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Wallace, Samuel Poulton

AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF INTERACTION INVOLVEMENT ON OUTCOME AND PERSUASION STRATEGY IN DYADIC NEGOTIATION SESSIONS

The Ohio State University

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF INTERACTION INVOLVEMENT ON OUTCOME AND PERSUASION STRATEGY IN DYADIC NEGOTIATION SESSIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The field of Communication can easily trace its roots to the rhetorical theories of the ancient Greeks. Even though the study of persuasion had been a central focus of interest for most of those two thousand years, contemporary students of communication theory have witnessed an apparent decline in persuasion research. It has been suggested by Miller and Burgoon (1978) that the decline is a function of several factors.

The first factor cited by Miller and Burgoon (1978) related to the decline in persuasion research is that, along with and perhaps as a result of the social and political unrest of the 1960's, there were strong ill feelings against any kind of manipulation, and persuasion was often viewed as a manipulative enterprise. Second, while persuasion had been traditionally viewed as a primarily linear and one-to-many operation, the trends of thought in the field were turning toward a more transactional as well as interpersonal approach to the study of communication. Third, in past research, persuasion was often viewed as action or issue-centered. While much persuasive activity is concerned with influencing individuals to fasten seat belts or to support a nuclear freeze, concentration on action or issue-centered
persuasion ignores the fact that "most people devote the preponderance of their persuasive energies to selling themselves" (p. 33). While credibility research is by no means a recent phenomenon, the more recent trend is to view communicator credibility as an end in itself rather than as an antecedent condition that must be met in order to sell a product or an issue.

The final reason cited by Miller and Burgoon (1978) for the decline in persuasion research is the familiar view of persuasion as an attitude-change centered activity. While an assumption underlying persuasion research has been that attitudes are the motivators of behavior, few studies have been able to demonstrate a consistent relationship. Failure to establish such a consistent relationship "has caused a number of communication scholars to question the scientific and social utility of persuasion research" (p. 35).

To summarize, the reason for the decline in persuasion research is that traditional views of persuasion and assumptions underlying persuasion research are no longer consistent with the views and interests of contemporary communication scholars (Miller & Burgoon, 1978). This is not to say, however, that research in persuasion is only a thing of the past. Recently there has been some indication that it is once again capturing the interests of scholars with a behavioral orientation (e.g., Dillard, Hunter, & Burgoon, 1984; Smith, 1982a, 1982b, 1984; Tracy, Craig, Smith, &
Spisak, 1984). Contemporary emphasis in persuasion research is especially apparent in various areas of interpersonal communication and small group conflict, with bargaining and negotiation settings being of particular importance (Donohue, 1978, 1981; Donohue, Diez, & Hamilton, 1984; Hopman & Walcott, 1976; Lieberman, 1979; Morley & Stephenson, 1977; Pruitt, 1981; Putnam & Jones, 1982a, 1982b; Walton & McKersie, 1965; Zartman, 1978). The focus of this study is consistent with contemporary research in persuasion as it is concerned with identifying persuasion strategies used in a negotiation setting. The current study, however, differs from most contemporary approaches in that it examines the role of a communication competence trait in determining persuasive strategy and success in achieving persuasion objectives.

The purpose of this chapter is to review pertinent research in persuasion and communication competence. The first section provides a brief review of literature on personality traits in persuasion. The second section examines current views of interpersonal communication competence and relates them to persuasion. The third section describes the trait of interaction involvement and reviews research on the concept. Finally, the trait of interaction involvement is related to persuasion and the research questions which guide this study are presented.
Personality Traits and Persuasion

Personality has been defined by Allport (1937) as the "dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment" (p. 48). Swigel (1968) refers to "behavior potentials" that the individual carries with him or her that are more or less enduring. They are a form of generalized expectations that form part of the individual's world view or "Weltanschauung" (p. 195).

There is a large body of literature attempting to provide evidence to support a relationship between personality characteristics and persuasibility. Support is considerable for the notion that certain personality characteristics make some individuals more or less susceptible to persuasion than other individuals. According to Linton and Graham (1959), "persuasibility is not an isolated phenomenon, but it is rather the product of certain underlying attributes of the personality. Personality patterns apparently make a person more or less susceptible to influence in a wide variety of situations, whether the influence arises from the structure of the external field, from another person, or from a written communication" (p. 101). Hovland and Janis (1959) and Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) suggest that persuasibility is a consistent trait; that is, that persuasibility on one issue is related.
to persuasibility on other messages on other issues. McGuire (1968) agrees that, while the reliability of suggestibility tests are discouragingly low, there is still considerable evidence to support it as an underlying trait.

It has also been suggested that persuasibility is the result not only of personality characteristics, but many other interacting factors as well (Hovland & Janis, 1959; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Proshansky & Seidenberg, 1968). Among the interacting factors are situation (McGuire, 1968; Swigel, 1968), ability to attend and comprehend (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; McGuire, 1968), and the relationship of the interactants (Blake & Moulton, 1962; Druckman, 1967; Sherif & Sherif, 1965).

There is often disagreement concerning the effect of a single personality trait on persuasibility. McGuire (1968) cites Hovland, Janis, and Kelley's (1953) "attention, comprehension, and acceptance" model as an example. A given personality variable may make an individual more susceptible to influence due to a tendency to yield (accept), "but it may all the same protect him from persuasion at another point by making him inattentive to the influencing message" (McGuire, 1968: 1140). The apparent result of this and other examples is that most simple generalizations about personality and persuasibility are not valid. According to McGuire (1968), "the moral is that we should not, in our quest for generality, seek absolute relationships between
personality variables and influenceability" (p.1170). While this may be true, the following review will attempt to describe briefly the research in which such relationships are examined.

Self Esteem

Earlier research seemed to agree that there is a simple inverse relationship between self esteem and persuasibility (Dittes & Kelley, 1956; Hochbaum, 1954; Janis, 1954; Janis & Rife, 1959; Kelley & Shapiro, 1954; Mausner, 1954; Samelson, 1957). There was some question (e.g. Janis & Field, 1959, reported the inverse correlation between self esteem and persuasibility for males, but could not support it for females), but the general conclusion reached by this body of research is that high self esteem people are less susceptible to persuasive attempts than people with low self esteem. Individuals with high self esteem were also suggested to be better persuaders. Cohen (1959) reported that persons with high self esteem were seen to exert more influence and perceived themselves as attempting to exert more influence than individuals with low self esteem (p.115). Thus, the early research tells us that not only are high self esteem individuals harder to persuade, but that they are also more persuasive.

Later research, however, did not produce evidence that would support the non-complex generalization of the
relationship between self esteem and persuasibility. Instead, both positive and nonmonotonic relationships were reported between persuasibility and self esteem (e.g. Cox & Bauer, 1964; Silverman, 1964; Silverman, Ford, & Morganti, 1966). There have also been interaction effects with other variables. Gollob and Dittes (1965) reported an interaction effect of self esteem and message complexity in which high self esteem is not likely to increase resistance to persuasion. Miller and Burgoon (1973) report that yielding and message comprehension operate differently for persons of varying levels of self esteem. In the two above cases, it is true that when self esteem is high the resistance to persuasion is high. However, Miller (1984) states that the high self esteem individual will (1) be self confident enough not to withdraw from the persuasive situation, and thus will be more likely to comprehend the message; and (2) be more likely to have the confidence to listen to and comprehend complex messages. More comprehension could therefore lead to more attitude change. The relationship between persuasibility and self esteem appears to be much more complex than originally reported.

Intelligence

Although research into the relationship between intelligence and persuasibility has been underway for quite some time, there have been few conclusions drawn. Some
studies have reported an inverse relationship (Crutchfield, 1955; Stukat, 1958) in which intelligence protects one from persuasion due to more confidence in one's own opinion, increased ability to formulate counter arguments, and superior critical abilities. There have also been research reports of a positive relationship between intelligence and persuasibility (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Ward & Wackman, 1971; Whitehead, 1971) due to more intelligent individuals being more interested in outside messages, having longer attention spans, and being better able to comprehend messages (although Wheeless, 1971, reports no significant relationship between comprehension of a message and its persuasiveness).

The most typical finding, however, seems to be an absence of any overall generalizable relationship between intelligence and persuasibility (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Janis & Field, 1959; Janis & Hovland, 1959; Murphy, Murphy, & Newcomb, 1937). The general conclusion reached seems to be that more intelligent people comprehend messages better and are, therefore, likely to be persuaded by them because of a reported positive impact of comprehension on opinion change. More intelligent people, however, are likely to change opinion less due to greater confidence in critical abilities (Eagly & Warren, 1976; Janis & Field, 1959; McGuire, 1968). If true, these two phenomena would
effectively mask any consistent relationship between intelligence and persuasibility (Janis & Field, 1959).

**Machiavellianism**

The research into the relationship between Machiavellianism and persuasibility seems to have yielded more consistent results than other research reviewed to this point. The Machiavellian personality has been known to view and manipulate others for selfish purposes (Christie & Geis, 1970). As such, one might expect the high Mach to be both less susceptible to persuasion and more persuasive. There is a reasonable amount of evidence to support this notion.

Geis (1964), Braginski (1966), and Christie and Geis (1970) indicate that high Machs are better persuaders than low Machs. Harris (1966) suggests that high Machs may not be more persuasive, but that when the two interact, low Machs are more persuasible. Christie and Geis (1970) report that high Machs will initiate and control the structure of a mixed Mach group. In a task situation, high Machs "are preferred as partners, chosen and identified as leaders, judged as more persuasive, and appear to direct the tone and content of the interaction, and usually the outcome" (Christie & Geis, 1970: 313). High Machs appear, then, to be more persuasive than low Machs.

With regard to susceptibility to influence, Christie and Geis (1970) report that high Machs appear to "stay cool
in the face of social influence" (p. 295). Much research reports high Machs being more resistant to persuasive attempts than low Machs in face-to-face encounters (Christie & Geis, 1970; Geis, Krupat, & Berger, 1965; Harris, 1966; Rim, 1966). Low Machs appear to be persuasible because they are reported to become caught-up in emotional involvement in the interaction process and often follow in the direction the other is going simply because the other wants it (Christie & Geis, 1970; Durkin, 1966). High Machs remain relatively unmoved by emotional involvement with others and are unlikely to cooperate with them; they will change opinions or comply with requests only if given sufficient justification (Christie & Geis, 1970; Vejio & Wrightsman, 1967).

Further support for the inverse relationship between Machiavellianism and persuasibility is supplied by Feiler (1967) and Epstein (1969) who report that, when giving counter-attitudinal arguments, only low Machs changed their opinions. The lows got carried away with what the experimenter wanted and talked themselves into opinion change.

In summary, high Machs are better persuaders and are less susceptible to persuasion than low Machs, but highs and lows are equally persuaded by factual information or rational argument (Christie & Geis, 1970). Low Machs, but
not highs, are often moved by pure social pressure. The low
Machs' more personal, open orientation makes them less
effective as strategists in interaction. The high Machs'
ability to size up subtle social cues (Lake, 1967; Teger,
1968), and resist social pressure suggests that they would
be more successful at bargaining (Christie & Geis, 1970).

Anxiety

The empirical results of studies of the relationship
between persuasibility and anxiety are inconsistent. There
are many reports of a negative correlation between
persuasibility and anxiety (DeWolfe & Governale, 1964; Janis
& Feshbach, 1953; Janis & Field, 1959; Goldstein, 1959;
There are also many reports of a positive correlation
(Berkowitz & Cottingham, 1960; Insko, Arkoff, & Insko, 1965;
Janis, 1955; Leventhal & Niles, 1964; Leventhal, Singer, &
Jones, 1965). Finally, there is some evidence of a non
significant relationship between persuasibility and anxiety
(Moltz & Thistlethwaite, 1955).

There have been attempts to observe the effect of
anxiety on the comprehension of messages. Janis (1954) and
Buss (1962) suggest that an anxious person would be
withdrawn and preoccupied with his own troubles and, as a
result, would not be attentive to outside stimuli, thus not
attending to and comprehending messages. Anxiety would then
be inversely related to persuasion. Freud (1936) provides further support for this notion with his contention that since anxiety is a negative reinforcement, if the message used fear appeals, the evoked anxiety would tend to punish any comprehension of the message. Janis & Terwilliger (1962) suggest that increased levels of induced anxiety will create hostility toward the communicator, and the hostility will furnish resistance to persuasion. However, Lazarus, Deese, and Osler (1952) and Brown (1961) suggest that since anxiety has drive value, which would enhance learning (particularly with otherwise unmotivated subjects), there could be more comprehension associated with anxiety, thus more persuasion with anxiety.

Since there is little agreement on the relationship between persuasibility and anxiety, prediction is, at best, difficult. Miller, Burgoon, & Burgoon (1984) state "accumulated research evidence suggests that making a person more anxious, even by using irrelevant fear appeals, increases resistance (to persuasion) when the person is chronically high in anxiety and lowers resistance when he or she is chronically low" (p.447).

The inconsistency of results concerning anxiety and persuasibility are most likely a result of the ambiguity of anxiety. There appear to be many forms of neuroses which involve some form of anxiety (e.g. Gray, 1978). Exactly how
anxiety may relate to persuasiveness and persuasibility is probably a function of what type of neuroses one manifests.

Locus of Control

Locus of control has been defined by Rotter (1967) as the degree to which an individual believes what happens to him/her is the result either of his/her own behavior or of chance, luck, fate, or forces beyond his/her control. As with other personality characteristics, there have been some inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between locus of control and persuasibility, but most findings appear to be consistent.

Hamid and Flay (1974) and McGinnies and Ward (1974) report that locus of control proved ineffective as a predictor of persuasibility. On the other hand, Minton (1972) states "empirical support is impressive for the generalized expectancy of internal-external control as a predictor of conceptually relevant behaviors. The individual with a belief of internal locus of control... tends to be an active, effective, influential, and initiating person" (p. 121). The idea that the internal person takes more initiative in influencing the environment has received other support as well (Hersch & Scheibe, 1967; Phares, 1968; Seeman, 1963; Seeman & Evans, 1962). Phares (1965) reported that internally controlled subjects were more successful at attempts to change attitudes of college students than
externally controlled subjects. Minton (1972) suggests that individuals who believe in an external locus of control are less effective as an influencing agent than those with a belief of internal control. Atkinson (1957) suggests that externals are less likely to attempt influence due to a low desire for need achievement. It appears, then, that persons believing in an internal locus of control should be more successful persuaders.

There is also support for the notion that persons believing in an external locus of control are more susceptible to persuasion than persons believing in an internal locus of control (Minton, 1972; Rotter, 1966). Linton and Graham (1959) studied inner and outer-directed individuals. This concept is defined as a value system which stresses personal goals and standards as opposed to group conformity and adaptation (Linton & Graham, 1959: 79), a concept very closely related to locus of control. In this situation, Linton and Graham (1959) reported that persons who were more easily persuaded proved to be significantly more "other-directed" than persons who were difficult to persuade. Thus, the evidence suggests that, along with being better persuaders, persons with an internal locus of control have a greater resistance to persuasion than persons with an external locus of control.
Authoritarianism and Dogmatism

Authoritarianism has been defined by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) as a syndrome including a power orientation, proneness to concrete thinking, and a cynical, mistrusting attitude toward others. There is research reporting that high authoritarians are more competitive (Bixenstine, 1966), more aggressive (Driver, 1965), and less trusting and trustworthy (Deutsch, 1960). These results suggest that the authoritarian might not be easily influenced, but there have been no clear conclusions drawn.

Linton and Graham (1959) concluded that persuasibility is "unrelated to the total score on the authoritarian questionnaire" (p. 86). McGuire (1968) reports that authoritarianism is positively correlated with persuasibility when the message is from a source positive to the subject, and it is negatively correlated with persuasibility when the message is from a negative source. There appears to be no clearly defined relationship between authoritarianism and persuasibility.

Dogmatism, a trait conceptually related to authoritarianism, refers to an individual's attitude structure being open or closed to new outside information (Rokeach, 1960). One could expect dogmatism to be significantly related to persuasion because an open-minded person should be more persuasible than a closed-minded
person (Bostrom, 1983). However, there are inconsistencies in research results and no clear relationship has emerged.

Druckman (1967) found high dogmatics to resist compromise in bargaining situations because they viewed the compromise as a defeat. Consistent with this finding, Miller (1965) found that dogmatism had a mild inhibiting effect on attitude change. These two studies lend support to the notion that high dogmatics should be harder to persuade. However, there is research which indicates that dogmatism enhances attitude change (Bostrom, 1964; Mertz, Miller, & Ballance, 1966). There has also been some indication that dogmatism is not related to persuasibility (Adams & Beatty, 1977).

In summary, from the evidence reviewed, there does not appear to be a clear relationship between authoritarianism and persuasibility or between dogmatism and persuasibility.

Other Traits

Androgyny Janis and Field (1959) and Scheidel (1963) found that correlations between personality variables and persuasibility were higher in women than in men. Hilgard, Lauer, and Melei (1965) found similar results while studying hypnotizability. Such results might suggest that gender could be a reasonable predictor of persuasibility. More recent research has suggested that it is not the biological sex that is the best predictor, but the sex role or
androgyny of the subject (Montgomery & Burgoon, 1977; 1980). Using Bem's (1974) androgyny scale, Montgomery and Burgoon (1977) examined persuasibility scores for traditional males and females and for androgynous males and females. Results indicated that androgynous males are more susceptible to persuasion than traditional males, but there was no relationship found for females.

Hostility/Aggression Barry (1931), Richards and Simmons (1941), and Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) suggest that persons who openly express hostility, excitability, and aggressiveness in interpersonal situations are "predisposed to remain relatively uninfluenced by persuasive communication" (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953: 193). There is also evidence suggesting that hostility is related to a lack of persuasibility in males, but an overall relationship between hostility/aggression and persuasibility was not found (Janis & Field, 1959; Janis & Rife, 1959). Weiss and Fine (1956) reported findings indicating that increasing hostility increases a person's resistance to benevolent arguments, but it makes him/her more susceptible to malevolent or hostile arguments. Thus, results of research into the relationship between persuasibility and hostility/aggression are inconclusive.

Richness of fantasy Although research into this variable has been rather sparse, the results appear to be
consistent. Richness of fantasy estimates the individual's predisposition to imagine the implications of message content (i.e., anticipate rewarding or punishing situations presented in the message). Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) and Infante (1975) agree that persons with a high richness of fantasy should be more susceptible to persuasion and persons with a low richness of fantasy should be relatively less susceptible to persuasion.

Social Withdrawal Festinger, Schacter, and Back (1950) and Hovland, et al (1950) present evidence, although not conclusive, that individuals who exhibit social withdrawal tendencies are less susceptible to persuasion. Freud (1943) supports this finding with the assertion that the capacity to develop strong emotional attachments to other people (object libido) is a necessary condition for responsiveness to therapeutic influence. Narcissism or social withdrawal should therefore be barriers to persuasibility.

Cognitive Complexity There is partial support for the theoretical notion that more complex persons will be able to handle inconsistency better than non-complex persons and, as a result, be less susceptible to persuasion (Clark & Delia, 1977; Reardon, 1981). There is also evidence to suggest that, due to abilities to adapt to the perspective of the persuasion target and use it to make strategic choices, a complex individual should be a better persuader than a non-

Conclusion

From the research reviewed, it is apparent that personality traits have some relationship to persuasiveness and persuasibility. Although most studies of the relationship between personality and persuasion seem to concentrate on the characteristics that make a person susceptible or resistant to persuasion, a few have directed attention toward discovering which traits were related to being a successful persuader.

According to the research in this review, a number of personality traits are associated with an ability to persuade others. Some of the earlier research in self esteem reported that persons with high self esteem were found to be better persuaders. Later self esteem research did not seem to dispute that finding. Also, the research suggests that persons with strong Machiavellian personalities are better persuaders than persons scoring lower on the Mach scale. It was reported that persons believing in an internal locus of control should be more successful persuaders than persons believing that their behavior was dictated by some external force. Finally, it was reported that persons who are higher
in cognitive complexity exhibit more behavioral flexibility and should be better persuaders than non-complex persons.

If these findings are correct, it appears that the more successful persuader will be an individual who is independent, inner-directed, confident, complex, and who is skilled at reading and responding to social cues in the environment.

The bulk of research studying personality and persuasion has focused on finding out what traits are related to an individual being more or less susceptible to persuasion. Early self esteem studies reached the conclusion that persons with high self esteem were more resistant to persuasion, while persons with low self esteem were more susceptible. Research examining the relationship between intelligence and persuasibility had similar results. Higher intelligence was related to resistance to persuasion due to superior critical abilities and abilities to compose strong counter arguments. However, later research in self esteem and intelligence began to contradict the earlier studies. The general conclusion was that persons with higher intelligence and/or higher self esteem would be more susceptible to persuasion because they would not retreat from persuasive situations, they could understand more complex messages, and they had a greater attention span. The result of this should be more comprehension of the persuasive message, and more comprehension was related to
more attitude change. McGuire (1968) suggests a difference in conformity and persuasion: conformity occurs when an individual expresses the position of another as his/her own in the absence of arguments; persuasion means changing one's attitude based on some sort of logical or emotional argument. It could be argued that while individuals with high intelligence/self esteem are unlikely to conform or yield to the opinions of others without some argument or good reason, they would be more likely to engage in the information processing necessary to be persuaded. Low intelligence/self esteem individuals, on the other hand, should be less likely to be influenced by argument alone, but should yield more easily than high intelligence/self esteem individuals.

The issue seems to be the effect of comprehension on attitude change. High intelligence and high self esteem subjects should theoretically comprehend more, but they also seem to have the strongest defenses against persuasion. Low intelligence and low self esteem subjects have fewer of the tools for defending against persuasion, but their comprehension should be lower. If comprehension has no relationship to attitude change, as Wheeless (1971) has reported, then past arguments for a positive relationship between persuasibility and self esteem and intelligence are not valid. If the highs are more susceptible to persuasion, there must be some other variable or variables operating. If
more comprehension does lead to attitude change, then the results are inconclusive.

The studies of Machiavellianism have yielded fairly consistent results. Persons with high Mach personalities are more resistant to persuasion, while low Mach personalities are more susceptible to persuasion. However, when presented with factual or rational argument, high and low Machs are equally persuasible. Locus of control research also presented consistent findings. Persons with an internal locus of control are less susceptible to persuasion than persons with an external locus of control. Other consistent findings were reported by those investigating the relationship of persuasibility to richness of fantasy, social withdrawal, and androgyny. Results indicate that persons with high richness of fantasy, socially withdrawn persons, or androgynous males (as compared to traditional males), are more susceptible to persuasion.

Research relating persuasibility to anxiety, authoritarianism, dogmatism, and aggression/hostility is inconsistent and conclusions are difficult to draw. The consistent research indicates that persons who are susceptible to persuasion feel they are directed externally, are fairly passive, are not as adept at reading social cues, and have little desire for environmental or social control. Persons resistant to persuasion appear to be inner directed, adept at reading social cues, motivated to control the
environment or social situation, complex, and are more active and initiating.

Even though many studies have been unable to reach any broad, generalizable conclusions, the evidence appears to be strong that there are some personality traits that make some individuals less or more persuasible and/or less or more persuasive than other individuals in interpersonal interaction. This conclusion lends support to the notion that continued research into personality traits related to persuasiveness and persuasibility is worthwhile. However, the focus of this research is not on personality and persuasion per se, but rather a trait of communication competence and persuasion. The relationship between communication competence, persuasion, and traits is briefly addressed in the following section.

Communication Competence and Persuasion

The connection between communication competence and persuasion is, in one sense, as old as the Communication field itself. McCroskey (1982) and others have traced concern about competence in the field as far back as Aristotle's Rhetoric. Diez (1983) and Hymes (1971) also have made reference to a close relationship between definitions of communication competence and persuasion.

While there is no agreed upon theory, or even a definition of communication competence (see McCroskey, 1982;
Spitzberg, 1983), many scholars appear to endorse a view of competence that is consistent with the following definition offered by Wiemann (1977):

...the ability of an interactant to choose among available communicative behaviors in order that he may successfully accomplish his own interpersonal goals during an encounter while maintaining the face and line of his fellow interactants within the constraints of the situation (p. 198).

Taking this definition as representative of current views of communication competence, it is clear that there is a close connection between competence and persuasion. Indeed, the parallel between Wiemann's definition of communication competence and Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is quite obvious.

There appear to be at least two major points of similarity between current views of competence and persuasion. First, most persuasion scholars treat persuasive communication as goal oriented (see Cegala, 1984). It is also true that most scholars view communication competence as goal oriented. Second, persuasion has historically emphasized the need to adapt to one's audience. Even discussions of coercive rhetoric point out the transactional nature of the persuasion process (see Burgess, 1972). As evident in Wiemann's (1977) definition, competence is also concerned with audience adaptation. In particular, it is expressed in terms of Goffman's (1967) work on the concept of face and the rules of social order that guides one's
conduct in interpersonal society. In summary, then, there appears to be considerable overlap between views of communication competence and persuasion. Also, there is a mutual concern for how traits contribute to individual differences with respect to competence and persuasion. The concern about traits and persuasion was reviewed in the preceding sections. The concept of trait and communication competence is briefly examined below.

Among the topics of controversy in interpersonal communication literature is how best to view competence (see Spitzberg & Hecht, 1984; Wiemann & Backlund, 1980). Some researchers emphasize competence as a trait of individuals, while others treat competence as a situationally determined phenomenon. Most likely, both approaches are correct. Competence is likely a function of dispositional tendencies of individuals, situational parameters such as norms and rules, and unique interaction among individuals. However, at the present state of research in communication, if not the social sciences in general, it is very difficult to examine all of these components simultaneously. Even so, some researchers are making an attempt to investigate selected communication traits in various situations to determine the role of these traits in human communication. One such program of research has focused on the trait of interaction involvement. The remainder of this chapter reviews the
research on interaction involvement and relates it to persuasion.

The Concept of Interaction Involvement

Interaction Involvement is the name of a relatively new construct that has been developed and investigated by Cegala and others (Cegala, 1981, 1982a, 1982b; Cegala, Savage, Brunner, & Conrad, 1982). Fundamentally, interaction involvement is the extent to which individuals participate in communication (see Cegala, 1981). When high in involvement, individuals typically integrate their feelings, thoughts, and conscious attention with the ongoing interaction. "Their consciousness is directed toward the evolving reality of self, other, and topic of conversation" (Cegala, et al, 1982: p. 229). Conversely, low-involved individuals are characteristically not so "tuned in" to social interactions. They are removed psychologically and communicatively from the ongoing interaction. They often appear preoccupied or withdrawn from the immediate social context.

The Interaction Involvement Scale (IIS) is an operational definition of the construct (Cegala, 1981; Cegala, et al., 1982). The IIS is a self-report questionnaire consisting of eighteen items which cluster into three related factors. The first factor has been named
"responsiveness." It is an index of an individual's certainty about how to act in social situations. The second factor is called "perceptiveness." This factor has been described by Cegala as a person's sensitivity to (1) what meanings ought to be applied to other's behavior, and (2) what meanings ought to be applied to one's own behavior. The perceptiveness concept is derived from Goffman's (1967) model of social interaction. The third factor is called attentiveness. It has been defined as the extent to which one is cognizant of and alert to the cues in the immediate social environment, especially one's interlocutor.

The operationalization of the involvement concept has undergone some changes over time. In order to explicate those changes, a discussion of the measuring instrument and its development is necessary.

In the first published report concerning interaction involvement, Cegala (1981) discussed the development of the Interaction Involvement Scale (i.e., IIS). The IIS was originally intended to assess the concepts of attentiveness and perceptiveness as derived from Goffman's (1967) work.

After administering the IIS, Cegala (1981) factor analyzed the data expecting a two factor solution (attentiveness and perceptiveness). The results, however, indicated a three factor solution. Attentiveness and perceptiveness appeared as two of the factors, but a third
factor emerged which was named "other-oriented perceptiveness."

In a more recent report, Cegala, et al. (1982) discussed a further refinement and interpretation of the IIS factor structure. This study was based on about 1800 subjects. Analysis revealed factors and loadings very close to the Cegala (1981) study. However, at this time, the perceptiveness factor was reassessed. The items that comprised the factor were noted to emphasize an overt dimension of behavior such as saying the appropriate lines or exhibiting the appropriate behavior in a particular situation. Cegala, et al. (1982) concluded, "As such, these items seem to tap Goffman's concept of facework (social skill) which, though related to perceptiveness, is not totally constituted by it" (p. 231). The factor was renamed "responsiveness," which was defined as a tendency to "react mentally to one's social circumstance and adapt by knowing what to say and when to say it. In brief, responsiveness is an index of an individual's tendency to deliver lines appropriate to the situation" (Cegala, et al., 1982: p. 233).

Cegala, et al. (1982) noted that this reassessment was important for two reasons. First, interaction involvement was originally conceived as a cognitive dimension of communication competence. It was now suggested that the IIS may be a more direct measure of overt behavior.
The second reason that the reassessment was significant is because it was consistent with earlier results of Cegala (1981). In the earlier study, high-involved subjects were found to be significantly more successful at achieving interpersonal objectives through verbal face-saving strategies. "Although univariate statistics revealed that successful individuals were significantly higher than unsuccessful individuals on all three of the IIS factors, the multivariate discriminant analysis revealed that only one factor (responsiveness) was significant in predicting group membership" (Cegala, et al., 1982: 233). Thus, the responsiveness factor, which upon reassessment was considered to contain items measuring overt behavior, was most significant in accounting for verbal face-saving strategies. This finding appeared to Cegala, et al. (1982) to be consistent with their reassessment of the responsiveness factor.

Review of Research on Interaction Involvement

The research undertaken in an effort to establish the construct validity of the IIS has, to date, gone in three related directions. First, a substantial amount of work has been done relating interaction involvement to other trait-like measures. Second, cognitive and affective responses to two communication situations has been examined. Finally, effort has been made to discover the overt behavioral
manifestations of interaction involvement. These three lines of research and their findings are reviewed briefly in the following sections.

Interaction Involvement and Other Traits.

The examination of the relationship of interaction involvement to other traits began by exploring the major personality types of extraversion and neuroticism. Cegala (1982a) began the research here for many reasons. First, the concepts of extraversion and neuroticism have a long history with roots as far back as at least the ancient Greeks (see Robach, 1927). Second, Eysenck (1969) and others (e.g., Zuckerman, 1983) have shown that these personality types have a significant biological basis. Third, extraversion and neuroticism have been shown experimentally (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1969; Eysenck, 1973; Morris, 1979) and clinically (e.g., Gray, 1978; Krohn, 1978) to include several personality traits in a reasonably reliable manner.

Many reported findings (Cegala, 1982a, 1982c; Cegala, et al., 1982) and unreported results have consistently indicated a moderately negative correlation (about \( r = -0.45 \)) between interaction involvement and neuroticism, especially for the IIS factors of responsiveness and attentiveness. The relationship between involvement and extraversion is slightly more complicated. The Eysenck's (1968) extraversion scale consists of two subtests, sociability and
impulsiveness. Interaction involvement has consistently correlated low (e.g., .30), but significantly with both subtests. The correlation with sociability is positive, while there is a negative correlation with impulsiveness. As such, the typical correlation between extraversion and involvement is near zero. Overall, the results suggest that low-involved persons tend to be highly emotional; some are introverted neurotics, while others are extraverted, or mixed neurotics.

Self esteem is another trait that has been examined in relation to interaction involvement (Cegala, 1982a, 1985). Results indicate that there is a moderate correlation (r = .50) between interaction involvement and self esteem. This finding is based on several different measures of self esteem. Most often used has been Coopersmith's (1967) measure. Others include Jackson's (1978) scale, and newly developed scales by Stake (1979) and Fleming and Courtney (1984). The correlation between self esteem and interaction involvement is consistent with the results discussed earlier involving neuroticism. Low self esteem is often experienced by people with emotional disorders, and perceptions and definitions of self concept are at the heart of most therapeutic strategies for treating neurosis.

Also related to the inverse correlation between interaction involvement and neuroticism is a consistent negative correlation between communication apprehension and
involvement \( (r = -0.45) \). McCroskey (1977) has defined communication apprehension as a basic fear or anxiety about communicating. Thus, the communication apprehension measure indexes some of the same traits of anxiety as included in the neuroticism concept.

Finally, there has been a consistent positive correlation with a self-report version of Weimann's (1977) measure of communicative competence (see Cegala, 1982c; Cegala, et al., 1982). Results indicate significant correlations with communication competence and all three factors of the IIS with the strongest correlation between competence and the perceptiveness factor.

Taken as a whole, the correlational data relating interaction involvement to other traits indicates that involvement has a significant affective component. This finding led Cegala (1985) to test further the relationship between involvement and affect by examining both cognitive and affective responses of individuals to an unstructured conversation and a competitive negotiation session. The results of this research are discussed below.

**Interaction Involvement and Ongoing Cognitive/Affective Responses**

Cegala (1985) tested the hypothesis that interaction involvement has a significant affective component by examining subjects' mood state and ego strength in two
communication situations with a stranger. The situations were an unstructured conversation and a negotiation session with the same person. In these two situations, the low-involved individuals experienced significantly more negative mood state and less positive mood state than high-involved individuals. In addition, low-involved persons rated themselves as less assertive, dominant, and self confident than their high-involved counterparts. The data from the two communication encounters were collected immediately following each session. So, even though they are self-report, they constitute a different response than is expected when generalized trait measures are used (see Hewes & Haight, 1980). The initial hypothesis that interaction involvement has a significant affective component is supported by the finding that the IIS can significantly predict mood states and ego strength in two different communication settings.

In the same study, Cegala (1985) reported results of a preliminary examination of the cognitive manifestations of interaction involvement. Results indicated that low-involved persons recalled less information about a conversation and negotiation than high-involved persons. This result appears consistent with earlier work by Ross (1978), who found differences in information processing styles between low and high-involved television viewers. However, Cegala (1985) concluded that further investigation
is needed into the cognitive manifestations of interaction involvement. For example, an apparent sex difference was found in the recall data. Females were able to recall more total thought units and multi-fact thought units than males. A close examination of the data revealed that only low involved males had poorer recall scores than high-involved males.

A secondary result indicated that the make-up of the dyads (high-high, low-low, high-low involvement individuals) might have contributed to the recall results. In particular, mixed dyads (one high, one low-involved person) recalled more single-fact, other-directed thought units and single-fact, self-directed thought units than dyads composed of same involvement level persons (high-high or low-low). Although more research is needed on the cognitive manifestations of interaction involvement, the Cegala (1985) results suggest a significant cognitive component to involvement.

Behavioral Manifestations of Interaction Involvement

The research into the behavioral manifestations of interaction involvement has followed three directions to date. First is an assessment of high and low-involved persons' use of various language strategies during conversation. Cegala (1981) examined the relative effectiveness of high and low-involved persons' use of
verbal face-saving strategies in conversation. Subjects were instructed to attempt to obtain sensitive, personal information from a partner in a dyad. Results indicated that high-involved persons were more competent at this than low-involved persons. The results were interpreted to lend support to the notion that interaction involvement is an aspect of a Goffman-based view of communicative competence.

In a later study, Redmon, Eifert, and Gordon (1983) asked high and low-involved subjects to conduct an interview to obtain sensitive personal information about an individual's dating preferences. The interviewer was a confederate trained to be resistant to disclose information, which required the subject to be persistent in obtaining the information. Results indicated that high-involved persons were more effective at managing topics and questions to obtain the desired information.

Villaume (1984) investigated conversational coherence of high and low-involved communicators. Results indicated that, in dyads, low-involved subjects showed greater reliance on the text of their partners, responding to what had immediately been said as opposed to responding to the overall thrust of the conversation. In general, low-involved persons gave greater control of the conversation to their partners and had less to say on their own.

The second direction of research into behavioral manifestations of interaction involvement has examined the
nonverbal behaviors of high and low-involved participants in communication situations. Cegala, Alexander, and Sokuvitz (1979), Cegala, et al. (1982), and Cegala and Sillars (1984) have found that high-involved individuals engage in more eye gaze than low-involved individuals. Cegala, et al. (1982) report that between 35 and 47 percent of the variance in individuals' body movement while speaking is accounted for by interaction involvement. As further extended by Conrad (1982), these data appear to provide additional support for the existence of a strong affective component in interaction involvement. Although more research is needed on the nonverbal manifestations of interaction involvement, overall the results to date suggest reliable patterns of body movement on the part of high and low-involved individuals, even among those who differ in relationship (i.e., strangers vs. married couples).

The most recent direction of the research into behavioral manifestations of interaction involvement has focused on how observers and participants judge the communication behavior of high and low-involved individuals. In Brunner's (1984) study, observers saw video tapes of a six-minute, unstructured conversation between individuals of varying involvement levels. In addition, each participant in the conversation made judgments of each others' communication. Results indicated neither observers nor participants were able to discriminate high or low-involved
communicators. Brunner attributed these results to the fact that both participants and observers had only a brief, six-minute conversation upon which to base their judgments. In follow up research employing respondents who knew one another quite well, Brunner and Hannigan (1984) and Phelps and Shaw (1984) did find a significant, positive correlation between self and other judgments of individuals' interaction involvement. In addition, Cegala, Rippey, and Wall (1985) examined self and other judgments of leadership style and IIS scores in two sets of data of small, problem-solving groups that had about an eight-week history. In this study, the IIS accounted for about 36 percent of the variance in self-report and observer-report data of perceptions of leadership style.

Overall, the research on interaction involvement has been both informative and supportive of the construct. However, there are still several areas that need to be investigated to assess the utility of the IIS as a measuring instrument and, by implication, the utility of the interaction involvement construct. One such area of investigation is to examine further how interaction involvement relates to individuals' ability to engage in interpersonal persuasion. That is the objective of this study.
Interaction Involvement and Persuasion

According to Cegala (1984), the general model of interpersonal persuasion involves three separate but related items: goals, context analysis, and rhetorical strategies. In order to explicate the relationship between persuasion and interaction involvement, it is necessary to examine the general persuasion model from the interaction involvement perspective.

The first component of the model involves the persuasion goal. The goal is very important because it is what directs the persuasive effort and the behavior of the persuader is based on it. Cegala (1985) suggests that high-involved people should have a clearer sense of their own as well as others' goals during interaction and "thus are more highly motivated to engage in communication than low-involved persons" (p. 19).

The second component of the interpersonal persuasion model is context analysis. The context analysis of a persuasion environment includes gathering information about the persuadee, the situation, and other goal-relevant items. Gathering this information entails an attention to, and subsequent awareness of, goal-relevant details. In a face-to-face situation such as interpersonal persuasion, possession of this goal-relevant information also involves a constant reassessment of the persuadee such that the persuader would be able to make the appropriate adjustments.
in strategy to compensate for unanticipated responses of the persuadee. Gathering this information, therefore, means being attentive and perceptive. By definition, low-involved individuals are low in attentiveness and perceptiveness, therefore they should not be as successful at gathering goal-relevant information as high-involved individuals. The third component of Cegala's (1984) model of interpersonal persuasion is a repertoire of rhetorical strategies to be used in the persuasive effort. This is a collection of behaviors that may be employed at any time by the persuader as a response to the requirements of the situation (based on information gathered during context analysis). The low-involved individual would be lacking in several areas in this case. First, low involvement has been negatively correlated to behavioral flexibility (Cegala, et al., 1982), so even if the low-involved individual was "in tune" with the situation, available behavioral alternatives would be limited. Second, choosing an appropriate behavior to exhibit is based on the persuader's analysis of the situation. Since the low-involved person is less likely to make an accurate assessment of the situation, he/she should be less likely to make the appropriate behavioral choice. The low-involved person often finds himself/herself, therefore, "unsure how to respond." Responsiveness is defined as the ability to react to one's social circumstance and adapt (with some appropriate behavior). Since the low-
involved individual is low in responsiveness, he/she should be less successful at interpersonal persuasion.

In summary, the more attentive, perceptive, and responsive one is, the more likely he/she is to be able to interpret accurately the behavior of the target, formulate effective strategies for goal attainment, and successfully exhibit the appropriate behaviors to achieve desired goals. The result should be more effectiveness in persuasive efforts. Since the high-involved individuals are more attentive, perceptive, and responsive than low-involved individuals, it appears that high-involved individuals should be more effective persuaders. This hypothesis is the focus of the current research. In particular, given a dyadic negotiation session, it is hypothesized that:

H1: High-involved communicators will be more effective in achieving favorable negotiation outcomes than will their low-involved counterparts.

Since the outcome of the negotiation exercise is presumably a reflection of how persuasive a person was, it is reasonable to expect that high-involved subjects will use different negotiation strategies than low-involved subjects. However, because the category scheme used in this study has not been tested in prior research, no hypotheses are stated as to the performance of highs and lows. Instead, the issue of negotiation style is addressed in the form of a research question:
RQ1: Will high- and low-involved individuals differ significantly in their negotiation style?
CHAPTER 2: METHOD

Design
Three types of dyads were created for this study: mixed dyads containing one high- and one low-involved subject and same-level dyads containing two high-involved subjects or two low-involved subjects. Results of previous research on interaction involvement indicated the existence of sex differences (Cegala, 1983c; Cegala, et al., 1982). As such, in an attempt to reduce the chances of possible confounding due to sex, same sex dyads were used for this study.

Cegala, et al. (1982) began to examine the differences between different types of interaction involvement. Interaction involvement type is defined by the combination of scores on the three factors of the IIS. The eight possible configurations are as follows, where R=responsiveness; P=perceptiveness; and A=attentiveness; a minus sign means below the mean and a plus sign means above the mean:

1. R+ P+ A+
2. R- P- A-
3. R+ P- A+
4. R- P+ A-
5. R+ P+ A-
6. R- P- A+
7. R+ P- A-
8. R- P+ A+

The eight configurations form four groups, each containing 42
the opposite score configurations (e.g., R+P+A+/R-P-A-; R+P-A+/R-P+A-). The four groups, which are called interaction involvement types, are listed below:

Type 1: R+ P+ A+/R- P- A-
Type 2: R+ P- A+/R- P+ A-
Type 3: R+ P+ A-/R- P- A+
Type 4: R+ P- A-/R- P+ A+

Since one of the goals of the ongoing research program is to learn more about interaction involvement types, involvement type was included in the criteria used for subject selection. However, since it has been reported that type 4 dyads are the least frequently occurring type of involvement, they were not included in this study.

The design of this study consists of a 2 (sex) by 2 (involvement level) by 2 (mixed or same) by 3 (involvement type) by 2 (negotiation role) factorial arrangement. ANOVA will be used for examination of the settlement data and the language categories used to describe the negotiation interaction.

Subjects

A group of 120 subjects were chosen from an original pool of 433 students enrolled in a multiple section, basic communication course at The Ohio State University. The course attracts students from a wide variety of majors, as
it is an option in the Liberal Arts Education core requirements of the university.

With regard to the subject selection criteria, the first group of subjects was selected if each individual's IIS factor scores were +/- .5 standard deviations from the mean. A second group was selected if only one of the scores was slightly closer to the mean (i.e., +/- .4 standard deviations), but the two other scores were +/- .5 standard deviations from the mean. To be certain of an adequate pool, a third group of subjects was selected if their responsiveness factor score and one other factor score was +/- .5 standard deviations from the mean, and the remaining factor score was between +/- .2 and +/- .4 standard deviations from the mean. The result was an experimental sample with a range of responsiveness scores from -4.16 to 1.98, with seven scores less than +/- .5 standard deviations; a range of perceptiveness scores from -2.55 to 2.84, with nine scores less than +/- .5 standard deviations; and a range of attentiveness scores -.275 to 2.07, with thirty scores less than +/- .5 standard deviations. The large number of near zero attentiveness scores was not considered a problem since previous research has suggested that the IIS attentiveness score is the least stable in a dyadic situation (see Cegala, et al., 1982).

The subjects were placed in dyads on the basis of same sex and same or opposite involvement level. Members of dyads
were of the same involvement type in all cases. As such, the sample consisted of 120 subjects: 60 males and 60 females; 60 high-involved subjects and 60 low-involved subjects; 70 Type 1 subjects; 20 Type 2 subjects; and 30 Type 3 subjects. 80 subjects were placed in mixed dyads, and 40 subjects were placed in same-level dyads.

Procedures

The data gathering component of the study was divided into two phases. Phase 1 involved the original total pool of subjects (n=433) completing the IIS, the Eysenck Personality Inventory, Form A (1968), Wiemann's (1977) communication competence scale, McCroskey's (1981) PRCA, and Bem's (1974) androgyny scale. In Phase 2, subjects who met the selection criteria were scheduled to meet at the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at a designated time.

After consent forms were read and signed, and after confirming that the subjects were in fact strangers, general directions about the purpose of the study were given. Subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to observe how strangers communicated in various settings. No mention was made of involvement or of the selection criteria. Subjects were then taken to a video taping room to participate in the first of two communication tasks. In the first task, which is not relevant to the current study, subjects were asked to participate in a brief conversation.
during which they could discuss any topic they chose. Subjects were asked to treat the situation as they might if they met a stranger at a bar or a bus stop. The video taping room contained two lounge-type chairs about three feet apart, facing one another. Each subject put on a small microphone to allow audio recording. A concealed television camera was placed outside the room in front of a window to allow video recording. At the conclusion of the six-minute conversation, the subjects were taken to separate rooms and asked to complete questionnaires about the conversation.

Subjects were then taken to another room to receive directions concerning the second communication task. In the second task, which is the focus of this study, subjects were asked to play the roles of attorneys who were attempting to settle a lawsuit out of court. Each subject was given a written description of the event involving his/her client (Williams, 1970) and a payoff schedule of points awarded for various dollar settlements (see Appendix A). One subject was assigned the attorney for the plaintiff, the other the defense attorney. Both were instructed to negotiate for the most points (i.e., to obtain the best settlement for their clients). Subjects were then taken to separate rooms and given five minutes to prepare arguments. They were then returned to the taping room and seated in the same chairs as they occupied during the first conversation. They were told
that they would have a maximum of fifteen minutes to reach a settlement, but they were not required to settle.

Immediately after the negotiation session, subjects were taken to separate rooms to complete post-negotiation questionnaires (see Appendix B). When the questionnaires were completed, the subjects were paid $3.00. Total time of the session was about 90 minutes.

Transcripts were then made from the audio tapes of the negotiation sessions for use in this study.

**Dependent Variables**

As directed by the research hypothesis and the research question, there were two dependent variables operationalized for this study: negotiation outcome and negotiation strategy or the verbal behavior of the participants. Each variable is explained in detail below.

**Negotiation outcome.** The participants were asked to obtain the best settlement they could for their clients. As such, the best settlement for the attorney for the plaintiff would be $500,000, and the best settlement for the attorney for the defendant would be $0.00. As only 19 of the 60 dyads reached agreement on a dollar amount, it was decided that the final dollar amount could not be used to test H1. An alternative method was devised which included recording each subject's initial offer, final difference score, and average concession made during the course of the negotiation.
Initial offer was operationalized as the first dollar amount proposed by a subject in an attempt to reach a settlement. The final difference score was defined as the absolute difference between the initial offer and the last offer; thus, the less the absolute difference the less "movement" from the initial proposal. Average concession was computed by dividing the final difference score by the number of concessions (i.e., a reduction or increase in the proposed settlement figure) a subject made during the negotiation. As for the final difference score, the smaller the average concession the better the negotiation performance.

Negotiation strategy categories. It was decided to define operationally negotiation strategy in terms of a content analytic scheme.

The transcripts of the negotiation interaction were coded into thought units. A thought unit is defined as an idea or collection of facts concerned with one topic. For example, the following statement: "And uh, the fence, it must have not been good enough for the kid to be able to get under it" contains one thought unit. The transcripts were divided into thought units while listening to the audio tapes. This coding was completed before giving the transcripts to an assistant for the purpose of computing a reliability estimate for coding the content categories.
Although a number of coding schemes are available for the content analysis of negotiation interaction (see Putnam & Jones, 1982a), Hopmann and Walcott's (1976) Bargaining Process Analysis II (i.e., BPA II) was originally chosen for this study. The BPA II appeared to focus clearly on the content of bargaining, and it has been reported to be reasonably reliable and valid coding system (Putnam & Jones, 1982b). A scheme developed by Donohue, et al. (1984) was also considered, but preliminary testing showed it to be unwieldy and resulted in little intercoder agreement.

Preliminary testing of the BPA II was done using several selected transcripts of the negotiation sessions. It was discovered at that time that the BPA II did not adequately describe the data. It was decided at that time to use the BPA II as a general guide for the creation of a new category scheme which could more fully accommodate the data and remain consistent with the focus of the study. Selected transcripts of the negotiation sessions were used in an attempt to create a new category scheme. The author and a graduate assistant at the University of Dayton analyzed transcripts and new categories were created independently. The categories were then exchanged by the coders who attempted to apply the scheme of the other coder. The coders then compared results. This cycle was repeated several times over the course of about five weeks until a scheme was developed that seemed to describe the data
adequately. The resulting category scheme appears in Table 1.

The scheme was modified after attempting, with the use of a new assistant, to apply categories. Very few disagreements were noticed, but those that were merit some mention here. There was very little agreement on the categories concerned with inconsequential and irrelevant information (i.e., task inconsequential statement and task irrelevant statement). These categories were initially developed when negotiators were observed discussing topics that were not related to the issues contained in the case. It was later observed, however, that the negotiators were using the apparent unrelated information to formulate arguments and reach conclusions. It was decided that, while the outside observer might consider the information contained in the statement to be irrelevant or inconsequential to task solution, it could be considered otherwise by the negotiators and used by them to help solve the problem or reach a settlement. As a result, the two categories were dropped from the scheme and the statements were recoded into one of the assertion categories, or where appropriate. The "task inconsequential refusal" category was also dropped from the scheme as a result of the coders' inability to determine what constituted "inconsequential" information.
**Table 1**

Preliminary Category Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assertion</strong></td>
<td>Statement of position without backing (reasoning or use of given facts; often implies that the speaker assumes it to be taken as a fact).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argument Assertion</strong></td>
<td>Statement of position with backing or rationale based on the facts of the case and/or reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agreement</strong></td>
<td>Acceptance of opponent's position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disagreement</strong></td>
<td>Rejection of opponent's position with no reason or backing offered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refutation</strong></td>
<td>Statement in direct response to opponent's position/utterance that has a rationale, explanation or counterargument based on the facts of the case and/or reasoning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statement of Blame</strong></td>
<td>Statement asserting fault or blame; no rationale is offered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proposal</strong></td>
<td>A dollar figure offered in an attempt to settle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concession</strong></td>
<td>A statement of compliance; giving in to the opponent (most often this will be a change in a dollar proposal in favor of the opponent).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment</strong></td>
<td>Statement of position indicating firmness or a non-negotiable position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question</strong></td>
<td>Statement requesting clarification, information, or justification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedural Statement</strong></td>
<td>Statements that focus on task material (e.g., whose roles are what, what information the case contains, etc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warning</strong></td>
<td>Statement implying punishment or aversive conditions that will occur from persons or agents other than the speaker if compliance does not occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>Statement indicating punishment or aversive actions that will be taken by the speaker if compliance does not occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sarcasm</strong></td>
<td>Statements that are cutting, sneering, or caustic (there is usually a negative implication about the opponent or about the opponent's position).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argument of Empathy</strong></td>
<td>Statement which attempts to persuade opponent to view another position (e.g., &quot;You know how it was when you were a kid.&quot; &quot;What if it was your kid?&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argument of Fair Play</strong></td>
<td>Statement that opponent has been unjust (e.g., &quot;You're not playing by the rules.&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countersupport Statement</strong></td>
<td>Statements that volunteer information, facts, arguments, or interpretations which support the opponent's position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restatement</strong></td>
<td>A statement repeating the same points made earlier with no attempt to extend them with further argument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role Distance</strong></td>
<td>Statements made out of task role; out of character.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Irrelevant Statement</strong></td>
<td>Statement completely unrelated to the task (e.g., baseball, the weather, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Inconsequential Statement</strong></td>
<td>Statement related to the task, but inconsequential to the solution to the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Task Inconsequential Refusal</strong></td>
<td>Statement of refusal to allow the conversation to proceed in an inconsequential direction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The "proposal" category was originally defined as offers of dollar figures made in the attempt to reach a settlement. It was later observed that many of the negotiators were offering services along with or instead of dollar figures as attempts to settle the case. As a result, the "proposal" category was modified to include offers of other services as well as offers of money.

The final modification to the scheme was the addition of an "other" category to accommodate all statements not conforming to any category contained in the regular category scheme. The final version of the category scheme appears in Table 2.

A graduate assistant was asked to be a coder in an effort to obtain an intercoder agreement estimate. Along with an explanation of the categories, the assistant was given a copy of the category scheme and transcripts of three negotiations (units of analysis already coded), which were selected by using a random numbers table. The assistant was instructed to apply the categories to the transcripts and to return in one week. During the next session, the transcripts were examined and the categories were further discussed with the assistant. The assistant was then given new transcripts to code. After practicing on a total of ten randomly selected transcripts over a period of five weeks, it was decided that the assistant had an adequate understanding of the categories and their applications.
Table 2

Final Category Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Assertion: Statement of position without backing | (reasoning or use of given facts; often implies that the speaker assumes it to be taken as a fact).  
Example: Bobby lives right next to the pond.  
Bobby dug under the fence with a shovel. |
| Argument Assertion: Statement of position with backing or rationale based on the facts of the case and/or reasoning. | Example: Bobby was playing with friends.  
I learned in child development that six year olds can read, so Bobby knew what he was doing. |
| Disagreement: Rejection of opponent's position with no reason or backing offered. | Example: No! You're wrong! |
| Refutation: Statement in direct response to opponent's position/utterance that has a rationale, explanation, or counterargument based on the facts of the case and/or reasoning. | Example: You couldn't be right about that because surgery costs $50,000. |
| Statement of Blame: Statement asserting fault or blame; no rationale is offered. | Example: It's Bobby's parents' fault.  
It's your company's fault that this happened. |
| Proposal: Services or a dollar figure offered in an attempt to settle. Proposal is also coded if the subject raises the price after the initial offer. | Example: I'll settle this case right now for $75,000.  
We'll fill in the pond and fix the fence. |
| Concession: A statement of compliance; giving in to the opponent (most often this will be a change in a dollar proposal in favor of the opponent). | Example: Ok, then I'll come down to $400,000. |
| Commitment: Statement of position indicating firmness or a non-negotiable position. | Example: I'll give you $50,000. No higher! |
| Question: Statement requesting clarification, information, or justification. | Example: How much was your offer?  
What is your definition of responsibility? |
Table 2 (continued)

Procedural Statement: Statements that focus on task material (e.g., whose roles are what, what information the case contains, etc).
Example: OK, you are the defendant, right?
We really need to reach an agreement here.

Warning: Statement implying punishment or aversive conditions that will occur from persons or agents other than the speaker if compliance does not occur.
Example: If this case goes back to court, you could lose quite a bit of money.

Threat: Statement indicating punishment or aversive actions that will be taken by the speaker if compliance does not occur.
Example: Give me $500,000, or I'll go to the EPA.

Sarcasm: Statements that are cutting, sneering, or caustic (there is usually a negative implication about the opponent or about the opponent's position).
Example: That's the dumbest thing you've said yet!
Your client is an idiot!

Argument of Empathy: Statement which attempts to persuade opponent to view another position.
Example: You know how it was when you were a kid. What if it was your kid?

Argument of Fair Play: Statement that opponent has been unjust.
Example: You're not playing by the rules!

Countersupport Statement: Statements that volunteer information, facts, arguments, or interpretations which support the opponent's position.
Example: I agree with you; I think the fence was not constructed properly.

Restatement: A statement repeating the same points made earlier with no attempt to extend them with further argument.

Role Distance: Statements made out of task role; out of character.
Example: Are they watching us?
I wish I had your part. I know I won't win.

Other: Statements not conforming to any other content category.
To obtain the reliability estimate, the assistant was asked to code randomly selected transcripts which constituted 20% of the total data. The assistant's results were then compared with those of the investigator using the method of calculating intercoder agreement explained by Krippendorff (1980). Results indicate an acceptable level of reliability (r = .835).

ANOVA was used to analyze the data following the design described earlier. The outcome and negotiation strategy data were analyzed independently. Each of the three outcome variables was treated as a dependent variable in the ANOVA. Similarly, the frequency of each of the negotiation strategy categories was analyzed separately in an ANOVA. An alpha level of P =< .05 was set for all analyses.
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS

The hypothesis predicted that high-involved individuals should be more successful at negotiation than low-involved individuals. To test this hypothesis, ANOVAS were computed on the three outcome variables: initial proposal, final outcome, and average concession. The research question asked: how does interaction involvement relate to negotiation strategy? ANOVAS were again used to answer the research question. In both sets of analyses interactions with less than ten subjects per cell were ignored to avoid interpreting possibly less stable relationships. In the case of the negotiation strategy categories, only categories with at least 50% usage were examined. Those categories used by less than 50% of the sample were ignored to avoid interpreting data that were possibly less representative of the experimental sample. In all, seven categories are not reported: Commitments (43%); Role Distance (40%); Warning (16%); Threat (18%); Sarcasm (40%); Argument of Empathy (41%); and Argument of Fair Play (12%).

The results are presented in two sections. First, the results of the outcome variables are presented. Second, the results of the negotiation strategy categories are presented.
Initial Proposal

The ANOVA on initial proposal resulted in one significant main effect for negotiation role (F=143.47, df=1/83, p<.000, .63 variance). This result is not meaningful as it simply reflects the fact that the plaintiff was attempting to obtain as much settlement as possible while the defendant was attempting to give up as little as possible.

There were two significant two-way interactions and one significant three-way interaction. Since the three-way interaction subsumes the two-way interactions, only the former is presented. The three-way interaction (F=5.65, df=1/83, p<.02, .06 variance) included interaction involvement level (i.e., high or low) by negotiation role (i.e., plaintiff or defendant) by dyad type (i.e., same or mixed). The cell means are reported in Table 3. Follow-up t-tests revealed no significant differences in the means for the mixed dyads, although they were in the expected direction. However, in same dyads, high-involved subjects performed significantly poorer than low-involved subjects when playing the role of plaintiff (t=1.99, df=27, p<.05, two-tailed) and the role of defendant (t=2.79, df=26, p<.008, two-tailed).

Final Outcome

An ANOVA on the final outcome revealed one significant main effect for dyad type (F=4.56, df=1/83, p<.04, .05
Table 3

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Initial Proposal

| Involvement Level | Same Dyads | | Mixed Dyads | |
|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|
|                  | Plaintiff  | Defendant | Plaintiff  | Defendant |
| High             | 353,500    | 213,750 | 480,000    | 107,500   |
|                  | (180,227)  | (158,420) | (48,304)   | (47,214)  |
| Low              | 441,850    | 106,250 | 460,000    | 161,900   |
|                  | (84,149)   | (68,285) | (87,559)   | (136,534) |

a A high score for the plaintiff is better performance, while a high score for the defendant is poorer performance.

b Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
Table 4

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Final Outcome:
Two-Way Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiation Role</th>
<th>Plaintiff</th>
<th>Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>106,625</td>
<td>107,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(88,574)</td>
<td>(104,499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>201,750</td>
<td>91,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(141,833)</td>
<td>(105,092)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( a \)
A low score is the better performance

\( b \)
Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
variance), such that same-level dyads performed overall better than mixed-level dyads.

There was one significant two-way interaction: negotiation role by dyad type ($F=8.04$, $df=1/83$, $p<.006$, .08 variance). The cell means are reported in Table 4. As indicated, subjects in mixed-level dyads performed best when playing the defendant role, but did poorest when playing the plaintiff role.

There was one significant three-way interaction including involvement level by dyad type by sex ($F=4.71$, $df=1/83$, $p<.03$, .05 variance). The cell means are reported in Table 5. Follow-up t-tests revealed no significant differences in the mixed-level dyads, although the means were in the expected direction. However, in same-level dyads, low-involved males performed significantly better than high-involved males ($t=2.02$, $df=38$, $p<.05$, two-tailed), while high-involved females tended to perform better than low-involved females ($t=1.57$, $df=38$, $p<.1$, two-tailed).

**Average Concession**

There was one significant main effect for average concession involving dyad type ($F=4.69$, $df=1/83$, $p<.03$, .05 variance). Again, the same-level dyads performed better than the mixed-level dyads.

There was one significant two-way interaction including negotiation role by dyad type ($F=6.89$, $df=1/83$, $p<.01$, .07
Table 5

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Final Outcome: Three-Way Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyads Males</th>
<th>Same Dyads Females</th>
<th>Mixed Dyads Males</th>
<th>Mixed Dyads Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>141,250</td>
<td>76,200</td>
<td>126,100</td>
<td>178,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95,123</td>
<td>104,655</td>
<td>75,269</td>
<td>181,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>84,600</td>
<td>125,500</td>
<td>150,900</td>
<td>131,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80,737</td>
<td>93,610</td>
<td>130,460</td>
<td>147,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a  A low score is the better performance

b  Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
variance. The cell means are reported in Table 6. Similar to the results for final difference, subjects in mixed-level dyads did best when playing the defendant role and poorest when playing the plaintiff role.

There was one significant three-way interaction including involvement level by dyad type by sex (F=5.23, df=1/83, p<.02, .06 variance). The cell means are reported in Table 7. Follow-up t-tests revealed no significant differences in mixed-level dyads, but in same-level dyads low-involved males tended to do better than high-involved males, while high-involved females did significantly better than low-involved females (t=1.81, df=38, p<.08, two-tailed; t=2.55, df=38, p<.02, two-tailed, respectively).

Summary

In summarizing the results of the outcome variables it is helpful to report two additional borderline significant results. For both the final outcome and average concession variables there was a near significant main effect for negotiation role (F=3.61, df=1/83, p<.06, .04 variance; F=3.70, df=1/83, p<.06, .04 variance, respectively). In both instances the defendant did better than the plaintiff. These results along with the other results reported above suggest that subjects found the plaintiff role to be more difficult than the defendant role.
### Table 6

**Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Average Concession: Two-Way Interaction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negotiation Role</th>
<th>Plaintiff</th>
<th>Defendant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dyad Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>40,267</td>
<td>38,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35,437)</td>
<td>(39,177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>79,625</td>
<td>34,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70,210)</td>
<td>(47,806)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* A low score is the better performance

*b* Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
Table 7
Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Average Concession: Three-Way Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyads</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>57,770</td>
<td>21,911</td>
<td>47,450</td>
<td>73,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46,192)</td>
<td>(24,313)</td>
<td>(25,312)</td>
<td>(88,913)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>34,025</td>
<td>44,354</td>
<td>57,883</td>
<td>49,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(36,268)</td>
<td>(30,935)</td>
<td>(64,405)</td>
<td>(65,664)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a A low score is the better performance

b Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
Overall, subjects performed more effectively in same-level dyads than they did in mixed-level dyads, although in mixed-level dyads, high-involved subjects did non-significantly better than low-involved subjects. Within same-level dyads, low-involved subjects made more effective initial proposals than high-involved subjects when playing either of the negotiation roles. The results concerning final outcome and average concession were essentially the same. In both instances, high-involved males performed less well than their low-involved counterparts, while high-involved females performed better than low-involved females.

One of the three outcome variables, initial proposal, is probably least indicative of who won or who lost the negotiation. The results pertinent to the remaining outcome variables (i.e., final outcome and average concession) indicate that females performed as expected (i.e., high-involved subjects did better than low-involved subjects), while males performed in the opposite way from what was expected. However, it must be emphasized that these differences apply only to the same-level dyads.

Negotiation Strategy Categories

The results for each of the persuasion strategy categories are presented separately below.

Assertions. There were no significant main effects for this category, but there were two significant two-way
interactions and one significant three-way interaction. Since the three-way interaction subsumed the two-way interactions, only the former is reported. The three-way interaction included interaction involvement level by dyad type by negotiation role (F=5.084, df=1/83, p<.03, .04 variance). The cell means are reported in Table 8. Follow-up t-tests indicate only one significant difference involving the means for plaintiffs in mixed-level dyads. High-involved subjects used significantly more assertions than low-involved subjects (t=2.78, df=18, p<.01, two-tailed).

Argument Assertions. There was one main effect for interaction involvement level such that high-involved subjects used significantly more argument assertions than low-involved subjects (F=4.047, df=1/83, p<.05, .04 variance).

There were also two significant three-way interactions, one including interaction involvement level by sex by negotiation role (F= 3.906, df=1/83, p<.05, .03 variance) and one including interaction involvement level by dyad type by negotiation role (F=5.130, df=1/83, p<.03, .04 variance). The cell means for the first interaction are reported in Table 9. Only two pairs of means differed significantly. High-involved males used significantly more argument assertions than low-involved males when playing the defendant role, while high-involved females used more argument assertions than low-involved females when playing
Table 8

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Assertions:
Three-Way Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyads</th>
<th>Mixed Dyads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Defendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>13.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.76)</td>
<td>(6.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>20.35</td>
<td>17.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.09)</td>
<td>(7.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
Table 9

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Argument Assertions:
First Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Defendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.90)</td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.67)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a^ Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
the plaintiff role. The cell means for the second interaction are reported in Table 10. Follow-up t-tests revealed only two significant differences, high-involved subjects used significantly more argument assertions than low-involved subjects when playing the defendant role in same-level dyads and when playing the plaintiff role in mixed-level dyads (t=3.10, df=38, p<.004, two-tailed; t=2.24, df=18, p<.04, two-tailed, respectively).

Refutations. There were no significant main effects for this category, but there was one significant three-way interaction including interaction involvement level by dyad type by negotiation role (F=4.253, df=1/83, p<.04, .03 variance). The cell means are reported in Table 11. Follow-up t-tests revealed no significant differences in the means of same-level dyads, but in mixed-level dyads high-involved subjects used significantly more refutations than low-involved subjects when playing the plaintiff role, but low-involved subjects used significantly more refutations than high-involved subjects when playing the defendant role (t*=2.92, df=12.98, p<.01, two-tailed; t=2.28, df=18, p<.04, 1 two-tailed, respectively).

Countersupport statements. There was one significant main effect for this category such that subjects playing the plaintiff role used less countersupport statements than subjects playing the defendant role (F=5.788, df=1/83, p<.02, .05 variance). The cell means were 0.77 and 1.38,
Table 10

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Argument Assertions:
Second Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyad</th>
<th>Mixed Dyad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Defendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.36)</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
Table 11

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Refutations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyad</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mixed Dyad</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Defendant</td>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Defendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>5.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.24)</td>
<td>(4.65)</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>(3.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.87)</td>
<td>(4.20)</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
<td>(5.81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
respectively. There was also a significant three-way interaction including interaction involvement level by sex by dyad type (F=3.837, df=1/83, p<.05, .03 variance). Cell means are reported in Table 12. Follow-up t-tests revealed only one significant difference, in mixed-level dyads high-involved females used more countersupport statements than low-involved females (t=2.14, df=18, p<.05, two-tailed).

**Statements of blame.** There were two significant main effects for this category. Subjects in same-level dyads used significantly less statements of blame than subjects in mixed-level dyads (F=4.357, df=1/83, p<.04, .03 variance, means: 1.11 and 1.65, respectively), while subjects playing the plaintiff role used significantly less statements of blame than subjects playing the defendant role (F=4.201, df=1/83, p<.04, .03 variance, means: 1.05 and 1.53 respectively).

There was one significant two-way interaction including interaction involvement level by sex (F=6.850, df=1/83, p<.01, .05 variance). The cell means are reported in Table 13. Follow-up t-tests revealed a significant difference only for males such that high-involved males used less statements of blame than low-involved males (t=2.00, df=38, p<.05, two-tailed).

**Restatements.** There were no significant main effects for this category. However, there was one significant three-way interaction including interaction involvement level by dyad
Table 12  
Cell Means and Standard Deviations  
For Countersupport Statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyads</th>
<th>Mixed Dyads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
Table 13

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Statement of Blame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0.87 a</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations
type by negotiation role (F=6.576, df=1/83, p<.01, .04 variance). Cell means are reported in Table 14. Follow-up t-tests revealed no significant difference among the means, although in mixed-level dyads, high-involved subjects used nearly significantly more restatements than low-involved subjects (t*=1.95, df=9.73, p<.08, two-tailed).

Remaining Categories. The following categories were used by 50% or more of the subjects, but resulted in no significant main effects or interactions: Disagreements, Agreements, Proposals, Questions, and Procedural Statements.

Summary

Of the strategy categories that revealed significant differences, assertions, argument assertions, and refutations appear most descriptive of the negotiation styles of high- and low-involved subjects. Overall, high-involved subjects used significantly more argument assertions than low-involved subjects, suggesting that highs attempted to advance arguments for their cause more so than lows.

The difference in negotiation styles of high- and low-involved subjects was especially illustrated by the results of how subjects played the more difficult plaintiff role. Overall, high-involved subjects made more assertions than low-involved subjects when playing the plaintiff, and they advanced more argument assertions and refutations when
Table 14

Cell Means and Standard Deviations For Restatement Involvement Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Involvement Level</th>
<th>Same Dyad</th>
<th>Mixed Dyad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plaintiff</td>
<td>Defendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.76)</td>
<td>(2.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>4.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.19)</td>
<td>(4.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Numbers in ( ) = standard deviations*
playing the plaintiff in mixed-level dyads. Similarly, highs used more restatements than lows overall in mixed-level dyads, suggesting that the highs were more persistent in their attempt to advance a position.

The results concerning a composite category variable perhaps best summarizes these trends. A ratio was created by dividing the sum of assertions plus argument assertions advanced by person one by the sum of disagreements plus refutations advanced by person two in each dyad, thus the higher the ratio, the more the subject was able to establish arguments without challenge from the dyad partner. The results of an ANOVA computed on this argument advancement ratio indicate a significant main effect for interaction involvement level, such that high-involved subjects performed better than low-involved subjects (F=5.861, df=1/83, p<.02, .05 variance, means: 4.03 and 2.30, respectively). These results indicate that high-involved subjects were more successful in advancing arguments to support their case than low-involved subjects.

Overall, the results of the outcome variables and strategy categories revealed a rather complex picture concerning interaction involvement. Regarding outcome variables, there were few clear significant main effects and several interactions, typically including interaction involvement level by dyad type by negotiation role or sex. Females appeared to perform as expected with respect to
interaction involvement, while males performed opposite from initial hypotheses. Despite these mixed results concerning the outcome variables, the data pertinent to the negotiation strategy categories suggest that high-involved subjects demonstrated a more effective negotiation style than low-involved subjects. These results are discussed further in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

There are three major results that are addressed in the following sections. First, the results of the outcome variables indicate that overall, same-level dyads performed better than mixed-level dyads. Second, within same-level dyads, females behaved as expected, with high-involved females performing better than low-involved females. Males, however, performed in the opposite way from what was expected. Third, the results of the outcome variables were not entirely consistent with the data regarding the negotiation strategy categories. Overall, high-involved subjects were more effective in advancing arguments to support their cause than low-involved subjects. Despite this difference in negotiating style, the high-involved subjects generally did not out-perform low-involved subjects with regard to outcome. Each of these aspects of the results is discussed separately below.

Same-Level Versus Mixed-Level Dyad Performance

The results of the final outcome and average concession variables most clearly point out the difference in performance of same- and mixed-level dyads. For both variables, dyad type was a significant main effect such that
individuals in same-level dyads performed better than individuals in mixed-level dyads. In addition, both outcome variables had significant two-way interactions including dyad type and negotiation role. These results indicated that individuals in mixed-level dyads performed better when playing the easier defendant role, but did poorer when playing the plaintiff role. Overall, the results suggest that when a high- and low-involved person were matched in a session, the negotiation was less likely to result in a clear winner or loser. Although in most instances high-involved subjects performed better than low-involved subjects in the mixed-level dyads, none of these differences was significant. It seems as though the mix of a high- and low-involved person made for a more difficult (i.e., hard to win) situation for both persons. This finding is especially surprising in light of the results of Villaume and Cegala (1985). In that study, the conversations of the same subjects who participated here were examined for coherence. Although all dyad types produced coherent conversations, a style difference was observed between high- and low-involved subjects, which was especially clear in the mixed-level dyads. In general, low-involved persons were observed to use several conversational devices to "piggyback" on the high-involved speaker. The low-involved subjects had less to say on their own and abdicated control and initiative in the
conversation to their dyad partner. Given these results, one might expect the negotiations of mixed-level dyads to be dominated by high-involved subjects. However, such was not the case. At the moment, there does not appear to be a clear reason why mixed-level dyads apparently produced the most difficult negotiation situation. Perhaps this is a reflection of highs and lows having difficulty meshing their communication styles. Another possible explanation for the differences observed in Villaume and Cegala (1985) compared to this study may be in the nature of the communication tasks. In the Villaume and Cegala (1985) study, subjects had no specific goal; they were simply put in a room and told to carry on a conversation. Under this ambiguous, unstructured situation, clear differences were observed between the conversational styles of high- and low-involved subjects, such that highs exerted more control than lows. In this study, subjects were given a clear goal by the experimenter. In addition, the negotiation game created an atmosphere whereby clear roles and role expectations were defined. Perhaps low-involved persons are better able to perform in such highly structured situations where perceptiveness to context and ability to adjust to flexible, changing conditions are less relevant to the accomplishment of the communication task. Assertions of high- and low-involved persons under conditions of varying goal specificity may be a fruitful direction for future research.
The overall superior performance of the same-level dyads appears somewhat more understandable in light of data from the post-negotiation questionnaire. The sample of subjects was split by dyad type and involvement level, and within each of these groups (i.e., same-level dyads, highs; same-level dyads, lows) t-tests were computed on post-negotiation questionnaire items comparing winners and losers. For high-involved subjects in same-level dyads, the only significant result was for the self-dominance rating; winners rated themselves as more dominant during the negotiation than losers (t=2.51, df=32, p<.02, two-tailed). For low-involved subjects in same-level dyads, losers tended to rate their dyad partner as higher in self-confidence than did winners (t=1.40, df=30, p<.14, two-tailed), and losers rated their partners significantly higher on assertiveness (t=2.11, df=30, p<.04, two-tailed). Overall, these data suggest that within same-level dyads, one of the members simply tended to dominate the negotiation. This appeared to be especially so in the low-involved dyads. Given that one member within the same-level dyads tended to dominate the negotiation and the mixed-level dyads tended to have less clearly defined winners and losers, it seems reasonable that overall, same-level dyads performed better than mixed-level dyads.

**Sex Differences Within Same-Level Dyads**

There were significant differences in the performances of high- and low-involved subjects in same-level dyads found
in the average concession and final difference data. All the differences were not, however, in the expected direction. High-involved females in same-level dyads had lower average concession and lower difference scores than low-involved females, which indicates a better performance by the highs. On the other hand, low-involved males in same-level dyads had the lower average concession and final difference scores, indicating that they out-performed their high-involved counterparts.

An explanation for this apparent sex difference may be related to the reported differences in the manner in which males and females approach conflict situations. Davidson and Duberman (1982) reported that a significantly higher degree of conflict existed between males than between females in a study of same-sex dyads. It was also reported in that study that women appear to engage in a covert struggle for dominance. The conclusion reached by Davidson and Duberman (1982) is that the data support the notion that females have been traditionally socialized to avoid or suppress conflict. Men, on the other hand, are socialized to enter into conflict and are therefore less likely to suppress the struggle for dominance (Davidson, 1981).

It has also been suggested that males enter conflict with the intention to win, while females attempt to avoid losing (Hattes & Kahn, 1974) and that females often adopt an anti-competitive strategy in bargaining situations.
of a fair outcome as opposed to winning (Collins & Raven, 1968; Gamson, 1964). Bean (1970), Horner (1968), and Phillips, Aronoff, and Messe (1971) have reported that females surpass males on measures of fear of success. Also, males exhibit greater needs for dominance and achievement, while females tend to exhibit needs for inclusion and affection in bargaining situations (however, Brown & Guy (1983) report that such manifestations could be a manipulative strategy for females). The result is that, in competitive contexts, males seem to out-perform females. Finally, Benton (1973), and Leventhal and Lane (1970) have reported that females voluntarily share a greater amount of available resources with their opponents than do males. Females also are reported to have greater concern with the performance of their partners than males (Kumr, 1983). Baird (1976) suggests that the result of this could be that females make weaker initial offers and make final offers "which provide opponents with a larger share of the reward" (p. 187).

The findings contained in this brief review of sex differences in conflict situations appear to provide a partial explanation for the results obtained here. Thus, the differences in self esteem and assertiveness that are associated with high and low interaction involvement (Cegala, 1982a; Cegala, 1985), and presumably relevant to persuasion skills in conflict settings, may have been more
important in influencing negotiation outcome in female dyads. Given less competitiveness among the females, and thus less need to win, low-involved females were apparently more willing to make concessions when faced with a superior argument. This may account for why females behaved as expected with respect to interaction involvement. However, it does not account for why males performed in the opposite direction from what was expected. Why would low-involved males out-perform their high-involved counterparts? One possible explanation for this result lies in the context in which the negotiations occurred.

In this laboratory situation, the goals of communication were made quite clear to the subjects. In addition, it was clear that the negotiation session had a limited time frame with no real consequences to subjects beyond the immediate situation. Given this setting and a presumed competitiveness among all the males, the low-involved males may have felt more able to engage in persuasion than they would under less artificial circumstances. They were given a clear goal to guide them and a reasonably safe environment in which to pursue it (e.g., they had a role to "hide" behind in a controlled environment with few consequences). Ironically, under these conditions, the low self esteem of the low-involved males may have worked in their favor. Here was an opportunity for a low self esteem, low-involved male to engage in competition in relative safety. Such an
opportunity may have been taken quite seriously by the low-involved males, as it afforded one of the few occasions for them to compete successfully in a conflict situation. In contrast, the high-involved males probably did not view the negotiation session quite so seriously. Also, it must be emphasized that the observed differences in the performance of male highs and lows occurred in same-level dyads. In light of the differences of winners' and losers' perceptions reported in the last section, it seems clear that one low-involved subject tended to dominate the negotiation in each same-level, low dyad; whereas this was less so in the same-level, high dyads. Overall, then, one low-involved male tended to win substantially over another low-involved male, thus overall the lows out-performed the highs when same-level dyads were compared.

**Outcome Variables Versus Strategy Categories**

With regard to the strategy categories, high-involved subjects used more argument assertions than low-involved subjects. High-involved subjects also used more assertions when playing the plaintiff, they used more argument assertions and refutations than low-involved subjects when playing the plaintiff in mixed-level dyads, and they used more restatements in mixed-level dyads. Also, high-involved subjects used a higher argument advancement ratio which suggests that they were able to advance more facts
unchallenged than low-involved subjects. Taken together, these strategy category results indicate that the high-involved subjects used a more thoughtful, reasoned, and persuasive negotiating style than low-involved subjects.

One main question seems to arise from these results. If the high-involved subjects used persuasive strategies superior to those of low-involved subjects, why were there no significant differences in outcome variables for mixed-level dyads? It seems logical to assume that, given the combination of a high- and low-involved individual in a persuasive situation, the high-involved should achieve the higher outcome.

An explanation for this result concerns the nature of the experimental situation. Since the negotiation session was a contrived, role-playing situation, and it only lasted a maximum of fifteen minutes, low-involved subjects might have been able to step out of their normal, characteristic behavior because they were able to "hide" behind the role they were playing. Given this premise, the low-involved individual might have been able to "play the part" more effectively than would otherwise be the case. For example, because the lab situation was artificial, subjects might not have responded to their opponents' arguments in the same way as if they were in a real-world context with actual consequences. The low-involved subjects could just "hang in there" and not give in to arguments because they knew there
would be no serious negative consequences and it would all be over soon. Similarly, perhaps the high-involved subjects did not apply themselves to the task as much as they might have under non-laboratory conditions.

Another explanation for the results of the outcome and strategy categories lies not with the contrived nature of the situation, but with the fact that the sessions involved only two people. Cegala, Rippey, and Wall (1984) have reported that low-involved subjects in small, task-oriented groups acted withdrawn and disinterested, and that their behavior was seen by others as counterproductive to the group's goals. It is possible that the low-involved subjects acted in-character in these small groups, but apparently out-of-character in the dyadic situation because they had more of an opportunity to be themselves in a small group. In the dyad, since there are only two people involved (and there was some pressure to reach agreement), the low-involved person could not as easily become withdrawn or distracted because he/she was under fairly constant pressure to participate in the conversation.

The fairly constant pressure to perform in a dyadic situation could also possibly explain some other recent findings. Cegala (1985) reported that persons who were low-involved experienced significantly more negative affect and higher anxiety than high-involved persons participating in a dyadic conversation. It could be that the low-involved
persons experienced the anxiety and negative affect because they were forced to participate in a situation that was uncomfortable for them and pressured them to perform in a manner that was out-of-character. Future research could investigate affect and anxiety in individuals participating in small groups. If what has been stated here is true, then the anxiety should decrease and the mood-state should improve for low-involved individuals in that situation because the low-involved person would be more able to act in-character due to the greater number of participant and less frequent pressure to perform.

Summary

Taken as whole, the results of this study appear to support the interaction involvement construct and advance the program of research. It was found that, overall, high-involved individuals have a more thoughtful, reasoned negotiation style than low-involved individuals. This style should be more persuasive than the style of low-involved individuals, but such was not clearly the case in this study. Low-involved males out-performed high-involved males in same-level dyads in terms of outcome, and there were no significant differences in outcome in mixed-level dyads. The negotiation style results are consistent with the concept of interaction involvement such that a high-involved individual should be a better persuader than a low-involved
individual. Being persuasive, however, should include the achievement of interpersonal goals which was not accomplished by the subjects of this study. It is thought that the nature of the experimental situation (i.e., a contrived, role-playing, dyadic situation) allowed the low-involved individuals to behave in an uncharacteristic manner and achieve greater outcomes than their persuasive abilities would otherwise warrant.

This study provides some directions for future research in interaction involvement. It seems as if the role-playing situation did not have serious enough consequences to inspire the subjects to do the best job that they could. Perhaps future research should attempt to use a more realistic or real-life negotiation situation with more realistic or serious consequences. Also, since the dyadic situation itself has been called into question, perhaps future research should compare behaviors of individuals in both groups and dyads. Future research should also consider a more long term persuasive situation. The "one-shot" situation used in this study could have allowed the low-involved individuals to achieve a higher outcome just by being stubborn. Since he/she would never have to see his/her partner again, there were no real consequences to that tactic. However, if the subjects had to accomplish multiple goals or interim goals leading to a larger goal over an extended period of time, being stubborn or some similar
tactic would probably not be successful for long. If the current study were designed as such, the outcome results would likely be different.

Finally, there is a suggestion that future research in interaction involvement might examine the communicative performance of highs and lows under conditions of varying goal definition. In comparing the results of this study to other research findings, there is the suggestion that the differences in high and low interaction involvement may be neutralized in contexts where goals and roles are well defined.
NOTES

1 T's that are indicated with a * are adjusted for nonhomogeneity of variance.

2 The subjects in this study participated in two communication tasks. The first task was a six-minute, unstructured conversation in which subjects could discuss anything they chose. The second task was the fifteen-minute negotiation session which is the focus of the current study.
Appendix A

Allison vs. F & W Chemical Company

The F & W Chemical Company manufactures some very caustic chemicals for construction purposes. In order to clean out their manufacturing equipment, they use water which is then pumped out to a settling pond where it evaporates. The water in the settling pond is extremely caustic and will burn the flesh of a human. The company has erected a 12 foot cyclone fence around the pond and has posted warning signs.

Six year old Bobby Allison, while playing with some friends near the fence, scraped out an opening under the fence and accidentally fell into the pond. He suffered severe burns over 80% of his body, and while he has recovered from the burns, he is left with some very unsightly scars on his face and arms.

The Allisons have sued F & W Chemical Company for $500,000 for medical expenses and the pain and suffering involved. Their attorney is arguing that by having such a dangerous pond the company accepts the liability for damage it inflicts on someone. Furthermore, the company was negligent in not providing a more foolproof fence. The company is arguing that they were not negligent in constructing the fence. Furthermore, since Bobby has completely recovered physically, the amount asked is excessive even if the company had been negligent. The judge has ordered the attorneys to settle out of court.
Attorney for the Defendant

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important in the figurative sense as your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how many points you win in the game. Remember, as attorney for the defendant, your objective is to argue for the LOWEST dollar figure. Below is a schedule of points in accordance with specific dollar settlements:

If you settle for:

$400,100 and above, you will receive: 0 points
$300,100 to $400,000, you will receive 1 point
$200,100 to $300,000, you will receive 2 points
$100,100 to $200,000, you will receive 3 points
$75,100 to $100,000, you will receive 4 points
$75,000 or below, you will receive 5 points
IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE 0 points

Remember that your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed from your partner's. Do not be concerned with how many points your partner may receive from a given settlement. Just try to get as many points as you can. At no time should you reveal how many points you will obtain for a given settlement figure.
Appendix A (continued)

Attorney for the Plaintiff

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how many points you win in the game. Remember, as attorney for the plaintiff, your objective is to argue for the HIGHEST dollar figure. Below is a schedule of points in accordance with specific dollar settlements:

If you settle for:

- $80,000 or below, you will receive: 0 points
- $80,100 to $175,000, you will receive: 1 point
- $175,100 to $300,000, you will receive: 2 points
- $300,100 to $424,900, you will receive: 3 points
- $425,000 to $450,000, you will receive: 4 points
- $450,000 or above, you will receive: 5 points

If you fail to settle you will receive: 0 points

Remember that your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed from your partner's. Do not be concerned with how many points your partner may receive from a given settlement. At no time should you reveal how many points you will obtain for a given settlement figure.
APPENDIX B
POST-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name ____________________________________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directions: Please evaluate the conversation you just had using the following terms. The N stands for neutral, the remaining alternatives indicate increasing likeness to either end term. Make a check at the place that best describes your evaluation of the conversation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Pleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Repetitive</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Valuable</td>
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<td>4. Bitter</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Nice</td>
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<td>6. Honest</td>
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<td>7. High</td>
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<td>8. Insincere</td>
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<td>9. Good</td>
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<td>10. Clear</td>
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<td>11. Smooth</td>
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<td>12. Meaningless</td>
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<td>13. Beautiful</td>
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<td>14. Full</td>
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<td>15. Sweet</td>
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<td>16. Stale</td>
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<td>17. Controlled</td>
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<td>18. Kind</td>
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<td>19. Obvious</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. Ordered</td>
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<tr>
<td>21. Near</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

96
Appendix B (continued)

Name: ______________________________________

Directions: Below is a list of several adjectives that may be used to describe one's current state at any particular time. Please respond to each adjective to indicate the way you would describe how you felt during the conversation you just had.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very slightly or</th>
<th>A little</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Quite a bit</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Determined</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Tormented</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Jittery</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Alone</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Joyful</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Surprised</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Downhearted</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Distressed</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Blue</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Loathing</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Guilty</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Inspired</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Afraid</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Angry</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Confident</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Attentive</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Alert</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Lonely</td>
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<td>20.</td>
<td>Sleepy</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Warmhearted</td>
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<td>22.</td>
<td>Sluggish</td>
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<td>23.</td>
<td>Revulsion</td>
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<td>24.</td>
<td>Interested</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>Tired</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>Nervous</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Bashful</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>Distaste</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Contemptuous</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Upset</td>
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<td>31. Shaky</td>
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<td>32. Disdainful</td>
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<td>33. Sad</td>
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<td>35. Frightened</td>
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<td>36. Enthusiastic</td>
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<td>37. Disgusted with self</td>
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<td>38. Blameworthy</td>
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<td>41. Scared</td>
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<td>58. Calm</td>
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<td>60. Amazed</td>
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**Name:** ____________________________
Appendix B (continued)

POST NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What was the settlement figure? ________________________

2. Was the settlement in your favor?
   (A) Yes, most definitely.
   (B) Yes.
   (C) No.
   (D) No, definitely not.
   (E) I'm not sure.

3. How long did the negotiation last? ____________________ minutes

4. About what distance were you from your partner during most of the conversation?
   ____________________ feet

5. What arguments did your partner give for his/her side?

6. What arguments did you give to support your side?

-OVER-
7. What was your body movement (e.g., gestures, head, leg, etc.) like during this conversation, especially when you were talking?
   (A) I moved a great deal.
   (B) I moved some.
   (C) I moved very little.
   (D) I didn't move at all.
   (E) I'm not sure.

8. What was your partner's body movement like during this conversation, especially while he/she was talking?
   (A) He/she moved a great deal.
   (B) He/she moved some.
   (C) He/she moved very little.
   (D) He/she didn't move at all.
   (E) I'm not sure.

9. How self confident did you feel during the conversation?
   (A) Very self confident.
   (B) Self confident.
   (C) Somewhat self confident.
   (D) Not very self confident.
   (E) Not sure.

10. How self confident did your partner seem during the conversation?
    (A) Very self confident.
    (B) Self confident.
    (C) Somewhat self confident.
    (D) Not very self confident.
    (E) Not sure.

11. My characterization of the overall interaction/situation is that:
    (A) I dominated.
    (B) No one dominated.
    (C) My partner dominated.

12. How assertive were you during the negotiation?
    (A) Very assertive.
    (B) Assertive.
    (C) Somewhat assertive.
    (D) Not at all assertive.
    (E) Not sure.

13. How assertive was your partner during the negotiation?
    (A) Very assertive.
    (B) Assertive.
    (C) Somewhat assertive.
    (D) Not at all assertive.
    (E) Not sure.


