INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of “sectioning” the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.
George, David Brian

THE STOIC POET LUCAN: LUCAN'S "BELLUM CIVILE" AND STOIC
ETHICAL THEORY

The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1985

University Microfilms International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1985 by George, David Brian
All Rights Reserved
THE STOIC POET LUCAN:
LUCAN'S BELLUM CIVILE AND
STOIC ETHICAL THEORY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
David Brian George, A.B., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1985

Reading Committee:
Mark P. O. Morford
David E. Hahm
Charles L. Babcock

Approved By

Advisers
Department of Classics
Copyright by
David Brian George
1985
For my wife, Linda.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A few sentences of acknowledgement are not enough to express the debt I owe to, and the affection I feel for, Professor Mark Morford. This dissertation would not be, were it not for him. I could not have hoped for a better teacher or friend. His office and class rooms have been the crucible in which my mind has been fashioned. He has taught me not only what classical scholarship should be, but has demonstrated in his own life the humanitas which it should produce.

The debt I owe to Professor David Hahm is no less. This dissertation would be far inferior and much less disciplined — if finished at all, were it not for him. Moreover, he has stirred in me an enthusiasm for Greek Philosophy and given me the tools to feed it. For this, I shall always be in his debt.

I, also, owe much to Professor Charles Babcock. He has, as department chairman, provided support and a comfortable environment for the research and writing of this dissertation. Moreover, he has had the wisdom to know when to listen to me, and when to send me away with a curt "Write!".

To all three of these men, I am indebted; for all three, I have great affection. Indeed as I finish this dissertation, my admiration and respect for them is greater than when I began. I can only begin to repay them, by attempting to follow their examples of scholarship and life.

My greatest debt is expressed in the dedication.
VITA

17 August, 1955..........................................................Born: Karachi, Pakistan

EDUCATION:

1981–1985...........The Ohio State University: Classics:
1979–1981...........The Ohio State University: Classics: 12/81 M.A.
1978–1979...........University of Missouri–Columbia: Ancient History
1974–1978...........University of Missouri–Columbia: Classics &
                   Art History/Archaeology: 8/78 A.B.
1973–1974...........Longview Community College

PAPERS:

"Horace Satire 1.3: An Epicurean Diatribe on Friendship",
CAMWS, Williamsburg, Va., 28 April, 1984

"To Hegemonikon of the army: An image from Stoic Psychology
in Lucan’s Bellum Civile", APA, Toronto, Canada, 29 Dec. 1984

"Lucan's Pompey, The New Sulla", CAMWS, Minneapolis, Mn.,
11 April, 1985.

FIELDS OF STUDY:

Silver Epic, Roman Satire, Greek Rhetoric, Euripides, Demosthenes, Lucilius,
Livy, Horace (Satires), Ovid, Lucan, Persius, Statius, Tacitus, Juvenal

Stoic Philosophy, Plato
Caesar, Horace (Odes)
Greek Drama, Virgil
Cicero, Apuleius
Greek Lyric, Lucretius
Aristotle
Theocritus
Greek Epigraphy
Homer, Greek Lyric, Virgil

Mark Morford
David Hahm
Charles Babcock
Stephen Tracy
Carl Schlam
Jane Snyder
Robert Lenardon
John Vaught
A.G. Woodhead
Meyer Reinhold
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT** ........................................................................................................ iii

**VITA** ................................................................................................................................ iv

**INTRODUCTION** .................................................................................................................. 1

  Notes to Introduction ............................................................................................................. 6

**CHAPTER**

I. **CAESAR AND CATO: IMAGES OF OPPOSITION** ........................................................... 10

  A. ............................ 10
  B. The Protagonists .... 15
  C. Caesar, The Destroyer of Society ............................ 18
  D. Caesar, τὸ ἡγεμόνιον 27
  E. Ira ........................................ 32
  F. Generalship ........................................ 47
  Notes to Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................. 54

II. **POMPEY THE STOIC PROFICIENS** ........................................................................... 67

  A. The Stoic Doctrine ............................................................... 69
  B. Seneca’s View ..................................................................... 73
  C. Pompey, the Triumvir .......................................................... 78
  D. The New Pompey .................................................................... 95
  E. Pompey: An Image of Opposition ...................................... 107
  F. Pompey, the Lover ................................................................. 112
  G. Pompey, The Republican ........................................................ 126
  Notes to Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................... 129

III. **QUID TIBI VIS, MARCE CATO?** ............................................................................ 143

  A. The Principate and the Civil War ........................................ 143
  B. Stoic Political Theory and the Roman Republic .................. 145
  C. The Imperial Stoa’s Dilemma .............................................. 150
  D. Cato’s Choice: Philosophic Justification ................................ 155
  E. Cato’s Choice: Dramatic Justification .................................. 170
  Notes to Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................... 178

**Conclusion** ....................................................................................................................... 199

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS** ............................................................................................ 207

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ............................................................................................................. 208
"Libamus...Iovi Liberatori. specta, iuuenis; et omen quidem dii prohibeant, ceterum in ea tempora natus es quibus firmare animum expediat constantibus exemplis."

Tacitus, Annales 16.35.

These words which Thrasea Paetus, the Roman Senator of Stoic faith, spoke as he opened his veins, articulate very well the spirit of Neronian Stoics as well as demonstrate the enigma which they present to later generations. For the words are at once both very Stoic and very Roman. Indeed by the first century of our era, Stoicism had so infused the Roman mind that it is often impossible (short of the ancients reporting it) to sort out what is Stoic and what is Roman. Moreover, Stoics, non-Stoics, and even anti-Stoics alike used Stoic philosophical terms, categories, and arguments to express their views. This is especially true when one looks at Senatorial Republicanism. Here, more than anywhere
else, the Stoic philosophical system was bound up with the moe maiorum.

In this first century context, Marcus Annaeus Lucanus lived and wrote. Though he and Thrasea Paetus are very different men, they do share something more in common than the time in which they lived — they were both associated with the Stoic sect and died because of their opposition to Nero. Moreover both sought to teach future generations something about Rome, the principate, and the nature of libertas. Thrasea created in himself an exemplum for his fellow Romans to meditate upon; he wrote his history lesson with his own blood. Lucan gave his countrymen the Bellum Civile to ponder;¹ his exempla were Caesar, Pompey and Cato. Both taught a similar lesson: that there was a never ending conflict between Caesar and libertas.² As the following chapters will show, however, they differed as to how and why that conflict should be fought.

Lucan’s associations with Stoicism are well known. His uncle was Seneca the philosopher. He was probably the student of the Stoic rhetor Cornutus and among the friends of the Stoic satirist Persius.³ More important than these biographical tidbits are statements culled from
his poem which show, if nothing else, that the poet had intimate knowledge of the Stoa's teachings. While no one doubts that there was a Stoic influence at work on the poet, many, however, have questioned the extent and importance of the Stoa's influence in the poem. On the other hand, many have seen the poem as Stoic in its conception. That is, the poem would not be the same were it not for the Stoicism which is perceived to pervade it. Indeed recently some have noted a Stoic metaphor (the civil war as the conflagration) running through and uniting the first seven books of the poem.

In terms of characterization, many have recognized this same type of Stoic influence. Most scholars would see in Lucan's Cato a type of Stoic wise man. This is so if for no other reason than that such was Cato's imago in imperial literature. When one reflects on the two other major protagonists in the poem, Pompey and Caesar, there is less unity. While most see Caesar as the villain par excellence, not all see him as an essentially Stoic villain — that is a villain in Stoic terms. There is even less agreement about Pompey. Some see him as a Stoic proficiens whose character develops (for philosophical reasons) until his death. Some, while agreeing that his character is morally elevated until Book seven,
argue that it is for republican reasons rather than Stoic. Others see him as a static and flawed character.

This dissertation will contend that it is possible to find more extensive Stoic influence in Lucan's characterization and in his treatment of motivation. It will consider one aspect of the interrelationship of Lucan's poem and Stoicism, namely ethics. It will argue that his choice of metaphor, vocabulary, and characterization arises in an intellect fashioned by Stoic thought. Indeed there were other forces shaping his poem: literary tradition, Neronian taste, and, granted its subject, the memory of the events themselves. But the major force which gave the Bellum Civile its form is Stoicism. I shall show that Lucan's psychological delineation of Caesar, Cato, and Pompey reflects Stoic emotional theory. They are, in short, paradigmatic for the fool, the wise man, and the Stoic proficiens.

This dissertation will also demonstrate that the reason for Lucan's Stoic treatment of the three protagonists is bound up in a controversy of the Roman Stoa — namely the role which the wise man should play in an unjust state. Should he be an active or passive
opponent of tyranny? An understanding of the relationship of Lucan's characterizations to this controversy will help to clarify the poem's overall meaning and the role which the poet hoped his Bellum Civile would play in the intellectual and political life of Neronian Rome.
Notes

1.) Hereafter the Bellum Ciuile will be cited simply by book and line number, following Housman's text except where noted.


4.) See e.g. H.-A. Schotes, *Stoische Physik, Psychologie und Theologie bei Lucan* (Bonn 1969), who extracts statements from the poem which can be shown to be Stoic but does not go far enough in considering their relationship to the poetry.


9.) E.g. M. Hafster, "Dem Schwanken Zünglein lauschend Wachte Cäsar dort," MH 14 (1957), 118-26, would see Caesar as an unintended hero.


11.) E.g. M. Rambaud, "L'apologie de Pompée par Lucain au livre 7 de la Pharsale," R.E.L. (1955), 258-296, holds that Pompey becomes a Stoic wise man owing to Lucan's anti-Caesarian propaganda, but falls back to the status of fool by book eight.

Chapter I

Caesar and Cato: Images of Opposition

No one would question that Cato is for Lucan (and the Neronian Stoics generally) the exemplum of the Stoic saint; few would see Caesar as anything but a villain. This chapter will examine Lucan’s characterization of Cato and Caesar. It will demonstrate that through his use of images drawn from Stoic psychology Lucan envisioned Caesar’s psyche to be working as the Stoics held that a fool’s would. Before proceeding, however, we should review quickly the relevant Stoic doctrines of psychology — especially \textit{otkêiōs}.

\begin{quote}
\textit{otkêiōs} is central to Stoic ethics. Indeed Chrysippus stated that without the doctrine there would be no Stoic. In brief, \textit{otkêiōs} is the natural orientation of a soul resulting from the composition which nature has given it. In a human, this is toward reason. For all living beings the Stoics held that the first impulse was toward self-preservation. It is from this impulse that all actions ultimately derive. Cicero has his
\end{quote}
Cato explain it thus:  

"placet his,"inquit,"quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitumuideantur afferre. ...(here he supplies proofs of this)... sequitur autem haec prima divisio: aestimabile esse dicunt (sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus) id quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficat, ut selectione dignum propter praeseit quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam δέλαυ vocant, contraque inaestimabile quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis ut ea quae secundum naturam sunt ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum est officium (id enim appellemus καθεδρικον) ut se conseruet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint pellatque contraria; qua inuenta selectio et item reiectione, sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi quid sit quod uere bonum possit dici. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam; simul autem cepit intellegentiam uel notionem potius, quam appellant ἔνυολαυ illi, uiditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimauerit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat, atque its cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum; quod cum positum sit in eo quod 'ομολογιαυ Stoici, nos appellemus conuenientiam, si placet, — cum igitur in eo sit id bonum quo omnia referenda sunt, honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solus in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum ui sus et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quae sunt prima naturae propter se nihil est expetendum.

In the passage, Cicero is dealing with the normal development
of a man. So long as the being is not rational (i.e., lacking a λόγος, e.g., animals or children before 7 years of age) all that it does according to impulse is natural. It is in harmony with nature. However with the introduction of Reason into a man there is a possibility of error. A man can make a false judgement about what is in his interest and thus generate impulses which are not in accord with nature. These impulses the Stoics call the emotions — παθὴν or in Latin perturbation animi. The wise man will always make right judgements about what is in his interest. The fool will sometimes make right judgements, at other times not. The distinction, however, is not between the rightness or wrongness of a particular choice/action, but how the choice is made. The wise man's soul has its natural orientation. That is, it is inclined toward the Rational and Natural. Its impulses are natural and rational. The fool, however, is a mass of irrational and unnatural impulses; thus, even though he may make a proper choice or perform an appropriate act, he is none the less morally wrong — the reasons for his choice are not in accord with Reason. It is the disposition of the soul which matters, not the deed.

Another aspect of this doctrine is the social duties which it engenders. The Stoics held that the basis for all human society is the
love which parents show their children: *pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur* (sc. Stoici) *intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur* (Cic. *de fin.* 3.19ff). From this love spring the bonds which cement humans into their natural union (e.g. nations) with each other which are necessary for their survival: *ex hoc nascitur ut eitam communic hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit non alienum uideri. ... multo haec coniunctius (sc. animalibus) homines. itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, ciuitates.* Thus patriotism and sacrifice of the individual for the good of the state are in accord with Nature and Reason: *ex quo fit ut laudandus is sit qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod debeat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nos met ipsos.* Moreover it is man’s natural orientation to help his fellow man: *impellimur autem natura ut prodesse uelimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibuesque prudentiae tradendie.* This is what separates men and gods from beasts: men and gods are impelled by nature to treat each other with respect and justice. Cicero’s passage is worth quoting at length (*de fin* 3.20.67).

*sed quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse uncula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praecclare enim*
Chrysippus cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eam autem communem et societatem sui, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria; quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret eum iustum, qui migraret iustum fore. ... cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem naturam esse uideamus, consentaneum est hic naturae ut sapiens uelit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura uiuat, uxorem adiungere et uelle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur.

The wise man recognizes his duty to family and society. From procreation (since this is the beginning of society) to entrance into politics, if he conducts his life rationally, he will benefit the state. In parting it should be noted that in Stoic terms any civil war is contrary to this doctrine. And hence civil war, as Cato noted in book two, is indeed nefas. It violates the laws of both Nature and men. Thus, a wise man will join in it, if at all, only to rectify an injustice which has perverted man's natural orientation. As we shall see below, one of the ways in which Lucan differentiates Caesar from Cato reflects these doctrines. Indeed central to his characterization is how each functions with regard to obsequi. Lucan is careful to demonstrate through their respective interactions with others that Caesar is as much the Stoic fool as Cato is the Stoic wise man.
B: The Protagonists

As Lucan begins his poem, he sets Pompey and Caesar into such brilliant contrast with his similes of the oak and the lightning that many have seen this passage as the introduction to the poem's major protagonists. This, however, is not the case. Indeed the poet himself expressly states that it is the causes of the civil war with which he is concerned. *fert animus causae tantarum expromere rerum...* (1.67) He examines these causes on three levels, the workings of natural law (i.e. fate) (1.67–84), the manifestation of this in Roman history (1.85–97), and in individual lives (1.98–157 for the leaders; 1.158–182 for the people). He intends his treatment of the break-up of the triumvirate to show how the war arose and so to start his poem proper. His focus demonstrates this. The triumvirate (and Pompey and Caesar with it) is a *concordia diecors* foreordained to bring war. While it lasted, there was peace (1.98–120). This is the point of the poet's similes. Crassus, the political link, is the Isthmus of Corinth. Julia, the personal union, is the Sabine women. Both stand between two forces determined upon collision. Thus when elements which bound it together died, there was war. *discussa tides, bellumque mouere/ permissum ducibus* (1.119–120). To reinforce his point, the poet
uses his characterisations of Pompey and Caesar to demonstrate that
owing to their nature war was inevitable: *stimulus dedit aemula virtus*
(1.121). Both men possessed great talent and will. They must collide. In
this Lucan is simply observing an historical fact. The war, in personal
terms, broke out between Pompey and Caesar.

When Lucan does turn to introduce the characters themselves
onto the poetic stage, it is Cato, not Pompey, whom he sets in opposition
to Caesar. He shows this by both the order of introduction (first Caesar,
1.261ff, then Cato, 2.234, and finally Pompey, 2.526) and the structure of his
first two books (both Caesar and Cato have a set of three speeches,
Curio–Caesar–Laelius/ Brutus–Cato–Marcia, while Pompey has only his
own single speech). Moreover, both sets of speeches deal with the
respective motivations of Caesar and Cato for embarking upon civil war.
Curio aims to push Caesar toward war; Brutus aims to keep Cato from it.
More importantly, both sets of speeches are concluded by a speech which
shows the effect of their motivations on family. It is clear Lucan means
for his readers to reflect upon Cato and Caesar. It is they whom Lucan
sees as the true protagonists. Despite the historical facts, the conflict for
Lucan is, in some way, between these two characters. In these
introductory speeches, Lucan sets the basis for his development of Cato and Caesar and thus lays the foundation for interpreting his poem.
C: Caesar, The Destroyer of Society.

The first direct speech which the poet puts into Caesar's mouth is a piece of self-justification before Roma for inflicting civil war upon her (1.195–203). Lucan uses the whole episode to bring before his reader three aspects of Caesar's character which will appear repeatedly: his haste in all that he does (1.183), his renunciation of peace (1.225), and his faith in Fortuna (1.226). Yet even though Caesar crosses the Rubicon with such bravado, he is nonetheless beset by doubts. Indeed the poet says that he felt shame and scrupled (1.262 ff.). But fate had predestined war, and strove to goad the general to it. ecce faces belli dubiaeque in proelia menti/ urgentes addunt stimulos cunctasque pudoris/ rumpunt fata moras; justos Fortuna laborat/ esse ducis motus et causas inuenit armis (1.262–265).

Fortuna's chosen goad was Curio, whom Lucan characterises as audax, being possessed of a uenalis lingua (1.269). Indeed, Curio is ideal for Fortuna's purpose. He himself confesses that he is experienced at overcoming people's doubts and stirring them to action (1.275–276). His speech is cunningly designed to prick Caesar's ira. But more important for
our considerations is that the psychological assumptions which underlie the speech are Stoic. In that the speech seeks to stir Caesar's *ira* as an expression of his lust, it is particularly Stoic. For the Stoa held that *ira* was a sub-class of *emouμενα*. This speech appeals to four aspects of Stoic *ira* -- a sense of injustice, lust, a sense of being wronged and jealousy. Lines 1.275-279 appeal to Caesar's sense of injustice. They open with Caesar's party line: the other side has violated the constitution (1.275-279; cf. Caesar to Roma 2.200-203). Caesar must set it right again (*tua nos faciet victoria ciues* 1.279). Lines 1.280-281 urge haste. Lines 1.282-285 aim to stir Caesar's ambition and lust. The world is yours if only you take it. Lines 1.286-289 appeal to his outrage at being denied the triumph which he judges to be rightfully his. Finally, lines 1.289-291 seek to renew that jealousy which destroyed the triumvirate. Indeed Curio's closing sententia, *partiri non potes orbem, solus habere potes*, recalls Lucan's description of the triumvirate and the reasons for its dissolution (1.92-93; 109-111). In this, Fortuna's *stimulus* only pricks what has already been goaded. *stimulus dedit aemula virtus* (1.120). Lucan's use of the word *stimulus* is noteworthy, for the Stoics often speak of *ira* as a goad. Indeed according to Seneca it is the most powerful goad there is (*de ira* 1.1.7; 2.14.1; 2.36.6) Lucan's Curio is a shrewd judge of character; his speech
does what it is designed to do: et ipsi/ in bellum pronu tantum tamen
addidit irae/ accenditque ducem...{1.291–293}.

Caesar, like Curio, delivers a speech which he intends to fill his
troops with ira. He cannot, as Curio did, appeal to envy or jealousy. That
would to say the least be dangerous. Yet the poet clearly shows these to
be Caesar’s major motivations; note how much of his speech he directs
against Pompey. But these two emotions are not necessary for ira. He
can and does, as Curio did, appeal to that which is essential — a sense of
being wronged (1.299–311), as well as his soldiers’ sense of injustice
(1.311–342), and their lust (1.343–349). Lest he end his speech on such a
blatant note of lust, he concludes with an appropriately patriotic and
religious sententia (1.349–351) which recalls the soldiers’ perception of an
injustice. The effect is powerful.

The men at first are full of doubts (dubium, incerta 1.352–353).
They, like Caesar, feel shame while piety puts a check upon their behavior.
Indeed, they waver between their own natural impulse toward the state
and family (olabiων) and the mad impulses which had been driving
them. This is Lucan’s point when he says: pietas patriique penates/
quamquam caede feras mentes animoque tumentes/ frangunt...fl.852-54

But in the end Caesar's speech works; they are driven by πατη to submit to their general's will. sed diro ferri reuocantur amore/ ductorisque metu (1.354-55). The words dirus amor are pointedly ironic. For it is this dirus amor which has replaced their sacer amor which arises from their natural orientation (cf. 4.190ff). They are brought into line by two πατη, amor (which like ira is a sub-class of επιθυμία) and metus. Lucan demonstrates the full effect and horror of this by Laelius' speech (1.359-86). He speaks both for himself and the entire army.

The sum of Laelius' declaration is that he and his fellows are Caesar's. They are an extension of Caesar's will. Their hands, their arms, their bodies, their blood are Caesar's (1.362ff). For them there is no duty to the gods, no allegiance to country, no honor for family — only Caesar (1.373ff). His concluding remarks are pointed: tu quoscumque uoles in planum effundere muros./ his aries actus disperget saxe lacertis./ illa licet, penitus tolli quam iusseris urbem./ Roma sit (1.383-86). He thinks of himself as the body to Caesar's will. Indeed his language is very corporal (e.g. dum movet haec calidus spirantia corpora sanguis 1.363; also 1.369, 376-78ff). Moreover again and again he says it is Caesar's place to will
and command (duc 1.367, tua classica 1.372, iubeas 1.377, uoleg 1.383), while it is his and the troop's function to listen to and bring this will into action (iussa sequi 1.372, audiero 1.373). Laelius' address to his general is indeed appropriate (1.359). For, as Jupiter is Rector Olympi, so Caesar is maxime rector for his troops.\textsuperscript{10} The poet shows the effect on the whole body through their response. They give their assent to what Laelius has said and thus their assent to Caesar's will. In doing so their assent is likened to the wild north wind with all its destructive force. The men have become Caesar's hands. Before we discuss the psychological implications of this we should consider another aspect of the lines.

Caesar's speech has undone the bonds which unite Laelius and his fellows to the rest of humanity. Caesar has distorted their natural orientation toward family and state (οὐκείνος). This is the point of Laelius' exclamation: nec ciuis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar,/audiero (1.373–374). Laelius is no longer a ciuis Romanus — indeed he is no longer a ciuis (the natural state of a man) he simply belongs to Caesar. Lucan emphasizes the depth of Caesar's control when he has Laelius declare: pectore si fratriis gladium iuguloque parentis/condere me iubeas plenaque in viscera partu/coniugis, inuita peragam tamæ omnia dextra...
(1.376–378). So it is that Laelius rejects family and more importantly parental love (his father's toward him and his own toward his unborn child) — the very basis of society. This, as we have seen above, is contrary to nature. Caesar the destroyer strikes not only at the state but the very impulses which bind it together. He has perverted his men's nature. This image of Caesar is in stark contrast to that which Lucan presents of Cato in book two.

That Lucan intends the two passages to be considered together is indicated by the structural symmetry of the Curio–Caesar–Laelius set of speeches with the Brutus–Cato–Marcia set. Moreover the entire thrust of the later set of speeches is to show Cato as a force which aims to bind society back together. Central to his speech to Brutus is the wish that somehow he alone could receive all the nefas of civil war and leave his fellow man intact (2.311ff). It is not by accident that Cato chooses as his simile for his concern over the state a father grieving for a dead son (2.299–303). The image arises from the central point of ὀμηρωσεῖς: parental love is the basis for patriotism. The point of Cato's simile is that as love extends from family to state so too do the other aspects of love, especially grief (dolor) at the loss of a loved one. Indeed Lucan himself
returns to the image when he later notes: \textit{uni quippe uscat studiis odiisque carenti/ humanum lugere genus} (2.377–378). The image shows Cato functioning as he should — as a Stoic wise man.

Moreover, there is another very striking contrast. While Laelius is part of Caesar's body, Cato is part of the cosmos' body. Indeed, his argument for his participation in the war rests on the proposition that he as a part of Rome must participate in her conflagration (the civil war) just as all men as part of the cosmos must participate in the universal conflagration. Thus, while Caesar causes civil war by making other men an extension of himself, Cato, because he is an extension of that which Caesar wishes to make over into his own image, must fight.

Lucan reinforces this with the Cato–Marcis exchange (2.326–49). The episode among other things focuses attention on Cato as family man — again the basis for one's relationship to the state. The contrast with Laelius is striking. For where Laelius rejects all duties from family to country, Cato accepts all of his duties beginning with the family. Indeed the first point of the scene made with reference to Cato is that he has done his duty to Rome by the procreation of three children, and to Stoic
doctrine by sharing his wife's fruitful womb with another wise man (2.329-33). Lucan brings Cato the binder into sharper contrast with Caesar the destroyer by means of the marriage itself. For at the outset he notes:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{...et tempora quamquam} \\
\text{sint aliena toris, iam fate in bella uocante,} \\
\text{foedera sola tamen usque carentia pompa} \\
\text{iura placent sacrisque deos admittere testes.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(2.350-353)

The contrast is indeed fitting. At the very moment \textit{(iam)} Caesar is dissolving the bonds which unite humanity and Romans, Cato is binding the bond which gives rise to the state. The poet reinforces this image through the use of \textit{foedera} and \textit{iura} — words which have considerable political color.

When Lucan concludes the wedding scene he moves back to the larger aspects of \textit{olaetius}. He reports in lines reminiscent of the development which Cicero's Cato gave to the doctrine (cf. \textit{de fin} 3.20.67):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{...hi mores, haec duri inmota Catonis} \\
\text{secta fuit, seruare modum finemque tenere} \\
\text{naturamque sequi patriaeque ipendere uitam} \\
\text{nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(2.380-383)

Whereas the disposition of Caesar's character drove him to
destroy the world, Cato's would lead him to die for it. In these lines Lucan outlines the nature of the Stoic sage — that is Cato. His mind is well ordered. He does not make others serve him but rather he serves them. It is in this last point that Lucan's Caesar is most clearly a Stoic fool — he treats others as an extension of his own being. This returns us to the psychological aspect of the Curio–Caesar–Laelius episode. For as was the case with Curio's and Caesar's speeches the image which underlies Laelius' speech (and indeed the poet's treatment of the troops' response) is one which comes from Stoic psychological theory. At this point a brief review of the salient points of Stoic ethical and psychological theory will aid the discussion.
For Hellenistic philosophy since Aristotle, the central question of ethics was the τέλος of life — what is life's sumnum bonum. Most schools answered "to live with ευσεβία". They differed, however, about how to attain it. Those systems which evolved from the Cynics responded that a life in accordance with nature was the answer. This was the position of the Stoic founders. Virtue, they held, was the τέλος of life; virtue was to live according to nature. Zeno's formula was, ὀμολογομένως γίνεται, which Cleanthes further explained by adding the κατὰ φύσιν. Chrysippus put it in its final form as κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὀλὴν φύσιν συμβαλλόντων γίνεται (To live in accordance with the experience of those things which happen in accordance with universal nature). Chrysippus' use of the word ἐμπειρία is important. It implies a faculty which can understand — reason. Thus to live in accordance with nature is to live according to reason. The faculty which allows a man to do this is his soul.

Unlike the Platonists and Peripatetics, the Stoics saw the soul
as a single unity. They did not divide it into a rational part at war with
the irrational part of the appetites. It was for them one unit. The soul's
only function was to be rational. Moreover they saw the soul as a body;
it could not be incorporeal and affect matter. This single body of the
soul which flowed from the heart throughout the rest of the body had
eight parts, the ηγεμονικόν (the governing part which gave the soul
its personality), the five senses, the voice, and the power of
procreation. They used the spider and its web as a metaphor for the
relationship of the ηγεμονικόν to the other seven parts. The other
seven parts were extensions of the ηγεμονικόν.

A very important aspect of Stoic psychology is that there can
be no purely mental acts. The soul is physical; its functions are physical.
Those things which others held to be spiritual processes or abstractions
they held to be the ηγεμονικόν in a certain condition or state (πῶς
ἐχον ἐστιν ηγεμονικόν or animus quodammodo se habens). That
is to say, virtue, justice, courage, even knowledge are simply the
ηγεμονικόν in a certain state. Indeed, rationality and irrationality
are both states of the ηγεμονικόν. This is also true in the case of
This brings us to the role which emotions played in Stoic psychology. For all emotion is judgement. The Stoics held emotion to be the expression of the state of the soul (rational or irrational) in the body. As the ἐγκυμονεῖν makes a judgement it takes on a certain state. This state is reflected in its body through ὀρμαί. Ὑπάρχουσαι are the movements of the body in response to the ἐγκυμονεῖν's taking on a state. If the ἐγκυμονεῖν is rational, that is, functioning in accordance with nature, the body will manifest three types of ὀρμαί. They are χαρά, βουλησίς, and εὐλαβεία, the three εὐπαθείαι. If however the ἐγκυμονεῖν is defective, it will make a false judgement, take on an unnatural state and produce ὀρμαί which are excessive or out of control. These types of ὀρμαί the Stoics called the four πάθη — λύπη, φόβος, ἐπιθυμία, and ἁσθενή. They liken the body controlled by the εὐπαθείαι to a man walking while the body subjected to πάθη is like a man running or a child stumbling. Thus the body takes on the character of its ἐγκυμονεῖν. The rare man, whose ἐγκυμονεῖν is in accord with nature and is ἀπαθής, they call a wise
man. All others are fools (S.V.F. 3.668).

This is indeed how Caesar relates to his troops. He is their ἄγωγοι; they are his body. They are the physical expression of his ira. One may see that point for point Laelius' speech reflects the effect which the Stoics conceived ira to have: the disregard of duty to the gods and to the family (Seneca, De ira 1.1.2; 1.21.1), the ruin of the state (1.2.3), the headlong rush (1.7.4; 3.1.4). Indeed so frequent and exact are the points of similarity between Laelius' speech and Seneca's outline of the effect of ira that they tempt one to envision Lucan composing his speech with his uncle's book before him.

Though a generation later Epictetus provides a similar image of the tyrant (1.29.9-12). ὁμέρι οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διδάσκετε καταφρονεῖν τῶν βασιλέων; μὴ γένοιτο. τῆς ἡμῶν διδάσκειν ἀντιπολείσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὃν ἐκείνου ἔχουσιν ἐξουσίας; τὸ σωμάτιον λάβε, τὴν κτίσιν λάβε, τὴν φήμην λάβε, τῶν περὶ ἐμὲ λάβε. ἂς τινὰς τούτων ἀναπείθω ἀντιπολείσθαι, τῷ ὅπιτε ἐγκαλεῖτο μοι. νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων
Here the tyrant controls through fear. Moreover it is the judgements of others which he wishes to control. He seeks to become their "tyrannus". This is identical to Caesar's modus operandi.

Lucan uses this image of τὸ ἡγεμονικόν and the body of Caesar's relationship with his troops through out his poem. It is a major point of contrast with his presentation of Cato. Lucan nowhere better demonstrates this contrast than in his use of ira.
In the *Bellum Ciuile* one can distinguish roughly two uses of the word *ira*. The first broadly reflects what the Greek Stoics meant by ὑπηρέτησις -- that emotion which arises when one perceives that he is denied that which he thinks is rightfully his (e.g. 2.93; 3.133). The second is the irrational rage which usually though not solely arises from the former -- like the rage of a wild beast or battle lust (e.g. 4.267; 6.487). *Ira* is, as one would expect, a major motivating force in the *Bellum Ciuile*. Many of its effects are commonplace. It frequently overcomes fear (7.103) and fear's effect, *dubium* (5.256ff). It can sweep away *pietas* (7.629). Indeed, *ira* compels men to act in ways which are contrary to custom and tradition (7.802ff), as well as to exhibit strength and motivation which is beyond their natural disposition (2.521; 3.614). It is often linked with *amor mortis* (4.267ff) and *amor belli* (2.323ff). In short it is part of the essence of war. Lucan however avoids the merely banal commonplace by his careful use of the word (as understood by Stoic psychology) to portray his characters. We shall provide two examples to demonstrate Lucan's general use of the word before examining the poet's uses of it in the context of Caesar and Cato.
The first example is in book four. Here during the Spanish campaigns, Caesar had reduced the Republican forces to obvious defeat. When the Republican troops had perceived this, the poet reports, \textit{ut leti uidere uiam, conversus in iram/ praecipitem timor est... (4.267–268)}. Caesar, recognising their state of mind, realized that he would be foolish to engage them as they only sought to kill and be killed. Thus he ordered his troops to avoid the fray. \textit{deserat hic ferox mentes, cadat impetus amens,/ perdant uelle mori (4.279–283)}. His insight into the nature of their \textit{ira} was correct. Denied a voluntary death, and the chance for revenge, reason displaced their \textit{ira}. \textit{inde, ubi nulla data est miscendae copia mortis,/ paulatim fugit ira ferox mentesque tepescunt... (4.283–284)}. The poet further explains this process in the simile of a wounded warrior after the heat of battle has subsided: \textit{tum frigidus artus/ alligat atque animum subducto robore torpor... (4.289–290)}. This refers to both the physiological and psychological effects of a fatal wound.

There are several aspects of this episode which reflect Stoic teaching. The first (little more than a matter of common sense) is that \textit{ira} is self-destructive.\textsuperscript{32} Of greater import is its ability to overcome fear.
The Stoics held that *ira* was the strongest of the *nērôs* and as such could drive all other *nērôs* from the mind. It is headlong, irrational and uncontrolled. Caesar's definition of it as *feruor* and *impetus amens* is apt. Seneca compares it to a body hurled from a precipice falling out of control once the emotion is allowed to develop. But whenever time is afforded for thought, it always cools.

A good example of the effect of time on emotion is provided by Curio's reflections as he prepares to attack Varus.

```
...uariam semper dant otia mentem.
eripe consilium pugna: cum dira uoluptas
ense subit presso, galeae texere pudorem,
quis conferre duces meminit? quis pendere causas?
qua stetit, inde fauet; ueluti fatalis harenæ
muneribus non ira uetus concurrere cogit
productos, odere pares.

(4.704-710)
```

Here Curio fears that if he allowed his men time to think, they might conclude that they have no cause to quarrel with the Pompeians. Thus he resolved to hasten battle and strip them of reason with an *ira* like the battle lust of the gladiators. In doing so, he demonstrates one of the major functions of *ira* in the poem — its use in all of its aspects (especially by Caesar) to control men.
This use of _ira_ to control men in war is of particular importance to the Stoics. For there were those who objected to the Stoic rejection of _ira_ on the grounds that it was needed to control and motivate people in war. Indeed there were those who argued that this was the best motivation for men at war.\textsuperscript{36} This, however, the Stoa utterly rejected. Seneca states the case well: "sed aduersus hostes," inquit, "necessaria est _ira._" nusquam minus; ubi non effusos esse oportet impetus sed temperatos et oboedientes.\textsuperscript{37}

In the _Bellum Civile_ _ira_ is very much a part of Caesar's being. Caesar for the poet is somewhat less than human; he is bestial. Lucan's use of _ira_ is central to his image of Caesar the beast. Indeed it is because these emotions control him that he is an animal. Often Lucan likens Caesar to an animal. There is considerable literary tradition for this. Indeed Homer makes careful use of "noble" and "ignoble" animal similes. For Lucan, however, animal similes are generally ignoble — that is irrational. For even those animals which Homer (and convention) uses as "noble" lack the _ratio_ that is necessary for virtue — which is, for the Stoics, the only good.\textsuperscript{38} It is important to note that Lucan only likens Cato to a human being.
Again Seneca (de ira 2.16.1) provides an interesting parallel.

"animalia" inquit, "generosissima habentur, quibus multum inest irae." errat qui ea exemplum hominis adducit, quibus pro ratione est impetus; homini pro impetu ratio est.

The poet first uses ira at 1.146, where he cites it and spes as the forces which drive Caesar. He notes that Caesar is fierce and untamed, where his spes, where his ira call him he brings his force (acer et indomitus, quo spes quoque ira uocasset, ferre manum). The words acer et indomitus suggest an animal metaphor. Caesar is like an animal, subject not to reason but to the expectation that his desires be fulfilled and to wrath should they be unfulfilled. Moreover Seneca uses these words to describe ira and its effect upon men. He, like Lucan, compares men whom ira has affected to wild animals. Indeed he even says that animals are better; for, unlike men, they do not feed on their own kind. Lucan develops this image of Caesar as a savage animal driven by ira throughout the poem. A few episodes will illustrate this.

As Caesar rushes across the Alps with his mind intent on the
coming war (1.183ff), he is paralyzed by the palpable manifestations of fear at the vision of Roma and her admonition to halt (1.192ff). Soon, however, he regains his control and after a patriotic invocation sets before Roma herself his case: "I have been and shall be your soldier, but Pompey has pushed me into war. Whatever I do, it is his wrong" (1.200-203). He, thus absolved in his own eyes of guilt, proceeds to unleash war upon the world: *inde moras soluit belli* (1.204). The poet then compares Caesar to a lion:

> ...sicut squalentibus aruis  
aestiferae Libyes uiso leo comminus hoste  
subsedit dubius, totam dum colligit iram;  
mox, ubi se saeuae stimuluit uerbere caudae  
erexitque iubam et uasto graue murmur histu  
infremuit, tum torta leuis si lancea Mauri  
ahereat aut latum subeant uenabula pectus,  
per ferrum tanti securus uolneris exit.

(1.205-212)

With this Lucan paints Caesar's answer to Roma as bravado to whip up his *ira* — Caesar himself is an irrational beast filled with blind rage at being denied what he perceives as rightfully his. So goaded he sets aside all law (1.225ff). Unlike the lion's, however, Caesar's bravado was short-lived; he scrupled and needed another goad to excite his *ira* — Curio.

> ecce, faces belli dubiaeque in proelia menti
urgentes addunt stimulus cunctasque pudoris
rumpunt fata moras: iustos Fortuna laborat
esse ducis motus et causas inuenit armis.

(1.262-265)

Here Fortuna goads Caesar like an animal. The word *stimulus* literally means a "goad for driving cattle". Fortuna "goads" Caesar into action by sending Curio to him. By this time, Caesar had reflected and his *ira* had dissipated; Curio designed his speech intentionally to stir Caesar's *ira* at being denied his triumph. Henceforth that *ira* — stirred by his justification to Roma and set full aflame by Curio — never subsided. He never again weighed the issues; he never again scrupled. Like the lion in his lunge, Caesar cannot turn back.

For the poet, *ira* reduces Caesar from a man to a beast, who is no longer conscious of his own self-interest — only of his rage at loss. In a simile at 10.443ff, Lucan again illustrates the unfocused self-destructive effect of *ira* upon Caesar. Here Caesar, trapped within the city walls of Alexandria, becomes a caged animal. The poet notes:

... tangunt animos iraeque metusque,
et timet incursus indignaturque timere.
sic fremit in paruis fera nobilis abdita claustris
et frangit rabidos praemorso carcere dentes...

(10.443-446)
There is another side to Caesar's *ira* in the *Bellum Civile* — his use of it to control others. The episode at the Druid grove (3.399–452) demonstrates this aspect well.

In book three, a sacred grove comes between Caesar's *ira* and Massilia. His *ira*, as is normal, erases all thoughts but that it be satiated. Thus he impiously orders the grove (saved in previous wars 3.427) to fall. When, however, because of their reverence (*uerenda*) Caesar's men falter, he grabs an axe and strikes the nearest tree. Lucan describes the effect.

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{...tum paruit omnis} \\
&\text{imperiis non sublato secura pauore} \\
&\text{turba, sed expensa superorum et Caesaris ira.}
\end{align*}
\]

(3.437–439)

The men act because they know and fear Caesar's *ira*. Their *pietas* yields to Caesar's *ira* whose effect is more immediate than the gods. Beyond this, however, Caesar's *ira* sets him apart from men. For it compels him to go beyond the limits which Nature has set; he even attacks the divine. Indeed that which for the poet makes him sub-human, to his men makes him super-human. It is the magnitude of Caesar's *ira* which they fear; this keeps all in check.
Another aspect of *ira* is its ability to make men act in unnatural ways. A good example of this is, of course, Pharsalus. Here as the poet is detailing the carnage which Caesar's troops inflict upon their fellow citizens, friends, brothers, and fathers, Lucan notes *in propria persona* that Hannibal would have had a better regard for the propriety of human convention than did Caesar, with whose behavior he claims nature herself to be displeased (7.799–811).

This contrast between Caesar and Hannibal is noteworthy, especially when one remembers Caesar's complaint as he himself crossed the Alps. *non secus ingenti bellorum Roma tumultu/ concutitur, quam si Poenus transcenderet Alpes/ Hannibal* (1.303–305; cf. Ariminum's complaint, 1.254). Indeed, Rome's dead would have been accorded more human dignity. Caesar's *ira* now ruled him, erasing his sense of duty (*ritus*), and decency, and his humanity (cf. Cordus 8.765). This is even more pointed when it is recalled that Seneca (*de ira* 2.5.4) used Hannibal at Cannae as the example of *ira* at its worst. He reports that when Hannibal saw a river filled with blood he exclaimed "*O formosum spectaculum!*" But even he is less subject to *ira* than Caesar.
Here the poet carefully balances Caesar's neglect of his duty as a man with Nature's effort to rectify it. Lucan clearly sets Caesar outside the bounds of Nature. With his allusion to the Stoic conflagration Lucan demonstrates the stupidity of Caesar's unnatural behavior. Caesar can only see or understand what his \textit{spes} and \textit{ira} show him. All that he does is directed by them. But those things after which his \textit{spes} luster, and for which his \textit{ira} inflicts suffering upon his fellow men, are inconsequential. They, like him, will perish. Nature will make all men equal. In this the poet makes an appeal to the Stoic doctrine of the unity of man. For, after death there is no personal Fortuna.

\begin{verbatim}
...quicumque tuam fortuna vocabit, 
hae quoque sunt animae: non altius ibis in auras, 
non meliore loco Stygia sub nocte iacebis. 
libera fortunae mors est...
\end{verbatim}

(C.7.815–818)

Caesar's mad quest for power, his \textit{spes} and \textit{ira}, control him. They drive him to act self-importantly contrary to Nature. But at the end of life, there is no Fortuna – only Natura. At the end of time all the things which Caesar's \textit{ira} drove him to slaughter and destroy will be no more. This for Lucan is the real horror of Caesar's \textit{ira}.

Caesar governs his men with, and is governed by, \textit{ira}. This is
not the case with Cato. Reason rules Cato; Cato governs with reason. He seeks to instill rationality in his men. Even in battle, he, as the Stoic sage, would prefer that they fight for the right reason than that they fight with martial lust. Like Cromwell, he would rather that his soldier "knows what he fights for and loves what he knows."

The first mention of \textit{ira} in association with Cato is the effect of his speech to Brutus (2.323–325). These lines follow Cato’s response:

\begin{quote}
...sic fatur, et acres
irarum mouit stimulos iuuenisque calorem
excitât in nimios belli ciuilis amores.
\end{quote}

Here Lucan reveals his knowledge of the historical Brutus. For Brutus was well known to be a fiery person. Indeed when Cicero reports to Atticus Brutus’ conversion to the Pompeian side, he worries that Cato’s nephew was too excessive in his new found passion for Pompey, whom he had begun to hate with equal fervor far too recently (\textit{ad Att.} 11.4a). Whatever the historical reason, both Cato and Caesar produce \textit{ira} in those who were earlier affected by \textit{dubium}. With Caesar, however, it was his own \textit{ira} which inflamed the men. With Cato, it was his steadfast dedication to \textit{libertas}. Moreover, with the word \textit{stimulus} Lucan pointedly calls to mind the Curio–Caesar exchange. There Curio was the goad; here Cato is.
Though his words move Brutus to *ira* rather than *ratio*, the episode reveals several important differences between Cato and Caesar. The first is the cause for either being *securus* or free from *dubiurn*. For Caesar, it is *ira* (1.205ff). For Cato, it is reason (2.241ff). Another important point of contrast is their view of humanity. To Caesar, other men exist for him. Thus he treats those who will submit as extensions of his will and those who resist he destroys. The only duty he knows is that of other men toward him (5.339ff). Cato however sees all men as his brothers with whom he shares duties. He does not allow them to be his master nor is he theirs. He would that they and he have but one master, reason. (2.239–241; 310ff).

Nowhere is this difference better demonstrated than in Cato's treatment of Gnaeus Pompeius' *ira* when he sought to avenge his father's murder by killing all who lived in Egypt. In grief, Gnaeus declared:

```
...has mihi poenas
terra dabit; linquam uacuos cultoribus agros,
nece, Nilus cui crescat, erit, solusque tenebis
Aegypton, genitor, populis superisque fugatis.
```

(9.161–164)
His *ira* affects him as Caesar's does. It would cause him to act violently against both gods and men. Cato, however, unlike Caesar, did not rejoice in another's *ira* nor seek to use it, but rather he restrained it. *sed Cato laudatam iuuenis conpescuit iram* (9.166). Even though his *ira* had just cause, it was nonetheless contrary to Nature and thus destructive. Cato knew that the interest of the Republican forces was not in Egypt but in the west, and so he reasoned with young Pompey. *Ira* does not motivate his army, nor will he allow it to motivate him.

This was how the Stoics viewed the wise man's attitude toward *ira*. He was to exclude it from his being and expel it from others. He was to be like a physician to the state and men and cut out *ira* as a cancer.43 The wise man, the Stoics held, will not tolerate *ira* in others or himself.

The poet further contrasts Cato with Caesar, when a little later in book nine Cato, as he sets out across Africa, comes to the city of Cyrene. This city, as Massilia had done to Caesar, refused to open her gates to him. But unlike Caesar, Cato was not overcome by *ira*.

proximus in muros et moenia Cyrenarum
est labor; exclusus nulla se uindicat ira,
poenaque de uictis sola est uicisse Catoni.

(9.297–299)

For Cato the reduction of Cyrene was a task (labor), not an act of vengeance. He used force no more than reason required to perform that task. He did not allow himself to be inflamed with ira.

Indeed only once does Cato manifest an emotion which the poet labels ira. During his march through the desert, the army happen upon a little water, only enough for one drink. This one soldier takes up into his helmet and offers to Cato. Not knowing what is in the helmet, Cato takes it and instantly becomes inuidiosus (9.505). The poet then, after giving Cato's response, describes his reaction. sic concitus ira/ excussit galeam, suffecitque omnibus unda (9.509–510). Ira affects him for very different reasons than in the case of Caesar's ira. By holding the water Cato is denied what is rightfully and of necessity his — the respect of his men. This he restores by a single act. All will suffer what fate puts before them equally. The emotion is one of the επιθετικ – βουλησις. Indeed Seneca (de ira 1.16.7 ff) speaking of the wise man notes... <sc sapiens> sentiet leuem quendam tenuemque motum; nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum ulus sanatum est, cicatriz manet.
sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras affectuum, ipsis quidem carebit. He elsewhere laments that, unlike Greek, Latin lacks other words to express the differing types of *ira* (1.4.2).

Moreover the passage serves a literary function. Indeed the entire episode is a *topos* drawn from the life of Alexander the Great. And immediately following it is the Zeus–Ammon episode (9.544–86). Thus the helmet episode marks the beginning of Lucan's efforts to compare and contrast Cato and Alexander. Like Alexander he is a great general. Unlike Alexander, he is a *sapiens*. There are also many antecedents for a hero being affected by *ira* at a crucial point.

Lucan is careful to show throughout that Caesar motivates and controls his men with *ira* while Cato restraining his men's *ira* and seeks to replace it with *ratio*. Indeed because of their nature, they are different types of commanders.
One of the more striking contrasts between Lucan’s Cato and Caesar is the way in which they command an army. Two episodes demonstrate this well. Indeed, as will be shown, the poet intends his reader to contemplate the relation between these two episodes — Caesar at Placentia, and Cato during Tarcondimotus’ revolt. Both mutinies challenge the right and/or power as well as the ability of the leader to lead, both men respond in different ways. As Caesar is returning from his Spanish campaign, his troops begin to complain that they have not been treated well. The poet says that they are finally tired of bloodshed and laments the peace which might have been (5.243). The poet notes that their refusal to fight not only challenges Caesar’s authority, but that more importantly it ends his ability to wage war, for his men are the instruments through which he may exercise his will. Without his men, Caesar is a cripple with his arms amputated (tot raptis truncus manibus... 5.252). The metaphor is clearly physical and returns to an image which Lucan often uses of Caesar’s relationship with his troops, mind and body. Only now, that body which Caesar had poetically gained at the Rubicon — of which he is τὸ νεκροῦ — is in rebellion.
The reason that the men are no longer submissive to Caesar's \( \pi v \sigma \nu \gamma \) is that they are controlled by a \( \pi v \dot{\omega} \sigma \zeta \) of their own. Indeed, they make three complaints which show their perception of the denial of their due, the very definition of \( \text{ira} \). They complain that they are dying but Caesar is getting the glory, 5.266–67). They then note that he has not paid them as they thought he should, arguing that Caesar should have allowed them to sack Rome. \( \text{quos hominum uel quos licuit spoliare deorum} \) (5.271)? After all, he had promised them spoils (\( \text{spe trahis} \)) which he has not yet given. They reason that he is no longer any better than they. For they assume that Caesar's authority rests on the state. Thus, when they crossed the Rubicon, Caesar lost his \( \text{imperium} \) over them. Indeed on the Italian side of the Rubicon they were no more than partners in crime. \( \ldots \text{Rheni mihi Caesar in undis/ dux erat, hic socius; facinus quos inquinat sequat} \) (5.289–90). Their third complaint was that he credited Fortuna for their efforts (5.292). Indeed, they argue that Caesar owes to them all that he has achieved. For they have made Caesar. And it is by their grace and in accordance with their \( \text{ira} \) that Caesar fights (5.293–95). His body is clearly seeking to control him.
Caesar's response is to confront his troops at the peak of their ira. He does not want it to subside, he only wants it to be his. Their ira must reflect his will (5.301-310). uult omnia a se saeua peti... (5.308). Indeed, it is noteworthy how much this passage recalls the speech of Laelius (esp. 304ff). Caesar seeks that his troops be nothing more than an extension of himself. His body must return to its former state of submission. The poet again clearly envisions Caesar and his troops as a body when he laments, non pudet, heu, Caesar soli tibi bella placere/ iam manibus damnata tuis? (5.310-311)

In his speech, Caesar answers them point for point. He first calls their bluff: "Here I am; kill me" (5.319-321). He then shames them (5.322-324), and answers their argument that they are responsible for his victories (5.325-327). They are wrong; Fortuna has made him. He then appeals to their spee; he will prosper with or without them, while they can prosper only with him (5.328-332), for he is great and they are nothing. Their loss does not matter to him. He is the ocean, they the river; he does not need them (5.333-339). Put bluntly:

...an uos momenta putatis
ulla dedisse mihi? numquam sic cura deorum
se premet, ut uestrae morti uestraeque saluti
fata uscent; procerum motus haec cuncta secuntur:
humanum paucis uiuit genus.

(5.339-343)\(^47\)

He concludes by returning to his efforts to shame them (5.343-353) again accusing them of greed (5.355ff).

Caesar’s body has now become rebellious and needs to be brought back into submission. This speech is as effective as his earlier one was. …tremuit saeua sub uoce minantis
uolgus iners, ununque caput tam magna iuentus
priatum factura timet, uelut ensibus ipsis
imperet inuito moturus milite ferrum.

(5.364-367)

The poet again returns to the image of the body. Once again Caesar is the active principle, caput; the troops the inert matter (iners) which he moves. He wills; they do. Though Caesar’s claims are nothing more than boasts (minans) when one reflects upon the reality of their relationship (cf. 5.249-251), his soldiers believe and therefore are the extension of Caesar’s will. His men are not driven by their own ira but by Caesar’s.

This is very different with Cato. Indeed the poet does not use the body metaphor to describe Cato’s relationship with his troops.\(^48\) It
would be unRepublican; Cato is simply primus (with a touch of the divine) inter pares. As the news sinks in that Pompey is dead the Pompeians decide to quit. Having lost their ἄγελοικον, they are no longer a coherent body. They wander about loudly in disorder fremit interea discordia vulgi (9.217). Then the king of Cilicia calls for their return home in a scene reminiscent of Iliad 2.155-210. But here as there the war (and epic) is not over; it is just beginning. Cato rebukes them as Pompeians recalling Pompey's extraordinary command against the pirates so as to shame them (9.222ff). The speech which follows is telling. It picks up on Cato's rebuke. For, as Pompey had indeed conquered the east, so many of those who were in his army were his clients. They pointedly tell Cato "we have fought for Pompey, he is dead, we have done our duty, now we will go home" (cf. 9.227ff). Indeed the speaker concludes by reminding Cato (as Brutus had) that Caesar, not Pompey, held the fasces, implying (again as Brutus had suggested some might 2.276-77) that Cato is fighting just because he likes civil war. "We are Pompey's clients - why is it that you fight" (9.249-251). Cato's response is that libertas, as it were, is his patron.

His speech can be summarized by his famous opening lines:
Ergo pari uoto gessisti bella, iuventus,/ tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti,/ non Romana manus? (9.256–258). The thrust of the speech is that with Pompey dead now they are free to fight not because they owe their blood to another man but because they are free men striving to remain free:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{...nunc causa pericli} \\
\text{digna uiris. potuit uestro Pompeius abuti} \\
\text{sanguine: nunc patriae iugulos enesque negatis,} \\
\text{cum prope libertas?}
\end{align*}
\]

(9.263–265)

He concludes his speech by shaming them. Cato calls them o degeneres, and o fumi turpes, who are willing to be property bequeathed from one master to the next (9.274–275). Indeed since they are so base, he invites them to kill himself.

This last recalls how Caesar began his speech at Placentia with an invitation for his troops to kill him. Moreover it is every bit as effective as Caesar's speech, for the troops submit. Only here it is not to Cato's ira but to reason. They resolve to fight for libertas. Both Caesar and Cato begin with their troops in revolt (Lucan uses tumultus to describe them in both cases 5.300;9.252)\textsuperscript{63} and bring them into submission. Their methods are very different. Moreover the poet reinforces this in his
metaphors. For Caesar he likens to a wild beast whose ira instills fear in all. But Cato he likens to a bee-keeper and a pastor. This is an apt distinction. For Caesar drives his men with animal passion unbridled with ratio, while Cato provides his men the example to follow. He shows them how to submit themselves to ratio.

This chapter has focused on Stoic ethical theory and through a close reading of the text has attempted to demonstrate that the Stoic doctrine of olistoûc is central to Lucan's characterizations of Cato and Caesar. Moreover, it has dealt at length with the emotion of ira and has attempted to show that Lucan's assumptions about its effects reflect Stoic dogma. The following chapter will examine the poet's characterization of Pompey.
Notes


54
3.) De fin. 3.5–6. The doctrine underwent some change of emphasis in the later Stoa. The first Stoics were very interested in the physics of it. The Roman Stoics as a whole (ignoring the physics) were more concerned with its application to ethics generally and specifically to its implications about one's relationship to society at large; cf. H. Hunt, "The importance of Zeno's physics for an understanding of Stoicism during the Roman Republic," *Apeiron* 1 (1967), 5–14.

4.) See below, section E: *Ira*, for a discussion of παθητήρ; for more on the distinction between a wise man/right choice and fool/wrong choice see Chapter 3 on the καθηκόντα. This whole process is related to sense perception — that is, to the recognition of the distinction between katalectic and non-katalectic presentations; cf. F. Sandbach, "Phantasia kataleptike," in Long, *Problems*, (above, note 2), 9–21.

5.) As we mentioned above, this was more a matter of concern for the Roman Stoa than the earlier School. Cicero, *De fin.* 3.19–22, is the major ancient treatment of the Stoa's position. Stob. 4.671ff. is also valuable. For modern discussions see: Pembroke, "Oikeiosis" in Long, *Problems*, (above, note 2), 117, 125ff.
6.) Cicero ends this passage by noting: **Cynicorum autem rationem atque uitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui eiusmodi forte casus inciderit ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.** This may have as much to do with the ascetic mode of life which the Cynics followed as with their notion of the **Κόσμον Πολιτας** and consequent rejection of family and state.

7.) There is, of course, precedent for Lucan's treatment of Cato and Caesar as exempla of different types of **vir**tus; cf. Sallust's **synkrisis** ([B. Cat. 53–54]).

8.) Scholars have given much attention to the lines. They have been well and diversely explicated. E.g., R. Getty, "Lucan and Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon," *The James Sprunt Studies* 46 (1964), 73–81, has an interesting suggestion that Roma is not the personified patria but the deified empire; W. Goerler, "Cäsars Rubikon-Ubergang in der Darstellung Lucans" in *Studien zum antiken Epos*, 291–308; E. Narducci, "Cesare e la patria (Ipotesi su Phars. 1. 185–192)," *Maia* 32 (1980), 175–178, who sees in the crossing a reference to Drusus (Dio 55.1.3.); E. Narducci, "Allusività e autodemistificazione. Lucano 7.254–263," *Maia* 28 (1976), 127–128 for how
Lucan ties the episode to the battle at Pharsalus; H. Glaesener, "Un mot historique de César," AC 22 (1953), 103–105, who argues that Lucan gives one of the best (i.e. truest) accounts of the episode in antiquity. For Caesar generally in the Pharsalia see M. Schioppa, Caesare nella Pharsalia di Lucano (Portici della Torre 1942).

9.) In the present case, the most important point is that it is a sub-class of \(\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\varrho\nu\mu\iota\alpha\), SVF 3.395. That is, it is an expression of lust. Also SVF 3.398 ties it closely to ambition. Seneca, De Ira 1.3.2, quotes Aristotle's definition (De Anima 403a.30) approvingly. Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostris abest; ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi. Also at 1.21.1ff Seneca cites ira with other types of \(\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\varrho\nu\mu\iota\alpha\) (luxuria, avaritia, libido, ambitio).

10.) cf. 2.4; 5.620.

11.) Aristotle sets the question in EN 1094a18ff. The Stoics (Cicero, De Fin. 3.21), Sceptics (D.L. 9.107), and Epicureans (D.L. 10.128) phrase the question in much the same way. J. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Albany 1970), 161ff, has a useful discussion of the development of the
Stoic position from its antecedents.

12.) SVF 1.179.

13.) SVF 3.12. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa² (Göttingen 1959), 2.67f notes Cleanthes' addition. See also Gould, (above, note 11), 163.

14.) SVF 3.12. ὁλη ὕσις is the same thing as κοινὴ ὕσις. See Gould, (above, note 11), 165f. Chrysippus has two distinct meanings for κοινὴ ὕσις. In natural philosophy, it is that irresistible Force of Nature. In moral philosophy, it is that part of man which is uniquely man, i.e., reason.

15.) SVF 3.16.

16.) A useful discussion is J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969), 256–272. See also Gould, (above, note 11), 126–133. Posidonius' statement in SVF 3.461 is an effort to defend his unorthodox (indeed Platonic) position. The orthodox position is the unity of the soul. See Rist, 26; Gould, (above, note 11), 189–192.
17.) In SVF 3.175, Plutarch contrasts the Stoic (Chrysippus) position with the Platonic.

18.) SVF 2.790.

19.) See Rist, Philosophy, (above, note 16), 24ff.

20.) SVF 2.879.

21.) Pohlenz in BPW 1 August, 1903 p. 971, reports the analogy. See Gould, (above, note 11), 129 note 1. SVF 2.885 indicates that Chrysippus at least regarded the parts of the soul as the extensions of the ἄγωγον τοῦ ζητοῦντος.


23.) Seneca, EM 113.2.

24.) SVF 2.823.

26.) SVF 3.384, 462, 476–479.


28.) All of these are ways in which Stoics express τὰ ἠθήν. See SVF 3.379–390.

29.) SVF 3.391.


32.) Seneca, De Ira 3.3.2. This it is not totally beside the point. For the Stoics held that ira was never an appropriate response to a situation. But there were those, e.g. the Platonists, who held that there was at times a place for this emotion in moderation. Seneca is arguing that ira is never appropriate; cf. De Ira, 1.20.1.

33.) De Ira, 2.36.6; 3.1.4.

34.) De Ira, 1.4.1–2; 1.7.4. The Stoics held ira to be a product of reason. Indeed without reason there can be no ira see De Ira 1.3.4.

35.) Voluptas is the Stoic πάθος ηθούτη. It differs from επιθυμία in that it is the expectation of a future good, while επιθυμία is the
perception of a present good.

36.) So Seneca reports Aristotle to believe. "ira," inquit Aristoteles, "necessaria est, nec quicquam sine illa expugnari potest, nisi illa inplet animum et spiritum ascendit; utendum autem illa est non ut duce sed ut milite" (De Ira. 1.9.2.)

37.) De Ira, 1.11.1.


39.) Spes, as ira, is a sub-class of ἐπιθυμία.

40.) Seneca, De Ira, 1.9.3; 3.8.7.

41.) De Ira, 1.1.6; 1.9.3; 1.17.7; 2.16.1 ff; 3.8.7; 3.23.1–2.

42.) De Ira, 2.8.3.
43.) De Ira, 1.6.1-5; 1.20.1; cf. Persius Sat. 3.


46.) See chapter 1, section D, above.

47.) Seneca's comment (De Ira 2.11.2), quoting Laberius about the need of those who use fear and ira to control others, is instructive: necesse est multos timeat quem multi timent. For a discussion of Lucan's inventio in this speech, see A. van Stekelenburg, "Lucan and Cassius Dio as heirs to Livy. The speech of Julius Caesar at Placentia," AClass 19 (1976), 43-57.

48.) He uses this metaphor of both Pompey and Caesar.
49.) Note that Cato calls his troops *comites* (9.390) and insists that there is no difference between himself and them (9.402).


51.) R. Syme’s argument (*Roman Revolution* [Oxford 1939], 31, note 6) that Labienus went over to Pompey because of a patron–client relationship is instructive.

52.) The poet’s use of *regens* with Republican Cato is something of an oximoron. Lucan wishes to underscore Cato as the regulating factor.

53.) Note that when Seneca describes the effect of any παχή on the body he uses similar words: *cum clamore et tumultu et totius corporis*
54.) Seneca in several places throughout his *De Ira* notes that animal metaphors are the best ones to apply to angry men (e.g. 1.1.6; 1.17.7). Observe that he likens Alexander in rage to a lion (2.23.1–2) as Lucan does with Caesar. Indeed this may be one more of the Alexander–Caesar parallels which are in the *B.C.*

55.) For a general discussion of Cato in book nine see G. Voegler, "Das neunte Buch innerhalb der Pharsalia des Lukан und die Frage der Vollendung des Epos," *Philologus* 112 (1968), 222–268; R. Shoaf, "Certius exemplar sapientis viri. Rhetorical subversion and subversive rhetoric in Pharsalia 9," *PhQ* 57 (1968), who argues that there are parallels with Apollonius giving the march a mythic quality; J. Aumont, "Caton en Libe (Lucain, Pharsale 9.294–949)," *REA* 70 (1968) 304–320 for geography etc.; M. Morford, "The Purpose of Lucan's Ninth Book," *Latomus* 26 (1967), 123–129, notes the importance of the passage for showing Cato as an exemplum of Stoic virtue. Moreover, his argument for the structure of the ninth book (beginning with Cato's reaction to Pompey's death and ending with Caesar's) shows a conscious effort of the poet to reflect Stoic
This chapter will examine Lucan's conception of Pompey. It will demonstrate that, as Lucan saw in Caesar the Stoic fool and Cato the Stoic sage, so he envisioned Pompey as the Stoic proficiens. Pompey's status is important for the poem. Indeed the fact that Lucan (or for that matter the Latin language) had no other word for "Republican" than *Pompeianus* makes Pompey until the battle of Pharsalus synonymous with the Republic. For this reason Lucan must purge (at least poetically) Pompey from his past as a partisan of Sulla and a fellow triumvir with Caesar and Crassus. Before considering the poet's treatment of Pompey, an understanding of how the Stoics defined a proficiens is necessary. For the misconception of the proficiens as one who continually must make progress in virtue has clouded the reader's perceptions of Lucan's purpose in treating Pompey as proficiens. We must also consider two letters of
Seneca's which deal with the proficiens — E.M. 75 and 94 — especially since the former has played such an important part in the discussion of Pompey's status in the poem."
A: The Stoic Doctrine

The Stoics from Zeno on divided adult humans into two classes — the fools and the wise men. They distinguished the sage from the fool by the disposition (habitus, ἀρχηγός) of the wise man's soul which was in perfect harmony both with its own true nature (οἰκείωσις) and Nature (φύσις). Thus he could not make a mistaken judgement and was therefore ἀπαθής. The distinction between the wise man and fool did not rest on what either one happened to know or do, but on how it was known and how it was done. For the Stoics, the deed did not matter, but the attitude of mind. The fool and wise man could do the same deed, yet only the wise man's deed would be morally right (κατορθωμα), for only he had right reason. The κατορθωματα belonged to the sage alone.

The rest of mankind — anyone who had ever made a mistake — the Stoics classed as fools. The nature and number of follies did not matter since all follies were equal. Anyone who was not perfect was a fool. Chrysippus used the simile of a drowning man to describe mankind's
plight. The fellow who is an arm's length from the surface is in no way better off than one on the floor of the ocean. In practical terms however, the Stoics (including Zeno and Chrysippus) did recognize a difference. While in absolute moral terms all fools fell short of moral perfection, there were some fools who were drawn toward moral perfection and were in a state of advancing toward virtue. This type of fool the Stoics labeled a προκόπτων or proficiens.

In discussing the proficiens, it is important to keep in mind this distinction between the moral discussion of the wise man and the practical discussion of the fool. To reflect this distinction the Stoics introduced the concept of the αδιάφορα — acts and things which are neither morally good (κατορθώματα) nor morally bad (καρμαρτήματα) but indifferent with regard to virtue. They divided the indifferents into three classes: 1) the primary indifferents or προπονυμένα which are things and actions in accord with man's native inclination toward reason (πρωτού ὀλεθνοῦ) and thus synonymous with τὰ κατὰ φύσιν — e.g. pleasure, health, wealth, riches, avoidance of pain; 2) the secondary indifferents which are things toward which a man is neither inclined nor disinclined — e.g. shaving, bathing, walking; 3) the ἀποπροπονυμένα
which are actions and deeds which men have a native inclination to avoid -- e.g. pain, death, poverty. As the \( \kappa \alpha \tau \rho \sigma \omega \mu \alpha \tau \alpha \) belong to the \( \sigma \alpha \pi \iota \epsilon \varsigma \) and virtue, these indifferent acts are the province of the \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \) and everyday life. It is his treatment of these indifferents which separates the \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \) from other types of fools. It is through his selection of more and more \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \) that he demonstrates that he advances.

To guide the \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \) toward a recognition of \( \tau \alpha \kappa \alpha \tau \alpha \) \( \phi \iota \omicron \omicron \omega \nu \nu \), the Stoics wrote treatises "On appropriate acts" (\( \pi \rho \omicron \iota \ \kappa \alpha \theta \iota \kappa \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) which largely provided \( \pi \rho \omicron \alpha \kappa \epsilon \psi \eta \pi \omicron \tau \nu \alpha \) -- rules apparently in the form \( \text{hoc vitabis, hoc facies} \). They were not intended to cause the \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \) to think or to understand better any given situation but only to reinforce his natural rational inclination by making appropriate actions (\( \kappa \alpha \theta \iota \kappa \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \)) a matter of habit. As he became more consistent in his selection of the \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \), the \( \pi \rho \omicron \gamma \iota \mu \epsilon \nu \alpha \) soul would become more and more in harmony with Nature. He could then be taught how to recognize the right choices in a situation himself. Thus he would make fewer and fewer mistakes of judgement; his emotions would abate until finally, without realizing it, he would become a wise man. This is the
orthodox (i.e. Chrysippean) view of the proficiens. Seneca (F.M. 94.48)
quite clearly sets out the orthodox position when he sets up an objection
to the doctrine and gives a defense:

"philosophia," inquit, "diuiditur in haec, scientiam et habitum
animi. nam qui didicit et facienda ac uitanda percepit,
nondum sapiens est, nisi in ea quae didicit, animus eius
transfiguratus est. tertia ists pars praepiendi ex utroque
est, et ex decretis et ex habitu. itaque superuacua est ad
implendam uirtutem, cui duo illa sufficiunt." isto ergo modo
et consolatio superuacua est, nam haec quoque ex utroque
est, et adhortatio et suasio et ipsa argumentatio. nam et
haec ab habitu animi compositi ualidique proficiscitur. sed
quamuis ists ex optimo habitu animi ueniant, optimus animi
habitus ex his est; et facit illa et ex illis ipse fit.
In his 75th epistle, Seneca presents his own view of the proficiens. It merits careful exposition. The appropriate passage begins in section 8.

Seneca begins by noting in a quite orthodox manner that only the wise man is happy (beatus). He too notes in an orthodox manner that the proficiens is still a fool, yet he quite rightly notes that he is (in practical terms) better off than the ordinary type of fool. nam qui proficit, in numero quidem stultorum est, magno tamen intervallo ab illis diducitur. He then notes that some (ut quibusdam placet) divide the proficientes into three classes. The first class is comprised of those who do not yet possess wisdom but are close to it (qui sapientiam nondum habent, sed iam in vicinia eius constiterunt). In Seneca's view (theory A), these are those who 1.) have set aside all emotions and vices (adfectus ac uitia), 2.) have learned the προπνευμα (quae erunt complectenda, didicerunt), 3.) they cannot backslide (unde non est retro lapsus), 4.) but are unaware of their perfection (scire se nesciunt).
Seneca next gives an alternate (quidam...dicant) view of the characteristics of those who comprise this highest class (theory B). It is made up of those who 1.) have escaped the disease of the mind, but not yet the emotions (effugisse morbos animi, adfectus nondum) and 2.) therefore can backslide (adhuc in lubrico stare) since only the wise man is immune (nemo sit extra periculum malitiae, nisi qui totam eam excussit). This may reflect the orthodox position. Indeed the use of Chrysippean language\(^\text{17}\) in the concluding words seems to indicated this — nemo autem illam (sc. malitiam) excussit, nisi qui pro illa (that is adfectus which is the periculum malitiae) sapientiam adsumpsit.\(^\text{18}\) In any case, whatever the origin of the two theories, according to theory B, the person whom Seneca (theory A) places in the first class would not be a proficiens at all, but rather one who has just become a wise man.\(^\text{19}\)

Seneca then digresses (11–12) on the distinction between morbus animi and adfectus to explain further the second view.\(^\text{20}\) He treats diseases of the mind first as before, giving two definitions, the first is his (note the first person in finiam): diseases of the mind are 1.) a prolonged perverted judgement so that something is strongly desired which should be mildly desired (iudicium in prauo pertinax, tamquam ualde expetenda sint,
For emotion, Seneca offers the only Stoic definition: impulses which are excessive and get out of hand. It is also important to note that whereas a morbus is a constantly present condition, an affectus is intermittent.

Having finished his digression, Seneca returns to his classification of the proficiens. The second class is comprised of those who 1.) have set aside both the greatest evils of the mind as well as the emotions (maxima animi mala et affectus deposuerunt) but 2.) they are not in full control (ita sit, ut non sit illis securitatis sua certa possessio) thus 3.) they can backslide (possunt enim in eadem relabi). Seneca's third and lowest class are those who have overcome many of the greatest vices but are susceptible to many others.
Thus in this epistle Seneca presents two different systems for classifying the proficiens, that is, a three-level system and what amounts to a two-level one. The former proficiens shows the "advance" by suppressing ever more vices, the latter by being brought to stamp out first the diseases and then emotion (that is false judgement) with reason. Again in his 94th epistle (94.13) Seneca, while outlining Aristo's objections to the entire doctrine of a proficiens, very clearly sets forth the distinction between the two systems:

duo sunt, propter quae delinquimus: aut inest animo prauis opinionibus malitia contracta aut, etiam si non est falsis occupatus, ad falsa procluis est et cito specie quo non oportet trahente corrumpitur. itaque debemus aut percurare mentem aegram et uitiis liberare, aut vacantem quidem, sed ad peiora pronam praeoccupare.

Whatever their origin and differences, there are two points which the systems share that one should not forget when considering Lucan's treatment of Pompey. The first is that in either system a proficiens can backslide — in the "orthodox" system (theory B) any proficiens, in the "Senecan-Posidonian" system (theory A) all but the highest level of proficiens. The second point is that a proficiens need not always be making progress. This is extremely important for our discussion. A proficiens can stand still. Indeed any man is a proficiens
who has overcome some of his vices and is not entirely ruled by emotion. Thus for Lucan to make Pompey a proficiens all he need do is to show that Pompey has set aside any vice which he formerly had had, or more pointedly that his character is such that while he is not a wise man, he at least is not an utter fool. In the world of the poem, this can be done by portraying him as falling between Cato, the wise man, and Caesar, the fool.
C. Pompey, the triumvir.

No one can question that when Lucan first discusses Pompey he is not meant to be seen as a virtuous man. Indeed, the poet notes that he is a man whose ambitions and pride had plunged Rome into internecine war (1.98ff). He is pointedly linked with Caesar both politically through Crassus (1.99-106) and personally through Julia (1.111-18). It is the dissolving of those links which is the historical and personal cause of the war. Moreover the poet's image of Pompey is a fear-filled man fleeing from before the very mention of Caesar's name and infecting all whom he passes with that fear (1.521-22). Lucan highlights just how much alike Pompey is to Caesar in his famous characterization of the two men (1.120-57).

Lucan aims with the passage to contrast Pompey's passivity with Caesar's action. Indeed, this is the basis for Lucan's characterization of the two throughout the poem. But underlining the characterization and similes is the notion that both men suffer from the same πάθος — only different aspects of it. That πάθος is καταναία. Caesar suffers from the more aggressive form, ἱρα (ἢρα), Pompey from the more passive
Indeed as *ira* was Caesar’s primary ιράς, so Pompey’s is *amor*. Pompey’s *amor* and his mastery of it will be discussed below. But suffice it here to say that at the outset Lucan believes that the two surviving triumvirs not only share blame for the war but also suffer from the same psychological defect, ιππαθία.

Seneca provides an intriguing parallel to Lucan’s introduction. In epistle 94, he has the voice of reason explain to the *proficiens* that those who seek to dominate others are themselves dominated by the ιππαθία. At section 64, along with Alexander the Great and Marius, he instances Pompey the Great and Caesar as exempla. The passage is worth quoting at length.

ne Gnaeo quidem Pompeio externa bella ac domestica uirtus aut ratio suadebat, sed insanus amor magnitudinis falsae. modo in Hispaniam et Sertoriana arma, modo ad colligandos piratas ac maria pacanda uadebat. hae praetexebant causae ad continuandam potentiam. quid illum in Africam, quid in septentrionem, quid in Mithridaten et Armeniam et omnis Asiae angulos traxit? infinita scilicet cupidio crescendi, cum sibi uni parum magnus uideretur. quid C. Caesarem in sua fata pariter ac publica inmisit? gloria et ambitio et nullus supra ceteros eminendi modus. unum ante se ferre non potuit, cum res publica supra se duos ferret.

The parallels are striking. Indeed in both passages, the villains
are affected by the identical aspects of $\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu$. Seneca's phrase insanus amor magnitudinis falsae has the same point as Lucan's famaeque petitor/ multa dare in uolgus (1.131-32) and stat magni nominis umbra (1.135). Moreover the point of infinita scilicet cupido cresendi, cum sibi uni parum magnus uideretur must have the same intent as Lucan's tu, noua ne ueteres obscurant acta triumphos/ et uictis cedat piratica laurea Gallis/ Magne, times (1.121-23). For Caesar too, Seneca's gloria et ambitio et nullus supra ceteros eminendi modus reflects the same aspect of $\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu$ as te, iam series ususque laborum/ erigit inpatiensque loci fortuna secundi (1.123-24). Indeed, the point of the summary sententiae are the same: unum ante se ferre non potuit, cum res publica supra se duos ferret and nec quemquam iam ferre potest Caesarue priorem/ Pompeius parem. Seneca, like Lucan, believes both Caesar and Pompey to be suffering from different aspects of $\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu$. With Pompey's first speech, Lucan presents us with a view of this folly-filled (in the Stoic sense) man in action. Indeed, the poet constructs the whole episode both to equate Pompey with Caesar in foolishness and to show that Pompey is liable to the same $\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu$ as Caesar, although in a less aggressive, more passive form.
At 2.526–27, the poet introduces Magnus as nescius. nescius interea capti ducis arma parabat/ Magnus, ut inmixto firmaret robore partes. Not an auspicious introduction. The adjective is emphasized; both Magnus and nescius stand at the beginning of their lines. Moreover, Pompey's intent calls to mind Agamemnon's disastrous "trying" of the troops (Iliad 2.1 ff.). An unknowing Pompey is compared to a foolhardy Agamemnon. Both make a mistaken judgement. The foolishness (in the Stoic sense) of this is enhanced when one reflects upon Lucan's other echo of the same Homeric scene — Cato's restraint of the fleeing troops (9.215ff). Here Pompey is the foolhardy Agamemnon; there Cato the wise Odysseus. Moreover, one must not forget that there Cato restrained his fellow troops with reason, in clear contrast to Caesar's control of his troops through ira. Pompey is acting like Caesar, not Cato. Indeed he attempts to make his men the extension of ira (temptandasque ratus moturi militis iras) as Caesar had done earlier (1.291ff). But as the passage shows, ira is not Pompey's state of mind; ignorance (nescius) and indecision are. The result cannot be the same as that produced by Caesar's speech. While still fools, Pompey and Caesar are different. Their bodies will reflect this difference. As the poet notes, Pompey's troops perceived his fear (metus), so that they were afraid. As he had been
defeated by the *fama* of a coming Caesar, so they now fall victim to a
*fama non uisi Caesaris* (2.598–600).

The simile which follows the speech is important (2.601–09).

*pulsus ut armentis primo certamine taurus
siluarum secretà petit uacuosque per agros
exul in adversis explorat cornua trunçis
nec redit in pastus, nisi cum ceruice recepta
excussi placuere tori; mox redditu uictor
quoslibet in saltus comitantibus agmina tauris
inuito pastore trahit: sic uiribus inpar
tradidit Hesperiam profugusque per Apula rura
Brundisii tutas concessit Magnus in arces.*

Pompey is likened to a broken bull withdrawing into the countryside to
renew his strength. In Stoic terms, at least as defined by Seneca, the
implication of having an animal analogue is clear.\(^50\) Pompey is a fool.
Moreover, Lucan reinforces this poetically. When Cato is first introduced
before the troops he is a man, Caesar an animal. Pompey the broken bull
and Caesar the Olympian charger clearly belong to the same class of
humans, except that one manifests the outward and more aggressive
emotions, the other the more passive. Another point to notice is that the
issue of the simile is rule over the herd. So it is with Pompey and
Caesar, for whom the issue is rule over Rome. Moreover the bull returns
to rule the herd *inuito pastore*. The bull (Pompey) will seek to extend his
own animal will over the herd not the rational will of the pastor (Cato).

Lucan's clearest indication of Pompey's state of mind is given in the speech he puts in Pompey's mouth. In this speech (2.531–95) Pompey demonstrates his mistaken view of reality culminating in his belief that Rome is an extension of himself. It is crucial for our understanding of Pompey as proficiens to see how these aspects of Pompey's character manifest themselves. For it is precisely these points which Pompey shares with Caesar that will become central to Lucan's treatment of Pompey.

Pompey opens his speech by exhorting his troops to act (2.531–33). They are scelerum ulores melioraque signa secuti — indeed they are the uere Romana manus. He next elaborates on the justness of their cause (2.534–40). Pompey then provides exempla chosen to demonstrate that the hand of fate is always against those who take up arms against the state; they need not fear (2.541–52). Then Pompey turns to his own part in the affair (2.552–68).

Lines 552–54 form his transition:

... Parthorum utinam post proelia sospes
et Scythicis Crassus victor remeasset ab oris,
ut simili causa caderes, quoi Spartacus, hosti.

Even though Pompey's cause is just, he would rather someone else bear the burden. He suggests Crassus, the victor over Spartacus, would have been a fitting general to go against Caesar. The rhetoric is subtle. Caesar, whom Pompey has already labelled worse than villainous (550-54), is now likened to a slave. (Note that the hostis is emphatic) But the introduction of Crassus undercuts Pompey's argument. Pompey is claiming to be the purest representative of Rome's old Republican constitution, yet Crassus calls to mind Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, the triumviri. Moreover Spartacus' defeat would have other overtones. It was after this that Pompey was given a triumph (for his victory over Sertorius) without having held office. He thus recalls a charge leveled against him by Caesar (1.315 ff.). Both Crassus and Caesar rose entirely within the constitution. It was Pompey who excelled outside the constitution. With this, Pompey's speech changes tone.

Until now, Pompey has stressed the rightness of his cause. His aim is rightly to stir the troops to patriotic fervor and action. Now, he focuses on himself. Rome disappears; Pompey is ever present. This is
underscored in lines 555–56 when Pompey boastfully exclaims, te (sec. Caesarem) quoque si superi titulis accedere nostris/ iussuerunt... This is exactly what Caesar claimed Pompey was after (1.338–40).

To ease the fears of his men (and poetically to answer Caesar), he begins to address the charges which Caesar brought against him. At first, he makes cogent points. 1.) That he was weakened by peace: disces non esse ad bella fugaces,/ qui pacem potuere pati (2.568–69; cf. Lucan’s words at 1.129 ff., Caesar’s at 1.324–26). To live in peace is not a vice. 2.) That he was too old and worn out: licet ille solutum/ defectumque uocet.../ dux sit in castris senior, dum miles in illis (2.559–61). It is not his body that is needed, but his experienced generalship. These two charges his rhetoric brushes aside. 3.) Then he says something quite revealing:

quo potuit ciuem populus perducere liber,
ascendi, supraque nihil, nisi regna, reliqui.
non priuata cupis, Romana quisquis in urbe
Pompeium transire paras.

(2.562–565)

As he develops his line of reasoning — that he is indeed fit to command — he turns to the point of his status within the constitution. He says, firstly, that he and he alone is at the summit of the Roman state, and secondly that to go beyond his position is to become a tyrant. This
demonstrates what the poet (like Seneca) has already said. Pompey could not bear an equal (1.125–26). Caesar, too, cites this as one of Pompey's motives. Pompey does not wish any one to outshine him. nunc quoque, ne lassum teneat priuata senectus,/ bella nefanda parat suetus ciuilibus armis... (1.324–25). Pompey now demonstrates that there is a core of truth in Caesar's rhetorical evaluation of him.

Moreover, Pompey has in his reasoning equated himself with Rome (2.564–67). This gives a different color to all his previous lofty talk. Indeed one becomes unsure as to whether for Pompey, it is Pompey not just Rome, or Rome not just Pompey, who has been outraged. He now returns to a point which he had made earlier. Whoever challenges Rome is destined to fall (2.544–46). Now, however, this has been expanded to mean that whoever challenges him is destined to lose. Indeed to emphasize this the poet now has him appeal to his own luck. non tam caeco trahis omnia cursu,/ teque nihil, Fortuna, pudet (2.567–68). Pompey now claims that Fortuna cannot be all that fickle. In this he is like Caesar, for both men rely on their own personal Fortuna or luck (cf. for Caesar, 1.225; for Cato, who follows fate not Fortuna see 2.285–87).
Pompey next turns to address his men's fears about Caesar's skill. Through a series of rhetorical questions, he seeks to belittle Caesar's accomplishments (2.569–65). He then caps his rhetorical questions by asking if Caesar takes his boldness from the people's "flight to arms". Here as before, his speech turns to his own ego. For with it he claims that it is not fear of Caesar, but rather love for Pompey which brings them out of Rome. *heu demens* non te fugiunt, me cuncta secuntur (2.575). This exclamation is doubly disastrous. Firstly it undoes the effect of Pompey's series of questions. For the people did flee in fear (1.514ff). All those present know it. Secondly, it reveals again Pompey's pride as well as his desire to be loved (cf. 1.131–33; 1.314–15; 7.7 ff.). He has again demonstrated that he feels, not that he is Rome's servant against Caesar, but that Rome fights for him against Caesar.

He provides more evidence of this in the final part of the speech (2.576–595). His aim is to contrast his accomplishments with those of Caesar. Yet, following on what has preceded, his words sound little more than boasts. They again reveal Pompey's pride. Though outwardly he may be more Republican than Caesar, his arrogance and aims are not much different (cf. Cato at 2.319–23). Throughout this section Pompey
notes that it is his laws and his standards (not Rome's) which the world fears (588, 592). Pompey's aims are little different than Caesar's. Let conquered peoples fear him (2.578, 588, 592; cf. 3.82–83). Moreover, Pompey claims to be Sulla felicior (582). The statement reminds all that he owes his beloved title, Magnus, to Sulla. Within the poem, this is an extremely shocking remark, for Sulla is synonymous with civil war, excessive bloodshed, and over-reliance on citizen-slaying Fortuna (cf. 1.113ff.). The very mention of Sulla's name evokes memories of Sullan butchery to "avenge" the wronged state and of Pompey's connection with it. Moreover Lucan has just devoted the first part of book two to the Sullanus terror. This plays into the hands of Caesar's rhetoric — et docilis Sullam scelerum uicisse magistrum (1.326, cf. 7.307 ff.). Pompey's last remark both summarizes his arrogance (he has done more than any other man can do) and reemphasizes his ties to Caesar and the triumvirate (socero, cf. 1.114ff.). quod socero bellum praeter ciuile reliqui (2.595)? Such is the pride which Pompey will show publicly. However in private he will show more. Indeed he had restrained himself in his address to his troops.

Lucan evinces Pompey's character flaws even more in the speech which Pompey makes to his sons (2.632–48). Having made
addressed his troops, Pompey turns to his sons. He begins by commanding them:

...mundi iubeo temptare recessus:
Euphraten Nilumque move, quo nominis usque
nostri fama uenit, quas est uolgata per urbes
post me Roma ducem.

(2.632-635)

He boldly says that the greatness of his own name is what makes Rome known. Rome follows in his wake. Rome is common when compared with Pompey. Lucan emphasizes this by the next line: post me Roma ducem. Pompey places Rome after himself and inside his personal world. It is not uncommon that a general should note how he had helped to make Rome greater. But Pompey implies that Rome's greatness rests on Pompey.

The structure of the speech reinforces this. As Lucan introduces the speech, he mentions the presence only of Pompey's son (631). Thus the tone of the speech might be taken as little more than fatherly bravado. But toward the end of the speech we learn that the consuls too were present (645). Pompey's arrogance and disregard for Republican form are magnified. He at first addresses only his son. Pompey places his family above the offices of the Republic. When he does address the consuls, he belittles them (this is the force of the at in
and emphasizes only the ceremonial aspect of their office (cf. 7.582): *at uos, qui Latios signatis nomine fastos...* Moreover, he expends thirteen lines telling his son where to collect Pompeian power. To the consuls he address four lines. Pompey has all the world; Republican Rome has only Greece.

At the end of the speech, Lucan returns to a tone which he had introduced earlier — the tone of Homeric-Vergilian epic. As Pompey leaves, the poet notes *omnes/ iussa gerunt solvuntque... puppes* (2.648-49). The significance of this will be seen shortly. For Pompey, like Aeneas, is soon to begin a voyage on which rests the destiny of Rome.

Indeed the first indication of this comes almost at the beginning of the poem. There the poet notes in his famous epigram: *uictrix causa deis placuit, sed uicta Catoni* (1.128). There must be something more morally right about Pompey's side; a wise man cannot make a morally relevant mistake. Yet Cato apparently chose the side which fate had declared must lose. Was Cato working against the divine order? How, we are left to ask, can it be that the sage Cato choses Pompey's cause? This very question troubles Brutus, who begs Cato to explain to him why it is
that Cato enters the civil war and, moreover, favors Pompey. Pompey after all is no different than Caesar; he would be a tyrant were he to win (2.134-284). Cato responds directly to the first part of the question but implies an answer to the second when he asks Brutus:

...quin publica signa ducemque
Pompeium sequimur? nec, si fortuna fauebit
hunc quoque totius sibi ius promittere mundi .
non bene conpertum est: ideo me milite uincat,
ne sibi se uicisse putet.

(2.319-323)

Why shouldn't I follow the emblem of the state and her general Pompey? It is a fact that if Fortuna does indeed favor him, he as well as (Caesar) intends to submit the entire world to his will, for that reason may he win with me as a fellow soldier that he may not think that he has won for himself.

Lucan's choice of words is very careful. Firstly he notes that Pompey is nothing more than dux of the Republican side. Cato enters on the side of the Republic (publica signa). But (Brutus has objected and the poet later will demonstrate) Pompey believes that the fight is between himself and Caesar over the possession of the Republic. Cato does not deny this, but he implies that there is hope. Cato hopes that he will be able to make Pompey see that he does not fight for himself but for the Republic. In short, he hopes that he will be able to correct Pompey's false judgement and put in its place right reason. It is for that reason (ideo)
that he enters the conflict, to change object of Pompey's allegiance from his own personal Fortuna to his fatherland. In Cato's view, Pompey is somehow better than Caesar. For, whether Pompey knows it or not, fate has chosen him as the Republic's champion.

The poet reinforces this in Pompey's introductory speech (2.531-95). Indeed while the major point there is Pompey's follies, the poet with one word recalls Pompey's position. The poet calls Pompey's voice ueneranda. This is a striking word. Lucan uses it only of things which relate to Rome's antiquity (real or mythic) or Republican offices and Pompey. For the poet, Pompey, tainted as he is, represents what is left of the glorious days of the old Republic. Pompey, the Republican leader is about to speak.

Again at the end of the speech, the poet in the middle of a very depressing simile of Pompey introduces a ray of hope (2.596-609). For the defeated bull goes off to renew his strength and return to fight. This has both dramatic and philosophical implications. For what Pompey lacks is not military strength but moral strength. So the poet implies that Pompey is teachable (Cato's implication), that his side is morally right
(Cato's declaration), and that he is the representative of the Republic. Pompey, however, as in other matters is nescius of this as well. This will change.

Indeed as he sets out on his ignoble escape from Brundisium,
Pompey prays to Fortuna.

dux etiam votis hoc te, Fortuna, precatur,
quam retinere uetas, liceat sibi perdere saltem
Italiam...

(2.699–701)

He still relies on his good luck. But he has put his faith in her unwisely.

...uix fata sinunt; nam murmure uasto
in pulpsum rostris sonuit mare, fluctuat unda
totque carinarum permixtis aequora sulcis.

(2.701–703)

Fortuna (who here is like the personal τηγαντις of Hellenistic kings) did not answer. Fate was the driving force. (The poet's own indignation is implied by the etiam.) Pompey still has faith in his own Fortuna. He still thinks that she loves him. But Fate has other things for him. Fortuna has deserted him.

...pelagus iam, Magne, tenebas,
non ea fata ferens, quae, cum super aequora toto
praedonem sequere mari: lassata triumphis
desciuit Fortuna tua.

(2.725–728)
Pompey does not yet realize that Fate has moved him elsewhere. Fortuna, which had favored him in accordance with Fate, finally grew tired of him. He had gone to sea a conqueror against the pirates. Now, however, he goes a refugee bearing with him his family and household gods (2.730).

Here Lucan brings the Vergilian ethos into full view.

...Cum coniuge pulsus
et natis totosque trahens in bella penates
uadis adhuc ingens populis comitantibus exul.
(2.728-730, cf. Aen. 3.11ff.)

Even though Pompey does not know it, he is a second Aeneas. He still thinks and acts as if he were like the old Pompey. But Fate has another purpose for him. He is to be the last representative of the Roman Republic. Driven by Fate (pulsus cf. profugus, Aen. 1.2), he will be the last commander of free Rome. To do so, Pompey must break with the past.
D. The "New" Pompey.

Lucan emphasizes this break at the beginning of his third book. As Pompey leaves the Italian shore, the poet notes that he alone has his eyes fixed back on the shore. *omnis in Ionios spectabat nauita fluctus:/ solus ab Hesperia non flexit lumina terra/ Magnus...* [3.3–5]. The symbolism cannot be lost. Pompey sits worn out looking at the shore. Caesar stands raging looking out to sea (3.46). Caesar has lost Pompey. Pompey is leaving Caesarism. They are physically and spiritually separating. Lucan is moving Pompey away from his past associations and preparing him to become the last general of the old Republic.

This image is reinforced by Pompey's dream of Julia. She chides her husband for having cut his ties with Caesar (*abscidis frustra fero tua pignora* 3.33). She reminds him of the glory which was his through those ties (*coniuge me laetos duxisti. Magne, triumphos* 3.20). But she says that that time is past. His fortune has changed with his new marriage (*Fortuna est mutata toris, 3.21*). As much as he would like to hold on to the glory and pleasure of the past he cannot. The ties to Caesar are now only insubstantial images: *sie fata refugit/ umbra per*
amplexus trepidi dilapsa mariti (3.34-35). He must move on. Fate has ruled that he must die. Lucan continues to treat Pompey in a Vergilian fashion, for the entire scene must call to mind both the Dido and Creusa episodes. Just as Aeneas must leave Creusa, Pompey must leave Julia. Fate forces both to serve Rome. With Julia and Caesar, Pompey's old Fortuna remains on the Italian shore. She is tired of her old consort having found a new paramour (cf. 2.725-728; cf. paelex 3.23). Lucan has now set the stage for Pompey to understand the world as Cato hoped he would.

The first pointed indication of this change is in a brief note at the outset of book five. There at Lentulus' urging the Senate makes Pompey its commander-in-chief. One might argue that the Senate (historically and poetically) was simply recognizing reality and putting the best possible face on that ugly tyrannical reality. But for Lucan, the events were more momentous. Indeed he interprets them to mean that Pompey has now become the Senate's servant and representative. This is the point of his declaration: docuit populos uenerabilis ordo/ non Magni partes sed Magnum in partibus esse (5.13). The word uenerabilis is noteworthy. This is the first time that Lucan uses it in the poem. He
uses it to indicate the just respect due to the Senate. Hereafter however, the poet only employs the word to describe Pompey. Pompey has become Lucan's symbol for the Senate — both of its virtues and vices. This change is more than just Pompey becoming a synecdoche for the Senate. For Lucan takes care to give Pompey a new psychological profile more suited to his new role.

This more Republican Pompey clearly manifests himself in book six at Dyrrachium. There the poet takes great care to differentiate between Caesar's and Pompey's psychological conditions. Caesar is out of control; Pompey is restrained. In Stoic terms, Caesar is manifesting the παθη and thus is filled with drives which are overactive and not bound by reason. His body reflects this by being in constant motion (e.g. 6.14). Pompey's impulsus on the other hand are bounded by reason. He is therefore more sedate (6.12). The lay of the land becomes a metaphor for their respective impulsus. Caesar wanders all over the open land inspecting his war works — frantically now here, now there (6.45ff). Pompey is at rest bound in and protected by his wall (6.12).

Lucan further differentiates the two through his choice of words
to describe their actions. Caesar's pathological (from a Stoic point of view) state of mind is represented by such words as praeceps and rapiendas (6.14). Lucan describes Caesar's condition at 6.29f. *hic auidam belli rapuit spes inproba mentem* / Caesaris. As usual, Caesar is in a state of *τενετημένα* which, before the episode concludes, bursts forth in its normal condition of *ira*. Indeed, when he discovers that Pompey has broken through his encircling wall, he becomes mad with rage, acts rashly, and allows Pompey to secure victory (6.278ff). Here, Lucan uses the wall as a metaphor for Caesar's state of mind. The broken wall which enrages Caesar reflects the restraint of his reason broken by his *impulsus*. *inuenit impulsos presso iam puluere muros/*...*mouitque furorem/* *ire vel in clades properat, dum gaudia (sc. Pompeiana) turbet* (6.280–284). A mistaken judgement (that to be killed making the enemy unhappy is good) broke down the restraining walls of right reason (*impulsos muros*) and Caesar became mad (*furor*). Lucan further emphasizes Caesar's pathology by contrasting it with the calm state of the Pompeians (*pax, quies, somnus* 6.281–282). Their control is the cause of Caesar's rage.

As is normal with Caesar's relationship to his troops, they reflect his state of mind. So it is that as Lucan likens Caesar's impulsive
raging to Scylla howling (6.64ff) he reduces Caesar's men to animals feeding on whatever the land affords (6.109–117). However the most striking reflection of Caesar is Sceeva. He epitomizes all that Caesarism does to a man.\(^5\) Indeed his body reflects Caesar's emotion: *perdiderat uoltum rabies, stetit imbre cruento/ informis facies* (6.224–225). This then is Caesar at Dyrrachium: Sceeva is an outward picture of Caesar's inner state.

The irony of the whole episode is pointed. For after Sceeva had collapsed, Lucan describes the reaction of Sceeva's friends thus:

\[
\ldots \text{labentem turba suorum} \\
\text{excipit atque uemeris defectum inponere gaudet;} \\
\text{ac uelut inclusum perfosso in pectore numen} \\
\text{et uiuam magnae speciem Uiritutis adorant.} \\
\text{(6.251–254)}
\]

This is what Caesarism does to *uirtus*; it perverts it. Moreover, such Caesarian *uirtus* destroys those who have it. They are not lifted to new moral heights, but rather used up (*defectum*) in Caesar's cause, they are lifted up and carried off — a dead reflection (*speciem*) of *uirtus*. The contrast between *uiuam* and *defectum* could not be more pointed. Caesar's *uirtus* destroys.
Lucan, however, presents us with a quite different image of Pompey. Indeed, throughout the entire episode, Pompey is in control of both himself and the situation. As Caesar was quick to act, so Pompey was quick to think. Lucan shows this no better than with his word play at 6.14–15. (sc. Caesar) Dyrrachii praeceps rapiendas tendit ad arces,/ hoc iter aequoreo praecipit limite Magnus. Caesar is hot headed (praeceps); Pompey anticipates him (praecipio). Moreover, as Caesar's state of mind is reflected in his troops, so too is Pompey's. His men are calm (2.281–282). Most strikingly they are ready to show compassion in the face of Caesarism at its worst. Poor Aulus believed Scaeva's plea for mercy (6.236). Lucan brings all these characteristics to a head at the climax of the battle.

While Caesar in his mad rage blindly charges, Pompey calmly brings his troops in from the flanks and encircles him (290ff). This suggests the psychological metaphor of the wall again. Caesar had tried to wall in Pompey, but lacked the self control. Pompey kept himself within the bounds of reason and so in the ends walls Caesar in. Moreover Lucan notes that after his victory Pompey restrained his men's urge to slaughter. usque uel in pacem potuit cruor: ipse furentes/ dux (sc.
Pompeius] tenuit gladios (6.300–301; cf. Caesar at 7.557–673). Clearly Pompey, their ἡγεμόνικον, is in a rational state. He is no longer subject to the type of τρεπωμένα which infects Caesar and had infected him earlier. He has recognized his duty to fellow Romans even when they are among the opposition. Moreover he has acquired Cato’s hatred for civil war. Indeed he himself says this (e.g. 6.322ff). Moreover, when pressed by his associates to return to Rome in Caesar’s fashion — as tyrant at the head of an army, he refuses.

..."numquam me Caesaris," inquit,
"exemplo reddam patriae, numquamque uidebit
me nisi dimisso redeuntem milite Roma.
(6.319–321)

This is all the more striking when one remembers the Curio–Caesar exchange. Curio’s stimulus moved Caesar’s already diseased mind to a πάθος reflected in his troops, which triggered the Civil War. Here Pompey receives the same stimulus but acts rationally to keep war away from Italy and Rome. Here in this one judgement at least Pompey is now in his proper rational state. His impulsus are rational; his body (i.e. the troops) is controlled. No longer does he want to possess Rome (let Caesar do that 6.328–329). He seeks to end the Civil War with as little bloodshed as possible. These are not idle words. He has just
demonstrated his sincerity. He is not perfect (e.g. the bravado at 6.322ff); but he is not the type of fool Caesar is. Lucan poetically emphasizes Pompey's status as proficiens through his association with Sulla (6.301-305). Lucan's use of Sulla and its adjective Sullanus is worth closer examination.

The name Sulla occurs thirteen times in the B.C., its adjective six. The word's primary connotation is of bloody civil war and recriminations which bleed Rome dry. Lucan's most extended treatment of Sulla is in the old man's speech of book two (2.68-232). After remembering Marius' bloody term at Rome, the old man reflects on Sulla's glorious return. He came back to avenge the state — however it was with slaughter in his turn. Sulla quoque inmensis accessit cladibus ultor (2.139). The old man acknowledges that Rome did indeed need treatment to excise its corrupt members, but Sulla went too far. He killed the patient (2.140-144). The poet gives a lengthy catalogue of exempla from the pax Sullana (2.171). Sulla's name is connected with mass slaughter — Sullanus cadauera (2.210). Even his title felix is soiled. For Fortuna granted it through the blood of his countrymen: "is this (i.e. slaughter) that for which Sulla is called saviour of his country, that for which he is felix?" hisne
103

salus rerum, felix his Sulla uocari... (2.221). For Lucan, Sulla's name also conjures up the image of tyranny. At 4.821 ff, Sulla felix is listed with Marius ferox, Cinna cruentus, Caesareae domus series as people who had taken it upon themselves to rule Rome through force: ius licet in iugulos nostros sibi fecerit ensis. This then is the color which the poet gives the name — war, death, and tyranny.

The first use of Sulla in connection with Pompey is also the first appearance of the name. It is at 1.326 in Caesar's speech at 1.299 ff. Here Caesar capitalizes on the name's bloodthirsty connotations and Pompey's connection with Sulla. While listing Pompey's wrongs against the state, he cites his association with Sulla as the climax of those evils. He exclaims, "Now once again, to escape the burden of an obscure old age, Pompey is planning unspeakable warfare. Civil war is familiar to him. He was taught evil by Sulla and is like to outdo his teacher et docilis Sullam scelerum uicisse magistrum (1.326). As the fierce tiger, who has drunk deep of the blood of slain cattle ... never after loses his ferocity, so too you, Magnus, once accustomed to licking the sword of Sulla, are still thirsty: sic et Sullanum solito tibi lambere ferrum/ durat, Magne, sitis (1.330–331). The message is clear; Pompey shared in Sulla's bloodbath.
Caesar elsewhere makes masterful use of Pompey's association with Sulla. Just before Pharsalus, he exhorts his troops to battle. Should, however, their strength wane and they think to seek mercy from Pompey, he warns them *cum duce Sullano gerimus ciuilia bella* (7.306). The adjective is sufficient. The name is synonymous with ruthless slaughter of a defeated foe. Pompey, Caesar says, is Sulla reincarnated. Pompey at one time would have taken this as a compliment.

Pompey in books one through four is proud of his ties to Sulla, who gave him his title "Magnus". In his first speech at 2.569 ff, Pompey emphasizes this pride. The poet constructs the speech to manifest Pompey's arrogance. Pompey plainly claims in the first part of the speech to have conquered the world not for Rome but for his own glory. As the poet has said in book one and Caesar in book two — Pompey seeks to be a tyrant. The poet had earlier noted that at the outset of the war there was no difference between Caesar and Pompey: The one could not bear an equal, the other a superior. Pompey now demonstrates this. Having catalogued his triumphs, Pompey caps them by saying "I am *Sulla felicior* (2.582). No part of the world have I left unconquered." As Caesar had said would be the case, Pompey seeks to outdo his bloody master.
With book five, this tendency toward tyranny subsides. Pompey, the triumvir of books 1 — 4, becomes Republican. The poet reflects this change in his use of Sulla. It first appears in our passage in book six. Indeed, after Pompey's victory the poet expressly notes that Pompey is no longer like Sulla. Pompey had restrained his troops from the internecine slaughter of Caesar's defeated men. The poet notes that he had acted correctly and justly, yet adds "if only a Sulla had won that victory Rome would have been felix and free from tyrants" (6.301-03). Pompey is Sulla no more. This state of affairs reflects a thirty-year development in Pompey's character. Lucan poetically reflects it by replacing Pompey, the arrogant bloodthirsty triumvir, with Pompey the Roman Republican general at Dyrrachium. Cato seems to confirm this when at 9.204-06 he says:

oolm uera fides Sulla Marioque receptis
Libertatis obit: Pompeio rebus adempto
nunc et ficta perit.

For he notes that, beginning with Pompey, Sulla, and Marius libertas in its true aspect had died, yet, while Pompey lived, Republican
"forms" at least were kept. But with Caesar's victory even the "form" of the Republic was brushed aside. In this way Pompey is indeed a grade better than Caesar.
E. Pompey and Caesar: An Image of Opposition.

It is a commonplace that Lucan makes Pompey a sympathetic character at the battle of Pharsalus. He is after all at the head of the Republican army and thus a tragic figure. But the poet presents Pompey as more than just a pathetic character to engage our sympathy. Lucan takes care to demonstrate just how much like Cato Pompey has become. This is most easily seen through Pompey and Caesar's speeches before the battle.

Indeed nowhere does Lucan make Pompey appear more like Cato. As Pompey saw Caesar's charge he recognized that this was the beginning of the end. Fate had begun to move. Thus as Cato declared of the sage witnessing the conflagration (2.290), Pompey stood overcome with awe (attonitus 7.340). Yet he does not allow this feeling to get out of hand; he reins in his fear (premit...metue 7.341). But more importantly Pompey appeals to his troops not to fight for him nor even for their selves but for their families:

...quisquis patrissm carosque penates,
Like Cato Pompey now sees the issue of the civil war to be more fundamental than just who will rule Rome. At stake is the very nature of human society. Lucan's choice of the word pignora is pointed. It expresses that duty which arises from the first impulse to love one's children. The stakes for which they fight are their children and through them Rome. This concept is central to Pompey's speech — he returns to and expands it at the end.

It is not Pompey for whom they should fight but their wives, grandmothers and old men. This is the other aspect of the foundation of society: their love for their parents. All this is summed up in Roma herself who, as she did before Caesar at the Rubicon, appears in fear of a master. It is noteworthy that this is Pompey's appeal to his troops. He does not, as he has done before, appeal to his own greatness nor to their...
duty to him. Now the issue is all of mankind — present and future. He now knows that before such an issue there is hardly room for him. He presents himself with his family as a suppllex. His only mark of worth is that which Rome has bestowed upon him, his imperium (7.376–79). For his own part he would not wish to be a slave: ne discam seruire senex (7.382). This is a very different Pompey from the one seen in book one.

The effect of the speech is reminiscent of that which Cato gave to Brutus (2.323–25). Indeed Pompey’s is in one way more successful. For while Cato’s had inflamed the youth to excessive desire for civil war and ira, Pompey’s speech lights his troops’ hearts with Romana virtus. While this is not true moral virtus, it is by far superior to that ira to which Caesar earlier had inflamed his troops and the virtus which it produces (e.g. Scaeva). For while Pompey’s troops burn (flagrant 7.383) and Romana virtus arises, Caesar and his men had been inflamed by lust for tyranny (flagransque cupidine regni 3.240).

More important, however, is that, in Stoic terms, their speeches are diametrically opposed. Indeed as Pompey encouraged his men to fight for family and Rome’s freedom, Caesar exhorted his troops to fight to
possess Rome and all that their hearts lusted for (omnia dum uobis liceant, nihil esse recuso 7.268). Indeed Pompey called for his troops to fight for a free people (libera...turba 7.375–76). Caesar, too, called for his troops to fight for a free people. But his freedom is perverse. It is his troops' freedom to work their will on the world: non mihi res agitur, sed, uos ut libera sitis/ turba, precor gentes ut ius habeatis in omnes (7.264–65).

Indeed Lucan with this speech returns to the theme of Caesar the destroyer. Only now it is in contrast to Pompey. Caesar reminds his men of the promise which they had made to him at the Rubicon. haec est illa dies, mihi quam Rubiconis ad undas/ promissam memini (7.254–55). He refers to Laelius' speech (1.359–86). The day has come, his men must recognize no bond but that which ties them to him. He seeks to soften the horror of this by claiming that for the most part they will be slaying non-Romans. Indeed he implies that they will be doing the world a favor by ridding it of such insignificant beings (pugnae pars magna leuabit/ his orbem populis 7.275–26). This strikes at a central tenet of oikeiosis — the essential relateds of all men. Indeed Caesar's view of the coming battle is the destruction of all government which does not derive from
...videor fluuios spectare cruoris
calcatosque simul reges sparsumque senatus
corpus et inmensa populos in caede natantes.
(7.292–294)

The word *sparsum* is meant to ease his troops fears. Only here and there will a Roman senator be killed but it reintroduces the central issue. Civil war is Roman against Roman. Caesar develops this at the end of his speech:

> uos tamen hoc oro, iuuenes, ne caedere quisquam hostis terga uelit: ciuis, qui fugerit, esto.
sed dum tela micant, non uos pietatis imago ulla nec adversa conspecti fronte parentes commoueant; uoltus gladio turbate uerendos.
siue quis infesto cognata in pectora ferro ibit, seu nullum uiolarit uolnere pignus,
ignoti iugulum tamquam scelus inputet hostis.
(7.318–325)

Thus while Pompey will conclude his speech with an appeal for his troops to remember their families, Caesar concludes his with an exhortation that his troops slaughter their families should they dare to oppose him. Caesar’s *clementia* only is for those who yield to Caesar. It is clear that while Pompey is not a Cato he is closer to Cato than to Caesar.
F. Pompey the lover.

So Pompey has come to recognize his proper relationship to the state. With the battle over the poet turns to another aspect of Pompey's life — his love for his wife. Indeed even though he had mastered (at least for a time) his relationship to the state, he continues to have great difficulty with the more personal aspect of ἐπιθυμία — amor. It should be remembered that the Stoics defined amor as a subclass of ἐπιθυμία. The Latin word amor, however, does not always correspond to the Greek ἔρως. Indeed, it often was used to reflect what the Greeks meant by ἕγκυμνησις, which is not a πάθος but an aspect of the ἐυπάθεια βουλήσις. Thus amor could be either a πάθος or an ἐυπάθεια.

So, too, Lucan uses amor in either sense. The distinction, of course, depends on the rationality of the impulse. When, for example, one desires peace (e.g. as Cato reports Pompey did 9.199), Lucan treats it as a virtue. Indeed, amor libertatis may be a just cause for war (cf. Cato's motives at 2.297ff and Lentulus' speech at 8.340ff). When the object is rationally chosen, Lucan will use amor in association with lex (e.g. 9.385) or virtus (e.g. 9.407). Indeed, such rational amor produces concordia (4.191)
and is itself synonymous with pax (1.61). This rational amor is, of course, the natural orientation of man's soul (οἰκείωσις). However, when the object chosen is not a rational choice, as for example sex for its own sake (10.75) or war for the wrong reasons (1.21, 5.303), then Lucan treats the amor as outside the law (8.398) and contrary to Nature and concordia (6.453, 459); this perversion of the natural orientation produces furor and rabies (10.70). The effect of irrational amor is generally grief (9.112ff), madness (10.70) and doubt (5.729). The Petreius episode in book four (4.157ff) provides an interesting example of the various aspects of amor and οἰκείωσις.

At the beginning of the episode, Caesar dispatches his men to cut off the Pompeians' retreat lest war escape him (4.157ff). When, however, his troops see the enemy face to face they realize the horror of what they are about to do (4.169-72). For a time, however, they are held by their usual fear of Caesar (4.172-74). But natural affection (οἰκείωσις) is stronger than Caesar's controlling force and his control dissolves. mox, ut stimuli maioribus ardens/ rupit amor leges (4.174-75). Here, Lucan returns to his image of τὸ ἄγεμονέν οὖν. Caesar has once again lost control of his body, this time to a stronger and more natural
impulse. With the presence of this rational amor, Lucan invokes Concordia, whom he calls o rerum mixtique salus mundi/ et sacer orbis amor (4.190–91). The troops' amor then is a reflection of this natural principle of harmony which holds the universe together and against which civil war is an outrage. That is, it is a reflection of the Stoic divine principle. The image is uniquely Stoic. Lucan, moreover, turns it into a very Lucanian paradox. Caesar's troops have broken the lex established by Caesar's παθεος in submitting to the lex established by Nature. But, in the perverted world of civil war, Lucan has inverted the normal definition of a παθεος. For a Caesarian, it is a παθεος to act in accord with nature. The impulse which Caesar's troops feel is the rational aspect of amor -- it is in accord with natural harmony and would end civil war.

The irrational aspect, however, quickly returns -- this time on the Pompeian side. Petreius, disturbed by the events, moves to restore discipline (i.e. Caesar's type of lex). The Pompeian Petreius acts like Caesar to inflame his troops with ira and thus overwhelm their natural impulses, and he undoes the foedera pacis which their Natural amor had produced (4.205ff). His speech is effective -- their amor is perverted. et omnes/ concussit mentes scelerumque reduxit amorem (4.235–36). Their
furor and rabies return. The simile which follows is pointed and pathetic:

sic, ubi desuetae siluis in carcere cluso
mansueuere ferae et uoltus posuere minaces
atque hominem didicere pati, si torrida paruus
uenit in ora cror, redeunt rabiesque furorque,
admoneaeque tument gustato sanguine fauces;
feruet et a trepido uix abstinet ira magistro.

(4.237-242)

The troops had for a brief moment risen out of the bestial state into which πειθήν had plunged them. They had become like men again. But ira had returned them to their perverted animal state. The language is reminiscent of Caesar’s description of Pompey (1.327ff), pointedly so, as it was a Pompeian who had returned his men to the horrors of civil war. In this episode, the poet demonstrates the perversion of the natural orientation in its broader sense — the state. Pompey, however, suffered from a different perversion of the natural orientation. The particular type of amor which most afflicts Pompey is that which one might call romantic love (ερως, venus or iustus amor).

The poet himself has provided a standard with which to judge Pompey as lover. Cato, as usual, sets the standard; Caesar provides the example of perverted behavior. After Cato had justified his participation in the civil war to Brutus (2.234–25), Marcia came to see him (2.326ff). The
focus of this passage, as was the case with the Brutus/Cato exchange, is family and duty to family (οἰκειώσως). The poet stresses that Marcia had done her duty to her husbands, family and the state:

\[
\text{interea Phoebo gelidas pellente tenebras}
pulsatae sonuere fores, quas sancta relicito
Hortensi maerens inrupit Marcia busto.
quondam virgo toris melioris iuncta mariti,
mox, ubi conubii pretium mercesque soluta est
tertia iam suboles, alios secunda penates
inpletura datur geminas et sanguine matris
permixtura domos...}
\]

(2.326–333)

Before she returned to Cato she had performed her final duty to Hortensius and mourned for his death, Marcia’s officium is meant to mirror Cato’s final duty to Libertas (2.297–303). Their respective duties arise from the same cause — their natural orientation (οἰκειώσως). Marcia’s duty as wife, and Cato’s duty as Rome’s father compels both to participate in the final rites. Moreover, Lucan takes pains to make it evident that Marcia has performed her duties in accord with Stoic doctrine. For he pointedly refers to the Stoic teaching about a wise man sharing his wife for the sake of procreation (2.328–333). The poet’s intent is clear: Marcia is on an equal footing with Cato. Although the scale is different, they both know their duty and discharge it.
Indeed Marcia herself appeals to Cato on the basis of duty. She notes that she has fulfilled her duty to bear children (2.338-41) and requests that she be allowed to share Cato's duties: ...in euris uenio partemque laborum (2.347). Marcia knows what is proper to expect from a married relationship — to share in her husband's duties. She does not ask for sex (da tantum nomen inane/ conubii, 2.343-44) nor for pleasure (non me laetorum sociam, 2.346). The only reward she asks is that her grave be marked Catonis/ Marcia (2.343-4) and that she may help Cato in his cause (da mihi castra sequi 2.348). She like Cato submits her self-interest to the state.

So too with Cato, Lucan notes in a very important passage that the sage had set aside his self-interests the better to serve mankind:

ille nec horrificam sancto dimouit ab ore caesariem duroque admisit gaudia uoltu (ut primum tolli ferialia uiderat arma, intonsos rigidam in frontem descendere canos passus erat maestamque genus increscere barbam uni quippe uacat studiiis odiisque carenti humanum lugere genus), nec foedera prisci sunt temptata tori: iusto quoque robur amori restitit. hi mores, haec duri inmota Catonis secta fuit, seruare modum finemque tenere naturamque sequi patriaeque impendere uitam nec sibi sed toti genitum se credere mundo. ...Uenerisque hic <uni>cus usus,
Cato was in mourning, but not for one man. He alone of all mankind could mourn for the whole of humanity. Moreover, he did not seek to renew his former sexual union with Marcia. For Cato, the only purpose of sex was procreation for the sake of the state. Nature set the bounds to his behavior. Thus, Cato did not seek any personal pleasure. His sole aim in life was justice, decency, and the common good. He knew that his duty was to live for the state.

Caesar, on the other hand, places his own personal pleasure before his duty to family, the state, and even before his own interest. Lucan clearly demonstrates this in the Cleopatra episode (10.53–171). After condemning Cleopatra as an enemy of Rome the poet notes the basis of her ability to threaten Rome:

hoc animi nox illa dedit quae prima cubili miscuit incestam ducibus Ptolemaida nostris. quis tibi uaesani ueniam non donet amoris Antoni, durum cum Caesaris hauserit ignis pectus? et in media rabie medioque furore et Pompeianis habitata manibus aula sanguine Thessalicae cladis perfusus adulter
Here because he is consumed with lust, Caesar has become oblivious to all of his duties. The poet reveals his own indignation through his choice of words. He describes Caesar and Cleopatra and their attraction toward each other with words like incestam (69) and adulter (74). Moreover, Lucan notes that Caesar had replaced his duty to state, family and self with his own perversions. When he should have been in mourning for those who had fallen at Pharsalus, he gave himself over to lust (10.74–75). When he should have been in mourning for both Pompey and Julia, he was instead replacing them with illegimate issue (10.77–78). So powerful is his lust, that it even brushes aside that drive which according to the Stoics is the most basic in all living things — self-preservation (10.80–81).

Lucan continues to show this perversion of otiositas in what follows. Indeed as Marcia had appeared before Cato in true mourning
(2.326–37), Cleopatra appeared before Caesar in feigned grief (10.83). As Marcia had based her argument on having fulfilled her Stoic duty in marriage (2.338–41), Cleopatra's argument is based on her incestuous marriage to her brother (10.92–100). Moreover the splendor which Lucan describes (10.104–71) is in stark contrast to the simplicity which surrounds Cato (2.380–91). And pointedly as the poet ends the passage, he notes:

postquam epulis Bacchoque modum lassata voluptas/ inposuit, longis Caesar producere noxem/ incoat adloquiis... (10.172–74). For Caesar, it is voluptas which sets the bounds on his behavior. For Cato, it was nature (2.381–82). This then is the standard which the poet himself has set and against which Pompey should be measured. With this in mind, let us consider Lucan's treatment of Pompey.

At the end of book five (5.722–815), just before the poet turns to treat the battle of Dyrrachium, he shows us a very touching scene of the love between Pompey and Cornelia. The scene is meant on one level to engage our sympathy. On another level, however, Lucan intends for the reader to see that the amor which affects Pompey is not the right type. For Pompey's mind is not where it should be: his first concern is his wife, not Rome. He knows that the battle is at hand, but he would still rather
spend the time with his wife than planning for the battle (5.724ff).
Moreover, it is clear that the nature of his *amor* here is sexual (792–96).
This is not a proper Stoic type of *amor*, for Lucan himself notes elsewhere
that the wise man avoids this "*φιλετε" except to produce children (2.379;
387). It causes considerable grief (e.g. 5.735ff, 759, 776, 795, etc.) — the
only *πάθος* for which there is no corresponding *ευπάθεια*. Indeed the
whole effect of this *amor* is damaging and clouds the mind. The poet
notes:

...heu quantum mentes dominatur in aequas
iusta Uenus! dubium trepidumque ad proelia, Magne,
te quoque fecit amor; quod nolles stare sub ictu
Fortunae, quo mundus erat Romaque fata,
coniunx sola fuit...

(5.727–731)

The words *aequa mens* do not mean "soft hearted" or "inclined
to love" as some think but rather "level headed" (i.e. a mind not disturbed
by a *πάθος*).44 In short, the statement is a philosophical observation, not
a sympathetic cry. The point is to note how this *πάθος* disrupts the
functions of the mind. Indeed, as Lucan notes, this *iusta Uenus* produces
dubium and trepidum. Again note that his fear is not for Rome or even
about possible loss, but rather only for his wife. Clearly *amor* so controls
his mind that he cannot function as a Republican general. So far Pompey
falls short of Cato's standard. However, he is better than Caesar. For Pompey, partly because he recognizes his duty to the state and partly to save his wife from danger (5.722–27), resolves to remove the object of his passion. He knows it is a matter for shame and so will say no to himself (5.744–52). Thus he banishes (Cornelia's view 5.762ff) the object of his love to Lesbos. Lucan does not miss the fortuitous element of Pompey's choice; he will use Lesbos, Sappho's home, as a symbol for romantic (sexual) love.

In Stoic terms, this is just the right therapy. For, Chrysippus argued that the only way to deal with a παρατηρήσεως is to show the sufferer that his judgement is wrong (i.e. to put Cornelia's welfare before Rome's is not good; Fate works – there is no need to grieve). One cannot do this, however, when the παρατηρήσεως is at its height (S.V.P. 3.474). Thus one must remove the stimulus and allow the aequa mens to return (S.V.P. 3.475). More importantly by sending away Cornelia and placing the interests of the state foremost in his mind, he is acting in a way which is similar to Cato. So it is that Pompey must set aside the enjoyment of the extremus fructus amoris before he can function as he should (5.796). Lucan treats Pompey's sending away of Cornelia as a necessary preparation for his
fated role at Dyrrachium and Pharsalus. Only with the source of his major πτερός gone can he bear the weight which destiny has placed on him and achieve what he did at Dyrrachium and Pharsalus.

The events before and after Pharsalus demonstrate that Lucan interpreted Pompey’s relationship with Cornelia thus. For just before the battle, Lucan returns to the theme of amor. Only there it is not between Cornelia and Pompey, but between Rome and Pompey (7.1ff). Moreover Lucan clearly has in mind the earlier episode with Cornelia. For here he wishes that Pompey might really (not just in his dream) enjoy the extremus fructus amoris of his amor for Rome and Rome’s amor for him (7.31–32). Pompey’s mind is now on what it should be. He is ready to do his duty.45

After the battle, however, when Pompey had discharged his duty and could set aside the burden which he was fated to bear (7.686–89), Lucan allows Pompey’s mind to return to Cornelia. Indeed his amor for her is listed as a major cause for his flight from the field. sed te quoque, coniunx,/ causa fuga uoltusque tui fatisque negatum/ parte absente mori (7.675–77). The reintroduction of this πτερός has a striking effect on
Pompey, for it undoes the Stoic discipline which he had so far achieved. For as book eight opens, Lucan presents Pompey fleeing full of fear. The man who could leave the disaster of Pharsalus with aequus animus, who could calmly reflect upon what he had been (7.689), is now terrified at every turn by everything as he races to his beloved Cornelia and Lesbos' world of amor (8.33ff). Lesbos consumes his mind. The dubium and trepidum which he had sent away with Cornelia and his amor have now indeed returned.47

Lucan pointedly demonstrates this both when Pompey arrives at Lesbos and at the meeting of the Curia on Syhedra. The poet, as he has done throughout the end of book seven and beginning of book eight, uses the island home of Sappho as a symbol for romantic (sexual) love. For he notes that after Pompey had embraced his wife: duri flectuntur pectora Magni,/ siccaque Thessalia confudit lumina Lesbos (8.106–107). All that he had mastered before now dissolved. Indeed even that ultimate folly — grief — now returned; he could no longer bear his fate in the face of his wife's anguish (8.88–105). Cornelia is again dearer to him than Rome (8.131ff). This is so much so that the poet has Lentulus appeal at Syhedra, not to Pompey's love for libertas nor even for Rome, but to his fears
concerning his wife to dissuade him from turning to Parthia for help (8.389-422). Pompey is indeed again consumed with his love for Cornelia.

It is important to note that Lucan, in his treatment of Pompey's love, places him between Caesar and Cato. While he lacks Cato's constitution to resist *justa venus*, he can, unlike Caesar, set aside *venus* and from time to time order his life in such a way that his duty to state comes before his own pleasure. Moreover one senses that that emotion which Pompey feels for Cornelia, even if wrong by Cato's standard, is better than the lust which Caesar feels for Cleopatra. Pompey the lover, while not a Cato, is definitely not a Caesar.
G. Pompey, Republican General

and Stoic proficiens

Nowhere does Lucan more clearly state Pompey's status as proficiens than in his description of Pompey's death. To die well was for the Stoics the goal of a philosophical life (cf. 9.581-84). This is especially true since they held that ἀσκοντος οὐκ ζωὴν would be fixed for as long as it survived in whatever state it was at the moment of death. Thus the poet's treatment of Pompey's death and final words is central to an understanding of Pompey's character. Lucan's treatment of the dying Pompey is sympathetic. There are, to be sure, flaws in Pompey's character. While he is not a Stoic wise man, not a Cato, he does, however, die in a manner befitting a Republican hero and a Stoic proficiens. The poet makes this clear when he comments that Pompey in his last moments had control of his mind. talis custodia Magno/ mentis erat, ius hoc animi morientis habebat (8.635-636). This is an important point. Pompey at the moment of his death is rational. He cannot be an utter fool. Indeed his thoughts bear this out. He thinks of his duty to history. He knows that he is representative of the struggles of the dying Republic for the generations to come (Romanos...labores 8.622). He is
mindful that he must be an *exemplum* for posterity (*nunc consule famae* 8.624) as well as for his wife and son (8.634–635). When one recalls the doctrine of *διεθνος*, this is all the more striking. For as he had begun by reflecting on his duty to mankind, he ends by reflecting on his duty to his family. He has the concentric circles of *διεθνος* in their proper relation. Moreover, he recognizes what is fated and accepts it (8.626–627). Even more dramatic is what happens to Pompey’s soul after death: it survives and ascends to a position between the earth and the moon (9.1–18). His soul does not ascend to the level of the wise man nor does it remain earthbound, but rest between the two. This can only be so if the nature of the soul is virtuous. Pompey must be a *proficiens*.

It is through Cato’s eulogy that Lucan gives his final assessment of Pompey. Cato’s first words set the tone. He died a citizen (*civis obit* 9.190), but one who was much inferior to his ancestors (*multum majoribus inpar*). He was, in short, the last vestige of the glory of the Republic. After a lengthy catalogue of his virtues (9.191–203), with an allusion to his flaws (much of his Republicanism was just appearance 9.204–207), Cato makes a statement which is important for our considerations. He comments on Pompey’s death: *scire mori sors prima*.
uiris, sed proxima cogi (9.211). The wise man chooses to die; the proficiens accepts it when compelled. Indeed Cato sees himself in the first class. He will, should fate declare that he lose, choose death:

"...et mihi, si fatis aliena in iura uenimus,
fac talem, Fortuna, Iubam; non deprecor hosti servari, dum me seruet ceruice recisa"

(9.212–214).

Cato places Pompey in the second class. Thus Cato declares that Pompey, while not perfect, is a proficiens.
NOTES


2.) SVF 1.216; Pohlenz, Die Stoa (Gottingen 1959), 1.153ff, has a general discussion. Children before the age of seven did not have a λόγος and were thus no different from animals (SVF 1.149). τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν (i.e. their natural impulses) motivate them (SVF 3.178-89). See S. Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," in A. Long, ed., Problems in Stoicism (London 1971), 114-149.

3.) Diogenes Babylonius (SVF 3.32) says there were none. Some however
held that in all of history there may have been one or two (SVF 3.663). The founders of the Stoa were careful to exclude themselves from the ranks of the sage (SVF 3.662).


5. See the discussion of emotion above at chapter 1, section E: IRA. Zeno (SVF 1.202; cf. 3.198) notes that knowledge is a state of the γνώμονικόν. So it is that the wise man's γνώμονικόν is in the state of knowledge and thus cannot be in the state of a πάθος.

6. SVF 1.66.

7. SVF 3.548 on knowledge; SVF 3.517 on deeds where Seneca reports: actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit voluntas...rursus voluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit...
8.) SVF 3.532.

9.) SVF 3.530; 539.

10.) Some scholars have considered the notion of a proficiens to be a late development introduced by the Stoa in its attempts to defend itself against Academic attacks (e.g. M. Reesor, "The Indifferents in the Old and Middle Stoa," TAPA 82 (1957), 63-82). Many have held it to be an innovation of Panetius to make the system more livable (e.g. M. van Straaten, Panetius, sa vie, see écrite et sa doctrine [Amsterdam 1946], 191ff) or reckoned it among his efforts to make the school more palatable to Roman tastes (e.g. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa², [above, note 2], 1.204ff). But it was Zeno who first introduced the concept of the προκόπτων (cf. Plut. Mor. 82f). I. Kidd provides an excellent discussion and guide for all of this in "Stoic Intermediates and the End for Man," in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 150-172.

11.) As Kidd, in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 168, notes, it was by neglecting this distinction that confusion arose among ancient non-Stoic
critics and modern scholars. Indeed as he puts it (165) the Stoics had two types of ethical philosophies, one entirely theoretical concerned only with the wise man, the other dealing with the rest of us.

12.) G. Kerferd, "Cicero and Stoic Ethics" in Cicero and Virgil [Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt] (Amsterdam 1972) 60–74, while concerned with demonstrating that Cicero did understand the point of Stoic ethics at Ac. Post. 1.35–37, provides (p. 69) a handy schematic presentation of the Stoic (Latin) terms relating to action. See also Kidd, in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 155ff; cf. SVF 3.133.

13.) Seneca, Ep. 94.50; see also Kidd, in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 156.

14.) SVF 3.541.

15.) The use of the rhetorical question "qui sint hi quaeris?" strongly implies that this is Seneca's view.

16.) This view may well be Posidonian in that it seems to rest on
assumptions from Posidonius' Platonized theory of the soul. Seneca elsewhere shows that he follows Posidonius on this doctrine (e.g., EM 31.11, 41.2); see Rist, in Rist, The Stoics, (above, note 4), 266ff. He can also argue the orthodox position cf. 94.55ff. On Posidonius' unorthodox theory of emotions and the soul see I. Kidd, "Posidonius on Emotions," in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 200–215.

17.) SVF 3.471. morbi animi is a concept introduced by Chrysippus; see J. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus (New York 1970), 186.

18.) Moreover, such an argument seems to presupposes a Chrysippean psychological model wherein emotions (false judgements) can be corrected only by reason (pro illa sapientia); cf. SVF 3.390, 465.

19.) See SVF 3.539, 541 for Chrysippus' view.

20.) Cf. SVF 3.421–430, especially 424.

21.) It is interesting to note that these two definitions differ on what may be the point of distinction between Posidonius' and Chrysippus'
psychological theory. Whereas Chrysippus held that the emotions were mistaken judgements contrary to the soul's natural inclination toward reason (hence the second definition), Posidonius argued that the emotions were the natural irrational impulses in a man's soul which would pervert his judgement into mistaking that which he is strongly inclined to seek ([άπλως οίκεια]) for that which he is merely inclined to seek (οίκεια).

Thus for Posidonius diseases of the mind are long-term submission of the rational to the irrational, whereas for Chrysippus they are the soul hardened into a long-term state of irrationality. cf. I. Kidd, in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 207.

22.) Posidonius and Chrysippus both agreed on it. cf. I. Kidd, in Long, Problems, (above, note 2), 204; SVF 3.377.

24.) For ῥογή and Caesar's relation to it, see Chapter 1, section E: Ιra.

25.) That τὸ σῶτος is a subclass of τρεμομῖα see SVF 3.394–397.

26.) E.M. 94.59.

27.) Cf. also Seneca's statement hae (sc. everything Pompey did) praeterebantur causae ad continuandam potentiam with the point of Caesar's speech 1.299ff; cf. 1.333–338.

28.) Lucan will return with greater frequency toward the end of book two to this Homeric–Vergilian allusion.

29.) See discussion in chapter 3, section B.

30.) Seneca, de ira I.1.5.6.

31.) Lucan uses veneror six times, five in the gerundive and once as a finite verb. He uses it at 2.530 to refer to Pompey's voice, at 5.397 to
refer to the potestas which once (before the empire) belonged to the office of consul, at 7.582 in reference to the corpses of Senators and Equites, at 9.987 of the antiquities which Caesar saw at Troy, and at 10.323 in reference to tradition. At 8.864, Lucan uses the finite verb to refer to the worship which will be accorded to the tomb of Pompey. The last reference has textual problems. The mss. read both fusco...numen and Tusco...fulmen (see Hosius' 3rd. edition). Whether the thing venerated is Pompey's numen with native Egyptian soil or the lightning which proves the site sacred with Etruscan soil, it is Pompey's tomb which is venerated. Cf. J. Makowski, "A Note on Lucan 8.860–61," CPh 70 (1972), 204–206.

32.) Venerabilis, e appears at 5.13 of the Senate; 7.17 of Pompey in his dream as he recalls that while still an eques he was accorded senatorial dress; at 8.317 in his Parthian speech; at 8.664 of his corpus; at 8.855 of his grave; and at 9.202 by Cato of Pompey for his service to Rome.

33.) So much so that Lucan uses Pompey's death and grave as a symbol for the Republican Senate. Cf. 8.823ff. Note that immediately after the Senate acts (5.57ff.) that Lucan begins to treat Pompey with great sympathy.


36.) See Chapter 1, section D, for further discussion of εντάξεια. Recall that the Stoics defined βουλήσεις as εὐλογος ὠρείς and κτισθεῖα as an ἐνικος ὠρείς.

37.) Other positive inclinations are labor (9.407), libertas (8.340). amor
mortis can be either a rational or irrational impulse.

38.) See discussion of this passage in Chapter 1, section D: 'νοτήν ηγεμονικών.

39.) For a discussion of ὀτρείων, see Chapter 1, section A. Concordia is a translation of θυμωνα with which Chrysippus describes Zeus, the common nature (SVF 2.1076; cf. Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus; SVF 1.58); M. Reesor, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa (New York 1951), 18–19, has a useful discussion.


41.) See chapter 1, section A.

42.) *SVF* 3.606, 608, 611, 682.

43.) See Housman, *ad loc.* 2.387, for the arguments in favor of Bentley's emendation of *maximus* to *unicus*.

44.) Cf. Duff's "Ah! how mighty is the power of wedded love over gentle hearts!" Bourgery is more correct with his "Ah! que la Vénus conjugale a de pouvoir sur l'esprit des justes!" if one take l'esprit des justes in the sense of the mind of wise men.


49.) For the view that Lucan’s treatment was not sympathetic and that Pompey through his death showed a proud and arrogant man see D. Gagliardi, "Il testamento di Pompeo (nota a Phars. 9.87–97), Vichiana 9 (1980) 329–331.

CHAPTER III:

Quid tibi uis, Marce Cato?

A. The Principate and the Civil War

The Bellum Ciuile, as we have it, is a poem about that part of the civil war which was waged between Pompey and Caesar. This was by any estimation an important war. It is, depending on one's view, either the transformation of the Republic into the principate or the death of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire. But however one views it, as Cicero laments, the res publica became res unica. Later generations of Romans did not miss this point. After this conflict, Rome was changed, or rather the definitions of libertas, dignitas, and auctoritas were. The struggles between the populares and the optimates which had dominated Rome since the time of the Gracchi were swept away. The old Senatorial order yielded to the princeps and his clients. The new struggle was for the Senatorial order to understand its role in the new state. In this struggle the memory of the war and of Cato, Caesar, and Brutus became very important.
The principate itself had sought at first to keep the memory of these events alive. It was the last civil war (the war ending at Actium the princeps held to be a foreign war), and as such provided evidence which when interpreted correctly proved the New Order to be a restoration of the true Republic. Octavian, ever the exemplum of pietas, had fulfilled his duty to his father at Philippi; the temple of Mars Ultor declared this to all. But in his treatment of the memory of his father, expediency rather than vengeance directed Augustus. Caesar the dictator was gradually and selectively set aside as he became less necessary. Caesar the man provided exempla both good and bad. Diuus Iulius was made an abstraction as far removed from man as a star. Moreover, Octavian reformed those whom Caesar the dictator had defeated. Pompey became the last noble example of the old tarnished order. He was the last of the great generals who had fought to possess the state on behalf of the corrupted senatorial order. Then there was Cato. His character, like Caesar's, was divided. Cato the man provided exempla both good and bad. Cato the sapiens became a symbol for the Republic. But this abstraction was as far removed from man as Caesar's star. It was too good for this imperfect world and died with Cato. Augustus had restored the republic, but not the Republic of Cato that was too abstract. He had restored a republic which worked.
So successful was the principate in its attempt to reinterpret the heroes of the Civil War that by Lucan’s day men could admire, even worship, Brutus, Cato, and Cassius without even the hint of that type of Republicanism for which they fought and died. Schoolmasters routinely assigned Catonian speeches to the children of those who administered Rome for the successors of Caesar. Indeed to recite Cato’s dying words was so common a bane for schoolboys that Persius could satirise it:

\[
\text{saepe oculos, memini, tangebam paruus oliuo grandia si nollem morituri uerba Catonis discere non sano multum laudanda magistro, quae pater adductis sudans audiret amicis.} \\
\text{(3.44–47)} \\
\]

These suasoriae however had nothing to do with Republicanism. Indeed in his Republicanism Rome had judged Cato to be wrong. Moreover, after the death of Gaius most Romans did not view the Republic as a viable alternative to the principate. The issue was Cato’s constantia. That is what the principate made him an exemplum of. Seneca the elder provides an entertaining example of this. At one point in his assignment deliberat Cicero an Antonium deprecetur, one Q. Haterius
exhorts Cicero with an appeal to Cato: M. Cato, solus maximum uiuendi moriendique exemplum, mori maluit quam rogare – nec erat Antonium rogaturus. Cato, the maximum uiuendi moriendique exemplum, would not have done it. Cato the moral man was a good example to follow; Cato the Republican, however, was wrong.

This was the opinion which most of the Roman aristocracy held of Cato. The Roman Stoa however was divided into two groups – those who accepted the common view that he was morally right but politically wrong, and those who thought that he was both morally and politically right. The reason for this division rests in a problem of the Stoa's political theory as old as the school.
B. Stoic Political Theory and the Roman Republic.

Whereas Plato and Aristotle held that the constitution of the state could and should be used to improve the virtue of its citizens, the Stoics held virtue to be unaffected by environment.\(^9\) Virtue is sufficient unto itself. Thus the exact nature of the state they saw as an indifferent. They did argue however that because of man's natural inclination (\(oikos, \text{"kinship"}\)) toward his fellow men that participation in a state (whatever its constitution) was natural; thus the wise man should have a role in the state.\(^10\) They differed on the nature of this participation. It did not pass unnoticed that while Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus called for the wise man's participation in the state, they themselves remained aloof from the practice of statesmanship. Indeed, Zeno at least did so by choice, for he declined the frequent invitations of Antigonus Gonatas to join his court. Yet Zeno did encourage others to participate; he sent a student of his, Persaeus of Citium, to Antigonus' court.\(^11\)

Persaeus presents an interesting problem. Indeed Persaeus became so active in the court life of Macedon (to the point of being one of Antigonus' generals against Aratus of Sicyon) that he aroused the ire
of other less active philosophers. He, some would charge, was not a philosopher but a courtier. The question of just how active one should become in the affairs of state is well exemplified by another of Zeno's students, Sphaerus, who became the court philosopher to the Spartan king Cleomenes. Sphaerus not only participated in court life and discussions but became involved with the day to day management of the state by overseeing the gymnasium and syssitia — both institutions at the heart of Sparta's existence. Moreover it appears that Sphaerus was actively involved in the land reforms which Agis and Cleomenes attempted to implement. This, to say the least, was disquieting to many. And some of Sphaerus' contemporaries feared that the political theories of the Stoa might become associated with such radical programs. To counter this they argued that the wise man (in his political functions) was best exemplified by Alexander the Great as one who brought the world under one government. Their argument rested on philosophy theory. They emphasized the wise man working to create in the monarch a bond which held together the brotherhood of mankind in peace and justice. The former group, however, saw the role of the wise man as one who worked to improve that bond. Thus from its very inception the school was divided on its view of the nature of the wise man's political involvement —
whether they emphasized reformer or uniter. Moreover this division continued throughout the history of the school. Indeed it reflected itself in second-century Republican Rome in the theories of Stoics such as Blossius (reformer) and Panaetius and Posidonius (conservers). While it is impossible to prove whether the policies of the Gracchi or the Scipios arose from or were influenced by such philosophers or whether they simply found in such philosophies the expression for existing sentiments, there is no question but that they did listen to and surround themselves with kindred spirits. Even if Blossius did not influence Tiberius Gracchus nor Panaetius Scipio nor Posidonius Pompey the Great, they did provide their patrons with a vocabulary with which to reflect on the nature of Rome’s government. In any event, there is no question but that Blossius and Panaetius represent two distinct views about the wise man’s role carried on into the Roman Stoa.

Another point which is crucial for the difference of opinion within the Roman Stoa is that while Stoics held the constitution to be an indifferent, they nonetheless saw certain forms as preferable. Diogenes Laertius reports in his life of Zeno that both Zeno in his πολιτεία and Chrysippus in his περὶ πολιτείας held the best type of government to
be one comprised of democratic, monarchic, and aristocratic elements. This was in the ideal philosophical world, however. Such a state did not exist in the Hellenic world about which the Stoa's founders knew and thought. What did exist were Hellenistic kingdoms. It is important to note that none of the school's founders participated in such governments. Indeed some have argued that it was their aversion to monarchy which kept them from doing so. With regard to the participation of others in government they neither encouraged nor discouraged. And thus the reality of existing kingdoms compelled them to consider the wise man's relationship to a despotic state. The criterion which they set was simple: participation depended upon the wise man having nothing to hinder him and the state being in such a condition that he could improve it. And if this was not the case then the sage was not to participate.
This was the state of the question which the founders had passed on. However with the rise of Rome and its movement into the Hellenistic world a new element was introduced into Stoic thinking. For in Rome, one could see the ideal Stoic state. The Roman Republic was Zeno's theory in action. Roman Stoics of the second and first centuries B.C. were quick to point this out. Indeed Panaelius, and Polybius following him, were quick to point to Rome as the ideal respublica mixta.²⁵ In such a state the wise man must participate. And so the Stoic ideal and the Roman reality became intertwined. This was the Ideal state for which Cato died. He could at once fight for the Stoic Ideal and the moes maiorum.
C. The Imperial Stoic's Dilemma: Republic or Principate.

With the decline of the Senatorial order and the rise of the princeps, Stoics, however, had to confront two problems: how should the wise man relate to the emperor and empire; secondly what to say about the Roman Republic. For the first they had a ready-made answer. They simply returned to the criterion which Zeno and Chrysippus had established. If the princeps was good and the state could be improved, participate; if not, withdraw. The second question however was much more problematic. The Roman Stoics seem to have been divided about this.

The first group is represented by men like Seneca and Thrasea Paetus. They tended to view the Republic as a form of government which could not work; indeed if they wished to they could point to the fact that fate had brought an end to it. While only a wise man could see what is fated, every one could see what was fated. Something of the argument can be gleaned from several passages in Seneca. The first passage is from the de beneficiis.

disputari de M. Bruto solet, an debuerit accipere ab diuo Iulio uitam, cum occidendum eum iudicaret. Quam rationem
in occidendo secutus sit, alias tractabimus; mihi enim, cum uir magnus in alis fuerit, in hac re uidetur uhehementer errasse nec ex institutione Stoica se egisse. qui aut regis nomen extimuit, cum optimus ciuitatis status sub rege iusto sit, aut ibi sperauit libertatem futuram, ubi tam magnum praemium erat et imperandi et seruiendi, aut existimauit ciuitatem in priorem formam posse revocari amissis pristinis moribus futuramque ibi aequalitatem ciuilis iuris et staturas suo loco leges, ubi uiderat tot milia hominum pugnantia, non an seruirent, sed utri.26

This passage provides ample evidence that the controversy which we have been tracing existed in the Neronian Stoa. While the infinitive disputari is impersonal enough, Seneca's interjection of himself with the mihi and the description of Brutus' error as uhehementer suggests that the disagreement was, for Seneca, very much alive. Moreover, when one recalls that Brutus was not a Stoic, Seneca's claim that Brutus did not act in accord with Stoic teaching (nec ex institutione Stoica se egisse) becomes all the more pointed. It is not directed at Brutus per se, but rather at those Stoics who would defend Brutus' action from Stoic doctrine. It is they who have very much erred since, according to Seneca, a true understanding of the Stoa's teaching shows that the rex iustus, not a republic, is the best form of government.

At any rate, Seneca makes several points which are germane
for our discussion: Brutus acted in an unstoic manner because 1.) he feared the name of king as an evil, and 2.) he believed that the Roman Republic could be saved. Seneca here argues that in the real world monarchy under a just king (i.e. the Alexander type) is the best form of government. Thus any faith which Brutus may have had in an ideal Republic was misplaced. For Seneca in the real world monarchy is best. Moreover he argues that the Roman Republic, as it was, was beyond salvation. Thus on the basis of the criteria set out by Zeno and Chrysippus a wise man would have withdrawn from and not participated in this struggle to defend a corrupt government. He goes on to say that the true issue of the civil war was not the survival of the Republic but which of two masters Rome would serve — to be a tyrannicide was senseless; Brutus should have withdrawn.

Seneca, elsewhere, levels similar objections against Cato. While Cato is the epitome of virtue and fortitude, he made the same political mistake which Brutus had made. He believed that the Republic could be saved.
153

potest aliquis disputare an illo tempore capessenda fuerit sapienti res publica. "quid tibi eis, Marce Cato? Iam non agitur de libertate; olim pessumdata est. quaeritur, utrum Caesar an Pompeius possideat rem publicam; quid tibi cum ista contentione? nullae partes tuae sunt; dominus eligitur. quid tua uter uincat? potest melior uincere, non potest non peior esse qui uicerit."

The point of this epistle is that the Republic could not be saved, thus the wise man should withdraw (14.15). Cato erred. For Stoics like Seneca then, the answer to "what to say about the Republic" is "reject it as an impossible form of government and make the new order as good as possible". So men like Thrasea and Seneca had no alternative should the princeps become a tyrant but to withdraw from government and finally from life in protest. Such Stoics were not opposed to the principate, only to the tyrant.

There were, however, those Stoics who disagreed with Seneca's view of the Republic and Cato's battle for it. They saw the Republic as indeed viable. For them the choice would not be between good king or bad king but between systems of government - Republic or tyranny. Such a Stoic was Helvidius Priscus. It is clear from Dio that he made speeches about the superiority of ἰμοκρατία to βασιλεία, in Latin the res publica over regnum. For such a Stoic, Cato would have been politically
right. As this chapter will demonstrate Lucan was among those who held this view. Indeed one of the epic's major themes is that Cato did not make a mistake, and that his entrance into the Civil War demonstrated that the Republic was viable for both Cato's and Lucan's day.
D. Cato's Choice: Philosphic Justification.

When Lucan's uncle Seneca rhetorically asks of Cato Quid tibi uis, Marce Cato? he is asking a question which is central to Lucan's epic. For implied in it is both criticism and another question — what was at issue in the Civil War? If, as Seneca argues, the war was waged only over who would be tyrant then Lucan's poem relates nothing more than the simple tragedy of civil war.

\[
\text{iusque datum sceleri ... populumque potentem}
\text{in sua uictrici conuersum uiscera dextra.}
\]

(1.2-3)

However, if there was more at stake and both the Republic and libertas could have been saved, then the poem deals with a different issue, the death of libertas and how one should struggle for it. To Stoics who lived under Nero this was a very important question, for its resolution determined how they should act toward the principate and how they would seek to exercise their libertas. For this reason, Lucan brings Cato into the poem much earlier than is otherwise needed. Thus even when Cato is not present, the issue is.

Lucan, at his first mention of Cato during his discourse on the
causes of the war, brings this question to the fore. He notes in his famous sententia: *victrix causa deis placuit, sed uicta Catoni* (1.128) that Cato is in opposition to the gods. The sententia goes to the heart of the problem: Cato's side lost. How could the wise man be so mistaken as to what had been fated? Did Cato act contrary to nature and fate? Lucan allows Cato to defend himself as he first introduces the Republican hero in book two.

Cato first appears at 2.234 ff. The poet effectively juxtaposes Cato's calm reflection against the self-indulgent grief of the people and Cato's correct judgement against Brutus' misguided thought and action. He represents sanity and reason in the midst of madness and superstition. In this passage, Lucan takes great care to show that Cato is not only a sapiens but manifestly the Stoic sapiens. As the poet used Laelius to delineate Caesar's character, so here he uses Brutus to define Cato's. In him, the poet creates a philosophical foil for Cato. Brutus is not a Stoic. Indeed one should remember that the historical Brutus was an eclectic Academic with strong Stoic elements among his tenets. Plutarch, *Brutus* 2, reports that of all the philosophies which Brutus studied he preferred Plato's. Plutarch then adds that he was not one of the New or Middle
Platonists, but rather turned to the source — Plato — to get his philosophy. διαφερόντως δ’ εσπονδάκει πρὸς τὸὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος. καὶ τὴν νεαν μέσην λεγομένην ἀκαδημείαν ὁυ πάνυ προσελήνως ἐξήρτητο τῆς Παλαιᾶς ... This "return to the master" may have as much to do with the anti-Stoic Plutarch's contemporary polemics as with Brutus. For Plutarch goes on to mention that Brutus (the nephew of Cato) was a great admirer of Antiochus of Ascalon, who with his Sosus turned away from the skepticism of Arcesilaus and Carneades to "reintroduce" dogmatism into the Academy (Cicero, Ac. Pr. 11ff). Antiochus took his criterion of truth from the Stoics — the φαντασία καταλεπτική. Indeed, Antiochus' ethics, physics and logic had so much in common with the Stoa that Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.235) complains that he did no more than preach Stoic doctrine under a Platonic label. Antiochus not only incorporated Stoic concepts, he even took over their vocabulary. Moreover, Brutus had Antiochus' brother and student, Aristus, as a companion and friend. At any rate, the historical Brutus' ties to the Middle Academy were so strong that Cicero (Tusc. 5.21ff) makes him the voice of Aristus and Antiochus. (Sed Brutus tuus auctore Aristo et Antiocho non sensi hoc...)
Lucan's Brutus is fearless but removed from the people, untouched and unmoved by their suffering. He is immune to the fear which affects the common people. The poet's words show how Brutus' megalopsychia severs him from the people.

\[ \text{at non magnanimi percussit pectora Bruti} \]
\[ \text{terror, et in tanta pauidi formidine motus} \]
\[ \text{pars populi lugentis erat...} \]

This one would imagine to be good. Do not the Stoics after all hold that the wise man is unaffected by fear? Do they not hold that the wise man should have no emotion? No. The Stoics held that the sage does indeed have emotion. 'Απελευθερωσis the lack of the four πράξεις, not of motion, drive and emotion. If reason dictates, the wise man may show concern.35 Moreover, the wise man recognizes his ties to his fellow man which arise from οικείωσις. The sage knows his duty to be concerned for mankind. Lucan demonstrates this. For while Brutus lacks fear, Cato the sapiens is touched by Rome's anguish. He is concerned (timentem)36 — not for his own safety (of which he is securus)37 but for the world (2.239–241). Thus the poet subtly implies the differences which the speeches will demonstrate. Brutus' philosophy makes him fearless yet withdrawn from Rome and aloof from the world; Cato's philosophy causes him to be
securus yet concerned about the Roman people. With Brutus' first words, Lucan emphasizes the gulf between Cato and Brutus. Brutus is beset by doubts about what course of action he should follow (2.245). He cannot be a sapiens, for the Stoic sapiens has no doubt. Yet one may infer that he views Cato as such a one (2.242–247). Indeed, as the people turned to their oracles and omens, he turns to Cato as an oracle (So Lucan calls him 2.285; cf. 9.544–586). Only the wise man knows how to interpret omens; he is the only true divine oracle. Thus only the wise man is trustworthy, since only he is unperturbed by any change in “fortune”. Only he can guide men to do right.\textsuperscript{38} Brutus makes these attributes exclusive to Cato at 2.242–245.\textsuperscript{39}

omnibus expulsae terris olimque fugatae
uirtutis iam sola fides, quam turbine nullo
excutiet fortuna tibi, tu mente labantem
derige me, dubium certo tu robore firma.

While ostensibly the aim of his speech is to ask Cato for direction, it implicitly reproves him. Indeed the reason for Brutus' doubt is that while he believes Cato to be good, he knows that Cato has resolved to enter the fight (2.255–56). Since he supposes this to be the wrong course to follow, he urges Cato to withdraw into peaceful philosophic contemplation (2.266 ff). Thus Lucan, not without point, puts
into the historically non-Stoic Brutus' mouth the schoolboy declamation: Should Cato the sage have entered the civil war? Brutus states the case against him; Cato justifies his own actions.¹⁰

Brutus begins by noting (2.242–47) that since Cato alone in the world embodies virtus, which is immune to the vicissitudes of Fortuna (243–44), he alone can be certain of the world, he alone is worthy to guide other men (derige me, dubium certo tu robore firma). Therefore, Cato will be Brutus’ leader (dux Bruto Cato erit, 2.247). All of this thus far would be acceptable to the Stoic Cato. Indeed if Brutus would have ended his speech here, it would have been a plea for direction. But it is colored by what follows.

Brutus next poses two rhetorical questions. A.) Will you follow peace (2.247–248)? or B.) Will you go to war (2.249–250)? Brutus makes his preferred answer clear. He sets pax and inconcusse dubio vestigia mundo against sceletas, furor and clades, namely civile bellum. For Brutus, civil war itself is an evil which can affect the wise man’s moral virtue. Peace is a good in that it provides tranquillity for clarity of thought (cf. 2.265). While it is true that Stoics saw civil war as an evil and nefas,
they, nevertheless, held war and peace to be externals which do not affect the virtue of the sapiens.\footnote{41}

Having set these choices (peace is preferred and war is to be rejected) before Cato, Brutus moves on to discuss the motivations which drive men to choose the "evil" of war (2.251–56).\footnote{42} He cites private crimes (2.252), poverty (2.253), and primarily greed (2.255). None of these motives can belong to Cato, so he is left to ask paradoxically if Cato simply likes war for its own sake (2.255–56).

In lines 2.256–81, Brutus attempts to convince Cato to withdraw from this present evil into philosophical retreat. He asks of what value Cato's long struggle to remain immune to the vices of the age would be were he to embark upon war. Indeed, Brutus strongly implies that if Cato enters the war he cannot be virtuous. accipient alios, facient te bella nocentem (2.259). With lines 2.261–66, Brutus shows how war will make Cato destroy Cato's virtue (virtus eat 2.263 and scelus esse tuum 2.266).\footnote{43} Against this horrible possibility Brutus offers a way out: Withdraw from the evil world.

...melius tranquilla sine armis
Thus Lucan makes Brutus' argument virtually identical with Seneca's. The poet, however, also gives it a somewhat unorthodox color. For virtue, the Stoics held, is self-sufficient. Externals cannot affect the moral virtue of the sapiens; the only good is virtue, which is conceived of as the proper ordering of the soul. Brutus' language is interesting. For De Ira 3.6.1–2, Seneca gives the same advice in similar words to one who wishes to live the philosophical life. The passage is worth quoting at length:

nullum est argumentum magnitudinis certius quam nihil posse quo instigeris accidere. Pars superior mundi et ordinatio ac propinqua sideribus nec in nubem cogitur nec in tempestatem impellitur nec uersatur in turbinem; omni tumultu caret, inferiorma fulminantur. Eodem modo sublimis animus, quietus semper et in statione tranquilla conlocatus, omnis infra se premens, quibus ira contrahitur, modestus et uenerabilis est et dispositus; quorum nihil invenies in irato. Quis enim traditus dolori et furens non primam reiecit uerecundiam? Quis impetu turbidus et in aliquem mens non quidquid in se uenerandi habuit? Cui officiorum numerus aut ordo constitit incitato? Quis linguae temperavit? Quis ullam partem corporis tenuit? Quis se regere potuit immissum? Proderit nobis illud Democriti salutare praeceptum, quo monstratur tranquillitas, si neque priuatem neque publice multa aut maiora uiris nostris egerimus. Numquam tam feliciter in multa discurrenti negotia dies transit, ut non aut
ex homine aut ex re offensa nascatur, quae animum in iras paret.

The parallels are indeed striking (right down to the lightning). It is important to note that Seneca cites Democritus, the fountainhead of Epicurean physics and thought. Moreover it is important that Seneca (lest he himself be accused of hypocrisy) allows that there are certain men whose character is such that they can and should enter politics. Lucan's use of similar arguments in Brutus' speech is pointed. For not only does he give these arguments — used by Stoics like Seneca — an unorthodox color, he shows that such a position is un-Catonian.

While in general some Stoics could accept the notion of philosophic withdrawal, Brutus bases his advice to withdraw on an analogy with nature (2.268–273) which is either unorthodox Stoicism, or, if orthodox, short-sighted. But whatever its origin and intent it is not an analogy which Cato will accept (2.289–95). Brutus develops his argument through his analogy. The lightning must be a reference to Caesar. The lightning simile of 1.151 ff is sufficiently powerful and programmatic. Moreover, in this case the poet has taken care to balance it with Caesar through the word accipio (2.59, 274). His point is that while Caesar and
war wreak havoc and destruction, and bring chaos to the lowly world of men, Cato should be as Olympus and stand above the aer in the pure, calm, and undefiled air of philosophical contemplation. It is the law of the gods, he says, that great things remain unperturbed by the rerum discordia.

Brutus continues with the declaration that if Cato enters the war, Caesar would rejoice (2.273-77). This is not idle. For, Brutus goes on to say, since Pompey is a private citizen (priusatus) to go to war with him would be unconstitutional, even though he is followed by the majority of the senate and a consul (2.277-79). Thus, Brutus reasons, Cato would be in the service not of the state but Pompey (sub iuga Pompei 2.280). This, he concludes, would leave only Caesar alone in all the world free. toto iam liber in orbe/ solus Caesar orit (2.281-82). In this way Cato, who was the sapiens at the outset of the speech, would be reduced to a slave with the rest of mankind. Hence Brutus advises him: otia solus ages. Brutus then concludes his speech with his patriotic declaration of enmity to both Pompey and Caesar and promise of death to whoever should win. This may reflect Lucan's knowledge of the historical Brutus. For while he had philosophical grounds to hate Caesar, the murder of his father gave him
personal reasons to hate Pompey. In any case, Brutus' speech sets forth the case against Cato.

Cato's response is, as the poet says, divine (cf. 9.564–65). The wise man is the only oracle of truth. With this speech Cato the Stoic sapiens corrects the faulty perception and philosophy of his nephew. He begins by admitting that civil war is nefas (2.286), but declares that the virtuous man will always accept unperturbed that which fate sets in his path. sed quo fata trahunt, virtus secura sequetur (2.287). Since virtue resides not in an act but the arrangement of the soul, civil war cannot (contrary to Brutus' opinion) destroy Cato's virtue. It is fated; if there is fault then it belongs to fate (2.288). He then addresses himself to the central question of Brutus' speech which is the same as Seneca's: quid tibiuis, Marce Cato? iam non agitur de libertate; olim pessumdata est.

To do so, he first corrects Brutus' either faulty physics or short-sighted perspective on the history of the world with the Stoic doctrine of ξηρύμων (2.289–95), since for the Stoics, a correct knowledge of physics was the basis of a wise man's knowledge and of his ethics. The stars are not eternal, but will dissolve. Who, Cato asks, can
look upon the end of the universe and not feel "fear" (metus).\textsuperscript{54} Metus is a strong word.\textsuperscript{54} Cato's point is that right reason can at times allow one to "fear". Brutus has misjudged not only the nature of the universe but also the severity of the present situation (it is cosmic).\textsuperscript{55} Cato equates the civil war with the \textit{συνεπικράσια}, thus implying that he knows the end of the Republic is near. At such a time, Cato continues, who can remain uninvolved (\textit{compressae tenuisse manus} 2.292). Indeed he goes on to ask that when even non-Romans are involved, how can he withdraw (\textit{otia solue agam} 2.292–297). This is a direct rebuttal of Brutus' advice (2.267) in the same cosmological context. It is Brutus' misunderstanding of nature and the of actual political reality which have caused his error.\textsuperscript{56}

Another issue is at work: the wise man's duty to care for the state and posterity. Cicero (\textit{de fin} 3.19.64) provides an interesting parallel when his Cato, having expounded that patriotism is a natural impulse for men, provides the following as proof.

ex quo fit ut laudandus is sit qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod debeat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque ulla uox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnia deflagratio consequatur (quod uulgari quodam uersu Graeco pronuntiari solet), certe uerum est
etiam iis qui aliquando futuri sint esse propter ipsos consulendum.  

Both to bring home the gravity of the situation and to explain his course of action, Cato uses a metaphor of a funeral (2.297-301). As was shown before, Cato knows the true issue of the war. He knows that its outcome will be the death of libertas. Again, the point is that Brutus does not perceive the world properly; he thought that it was a contest between two tyrants. He thought that libertas could be restored by the death of both (2.283-84; cf. Seneca's rebuff at de ben. 2.20.2.). Cato knows better. The present war will kill libertas. Cato will go to war. But he will not (as Brutus charged) follow Pompey. He will follow Republican Rome to her grave. Even as in Brutus' speech lightning recalled Lucan’s introductory simile for Caesar, so here Cato recalls the introductory simile for Pompey (magni nominis umbra 1.135) with:

...non ante reuellar
exanimem quam te conpleetar, Roma; tuumque nomen, Libertas, et inanem persequar umbram.

(2.301-03)

Only here the umbra is redefined. It emphasizes Cato's point that not Pompey but libertas is the issue. Cato moreover uses the metaphor to show that it is his duty to enter the war. As it is a father's duty to bury a dead son, so Cato will not return until he has done his duty to libertas (2.301-303).
Here again Lucan's uncle provides an interesting point of comparison. After discussing the way ira makes one act, Seneca notes:

hoc non facit ratio; sed si ita opus est, silens quietaque totas domus funditus tollit et familias rei publicae pestilentes cum coniugibus ac libeis perdit, tecta ipsa diruit et solo exaequat et inimica libertati nomina extirpat. hoc non frendens nec caput quassans nec quicquam indecorum iudici faciens, cuius tum maxime placidus esse debet et in statu uultus, cum magna pronuntiat (de ira 1.19.2).

In short, Cato may, if reason dictate, do all those things which a Laelius would do as an extension of Caesar's will and not be morally culpable. The error is not in the deed; it is in the reason and motivation for the deed.

Cato concludes by returning to his opening point (2.304-305).

So it is fated (sic: cat 2.304); let it be done. Lucan's Cato thus answers Brutus and the declaimers' question about what he fights for. "Fate has put me in a situation where my duty to my fellow man is to go to war. Moreover, it is the wise man's duty to attempt to set the state right when it goes off the right path." So he concludes by asking why he should not follow the publica signa with Pompey as his general -- the issue is the Republic.
One, however, must not forget that there is another point at question — could the Republic have been saved? That is -- was the choice really between libertas and a tyranny or between just two different types of tyrants? For if Pompey's side was not essentially different, then the Republic could not have been saved; Cato, though his intentions were good, would still be wrong. The wise man must only be involved in a state which can be improved. Cato implies by his choice that he thought Pompey's side to be such that it could be instructed; the Republic could be saved. Lucan demonstrates this to be so in book nine. There he shows that Cato did indeed affect the nature of the conflict. He turned the followers of Pompey into a Republican army.
E. Cato's Choice: Dramatic Justification.

While Lucan would agree that the leaders of the conflict until Pompey's death were both imperfect men, he labors to show throughout his poem that Cato was not wrong in his assessment of Pompey and more importantly that the conflict did, because of the participation of Cato, indeed evolve into the struggle of Rome to be free from a tyrant. This is the central point of Cato's eulogy over Pompey (9.190-214). If one considers the speech in isolation, one may rightly question Cato's tone. The speech is, after all, meant to eulogize Pompey, but Cato appears to move himself to the fore. Indeed, even the rhetoric of Cato's speech changes halfway through. The reason for this is that Lucan intends this speech to mark the transformation of the army from the followers of Pompey into the defenders of the Republic. That is the point of Cato's implied criticisms:

olim uera fides Sulla Marioque receptis
Libertatis obit: Pompeio rebus adempto
nunc et ficta perit. non iam regnare pudebit,
nec color imperii nec frons erit ualla senatus.
o felix, cui summa dies fuit obuia uicto
et cui quaerendos Pharium scelus obtulit enses.
forsitan in soceri potuisses uiuere regno.
scrie morti sors prima uiris, sed proxima cogi.
et mihi, si fatis aliena in iura uenimus,
fac talem, Fortuna, Iubam; non deprecor hosti
seruari, dum me seruet service recisa.

(9.204–214)

Harsh words indeed, even if true, for a man just dead. "Had he lived, he would not have acted heroically — it is good that he died before he embarrassed the cause." Harsh as it is, that is just the point, for Pompey's army is made up of his clients. Pompey and not the Republic, as the poet will demonstrate in a few lines (9.227ff), is the cause. Cato must change that.

Throughout the speech Cato has noted Pompey's faults. He is not as great as the great Romans of the past (multum maioribus inpar 9.190). More pointedly, he is rector senatus (9.194), recalling the imagery of τὸ ἄγεμονεικόν, and parallels with Caesar the maximus rector (1.359). Thus, for Cato, libertas under Pompey is ficta (9.206). And Pompey's army fights for a Republic that is but a facade. Pompey however was useful (9.191;203) for he was a step better than Caesar. But he still was far from perfect. His army fought for the wrong reasons. This must change, else those who censured Cato for fighting for an already dead form of government would be right. The poet begins this transformation immediately.
Nowhere does he deal with this transformation more pointedly than when he presents Cato assuming command of Pompey's troops. Here Lucan makes it clear that whatever Pompey's understanding of the nature of the struggle may have been, the majority of his army still fought not for the Republic but for him. Lucan emphasizes this by immediately following Cato's eulogy with the army's attempt to disband. This is indeed a natural course for the army to follow. For Lucan has treated the Pompeians, as he did Caesar's troops, as the physical extension of Pompey's will. Their driving force is dead, they have no will to fight. Moreover, as Pompey often had said, the army was there because of their loyalty to him. They were his clients. One of the troops pointedly tells Cato this:

nos, Cato, da ueniam, Pompei duxit in arma,  
non belli ciuillis amor, partesque fauore  
 fecimus. ille iacet, quem paci praetulit orbis,  
causaque nostra perit.

(9.227–229)

His point could not be any clearer: he views himself to be a partisan of Pompey. His cause is not the Republic or libertas but Pompey. Indeed he later notes that his only legal or moral justification for partaking in a civil war was Pompey's patronage: Pompeio scelus est
bellum ciuiile perempto, quo fuerat uiuente fides (9.248–49). Moreover he expressly tells Cato that he is now willing to submit to Caesar as the legal representative of Rome (9.236ff). The poet himself indignantly calls the army little more than slaves (indiga serviti, plebes 9.254).

At this point, Cato sets before the army the true issue of the war. He delivers a speech which transforms them from partisans of Pompey to free men struggling to keep their libertas.

...quod non in regna laboras,
quod tibi, non ducibus, uuius morerisque, quod orbem adquiris nulli, quod iam tibi uincere tutum est,
bella fugis quaerisque iugum ceruice uacanti
et nescis sine rege pati. nunc causa pericli digna uiris. potuit uestro Pompeius abuti sanguine: nunc patriae iugulos ensesque negatis,
cum prope libertas?

(9.258–65)

With this speech Cato transforms the army into a truly Republican army, one which fights for the proper cause, libertas. He has given them a cause which is worthy of free men not slaves. The poet emphasizes this transformation by his choice of vocabulary around the speech.

Before the speech Lucan described the troops not as an army
but as a mob. (frequit interea discordia volgi 9.217; indiges servitii feruebat litera plebes 9.254) After the speech they are like bees working in harmony to collect honey (9.284–92). Lucan pointedly transforms Homer's simile at Iliad 2.87 ff to emphasize Cato's effect on the army. The point of Homer's simile is the swarming nature of the troops on the beach. They are thickly packed, moving here and there (at μέν τ' ἑνθα ἀλιç πεποτήσαναι, at ἐς τε ἑνθα..., Iliad 2.90). For Lucan however, the point is that their random flight (sibi quaque volat... 9.287) has been checked so that they can perform their natural task (9.290 ff). Before they were weary of the war (castrorum bellique piget post funera Magni 9.218). Cato's speech made them willing to endure it for the right reasons to the end (sic uoce Catonis/ inculcata viris iusti patientia Martis 9.291–92). Before Cato spoke, Rome's cause was lost (actum Romanis fuerat de rebus 9.253). Cato's speech renewed it (9.294 ff). And, most importantly, whereas Cato was regens (9.226) when the troops were still Pompey's, he has become pastor now that they are Rome's (9.291).

This transformation is essential to the poem, for without it the struggle would have been a meaningless one. Now it is one between Republicanism and Caesarism. Indeed throughout the remainder of the
ninth book, Cato, by his own example, teaches the new Republican army virtue, not Caesar's perverted type of virtus expressed in Scaeva but rather true virtus. This lays the foundation for the tenth book. For, the ninth book ends, after the emergence of the purified Republican army from the desert, with Caesar's arrival at Alexandria and his reaction to Pompey's death. Book ten then opens, after Caesar's landing, with a diatribe against Alexander the Great as a tyrant (10.20–52). This is indeed appropriate. For, it brings the new nature of conflict into clear view. By denouncing Alexander, Lucan also rejects the theory of the iustus rex, since Alexander was, for those Stoics who held it, its prototype. It is important to remember that those Stoics who held Alexander up as a model based that opinion on the theory of otakwos. Alexander had united all of mankind under one bond of brotherhood. This, however, is precisely the point on which Lucan rejects Alexander. For he notes:

nam sibi libertas umquam si redderet orbem,
ludibrio seruatus erat, non utile mundo
editus exemplum, terras tot posse sub uno
esse uiro.

(10.25–28)

Lucan turns their argument against them; that Alexander united the world is not a good but an evil. For, he did it by destroying mankind (10.28ff). For Lucan, then, the prototype is corrupt. Indeed, so much so
that Nature herself stopped him (10.41). Moreover, the poet associates Alexander (and the *iustus rex* theory) with Caesar (note *fulmen* 34; *sidus iniquum* 35). Thus at the outset of book ten, Lucan contrasts Caesarism, despotism, and tyranny with Republicanism. Clearly Cato was right to have entered the war.

Lucan has indeed taken care to demonstrate this both philosophically and dramatically. His reasons are clear. There were those around him, even sharing his philosophical assumptions, who were arguing that Cato was wrong: the Republic was unsalvageable. Moreover, they argued that a monarchy was the best type of government. Lucan disagreed. With his poem, he demonstrated that they were wrong. He showed both that the Republic lived and could be made to work and that the fountainhead of the principate, Caesar and Caesarism, destroyed the very bonds of humanity. Had Lucan lived to finish the poem he would have developed this theme more clearly. Indeed one wonders whether Lucan would not have ended his poem by declaring that Cato had not lost the war, only one aspect of it. The battle for the Republic, he might have
said, goes on. Even as we have it his poem's implications are clear. Caesar and libertas are at odds. The wise man must choose to fight to die to keep libertas alive.
NOTES


2.) Cicero, N.D. I.1.

3.) For much of what follows the discussion was greatly aided by P. Jal, La Guerre Civile à Rome, Etude Littéraire et Morale, (Paris 1963), and W. Alexander, "Julius Caesar in the Pages of Seneca the Philosopher," TRSC 35 (1941), 15-18. Of less value (because it is concerned with the books of Lucan which he did not finish) was W. Alexander, "Cato of Utica in the Pages of Seneca the Philosopher," TRSC 40 (1946), 59-74. P. Grenade, "Le mythe de Pompée et les Pompéiens sous les Césars," REA 52 (1950), 178.
28–63, is an excellent discussion of Pompey. See also R. Wolverton, "Speculum Caesaris," The James Sprunt Studies 46 (1964), 82–90; A. Dyroff, "Caesars Anticato und Ciceros Cato," RhM 63 (1908), 587–604, collects what is known about Cicero's and Caesar's efforts to interpret Cato's death; pp 600–604 are very useful for Neronian views.


7.) Susoriae 6.2; *cf.* also Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus’ attempt at 6.4: occurrat tibi Cato tuus cuius a te laudata mors est; quicquam ergo tanti putas ut vitam Antonio debeas?


9.) *Cf.* Plato, *Rep.* 543–576 where he argues that the character reflects the constitution of a state; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1337a22 where he argues that the state makes virtue by the proper education of her citizens. *Cf.* Aristo of Chios who argues an extreme Stoic view that the state has little value and is artificial *SVF* 1.371; see M. Reesor, *The Political Theory of the Old and*
Middle Stoa (New York 1951), 15 note 10.

10.) e.g. SVF 1.197; see also M. Reesor, (above, note 9), 13 note 8.

11.) SVF 1.271 on Zeno's avoidance of politics; For Antigonus see SVF 1.3; he did, however, send Persæus of Citium in his place (D.L. 7.7–9).

12.) SVF 1.441; 442; 460; cf Reesor, (above, note 9), 14–15.

13.) SVF 1.622; cf Reesor, (above, note 9), 15 ff.

14.) SVF 1.622–623.

15.) Plutarch Agis. 7; 13.3; Cl. 11.1; cf Reesor, (above, note 9), 17–19.

16.) See Reesor, (above, note 9), 17–19, for the arguments on the origin of sections 6–8 in Plutarch's de fortuna Alexandri and its probable derivation from Eratosthenes. Whether it is directed against Sphaerus or not does not affect our argument. It is enough to note that there was a difference of opinion in the Stoa on whether the wise man was a radical reformer or

17.) See Reesor, (above, note 9), 36-37, for Blossius; Panaetius 27-35; Posidonius 38-58.

Republic (Cambridge 1955), 76–85 and passim.


20.) Adam, (above, note 6), 64f; Sizoo, (above, note 8), , 230.

21.) A. Kargl, Die Lehre der Stoiker vom Staat, (Erlangen 1913), 43.

22.) SVF 3.695.

23.) SVF 3.697.

24.) SVF 3.611.

25.) Cicero, de rep. 1.34; Adam, (above, note 6), 65–66; Sizoo, (above, note 8), 231–232. It does not matter whether Polybius (Book 6), or Panaetius truly understood how the Republic worked. What does matter is that they believed that it was the Stoic respublica mixta and convinced those who would listen to them (e.g. Scipio, cf. de rep. 1.34, 69). Indeed the Roman aristocracy was pleased with the doctrine.
26.) de ben. 2.20.2.

27.) Adam, (above, note 6), ibid., 65, is right when she says that what Seneca is dealing with here is an historical problem not an abstract theory of the state. But she is wrong to strip it of any philosophical significance.


29.) Wirszubski, (above, note 5), 138–143 for Thrasea's protest. Whether there were those who wanted to return to a Catonian Republic or just back to the Augustan principate it is impossible to tell; cf. Wirszubski, (above, note 5), 148. Surely Toynbee, 53, and D. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D. (London 1937), 135ff, are wrong about a "conversion" of Helvidius Priscus to Cynicism. There is no evidence for such a conversion in the sources. Cf. Wirszubski, (above, note 5), 147–150 for a more balanced treatment.

30.) Dio 66.12.2; Wirszubski, (above, note 5), 148. On Lucan's hatred of

31.) The quote is from Ep. 14.13. While Seneca Ep 14.12ff seems to indicate that Cato's actions were his one mistake, M. Griffin, (above, note 28), argues that Seneca did not disapprove of Cato's entrance into the war; cf. P. Pecchiura, La figura di Catone Uticense nella letteratura latina (Turin 1965), 69–71 who argues the more commonly held opinion that he did. Ahl, Lucan, 236 argues, wrongly I think, that neither Seneca nor Lucan resolves the question. On the Cato–Brutus exchange see P. Grimal, "Le poète et l'histoire," in Entretiens 15 53–117, esp. 98–105 for a similar view; cf. J.–M. Croisille, "Caton et Sénèque face au pouvoir: Lucain, Pharsale, 2.234–235; 9.186–217," in Neronia 1977 (Adosa 1982), 75–82, who argues that Cato and Brutus stand for Seneca and Lucan. He, also, attempts to relate the exchange to Neronian politics; J. Adatte, "Caton ou l'engagement du sage dans la guerre civile" E.L. 7 (1965), 232–240, who argues that the passage is nothing more than a school exercise with little relation to the
32.) See Pohlenz's discussion of this line 1.285f.


34.) See Grimal, 97ff, for a discussion of Brutus' historical ties to the Academy and its importance to Lucan. A useful collection of Antiochus' fragments is Georg Luck, Der Akademiker Antiochos (Bern 1953). Luck, 45–51, discusses his relationship to the Stoa. J. Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen 1978), 13–98, provides a convenient account of the sources which relate to Antiochus' life and thought. Concerning the Stoic influences on the Middle Academy, especially Antiochus, see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (80 B.C. to A.D. 220) (Cornell 1977), 53–113.
Pages 43–51 of Dillon provide a summary of the doctrines of the Middle Academy. Pohlenz Stoa 1.248–256 is a summary of the cross currents between the so called Middle Stoa and Middle Academy. H. Strache, Der Eklektizismus des Antiochos von Ascalon (Berlin 1921), discusses Antiochus' Stoic sources. A very useful discussion of the philosophical "camps" among those Republicans who opposed Caesar and Octavian and the problems involved in philosophical labels is A. Momigliano, "Epicureans in Revolt," J.R.S. 31 (1941), 151–157.

35.) See J. Rist, "The Stoic Concept of Detachment," in J. Rist, ed., The Stoics (Berkeley 1978), 259–272. Also note that the Stoic sage may feel a type of ira, Seneca de ira 1.16; cf. Plutarch, de virt. mor. 9 who sees the *ευπόθεια as the Stoics begging the question.

36.) For the distinction among timor, metus, and formido see Donaldson, Complete Latin Grammar 489. This word reflects the Stoic *ευπόθεια *ενλαβεια – a rational recognition that moral danger is present SVF 3.431. It is exclusive to the wise man. Cicero, Tusc. 4.12 (= SVF 3.438) notes that the Stoics held:

*quoniamque ut bona natura adpetimus, sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio cum ratione fiet, cautio appelleetur,
The *eυπάθεια* were a point of contention between the Stoics (who held that the wise man was *αυτός*) and the traditional Academics (who held that he should aim to be *μετριοπάθειος*). More importantly, they were a point of differentiation between the new Academics and those who followed Antiochus (Cicero, *Ac. Pr.* 13). Antiochus accepted the Stoic *αυτός* but modified Stoic theory of *eυπάθεια* to make the *eυπάθεια* more moderate gradations of the πάθη in accord with Peripatetic-Academic thought. See Dillon, (above, note 34), 77 f.; Luck, (above, note 34), 48 ff., 67 ff. On *οικείωσις*, see Chapter 1, section A.

37.) SVF 3.548 reports that because the wise man rightly sees the world he is *βέβαιος*.

38.) He always knows how to act SVF 3.548; SVF 3.605; At SVF 3.570, Cicero says of the wise man: *qui fortis est, idem est fidens, qui autem est fidens, is profecto non extimescit*. Cf. SVF 3.567, 572; SVF 3.600. SVF 3.453 (*consulit et corrigit*), cf. SVF 3.620, where only the wise man is fit to rule. Cf. Seneca *de ira* 1.6.1–5, where the wise man has a duty to cure the state of *ira*. 
39.) The argument that "only the wise man can do anything well" is particularly Stoic (SVF 3.557-566). Indeed, it was a point of ridicule among those who were anti-Stoic (e.g. SVF 3.562 where Dio Chrysostomos argues that it's hard enough to do even one thing well). Most complained that the Stoics redefined their terms (παραβαίνοντες τὴν κειμένην λέξιν SVF 3.594). In point of fact they held that, since only the wise man always held kataleptic information (SVF 3.548), only he could act always in accord with the truth (SVF 3.593).

Particularly germane to this context is the fact that this was a notorious point of agreement between Antiochus and the Stoics which was cited as a major point of disagreement between the New and Middle Academy. Cicero's polemic against this doctrine is worth quoting at length.

atrocitas quidem ista tua quo modo in ueterem Academiam irruperit nescio: illa vero ferre non possum, non quo mihi displeaseant (sunt enim Socratica pleraque mirabilia Stoicorum, quae 'ευπρόειδαι nominatur) sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? Hos enim quasi eodem esse vultis. illi umquam dicerent sapientis solos reges, solos diuites, solos formosos, omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? neminem consulem praetorem imperatorem, nescio an ne quinqueuirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo, solum civem, solum liberum, insipientis omnis peregrinos exsules servos furiosos? denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis,
duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges, ne urbis quidem aut
ciuitatis, nisi quae essent sapientium? haec tibi, Luculle, si
es adsensus Antiocho, familiari tuo, tam sunt defendenda
quam moenia, mihi autem bono modo, tantum quantum
uidebitur (Ac. Pr. 136).

40.) See Ahl 236f., for another view.

41.) For Seneca's view of war, see: EM 14.3-4; that the wise man's virtue
is unaffected by evils see: SVF 3.567.

42.) Brutus' reasoning is similar to Antiochus' brand of Platonism or
even Epicureanism. Antiochus held that there were things which were by
their own nature good and and evil. Virtue was not self-sufficient. The
wise man should flee those situations which were bad and seek those
which were good. This is contrary to the Stoic doctrine of 'αδιάφορα
which can be either προπηγεμένα or 'αποπηγεμένα. See Luck,
(above, note 34), 58 ff.

43.) But the Stoic wise man is unaffected by evils. SVF 3.567 ff.

44.) SVF 3.38-43 η αρετὴ δι'αυτὴν αἱρετὴν; Cf. SVF 3.572 non
enim eget ipse animus, in quo posita vita beat. ipse enim perfectus est.
nullus autem perfectus aliquo eget et quod videtur corpori necessarium, sumet, si adfuerit. SVF 3.49 αὐτάρκης τε ἐστὶν αὐτὴν (sc. ἁρετὴν) πρὸς εὐθαμονίαν. The Commenta Lucani is quite right when it reports at 2.380 (= SVF 3.199) ...[sc. virtutis] haec definitio est: "habitus consentiens uitae". Cf. SVF 3.197 τὴν τε ἁρετὴν διάθεσιν ἐστὶν ὀμολογομένην, and SVF 3.198 virtus est affectio animi constans conueniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos, in quibus est.

45.) SVF 3.649 ἀπράγμονας τε ἐστὶν [sc. τὸνς σοφοὺς] ἐκκλίνειν γὰρ τὸ πράττετι τι πάρα το καθήκον. Chrysippus allowed that one could follow either course as his nature (fate) directed him λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐτυχεῖν ἐπίκλισιν, οἷς γίγνεται... SVF 3.699.

46.) If the semper of 2.266 is intended to claim eternal movement then the analogy must be rejected in that neither the Stoic ekpyrosis (nor Epicurean atomic theory for that matter) would allow for the universe to remain eternally stable. Cf. SVF 2.299; Epicurus, ad Herod. 43, Lucretius 5.64–109. C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (London 1928), 361–367, neatly presents the position. This is, however, the case in Antiochus’ brand of Academic physics. Cf. Cicero, Ac. Post. 27 ff; Luck, (above, note 34), 36 ff;
In this case, Lucan may be seeking to remind his readers that though Brutus may sound Stoic or Epicurean he is not either. However, it should be noted that Panaetius took exception to Stoic physics, especially the ekpyrosis. Indeed in his system, he replaced it with a Platonised type of steady-state physics. See, M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*² (Göttingen 1959) 1.191–207. But this is an anomaly, for the the entire Roman Stoa has the notion of an ekpyrosis (e.g. Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius). Moreover, one should note that in addition to teaching an unorthodox physics, Panaetius was also among those few Stoics who argued that the wise man should not ever participate in politics (Seneca, de Tran. An. 2.2). Cf. Pholens, 1.205ff., Grimal, 100. If, on the other hand, one takes the semper as poetic hyperbole, Lucan may be contrasting two Stoic views — the short view and the long view. In the short view (Brutus'), things look eternally stable, but in the long view (Cato's), eventually there will be a conflagration (cf. Seneca, *Ad Marciam* 26.5–6; *NQ* 3.27–9).

47.) The opposition of the gens Iunia to tyranny is well known beginning with L. Brutus and Servilius Ahala. Indeed Brutus may have been responsible for the latter's reputation. In any case, he minted coin types of both as one of the tresviri monetales of 54 B.C. See M. H. Crawford,
Roman Republican Coinage (Cambridge 1974), 455-6; cf. E.A. Sydenham, The Coinage of the Roman Republic (London 1957), p.57, note to #483; p.150, #907. One also should remember that these coin types may have been directed against the rumor of a dictatorship for Pompey (Cf. Cicero, Att. 4.18.2–3). Moreover, Brutus' de dictatura Pompei makes his opinion of Pompey clear. See Quint. Instit. 9.3.95; Sen. Contr. 10.1.8.

48.) SVF 3.592: in quo vero dei oracula habitauerint sapientiae studio atque uirtutis....

49.) SVF 3.548; 553.

50.) SVF 2.928 = god; SVF 2.939: the wise man is obedient.

51.) SVF 3.589.

note to 2.289 and S. Timpanaro, "Note a Lucano," in Letteratura Comparata: Problemi e Metodo [Studi in onore di Ettore Paratore] vol. 2 (Bologna 1981), 603–608 note that the line is a reflection of Horace Odes 3.3. If this is so, Lucan is using the passage to correct Horace and state the proper concept of Stoic παθεξεεα as well.

53.) This is the only occurrence of the word in the B.C. in which it is not the παθεξεεα.

54.) The TLL s.v. metus 910.20ff notes sensu artiore: a), i.e. reverentia, verecundia, religio and cites Verg. Aen. 7.60 with Servius' comment: religione, quae nascitur per timorem; cf. B.C. 8.804 where Lucan uses metus in this sense of avoiding treading upon Pompey's ashes.

55.) See Lapidge, (above, note 33), 355 ff. for discussion. Note that Seneca (NQ 3.26 ff.) uses the word metus in the same context of the conflagration.

56.) This misreading of nature is the reason which Stoics commonly give for error. A note should be made here about the reading of line 292. Housman reads: complossas tenuisse manus— with the note: "complosas M,
complosas Z, compressas Æ et edd. plerique, non apte, compressas enim manus tenet qui opem ferre potest nec uult. complosas participium, ut Luc. 1.40, sperata (quam spero) sine praeteriti temporis notatione ponitur, ut sit complosionem manuum tenuisse, id est cohibuisse, abstinuisse a manibus complodendis." But surely the point expressed in the metaphor is "how can one watch the conflagration and not be involved in man's fate" (hence compressas). Brutus is after all asking him to watch the civil war and compressas tenuisse manus.

57.) It is noteworthy that the *De finibus*, which is addressed to Brutus, is an attack upon Stoic (books 3 and 4) and Epicurean (books 1 and 2), ethics in favour of the Academic ethics of Antiochus (book 5). In any case, Lucan's Cato is making the same point: it is his natural duty to to show concern.

58.) See *SVF* 3.611 on the wise man's duty to be sure that his fellow man lives under a just government.

59.) *SVF* 3.629: *quia boni viri officium est, errores hominum corrigere eosque in viam reducere; siquidem socialis est hominis ac benefica natura,*
60.) SVF 3.611.


63.) Cf., Cato's statement on Pompey and Caesar at 2.319ff.

64.) Housman's note at 9.238 is misleading. He says on togati: gentis togatae, Romani; neque enim tum Caesar toga amicitus erat. But Lucan's point is simply to note the fact that Caesar is a Roman not a barbarian. If one is to serve a tyrant it might as well be a Roman one. Moreover at 9.250–251, he emphasizes that Caesar is the legitimate representative of the Roman people.


Conclusion

This thesis has sought primarily to demonstrate that the *Bellum Ciuile* is a Stoic poem. Many indeed have recognized Stoicism's importance to the poem. While some have seen the philosophy's role as little more than a source for platitudes sprinkled throughout the poem, others have argued for a more general influence — especially in Lucan's acceptance of the Stoic categories of wise men and fools. Recently attention has been turned to Stoicism's role as a source for imagery. Building on the work of Marti, Schotes, Lapidge and others, but focusing on ethical theory, this dissertation has attempted to do two things. The first is to correct some misconceptions and errors about Stoic doctrines (particularly the *proficiens*) which have become part of the discussion of Lucan's Stoic connections. And the second is to argue that the school's influence can be shown to be more pervasive and organic in the poem than has previously been demonstrated. That is, that the assumptions underlying the poet Lucan's view of human psychology, duty, and the cosmos are Stoic. He is, in short, a Stoic poet.

To demonstrate this I have examined aspects of Lucan's
treatment of Cato and Caesar’s relationship to themselves and others. Focusing on Stoic ethical theory (especially psychology) the dissertation by a close reading of the text has shown that both Lucan’s statements in propria persona and his characters’ actions and expressed views about the proper relationship of the self to family, state, and mankind arise from the Stoic doctrine of ὀπτικωδίᾳ. Moreover, dealing at length with one emotion, ira, it has demonstrated that Lucan’s assumptions about the effects of ira, beyond the commonplace observations, accurately reflect Stoic teachings. It has further noted that Lucan’s descriptions of the effect which ira has upon Cato and Caesar reflect Stoic teachings about the distinction between the psychological disposition of the wise man and the fool. In addition to recognizing Stoic psychological doctrines on the poem’s literal, descriptive level, it also has demonstrated the use which Lucan makes of imagery drawn from Stoic theory concerning τὸ ἰγισμονικόν.

In larger terms, the dissertation has dealt with Pompey’s role in the poem. It has argued that Pompey is a proficiens. It first set forth the Stoic doctrine which earlier discussions of Pompey as proficiens have not properly understood by attempting to clarify Seneca’s teachings. One tenet
of the Stoa's doctrine which it has stressed is that it is not necessary for a proficiens to advance continually toward virtue. It has then demonstrated that in terms of ὀκτείωσις and ἴρα Lucan treats Pompey so as to place him between Caesar and Cato. Moreover, while advance in virtue is not required, the thesis has argued that Pompey does advance in at least one way — he comes to a better understanding (i.e., more Catonian) of the relationship of self to state. The reasons for this change are dramatic, philosophic, and political — dramatic, to heighten the pathos of the events in books seven and eight, philosophic, to assist in Lucan's justification for Cato's choice of Pompey over Caesar, political, to purify Pompey's name which is synonymous with Republicanism.

There is an epistemological assumption at work here which must be dealt with briefly — namely that language and text can have a unique meaning and the related proposition that there is such a thing as verifiable authorial intent. This is particularly true in the case of ancient authors. That is not to say that their intent is always verifiable but that an ancient author will write in the hope of expressing a particular set of ideas. To apply modern theories of composition and criticism to an ancient text whose author was working under a different set of premises about
writing is, while interesting and perhaps cathartic, dangerous. But to reject ancient notions about the nature of language, communication, and literature in one's consideration of an ancient work is simply wrong. When Lucan wrote his poem he was fixed into an historical and intellectual context. There were rules and assumptions which governed the way he lived and wrote. Even though they may not have been universal, they were his. Some of these assumptions can be gleaned from a knowledge of what his contemporaries were doing and writing. Others come from a recognition not only of what Lucan says on a literal level but also how he says it — his diction and images. While the text must be central to one's consideration, there is also room for the biographical dimension to confirm observations about the text. Lucan wrote for those who knew him and his world. But more importantly Lucan himself wrote with the assumption that those who read his work would take the biographical dimension into account. This was an important aspect of ancient criticism, and an important aspect of ancient literature — that something of the person would survive in the work. For many Romans, it was their only hope for immortality — to write or be written about. This does not imply rejection of modern modes of criticism. They are often useful for moving one toward an understanding of what the author has
done in his work intentionally or otherwise. And this dissertation has
used some of these methods. But they are not an end in themselves; they
must be a tool to move one to a better understanding of the work, the
artist, and his world. It is for this reason that this dissertation has
attempted to find the assumptions which underlie Lucan's poem, so as to
facilitate the reading of the poem as closely as possible in the manner
Lucan intended it to be read. After Lucan's Stoic assumptions are
recognized, one can see the relationship of many passages to the whole
poem better than has been possible in the past.

Thus, for example, when one notes that assumptions from the
Stoa's doctrine of ὀλυστήρωσις lie behind Lucan's treatment of the horrors
of civil war, the Laelius episode of book one and the Cato-Marcia episode
of two, take on even greater significance than they have held in the past.
For in these episodes Lucan establishes one part of his foundation for
interpreting the poem. For here it becomes clear that the poet is treating
Caesarism as a perversion of those very impulses which give rise to the
bonds which unite mankind, while he presents Cato as striving to bind
society back together. This image of Caesar the perverter and destroyer
of natural bonds and Cato the restorer runs throughout the poem. The
horrors of civil war lie not just in the many deaths it causes but because it arises from a perversion of human nature — one which has its root in one man and all that he represents, Caesar. By implying that Caesar and Caesarism are by their nature contrary to Nature, Lucan argues for the rejection of the entire series domus Caesaris on Stoic principle. It is little wonder that Nero halted his recitation by calling a meeting of the Senate. Moreover, it demonstrates that that part of Lucan's poem which was published before the ban and that which followed are unified by their imagery. For as has been noted, Lucan is consistent in his treatment of Cato and Caesar with regard to oikeiōsis. This suggests that Lucan did not change his conception of the poem or its aims. From the outset he intended the poem to put forward a Stoic view of the state, the citizen, and the Republic.

Another result of recognizing the deeper influence of Stoicism on the poem is that it allows one more securely to place the poem in its historical context. For when one notes that behind the Brutus-Cato exchange of Book two is an argument which raged in the Stoa from its inception about the how the wise man should resist tyranny, it becomes clear that with the Bellum Ciuile Lucan intended to justify active
resistance to tyranny and to put forward Cato's Republic as an ideal alternative to the principate. This sets him at odds with many other Neronian Stoics — including his uncle Seneca — who were moving steadily toward a notion of enlightened monarchy. Moreover, it was contrary to the tendency of contemporary Roman political thinking, which was in the process of giving up any notion of Republican libertas in favor of the principate's version of it. There were, to be sure, others who saw a similar Catonian ideal, Helvidius Priscus, for example. But in general, to the minds of most Romans, the Republic was extinct forever. Yet Lucan strives in his poem to revive the shade of true Republican libertas and to set before his fellow Romans the full extent of that which they had handed over to the house of the Caesars. This does not mean to imply that the Pisonian conspiracy was in any way more Republican (in Cato's sense) than conspiracies against other emperors but rather that in the mind of one of its young co-conspirators Cato's ideal lived. It can never be known whether the poet believed that this ideal could be reintroduced to the real world or whether he would have sought to modify it. His life ended before he dealt with the question. But there can be no doubt that to the mind of the poet the ideal itself was not dead. For one Neronian Stoic poet at least, that libertas for which Cato fought and died was not a
lost cause in the ultimate workings of the divine will. Indeed it was a
morally right act for Cato and Lucan to die in the name of libertas.
List of Abbreviations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;A</td>
<td>Antike und Abenland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>L'Antiquité Classique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AClass</td>
<td>Acta Classica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>American Journal of Philology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANRW</td>
<td>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;R</td>
<td>Atene e Roma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BStudLat</td>
<td>Bollettino di Studi latini.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>Classical Bulletin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;M</td>
<td>Classica et Mediaevalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPh</td>
<td>Classical Philology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Classical World.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td>Etudes des Lettres (Lausanne).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIF</td>
<td>Giornale Italiano di Filologia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G&amp;R</td>
<td>Greece and Rome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAnt</td>
<td>Hesperia Antiqua.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HThR</td>
<td>Harvard Theological Review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>L'Information littéraire (Paris).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHP</td>
<td>Journal of the History of Philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>Journal of Roman Studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>Museum Helveticum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhQ</td>
<td>Philological Quarterly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des Études Anciennes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Revue des Études Latines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Rheinisches Museum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Symbolae Osloenses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVF</td>
<td>J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Leipzig 1903).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPA</td>
<td>Transactions of the American Philological Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRSC</td>
<td>Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VL</td>
<td>Vita Latina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPE</td>
<td>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography

TEXTS, etc:

A. Bourgêry and M. Ponchont, La Guerre Civile, 2 vols. (Budé, Paris 1926–9).


C. Haskins, Pharsalia, (London 1887).

C. Hosius, M. Annaei Lucani Belli Ciuilis (Leipzig 1913).


Editions of various books:


P. Lejay, Bellum Ciule I, (Paris 1894).


Scholia:


H. Usener, Commenta Bernensia, (Leipzig 1869).
Concordances:


OTHER WORKS:

T. Adam, Clementia Principis (Stuttgart 1970).


E. Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge 1911).


R. Bruère, "Lucan's Cornelia," *CPh* 46 (1951), 221-36.

--------, "The Helen Episode in *Aeneid* 2 and Lucan," *CPh* 59 (1964), 267-268.

B. Busch, *De M. Porcio Catone Uticensi quid antiqui scriptores aequales et posteriores censuerint* (Dis. Münster 1911).


A. Cattin, "Une idée directrice de Lucain dans la *Pharsale*," *EL* 7 (1965), 214-23.


E. Cizek, L’époque de Néron et ses controverses idéologiques (Leiden 1972).


J.-M. Croisille, "Caton et Sénèque face au pouvoir: Lucain, *Pharsale*,"


J. Glücker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978).


A. Kargl, Die Lehre der Stoiker vom Staat, (Erlangen 1913).


--------, Der Akademiker Antiochos, (Bern 1953).


A. Momigliano, "Epicureans in Revolt," JRS 31 (1941), 151–57.


--------, The Poet Lucan (Oxford 1967).

E. Narducci, "Cesare e la patria (Ipotesi su Phars. 1. 185–192)," Maia 32 (1980), 175–78.


P. Pecchiura, La Figura di Catone Uticense nella letteratura latina (Torino 1965).


R. Pichon, Les Sources de Lucaïn (Paris 1912)


------------, "L'apologie de Pompée par Lucain au livre 7 de la Pharsale," REL (1955), 258–96.

M. Reesor, "The 'Indifférents' in the Old and Middle Stoa," TAPA 82 (1957), 63–82.

------------, The Political Theory of the Old and Middle Stoa (New York 1951).


--------, "Problems in the Chronology of Lucan's Career," CW 57 (1963), 96.


--------, Lucan (Wege der Forschung 235), (Darmstadt 1970)


E. Sanford, "Lucan and his Roman Critics," *CPH* (1931), 233–57.

M. Schioppa, *Cesare nella Pharsalia di Lucano* (Portici della Torre 1942).


H. Strache, Der Eklektizismus des Antiochos von Askalon (Berlin 1921).


M. Van Straaten, Panétius. sa vie et ses écrits (Amsterdam 1946).


C. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate, (Cambridge 1950).
