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Savage, Grant Theodore

NEGOTIATION IN SMALL GROUP DECISION-MAKING: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC
AND CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE IN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE MEETINGS

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NEGOTIATION IN SMALL GROUP DECISION-MAKING: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC AND
CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE IN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE MEETINGS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Grant Theodore Savage, B.A., M.A.

* * * *

The Ohio State University
1984

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Department of Communication
To that which leads beyond understanding: the unfolding, the emerging, the dialogic.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The written word continually points beyond what one means, posing limitations and possibilities not originally intended. Each word is a testimony to a tradition which still lives, to a language which informs us beyond our own doing and knowing. Many people have facilitated my struggle, inscribed upon these pages to go beyond that which I knew.

I am particularly indebted to the Center for Human Resource Research at Ohio State University, both for partially funding this dissertation and for providing an environment in which this work could be begun. Part of the funding for the dissertation also came from the Center for Work and Mental Health, National Institute for Mental Health.

My thanks to William Morgan, Arthur Flesch, Mark Larson, Edward Ostrowski, and Roger Wilkens who helped me in ways that stretch, perhaps, even the bounds of friendship.

Ray McKerrow, Eric Peterson, and Dwayne Van Rheenen from the University of Maine provided critical ears, valuable advice, and a collegial atmosphere for continuing this work, while Jerry Hunt and David Bertram from Texas Tech University offered me both the encouragement and the material support necessary to complete this work; my thanks to all of you.
The members of my committee--Donald Cegala, Joseph Pilotta, and Don Ronchi--have shown me their trust, patience, and wisdom. Their guidance and criticism have allowed me to find my own way in this work.

Phyllis Byard, by taking on the burden to produce the final copy of this dissertation, has shown me her extraordinary patience and good will: thank you. Lastly, without the encouragement and help of Nancy, my wife, this work would not have been accomplished.
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Presented Papers

Grant T. Savage, "Decision Making as Negotiation: A
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INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Current models of small group decision-making do not account for the larger context of negotiation in which decisions are made. Conversely, contemporary theories of negotiation either do not explicitly account for communication, or they inadequately account for communication as the means by which information is exchanged. The central question of this dissertation--"How is communication fundamental to the processes of decision-making and negotiation?"--is answered by articulating a critical theory of dialogue. This theory assumes that the eidetic and interpretive structures of dialogue may subsume both negotiation and decision-making.

As used most often in the news media and everyday conversation, negotiation refers to a process of dispute settlement that involves not only at least two parties, but also a more or less concerned public. For example, labor and management negotiate a contract, political parties negotiate a fiscal budget, and business firms negotiate a take-over. In each of these cases, the act of negotiating is more or less open to public scrutiny. Decision-making, in contrast, is a private process in which an individual or small group engages to solve
problems, to settle differences, and to choose among alternative courses of action. For instance, a person (or the executive board of the union) decides whether to strike, a politician (or party leaders) decide whether to vote for a budget proposal, and the chairperson (or board of directors) decides whether to buy another company.

However, decision making and negotiating may share a common purpose: the resolution of conflict between two or more parties over some issue. Borrowing from the language of economics and systems theory, one may refer to negotiating and decision making as macro and micro processes, respectively, for settling disputes. When dialogue is included in this perspective, it is readily viewed as a sub-process within the systems of negotiation and decision making.

Although "dialogue" often is used to refer to conversations between two people (especially conversations in movies, plays, and novels), it may refer to the initiation or re-establishment of cooperative relationships between nations, organizations, and individuals. Thus, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. hope to re-initiate a dialogue about the nuclear arms race; the "Big Three" auto makers and the United Auto Workers carry on a dialogue about renegotiating contracts; and President Reagan and House Speaker O'Neil conduct a dialogue (albeit, unsuccessfully) on the national budget each year. When used in this sense, "dialogue" is mere talk, a preliminary to the real negotiating or decision making. In other words, dialogue is ordinarily viewed as a vehicle for initiating the supra processes of decision making and negotiating.
Rather than viewing dialogue as mere talk, this dissertation contends that a critical theory of dialogue is essential for explaining consensual decision making and negotiation. Consider another common meaning for dialogue, a meaning for dialogue which has been held since the time of Socrates: a process for reaching a mutual understanding. As such, dialogue subsumes both decision making and negotiation since the process of consensually settling a dispute must be built upon the common understandings that are reached between the conflicting parties. This thesis recognizes that the consensual process of dialogue is not the only means available for settling disputes, since power may be exercised to bring about unilateral settlements; however, a critical dialogue does offer the most "rational" means for reaching consensual courses of action.

In summary, this dissertation articulates a critical theory of dialogue that explicates the fundamental role of communication in the processes of consensual negotiation and decision making. In other words, a critical dialogue embodies the processes of consensual negotiation and decision making.

Outline of the Dissertation

Five chapters comprise this dissertation. Chapter I provides (1) an overview of influential models of decision making and group development, (2) a critique of these decision making models, (3) an
explication and critique of a consensual model of negotiation, and (4) a rationale for investigating dialogue in order to explain the relationship between consensual decision making and negotiation.

Chapter II provides the basis for a critical theory of dialogue by explaining Habermas' universal-pragmatic theory of communication. To examine the structures underlying critical discourse, Habermas' theory is then compared to rhetorical and philosophical theories of dialogue. By supplementing Habermas' universal-pragmatic theory of communication with phenomenological and hermeneutic theories of dialogue, a critical theory of dialogue is articulated which takes into account the eidetic and interpretive structures of dialogue.

A method for explicating dialogue is presented in Chapter III. The methodological criterion of selectivity, derived from the critical theory of dialogue articulated in Chapter II, provides a rationale for using conversational and ethnographic analyses of conversation to partially explain critical discourse. Field research and written records provide an ethnographic history of conversations which partially explains the interpretive structure of dialogue. SYMLOG (Bales & Cohen, 1979) analyses of conversations serve a dual purpose: (1) these analyses act as an interpretive foil, highlighting how the researcher's selectivity affects his participation, and (2) these analyzes provide an indirect means to assess the eidetic structure of dialogue.

Chapter IV explicates a critical theory of dialogue by applying the methods presented in Chapter III to a labor-management committee's
decision making. The ethnographic and SYMLOG analyses of the committee's conversation illustrate that the members reached an agreement which did not harmonize their interests because they did not question the grounds for the agreement. In other words, a non-critical dialogue led to a pseudo-consensual decision.

The concluding chapter reviews the critical theory of dialogue developed throughout the dissertation and derives a set of methodological criteria for assessing communication. Additionally, the key assumptions of a critical theory of dialogue are contrasted with exemplary decision making and negotiation theories. These critical dialogical principles suggest new directions for decision making and negotiation research, as well as directives for facilitating consensual decision making.
CHAPTER I

DECISION-MAKING, NEGOTIATION, AND COMMUNICATION

Models of Decision-Making

During the last thirty years, the literature dealing with small-group interaction has grown extensively and encompasses at least three disciplines: communication, psychology and sociology. As a number of reviews of this literature point out (Hare, 1973, 1962; Ofshe, 1973; McGrath and Altman, 1966; Tuckman, 1965), group problem-solving or decision-making comprises a small but significant strand of small-group interaction research. This part of Chapter I focuses on the major models or theories that have influenced small group decision-making research. So that the historical context of small group decision-making is understood more fully, the concurrent development of models and theories of group dynamics are also reviewed.

History

The three-phase model. This model of problem-solving, developed by Bales and Strodtbeck (1951), was the first experimental attempt to
describe the stages that small task groups undergo during the process of solving problems. As Bales and Strodtbeck (1951) note, the notion that groups go through qualitatively different stages of problem-solving was first advanced in the form of various prescriptive models (Dewey, 1910; Elliott, 1928; Lasker, 1949). In turn, these prescriptive models of group problem-solving were "more or less direct extrapolations of steps or stages assumed to exist in individual mental processes" (Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951, p. 488).

The three-phase model assumes that work groups must successfully address three problems:

1. Orientation - determining what information is relevant to their task;
2. Evaluation - determining what values and interests shall be used to judge proposed courses of action; and
3. Control - determining who shall do what in order to implement the solution.

In other words, Bales and Strodtbeck posit a linear progression of the group through each stage of the problem-solving. Moreover, in order to solve problems effectively the group must also achieve a balance between task and socio-emotional behavior; since the accomplishment of the task strains the social relationships among group members, the group must be able to counteract the negative reactions of group members with positive reactions.

(A)tempts to accomplish the task ... tend to lead to differentiation of the roles of the participants,
both as to the functions they perform and their gross amounts of participation ... Both types of differentiation tend to carry status implications which may threaten or disturb the existing order or balance of status relations among members and impair the basic solidarity of the group. (Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951, pp. 488, 489)

It is for these reasons that Bales and Strodtbeck hypothesize that "groups tend to move in their interaction from a relative emphasis upon problems of orientation, to problems of evaluation, and subsequently to problems of control, and that concurrent with these transitions, the relative frequencies of both negative reactions and positive reactions tend to increase" (1951, p. 485).

Additionally, Bales and Strodtbeck recognize that various external/internal factors may affect the group in such a way that one or more of the phases may not occur. In order for the three phases to occur, the group must meet six conditions which state that group members:

1. Have normal, adult personalities and competencies;
2. Share the same culture and language;
3. Have not developed traditional phases of group interaction that counter the three phase model;
4. Are committed to the continued existence of the group;
5. Are bound and affected by the group's decision;
6. Are enabled by the organizational structure "the right to participate and influence the choice of the ultimate decision."
In addition, the group must work upon a "full fledged problem," one that presents "the functional problems of orientation, evaluation, and control."

Problems of orientation occur whenever a member is not fully informed about the issue under consideration or is not certain about what he does know. Problems of evaluation occur whenever there are multiple values and criteria for judging the proposed course(s) of action. Finally, problems of control "of the member over each other and over the common environment" (Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951, p. 487) occur when members not only feel pressed to make a decision but also expect "further joint action."

In order to demonstrate the existence of the phase model, Bales and Strodtbeck applied interaction process analysis (IPA), a system of 12 categories for coding task and socio-emotional behavior, to 22 cases of groups performing problem-solving tasks. Only eight of these cases, however, dealt with full-fledged problems. The IPA categories were then grouped (Figure 1) so as to operationalize the measurement of problems of orientation, evaluation, and control, as well as negative and positive reactions. The total array of acts categorized for each case was then arbitrarily divided into thirds to correspond to the three hypothesized phases. Table one displays the expected phase distribution for the five different types of acts. The major test of the hypothesis was based on the eight cases in which groups solved full-fledged problems, and the statistic chosen for this test was the number of transpositions of adjacent values required to match
Figure 1. Interaction Process Categories Defined and Grouped By Types

Key: a, problems of orientation, b, problems of evaluation, c, problems of control, d, problems of decision, e, problems of tension-management, and f, problems of integration.
Table 1
Expected Phase in Which Frequencies of Acts by Type Will be High, Intermediate, and Low under Conditions of the Full-Fledged Problem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Act</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Low</th>
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<td>Orientation</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Final</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Final</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Final</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Final</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Final</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>First</td>
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From Bales and Strodbeck, "Phases in Group Problem-Solving," p. 491
the observed values with the predicted phase values for each type of act. Six of the eight group sessions had three or less transpositions, and this warranted the rejection of the null hypothesis.

Bales and Strodtbeck also report that "when all of the acts of the 22 cases are summed together by type of act and phase, the values for each type of act have maxima and minima which correspond exactly with the particular phase movement under discussion" (1951, pp. 492, 493). They reasoned that this observation could be a statistical artifact, resulting from cases in which compensating differences happen to exist. However, they speculate that it might not be a statistical artifact, and they argue

that parts of the interaction process itself tend to affect other parts in such a way that at the time of any given act, the acts which have gone before, or which have not yet occurred but are expected to come, constitute a set of "internal" conditions which operate in addition to whatever "external" conditions there may be of the sorts specified in the statement of the hypothesis. We know that in the more microscopic act-to-act sequences this is the case. Questions tend to be followed by attempted answers, and these in turn tend to be followed by positive or negative reactions or more questions. These are "internal tendencies" of the process itself on a microscopic time span. It may be that similar internal tendencies operate on the more molar level of longer chains of sequences leading to group decision. (Bales and Strodtbeck, 1951, p. 493)

The notion that act-to-act sequences may index longer chains of sequences within the process of decision-making has had a profound influence on subsequent models of decision-making.
The process of group development was made thematic by many other researchers interested in group dynamics and working with therapeutic or self-analytic groups during this same period. This work was in striking contrast to Bales and Strodtbeck's which focused on task group behavior. From the late 1940's through the mid 1960's, a number of models were generated to explain the process of group development (Bennis and Shepard, 1956; Stock and Thellen, 1958; Bion, 1961; Tuckman, 1965; Slater, 1966). These models, though not formulated with group decision-making as their primary focus, have influenced later researchers' conceptualization of the decision-making process (see Fisher and Hawes, 1971; Hare, 1973; and Poole, 1981). In retrospect, this influence can be explained by two interrelated lines of reasoning. The most general of these lines of reasoning can be summed up as follows: the process of group development is recapitulated in the process of group decision-making. In other words, the stages of group development (a molar process) are re-enacted, partially or in full, as the group addresses a problem and makes a decision (a micro process). The second line of reasoning provides a rationale for the above thesis: each problem that leads to group decision-making requires that the group re-establish its identity as a group, i.e., its status and role relationships. As noted in the precis of Bales and Strodtbeck's article, this is the precise reasoning that led to their hypothesizing the three-phase model of problem-solving. As exemplars of group developmental models, the works of Bion, Stock and Thelen, Bennis and Shepard, and Tuckman are reviewed below.
Bion's theory. This theory of group dynamics (1961), proposed in a series of articles from the mid-1940's through the early 1950's, was based on Bion's experience with therapeutic groups, and his treatment of disturbed military personnel in Britain during World War II. Two principle components comprise his theory: one, the mental aspect of the Work Group in which group members voluntarily participate, and two, the emotional drives or three basic-assumptions - dependence, pairing, fight/flight - which group members involuntarily share. His theory emphasizes the tension between the mental activities of the Work Group and the basic-assumption "culture" of that same group. In contrast to Freud's "individual" psychology, he expressly formulated his theory to deal with group psychology. Bion's work, while not presenting a group developmental theory per se, has influenced many researchers, most notably Stock and Thelen (1958), to extend his work in this direction.

Bion attributes certain aspects of mental activity to the Work Group, and notes that any group, no matter how "casual, however idle it may appear to be, meets to 'do' something" (1961, p. 442). This work requires voluntary cooperation from all group members, and this cooperation is dependent upon the degree of social skill attained by each member. Bion considers the social skill of an individual member to be a product of training, previous experience in groups, and mental development. He points out that the task activity of the work group "is related to reality, its methods are rational, and, therefore, in however embryonic a form, scientific" (1961, p. 442). Furthermore, in
Bion's assessment, the characteristics of the Work Group as a mental activity are similar to those attributed by Freud to the ego.

Bion contrasts the "rational" mental activity of the (Work Group) with the basic-assumption mental activities which have powerful emotional drives. "The activities of (the Work Group) are obstructed, diverted, and on occasion assisted by certain other mental activities which have in common the attribute of powerful emotional drives" (Bion, 1961, p. 444; my emphasis). Such mental activities arise from basic-assumptions shared by group members at an unconscious level of awareness:

1. Dependence - group members assume that the "group exists in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection" (Bion, 1961, p. 444).

2. Pairing - group members assume that the group "has met for purposes of pairing . . . It is suffused with mesianic hopes and its leader . . . can best be described as the unborn genius" (Bion, 1961, p. 447, 448).

3. Fight-Flight - group members assume that the group "has met to fight something or to run away from it" (Bion, 1961, p. 448).

Bion summarizes the characteristics of the basic-assumption mental activity and introduces the concept of valency. "Participation in basic-assumption mental activity requires no training, experience, or mental development, (and) . . . depends on the individual's possession of what I call valency - a term I borrow from the physicists to
express a capacity for instantaneous involuntary combination of one individual with another for sharing and acting on a basic assumption" (Bion, 1961, p. 449).

Four aspects of basic-assumption mental activity should be stressed. First, the leadership of the basic-assumption group may be identified with the Work Group leader; however, the "identification may in each case be with an inanimate object or with an idea. It may also be identified with the history of the group, a phenomenon I have most often noticed in D(ependent groups)" (Bion, 1961, p. 450). Thus, Bion utilizes a very abstract notion of leadership, and more or less associates it with a specific goal orientation that may be symbolized for the group by a number of different objects. Second, an inherent characteristic of basic-assumption mentality is a lack of awareness of time. "Time plays no direct part in basic-assumption mentality; it is a dimension of mental function that is not recognized: consequently, all activities that require an awareness of time are imperfectly comprehended and tend to arouse feelings of persecution" (Bion, 1961, p. 453). A third aspect "is the absence of any process of development as a part of basic-assumption mentality" (Bion, 1961, p. 453). As Bion notes, this aspect is derived from the absence of time as a significant dimension of group mental activity. Since any form of development has time as a primary component, Bion argues that the manifestation of time causes the basic-assumption group to feel anxiety which, because it cannot be relieved, engenders hostility toward development. In turn, this hostility provides the impetus for the cyclical
change from one basic assumption to another. Such cyclical change allows the group to "be overwhelmed by basic-assumption mentality and thus become approximated to one kind of mental life in which a capacity for development is not required. The main compensation for such a shift appears to be an increase in a pleasurable feeling of vitality" (Bion, 1961, p. 453). Lastly, in contrast to the Work Group which "understands that particular use of symbols which is involved in verbal communication; the basic-assumption group does not" (Bion, 1961, p. 474). Bion explicates this point by noting that the member in a basic-assumption group does not identify with or equate him/herself with the symbols of Dependence, Pairing, or Fight-Flight; rather, he/she is those basic-assumptions "or a function of those symbols" (Bion, 1961, p. 475).

The problem for every group, according to Bion's theory, is that the Work Group mental activity and only one of the basic-assumption mental activities are always co-present within the group at any particular time. This presents a problem because the group members, under the sway of a particular basic-assumption, are incapable of forming or employing symbols which are fundamental to the mental activity of the Work Group. As Bion notes "the sense of intellectual deficiency produced by the interplay between the basic-assumption group, which is incapable of symbol formation, and the W(ork) Group, which constantly employs it, can be so strong as to pervade W(ork) Group function and inhibit intellectual activity in it" (Bion, 1961, p. 465). The assumption that the employment of symbols by the group
is relevant only to the Work Group mental activity leads Bion to postulate that a group which deploys symbols with any emotionality should be considered as expressing a basic-assumption. Thus, to understand the basic-assumption characterizing the group activity, the manifest content of the symbols should be discarded in favor of either the preverbal significance or emotion underlying the use of the symbols.

Bion envisions the basic-assumption group as incapable of development and, therefore, continually passing from one basic assumption to another. He describes "the most common sequence of events" in the following passage.

When D(ependence) or F(ight-Flight) are dominant, a struggle takes place to suppress the new idea, or P(airing) L(eader), so that these basic assumptions should retain their dominance in the emotional life of the group. If the P(airing) L(eader) is not suppressed in its incipient stage, then a period of dominance by P(airing) in a group continues until feelings of anxiety give way to feelings of persecution, whereupon a period of dominance by F(ight-Flight) supervenes. This in turn, after a similar sequence of emotions, gives way to a period of dominance by D(ependence). (Bion, 1961, p. 451)

In essence, Bion views the group as cycling through the basic-assumptions, starting out with Dependence, moving to Pairing, followed by Fight-Flight, and then back to Dependence.

Stock's and Thelen's theory. Drawing on observations made by Bion, Stock and Thelen (1958) report on the efforts of the National Training Laboratory to extend and refine Bion's theory. They elabo-
rate his theory by explicating two key concepts and empirically testing their implications. First, they define Bion's own term, culture, as referring to the dynamic interrelation of the work (Work Group) and emotional (basic-assumption) components of the group.

This reasoning provides a basis to redefine the concept of valency in terms of individual predispositions. Thus, they find that valency "refers to the particular way in which the individual interacts with the group culture and appears to involve two interrelated aspects: expressive behavior and combining with others" (Stock and Thelen, 1958, p. 15; my emphasis). Valency refers not only to the individual's capacity to "instinctually" collaborate with others in an emotional mode - dependency, pairing, fight/flight - but also to the tendency for individual's to express certain basic affects.

Summarizing these points and articulating their implications, Stock and Thelen succinctly state their view of group development:

1. Group interaction can be described in terms of two aspects: work and emotionality.

2. The significant emotional categories of group interaction are dependency, pairing, and fight-flight.

3. At any given time a group is operating in a work-emotionality culture in which work is associated with one or another of the above emotional states.

4. The development of a group can be described in terms of successive phases of varying duration in which one work-emotionality culture gives way to another. Successive work-emotionality states or cultures differ in the particular emotionality associated with the work and/or in
the relative dominance of work over emotionality or vice versa.

5. Anxiety and need gratification account for the shift from one work-emotionality culture to another.

6. As the group develops, there is a trend toward integration of work and emotional activity such that neither is denied and both are mutually supportive (Stock and Thelen, 1958, p. 191).

In support of these statements, Stock and Thelen present two empirical studies that investigate group development by examining the changing relationships between work and emotionality. In each of these studies, group interactions were content analyzed using a category system (see Table 2) which operationalized the key concepts of Bion's theory. The content analyses were then examined using such techniques as flow charts and graphs of the various categorized acts to describe the group interaction. The first study examined the development of a training group over the course of thirteen meetings moved through four phases:

The first phase . . . included attempts to define a task accompanied by much expression of personal need unrelated to the tasks of the group. During the second phase there was . . . toward a more organized discussion of issues; but such discussion tended to be quite without affect. During the third and longest phase the group operated in a variety of ways: the new element was that expressions of personal feelings were integrated with and supportive of the work of the group. The final phase, comprising the last two meetings, found the members withdrawing their affect from the group situation - still working hard but in a more intellectual way . . . In general, then, this group increased its ability to work effectively as a unit . . . In our
### Table 2

**Definitions of the Behavioral Rating System Categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension I: Quality of work expressed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1---</strong> level work is personally need-oriented and unrelated to the group work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2---</strong> level work is maintaining or routine in character. It may involve attempting to define a task, searching for methodology, clarifying already established plans, and the like.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3---</strong> level work is group-focused work that introduces some new ingredient; active problem solving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4---</strong> level work is highly creative, insightful, and integrative. It often interprets what has been going on in the group and brings together in a meaningful way a series of experiences.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension II: Character of emotionality expressed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fight (F): expressions of hostility and aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight (FI): expressions of avoidance of the problem or withdrawal from participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairing (P): expressions of warmth, intimacy, and supportiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency (D): expressions of reliance on some person or thing external to the membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: this category is reserved for the relatively few statements in which some affect is clearly present but is too confused or diffuse to be placed in any one or any combination of the above categories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on system reported in Stock and Thelen, *Emotional Dynamics and Group Culture*, p. 193.
terms, work and emotionality were more integrated and mutually supportive toward the end of the group experience than at the beginning. (Stock and Thelen, 1958, p. 232)

The second study compared the interrelation of subgroup (i.e., members who share an emotional valency) structure and development in two therapy groups. One group showed movement toward integration of work and emotionality, while the other group remained polarized. This second group had many diverse subgroups and "the entire life of the group was something like Phase I of the group already described" (Stock and Thelen, 1958, p. 233). Based on these results, Stock and Thelen are very cautious about generalizing to all groups the pattern of development described in the first study. They note that group development may be viewed "both in terms of shifting group cultures and changing relationships between work and emotionality" (1958, p. 232). Since the shifts in the group culture are not accounted for in the above studies, such shifts may be an additional factor influencing group development.

As Stock and Thelen also note, since that the theory of group dynamics is based on participant-observation and experimental studies of therapeutic or self-analytic groups, one may easily question the generalizability of the above findings for task group decision-making. However, they cite an experimental study of task group decision-making conducted by Glidewell (Stock and Thelen, 1958) as providing some evidence for the predictive validity of Bion's theory. This study also provides some evidence for the impact of group culture by controlling for the emotional mode characterizing the group.
Bennis' and Shepard's theory. Bennis and Shepard (1956) also proposed a theory of group development which, after Bion's, was probably the one most seminal theory advanced during this period. Certainly, the work of Stock, Thelen, and others associated with the University of Chicago and National Training Laboratory represents a significant programatic effort to utilize experimental means to test, extend, and refine Bion's theory of group dynamics. Needless to say, group dynamics may also be accounted for by other theories. Based, for the most part, upon five years of teaching and observing a graduate course in group dynamics, Bennis and Shepard assume that a group must develop or mature before it can know "what it is doing." In this sense, group development "involves the overcoming of obstacles to valid communication among members, or the development of methods for achieving and testing consensus" (Bennis and Shepard, 1956, p. 415). The authors identify two major areas of "internal uncertainty" -- obstacles to valid communication -- which are the principal components of their theory. The first area is the orientation of group members toward authority, "or more generally toward the handling and distribution of power in the group" (Bennis and Shepard, 1956, p. 416). The second area is the "members' orientations toward one another," i.e., toward intimacy. These two sets of orientations are interrelated, though distinct. According to their theory, these orientations that members bring to the group often result in behaviors "directed toward enslavement of the other in the service of the self, enslavement of the self in the service of the other, or disintegration
of the situation. Hence, they prevent the setting, clarification of, and movement toward group-shared goals" (Bennis and Shepard, 1956, p. 417).

As Bennis and Shepard note, theorists such as Freud (1949), Bion (1961), and Schutz (1954) have also made these two orientations central to their theories of groups. They summarize their theory of group development in the following passage (see Tables 3 and 4).

In accord with Freud's observation, the orientations toward authority are regarded as being prior to, or partially determining of, orientations toward other members. In its development, the group moves from preoccupation with authority relations to preoccupation with personal relations. This movement defines the major phases of group development. Within each phase are three subphases, determined by the ambivalence of orientations in each area. That is, during the authority ("dependence") phase, the group moves from preoccupation with submission to preoccupation with rebellion, to resolution of the dependence problem. Within the personal (or "interdependence") phase the group moves from a preoccupation with intermember identification to a preoccupation with individual identity to a resolution of the interdépendence problem. (p. 417)

The dynamics of their theory are rooted in the personality conflicts of group members, and, in accordance with Schutz's (1955) terminology, two aspects of personality are focused upon:

The dependence aspect is comprised by the member's characteristic patterns related to a leader or to a structure of rules. Members who find comfort in rules of procedure, an agenda, an expert, etc. are called "dependent". Members who are discomfited by authoritative structures are called "counterdependent".
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>PHASE I. DEPENDENCE—POWER RELATIONS*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subphase 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dependence-Submission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Content Themes</td>
<td>Discussion of interpersonal problems external to training groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dominant Roles (Central Persons)</td>
<td>Assertive, aggressive members with rich previous organizational or social science experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Group Structure</td>
<td>Organized mainly into multi-subgroups based on members' experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Group Activity</td>
<td>Self-oriented behaving reminiscent of most new social gathering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Group movement facilitated by:</td>
<td>Staff member abnegation of traditional role of structuring situation, setting up rules of fair play, regulation of participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Main Defenses</td>
<td>Projection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Course terminates at the end of 17 weeks. It is not uncommon for groups to remain throughout the course in this phase.
| TABLE 4 |
|---|---|---|
| **PHASE II. INTERDEPENDENCE—PERSONAL RELATIONS** |
| **Subphase 4—Enchantment** | **Subphase 5—Disenchantment** | **Subphase 6—Consensual Validation** |
| **Emotional Modality** | Pairing-Flight Anxiety reactions. Distrust and suspicion of various group members. | Pairing, understanding, acceptance. |
| **Content Themes** | Discussion of "group history", and generally salutary aspects of course, group, and membership. | Revival of content themes used in Subphase I: What is a group? What are we doing here? What are the goals of the group? What do I have to give up personally—to belong to this group? (How many intimacy and affection is required?) Invasion of privacy vs. "group giving". Settings up proper codes of social behavior. | Course grading system. Discussion and assessment of member roles. |
| **Dominant Roles (Central Persons)** | General distribution of participation for first time. Overpersonals have salience. | Most assertive counterpersonal and overpersonal individuals, with counterpersonals especially salient. | Assertive independents. |
| **Group Structure** | Solidarity, fusion. High degree of camaraderie and suggestibility. Le Bon's description of "group minde" would apply here. | Restriction of membership into two competing predominant subgroups made up of individuals who share similar attitudes concerning degree of intimacy required in social interaction, i.e. the counterpersonal and overpersonal groups. The personal individuals remain uncommitted but act according to needs of situation. | Diminishing of ties based on personal orientation. Group structure now presumably appropriate to needs of situation based on predominantly substantive rather than emotional orientation. Consensus significantly easier on important issues. |
| **Group Activity** | Laughter, joking, humor. Planning out-of-class activities such as parties. The institutionalization of happiness to be accomplished by "fun" activities. High rate of interaction and participation. | Disparagement of group in a variety of ways: high rate of absenteeism, tardiness, balkiness in initiating total group interaction, frequent statements concerning worthlessness of group, denial of importance of group. Occasional member asking for individual help finally rejected by the group. | Communication to others of self-system of interpersonal relations: i.e. making conscious to self, and other aware of, conceptual system one uses to predict consequences of personal behavior. Acceptance of group on reality terms. |
| **Group movement facilitated by:** | Independence and achievement attained by trainer-rejection and its concomitant, deriving consensually some effective means for authority and control. (Subphase 3 rebellion bridges gap between Subphases 2 and 4.) | Disenchantment of group as a result of fantasized expectations of group life. The received threat to self-esteem that further group involvement signifies creates schism of group according to amount of intimacy desired. The counterpersonal and overpersonal assertive individuals alleviate source of anxiety by disparaging or abnegating further group involvement. Subgroups form to ward off anxiety. | The external realities, group termination and the prescribed need for a course grading system, comprise the barometric event. Led by the personal individuals, the group tests reality and reduces autistic convictions concerning group involvement. |
The personal aspect is comprised by the member's characteristic patterns with respect to interpersonal intimacy. Members who cannot rest until they have stabilized a relatively high degree of intimacy with all the others are called "overpersonal". Members who tend to avoid intimacy with any of the others are called "counterpersonal". (Bennis and Shepard, 1956, pp. 417, 418)

Bennis and Shepard consider as "conflicted" members who evidence some compulsiveness and ambiguous communication "in the adoption of highly dependent, highly counterdependent, highly personal, or highly counterpersonal roles" (1956, p. 418). These members are "conflicted" precisely because their behavior is one-sided (e.g., either overly trusting or distrusting), and even though the reactions of others make the unbalanced nature of their behavior apparent, they are unable to change their behavior appropriately. Thus, for example, a highly dependent member who places unfulfilled trust in authority will tend to repress his/her resulting distrust of authority. In turn, this produces an unconscious level of conflict which is apparent in the communication of the group member "who manifests submission in that part of his communication of which he is aware, and distrust or rebellion in that part of his communication of which he is unaware" (Bennis and Shepard, 1956, p. 418).

Bennis and Shepard assume that those group members "who are unconflicted with respect to the dependence or personal aspect are ... responsible for the major movements of the group toward valid communication" (1956, p. 418). The actions of these group members enable the group to deal successfully with the problems or uncertainty faced
during a given phase and thus move onto another phase. They call such actions "barometric events" and label the initiators of these actions, "catalysts." As the authors note, "this part of the theory of group development is based on Redl's thesis concerning the 'infectiousness of the unconflicted on the conflicted personality constellation'" (1956, p. 418). In summary, the barometric event associated with the catalyst has its "forward" effect because it reduces the uncertainty characterizing a given phase.

Tuckman's four-stage model. Tuckman (1965) synthesizes the results from 26 studies of group therapy and proposes a four-stage model of group development that provides an excellent summary of the later work in group dynamics. During the following decade, numerous studies of group dynamics (Slater, 1966; and others) followed in the wake of the theories that are reviewed above. Tuckerman constructs his model so that the four stages describe the development of both task activities and group structures (i.e., socio-emotional behavior). The prior discussion of group dynamics provides the reader with sufficient background for understanding the following brief description of Tuckman's four stages of group development:

Stage 1
Group structure: testing and dependence.
Task activity: orientation and testing.

Stage 2
Group structure: intragroup conflict.
Task activity: emotional resistance.

Stage 3
Group structure: development of group cohesion.
Task activity: self-disclosure and open communication.
Stage 4
Group structure: functional role-relatedness.
Task activity: emergence of insight.

The spiral model. Scheidel and Crowell (1964) introduced a spiral model of idea development that is best understood within the context of the models and theories of group dynamics developed during the 1950's and 1960's. On the one hand, by placing heavy emphasis upon the emotional and individual aspects of group interaction, these theories have heuristic value to researchers investigating the behavior of task groups. On the other hand, they have the effect of deflecting research efforts (Fisher and Hawes, 1971) from the investigation of the "rational," cognitive aspects of groups, especially task groups that make decisions. The spiral model was developed in antithesis to the view that group decision-making involves a linear progression of discrete steps from the recognition of a problem to its solution. While this model was largely a reaction to idealized models, such as Dewey's (1910), the authors also criticizes Bales' category system (IPA), thus indirectly questioning the three-stage model of problem-solving.

Scheidel and Crowell attempted to describe decision-making as the "process of human reasoning in groups." Although they recognized that conversational contributions contain both logical and socio-emotional aspects, they limited their study to the analysis of the logical development of ideas in small group discussion. Their view of human reasoning is summarized below:
The essence of the process by which ... a cooperating group makes its judgment is the progressive modification of ideas. An idea is introduced spontaneously by one of the participants. Another in the group suggests an extension, a different emphasis, an example, a substitution, et cetera, or perhaps merely expresses his affirmation or rejection of the point. Others volunteer similarly. Thus there is an idea-in-the-making, a preliminary idea changed by the work of the group through oral modification until it represents more or less well their cumulative, developing, mutual point of view. (p. 141)

The authors also critiqued Bales' IPA, noting its inadequacies for analyzing the development of ideas in a small decision-making group. They found Bales' category system both too general and too static for their purpose. They argued, for example, that Bales' IPA category labeled "give orientation" may be correctly applied to either a statement introducing a new idea or a statement synthesizing ideas already presented. Yet these two actions may function in markedly different ways upon the development of a line of thought. "The same statement may be a repetition, a rejection, or a turning of the group thought to a new line depending upon what has preceded it" (Scheidel and Crowell, 1964, p. 141). Their complaint that Bales' IPA is too static raises a methodological issue: which analysis, static, or dynamic is more or less appropriate for describing "what one contribution does in terms of what precedes it?" (Scheidel and Crowell, 1964, p. 141). Scheidel and Crowell argue that only a dynamic analysis, one that takes into account the effect of contiguous acts, is appropriate for this purpose. Ironically, this very concern with a dynamic
analysis was foreshadowed by Bales and Strodtbeck's concluding remarks that there may be "internal tendencies" at the microscopic act-to-act level that account for the stages of problem-solving.

In 1961, Scheidel and Crowell developed a category system (Table 5) and applied it (1964) to 10 cases of group discussion (5 groups, each having two 1 hour problem-solving tasks); this system would allow them to "describe what one contribution does in terms of what precedes it" (1964, p. 142). Their category system uses as its unit of analysis, "thought-units" which vary from a phrase to an entire "paragraph" of talk. Only the relevant, problem-solving portions of the two meetings were coded using the category system, and the sets of coded data were then submitted to both static and dynamic analyses. The static analysis provided a simple "breakdown of the number of thought-units categorized." Scheidel and Crowell reported that

the initiation, extension, modification, and synthesis of ideas, acts which would seem to comprise the very essence of the development of a thought (made up only 22 per cent of the thought-units) . . . Fully one fourth of all comments were statements in confirmation of something already before the group. Another quarter of the group effort was devoted to clarifying and substantiating ideas before the group . . .

This oral play on an idea and the verbalizing of concurrence are probably the ways by which a group gets its anchoring. Group thought seems to move forward with a "reach-test" type of motion, that is, one participant reaches forth with an inference which seems to be elaborated at length with movements of clarification, substantiation, and verbalized acceptance. Little wonder that group thinking often proceeds slowly when the anchoring of group thought takes up practically half the total time. (1964, p. 143)
Table 5  
Categories for Analysis of Idea Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension I</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Assertion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q Question</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ Assertion-Question (combined in single thought-units)</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension II</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O Information</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>E Inference</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S Substantive</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>P Procedural</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension IV</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Volunteered</td>
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<tr>
<td>R Requested</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension V</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Initiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Restatement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Clarification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Substantiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Extension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Simple Response to request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7p Positive Modification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7c Negative Modification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a Stated Acceptance-approval</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8r Stated Rejection-disapproval</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Synthesis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Summary</td>
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</table>

The dynamic analysis performed on the data consisted of a contiguity analysis which "for each type of assertion, gives the percentage of times it was followed directly by each of the types of assertions" (Scheidel and Crowell, 1964, p. 143). The authors interpreted their results as suggesting that "specific subsequent assertions in group discussion are relatively unpredictable on the basis of immediate antecedent assertions" (1964, p. 143). In other words, the group members showed a great deal of freedom in their responses to specific acts initiated by other group members.

Nevertheless, Schiedel and Crowell argue that the results do show some interpretable order. First, the acts following a statement which initiated an idea were always ones that "built up" the idea so that if rejection came, it did so only after the idea had some degree of development. Second, there was a significant tendency for assertion types to be reciprocal. "If one assertion type follows a certain other type, then the latter tends also to follow the former; conversely, if one certain type does not follow the other type, then neither does the latter usually follow the former" (Scheidel and Crowell, 1964 p. 144). Specifically, four sets of assertions tended to be reciprocal:

1. clarification-acceptance-further clarification
2. substantiation-acceptance-further substantiation
3. extension-restatement-further extension
4. clarification-substantiation-further clarification
Scheidel and Crowell conclude that, based on the results of the dynamic analysis, the findings also demonstrate the continuous anchoring of the group's position as an idea is developed; they further suggest that "this anchoring is done with the circular, reciprocal process illustrated by the data" (1964, p. 144).

In summary, Scheidel and Crowell propose that the process of idea development and, hence, decision-making is a spiraling process in which ideas are generated, developed, and either accepted or rejected. Those ideas that are accepted become anchors from which other ideas are then generated, tested, and so on until a decision is reached on a problem or issue under discussion.

The four-phase model. Fisher's four-phase model of decision-making (1970) exemplifies the general approach and conclusions of many other small-group researchers during the next decade (Bostrom, 1970; Stech, 1970; Gouran and Baird, 1972; and Mabry, 1974, 1975). Scheidel and Crowell had a marked influence on Fisher's conceptualization of decision-making as well as his methodology for examining group interaction. Fisher developed a category schema for interaction analysis that was similar to Scheidel's and Crowell's; however, rather than focusing on ideas, his system focused on the decision proposals suggested by group members and the reactions to these proposals. Additionally, like Scheidel and Crowell, Fisher's interaction analysis (IA) schema codes only task related statements (see Table 6). He also echoes their criticism of Bales' IPA and criticizes Bales and Strodtbeck for not focusing on the interaction process. But, in turn, he criticizes Scheidel and Crowell for not "observing aspects of the time
Table 6

Categories for Interaction Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension I</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Asserted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Seeking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension II</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Substantiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Clarification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Modification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension III</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(applicable to &quot;1&quot; and &quot;2&quot; categories only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>Favorable toward the proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>Unfavorable toward the proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Ambiguous toward the proposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oₜ</td>
<td>Origin of decision proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dₜ)</td>
<td>Reintroduction of a proposal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

dimension" in their content analysis of group problem-solving discussions; by sampling only one segment of each group discussion, they are unable to account for the interaction process across time. This criticism is consistent with Fisher's intent "to discover the nature of the interaction process across time leading to group consensus on decision-making tasks" (1970, p. 54). Fisher's unit of analysis also varies from the "thought-units" of Scheidel and Crowell; he utilizes a functional unit of interaction where the "distinction between two units of interaction ... is the interruption of one individual's contribution by another individual or the crossing of function categories within an individual's contribution" (1970, p. 55).

The theoretical basis for Fisher's model is grounded, in part, upon a pilot study from which he derives three general characteristics of task group decision-making:

1. Decisions emerge gradually as a result of the accumulation of verbal cues;

2. This pattern of verbal cues is independent from the socio-emotional dimension of the group's interaction; and

3. The above pattern is not reducible to an agenda for problem-solving suitable for individual decision-making.

He speculates that these general characteristics mean that group members perceive several alternatives for accomplishing their tasks. As discussions progress, these alternatives are debated, refined, accepted,
changed, rejected, etc., until the final task product evolves from their deliberations - largely through a "method of residues" or elimination of available alternatives. (Fisher, 1970 p. 54)

Interestingly, Fisher shares with Bales and Strodtbeck a concern to make explicit the characteristics of the groups he uses for exemplifying his model of decision-making and he used the following criteria to select groups for observation.

1. The group's goal is to achieve consensus on decisions.
2. The group's interaction is primarily verbal.
3. The group operates in a developing or emergent context.
4. The entire history of the group is available for study.
5. A written record of the group's task performance is available.
6. The group successfully accomplished its task.
7. The group is not formed within a classroom context. (Fisher, 1970 p. 54)

Moreover, Fisher reports that while the ten selected groups met these criteria, these same groups varied in composition with regard to sex (from all male to all female), age (from teenagers to adults in their sixties), size (from 4 to 12), and duration (from twenty-five minutes to over thirty hours). These variables also implied "a diversity of social structures, role relationships, leadership methods, and
decision quality, among others" (Fisher, 1970, p. 54). He argues that since "the purpose was to discover patterns of verbal task behavior regardless of socio-emotional structures and individual differences among participants, the diversity of social dimensions among the groups was vital" (1970, p. 54).

Fisher explains his method in great detail and places particular emphasis upon the fact that "the static analysis of the data provides units of 'acts,' and contiguity analysis of the data provides units of 'interacts'" (1970, p. 56). The steps he takes in analyzing the coded data from each group are outlined below:

Preliminary Analyses

1. The coded group discussion data are arbitrarily divided into 5 minute segments;

2. Following the same procedure as Scheidel and Crowell, contiguity and static analyses are made of each coded comment in each segment of the group data;

3. The data from each 5 minute segment for each group are examined for proportional fluctuations of "interaction units favorable, unfavorable, and ambiguous toward the decision proposals" (Fisher, 1970, p. 56).

Final Analyses

4. Each group's data are segmented into four phases based on step 3, above.

5. Data from all groups are collapsed into the four phases "and transferred to contiguity and static analysis tables utilizing the four phases as the rows and the various combinations of units and
pairs of units as the columns" (Fisher, 1970, p. 56).

6. All the coded units are collapsed into each of the three dimensions of the category system, creating six tables: three each for contiguity and static analysis.

7. Using the Pearson chi square test of association, "each category was compared across all four phases using six contingency tables for each category-unit" (Fisher, 1970, p. 58).

In the preliminary analyses, step three was conducted to discover patterns of interaction; it yielded a consistent four phase pattern.

Fisher reports that

In the early stages of the discussion, both favorable attitudes and ambiguous attitudes were expressed with greater frequency than unfavorable attitudes. Then, as the proportion of ambiguous units declined, unfavorable units increased to surpass the proportional frequency of ambiguous ones. In a third phase, unfavorable units declined while the proportional frequency of ambiguous units rose above the frequency of unfavorable ones. In the final phase, favorable units rose sharply, and both ambiguous and unfavorable units declined sharply. (1970, p. 56)

Steps five through seven of the final analyses were undertaken in order to "determine whether the four phases were independent of the categories of content analysis" (Fisher, 1970, p. 58). The last step (7) entailed comparing the frequency of each category against the combined frequencies of all other categories for each phase.

As a result of these analyses, Fisher concludes that the four phases are independent of the category system and "can be
differentiated on the basis of an interaction pattern characteristic of each phase" (1970, p. 58). The four phases of his model of decision-making are summarized below.

1. Orientation: getting acquainted, clarifying, and tentively expressing attitudes toward decision proposals

2. Conflict: ideational conflict over decision proposals

3. Emergence: dissipation of disfavor toward an emerging decision via ambiguous statements

4. Reinforcement: consensus - agreement on and commitment to the decision

The communication literature has recently begun to question the appropriateness of these stage and phase models of decision-making (and group development). Poole (1981) argues that groups do not go through unitary phases or stages of decision-making; rather, they go through varying, multiple sequences or phases of interaction in the process of making a decision. Moreover, he argues that the sequence of phases are largely determined by the task facing the group. For the purpose of this study, Poole's criticisms are indicative of the inability of the stage and phase models to account for the context of negotiation in which group decision-making occurs.

**Critique of Decision-Making Models**

**Decision-making as negotiation.** As Poole, McPhee, and Seibold (1982) have noted, the presupposition of all the models reviewed above
is that group decision-making differs from individual decision-making because the former offers the opportunity for discussion. Each of these models assumes that communication among group members has the effect of changing the initial value judgements of those members; in addition, the experimental test of this assumption provides support for this tacit view of decision-making. This understanding of small group decision-making calls for a fundamental change in defining or theorizing about this phenomena.

The common meaning of the verb, decide is "to determine (a question, controversy, or cause) by giving victory to one side or the other; to bring to a settlement, settle, resolve (a matter in dispute, doubt or suspense)." The common meaning of the verb, negotiate is "to hold communication or conference (with another) for the purpose of arranging some matter by mutual agreement; to discuss a matter with a view to some settlement or compromise." An essential similarity exists between the contemporary meaning of the two words in that each refers to a means for settling some matter; this similarity also discloses a difference. Thus, something may be decided unilaterally, while a matter that is negotiated involves multilateral agreement.

While the definition of decision-making is applicable to the case of the individual, it is not wholly suitable when considered in terms of the actions of a group. The "small group" part of "small group decision-making" changes the meaning of "decision-making"; what seems to characterize group discussion is negotiation, the settlement of disputes by mutual agreement.
The above discussion has set the groundwork to support the contention that the context of negotiation is not accounted for by current models of decision-making. The models proposed by Bales and Strodtbeck and Fisher more or less explicitly limit decision-making to organizational settings. These settings are not accounted for by the models but are viewed as prior conditions necessary for decision-making to occur. As such, these models presuppose a context of negotiation, and require a theory of negotiation to account for this context.

As noted, Bales and Strodtbeck set up an elaborate set of conditions under which their phase hypothesis will hold. For example, consider conditions four through six which state that group members:

4. Are committed to the continued existence of the group.
5. Are bound and affected by the group's decision.
6. Are enabled by the organizational structure, "the right to participate and influence the choice of the ultimate decision."

An examination of these conditions reveals that they either imply or state explicitly that the group members are members of a larger system or organization.

Furthermore, Bales and Strodtbeck posit a seventh condition in order for the phases to occur: that groups be faced with a full-fledged problem. This seventh condition reinforces the above statement and discloses the context of negotiation. A group needs
1. Fully understand the problem (have perfect and certain information);

2. Judge solutions to the problem by applying the same criteria and values; and

3. Are not committed to implementing the solution and/or will not be affected, as a group, by their decision.

In other words, there is no dispute to settle by mutual agreement but simply the need to confirm a pre-ordained course of action. Problems such as these are encountered in many organizations, especially bureaucracies, whenever there are "standard operating procedures" or decision rules that can be unambiguously applied. Yet, we still label the process of answering these problems "decision-making," however routine such decisions may be. The point, of course, is that Bales and Strodtbeck do not consider their model as applicable to this latter situation and, as a result, presuppose a context of negotiation for their three-phase model of problem-solving.

Following this same line of reasoning, Fisher's seven criteria for selecting decision-making groups also seem to require a context of negotiation, particularly with criteria one, three and seven:

1. The group's goal is to achieve consensus.

3. The group operates in a developing or emergent context.

7. The group is not formed within a classroom context.
Fisher (1980) explains in a recent book that when he speaks of consensus he does not mean unanimous agreement, but rather commitment by all members to the group's decision. As such, the goal of consensus implies a prior state of dispute, the same starting point and ending point as negotiation. The other two criteria indicate that the decision-making situation is "real," and presumably deals with some matter to be negotiated by the group.

**Decision-making as dialectic.** The spiral model of idea development also fits the definition of negotiation: the progressive modification of ideas mirrors the process of reaching agreement (anchoring ideas) over matters of dispute (reach-testing ideas). Yet Scheidel and Crowell are implicit in the theoretical foundation for their admittedly descriptive model of human reasoning. This implicit theory of reasoning, however, is evident in the structure of their model. Figure 2 depicts this dialectical structure of idea development and provides a perspective for interpreting the dynamics of the cyclical, spiraling movement of the model: ideas are proposed, supported, and/or countered; then they are accepted, rejected, or modified. This movement progresses to another cycle where these same ideas serve as a foundation for subsequent ideas to develop. Inherent in this structure is the notion that the juxtaposition of support for and objections to an idea tests the consensual truth of the idea. This play of opposites is dialectical; it pits thesis (support for the idea) against antithesis (objections to the idea) and produces one of three results: support for the idea, rejection of the idea, or the transformation of the idea (synthesis). This view of dialectic is echoed
Figure 2  The Dialectical Structure of the Spiral Model
in the works of Grossberg (1979), Rescher (1977), and Rychlak (1976) among others.³

A similar problem occurs in Fisher's four-phase model: it describes the process of a group's reaching consensus on some matter of dispute, but does not proffer any theory or dynamic to explain this process. Again, if group discussion is the (implied) means to the end of "rational" consensus, a theory of consensual reasoning is missing. Interestingly, Fisher (1980, pp. 142-154) notes that the four-phase model may be viewed (1) as both incorporating the spiral model, especially within the conflict phase, and (2) as a spiral model itself, especially within the context of a group making a number of serial decisions. His assessment also applies for the dialectical model that has been emphasized in the above discussion. To exemplify this point, the dialectical structure of Fisher's four-phase model is portrayed in Figure 3.

The first phase of the model, orientation, provides a cycle in which decision proposals (d-p) are initially considered. In this cycle, each d-p is not fully tested since most statements toward a d-p are ambiguous (bi-valued) -- the statements provide both support for and objection to the d-p. Nevertheless, a number of d-p are selected for further consideration through this cycle. The end result of the orientation phase is the generation of multiple d-p's ("i" through "n") that require further deliberation in the conflict phase which represents a "truer" dialectic: each d-p (thesis) is alternately supported and countered in the light of alternate d-p's (antithesis). As this cycle continues, a d-p emerges that has either more
Figure 3  The Dialectical Structure of the Four Phase Model
support and/or less objections than any other d-p. Fisher calls this the "method of residues." At this point, the conflict phase fades and the emergent phase begins.

The emergent d-p ("e") becomes the apparent decision because of the concentration of bi-valued or ambiguous statements toward it. The final phase, reinforcement, acknowledges d-p_{e} as the decision and validates the grounds for it. As noted, the conflict phase of the model is certainly dialectical, while the entire model, considered in the context of unfolding decisions, is itself dialectical.

What is tacit in the spiral and four-phase models of decision-making is masked in the three-phase model of problem-solving. For Bales and Strodbeck, the dynamic of their model is the need to balance the demands of the task against the demands of the socio-emotional needs of that group. Needless to say, the countermovements of the task and the social may be viewed as a dialectic. Moreover, as depicted in Figure 4, each of the three phases of the model can be conceptualized as a dialectic, and each of the developmental models can also be conceptualized in dialectical terms. For example, the tension between Bion's concept of the "Work Group" and the emotional aspects of the group may be explained as a dialectical unfolding of opposite (counter) moments in the experience of the group. And, Bennis and Shepard's model of group development in each of its substages (of dependency, counter-dependency and resolution) readily fits the dialectical paradigm.

By viewing these models from a different perspective, the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) for investigating decision-making may be
Figure 4. The Dialectical Structure of the Three Phase Model
shifted. As Grossberg (1979) has indicated, a dialectical perspective has major implications for rhetoric. Similarly, this study implies that dialectical logic challenges the theory of communication utilized by such decision-making researchers as Fisher. This discussion sets the context for considering decision-making as dialogue.

**Decision-making as dialogue.** Smith and Williamson (1981) note that theories of communication have been modeled in terms of action (mechanical), in terms of interaction (information exchange), and in terms of transaction. Fisher and Hawes (1971) present an interaction model of communication which provides the rationale for not only Fisher's (1970) model of decision-making but also Scheidel and Crowell's spiral model. Indeed, the initial suggestion by Bales and Strodtbeck to investigate the micro structure of interaction can also be seen as immanating from this same theory. Hence, the theory of communication proposed by Fisher and Hawes will be outlined, and the logic of this theory will then be contrasted with one version of dialectical logic. Given the number of critiques of the interaction model of communication (Carey, 1975), the discussion will highlight differences rather than carefully counter the foundations of their theory point-for-point.

Fisher and Hawes propose their "interact system model" of communication in order to provide a rationale for a program of small group research. Their model is based on a grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) which "attempts directly to integrate diverse research efforts and provide a unified research program focused on the development of a comprehensive formal theory" (Fisher
and Hawes, 1971, p. 445). Moreover, they assume a general systems
theory perspective and apply this perspective to past research of
small groups in order to better adumbrate their own theory. Using
this approach they are able to conclude that for small group research
there are two very different system research
emphases. The research model that considers group
members as systemic components has been labelled the
Human System Model (HSM) . . . Components of the
HSM are people . . . The HSM generates small group
research aimed at discovering relationships among
people - cognitive and affective constructs such as
cohesiveness and commitment, power and influence,
leadership and authority . . . In contrast, the ISM
is directly concerned with observable verbal and
nonverbal behavior. Components of the ISM are
codable units of verbal and nonverbal
communication. (1971, p. 448)

The crux of the ISM theory is its basis in observable units of
communication. For Fisher and Hawes, these units are directly observ-
able acts engaged in by the individual, and they explain their
theory/methodology in terms of three levels. Level one consists of
identifying acts and interacts using content analysis. Through
statistics, patterns or phases of acts and interacts that differ
significantly over time may be identified. In level two, "differences
among phases [are operationalized] as differences in empirically
redundant patterns of acts and interacts from a Level-One analysis"
(Fisher and Hawes, 1971, pp. 449, 450). Taking the form of an assump-
tion, "Level Three of the ISM specifies the cyclically recurring
nature of Level Two's phases - i.e., the phasic progression toward
task completion recurs in each subsequent task performance by the same
group" (Fisher and Hawes, 1971, p. 450). Fisher and Hawes summarize
their program of research as follows:

Perhaps the most important advantage of the ISM is that research moves down rather than up the levels of conceptual abstraction. That is, the HSM infers the existence of hypothetical constructs from indirect measures while the ISM observes verbal and nonverbal behavior directly and discovers patterns and of acts and interacts in phases and cycles ... Unlike the HSM, the ISM defines the collective structure of a group as behavioral acts and interacts. Rather than inferentially derived affective and cognitive constructs, the basis of "a group's" existence are directly observed and empirically measured communicative behaviors. (1971, pp. 452, 453)

Explicit in the theory proffered by Fisher and Hawes is the assumption that behavior equals significance as evidenced by their statement that they may directly observe and make sense of communicative behavior. Poole and Folger (1981) have recently questioned the validity of assuming that category systems are able to measure directly the meaning of what is said; they argue that any behavior may be viewed as having at least three levels of meaning: (1) meanings that are universally and unambiguously recognized by all humans, (2) meanings that are commonly recognized by a member of a certain culture, and (3) meanings that are recognized (and/or intended) by members of a specific culture within a specific context. Based on Poole's and Folger's assessment, only behaviors that provide the first level of meaning can be defended as directly observable. More importantly, they point to the dimension of meaning or significance as an essential consideration for any discussion of communicative behavior.
While the thinking of Poole and Folger challenge the basic assumption (level one) of Fisher and Hawes' ISM, one may also critique their theory from the viewpoint of dialectical logic. For example, they claim that one can identify the patterns or phases of interaction using solely statistical means. In question is not their method, but rather the account of their method. As Poole (1981) recently noted, many statistically significant clusters of acts made little or no sense to him. This is because statistics uses only a two-valued logic: either an act is or is not; it cannot be and not be at the same time. However, according to dialectics, human reasoning makes sense of something by considering what it is in terms of what it is not (Adorno, 1973; Grossberg, 1979; and Rychlak, 1976). Thus, dialectics allows for a three valued logic (Pilotta, 1979), a logic in which "both/and" stands beside "either/or." In contrast, Fisher and Hawes' account of their method leaves out the human reasoning that not only interprets the statistical findings but also determines the data. As a result, their theory is based on unexamined methodological assumptions, and it is not able to account for communication in its significative dimension.

In this critique, it has been noted that decision-making may be viewed as dialectical, and it has been suggested that dialectical reasoning points to a significative dimension of communication. This dimension is the dialogical or in-between, that which constitutes the space where ideas are thrown and played against each other by members of the decision-making group. The group development theory of Bennis and Shepard, concerned as it is with the conditions for effective
communication, gives some indication of the necessary grounds for
decision-making as dialogue. Their two stages in which power and
intimacy are viewed as obstacles to communication, may be seen as
metaphors for the upper and lower limits of the dialogical region.

Negotiation as Joint Decision-Making

Certain theories for the investigation of negotiation are
paradigmatic in the social sciences. Central among these theories are
those dealing with social exchange (Homans, 1974), symbolic interactionism (Strauss, 1978), gaming, bargaining, and manipulative
strategies (e.g., Young, 1975), and, most recently, joint decision-making (Gulliver, 1979). Each of these theories make different
assumptions about the role of communication in negotiation and, in
turn, accounts for it in different ways. As noted in the
introduction, one of the contentions of this dissertation is that a
theory of dialogue is needed to account more fully for the communica-
tion that occurs in negotiations. Before supporting this contention,
however, it is necessary to delineate how the context of negotiation
may affect decision-making; this is most directly accomplished by a
review of Gulliver's joint decision-making theory of negotiation.

Gulliver (1979) has presented one of the most lucid and detailed
theories of negotiations: the process of settling disputes through
joint decision-making. The concept of dispute applies to conflicts
between individuals or groups (Gulliver refers to both with the term,
party) which are voiced in public and involved people in addition to
the parties in conflict. Negotiation, as Gulliver (1979, p. 79) defines the term, only occurs in light of a public dispute; private conflicts, in contrast, are settled directly and solely by the interactants through "dyadic adjustment." Although negotiations usually involve supporters, representatives, or third-parties, the disputing parties jointly decide upon how to resolve their conflict. In other words, a third-party adjudicator does not make the decision for the negotiators. Hence, the outcome of the negotiation "reflects the relative strengths of the parties in terms of their resources of material and symbolic power and the constraints of moral and practical rules and values in the society" (Gulliver, 1979, p. 80).

Two models that describe the processual patterns of negotiation are central to Gulliver's theory; one is a cyclical model of the exchange of information between the negotiating parties, and the other is a development model of the negotiation. This latter model views the negotiation as a series of stages, from the initial confrontation to the final outcome. Gulliver uses the analogy of a moving automobile to describe the relationship of these two models. The cyclical model of information exchange and learning serves as the engine for negotiations, the process which turns the wheels. The developmental model maps the progress of the negotiations and serves as a guide for the journey.

Figure 5 presents Gulliver's cyclical model of negotiation, a model which stresses not only the repetitive sharing of information among the disputing parties, but also the cognition and learning that result from such sharing of information. Gulliver describes the model
Figure 5. The Cyclical Model of Negotiation

From P. H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, p. 84.
as follows:

Briefly, the pattern of repetitive exchange is that, in turn, each party receives information of various kinds from the other and in response offers information to him. There is, however, more than merely communication. There is cognition and learning. Received information is interpreted and evaluated by a party and added to what he already knows or thinks he knows. Thus a party may be able to learn more about his own expectations and preferences about those of his opponent, and about their common situation and possible outcomes. Learning may induce changes in the party's preference set and his strategies or it may reinforce his existing position. Learning may raise the need for more information from the opponent and/or the need to give further information to him so that he may be induced to learn and therefore be persuaded to shift his position to something more favorable to the party. Depending on the kind of learning, the party makes a tactical choice concerning the purpose and content of his next message, which is then proffered to his opponent. In turn, the other party goes through the same procedure and then offers his information to the first party ... and so on. Thus, one might say, the wheels turn and the vehicle moves. (1979, p. 83; my emphasis)

The cyclical model shows that the exchange of information has a variety of effects: By receiving information from each other, the disputing parties may either change their own preferences or their set of expectations about the other party's preferences, or both.

In discussing the developmental model of negotiation (Figure 6), Gulliver states that

Briefly, it comprises a series of overlapping sequences or phases, each with its particular emphasis and kind of interaction and each opening the way for the succeeding one in a complex progression. Summarily, these phases are (1) the search for an arena for the negotiations; (2) the
Figure 6. The Developmental Model of Negotiation: A, predominance of antagonism; C, predominance of coordination

formulation of an agenda and working definitions of the issues in dispute; (3) preliminary statements of demands and offers and the exploration of the dimensions and limits of the issues, with an emphasis on the differences between the parties; (4) the narrowing of differences, agreements on some issues, and the identification of the more obdurate ones; (5) preliminaries to final bargaining; (6) final bargaining; (7) ritual confirmation of the final outcome; and, in many cases, (8) the implementation of the outcome or arrangements for that. (1979, p. 82)

Gulliver stresses that the developmental model idealizes the general pattern of movement that characterizes successful negotiation; he repeatedly states that for any actual case of negotiation, one or more of the phases may be absent, condensed, and/or further divided into other subprocesses. Additionally, the eight conceptually distinct phases may more or less parallel actual phases in chronological time: some phases may take only minutes or hours to occur while others may take years.

To this point, only the structure of the cyclical and developmental models of negotiation have been summarized. Each model also "has an internal dynamic of its own that is logically generated and sustained within the process itself" (Gulliver, 1979, p. 180). For the cyclical model the dynamic was shown in the form of persisting dilemmas. Each party needs to receive information from the other party in order to learn about the other's preferences, strengths, and weaknesses. At the same time, each party also needs to provide information to the other to make demands clear and to persuade the other not only to accept such terms, but also to change his/her own
expectations and demands as well. The dilemma facing each party is that he or she cannot simply receive or provide the information that he or she desires to know or even intends to give. As Gulliver explains, the receiver of information is socially indebted to the provider of information:

(A party needs) to give information specifically in order to be able to receive information in return from the opponent. In giving information, however, there is a risk of revealing, and being compelled to reveal, more than the party might wish. Thus neither party can merely give such information as he alone might choose but also, and predominantly, that which the opponent desires . . . In order to counteract those liabilities there is a persistent, strong motivation to give and receive further information . . . In choosing to act in some particular way, a party provokes and intends to provoke reaction from the opponent. His reaction in turn provokes succeeding reaction from the party. Thus, there is a persisting force, arising from the dilemmas of exchange, that propels the continued, cumulative exchange process. (1979, p. 180-181)

The dynamic present in the developmental model is comparable to that of the cyclical model but takes a slightly different form.

The intrinsic contradiction here is between, on the one hand, the recognized conflict in which the parties seek different objectives at each other's expense and, on the other hand, their need for joint action in order to achieve an outcome in circumstances wherein neither party feels able merely to impose his own demands upon the other. This fundamental contradiction in the situation inevitably creates dispositions of antagonism and coordination that are evident in contrasting modes of interaction. (Gulliver, 1979, p. 181)
Table seven presents the pattern of these contrasting modes of interaction for the developmental model.

Each phase of negotiation is constituted and maintained by the negotiators' joint decision-making. Viewed more speculatively, the traditional decision-making situation -- as demarcated by Bales and Strodtbeck's (1951) seven conditions or Fisher's (1970) seven criteria -- can be located between phases three and seven of Gulliver's developmental model of negotiation. For example, the orientation phase of both Fisher's and Bales and Strodtbeck's models seems quite similar to the third phase of Gulliver's model, while the sixth phase (final bargaining) of Gulliver's model is similar to Fisher's decision emergence phase, as well as Bales and Strodtbeck's control phase.

All group decision-making, however, is not just a subset of negotiation, nor is all negotiation just a more expansive view of group decision-making. The crucial point of similarity and difference between the two processes is whether an issue has become a point of dispute within a group and whether the group has become polarized upon the issue. Certainly some cases of group decision-making do center upon a clearly disputed issue, while other cases of group decision-making simply serve to reduce uncertainty among group members as to a course of action. In the former case, some group members do view other group members as opponents, and group decision-making may then be viewed as a form of negotiation; in the latter case, group members do not view each other as opponents (as do the parties to a negotiation). Since both Fisher (1970) and Bales and Strodtbeck (1951)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Dominant Disposition</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Search for arena</td>
<td>From antagonism to coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agenda formulation</td>
<td>From antagonism to coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Exploration of the range of the dispute</td>
<td>Antagonism persists (possibly increases)</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. Narrowing differences</td>
<td>From coordination to antagonism</td>
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<td>5. Preliminaries to final bargaining</td>
<td>From coordination to antagonism to coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Final bargaining</td>
<td>From antagonism to coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ritual confirmation</td>
<td>Coordination remains</td>
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</tbody>
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From P. H. Gulliver, *Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*, p. 183
consider conflict necessary for their respective models of decision-making, it would seem that there is considerable overlap between their models and Gulliver's model of negotiation.

Within the cyclical model of negotiation, it is fairly clear that the process of exchanging information also occurs within decision-making groups. The previous dialectical modeling of various decision-making theories made explicit the exchange of information and changes in preferences that occur among group members throughout the decision-making process. Again, the applicability of this model to decision-making depends upon the attitude of group members. Do they view each other as colleagues or as opponents? The latter case allows a very straightforward application of the cyclical model of information exchange to group decision-making. However, even the former case would seem to involve some sort of information exchange and learning. The difference between the two situations of group decision-making perhaps would be in the willingness of group members to exchange information. Common sense indicates that colleagues would be more willing than opponents to disclose and receive information.

**Toward a Theory of Dialogue**

In as much as Gulliver's developmental model of negotiation depends on the negotiator's dilemma of being simultaneously in conflict and interdependent, questions of how the negotiators can reach consensual (jointly made) decision arise. On what grounds can a
negotiator accept the other's offers and/or demands? On what basis can a negotiator show that an offer and/or demand is reasonable? Only if negotiators can agree to the reasonableness of demands/offers will the negotiation progress to its final phase. Gulliver's developmental model depends upon an implicit theory of consensual reasoning.

Gulliver uses an explicit theory of communication as information transfer to model the cyclical exchange of information that occurs during negotiation. He supplements this theory with learning theory in order to describe the dilemmas that arise from the exchange of information. However, Gulliver's model does not explain why negotiators are faced with the dilemma of being compelled to supply more information to their opponents than they wish, nor why providing information to an opponent obligates the opponent to reciprocate. In short, Gulliver's theory of negotiation may be critiqued for modeling communication inadequately; his theory ignores the relational or social dimension of communication and relies upon an assumed process of consensual reasoning.

Previous critiques of decision-making pointed to the need to make explicit the theory of consensual reasoning upon which the models of decision-making are founded. Bion (1961), Stock and Thelen (1958), and Bennis and Shepared (1956) all note ways in which groups are influenced by unconscious drives that may lead to irrational (non-reflective) decisions. Hence, a theory of consensual reasoning provides a rational (conscious or reflective) basis for group decision-making, as well as negotiation.
To this point the critiques of decision-making and negotiation have shown how communication (viewed as interaction or as information exchange) is inadequately modeled. Thus, a theory of consensual reasoning necessarily must more adequately model the process of communication. It is the contention of this dissertation that a theory of dialogue (1) more adequately models communication, and (2) provides a rational basis for consensual reasoning. These contentions are explicated and supported in the next chapter.
Endnotes

1 Based on notes taken at a guest seminar conducted by Marshall Scott Poole; Department of Communication, Ohio State University, Spring Quarter, 1982.


3 Compare Figure 2 with Rescher's model of the common structure of disputation and probative inquiry (see below). He explains what the model attempts to show in the following passage:

the general process of dialectic can assume two rather distinct forms whose structure is altogether parallel. In each instance, what is at issue is a process which proceeds by way of a fundamentally cyclic pattern of sequential development:

(1) As an adversary procedure in disputation, taking the form: initial defense of thesis -- counterargument (antithesis) -- return to the starting point by an improved defense of thesis that encompasses (bypasses or overcomes) the counterargument (synthesis).

(2) As a methodology for probative testing in inquiry, taking the form: tentatively adopting a probative position -- critique in the light of counterconsiderations -- return to the starting point by the formulation of an improved position. (Such a process can take a purely intellectual or an actually empirical form, that is, it can either take the form of a testing by supportive grounds in the purely rational domain, or else, in the empirical sciences, a testing by observational evidence or actual experimental trial.)

On both sides one encounters a fundamental sameness of structure. For either way the dialectical process amounts to one and the same pattern of cyclical feedback.

4 Based on notes taken at a guest seminar jointly conducted by Marshall Scott Poole and Joseph P. Folger for the Department of Communication, The Ohio State University, Spring Quarter, 1982.
The concept of dialogue has seen a wave of recent popularity in contemporary social science and humanistic literature. Developmental linguists (Fine, 1978), discourse analysts (Goodenough and Weiner, 1978; Nelson and Gruendel, 1979; Nowakowska, 1980; and Posner, 1980), ethnographers (Bauman and Sherzer, 1974), psychiatrists (Leavy, 1980), sociolinguists (Burton, 1980) and others have rediscovered the importance of dialogue in their respective fields of study. But the development of a general theory of dialogue, based on a survey of this vast and rapidly growing literature, would be a lifetime endeavor and would focus only indirectly on the relation of dialogue with communication. There have been, however, significant works on the subject of dialogue in fields that are directly related to communication (for example, Makay, 1980; Stewart, 1978; Makay and Brown, 1972), and perhaps the most comprehensive theory of dialogue presented to date is by Jurgen Habermas (1979), the critical social theorist. This theory is reviewed in the next section of this chapter.
To familiarize the reader with the scope and intent of his theory, Habermas' use of dialogue is first explicated; second, the body of his theory is presented and the universal pragmatic structure of dialogue is examined; and, third, a commentary is offered to show the utility of Habermas' theory for more elegantly explaining and understanding the processes of decision-making and negotiation.

Following the review of Habermas' theory, selected rhetorical and philosophical theories of dialogue are examined, theories directly related to communication which provide alternatives to Habermas' perspective. Although it may be misleading to label some of these works "theories," each work does provide a distinct stance or perspective for reconsidering Habermas' theory of dialogue. Moreover, it is the intent of these six sections to show ways in which Habermas' theory may be supplemented and more fully understood.

In the U.S., theorizing about dialogue has engendered polemical discussions in the field of rhetoric: dialogue, as expressivity, is opposed to rhetoric, as instrumentality. Habermas' theory of dialogue provides a means for unifying both of these viewpoints.

Philosophical theories of dialogue differ in terms of their basic assumptions. Ordinary language philosophy assumes a linguistic tradition; existential philosophy assumes the existence of humans as social beings; and phenomenological/hermeneutic theory assumes both the social existence of humanity and the tradition-mediation of language. Although Habermas' theory of dialogue draws upon all of the preceding philosophies, his theory is best supplemented by phenomenological/hermeneutic theory.
Habermas' Theory of Dialogue

Habermas' Use of Dialogue

Since Habermas' theory of dialogue is the focal point for this section, it is necessary to contextualize his work, and the relevance of the following themes to the evolution of Habermas' thinking about dialogue are briefly discussed:

1. Critical theory
2. Dialectical hermeneutics
3. Communicative competence

Critical theory. Habermas, as the leading successor of the Frankfurt School of neo-Marxist social theorists, has sought a firmer philosophical foundation for critical social theory which has as its goal the emancipation of mankind from domination. Central to this goal is the critique of "false consciousness" or ideology. In securing a firm philosophical basis for critical theory, Habermas (1971) argues that critical theory must first critique its own foundation as a social science theory.

Habermas (1971) identifies a technological interest as the pre-condition for both physical and behavioral (empirical-analytical) sciences. These sciences are possible only because of the technology of measurement and specialized training that allow for the investigation of objects and the generation of knowledge about these objects. Such knowledge takes the form of explanation which allows man to control not only nature (the physical sciences) but also mankind (the
behavioral sciences). Traditionally, these sciences have assumed a value-freedom which separates the subjective values of the researcher from the knowledge of the object; subsequently, the consequences of the uses made of knowledge are not the concern of the researcher. Unfortunately, the technological interest of this traditional view of science and the assumed theme of value-freedom permit these sciences to support totalitarian regimes. In other words, this traditional (non-critical) view of science allows for the domination of mankind.

Habermas contrasts this tradition with the "counter" position in the social sciences which stresses human understanding which occurs where there is dialogical communication which aims at consensus among the interactants. Such a humanistic tradition is based upon a hermeneutic interest which does not accomplish the goal of critical theory per se, but does present the means for furthering an emancipatory interest through the use of a dialectical hermeneutic.

An emancipatory interest is accomplished by the double (reflexive) movement of a dialectical hermeneutic: (1) it informs future scientific projects by taking into account human interests and values, and (2) it applies scientific knowledge to aid the process of reaching human understandings so that unconscious motives do not distort reasoning and lead to false consensus.

In summary, an emancipatory interest can be served by a dialectical hermeneutic which mediates the technological and hermeneutic interests of social science.
Dialectical hermeneutics. A dialectical hermeneutics (Habermas, 1970a, 1980) is based on the two-fold insight provided by philosophical hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1975, 1979). First, all understanding, including scientific understanding, has a circularity. Scientific truth is informed by a pre-understanding, lent by a linguistic tradition, whose anticipatory movement determines and secures its understanding. Yet the meta-theory of the positivistic empirical-analytical social sciences tries to break this circularity by advocating a methodology which neutralizes history. Empirical-analytical methods neutralize history by focusing upon the repetition of empirical observations. The criteria for repetition are generalized and applied to other empirical circumstances or domains. The knowledge gained by this method, therefore, is secured by empirical agreement. The problem with this method occurs when the criteria for assessing repetition are to be corrected or in any way changed: changing the criteria effectively changes history. Hence, empirical agreement as a basis of knowledge is brought into question.

To explicate this point, Habermas (1970a) applies the second half of the insight offered by philosophical hermeneutics and utilizes Gadamer's (1975) notion of the "merging of horizons." This notion relies on the insight that the circularity of understanding not only tests one's presuppositions (i.e., a linguistic pre-understanding which Gadamer calls the past horizon), but also involves a testing of the present horizon which is formulated in the very movement of understanding. Thus, all understanding involves a merging of horizons, an
intersecting of past tradition with the present moment, i.e., a
tradition-mediation. In contrast to empirical agreement as the basis
of knowledge, the "merging of horizons" implies that types of
knowledge are based on the pre-understanding of tradition that allow
conventions to arise. Moreover, in light of the mediation of
tradition, conventions are viewed as consensus which as such, relies
not on the norm of agreement as a convention, but rather on agreement
as mediation that takes into account the interests of the community.
Tradition-mediation accounts for the historicality of these
interests: the particularity of the present is an arc that intersects
the past and the future.

Habermas (1980) argues that since reflection (i.e., mediation by
the singular subject) can never encompass the whole (collective his-
tory) of the linguistic tradition, tradition operates latently domi-
nates human actions. To counter this hermeneutical circularity, he
advocates a reflection on the historical presuppositions of linguistic
tradition and this is the task of a dialectical hermeneutic: to
emancipate mankind from the dominance of historical-linguisticality.

**Communicative competence.** In posing the above task, Habermas
questions the origin of historical-linguisticality. The theme of
communicative competence is Habermas' (1970b) answer to this
question. Simply put, "communicative competence . . . is the ability
of native speakers to participate in everyday communication through
understanding and speaking" (Habermas, 1980, p. 185). Habermas
explains the project of communicative competence by contrasting it
with Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence.

The general competence of a native speaker extends not only to the mastery of an abstract system of linguistic rules which he - preprogrammed by his organic equipment and the processes of stimulated maturation - introduces into a communication in order to function as sender or receiver during the transfer of information. It is not enough, to understand language communication as an application - limited by empirical conditions - of linguistic competence. On the contrary, producing a situation of potential ordinary language communication belongs by itself to the general competence of the ideal speaker. The situation, namely, in which speech, i.e., the application of linguistic competence, principally becomes possible, depends on a structure of intersubjectivity which in turn is linguistic. This structure is generated neither by the monologically mastered system of linguistic rules nor by the language-external conditions of its performance. On the contrary, in order to participate in normal discourse, the speaker must have - in addition to his linguistic competence - basic qualifications of speech and of symbolic interaction (role-behavior) at his disposal, which we may call communicative competence. Thus, communicative competence means the mastery of an ideal speech situation. (Habermas, 1970b, p. 138)

The ideal speech situation describes the special form of intersubjectivity that gives rise to pure mutuality of understanding or unconstrained consensus. In other words, the ideal speech situation is a necessary condition for unconstrained dialogue to occur. Habermas (1970b) draws upon Austin's (1975) theory of speech acts to demonstrate that the mastery of the pragmatic dimension of speech generates and maintains linguistic intersubjectivity which is the basis for the communication of meaning. Habermas calls these universal pragmatic features of speech dialogue constitutive universals, and in turn, he
argues that the "ideal speech situation can then be analyzed according to the functions of the pure dialogue constitutive universals" (1970b, p. 141).

To understand more fully Habermas' use of dialogue, the reasoning that supports the analysis of the ideal speech situation as a function of the pure dialogue constitutive universals must be explained. Habermas argues that Austin's (1975) distinction between the locutionary meaning (what one says about something) and illocutionary force (what one does in saying something) points to the essential difference between analytic and reflexive aspects of speech. Austin claims that illocutionary force is evidenced by linguistic markers which he calls performatives. For example, saying "I (hereby) promise to be home at six" utilizes the performative "I hereby promise."

Habermas views performatives as generating and maintaining specific intersubjective contexts by commenting on the use of the analytic portion of speech ("home at six"). This commenting is a reflexive use of speech. Moreover, since the performative "promise" is not tied to any specific situation of promising, it indexes a universal, pragmatic dimension of speech.

Habermas, noting that performatives are not the only "discourse meta-markers" present in speech, points out that the use of pronouns and other deitic uses of language establishes the intersubjective basis for the sharing of identical meanings in communication. Normal, everyday communication generates and maintains the intersubjectivity of relations among individuals who secure their identity by mutually
recognizing each other. Habermas argues that this structure relies on the reflexive use of language since

the relations between I, You (other I) and We (I and the other I's) are established through an analytically paradoxical achievement. The speakers identify themselves with two mutually incompatible dialogic roles and thereby secure the identity of the I as well as that of the group. The one (I) affirms his absolute non-identity vis-a-vis the other (You); but at the same time both recognize their own identity by accepting one another as irreplaceable individuals. In this process they are connected by something they share (We), i.e., a group which itself affirms its individuality vis-a-vis other groups, so that the same relations are established on the level of intersubjectively united collectives as exist between individuals. Habermas. (1980, p. 196)

Habermas stresses that on the basis of linguistic inter-subjectivity, individuals can communicate private meanings or significations using the general analytical categories provided by linguistic symbols. By mastering indirect means of communication, the competent speaker relies on metacommunication "to express indirectly that part of the I that is non-identical and that cannot be represented by general determinations - even though they are the only means for expressing it" (Habermas, 1980, p. 196).²

Habermas (1970b) identifies four classes of dialogue constitutive universals based on the functions that each class serves in creating and maintaining the ideal speech situation. First are the personal pronouns and their derivatives which serve the function, explicated above, of establishing reciprocal recognition among speakers and,
thus, make possible valid intersubjective meanings.³ The second class consists of "deictic expressions of space and time as well as articles and demonstrative pronouns" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 141). These form a reference system of possible denotations and "link the levels of intersubjectivity on which the subjects converse and interact reciprocally with the levels of objects about which the subjects converse" (Habermas, 1970b, pp. 141-142).⁴ Performatives directed at the act of speaking comprise the third class of dialogue-constitutive universals. These include "Forms of address (vocative), forms of contact management (greeting), of speech introduction and speech conclusion, indirect discourse, (and) question and answer" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 143). Such performatives "determine the structure of potential speech inasmuch as they explain the pragmatic meaning of speaking itself" (Habermas, 1970b, p. 143). Habermas argues that the remaining speech act performatives may be formulated into a fundamental three part system. This fourth class of dialogue constitutive universals differentiates among (1) being and appearance (propositional truth) (2) being and essence (sincerity of intention) and (3) being and ought to be (appropriateness of conduct). As elaborated in the next part of this section, this last class of universals function as validity claims for dialogue.⁵

Habermas (1970b, 1980) further exemplifies communicative competence by describing its negative, systematically distorted communication, which is the basis for pseudo-consensus. Since pseudo-consensus occurs when humans falsely believe that they have achieved
mutual understanding or agreement, it is an object of both psychoanalytic and ideological critique. Habermas choses neurotic communication as an example of systematically distorted communication. Drawing upon Freudian theory, Habermas notes that

There are available three criteria for demarcating neurotically distorted, which here means specifically incomprehensible forms of expression. (First, on) the level of linguistic symbols, distorted communication is apparent in the application of rules which deviate from the publicly accepted rule-system. It is possible for an isolated semantic content or complete fields of meaning, in extreme cases even the syntax, to be affected. . . (Second, on) the level of the behaviour, a deformed language game is noticeable because of its rigidity and compulsion to repeat. Stereotyped patterns of behaviour recur in situations with the same stimuli which give rise to affective impulses. This inflexibility is an indication that the semantic content of a symbol has lost its specifically linguistic situational independence. (Third, when) we consider the system of distorted communication as a whole it becomes apparent that there exists a characteristic discrepancy between the levels of communication: the usual congruence between linguistic symbols, actions and accompanying expressions has disintegrated . . . No matter on what level of communication these symptoms appear - in linguistic expression, body-language or compulsive behaviour - it is always the case that a content, which has been excommunicated from its public usage, assumes independence. This content expresses an intention which remains incomprehensible according to the rules of public communication, and is, in this sense, privatized; but it also remains inaccessible to its author. (1980, p. 192)
The task of the psychoanalyst is to relieve the dis-ease or symptoms of the analysand. This is accomplished by scenic understanding, which Habermas terms an explanatory or depth hermeneutic.

Hermeneutics relies on the natural language competence of the interpreter to understand that which is non-sensical due to cultural and/or historical distance from the present world of the interpreter. In contrast, scenic understanding proceeds from a theoretical framework which is not a natural skill which may be developed into an art. Habermas cites two ways in which scenic understanding relies on theoretical pre-suppositions that do not follow from the natural competence of a native speaker.

Scenic understanding is, first of all, tied to a specific hermeneutical form of experimentation. The analytical rule introduced by Freud guarantees a form of communication between doctor and patient which, as it were, fulfills experimental conditions; virtualization of an actual situation and free association on the part of the patient, and goal-inhibited reaction and reflective participation by the analyst, make it possible that a transference occurs which can be used as a foil for the task of 'translation'. Secondly, the analyst's pre-understanding is directed at a small segment of possible meanings: viz. early, conflictive object-relations. The linguistic material that emerges in talks with the patient is classified within a closely circumscribed context of possible double meaning. This context consists of a general interpretation of infant patterns of interaction which is correlated with a theory of personality that exhibits specific phases of development. (1980, p. 194)

Scenic understanding allows the analyst, based on a comparison of the transference "scene" with the neurotic symptoms of the analysand, to
construct the early childhood trauma which the patient has repressed. The interpretation of the analyst, which makes neurotic behavior understandable by explaining its cause, is then shared with the analysand. The interpretation of the analyst, of course, gains its validity only if the insight is accepted by the analysand.

Habermas' project of communicative competence, in the light of distorted communication, can be understood as an attempt to demonstrate the limits of hermeneutics in order to justify the goal of critical theory. Moreover, since the depth hermeneutics of the psychoanalyst is concerned with the structure of communication rather than the scope of a given language (as in hermeneutic understanding), it is clear that the project of communicative competence has a particular methodological direction.

Communicative competence is . . . a transcendental or phenomenological reflection upon a normative ideal, which means that communicative competence is a transcendental condition or the general and necessary presuppositions for the possibility of maintaining intersubjectivity. Habermas is searching for a pre-linguistic structure which is revealed in and through any communication interaction. He is interested in a science of communication which is capable of delimiting the natural competence of ordinary communication and learned interpretations. (Pilotta, 1981a, p. 108)

In summary, Habermas' use of dialogue must be understood not only from the viewpoint of critical theory and communicative competence (Burleson and Kline, 1979), but also, and primarily, from the viewpoint of dialectical hermeneutics. For Habermas, the ideal speech
situation is necessary for unconstrained dialogue. This normative ideal is the model for a consensus emancipated from domination. It is also the pre-supposed "pure" basis for all deformed and distorted systems of communication. As the next section delineates, Habermas constructs a theory of dialogue based on the pre-linguistic structure of the universal pragmatic features of communication.

The Universal Pragmatic Structure of Dialogue

In accord with the intentions laid out in the preliminary remarks, explicated Habermas' project of universal pragmatics by taking up his intentions as faithfully as possible. Nevertheless, the discussion that follows is not so much a precis but a commentary which duplicates Habermas' major theses. For this reason, this section is divided into seven parts:

a. Dialogue as the basis for social action
b. The object domain and analysis of universal pragmatics
c. The pragmatic analytic units of speech act theory
d. The double structure of speech
e. The meaning structure and validity basis of basic types of speech acts
f. The rational foundation of illocutionary force
g. Conclusion

Dialogue as the basis for social action. Elaborating on his distinctions concerning dialogue-constitutive universals, Habermas develops the thesis that all dialogue is based on four universal (implicit) validity claims that can, in principal, be redeemed.
The speaker must choose a comprehensible (verstandlich) expression so that speaker and hearer can understand one another. The speaker must have the intention of communicating a true (wahr) proposition (or a propositional content, the existential presuppositions of which are satisfied) so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker. The speaker must want to express his intentions truthfully (wahrhaftig) so that the hearer can believe the utterance of the speaker (can trust him). Finally, the speaker must choose an utterance that is right (richtig) so that the hearer can accept the utterance and speaker and hearer can agree with one another in the utterance with respect to a recognized normative background. Moreover, communicative action can continue undisturbed only as long as participants suppose that the validity claims they reciprocally raise are justified. (Habermas, 1979, pp. 2-3)

Habermas expands upon his thesis by articulating the ambiguous meanings associated with the term "understanding."

In its minimal meaning it indicates that two subjects understand a linguistic expression in the same way; its maximal meaning is that between the two there exists an accord concerning the rightness of an utterance in relation to a mutually recognized normative background. In addition, two participants in communication can come to an understanding about something in the world, and they can make their intentions understandable to one another. (1979, p. 3)

According to Habermas full agreement or understanding "terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another" (1979, p. 3). Thus, full agreement is based on the mutual recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, sincerity, and rightness. However, as the ambiguity associated with
understanding indicates, communication does not normally entail full agreement. "The typical states are in the gray areas in between: on the one hand, incomprehension and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary untruthfulness, concealed and open discord; and, on the other hand, pre-existing or acheived consensus" (1979, p. 3).

Habermas argues that in everyday life a background consensus or shared definition of a situation is assumed, but the fabric of this taken-for-granted consensus is torn whenever one or more of the validity claims is left unsatisfied or the possibility of its redemption is questioned. Once this background consensus is questioned, communicative action is aimed at re-establishing this consensus. This can occur either by discursive action or by strategic action, but Habermas focuses exclusively upon consensual action or dialogue.

Figure 7 explicates the notion that all dialogic communication makes four implicit validity claims; it also explains more schematically how Habermas' use of dialogue focuses on an ideal speech situation. For Habermas, the ideal speech situation is a "'consensual interaction', in which participants share a tradition and their orientations are normatively intergrated to such an extent that they start from the same definition of the situation and do not disagree about the claims to validity that they reciprocally raise" (1979, pp. 208-209). This situation is designated in Figure 7 by the bracketed term "Dialogue." Habermas distinguishes between dialogue and discourse as follows:
Figure 7. A Typology of Different Forms of Social Action Based on the Validity Claims Raised by Participants

Based on Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," p. 209.
In communicative action (i.e., dialogue) it is naively supposed that implicitly raised validity claims can be vindicated (or made immediately plausible by way of question and answer). In discourse, by contrast, the validity claims raised for statements and norms are hypothetically bracketed and thematically examined. As in communicative action, the participants in discourse retain a cooperative attitude. (1979, p. 209)

Habermas explains that action which is oriented toward reaching understanding seeks a common definition of the situation, i.e., mutually recognized validity claims; in contrast, consensual action (dialogue or discourse) presupposes such a background consensus. Strategic elements may color action which is oriented to reaching understanding so long as they are designed to lead to a direct understanding. Communicative action differs from strategic action precisely because it does presuppose mutually recognized validity claims. Thus, Habermas states that in "the communicative attitude it is possible to reach a direct understanding oriented to validity claims; in the strategic attitude, by contrast, only an indirect understanding via determinative indicators is possible" (1979, p. 209). Openly strategic action may be exemplified by the well-known "posturing" that occurs as two parties begin formal negotiations and mutually recognize the explicitly strategic aspects of their action.

Finally, Habermas distinguishes between manipulative action and systematically distorted communication: in the latter case, at least one of the participants deceives him/herself by not recognizing that the basis for consensual action is only apparently being maintained;
in the former case, one of the participants deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.

The object domain and analysis of universal pragmatics. As previously mentioned, Habermas' concern with communicative competence is to discover the pre-linguistic structure of speech or, as he puts it, to analyze the universal-pragmatic bases of speech. Table eight delineates the different levels of analysis and corresponding object domains of Habermas' semiotic. The distinction between empirical pragmatics and universal-pragmatics is crucial to Habermas, for here he begins to integrate the four validity claims (comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, rightness) of dialogue with the work done in the many fields which theorize about the meaning of speech acts. Of all the validity claims, only that of comprehensibility can be fulfilled by language alone.

To bring forth a grammatical sentence - as an example, say, for linguists - a competent speaker need satisfy only the claim to comprehensibility. He has to have mastered the corresponding system of grammatical rules; this we call his linguistic ability, and it can be analyzed linguistically. It is otherwise with his ability to communicate; this is susceptible only to pragmatic analysis. By "communicative competence" I understand the ability of a speaker oriented to mutual understanding to embed a well-formed sentence in relations to reality, that is:

1. To choose the propositional sentence in such a way that either the truth conditions of the proposition stated or the existential presuppositions of the propositional content mentioned are supposedly fulfilled (so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker);
### Table 8
The Different Levels of Analysis and Corresponding Object Domains of Semiotics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Level</th>
<th>Object Domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linguistics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sentences</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grammar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sentences</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammatical theory</td>
<td>of an individual language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aspects of linguistic Analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rules for generating sentences in any language whatever</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phonetic theory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inscriptions (language sounds)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syntactic theory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Syntactical rules</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Semantic theory**</td>
<td><strong>Lexical units</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pragmatics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Speech actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical pragmatics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Context-bound speech actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universal pragmatics</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rules for using sentences in utterances</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aspects of universal-pragmatic analysis</strong></td>
<td><strong>Acts of reference and predication</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of elementary propositions</td>
<td><strong>Linguistic expression of intentions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of first-person sentences</td>
<td><strong>Establishment of interpersonal relations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory of illocutionary acts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," p. 33.
2. To express his intentions is such a way that
the linguistic expression represents what is
intended (so that the hearer can trust the speaker);

3. To perform the speech act in such a way that
it conforms to recognized norms or to accepted
self-images (so that the hearer can be in accord
with the speaker in shared value orientations).

To the extent that these decisions do not depend on
particular epistemic presuppositions and changing
contexts but cause sentences in general to be
engaged in the universal pragmatic functions of
representation, expression, and legitimate in-
terpersonal relation, what is expressed in them is
precisely the communicative competence for which I
am proposing a universal-pragmatic investigation.
(Habermas, 1979, p. 29)

Just as linguistic analysis may be conducted from a variety of
viewpoints (i.e., phonetics, syntactics, semantics), so may universal
pragmatic analysis. Habermas summarizes the three viewpoints from
which the universal-pragmatic aspects of speech may be analyzed in the
following passage.

The three general pragmatic functions - with the
help of a sentence, to represent something in the
world, to express the speaker's intentions, and to
establish legitimate interpersonal relations - are
the basis of all the particular functions that an
utterance can assume in specific contexts. The
fulfillment of those general functions is measured
against the validity conditions for truth, truth-
fulness, and rightness. Thus every speech action
can be considered from the corresponding analytic
viewpoints. Formal semantics examines the struc-
ture of elementary propositions and the acts of
reference and predication. A still scarcely
developed theory of intentionality examines inten-
tional expressions insofar as they function in
first-person sentences. Finally, the theory of
speech acts examines illocutionary force from the
viewpoint of the establishment of legitimate
interpersonal relations. (1979, p.33)

The pragmatic analytic units of speech act theory. Since the establishment of interpersonal relations is crucial for achieving unconstrained consensus, Habermas finds the theory of illocutionary acts or speech act theory the most promising approach for investigating pragmatic universals. Figure 8 traces Habermas' derivation of the pragmatic analytic units of speech act theory that are explicitly oriented to reaching understanding. Habermas argues that strategic action and symbolic action differ from communicative action because these actions suspend one or more of the dialogical validity claims.

It seems to me that strategic action ("oriented to the actor's success" - in general, modes of action that correspond to the utilitarian model of purposive-rational action) as well as (the still-insufficiently-analyzed) symbolic action (e.g., a concert, a dance - in general, modes of action that are bound to nonpropositional systems of symbolic expression) differ from communicative action in that individual validity claims are suspended (in strategic action, truthfulness, in symbolic action, truth). (1979, p. 41)

For Habermas, the force of an illocutionary or speech act is non-trivial to the extent that it has a generative power to establish an intended interpersonal relationship between participants.

It is to this generative power that I trace the fact that a speech act can succeed (or fail). We can say that a speech act succeeds if a relation between the speaker and hearer comes to pass - indeed the relation intended by the speaker - and if the hearer can understand and accept the content uttered by the speaker in the sense indicated (e.g., as a promise, assertion, suggestion, and so
Instrumental Actions

Symbolic Actions

Not Propositionally Differentiated

Nonverbal

( illocutionarily abbreviated speech actions)

Verbal

Propositionally Differentiated

Institutionally Bound

Implicit

Context-dependent

Analytic Units

Social Actions

Communicative Actions

Institutionally Unbound

Explicit

Context-independent

Strategic Actions

Verbal

Analytic Units of the Theory of Speech Acts

From Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," p. 40.
Thus the generative power consists in the fact that the speaker, performing a speech act, can influence the hearer in such a way that the latter can take up an interpersonal relation with him. (1979, pp. 34-36)

However, Habermas argues that the establishment of an interpersonal relation is an insufficient criterion for a universal pragmatic analytic unit. For example, the communicative action of yelling "Fire" establishes an interpersonal relation: people may flee, assist you or others to fight the fire, "mimic" your message, or simply panic. Obviously, a communicative action is not capable of specifying the interpersonal relationship intended by the speaker, and the reason for this inability, Habermas argues, is that such actions (including non-verbal actions) do not to explicitly represent or say something about the world. Yelling "Fire," thumbing a ride, or scowling at a lazy waiter all share a similar deficiency: such actions can only indicate a presupposed state of affairs or propositional content based on normative expectations. Habermas calls these "not propositionally differentiated" communicative actions.

In contrast, propositionally differentiated communicative acts "uncouple" the illocutionary force from the propositional content. This occurs because these speech acts consist of two explicit components: a propositional component and a illocutionary component. In propositionally differentiated speech acts, "(1) the propositional content can remain invariant across changes in the illocutionary potential, and (2) the holistic mode of speech, in which representation, expression, and behavioral expectation are still one, is
replaced by differential modes of speech" (Habermas, 1979, p. 37). As the example of yelling "Fire" demonstrates, one is more constrained by contextual clues with non-propositionally differentiated acts than with propositionally differentiated acts. Habermas emphasizes that for the actor, the representational function of propositionally differentiated acts provides more degrees of freedom in relation to a recognized normative background than do non-propositionally differentiated acts. However, many propositionally differentiated speech acts are institutionally bound.

Habermas cites such speech acts as "betting," "christening," and "appointing" as examples. The institution associated with the speech act limits the permissible propositional content that can be expressed with the illocutionary component. Habermas contrasts institutionally bound and unbound speech acts, explaining that

With institutionally bound speech actions, specific institutions are always involved. With institutionally unbound speech actions, only conditions of a generalized context must typically be met for a corresponding act to succeed. Institutionally bound speech actions express a specific institution in the same way that propositionally nondifferentiated and nonverbal actions express a presupposed norm. To explain what acts of betting or christening mean, I must refer to the institutions of betting or christening. By contrast, commands or advice or questions do not represent institutions but types of speech acts that can fit very different institutions. (1979, pp. 38-39)

Just as propositionally differentiated acts may be institutionally bound or unbound, institutionally unbound acts may be implicit or
explicit. Implicit acts rely on the context and/or partially complete verbalizations to indicate the performative meaning of the sentence. Habermas cites as examples utterances in which "isn't it," "right?" and other particles, as well as inflection, punctuation or word position, indicate the performative meaning of the sentence. Lastly, Habermas distinguishes between context-dependent and context-independent acts. Context-dependent acts are explicit speech actions in standard form that appear in contexts that produce shifts of meaning. This is the case when the pragmatic meaning of a context-dependent speech act diverges from the meaning of the sentences used in it (and from that of the indicated conditions of a generalized context that have to be met for the type of speech action in question). (Habermas, 1979, p. 39)

For example, if the command "Close all the windows," were spoken in a stuffy room, it would have just the opposite performative meaning than the one reflected by the command. Thus, the pragmatic-analytic speech unit that Habermas identifies is propositionally differentiated, verbal, institutionally unbound, explicit, and context-independent.

The double structure of speech. Having identified the basic unit for a universal pragmatic analysis of speech acts, Habermas turns to the double structure of speech to clarify the project of universal pragmatics. The propositional content of the basic unit may remain invariant and be coupled and uncoupled with various illocutionary components; for example, the propositional component "X has a good
time" takes on different senses when coupled with such illocutionary components as "I ask you does (X)," or "I assert that (X)," or "I beg of you (X)." Habermas notes that this uncoupling is a condition for the differentiation of the double structure of speech, that is, for the separation of two communicative levels on which speaker and hearer must simultaneously come to an understanding if they want to communicate their intentions to one another. I would distinguish (1) the level of intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer, through illocutionary acts, establish the relations that permit them to come to an understanding, and (2) the level of propositional content which is communicated. Corresponding to the relational and the content aspects in which every utterance can be analyzed, there are (in the standard form) the illocutionary and the propositional components of the speech act. The illocutionary act fixes the sense in which the propositional content is employed, and the act complement determines the content that is understood "as something . . ." in the communicative function specified. (1979, p. 42)

One of Habermas' reasons for identifying the basic pragmatic speech unit, is to make explicit the fact that participation in dialogue requires the simultaneous filling out of the double structure of speech. In Habermas' words, participants must communicate on two levels: "They combine communication of a content with communication about the role in which the communicated content is used" (1979, p. 42). Such "commenting" about communication or reflexivity relies on two different communicative attitudes that are simultaneously brought to bear in a speech act. Communication of content is effected in an objectivating attitude, while communication concerning the relational
aspect in which the content is to be understood is effected in a performative attitude. Habermas demonstrates that the relational aspect of immediately prior utterances may be objectivated in a subsequent act, but it is not possible to simultaneously perform and objectivate an illocutionary act. Habermas points out that since the performative component can be subsequently objectivated, as a content, many analyses of language fall into the fallacy of reducing communication to a single level -- that of content -- as is done, for instance, in information theory. What is lost in such approaches is the recognition that the illocutionary component of an utterance represents a specific mode of reaching an understanding of the propositional content. Habermas considers "the task of universal pragmatics to be the rational reconstruction of the double structure of speech" (1979, p. 44).

The meaning structure and validity basis of basic types of speech acts. Habermas approaches this task by considering (1) the universal-pragmatic categories of meaning, (2) the thematization of validity claims, and (3) modes of communication, and Table 9 shows the reader the conclusions to be explicated in this discussion.

The project of universal-pragmatics delineated above leads Habermas to question the distinctions made by Austin (1975) and subsequent speech act theorists regarding the relation of meaning to illocutionary force and propositional content. He concludes that:

a. It is not advisable to reserve the concept of semantic content for the propositional component of
a speech action and to characterize the meaning of
the illocutionary component only by a pragmatic
operator (which designates a specific illocutionary
force);

b. On the other hand, it is also unsatisfactory to
reconstruct the meaning of a performative sentence
in exactly the same way as the meaning of a
sentence with propositional content; the
ilocutionary component of a speech act neither
expresses a proposition nor mentions a proposi­
tional content.

c. It is equally unsatisfactory to equate
ilocutionary force with the meaning components
that are added to the meaning of a sentence through
the act of utterance.

d. From a universal-pragmatic point of view, the
meanings of linguistic expressions can be
categorically distinguished according to whether
they can appear only in sentences that take on a
representational function or whether they can spe­
cifically serve to establish interpersonal
relations or to express intentions. (Habermas,
1979, pp. 49-50)

Extending a key insight provided by Austin (1975), Habermas cor­
relates types of speech action, thematization of validity claims and
modes of communication. When Austin first began his investigation of
how to do things with words, he distinguished between locutionary and
ilocutionary acts; he termed locutionary acts, which say something,
"constatives;" in contrast, he called illocutionary acts, which do
something, "performatives." Once Austin recognized that all speech
acts contain both a locutionary and an illocutionary component this
distinction, of course, did not hold. Indeed, Austin came to regard
constative speech acts as only one of the different classes of speech
acts. Yet the comparison of constative and non-constative
(performative) speech acts reveals that constative acts emphasize the validity claim of truth, while performative acts stress the validity claim of rightness. Habermas extends this insight as follows:

We have seen that communication in language can take place only when the participants, in communicating with one another about something, simultaneously enter upon two levels of communication - the level of intersubjectivity on which they take up interpersonal relations and the level of propositional contents. However, in speaking we can make either the interpersonal relation or the propositional content more centrally thematic; correspondingly we make a more interactive or a more cognitive use of our language. In the interactive use of language we thematize the relations into which speaker and hearer enter - as a warning, promise, request - while we only mention the propositional content of the utterances. In the cognitive use of language, by contrast, we thematize the content of the utterance as a proposition about something that is happening in the world (or that could be the case), while we only indirectly express the interpersonal relation. (1979, p. 53)

When the interactive use of language is thematized, only those speech acts that establish specific relations between speaker and hearer are permitted. Habermas calls these performative speech acts, regulatives. He retains Austin's label in reference to constative speech acts. Moreover, Habermas argues that in addition to the cognitive and interactive modes of communication, is the expressive mode of communication, a mode which corresponds to the validity claim of truthfulness, which:

guarantees the transparency of a subjectivity representing itself in language. It is especially
emphasized in the expressive use of language. The paradigms are first-person sentences in which the speaker's wishes, feelings, intentions, etc. (which are expressed incidentally in every speech act) become disclosed. (1979, p. 57)

However, Habermas notes that only when the validity claim of truthfulness or sincerity is questioned is the expressive mode of communication usually thematized. Thus, avowals are the type of explicit speech act correlated with the expressive mode, for example:

"I must confess . . ." and
"I won't lie to you . . ."

Habermas, as indicated in Table 9, is presenting a paradigm for viewing speech acts, a paradigm which makes no claim to unequivocally classify every speech act. Instead, since all speech acts must raise three universal validity claims, the paradigm is based on the principle that every competent speaker has the possibility of unequivocally selecting one communicative mode to thematize.

The rational foundation of illocutionary force. Having presented a paradigm for viewing speech acts from the perspective of universal validity claims, Habermas again addresses the question: "in what does the illocutionary force of an utterance consist?" (1979, p. 59). Speech act theorists typically approach this question by seeking those cases in which a speech act fails or succeeds. Since at least two parties must be engaged in order for a speech act to occur, the success or failure of a speech act is dependent upon actions taken by both the speaker and the hearer. Habermas is concerned, however, only
Table 9

Correlations Between the Mode of Communication, Type of Speech Action, Theme, and Thematic Validity Claim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Communication</th>
<th>Type of Speech Action</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Thematic Validity Claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Constatives</td>
<td>Propositional content</td>
<td>Truth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td>Regulatives</td>
<td>Interpersonal relation</td>
<td>Rightness, appropriateness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>Avowals</td>
<td>Speaker's intentions</td>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," p. 58.
with the case "in which the speaker himself is responsible for the failure of the speech act because the utterance is unacceptable" (1979, p. 59). In contrast to Austin's (1975) approach to this question which bases the conditions of acceptability upon a normative context, Habermas seeks those "conditions of acceptability that lie within the institutionally unbound speech act itself" (1979, p. 60).

After considering Searle's (1969) approach to the question (which accounts for the success of speech acts by positing preparatory, essential, and sincerity rules), Habermas concludes that

a. A speech act succeeds, that is, it brings about the interpersonal relation that S (the speaker) intends with it, if it is comprehensible and acceptable, and accepted by the hearer.

b. The acceptability of a speech act depends on (among other things) the fulfillment of two pragmatic presuppositions: the existence of speech-act-typically restricted contexts (preparatory rule); and a recognizable engagement of the speaker to enter into certain speech-act-typical obligations (essential rule, sincerity rule).

c. The illocutionary force of a speech act consists in its capacity to move a hearer to act under the premise that the engagement signalled by the speaker is seriously meant: in the case of institutionally bound speech acts, the speaker can borrow this force from the binding force of existing norms; in the case of institutionally unbound speech acts, the speaker can develop this force by inducing the recognition of validity claims.

d. Speaker and hearer can reciprocally motivate one another to recognize validity claims because the content of the speaker's engagement is determined by a specific
reference to a thematically stressed validity claim, whereby the speaker, in a cognitively testable way, assumes with a truth claim, obligations to provide grounds, with a rightness claim, obligations to provide justification, and with a truthfulness claim, obligations to prove trustworthy. (1979, p. 65)

Conclusion. Habermas completes the presentation of his universal pragmatic theory of dialogue by indicating how the universal validity claims demarcate certain worlds or domains of reality. Table 10 indicates the correlations among domains of reality, modes of communication, validity claims, and general functions of speech. In Habermas' words, the table represents a model of linguistic communication in which grammatical sentences are embedded, by way of universal validity claims, in three relations to reality, thereby assuming the corresponding pragmatic functions of representing facts, establishing legitimate interpersonal relations, and expressing one's own subjectivity. According to this model, language can be conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every successful communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (a) "the external world" as the totality of existing states of affairs, (b) "our social world" as the totality of all normatively regulated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (c) "a particular inner world" (of the speaker) as the totality of his intentional experiences.

We can examine every utterance to see whether it is true or untrue, justified or unjustified, truthful or untruthful, because in speech, no matter what the emphasis, grammatical sentences are embedded in relations to reality in such a way that in an acceptable speech action segments of external nature, society, and internal nature always come into appearance together. Language itself also
Table 10

Correlations Between Domains of Reality, Modes of Communication, Validity Claims, and General Functions of Speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of Reality</th>
<th>Modes of Communication: Basic Attitudes</th>
<th>Validity Claims</th>
<th>General Functions of Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The&quot; World of External Nature</td>
<td>Cognitive: Objectivating Attitude</td>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Representation of Facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Our&quot; World of Society</td>
<td>Interactive: Conformative Attitude</td>
<td>Rightness</td>
<td>Establishment of Legitimate Interpersonal Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;My&quot; World of Internal Nature</td>
<td>Expressive: Expressive Attitude</td>
<td>Truthfulness</td>
<td>Disclosure of Speaker's Subjectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?," p. 68.
appears in speech, for speech is a medium in which the linguistic means that are employed instrumentally are also reflected. In speech, speech sets itself off from the regions of external nature, society, and internal nature, as a reality sui generis, as soon as the sign-substrate, meaning, and denotation of a linguistic utterance can be distinguished. (1979, pp. 67-68)

A Commentary on Habermas' Theory

At this point, some of the ways in which Habermas' theory of dialogue lends a new perspective to the models of decision-making and theories of negotiation reviewed in the first chapter should be noted. However, Habermas' argument delineated above should be reviewed.

Habermas intently develops a pragmatic unit of analysis solely for the purpose of identifying a "surface" structure congruent with his thesis that all dialogue (speech directed toward consensus) is based on four validity claims: comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness. These claims must be mutually recognized (and redeemable) by the participants in a dialogue if a "true" consensus or full understanding is to unfold. Habermas, then goes on to identify three types of speech acts that correspond to these validity claims: constatives, avowals, and regulatives. Moreover, he notes that these speech acts correspond to different modes of communication (cognitive, expressive, interactive) and basic attitudes toward the world (objectivating, expressive, interacting) both of which thematize each of the validity claims. Thus, in a conversation, one may stress the propositional content and raise the validity claim of truth; one may emphasize the interpersonal relation and evoke the validity claim of
rightness; and one may thematize one's own intentions and surface the validity claim of truthfulness. Moreover, since each of the validity claims is implied by any speech act and must be either mutually recognized and/or redeemed by the participants in a dialogue, one should expect the conversation to turn from one theme to another as participants seek to accomplish mutual understanding.

This alternating thematization that occurs in dialogue also seems to characterize what occurs in decision-making and negotiation, and this point will be adumbrated by Bales and Strodtbeck's three-phase model of problem-solving and Gulliver's theory of negotiation.

The three-phase model proposes that small groups first solve problems of orientation, then evaluation, and finally control. The dynamic underlying this phase movement is the tension between the task and the socio-emotional needs of the group. Habermas' grounding of his theory in domains of reality (the "external world," the "social world," and the "internal world") further explicates this dynamic. It seems plausible to argue that the conceptualization offered by Bales and Strodtbeck can be viewed as follows: (1) the task needs of the group are to deal with the external world, and (2) the socio-emotional needs are to integrate the social world of the group with the internal world of each group member. Thus, the tension posed in this theory may be viewed as the problem of integrating the external world with a presupposed unity of the social world of the group and the internal world of each member. Bales' IPA (see Figure 1) is of more than passing interest since the interaction process categories corresponding to
problems of orientation, evaluation, and control may also be characterized as constative, expressive, and regulative speech acts respectively. This suggests that the three-phase model portrays the alternating thematization of validity claims as the group seeks the grounds for a full understanding. Hence, during the orientation phase, the group ascertains the facts of the situation and highlights the validity claim of truth. During the evaluation phase, the group members are interested in expressing their opinions and making their viewpoints known, thus stressing the validity claim of truthfulness. Finally, during the control phase, the group is concerned with determining who will do what, or establishing legitimate interpersonal relations in which the validity claim of rightness is emphasized.

Gulliver's joint decision-making theory of negotiation may be approached in a similar fashion. The developmental model provides a diachronic accounting of negotiation, while the cyclical model represents a synchronic account. One of the points made in the critique of Gulliver's theory is that the developmental model provides a more extensive account or larger context for decision-making. Thus, the three-phase model of problem-solving can be viewed as a set of sub-phases within the 8 phases of the developmental model. Clearly, this same approach may also be applied to Gulliver's developmental model.

One of the criticisms of the cyclical model is its reliance upon an information theory of communication. Indeed, it can be argued that Gulliver's reliance on learning theory is an explicit attempt to counteract the shortcomings of the information model of
communication. According to Gulliver, the dynamic of the cyclical model is the persisting dilemma of information exchange; each negotiating party needs both to give and receive information. On one hand, each party needs to make his/her demands clear so as to persuade the other; on the other hand, each party needs to assess the other's demands and expectations so as to understand better one's own position vis-a-vis the other's. Yet, in providing information, one may reveal and/or be compelled to reveal more than what one intends. Conversely, in receiving information, one incurs a social debt which obligates one to provide information in exchange. What seems lacking from this account is precisely how the parties may be persuaded or compelled to reveal more information than necessary, as well as why a social debt of exchange may accrue.

Habermas' theory of dialogue addresses these shortcomings, how the obligation to exchange information is accounted for in his theory will be addressed first. Negotiation presupposes the goal of reaching a full understanding or consensus and, as such, seeks to arrive at a common definition of the situation so that dialogue (or, more likely, discourse) may occur. In other words, the negotiating parties seek the mutual recognition of validity claims. Thus, it is essential that each party recognizes the subjectivity of the other. This is accomplished in communication by responding to the other, validating the claim that the other makes. In accord with Habermas' theory, the validation of the other occurs when one assumes a conforming attitude through the interactive mode of communication.
This leads to the other question of how one may be compelled or persuaded to reveal more information than one desires. Here, Habermas' contention that illocutionary force may be rationally grounded comes to the foreground. If this is indeed the case, it would follow that negotiators may be persuaded to provide information precisely because they can reciprocally motivate each other to recognize validity claims. According to Habermas, the rational foundation for such motivation is the obligation that each speaker incurs when thematically raising a validity claim which provides grounds, justification, or proof for his/her claim. An example will clarify this point.

Imagine an individual coming to terms with an insurance agent over payment for accidental damages to his car. He provides information to the agent about his employment in order to persuade the agent that he needs a rental car in order to support himself while his car is being fixed. In making his argument, the individual stresses that he is only "telling it like it is," or representing the facts. However, in doing so he obligates himself to provide grounds for his claim. Thus, the agent may question the individual concerning the location of his home and workplace. This additional information may reveal that the individual can easily get to work by bus. Or the agent may continue to test the individual's claim by asking if he has another car, etc. Needless to say, the agent also is obligated in a similar fashion.
Scott's Agonistic-Transcendent Rhetoric

In "Dialogue and Rhetoric," Scott (1969) does not explain what dialogue is, but rather shows what is not. He does this by noting the reasons why the concept of dialogue (or, as he would prefer, polylogue) became a god-word during the 1960's. Part of the appeal of dialogue is that it is not part and parcel of an information model of communication that implicitly values efficiency, productivity, and control. Rather, dialogue is viewed as a means to treat interpersonal relations as indeterminate but capable of symbolic definition. Moreover, Scott points out that present conditions in the world have accentuated the universal human dilemma of community vs. individual, thereby increasing the call for dialogue. 11

The human dilemma in which we find ourselves entangled lies with the attraction-peril of community or regimentation on one side and the attraction-peril of individuality or anarchy on the other. The constant problem of maintaining a balance which will allow individuality within community without tumbling either into regimentation or anarchy seems especially intense today. The intensity of this human problem accounts for the almost hysterical energy we have directed to the elaboration of certain social symbols. The major thrust of this effort might be captured in such a sentence as, "We must commit ourselves to an involvement in relevant dialogue." (1969, p. 5)

As such, the concept of dialogue, even with all its ambiguity, challenges the traditional view of rhetoric. Yet Scott argues that rhetoric should see this challenge as a means to expand and complement rhetoric.
Since I would define rhetoric as symbolic efforts to shape human means-ends relations, I would draw the tentative conclusion that the value inherent in the contemporary demand for dialogue is a thrust toward enlarging the concept of rhetoric to come closer to encompassing the verbal interactions engendered by the human dilemma. The point is not so much to relinquish the old rhetoric as to see its limitations and especially, to see the potentialities of different rhetorical thrusts. (Scott, 1969, p. 6)

Scott constructs three ideal types of rhetoric to illustrate the rhetorical implications of dialogue: moderate, militant, and agonistic-transcendent.

Moderate rhetoric is identified with the Aristotelian tradition that assumes that the status quo should be maintained. This type of rhetoric makes the following assumptions about society, rhetoric, and the role of the rhetorician:

1. Most members of society share a set of values as well as a stable set of social roles.

2. Rhetoric has the goal of cooperation, and moves others toward well-accepted social goals.

3. The rhetorician identifies with his/her audience; persuasion depends upon showing that the rhetorician's goals are shared by her/his audience.

4. The rhetorician is superior to the audience since he instructs the audience as to their best interest.

In contrast to a moderate rhetoric, a militant rhetoric seeks to change the status quo; hence, this rhetoric makes some assumptions
that fly in the face of moderate rhetoric.

1. The set of values that the majority of society allege to uphold are worthless.

2. While rhetoric has the goal of cooperation, this entails moving others toward goals that are consistent with the values held by the minority, not the majority.

3. The rhetorician polarizes his/her audience; members of the established order are attacked for insincerely supporting societal values.

4. The persuader is inferior to the one persuaded (at least in terms of the dominant societal roles).

An agonistic-transcendent rhetoric attempts to go beyond both moderate and militant rhetoric. It does not take a middle-of-the-road viewpoint since it radically questions both society's values and the rhetorician's own values:

1. The values held by both the majority and the minority are put to question.

2. Rhetoric adheres to the goal of cooperation, but there is no predetermined set of values for this effort.

3. The rhetorician tests his/her audience and urges them to seek with him a relevant set of values.

4. The persuader and the persuaded are equals since their respective value orientations are both put to question.

At this point, the question that is most pressing is the grounds on which Scott's theory may be compared to Habermas' and to place moderate, militant, and agonistic-transcendent rhetoric within
Habermas' typology of social action. It may be argued that a background consensus is assumed by moderate rhetoric because values in society are shared and roles are well established. Since moderate rhetoric seeks cooperation, and the rhetor identifies with the audience, one may conclude that moderate rhetoric is a form of communicative action. And since such rhetoric seeks to move others toward a common definition of the situation, it may be viewed as an action oriented toward reaching an understanding.

In contrast, militant rhetoric questions the background consensus, and the rhetor polarizes his audience by questioning their validity claims. As such, this rhetoric is a form of strategic action; however, since it also seeks cooperation, or the grounds for a common definition of the situation, it may be viewed as an openly strategic action directed toward reaching an understanding.

Lastly, agonistic-transcendent rhetoric brackets the validity claims assumed by both the rhetor and the audience, and it tests the values inherent in both set of claims. Hence, this rhetoric, like the moderate, is also a form of communicative action, but one that is more closely aligned with what Habermas calls discourse.

In summary, each of Scott's three types of rhetoric correspond to a particular form within Habermas' typology of social action illustrated by the following correlations:

- agonistic-transcendent rhetoric : discourse
- militant rhetoric : openly strategic action
- moderate rhetoric : action oriented to reaching an understanding
Johannesen's Six Characteristics of Dialogue

Drawing chiefly from the works of Martin Buber and Carl Rogers, Johannesen (1971) presents six distinguishing features of dialogue. He is concerned with articulating a form of communication that is non-instrumental in nature. Hence, Johannesen's (1971) view of dialogue is implicitly opposed to the traditional view of rhetoric as instrumental action. He briefly summarizes the essential characteristics of dialogue as follows:

1. **Genuineness.** One is direct, honest, and straightforward. One imparts himself as he really is and avoids facade, stratagem, or projecting an image.

2. **Accurate Empathic Understanding.** Things are seen from the other's viewpoint. One feels an event from the side of the other as well as from one's own side.

3. **Unconditional Positive Regard.** The other is valued for this worth and integrity as a human. A partner in dialogue is affirmed, not merely tolerated, even though one opposes him. . . . The spirit of mutual trust is promoted. One affirms the other as a unique individual without necessarily approving of his behavior.

4. **Presentedness.** Participants in a dialogue must give full concentration to bringing their total and authentic beings to the encounter. . . . The dialogic person listens receptively and attentively and responds readily and totally. One is willing to reveal himself to others and to receive their revelation.

5. **Spirit of Mutual Equality.** Participants do not impose their opinion, cause, or will. In
dialogic communication, agreement of the listener with the speaker's aim is secondary to independent, self-deciding participation. Participants aid each other in making responsible decisions regardless whether the decision be favorable or unfavorable to the particular view presented.

6. Supportive Psychological Climate. One encourages the other to communicate. One allows free expression, seeks understanding, and avoids value judgments that stifle. One shows desire and capacity to listen without anticipating, interfering, competing, refuting, or warping meanings into preconceived interpretations. (1971, p. 376-377)

Since it seems clear that Johannesen is concerned with articulating a form of communicative action, his six characteristics will be compared with Habermas' three validity claims--truth, sincerity, and rightness. Genuineness, the first characteristic, is similar to Habermas' validity claim of sincerity or truthfulness. Accurate empathic understanding may also be correlated with sincerity. The most direct argument in both cases relies on the correlation of sincerity with the expressive mode of communication: in the case of accurate empathic understanding, the reflexivity of language is essential since it is through its use that intersubjective relations are established and maintained. Genuineness, in turn, is an essential characteristic for fulfilling the implicit promise of sincerity. The truthfulness of one's intentions are reflected in the genuineness of one's actions.

Unconditional positive regard, the spirit of mutual equality, and a supportive psychological climate may all be correlated with the
validity claim of rightness; underlying each of these characteristics is a concern for the interpersonal relationship, or, in other words, an appropriate recognition of the other.

The fourth characteristic, presentedness, is not so neatly categorized by a single theme. Rather, this characteristic seems to holistically subsume each of Habermas' validity claims including that of truth. This last point is seen in the requirement that participants reveal themselves and receive the revelations of others. That which is revealed is not simply a relationship or an intention, but includes one's representative knowledge of the world. Listening receptively and responding are each indicative of a style of relating, and bringing one's total and authentic being to the dialogue certainly implicates one's subjectivity.

Summarily, Johannesen's six characteristics of dialogic communication may be correlated with Habermas' validity claims as follows:

genuiness : sincerity
accurate empathic understanding : sincerity
unconditional positive regard : rightness
spirit of mutual equality : rightness
supportive psychological climate : rightness
presentedness : sincerity, rightness, truth

In the above correlations, each particular characteristic of dialogue is necessary for the redemption or fulfillment of the corresponding validity claim.
Hart and Burks' Concept of Rhetorical Sensitivity

Taking the view that Johannesen's characteristics of dialogue are not adequate for effective social interaction, Hart and Burks (1972) propose that successful communicators must exhibit rhetorical sensitivity. Specifically, Hart and Burks argument rests upon two objections to the dialogic characteristic of genuineness. First, they object to the eschewing of role-taking which is implied by this characteristic. In their view, the person who does not project an image or take on various roles, depending on the situation, is overly rigid and, as a result, ineffective as a communicator. Their other objection to this characteristic of dialogic communication centers upon the directive "be spontaneous." Spontaneity, for Hart and Burks, means not thinking before one speaks; thus, genuineness results in one not showing adequate consideration for the other and the communicative situation.

Rather than expressivity, effective communication relies on an orientation that is instrumental. The instrumentality that characterizes effective communication, they claim, requires a rhetorically sensitive person.

The rhetorically sensitive person, then, (1) tries to accept role-taking as part of the human condition, (2) attempts to avoid stylized verbal behavior, (3) is characteristically willing to undergo the strain of adaptation, (4) seeks to distinguish between all information and information acceptable for communication, and (5) tries to understand that an idea can be rendered in multi-form ways. (Hart and Burks, 1972, p. 76)
At first glance, the conception of a rhetorically sensitive person seems incongruent with Habermas' theory, and questions such as the following must be answered: "How does Habermas' theory of dialogue account for role-taking?" and "How does his theory account for adaptation to situational constraints?" As a first step, the question of how Habermas accounts for role-taking will be considered. Based on Habermas' typology of social action (Figure 7), each form of social action implies both a concrete situation as well as specific roles or interpersonal relations. Since Habermas' theory is oriented toward an ideal speech situation, his theory measures all role-taking against the validity claim of rightness or appropriateness. This provides a starting place for considering how his theory accounts for the human willingness to undergo the strain of adaptation.

Habermas' theory accounts for this willingness via the argument that illocutionary force has a rational foundation. By making a specific mode of communication thematic, an implicit promise to fulfill a specific claim is also made which may motivate one's partner to recognize the claim, as well as other claims. This line of argument suggests that the validity claims of rightness, truth, and sincerity are correlated with the willingness to adapt.

This same mode of questioning makes the remainder of Hart and Burks' maxims for achieving rhetorical sensitivity more easily understood in relation to Habermas' theory. Certainly, the directives to avoid stylized verbal behavior and to distinguish that information
which is acceptable to communicate seem understandable in the light of the validity claim of rightness. Both maxims ask that legitimate forms of interaction be established and maintained. Additionally, the recognition that the same idea can take a multiplicity of forms, suggests the validity claim of intelligibility.

Thus, Hart and Burks' conception of rhetorical sensitivity, even though it seemingly is in opposition to Johannesen's dialogic characteristics, corresponds as follows to Habermas' validity claims:

- multi-form of ideas: comprehensibility
- distinguishing acceptable information: rightness
- avoiding stylized speech: rightness
- role-taking: rightness
- willingness to adapt: rightness sincerity, truth

Just as was the case with Johannesen's characteristics of dialogue, each aspect of rhetorical sensitivity is necessary for the redemption of a specific validity claim or claims.

Implications of Habermas' Theory for Rhetorical Theories of Dialogue

The polarization between Johannesen's view of dialogue and Hart and Burks' notion of rhetorical sensitivity may be seen more clearly as a difference of emphasis regarding the role of rhetoric as social action. This difference in emphasis is apparent only within the unity of Habermas' theoretical framework of social action. For example, Johannesen's characteristic of "presentedness" emphasizes the role of rhetoric as a communicative action leading to or already assuming a
background consensus. In contrast, Hart and Burks' conception of rhetoric emphasizes its broader relation to social action. For instance, the "willingness to adapt" implies that rhetoric may be a strategic action oriented toward reaching a common understanding. Johannessen's account of dialogic communication seems in accord with Scott's agonistic-transcendent rhetoric, while Hart and Burks' articulation of rhetorical sensitivity seems to correspond to both moderate and militant rhetoric. In turn, an agonistic-transcendent rhetoric is correlated with Habermas' notion of discourse; moderate rhetoric is correlated with actions oriented toward reaching an understanding; and militant rhetoric is openly strategic action (which may still be oriented toward reaching a common understanding).

Grice's Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims

It should be noted that speech act theory, as a point of reference, is grounded in ordinary language philosophy, and Grice is a representative of the fundamental tradition that gave rise to Austin's and Searle's projects. Paralleling Searle's (1969) efforts to reconstruct the rules governing speech acts, Grice inquires "into the general conditions that, in one way or another, apply to conversations as such, irrespective of its subject matter" (1975, p. 43). Interestingly, this question results from Grice's attempt to account for indirect speech acts, the lack of which he believes is a shortcoming of Searle's (1969) explication of speech acts. (In Habermas' terms,
most indirect speech acts may be viewed as propositionally differentiated, institutionally unbound, but context-dependent acts.)

Grice's answer to the problem of indirect speech acts is to posit a general principle governing speech and related maxims for conducting conversations. It is clear that the question of how everyday conversation is conducted closely parallels the fundamental question governing Habermas' program of communicative competence. Grice's maxims for conducting conversation although not explicitly stated as a theory of dialogue certainly demand comparison with Habermas' theory of dialogue.

In considering the question of the general conditions that apply to conversation, Grice proposes the Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (1975, p. 45). If each participant in the conversation follows this principle, a common goal, purpose or direction will be fulfilled by the exchange of talk. Thus, conversationalists will not be at cross-purposes.

Additionally, Grice distinguishes "four categories under one or another of which fall certain more specific maxims and submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle" (1975, p. 45). The first of these categories he calls Quantity since it relates to the amount of information to be provided in a conversation. Under this category Grice lists two maxims:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. (1975, p. 45)

The second category, called Quality, contains three maxims:

1. Try to make your contribution one that is true.
2. Do not say what you believe to be false.
3. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. (Grice, 1975, p. 45)

"Be relevant" is the succinct maxim that is placed under the third category, Relation. Lastly, the category of Manner, which relates to "how what is said is to be said," contains five maxims:

1. Be perspicuous.
2. Avoid obscurity of expression.
3. Avoid ambiguity.
4. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
5. Be orderly. (Grice, 1975, p. 46)

Grice argues that the Cooperative Principle (CP) and the conversational maxims enable one to view conversation as rationally motivated, such that any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the CP and the maxims. (1975, p. 49)

Given the supposition that conversation is rationally motivated, Grice proceeds to show how "conversational implicature" is "worked out" by the listener's reasoning in the following general pattern:

He has said that $p$; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP; he could not be doing this unless he thought that $q$; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that $q$; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that $q$; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that $q$; and so he has implicated that $q$. (1975, p. 50)

According to Grice, conversational implicature can occur under three different conditions: (1) no maxim is violated; (2) a maxim may be violated if it clashes with another maxim; and (3) a maxim may be deliberately flouted. In each of these cases, the listener relies on the following data to determine the meaning implied by the speaker:

(1) the conventional meaning of the words being used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;

(2) the CP and its maxims;

(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;

(4) other items of background knowledge; and

(5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both
participants know or assume this to be the case. (Grice, 1975, p. 50)

The listener utilizes the above data only if assured that the speaker is following the CP (and its related conversational maxims); to "make sense" of a speaker's remark which may deliberately flout a particular maxim, the listener discards the direct sense of the remark and seeks its implied meaning.

For ease of reference, the various maxims aligned with each of the above categories may be condensed so that a single "supermaxim" is correlated with each of Grice's categories:

- **Quantity** = say neither more nor less than is required;
- **Quality** = say only that which is propositionally true;
- **Relation** = say only that which is relevant;
- **Manner** = say what you say as perspicuously as possible.

How does Habermas' theory stand in comparison to the above maxims? First, Grice's CP is a directive to ensure that one's speech is appropriate given the assumption that the conversation is rationally motivated. This assumption and Grice's discussion of conversational implicature suggests that implicature can only occur as communicative action. Something like the CP also underlies Habermas' theory; all social action is based on the transcendental possibility of communicative action. This possibility, formulated as a principle, states
that participants in social action strive for a full (rational) understanding. For Habermas, a full understanding means mutual recognition of the four dialogic validity claims: agreement as to the meaning of what is said, agreement about something in the world, acceptance of each participants' intentions, and accord among the participants as to the rightness of what is said in terms of a normative background. If these validity claims are presupposed for dialogue, then other forms of social action, such as strategic action, can occur only as dialogical deformities.

In summary, the underlying principle for Habermas' theory is similar to the CP since both seek the rational basis for speech. Yet, the principle derived from Habermas' theory is more universal than Grice's CP precisely because it seeks the transcendental basis or prelinguistic structure for all social action (see Apel, 1980). This point is partially explicated by the correlations between Grice's categorical maxims and Habermas' validity claims. If each of Grice's maxims are followed, then Habermas' validity claims are fulfilled. By following the maxim of Quantity, an individual ensures that his truthfulness will not be questioned; by following the maxim of Quality, an individual upholds the claim to propositional truth; by following the maxim of relation, an individual fulfills the claim to rightness; and by following the maxim of Manner, an individual ensures that he is comprehensible.
Buber's Existential Theory of Dialogue

Buber (1965, 1970, 1982) identifies the dialogic with that interhuman relationship in which person meets person, and he contrasts this I-Thou relation with the I-It relation that characterizes most social interaction. The interhuman dimension or dialogical sphere unfolds only when each person confronts the other as another person. In social relationships, people assume roles that allow them to maintain distance between themselves and others. When the role is used to distance oneself from another, the other is treated not as a person but as an object.

Buber (1982) identifies three problems that interfere with dialogue, and each of these problems is briefly described below. The first centers around the duality of seeming and being; the second involves the way we perceive other people; and the third is a tendency toward imposition rather than unfolding.

All humans have the capacity either to present themselves to others as what they really are (being) or to project an image or role (seeming). Buber views "being" as essential for dialogue since only when the true self is unreservedly presented to others can the interhuman dimension occur. Buber also recognizes the these two modes of being-toward-the-world are generally mixed, yet he feels that those people in whose essential attitudes "being" predominates can be distinguished from those in whom "seeming" predominates. The motivation for "seeming," according to Buber, is the essential need
for personal confirmation. By "seeming" to be what others believe is
appropriate or good, one often receives confirmation from others.
Thus, "seeming" is a particular human weakness, a form of cowardice,
while "being" is the essential form of human courage since it is
through "being" that "seeming" is resisted.

Turning to the second problem, how one perceives the other, Buber
notes that dialogue presumes "that each person should regard his
partner as the very one he is" (1982, p. 341). He contrasts this view
with the views of fatalistic existentialists, such as Jean-Paul Sarte
(Being and Nothingness, 1953), who expound the belief that ultimately
one can only know oneself. In order to "know" the other, one must
assume a particular sort of attitude toward that person. This
attitude cannot be that of objectivity, but must be an attitude
attuned to the uniqueness and subjectivity of the other. Buber labels
this mode of perceiving others "personal making present." He explains
that this attitude relies on the human capacity for "imagining the
real" of the other. Only when one turns away from the self and
swings, so to speak, into the life of the other does the interhuman
relationship begin. The analytic or objectifying attitude of science
contrasts starkly with the intersubjective mode of personal making
present. Buber does not object to the scientific, objective view of
the world, but he does object to the extension of the scientific
viewpoint to all of life. The scientific attitude tends to reduce
everything to the analytic mode, objectifies human relationships and,
thus, obscures that interhuman relation that is essentially human.
Buber addresses the third problem that hinders dialogue, the tendency toward imposing, as an ethical one. He notes that there are two opposing ways to affect others: one may impose oneself upon the other, or one may seek that disposition toward what is "right" and help it unfold in the other. This unfolding process depends upon one's ability to meet the other, to believe in the other, and to further the growth of that which is already present. In contrast, the imposing process is predicated on a disregard for the other and an exploitation of individual differences so as to force the other to see the world from the imposer's point of view. As with "seeming" and "being," Buber readily notes that imposing and unfolding are never purely present nor absent in human relationships.

So that unfolding may be the predominant mode for affecting others, Buber endorses an ethic that is similar to Kant's categorical imperative: persons should never be treated as means to an end, but only as ends in themselves. He distinguishes this ethic from Kant's view that persons exist in isolation; for Buber, however, persons exist in the interhuman or dialogic relation.

Buber (1982) summarizes and clarifies what genuine dialogue means by stressing the following points:

1. Essential to all dialogue is the sincere turning of one's being toward the other.

2. This turning is accomplished by "making present" the other, by "imagining the real" of the other.

3. In this turning the other is confirmed: "by accepting him as my partner in genuine dialogue"
I have affirmed him as a person" (Buber, 1982, p. 345).

4. Dialogue depends upon the commitment of the participants to speak what they have to say, insofar as what they have to say is legitimate to the dialogue. "Where the dialogical word genuinely exists, it must be given its right by keeping nothing back. To keep nothing back is the exact opposite of unreserved speech. Everything depends on the legitimacy of 'what I have to say'" (Buber, 1982, p. 345).

5. The commitment to dialogue is broken as soon as one "seems" or tries to bring attention to one's "I;" rather than making what one has to say thematic, one's image intrudes and damages the process of "making present."

6. The dialogical commitment is essential for all partners to a dialogue; this commitment is questioned as soon as one or more members to the dialogue are not expected to take an active part in it.

7. The dialogic or interhuman relation results in a "memorable common fruitfulness which is to be found nowhere else . . . the interhuman opens out what otherwise remains unopened" (Buber, 1982, p. 346).

How may Buber's theory of dialogue be accounted for in terms of Habermas' theory? While Buber stresses that turning toward the other is essential for all dialogue, Habermas emphasizes that striving for consensus (full understanding) is essential for dialogue. Habermas seems to enter into an account of dialogue at a later point than Buber. In so doing, Habermas implicates but does not account for the process of "making present" the other by "imagining the real." That these processes are implied is evidenced by the fact that Habermas does account for the analytically paradoxical identification of self
and other through the reflexive use of language. Hence, Buber's theory provides a more radical grounding for Habermas' theory.

This last assertion finds additional support due to the ways in which Habermas' theory seems to complement Buber's points about dialogue. For example, Buber's point (that dialogue depends upon the commitment of the participants to speak what they have to say, so long as it is legitimate to the dialogue) seems explicable in terms of Habermas' assertion that the possibility of redeeming each of the four validity claims is essential for dialogue. First, one can judge the legitimacy of what is said in terms of whether its validity claim(s) can be vindicated. Second, one may view as essential for vindicating any validity claim the directive to say what one has to say. Lastly, in every discourse in which validity claims are bracketed (dialectical dialogue), only the commitment to speak one's opinion in a legitimate way will allow the discourse to obtain closure.

Buber's fifth point is also understandable using Habermas' theory, especially from the viewpoint of different modes of communication and mutual recognition of validity claims. Dialogue is disrupted for both Buber and Habermas whenever subjectivity is thematized through the expressive mode of communication at the expense of the intersubjective relationship (thematized by the interactive mode of communication). Such subjective thematizing becomes excessive whenever it blocks the recognition of the other as a co-subject in the dialogue; in Habermas' terms, the validity claim of rightness or appropriateness is not mutually recognized.
Moreover, Buber's sixth point, that the dialogical commitment is essential for all partners to a dialogue, is exemplified in Habermas' typology of social action (Figure 7). As soon as one or more people present during a conversation are not expected to take part, one is dealing not with dialogue but with strategic action. Indeed, if this is covertly practiced, one is dealing either with manipulation or systematically distorted communication.

As a final note, Buber's point that dialogue produces a "common fruitfulness" and unfolding of "what otherwise remains unopened" suggests a dimension of dialogue only hinted at by Habermas' notion of unconstrained consensus, a dimension of dialogue relying upon the essential processes of "imagining the real" and "making present" the other.

A Phenomenological/Hermeneutical Theory of Dialogue

A phenomenological/hermeneutical theory of dialogue centers on the significative dimension of communication and is divided into six parts:

(1) The location and limits of the dialogical region
(2) The triadic relationship of the dialogical region
(3) The constitution of the dialogical region in temporality
(4) The corporeal-linguistic mediation of the dialogical field
While each of the above topics analyzes a different aspect of dialogue, these aspects are always intertwined in the dialogical experience. And while the discussion of these topics is not a pure analysis of the dialogical process, it does reflect this concept of the intermingling of parts.

The Location and Limits of the Dialogical Region

According to Mickunas (1982) and Pilotta (1981b), the dialogical region is located between subjectivism, where self is the center and value creator of the world, and collectivism, where the individual is the product of social forces. And so, to avoid ego-centrism where the self either constructs the meaning of the other or becomes closed off to the other, the following principles are required:

1. The upper limit of the dialogical region is crossed whenever only one person constitutes the meaning of events or things;

2. The lower limit of the dialogical region is transgressed if (a) the dialogue between individuals is viewed as a system of fixed signs, (b) the dialogical region is seen solely as a spatio-temporal system of transmission, or (c) the communicators are viewed as mind-body composites seeking to express the state of the mind.
3. To maintain the dialogical process, each communicator must engage in a common signification of the world.

The dialogical region relies on the significative dimension; indeed, it is actually constituted by this dimension which, according to Pilotta (1981b), is a process in which the significance of something is different from its signifier as well as that which is signified. For example, an individual points toward a ringing telephone. This pointing means something other than simply the act of pointing (signifier), and also means something other than what is signified (the ringing telephone). The individual may be signifying that he is busy and that the other person should answer the telephone or, perhaps, he is annoyed at being interrupted. If the other person answers the telephone or shakes his head, these actions may indicate that the other person shares a similar significance for the event.

That two people make shared sense of their joint actions implies that a common signification permits communicability. Yet, as the example suggests, the dialogical region can be easily disrupted if no common signification of the world exists. If the ringing of the telephone is viewed as "annoying interruption" by one person, and the other person sees the same event as "welcome company," then the upper limits of the dialogical region may soon be crossed.

More abstractly, signification constitutes the atemporal or reiterable aspects of both the external world (objectivity) and the internal world of self and alter (subjectivity). By constituting the
place in which common signification may occur, the dialogical region encompasses both objectivity and subjectivity. Mickunas explicates the importance of this significative dimension for communication as follows:

What is communicated or remains constant through the variations of things or events, is their meaning. We must recall that meaning always designates the meant. In this sense things and events constitute exchangeable examples of meanings without dictating a particular meaning they exemplify. The communicative process is an aim at a common meaning which is without spatio-temporal or environmental restrictions and need not change with variations in the spatio-temporal phenomena, and thus is capable of maintaining the constancy required for communication. While we cannot go back to yesterday's events, we can communicate the way those events were meant. (1982, p. 57)

The basis for commonality is the presence of others, a presence which decenters the ego. This decentering does not occur by ego-reflection or self-objectification, but rather by another person who either shares or contests a particular signification. Since the ego is already poly-centrically oriented within a field of experience, the alter is copresent with the ego prior to self-reflection (Husserl, 1962). This copresence and co-engagement of the self and alter is constituted neither by the self nor the alter; instead, it emerges as an in-between (dialogical) region, a common field of signification in which both self and alter are unique points of reference.
The Triadic Relationship of the Dialogical Region

In addition to the principles of the dialogical region and the role of signification for communication, the relationship that constitutes the dialogical region should also be considered. As Mickunas explains:

It consists of (1) the significative orientation to a state of affairs, things or events by the dialogical partners; (2) an orientation of the dialogical partners to each other in terms of the signification or meaning of the things or events (and not to the other as an entity in a field of orientations); (3) an orientations of the dialogical partners to themselves. (1982, p. 57).

When an individual points to the ringing telephone, he orients himself not only to this event but also to the other, and in so doing, communicates what that event personally means. This same triadic relationship (in phenomenological terms, eidetic structure) is seen in the alter's reaction to the gesture shaking his head, he shows a meaning and an orientation both to the other individual and to the ringing telephone.

The triadic relationship of dialogue radically differs from the ordinary binary relationship one has with the world or with the other as an object. The binary, subject-object relationship is one where a person is motivated by what the object is as signified. Thus, if the project is visiting a friend, a brook which crosses that path takes on the significance of an obstacle to be overcome. Unlike the friend, the brook itself has no way to initiate a different meaning or
significance: it cannot call the actual project into question. Yet, in the company of the friend, the brook may become part of a subject-object-subject relationship, and this friend can contest the significance of the brook by pointing to the splendor of the leaves swirling in the passage of water. In response, the other friend can note the hazard of crossing the slippery leaves covering the stepping stones. Thus, both the "objective" and the "subjective" state of affairs that the ego may signify are transformed by the alter's re-signification, and the ego is decentered.

The analogy of space may be used to suggest metaphorically what the copresence of the other is like in the triadic relationship of dialogue. The alter is neither facing the other individual (as an object) nor is he in the background (as is the ego); rather, he is along side of the self. Thus, turning toward the other is not the same as turning toward an object: "The other is not an object but an addressee of one's comportment, a receiver or lender of signification of something" (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 6).

The copresence of the alter may be further exemplified by the speaking and counter-speaking of the dialogical process where speaking and listening are one event with various phases. The activity and passivity associated with speaking and listening are intertwined in the dialogical region. Mickunas notes how speaking and listening are unified in a double movement in which the activity of speaking (initiating a question) presupposes the passivity of reception.
While addressing someone, while asking a question actively, one is already passively expecting an answer which fulfills the question and at the same time contains an aura of possibilities: acceptance, rejection, correction or perhaps a rephrasing of the question. Every initiation is already an expectation, and expectation contains a possibility for reinitiation. By initiating the dialogue, the speaker at the same time lends to the listener a co-initiative to listen and reply and for the speaker to become a co-listener. (1982, pp. 58-59)

At the same time, the listener's passivity is not simply a stage to be passed before responding. In listening, one is already participating, already taking an initiative that hampers or helps one to receive what the other says. In receiving the question, one is already anticipating the answer, just as a dive under the waves is already a movement of the surface. Every question, once initiated, raises an expectation for an answer, while every answer is copresent as a re-initiation.

The dialogical process does not constitute or create the commonality of significations of an event, a state-of-affairs, or thing; instead, it is a process that presupposes such commonality. As Pilotta (1981b, p. 2) notes, without this presumption, meaning is reduced to a binary subject-object or subject-subject process.

Throughout the process of dialogue an identical meaning or unity exists across the movement and counter-movement of speaking and listening. The unfolding of this process may serve both to elucidate and to obscure this significative commonality as the partners alternately question, answer, accept, reject, understand or dispute the meaning of the state of affairs. In every phase and moment of these
variations, the stability and continuity of the dialogical process rely on the common core of meaning that the facticity of the state of affairs evokes.

Just as speaking and counter-speaking are intertwined, the factual and significative intersect in the dialogical region. This is evidenced in the extension of the dialogical region into the spatio-temporal fields. The existence of dialogue in time and space is taken for granted and deserves explication since the constitution of the dialogical region is co-equal with the constitution of a temporal and spatial field.

The Constitution of the Dialogical Field in Temporality

The constitution of the dialogical field may be explicated as a constant opening and maintenance of temporal horizons which incorporates the triad of the self, the other, and the state of affairs. Temporality exposes the dialogical region to the possibility of both unification as well as fragmentation. The copresence of past and future horizons provide significative variations from which the dialogical partners may select, accept, or reject significations. Since each partner may select a particular temporal horizon from which to disclose or obscure a certain significance of the state of affairs, a partial rather than isomorphic covering of horizons occurs in the dialogical region. As past events or future possibilities are raised which resignify the dialogue, the dialogical process is disrupted and
thematic changes occur. These new themes lead to new syntheses of the various temporal horizons, and such syntheses identify a common core of meaning which partially link the temporal horizons of the dialogical partners.

The identification of a common core of meaning requires one to view the dialogical region as a movement in which the significations of one dialogical partner are mediated by the other and appropriated in the other's significations. While this perception of the dialogical region is necessary it is not, of itself, sufficient. The identification of a common core of meaning, a unity across the movements of the poli-centric field of dialogue, also requires a temporal structure of "supra-personal consciousness."

A proper understanding of the both the "supra-personal consciousness" and the "poli-centric field," requires that they be grounded neither in an organismic social consciousness nor in a radical egology.

Only in the dialogical domain do we encounter a locus of a constitution of commonality founded on immanent relationships of meaning of independent personalities. This commonality is actualized in communication where the partners confront the same core of meaning of events and objects. This signification is a "higher unity," a founded whole. A found group given only in relation to the others. A distinction must be made between a pervasive unity in which dependent parts are founded one in the other (tone quality and intensity), and where independent parts found a new content, e.g., the tones build a melody. The latter unity is similar to the dialogical domain constituting a "supra-personal consciousness." It is a complex formation of significations having a continuous
relationship to the dialogical partners. The significations of the one are mediated and thus appropriated by the acts of the other. Like the notes, the acts found the unitary meaning, although the latter is not identical to the acts. This founding can be assumed by various other means: arts, rituals, codes of interaction and diverse institutions. The individual, without a loss of individuality, becomes a carrier and transmitter of a tradition. (Mickunas, 1982, pp. 60-61)

individuality is not lost since the field of significations allows each dialogue partner to assume an encompassing role, and each partner is transformed by the revelation of the other's experience. As a result, both partners expand their own experiences, and the state of affairs is viewed not only from one's own "here and now," but also from the other's "there and then." In the process of distinguishing one's own perspective from a partner's, the perspectives of both ego and alter are copresent; each partner necessarily assumes the perspective of the other to "see" the same thing "from there" and "from then." Moreover, the encompassing role made possible by the dialogical process extends one's experiences and sensibilities to include not only those experiences actually present but also those of past and future generations.
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The Corporeal-Linguistic Mediation of the Dialogical Field

The pure dialogical region is a necessary but insufficient condition for the communicative process. Communication requires mediation by "a specific, concrete linguistic tradition, by a specific hermeneutic" (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 13). The significations of the dialogical region are always concretely expressed, mediated, or interpreted by a linguistic tradition in a particular way. This mediation of significations occurring through concrete expression directs the dialogical region on a particular course lead by the linguistic tradition. In accordance with linguistic requirements, the dialogical processes of activity/passivity and question/answer are shaped in such a way that while the significations of the dialogical partners have an
universality, they are subsumed under a specificity of (1) a situation, (2) historical requirements, and (3) the expressive abilities of the dialogical partners (Mickunas, 1982, p. 62; Pilotta, 1981b, p. 13). If one examines each of the delimiters of signification (1, 2, and 3 above), one discovers the concrete, corporeal basis of the linguistic process and how this process is imbedded in the historical situation. Mickunas notes that "(i)n the final analysis, corporeal expression and gesture constitute a commitment to a situation, an anchorage in a milieu, an immersion in an environment and an attunement of a field of action" (1982, pp. 62-63). To investigate further the dialogical region, it is necessary to both understand the structuration of the perceptual fields of the dialogical partners and to explicate the bodily rootedness of all experience.

The Structuration the Perceptual Fields

Merleau-Ponty's (1962) study of the phenomenology of perception articulates how corporeity, as "being toward the world," constitutes an originary experience of the world as a field of action. Prior to either subjectivity or objectivity, corporeity provides signification with a foundation since it is the very structure of perception. Corporeity is the principle of both the limitation and transcendence of perception.

Bodily existence is always situated, yet this very situateness provides the possibility for going beyond present limits and surpassing a situation. That linguistic and bodily gestures may transcend
one's present position in time and space, a universal aspect of one's experience, is not a result of our gestures imposing a meaning upon our experiential field. Rather, the experiential field displays its own communicative process. A brook experienced in the present is fixed neither in time nor space: the abraded bank points to the floods of past springs; the emerging sandbar prefigures the future course of the water; the eroded bank leads to deer tracks in the sand, bark rubbed from the tree overhanging the stream, and a deer sniffing the air along the path from the brook.

Our gestures do not project a meaning on the field, but trace it, elicit it from latency, a latency possessing more meaning than any specific gesture could exhaust. Is the deer sniffing for danger or water, for foliage or mate? Our communication about one of these possible meanings does not exhaust the field, each spoken word and its meaning are not complete, but it is always tensed toward more which is present in the field. (Mickunas, 1982, pp. 63-64)

The arm pointing at the ringing telephone signifies the telephone ringing, while the telephone ringing has its own situatedness, its own temporal horizon, which evokes the meaning of the gesture. The experiential field is not contemplated by the gesture but is immanent in that very gesture. The gesture has no meaning without the field of action in which it is embedded: this meaning is nothing but a tracing of the intersecting and moving vectors of the experiential field of the office with its projects, deadlines, and interruptions. Mickunas articulates what this intertwining of corporeal signification and
communication of the experiential field implies for the dialogical process.

In terms of the dialogical process, the dialogical partners are engaged in signifying a common field which, while eliciting their gestures, has more latent meaning than the dialogue could exhaust. At the same time the partners are completely decentered from their own ego-centric stances and are intertwined in the field and its communicative process. This is not to say that they are completely subsumed in the field; rather, with their shifts of significations and perceptions, as parts of the field, the field as such is affected, is manifested in its different meanings and horizontal implications. The corporeal communicative power is two sided: while moving with its own gestures to signify the field, the field calls forth the gestures appropriate to a given situation. Corporeity with its expressive gestures signifies both the field in communication and its own posture toward the field. (1982, p. 64)

Corporeity is an anonymous being toward the world; its anonymous positioning in a field of action implies that not only this body but any other body can assume a particular stance or viewpoint within the field. Hence, the intercorporeal encounter or dialogue is an upsurge toward the experiential field.

The dialogical partner is decipherable directly in terms of the gestures elicited by the vectors, the planes of actions, the forces of the field yielding the significance of the gestures and the other's unique mode of signifying something. The gesture is effaced before the signified aspects of the field and the position of the gesture makes sense only in relationship to such aspects. The dialogical partners are primarily engaged in a field of action, at a task or discussion of something. The perspectives blend and cross at the horizon, at the task, where significations converge
to form a unitary process constantly exposed to
disruption by the factors in the field establishing
new orientations and calling for resignification.
(Mickunas, 1982, p. 65)

The gesture of pointing toward the phone leads to other facticities
such as the papers on the desk, the typewriter humming, the furrowing
of the brow -- all of which may be read by the other and signified in
the other's response such as a shrug and a smile. These gestures of
the other lend a certain significance to one's own comportment, while
resignifying the field of action, the ringing of the phone and the
working world of the office.

Moreover, when engaging with others, a style of presenting and
carrying the body is established. The style of expression is a
precursor to the ego and indexes the experience of consciousness, of
intentionality. As such, corporeity is "significative of the concrete
self and simultaneously of the significances, the vectors of worldly
events" (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 16). For this reason, expression always
means both more and less than that intended.

The style of expression is begetted by the corporeity of the
other in dialogue (Mickunas, 1982, p. 65). The arm uplifted in
disgust, the brows raised in tired resignation and other expressions
of the ego are all directly incorporated by the other either through
the showing of concern, questioning, or an immersion in the same
expressive style. A gesture of annoyance at the ringing telephone
intersects with the other's shrug and smile; a furrowed brow is
reflected in the other's eyes upturned in resignation; and the
gestural expressions interpenetrate and form a unity, an intercorporeal dialogue. This intercorporeal dialogue, as Pilotta notes,

is an unitary, wholistic phenomenon tracing itself across two corporeities; an anonymous constitution traced across two corporeities, revealing one another in subsequent reflections as traces not only of one another but as traces of the significance of the phenomenal field in which both are originary geared. (1982, p. 17)

The Historical Dimensions of the Dialogical Region

History is commonly viewed as something once real but now gone, and the traces of this "there and then" are only visible to those who cultivate a knowledge of the past. Yet this view of history divorces it from the "here and now" of the present, and does not bear up if scrutinized in the light of temporality and corporeity. In the speaking and counter-speaking of the dialogical partners, the question is still copresent in the reply that follows. The corporeal tracing of signification by one partner--pointing toward the phone--is copresent with the resignifying corporeity of the other--a shrug and a smile. In each of these examples, a sedimentation occurs: the movement of question and answer builds upon the past discussion; the exchange of gestures belies the stylization of such gestures so that a glance at the phone now recalls the gesturing arm. Such sedimentation encompasses not only time but also space.

Space, as a concrete dimension of the world, is essentially experienced temporally:
The distant in space is the possible in the nearing future. . . . This sort of temporality is also the ground of the corporeal capacity to transcend to the "other side" of objects. . . . Hence the field of action with its vectors, forces and movement orientations is both temporal and spatial. (Mickunas, 1982, p. 65)

The perceptions of historical persons (their traditional points of view) can be "borrowed" by the dialogical partners, allowing them to extend their own concrete perceptions. Not only are they borrowed, but they also become part of the field of action as the dialogical partners evoke various institutionally transmitted expressions from language, ritual, or social organization in order to signify the traces of the world.

The human ability to take up the point of view of others, even from a remote past, is based on the corporeal experience of temporality. Moreover, since historical expressions of signification are institutionally transmitted (and transformed) by the intercorporeal encounter, the dialogical process is at once both natural and cultural. Just as the bodily presence of the other is copresent in the poli-centric dialogical region, so is the "historical body" of sedimented institutional expressions. The language spoken and the bodily gestures enacted in tracing the significations of the phenomenal field assume historically transmitted modes of expression. In disclosing the beauty of the stream, an individual assumes an orientation and a mode of action sedimented in the historical-cultural institution of poetry; his gestures and speech reveal the beauty of the brook as
perceived by Longfellow, Keats, Frost and other poets both modern and ancient.

The dialogical region may thus be viewed as encompassing historical-cultural and natural meanings. As Pilotta notes, these meanings are disclosed through the intercorporeal dialogue which, in turn, can be divided into two processes:

(i) one flowing from the pre-personal modality of an intercorporeal upsurge toward the world, manifest in perception and gesture and

(ii) in the externality of bodily gestures inhabiting institutions of education, language, arts and sciences; both constitute a dialogical region, an anonymous intercorporeity pervaded both with novelty and institutions of a dialogue. (1981b, p. 19)

These two dialogical processes are intertwined in the intercorporeal encounter and open the experiential field to institutionally sedimented significations embodied in the dialogical partners' concrete gestures and speech. In turn, the experiential field exhibits its own communicative power to resignify the meanings traced both by tradition and "natural" perception.

The Heideggerian notion of implementality exemplifies the historical process of the concrete intercorporeal dialogue. Everywhere that one encounters traces of the other, the dialogical region can be found. For example, farmers, truck drivers, factory workers, and grocers are all implicated in the soup that one eats. "In other words, while the implementalities "communicate their sense" one to the
other, the participants with the implementalities communicate with one another along the system of significative interconnections inscribed in such implementalities" (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 21). The communication of implementalities, signified by the dialogical partners, reveals the intertwining of the transcendental and immanent dimensions of the world. Moreover, it leads to the view that communication is not "simply to say something but to place oneself into a world of significative inter-connections" (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 22).

In placing oneself in the significative interconnections of the world, one relies on a passive pre-understanding, a hermeneutic which interprets the historical sense of the state of affairs across both subjectivity and objectivity. One interprets by perceiving a particular signification of a particular text or event from a specific point of view within a distinct historical period. Here the question of the experience of the historicity of the dialogical region is raised. Signification is the meaning or sense given by experience, and it, in turn, is reiterable: a style, a generality, or typology which is relatively stable and permanent against the on-going processes of the world.

The sense, the style of the real encountered in experience correlates to specific experiential processes such as judgement, wondering, predicting, distinguishing wherein the real appears as this kind, this nature, of this style and orientation. The question is thus "What kind of experiences are required per se in order for a particular kind of being, particular type of event to be present?" This means that the question concerning the types and kinds of beings, their
sense, becomes a question of experience and the modes of experience wherein such kinds, types and senses are constituted. Experience is thus conceived as an activity of sense-constitution wherein being of a particular kind or type is signified. Sense thus designates universal structures comprising a matrix for the experience of entities of various kinds, types, and styles.

(Pilotta, 1981b, pp. 22-23)

At this juncture, a number of caveats and conclusions may be drawn. The matrixes or universal structures constituting sense are not imposed abstractly upon the world. Rather, the world, with its horizon of the not-yet and the no-longer, is continuously present, fulfilling or contesting the significations of the facticities implicated by such structures. This means that the horizon of the experienced event may also be indefinitely followed; various aspects are disclosed and others are implicated by the significations sedimented in experience and presented by gestures, language, and institutions. Moreover, these significations are disclosed by a certain style or typology which, in turn, indicates what further experiential acts and orientations one must perform in order to pursue the horizon of possible meaning.

The possible orientations of experience, the totality of that indexed by the dialogical encounter with the world, do not immanate from the present experience alone. Rather, the totality of these indices transcends toward "all that has been experienced through the communication with others and the historicity of institutions" (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 23). Thus, a particular gesture, in all its
uniqueness, discloses a generality; an institution, with its particular locus in space and time, radiates a saliency across generations and far from itself. For example, the wave of a hand, in all its unique variations, still discloses a greeting, and the Roman Empire's principles of law, though constituted long ago, still pervade the U.S. system of justice. This saliency is due to the affectivity of sedimentations that have not been explicitly recollected nor enacted; though forgotten, these sedimentations still function as typological indices. An individual need not be consciously aware of Keat's poetry, or of any poetry, to experience and to make manifest the beauty of the swirling leaves dancing on the water. Yet, his openness to and presentation of this experience belies the institution of poetry and its modalities of experiencing the world. In essence, the sedimented language of poetry not only structures his experience of the significance of the stream, but also makes manifest this experience.

The forgotten by us, still retains its affectivity in the dialogical region in the form of what Gadamer calls the "historically affective consciousness." We do not know ourselves in toto but in terms of specific styles and typologies, specific systems of significative interconnection which we already find pre-given in the "text" of the world as a region of all dialogue. We can know ourselves, even our pure transcendental process of pure signification only to the extent that the clues in the dialogical region allow us. The transcendental, the purely significative dimension is always mediated through the historically factual, the limited interpretation leading to the notion that the factual and the general (which no facticity can exhaust) are always interconnected. (Pilotta, 1981b, p. 24)
Implications of Habermas' Theory as Complemented by Phenomenological/Hermeneutic Theory

**Signification**

Perhaps the single most important feature of the P/H theory is the significative dimension, a dimension implied by Habermas' analysis of the double structure of speech. It presents an alternative to the assumption of decision-making theories that meaning is isomorphic with behavior. Moreover, the significative dimension seems more elegantly to explicate the communication that occurs during negotiation. For example, Gulliver's use of both information and learning theories to describe the exchange of communication during negotiation relies on the significative dimension: the significance of what is learned is not identical with the information received.

For significance to be recognized as integral to dialogue, such dialogue must span both subjectivity and objectivity. Habermas explicitly recognizes this "intersubjective" region (see also McCarthy, 1978), and tacitly assumes the poli-centrism of the dialogical experience in his discussion of intersubjectivity. This poli-centrism counters the ego-centrism of both decision-making and negotiation theories. Rather than starting from subjectivity, exemplified by the isolated (yet rationally ruled) individuals of bargaining theories (Young, 1975), a dialogical theory begins by viewing the individuals as situated in a poli-centric field already co-oriented by the presence of the other. As a result, meaning is
intersubjective in a dialogical theory, while meaning is subjective for ego-centric theories. This raises the problem of how similar meanings may be shared between subjects.

**Eidetic Structure**

Signification and poli-centrism are crucial for understanding the triadic relationship or eidetic structure of dialogue in which one is oriented toward the signification of the state of affairs, the other in terms of the state of affairs, and oneself in terms of the state of affairs. This structure clearly complements Habermas' theory by supporting his assertion that the claims of truth, rightness, and truthfulness are tacitly assumed by speech. The signification of the state of affairs is the ground upon which the propositional truth may be contested and validated; the orientation toward the other in terms of the signification of the state of affairs is the basis on which the rightness and appropriateness of interpersonal relations may be judged; and, the orientation toward oneself in terms of the signification of the state of affairs is the foundation for any proof of truthfulness and trustworthiness.

The triadic relationship of dialogue (subject-object-subject) differs radically from the dyadic relationship (subject-object or subject-subject) of communication that underlies the decision-making and negotiation theories previously considered. The problems that arise from the latter's binary relationship of communication (How is it possible for meanings to be shared; how can "new" meanings occur?)
are transformed by the former's triadic relationship. This suggests
that decision-making and negotiation may be fruitfully examined from a
dialogical perspective.

**Temporality**

The intertwining of activity and passivity experienced in both
speaking and listening is indicative of the temporality of dialogue, a
dimension of the P/H theory that also supplements Habermas' theory.
The thematization of this or that validity claim, as well as the
acceptance or rejection of such claims are activities of the
dialogical partners that signify schematic variations of temporal
horizons. Each speech act synthesizes a horizon of the no-longer and
the not-yet, the former referring to that time (past) for which one's
speech is now a reply and/or initiative, while the latter denotes that
time (future) toward which one's speech is now aimed and during which
one may show grounds for one's claims. This synthesizing of the
temporal horizons constitutes the signifying selectivity of the
dialogical partners and along with the eidetic structure of dialogue
is the foundation for what Habermas terms the thematizing of validity
claims.

To make a truth claim thematic is to set it down and bring it to
the other's attention. This selective activity of the dialogic
participant, according to Habermas, simultaneously reveals a passive
anticipation that any such claim may be accepted or rejected on the
basis of whether it may be redeemed; this anticipation that a truth
claim may be redeemed is the rational basis for illocutionary force. Every claim may be discursively examined for its grounds, justification, or proof.

Earlier, it was argued that the rational basis for illocutionary force provides an explanation for the revealing of information and social "debt" that may occur in negotiations. Similarly, the various phases of negotiation and decision-making models turn upon the thematizing of particular truth claims, and even Poole's (1981) multiple sequence theory of decision development merely traces the thematizing of particular truth claims as a stage or phase of decision development. In other words, a dialogical theory may argue that decision making and negotiation are rationally grounded insofar as any claim to truth may be discursively argued and agreed upon. Because no single truth claim necessarily has precedence over another, different groups, depending upon historical circumstances and cultural traditions, will engage in different stages and will thematize different claims.

Corporeity and Mediation

Habermas' analysis of the double structure of speech not only discloses the significative dimension, but also reveals that the mediation of significations by speech is a two-fold inscription of both the world and being-in-the-world. As such, the double structure of speech rests upon the transcendence and immanence of perception. To be more precise, the double structure of speech indexes the world
and being-in-the-world. All speaking is situated here-and-now, has a history, and is limited by the expressive abilities of the dialogical partners. Yet, at the same time, all speaking as signification transcends its immediate context since that which is significative is reiterable. Though expressed in a different way, it remains the same; but to stay the same, to have the "same" meaning at this time X as in that time Y, is not to say that the meanings are identical. Rather, what occurs is that a core of sameness is perceived within the context of the not-same. In other words, the mediation of signification by speech may be conceived as a "negative dialectic" (Adorno, 1973) or, in Habermas' terms, a paradox to analytic (two-valued) logic. This paradox is demonstrated by the car salesman who may claim of a used vehicle, "It's as good as new." Whether or not an individual agrees with the claim, to consider the claim, he must recognize that the vehicle is not new and compare it to that which it is not.

In accord with Gadamer's (1975) thinking, "negative dialectic" may be viewed as an openness to experience, a true questioning of the sense of the object toward which decision-making or negotiation are aimed. Such questioning, according to Habermas, occurs as discourse only in the context of communicative action; Gadamer calls such action, dialectic and describes it as the art of conducting a true conversation.

To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the object which the partners in
the conversation are directed. It requires that one does not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the weight of the other's opinion. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330).

The stages of decision-making and negotiation correspond to the thematizing and bracketing of particular validity claims; each so-called phase displays a certain form of argumentative discourse. Gadamer (1975) indicates how such discourse, as dialectic, is a testing of opinion that seeks that which is true about the object of the conversation. As such, speech that characterizes the various phases of decision-making and negotiation enpresents a particular domain of reality. The limits of negotiation and decision-making are precisely those significations or claims to truth that are left unquestioned or whose questioning is suppressed by the dominant opinion.

**Historicity**

As the repositories of tradition, language and speech provide us with our prejudices, our pre-judgements of experience, and dialectic is aimed at the questioning of such prejudices. Through dialectic, the individual seeks to discover if his prejudices are sustained by experience. The understanding that is sought through dialectic may be explicated as a merging of temporal horizons, an interpretive experience in which the past appropriates and is appropriated by the future-oriented movement of the present. Thus, the interpretive experience is that of sense-constitution: the significance of
experience is correlated with a particular experiential process, be it wondering, judging, or distinguishing.

Habermas argues that the experience of understanding requires an openness and commitment to certain argumentive forms of discourse correlated with each of the various truth claims. In essence, he is advocating a communicative ethic in which rational discourse is explicitly recognized and practiced by all participants who wish to reach consensus. Such an ethic redirects decision-making and negotiation theories and places these processes within the context of communicative action rather than dismissing them as strategic actions in which domination is a means to a unilateral end.
1 In this and the following parts of Habermas' *Use of Dialogue*, I expand upon and partially recapitulate the arguments and terms set forth in Pilotta, 1981.

2 Here, and in later statements, Habermas uses "metacommunication" in the same sense as Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967).

3 Categorical distinctions between reality and appearance, private and public being, subject and object are assumed by competent 'normal' communicators. Habermas (1980, p. 195) notes that

   The differentiation between reality and appearance is, in addition dependent on the difference between linguistic symbol, its meaning-content (signification) and the object referred to by the symbol (referent, denotation). Only on this basis is it possible to use linguistic symbols independently of a given situation (decontextualization). The speaking subject becomes capable of distinguishing between reality and appearance to the extent to which language acquires for him an existence separate from the denoted objects and the represented state of affairs as well as from private experience.

4 Habermas (1980, p. 196) explains that in normal communication the sense of substance and causality, space and time differs "depending on whether these categories are applied to objects in the world or to the linguistically constitutive world of speaking subjects itself." Thus, for example, causality when applied as an interpretative framework to the empirical world allows one to examine "physical" causes while its application to human, intentional actions leads to the questioning of "motives."

5 This class of dialogue constitutive universals are further explicated in Habermas' 1979 article, "What is Universal Pragmatics?"
According to Bleicher (1980), the success of this demonstration is crucial to critical theory. If critical theory is to offer a critique of ideology, it must be able to defend itself from the charge of also being an ideology. A dialectical or depth hermeneutics, modeled after the explanatory hermeneutics of psychoanalysis, critically examines consensual understandings, using the ideal speech situation as a frame for critique. Following Apel (1980), Habermas (1980) recognizes that the critique of consensus can only succeed if critical theorists engage in an ethic that supports open, public dialogue with the parties to the alleged pseudo-consensus. Just as the insight offered by the analyst must be validated by the analysand, so must the insight offered by the critic be validated by society. Thus, Habermas (1980, p. 209) writes that "There is no validation of depth-hermeneutical interpretation outside of the self-reflection of all participants that is successfully achieved in a dialogue."

Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to Habermas (1979) "What is Universal Pragmatics?".

Habermas' argument regarding the fragility of the social world is quite similar to the stance taken by Goffman and other symbolic interactionists; needless to say, however, his argument enriches their analyses. For example, Goffman's (1967) concept of "face" focuses almost exclusively on (one might also say, condenses) the validity claims of sincerity and rightness.

Discourse, as Habermas uses the term, seems to correspond rather closely to the concept of "dialectical dialogue" adumbrated in Toward a Definition of Dialogue, above; for this reason, "Dialectical Dialogue" is placed in brackets below "Discourse" in Figure 7.

Habermas (1979, p. 7) cites works in the following areas: logic, linguistics, and the analytic philosophy of language; based on a more comprehensive survey of Habermas' writing, Burleson and Kline (1979) list specific sources influencing Habermas' project of universal pragmatics.

Habermas (1979, p. 8) argues that the approaches taken by logic, linguistics, and analytic philosophy present the danger of cutting short the analysis of the conditions of possible understanding, either:
a. Because these approaches do not generalize radically enough and do not push through the level of accidental contexts to general and unavoidable presuppositions - as is the case, for instance, with most of the linguistic investigations of semantic and pragmatic presuppositions; or

b. Because they restrict themselves to the instruments developed in logic and grammar, even when these are inadequate for capturing pragmatic relations - as, for example, in syntactic explanations of the performative character of speech acts; or

c. Because they mislead one into a formalization of basic concepts that have not been satisfactorily analyzed - as can, in my view, be shown in the case of the logics of norms that trace norms of action back to commands; or finally,

d. Because they start from the model of the isolated, purposive-rational actor and thereby fail - as do, for example, Grice and Lewis - to reconstruct in an appropriate way the specific moment of mutuality in the understanding of identical meanings or in the acknowledgment of intersubjective validity claims.

Habermas (1979, p. 36) explains that

The illocutionary component consists in an illocutionary act carried out with the aid of a performative sentence. This sentence is formed in the present indicative, affirmative, and has as its logical subject the first person and as its logical (direct) object the second person; the predicate, constructed with the help of a performative expression, permits in general the particle "hereby." The performative component needs to be completed by a propositional component constructed by means of a sentence with propositional content. Whenever is is used in constative speech acts, the sentence with propositional content takes the form of a propositional sentence _Aussgesatz_. In its elementary form, the propositional sentence contains: (1) a name or a referring expression, with the aid of which the speaker identifies an object about which he wants to say something; and (2) a predicate expression for the general determination that the speaker wants to grant or deny to the object. In nonconstative speech acts, the propositional content is
not stated but mentioned; in this case propositional content coincides with what is usually called the unasserted proposition.

13 Threats to use physical force, etc., however, are another matter since they may be viewed quite legitimately as speech acts. In Habermas' scheme, threats would probably be considered explicit strategic actions. Clearly, the argument presented in the text also holds for such speech acts as threats. However, I would further qualify the argument so that it holds only if the threat is directed toward reaching a mutual understanding, e.g., threatening to press charges in court if the other will not negotiate.

14 This statement needs to be clarified with reference to speech act theory. Austin's (1962) conceptualization of speech act theory included not only locutionary and illocutionary acts, but also perlocutionary acts. He defined perlocutionary acts in terms of their function of actually causing another to do something, and thus equated persuasion with perlocutionary acts. For Austin, the problem with perlocutionary acts was twofold: (1) using his definition, often such acts occurred unintentionally, while (2) the illocutionary act which intended to secure the perlocutionary effect would often fail. It seems to me that Habermas' argument that illocutionary force has a rational foundation addresses Austin's problem with perlocutionary acts, allowing for illocutionary force to be equated with persuasion.

15 This sense of dialectic is quite close to the definition of dialogue that was suggested in the preliminary remarks: "the gathering of reason between speakers." Moreover, Sallis (1980) suggests that the creativity of logos (the root word for dialogue) is found in its imaginary power; as he notes, imagination is itself a form of play.

16 In fairness to Habermas, this aspect of dialogue is articulated in his account of the intersubjectivity of relations revealed by the use of pronouns and other articles. He notes that the reflexivity of language provides the basis for intersubjectivity through an analytically paradoxical operation. By differentiating the I from the You, one secures an identity for the self and affirms, at the same time, the "I-ness" of the other. Moreover, a supra-subjectivity, we, is also accomplished via similar operations. Yet this formal definition of intersubjectivity lies dormant, in the background of Habermas' theory, submerged by his thematizing of the interactive mode of communication.
Compare Scott's comments with those of Roy Harvey Pearce; in *The Continuity of American Poetry* (1961) he writes that:

The problem of communitas is that of finding a moral and social order which a man can accept, while remaining sufficiently differentiated from his fellows to be aware that the acceptance leaves him a right to be an individual and furnishes him the means to know that he is an individual. It is the problem of defining and making a society in which men can remain individuals and at the same time share values, ideas, and beliefs; in which they can realize themselves as at once different and alike, separate and together, simple and enmasse. Living with himself, a man may live with others; living with others, he may live with himself. (p. 290)
If the process of dialogue is to be explicated, care must be taken that the method used is appropriate for that purpose. Deetz warns communication researchers that

most current research is conducted with inconsistent assumptions. While many of the concepts used in the research come out of a humanistic, processual tradition, many communication models and almost all the methodological guidelines have evolved out of a postivistic framework. Initially these positions may seem compatible. At some point, however, the researcher realizes that s/he is making assumptions about the nature of interaction which cannot be handled by the existing scientific concepts and methods. (1982, pp. 3-4)

For this research, the above caveat means that the epistemological assumptions of the methods utilized to explicate decision-making as dialogue must be compatible with the theory being explained.
Selectivity as a Methodological Criterion

The methodological criterion of selectivity, derived from the theory of dialogue, provides a rationale for the methods used to explicate dialogue. Selectivity occurs whenever participants in a dialogue engage in signification: participants must select this or that aspect of an object, event or state of affairs as significant. Moreover, such signification is further affected by the selectivity imposed by language and culture. Something that is signified must be concretely expressed using a particular language in a specific culture; in turn, that same language and culture provide the hermeneutic for interpreting the meaning of the expression. Temporality is also implicated by selectivity: the signification of the state of affairs shifts as the temporal horizon shifts.

Schutz (1964) describes the process of selectivity as relying on systems of relevances and typifications that are transmitted, maintained, and transformed by social groups. By typifications, Schutz refers to the significations that are evoked by objects, events, and states of affairs. The system of relevances for any individual refers to that person's biographical situation which includes both sedimented, first-hand experiences and institutionally transmitted second-hand experiences. The system of relevances provides certain possibilities for future activities (Schutz, 1967, pp. 8-10). Each future oriented activity provides a "purpose at hand" and a corresponding set of criteria for selecting those aspects of an
event or object that are significant (typical). As the individual's purpose at hand shifts, the significance of events or objects shifts for that individual.

The criterion of selectivity has particular importance since it is equally applicable to common-sense thinking and scientific thinking: both forms of thought rely on abstractions or constructs of reality, i.e., significations. However, science differs from common-sense thinking since it attempts to harmonize the constructs (typifications) of common-sense thought into logically consistent systems of thought. This process is fairly direct for the natural scientist who proceeds with little difficulty since the objects of nature do not reveal intrinsic relevance structures. However, the social scientist is faced with a social world that is already pre-interpreted by others. This hermeneutic means that social objects reveal intrinsic relevance structures--this or that activity has some meaning both for the individuals performing the activity and for those observing it. As a result,

the social sciences have to deal with human conduct and its common-sense interpretation in the the social reality, involving the analysis of the whole system of projects and motives, of relevances and constructs. . . . (which) refers by necessity to the subjective point of view, namely, to the interpretation of the action and its settings in terms of the actor. (Schutz, 1967, p. 34)

Schutz (1967) points out that analyses incorporating the subjective point of view present two problems for the social
sciences: (1) "How is it... possible to grasp subjective meaning scientifically?" and (2) "How is it... possible to grasp by a system of objective knowledge subjective meaning structures?" (p. 35). The answer to the first question, according to Schutz (1967), is fairly simple. The scientist does not construct thought objects that refer to the subjective meanings of unique individuals; rather, by particular methodological devices, the scientist constructs a model of a portion of the social world which deals with typified events that are relevant to the research problem the scientist is examining. This model, based on a particular problem, limits the data considered relevant, and it puts any contingent data beyond question through the use of appropriate methodological devices. Hence, the modeling process of the scientist relies on the selectivity imposed by a research question.

In order for the scientific problem to determine the structure of relevances, the scientist has to assume a disinterested stance toward the common-sense world. The individual in everyday life allows his personal biographical situation to determine his structure of relevances. During social interaction, this individual assumes that his motives are interlocked with those of his partners and the significance of events revolves around his "project at hand." In contrast, the scientist detaches himself from his biographical situation and replaces this structure of relevances with that body of knowledge constitutive of the scientific problem he is investigating.
In other words, the scientific problem is the "locus" of all possible constructs relevant to its solution, and each construct carries along--to borrow a mathematical term--a subscript referring to the problem for the sake of which it has been established. (Schutz, 1967, p. 38)

The preceding methodological devices--assuming disinterestedness toward the common-sense world and relying on the selectivity of a scientific problem--allow the scientist to construct typical patterns of behavior which correspond to the observed behavior in the social world which is delimited by the research problem. The scientist, in turn, uses a third methodological device: he ascribes to the actors within his theory a certain consciousness that accounts for the patterns of behavior. The consciousness of the theoretical actor is limited "in such a way that its presupposed stock of knowledge at hand (including the ascribed set of invariant motives) would make actions originating from it subjectively understandable, provided that these actions were performed by real actors within the social world" (Schutz, 1967, p. 41). The three methodological devices that Schutz describes incorporate the criterion of selectivity and provide a framework for delineating the methods used to explicate dialogue.

The Scientific Problem

"How is small-group decision-making dialogical?" was the initial question that framed this research. To answer this question, the decision-making of five labor-management committees were examined using participant-observation. (As a third party facilitator for a
cooperative labor-management Quality of Working Life Program (QWL) in a large Midwestern city, the author regularly participated in a round of meetings for five worksite-level committees from August, 1981 through August, 1982.) During this stage of the research, the primary concern was to identify those committees whose decision-making best exemplified the various aspects of dialogue. Hence the research question was reframed: "Which committee's decision-making best illustrates dialogical communication?" Three committees which seemed to show marked differences in their communication were examined during the next phase of research; two meetings of each committee were tape-recorded so that transcripts of the verbal communication of the committee members could be examined.

The transcripts of the six meetings were examined to identify topics or issues upon which the committees had made decisions. Two of the committees made many decisions about different issues during meetings, but neither of these committees devoted much discussion to any one topic. However, another committee extensively discussed the topic of flextime, and it reached two different decisions on the topic during its two meetings. This committee's decision-making became the focus for this study, and the research question was again reframed: "How is the decision-making of this committee based on dialogue?" As the research continued, an additional reason for examining this committee's decision-making became apparent: it had difficulty reaching a true consensus on flextime. In essence, the committee's communication appeared to be systematically distorted at some point
based on this discovery, the answer was sought to the following question: "What form of communication characterizes the committee's decision-making?" This question subsequently directed the selection of data and methods.

The Disinterestedness of the Observer

As a participant within the committee, the author had a stake in the outcome of the decisions reached by the committee, and his role as facilitator provided a set of relevances for selectively interacting with the committee members. As an observer, the author's set of relevances centered upon the research questions previously mentioned. This meant that the author was continually moving between the natural attitude of the participant and the scientific attitude of the observer. Moreover, the types of participation that the author engaged in limited the types of social interaction that were observed. As Schutz (1967) notes, when "adopting the scientific attitude, the social scientist observes human interaction patterns or their results insofar as they are accessible to his observation and open to his interpretation" (p. 40).

The use of participant-observation thus directs the selection of data in ways that may not be relevant for the scientific problem under investigation. Additionally, the system of relevances associated with participation may be unconsciously incorporated into the theorizing associated with observation. To counter the value-latent effect of participation upon observation, the participant-observer must become
aware of the values associated with participation. This can be done through various methods which utilize the methodological device of reflexivity. Reflexivity establishes a distance between the actor and behavior through self-reflection upon the behavior.

The Model of Consciousness

The theory of dialogue delimits the consciousness of actors by assuming that they act rationally, implicitly upholding the truth claims of intelligibility, propositional truth, appropriateness, and sincerity. Moreover, it assumes that the actors interactively constitute the significance of the state of affairs. Actors also seek to sustain a dialogical relationship, synthesizing temporal variations that signify the "same" topic. These assumptions directed the research undertaken in the following ways:

1. The rational basis for each individual's actions were sought by examining the context and the history of the committee's discussion of flextime.

2. The significance was sought for each committee member's contribution to discussion in terms of its relation to past significations.

3. The common core of meaning was sought that would synthesize the committee's various references to other times and situations.
Using Conversational and Ethnographic Analyses

Combining ethnographic and conversational analyses is not without precedent. Circourel (1980) makes a strong case for supplementing conversational analyses with participant-observation and other qualitative, field research methods. As he and Poole and Folger (1981) have noted, what is normally lacking in conversational analyses is an understanding of the historical context: a recognition of how the conversation, as a single event, indexes a matrix of interconnected events. If the aim of conversational analysis, such as SYMLOG (Bales and Cohen, 1979) is to explicate the meaning of what is said or is revealed in conversation, only a part of that meaning can be illustrated since all conversational analyses are categorically constrained. One way to expand upon the meaning in a conversation, offered by Labov and Fanshel (1977), is to historically contextualize the conversation. An ethnographic account of the labor-management committee provides a partial history and context in which the significance of the conversation may be more fully understood. In summary, while SYMLOG offers a way to partially assess dialogue, the ethnographic analysis supplements the SYMLOG analysis by checking the accuracy of the SYMLOG interpretations of the meeting.
Field Research and Ethnography

Participation/Observation

As a third-party facilitator, the author's major responsibilities were to attend worksite committees and to help them address work-related problems and/or formulate proposals for experiments. Acting as a liaison to other QWL committees throughout the city, he provided and sought information about QWL activities. Much of the author's time was devoted to contacting people both within and outside of committees to arrange meetings and presentations. These duties permitted various levels of entree into the division and worksite organizations since the author's role was differently defined depending upon the needs and desires of the worksite committees.

In addition to the above responsibilities, the author also attended QWL meetings at the division-, department-, and city-level. At the department and city meetings he gave reports on the status of the QWL program for one division (W) of the city, and he participated in discussions when questioned or when he deemed it appropriate. (The latter usually occurred when the author felt he could supply needed information or correct a misconception.) On occasion, a worksite committee or sub-committee from the W division would report to the city or department committees about on-going or proposed experiments such as daycare. The author was actively involved "behind the scenes" in these presentations and helped to prepare reports and coached the people who would present the reports. On a periodic basis, the author
also helped plan QWL conferences and taught workshops for QWL participants from throughout the city.

The author's interaction with most committee members was limited to discussions within the setting of the QWL meetings. However, the author deliberately tried to extend his contact with committee members by arriving early and/or staying after meetings to shoot the breeze. It was during such discussions that he learned the most about each committee's history. Such sessions also were occasions for gossip about the organization: future plans, "secrets" about certain members, and other rumors were fair game for discussion. Often, the author attempted to direct these conversations to the topic of how committee members viewed the upcoming (or just enacted) meeting.

Minutes, Notes and Other Texts

The materials on which the ethnographic accounts in Chapter IV are based range from minutes of meetings to field and retrospective notes recorded as a participant-observer to cryptic notes from past facilitators. The field notes were written during the actual time of attending meetings, while the retrospective notes were written after the meetings. These notes vary greatly in their "thickness" (Geertz, 1973) for a number of reasons.

The field notes were greatly affected by the degree of active participation in the meeting. Generally, the greater the participation in discussion, the less the amount and quality of the notes. For this reason, retrospective notes were written to fill out
the detail glossed over in selected field notes. This practice also had its drawbacks: meetings often would occupy a large portion of one week during the month which allowed little time for writing notes immediately after each meeting. In such cases the retrospective notes may not have been written until a week (or two) after the meeting. This delay affected the amount recalled about an event. So that the degree of freshness of the retrospective account could be assessed, each entry was dated twice: when the meeting occurred and when the entry was written. One advantage of the retrospective notes, whether written late or not, was that they provided a place to record the information gained during conversations with committee members outside of the actual meetings.

Every committee elected secretaries or recorders to take minutes. These records varied in detail and accuracy with the abilities of the person holding the office and the demands placed by the particular committee. Fortunately, each past facilitator for the committees had also taken field notes, similar to the ones I made. These notes suffered from the problems previously noted. However, having at least two sources of information for each meeting allowed me to check the records (Douglas, 1976) and verify any facts reported.

A last source of information which proved quite valuable were the conversations held with other third-party facilitators. Two different sorts of experiences provided additional insight and information about the committees. One was the collegial relationship that usually is established with those with whom one works. Informal conversations,
staff meetings and other work-related conversations provided a great deal of information about each committee's history. The other experience was more structured but equally valuable: as a matter of routine, one member of the facilitation staff would conduct "debriefings" every month or so. These sessions lasted approximately an hour and focused upon descriptions of committee interactions and concerns. This descriptive focus was then turned to theoretical analysis. Since these debriefings were tape-recorded, they provided the oral equivalent of retrospective field notes.

**Using Field Research and Ethnography to Examine Dialogue**

Two means are used to "thickly" describe the committee's meeting. First, a narrative of events provides an historical framework for contextualizing the SYMLOG analysis of the committee's meeting. The narrative traces the history of the discussion of flextime in the committee and makes understandable the motivations for various committee members' actions.

To supplement the SYMLOG analyses, the second method incorporates the data from the narrative and draws, on an ad hoc basis, upon the understanding the author developed as a participant-observer. The aim of this method is to explicate the historical dimension of dialogue by checking the accuracy of the SYMLOG interpretation of the conversation. This is done, for example, by revealing the motivation for certain actions of committee members that may be misconstrued if the
history of the committee is ignored. In other words, the SYMLOG analysis of the image diagrams provides a naive, surface-level understanding of the committee's conversation which is contrasted with the historical, sedimented understanding drawn from records, experience, and heresay.

**SYMLOG as a Form of Conversational Analysis**

SYMLOG is an acronym for a "System for the Multiple Level Observation of Groups." This system uses three orthogonal dimensions to describe the quality of "the behavior of members or the images suggested in the content of what they say. The dimensions, described in terms of behavior adjectives are: (1) Dominant vs. Submissive, (2) Friendly vs. Unfriendly, and (3) Instrumentally Controlled vs. Emotionally Expressive" (Bales and Cohen, 1979, p. 9). The space created by the three dimensions is illustrated in Figure 9; Appendix A contains extensive definitions of each of these dimensions in terms of the levels explained below.

When using SYMLOG, information may be gathered in two ways: (1) group interaction may be rated retrospectively by one or more of the group members and/or by observers (this technique relies on an adjective check list), or (2) group interaction may be scored by one or more observers. Interaction scoring may be performed either during the group interaction or from recordings of the interaction. This last type of interaction scoring may rely on video tape recordings,
Figure 9. SYMLOG Three-Dimensional Space
Behaviors, Images, and Values

Interaction scoring of group interaction assesses three levels of "meaning": (1) the behaviors members display (what people express verbally or nonverbally), (2) the images that members evoke (what people say about various referents), and (3) the pro or con value judgements that members exhibit toward certain images (what attitudes people imply by what they say or do). Both behaviors and images may be scored on all three dimensions (UNF), on any two dimensions (DP), or on any one dimension (B). Values are scored as either P (pro) or C (con). The distinction between behaviors and images within SYMLOG is analogous to the distinction between relational and content messages (Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson, 1967): group member behavior often indicates how the image level of meaning is to be interpreted. This interpretation, in turn, is summarized within SYMLOG scoring as a value judgement about some referent (topic of discussion). Moreover, just as relational and content messages may be congruent or incongruent, so may SYMLOG behaviors and images be in discord or accord with one another.

Specifically, the first category of meaning (behavior) allows interaction scoring to focus on either nonverbal or verbal acts. The second category of meaning (images) distinguishes among six types of references.
They are, briefly (1) references to (or descriptions of) the self, (2) references to the other, (3) references to the group as a whole, (4) references to the immediate external situation in which the group interaction takes place, (5) references to general features of the environing society, and (6) references to any kind of thing, real or imaginary, which the observer judges to be informative about the imagination and feeling of the person speaking, a class of content called fantasy images. (Bales and Cohen, 1979, p. 9)

Field Diagrams

SYMLOG scores may be viewed in graphic form by using either behavior or image field diagrams (see Figures 10 and 11). The behavior field diagram (Figure 10) plots behavioral scores on the three dimensions, while the image field diagram (Figure 11) plots image scores on the three dimensions. The points plotted on the behavior diagram represent the F-B and P-N behaviors of the participants in an interaction. In other words, the location of the point on the behavioral field diagram portrays the degree to which each participant's behavior is instrumentally controlled (F or forward) vs emotionally expressive (B or backward) and/or friendly (P or positive) vs unfriendly (N or negative). The U-D number below the point corresponds to the degree of dominance or submission exhibited by each participant: The larger the U number, the more dominant the behavior of a participant; conversely, the larger the D number the more submissive the behavior of a participant. In contrast, the image field diagram plots each participant's attitude toward the content talked about during the interaction. As in the behavior field
Interaction Scoring Form

Observer ______________________ Group ____________ Date ________ Page _____

Draw a diagram of the physical location of group members on back of page 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Who Acts</th>
<th>Toward Whom</th>
<th>Act/Non</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Ordinary Description of Behavior or Image</th>
<th>Pro/Con</th>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Image Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Figure 10. SYMLOG Interaction Scoring Form
**Figure 11. Behavior Field Diagram**

```
BEGINNING TIME: 9:25
END TIME: 10:40

FIELD DIAGRAM SCORES: * INDICATES INDIVIDUALS THAT PAY RAVE SAFETY RISK

NAME   L/C  F/H  F/FE   # ACTS   NAME   L/C  F/H  F/FE   # ACTS
GDK    12 3  17 7  11 4  11 1  GDK   14 4  11 2  10 9  8 5  9 2  6 3  10 4  8 5
KDK    12 3  17 7  11 4  11 1  GDK   14 4  11 2  10 9  8 5  9 2  6 3  10 4  8 5
GDK    12 3  17 7  11 4  11 1  GDK   14 4  11 2  10 9  8 5  9 2  6 3  10 4  8 5

Figure 11. Behavior Field Diagram
```
Each type of field diagram is analogous to a photograph. Just as some photographs are snapshots and some are timed exposures, so also do the field diagrams vary in terms of time. A diagram may encompass an entire meeting by averaging all of the scores for each individual participant over that period of time. Or, the meeting may be broken into smaller units of time, and field diagrams may be constructed for each time period. This latter method is the most useful for viewing changes in the images and/or behaviors of participants.

Polarization and Unification

The use of image field diagrams allows one to graphically view how the group members form PRO and CON coalitions around images. Similarly, the use of behavioral field diagrams show which group members behave differently and which behave similarly. If a group has two or more subsets of members who differ extensively in their images or behaviors (e.g., one subgroup is located in the UPF space, while another subgroup is located in the UNB space), the group is polarized. Conversely, a group is unified if all members may be located in roughly the same space, e.g., the UPF space. Bales and Cohen (1979) argue that groups that are extremely polarized or unified will have difficulty accomplishing tasks: the polarized group is
unlikely to reach an informal consensus on anything, while the unified
group is likely to practice "groupthink" and too readily agree to
suggestions made by any group member. The polarization scores (1
through 0) used in the analysis are based on the distribution of group
members on both directions of the three SYMLOG dimensions. A
polarization score of zero means that the group is unified on a single
direction of a dimension. As the polarization score approaches 1, the
group becomes more evenly split upon each direction of a particular
dimension.

Using SYMLOG to Examine Dialogue

In this study, SYMLOG is used to examine dialogue in two ways.
First, the behavioral field diagrams are used to index whether the
group is under the sway of a basic-assumption (Bion, 1961); in other
words, extreme polarization or unification on a behavioral field
diagram may indicate that the group's communication is systematically
distorted. The following correlations between the SYMLOG dimensions
and Bion's basic-assumptions serve as heuristic devices for assessing
if the group's communication is systematically distorted:

DB : dependency
PB : pairing
UNB : fight
DNB : flight
Note that emotionality (B) is the key vector in each of the SYMLOG combinations; Bion's theory assumes that the expression of excessive emotionality indexes a basic-assumption. For example, if the group is unified in the PB space, group members probably are unconsciously assuming that they are meeting for the purpose of pairing. Polarizations of sub-groups which occur with any of the above correlations are indicative of a group struggling either to overcome a basic-assumption or to change from one basic-assumption to another. In either case, systematically distorted communication is likely to occur.

The image field diagrams provide a second way to examine dialogue. In contrast to the behavioral diagram, which focus on how participants act toward each other, the image diagrams focus on the topic of the discussion. Hence, the image diagrams are more or less directly correlated with the significations of the state of affairs. Given the mapping of participants' positions toward certain topics that occur on the image diagrams, the fragmentation and unification of significations is easily indexed. In other words, the image diagrams show how a single topic may be variously thematized by different participants, and make it is possible to explicate the significative variations that occur in a dialogue as a result of the selectivity of the dialogical partners.

The triadic relationship necessary for dialogue can also partially be assessed. Since six referent levels may be indicated on the image diagrams, movement from the image of the state of affairs
(level 4) to the image of the other (level 2) or of the self (level 1) allows one to assess whether participants are focusing upon the same object of signification.

Using SYMLOG as an Interpretive Foil

In addition to assessing observed communication behaviors, SYMLOG may be used by participant-observers as a foil for interpreting how their own value orientations affect the collecting of data and subsequent theorizing. As researchers withdraw from participation in an organization, they naturally begin to re-evaluate their participation and begin to recognize how their value-orientations as participants caused them to selectively gather and interpret data. This reflexive process is systematically aided by the use of SYMLOG interaction scoring after the collection of data. The SYMLOG scoring of the meeting's conversation by the naive coder surfaces the value orientations latent within the author's participant-observation of the conversation. This technique allows the author, as a participant-observer, to reconstruct his data and theorizing so that it is value-oriented and incorporates the values held by him.

SYMLOG Coding Procedures

In the analyses undertaken for this dissertation, only verbal (speech) acts from a written transcript were coded using the SYMLOG
categories for behaviors, images, and values. The coding procedure used in this study differed in many ways from the interaction scoring method described by Bales and Cohen (1979). For example, Bales and his colleagues usually score an interaction "live" and use a group of observers. These observers view the group interaction from behind one-way windows/mirrors. The observers do not attempt an exhaustive analysis of the interaction; they score only those behaviors and/or images which they sense are important. Moreover, each observer indicates a physical-time reference for each act and/or image scored so that a basis for comparing different observers' scores is provided. In contrast, the scoring procedure used in this study, being textually based, was more exhaustive: transcripts were scored by a single (naive) observer who divided each person's utterances into one or more acts based upon changes in either the behaviors or images evoked by the transcribed utterance. Additionally, each act was assigned a sequential number so that SYMLOG scores could be mapped line-by-line on the transcripts.

Recording and Transcription

The committee meeting was tape-recorded early in December 1981 with the committee's prior approval. A single microphone was used so all voices were recorded on one track.

Transcription of the tape-recording was done by a professional secretary who was instructed to punctuate pauses and to inscribe the conversations verbatim including vocal disfluencies. The author
produced the final transcripts; he identified the speaker's using three-letter codes and corrected any errors in transcription (see Appendix B).

**The Coder**

The coder was familiar with the group members since he had attended a number of committee meetings prior to the meeting that was coded. However, he was not present during the group's actual interaction, and he was privy to only a limited history of the group's discussion on the topics that were scored.

**Training**

The coder was trained by the author based on the SYMLOG descriptions (see Appendix A) and the instructions provided by Bales and Cohen (1979). The 20 hours of training concentrated on three objectives: (1) achieving consistency in identifying scoring units (acts) to be coded; (2) distinguishing between behaviors and images in an accurate manner; and (3) applying each of the three SYMLOG dimensions in a consistent manner to both behaviors and images.

**Scoring Reliability and Validity**

At the end of the training period, an excerpt from a transcript of another committee meeting was scored by both the author and the coder to assess intercoder reliability for acts scored. High intercoder reliability resulted: .94 using a Pearson R split-half
test. While no formal (statistical) assessment of the coder's scoring validity was made before he began scoring, both the author and the coder spent considerable time examining and mutually justifying variations in the scoring of acts using the SYMLOG categories. Only after both were satisfied with their explanations did the coder proceed with the scoring of the transcript. After the coder had scored the transcript, his scoring validity was assessed using procedures developed by Professor Strodtbeck at the University of Chicago. In essence, Strodtbeck's test assesses those SYMLOG dimensions upon which the coder may be biased by comparing the coder's scores to an ideal set of scores on each combination of the SYMLOG dimensions; this test is conducted separately for both behavior and image scoring.

The results of these two tests showed that the coder was accurately applying the SYMLOG dimensions.

Scoring Procedures

The interaction scoring form used by the coder is illustrated in Figure 12. The transcript was coded on the interaction scoring form as follows:

1. In the "Time" column, three-digit, ordinal numbers were placed so as to sequentially reference each act scored.

2. The code name of the participant currently speaking was placed in the "Who Acts" column.
Figure 12. Image Field Diagram
3. The code name of the participant addressed by the speaker (or GRP, if addressed to the group as a whole) was indicated in the "Toward Whom" column.

4. Since only speech acts were considered, the "Act/Non" column was invariably marked "Act."

5. The location in the three dimensional space to which the behavioral act corresponded was indicated in the "Direction" column. In other words, the act was scored in terms of whether it was U or D, P or N, F or B.

   An act could be scored on all three dimensions (e.g., UNF), on any two dimensions (e.g., UN), or on any one dimension (e.g., U).

6. In the column labeled "Ordinary Description of Behavior or Image," the topic or reference for the speech act was described in ordinary language.

7. A "P" or "C" was placed in the "Pro/Con" column, thus designating whether the attitude toward the image was positive (P) or negative (C).

8. The "Direction" of the image was indicated in this column; the same procedures were followed as in step 5.

9. Lastly, the reference (levels 1-6) for the image was designated in the "Image Level" column. Image level 4 (situation), as an immediate reference to the context of the meeting, was used to index the topic under discussion by the committee.

Procedures for Selecting SYMLOG Diagrams for Analysis

The following procedures were used to select the SYMLOG diagrams for analysis. First, the transcript and the scoring forms were divided into topical sections. This division by topic was done by examining on the SYMLOG scoring forms the coder's descriptions of the images using ordinary language; then the transcript (on which the
SYMLOG acts were mapped line-by-line) was divided into corresponding sections. Second, each section of the conversation was examined to account for the number and sequence of participants. As a rule of thumb, a field diagram was not generated until at least three participants had spoken on a topic. Third, further diagrams were generated each time a new participant entered the conversation. These three steps generated about two field diagrams per page of transcript.

Fourth, each diagram was examined for the degree of contrast it illustrated compared to the diagram generated prior to it. Diagrams that showed little or no change (for either behaviors or images) were discarded. This was done to make the interpretation of the diagrams easier by eliminating redundant information.

**Procedures for Analyzing SYMLOG Diagrams**

The behavior and image diagrams of the meeting were systematically examined using the following procedures:

1. A behavior and an image field diagram that summarizes the discussion up to the point of the initiation of the flextime topic provides a baseline for assessing changes in the behavior and images of the participants during the flextime discussion.

2. Another behavior field diagram is then examined that summarizes the behaviors of the first three participants discussing flextime (this diagram assesses only the behavior from the initiation of the flextime topic). A comparison is made between this diagram and the first behavior field diagram generated (step 1 above).
3. An image field diagram, corresponding to the same time span as in step 2 (above), is inspected in order to provide another baseline for assessing changes in the images evoked by each participant.

4. A behavior field diagram is then examined that summarizes the behavior of either the first four participants, or the original three participants as they discuss a new theme. This diagram is compared to the diagram generated in step 2.

5. An image field diagram, covering the same time period as the behavior diagram described in step 4, is scrutinized next. A comparison of this diagram with the image diagram generated in step 3 provides a way of assessing changes in the images evoked by each participant.

6. With each additional participant and/or the introduction of a new theme, the procedures outlined in steps 2 through 5 are reiterated, providing a series of behavior and image field diagrams over the course of the flextime discussion.

Interpretive Procedures

To partially illustrate the dialogical aspects of the discourse, three interpretations of the committee's meeting are presented in Chapter IV: (1) a SYMLOG interpretation; (2) an ethnographic interpretation; and (3) a dialogical interpretation.

SYMLOG Interpretation

The SYMLOG diagrams function as sensitizing matrices for dialogue, and provide clues or indications about the dialogical process that may be further tested against the transcript and the
historical record. Moreover, the diagrams disclose the value-orientations of the author, as a participant/observer. The interpretations of the SYMLOG diagrams focus upon the following indices:

1. **Polarization/unification of behaviors:** Extreme polarization or unification on a behavior field diagram may indicate that the group's communication is systematically distorted. Polarizations which occur with UNB, DNB, PB, or DB sub-groups are indicative of a group struggling either to overcome a basic-assumption or to change from one basic-assumption to another. Extreme unification of the group upon those same SYMLOG coordinates is indicative also of a basic-assumption group.

2. **Polarization/unification of images:** Polarization indicates disagreement about the significance of the state of affairs, while unification indicates agreement.

3. **Similarity/dissimilarity among participants' image levels:** The image level provides some indication of the aspect of the dialogical relationship (self, other, state of affairs) being thematized by the participants. Similarity among participants' image levels signifies that the dialogical region is unified, i.e., the same aspect of the dialogical relationship is being thematized. Conversely, dissimilarity among the image levels indexes a fragmentation of the dialogical region since the object of signification is not shared.

4. **The unification/polarization of images across time:** Movement toward unification illustrates the merging of temporal/significative horizons for the state of affairs (consensus), while polarization indexes the fragmentation of such horizons.
Ethnographic Interpretation

The ethnographic interpretation provides a way of checking the clues and indications about the dialogical process suggested by the SYMLOG interpretation. This interpretation proceeds by examining the themes raised in each participants utterances using the following criteria:

1. **Specification:** The signification of the state of affairs by each participant is described and compared. Additionally, the orientation of each participant toward other participants is assessed.

2. **Elaboration:** The historical motivations (sedimented meanings) for each participant's utterance are explicated. Additionally, the value-orientations of the author, as a participant/observer, are taken into account.

3. **Reconsideration:** Each clue provided by the SYMLOG interpretation is checked against the elaborated and specified reading of the transcript.

Dialogic Interpretation

The dialogic interpretation builds upon the results of both the SYMLOG and the ethnographic interpretations and explicates the following aspects of dialogue:

1. **The maintenance/disruption of the triadic relationship:** The orientation of each person toward the state of affairs, toward the other, and toward the self is assessed.

2. **The thematizing, bracketing, and redemption of truth claims:** Each individual's utterances are characterized in terms of the four truth claims;
assessments are then made of the type of social action embodied by each person's utterances.

3. The extent to which an ideal speech situation exists: Building upon steps one and two, a wholistic assessment is made of the group's conversation to determine whether true consensus occurred during decision-making.
These SYMLOG diagrams, as well as the ones examined in the next chapter, were generated using a computer program package developed by Richard Polley, called SYMSCO. Extensive descriptions and explanations of this program package may be found in Polley (1981, 1982) as well as Bales and Cohen (1979).

The coder completed two assessments: The Behavior Implications Task (BIT) and The Value Implications Task (VIT). Professor Strodtbeck developed and used both the BIT and VIT in his PSR 1330r Group Psychology Laboratory course during Fall, 1980.
CHAPTER IV

AN EXPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF DIALOGUE

While the central focus of this chapter is the discussion of flextime by the DR labor-management committee during the course of one meeting, the first two sections of the chapter provide a context for more fully understanding the meeting. Thus, the chapter is divided into four sections:

(1) History and Structure of the QWL Program
(2) Narrative History of the Discussion of Flextime
(3) Conversational Analyses
(4) Summary

History and Structure of the QWL Program

The Quality of Work Life (QWL) Program was established in 1976 based on an agreement signed by the city, the union local, and a local university to develop a cooperative labor-management program that would improve both the quality of the working conditions for municipal employees and the services provided by the city government. This
agreement stated that the program would be an experiment for 24 months; funding for the program was provided by a grant from the federal government, and it was supplemented by the city and the union local. The program held its first official meeting in late 1976, and by 1978 the program had grown to include two divisions within the city. At the end of 1978 the city-wide committee decided that the program should be continued, and a program-wide retreat was held to draft a set of principles for the program which was now funded solely by the city and the union local.

The QWL Program's Operating Principles

Five major principles for the QWL program were identified during the retreat: communication, attitude, cooperation, responsibility, and experimentation. These principles were articulated as follows:

1. Communication means the willingness to share information with an open mind and to recognize and to respect that there are different opinions.

2. An attitude of mutual trust promotes an atmosphere of mutual respect and open-mindedness.

3. Cooperation between different groups of employees, different levels of management, and different units or areas of the city means that program incorporates a wide range of individual, group, and institutional interests.

4. Responsibility means that program members have an obligation to identify the goals of their work group, to analyze, investigate,
plan, evaluate, and pursue these goals in a mutual manner.

5. Experimentation allows program members to test proposed changes, and it allows changes to be made within one area of a division or the city without affecting the operation of the rest of the division or city.

Expansion of the QWL Program

The city-wide committee decided to expand the QWL program to include a third division in the fall of 1981. This expansion meant that approximately 1200 city employees would be affected by the program since there are roughly 400 employees in each one of the three divisions. Considerable effort was expended by third party facilitators, union officials, and city administrators in laying the foundation for the new worksite committees; the first worksite-level committee did not meet until the beginning of 1982. Much of the time spent in the interim was devoted to determining the structure of the proposed division-wide program, the make-up of the membership on committees, times and sites for holding meetings, and conducting elections of representatives from the workforce for membership on the committees. The extensive planning and discussions undertaken to establish the new division of the program were analogous to the procedures followed during the initial establishment of the program in the other two divisions in the city and indicates the context of negotiation in which the QWL program exists.
The QWL Program's Committee-Based Structure

Compared to the city's organization, the QWL program offers an alternate but parallel structure of four levels of committees: (1) a city-wide committee, (2) a department-wide committee, (3) a number of division-wide committees, and (4) many worksite committees. While the structure of the QWL program parallels the hierarchical structure of the city administration, the locus of control is decentralized. The worksite committees are empowered to make decisions that directly effect their working conditions, but they can not violate city-, departmental-, or division-wide rules. However, a worksite committee can suggest experiments to the higher level QWL committees so that changes in rules can be tried on a trial basis. In short, the QWL program provides lines of communication between city employees and managers that would not ordinarily exist. This enhanced communication occurs because of the make-up of the committees.

Worksite committees consist of both fixed and elected positions. Fixed positions are seats on the committee for people who occupy certain management and union roles; generally, the worksite manager and assistant manager have fixed positions as do the union steward and a designated union assistant. The elected positions are more variable in nature; each committee sets up guidelines for elections and determines how the workforce should be represented in the committee.

The division-level QWL committees include fixed positions (the worksite managers and union stewards as well as the superintendent of
the division) and elected representatives (generally the chair of the committee) from the worksite committees. Representatives elected from the division-level committees sit on the department-level committee which includes the director of the department. The city QWL committee more or less serves as a steering committee, and it includes the Mayor, selected members of his cabinet, the President of the union local, and selected board members of the union local.

The various types of committee meetings serve the cooperative needs of the labor union local and city management as well as individual workers and supervisors by providing the following settings: (1) an arena for settling disputes that arise at the workplace; (2) a place in which technical, work-related problems can be discussed and sometimes solved; (3) a forum in which cooperative labor-management decision-making can occur regarding work rules or policies; (4) a testing ground in which ideas for improving the work place may be developed and experimentally implemented; (5) a place and time in which "gripes" and "bitching" about work relations may be aired; and (6) a "neutral" place in which work related roles and status may be transformed and emergent social relationships developed and maintained.

**The QWL Program's Consensus Decision-Making Process**

Every QWL committee attempts to follow an informal process of consensus decision-making in which each member voices an opinion on an issue; if dissenting views are not voiced, the committee assumes that
a consensus exists on an issue. Normally, therefore, formal votes on issues do not occur; when disagreements do arise, committee members attempt to reach a compromise or suitable settlement through informal discussion. However, even though each QWL committee member has the power to persuade other committee members, including city administrators, these same administrators have the power to veto any suggestion. Such vetos rarely occur without the committee as a whole reaching an understanding of at least the rationale for the refusal. Moreover, the striving for consensus decisions often leads to a reluctance on the part of the worksite manager (and even higher level administrators) to directly veto something the rest of a worksite committee considers worthwhile. For this and other reasons, some issues are not resolved by the worksite committees. In these instances, the committees have recourse to the division-, department-, and city-wide committees. Generally, these committees are approached in successive order, but most issues are addressed at the division level. However, experiments which would require a change in the city work-rules and/or the union contract are referred to the city-wide committee.

The DR Committee's Membership

At the time this study occurred, members holding fixed positions on the DR committee were ALF (the plant manager), BOB (the assistant plant manager), VRG (the shop steward for the union local), and DEN (a designated member of the union). The eight elected members included the following individuals:
Name | Work Area | Status
--- | --- | ---
ARP | laboratory | supervisor II
BIL | plant maintenance | electrician
BIM | plant maintenance | stockroom clerk
CLY | ground maintenance | supervisor II
DIK | ground maintenance | supervisor II
GEN | plant maintenance | worker
HRB | laboratory | chemist
RPH | plant maintenance | supervisor II

**Narrative History of the Discussion of Flextime**

For over two and 1/2 years the DR committee discussed a flextime schedule at its worksite, but in the course of only one meeting it decided to disband the subcommittee which was investigating the flextime schedule. The chair of the flextime subcommittee (VRG) immediately challenged this decision at a division level QWL meeting. He argued that some members had not had a chance to openly voice their opinions at the meeting, and he requested that the division-level committee order the DR committee to reconsider their decision. During the following meeting, the DR committee readdressed the issue of flextime and reaffirmed its original decision. To understand the motivation for the DR committee's actions, the sequence of events that led to the committee's disbanding of the flextime subcommittee are examined. A timeline of events (Table 11) reveals 18 events (committee meetings, subcommittee meetings, and fact finding missions) in which flextime was discussed and/or actions were taken.²
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/12</td>
<td>VRG initiates discussion of flextime and a compressed work week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/26</td>
<td>The DR committee surveys employee interest in flextime and a compressed work week.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/9</td>
<td>The survey results are reported, and a subcommittee is formed to draft a compressed work week proposal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27</td>
<td>Influenced by another division-wide committee's denial of a compressed work week proposal, the DR committee drops its own proposal and tables discussion of flextime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/11</td>
<td>The DR committee invites PAL (the MR plant manager) to discuss the flextime experiment at the MR plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/23</td>
<td>PAL discusses the MR flextime experiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/23</td>
<td>Based on a report by a facilitator that the MR plant is having problems with its flextime experiment, the DR committee tables discussion on flextime pending a final report on the experiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/3</td>
<td>The DR committee forms a subcommittee to investigate flextime with VRG as the chair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>GRY replaces GEN on the flextime subcommittee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/11</td>
<td>RPH and ARP object to implementing a flextime program in the DR plant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/2</td>
<td>The DR committee invites the MR committee to discuss flextime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7</td>
<td>The DR committee forms a task force (VRG, BIL, DIK, and RPH) to visit the MR plant on a flextime fact-finding mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/22</td>
<td>VRG, BIL, and I visit the MR plant; we receive a positive evaluation of the flextime program from supervisors and employees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 11 (continued)

Timeline of Events Preceding the Decision to Disband the Flextime Subcommittee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/4</td>
<td>VRG and BIL's report on the MR flextime program is tabled pending a supervisory fact-finding mission; many negative opinions about the MR flextime program are voiced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/25</td>
<td>DIK, RPH, and I visit the MR plant; we receive a negative evaluation of the flextime program from upper level supervisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2</td>
<td>DIK, I, and VRG report on the findings of the flextime task force; discussion of flextime is tabled until a survey on interest in flextime by the DR employees is conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/15</td>
<td>VRG, BIL, and I meet to draft a survey; VRG and BIL desire to educate the DR employees about flextime prior to any survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/29</td>
<td>VRG, BIL, and B meet and explore strategies for informing employees about flextime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
July 1979 DR Committee Meeting

VRG initiated discussion of flextime as well as a compressed work week in July, 1979. According to the facilitator at that point (A), VRG was motivated more out of self-interest than as a representative of the plant employees (which was his position on the committee until 1981). Nevertheless, the committee surveyed employee interest in both a flextime and compressed work week (4 day week with 10 hour days) schedule.

August 1979 DR Committee Meeting

During the August meeting, the survey results were reported: while there was interest in a flextime schedule, greater interest was shown for the compressed work week schedule. Notes made by the temporary facilitator at this meeting indicate that the committee was about evenly split in support of flextime, while about 2/3 of the members supported a compressed work week schedule. Moreover, two of the three supervisors who would be affected by a compressed work week were willing to help draw up a proposal.

September 1979 DR Committee Meeting

However, during the last meeting in September the committee dropped the compressed work week proposal because of a "change of heart" among employees; the committee probably was influenced by the
fact that another division-level QWL committee had turned down a compressed work week proposal from a worksite committee. At this same meeting, further discussion of flextime was tabled until more information could be gathered based on the success or failure of a flextime schedule at another plant (MR).

April 1980 DR Committee Meeting

During its second meeting in April 1980, the committee heard an interim report on the flextime program at MR from that plant's manager, PAL. Various committee members later informed me that PAL attempted to present both the positive and negative aspects of the program. He mentioned that the change from a stationary to a day-to-day flextime schedule had caused a problem with some employees punching in other employees' time cards at the start of the day. PAL noted that when this had been brought to his attention he had issued reprimands to the involved parties. As far as PAL was concerned, the problem was resolved.

July 1980 DR Committee Meeting

The QWL facilitator at that time (J) learned that the practice of illegally punching time cards was once again occurring at the MR plant and denounced the activity in a briefing paper to the W division-level committee. Based on this report, the DR committee decided to table discussion of flextime at the July meeting until the MR committee issued a final report on their flextime experiment.
June 1981 DR Committee Meeting

External events made the implementation of flextime more attractive to the plant work-force. From mid-1980 through mid-1981 a bridge, used by many employees to get to work, was under construction. The alternate route to the plant added approximately an hour of travel each day for these employees, and a flextime schedule would have alleviated some of the problems caused by the bridge construction. Hence, flextime remained salient within the committee, and in June, 1981 a subcommittee headed by VRG was formed to investigate the feasibility of such a program in the DR plant.

August and September 1981 DR Committee Meetings

The subcommittee broached the topic of flextime during the August meeting, and RPH and ARP (both supervisors) heatedly objected to implementing it in the plant. Much of the discussion at this meeting, and during the meeting in September, focused upon contentions about the flextime program at MR. At my suggestion, the DR committee extended an invitation to the MR committee to discuss their flextime program. The MR committee declined the invitation, but they invited members from the DR committee to visit the MR plant and to see how the flextime program worked.
October 1981 DR Committee Meeting

During the October meeting, DIK and RPH (supervisor representatives) and VRG and BIL (union representatives) volunteered to visit the MR plant; I was asked to accompany the task force on their fact-finding mission.

October 1981 Task Force Visit to the MR Plant

VRG, BIL, and I visited the MR plant late in October; DIK and RPH were unable to visit the plant with us because of construction they had to oversee. VRG and BIL conducted interviews with 15 people in approximately two hours (8 am to 10 am). Their interview format was open-ended, and VRG asked most of the questions which were directed at various issues that previously had been raised at committee meetings. VRG and BIL interviewed the Supervisor I's (PEK and JIT) and the Supervisor II (JOE) of maintenance as well as the assistant plant manager (JIM). They also talked with the stockroom manager and various maintenance mechanics and laborers, and gathered favorable impressions about the flextime program.

November 1981 DR Committee Meeting

During the November meeting, VRG began to report about the flextime task force's findings, but he immediately qualified his remarks by noting that the subcommittee did not have a supervisor present during the MR visit. I interjected that BIL and VRG had gathered a balanced report since they had sampled the opinions of both
supervisors and employees. However, ALF (the plant manager) still attempted to reprimand BIL and VRG for gathering information without the DR supervisors being present. DIK defended VRG's actions: Since RPH and he had been needed on a construction project, he had urged BIL and VRG to go.

At this point, the committee agreed to table discussion of the task force's findings until a group of supervisors could visit the MR plant. However, discussion of flextime continued for a good 15 minutes, and VRG and BIL fielded questions from various committee members about the MR flextime operation. Many of these questions were based on the following perceptions:

1. Every worker had a key to the stockroom, and it was a mess;
2. Men coming in early punched in time cards for men coming in later since Supervisor I's were not always present at 6 am; and
3. Men coming in early or staying later than "core time" (8:30 am through 2:30 pm) spent their time "goofing off," e.g., drinking.

VRG and BIL refuted these perceptions with the following explanations:

1. Only supervisors had keys to the stockroom;
2. Since PAL had issued reprimands to the employees punching other employees' time cards, this activity no longer occurred; and
3. Since JIT came in early (6 am) and PEK came in later (7:30-8:30 am), there was always a supervisor present so that men did not goof-off.

Following the meeting, DIK and I made arrangements to visit the MR plant for an early afternoon meeting in late November.
November 1981 Task Force Visit to the MR Plant

In contrast to the earlier visit to MR, the supervisor investigation was both more limited and more in-depth. DIK had told me he would be accompanied by SMT, his immediate supervisor, since RPH and CLY were not interested. However, RPH ended up accompanying us on the visit. We proceeded to JIM's office; JOE and JAY were also there. JIM suggested that since PAL was at a downtown meeting we meet in PAL's office because of the plant noise. RPH was the most dominant member during the discussion, followed in harmonic order by JOE, JIM, me, and DIK. (JAY, as a lower level supervisor, was excluded from the meeting.) RPH immediately set the tone of the meeting by asking JIM for his real feelings about flextime. JIM and JOE cited four problems:

1. Employees goof-off early in the day since they wait for supervisors to arrive before starting work;

2. Employees resent working for more than one immediate supervisor;

3. Only a skeleton crew is left for the late afternoon since most employees arrive early in the morning (6 am) and leave early in the afternoon (2:30 pm); and

4. A mistrust of employees based on the suspicion that some employees still punch time cards for other employees.

RPH's position throughout the meeting was that "things are near perfect" and "we don't need flextime" since it would "wreck the good
thing we have" at the DR plant.

December 1981 DR Committee Meeting

DIK, I, and VRG, respectively, reported on the MR flextime program "fact finding missions" during the December meeting. DIK reported that the flextime program at MR caused at least two problems. First, the crew overlap that occurred in the program (due to men and supervisors coming in anytime between 6:00 and 8:30) produced employee-supervisor conflict: some crew members resented supervision from more than one immediate supervisor. Second, the day-to-day, variable-starting-time flextime schedule resulted in many employees arriving early rather than late in the morning, and it meant that only a skeleton crew was present during the late afternoon.

I supported DIK's report and cited some more specific examples of problems with the flextime program. VRG was left rather undone by our reports. He noted that on the first visit the MR supervisors had positively evaluated the flextime program, but they must not have been willing to say anything negative about the program to non-supervisory personnel. I remarked that VRG and BIL had done an excellent job of surveying a wide variety of opinion, and the MR management team had disclosed different information to RPH and DIK. At this point the committee tabled discussion on flextime until more information about the employee need for flextime was ascertained.

After the meeting I arranged to meet with BIL and VRG during the third week in December to construct a questionnaire to survey employee
interest in flextime.

Mid-December 1981 Flextime Subcommittee Meeting

Neither BIL nor VRG was very eager to survey employee opinion since they believed that employees had too many misconceptions about flextime and that the employees needed to be "educated" before their opinions were sampled. Nevertheless, I urged them to construct a questionnaire and fulfill the mission they had been assigned by the committee since it was the most "politically" adept move for them. Unfortunately, I had little time to spend with them (approximately an hour) and not much was accomplished at this meeting.

Late-December 1981 Flextime Subcommittee Meeting

A follow-up meeting, during the last week in December, was held with another facilitator (B) who was also rushed for time; however, he suggested that BIL and VRG could pursue their wish to address the employees about flextime by asking the committee for permission to hold a general meeting or series of smaller meetings.

January 1982 DR Committee Meeting

Flextime was the first item on the agenda for the January, 1982, meeting of the committee. VRG and BIL asked the committee if they and other people could speak to some of the employees about flextime. They proposed a meeting, sometime in the next month, in which the 23 members of the work crew would hear presentations on flextime and
other alternative work schedules. After hearing about alternative work schedules, the workers would vote on whether they wished to investigate and/or participate in a flextime program. Since VRG and BIL did not fully delineate this proposal, the committee spent considerable time questioning them about it. In the course of this discussion, at least two counter-proposals were suggested by DK and other members: (1) postponing or tabling any action on flextime until the MR flextime program is evaluated (I eventually undermined this proposal by noting that the MR experiment had been evaluated and already was implemented), and (2) surveying the work crews to assess their interest in participating in a flextime program.

The committee was split on the merit of both the survey proposal and the presentation proposal. The members supporting one or the other proposal cited the positive evaluation of the MR flextime program, while the members opposing the proposals emphasized the negative report about the same program. Since I had been present during both task force visits, DK asked me my opinion about what action the committee should take. I advocated that the committee support BIL and VRG's proposal, and I mentioned that a compressed work week was also something that employees could be informed about. The merits of a compressed work schedule, but again reached no agreement. At this point, DK suggested that the committee table discussion on the whole topic for six months or so. However, I interjected that the subcommittee had reached its level of frustration and wanted either a go-ahead for some action or to drop the whole
thing. GEN immediately made a resolution to disband the subcommittee which was put to voice vote with no further discussion. This resolution was passed by 4 votes "aye"; not a single dissenting vote was cast even though 11 of the 12 committee members were present.

While the preceding account conveys the content of the January meeting, it does not indicate the emotions that surfaced during the discussion of flextime.

For example, BIL expressed negative feelings toward the group as a whole, remarking repeatedly that "we're doing nothing but talking." Other members of the committee who opposed the flextime concept also responded in a negative fashion. Not only did ALF and ARP make negative comments about flextime, but also they also slighted the subcommittee's efforts. VRG, in particular, became the target for personal attacks by ARP, ALF and GEN. DIK's response to these heated exchanges was to propose that discussion be tabled for "six months or more." When I intervened to keep the discussion going, GEN proposed that the subcommittee be disbanded. The vote on this proposal came as the committee's emotional tension peaked; the vote released this tension as if a taut line were slashed with a knife.

Following the vote, the committee dispassionately discussed other matters for about 30 minutes. After the meeting I talked with BIL, DEN, and VRG about the flextime vote and expressed my amazement that they had not voiced their opposition to the proposal to disband the subcommittee. I pointed out that their "nay" votes would have been enough to deadlock the committee; then the committee would have
reopened discussion on flextime. DEN argued that their abstention was a strong stand since it indicated their refusal to consider the proposal. In contrast, VRG stated that he was "relieved but not satisfied," and BIL expressed his anger about the whole matter. VRG then threatened to confront the committee about their unethical behavior: rather than seeking consensus, they forced a vote. In response, BIL said that "they BIL, VRG, and DEN didn't stand a chance" on a vote since management representatives outnumbered employee/union representatives. I keyed in on the representation issue and suggested that it be brought up at the next meeting of the DR committee.

January 1982 Division Level Meeting

To my surprise, VRG not only brought up the vote to disband the flextime subcommittee at the W division-level meeting when making his routine report about the DR QWL meeting, but also accused the committee of unethical behavior for voting on the issue rather than seeking informal consensus. He then advocated that the DR QWL committee vote by secret ballot on the proposal. ALF immediately began to refute VRG's accusations by questioning the accuracy of his statements (for example, VRG said only three people voted; ALF claimed that six people voted). I intervened at this point because I felt VRG was not capable of arguing coherently with ALF in front of the QWL members from throughout the division. My intervention resulted in the division committee focusing upon my interpretation of the DR QWL
meeting. The division committee members stated that they did not feel that VRG's complaint was justified and that his solution (vote by secret ballot) was worse than the original voice vote on the proposal. Grasping from the discussion that these perceptions were based on the assumption that a "voice vote" was another term for "informal consensus," I explained that the way in which the voice vote had been conducted (members simply voted "aye" or "nay" in unison) had seemingly inhibited many members from voicing any opinion. The division committee then directed the DR committee to reconsider the proposal and to reach a decision by openly voicing their opinions on the proposal.

**February 1982 DR Committee Meeting**

Another facilitator (A) accompanied me during the February committee meeting; he presided over a short discussion of the flextime issue and then directed the group members to sequentially state their support or opposition to disbanding the flextime subcommittee.**3** The committee was grouped in a circle, and each member spoke for a short amount of time about the proposal and then cast a vote. The resolution was supported by a vote of seven to four, with one abstention. After the vote on the proposal, A emphasized that the committee could still discuss flextime since the committee had decided only to disband the flextime subcommittee.
Commentary: Bion's Theory as Applied to the Discussion of Flextime

Several points seem noteworthy about the January, 1982, DR committee meeting. First, the meeting had a strong emotional undercurrent: VRG and BIL expressed negative feelings toward the DR committee, while ALF, ARP and GEN expressed similar emotions toward the flextime subcommittee. These negative emotions suggest that the committee was expressing a basic-assumption. Second, the hostile expressions seemed to follow remarks in which the passage of time was emphasized. This was particularly notable when I attempted to keep discussion open on flextime subsequent to DIK's suggestion that the topic be tabled: GEN immediately moved that the subcommittee be disbanded. These hostile reactions are congruent with Bion's points that (1) an inherent characteristic of basic-assumption mentality is a lack of awareness of time, and (2) activities that require an awareness of time tend to arouse hostile feelings among group members. Third, even though the group had discussed many of the issues previously, it could not build upon at any point of agreement on the subject of flextime; rather, the discussion seemingly went in circles. This last point suggests that the committee was not able to develop its thinking, just as a basic-assumption group is incapable of mental development.

Taking a broader view of the DR committee's discussion of flextime, the numerous instances in which discussion was tabled indicates that the committee was fleeing from making a decision. In other words, the basic-assumption influencing the committee was that
of fight-flight. The disagreements that marked the late summer and fall discussions of the committee in 1981 also support this claim and indicate that the committee facilitated between fleeing and fighting.

Conversational Analyses

The history of the flextime discussion by the DR committee suggests that the committee's communication was systematically distorted (see Savage, 1984). VRG's actions alone indicate that a true consensus was not reached during the January meeting. What is not clear is whether the committee's communication immediately prior to the January meeting was dialogical or systematically distorted. In other words, were there any indications, based on the committee's prior communication, that it would reach a false consensus?

To answer this question, this section analyzes the discussion of flextime during the December, 1981 committee meeting (Appendix B contains a transcript of the meeting). First, however, the committee's conversation leading up to the flextime discussion is summarized to provide a baseline for latter comparisons.

SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 000-251/Figures 13 and 14

Figures 13 and 14 display behavior and image field diagrams that summarize the committee's conversation up to the point of the flextime discussion (bt=0.0, et=2.52).4 Examining Figure 13, the polarization indices show that two dimensions are polarized: the P/N dimension
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### Figure 14

![Figure 14 Image](image-url)
(0.387 P) and the U/D dimension (0.650 U). While part of the U/D polarization is due to unidentified (UKN) participants (with four acts rated 5.3 D), VRG is the major contributor to this polarization (with 46 acts rated 4.2 D). The P/N polarization is due solely to ALF, who has 14 acts rated 6.1 N.

Figure 14 displays polarization of the PRO and CON images on two dimensions. The PRO image polarization occurs on the U/D dimension (0.596 U) and is attributable to ALF. He is the only participant with a PRO image in the D direction. Strangely enough, the CON image polarization (0.391 B) is also due to ALF's image rating since he is the only participant with a CON image in the F direction.

The image level indicator in Figure 14 shows that there are incongruities of image level among the participants. The PRO images, on the average (see GRP rating), are at the 3.5 level. Since DIK, VRG, GRT, ALF and the unidentified participants are at the 3.6 level or above, ARP (level=1.9) and BIL (level=3.0) are the principle participants thematizing the self or others. The story is different, however, for the CON images. Here most participants are at the situational level (GRP level=3.9), and DIK is the most notable exception.

Interpreting the above results as straightforwardly as possible may be slightly misleading since an extensive portion of the meeting is summarized in two figures. With this caveat in mind, three interpretations are proffered:
1. Since the two polarizations on the behavior diagram (Figure 13) may be separately accounted for by only two individuals (ALF and VRG), it is unlikely that the group is struggling to overcome a basic-assumption sub-group.

2. The polarization of images in Figure 14 suggests that ALF is disagreeing with the significations of the state of affairs offered by other committee members. Since ALF is the plant manager, one might expect such disagreement to dampen efforts to reach consensus.

3. The triadic relationship on which dialogue is based (an orientation toward self, other, and the state of affairs) is somewhat questionable based on the dissimilarity among the participants' image levels; these incongruities suggest that participants may be "speaking past each other."

Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 000-251/ Figures 13 and 14

Specification and Elaboration. Six themes are expressed by VRG: (1) he manifests some confusion about the minutes; (2) he has his remarks about fumes dismissed by ARP as irrelevant; (3) he contributes suggestions about ways to help the performance appraisal committee even though the appropriateness of this action is questioned by GRT; (4) he has these same suggestions ignored by BIL when the two of them interweavingly speak**5; (5) he seeks the approval of the committee in order to submit questions to the Civil Service, and acquiesces to DIK and ARP's request that he consult with them before submitting
the questions; and (6) he unsuccessfully attempts to report on the
remarks made by the Director of the Civil Service at the QWL
department-level meeting.

ALF's utterances seem to have greater impact on the meeting than
VRG's: (1) ALF questions whether signs had been placed to inform truck
drivers to shut off their engines; (2) he inquires about the lateness
of the program being tested by the performance appraisal committee;
(3) he notes that the last performance appraisal survey had taken all
personnel "off their duties;" (4) he asks how often job analyses/
appraisal will occur; and (5) ALF questions the need for job analyses
at the plant since "ours is just repetitional" work.

Reconsideration. Many of VRG's remarks are judged as inappro­
priate by his interlocutors (themes 2, 3, 4, and 6 above) and his
significations of the state of affairs are rejected. However, two of
his significations (themes 1 and 5) are accepted by the committee.
Nevertheless, since VRG's significations of the state of affairs are
at least acknowledged most of the time, he does sustain a dialogical
relationship with the committee.

Two points may be made about ALF's utterances. First, as indi­
cated in the SYMLOG interpretations, some of ALF's remarks do reject
the significations of the state of affairs (themes 1 and 5, above). However, many of ALF's utterances also transfigure the significations
of the state of affairs, introducing new topics (themes 2, 3, and 4). Hence, the SYMLOG interpretation that ALF is dampening the
efforts toward consensus seems too harsh when compared to this textual
interpretation.
Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 000-251/Figures 13 and 14

The comparison of the SYMLOG and ethnographic interpretations for this segment of the conversation suggest the following about dialogue:

1. The triadic relationship is sustained for most of the conversation; only when VRG and BIL interweavingly speak (theme 4) is the dialogical relationship disrupted.

2. ALF brackets two truth claims in the themes that he raises: he questions the propositional truth of certain facts, and he questions the appropriateness of certain actions. This suggests that ALF and the participants who respond to his questions are engaged in discourse. VRG's utterances are discounted by most of his interlocutors which suggests that he is often unable to fulfill his claims to truth.

3. The decisions (topical closures) that occur in this segment of the meeting seemingly are made in good faith by most group members; however, the fact that VRG's contributions are often discounted by the group suggests that less than an ideal speech situation exists.

SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 252-308/Figures 15 and 16

Figure 15 (bt=2.52, et=3.09) plots the behavior of the first three participants discussing the flextime topic. Since, for all practical purposes, DIK, VRG, and GRT occupy the same space (UPF), the polarization indices are zero. However, it is apparent that DIK and VRG differ on the P/N dimension, with GRT in the middle ground between them. There also is a surprising (based on the interpretation of
Figure 15
Figure 13), though slight, difference on the U/D dimension since VRG is the most dominant member.

Figure 16 presents the image field diagram for this same time period (bt=2.52, et=3.09). The PRO images for the participants are unified and located in the UPF space. However, there is a prominent polarization in the cluster of CON images (0.878 F). The images associated with GRT and VRG are located in the UNF space, while the images associated with DIK lie in the UNB space. The image level indicator shows that the participants evoked images of the situation (flextime).

1. Since the participants are unified in the UPF direction and are not acting emotionally, that the group is not swayed by a basic-assumption.

2. The congruity of image levels among participants (Figure 16) indicates that the triadic relationship of dialogue is sustained in this portion of the conversation.

3. However, the polarization of CON images in Figure 16 suggests that DIK is rejecting, at least in part, the significations of flextime made by GRT and VRG. Conversely, the unification of PRO images indicates a core of agreement among the participants about the significance of flextime.
### Image Field Diagram

**HARMONIC CONSTANT FOR 3 PARTICIPANTS WITH PRC IMAGES:** 0.52

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**POINTS ON REGRESSION LINES:**

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**FIELD DIAGRAM SCORES:** Indicates individuals that may have the same P/N and F/B scores.

**LEVELS:** O=ACC. RCDS, L=SEL, O=OCT, 3=GRP, 4=SIT, 5=ACC, 6=FAN

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**Figure 16**
Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 252-308/Figures 15 and 16

Specification. DIK (acts 252-280) begins by asking VRG if he is ready to discuss flextime. VRG gives his assent, and DIK then asks him if he prefers to go first; DIK takes the absence of a verbal response as license to set the agenda. DIK volunteers to talk first, and he proposes that GRT talk next followed by VRG. DIK reports on the supervisory meeting at the MR plant by first noting the date and participants involved. He then evaluates the flextime program at MR: at first the program "went well" and then a problem arose with work crews overlapping.

DIK notes that the problem with worker overlap, in part, is due to employees refusing to work for any supervisor but their own. While some of this problem has been "ironed out," the supervisors in the middle (the supervisor II and assistant plant manager) feel they are "getting static" from both the workers and from upper management about problems with flextime. DIK suggests that "middle management" is caught in a bind: they continually have to make win/lose decisions that polarize workers and upper management. As a result, these middle managers "would like to get out of the situation."

Diagnosing the problem, DIK reminds the committee that many of the current problems are a result of the change from "stationary" to "day-to-day" flextime. This change has resulted in both good and bad; one good point has been the increased hours of coverage, while a bad point has been the deterioration in labor relations.
DIK states that he feels employees are not providing the necessary input on the job. This, in turn, creates tensions for middle management since they face pressure from both upper management (to change the situation) and employees (to maintain the situation). In DIK's view, such decisions should be made by upper management, even though he advocates that the "three factions" (employees/lower supervision, middle management, and upper management) meet to decide.

Concluding his utterance in somewhat of a rambling fashion, DIK (1) cites a concrete example of the problem with flextime (employees drinking coffee until "their" supervisor arrives, even though another supervisor may be present); (2) notes that this information is confidential since the MR management is presently addressing this problem; (3) mentions that middle management would not recommend a flextime program; and (4) asks for GRT's comments.

Sumarizing GRT's utterance (acts 271-281), the following themes emerge. First, GRT notes the general nature of DIK's remarks, stating that he can understand "why in a sense." Restating the thrust of DIK's analysis of the problems with the flextime program, GRT points distrusts the "lowest level supervisors" (Supervisor I's) and feels they "are in cahoots with employees on flextime." While both lower level supervisors and employees are satisfied with the program, this satisfaction is not proof that flextime is as productive as a standard work schedule.
GRT mentions that employees often are unsupervised at the beginning of the work day and usually drink coffee until a supervisor appears; most employees arrive early which leaves only a skeleton crew in the afternoon which counters the increased coverage that might otherwise result. However, GRT also points out that these problems could be easily addressed; the latter problem could be alleviated by careful scheduling of work crews (following a stationary rather than day-by-day flextime model), while the former problem could be relieved if employees were assigned routine chores to be completed during the first few hours of the workday.

GRT concludes by noting the following points: (1) the MR management plans to address the above problems in upcoming QWL meetings at the plant; (2) the MR flextime program was implemented because both employees and supervisors supported the idea (which may have been why the program faced few problems at first); (3) the DR committee should assess if there is comparable demand for flextime in the plant; and (4) the upper management of the W division does not feel that the flextime program has provided the advantages that it might.

An examination of VRG's initial utterances (acts 282-301; 303; 305-308) reveals a number of themes about flextime that differ from those raised by DIK and GRT. VRG begins by noting that "this stuff you mentioned" about problems with the flextime program either surfaced after the visit he made, or was concealed from him by the middle managers. He then reports that JOE (Supervisor II) stated that
it the flextime program worked real good" and improved the "supervision and labor relationship."

This favorable assessment of the program is echoed in the remarks attributed to PEK and JIT (Supervisor I's), both of whom benefit from the program's flexible working hours. VRG comes to the defense of JIT (the supervisor who is supposed to cover the beginning of the working day) and notes that he prefers coming in at those early hours, and VRG suggests that those occasions when JIT does come in later may be caused by actual emergencies. He also notes that PEK feels the "biggest advantage" of the flextime program is being able to "overlap on maintenance time."

VRG remarks that even the stockroom manager, ART, supports the flextime program. VRG stresses that workers are able to get supplies since, just as in the DR plant, the MR supervisors are able to draw issue if the stockroom manager is not present.

In emphasizing this similarity in procedure, VRG digresses with a recent example in the DR plant and has some difficulty regaining his line of thought. After a number of false starts, VRG cites a remark, attributed to the superintendent of the W division, that flextime "needed a subjective report" to balance the "objective reports" the superintendent has received so far.

Overlapping his speech with VRG's, GRT corrects him: the secretary writing the minutes for the last division-level meeting had mistakenly juxtaposed the words "objective" and "subjective." The superintendent had actually said just the opposite.
Recovering from this miscue, VRG argues that the problem facing flextime is similar to the problem first faced by the QWL program: negative attitudes and a lack of cooperation. However, he argues, this does not mean that the flextime program cannot work since "if people want it and are willing to work hard enough to make it work, it can work." Readdressing the problem, VRG notes that the issue for the committee is twofold: are "there enough concerned people" and "can we work up a program?"

**Elaboration.** A number of themes raised by each participant may be more completely understood if the meanings sedimented in their remarks are made explicit. DIK's theme that the MR flextime program (which was working well at first) now has problems, requires some knowledge of the original flextime program. At first, employees "flexed" by starting at various fixed times in the morning (6:30, 7:00, 7:30, 8:00, 8:30) for two week periods; this was changed so employees could begin work at any time between 6:00 and 8:30 without prior notification to the supervisor. He calls the former "stationary flextime" and the latter "day-to-day flextime."

Moreover, GRT's opening remark that he could understand "why in a sense" DIK is very general in his comments about flextime, is more than just a complimentary gesture. It is an oblique reference to a series of past events that involved the MR flextime program, the W division-level committee, and the DR committee. PAL, the manager of the MR plant, had made a report about the MR flextime program to the DR committee in the spring of 1980. This report mentioned that the
change from a stationary to a day-to-day flextime schedule had caused a problem with some employees punching in other employees' time cards at the start of the day. PAL noted that this had been brought to his attention and he had issued reprimands to the involved parties. As far as PAL was concerned at that point, the problem was resolved. However, sometime later that summer, the QWL facilitator at that time (J) learned that this practice was once again occurring and denounced the activity in a written report to the W division-level committee.

There were a number of repercussions wrought by this report. First, the upper management in the W division demanded a halt to this practice and threatened to dismantle the flextime program at MR if it continued. Second, as one might imagine, this report contributed to many of the negative evaluations of the program held by DR committee members. Third, the MR committee members felt that they had been betrayed by the QWL facilitator and became very wary of discussing any topic which was "confidential." (Indeed it was probably this particular incident that explains why the MR committee declined the invitation from the DR committee to discuss the flextime program.) Lastly, and somewhat ironically, the submission of briefing reports by facilitators was discontinued.

Realizing all of the above, DIK is very cautious in his statements: he does not wish to betray the trust of JIM and JOE for revealing that problems still exist within the flextime program. Note also that neither DIK nor I mention that the MR middle management still suspects that employees punch in other employees' time-cards.
The themes stressed in VRG's utterance are probably best understood in the context of the issues debated during the November meeting (see the Narrative History) in which VRG and BIL first attempted to report their findings about the MR flextime to the committee. Thus, VRG stresses that the stockroom is not in chaos since only supervisors have keys to it, and he emphasizes that supervisors are present so men will not goof-off. (Interestingly, DIK's complaints about flextime neatly skirt VRG's stance on these issues; by claiming that worker's do not obey the alternate supervisor, the presence of supervision becomes an irrelevant issue.)

Reconsideration. The SYMLOG interpretation seems partially supported since the participants are clearly oriented toward the significance of flextime. Some general themes synthesize DIK, GRT and VRG's disagreements about the significance of flextime:

1. Satisfaction with the flextime program: DIK states that middle management would not recommend the program; GRT expresses the view that middle management is not satisfied with the results of the flextime program; and VRG argues that not only middle management but all the affected supervisors and employees are satisfied with the program.

2. Employee idle time: Both DIK and GRT stress that one major problem is employees "goofing off" because supervision is not present in the early morning; VRG emphasizes that this is a rare problem and that it is due to emergencies that occasionally arise.
3. Hours of coverage: Both DIK and VRG point out that a major advantage of the program has been increased hours of coverage at the MR plant; GRT claims that most employees come in early which leaves a skeleton crew in the afternoon, thus negating the advantage of increased coverage.

However, the contesting of significations by DIK, GRT, and VRG is not nearly as clearcut as the interpretation suggested for the CON image polarizations in Figure 16. Each participant also selects different aspects of the flextime program as significant. DIK emphasizes the stress put on middle management by employees and upper management as a result of the program, and he suggests that all three parties meet to solve the problems with the program. He also repeatedly notes that the problems with flextime are largely due to the change from a stationary to a day-to-day program. Hence, generally speaking, DIK makes the appropriateness of flextime thematic, questioning its legitimacy at MR (and DR by implication).

GRT points out that middle management now distrusts lower level supervision, yet the program was first implemented because both employees and supervisors wanted it. Moreover, GRT suggests ways that current problems with the program may be solved. In contrast to DIK, GRT generally thematizes the propositional truth about flextime, rather than its appropriateness.

VRG counters some of the sedimented prejudices about the program; for example, he stresses that it causes no problems in the stockroom. Drawing an analogy with the QWL program, VRG suggests that
the flextime program problems are due to negative attitudes and lack of cooperation. Hence, VRG thematizes the sincerity or intentions of the present (and potential) flextime participants.

**Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 252-308/Figures 15 and 16**

Even though this segment of the conversation is highly structured by the set order of speakers, it displays many of the features of dialogue:

1. The triadic relationship of the dialogic region is sustained since each participant is oriented toward the significance of flextime and attempts to incorporate, if only partially, the themes raised by others.

2. Each participant makes different validity claims thematic: DIK questions the legitimacy of flextime, GRT stresses the representation of reality, and VRG draws attention to the sincerity of the flextime participants. Since the participants are "reporting," they do not bracket any of their claims by engaging in the play of question/answer.

3. At this point in the conversation, no closure (decision) is evident; however, each participant seems to be communicating in good faith and an ideal speech situation seems to be sustained.

**SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 309-330/Figures 17 and 18**

Figures 17 and 18 present the behavior and image field diagrams, respectively, for the period of time from the onset of the flextime
Figure 17
Figure 18
discussion to the last utterance before ARP speaks (bt=2.52, et=3.31). When Figure 17 is compared to Figure 15, it is apparent that the U/D ratings of DIK and VRG have changed: DIK is rated as 13U (versus 11U) and VRG is rated 10U (versus 15U). Additionally, there is a general (though slight) movement by all participants in the F direction.

Figure 18, when compared to Figure 16, displays an increase in the polarization index for the CON F/B dimension (0.941 F versus 0.878 F). While not evident in the polarization indices, DIK and VRG have become much closer on the PRO U/D dimension: DIK displays much more dominant imagery (13.7 versus 0.0) and VRG shows less dominant imagery (18.8 versus 24.4) in Figure 18 than in Figure 16. Based on the image level indicator, the situation (flextime topic) is the primary image made thematic by the participants.

In summary, these results are very similar to the interpretations of the previous set of SYMLOG diagrams.

1. The continued absence of emotional behavior suggests that the participants' conversation remains dialogical.

2. The similarity of image levels among participants suggests an orientation toward the significance of flextime.

3. The increasing CON image polarization on the F/B dimension indicates continued disagreement among the participants about the significance of flextime, while the continued unification of the PRO images suggests a core of agreement. Hence, there is partial covering of the significations of the state affairs by the participants.
Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 309-330/Figures 17 and 18

Specification. During the portion of the transcript summarized by Figures 17 and 18 (acts 309-330), DIK and VRG focus upon the form of flextime that might be appropriate for the DR plant by discussing the MR program. DIK contrasts stationary with day-to-day flextime. While mentioning the band of hours during which employees may flex at MR, DIK and VRG overingly speak: VRG corrects DIK about the flextime hours, and DIK asks VRG if the day-to-day flextime method is right for the situation at MR. VRG's speech overlies DIK's before he completes this question. DIK talks on, completing the question, and his speech overlies VRG's attempted answer. Noting that he asks the question because he believes that the three parties at MR should make this decision about the appropriateness, DIK receives an approving back-channel from VRG. Continuing to speak, DIK asserts that two supervisors cannot effectively overlap under day-to-day flextime since the one carrying over would not "know what's going on."

VRG agrees with DIK's recommendation that "all three parties" should work out the form of flextime that is right for MR, and he opines that the starting time under day-to-day flextime should not be decided by one person (the employee). Interweaving his speech with VRG's, DIK counters with the opinion that a supervisor and his crew should all start at the same time; however, if an emergency arises, then an employee could come in when the other crew begins work. Moreover, DIK notes, flextime would be "beautiful" if one could "come in any time for the next eight hours." VRG interweaves his reply with
DIK's speech, noting that flextime must be set up on at least a weekly basis if employees and supervisors are to start work at the same time. Interweavingly speaking as VRG completes his talk, DIK stresses that under daily flextime one can come in anytime during a two and one-half hour period.

Overlapping DIK's speech, VRG emphatically expresses the opinion that day-to-day flextime is not appropriate. DIK overlaps his speech with VRG's comments, reiterating his suggestion that the three parties at MR should meet to "set some ground rules."

Elaboration. This set of interchanges between DIK and VRG seem puzzling: while they are in agreement, they do not appear to recognize this fact. However, their interaction becomes more understandable when the context of past discussions of flextime is considered. In the Narrative History it was mentioned that VRG's motivation for raising the topic of flextime was self-centered. As recently as the August 1981 meeting, VRG had noted that in a former job he had working for a state highway crew out West he was able to work whenever he liked so long as he put in 40 hours a week cutting grass. This extremely flexible work schedule was discounted at that meeting by a number of supervisors (RPH being the most adamantly opposed) and employees (GEN). The majority's view was that flextime was appropriate for an office, but it was not appropriate for the team work that characterized most of the activity at the plant. Since DIK may expect VRG to respond as he did in August to the question about whether flextime is appropriate for the (MR) plant, DIK's apparent
misunderstanding of what VRG is actually saying is understandable.

Reconsideration. During a good portion of the conversation, it appears that VRG and DIK partially misunderstand each other. This is illustrated by the three different types of interruptive structures that characterize their turn exchanges. During acts 311-318 VRG and DIK overlyingly speak three times. This type of interruptive structure is fairly innocuous, and it is used by both VRG and DIK to correct (or further inform) each other. However, during acts 321-327, DIK and VRG interweave their speech and it is here that DIK makes a puzzling utterance: he mentions day-to-day flextime in reply to VRG's assertion that stationary flextime would have to be set up at least weekly. Apparently, DIK misunderstands and thinks that VRG is referring to day-to-day flextime. During acts 328-330, DIK and VRG overlappingly speak but seem to grasp what the other is saying. Nevertheless, based on the previous misunderstanding, it is not clear if VRG's rejection of day-to-day flextime is correctly interpreted by DIK as an agreement rather than as a disagreement.

Moreover, there is an interesting ambiguity running throughout DIK's remarks. On one hand, he makes the propositional truth of the MR flextime program thematic. On the other hand, he explicitly expresses concern about the appropriateness of the flextime program at MR and makes thematic the legitimacy of the program. VRG's reacts to this ambiguity by thematizing his sincerity: he stresses his opinion when discussing the situation (see acts 321 and 328).
Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 309-330/ Figures 17 and 18

Ironically, the conversation takes an apparent turn for the worse in this segment of the meeting since VRG and DIK do not seem to realize they are in agreement.

1. The triadic relationship is not sustained during VRG and DIK's series of interruptive turn exchanges since VRG and DIK are not oriented toward the same state of affairs during at least part of the conversation: DIK talks about day-to-day flextime, while VRG discusses stationary flextime.

2. Interestingly, the contesting of significations during the conversation occurs more in terms of the thematic modality chosen by the participants than in what they disclose. DIK makes both the propositional truth and the appropriateness of the state of affairs thematic. VRG, conversely, makes his sincerity thematic.

3. Even though, from an observer's standpoint, the two participants seem to be reaching closure, their communication is systematically distorted by their interruptive structure of turn-exchanges.

SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 331-338/ Figures 19 and 20

Figures 19 and 20, which represent the flextime conversation up to BIL's contribution (bt=2.52, et=3.39), are noteworthy for three reasons. First, polarization (0.503 F) is now evident in the behavior field diagram (Figure 19). This polarization is due to ARP's entrance into the discussion: his behavior rating shows that he is the only
Figure 19
Figure 20
participant in the B space on the diagram. Second, Figure 20 reveals a slight lessening in the polarization of the CON images in comparison with Figure 18 (0.802 F versus 0.941 F). Again, this movement is attributable to ARP's contribution; his single CON image aligns him with GRT and VRG in the UNF space and counters the polarization of these images due to DIK's ratings in the UNB space. Third, the image level indicator shows that the situation is still the primary image referred to by the participants.

The followings points summarize the interpretation of the SYMLOG diagrams:

1. While ARP behaves somewhat emotionally, his emotionality lacks any direction indicative of a basic-assumption mentality; hence, the conditions for a dialogical conversation are sustained.

2. Since the participants are sustaining a focus upon the topic of flextime, the triadic relationship is being maintained.

3. Based on the lessening of the CON image polarization, the signification of flextime is, perhaps, merging toward a consensus.

Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 331-338/Figures 19 and 20

Specification. Figures 19 and 20 summarize the phase of the conversation (acts 331-338) during which ARP enters the discussion of flextime for the first time. ARP and VRG start speaking simultaneously, with VRG yielding to ARP. ARP begins his utterance with a request for the floor, receiving DIK's assent via a backchannel. Continuing his utterance, ARP makes a reference to
recent activities at the DR plant that required everyone in the laboratory to be present throughout their entire shift. He points out that if employees came in at different starting times, the type of work that had just been performed at DR would not be possible. Having made this point, ARP asks a number of questions: "how did this situation ever happen" and "how did you members at the MR plant solve it?"

DIK replies that the different starting times allowable under flextime at MR have caused "trouble." ARP and GRT simultaneously start to speak, with DIK's speech overlying each of their utterances. ARP again asks how the problem was resolved; GRT reiterates DIK's point that the different starting times have been a problem; and DIK specifies that starting times have been part of the problems under "daily" flextime.

**Elaboration.** ARP refers to the recent modernization of the plant's equipment in the laboratory. Essentially, this modernization substituting manual inspection of valve pressures, etc. with electronic displays at a central location. The validation of the electronic displays requires coordination between the laboratory workers and the maintenance crew of the plant. Such coordinated activity would be fairly inefficient if the laboratory workers did not know when maintenance employees would be starting work, as might occur under day-to-day flextime.
Reconsideration. ARP focuses upon the state of affairs (flextime) in terms of himself (the laboratory) and the others ("did this situation ever happen"). DIK and GRT retain this focus in their replies. Moreover, while flextime remains the focus of the conversation, ARP's remarks make the appropriateness of the state of affairs thematic. His questioning ("how did you solve it") assumes that the inefficiency of coordinated activities associated with different starting times for employees is inappropriate; DIK and GRT's replies affirm this inappropriateness. Thus, there is a merging of significations about flextime since ARP, DIK and GRT agree that day-to-day flextime is inappropriate for both the MR and DR plants.

Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 331-338/Figures 19 and 20

While the triadic relationship of dialogue seems to be sustained, less than an ideal speech situation seems to characterize this segment of the conversation:

1. The triadic relationship is sustained during this portion of talk despite the potentially disruptive interruptive structures that characterize the beginning and closing interchanges.

2. ARP's questioning indicates a quasi-bracketing of the truth claim of appropriateness; however, the grounds for the appropriateness of flextime are not actually discussed because both DIK and I agree with ARP's implicit assessment that flextime is inappropriate.

3. The closure that occurs at this point is a consensus based on implicit assumptions about what is inappropriate; hence, the
rationality of the consensus is questionable.

**SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 339-355/Figures 21 and 22**

Figures 21 and 22 deal with the conversation up to the point of GRT's utterance (bt=2.52; et=3.56); here, BIL enters the conversation for the first time. Two features in Figure 21 seem important. The polarization on the F/B dimension, first evident in Figure 19, is now lessened (0.335 F versus 0.503 F). This lessening of the polarization is probably due to BIL's behavior receiving a UPF rating. Even more remarkable is the change in DIK's behavior toward the P direction; comparing his rating in Figure 21 with Figure 19 one sees a movement of 10 points toward P (13.7 P versus 3.5 P) based on only 8 acts.

Figure 22 illustrates a continued lessening of polarization on the F/B dimension for CON images. This change seems partly attributable to BIL's contribution. Additionally, DIK evidences a slight movement toward the F direction in his CON images in Figure 22. There is one other feature of note in Figure 22: the image level indicator shows that both BIL and DIK's PRO images refer to topics other than flextime.

The interpretation of the SYMLOG diagrams suggests the following:

1. While the emotionality in the group is lessening, a definite direction is emerging for that emotion (P) which suggests the basic-assumption of pairing; nonetheless, the group's behavior is appropriate for dialogue.
2. The triadic relationship does not seem to be sustained based on the incongruous PRO image levels.

3. The trend toward a merging of significations toward flextime continues since DIK now shows some movement toward the CON UNF space.

**Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 339-355/Figures 21 and 22**

*Specification.* During this phase of the conversation, BIL notes his membership on the flextime subcommittee and states that he has some suggestions for flextime. One of these recommendations is to schedule flextime on a two-week basis. (At this point DIK signals his approval using a backchannel.) BIL explains how the two week scheduling would work and receives another approving backchannel from DIK. Further, BIL notes that scheduling on a bi-weekly basis should work since "your supervisor should know your workload." BIL adds that the supervisor should also, though not necessarily, know what is "coming up." BIL's speech overlies DIK's wry "Thank you" in response to BIL's qualification, and BIL sums up his proposal that the "whole plant go on a two week schedule."

Overlapping his talk with BIL's concluding remark, DIK notes that the bi-weekly schedule was originally followed at MR and did not create many problems. Since the change, however, the problems have increased. BIL interweaves his utterance with DIK's last remark, stating that he can see how the program needs supervision in order to work. Indeed, he notes that MR must have "lost" some of the supervision with the change to day-to-day flextime. BIL's conclusion
BEGINNING TIMES: P/E, ENC TIME: 3:46
REMARKS: P/C DIAGRAM
HEMOLYSIS CONSTANT FOR 1 MSPEL: 0.4 E'H AE APPROX. EQUAL TO 0.5
THE LEAST OF THE FCs IN RESIS.
U/C MAXIMAL F P/E / 0.137
P/E MAXIMAL F 0.5/43
P/F MAXIMAL F P/E 0.335

PLOTS OF REGRESSION LINE: "GFP" AND (P/E) IE. EXP 15.41.

| Figure 21 |
BEGINNING TIME: 1.32  END TIME: 3.16

IMAGE FIELD DIAGRAM

HARMONIC CONSTANT FOR 4 PARTICIPANTS WITH ARC IMAGES: 0.480
ARC U/C MAX.: 3.234
40 X P/F MAX.: 0.925
40 X IMAGE U/C POLARIZATION INDEX = 0.0 F
40 X IMAGE P/F POLARIZATION INDEX = 0.0 F
40 X IMAGE P/F POLARIZATION INDEX = 0.0 F

HARMONIC CONSTANT FOR 5 PARTICIPANTS WITH CCN IMAGES: 0.938
CCN U/C MAX.: 3.234
40 X P/F MAX.: 0.925
40 X IMAGE U/C POLARIZATION INDEX = 0.0 F
40 X IMAGE P/F POLARIZATION INDEX = 0.0 F
40 X IMAGE P/F POLARIZATION INDEX = 0.0 F

POINTS ON REGRESSION LINES:

ARC IMAGE POINTS: "GRP/PCR" AND "F/P/E" (0.0/II = 13.1)
CCN IMAGE POINTS: "GRP/CON" AND "F/P/E" (0.0/II = 18.0).

FIELD DIAGRAM SCORES — INDICATES INDIVIDUALS THAT MAY HAVE THE 5ARC P/F AND F/P IMAGES

LEVELS OF MAC RECORD: 1*SEL, 2*CIN, 3*GRP, 4*SIM, 5*SEL, 6*FM

ARC IMAGES

CCN IMAGES

Figure 22
to this utterance overlies DIK's speech. DIK begins to make a suggestion and then concurs with BIL's final statement that day-to-day flextime would not work in his three man crew.

VRG enters the conversation, summing up the group's assessment of the flextime program at MR. In his opinion, the original program worked well and then problems arose when it was changed to day-to-day flextime. DIK offers an approving backchannel, and VRG continues. He can envision a program set up on a bi-weekly basis in which employees could not change starting times during that period. (Here, DIK again provides an approving backchannel.) However, VRG cannot see how day-to-day flextime can be anything but confusing "for all parties concerned." DIK interweaves his speech with VRG's, confirming that day-to-day flextime is now one of MR's biggest problems.

Elaboration. VRG is the union steward for the plant and is employed as a grounds maintenance worker under DIK's supervision. BIL, while not a supervisor, has somewhat greater employee status than VRG since he is one of three electricians at the plant. Furthermore, since he can divide up maintenance and other work with his fellow electricians, BIL has greater autonomy at his job than VRG. Thus, BIL's support for a stationary rather than a day-to-day flextime program is perhaps more persuasive than VRG's since BIL could more feasibly work under a day-to-day program than could VRG.

Reconsideration. BIL makes his sincerity thematic in his opening remarks, and he then makes the propositional truth thematic. When articulating the bi-weekly flextime proposal, BIL emphasizes the
legitimacy of the supervisor-employee relationship. While DIK's remarks once again thematize the propositional truth about flextime, BIL's response thematizes his sincerity. VRG's closing utterance also thematizes sincerity. The shift in thematic focus by BIL and VRG makes their remarks more persuasive because the topic of flextime is never occluded by either speaker's expressivity. These shifts in thematic focus also account for the incongruity of SYMLOG image level references and suggest that the triadic relationship is sustained. Moreover, BIL, DIK, and VRG concur that a stationary flextime program would be more appropriate at the MR (and, hence, at the DR plant), while reaffirming the inappropriateness of a day-to-day flextime program.

Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 339-355/Figures 21 and 22

While BIL, DIK, and VRG seem to be reaching consensus about flextime, the reasons for this understanding remain implicit.

1. The triadic relationship is sustained; however, participant's emphasize various aspects of this relationship throughout this segment of the conversation.

2. BIL tacks from thematizing his sincerity, to the propositional truth, to rightness, and then truthfulness when talking about flextime; DIK thematizes first the appropriateness and then the propositional truth of flextime; and VRG once again emphasizes his sincerity about flextime. The thematizing of truth claims does not, however, lead to the bracketing of these claims.
3. The closure on the topic of flextime is grounded upon implicit understandings among the participants; hence, the rationality of the consensus may still be questioned.

**SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 356-370/Figures 23 and 24**

Figures 23 and 24 portray the flextime conversation up to the point of ALF's second utterance (bt=2.52, et=3.71). Several prominent features characterize Figure 23. First, ALF enters the discussion of flextime for the first time, and his behavior score shows him to be marginally within the UPF space. Second, GRT's behavior rating shows a small movement toward the extreme UPF space when compared to his score in Figure 21. It is probably on the basis of these scores that the polarization index (0.307 F compared to 0.335 F in Figure 21) continues to decrease.

Figure 24 shows a continuation of the trend toward a decrease in the CON image polarization: 0.532 F compared to 0.612 F in Figure 22. As in Figure 23, the decrease seems partially attributable to ALF's contribution; moreover, his CON image rating is the same as ARP and BIL's. While up to this point, little mention has been made of the clustering of PRO images, there has been a series of very gradual changes in the relationship of these images for DIK, GRT, and VRG. Previously, VRG's PRO image rating has consistently been the most extreme of the three in the UPF space, with DIK and GRT alternately moving closer toward VRG's position. However, in Figure 24 one sees GRT's PRO image rating is more F than VRG or DIK's. This change seems
Figure 23
attributable to the new contributions made by GRT (showing an increase in F) and VRG (showing a decrease in F) during this period of the conversation.

The image level indicator shows that all participants, except BIL, are making flextime (level 4) thematic. Thus, the average (GRP) image level PRO is 3.8, while the CON image level average is 4.0.

With only a few qualifications, the interpretation of these results mirrors those for Figure 21 and 22:

1. Behavior conducive to dialogue seems to continue within the committee.
2. The triadic relationship is sustained based on the congruity of image levels.
3. A merging of the significations of the state of affairs continues, based on the decreasing CON image polarization.
4. A transfiguration of the dialogical field may also be indicated by the changes in the PRO image unification due, perhaps, to a re-signification of flextime by GRT.

**Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 356-370/Figures 23 and 24**

*Specification.* GRT overlaps his utterance with DIK's last utterance (act 355), and he suggests that the committee may be interested in perusing a copy of another worksite committee's flextime experiment proposal since it entails "pretty much what you have suggested." He mentions that the proposal does differ in one respect
since it gives the immediate supervisor of a work unit the option of deciding, for the unit as a whole, whether to participate in flextime.

BIL notes that his suggestion includes having an orientation period for all employees in which the rules of the program would be discussed and made known; during such an orientation session, employees could be made aware that the supervisor has the power to decide whether to have flextime. ALF ascertains if the other worksite committee has not yet started its program and receives an affirmative backchannel from GRT. Continuing his utterance, ALF remarks that MR "isn't working out" and suggests that the flextime discussion be tabled "until some more positive information comes in."

GRT follows up on ALF's recommendation by noting his own reservation about flextime based on his talks with both management and employees at DR. He wonders if there is an actual employee need for flextime. GRT suggests that the subcommittee should reassess employee needs before making proposals for flextime. Elaborating upon the flaw in the last survey of employee opinion, GRT stresses that it merely measured employee opinion toward flextime but did not assess whether employees would participate in a program.

VRG concur with GRT's assessment of employee attitude and commitment toward flextime: none of the 30 or so employees who answered the survey about flextime were opposed to the program, but only two people are now interested in participating in flextime.

GRT proposes that the subcommittee on flextime should meet with him to draw up a short questionnaire to reassess employee
participation in a flextime program. This questionnaire could be administered in the next few months and provide the committee with further information on which to make a decision about flextime.

**Elaboration.** The other worksite committee (the O committee) had a proposal for a flextime program late in 1980 which had received tentative approval from the superintendent of the W division. However, its implementation date had been postponed three times (once in February, 1981; again during the summer of 1981; and in September, 1981). The new target date for implementation was set for late February or early March, 1982.

Interestingly, the former facilitator (J) had made copies of the O committee's flextime proposal available to BIL and VRG. There is a high probability that BIL's suggestions are derived from that proposal (in any case, his ideas are very similar to the O committee's).

VRG and GRT's reference to a survey of employee opinion harkens back to the questionnaire mentioned in the Narrative History that was administered in July, 1979. Besides being somewhat flawed in its question construction, this survey was also non-representative of the entire plant. VRG and others had solicited the opinions of only those they felt might be interested in flextime. Nevertheless, since the plant employs approximately 70 people at maximum, the opinion of 30 people does carry some weight.

**Reconsideration.** The conversation during this period undergoes various thematic shifts. GRT begins his utterance on an expressive note, making thematic his sincerity; however, he shifts to thematizing
the propositional truth. BIL's utterance also combines these two themes. Interestingly, ALF's remark starts out by thematizing the propositional truth (the 0 flextime proposal), shifts to the inappropriateness of flextime at MR, and ends with his sincerity being the thematic focus ("I suggest we table it"). GRT's response again combines two thematic foci: first that of sincerity (regarding his talks with DR managers and employees) and then that of appropriateness (of the last survey of employee attitudes toward flextime). VRG's utterance also initially makes sincerity thematic but then shifts to the representation of reality (actual number of employees interested in participating in flextime). Lastly, GRT's final utterance makes the appropriateness of the state of affairs thematic as he suggests that the flextime subcommittee reassess employee interest in such a program.

Based on the shifts in thematic focus as well as the introduction of new significations of flextime, there seems to be support for the SYMLOG interpretation that the dialogical field is transfigured in this portion of the conversation. There also seems to be a partial merging of significations: ALF urges the tabling of flextime, and GRT supports this move by suggesting that the subcommittee reassess employee interest in flextime. Moreover, VRG affirms GRT's view of the current lack of employee interest in flextime and tacitly supports the tabling of discussion.
Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 356-370/ Figures 23 and 24

This portion of the conversation continues the trend toward consensus based on implicit understandings.

1. The triadic relationship continues to be sustained, and participants continue to thematize various aspects of the relationship.

2. GRT sequentially thematizes the following truth claims: sincerity, propositional truth, sincerity, and appropriateness. BIL mirrors GRT's theme sequence, while ALF thematizes propositional truth, appropriateness, and truthfulness. VRG thematizes sincerity and propositional truth. Even though each participant shifts thematic focus, none of the participants bracket any truth claims.

3. The conversation moves toward closure on the flextime topic, but it does so based still on implicit understandings.

SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 371-385/ Figures 25 and 26

Figures 25 and 26 (bt=2.52, et=3.86), which plot the conversation up to the point of ARP's third utterance, show that many changes have occurred. Note the new polarization on the P/N dimension (0.295 P) in Figure 25. This seems due to BIL's behavior rating since his is the only rating in the UNF space. The polarization on the F/B dimension, however, continues to decrease (0.254 F compared to 0.307 F in Figure 23). This is due to the contributions of a new participant, DEN, who shows marginal alignment with the majority of participants in the UPF space.
Figure 25
Figure 26 presents as complex a picture as Figure 14. This complexity is due to the incongruity of levels (referents) for both the PRO and CON images: DEN's PRO image refers to himself (level=1.0), and BIL's new CON image, by deduction, refers to some other member of the group.

The incongruity of image levels makes the interpretation of the polarization indices more difficult. Note that a CON image polarization on the U/D dimension (0.523 U) appears for the first time. Since all participants except BIL have U ratings for their CON images, this polarization is due to his image in reference to another member of the committee. While the CON image polarization on the F/B dimension continues to decrease (0.507 F compared to 0.532 F in Figure 27), this movement toward unification is somewhat misleading. Indeed, some of this decrease is due to the new contributions by BIL which, as previously noted, deal with another group member rather than the situation.

Nevertheless, a portion of the decrease may also be due to ALF's additional comments during this time period. His CON images show a slight change toward the NB direction, though still remaining in the UNF space.

The following interpretations summarize the discussion of Figures 25 and 26:

1. The behaviors of the participants remain conducive for dialogic communication.
2. The triadic relationship seems not to be sustained by all the participants in this portion of the conversation since one member refers to another, perhaps as an object, while a second member focuses upon himself.

3. There are indications of a re-signification of flextime by ALF and a merging of signification since the movement toward unification of the CON images is due partly to ALF's contributions.

**Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 371-385/Figures 25 and 26**

**Specification.** The interruptive structures that characterize this portion of the flextime discussion reveal that at least two dialogues are going on at the same time. ALF and GRT continue to discuss tabling the flextime discussion, but BIL, DEN, DIK, and VRG debate about chairperson for the flextime subcommittee.

ALF (act 371) responds to GRT's proposal (act 370) that the subcommittee reassess employee interest in flextime by noting that there is not enough positive information to warrant any other action. ALF's utterance overlies BIL's query: "who's the chairperson of this subcommittee?" VRG's response to BIL overlaps ALF's utterance. Though first expressing his ignorance, VRG asserts that BIL is the chair.

GRT interweaves a reply to ALF as VRG ends his utterance. Agreeing with ALF's view, GRT notes that the MR flextime program reports showed a "mixed review" and there are real problems with the program. Further, since the 0 flextime program has not yet started,
there is no positive support for flextime in the city. ALF overlaps his utterance with GRT and agrees: a new flextime program should not be started since it would merely add confusion. GRT agrees with ALF, and DEN interweaves his utterance with GRT's.

DEN asks who is the chair of the flextime subcommittee, questioning whether BIL is indeed the chair. DIK, overlapping his reply with DEN's query, claims that BIL is the chairperson. Overlapping his utterance with DIK's, VRG professes that both he and BIL chair the subcommittee. BIL asserts (VRG's utterance overlying his own) that VRG is the chair. Continuing his utterance, VRG notes that the last time he asked ROY, he said he was no longer interested. At this point, BIL again speaks as VRG's utterance overlaps his own: BIL asserts that VRG is the chair so he should call a meeting. VRG seemingly ignores BIL's remarks and explains that ROY is no longer interested because the bridge is now repaired. (BIL speaks sotto voce while VRG notes what ROY said. BIL's version is that ROY said "shove it." The remainder of BIL's commentary is unintelligible.)

Elaboration. The contesting of the chair to the flextime subcommittee is somewhat surprising since the minutes to the June, 1981, meeting state that VRG is the chair (Table 12). However, some confusion about leadership is not without reason since GRY has replaced GEN on the committee, and ROY has dropped from the committee. Moreover, the subcommittee held few meetings during 1981. The bridge construction (see the Narrative History) was one
reason why employees at the plant were interested in flextime; now that the bridge repairs are complete, ROY has lost interest in the program.

Reconsidération. The opening remarks and the specification of the themes evoked by the various speakers indicate that two dialogues, rather than one, occur in this phase of the conversation. Hence, the triadic relationship is disrupted for the group as a whole. However, the two dialogues do not continue throughout this phase. DEN's query serves to demarcate the ending of the dialogue between GRT and ALF, and BIL and VRG's exchange becomes the group dialogue. Yet this dialogue is not sustained, and BIL's last utterance reduces the dialogue to a monologue: BIL's sarcasm treats VRG as an object of derision, not as a dialogical partner.

The group's dialogue is transfigured by the contention over the chairing of the flextime subcommittee, and this contention does not, at least in this portion of the conversation, end in agreement. Nevertheless, a partial merging of significations about flextime does occur; ALF and GRT agree to the advisability of reserving further action on flextime based on the lack of positive information about such programs in the City.

Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 371-385/Figures 25 and 26

The dialogue is disrupted twice in this portion of the conversation, and the basis for a rational consensus is further hampered.
1. The triadic relationship of dialogue is disrupted during the first half and is reduced to a monologue during the last half of this segment of the flextime discussion.

2. The dialogical field is fragmented by the conversation conducted by BIL and VRG; the merging of significations that result from ALF and GRT's talk represent only a partial agreement by the committee.

3. The consensus in this portion of the conversation is not only based on implicit understandings, but it is also based on the agreement of only part of the committee.

SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 386-399/Figures 27 and 28

The penultimate set of figures (27 and 28) for the meeting focus on the discussion of flextime up to the point of DIK's second to last utterance (bt=2.52, et=4.00). Figure 27 shows that the polarization on the P/N dimension continues to increase, while the polarization on the F/B dimension continues to decrease. The increase in the P/N polarization is largely due to ALF's new utterances, which align him with BIL in the UNF space. The decrease in the F/B dimension, in turn, may be traced to a slight change in ARP's behavior rating.

Figure 28 shows no change in the CON image polarization on the U/D dimension, but it does show an increase of CON image polarization on the F/B dimension. This polarization indicates a reversal of the trend toward unification on this dimension. The increase of polarization on the F/B dimension may be traced to CON images by ARP
BEGINNING TIMES: 2:52 END TIMES: 4:52

GENEVA FIELD DIAGRAM

HARMONIC CONSTANT FOR 7 PEOPLE = 0.255; SHOULD BE APPROXIMATE.

V/C PARIAM = 0.250
F/R PARIAM = 0.250

PEAKS ON REGRESSION LINE: "GRF" AND "P/R" 100.0%/80.0% 12.0%.

Figure 27
**Figure 28**

**IMAGE FIELD DIAGRAM**

- Harmonic constant for 5 participants with PRC images: 0.34
- Harmonic constant for 6 participants with CN images: 0.40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRC IMAGES</th>
<th>CN IMAGES</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>P/N</th>
<th>F/P</th>
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<th>LEVEL</th>
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<td>CN Images</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Harmonic constant for 5 participants with PRC images: 0.34
- Harmonic constant for 6 participants with CN images: 0.40

**POINTS ON REGRESSION LINES**

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<th>10</th>
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</table>

**FIELD DIAGRAM SCORES:** *indicates individuals that may have the same P/N and F/P scores

**LEVELS:** CN/CN RECORD, 2-CIN, 1-CIN, 1-CIN, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X12, X13, X14, X15, X16, X17, X18

**PRC IMAGES**

- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CN: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1

**CN Images**

- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CN: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
- CNR: 1.9, 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1, 1.1
and ALF in the F direction. The image level indicator shows that both ARP's and ALF's CON images are references to flextime (level 4).

There seem to be no remarkable changes in the PRO images, with the cluster of images being very similar to past clusterings. However, the image level indicator shows that BIL's new PRO image refers to the group rather than flextime.

Interpreting these results, the following implications about dialogue seem warranted:

1. The conditions for dialogue are sustained since the participants' behavior remains unemotional.
2. The triadic relationship may be disrupted if BIL's reference to the group treats the group as an object.
3. ARP and ALF re-signify flextime, and their significations seem to contest those of the rest of the group.

Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 386-399/ Figures 27 and 28

Specification. During this portion of the conversation, two dialogues again occur within the group. ARP's utterance overlies VRG and BIL's exchange. VRG and BIL carry over their talk from the previous portion of the conversation: VRG reiterates that the bridge was constructed; BIL asks VRG if he accepts the chair position; and VRG accepts. Talking during this whole exchange, ARP wonders how the decision would be made of which work crews may go on flextime and how supervision would be determined as a result.
DIK replies to ARP by suggesting that the supervisor would decide. ARP restates and exemplifies his question: Who would be the supervisor for the "late" crew if one work crew comes in at 6 AM and another at 8:30 AM, but both supervisors come in at 6 AM? ALF overlaps his speech with ARP's utterance and notes that this problem is one experienced by "everybody." Starting to speak simultaneously with BIL, GRT agrees with ALF's statement.

BIL mentions that SMIT's work crew must be on flextime during the summer since they are cutting grass before sunrise. Picking up on BIL's line of thought, DIK points out that it can't happen in Arlington since "they won't let you in there 'till eight." (This evokes laughter from the entire committee.) BIL replies that he will also go on "flextime" in the summer and notes that there is a "transitional period" before the summer. (This concluding remark again evokes laughter from the entire committee.)

Elaboration. BIL rather humorously points out in this conversation that SMIT's practice of changing the starting time during the summer months from 7 AM to 6 AM is a form of flextime. He also notes (and this is what really evokes the laughter) that there is a transition period (due to daylight savings time) which prepares one for the earlier starting time. DIK's reference is to a suburb of the city which prohibits the operation of municipal machinery before 8 AM. In the past, the violation of this restriction has generated irate calls to the Mayor's office.
Reconsideration. Based on the dual dialogue occurring during ARP's opening utterance, the triadic relation is disrupted. However, it seems to be sustained after ARP's first utterance. Both ARP and BIL resignify flextime: ARP questions the practicability of day-to-day flextime, while BIL's second utterance points out that the workforce already engages in a form of flextime during the summer.

Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 386-399/Figures 27 and 28

The conversation takes a lighter turn in this segment; a shifting and merging of significations toward flextime takes place; and the triadic relationship is re-established.

1. As in the previous segment, this portion of the conversation supports two dialogues. While the triadic relationship is disrupted for the group as a whole during the first few utterances, the triadic relationship is re-established for the group once BIL and VRG agree.

2. The thematization of truth claims shows marked changes during this segment: from a thematization of the appropriateness of flextime relationships among committee members (VRG and BIL) to the relationship of flextime to supervisors/employees (ARP) to the propositional truth of flextime at DR (BIL). While ARP's repeated questioning attempts to bracket the truth claim of appropriateness, this questioning is not pursued by other members.

3. The closure reached by BIL and VRG is indicative more of a private agreement than of a group consensus since other members of the group do not acknowledge the agreement. Moreover, the committee's
SYMLOG Interpretation: Acts 400-408/Figures 29 and 30

The last set of diagrams (Figures 29 and 30) summarize the entire discussion of flextime (bt=2.52, et=9.99). Figure 29 reveals a decrease of polarization for both the P/N and F/B dimensions. The decrease in the P/N polarization is due to the change in BIL's behavior rating; he is now marginally aligned with the other participants in the UPF space. The decrease in the F/B polarization seems to be caused by slight changes toward the F direction in the behavior ratings of VRG, GRT, DIK, BIL, and ALF.

A decrease in the CON image polarization on both the U/D and F/B dimensions is shown in Figure 30. The decrease of the F/B polarization is attributable to DIK and ALF's CON images. They both show slight movements toward the F direction. However, the decrease in the U/D polarization seems entirely due to DIK's CON images since he shows a fairly large change toward the U direction.

The image level indicator in Figure 30 shows that the situation (flextime) is referred to by the majority. The only exception is BIL, whose PRO images refer again to the group.

These findings suggest the following interpretation:

1. The behaviors of the participants sustain the conditions for dialogue.
2. The triadic relationship of dialogue may be disrupted based on BIL's incongruous references to the group.

3. A merging of significations about flextime occurs based on the movement toward CON image unification on both the F/B and U/D dimensions.

4. A core of agreement about the significance of flextime is apparent based on GRT, DIK, and VRG's PRO images of the situation (this interpretation discounts the PRO images by DEN and BIL since they do not deal with the situation of flextime).

**Ethnographic Interpretation: Acts 400-408/Figures 29 and 30**

*Specification and Elaboration.* DIK begins this part of the conversation by noting that the change from standard to daylight savings time helps people have time to do things at home and thus is similar to flextime. BIL overlaps his utterance with DIK's, and he agrees that flextime is not necessary. Overlapping his speech with BIL's, DIK notes that daylight savings time is "compulsory." Again overlapping with DIK's utterance, BIL sums up the conversation: flextime is tabled or deferred. Interweaving his utterance with BIL's, ALF completes BIL's remark, stating that it is tabled "in the city. . . 'til we get some feedback." In response, DIK issues an affirmative backchannel; BIL cryptically states "Very much;" and VRG expresses agreement. BIL concludes the discussion by noting that he has everything written down.
Figure 29
Figure 30
Reconsideration. While there are many interruptions, most are overlapping rather than interweaving which suggests that participants are listening to each other. The interruptive structures also indicate that flextime is differently signified by DIK, BIL, and ALF; however, a core theme emerges and a partial merging of significations does occur since DIK, BIL, VRG and ALF explicitly agree that flextime should be tabled.

Dialogic Interpretation: Acts 400-408/ Figures 29 and 30

This final segment of the flextime discussion ends with an explicit agreement based on an implicit understanding of the inappropriateness of flextime in the DR plant:

1. The triadic relationship is sustained since all participants retain a focus upon the significance of flextime.

2. There are at least three topical shifts during this last segment and at least as many shifts in the pattern of thematizing truth claims. The conversation moves from the propositional truth (time change), to appropriateness (flextime and daylight savings time), to the propositional truth (tabling of flextime), to appropriateness (tabling flextime). Once again the truth claims are not bracketed.

3. Although the participants explicitly agree to table flextime, there is some ambiguity about what this "tabling" means since the committee bases its consensus upon implicit understandings. In other words, the rationality of the consensus may be questioned.
The DR committee's discussion of flextime culminates in an explicit agreement to table flextime. However, this agreement relies on the implicit understandings of the participants as to what is meant by "tabling." For example, my own understanding of the agreement was that BIL and VRG should survey the workforce about flextime. But, the ethnographic reading of the transcript suggests that ALF probably understands this agreement to mean until the committee implements and evaluates a flextime program; conversely, BIL and VRG probably understand it to mean discussion will continue once employee interest is shown in flextime.

Moreover, the tabling of flextime seems to be based on an implicit understanding that flextime is inappropriate for the DR plant. Precisely what is inappropriate about flextime and why it is inappropriate are never explicitly discussed; rather, such reasoning is implied by the participants (see in particular the interpretations of Figures 19 through 30/Acts 331-408). While the participants during these portions of the conversation raised various truth claims, none of these claims were bracketed. Hence, the basis for agreement was never explicitly established through discourse (dialectical dialogue).

Additionally, the interruptive structures that characterize three sections of the conversation indicate that dual dialogues occurred during the committee's discussion of flextime (see Figures 17-18/Acts 309-330 and Figures 25 through 28/Acts 371-399). During these periods
of dual conversations, the committee's dialogue was fragmented, and the significations of flextime expressed at these times were only partially acknowledged by certain committee members. In other words, the possibility for systematic misunderstandings were introduced during these portions of the conversation.

In essence, the DR committee's dialogue never becomes dialectical and the participants do not question the "dominant" opinion about flextime. Thus, while the committee's communication is often dialogical, it still provides the seeds for systematic misunderstandings.
1 Flextime refers to the institution of some form of alternative work scheduling, especially such scheduling that allows employees to come to work at different starting times, so long as they put in the required hours of labor necessary for the job. A wide variety of alternative work schedules are called "flextime" since they allow employees more flexibility in arranging their working hours.

2 I have used minutes to the meetings and conversations with past facilitators and committee members in portraying the events prior to 8/11/81. After that point, I have also utilized both my field (written during meetings) and retrospective (written following a meeting or encounter) notes.

3 After consulting with other third-party facilitators, I agreed that having another facilitator direct the meeting would enhance my role as a "neutral" third party since I had acted, in part, as an advocate during the previous DR meeting.

4 The symbols "bt" and "et" correspond to the beginning and ending times, respectively, for the SYMLOG diagrams. These times, in turn, refer to the numbered acts in the transcript. Hence, 0.0 refers to the first utterance in the transcript, while 2.52 refers to that utterance in the transcript numbered "252." Each SYMLOG diagram summarizes the conversation from the first utterance up to, but not including, the utterance corresponding to the ending time.

5 For definitions of the interruptive structures mentioned here and in later parts of the text, see Savage (1982). Interweaving speech seems to be the most disruptive of the four types of interruptive structures. Examples of each type of interruptive structure are displayed below.

**Simultaneous Starts**

S1: /No
S2: /You think

**Overlapping Speech**

S6: Well, it's ten-sixty-five an hour you can't hardly um beat it, so... I've already got a job this /summer

(S5) now?

S5: /you have a job
Overlying Speech
S5: Communication . . huh . . two-oh-nine, /cause that's what
S6: /oh, I had
(S5) that's where we did this through

Interweaving Speech

Example One
S5: Um . /well since
S6: /I mean are you ah you live in dorm (yeah) so you
(S6) must be

Example Two
S6: That's . . a class huh, /that's your, that's your
(S6) degree huh, great
S5: /that's their yeah they
(S5) get credit for that and then they have another class all
they did was ah um, what was it ah, oh they just did projects
so they could make enough money to go to Europe that summer
This dissertation makes a two-fold contribution to Habermas' (1979, 1982) critical theory of dialogue. On the one hand, it supplements his theory of universal pragmatics by partially explicating the phenomenological/hermeneutic structure of dialogue. On the other hand, it provides a set of methodological criteria for critiquing communication, e.g., assessing whether group decision-making is systematically distorted. For communication theorists, this dissertation offers new directions for decision making and negotiation research; for communication practitioners, it offers a set of directives for facilitating consensual decision making.

The review section of this chapter (1) retraces Habermas' critical theory of dialogue, (2) articulates the eidetic and interpretive structure of dialogue, and (3) indicates a set of methodological criteria for critiquing communication. The implications section (1) contrasts Fisher and Hawes' (1971) interact system model (ISM) of communication with a critical theory of dialogue, (2) differentiates between a critical theory of dialogue and current models of decision making (Fisher, 1970) and negotiation (Gulliver, 1979), (3) indicates how a
critical theory of dialogue provides new directions for researching decision making and negotiation, and (4) provides several directives for facilitating consensual decision making.

Review

Habermas' Critical Theory of Dialogue

Habermas' (1979, 1982) theory of dialogue has a critical aim since it seeks to free social action from "false consciousness," that is, political ideologies that systematically distort communication. As such, a critical theory of dialogue has self-enlightenment (Kortian, 1980) as its goal; it seeks to use rational reasoning to emancipate people from the self-deception caused by unconscious repressions of societal forms of domination (Habermas, 1971). Since linguisticality encompasses both self-reflective and self-deceptive forms of social action, Habermas (1970, 1971) seeks a basis for communication that prefigures speech and language.

In order to explicate the pre-linguistic structure of communication, Habermas (1970, 1971, 1979) employs a negative dialectic. Thus, he argues, the very fact that people (1) experience social actions in which interactants misrepresent reality, act inappropriately or unjustly toward one another, deliberately lie about their intentions, or remain incomprehensible and (2) recognize the invalidity of these actions indicates that all communication is oriented toward (anticipates) an ideal speech situation. This ideal speech situation
complements the counterfactual, pragmatic experience of social action by providing it with a universal structure of four validity (truth) claims. Moreover, through a process of "reverse deduction," Habermas (1979, 1982) induces a typology of social action (including communicative and strategic action) from the four universal-pragmatic validity claims of intelligibility, truth, rightness, and sincerity.

Habermas' (1979) theory of universal pragmatics emphasizes the double structure (propositional content and illocutionary force) of speech since this structure introduces the possibility of thematizing, bracketing, and discursively redeeming truth claims. According to Habermas (1979), communicators may thematize three truth claims: (1) constative speech acts raise the claim of propositional truth, (2) regulative speech acts evoke the claim of appropriateness, and (3) avowed speech acts surface the claim of sincerity. The thematization of a truth claim anticipates that it can be fulfilled (redeemed); this implicit promise is the rational basis for illocutionary force. Testing this promise entails bracketing a validity claim and discursively seeking the grounds for the claim. Such discourse (dialectical dialogue) makes the bases for any consensus explicit and counters the "domination" of non-reflective opinion (ideology). Hence, by explicating the double structure of speech acts and the rational basis for illocutionary force, Habermas (1979) produces a theory of communication that relies upon consensual reasoning: in other words, a critical theory of dialogue.
The Eidetic and Interpretive Structures of Dialogue

However, since Habermas' (1979) universal-pragmatic theory does not sufficiently analyze the process of dialogue or discourse, it leaves unanswered several crucial questions about consensual reasoning: (1) How does the process of discourse (dialectical dialogue) lead to consensus? (2) How does the process of systematically distorted communication lead to a false consensus? (3) How (on what bases) can an observer distinguish between a "true" and a "false" consensus? Answers to these three questions require an explication of the process of dialogue. Phenomenology (which analyzes the eidetic structures of experience) and philosophical hermeneutics (which examines the linguistic experience of understanding and misunderstanding) provide Habermas' theory with a foundation for examining dialogue and, hence, determining whether social action is communicative or strategic. In other words, phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics supplement Habermas' critical theory by explicating the eidetic and interpretive structure of dialogue.

As noted previously, the eidetic structure of dialogue (Mickunas, 1982) requires a three-pronged relationship: (1) an orientation toward the signification of the state of affairs, (2) an orientation toward alter in terms of the signification of the state of affairs, and (3) an orientation toward oneself in terms of the signification of the state of affairs. The interpretive structure of dialogue (Bleicher, 1980; Heidegger, 1982; Gadamer, 1975) complements this eidetic structure; understanding is a circular process where one's "preju-
"dices" anticipate the significance of something and are subsequently either fulfilled, rejected, or transformed. Hence, ego and alter's dialogue is oriented by sedimented significations (prejudices). Three concepts -- relevance, selectivity, and historicity -- are implicated by the eidetic and interpretive structures of dialogue.

**Relevance.** Central to dialogue is the significative dimension which is constituted by corporeity (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Mickunas, 1982). While all communication is situated here-and-now and is limited by the expressive abilities of the communicators, communication as signification transcends its immediate context since significance is reiterable. The concept of relevance (Schutz, 1962, 1964), underscores how meaning relies on typifications, classifications, and other forms of contrasting and comparing the relatively stable aspects (eidos) of being-in-the-world (intentionality). In order to understand alter's motives, ego has to perceive what is relevant to alter. Dialogue calls for ego and alter to coorient themselves toward the significance (relevance) of some object, event, or state of affairs. This is possible since the dialogic experience constitutes a policentric field of action (Husserl, 1962) where ego is already decentered by the presence of alter. Hence, to understand (if only partially) the relevance of some state of affairs for alter, ego assumes the signifying orientation of alter (again, if only partially) by engaging in alter's project-at-hand. In short, the concept of relevance dictates that the meaning of something, either for the signifier or for the interpreter, is shaped by the mutual intentionality of the
signifier and the interpreter.

Selectivity. Engagement in alter's project-at-hand, of course, is possible only to the extent that ego attends to those significations of alter that are reflective of alter's project (Schutz, 1962). The very fact that alter says something in this place, at this time, with this emphasis discloses the selectivity of expression, while ego's ability to attend to this or that expression, in a more or less involved manner, reveals the selectivity of attention. The interplay of attention and expression indexes the selectivity of signification. By alternately accepting, rejecting, or rephrasing significations of the state of affairs, ego and alter may disclose (or obscure) its significance from a mutual horizon which intersects the individual horizon of each partner (Gadamer, 1979; Mickunas, 1982). Thus, only to the extent that ego (1) engages in alter's project and (2) accepts the engagement of alter in his or her own project is ego able to understand alter's motives.

Historicity. The concept of historicity "refers to the transcendence of the present moment toward the future" which is shaped by "an openness toward both the future and the past" (Stewart and Mickunas, 1974, p. 72), an openness which language and other institutionalized means of expression both allow and limit. Gadamer's (1975) account of historicity emphasizes the effect of historical consciousness upon interpretation. Linguistic terms, organizational forms, or cultural types unconsciously affect the dialogical partners' view of the world since such terms, forms, and types are pre-given in
the social world and provide the background for engaging in and interpreting dialogue. Thus, ego and alter bring to a discussion a preunderstanding derived from both sedimented personal experiences and sedimented institutional experiences (due to language and other social institutions). Gadamer indicates that through dialectic ego discovers if his or her prejudices are sustained within alter's experience. In other words, dialectic is a testing of opinion that seeks what is mutually "true" about the object of the conversation.

Methodological Criteria

The concepts of relevance, selectivity, and historicity provide answers to the questions raised in the preceding discussion and, thus, serve as methodological criteria for assessing social action.

(1) How does the process of discourse (dialectical dialogue) lead to consensus? The concepts of selectivity and relevance imply that consensus occurs when the significative horizons (systems of relevance and intentional structures) of ego and alter intersect; importantly, this agreement about the relevance of something also implies a basis in differences since the significative horizons of ego and alter are not isomorphic. Moreover, the intersection of significative horizons relies upon traditions which provide the systems of relevances and intentional structures employed by ego and alter. This historicity, in turn, is the basis for both "true" and "false" consensus.

(2) How does the process of systematically distorted communication lead to a false consensus? Systematically distorted communica-
tion occurs when both partners to a discussion misapprehend the systems of relevances and/or intentional structures (opinions and values) guiding the discussion. Such mutual misapprehension occurs only if neither partner tests the grounds (opinions and values) on which a consensus rests.

(3) How (on what bases) can an observer distinguish between a "true" and a "false" consensus? First, the observer has to comprehend the significative horizons of both ego and alter. Second, the observer has to comprehend how ego and alter view the intersection of their two significative horizons. And, third, the observer has to compare ego and alter's view of the intersection of their significative horizons with his or her own comprehension of the significative horizons of ego and alter. In short, the observer must test the grounds for the consensus.

Hence, the criteria of relevance, selectivity, and historicity complement one another by dictating that the social scientific "observer" recognize how he or she participates in the very social event which he or she investigates. Reliance solely upon techniques of distancing only obscure the extent to which the researcher's understanding of social action depends upon the researcher's value-orientations and project-at-hand intermeshing with the systems of relevance and intentionality of the subjects being observed. This dialectic means that the researcher cannot isolate him or herself from the social world in the name of objectivity and expect to accurately and reliably account for social action; in all such instances, the
conclusions of the researcher will be value-latent. Indeed, the "critical" moment for the value-oriented researcher occurs when he or she shares his or her assessment of social action with the participants since their acknowledgement of that assessment completes the reflexive movement of critique.

Implications

The stance taken by the researcher who applies a critical theory of dialogue is perhaps best seen through contrast. As was noted in Chapter I, Fisher and Hawes' (1971) interact system model (ISM) of communication explicates how many communication researchers examine decision making. This influential model, however, makes a number of assumptions about communication and methodology which are countered by a critical theory of dialogue. Hence, the first part of this section contrasts both the communication theory and the methodology supported by ISM with those of a critical theory of dialogue.

Communication Theory and Methodology

Fisher and Hawes' (1971) ISM attempts to build a grounded theory of communication by viewing interactions as behavioral systems. Assuming that observed behaviors are directly meaningful (may be assigned an unambiguous meaning by an observer), Fisher and Hawes call upon researchers to search for statistically significant patterns of behaviors in order to explain the phenomenon of small group decision
making. Thus, ISM focuses on cyclical features of communicative behavior; i.e., repeated sequences of communicative interacts identified within an empirical sample of small groups are used to predict the interaction of future decision making groups.

In contrast to ISM, a critical theory of dialogue assumes (1) that observable communication behaviors index multiple meanings (systems of relevance) and (2) that through the interplay of these relevances ego and alter selectively found a common core of significance about something. Hence, to explain the phenomenon of small group decision making, a critical theory of dialogue requires that the researcher examine not only the communication behaviors, but also the systems of relevance and selectivity of the group.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of a critical dialogical theory, ISM's descriptive explanation of decision making is problematic since the researcher must assume that the meaning of a communicative behavior remains static over time. Thus, a critical theory of dialogue also proffers a temporally-oriented explanation of communicative behavior which takes into account the historicity of all communicative acts. Rather than predicting the interaction of future decision making groups, a critical theory of dialogue yields a means (1) to assess current decision making and (2) to anticipate the direction of future decision making.

The preceding argument may be augmented by illustrating (1) the theses of Fisher and Hawes' ISM and (2) the counter-theses of a critical theory of dialogue. Fisher and Hawes' ISM assumes the following
about communication and methodology:

1. Communicative behaviors are **isomorphic** with significance. Thus, signification reflects a subject-object relationship in which ego (the researcher) perceives communicative behaviors as objects which are assigned unambiguous meanings.

2. To obtain constancy of meaning, the temporality of signification is ignored and communicative behaviors are thereby reified. Objectification of communicative acts "freezes" the meaning of behaviors to a fixed system of signs and symbols.

3. Since behaviors are reduced to a fixed system of signs, numeric values may be assigned to specific behaviors so that appropriate statistical procedures may identify repeated behavioral sequences and cycles which portray the communicative process of decision making.

Countering the theses of Fisher and Hawes' ISM, a critical theory of dialogue makes the following assumptions about communication and methodology:

1. Communicative behaviors are **indices** of significance. Since dialogue requires an intersubjective attunement, signification reflects a threefold relationship to (a) the topic or object of a conversation, (b) alter's view of the topic, and (c) ego's view of the topic.

2. Constancy of meaning (a common core) is gained by accounting for temporality as the opening, shifting, and maintaining of past and future horizons in which ego's significations are selectively mediated
by alter and appropriated in alter's significations and vice-versa.
Significance thus viewed is a "founded whole," a melody that arises
from the notes "played" by ego and alter.

3. The significance of some communicative behavior for an
observer depends upon the observer's (a) system of relevances, (b)
selective engagement in the situation observed, and (c) historical
prejudices (hermeneutic or pre-in4e pretive framework). Since the
relevance, selectivity, and historicity of the group observed differ
markedly from that of the observer, the observer cannot simply assume
that his or her observations (significations) are valid.

4. Valid observations of communicative behaviors account for
(but are not necessarily identical with) the participants'
significations of those same behaviors. Hence, "observers" will make
valid observations only to the extent that they (a) participate in the
situation and reflect upon their selective involvement in order to
recognize their projects-at-hand; (b) test their systems of relevances
against those used by particiQagts in order to develop a shared
language for signifying the relevance of the state-of-affairs; and (c)
reflect upon how their prejudices—which are revealed through steps
"a" and "b"--are supported, rejected, or transformed.

A critical theory of dialogue thus requires that the researcher
engage in dialogue and reflect upon that engagement in order to
investigate the process of decision making. This engagement and
reflection, which seemingly are obviated in the ISM researcher's
understanding of signification, merely remain hidden from view.
Consider the following questions: How can the "same" expression mean more than one thing? How can the "same" thing be expressed in more than one way? Neither a fixed system of signs nor an isomorphism of meaning and behavior can address these questions. However, a critical dialogical theory can answer these questions by pointing to the significative dimension which underlies the multivalent nature of expression. It is this dimension upon which the researcher relies in order to "make sense" of his or her observations. Indeed, the difference between the ISM and the critical dialogical researcher lies in the latter researcher's recognition and orientation to the significative dimension. ISM researchers unreflectively "assign" sedimented significations to the behaviors that they observe, while critical dialogical researchers test the system of relevances which they selectively use through (1) engaging in dialogue with their "subjects" and (2) reflecting upon that engagement.

The upshot of this discussion is not to discredit the actual research findings of investigators such as Fisher (or others that believe in the ISM); rather, this discussion suggests that such empiricist accounts of methodology are founded on misconceptions about how communication researchers actually go about their research. For example, Fisher's (1970) own account of his model of decision making (see Chapter I) shows that he was oriented by his own engagement in and reflection about decision making groups. Moreover, he relies on the significative dimension to differentiate between the orientation and emergence phase of his model. In both phases, the same behavior
(ambiguous statements about decision proposals) occurs; however, Fisher assigns this behavior two different meanings: (1) it functions as a way to avoid being too assertive during the orientation phase and (2) it functions during the emergence phase as a means to save "face" while agreeing with the decision proposal which one had previously opposed. Hence, this discussion asks for a more complete accounting of the research process in terms of the communication praxis of the researcher in order to assess the validity of his or her findings.

**Dialogue, Decision Making, and Negotiation**

The preceding section lays the groundwork for differentiating between a critical theory of dialogue and current models of decision making and negotiation. Both Fisher's (1970) four-phase model of decision making and Gulliver's (1979) model of negotiation as joint decision making are briefly reviewed and interpreted in terms of a critical theory of dialogue.

As noted previously, Fisher's model of decision making posits four phases: orientation, conflict, decision emergence, and reinforcement. Fisher's model delimits decision making by viewing it as a sequential process directed toward a particular outcome—a decision about some course of action. The phases that he proposes encompass the social action that transpires from the time a group meets to discuss a course of action to the point that a decision has been made and accepted by the group. Each phase is interpreted in terms of its function for the group vis-a-vis this outcome. Thus,
during the orientation phase, the group defines the situation for which the decision is a necessary outcome; the group contests various decision proposals during the conflict phase; during the emergence phase, the group chooses a particular proposal; and the group commits itself to this proposal during the reinforcement phase.

In a similar fashion, Gulliver's eight-phase developmental model of negotiation is outcome oriented. For example, the first phase, search for an arena for the negotiations, presupposes some sort of dispute settlement, just as each of the other phases (formulation of an agenda, preliminary statements of demands, narrowing of differences, preliminary bargaining, final bargaining, ritual confirmation, and implementation) articulate a set of activities which are oriented toward the settlement of a dispute. Indeed, Gulliver stresses that the developmental model idealizes the general pattern of movement that characterizes successful negotiation outcomes.

Although Fisher offers no explicit theory to explain how a decision making group moves from one phase to another, Gulliver does try to explain the movement from one phase of negotiation to another with a cyclical model of information exchange between the two negotiating parties. This model shows that through the exchange of information the disputing parties may either change their own preferences or their set of expectations about the other party's preferences, or both. Such changes set in motion the developmental phases of negotiation.
However, Gulliver's cyclical model of information exchange does not explain why negotiators are faced with the dilemma of being compelled to supply more information to their opponents than they wish, nor why providing information to an opponent obligates the opponent to reciprocate. As was articulated in Chapter II, a critical theory of dialogue explains the negotiators' "dilemma" by showing that communicative action has a rational basis. Interestingly, Niklas Luhmann (1979, p. 109) presents another explanation for this same "dilemma" which shows the compelling force of strategic actions which utilize the "communication media" of power or money:

(B)y communication media I mean a mechanism additional to language, in other words, a code of generalized symbols which guides the transmission of selections. In addition to language, which normally guarantees intersubjective comprehension, i.e., the recognition of the selection of the other party as a selection, communication media therefore have also a motivating function; for they urge the acceptance of other people's selections and as a rule make that acceptance the object of expectations. Accordingly, communication media can always be formulated when the manner of one partner's selection serves simultaneously as a motivating structure for the other. The symbols of this connection between selection and motivation then take on the function of a transmission and make clear the connection between the two aspects, so that this anticipatory connection can strengthen and, in addition, motivate the selectivity. (Luhmann, 1979, p. 111)

The distinction between communicative and strategic actions is clarified by Habermas (1982) in a reply to his critics; importantly, Habermas argues that the "communication media" of power or money may be linguistically mediated.
Communication and purposive activity are two equally fundamental elements of social interactions. These interactions fall into two classes, depending on the mechanism for co-ordinating action: communicative action and strategic action. In the one case co-ordination takes place by way of building consensus, in the other case by way of complementing interest situations. In the former case communication in language has to serve as the medium for co-ordinating action; in the latter it can do so. To the extent that strategic interactions are linguistically mediated, language serves as a means of influencing. With reference to sanctions, ego brings alter to decisions from which ego expects consequences favourable to the attainment of its own ends. In doing so, ego does not—as it does in communicative action—first have to get involved in the consensus-forming function of language. If, on the other hand, ego and alter harmonise their plans of action with one another, that is, if they pursue their individual ends only under the condition of a communicatively produced consensus regarding the given situation, they have to make use of language in a manner orientated (sic) to reaching understanding. (1982, p. 237)

By delimiting both decision making and negotiation as outcome oriented, Fisher and Gulliver explicitly formulate these two processes as purposive activities. Yet, Fisher argues that his model of decision making portrays a "the interaction process across time leading to group consensus on decisionmaking tasks" (1970, p. 54). And Gulliver, while more cautious, states that a negotiation's outcome "reflects the relative strengths of the parties in terms of their resources of material and symbolic power and the constraints of moral and practical rules and values in the society" (1979, p. 80). Thus both Fisher's and Gulliver's models exhibit an ambivalence toward the
type of social action embodied by the processes of decision making and negotiation. In other words, neither Fisher's four-phase model of decision making nor Gulliver's two models of negotiation distinguish between strategic and communicative action. This is a crucial point since either form of social action may be used to coordinate the interests of group members or disputing parties.

A critical theory of dialogue contributes to decision making and negotiation theories not only by distinguishing between communicative action and strategic action, but also by explicating communicative action as the process of consensual reasoning. Dialectical dialogue, thus, underlies the "rationality" of consensually-based decision making and negotiation. For Habermas, consensus requires not only a shared definition of the situation, but also mutual agreement as to the validity about some course of action or settlement. Such validity cannot be merely assumed, but requires discourse (dialectical dialogue) to support the basis for the claim of validity. Phenomenological and hermeneutic theory further articulate dialectic as aiming at the merging of significative horizons which takes into account the systems of relevances, selectivity, and historicity of the group or of the disputing parties.

New Directions for Decision Making and Negotiation Research

Clearly, the processes of decision making and negotiation (1) may rely on strategic and/or communicative actions and (2) decisions or settlements may be based upon consensus, pseudoconsensus, or a
complementarity of interests. A variety of directions for future research may be delineated based on these insights. Directions for decision making research are discussed first, then directions for negotiation research are discussed.

Decision making. Current small group communication research of consensual decision-making has relied on self-report measures of consensus gathered after a group has arrived at a decision (Destephen, 1983; Hill, 1976; Knutson, 1972; Knutson and Holdridge, 1975; Knutson and Kowitz, 1977). Moreover, even dynamic measures of consensus (Spillman, Bezdek, and Spillman, 1979) rely on self-report instruments administered while a group is making a decision. Hence, this line of research treats consensus as an important outcome of group discussion, but it does not directly examine how the process of discussion affects consensus.

Also, and perhaps most importantly, consensus is usually considered by these researchers as unanimous agreement among group members upon some course of action. Since unanimity rarely occurs, a standard procedure is to ask group members to assign weights (values) to various alternatives which the group discusses. Groups in which members display similar values are considered to be closer to consensus than groups in which members exhibit diverse values.

A critical theory of dialogue (1) provides a more direct way to assess the process of consensual reasoning by (2) examining the significations of the various group members in terms of their systems of relevance, selectivity, and historicity. Consensus requires that
the members reach an understanding, a merging of significative horizons; in contrast, "agreements" such as those measured by current researchers may mask pseudoconsensus or the simple complementarity of different interests. For example, group members may assign various alternatives similar weights for very different reasons. Thus, the present means used to measure consensus may actually obscure the misunderstandings or different interests which are the basis for the observed "agreement."

In a similar fashion, a critical theory of dialogue introduces the possibility of addressing how groups may make more effective decisions. This question has traditionally been addressed by studying group problem-solving; recent studies of effective and ineffective problem-solving (Hirokawa, 1983; Hirokawa, 1982; Hirokawa, 1980) compare a group's solution with a model solution that a panel of experts have developed. This approach to problem-solving has several limitations when it is applied to decision making. The expert panel approach merely judges effectiveness in terms of the group's ability to match the system of relevances employed by the panel of experts; competing systems of relevance are thus ignored. Furthermore, this reduction obscures other factors which a critical theory of dialogue stresses: (1) the selectivity (intentional structures) of the group members and (2) the historicity (pre-interpretive framework) of the group. These three concepts (relevance, selectivity, and historicity) influence whether a group is more or less effective since a critical dialogical theory uses the criterion of consensus to assess the
effectiveness of a group's decision making. Hence, from a critical
dialogical theory perspective, it is not surprising that Hirokawa
(1983) reports that "no single uniform sequence of (decision making)
phases is necessarily associated with either "successful" or
"unsuccessful" group problem-solving" (p. 291).

Poole (1983) argues that Hirokawa's (1983) finding supports his
contention that phasic models of decision-making are overly
simplistic. He presents a multiple sequence model of decision-making
based on three "activity tracks:"

1. Task process activities: those activities the
group enacts to manage its task.

2. Relational activities: those activities that
reflect or manage relationships among group
members as these relate to the group's work.

3. Topical focus: the substantive issues and
arguments of concern to the group at a given
point in the discussion. (1983, p. 326)

These three activity tracks "evolve simultaneously and interlock
in different patterns over time" (Poole, 1983, p. 326). Poole argues
that certain "breakpoints" may be identified that are crucial for
tracing the development of a group's decision-making: (1) sanctioned
or normal breakpoints, (2) delays, and (3) disruptions. The activity
tracks and breakpoints are supplemented by taking into account
structural requirements for decisions similar to those listed by Bales
and Strodbeck (1951). According to Poole, this framework is affected
by two factors: the task (difficulty and coordination requirements) and the group's history (involvement, consensus, and procedural norms).

A critical theory of dialogue complements and further articulates Poole's model for assessing decision-making phases. For example, the triadic relationship of dialogue may be correlated with the three activity tracks that Poole presents: an orientation toward the significance of the state of affairs implies a topical focus; an orientation toward the other in terms of the significance of the state of affairs implies a relational activity; and an orientation toward oneself in terms of the significance of the state of affairs implies a task activity. Moreover, the thematizing and bracketing of truth claims provides a means for tracing "breakpoints" and plotting the development of the group's discussion. Furthermore, a critical theory of dialogue enhances Poole's model of the multiple and sequential development of decisions by taking into account how communicative and strategic actions are used to coordinate the interests of group members.

In summary, a critical theory of dialogue provides new insights for research which examines consensual decision making, decision making effectiveness, and phases of decision making. By bringing the methodological criteria of relevance, selectivity, and historicity to bear upon each of these areas, future researchers should be able to address basic questions about decision making in a new and fruitful way.
Negotiation. Although many theories of negotiation (Homans, 1974; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Young, 1975) either implicitly or explicitly view negotiation as a form of strategic action, the discussion of Gulliver's (1979) theory of negotiation illustrated that it may also be viewed as a form of communicative action. Moreover, during the last decade, cooperative labor-management committees (such as the committee examined in Chapter IV) have created a context for viewing informal and non-contractual small group decision making as negotiation (Herrick, 1983; Van de Ven & Joyce, 1981; Zager & Rosow, 1982). In turn, organizational scholars have shown an interest in broadening the concepts of negotiation (Bazerman & Lewicki, 1983; Strauss, 1978) and decision making (Tompkins and Cheney, 1983; Lindblom, 1981: March, 1981). Kochan and Verma (1983, p. 15) and Lindblom (1981, p. 245) both note that efforts to enhance these concepts are based on interpretive approaches to organizations.

A critical theory of dialogue advocates a critical interpretive approach to both decision making and negotiation, and it raises several issues for researchers of negotiation. First, the relationship between decision making and negotiation demands further clarification. For example, in Chapter I it was argued that decision making which involves polarization among group members may be considered a form of negotiation. This distinction appears fruitful if negotiators seek mutual understanding since it not only indicates issues for discussion, but also indicates that the definition of the situation must be addressed before these issues can be resolved. However, what
are the implications if one negotiator seeks a mutual understanding, but the other does not?

This raises a second issue requiring explication: the relationship between communicative and strategic actions as means for coordinating the interests of negotiators. More specifically, this issue can be formulated as a series of research questions: Under what conditions do communicative or strategic actions better enable negotiators to coordinate their interests? How may strategic actions further action oriented to reaching an understanding? How may communicative actions further unilateral ends? Answers to these questions require further explication of strategic actions as "communication media," as well as consideration of how such media systematically influence negotiators. Indeed, this line of inquiry is elaborated upon in Habermas' (1984) latest work.

A third issue which a critical dialogical theory raises concerns methodology. Much of the negotiation research conducted under the rubric of bargaining assumes that negotiators follow an economic model of reasoning; i.e., each negotiator attempts to maximize economic gains (Young, 1975). The methodological criteria of relevance, selectivity, and historicity offer researchers conceptual means for attempting to go beyond the "economic rational" approach. Addressing how these concepts may be most effectively applied to answer the questions previously raised is another fruitful direction for negotiation research.
Three Directives for Facilitating Consensual Decision Making

The study of a labor-management committee's decision-making in Chapter IV explicated a number of aspects of dialogue. First, the analyses illustrated how a conversation may be transfigured through the introduction of new themes and temporal horizons. Second, these same analyses pointed out how different significations of a state of affairs (flextime) may be synthesized by the participants in a conversation and provide the basis for mutual agreement. Third, the analyses showed how the disruption of dialogue (through the irruption of multiple conversations) introduced possibilities for systematic misunderstandings since not all participants were signifying the same state of affairs. And, fourth, while participants in the conversation reached an implicit agreement (consensus) by mutually raising and recognizing truth claims, such a reliance on implicit grounds for agreement introduced possibilities for participants to systematically misunderstand one another. By implication, the achievement of a "true" consensus requires that participants engage in discourse (dialectical dialogue) and strive to make explicit the bases for consensus.

These findings also imply that certain directives for facilitating consensual decision making (and negotiations) may be derived from a critical theory of dialogue. First, a facilitator must test the grounds for any potential consensus; the system of relevances and intentionality of each party to an agreement must be mutually acknowledged if a "true" consensus is sought. Second, the facilitator must
recognize that groups making decisions or negotiating settlements may 
be swayed by irrational drives (Bion's basic assumptions) which means 
that the bases for agreements cannot be directly and "rationally"
tested by the facilitator. Third, in such cases, the facilitator must 
employ strategic actions (albeit, oriented toward reaching an 
understanding) in order to induce the group to reflect upon and 
recognize the basis for its actions.

The first directive calls for the facilitator to engage the group 
in discourse (dialectical dialogue) about the grounds for a consensus. Moreover, the facilitator must reflect upon his or her 
participation in order to effectively engage the group in discourse. 
In other words, facilitators must (1) reflect upon their selective 
involvement in the group's discussion in order to perceive how their 
own intentional structures affect the group, (2) test their systems of 
relevance against those used by group members in order to mutually 
signify the relevance of the state of affairs, and (3) reflect upon 
how their prejudices and the prejudices of group members are suppor­
ted, rejected, or transformed.

In contrast, directives two and three call for the facilitator to 
apply a "depth" hermeneutic. Hence, the facilitator (1) attends to 
the emotional expressions of the group to determine if the group is 
coordinating its actions via emotional valency rather than consensual 
reasoning; (2) rechannels the basic assumption by transfering its 
objective force, e.g., so it is directed toward him or herself; and 
(3) thematizes the resulting group catharsis in order to induce the
group to reflect upon the bases for its actions.

**Epilogue**

Although the assessment of social action and the facilitation of communicative action seem necessary to ensure "true" consensus, every consensus remains, in principle, open to dispute. Changes in the situation and/or in the significative horizons of the participants warrant the reconsideration of the bases for consensus. Thus, a critical theory of dialogue does not envision a utopian state of perfect agreement. Rather, it calls for a communicative ethic (praxis) in which the mutual interests of participants are actively sought and recognized in)order to coordinate social interaction.
Appendix A

SYMLOG Directional Definitions (Bales and Cohen, 1979: 355-386)

DIRECTION U

Behavior

ACT U Acts overtly toward others in a way that seems Dominant (Upward). Examples: takes the initiative in speaking; speaks loudly, firmly, rapidly, or with few pauses for the other to reply; holds the floor with "uh..."; or addresses communications to the group as a whole rather than to individuals.

NON U Gives nonverbal signs that seem Dominant (Upward). Examples: moves strongly, rapidly, or expansively; sits or stands very straight; keeps very alert and active; keeps arms or legs in open posture; holds shoulders squarely back; holds chest high; holds elbows back with palms forward as if ready to grasp; holds the knees firmly back or grips the ground with the toes.

Content Image

U in SEL Mentions a content image of some U element in the SELF, U in OTH in the OTHER, or in the GROUP. Examples: describes U in GRP self, other, or group as active, talkative, strong, assertive, powerful, adventurous, thick-skinned, extroverted, superior, of high social status, rich, highly educated, experienced, successful, older, or self-confident.

U in SIT Mentions a content image of some element in the external SITUATION immediately facing the group as if it were acting toward the self, other, or group in a U manner. Examples: Some outside stimulus is described as imposing powerful demands for response, or as overwhelming. "Time is running out." "There is too much to do." "We are about to lose." "We are up against it." "It is a great challenge."
U in SOC  Mentions a content image of some U element in SOCIETY. Examples: a rich person; a powerful public figure; a person of high formal rank in government, the military, finance, large industry, or the arts; a person of distinctive achievement; or a high-status collectivity such as the upper classes, powerful corporate groups, management, owners.

U in FAN  Mentions a content image of some U element from some form of FANTASY, or with some fantasy-arousing quality. Examples: a giant in a dream, a general in a play, a literary reference to destiny, a myth of ascension, an expensive car, an anecdote of walking on water; or, from the past or current outside experience of the individual: "My father was huge." "My mother was more dominant than my father." "I just won the pole vault!"

Value Judgment

PRO U  Makes a value judgement in favor of or against some U image. Examples: "I am not going to try that trick of walking on water again!" (CON U IN FAN). "I think we should all fell free to speak up whenever we like" (PRO U in GRP).

DIRECTION UP

Behavior

ACT UP  Acts overtly toward others in a way that seems Dominant (Upward) and Friendly (Positive). Examples: takes the initiative in asking others about themselves; talks about others in the group in a friendly way; or initiates new actions to symbolize friendly social interest, such as making introductions, beginning the use of nicknames, giving compliments, or making social small talk.

NON UP  Gives nonverbal signs that seem Dominant (Upward) and Friendly (Positive). Examples: takes the initiative in exchanges of smiles or waves, shakes hands warmly, approaches closer to the other, places hands on the shoulders of others, claps others on the back, links arms, or puts arms around the other; gives the other a seat, food, or drink; physically demonstrates affection or good will.
Content Image

UP in SEL  Mentions a content image of some UP element in the SELF, the OTHER, or in the GROUP. Examples: describes self, other, or group as outgoing, open, sociable, good-natured, happy, hale and hearty, cordial, genial, socially extroverted, or popular.

UP in SIT  Mentions a content image of some element in the external SITUATION facing the group as if it were acting toward the self, other, or group in a UP manner. Examples: defines some sponsor or condition outside the group that encourages the self and others to form a strong solidary group; some outside inducement that rewards the identification of the members with each other as a group; or some outside source of reward that induces the members to identify themselves with it, e.g., "The money is out there just waiting for us!" "We are bound to win the pennant!" "This is our happy home!" "Our luck is holding!"

UP in SOC  Mentions a content image of some UP element in SOCIETY. Example: One's own ethnic group, the good institutions, the generous foundations, our founding fathers, our sponsors, our totem group.

UP in FAN  Mentions a content image of some UP element from some form of FANTASY or with some fantasy-arousing quality. Examples: a dream of a big dish of ice cream, a play about the most popular person at the party, a book called All-Time Greats, the myth of the birth of a hero, the crowning of Miss America, an anecdote about Queen for a Day; or from the past or current outside experience of the individual: "My old man was a hockey star." "My older brother was always ready to back me up in fights."

Value Judgment

PRO UP  Makes a value judgment in favor of or against some UP image. Examples: "We are lucky to be Americans!" (PRO UP in SOC), "The higher they rise, the harder they fall!" (Con UP in FAN).
### DIRECTION UPF

#### Behavior

**ACT UPF**
Acts overtly toward others in a way that seems Dominant (Upward), Friendly (Positive), and Instrumentally Controlled (Forward). Examples: takes the initiative in persuading or offering to help the group on a task of confronting the group as a whole, offers democratic leadership, or tries to smooth out conflicts between group members by mediating, conciliating, or moderating so as to get ahead with the tasks of the group.

**NON UPF**
Gives nonverbal signs that seem dominant (Upward), Friendly (Positive), and Instrumentally Controlled (Forward). Examples: takes a position in front of the group in the direction of attention or physical movement necessary for a group task; places the self between the group and some threatening location; sits in a prominent place in order to communicate with as many group members as possible about the task; demonstrates some form of task-oriented behavior for others to perform; or tries to persuade others to perform work by work gestures.

### Content Image

**UPF in SEL**
Mentions a content image of some UPF element in the SELF. Examples:

**UPF in OTH SELF, in the OTHER, or in the GROUP.**

**UPF in GRP**
describes self, other, or the group as high in leadership; as interested in the group's success in the task; as taking the initiative in helping the group's task performance or in building group unity or morale in relation to group tasks; as a "natural leader"; or as an "inspirational leader."

**UPF in SIT**
Mentions a content image of some element in the externam SITUATION immediately facing the group as if it were acting toward the self, other, or group, in a UPF manner. Examples: "The management of this business is showing good leadership." "The reward for our improved performance will be given to the group as a whole." "The incentive system here is arranged so that we will have to cooperate and maintain a high standard of performance in order to receive the highest rewards."
UPF in SOC  Mentions a content image of some UPF element in SOCIETY. Examples: a school where one can obtain needed teaching, a labor union that is regarded positively, a positively regarded action-oriented organization, one's own political party, or one's own candidate for election.

UPF in FAN  Mentions a content image of some UPF element from some form of FANTASY or with some fantasy-arousing quality. Examples: a dream of a ladder leading to heaven, a play about Abraham Lincoln, a myth about a messiah, or, from the past or current outside experience of the individual: "I was the leader of the team in high school." "My mother was the real head of the family." "Our team won today!"

Value Judgment

PRO UPF  Makes a value judgment in favor of or against some UPF image. Examples: "John has what it takes, why not let him lead?" (PRO UPF in JOHN). "I've had enough of pie in the sky!" (CON UPF in FAN).

DIRECTION UF

Behavior

ACT UF  Acts overtly toward others in a way that seems Dominant (Upward), and Instrumentally Controlled (Forward). Examples: acts as chairman or manager of the group, calls the meeting together, suggests an agenda, calls on individuals to participate, regulates communication between others, makes impersonal attempts to persuade or guide others, makes suggestions for group performance, gives routine signals regulating performance, closes the meeting, or dismisses the group.

NON UF  Gives nonverbal signs that seem Dominant (Upward), and Instrumentally Controlled (Forward). Examples: starts a new phase of activity prior to the others or goes first; maintains a facial appearance of confident dignity, impartiality, or self-control; or holds head well up, holds face composed, with wings of nose relaxed, mouth and brows relaxed.
Content Image

UF in SEL  Mentions a content image of some UF element in the SELF, in the OTHER, or in the GROUP. Examples: describes self, other, or group as firm, resolute, managerial, identified with impersonal ideals, identified with external task demands, determined, businesslike, controlling, concerned with receiving loyalty rather than love, or concerned with receiving effective performance in relation to the task.

UF in SIT  Mentions a content image of some element in the external SITUATION immediately facing the group as if it were acting toward the self, other, or group in a UF manner. Examples: the situation is described as providing a fast and dependable feedback on success or failure of efforts to perform according to a work standard or according to a value standard, or as providing reward or punishment according to individual performance: "Our job is cut out for us." "This is not an easy situation, but it is a fair one." "People will get what they deserve in this organization, no more, no less."

UF in SOC  Mentions a content image of some UF element in SOCIETY. Examples: a high-status business or occupational group, a judge, a manager, a certified public accountant, a priest, a customs inspector, an administrator, the courts, the law, an examining and certifying system.

UF in FAN  Mentions a content image of some UF element in some form of FANTASY or with some fantasy-arousing quality. Examples: a play about justice, a book on constitutional powers of the president, a myth about Solomon, a dream about blind justice holding the scales, an anecdote about red tape in the bureaucracy, or, from the past or current outside experience of the individual: "I've got to go take that test tomorrow."

Value Judgment

PRO UF  Makes a value judgment in favor of or against some UF image.

CON UF  Examples: "I found that being businesslike didn't pay
off" (CON UF in SEL). "I wish you weren't so impersonal" (CON UF in OTH). "We've just got to keep our eyes on the ball" (PRO UF in GRP).

DIRECTION UNF

Behavior

ACT UNF Acts overtly toward others in a way that seems Dominant (Upward), Unfriendly (Negative), and Instrumentally Controlled (Forward). Examples: tries to take control arbitrarily or moralistically, tries to control what should be considered right or wrong in the group, tries to restrict others, makes demands, gives commands, shows disapproval or moral indignation, or assumes a pose of moral superiority.

NON UNF Gives nonverbal signs that seem Dominant (Upward), Unfriendly (Negative), and Instrumentally Controlled (Forward). Examples: raises brows in disapproval, closes eyes as if giving up in disgust, or indicates hauteur by facial expression, e.g., shows fullness of the throat below the jaw (suggesting a rising of the gorge), opens mouth slightly (as if about to gag), pushes the lower lip somewhat forward (as if in disdain), or constricts the nostrils (as if sampling an offensive odor).

Content Image

UNF in SEL Mentions a content image of some UNF element in the SELF, UNF in OTH in the OTHER, or in the GROUP. Examples: describes self, UNF in GRP other, or group as authoritarian, moralistic, inflexible, inhibiting, demanding, punishing, prejudiced, dogmatic, insistent on discipline, self-righteous, arbitrary, pompous, or self-important.

UNF in SIT Mentions a content image of some element in the external SITUATION immediately facing the group as if it were acting toward the self, other, or group in a UNF manner. Examples: "We're in a tough situation!" "Some of us are not going to get out of this alive." "This situation will separate the men from the boys." "In this situation,
individual failure to conform or meet the standards will be punished." "In this situation every man is expected to do his duty."

UNF in SOC  Mentions a content image of some UNF element in SOCIETY. Examples: the Marine Corps, a drill sergeant, the boss of a chain gang, a restaurant inspector, a fire chief, the warden of a prison, a hell-fire-and-damnation preacher, a prosecuting attorney, a dictator, the draft, or, when negatively regarded, the police, the system, the establishment.

Value Judgment

PRO UNF  Makes a value judgment in favor of or against some UNF image. Examples: "What this country needs most is law and order!" (PRO UNF in SOC). "I'm tired of being bossed around by you" (CON UNF in OTH).

DIRECTION UN

Behavior

ACT UN  Acts overtly toward others in a way that seems Dominant (Upward) and Unfriendly (Negative). Examples: overrides others in conversation, interrupts and outtalks others, refuses to give way in conversation, disregards others' feelings, attacks or deflates the status of others, asserts own status, or shows aggression or active hostility.

NON UN  Gives nonverbal signs that seem dominant (Upward) and Unfriendly (Negative). Examples: frowns, scowls, knits and lowers the brows, glares with rigidly open eyes, dilates the nostrils (as in anger), pushes the lower lip and lower jaw forward (as if about to bite), puffs out the upper lip and the cheeks with mouth pressed closed (as if barely containing rage), or physically attacks, propels, or restrains others.
UN in SEL: Mentions a content image of some UN element in the SELF, in the OTHER, or in the GROUP. Examples: describes self, other, or group as dominating, aggressive, or hostile, tough-mended, ambitious, contemptuous of others, insensitive, competitive, overbearing, or threatening.

UN in SIT: Mentions a content image of some element in the external SITUATION immediately facing the group as if it were acting toward the self, other, or group in a UN manner. Examples: says there is not enough of some necessary resource to go around or that the situation guarantees that some of all members of the group will fail "It's every man for himself." "It's dog eat dog." "Let the buyer beware."

UN in SOC: Mentions a content image of some UN element in SOCIETY. Examples: gangsters, hired guns, crime in the streets, armaments of other nations, a prize fighter, a con man, a kidnapper, an assassin, the secret police, roller derby, violence on television, foreign agents, foreign intelligence.

UN in FAN: Mentions a content image of some UN element from some form of FANTASY or with some fantasy-arousing quality. Examples: a dream of murdering someone, a play about spies, a book about an execution, an ad for handguns, an anecdote about a mad dog, or, from the past or current outside experience of the individual: "I was afraid he was coming at me!" "My roommate was robbed last night." "My mother was a terror!"
APPENDIX B

Transcript of Dublin Rd. WTP QWL Committee Meeting
December 2, 1981

DIK: I believe our first order of business should be to take the minutes of the last meeting and ah check 'em over and 'prove 'em or disapprove 'em . . . are there any questions on any of the minutes? (10 second pause)

VRG: The minutes you're referring to are for the last meeting

DIK: November fourth, right

UKN: /unintelligible/

VRG: Did we receive them?

DIK: Yes

BIL: I got one but it's a little bit /unintelligible/

VRG: I don't believe I did . . . I got, all, all I got is the the minutes, letter (4 second pause)

UKN: /unintelligible/ (26 second pause)

ARP: The only thing I can add eh to the last one if I may have the floor please was these are fumes people brought up on the safety meeting too and seemed like nobody know any solution there except ah shut the truck off there and ah Bob Hinky's not complaining lately about it so I don't know if he just uh, his heart getting better or you know or just ah he he think's he got a losing battle I really don't know but he he
(A) you know he don't complain lately to me about it since I'm the safety head and I don't know if there's anything could be

DIK: Hope, so ah

(A) worked out about the diesel because somebody mentioned that even in the day time when the trucks shu, shu, you know shut off there you get some fumes fairly strong fumes either in the feeder room /unintelligible/ stock room

DIK: Well ah on that we did ah we had a boom truck out here and Ralph and some of our men went down in the . . filter areas that goes into the basement into the furnace and stuff like that, cleaned up everything they could get out off the uh outside uh pits and uh they cleaned all the filters and everything they could think of down there to try to help, in case any of the fumes was coming in from outside through our cold air return and stuff like that . . ah I think they did mention it to the truck drivers to leave the doors open if the truck was running, after they've pulled in and shut the truck off then they could shut the uh, er shut the doors, but as long as those trucks are running they were to leave the doors open

ALF: BIL put signs down there that they were /unintelligible/

DIK: Ah not as far

(D) as I know, um I think there's signs down there that says please shut off truck engine but uh, not why I I I couldn't

ALF: Yeah Carl _____ did that

(D) remember whether Carl had any signs already made up or whether we had to make them or not

HRB: He said he had put them down there some time ago I think

DIK: Yeah
ARP: Now one more, one more, fumes uh problem there which is probably considerably stronger than we have the diesel, there is on Granview, there is a plastic factory, and at times, I would say that, every, about once a week, it must be something going wrong with their production or they're having a whole bunch of burnt plastic fumes coming out, at times it's so bad you know that's really your eyes, eyes uh eh get watery and all that there so I don't know uh this this is not regularly but at times it come in our heating system I remember about a month ago or so Carol _____ run out, while she was still working here, run out from the research lab and she almost vomited and all that there the fumes came in, huh came in through their vents or wherever in /unintelligible/ lab there that was pretty strong at times you go out on the, like the number four basin area and really your eyes burning from the plastic fume burnt plastic fumes, I don't know how

VRG: /unintelligible/

(A) could be it stopped

VRG I don't know about the fumes from outside but two huh, was it two months ago we had the association meeting up here and the chlorine was coming through there real strong I started noticing after a while, eventually it went away but huh we were getting chlorine through there the, air vents

ARP: I mean you always get chlorine I mean it's huh huh standard procedure if you gotta leak that's you know the . . take it off but I that plastic odor there that's really that could be

(A) /unintelligible/

DIK: Well I'm afraid on that the only thing huh, uh I've it marked down here that Smitty and I are going to try to check on it, but the only thing that we could do we be to report it to E P A or something like that when it does happen and by the time
it happens by the time we get around to it then it's all over with

ARP: When there's no wind, you know, when there's no wind, seems like all the fumes around number four basin and when bulk unloading area there and the trailer area seem like that fumes there just standing there stationary for a long period time, it's the wind that whip up you know get it all over everybody 'en there's no wind there that's the reason awful strong

DIK: I still think we should check or notify the, E P A on that and see if there's anything we can do or or they can do about it

(A) do about it

(D) that's probably would be ah would be ah excellent idea to start on it or . . (5 second pause)

DIK: Alright (5 second pause) oh I see here where DIK _____ was elected chairperson BIL _____ was elected secretary-vice-chairperson there's any question on that //laughter, 3 seconds + 5 seconds//

BIL: You guys take notes

UKN: That's your problem

DIK: Do we have any resignations?

GRT: //laughter 1 second + 2 seconds//=

BIL: /unintelligible/ you guys treat me you ought to . .

ARP: May I wish them all good luck and success for the next year and do excellent job //laughter, 3 seconds// put it on the
minutes

BIL: You guys caught me short /unintelligible/ //laughter, 4 seconds//

VRG: He looks bleeped to hell

DIK: Turn it off //laughter, 4 seconds// well, if if there's no objections then I move we uh accept the minutes as read, as written (2 second pause) do I hear a second?

VRG: Second /unintelligible/

DIK: Ac acting secretary did you get all of that?

BIL: Sure did //laughter, 3 seconds//

DIK: There's one comment I'd like to make on this uh recommendation for the QWL performance appraisal committee, I've had two or three people approach me on it and they seem to think it is a good idea and they've got some good points in it there's two or three points that they think might be (2 second pause) uh a problem ah such as job evaluations stuff like that which I don't think this plant has any problem with . . but ah at the same time it should be put in or some the other, departments but they were concerned aabout some of some of the wording uh, too uh like to have an employee performance we've been doing that all of our life anyhow and we try to keep up on that if we can but uh they overall they were in favour of most of the points on here but there were some of them that were a little bit touchy for some of the people (3 second pause) anybody else have any comment on that uh
ALF: Is that kinda of a late program or what, other industries have been doing this

GRT: Yeah uh as as it is now I'm not exactly positive what the law is ah but the uh city's facing ah legal mandate in order to have some form of job appraisal ah and analysis and, and they are behind schedule already on this and uh the thought was was that the QWL subcommittee if they could come up with a satisfactory system for doing this uh it would be better than trying to have a consultant firm come in from Chicago, New York wherever and with their set froms go through and do all this job analysis and appraisal um that this might be a better approach to it in terms of being more satisfactory not only to uh workers but also hopefully to managers because uh rather than having some consultant who doesn't have any idea really what what the work might be here the actual people who have a good idea would be involved in the process right from the start um the proposed, that the um item that I gave you last time was pretty much an outline of the objectives for the subcommittee uh and ah what they are currently trying to do is just simply the job analysis without the appraisal uh in other words trying to get an idea of what what particular people do in the various uh two areas that I mentioned before where they're trying to implement this program without tying it in to any system as of yet of uh ah merit raises, et cetera ah so the idea here is just simply to get get some idea of the very many, many of the jobs in the city that have not been analyzed in terms of what actual work people are doing in these positions uh

ALF: /unintelligible/ in the last survey they had everybody pulled off their duties /unintelligible/
GR: Sure

ARP: I guess the last survey what we had uh conducted by that independent surveying firm I guess from _____ and after that I don't know how much it cost to the city or oh it didn't amount to much after that the civil service took over

GRT: Sure

VRG: /un intelligible/

(A) I guess under Mayor _____ about once a year we had to fill out survey paper about our job and all that /un intelligible/ seemed like it was it was alright after that seemed like it was dis discontinued I don't know was too much work for Civil Service to add up all the information or what I really don't know about it I still got some of the old survey papers you know made copies out of it and uh just in case you know

GRT: Yeah the ah thought here is that while it's appropriate in some kpositions to have self evaluation of the job in other positions its actually a disadvantage to the employee because what happens is you get people in similar positions doing similar work one person has good writing skills can write up that job so it sounds like they're doing a lot of things another person might be very direct and not write up a very good description of what they're doing and as a result gets classified and might get a lower pay for doing pretty much the same thing as somebody right down the hall, um the idea here is to try to eliminate these discrepancies if possible by being a little bit more uniform in ah the job appraisal ah and analysis

ARP: If I may interrupt you just one second or so here's the we used to have that survey paper once a year so like a water

GRT: Sure
(A) Treatment plant operator job got boosted up to say range twenty-eight and the mechanics job was demoted down because they didn't have no responsibility or anything like that and after we quit that now we come to the point there is our job going to stay where we are and the mechanics going to be way boosted up because they got uh say more I don't know more pull or more writing skills write how important the job is or all that so I guess that's you know I agree with you //laughter// about that's somebody can write better and uh not uh because of the responsibilities and duties that we have but we can write better so we get more money

GRT: The idea here is there's a number of different ways of trying to analyze jobs, some, some sometimes they say the best way is to simply to follow the person around as they do their job, well certain jobs you can do that where people have routines that they follow from day to day but other jobs where your . . like a managers job where might encounter a crisis this day and might have some routine things here but its its mixed up pretty pretty well it's hard to do that . . ahh sometimes a interview a structured interview will help to ah elicit some of these ah ah details of the job other times ah that in line in addition to ah a self evaluation of a job is needed to sometimes three different methods might be used so what they're trying to do is not tie down the job analysis part of this to any particular method but try to see what mix of methods might work the best

ALF: How often?

GRT: That's a good question I'm /unintelligible/ I don't know what the the details might be um

ALF: /unintelligible/
BIL: This some company out of Chicago?

GRT: No, no, no

BIL: Is it the city?

GRT: This is the subcommittee from the city ah committee is working on this and they're trying to

BIL: Now if they're going to do it huh my suggestion is to go, ah eh I don't know if civil service out at ah ____ they have some information on evaluation that, it's all for the air force that's evaluate once a year and that's everything, and

GRT: um um

ALF: Probably too they have this contingency, /unintelligible/

BIL: But I was trying to figure out some way to get them some help if they needed it, yeah, see the civil service down at ____ I'm pretty sure they got some evaluation form and most people there have definitely wrote evaluation all their lifes I have wrote evaluation most of

GRT: um um

(B) /unintelligible/ the service

GRT: So you're fairly familiar with it to, I know that they, they

BIL: I know what they're

(G) have already spent a good amount of time working on questions

(B) running up against

(G) and what types of evaluations might be appropriate I'm I've kind of discussed some of the different options they were talking about, at this point all they're trying to do is to is to to work out what they have decided on and ah in those two divisions I've talked about ah last meeting, what was
that ah recreation, parks and recreation division, and
where was the other one, traffic engineering, and ah and
those are two that volunteered they wanted to have they
wanted them to come in and do it, so uh so they are going to
see how that works out //redline paging call// as far as I
know and ah hopefully we'll have another report at the city
level on ah the progress of this, um

BIL: That's just as well

GRT: um um

VRG: I ah my wife works for and they write up a complete,
every year there it's mandatory that they write up a complete
job description and all and everything they do, during the

GRT: um um

(V) year and submit it once a year, I believe it's once a year,
it might be more often than that, I think it's just once a
year (5 second pause) I don't know whether they'd be
completely different or whether they'd be beneficial to them
or if ah anyone's you know interested in //red line paging
call// talking, discussing this, discussing this with ah some
people down at Midlin Mutual if anything they have to suggest

GRT: um uh

BIL: You just know they're going to have a problem if they go in
there and try to write, you know, ah . . now I'm saying if

VRG: You can't write them directly, I

(B) they go in there and try . .

(V) don't know if they gain anything if they discussed it

BIL: Try to write an evaluation on say thirteen hundred people at
one time
ALF: Is there that much variation in a plant like this, it seems our's is just repetitional.

GRT: Um um, well I think one of the problems ah that they're facing is uh um of ah the approximately six thousand city employees there are roughly over two thousand cla different classifications and of those classifications well over half of them have never had any type of analysis so they're that's the problem they're facing right at this point.

UKN: We ah.

ALF: These classifications, they're created.

GRT: Right, those have been new classifications and very often its its its tied in with a problem that we've talked about before of ah ah provisional employees because many of these classifications have been newly created or were created a while ago never were analyzed tested ah so hopefully this might be another advantage to ah this particular system, ah it might help clear up those problems.

UKN: /unintelligible/

GRT: Yeah, now the civil service has been ah sitting in on this committee and they have had input into it and they would, now I'm not exactly sure of the details of who would be training because the biggest problem for this particular committee is the training of people who will be doing the analysis of the jobs, not the appraisal of the jobs, but in other words words you usually that is your supervisor who appraises ah ah an employee but the particular analysis of that job that has been an issue within the subcommittee itself ah Cheryl within the city is the chairperson and she and another.
person are at least doing the initial training so if you wanted to talk to other people ah and find out more information that would be the person to talk to, Cheryl ______ (7 second pause)

DIK: Any other comments on this appraisal study

UKN: /unintelligible/ (9 second pause)

DIK: Ah at the last meeting I think ARP mentioned the black top down at the service entry gate, now was that around the manhole cover?

ARP: Yeah you got about I would say about an inch or so ah

DIK: It was on, well, well
different between the black top and the concrete wall there what we have, enough so that if you don't watch or all that there you know it could be like /laughter/ get getting your front end out of your car out of alignment or if you got a new car . . . yeah

ALF: Especially the left side (3 second pause)

DIK: Going down and check it and set our set our snow blades so it would miss it but ah that don't help your car any ah I talked to Smitty about it and we were going to try to get some cold patch or something and build it up but ah . . . ah . . . so far

ARP: That would be we haven't been able to get any that was extra down at the plant right now

(A) simplest, wouldn't it

UKN: /unintelligible/
ARP: Yeah well by the time you get half the /unintelligible/
DIK: If we could build it back
a foot and a half or so why it would probably take care of it
BIL /unintelligible/

ALF: You can see they got it all graded off and /unintelligible/
BIL: /unintelligible/.
you oughta //laughter// that's not something you
/unintelligible/ because legally you gonna have an accident
/unintelligible/
ARP: Talking about that, what we brought that up in the
safety meeting, not last one before that to, its the county
changed that yield sign on us and I really agree with
Ed _____ when he brought the the subject up there, the people
go to our door its a hell of a hard time to see whose come up
with the county ah if the county come they can see ours you
know better than we, can try to twist our neck out to see
DIK: Yeah

(A) whose coming there
DIK: Now it
VRG: There again your biggest concern too, even
even though it isn't concern for ah regular driving a regular car,
especially you take that grass truck and you got that large
tailgate and all them racks or any any large vehicle of ah
where you don't have much view, side view, hey it's it's a
monster trying to make sure don't get hit by someone or
pulled out in front by county engineers, 'cause when they
come down their angle, they've got some straight shot they
can see anybody ahead of them
DIK: Ah, I think, I think the big problem

(D) there, until you go out and look at the situation, ah it it
is a kind of bad set up there cause the county coming out ah
should stop but we have to have a yield sign for traffic
(D) coming from our left, because they've got the right of way, if we pull out in front of traffic coming from the left we are in the wrong that's the reason we have to have a yield sign, but there should still be a stop sign on the county side, coming out of their yard

ARP: I believe that /unintelligible/ so

DIK: Ah that's what we're running into you come down there you see a yield sign or no sign and on our road, you pull out in front of somebody coming from the left, because they don't have to stop there

VRG: That's, that's what I was saying, they should have a stop,

DIK: That's the big problem

(V) though we should have a yield

(D) right there

DIK: They should still have a stop sign and we should have a yield sign our yield is from the left though not from the right

VRG: Right

(D) (3 second pause)

VRG: But they don't have any sign

DIK: They don't have any sign now they took the stop sign down,

ARP: /unintelligible/

(D) but there should still be a stop sign on the county's access to our road there, they're they're coming out of a material

VRG: Right

UKN: Um um

(D) yard the same as we are but ah right is not always right

VRG: Right, that's

(V) what I mean, we've got the same clear view to our left that
they have, theirs is either a straight ahead or a left view,

DIK: Correct

(V) but they've got a clear view we've got a distorted .. view, if we had to look clear back over our right shoulder, it also distracts our our sight ahead or to the left, and that could take away from our safety of seeing someone coming toward

DIK: But . . . alright . . . . . . . .

(V) you, it shouldn't if we're /unintelligible/

(D) . . yet . . . there there there again if they don't put up a stop sign we should put up a stop sign, pull up and make a turn to the right so we can see, if we don't we're we're in trouble cause sometimes we can't see how that dump truck and that grass truck /unintelligible/ them, but ah /unintelligible/

ARP: Especially if you have a big lime truck going out there or ah acid tank /laughter/ or all that there goes out that way there could be a problem, a problem

DIK: It it it's a bad situation because

(D) we do have to have a yield sign there for traffic from the left

VRG: /unintelligible/

ARP: Specially one of the truck load of hydrosulfidic acid come most dangerous acid what you can get and that's going to spill they're going to eat up everything /unintelligible/

DIK: That that would be another

(D) good ah point to mention that we do have trucks coming in here thats got acid and stuff like that in it
ARP: Hydrosulfuric acid the most dangerous acid what you can haul in a truck, really, it can eat you up if you don't have a special lining for it and all

DlK: The county truck might argue with him but it would be too late then (8 second pause) ah we talked about an Q-W-L bulletin board, I think I that I can find a place to put one down there, so if we find a bulletin board around put in to place or if we have to get one, why, we will try to get one up for Q-W-L ah minutes and stuff like that, how soon it will be right now I don't know

ARP: How about the flextime, was anything done about it

DlK: ahh well we

D (D) were going to get into that just as soon as all the rest of the the um old business over with I think that was the last of the old business I had, is there any other old business anyone can bring up

ARP: Well you got lab phone here, flextime from last one and the old rules

DlK: Well, neither one of those people are here so I don't think that we can decide anything

ALF: I haven't heard anything from Mister Holt on the phone system, you'll have to wait on that

DlK: Yes ta table table it on 'til next meeting

ARP: Yesterday I had to chase uh somebody off from my phone I /unintelligible/ I didn't have no free phone, so I had to very rudely go up to the phone and said "That's a long distance call and I have to get it, so please get off," so he did /laugh/ (4 second pause)

DIK: VRG?
Well I, I don't know whether to like say to you guys rather than wait 'til later on on flextime maybe I should get into a little bit of this on the, what's taking place here on the Division level on the Civil Service I, wouldn't you say that if we can find find out something today it wouldn't be late to submit a proposal now, if anyone's interested in asking any questions on whether we like to take them down there or what 'cause I really don't have anything to do as long as you give me anything but but I'd like to check around

You say that's on Civil Service

This is concerning Civil Service ah we're going to, that's a week from today, right we're going we're going we're going to be having our Division level Civil Service meeting, or excuse me, Q-W-L meeting held at ah . . . the, the what is it, Beacon . . Marconi

Marc ah it should be ah, it should be here

as usual

isn't it

I thought we was going to have it on the eighth floor to accomodate ah, ah

No, it was decided at at the the Division level meeting that it would be held here ah and the the reason we're asking for comments was to um, ah make sh, to limit the number of people that would be here and make it a little easier for a friendly discussion, ah with Civil Service we felt that it would be a little, tha tha not, yeah, I think the committee felt that it would be intimidating if
we tried to hold a larger meeting where everybody from various committees could attend if they desired, ah it was felt however that, if the regular division meeting was held here plus the chairmen on the working level if they desired could attend ah with submission of questions that they should be ah a pretty good discussion that would be generated, the idea here was to allow the, the ah Civil Service representatives to have time to research and respond to ah questions and ah, I should be finding out ah I hope to talk to O Z who's in charge of that along with Bill ah about what types of questions they've got they may have not gotten too many and it might not be too late for it but that, those

those would be the two people I would talk to

VRG: Right, it it was asked that we all get back to our respective locations and ah circulate and find out if there's any questions or any concerns of the people that they'd like for us to take back to Civil Service because they'll have a record of them being Civil Service, and attendance of next week's meeting our monthly meeting, Division level meeting, and ah if there's any concerns, questions, that any of them would like to have asked, of the representatives from Civil Service so that ah we submit to them at that time, asking them if there's any points of interest, any questions

DIK: Um VRG if I can say something ah I-M-T is having a meeting this afternoon, or a seminar, on Civil Service and I'm planning on attending that, after that meeting I may have something to ah report to you on that

ARP: Me too, so is BOB, we all go to that meeting, twelve-thirty to four-thirty

DIK: Well, ah yeah (3 second pause)
VRG: Who else? will there be any objections to either of you, that ah, I ah get back to them tommorrow then and try to write down something, get some feedback tommorrow so that if

DIK: Well

(V) you have a meeting it will carry over past the normal ah quitting time today .. I ah, I think they'd still have time wouldn't they, GRT

GRT: Yeah, I I think that that ah I know that Bill

(G) ____ will be up here for a ah ah subcommittee meeting of the compressed work week for Field Service so you might be able to run into him then I I'll mention it to him and see what his reaction to it is I was also going to give ah ah O Z a call ah so I can bring it up with him then also but I think ah it's up to them because they're the people making the arrangements

VRG: Okay what I'd like to do I would like to try to get ah, circulate a little, to see if I could get some kind of, introducing what others might be interested and having any questions asked to Civil Service and then also get back with ah, who all you say, BOB and you, and DIK

ARP: BOB, me, DIK - I don't

(A) who else from here

DIK: I don't either ah

ARP: I mean we had to choose to sign up for the course I guess I

DIK: Yeah

(A) was very interested in it, so what ah with twenty years of Civil Service, point up certain area there, so (4 second pause) should you ask, I mean should it start at twelve-thirty and finish about four-thirty, so ah (10 second pause)
DIK: Well, any other questions

VRG: Ah, I guess, I don't know whether it's, the ah, proper to say some of the comments that was made at the Department level, should I go ahead and . .

DIK: On what?

VRG: Ah concerning Civil Service, just ah, that it will be proper, will it, what Mr. Murray had to say, it's /unintelligible/. DIK: I I can't see just in case it is though

(D) thing wrong with it, I mean if it's constructive

(V) GRT: Do people want to hear it here, I think (laughter)

(V) VRG: Pardon?

GRT: If people here want to hear it

VRG: If people here want to hear it, I mean what some of the various comments was, his feelings on ah Civil Service and what he'd like to submit back to the advice of the charter board and everything

DIK: Well ah, really if it isn't anything definite or anything that ah is concrete, why don't we just wait 'till ah a report does go back and ah VRG: Alright, alright . .it's like this is only his opinion, opinions, his ideas

(V) DIK: Maybe in in the mean in the mean time your opinion tomorrow, sent in, might help some and might change

(D) VRG: Right. . . . . . . . . okay, yeah I (D) the whole flavor
suppose so, maybe anything, it's only his opinion anyway, so

DIK: Well hang on to it, then after the ah the next ah meeting anything else comes across why, then your report will be in order then

GRT: I I think um that the Office committee was interested also in those comments and they, what they did was they'd rather then read them aloud and discuss them in the meeting they just included them in their minutes, they just took took a copy and and I'm sure that would be a easy way of distributing it and making it available (9 second pause)

DIK: Well, ready for flextime (laughter) um . . you want to start VRG: Sure

at top and work down or start at the bottom and work up (laughter) well if it's alright with you then I'll ah, give a report on the way I felt things were going at Morse Road and why I understood them to say and ah, after that I'd like to have GRT mention what he thinks about it and then VRG's got something from the employees who'd like, we'd like to get that too, but um on November 24th RPH _____ and I met with ah supervisory and management personnel at ah Morse Road, GRT at O-S-U ah, was present, ah when flex time was started at Morse Road it was set to go for three months at a time and set upon the plan where you run it three months at a time and then change it around if they wanted to, ah they thought they'd possibly have two crews interested in it, the project went well at first, each crew had their own supervisor, then when the work crews started to overlap some of this time the supervisor would overlap on to the other crew and the crews and the supervision overlap was causing a problem, because ah
the crew thought they should work for their supervisor only and ah they were having a little problem with it, but they have been working on it and got some of it ironed out, some of it still ah um still causing trouble, there's ah (5 second pause) the supervisors' opinion at this time is the feeling that they are getting static from their employees or workers and in trying to solve their problem they're also getting static from management, so they they've got problem on both sides that ah ah is forcing the supervisor to try to make decisions that can't please both of them and they they would like to get out of that situation if they can and either let management decide it or ah or whatever has to been done .. um, they have changed from the three month stationary flextime to day-to-day flextime it's got a couple of good points and it's got some bad ones but as they come in anywhere in a two hour period so that gives them ten to twelve hours of ah time in the plant where they are able to take care of any problems that they have .. ah, management on the other hand feels that ah they ah have lost some of their good labor relations from flextime, but ah there again it's something they are trying to work out that ah that some of the employees have asked for things that they have gone along with and ah they really feel they have lost a little bit of their good relationship with the employees because of flextime and some of the problems that they're having with their supervisors and stuff like that (3 second pause) ah (4 second pause) my own personal feeling, from talking to them up there was that, at this time I believe management feels they are not getting the employee input that is necessary, but they are willing to keep trying the new method in hopes of straightening things out, the supervisors say they are in the middle and get the problems on both management and employees and they do not appreciate having to make these
decisions between the two when ah possibly higher ups should make the decisions, ah I feel that all three factions should meet and make some ground rules to decide ah who are going to settle the problems, management has to settle the problems as far as I'm concerned because ah ah the supervisor can go so far and if management doesn't back him up then he's in trouble same way with the employees, they can go so far and if the supervisor won't ah won't help him then management has to do it (4 second pause) it was also mentioned that ah on the flextime ah it's like ah RPH mentioned at our meeting, that ah when they do have the two hour overlap ah if they have the supervisor that ah they have problems with one way or the other they set and drink coffee for two hours and that is not productive time, so ah ah they are still working on it, they don't want this out for awhile until they can maybe straighten some of the things up that ah ah it was mentioned that if they had it to do over again and know then what they know now, they would not have recommended flextime, so, so that's all there was to it, ah GRT do you have anything to say on that ah

GRT: Um you've been fairly general in your discussion here and I I can understand why in a sense um I think when you said that there's there's um a problem with this in um management supervision in workers um this is a chain of command type of problem, in the sense that ah manag, the highest level of management don't, do not feel that their ah lowest line supervisors are ah enforcing what they feel should be the rules for flextime, ahm and ah this in a sense ah has caused some problems for them, ah employees the, in a one sense ah upper levels of management feel that the supervisors, ah lowest level supervisors are in cahoots with the employees on flextime and that they're taking advantage of it, and and in
In this sense, they feel that, yes, those particular people are satisfied with what they are getting out of it but they don't feel that they are getting productivity that they could get out of it. Now let me cite some specific ways in which this is causing problems, one way in which it's causing problems is as DIK mentioned, if one of the lower line supervisors does not come in at the six o'clock start of flextime but decides to come in at seven, which is perfectly legal under the rules there, then there's there may be an hour in which there is no supervisor present for employees there, this might not be a problem if employees had a routine type of job that they would be doing at that time, so that if it wasn't done you knew it, but if they are, since they do not have that, what usually happens is exactly what DIK says and that is that they sit down and drink coffee for an hour, which certainly is not very productive, um at the other, the other problem is that they have found that given this flextime of about two hours, most of the men have now taken the position that they'll come in early and leave early which means that there's really a skeleton crew left for the later afternoon, it would be much better if they could ah have some system where they could split up the work crews so that they that good coverage and they could take advantage of flextime a little bit better, now I brought these up because these are problems that management hopes to bring up at their Q-W-L meetings and make some proposals for some changes in flextime program there, so I don't think all of the, the marbles are in yet on this particular program but those are some of the the actual problems that they've encountered ahm and that ah, I think clearly are there for a variety of reasons as DIK pointed out um, (3 second pause) the, I think the impetus for flextime ah was largely with both the supervisors, the lower line supervisors, and the employees
initially, and that was one reason why I think they were, was a good positive response at first, um this may be something people should take into account here um that there was a push from both levels ah and upper management felt that it might have some advantages to them ah at this point they don't feel that those advantages are what what they might have been .. okay (4 second pause)

VRG: Okay, I'd like, okay to begin with, alot of this stuff that you mentioned apparently surfaced since we were there, or they were reluctant to mention any of this stuff because ah to begin with okay I'll start off with Joe ____ , Joe feels that the flextime has definitely meant an advantage to his location, I don't what he said to you, but this is exactly what he told me, he feels that the flextime program has improved both the people's attitudes and this in turn helps job performance, he went on to mention that he's, he's very impressed with the results he's gotten and he commented that even, he read articles in Reader's Digest and various other places where its been quite well taken and has always, in every location in which it's been implemented has been to people's advantage, I know this is all talk in general, but ah I mean this was his province, maintenance, he said said he was really impressed that he liked it he thought it worked real good, his men liked it, he said it improved the ah supervision and labor relationship, you know, this was Joe's problem, okay, he's a supervisor two, Bill ____ 's supervisor one, ah while we were talking Earl ____ and Bill ____ come walking in in then and this was, he was just passing in for the morning this was ah, he was supervising, and this was at eight o'clock, so he comes in at 8 o'clock punches in, Jim ____ , ____ had already been there since six, Jim said he liked it and preferred the earlier hours where you said
sometimes, and ah I'm not saying it doesn't happen, I'm sure
it probably does, there's other time they come in, maybe a
little later, maybe something came up, an emergency that
wouldn't allow him to be there at six but he's told me that
he prefers being there at six, but there again there's going
to be a situation where the supervisors are more than willing
to overlap, and you know, take up the certain hours, but ah
Jim ah _____, see who has it, Bill, and Bill his comments
was, ah, he's the supervisor, so he said the workers' super,
supervisor relationship was working good, Bill arrives at
eight A M, and Bill said the biggest advantage was being able
to overlap overlap on maintenance time, and he didn't have
any figures or facts with him, so this is his opinion, that
they were able to overlap and get better performance due to
the fact that they were able to overlap and have longer
maintenance hours and ah Jim _____, well he just said that
he'd preferred coming in earlier and working those hours,
that's more or less to his advantage, but ah I guess
he he feels it's also to the other crew members advantage too
that, Art _____'s the stock room man, ah, he said that he'd
like the flextime and that there's never been a situation
arrived yet where there's been any problems as far as not
being able to supply the people with what ever they need from
the stock room, he said that if he isn't there and he's
needed the supervisor would just go in and draw issue, which
is ah, I'd like to comment, is that happens right now and not
even on the flextime like yesterday, you remember, CLD, we
needed to drill things, CLD came in and got it, he went in
drew issue of what we needed and we got the drill and bits
and everything for me and then we were working out here, you
know in the road, but ah, which is exactly the same as if we
was on flextime and regular time, it's really in my opinion
it's ah, if ah if ah the people that ah if if we can show,
(V) well like ah okay let me get back to what ah Jack ____ said, here Jack's just mentioned that ah concerning flextime he said he felt that ah the study needed a subjective report, this is in relation to objective reports with that he should see; now, okay, go ahead

GRT: Vir Vir VRG I I think that that was ah ah an

(G) error on Bill's reporting because I think just the opposite was said by by Jack as as I recall from that meeting, that he he felt that there would be a number of subjective reports but more objective reports were needed, ah

VRG: More objective reports, I I said

(V) ah, it didn't sound right, but ah I I just like to try to

DIK: Ah

(V) summarize by saying that, if it could apply to us, there's enough people concerned, the only problem is cooperation, we had a lot of negative attitudes toward Q-W-L when we first started, whereas I'm sure there's a lot of negative impressions or attitudes toward the flextime program, but if people want it and are willing to work hard enough to make it work, it can work, it can work here it can work anywhere, if there's a need for it, ah the matter is, is there the need, is there enough concerned people, and can, can we work up a program and that's a question for everybody

DIK: VRG

VRG: Yes

DIK: Just one question, ah the way I understand it now, up there, they can come in anytime from six to eight, oh yeah, eight-

VRG: Eight-thirty . .

(D) thirty or what ever, ah ah do you think, in your own mind,

(V) six to eight-thirty
that they should be able to come in any time during that two-and-a-half hours or should they report, ah just like they did when they started, they had three months that they had to report at six, seven, or eight, I mean at a certain time everyday, now they can come in anytime between that two-and-a-half hours, do you think that is the right situation there,

VRG: Well

that's the reason I'm saying that all three should get

VRG: There again

together and decide that, because I can't see any way that a

VRG: um um

supervisor could come in at seven, have his men come in at seven-thirty or eight o'clock and expect the other supervisor to carry over because he doesn't know what's going on

VRG: Well there again that's something that I feel should be worked out like you say between all three parties, you know, ah, it's not a decision, I really don't believe it's a decision that one person should be allowed to make, just say well I I don't feel like going in at six I think I'll go in at seven, that there again

DIK: Ah, to to me, um just personally, I think that

the supervisor and all of his men should come in at the same time, all of them early, all of them in the middle, or all of them late, but if you have a break down or something, then flextime can carry you over into the other crew if ah, if you have problems getting to work or something, one day a week or something like that, then flextime would be beautiful, to come in any time for the next eight hours

VRG: That's where you set it up on at least a weekly basis, you couldn't have it set up on a daily basis

DIK: If they'd come back to, if they .. if they'd
because they'd want to know
come back to the daily basis and don't have to tell you the
day before, the day before, what time they're coming in, they
could come in anytime in that two-and-a-half hour period

VRG: I don't

feel that's right, that's all

DIK: Well that's the reason I say all three of

them should get together and set some ground rules

VRG: That's ah

ARP: May, may I have

one question, like yesterday we've been doing, day before

DIK: Sure

yesterday's started, you don't eat for the birds, you know,
er ah it cost money to change the water treatment and all
that there here so everybody more or less had to be there and
work and all that, in case like that anything like that
happen up at Morse Road on the flextime why should the guys
decided well I'm come in at six the other decide I'm come in
at eight-thirty so how did this this situation ever happen,
how did you solve it, you know like, everybody should be in
by the, you said daily day, ah, they come in daily base so
nobody can give them anything, so well with flextime at least
they don't come on in say seven o'clock cause we can do the
whole group with workers alone so some of the guys showing up
at eight-thirty and all that, that situation ever happen up
there, did anybody mention that at Morse Road

DIK: Well it had been happening, yes, that's the trouble, that's

ARP: How did

GRT: That

that's some of their problems since they went on the daily

(A) you solve it

(G) that that that's been a problem
Well, now, since I was on the subcommittee now, I got a list of things over and over, they shouldn't now have to be in the book, but one of the things that I had made that, regardless, of the crew, but as far as the whole plant is concerned, was to schedule the flextime as a two weeks period, in other words, this two weeks you come in at

DIK: Right

this time and if you want to change it then you put in a request to the supervisor, or whoever, to change it until ah for ah the next two weeks, because your supervisor should

DIK: Right

know your work load, what's coming up, what kind of problems I think should, not necessarily so, but //laughter// but this

DIK: Thank you . . but ah

is one of my suggestions, that the whole plant go on a two week schedule, ah

DIK: That's what it was to start with and they didn't have too many problems then there's been a rise with

BIL: Right, right, I can see

their problems

DIK: Well I, could I make ah, that'd be

man crew that I'm on

VRG: It appears to me that what actually took place, they originally had a good flextime program, and they allowed it, the, confusing, you know, why they changed it ah they allowed
to kind ah deteriorate by allowing 'em to go daily day-to-day basis, I can see like two weeks, set up on two weeks basis
DIK: I agree with that

and not be allowed to change at at least every two weeks, at least every two weeks, but daily, I can see where daily,
   DIK: Right

setting it up on a daily basis, really be confusing you know,
   DIK: I think that's one of their

for all parties concerned
   DIK: biggest problems right now

GRT: Yeah, I I would like to throw in one little uh suggestion here ah, if you haven't already the ah flextime proposal I just happen to have an extra copy here, ah submitted by the, ah Office committee, which they hope to implement if everything goes well by by February or March of this next year, it does have pretty much what you have suggested, now they also throw in there a clause that, flextime is at the ah discretion of the supervisor, in the office, so if ah supervisor decides that, their particular, or her particular work unit isn't going to go on flextime, it's not going to work out, they don't have enough employees, whatever, ah then they won't, uh as far as this this program goes on and I'll just make this available and let people look at it because it's pretty much details what you're suggesting here

W ell I think ah, my suggestion in one light, cause I got a list here, one, was, is ah, as has been suggested, was to have an orientation period for all employees, on flextime, to let them know some of the rules, do's and don't's of ah flextime, such as your supervisor saying "no that's the end of it"
ALF: Well does the office committee, hasn't started yet Morse Road 

GRT: Right

(A) isn't working out, I suggest we table it until some more 
positive information comes in

GRT: Yeah, if if I could also make another suggestion here, I 
think that there's couple of questions in my own mind from 
sitting through, well not sitting through, but going through, 
two visits to Morse Road with, two different groups, getting 
two different impressions about it and finding a little bit 
more about, through talking with each of these groups, about 
what some of the concerns are, both on the management side 
and on the employees side about work conditions here, I think 
that there's a question in my own mind at least, about what 
the actual need is for flextime here, ah certainly I think 
that would be the first thing to do here, before even 
beginning any discussion about it, is to reassess, if in fact 
there is an employee need here, now it it was noted by a 
number of people when I talk to them that, sure I would be in 
favor of flextime for somebody else and I'm not going to vote 
against it for somebody else but I wouldn't participate in 
the program, well that's fine and good and you can get people 
saying "yes" for the flextime program on that basis but that 
doesn't really tell you if that person is going to 
participate in the actual program, and that's really what you 
want to find out

VRG: I think that's alot of what we're getting to right now, as as 
far as I know of everyone, which is thirty some people which 
read the thing, they would like to be, they would like to see 
the flextime implemented but there's only two that I know of 
that's actually interested in participating in it at this time
GRT: I ah I think of ah my suggestion here would be ah since there is a subcommittee already formed, I could meet with the subcommittee and we could ah ah compile a questionnaire, a very short one, that would, hopefully counteract some of these problems that we just discussed and that could be administered ah within the next month, month and a half and you get some, another assessment of the need, and that that would give you some information whether to go forward with this or not

ALF: Yeah, /unintelligible/ don't have enough positive information

BIL: Who's the chairperson of this

VRG: I don't know, I thought you were

(V) GRT: Yeah, yeah, yeah I I, I I don't, I think that there was a mixed review ah there's some real problems with the Morse Road flextime, that we don't have any idea whether the office flextime is going to work, so um

ALF: Right, no sense in adding more

(A) confusion to the rest of it

GRT: I I I agree on that

DEN: I I got something to do, who is the chairperson to this subcommittee anyway, is BIL, who say he was the chairperson

(DEN) DIK: I thought BIL

(DIK) _____ was

VRG: I thought originally it was both of us and .. and

BIL: Well I thought VRG was

(V) when I, the last time I mentioned it to _____ he said he wasn't interested .. he's no longer interested in, in flex-

BIL: You're the chairperson so call the meeting

(V) time because, his main concern was, flextime so he could get

(B) . . . . . . . . shove it . . . . . . is . . . /unintelligible/
(V) across the bridge down here

ARP: Just ah one look into that flextime there, I ah I don't know

VRG: They built the bridge

(A) how long you've's been thinking about it, like certain groups

BIL: It's up to do you

(A) just have, one supervisor, like let's say, electrician's

VRG: Alright /unintelligible - with other voices/

(B) accept

(A) supervisor, so the electrical crew who would go on flextime

how they would ah be divided or be under supervision,

//laughter// you know, how is supposed to be done you know

DIK: Ah'd just like to say the supervisor would decide whether

they come in at six, seven or eight o'clock and that would be

it

ARP: That didn't like what you case, to you and Smitty, so that

some of your crew want to come in at six o'clock, the other

crew want to come at eight-thirty, and none of you guys want

to come in late so what would happen to the guy, you know,

who's you know, who's, who would be supervisor

ALF: That's the problem that everybody

(A) experiences

GRT: Yeah ah

BIL: Well I think for Smitty the employees this summer must

flextime, you do (3 seconds) you be up there in the morning

getting the grass cut before sunrise

DIK: Well uh unless you go to Arlington, they won't let you in

there 'till eight //laughter//
BIL: I'll go back there on flextime during the summer to (3 second pause) actually you have there a transitional period //laughter//

DIK: Well the the time change helps a little bit on the same thing, I mean you get more, time in the evening to do whatever you want to do at home, but ah ..

    BIL: You don't have to be on

(B) flextime

DIK: Yup, when you really think about it, it's compulsory.

    BIL: Okay so that

(B) is, that is actually tabled or deferred, further until

    ALF: In the city

(A) of Columbus 'til we get some feedback

    DIK: Yeah

BIL: Very much

VRG: Right (3 second pause)

BIL: And I wrote all that down too (6 second pause)

GRT: Who's next

DIK: Is there any new business besides this ah, to consider (10 second pause)

GRT: I would just like to mention ah one thing that has, I think been useful ah at the Water Distribution Center, I think I mentioned this um, ah in a number of reports to the Department level ah and I was hoping to mention at the City, the City committee was cancelled by the way, yesterday, and rescheduled, I think the fifteenth, that would be ah two
weeks from yesterday, ah and that is that the Water Distribution Center I think is implementing, the ah on a trial basis I think, ah something I think is worthwhile at least for uh getting information for the Q-W-L ah committee meetings, making them a little bit more worthwhile, they're having crew meetings uh they'll bring in two or three crew crews, at a time, have um the various representatives who would be concerned with those crews meet with them for about ten minutes, once a month, for that that particular group of crews, and ah, discuss the minutes ah on the Q-W-L, of last Q-W-L meeting and ask them if they have any um questions, problems etcetera that they they'd like bring up at the next meeting and this has generated I think ah some pretty good job oriented concerns that would affect both the quality and the productivity of the ah, the job, for example, and eve even though it might sound crazy, the the problem, shovels cutting shoes, it certainly one that they are, they wouldn't have been aware of unless they had held this, or if they were aware of it, it would have taken awhile for it to filter up to Lowell _____, but he found out about it pretty much as soon as it occurred, um some other problems with um pipe clamps uh ah there was a discussion there in uh there's probably going to have to be some changes in the the use, not only of techniques of using /laughter/ some of these clamps ah, but probably they're going to have to change some of their ah their supplies . . down the road, because of problems with these, so these are just two examples of, I think, what was a useful techniques for getting information

ALF: I know that

Mark pretty well covered that
as a representative, and and talk with your constituency would be useful, I I know that that's done largely on an informal basis, a person has a problem they'll, sometimes they'll come to somebody or people will elicit, ahh comments on something that they they have concerns about, like what your going to be doing, ahm

Uh it give a person an opportunity to just maybe jot down, and and, you know, when fresh in their minds, they've got a piece of paper you know _TAPE BROKEN_ jot a comment or concern that whereas the and in a place that they can back to rather than maybe he come in later in the day he might start say something to about it somebody else come in and someday you forget about it and maybe you wouldn't think about it

again until a long time after that I can see where the

Anything else . . is there a motion to adjourn, are you through everybody else through . . I move we adjourn . . .

now you can say whatever you want to he turned off, have you turned that thing off yet /laughter/

FINIS


