower and Johnson secretaries did have some definite ideas as to the role they would be playing, or had at least expressed their sentiments as to the anticipated role they planned to have. In comparison to Kennedy's cabinet members, the Johnson and Eisenhower secretaries seem more
interested in policy-making (and as noted above, the Johnson secretaries seem committed to department management), and less hesitant to blindly adopt a "devoted servant" mentality. I will shortly examine what I have labeled a naive mentality in looking at midterm versus initial cabinet appointments. For now I would suggest that the Kennedy cabinet, unlike the Johnson and Eisenhower cabinets, had a more generalized concept of their role. Statements made by the secretaries followed the lines of "serving the President," "supporting the President's positions," "serving the Nation," or "upholding the Constitution." However, this could be a function of the nature of the appointments made—most of Kennedy's cabinet stayed throughout his tenure, resulting in few midterm appointments. Johnson and Eisenhower had a greater number of changes in cabinet members throughout their respective administrations.

ROLE PERCEPTION BY DEPARTMENT

An appropriate method of categorization is to examine the roles envisioned by secretaries in each of the respective Departments. An examination of the data suggests a number of interesting aspects of the cabinet that should be explored and will be examined in the remainder of this chapter. (see Table 11).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Labor</th>
<th>HEW</th>
<th>HUD</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>25% (1 of 4)</td>
<td>50.0% (4 of 8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57% (4 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100% (1 of 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering Dept</td>
<td>25% (1 of 4)</td>
<td>37.5% (3 of 8)</td>
<td>17% (1 of 6)</td>
<td>43% (3 of 7)</td>
<td>100% (1 of 1)</td>
<td>100% (1 of 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>25% (1 of 4)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33% (2 of 6)</td>
<td>14% (1 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>75% (3 of 4)</td>
<td>25.0% (2 of 8)</td>
<td>50% (3 of 6)</td>
<td>57% (4 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100% (1 of 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>75% (3 of 4)</td>
<td>12.5% (1 of 8)</td>
<td>50% (3 of 6)</td>
<td>28.5% (2 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work With Congress</td>
<td>50% (2 of 4)</td>
<td>62.5% (5 of 8)</td>
<td>50% (3 of 6)</td>
<td>43% (3 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>75% (3 of 4)</td>
<td>50.0% (4 of 8)</td>
<td>67% (4 of 6)</td>
<td>28.5% (2 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100% (1 of 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Up to 4 roles were coded for each secretary, hence frequencies are greater than 100%)
What strikes me is the diversity of roles envisioned by these members both within a Department and across Departments. This diversity begins to suggest why the cabinet is not the most easily observed and summed up of bodies. The data do, however, support some commonly held assumptions concerning cabinet secretaries and provide some explanation for these assumptions.

In looking at the role perceptions of the Secretaries of State it becomes apparent why they are not comfortable in the State Department and why the career Foreign Service likewise may be uncomfortable with the Secretary. During the time frame of this study, 83% (5 of 6) of the Secretaries expressed a desire to serve the President while all 6 indicated a willingness to work with Congress. If the Secretary's shaping of foreign policy is to be done with the White House and Congress, what role is left for the State Department per se? None of the secretaries involved the department in much of a foreign policy role. Of all the secretaries, the Secretary of State seems most suited for the broad advising role usually expected of a cabinet member.

This becomes even clearer if another role is considered—that of policy-making. Only one of the Secretaries of State expressed explicit policy-making as a role. Rather than propose specific policies at the outset, and then lobby on their behalf, the primary role as stated throughout interviews and Senate hearings was that of serving the interests of the President, and supporting foreign policy as directed by the President, along with an interest in keeping Members of Congress
informed of current foreign policy, soliciting their counsel as issues arise, and subsequently informing the President of Congressional sentiment.

The Secretary of Commerce is a surprising purveyor of policy-making statements. 4 of 8 Secretaries indicated their role as including the enunciation of and garnering of support for specific policy recommendations. The only other Departments with similar percentages are those of Transportation (this newly created position was headed by but one individual--Alan S. Boyd--during the course of this study) and HEW. As I will discuss in a later section, the establishment of HEW in 1953 and Transportation in 1967 (as well as HUD in 1966) as new Departments would, I suggest, lead to altered role perceptions from those secretaries heading Departments well established in the Executive Branch. As for the Secretary of Commerce, this policy role does appear to set this post apart from the rest of the outer cabinet positions, since at most one individual in each of the other departments of the outer cabinet adopted this initial role perspective (except as noted above).

It could well be that the functional responsibilities of the Secretary of Commerce lead to this policy-making role. And the policy concerns of Commerce may not be important enough to be of concern to the President, thus leaving the Secretary with a strong role perception in the policy arena. In reading an oral history interview of Luther Hodges, Secretary of Commerce in the Kennedy Administration, some
support is found for this position. For instance, upon assuming the post of Secretary of Commerce, Hodges met with the Budget Director who suggested not bothering the many independent agencies in the Department (e.g., Weather Bureau, Patent Office) since they "are pretty well established and they knew where they were going." Hodges did not agree with this position and moved to gain control over a sprawling department. In addition, as Table 11 indicates, the Secretaries of Commerce have not felt as strongly about serving the President. Perhaps Hodges has best explained the reason for this position. The Secretary of Commerce should be an economics adviser to the President and does have research support in that area in the Department, yet the role of economics adviser had been lost to the Council of Economic Advisers to the President since the units in Commerce were functioning quite autonomously during much of the time period of this study. Thus, it appears that Secretaries of Commerce may have chosen to work in the areas that the President is less concerned about.

In looking at Table 11, it appears that of outer cabinet members only the Postmasters General join the Commerce Secretaries in this lack of interest in "serving the President." Perhaps these individuals do have the clearest concept of what their job is to be, and therefore do not have to resort to general statements that really give little indication of what the Secretary will actually be doing during the course of the Administration. As the Secretaries of Commerce seem confident in stating a policy-making role, with widespread awareness of
the need to work with Congress, the Postmasters General also seem to have been aware that their Department is a business—and as such, their role is to see that that business is run in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible. 71% (5 of 7) of the Secretaries made statements to that effect.

In looking at the backgrounds of the Postmasters General this finding is not surprising, although it appears to run counter to the earlier practice of having a political Postmaster General who was typically the national party chairman. During the period of this study, only two of seven Postmasters General had served as chairs of their national party committees—Robert Hannegan, who served under Truman, and Arthur E. Summerfield, who served under Eisenhower. Although most of the seven had been active in party politics, three had strong backgrounds in business (Summerfield, J. Edward Day, William M. Watson); one was a Professor of Finance and Taxation (John Gronouski); and one had moved up through the ranks of the Post Office Department to serve as the first careerist in the post of Postmaster General (Jesse Donaldson). Only two had careers dominated by politics—Hannegan and Larry O'Brien.

One further observation should be made apropos to the theoretical frameworks for the cabinet described in Chapters 1 and 2. It is interesting to note the absence of clientele concerns from the inner cabinet posts, and the inclusion of those concerns among the outer cabinet posts, except in the case of the Postmaster General. Other differences between the inner and outer cabinet departments will be
summarized later in this chapter.

As the introduction to this chapter has indicated, the difficult task is to identify the commonalities as well as the differences found in the President's cabinet. Table 11, as bulky and cumbersome as it is, does begin to suggest that identifiable patterns do exist and that further exploration is warranted.

In looking at Table 11, one does become aware that there are but a few cases in each Department. Strict tests of significance are meaningless in the context of this universe, but in terms of a cut-off point, a difference of 10 percentage points will be used as a guide for discussing the substantively important differences in the tables that follow.

Now that we have examined the differences between administrations and departments, once again the theoretical frameworks described in Chapter 1 will be examined in a further attempt to determine their appropriateness in providing understanding of this body.

In looking at individual departments, the absence of clientele concerns among the secretaries of the inner cabinet departments was noted. This observation redirects our attention to the theoretical construct of the inner cabinet versus the outer cabinet identified in the early 1970's by Cronin, so we can evaluate the appropriateness of this theoretical framework in understanding the cabinet.
THE INNER CABINET VS. THE OUTER CABINET

In looking at the distinctions between the inner cabinet and the outer cabinet, there are some differences, yet also some remarkable similarities. If the inner cabinet is viewed in terms of the more collegial set of advisors to the President as often described, one would expect to find "serving the President" in non-specific terms to predominate as a role perception. Yet that is not the case. (see Table 12)
Table 12: Role Perception--Inner Cabinet vs. the Outer Cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Inner Cabinet</th>
<th>Outer Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>21.0% (6 of 29)</td>
<td>31% (12 of 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Administering Dept</td>
<td>21.0% (6 of 29)</td>
<td>38% (15 of 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>27.5% (8 of 29)</td>
<td>18% (7 of 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>45.0% (13 of 29)</td>
<td>44% (17 of 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>24.0% (7 of 29)</td>
<td>31% (12 of 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>76.0% (22 of 29)</td>
<td>49% (19 of 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41% (16 of 39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Role Perception--Initial vs. Midterm Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Midterm Appt</th>
<th>Initial Appt*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>29.0% (11 of 38)</td>
<td>18.5% (5 of 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Administering Dept</td>
<td>34.0% (13 of 38)</td>
<td>18.5% (5 of 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>18.0% (7 of 38)</td>
<td>30.0% (8 of 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>42.0% (16 of 38)</td>
<td>44.0% (12 of 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>29.0% (11 of 38)</td>
<td>30.0% (8 of 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>66.0% (25 of 38)</td>
<td>59.0% (16 of 27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>31.5% (12 of 38)</td>
<td>11.0% (3 of 27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Hobby, Weaver, and Boyd, who served as initial heads of new Departments have been omitted from this table.
In looking at Table 12, there appears to be no overall difference between the inner cabinet and outer cabinet in terms of serving the President, as might be expected due to the President's turning to inner cabinet secretaries for advice of a general nature. That might be a reason to explain relatively short tenure of secretaries (approximately 2 1/2 years). If outer cabinet secretaries initially perceive the same role functions as inner cabinet secretaries, yet the President views their roles as distinct (e.g., the outer cabinet secretaries as serving clientele groups) the ability of those secretaries to successfully perform roles they envision will be severely restricted, resulting in frustration and disappointment in office.73

One unexpected finding is the far greater role perception of "working with Congress" on the part of the inner cabinet secretaries than expressed by outer cabinet secretaries. Again, in thinking in terms of subgovernments, intuitively I would have suspected the reverse to be the case, especially if one views outer cabinet secretaries as serving or representing clientele groups. The subgovernment literature notes the close workings of clientele groups, department heads, and congressional committee members due to mutual needs.74 However, two reasons can be used to explain this finding. Returning to the earlier discussion of the Johnson cabinet, and the lessened emphasis on working with Congress in contrast to the emphasis on managing the Department, the argument suggested to explain that finding can also be used here. If outer cabinet secretaries are more concerned with the day-to-day, as
well as long-term functionings of their departments (and 38% of the outer cabinet secretaries so indicate vs. but 21% of the inner cabinet secretaries), then an expected job function would be that of working with Congress and would be viewed as part of the department's tasks and not as a separate task. In looking at prior governmental experience of the inner cabinet secretaries, one finds that 48% had served as Deputy or Assistant Secretary in their respective Departments, whereas but 19.5% of the outer cabinet secretaries had so similarly served. Since the Assistant Secretaries, to a large extent, serve as liaisons to Congress in terms of providing testimony at hearings, responding to inquiries, or specifically being assigned the role of Congressional liaison, this finding is not so surprising.

As expected, none of the inner cabinet members viewed their role as that of serving interest group or clientele needs. This is in contrast to the outer cabinet departments, where 41% of the secretaries expressed such a role perception.

Throughout the remainder of this chapter I will continue to examine this theoretical construct.
MIDTERM VERSUS INITIAL APPOINTMENTS--
THE "NAIVE" VIEW OF THE CABINET

To return to an earlier discussion—that of the appointments of Kennedy versus the appointments of Eisenhower and Johnson, a reference was made to the fact that differences in role perception could be a factor of the nature of the appointment—that is, an initial appointment or appointment as a midterm replacement. In this section I will examine more closely the naive view that has been identified surrounding a President's cabinet and see if it is a phenomena more prevalent among initial appointments.

If one defines this naive view of the cabinet as one where the press, the President, and secretaries view the position of a cabinet secretary in idealized terms of "advising the President," "serving the Nation," "upholding laws," and so forth, it would appear that only a slight difference in role orientation is evident between a President's initial cabinet appointments and subsequent appointments made in the course of an administration in the area of "following the laws/constitution" (see Table 13).

Perhaps the most interesting finding is the shift that takes place between Truman's initial appointments and all subsequent appointments in
this study. In an earlier paper in which results analyzing only the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson cabinets were presented, a strong case was made for a naive view of the cabinet among the initial cabinet appointees. That is, from an analysis of role perception it became apparent that more of the initial cabinet appointments were perceiving their jobs in non-specific terms such as "serving the President" or "serving the nation" than was true for midterm appointments. However, when the Truman cabinet was added for this analysis the findings did not hold (see Table 13). There was little difference between initial and midterm appointments in the use of vague, non-specific terms in describing their role. I found it puzzling that the Truman appointees would have made such a dramatic difference in the results. To test this possibility, I again isolated the Truman appointees from the other 3 cabinets and compared role perceptions of initial and midterm appointments (see Tables 14 and 15). This time the findings did confirm earlier results. A naive view did permeate the initial appointees subsequent to the Truman administration. As noted in Chapter 2, 66% of midterm appointments, but only 26% of initial appointments came from the federal sector. As for the Truman administration, the same percentage of midterm and initial appointments were drawn from the federal sector, which is not surprising, given the huge governmental structure created to serve war and demobilization needs. Therefore, the Truman appointments would not have the naive perceptions differentiating initial from replacement secretaries as is true in the other three administrations.
Table 14: Role Perception—Initial Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Truman</th>
<th>All Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>17% (1 of 6)</td>
<td>21% (4 of 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26% (5 of 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42% (8 of 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>33% (2 of 6)</td>
<td>53% (10 of 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42% (8 of 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>17% (1 of 6)</td>
<td>68% (13 of 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>33% (2 of 6)</td>
<td>5% (1 of 19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Role Perception—Midterm Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Truman</th>
<th>All Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>20% (3 of 15)</td>
<td>32% (8 of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept.</td>
<td>27% (4 of 15)</td>
<td>36% (9 of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>7% (1 of 15)</td>
<td>24% (6 of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>47% (7 of 15)</td>
<td>36% (9 of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>27% (4 of 15)</td>
<td>28% (7 of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>67% (10 of 15)</td>
<td>60% (15 of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>33% (5 of 15)</td>
<td>28% (7 of 25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intrigued by the apparent difference between midterm and initial appointments it seemed useful to take this analysis a bit further. Combining the inner/outer framework with type of appointment (initial or midterm), led to some interesting observations (see Tables 16 and 17).

Table 16: Role Perception—Inner Cabinet by Type of Appointment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Midterm</th>
<th>Initial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>28% (5 of 18)</td>
<td>9% (1 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering Dept.</td>
<td>17% (3 of 18)</td>
<td>27% (3 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>28% (5 of 18)</td>
<td>27% (3 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>39% (7 of 18)</td>
<td>54.5% (6 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>17% (3 of 18)</td>
<td>36% (4 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>83% (15 of 18)</td>
<td>64% (7 of 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: Role Perception—Outer Cabinet by Type of Appointment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role Perception</th>
<th>Midterm</th>
<th>Initial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>27% (6 of 22)</td>
<td>28.5% (4 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Administering Dept.</td>
<td>45% (10 of 22)</td>
<td>14.0% (2 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow Laws/Constitution</td>
<td>9% (2 of 22)</td>
<td>36.0% (5 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve President</td>
<td>41% (9 of 22)</td>
<td>43.0% (6 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Nation/Public</td>
<td>36% (8 of 22)</td>
<td>28.5% (4 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>45% (10 of 22)</td>
<td>64.0% (9 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>54.5% (12 of 22)</td>
<td>21.0% (3 of 14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In looking at the outer cabinet, it appears as if an equal proportion of initial and midterm appointees do harbor vague ideas as to their position—i.e., "serving the President," or "serving the nation." This is in contrast to inner cabinet secretaries where there is a noticeable decline in the numbers holding those views.

But although the midterm appointees to the outer cabinet do suggest a naive view of the cabinet, there are noticeable differences from the initial appointees. Over half express a desire to serve and represent clientele needs, whereas but 21% of the initial appointees had such a view. I had expected the reverse, especially in view of the literature and press reports of the cabinet. As described in Chapter 1, "balance" has long been used in conceptualizing the President's cabinet— is there representation of a broad range of interests and regions in the cabinet?
Yet, as suggested earlier, an outsider's perception of balance may be different from that of the secretary. Balance is rarely used in describing replacement appointees, yet over half of those secretaries viewed their role in representative terms. A President is usually replacing but one appointee at a time—and the overall balance of the cabinet is less important than the needs of a particular Department and area. And these midterm replacements do seem to have a greater interest in the specific task at hand. Nearly one-half perceive their role as administering their Department in the most effective manner with almost 55% specifically wanting to address the needs of their clientele.

I would suggest that balance is an archaic concept. It really serves no useful purpose in understanding how cabinet secretaries perceive their role.

A final difference to note is in terms of the role orientation concerning Congress. Initial appointments to the cabinet (both inner and outer cabinet members) equally perceive their job as including working with Congress. However, there is a noticeable drop in terms of stating this as a role perception on the part of midterm appointments to the outer cabinet. Recalling that 66% of all midterm appointments were moving from one federal government position to another, one could assume that this experience would temper their job expectations and make them realistic as to their role and their Department's role in Washington (the latter will be examined more carefully in Chapter 4).
Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson have described organizations in terms of a contextual framework. Departments and agencies cannot exist in isolation. They are dependent upon external support either via Congress, clientele groups, other departments and agencies, or even the President. All departments are dependent upon Congressional authorizations and appropriations in order to exist. Whereas inner cabinet secretaries can expect broad-based support in Congress, the same is not true for outer cabinet secretaries. As a result they are forced to turn to outside clientele groups for support who will then lobby appropriate congressional committees and subcommittees on their behalf.

In looking at Tables 16 and 17, one can see the strong role perception of serving clientele needs on the part of the midterm appointments to the outer cabinet which is not true of the other three categories, suggesting that these secretaries do appreciate the role of clientele groups in engendering congressional support for their departments.
A recent description by Hugh Heclo of the top levels in the Washington bureaucracy suggests issue networks as a useful conceptual tool. He writes,

Unfortunately, our standard political conceptions of power and control are not very well suited to the loose-jointed play of influence that is emerging in political administration. We tend to look for one group exerting dominance over another, for subgovernments that are strongly insulated from other outside forces in the environment, for policies that get "produced" by a few "makers." Seeing former government officials opening law firms or joining a new trade association, we naturally think of ways in which they are trying to conquer and control particular pieces of government machinery.

The notion of iron triangles and subgovernments presumes small circles of participants who have succeeded in becoming largely autonomous. Issue networks, on the other hand, comprise a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in their environment; in fact it is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins. Iron triangles and subgovernments suggest a stable set of participants coalesced to control fairly narrow public programs which are in the direct economic interest of each party to the alliance. Issue networks are almost the reverse image in each respect. Participants move in and out of the networks constantly. Rather than groups united in dominance over a program, no one, as far as one can tell, is in control of the policies and issues. Any direct material interest is often secondary to intellectual or emotional commitment. Network members reinforce each other's sense of issues as their interests, rather than (as standard political or economic models would have it) interests defining positions on issues.
Perhaps this construct is helpful in understanding the secretary's role perception, especially given the high percentage of secretaries throughout this study who do express an understanding of the need to work with Congress. I would hypothesize that if there are issue networks, then past employment experiences of an individual would be of less importance than other factors in determining role perception as there would be a free flowing exchange of "policy politicians", any of which could be influential in a policy area at a given point in time. However, whether one was part of the "first cabinet" or was added later could have an influence on one's role. In addition, Heclo states that this is a new phenomena, given the growth of governmental programs, especially welfare spending, in the past 20 years. An examination of the data will test these hypotheses.

While this study is not of sufficient scope to do anything more than superficially touch upon the concept of issue networks, it would appear that one observation could be made. In looking at prior departmental experience, it is interesting to note that only in the case of those midterm replacements who have had no prior departmental experience do fewer than half of the secretaries express a desire to work with Congress. If issue networks do exist, I would expect most of the secretaries to perceive this as a role. Whereas nearly half of the midterm secretaries do envision working with Congress as an expected role, the proportion is not as great as in all of the other categories (see Table 18).
Table 18: Role Perception: Prior Departmental Experience—Initial vs. Midterm Appointments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Worked in Dept</th>
<th>No Prior Dept Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering Dept</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one other test of the presence of issue networks, I examined role perception as a function of most recent employment and predominant adult employment. Without the presence of issue networks, I would suspect that one’s understanding of governmental processes and the necessity of working with Congress would vary by past employment experiences, with those coming from business having far less of an understanding than those who have served as Members of the U.S. Congress or Assistant Secretaries for Congressional liaison in the Department of State.

In looking at the results, it appears as if issue networks are present (see Tables 19 and 20). Over half of the appointees express a desire to work with Congress, with the largest proportion coming from those whose employment experiences have seen them crossing back and forth between government and law practice (e.g., Clark Clifford, Dean
Table 19: Role Perception—Last Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Government—national</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency and Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Administering Dept.</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Role Perception—Predominant Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Govt-nat.</th>
<th>Mixed: Govt and Business</th>
<th>Mixed: Govt and Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Efficiency and Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Administering Dept.</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with Congress</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Clientele Needs</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS

Based on the research findings presented in this chapter, I offer the following conclusions.

The "Naive" View of the Cabinet

The idea of a certain naivete in cabinet secretaries, where expectations that all cabinet secretaries do have similar roles—i.e., as advisors to the President on a broad spectrum of issues, with cabinet meetings serving a deliberative function, as promulgated by the media, President, and even the secretaries themselves, does appear to be a useful concept in understanding initial and ensuing relationships between a President and his cabinet after the initial appointments have been made. As has been demonstrated, only changes in particular respects in role perception for the inner cabinet vs. the outer cabinet secretaries were detected. As a result, this naive view that all secretaries serve the same role may have wider application as an explanation for not only the similarities in perceived roles, but also in frustrations that may later arise as the President does use inner cabinet secretaries in a way different than he uses his outer cabinet secretaries.
One difference noted, however, is the greater percentage of inner cabinet vs. outer cabinet secretaries identifying "upholding the Constitution" as a role. This reflects a role frequently stated by one particular member of the inner cabinet--i.e., the Attorney General.

There also is a substantially larger percentage of inner cabinet (76%) vs. outer cabinet (49%) secretaries identifying "working with Congress" as a role they anticipate performing. I have suggested that this could be explained in two ways. Perhaps outer cabinet secretaries perceive working with Congress as a function of their department, in accordance with a subgovernment view of the policy process. And rather than view "working with Congress" as a distinct role it is an implicit responsibility as part of the Department the secretary heads. Another interpretation is that with 48% of the inner cabinet, but only 19.5% of the outer cabinet secretaries having backgrounds as assistant or deputy secretaries in the past, perhaps continuing legislative functions begun in that post (e.g., congressional liaison work, testimony at hearings, providing information to members of Congress) leads the secretary to continue to view working with Congress as a definite part of their new duties.

In looking at the initial appointments a President makes vs. the midterm appointments made as vacancies arise, it would appear as if the initial appointments tend to have this naive view far more than do the midterm appointments for the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Far more of the initial appointments than midterm
appointments tend to perceive their job in non-specific terms such as "serving the President" or "serving the nation" or "working with Congress" as a distinct role. This may best be explained in terms of the past governmental experience of these individuals—66% of the midterm appointments, but only 26% of the initial appointments have had federal governmental experience and hence may have gained a more pragmatic view of their position. As for the Truman administration, the same percentage of midterm and initial appointments were drawn from the federal sector, thus explaining the absence of a naive view of the cabinet for these initial appointees.

Johnson's Cabinet

It appears as if there is a difference in role orientation as expressed by Johnson's cabinet secretaries and the cabinet secretaries of the other administrations. "Serving the President" and "working with Congress" were less important to Johnson's cabinet than is true for the other cabinets. Instead, administrative management of the departments was viewed as a primary role by many. The inbred sense of working with Congress as a normal function in heading the department, rather than as the distinct role envisioned by the other secretaries, perhaps can be explained in looking at the governmental background of the respective appointments. In looking at Johnson's appointments, one finds 73% had
had federal governmental experience. Therefore, they were bringing to the post a working knowledge of the federal government. This is in contrast to the cabinet appointments of the Kennedy and Eisenhower administrations, which finds but 23% and 40% respectively of the appointments having served previously in the federal sector. Although a similarly high number of the secretaries in the Truman administration were drawn from the federal sector, they do express a greater interest in working with Congress and in serving the President. As stated, this could be a factor of the change in cabinet structure and the addition of new departments to deal with an expanded federal government beginning with the addition of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and therefore a changed perspective on the nature of the position. The limited time period of this study does not allow for further clarification of this difference. In addition, with Johnson's strong ties to Congress stemming from years as Senate Majority Leader and the establishment of a strong legislative liaison unit under Larry O'Brien in the White House, the direct ties to Congress may not have been as important. But that does not mean that these secretaries were not in contact with appropriate committee members and legislative leaders and on top of relevant legislation.
An interesting finding is the difference between initial and midterm appointments to the outer cabinet and their role perceptions. I would have suspected a greater percentage of initial appointments to be concerned with filling a representational role, given the literature's emphasis on the balance of a President's initial cabinet. Yet only one fifth of initial appointments to the outer cabinet appeared to be interested in serving clientele needs, while over half of all midterm appointments envisioned that as a role. This would support the position that the secretary's perception of the job and role can be different from that of the outsider looking in and that "balance" is of little importance to individuals selected for the President's first cabinet.
Issue Networks

The scope of this study precludes an in-depth analysis of issue networks, but suffice it to say there does appear to be a shared understanding of the way policy-making evolves in this country among cabinet members. Regardless of past employment experience, those moving back and forth between the private and federal sectors appear to have the best understanding of a role that will find them working with Congress, even more so than those who have worked predominantly within the federal sector.

Summary

This chapter has demonstrated the usefulness of the inner and outer cabinet distinction, and the concept of the "naive" view of the cabinet where secretaries do not hold realistic perceptions of the cabinet. The past work experience of an individual does seem to affect perception of the position, with a less naive view of the role of the cabinet coming from those individuals who have had prior federal sector and department experience. This explains why inner cabinet secretaries
and midterm appointments tend to view the position in more realistic terms since greater percentages of these individuals have had past department work or other service in the federal government.

The next Chapter will look at the related area of initial department goals and objectives in a continued examination of these frameworks.
Chapter 3: Footnotes


3 Ibid.


6 Ibid., p. 89.


16. During the time frame of this study the *New York Times* shifted from an 8 column to a 6 column format.


29 Ibid., p. 236.


32 Ibid., p. 155.


34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.
In this chapter, as in the next, three secretaries have been dropped from the analysis. Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, appointed by Roosevelt in 1933, and serving under Truman until March of 1946, and Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce, appointed by Roosevelt shortly before his death in 1945 and serving until September of 1946, have been excluded from the analysis since their initial role perception would include a Roosevelt administration, which is not a focus of this study, rather than the Truman administration. Also, Robert Wood, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, who only served 2 weeks at the end of the Johnson administration, has been excluded due to his short duration in that post.

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The President's Cabinet, p. 34.

Ibid., p. 34.


J. Edward Day, My Appointed Round: 929 Days as Postmaster General, pp. 52-54.


47 Luther Hodges, Oral History Interview, Dan B. Jacobs, Kennedy Library, May 19, 21, 1964; May 18, 1964, p. 40 (revised numbering).


50 Luther Hodges, Oral History Interview, pp. 31-32 (revised numbering).


52 Orville L. Freeman, Oral History, p. 29.

53 Ibid.


55 Ibid., p. 7

56 Ibid., p. 13.

57 Ibid., p. 32.


R. E. Kintner, Memo to H. Fowler, CF FG100/M, Subject: 2-1-67 Cabinet Meeting, February 2, 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.


Janet M. Martin, "The President's Cabinet--The Secretary's Perspective: An Examination of Role Perception and Goals," paper

71 Luther Hodges, Oral History Interview, p. 36 (revised numbering).

72 Ibid., p. 35 (revised numbering).

73 In this time frame the median length of stay for inner cabinet members is 35 months and for outer cabinet members is 32 months, although the mean length of stay is 38.1 months for inner cabinet members and 39 months for outer cabinet members, and the mode is 1 1/2 to 2 years for inner cabinet members and 2 1/2 to 3 years for outer cabinet members.


75 Martin, "The President's Cabinet--The Secretary's Perspective: An Examination of Role Perception and Goals"

76 As stated in Chapter 2, since both Truman and Johnson succeeded to the presidency upon the deaths of Roosevelt and Kennedy, respectively, each inherited a cabinet. But each President dealt with his holdover cabinet in a different fashion. Truman replaced most of the Roosevelt appointees within the first few months of his administration. In contrast, Johnson retained most of the Kennedy appointees, at least through the end of 1964, when he won the presidency in his own right. For the purpose of this analysis, all appointments made after the first six months of Truman's administration are considered midterm appointments. All appointments made by Johnson after November, 1964, are considered midterm appointments. Therefore, the midterm appointments for Truman are: Dean Acheson, Charles Brannan, Oscar Chapman, Jesse Donaldson, James Forrestal, William A. Harriman, Louis Johnson, Julius Krug, Robert Lovett, George Marshall, James McGranery, James McGrath, Charles Sawyer, John Snyder, and Maurice Tobin.

Ibid., p. 401


Ibid., pp. 87-124.
CHAPTER 4: DEPARTMENT GOALS

Not only is the secretary's perception of his or her role important, but so are the goals a cabinet secretary envisions for the department at the start of his or her tenure. These goals set the initial tone for the department for the next few years. Goals may change over time, but initial goals are useful since they serve as a guide for both department action and leadership activity on the part of the presidential appointees within the department.

In this chapter, I will begin with a discussion of the methodology used to ascertain how each secretary perceived his or her respective Department's goal orientation. I will then explore goal orientation by Administration. Thirdly, as with the analyses in Chapter 3, I will examine goal orientation by department. And finally, after this longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis of cabinet secretaries, I will return to the various frameworks used throughout this study (the inner and outer cabinet distinction, midterm versus initial appointments, the "naive" view of the cabinet, and prior work experience), examining their appropriateness in explaining departmental goal orientation as defined by the cabinet secretaries.
Before examining methodological procedures, it is important to state that the goals identified in this chapter reflect pronouncements made by the secretaries as to the objectives and direction envisioned for their respective departments. In contrast to the types of statements used in analyzing the secretary's individual role perspective in Chapter 3, statements examined for this chapter deal with the secretary's intentions regarding future department emphasis and department orientation. The secretary can envision a role for himself or herself that is different from that the Department will play.

As an example of this distinction, as stated in Chapter 3 in the case of Stewart L. Udall's confirmation hearing to the post of Secretary of the Interior in the Kennedy cabinet, Udall distinguished his position as different from that, say, of a bureau commissioner. For example, as Udall explained, Floyd E. Dominy, Commissioner of Reclamation, was in a line position and not in a policy making post. As Udall stated, "...there are times when either by default or purpose, these people are made into policy officers because someone else does not want to take the rap for something, but I regard this (the Commissioner of Reclamation) as a largely line office. It may mean extra burdens, but I intend to make the policy and consult with my associates within
the Department when necessary on it."¹

A modified content analytic approach, as described in Chapter 3, was used to gain information as to how each secretary perceived their respective department's goal orientation. Once again, public pronouncements and internal communications provide the data base for this analysis.

Especially useful for this part of the study were the administrative histories written at the end of the Johnson Administration, Senate confirmation hearings, oral histories, and initial press conferences and interviews recorded in the New York Times. Given the lack of published confirmation hearings for the Truman appointees, memoranda from the Secretary to Department officials and/or the President and White House Staff were especially useful for that administration.

Again, I am aware of complications with using public statements and material that is available in the presidential libraries; I discussed these problems in Chapter 3. However, in the case of determining the secretary's perspective on department goal orientation, this approach is less problematic in that a secretary's intentions for the department would have to be publicly communicated, and communicated in accordance with the secretary's true intentions, if he or she is ever to see those goals carried out by the department.
A coding scheme was developed to categorize the goal statements. This coding scheme will be described in the remainder of this section.

**The Categorization Scheme**

I found that departmental goals envisioned by cabinet secretaries fell into approximately fifteen broad categories. The six most common goals are shown in Table 21.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/Platform</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work With and Seek Congressional Advice</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimize and/or Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve the Public</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform the Public</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, department goals identified by at most two or three secretaries have been omitted from the analysis that follows. These include: working on intergovernmental relations; boosting department's
reputation; working on employment and working conditions for department personnel; maintaining predecessor's programs; and finally, turning over department programs and activities to the private sector and/or the states.

Work on President's Priorities/Platform

In this category I have included statements made by cabinet secretaries stating that their respective departments will be working to follow priorities as set by the President. As stated above, whereas the role perceptions identified in Chapter 3 pertain to the role envisioned by the secretary for himself or herself, the goals identified in this chapter reflect the secretary's vision for the department. In some instances the role envisioned for the secretary and the goals identified for the department may be similar. For example, Robert Kennedy, in his confirmation hearing for the post of Attorney General in his brother's cabinet, continually states that he and the Justice Department will follow the President's recommendations. When questions were asked as to the provisions in the Democratic Party platform on civil rights and how the Justice Department would deal with those provisions, Kennedy responded in a fashion deferential to the Office of the President:

All the facts will have to be examined, and then, if President-elect Kennedy requests a recommendation from the Department of Justice, we will study the matter and make a recommendation to the President. What he does finally or
ultimately in this field will be up to the President of the United States, not me. 2

When a Senator pursued this line of questioning and asked whether it is not a part of the role of the Attorney General and the Justice Department to make recommendations, Kennedy replied:

If I am asked for the recommendation, and, as you point out, it has been traditional that the Department of Justice has been requested for recommendations, assuming that that continues in the future, which I anticipate that it will, we will make an examination of all the facts, the legislation that exists at the present time, and if we find that we feel that further legislation is necessary, legislation will be suggested, recommended to the President.

After that, he will examine all the facts, and if he feels legislation is necessary, he will then submit it to the Senate and the House of Representatives. 3

Policy-making

In terms of departmental goals, in this categorization scheme policy-making includes remarks made concerning those subcabinet appointees and bureau heads under the secretary playing an active part initially in the policy-making process—that is, these individuals will participate in the setting of policy in their respective departments. It also includes the department as a collectivity working on policy in various areas. It does not include the department as implementers of policy as set by other actors, for example, the President.

For example, in the collection of letters James Forrestal wrote to various individuals concerning the unification of the armed forces in a
new Defense Department, there is a letter to General Eisenhower responding to an earlier memo Eisenhower had sent concerning the progress of unification. Forrestal writes:

I propose to expand somewhat your idea of weekly lunches with the three Chiefs to this extent: I propose to get them away with me for a long weekend once every two or three months....On these occasions I am going to have an agenda of unsettled questions on which we will try to get decisions during that interval. The difficulty with this town is the constant interruptions from various sources with consequent failure to get any time for sustained thinking. Some of the questions that face the Joint Chiefs and all of us are, as you know, of a character that cannot be settled, either off the cuff or in a half hour generalized discussion.

Similarly, Ezra Taft Benson held weekly policy meetings with what he viewed as his policy staff—that is, the Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries, and other staff aides. In addition, "smaller groups met with me often on special problems....Once a month we held a luncheon for all agency heads. The agenda included open discussion, reports, announcements, and sometimes a formal presentation...."
Another goal orientation for departments is that of working with Congress, especially relevant committees, and seeking congressional input in department proposals and activities. For example, shortly after heading the Treasury Department, Henry Fowler sent a memo to all presidential appointees in the department to explain what was expected of employees in terms of facilitating the successful passage of legislation beneficial to Treasury's interests. In part the memo stated that:

Treasury legislation, almost by definition, can rarely be classed as popular legislation. As I look back over the past four years, I would estimate that the majority of Treasury proposals would either have been defeated by the Congress or distorted out of all proportion had it not been for the close and continuing relationship that we maintained with the Congress. It is obviously impossible for us to formulate a proposal, send it forward to the Congress, and forget about it.

And Fowler felt that the top appointees in Treasury should be facilitating congressional relations and monitoring congressional activity. In addition, Fowler wrote that:

It should be obvious that a pending vote in committee or on the floor takes priority over all other Department affairs. The only possible exception would be the execution of a direct Presidential order--and President Johnson would be extremely unlikely to interfere with this priority. This priority applies across-the-board--to me as well as to all other officials of the Treasury.
Minimize and/or Manage Intragovernmental Conflict

In this category are included statements urging cooperation among departments and agencies throughout the Executive Branch. For example, during his confirmation hearing for the post of Secretary of the Treasury, C. Douglas Dillon stated his intention that "there should be the closest cooperation and coordination between the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board." Later in the hearing, when asked if Treasury would dictate policy to the Federal Reserve Board, Dillon stressed the need for independence of the Board, yet the need for cooperation between Treasury and the Board. "I do not necessarily think that independence means that there should be action without consultation and without cooperation. I think that we can maintain a full independence and, at the same time, have cooperation."9

Other Kennedy appointees expressing similar views included Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara. During his confirmation hearing, McNamara stated that he had "already discussed with the Secretary of State-designate, Dean Rusk, relationships between the two Departments, and we have agreed that we expect them to be cordial, close, and intimate at all levels."10

Similarly, Dean Rusk also expressed the need for the State Department to work with other departments and agencies involved in
foreign policy during his confirmation hearing. For example, in discussing the diplomatic corps abroad, Rusk emphasized the importance of policy coordination in Washington in order that the ambassadorial coordination in the field can be effective.

I do believe that there is such diversity among countries that operational decisions need to be made on the spot, that it is important to allow the ambassadors very large freedom of action in the field.

This can be possible only if there is very close coordination of policy in Washington among the agencies that we are talking about.

I believe that we can work that out satisfactorily with the USIA and, of course, the ICA, which is now under the direction of the Secretary of State for Policy matters, and continue to make improvements on that point.
Efficiency in Department

Smother relations are not only sought between departments and agencies, but also within a department, as expressed in statements included in the category of efficiency in the department. Typical of such statements are the memoes by cabinet secretaries in the Johnson Administration addressing this subject of efficiency in respective departments, including one sent by Nicholas Katzenbach for a cabinet report. Katzenbach writes, "the Department of Justice has been actively engaged in the reassessment of its activities and procedures, in searching out new directions, and in achieving maximum effectiveness at lowest cost." Katzenbach goes on to outline the activities envisioned for the Justice Department in order to meet this goal of efficiency and effectiveness for the department. For example, Katzenbach writes,

We believe that we under-utilize our top legal officials if we restrict them solely to the specialized areas under their supervision. To achieve an exchange of information, expertise, and experience among these skilled lawyers, we have

--instituted staff conferences at which serious problems in one Division are considered by the heads of all Divisions;
--Assigned heads of certain Divisions to assist heads of other Divisions on particularly difficult or sensitive projects.
In addition, Katzenbach writes,

We have established a central office for the coordination of all our electronic data processing activities and are seeking new applications of computers to
--Mass storage and retrieval of legal information;
--Control of caseloads and dockets;
--Information on events and subjects in the organized crime field;
--The prediction of the effects of proposed policies in such areas as antitrust, civil rights, and crime reduction;
--The assembling of crime information and statistics from state and local agencies for distribution to such agencies and for analysis of crime trends and patterns.

Katzenbach also includes a discussion of cost reduction objectives for the Department of Justice.

Serve Group Interests

Moving to an external department orientation are statements concerning the cultivating of clientele support by the department. Statements in this category include the remarks made by Luther Hodges during an oral history interview with the Kennedy Library. When asked what his conception was, when he arrived at Commerce, "of the role of the Department in relation to the business community and U.S. economic growth," Hodges replied

...Strangely enough,..., the businessman shys (sic) away, or did shy away, from the Department of Commerce, or any
other Department of Government. For example, ... the business man says that Labor Department represents labor and the Department of Agriculture represents the farmers and so forth, why don't you represent us? Or why doesn't somebody represent business? And I said, freely and openly, "That is what we are doing. We are spending millions of your money, giving you services of all kinds, modernization conferences, trade fairs, trade missions, ... , etc., all over the world and we practically never hear from you." I say that with 30 years background as a businessman I never thought of the Department of Commerce in the whole 30 years. It never crossed my mind because I was against Government as most businessmen still are." 

The Public

The final department goal orientations to be discussed are those of serving and informing the public. Included in the category of serving the public are all explicit references made concerning the department having as a top priority service to the general public. Throughout his confirmation hearing to the newly created post of Secretary of Transportation, Alan S. Boyd stated repeatedly the mission of the new department as serving the general public. Boyd explained this objective as follows: "I conceive the Department of Transportation, it is to promote transportation in the public interest, which means the interest of the transportation operators and the interest of the shipper and the consumer." 

In terms of informing the public, an illustration of the types of statements included in this category would be statements made by Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations. Throughout his confirmation hearing, McNamara stressed the efforts the Department would take to keep the public informed of Defense activities. He discussed the appointment of Arthur Sylvester to the post of Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs as facilitating that communication objective. When asked if he would hold regular press conferences McNamara responded, "I have met with the press already on two or three occasions and told them that I expect to keep them fully informed of the activities of the Defense Department, not because I think the press per se has the right to that, but because I think the public has the right to that." 17

In looking at the Administrative History for the Department of Defense, there is included a section dealing with the Defense Department's efforts at keeping the public informed. In a memo sent to all of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Assistant Secretaries, and various staff and unit heads from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Phil G. Goulding, there is a discussion of the upcoming 38th Joint Civilian Orientation Conference to be convened by the Secretary. Along with an outline of the conference objectives is a statement about the purpose of the conference series, which was a "program of the Secretary of Defense," serving "as a report to the nation on the manner in which the mission of the Department of Defense is being discharged." 18
Role Perception versus Department Goals

Before analyzing goal orientation, it is important to first clarify the difference between the secretary's role perception and the secretary's view of department goals.

In looking at Table 22 there are some similarities as well as dissimilarities in terms of department goal orientation mirroring the individual secretary's role perception. For example, in 41% of cases where the secretary envisioned his or her department working with Congress, they also viewed their own role as that of working with Congress. Yet even in this example where the correspondence between department goals and the secretary's role perception is the greatest, less than half of the secretaries are perceiving a similar role for themselves and the department. The similarities that do appear in these two variables can be explained, in part, as a function of the documents used to ascertain roles and goals. For example, the same Senate testimony was used to code both role perception and department goals. But on a theoretical level there should be some differences since these two variables are not the same. Role perception reflects the secretary's behavioral orientation to the position—and department goal orientation reflects department objectives and not necessarily the behavior required to meet those objectives. And we do see some
differences in Table 22.
### Table 22: Department Goals by Role Perception

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department Goals</th>
<th>Serve President</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Work With Congress</th>
<th>Efficiency and Effectiveness in Administering Department</th>
<th>Follow Laws/Constitution</th>
<th>Serve Clientele Needs</th>
<th>Serve Nation/Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Policy</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and seek congressional advice</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage intragovernmental conflict</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since visual inspection of Table 22 does suggest some overlap in the coding of roles and department goals it is important to address the question as to whether these two variables overlap to such an extent that there is the problem of their measuring the same thing.

In looking at several statistics appropriate for measuring the degree of relationship between two nominal level variables, the correlation between roles and goals in Table 22 is small. The Goodman and Kruskal's symmetric tau is only .03 and the uncertainty coefficient is only .04. Cramer's V is also appropriate for a non-square table, and it is just .17.  

The application of a significance test to these data is of dubious value since these data are of the entire population of cabinet secretaries from 1945 to 1969 and not a sample. Still, if one viewed a significance test as appropriate, the chi-square value is 51.696 with 42 degrees of freedom, and is not significant. This means that a systematic relationship between these variables is not present.

With the low values for Goodman and Kruskal's tau, the uncertainty coefficient, and Cramer's V, as well as the chi-square value indicating statistical independence, I would be fairly confident in stating that there is not a statistical relationship between these two variables and the comments made by secretaries concerning their roles are different from the comments made by secretaries concerning goals for their department.
GOALS BY ADMINISTRATION

To begin an analysis of department goal orientation on the part of cabinet secretaries, I will begin by chronologically examining goals by Administration. In looking at the various administrations, the goals of the Truman cabinet were disparate, with no one goal predominating (see Table 23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Truman</th>
<th>Eisenhower</th>
<th>Kennedy</th>
<th>Johnson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priorities/Platform</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and seek</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional advice</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimize intragovernmental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve the Public</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform the Public</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Up to 3 goals were identified for each secretary.)
By contrast, in the case of the Eisenhower cabinet, over half of the members identified specific policy-making goals. This would tend to support Eisenhower's style of delegating responsibility for policy-making to his cabinet members. A memo of Arthur Flemming to President Eisenhower gives recommendations for the President's upcoming State of the Union Message, and prefaces his suggestions by recalling that "I remember that early in your administration you stressed the fact that you did not want members of the cabinet to function solely as representatives of their Departments but to also think of themselves as general advisors to you. It is in that spirit that I would like to pass on the following reactions to you personally." A number of similar exchanges between cabinet members and President Eisenhower reflect the encouragement given cabinet members to give policy advice.

The secretaries serving under President Kennedy identified working on the priorities determined by Kennedy as a primary goal—far more than did the secretaries serving under the other three Presidents. This reflects the statements made by most of Kennedy's cabinet of their intent to serve the President, as described in Chapter 3.

No single goal predominated in the Johnson cabinet, but one of the most prevalent goals was working with Congress. That fits with Johnson's congressional background and the importance he gave to working with Congress. The other goal that was as common for the Johnson appointees was departmental efficiency. In reading Administrative Histories (which are unique to the Johnson Administration during the
time frame of this study) it becomes apparent that department efficiency, and strong management were important objectives throughout the Johnson administration. All the Presidents of this study did emphasize department efficiency and cost-effectiveness in their respective first State of the Union Addresses.24 But from a subjective viewpoint, there appears to be a greater emphasis in this area throughout the Johnson administration in comparison with the three other administrations. For example, eight days after succeeding to the Presidency, one of Johnson's first memoranda for Department heads stated his pledge "that the Executive Branch will be administered with the utmost thrift and frugality; that the Government will get a dollar's value for a dollar spent; and that the Government will set an example of prudence and economy."25 And, six months later, Johnson described to the press the first of a series of cabinet meetings to be held on "management of the Executive Branch." Johnson told the press that "in our efforts to increase efficiency and economy in the executive branch, we ought to be as unsatisfied as a little boy's appetite...From time to time, therefore, I will devote a meeting of the Cabinet and agency heads to progress reports on these efforts."26
Now we will examine broad goal categories by department. Again, in an attempt at categorization, a logical starting point in examining the goals a cabinet secretary sets for the department at the start of tenure is a look at goals by department to see where there are commonalities and differences (see Table 24).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Treasury</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Attorney General</th>
<th>Postmaster General</th>
<th>Interior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's</td>
<td>50%(3 of 6)</td>
<td>28.5%(2 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25.0%(2 of 8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20%(1 of 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>50%(3 of 6)</td>
<td>43.0%(3 of 7)</td>
<td>56%(5 of 9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.0%(1 of 7)</td>
<td>20%(1 of 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and seek</td>
<td>33%(2 of 6)</td>
<td>43.0%(3 of 7)</td>
<td>22%(2 of 9)</td>
<td>25.0%(2 of 8)</td>
<td>28.5%(2 of 7)</td>
<td>20%(1 of 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional advice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental</td>
<td>17%(1 of 6)</td>
<td>14.0%(1 of 7)</td>
<td>44%(4 of 9)</td>
<td>12.5%(1 of 8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20%(1 of 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33%(3 of 9)</td>
<td>25.0%(2 of 8)</td>
<td>43.0%(3 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.5%(2 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g., business, labor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28.5%(2 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.0%(1 of 7)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22%(2 of 9)</td>
<td>25.0%(2 of 8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20%(1 of 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Work on President's         | Agriculture | Commerce | Labor | HEW | HUD | Transportation |
| Priorities/Platform         | 25%(1 of 4) | 12.5%(1 of 8) | 50%(3 of 6) | 28.5%(2 of 7) | 0 | 100%(1 of 1) |
| Policy                      | 50%(2 of 4) | 37.5%(3 of 8) | 17%(1 of 6) | 28.5%(2 of 7) | 100%(1 of 1) | 0         |
| Work with and seek          | 25%(1 of 4) | 25.0%(2 of 8) | 0      | 14.0%(1 of 7) | 0 | 0         |
| Congressional advice        |         |          |         |                  |                    |           |
| Manage Intragovernmental    | 0       | 12.5%(1 of 8) | 17%(1 of 6) | 14.0%(1 of 7) | 0 | 0         |
| Conflict                    |         |          |         |                  |                    |           |
| Efficiency in Department    | 50%(2 of 4) | 12.5%(1 of 8) | 0      | 0                | 100%(1 of 1)      | 0         |
| Serve Group Interests       | 50%(2 of 4) | 62.5%(5 of 8) | 83%(5 of 6) | 0                | 0 | 0         |
| (e.g., business, labor)     |         |          |         |                  |                    |           |
| Serve Public                | 50%(2 of 4) | 12.5%(1 of 8) | 50%(3 of 6) | 14.0%(1 of 7) | 0 | 100%(1 of 1) |
| Inform Public               | 0       | 12.5%(1 of 8) | 0      | 0                | 0 | 0         |
In looking at Table 24, there are several patterns that appear. Regarding policy expectations for the departments, there does seem to be a difference among them. The three inner cabinet departments of State, Treasury, and Defense have policy demands placed on them by about half of their respective secretaries, as does the Department of Agriculture. And Robert Weaver, first Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Oveta Culp Hobby, first Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, also envision their respective departments providing policy recommendations. A noticeable difference is that none of the Attorneys General envision a policy role for their department, unlike the other inner cabinet departments. The Department of Justice appears to serve more as an administrative unit to assist the Attorney General in the enforcement of laws than as a policy-making body, or so the Attorneys General think at the time of their appointments. 27

An interesting cluster appears in looking at the departments expected to serve group interests. At least half of the secretaries in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor envision their department serving clientele needs. In rethinking the outer cabinet definition proposed by Cronin, that is, "by custom, if not by designation, these cabinet officers assume a relatively straightforward advocacy orientation that overshadows their counseling role," 28 it strikes me that there are only a few cabinet secretaries that assume such a "straightforward advocacy orientation." The Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor all have easily identifiable clientele groups that were successful at various points of time in the country's history in obtaining a cabinet department to represent their particular interests. In contrast, the remaining outer cabinet departments represent a less clearly defined clientele. For example, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare can be serving the interests of higher education, elementary and secondary schools, hospitals, the poor, and so forth. The Department of the Interior can be protecting the interests of environmentalists plus the interests of those wanting leasing rights for mineral deposits in governmental lands, or those wanting timber from U.S. forests.

By way of example, in looking at several Secretaries of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare the diversity of interests represented by that Department become apparent. John Gardner, coming from the Carnegie Corporation to head the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1965, had such a strong identification with education that a reporter present at a news conference announcing the appointment asked President Johnson if his "appointment of Mr. Gardner suggest(s) that there will be less interest now in the creation of a separate Department of Education?" In contrast, Wilbur Cohen was easily identified with other aspects of HEW, especially the social security system. In writing to President Johnson in support of the promotion of Cohen to the position of Under Secretary of HEW, John Macy wrote, "Wilbur Cohen is the most thorough professional in HEW's social programs in the entire country. Since 1934 he has served as employee,
consultant, and Presidential appointee in connection with the design and development of the social security system." Macy went on to elaborate on the varied aspects of HEW's programs that Cohen had handled. "The success of education, social security, medicare, drug control, and other legislation is at least partially attributable to his ability as a draftsman, negotiator and persuader."\(^{30}\)

Perhaps the definition suggested by Cronin for the outer cabinet most clearly applies to the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce. The remaining Departments of the outer cabinet can still have an advocacy role, but of a more varied nature, especially the recent additions of Housing and Urban Development and Health, Education and Welfare which encompass a broad range of interests. (As Johnson went on to indicate in the press conference noted above, the appointment of Gardner did not mean all of education's needs were met—the administration and education lobby would continue to push for a separate Department of Education, finally realizing this goal in the Carter administration.)

In looking at the other outer cabinet departments, it is impossible to determine if Transportation would fit the outer cabinet pattern of the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce with but one case and Transportation being added to the cabinet in the last two years of this study. However, Alan S. Boyd, the first Secretary of Transportation, made it clear during the course of his confirmation hearing to this post, that the department would not be an apologist for
various interests. Boyd moved from the position of Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation to the post of Secretary of Transportation and, at the same time, transferred "most of the functions and personnel" of his bureau in the Department of Commerce to the new Department. According to the Administrative History for the Department of Transportation prepared at the end of the Johnson Administration, "Boyd and his staff had a prominent role in drafting legislation and in the formation of the Department and particularly in the decisions concerning the structure and functions of the organization." Boyd organized the Under and Assistant Secretaries along functional lines, so they could work on the total picture, and not just the problems of air transportation, highways, water travel, and so forth. If the successors to Boyd have held similar views this outer cabinet department would also seem different from Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture in terms of their serving identifiable clientele, but similar to the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and Health, Education and Welfare, which encompass a broader set of interests.

The Postmasters General do appear to also have a broader mission than serving a particular clientele—that of moving the mails as quickly and efficiently as possible. As described in Chapter 3, J. Edward Day, Kennedy's first Postmaster General, stressed department management and means to reduce the Post Office deficit in both his confirmation hearing and autobiography. Similarly, Arthur E. Summerfield's handling of the Post Office Department was described by one of his subcabinet members,
Eugene J. Lyons, in terms of the administrative and management changes made to the Department. Summerfield was viewed as a "good administrator." Efforts were made to reduce the bloated employment rolls that resulted from rewarding those "deserving people who would vote the correct way." Lyons noted that "Summerfield had reduced the employment by some 80,000 in the first four years. He was bent on either eliminating completely or greatly reducing the postal deficit." In addition, under Summerfield, the Department "insisted on administrative experience in every postmaster that we appointed....we got some fine administrators in the Post Office Department, men who had a great deal of experience at business and attempted to run a post office the same as any other business and it enabled us to save a lot of money."

The final department to consider is that of Interior. Unlike the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture which have had an identifiable and consistent clientele, Interior's mission is not as clear. Although Oscar Chapman, Secretary of Interior under Truman described himself as a "conservation officer," he still identified the varied functions of Interior: "it was a cross-section of functions including conservation of land and conservation of human resources, coordinated with land use resources." Timber and mineral rights to land held by the United States Government has long been a troubling issue for the Department. In an editorial the New York Times praised the appointment of Stewart Udall as Kennedy's Secretary of Interior, and described the tension that has historically plagued Interior. "The
Department of the Interior historically has been buffeted between the exploitationists, who are legion, and the preservationists, who until recent years have been relatively few.\textsuperscript{43} Udall was viewed as someone who would be sympathetic to the need to see that the nation's "resources be conserved for wise use and permanent protection."\textsuperscript{44} A startling contrast to Udall, Oscar Chapman, and Fred Seaton (described in 1960 by the \textit{New York Times} as "one of the best Secretaries in recent years,"\textsuperscript{45}) was the tenure of James Watt as Secretary during Reagan's first term. The \textit{New York Times} aptly described the conflict that was to reign throughout Watt's tenure:

Some ardent conservationists and officials of environmentalist organizations greeted the selection of Mr. Watt with dismay and hostility. They have voiced displeasure that he has directed a conservative legal foundation that has used their own weapon, the public interest lawsuit, against what Mr. Watt describes as "extremist" environmental organizations that have used the courts so effectively to shape or to obstruct government policies affecting the public lands and the environment.\textsuperscript{46}

The \textit{Times} reported that William Turnage, executive director of the Wilderness Society, had "recently called Mr. Watt 'a joke' a 'caricature of an anticonservationist.'"\textsuperscript{47}

Although there do appear to be some differences suggested in looking across departments, Table 26 is quite unwieldy. A return to the various frameworks used in the analysis in Chapter 3 provides a means to look for commonalities among departments or groups of secretaries in terms of the goals envisioned for respective departments.
To return to the frameworks for analysis used in Chapters 2 and 3, I will begin by looking at inner and outer cabinet distinctions. The inner vs. outer cabinet distinction appears to be of some importance in understanding the goals a secretary sets for his or her Department (see Table 25). By a slight margin, more inner cabinet secretaries expect their Departments to be policy specialists and initiators than do outer cabinet secretaries. And, in conjunction with this, the sharing of information across Department lines with interdepartmental cooperation is a more prevalent view among the inner cabinet secretaries.
Table 25: Goals--Inner Cabinet vs. the Outer Cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Inner Cabinet</th>
<th>Outer Cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work With and Seek Congressional Advice</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests (e.g., business, labor)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 29 39

If the secretaries of the inner cabinet do anticipate a broad policy role, as appears to be the case, this need for interdepartmental cooperation is appropriate. Only through interdepartmental cooperation can comprehensive plans and programs be undertaken.

An important difference between the inner and outer cabinet secretaries is in their expectations concerning their Department's role vis a vis the public. The inner cabinet members see their Department as having little, if any, role with the public except to keep the public informed of what programs and policies that Department is concerned
with. This is in marked contrast to the secretaries of the outer cabinet. Whereas the inner cabinet members will have their Departments keep the public informed, the outer cabinet perceives their Department’s role as that of a servant to the public.

 Appropriately, the largest difference between the inner and outer cabinet secretaries is in their goals regarding client groups. 36% of the secretaries of the outer cabinet expressed specific group goals for their department, ranging from seeking the views of business and industry to meeting with labor, business, and the public as a means of minimizing labor disputes in the future. No member of the inner cabinet expressed a view that would have had their Department looking out for or serving the particular needs of any group in society (see Table 25). Again, this would help explain the lack of concern for managing intragovernmental conflict on the part of the outer cabinet secretaries. These secretaries would find this activity inconsistent with the perceived need of their department to serve as advocates for their constituents’ interests, and would therefore avoid this activity.

 In looking at Table 25, the work of Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson is also useful in understanding differences between the inner and outer cabinets. Simon et al describe organizational equilibrium as a function of individuals and groups outside the organization who contribute to the organization’s support, including "the legislature, the chief executive, other governmental organizations, groups regulated or served by the organization
('cliente' groups), and the general public." These authors explain how some organizations are dependent upon the support of clientele groups for garnering Congressional support.

For some administrative organizations there are groups within society whose support, working through their representatives in the legislature, can guarantee the survival of the organization against almost any odds and whose opposition, in like fashion, is tantamount to the death of the organization or at least considerable modification of its objective and methods.

As Simon et al argue, all departments and agencies are dependent upon enabling statutes and congressional appropriations, including cabinet departments. Only the inner cabinet departments have a realistic hope of ongoing congressional attention. Therefore, outer cabinet secretaries are forced to turn to clientele groups for support who in turn will lobby appropriate congressional committees on their behalf. "They can survive only so long as they can continue to secure the support of politically effective groups in the community and continue through these groups to secure legislative and executive support."

MIDTERM VERSUS INITIAL APPOINTMENTS--
THE "NAIVE" CABINET EFFECTS

In comparing the department goals that have been identified by midterm appointees with those identified by initial appointees, there is
one observation that can be made in terms of the "naive" view of the cabinet characterization. Midterm replacements are less interested in adhering to the President's platform than are the first appointments of a new administration (see Table 26). This is the largest difference in goals, and even it is only a 15% difference.

Table 26: Goals--Midterm Appointment vs. Initial Appointment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Midterm</th>
<th>Initial*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/Platform</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and seek Congressional Advice</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests (e.g., labor, business)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 40

(*Includes Hobby, Weaver, and Boyd)
Recalling that a large percentage of midterm appointees have served in the federal sector, with 66% moving from one position in the national government to another, it would make sense for them to know what the Department needs are and the direction desired for the Department. These individuals would not be as dependent upon the President to determine Department priorities. Some may have expected the reverse to be the case with "loyalists" being placed in these positions. But there are two arguments to consider. First, with the President's program already in place, or modified as the course of the administration progresses, it would make little sense to adhere to a rigid program identified as the administration's platform. In addition, although it is not a focus of this dissertation, it would appear that sometimes if the President selects a "loyalist" for the number one position in the Department, then subcabinet members will be part of the Washington-experience based community, or a specialist in a substantive policy area of the department. By the same token, an experienced member from the Washington community in the number one position may signal a presidential loyalist in the number two spot in the department hierarchy.51
Federal Sector Experience

In rejecting the concept of balance as influencing the secretary's perspective as stated in Chapters 2 and 3, I would have suspected a greater difference in terms of serving particular group needs, with far more midterm appointments than initial appointments expressing that goal. The reason for this would be that these individuals, cognizant of the workings of subgovernments and the presence of issue networks, would be sensitive to constituent concerns. I decided to explore that further. I would suspect that those individuals who worked in the federal sector, especially members of the outer cabinet, would express a far greater concern for careful dealings with the public and constituent groups than would those without such service. This did not prove to be the case.

I began an exploration with a look at those having had prior service in the same Department which they were now heading (see Table 27).
Table 27: Goals--Prior Service in the Same Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Prior Dept Work</th>
<th>No Prior Dept Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/Platform</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and Seek Congressional Advice</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests(e.g., labor,</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 32</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The greatest difference occurs in the areas of seeking out congressional advice and seeking input from various constituent groups. As stated in Chapter 3, many of those with prior service in the Department served as Assistant for Congressional liaison. It is therefore not surprising to find a larger percentage of this group anticipating cooperation with Congress as a goal for the Department. But if one accepts the idea of subgovernments and issue networks, it is surprising to find a greater percentage of those lacking experience in the Department expressing an interest in their Department serving constituent needs and receiving input from these groups than do those with prior service. However,
there is a problem in looking at those with prior Department service since the greater proportion consists of members of the inner cabinet. As Table 25 indicates, none of the inner cabinet members anticipate a role in constituent service. The next section will address this problem further.

Past Employment: Governmental Versus Non-Governmental Experience

Before turning to a look at the inner cabinet/outer cabinet framework and past employment experience, I want to first examine the effect of past governmental experience broadly speaking. It appears as if those coming directly from the federal sector (see Table 28) have a more disparate view of the goals for their respective Departments, suggesting a department-specific orientation.
Table 28: Goals—Last Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Business/Law</th>
<th>Govt.—National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and Seek Congressional Advice</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests (e.g., Labor, Business)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 21 31

That is, they are clear about the direction in which their Department is heading, and what the Department's tasks are. In contrast, those coming from the private sector again have a naive view of the cabinet and are less specific in the direction of their Department. In addition, a far greater proportion are interested in "cabinet government," with cooperation with other Departments and the minimizing of intragovernmental feuding being Department objectives.

In looking at the policy objectives of the secretaries based on past employment, it is not surprising, with this naive view, that more
governmental outsiders perceive policy-making as a role. And, in looking at overall patterns of employment (see Table 29), those with mixed governmental experience view policy-making as far less of a Department objective than those strictly from the private sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 29: Goals--Predominant Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mixed: Govt and Business/ or Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt-National or Law or Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and Seek Congressional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests (e.g., labor, business)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting, however, to see the difference between those with a mixed governmental-private sector background and those who have mostly worked in the federal sector. Twice as many of those with a mixed
background do see policy-making as a Department objective as do those with experience only in the federal sector. This would lend some support to Heclo's identification of issue networks, and a free-flowing exchange of people "having to do with some aspect (or, as defined by the network, some problem) of public policy." As Heclo writes, "Rather than groups united in dominance over a program, no one, as far as one can tell, is in control of the policies and issues. Any direct material interest is often secondary to intellectual or emotional commitment. Network members reinforce each other's sense of issues as their interests, rather than (as standard political or economic models would have it) interests defining positions on issues." If issue networks do exist, then the expectation is that a greater proportion of individuals serving in various sectors would be moving from one to another due to their commitment to a particular aspect of public policy. The data does seem to indicate this may be the case. However, the limits of this study prevent any attempt to demonstrate this further.

What is interesting to note is that there is little difference between those with private sector experience and those who have moved back and forth between the federal and private sectors in Department concern for group interests (see Table 29).

However, in looking at Table 28, 19% of those who were just serving in the federal sector do see group interests as a Department concern. I would have expected a far greater percentage of those with mixed experience to understand the importance of receiving input and sharing
information across the sectors of society. However, the inner-outer cabinet framework may again be causing a distortion due to the concentration of those with federal sector experience in the inner cabinet.

Prior Employment:

Inner Versus Outer Cabinet

In controlling for inner versus outer cabinet posts, the number of cases becomes small, but the results do show that it is those members of the outer cabinet from the private sector that are more interested in group interests (see Table 30).
Table 30: Goals—Predominant Adult Employment Controlling for Inner/Outer Cabinet

INNER CABINET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Mixed: Govt and Business/ or</th>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Govt-National</td>
<td>Govt-National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and Seek Congressional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests (e.g., labor, business)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 4 13 9
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Govt-National</th>
<th>Mixed: Govt and Business/Law</th>
<th>Law or Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work on President's Priorities/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy-making</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage Intragovernmental Conflict</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in Department</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Public</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform Public</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with and Seek Congressional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve Group Interests (e.g., labor, business)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 4  19  8
CONCLUSIONS

In examining goals, it appears as if they fit in nicely with role orientation. The goal of President Kennedy's secretaries mentioned most frequently, that of following the priorities set by the President, reflects their primary role orientation of serving the President. Much has been written concerning Eisenhower's delegation of responsibility to his secretaries, and they appear to be attuned to that approach with 55% indicating specific policy goals in contrast to 28.5% of Truman's, 15% of Kennedy's, and 21% of Johnson's appointments expressing a similar Department orientation.

The Inner Cabinet vs. the Outer Cabinet

The most vivid distinction between members of the inner cabinet and the outer cabinet appears in the way respective secretaries envision their Department's dealings with the public. The inner cabinet members see little, if any, role for their Department vis a vis the public, except in disseminating information. In contrast, over a third of the outer cabinet members view their Departments as dealing with specific constituent groups, soliciting input from labor, business, or consumers as to their Department's actions. Although Cronin's categorization
appears useful, the definition of the outer cabinet as those cabinet members who "assume a relatively straightforward advocacy orientation," needs to be interpreted rather broadly in order to include those secretaries serving distinct clientele groups (agriculture, labor, commerce), as well as those outer cabinet secretaries who have several constituent groups to serve.

Initial Versus Midterm Appointments

There are differences in goal orientation between initial and midterm replacements, with midterm replacements having more clearly defined objectives for the Department and less of a dependency on the President for direction of the Department. Once again the recruitment of midterm replacements from the federal sector would create a pool of individuals having a definite concept of the Department's needs. This is further supported when past employment is examined. Those individuals serving in the federal sector upon their selection as secretary appear to be more specific in the direction of their Department and less inclined than those from the federal sector to let the President's priorities shape Department activities.
To sum up, the inner and outer cabinet distinction, and the concept of the "naive" view of the cabinet where secretaries without past federal governmental experiences tend to hold an over-idealistic view of the cabinet, are useful in understanding cabinet secretaries; despite differences by administration, these frameworks allow broader statements to be made about the cabinet secretaries. As has been noted throughout the past three chapters, the limited number of cases in each department limits conclusions as to whether specific departments can be grouped together in various configurations that have not yet been identified by cabinet observers. In addition, if the cabinet has undergone changes in the time period of 1945 to 1969, it is difficult to firmly detect the origins of these changes given the limited number of administrations (and therefore, cases) in this study. These are subjects that will be addressed more fully in the final chapter of this dissertation.
Chapter 4: Footnotes


3Ibid.


5Ezra Taft Benson, Cross Fire: The Eight Years with Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), p. 88. While in office, Benson kept a daily journal and his autobiography is the result of the journal.

6Henry Fowler, Memorandum to all Presidential Appointees in Treasury Department, FG 110 Department of the Treasury, 12-4-65 to 1-26-66 Folder, Draft Memorandum for the President attached to January 13, 1966 Memo, p. 1, Johnson Library.

7Ibid., p. 3.


12 Nicholas Katzenbach, Cabinet Report for the President, May 17, 1966, Subject: Program to Promote Creative Thinking, Social Progress, and Efficiency in the Department of Justice, Confidential File, Johnson Library.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Luther Hodges, Oral History Interview, Dan B. Jacobs, Kennedy Library, May 19, 21, 1961; May 18, 1964, p. 40 (revised numbering).


17 U. S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Confirmation Hearing for Robert McNamara, 87th Cong., 1st sess., January 17, 1961, p. 27.

18 Administrative History, Defense Department, Vol. 8, Public Affairs Box #3; Folder: Documentary Supplement, #36-#44, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; and others, January 8, 1968, from Phil G. Goulding, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Johnson Library.


All of these statistical measures assume that any individual will only be placed in one cell of the crosstab. However, I have recorded several roles and goals per secretary, which decreases the apparent extent of relationship in Table 22.


As Ramsey Clark recounts in an oral history interview, although he viewed the position of Attorney General as far more of a legal than policy-making role, he did state that "you can't help but inject yourself into policy matters where I was quite strongly
opposed." While serving as Assistant Attorney General in the Lands Division under Robert Kennedy, Clark illustrated how the Justice Department got involved in more than legal questions and into the policy side of issues: "we could see conflicts in policy between the power commission and the Department of Interior and other federal agencies. This gave us both an opportunity, and, I think, a responsibility to go beyond the mere legal technician's work and try to do a little architecture, which we did." Ramsey Clark, Oral History Interview, Johnson Library.


30 Macy to Johnson, Memo, Macy Files, Cohen Folder 2 of 2, April 27, 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.

31 Confirmation Hearing for Alan S. Boyd.


33 Confirmation Hearing for Alan S. Boyd, p. 5.

34 Department of Transportation, Administrative History; p. 1.


37 Ibid., p. 53.
This is true even to this day, although the appointment of Raymond Donovan, representative of management's interests, to head Labor in President Reagan's first term, has been a unique move.


"Interior Secretary," New York Times, December 8, 1960, p. 34.


For example, Nicholas de Belleville Katzenbach as Deputy Attorney General under Attorney General Robert Kennedy in the Kennedy Administration. ("Daily Dilemma of the Attorney General," Don Oberdorfer, New York Times, March 7, 1965, sec. 6, p. 28).; Chester Bowles as Under Secretary of State to Secretary of State Dean Rusk in the Kennedy Administration (Transcript of News Conference, New York Times, December 8, 1960, p. 34.)
Times, December 13, 1960, p. 19); or careerist Jesse Donaldson, 1st Assistant Postmaster General under Postmaster General Robert Hannegan in the Truman Administration.


53 Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," p. 102.

CHAPTER 5: THE CABINET--A CONCLUDING LOOK

A good understanding and perspective on the function of the cabinet and its place in the Executive Branch of government comes from the U.S. Senate. Often during confirmation hearings questions may arise as to the appropriate age or relevant experience of a prospective secretary (For a good example of the questions raised and of thoughts concerning the fitness or unfitness of a candidate, see Robert Kennedy's hearing for the post of Attorney General\(^1\)). Yet as long as a nominee is of good character and intelligence, and with no conflict of interest, that individual will be confirmed to serve as a member of the President's cabinet. In the time frame of this study only one individual nominated for a Cabinet position failed to win Senate confirmation.\(^2\) Thus the collective wisdom of the Senate, expressed throughout the hearings, is that the cabinet is to serve as the President's advisers and the selection is up to the President, not the Senate, and for whatever reasons the President wishes.

Observers of the Presidency are often quick to evaluate the cabinet, in its initial configuration, as a collectivity without consideration of the President's or secretary's perspective. One finding that emerges from this study is that although there are
identifiable patterns from an outsider's point of view (not necessarily all of the traditionally identified ones), there remain distinctly different patterns that can only be understood if the view is taken from the secretary's perspective—that is, an insider looking out. There are differences from administration to administration that can only be identified if one takes the cabinet member's perspective and looks at role perception. The idea of "balance" has little relevance to individual secretaries, who rarely view themselves as serving or representing a particular group or region in society. And, if members of the cabinet ever do envision their respective Departments as having as an objective the cultivating of constituent needs, it is the midterm appointments and not the initial, "first" cabinet members that perceive this role. Understanding of the cabinet has been hindered by attempts to analyze individual members in terms of superficial and unimportant attributes (i.e., geographical balance, interest group affiliation), and by ascribing an often non-existent collectivity of purpose to the cabinet as a whole, thereby obscuring patterns of cabinet performance which could help explain what this enigmatic body is all about.
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION--
A SHIFT IN CABINET ORIENTATION?

In looking at these four administrations it does appear as if there is a shift in the role of the cabinet that would parallel the institutionalization of the executive branch as the dominant force in the lives of Americans. The cabinet of the 1940's was composed of "political generalists." Cabinet meetings were used to "float ideas." For example, "would this plan sell in Peoria?" or "would the people back home in Georgia find this option acceptable?" Cabinet meetings were most effective for this purpose because of the political backgrounds of the members.3

By way of example, Dean Acheson's notes concerning a September 21, 1945 cabinet meeting illustrate the use of a cabinet meeting as a means of gaining feedback in an open discussion on the question of sharing information on the atomic bomb with the Russians. Acheson records the comments of all participating in the discussion. Clinton Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture, is recorded by Acheson as stating the importance to the President of retaining the "confidence of the Country on his ability to handle and deal with the Russians." Anderson "felt that giving our atomic energy and bomb knowledge to the Russians would weaken that confidence....In his recent speaking tours both in New
Mexico and Illinois he found universal disapproval of any idea that we should share our advantage with the Russians. Russia sold Alaska not because of good will to us but because of the frustration of their efforts to get control of the West Coast. After all present had given their opinions, Truman then requested a memorandum in writing of each one's views, with a meeting to follow in a week at which time he would make known his position.

Truman and Johnson both inherited cabinets and equally selected cabinet members from the federal sector. However, if one compares the Truman secretaries with the Johnson secretaries, there is a difference in perspective—far more of Truman's appointees do perceive their role in vague, non-specific terms than is true for the Johnson administration. With the creation of several new Departments, beginning with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1953, the development of a new executive branch structure appears to have ushered in a new cabinet perspective. The secretaries of the Eisenhower and Johnson cabinets appear to have had a clear idea as to what their position was and the objectives for their Department, with little need to rely solely upon the President for constant direction. Johnson's cabinet members emphasized the Department management tasks at hand, and Eisenhower's cabinet emphasized policy-making, especially as related to their respective Department's needs. This is not the case with the Kennedy cabinet, where most intended to proceed cautiously and look to the President for advice.
Although the Kennedy cabinet appears to be an anomaly, there still is evidence of this historical shift in the cabinet's role. The most loyal of Kennedy's appointees, his brother Robert, at the time of his confirmation hearings, emphasized the administrative aspects of his role as head of the Justice Department. And if Kennedy had served a complete term or even a second term, the overall perspective of the cabinet might have been different, especially as the composition of the cabinet changed. Only by looking at subsequent administrations and the cabinets of the 1970's and 1980's will it be possible to determine if a true shift in the perception of cabinet members as to their role in the executive branch has taken place in the past 32 years.

What can be demonstrated is the appropriateness of several theoretical frameworks, some of which have become quite prevalent in the literature, in understanding the cabinet.

INNER CABINET VS. THE OUTER CABINET

There is strong evidence to support the inner/outer cabinet framework first identified by Cronin. First, in looking at recruitment patterns for the secretaries there are differences in terms of their backgrounds. Over half of all the secretaries in inner cabinet Departments are recruited directly from the federal sector. This is not the case with the outer cabinet. In addition, nearly one half of all
inner cabinet secretaries had served in the Department which they were now heading, usually as assistant or under secretary. Only a fifth of the outer cabinet secretaries had gained similar experience. And the outer cabinet secretaries, unlike the secretaries of the inner cabinet, gained substantial governmental experience at the state and local levels rather than at the national level.

In looking at the role perceptions of members of the inner cabinet and outer cabinet there is no difference in the area of "serving the President," suggesting a "naive" view of the cabinet whereby all secretaries envision the same role, i.e., as a collegial set of advisors to the President on a broad cross-section of issues. This view in and of itself is commendable and constructive enough, but it does lay the groundwork for eventual frustration on the part of those secretaries who will not be used or viewed in that manner by the President.

But there do appear to be differences in terms of the envisioned role of the secretary and Department vis a vis Congress with a far greater percentage of inner cabinet than outer cabinet secretaries perceiving congressional interaction as a role. Again this could reflect the recruitment of individuals to the inner cabinet who have served as assistant secretary (oftentimes for congressional relations) in the Department on a previous occasion, and the selection of outer cabinet members who might perceive this as a routine (and therefore unstated) role.
The inner cabinet also perceives little, if any, dealings with the public, or specialized groups, as a part of their job or the job of their Department. This is in contrast to those secretaries of the outer cabinet where 41% perceive serving clientele interests as a definite role and 36% have clear Department objectives that include meeting with and soliciting input from labor leaders, farmers, consumers and so on.

INITIAL APPOINTMENTS VS. MIDTERM APPOINTMENTS

There also appear to be several differences between the first cabinet a President selects and replacements to that cabinet as members leave during the course of an administration. The findings of Stanley et al., that a President tends to select more individuals from the federal sector to executive Department posts as an administration wears on, remains true when cabinet members apart from the Executive Branch are examined. There are also other differences between midterm and initial appointments. Beginning with the midterm replacements of Eisenhower, there is a more pronounced "naive" view among the initial appointments than is true for subsequent replacements. Again, the Truman cabinet appears to have a stronger notion of "serving the President" and of serving as collegial advisors throughout the administration. This would lend support to the view that a shift does begin to take place with the Eisenhower cabinet when members begin to
have a more differentiated view of their task dependent upon the President's and Department's needs. As the administration progresses in time this becomes more marked since replacement secretaries, more heavily recruited from the federal sector, tend to have a greater understanding of their role and what they wish to accomplish in this post than do the first appointments of a President.

An interesting discovery is that it is the midterm appointments and not those appointed at the start of an administration that are more concerned with the representation and serving of constituent interests. In looking at role perception, 31.5% of midterm appointments, but only 11% of initial appointments identify serving clientele needs as a role. But in looking at this further, it is not the time of appointment as much as the nature of past work experience that appears to affect how a secretary will set forth the Department's objectives. While those coming directly from the federal sector do have a more disparate view of the goals for their respective Departments, and hence a Department-specific orientation, it is those individuals with a mixed employment record including service in the national government (although not predominantly a federal employee throughout adulthood) that have the greatest desire to see that clientele needs are served.

In looking at this finding, it appears as if it would support the concept of issue networks identified by Heclo. It is those individuals who are moving across estates that will have the greatest interest in policy, and understand the need for sharing information across sectors
and with Congress.

Although members of the inner cabinet also have a mixed background, they have a dissimilar view of the need to service groups, reflecting a major difference between inner cabinet and outer cabinet secretaries.

THE PARTISAN FACTOR

Partisan differences do not appear to be as important a factor in explaining cabinet recruitment or secretary role perception as do the frameworks of the inner and outer cabinet, midterm versus initial appointments, and issue networks. Although I have but one Republican administration in this study, my findings are supported by a study that attempts to examine governing coalitions. Kenneth Prewitt and William McAllister examine a problem of democratic theory which "assumes a necessary link between elections and electoral activity, on the one hand, and elite recruitment and governing, on the other." The focus of their study is on the executive elite--cabinet and subcabinet members, along with the heads of regulatory agencies and independent commissions--in a four decade period of time, extending from the Hoover through Nixon Administrations.
Prewitt and McAllister "attempt to bring (this) theorized relationship into empirical focus by concentrating on whether the presidential governing coalition systematically varies with the President's electoral coalition, the latter being indexed by which party controls the White House." These authors note a declining proportion of lawyers which occurs in the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Beginning in the early 1960's, elites with doctorates gain at the expense of those trained in law...The skill of law, which has generally been seen as integrally linked to governing, is being replaced by a different sort of expertise which might well be the hallmark of a new ruling group. This transformation apparently is immune to variations in party control of the White House.

Prewitt and McAllister do note some short-term fluctuations by political party in power in terms of such social attributes as religious composition or type of college or university attended. Also, there does appear to be a partisan difference dependent on "whether a given administration is of a party which has been in control of the executive branch for a long or short period of time." For the in-party (already in power), Republican Presidents in their study have drawn more from the business sector than from appointed government than is the case for the Democratic administrations (although in both instances more individuals from appointed government than business were selected for these executive posts). They conclude that an overall trend towards the selection of individuals with more specialized and technical skills for these positions is stronger than partisan differences. Again this reinforces Heclo's concept of issue networks and the movement of skilled individuals across various estates--party affiliation is not as important as policy interest or expertise. (It is important to note
that both Heclo and Prewitt and McAllister are examining more broadly the governing elite, whereas my study is limited to cabinet secretaries, although the findings do lend support to one another).

The inability to explain differences in recruitment of cabinet secretaries and/or their role perception, arising because of change in party control of the White House, is not surprising given the drop in party identification, increase in ticket-splitting, and rise in issue voting.¹² (There is one caveat in that for the most part the Democratic Presidents did appoint Democrats, and Eisenhower did appoint Republicans to their respective cabinets.)

As I have stated earlier in this chapter, the Eisenhower Administration appears to mark a break with the past, and the ushering in of a new type of cabinet—where administration of respective departments is an important consideration by both the President and Secretary. Prewitt and McAllister would date this shift as beginning in the 1960's, although there are important shifts underway in the 1950's (such as the consolidation of several agencies into the Department of Health, Education and Welfare). They describe the emergence of a new generation in power,

which matured politically during and after rather than before the New Deal....The executive elite drawn from this new generation accepts that government will play a managerial, perhaps even a planning role in the economy. Moreover, they run a government which must necessarily become intimately involved in the economic and social welfare of society. The economic collapse of the thirties and the co-ordination needs of World War II caused the development of new governmental structures and responsibilities.¹³
It would appear as if a partisan explanation is not as appropriate in understanding cabinet members and others of the executive elite as are the other frameworks of this study. And there does appear to be a shift in cabinet orientation beginning with the Eisenhower Administration to more administrative functions that overshadows any partisan differences.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The question remains, is there another way of looking at the cabinet outside of the frameworks this study has examined? In looking at the backgrounds of the secretaries there is a similarity in Defense and Commerce Secretaries coming from the business world, with an absence of post-baccalaureate degrees. And in looking at role perception, again the Commerce Secretaries and Postmasters General appear to be apart from the rest of the outer cabinet in having specific interests and a definite view of the position, with few indicating a vague "serve the President" role. In addition, unlike the rest of the outer cabinet, these two groups are the most interested in working with Congress.

In an attempt to see if the Commerce Secretaries and Postmasters General are more similar to the inner cabinet or to the remaining members of the outer cabinet, I looked at the role perceptions of the
members of the inner cabinet. There does appear to be a split—the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury are far more inclined to have a broad conception of the role, with a high percentage viewing their position as one of serving the President or working with Congress, and the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General join the Secretary of Commerce and the Postmaster General in having a more narrowly defined view—e.g., administrative management of the Department, policy, enforce laws, and so on.

But given the changed nature of the cabinet, with the post of Postmaster General removed from the ranks of the cabinet in 1971, that aspect of the cabinet is moot. Yet the Secretaries of Commerce may be better off in a different framework than that of the inner cabinet vs. the outer cabinet, especially if more and more of those serving in that post do have a mixed employment history. With so few cases to examine, no true conclusions can be drawn, but it does suggest an area ripe for research. However, as stated in Chapter 4, the secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor are more inclined to envision their department serving clientele needs than are the other cabinet secretaries, perhaps because of the diverse clientele a department such as Health, Education and Welfare or Housing and Urban Development would be serving. Again, the limited number of cases does limit conclusions that can be drawn, encouraging research of a more expanded nature to address this question.
A worthwhile area to consider in looking at roles and goals is that of the past ties and relationship an individual had with the President, prior to appointment. Although I intended it as part of this study, I discovered that except in the most widely written of cases, available information was not reliable, and an outsider would have an extremely difficult time in tracking down who the President knew, to what extent, and at what point in time. 14

This research has looked at only the initial perceptions of the cabinet member, with attempts made to assess existing ideas or ways of thinking about cabinet secretaries. How these perceptions adapt over time to changes in the environment is left for future research. I would suggest, given the more clearly delineated approach adopted by secretaries after Truman, that there would not be as great a shift throughout their tenure, especially in the case of midterm replacements. The constant tenure of secretaries throughout administrations and Departments would reinforce this view. That is not to rule out the idea of disenchantment, but to suggest that if role perceptions are constant then departures could be more the function of a need to return to one's business interests than in job dissatisfaction.

Monitoring stated roles and goal orientation throughout a term of office would provide an important base for an appropriate next step—determining actual role activity on the part of the secretary and actual priorities worked on by the department. The link could then be made with other actors in the Executive Office of the President and
Cabinet, as well as the President—identifying how relationships are initially perceived by all relevant actors, and how, in fact, they manifest themselves. The role of the cabinet in the presidential decision-making process has become muddied by the growth of the White House staff and other institutionalized advisers in the Executive Office of the President. By isolating the role of cabinet secretaries and then moving analysis to relationships with other actors in the Executive branch, this process could be clarified.

In this dissertation I have attempted to facilitate future research on the cabinet by examining and sorting through the various ways of looking at cabinet secretaries as a first step for future analysis. By using documentary evidence I have hoped to suggest that such research, especially when interviews are not possible, can be of value. It would be ideal to look at documentary evidence, as well as interviewing secretaries at the start of a term of office and at several points of time throughout a term of office to determine consistency of expressed opinions. I would hope that my future research could expand to include such interviews.

Moving the study of cabinet secretaries to a level comparable with other areas of study by first identifying categorization schemes needed as a basis for further analysis has been one of my research objectives. In addition, isolating the perspective of the secretary from that of the press, President, and political scientists is an important difference of this study from other studies that have been done on the cabinet. As a
result, this study has not looked at the cabinet as a collectivity. My study has looked at individual cabinet secretaries. The role perceptions and departmental goal orientations I have identified have been those of the secretary as head of a department. I have not looked at the secretary's perspective as a member of a group and have not analyzed the cabinet from a group perspective. Research in that area could be facilitated by looking at participation at cabinet meetings—who attends, what is discussed, what is the perception of these meetings—and there is a good deal of documentary evidence available on cabinet agendas, notes recorded by participants, as well as attendance information, although transcripts of such meetings may not be available. I would suspect that the frameworks examined in this study would also be of use in such research.

The cabinet has undergone several changes in the past fifteen years—the loss of the Post Office Department, the addition of the Departments of Energy and Education, and the transformation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare into the Department of Health and Human Services—that suggest continued response to clientele concerns, as well as the need for better administrative control over Departments. Finally, four administrations have followed the Johnson presidency and have not been included in this analysis. It would be worthwhile to extend this analysis through the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan cabinets; perhaps this study of theoretical frameworks will be of use to researchers attempting to understand this enigmatic institution.
FOOTNOTES


2 see the case of Lewis Strauss, nominated by Eisenhower for the post of Secretary of Commerce, and sworn in but rejected by the Senate 7 months later in a 49 to 46 vote, the first nominee to be rejected since 1925 (see the New York Times, November 14, 1958, p. 3, June 19, 1959, p. 1; U.S. Congress, Senate, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Confirmation Hearing for Lewis L. Strauss, 86th Cong., 1st sess., March 17-May 14, 1959).

3 John Kessel has shared these comments and observations Professor Arthur Macmahon made to his students.

4 Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Cabinet Meetings, September 21, 1945, Truman Library.

5 Ibid.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 108.

9 Ibid., p. 126

10 Ibid., p. 112.

11 Ibid., pp. 127-128.
I realized the futility of research in this area unless it was the sole task at hand, in reading accounts of Jesse Donaldson's appointment to the post of Postmaster General in 1947 by President Truman, and subsequent accounts of his place in the cabinet. Upon his appointment the New York Times stated that Donaldson had met the President while serving as a postal inspector in Kansas City when Truman was serving as a Missouri County Judge but had never gotten "to know each other intimately." (New York Times, November 26, 1947, p. 13, col. 1) Within a year, Donaldson is described as "an old personal friend of the President," (November 4, 1948, p. 15, col. 3-4).

12 Ibid., p. 127.

13 Ibid., p. 128.
APPENDIX A: SENATE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

Not until the Eisenhower Administration was any systematic attempt made to publish Senate confirmation hearings of cabinet members. A published account of Robert E. Hannegan's Senate confirmation for the post of Postmaster General suggests the procedures in place in the 1940's:

Threaded through the lengthy oral contest were protests from the minority side against a practice in Senate committees of reporting nominations favorably after informal polls are taken, rather than making voting decisions based on meetings and hearings.

Some minority members of the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, which considered the Hannegan nomination, complained that they had not been polled, even informally.1

At Acheson's confirmation for the post of Secretary of State, Senator Vandenberg commented on the "unprecedented public hearings" being held.2

If some questions were being raised as to a nominee then the possibility of a hearing was discussed and vote would be taken by Committee to determine if a hearing would be held.3

Although hearings were held and published on a routine basis beginning with the Eisenhower Administration, that did not mean that all would be of an in-depth nature with a true questioning of a nominee as
to his or her perceptions on the post. Often the financial arrangements of individuals with huge corporate stockholdings would dominate the hearings. As a case in point both Charles E. Wilson and Robert S. McNamara, respective Presidents of Ford Motor Company and General Motors, nominated for the post of Secretary of Defense, found Committee interest centering around their trust arrangements rather than on their plans for the United States' defense forces. One of the stranger exchanges in a confirmation hearing occurred at the hearing of Sinclair Weeks, Eisenhower's selection as Secretary of Commerce, illustrating the less than serious side of some hearings:

The Chairman. Mr. Weeks, a personal question--the women will not listen--do you use zippers on your trousers? One of our columnists suggested that you had an antipathy to zippers.

Mr. Weeks. I don't make zippers, but I use them occasionally.

The Chairman. That is very pertinent to our approval. Are there any other questions?

Yet in spite of these examples, there are many useful exchanges that do provide an insight into the Secretary's intentions and views on matters of interest to either the relevant Senate Committee or Secretary, or to both. As a case in point, the U.S. Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service had few questions for W. Marvin Watson, nominated for the post of Postmaster General early in 1968, yet suggested what areas Watson and the Committee could explore together. Watson admitted having little knowledge of the Post Office Department, but that made little difference to the committee which was pleased with the just completed service of Larry O'Brien in that post and of Watson's 3 years of service as Special Assistant to Lyndon Johnson in the White
House. The hearing served an educational role with the Senators suggesting that Watson's personnel and business background in work both in private industry and the White House were most appropriate for the head of the Post Office, which was a service organization requiring a manager. Also, the Committee suggested a dual exploration, by both the Committee and Watson, of the possibility of making the Post Office a non-profit organization.

Perhaps interviews of each Secretary in this study would have been the best means of obtaining desired information. However, the interviews would have had to be conducted at the start of each administration in order to have gotten initial perceptions, rather than a retrospective view. By undertaking this analysis with the use of historical documents, students of the Presidency, and more specifically, of the Cabinet, can in the future have a base from which to question cabinet appointees from the time their appointment is first announced. Some may fault this approach, including past members of these administrations. (See Charles Sawyer's autobiography for an exceptionally critical statement on Neustadt's failure to interview Sawyer about the Steel Seizure case for his classic work Presidential Power--the Politics of Leadership and to therefore have written a chapter of "pure fiction." To quote Sawyer: "Dr. Neustadt tells of the people with whom he consulted. Strangely enough he never consulted me. One might think that a careful playwright would talk to the party involved, even if he were the villain of the play. Perhaps I have done
Dr. Neustadt an injustice. His failure to contact me may not have been an oversight. He may have realized that such a call would impair, if not eliminate, one illustration of the theory upon which his book was written. It would be unfortunate indeed if 'presidential power' were to be destroyed by an effort to ascertain the facts.\]
Appendix A: Footnotes


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